

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/228
Appendix III/Vol. IV
21 August 1981

ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

APPENDIX III

VOLUME IV

Index of Statements by Country and Subject
and Verbatim Records of the Committee on Disarmament
in 1981

CD/PV.122
7 April 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SECOND MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 7 April 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. G. PFEIFFER (Federal Republic of Germany)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. A. SALAH-BEY
Mr. A. ABBA
Mr. M. MATI

Argentina:

Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD

Australia:

Mr. R.A. WALKER
Mr. R. STEELE
Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium:

Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. R. DEYANOV
Mr. K. PRAMOV

Burma:

U SAW HLAING
U NGWE WIN
U THAN HTUN

Canada:

Mr. D.S. McPHAIL
Mr. G. SKINNER

China:

Mr. LIANG Yufan
Mr. LIN Chen
Mr. PAN Jusheng

Cuba:

Mr. L. SOLI VILA
Mrs. V. BOROWDOSKY JACKIEWICH
Capt. F. CUSPINERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. RUZEK
Mr. A. CIMA
Mr. L. STAVIMOHA

Egypt:

Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M.B. FAHMY

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. KAULFUSS
Mr. P. BUNTIG

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. H. MULLER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India:

Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. S. DARUSMAN
Mr. I. DAMANIK
Mr. S. HADI
Mr. F. QASIM
Mr. KARYONO

Iran:

Mr. M. DABIRI

Italy:

Mr. V. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. R. ISHII
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya: Mr. S. SHITEMI
Mr. G. MUNIU

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
Mr. C. HELLER

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. S.-O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS
Mr. A.Y. MEERBURG

Nigeria: Mr. O. ADENIJI
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. M. AKRAM
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. M. MALITA
Mr. T. MALESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. G. EKHOLM
Mr. J. LUNDIN
Mr. H. BESGLUND

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRALLYAN
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO
Mr. A.F. KUSNETSOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. FLOWERREE
Mr. F. DESIMONE
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. J.A. MISKEL
Mr. C. PIERCY

Venezuela:

Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. V. VOIVODIC
Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. LONGO B. NDAGA

Secretary of the Committee
and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee starts today its consideration of item 5 on its agenda: "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons".

Before proceeding with our regular business, I would like to draw the attention of the Committee to Working Paper No. 36, concerning the request submitted by Spain in connection with its participation in meetings of the Committee's ad hoc working groups on chemical weapons and on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. This draft decision is substantially identical to other draft decisions adopted by the Committee on the participation of non-members. If there are no observations I shall consider that the draft decision is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: I will inform the permanent representative of Spain accordingly.

Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): Mr. Chairman, in my statement today I would like to deal with item 5 of the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament for its work in 1981, the question of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

Ever since 1975 when the Soviet Union submitted a proposal and a draft international agreement to the General Assembly of the United Nations effectively to prohibit the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction, this aspect of disarmament has been recognized as one of the urgent problems to be solved.

The Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in paragraph 77, stated: "In order to help prevent a qualitative arms race and so that scientific and technological achievements may ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes, effective measures should be taken to avoid the danger and prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements. Efforts should be appropriately pursued aiming at the prohibition of such new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction".

Since 1976 our Committee has been actively dealing with the task of prohibiting the development of new weapons of mass destruction and accumulating a huge quantity of expertise and valuable material as a result of the useful discussions and exchanges of view in the framework of formal and informal meetings held with experts. The experts participating in the work of the Committee, however, had to take into consideration the fact that the Committee is not composed of scientific, technological or military experts which itself set a limit to the scientific-technological depth of their discussion.

Early in 1978 the delegation of the USSR proposed the establishment of an ad hoc group of qualified governmental experts to consider the question of possible areas of the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction which should be included in an initial list of types of such weapons to be prohibited under a comprehensive agreement. This proposal in a renewed form was also discussed during our last year's session in the course of the consideration of this issue, as well as during this year.

My delegation continues to be convinced that a comprehensive approach to the question of the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction is feasible

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and offers the most effective solution to prevent the emergence of such weapons, supplemented by individual agreements on particular types of weapons, and that the most effective method of handling this question would be the setting up of an ad hoc group of qualified governmental experts.

However, it has to be admitted that there are differing approaches as to the organizational aspects as well as to the basic approach to the substance of the question.

The Hungarian delegation has today circulated a working paper on an informal basis which will shortly be issued by the Secretariat officially in all the languages. In this working paper my delegation proposes the holding of informal meetings of the Committee on Disarmament with the participation of experts during the second part of our 1981 session. My delegation took note of the fact that some of the delegations in the Committee for the time being are reluctant to agree to the establishment of an ad hoc group of qualified governmental experts to be entrusted with the in-depth consideration of the prohibition of the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction. However, my delegation feels it appropriate to take further concrete steps -- even if intermediate -- to promote the consideration of this issue as contemplated in General Assembly resolution 35/149 in which the Assembly requests the Committee on Disarmament, "in the light of its existing priorities, to continue negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, with a view to preparing a draft comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and to draft possible agreements on particular types of such weapons".

The major subjects to be dealt with during the informal meetings are listed in the working paper and therefore I would not like to repeat them in this statement. The Hungarian delegation proposes that the Committee on Disarmament take a decision or at least come to an understanding that preferably during the last week of June 1981, in the course of our summer session, the Committee on Disarmament will hold informal meetings with experts on the prohibition of the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction. The exact number of informal meetings could be decided when the programme of work of the Committee is under discussion early this June, depending also on the number of experts who participate in the meetings. The presence of experts would be of twofold use in the following way:

(1) They could promote with their contributions the substantive consideration of the question of new weapons of mass destruction, the results of which could provide for the Committee a scientifically substantiated basis to give fresh consideration to the issue as a whole, including the possibility of finding a possible mandate for the proposed group acceptable to all.

(2) The informal meetings having been accomplished, the experts could be of incalculable use in the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons which will be in a crucial period of its activities at that time.

My delegation would be grateful to hear the views of delegations on the proposal, and expresses its hope that the Committee will agree to conduct such meetings, which would be of double use for our work.

Mr. FLOMEREE (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, it has been the custom in this Committee to congratulate the new Chairman for the month when a delegation takes the floor for the first time during his chairmanship. I personally think the

(Mr. Flowerree, United States)

more proper sentiment would be an expression of sympathy; for taking the Chair is, after all, an inescapable burden under our rules of procedure. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I would take this opportunity, rather, to wish you well and to pledge to you our full co-operation during the month of April. Your dedicated, serious and thoughtful contributions to the work of our Committee in the past give us confidence that you will discharge your duties efficiently and effectively. We look forward to working under your leadership for the remainder of this part of our 1981 session.

I would also like to add a word of appreciation for the manner in which your two predecessors have carried out the demanding duties of the office of Chairman during the months of February and March. Drawing on his broad experience and consummate diplomatic skills, Ambassador de la Gorce launched us smoothly into the ocean of work that lay before us as our 1981 session began and, as the tide swelled, Ambassador Herder guided the Committee with a sure hand past numerous rocks and shoals to enable us to make considerable progress on both procedural and substantive matters. Both can take satisfaction in having met the most difficult test that our Committee can impose with new lustre added to their reputations.

At the outset, let me say that I am not planning to announce today any new United States policies on the issues with which the Committee on Disarmament deals. The policy review in which the United States Government is engaged, and to which I referred in my brief intervention on 12 February, is broad in scope and detailed, touching all aspects of arms control and related national security and foreign policies. Because of its fundamental nature and the complexity of the issues involved, the review will take some time. Its completion date cannot now be predicted. That does not at all mean that in the meantime the United States delegation will be unable to contribute to the work of the Committee, as I am confident we have made clear by our activity during this session to date, and we will continue whenever possible to participate fully and actively in the advancement of the Committee's work.

My reason for taking the floor today is to give my delegation's views on the vital question of the balance of military power and its relationship to arms control, particularly nuclear arms control, and to deal with some misleading impressions that may have been left by certain representatives who have addressed this subject in previous meetings. We have listened also to a lively exchange in this forum on the subject of the doctrine of deterrence -- or of houses with guard dogs and burglar alarms, in the analogy which seems to have captured the Committee's imagination -- and I would like to address that subject as well.

Reflecting on what has been said about the dangers of relying on a balance of nuclear power to maintain the peace, I would be the first to admit that the world could breathe more easily if there were no nuclear weapons in existence, although the dangers from modern conventional weapons, which are themselves appalling enough, would still be with us. But nuclear weapons do exist. Until we can find and agree upon a sure means of eliminating them, without jeopardizing the security of any State or group of States, they will continue to be a fact of life, and nuclear deterrence must remain a key element in maintaining stability and peace.

What are the alternatives? One course that has been advocated from time to time is unilateral disarmament. If the United States alone were to undertake nuclear disarmament, the result would almost certainly be a major military imbalance. We would all need to ask ourselves whose interests would then be served? In this regard I would draw your attention to certain remarks in a recent article on Soviet

(Mr. Flowerree, United States)

military thought by Professor Major-General A.S. Milovidov of the Lenin Military Academy. In the article he stated:

"The Soviet Union cannot undertake the unilateral destruction of its nuclear weapons and indeed has no right to do so, as it is responsible to the peoples of the whole world for peace and progress. Marxist-Leninists decisively reject the assertions of certain bourgeois theoreticians who consider nuclear missile war unjust from any point of view."

These views on unilateral nuclear disarmament and the role that nuclear weapons play in Soviet military thinking are in stark contrast to some comments on those subjects that have been presented to us here in this Committee. They serve to reinforce our grave doubts about the wisdom of unilateral disarmament.

If unilateral disarmament is out, what about unilateral restraint in nuclear armaments? Well, we tried that and the results were not encouraging. In the early post-World War II period the United States was the only nuclear Power, and for a long time after that helped to achieve stability and peace by virtue of its nuclear superiority. As the Soviet Union eventually brought its nuclear arsenal to a position of approximate parity, the United States decided that in the long-term interests of a stable peace, we should not attempt to maintain superiority. Our hope was that this exercise of restraint would persuade the Soviet Union to follow suit. In this hope we were disappointed. When we curbed and even cancelled significant armament programmes, the USSR continued to build up in all spheres.

Some examples:

- The Soviet Union has continued to strengthen its ground and air forces in Europe. In the last 15 years, Soviet military manpower has increased by about 1 million men. Some 25 divisions have been added to Soviet ground forces, and all divisions have been upgraded in capability and fire-power. During the same period, the tanks in the numerous Soviet divisions in eastern Europe and the western part of the USSR have been replaced with new, modernized and improved, tanks -- in most cases more than once. Some 1,400 aircraft have been added to the inventory of Soviet frontal aviation. Many of these new aircraft are designed for deep strike missions, bringing more of western Europe into the range of Soviet tactical aviation.

- The Soviet Union has also in recent years deployed the Backfire bomber, which carries more weapons than older bombers, and which, because of its greater range, can reach all of western Europe, vital sea-lanes, and even the continental United States.

- Soviet naval capabilities have also been expanding rapidly on a global basis; new warships have been built and deployed at an unprecedented pace during recent years.

- The USSR has continued to build up its nuclear missile forces in Europe. Some years ago, the Soviet Union began deployment of the SS-20 intermediate-range nuclear missile. In the past year alone, some 80 new SS-20 launchers have been deployed. This missile is qualitatively superior to its predecessors: it is mobile; it has greater range, and it carries not one, but three accurate warheads.

- In the last 15 years, the USSR has more than quintupled the number of its strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. In recent years, primarily through the

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deployment of three new ICBM systems, the Soviet Union has expanded the number of weapons these vehicles can carry by a factor of 11.

All of these programmes, along with other examples I have not included, have naturally caused the Soviet military budget to swell. It is a measure of the different emphasis on military efforts in the Soviet Union and the United States during the past decade that the costs of Soviet military activities, measured in dollar terms, were some 40 per cent higher than those of the United States; in 1980 Soviet outlays were some 50 per cent higher.

Those of you who read the Western press reports beginning in late 1979 surely know that it was only after it became clear that there were no alternative means of maintaining the balance that preserves the peace that plans for a NATO military response to these developments were decided upon and announced. Even now, more than a year later, the programmes contemplated in the NATO plans to strengthen its nuclear posture in Europe will not come to fruition for some years hence. When the Soviet Union attempts to justify, retrospectively, its own arms build-up on the basis of this necessary defensive response on the part of the NATO countries, it is a hollow and unbelievable justification. The NATO plans are a response to a Soviet build-up which in large measure has already taken place, such as the development to which I referred earlier -- the deployment of more than 180 nuclear-tipped SS-20 missiles, many of which can reach this very room within a matter of minutes. The NATO alliance has no equivalent systems to match the land-based, long-range theatre nuclear missile systems of the Soviet Union. Why should the Soviet Union not be delighted to freeze the situation with regard to theatre nuclear weapons where it stands now, as proposed by President Brezhnev? In contrast, the offer of the United States, on behalf of the NATO alliance, to negotiate on the limitation of land-based, long-range theatre nuclear weapons before Western deployments take place, is an eminently fair approach to halting the further build-up in nuclear weaponry on both sides.

I must point out here that, despite the clearly documented reasons for the NATO decisions, the distinguished representative of the USSR, in his statement during our meeting on 26 March, asserted that, like all the actions of the Soviet Union in its build-up of offensive military capability, those relating to Europe were purely and completely defensive responses to actions taken by others. But I wonder what he had in mind when, for example, he stated that while the Soviet Union admittedly has a large number of tanks, NATO has a large number of anti-tank weapons. Perhaps he wanted us to believe that the Soviet Union had to build and deploy all those tanks to defend itself against all those anti-tank weapons.

We have heard much during our debates here about the malign effects of international tension on arms control and disarmament efforts, as though international tension were an epidemic for whose spread all militarily significant nations were equally responsible. But would the level of international tension be so high if the build-up in Soviet military strength which I have briefly touched upon had not occurred, or if it had been more moderate? Or if there had been no invasion and suppression of Afghanistan? Or if surrogate forces encouraged by Moscow had not been at work in other parts of the world to thwart the desires of free people for true political self-determination and independence? We cannot be unmindful of the impact of such developments on the prospects for arms limitations. As United States Secretary of Defense Weinberger said in London on 5 April, just two nights ago, part of our response to a Soviet intervention in Poland would affect such things as further summit meetings or further discussion on limitations of arms.

(Mr. Flowerree, United States)

While we are on the subject of military build-ups and the causes of tension, I would like to note another element of asymmetry between the two main military groupings that has been largely ignored in our debates. Many speakers have regaled us with quotations from the International Herald Tribune and other American journals concerning military programmes that are under consideration -- or even simply advocated by individuals -- in the United States or in the NATO alliance. In contrast, we know nothing from the media in the Soviet Union or from statements by political leaders about Soviet military planning until the missiles, aircraft and ships begin to be deployed, or other action is taken. We Americans cherish our free press dearly, and I hope that the rest of my colleagues here appreciate the unique opportunity they have to follow the debates within our nation that illuminate the rationale for proceeding or not proceeding with specific military programmes. If the day were ever to come when we could read similar open discussions in Pravda or Izvestia, the climate of confidence would improve immensely.

Now let me return to the question of whether nuclear deterrence serves the interest of world peace and security. In the current international situation there are simply no good alternatives. This does not mean, however, that we necessarily expect deterrence to serve for ever. An arms race is not to our interest nor to the interest of the Soviet society. The United States, in conjunction with its allies, has undertaken serious efforts to find negotiated solutions to the dangerous and regrettable build-up of armaments. I have already made reference to the United States offer to negotiate equal and verifiable limits on long-range, land-based theatre nuclear forces.

With regard to strategic nuclear weapons, there has been much criticism in this forum of United States failure to ratify the SALT II agreement. As is well known, that development was due to a combination of factors, not the least of which was the wanton Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, an act which called into question the Soviet Union's willingness to abide by the norms of international behaviour and to live up to its commitments to international agreements. For its part, the United States, while undertaking its review of arms control and security policies, is continuing to act in a restrained and responsible manner, conscious of its commitment to peace and stability. In this regard, I would like to quote from a statement by the official spokesman of the United States Department of State, who said on 3 March of this year:

"While we are reviewing our SALT policy, we will take no action that would undercut existing agreements so long as the Soviet Union exercises the same restraint."

(Mr. Flowerree, United States)

As the new Administration in my country has made clear, the United States is not prepared to freeze through agreement a situation in which there is an imbalance favouring the Soviet Union; at the same time, the United States continues to wish to pursue a SALT process that brings about meaningful reductions in nuclear weapons.

President Reagan, in an interview with Walter Cronkite on 3 March, included in his response to a question about conditions for a summit meeting the following reference to reductions in strategic nuclear weapons:

"I have said I will sit down and negotiate with them [the Soviet leadership] for a reduction in strategic nuclear weapons to lower the threshold of danger that exists in the world today."

He went on to say:

"So far, previous presidents, including my predecessor, tried to bring negotiations to the point of actual reductions and the Soviets refused to discuss that."

He concluded by saying that the United States would have to know that the Soviet Union is willing to join in this approach. Secretary Weinberger also spoke about the SALT process in a television interview on 29 March. He said:

"... the attempt to reach an effective limitation of strategic arms is an extremely valuable and vital one, and we are perfectly ready to engage in it if the Soviets do not demonstrate by their behaviour that it's perfectly useless to engage in it."

The approach of the United States with regard to strategic arms limitations is clearly on the record.

The discussions we have been having in this Committee on the doctrine of deterrence and related matters, both in plenary and in informal meetings during this session, have been serious and useful to our work. A little over a year ago when I first took my seat as the United States representative in this important international body, I stated that I would do my utmost to interpret accurately my Government's position to the other members of the Committee and, whether we agree or disagree, I pledged faithfully to convey to my Government the views of other countries. In this spirit I ask that you ponder the statement I have made today as a serious and candid exposition of United States views on the vital topic of the interrelationship of the international climate, the military balance and the reduction of nuclear armaments.

Mr. VRHUNEC (Yugoslavia): Mr. Chairman, we assess the work done so far by the Working Group on Radiological Weapons as very intensive and the negotiations that are under way as constructive and going in the right direction. It is our desire to arrive, as soon as possible, at a definite text of the international instrument in order that we may ban these dangerous weapons. The adoption of an international convention on radiological weapons will undoubtedly also give additional impetus to the taking of other concrete disarmament measures, nuclear in particular, and will encourage the further process of negotiation within our Committee for which this is, after all, the most important task.

In my statement, I would like to refer to two problems that I consider as fundamental. In saying this I would not like to imply that the other issues are not of corresponding significance. However, my delegation has been and will express its positions with respect to them during the process of negotiations in the Working Group.

Undoubtedly one of the most important questions concerning the further work on the convention is the problem of the definition of radiological weapons. As is known, my delegation has submitted its own draft definition to the Committee for consideration, and I would like to take this opportunity to offer some observations that have to do with our fundamental concept with regard to this question.

The definition of radiological weapons must contain the basic characteristics of this type of weapon of mass destruction and must clearly differentiate between this and other types of weapons of similar characteristics. We consider that it is possible to formulate a clear definition which describes radiological weapons and which must specifically refer only to these weapons. A very important circumstance is that radiological weapons in a concrete, operative and physical form are unknown. This was the reason why we focused our definition on specific characteristics of radiological weapons. Numerous scientifically-founded facts indisputably confirm that the basic characteristic of a radiological weapon is that it inflicts injury on living beings by its ionizing radiation. Other forms of energy can completely be neglected. When we say that radiological weapons act through their ionizing radiation, we consider that this radiation has been created during the process of natural radioactive decay, that the content of radiation in the physical sense is changeable while its ionizing trait remains constant. Being different from nuclear weapons which free large quantities of other forms of energy as well, such as mechanical energy, thermal energy and visible light, radiological weapons act on living matter through their ionizing radiation from the beginning to the end of their application as weapons. Once radiological weapons start to go into effect, the process of radioactive decay cannot be either stopped or accelerated. The acceptable and controlled risk of professional exposure in the peaceful application of radioactive material is transformed into an uncontrolled exposure of the largest segments of population with effects which are very numerous, when it is used as a weapon. On the basis of the above reasons we think that the definition which links the essential characteristic of radiological weapons to ionizing radiation and does not in any way imply the direct or indirect legitimization of nuclear weapons might be the most acceptable one.

(Mr. Vrhunec, Yugoslavia)

Permit me to dwell on yet another of the very important problems to which the convention on radiological weapons should devote special attention. This is the peaceful application of nuclear energy and, respectively, radioactive isotopes. The research and achievements registered in this field so far have attained an enviable level by which the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes creates great possibilities for the solving not only of energy problems but also of development throughout the world and particularly in the developing countries. There is a need to regulate this question within the system of international economic relations in such a manner that nuclear energy may really be used for peaceful purposes and development and not for the destruction of mankind. The non-aligned and other developing countries have for a long time been saying that it is indispensable to approach as boldly as possible the settlement of the economic and political situation in the world on the basis of equity, sovereign equality and justice aimed at creating optimal conditions for the utilization of all available resources for the further unhindered development of all and particularly for a more rapid development of the developing countries. A particular role is played by the adoption and implementation of those United Nations decisions which strive for the establishment of the New International Economic Order. The use of nuclear energy plays an especially significant role in this process and, therefore, poses the question of the establishment of international instruments that will accord corresponding attention and offer adequate solutions to this problem. One such international instrument should by all means be the convention on radiological weapons that we are trying to agree upon.

In the opinion of the Yugoslav delegation, the convention that we are trying to elaborate must secure the conditions for an unhindered use of all the potential possibilities of nuclear energy for development purposes on a non-discriminatory basis and with the full recognition of the interests of all. The recent Ministerial Meeting of non-aligned countries held in New Delhi accorded, inter alia, particular attention to these problems. In this connection, the Final document of the non-aligned countries contains the following statement: "They particularly stressed the right of each nation to establish its peaceful nuclear programmes in accordance with its own priorities and requirements, as well as the need for free and non-discriminatory access to nuclear materials and technology for peaceful purposes".

In this context, we consider that the convention we are trying to work out must reflect the aspirations and needs of all countries, especially the developing ones, by respecting the inalienable right to development and prosperity through the use of contemporary scientific achievements on the basis of a corresponding equitable co-operation between countries that possess the know-how and technology and those who do not have them but have a great need for them.

Mr. MALITA (Romania) (translated from French): I am happy to welcome you as the Chairman of the Committee for the month of April. I am sure that the valuable qualities of competence, patience and tact that you have acquired as a result of long acquaintance with the difficult topics before us, as well as your ability to combine the official part of our work with sincere and thorough informal discussions will make this month a fruitful one.

I should also like to congratulate the out-going Chairman, Dr. Herder, for the excellent way in which he performed the task entrusted to him, so that we were able to make definite progress.

(Mr. Malita, Romania)

The debate in the Committee on Disarmament on the agenda item relating to new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons leads us to make the following remarks:

It cannot be said that weapons of mass destruction are not a well-defined category. They are weapons the effects of which are not confined to the area of a military conflict or war -- weapons which, owing to their monstrous destructive power, make no distinction between combatants and civilians. They are, in fact, weapons which represent a danger for the entire human race. These are weapons against which there is no defence, the only answer to them being the use of the same type of weapons, thereby multiplying destruction up to the limit of total annihilation.

Repugnance at the odious and degrading character of such weapons is unanimous. No one in public life has been heard to defend their legitimacy. It would be impossible to find any politician or military man who would openly declare that the use of such weapons is permissible for political and military purposes. The argument employed to defend their existence is that weapons of mass destruction are possessed, not to be used but to discourage others from using them. We shall return to this argument, which leaves the responsibility with those whose task it is -- as it is that of this Committee -- to find satisfactory solutions taking into account security conditions and the need to prohibit such weapons -- so far without success. The important point is that there is unanimous international recognition of the need to continue the process of outlawing weapons of mass destruction.

Quite clearly there is evidence that this is not only desirable but also possible. In the greatest military conflagration in history -- the Second World War -- chemical weapons were not used. A recently adopted Convention prohibited the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons. It was signed by 124 States and has been ratified by 81. The Committee has been solemnly called upon by the General Assembly to draft conventions on the abolition and prohibition of nuclear, chemical and radiological weapons. This is to some extent a proof that the premises for fruitful activity exist. Nor can we doubt the active support of public opinion, which has shown itself many times to be against environmental pollution and will not hesitate to express itself on the much more important question of survival.

We have not succeeded in finding solutions to the problems posed by weapons of mass destruction like nuclear, chemical and radiological weapons, and we already know that there is a possibility of still others being invented. The Romanian delegation wishes to draw attention to the contradiction, the opposition and the abyss that exist between the pace of disarmament negotiations and the pace at which science is perfecting existing weapons and creating others.

The effect of the concentration of creative scientific resources on military purposes (over 50 per cent of research expenditure is devoted to weapons, and 40 per cent of the world's scientists are engaged in the same sphere) is that weapons systems become obsolete so quickly that many of the subjects of our negotiations may soon be out of date. At the same time the complexity of the problems engendered by the new weapons will be greater, and new obstacles will thus block the way to the prohibition and control of a new golem.

(Mr. Malita, Romania)

Nowhere is the rate of modern scientific and technological progress more apparent than in the micro-electronics revolution. Operating speeds have increased and dimensions and costs have fallen in proportions varying from 1,000 to 1 million times over the past 20 years. No instrument or machine designed by man has been perfected at such a rate. The direct consequence is the improvement of the accuracy and reliability of missiles. Even more serious is the fact that the huge process of improvement merely increases the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons -- of all weapons of mass destruction -- which are more and more considered as instruments of war and not of deterrence.

I should like now to make a few remarks about the relationship between the rate at which weapons research and development laboratories are working and the pace of our negotiations.

With regard to nuclear weapons, the Romanian delegation is one of those which urged that the Committee should start some structured work on this subject, even if only in the form of informal consultations. We should therefore like to express our satisfaction at the initiation of these consultations. At the same time we must stress that the holding of informal consultations is not an end in itself. In our view the goal we must all pursue is to ensure that the activities undertaken constitute a step forward towards the beginning of real negotiations for the elaboration of nuclear disarmament agreements. We therefore support the proposals put forward by the delegations of Brazil and India to that effect. Unless it leads to that goal, the praiseworthy effort made by holding informal consultations will be devoid of any practical purpose.

The Romanian delegation considers that, taking as a starting point the provisions of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, it is necessary to elaborate the principles which are to govern the nuclear disarmament negotiations and to identify the concrete measures which are to be negotiated within the Committee. The establishment, during the second part of the Committee's current session, of an ad hoc negotiating group or any other subsidiary body with this as its mandate seems to us to be the necessary logical continuation of the action taken so far.

The prohibition of chemical weapons is one of the subjects on which our delegation has already had the opportunity to state its position and views. At this stage of our work we should like to present the following observations for the Committee's consideration.

First, the Romanian delegation considers that the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons have reached a delicate point of which we should all be aware. It is clear that if, after more than 10 years of negotiations, we are not in a position to begin work on drafting the text of an international instrument, it is possible that this will cause some State, given the present international situation, to decide to develop their arsenals of chemical weapons. The Committee's inability

(Mr. Malita, Romania)

to outlaw chemical weapons will thus be, not merely the failure of a series of efforts spreading over a long period of time but in fact a powerful stimulus towards the renewal of the arms race in one of the important areas of weapons of mass destruction.

The second observation concerns the preparations of a technical nature made in the Committee with the participation of experts. Our delegation appreciates the usefulness of this work, which has enabled us to gain an insight into some important and complex questions relating to the prohibition of chemical weapons. It is now necessary to move on to negotiations to solve these problems. It is for this reason that it should be one of the Committee's priority tasks at the beginning of the second part of its session this year, to reconsider the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons with a view to bringing it into line with the present stage of our work.

Lastly, we should like to refer to the question of verification, which has been the subject of many statements. The Romanian delegation is in favour of establishing an effective system for verifying compliance with the provisions of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. At the same time we are of the view that the machinery agreed upon, however perfect it may be, will not be able to guarantee absolutely that all the provisions of the convention will be respected. That is why the Romanian delegation considers that it is in the interests of all States to supplement the specific verification provisions contained in the convention by a set of measures designed to increase confidence among all the parties in the implementation of this international instrument. We are thinking of provisions for the development of co-operation with regard to protective equipment, antidotes, alert and decontamination systems, etc. It is in that light too, that we should study the proposal of Sweden regarding the scope of the prohibition and that of Brazil concerning the title of the convention itself.

As you know, the Romanian delegation has expressed its support for the idea that the Committee should begin to consider measures designed to stop scientific and technological discoveries from being used for the production of weapons of mass destruction. In our delegation's view, the decision to establish an ad hoc group of scientific experts to study the technical implications in this field will constitute a practical and significant step forward by the Committee on Disarmament.

The work initiated in the Committee on the subject of the prohibition of new weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons should be supplemented by a decision by all States which have a substantial military research and development potential to take the necessary measures at the national level to prevent scientific and technological discoveries from being used for military purposes.

With regard to the conclusion of an international convention prohibiting radiological weapons, the Romanian delegation would like to draw attention to the constructive way in which the negotiations are proceeding and the need to take action towards the preparation of the text of an international agreement. In our opinion,

(Mr. Malita, Romania)

at the present stage we should try to solve three fundamental problems on which the success of the convention depends, namely: the definition of radiological weapons, the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, and the relationship between the convention and the nuclear disarmament process. At the same time we should like to stress the importance which some States, including Romania, attach to a solution which could increase the protection of nuclear power plants during armed conflicts, a proposal put forward by the delegation of Sweden.

By way of conclusion I should like to say that we are constantly being told that weapons of mass destruction in general, and nuclear weapons in particular, are produced solely in order to deter aggression. If this is the real reason for the possession of weapons of mass destruction, is it not much simpler and more economical, as well as safer, to seek to attain that result through disarmament negotiations rather than by ceaselessly accelerating the arms race in order to increase the deterrent effect of these weapons, a process which contains in itself the seed of the destruction of the existing balance?

The Romanian delegation emphasizes the need to take action, with all due sense of responsibility, not only to eliminate the danger of a devastating conflict but also to adopt measures which will protect future generations from this danger.

A few days ago Nicolae Ceausescu, the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, expressed the hope that all States would understand the need to halt the arms race, and especially the nuclear arms race, promoting to that end a policy of contacts and negotiations conducive to improving mutual confidence and to finding the best solutions for the purposes of détente, disarmament and the strengthening of international co-operation and peace. In our opinion this is the only course to take, especially in view of the more difficult and complicated conditions now prevailing in the world.

New weapons are not mere exercises in futurology. The deadlock encountered in the regulation of existing weapons, as well as the fact that they are being qualitatively perfected as the result of scientific and technological discoveries, means that every day it is more likely that they will become a practical reality. The fact that the qualitative gap remains open-ended as far as weapons of mass destruction are concerned leads not only to the perfecting of existing weapons but also to discoveries having vast military implications.

That is why the Romanian delegation considers that, while attaching the highest priority to the outlawing of those weapons of mass destruction which already exist in the arsenals of States, the Committee should not overlook the subject of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Romania for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, may I express my best wishes for your successful term of office as Chairman of the CD and pledge the co-operation of my delegation in the discharging of your duties.

Before I start the main section of my statement today, which will be devoted to radiological weapons, may I be allowed to dwell briefly on a point raised by your own delegation, at our plenary meeting of 26 March, regarding chemical weapons. On that occasion, speaking as head of the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, you mentioned the experience acquired by your Government in the field of the destruction of toxic agents remaining from the first and second world wars. The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany has also touched on that question in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. As members of this Committee are aware, my own delegation and several others attach the utmost importance both to the destruction of existing stockpiles of chemical weapons as well as to the dismantling of production facilities, in connection with the negotiations currently under way in the Working Group chaired by Ambassador Lidgard. My delegation would be most grateful if your delegation would find it possible to provide the Committee with additional information on the work carried out in this field in your country, with particular emphasis on the aspects of cost and environmental protection mentioned in your statement. We believe that such data would help many delegations to better understand the technical aspects of the issues involved, particularly with regard to the delays needed to comply with the obligation, to be embodied in the chemical weapons convention, to destroy the existing arsenals of chemical weapons.

May I turn now to the main subject of my statement today. Our Committee is examining this week item 5 of our agenda, namely, radiological weapons, according to our programme of work. In my statement of 12 February of this year, I have already had the occasion to share with the Committee my Government's general position on this matter. Brazil believes that the Committee on Disarmament should concentrate its efforts on issues to which a much higher priority has been assigned by the General Assembly, rather than devote the scarce time available to measures which are, at best, lateral to the main problems of disarmament. So far, the Committee has been unable to agree even on the organizational aspects of the substantive negotiations on nuclear disarmament or the comprehensive test ban, the urgency of which has been unanimously recognized in the Final Document and in countless United Nations resolutions. It should not be difficult to imagine the dismay of the membership of the United Nations if the Committee on Disarmament cannot go beyond presenting the international community, at the forthcoming General Assembly, with a draft text on weapons that do not exist, and which according to some expert opinion do not stand even the chance of ever existing, and reporting at the same time that no progress has been accomplished on measures deemed vitally urgent by the higher forum on repeated occasions. My delegation sincerely hopes that the earnest desire displayed in some quarters for the speedy conclusion of a text on radiological weapons be matched by a corresponding willingness to arrive at a workable arrangement that will enable the Committee also to tackle the urgent questions to which the highest priority was assigned.

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

Nevertheless, we believe that a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons might be useful in two main directions. First, it should contain explicit provisions that spell out the commitment of the parties to concrete measures of nuclear disarmament; secondly, it should be conceived as an effective tool to promote international co-operation on the peaceful utilization of radioactive materials for peaceful purposes.

One of the main difficulties to which the Ad Hoc Working Group has been addressing its attention is the formulation of an acceptable definition for the kind of weapon that would be the object of the prohibition. My delegation favours the suggestions that have been made in the Committee and in the Working Group, according to which it would be advisable to define radiological weapons by their characteristics, rather than by explicitly excluding nuclear weapons from the purview of the convention. There seems to be little point in adopting a definition that amounts to a legitimization of nuclear weapons only to have the following article disclaim that fact by stating that nothing in the convention can be interpreted as legitimizing nuclear weapons. Such a disclaimer would, in fact, only underline the assumption that the very real nuclear weapons are, indeed, considered as a viable option, while the non-existent radiological weapons are prohibited. The exclusion clause, as it has been described, is, for those reasons, unacceptable to my delegation.

As we have already pointed out, the proposed convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons provides the international community with an opportunity to give formal expression, in an internationally binding instrument, to the commitment to nuclear disarmament. We believe, therefore, that the convention should contain an explicit provision to that effect, and not merely a vague preambular reference to nuclear disarmament. In the history of international agreements in the field of disarmament, a provision of this kind would mark a significant step forward.

In 1968, the predecessor of this Committee was called upon to approve an international treaty that contains, in its article VI, explicit provisions regarding nuclear disarmament. The Parties to which the Treaty accords a special status seem, however, to have interpreted that provision in a diametrically opposite sense. The second review Conference of the Parties to that Treaty, celebrated last year, showed the growing concern of the vast majority of its Parties, who have scrupulously adhered to the obligations entered into and are still waiting for a better understanding, by those same Powers, of the commitments embodied in article VI. Clearly, the expression of the commitment to nuclear disarmament on the part of the nuclear-weapon Powers needs to be reinforced at the legal level. The proposed convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons affords the Committee on Disarmament, and the international community at large, a new opportunity to achieve that purpose.

The question of the peaceful uses of radioactive materials and sources of radiation is also of paramount importance for the Brazilian delegation. We are firmly convinced that the proposed convention could serve a very useful purpose if it were to further and promote international co-operation in that field. While

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

preventing the possibility that radioactive material could ever, even in the remote future, be utilized in warfare by those that have the technological means to envisage such a possibility, the convention would have quite a constructive impact if it were to facilitate and enhance the peaceful applications of such materials in the present. My delegation has already made its views known, in the Working Group, on this subject, and I do not have to repeat them here in detail. Suffice it to say that we prefer a positive formulation for the corresponding article of the instrument, rather than simply stating in a negative way that the provisions of the convention will not hinder or prejudice the use of radioactive material for peaceful purposes; mention should also be made of the need for promoting international co-operation, including co-operation in the field of transfer of technology. The delegation of Romania last year made some interesting proposals to this effect, and also introduced, this year, a constructive amendment to article V of the draft convention. The suggestion embodied in working paper CD/RW/WP.4, submitted last year by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, is in our opinion also very positive. We further believe that every nation has an inalienable right to carry out national programmes for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in all its forms. The recognition of this right by the parties to an eventual instrument should, thus, not be limited to the parties themselves; we are dealing here with a general principle that should be stated in a general, non-discriminatory manner.

Discrimination may also arise from formulations which tend to confer a privileged status on some of the parties to the proposed convention, as would be the case if the complaints procedure made use of the Security Council of the United Nations. We fail to see the merit of establishing a procedure that can easily be blocked by a handful of nations, among which, incidentally, are included those that possess the technological means to contemplate the production of radiological weapons. My delegation would be unable to agree with a mechanism for the lodging of complaints that does not take into account the principle of the sovereign equality of States. Procedures designed to solve problems that may arise in the application of the provisions of international agreements cannot contain any elements of discrimination among States parties.

These are the main views of the Brazilian delegation on the question of a convention to ensure that, in the future, radiological weapons will not be added to the arsenals of States. The low priority of this question, as compared to the urgent need for other measures contained in the Committee's agenda, should not, of course, prevent the Committee from proceeding with its efforts for the negotiation of a convention, and my delegation stands ready to continue making its contribution to the discussion. According to the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group, the completion of the examination of the main elements of the future treaty will provide substantive material for the next phase of the task.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Brazil for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. DARUSMAN (Indonesia): Mr. Chairman, speaking for the first time in a meeting under your chairmanship, may I say how glad I am to see you in the Chair. The many and useful contributions you have made in the past to the Committee make you eminently suited to this difficult task and we are convinced that under your wise guidance this spring session of the Committee on Disarmament will certainly close with positive results. My delegation for its part pledges its full co-operation to you in the discharge of your duties. I also wish to express the appreciation of my delegation to Ambassador Herder for the further constructive stages that were achieved in the work of the Committee when he chaired it last month.

The Indonesian delegation will on another occasion put forward its position on certain aspects of item 5 of the agenda, which is now before the Committee.

Today I would like to say a few words on some aspects relating to item 3 of our agenda, i.e. on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

When the question of security assurances was discussed in 1973 by the First Committee of the General Assembly, the Indonesian delegation, in its statement on 1 November, stated that "the most effective guarantee is, of course, the cessation of all forms of nuclear-weapon testing in all environments, the prohibition of the manufacture of additional nuclear weapons, followed by the destruction of existing stockpiles". My delegation continues to hold this view. However, as we all realize that such an absolute guarantee can hardly be achieved in the foreseeable future, my delegation believes it imperative for the international community at least to develop at this stage effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarter.

The Committee on Disarmament, which has been entrusted with the task of negotiating with a view to reaching agreement on and concluding effective international arrangements on security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, is still faced with some difficulties. My delegation is, however, optimistic that these difficulties can be overcome.

During the discussions in the relevant Ad Hoc Working Group some questions have been raised on which my delegation would like to comment briefly.

Firstly, concerning the proposal on the issuance of declarations by the nuclear-weapon States that are identical in substance, my delegation has stated its satisfaction at the unilateral declarations of assurance of non-use of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States against non-nuclear-weapon States. We feel, however, that to be effective, such unilateral declarations should be put into a binding international instrument. We are therefore pleased to note that the Committee has in principle already recognized this need. As the distinguished

(Mr. Darusman, Indonesia)

delegate of Pakistan has pointed out, undertaking such a declaration is a prerogative right of the individual nuclear-weapon States themselves. It will, however, be difficult for my delegation to accept this idea as a precondition for our further negotiations. The absence of such declarations, which are identical in substance, should not prevent us from initiating negotiation on an international agreement on this subject.

Secondly, with regard to the non-stationing of nuclear-weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present, this question should, in the opinion of the Indonesian delegation, be part of the obligation to be undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States. It is pertinent to note in this context that the obligation of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT, to which Indonesia belongs, is quite clear. The non-stationing of nuclear weapons in the territories of those States constitutes a further measure to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. My delegation feels that in view of the particular geophysical configuration of a country like Indonesia, the concept of the non-stationing of nuclear weapons should be broadened so as to cover also their transportation through lands and seas falling within the jurisdiction of non-nuclear-weapon States where there are no nuclear weapons at present. Without such an expanded concept, any eventual international agreement agreed upon would not give adequate security assurances to an archipelagic State like Indonesia, consisting of thousands of islands surrounded by waters with innumerable straits and sea-lanes. Moreover, its strategic location between two oceans makes Indonesia very vulnerable, and my delegation therefore considers transit through or deployment of nuclear weapons in its waters undesirable. In the event of a military confrontation between major Powers, the transportation of such weapons through Indonesian waters might very well become necessary from the point of view of the warring parties. This in turn would give reason for the belligerents to attack the enemy craft that carry them, in which case, Indonesia as a non-party to either belligerents could not possibly escape the harmful effects of nuclear weapons so damaged or destroyed. From the foregoing it is clear that, based on those considerations, ways and means should be explored to make an eventual agreement cover all aspects of the security interests of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

Thirdly, concerning the inherent right of self-defence, we are all aware that security assurances would be meaningless if nuclear weapons were used as a means to settle political and military conflicts. In this connection my delegation would like to associate itself with the views expressed by other delegations that, in the exercise of the right of self-defence, due account must be taken of the international community, namely, to save mankind from total annihilation.

Fourthly, regarding the Pakistani proposal as contained in document CD/161, my delegation would like to express its appreciation to the distinguished representative of Pakistan for his unceasing efforts to come up with alternative proposals with a view to reaching a common agreement. After having studied it carefully, my delegation feels that alternative B might preferably be used as a point of departure. This alternative is included in stage two of the working paper of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group, contained in document CD/SA/WP.5. While this alternative may not be the one and only way to facilitate our work, it is my delegation's considered opinion that the Ad Hoc Working Group should start its endeavours forthwith from the less controversial one. My delegation is flexible as to the approach that will be taken later on.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): First, Mr. Chairman, I want to convey to you our congratulations on your assumption of the chairmanship for this month. Needless to say, we are confident that the Committee will fare well in your experienced hands. Further, the Swedish delegation will continue to make all efforts in order to contribute to this effect. I should also like to address myself to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Herder, and to say again how we appreciated the skilful and impartial way in which he accomplished his task in the month of March.

Radiological weapons are on our work programme for this week and I am going to focus on this item in my intervention today. I should first like to express my great appreciation of the way in which Ambassador Körnives of Hungary is conducting the Working Group on Radiological Weapons. He has shown his full devotion to his task, which he is accomplishing with the greatest skill and energy. We shall continue to give him our full support till the work has been concluded, which we hope will be at the end of this session.

However, we see danger in the argument which some delegations have put forward, namely, that the CD must prove its capacity to negotiate disarmament agreements through rapidly approving the draft elements of a convention on radiological weapons that have been submitted to the Committee. We agree that it is in our own as well as in the general interest that the CD should prove its efficiency in the negotiation process. This may imply a further intensification of our work. It may also imply a more critical look at our priorities, and it is in this context that I should like to express our deeply felt concern.

We do not believe that we shall be responding to the expectations of the nations of the world, which are eagerly waiting for disarmament measures, if what we submit to them after years of bleak results are measures of a very limited importance, which some may even state to be no real disarmament measures at all but only sham arms limitation. The CD should be very careful in order to avoid such criticism. We must refrain from submitting disarmament agreements to the United Nations which we cannot honestly state to be of any importance.

It is in this light that we have scrutinized the draft elements on radiological weapons. We think that here we are placed in front of some very important and difficult decisions, and I grant that they may be particularly painful for the two delegations which have submitted the draft elements to the Committee.

As I stated in my intervention in this Committee on 26 February last year, quoting from a Dutch working paper from 1970 (CCD/291), "judging by the available information, possibilities for radiological warfare do exist theoretically but do not seem to be of much or even of any practical significance".

Studies which have been undertaken by the competent scientific and technical institutions in Sweden since the early 1950s, and which have now again been carefully examined, show that the development of specific radiological weapons, as defined by the drafters, is a very remote possibility. They could hardly become practical weapons of mass destruction or have any effective use in the battlefield. A radiological weapon of sufficient strength for denying an enemy access to significant areas of terrain would be almost impossible to fabricate, handle or deliver.

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

To produce the necessary amounts of radioactive substances, large nuclear power reactors or large special production reactors would be needed. If, for instance, an ordinary electrical generating station of 1,000 MW electric output is shut down at the saturation level for many of its most energetic waste products; if, then, all its fuel elements are taken out and grained to powder after a cooling period of one month, and if, finally, the resulting matter is spread out to cause a dose rate of 1,000 rad/hour, i.e. denying access to the contaminated area, only 4 km² would be covered. It should be noted that the fuel inventory of such a reactor has a weight of some 150 tons, and the enormous radioactivity of some 1,000 MCuries. The shielding necessary to protect personnel from this amount of radiation would come to several hundred tons of material.

It is obvious that such a bulk of deadly dangerous material could not be handled for dissemination without killing one's own personnel long before the material could have an impact on an enemy.

We have repeatedly asked the drafters to substantiate why they consider radiological weapons a possibility in warfare, but we have never obtained any specific answer. Only once has an effort been made to give technical data in order to support the conception of radiological weapons as something real and threatening. The delegation which came forward in that endeavour, mentioned that one ton of the isotope scandium 46, if disseminated, would effectively bar access to about 1,000 km². That is true.

However, it is also true that handling such an amount of that nuclide (34,000 MCuries) would be even more impossible than handling the reactor fuel waste I have just mentioned. Moreover, its production would require the use of all at present installed reactors in the world. The same analysis would apply to other nuclides of potential interest for radiological weapons.

Such weapons, as defined by the author of the draft elements, are as a matter of fact impossible to realize physically. New means of handling protection, which could make them more realistic in the future, do not seem possible. There is one obvious way to cover areas with radioactive substances in sufficient amounts and with sufficient flexibility to make them generally useful to the military. That is the production of these substances at the target by means of surface explosions of nuclear weapons. That case is exempted from the prohibition in the draft convention.

It was argued last year that low dose contamination of wide areas, while having no immediate somatic effects, would be a weapon of mass destruction, because a very large number of people could be affected. However, those effects would appear only after a long delay -- 10-20 years -- and they would therefore have no military meaning.

In expressing our doubts about the feasibility of radiological weapons I have tried to be more explicit and specific than diplomatic. Not all delegations here have the means to carry out studies of the kind I have referred to. We are strongly convinced that honesty requires a clear and straight presentation of facts behind the problems we deal with. We consider the reputation of the CD to be at stake.

Therefore, we think it is the obligation of those who state radiological weapons to be a threatening reality to substantiate their arguments in scientific and technical terms. We must have an open discussion of this very fundamental question.

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

There exists, on the other hand, a very real risk of mass destruction from the dissemination of radioactive substances in war, apart from nuclear explosions. That is the case of military attacks on nuclear power industry installations, where very large amounts of radioactive materials are present. In this case the main obstacles to the use of radiological weapons are bypassed, namely, the production and delivery problems.

As shown by numerous studies in many countries, including my own, nuclear reactor catastrophes caused, for instance, by a military attack, would have lethal consequences for man over an area of the order of 100 km^2 , depending, of course, on the meteorological conditions at the time. It means that in densely populated regions with a developed nuclear power industry, large populations would be involved. This is so today in the industrialized countries, but in the future many densely populated developing countries with emerging nuclear energy production may come under the same threat.

The radioactive effects of an attack on an ordinary power reactor could cause immediate effects comparable to the fall-out from a 20 kT nuclear-weapon surface explosion, while the long-term radioactive effects could be in orders of magnitude more severe than those for a nuclear explosion. It should be noted in this connection that the production rate of radioactive substances in a 1,000 MW nuclear electrical generating station is equal to that of one 60 kT atomic bomb every day. After some time of operation, the core of such a reactor is very dangerous indeed, if brought into the open. The radioactive material would in this case not have "cooled off" most of its radiation as in manufacturing a radiological weapon.

In my country we have made an extensive study of the catastrophe risks concerning the reactors at Barsebäck in southern Sweden. These reactors have an aggregate electric power output of 1,160 MW and, if damaged, the risk zone for lethal radioactivity spreadout would include about $3,000 \text{ km}^2$ where about one million people live. It would not be difficult for me to mention, on the basis of this study, which populations would live in similar risk zones around reactors situated in Central Europe, the Soviet Union and the United States of America. Some of these risk zones would extend into neighbouring countries. The data are easily available. The reactors are all listed by IAEA.

In addition to the zone of killing-dose rates, large areas of the order of $1,000 \text{ km}^2$ would be covered by radioactive substances in lower concentrations, that would not kill people at once but would make it necessary to keep those areas evacuated for a long time.

The draft elements exempt the most effective method of radiological warfare, namely, that of using nuclear weapons. If our proposal for banning military attacks on nuclear power stations is not accepted, the second most effective method would also be exempted. Only the impossible method of using special radiological weapons will be forbidden.

The Swedish delegation has elaborated its proposal in a working paper (CD/RW/WP.19) which was submitted to the Working Group on 16 March 1981. The discussion of the proposal is proceeding in the Working Group and I shall therefore limit myself to three points.

First, it has been stated that the Swedish proposal is a rule of war and therefore does not belong to a convention on radiological weapons. To this I should like to respond that actually article III in the draft elements also is a rule of war,

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

since it contains an explicit undertaking to refrain from a specific action of warfare, namely, the deliberate employment, by its dissemination, of radioactive material to cause destruction, damage or injury. Our proposal can be conceptually placed within this framework.

It should be added that disarmament or arms limitation agreements sometimes also encompass rules of war. In this case it seems so much more appropriate, since the specific weapon that the agreement would prohibit is of such remote possibility, if not altogether unfeasible.

Secondly, it has been stated that the Swedish proposal has already been taken care of in the 1977 Additional Protocols (I:56, II:15) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. As we have already stated in our working paper, these provisions are limited in two respects. They cover only nuclear electrical generating stations and leave other installations with large amounts of radioactive materials uncovered. Further, their purpose is limited to providing protection for the civilian population in the vicinity of these installations, but permit military considerations to take priority over the humanitarian ones and thus provide for exceptions from the protective provisions. A general prohibition of radiological warfare should cover all important risks and have no loopholes.

Thirdly, the question has been raised how not to place military installations under protection. In our working paper the approach was to show that there are scarcely any military installations on land with a high radiation intensity and that therefore no important military option would be sacrificed if preponderance were given to the prevention of the possible mass destruction effects. Nuclear weapons, stocks of fissionable material for such weapons and means of production for them would, of course, not be protected. We see, however, no difficulty in explicitly limiting the protection to civilian nuclear energy facilities. As I just said, IAEA publishes extensive data about such facilities, so they are well known, but if it would be considered necessary, it could also be envisaged that the States parties, in order to obtain protection for their civilian nuclear energy facilities would have to notify the depositary about them and their location and also mark them in the way stipulated in the 1977 Additional Protocol for nuclear electrical generating stations.

Concerning the military importance of this protection, I do not think that it is necessary to point out that the military objective of terminating power supply from nuclear power plants can, without much additional effort, be achieved through other means than by attack on the reactor itself. It is also only a direct hit on the reactor that creates the release of radiation of the dangerous magnitudes I have previously referred to. The same is true as regards other nuclear facilities to be protected, such as reprocessing facilities and deposits of spent fuel and radioactive waste.

To sum up, we think that the two delegations which have submitted to us the draft elements of a convention on radiological weapons owe it to us to give a precise and specific explanation why they think that this issue deserves our priority attention. I have at some length given my authorities' views why we think that radiological weapons, even without a prohibition, most probably never will come into existence. Since others, not least those outside this Committee, probably will raise the same question, I want to repeat my request for precise and clear information why the two delegations have come to a different conclusion about the technical feasibility and effectiveness of radiological weapons.

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

On the other hand, we see a very obvious risk for radiological warfare through the dissemination of radioactive substances by attacks on nuclear energy installations with high radiation intensity. An effective prohibition against such warfare would be hailed as an important step forward by public opinion, not only in the industrialized countries which today have a nuclear power industry or have nuclear facilities close to their borders. It will in the future be of great interest to an increasing number of countries as further growth of the nuclear industry takes place.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Lidgard, for his statement and also for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, since I wish to speak in right of reply, I shall reserve my right to congratulate you formally and to thank your predecessor in the office of Chairman at the next meeting.

In its statements before the Committee on Disarmament the Soviet delegation has always refrained and continues to refrain from drawing the Committee into a discussion of controversial topics which might provoke a confrontation in the Committee and ultimately divert it from its tasks. Because we are interested in business-like negotiations on disarmament, that was our position last year and it is still our position. The statement of the Soviet delegation of 26 March was made in the same spirit, as you know. In that statement we touched on such general topics as the principle of non-impairment of the national security interests of the countries participating in the negotiations and various theories relating to nuclear weapons, with references to the relevant Soviet and foreign sources. Our statement, we believe, did not stray from the subjects being discussed in the Committee. Of course, it met with various responses; we heard positive reactions, and there were probably some that were not, but no one could reproach us for going beyond the problems being discussed in the Committee.

However, the United States representative today took another course, and a frankly dangerous one. In his statement he dealt repeatedly with questions which have nothing to do with the Committee's agenda. He referred to the situation in various countries of the world. He referred to the kinds of information found in the Soviet press and, in effect, to the nature of Soviet society, and so on. It would hardly promote mutual understanding and progress if the Soviet delegation should in turn start to enumerate the vices of American society to which we have been witness, especially recently. We have no such intentions and I wish to assure the Committee that we shall never do so.

We do not hide the fact that we had awaited the statement of the United States delegation with interest and I think everyone will agree that it would have been very much more useful had Ambassador Flowerree informed us, let us say, that the United States was prepared to conduct within the Committee on Disarmament, and in particular in an ad hoc working group, negotiations on nuclear disarmament or on the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general cessation of nuclear weapon tests and on many other specific problems now under discussion.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Needless to say, too, not only the Committee's work, but also progress in the settlement of many problems in international life, would be advanced by a positive reply from the United States to the many proposals made to that country by the Soviet leadership and which in essence called for negotiation instead of confrontation. It is still our view that only dialogue, and not provocative discussion, will enable us to make progress in the Committee and save the world from a nuclear catastrophe. I do not think that the statement of Ambassador Flowerree contributed to such a dialogue, at least not in the Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. FLOWERREE (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, I do not wish to prolong the debate. I want simply to say that I respectfully submit that the statement made by the Soviet Union on 26 March raised questions which related to the work of this Committee at its informal sessions. I have given what to us seems to be a description of the objective situation and what I brought into the discussion were subjects that were related to that particular area of our concern. I do not want to prolong the discussion but simply to stand by all the statements that I made today.

The CHAIRMAN: As members of the Committee are aware, the Secretary-General of the United Nations will be in Geneva during this week. A number of arrangements have been made in connection with his presence in the Palais des Nations. At mid-day on Thursday the area of the Salon Czech and the Salon Français will be reserved for activities relating to the visit of the Secretary-General. Therefore, may I suggest that on that date the Committee meet earlier, at 10 a.m., to avoid any inconvenience in our own proceedings. If there is no objection, I will take it that the Committee agrees to hold its next plenary meeting on Thursday, 9 April, at 10 a.m.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.

CD/PV.123
9 April 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-THIRD MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 9 April 1981, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. G. PFEIFFER (Federal Republic of Germany)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. M. MEDKOUR
Mr. M. MATI

Argentina: Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD

Australia: Mr. R.A. WALKER
Mr. R. STEELE
Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium: Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA

Bulgaria: Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. R. DEYANOV
Mr. K. PRAMOV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U NCWE WIN
U THAN HTUN

Canada: Mr. G. SKINNER

China: Mr. LIANG Yufan
Mr. LIN Chen
Mr. PAN Jusheng

Cuba: Mrs. V. BOROWDOSKY JACKIEWICH

Czechoslovakia: Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. A. CIMA
Mr. L. STAVINOHA

Egypt: Mr. M.N. FAHMY

Ethiopia: Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Mr. P. BUNTIG

Germany, Federal Republic of

Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. N. KLINGER
Mr. H. MULLER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India:

Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. I. DAMANIK
Mr. F. QASIM
Mr. KARYONO

Iran:

Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA

Italy:

Mr. A. CIARRAPICO
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. R. ISHII
Mr. K. SHINADA

Kenya:

Mr. S. SHITEMI
Mr. G. MUNIU

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
Mr. C. HELLER

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. L. BAYART
Mr. S.O. BOID

Morocco:

Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria:

Mr. W.C. AKINSAINYA

Mr. T. AGUTIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan:

Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA

Mr. J. CIAŁOWICZ

Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden

Mr. C. LIDGARD

Mr. G. JONANG

Mr. G. EKHOLM

Mr. J. LUNDIN

Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Mr. H. BESGLUND

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAEILYAN

Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV

Mr. V.A. PERFILIEV

Mr. V.M. GANJA

Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO

Mr. B.T. SOURIKOV

Mr. S.N. RIUKHINE

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES

Mr. N.H. MARSHALL

Mrs. J.I. LINK

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. FLOWERREE

Mr. F.P. DESIMONE

Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER

Mr. J. MISKEL

Mr. C. PEARCY

Mr. S. FITZGERALD

Venezuela:

Mr. H. ARTEAGA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:

Secretary of the Committee
and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

Mr. CIARRAPICO (Italy) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, I should like, first of all, to say how happy I am to see as Chairman of the Committee for the month of April, the representative of a country -- the Federal Republic of Germany -- with which Italy maintains close relations of friendship and co-operation at both the European and international levels.

Furthermore we are convinced that, given your outstanding personal and professional qualities, the Committee will, under your leadership, make progress in carrying out its tasks.

My delegation promises you its wholehearted co-operation. I also take this opportunity to congratulate Ambassador Herder for his noteworthy and fruitful efforts to advance our deliberations during the month of March.

I should like to speak today on item 5 of our agenda, entitled, "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons".

With respect to the more general aspect of this item, we have noted the proposal submitted on 7 April last by the Hungarian delegation, concerning the convening of informal meetings of the Committee, with the participation of governmental experts. Although the proposal is structured in a more complete and detailed manner than other similar proposals put forward in past years, we believe that we must maintain, in respect of it, the reservations which, in common with other delegations, we have expressed repeatedly in the past. In our view, the most effective approach to the problems which may be raised by new systems of weapons of mass destruction is to negotiate separate agreements on specific types of such weapons as soon as they are identified. I should like to recall in this connection that, for many years, discussions were held in the United Nations in an unsuccessful attempt to arrive at an adequate definition of the terms "weapon of mass destruction", "weapons system" and "new weapons system".

We also fear that, given the limited time available for the Committee's deliberations as a whole, such a proposal could be adopted only at the expense of other topics of greater priority and urgency.

My delegation welcomed the presentation to the Committee, on 10 July 1979, of a joint proposal by the United States of America and the USSR on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.

We believe that the conclusion of such a treaty would constitute a modest, but useful, contribution to the disarmament process.

First, a treaty on radiological weapons should be considered as the implementation of the prohibition on radioactive material weapons referred to in the definition of weapons of mass destruction contained in the resolution of the Commission for Conventional Armaments, of 12 August 1948. Coming in the wake of the prohibition of bacteriological weapons, it would place outside the law a new system of weapons of mass destruction which, although for the time being neither operational nor deployed, has nevertheless been identified.

Secondly, a treaty on radiological weapons would have the advantage, not only of averting a potential danger, which is becoming increasingly real with the rapid build-up of radioactive materials, but also of alerting Governments and public opinion to the dangers of certain new forms of modern warfare.

(Mr. Ciarrapico, Italy)

Thirdly, the elaboration of a treaty would provide an impetus to the achievement of progress in other areas of disarmament. In the view of the Italian delegation, this consideration is of particular importance at a time like the present when the general situation is not itself propitious to the efforts made in the field of disarmament. It is not an insignificant fact that the basis for our discussions within the Committee should be a joint American-Soviet proposal. We all know that, to be successful, the disarmament process requires the combined will of the two Powers possessing the largest military arsenals. Within the narrow limits of its scope, the joint proposal is a demonstration of such a combination of will.

Fourthly, the elaboration of a treaty on radiological weapons could afford the Committee its first opportunity to fulfil the task for which it was set up, namely, the negotiation of the texts of agreements. We are aware that there is a sharp divergence of views in that respect. We nevertheless believe that, with less than a year to go before the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, it would be useful to have at our disposal a concrete example which would permit the international community to judge whether the Committee, in its present form, is in a position to discharge its mandate and to meet the technical conditions necessary for the conduct of negotiations. As for the Committee itself, the experience thus acquired cannot but prove useful as a precedent for other, more complex, deliberations in the future.

These are some of the reasons why my delegation has from the outset, co-operated towards the success of this undertaking.

It seemed to us that, in negotiating this treaty, the Committee should set itself two main goals: on the one hand, to arrive at a precise definition of radiological weapons and to prohibit them, and on the other to ensure that the provisions of the treaty do not entail any interference with other perfectly legitimate and important activities such as the peaceful use of nuclear energy and radioactive materials. In keeping with this approach, we have submitted a number of specific proposals and suggestions.

The patient and tireless efforts of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group, Ambassador Komives, to whom we should like today to express our sincere appreciation of the work accomplished, have shown that it is possible to amend and enrich the joint American-Soviet proposal in a constructive manner, by incorporating the ideas put forward by a number of delegations.

The Ad Hoc Working Group has advanced from the stage of identifying the main elements of the future treaty to that of negotiating on each of the elements identified. It would be desirable for the Group to be able to pass on to the final stage, that of the drafting of the text of the treaty. My delegation, for its part, is prepared to participate in that work, with the collaboration of its experts.

It must be recognized, however, that the actual drafting work can be undertaken with a reasonable hope of success only if all delegations accept the idea of a convention of limited scope the urgency and importance of which would not be of the first order.

Another approach has been suggested, which would entail the radical widening of the field of application and the role of the convention. In this context, questions of major importance have been raised and discussed.

(Mr. Ciarrapico, Italy)

The question arises as to how far the present structure of the convention, as it emerges from the amended version prepared by the Chairman of the Working Group, is capable of absorbing these new elements without needing to be entirely recast and without this jeopardizing the possibility of agreement.

It is our feeling that certain concerns could be adequately accommodated either in the preamble or in the body of the convention, for example, those regarding the priorities which the Committee should observe, and the duty incumbent upon it to resolve, first and foremost, the problems presented by weapons systems which have already been developed and deployed, in particular in the nuclear field. Others raise problems calling for very detailed study.

The memorandum submitted by the Swedish delegation on 16 March 1981 and contained in working paper CD/RW/WP.19 is one example. We are grateful to the Swedish delegation for preparing a paper which has the merit of being thought-provoking, and to Ambassador Lidgard for providing us, in his statement of Tuesday last, with very interesting additional information, including information of a technical nature.

Those aspects are receiving careful study by the Italian authorities.

It would be premature to try to formulate any comments, even of a preliminary nature. I would simply note that the memorandum raises real problems and expresses legitimate concerns which Sweden is not alone in feeling.

At this stage, it is more important to reflect on these problems, rather than to know whether they can be solved within the framework of a convention on radiological weapons, or within the context of humanitarian law applicable to war situations. They will undoubtedly constitute an important subject for discussion at our summer session. My delegation's attention is directed towards a careful evaluation of the dimensions of these problems and in particular of the effects which could result from conventional military attacks on nuclear power stations and also on reprocessing facilities and waste deposits bearing in mind also the variety of types of existing installations.

In its discussions, the Ad Hoc Working Group has dealt also with another issue to which my delegation attaches special importance, that of the peaceful use of nuclear energy and radioactive materials. Last year, my delegation took the initiative of proposing amendments to the text of the joint proposal, with a view to safeguarding the right of parties to the treaty to institute international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses. Other delegations made proposals designed to give a positive tone to the text of the convention by reaffirming, on the one hand, the right of States parties to have access to technology, equipment, scientific information, etc. and, on the other hand, the obligation of States parties to promote international co-operation to that end.

In our view, such an approach could be adequately reflected in the treaty. Moreover, the examples of the Convention relating to biological weapons and the Convention relating to environmental modification techniques, which contain provisions of this type, lead us in this direction and can themselves serve as useful precedents guiding our efforts to reach a satisfactory compromise.

(Mr. Ciarrapico, Italy)

With regard to the concern that the convention might lead to possible discrimination against non-party States, I should like to point out that that is a problem inherent in any type of agreement or treaty and that it has been traditionally dealt with in accordance with the legal principle that "pacta tertiis neque juvant neque nocent".

Before concluding my statement, I wish to inform the delegations present that, tomorrow, Italy will sign, in New York, the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

In fact, 10 April is the day set for the opening of the Convention for signature. By thus signing it we wish to stress the importance we attach to that Convention and to international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts in general. In that area, Italy remains committed to co-operation for the achievement of further progress.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Italy for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the chair.

Mr. OKAWA (Japan): Mr. Chairman, it is a particular pleasure for me to welcome and congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship of our Committee for April. And I pledge to you the fullest co-operation of my delegation during your tenure of office. As to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Herder of the German Democratic Republic, my delegation wishes to express its gratitude to him for his valuable work in March; we shall remember him for his successful efforts in achieving a consensus on the launching of informal discussions on items 1 and 2 of our Agenda.

Today, with your permission, I wish to address myself to item 4 of our agenda, although I know I am one week late in taking the floor on this subject.

The question of a chemical weapons ban is one of the most urgent matters on the disarmament agenda. This is clearly stated in paragraph 75 of the Final Document of the General Assembly's first special session on disarmament as well as in countless General Assembly resolutions, the most recent of which is resolution 35/144 B.

Over the years during which this question has been on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament and its predecessor, member countries have made contributions in the form of countless studies and proposals. The Japanese delegation itself put forward a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, prohibition and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction as far back as in 1974, as well as a number of other working papers in succeeding years, in the hope of contributing to the early conclusion of a chemical weapons ban. A great many problems still remain to be solved. Some of the problems originate in political and military or security considerations of the States involved; others derive from the scientific and technological characteristics inherent in chemical warfare agents and chemical weapons themselves. We must, through our discussions in the Committee on Disarmament, try to achieve compromises in the form of realistic and effective solutions to the outstanding

(Mr. Okawa, Japan)

problems, taking into account and respecting as much as possible the various positions expressed by the delegations around this table. My delegation will also endeavour to work toward such compromises at the appropriate stage; today I shall limit myself to a few observations based on the basic position or way of thinking we have maintained over the years.

The use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases is prohibited by the Geneva Protocol of 1925 to which 96 States are Contracting Parties. Nevertheless, huge stockpiles of chemical weapons are maintained in certain countries, and production is continuing. This is the main reason why the banning of chemical weapons is considered by the international community to be of such great urgency. If the existing stocks of chemical weapons and chemical warfare agents could be destroyed, and the existing facilities for their production, assembly, storage, etc., could be destroyed, dismantled, or converted to peaceful purposes, it would be a great relief to the international community. At the same time my delegation is convinced that those countries not possessing chemical weapons, including my own, are hoping for a comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons, not only from humanitarian considerations but also from the point of view of their national security.

It was against this background that the Committee decided last year to establish an Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. This step was welcomed by my Government as the beginning of a promising new phase in the long history of international efforts towards the elaboration of a multilateral convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Although the initial mandate of the Working Group necessarily had to be of a somewhat limited nature, the discussions in the Working Group were characterized by a remarkable spirit of co-operation and goodwill among the delegates participating in the joint effort. The same spirit of co-operation is prevailing in the Working Group that has been re-established this year, and my delegation wishes to express its deep appreciation to Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden for the energetic but meticulous manner in which he is presiding over the proceedings of the Working Group. My delegation also welcomes the participation of the chemical weapons experts once again this year, as well as the presence of the delegates of non-member countries interested in this subject.

Before I proceed into the substance of the question, I wish to express my Government's hope and expectation that the Soviet Union and the United States will be able to reopen their bilateral negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons in the very near future. While fully endorsing the important role of the Committee on Disarmament as the only multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, and consequently as the legitimate body for conducting multilateral negotiations on a chemical weapons ban, my delegation does recognize the importance of the bilateral negotiations and the fact that the two sets of negotiations must march forward hand in hand, so to speak. The USSR-United States joint report presented to us last July in document CD/112 is of great importance to the other members of the Committee as an indication of the progress so far made and of the problems that remain to be solved between the bilateral negotiators. My delegation hopes that we shall have the benefit of further such joint reports at regular intervals to help our work in the Committee. We also hope that our discussions in the Committee will act as a stimulant to the bilateral negotiators and will also be able to assist them in finding solutions to some of their problems.

(Mr. Okawa, Japan)

The basic concept of the Japanese draft convention of April 1974, which I mentioned a few minutes ago, was the comprehensive coverage of the prohibition to be envisaged as the long-term objective; this was, however, combined with the more realistic approach by stages, under which we would begin with the prohibition of those chemical agents known to be used for hostile military purposes and regarding which verification would present no problem or regarding which their verifiability could be agreed upon.

Paragraph 2 of the USSR-United States joint report (CCD/112) classifies chemical into three categories, namely, super-toxic lethal chemicals, other lethal chemicals and other harmful chemicals. Regardless of how toxicity criteria would come to be incorporated into the provisions of the convention, my delegation has been advocating the adoption of toxicity criteria to supplement the general purpose criterion and as a means of concretely identifying the chemicals for hostile military purposes that would be prohibited under the convention. We therefore consider that this classification of chemicals into three categories would be more or less appropriate for our purpose. We can also accept the idea that agreed ranges of toxicity levels should be used for distinguishing the three categories. However, the joint report recognizes that methods of measuring toxicity have to be agreed upon. My delegation mentioned last year the need to establish a standardized method of testing or measuring the toxicity of chemicals. A group of Japanese experts is now working on this question and we may eventually be able to present to the Committee some suggestions regarding the standardization of such testing methods.

My delegation has always considered it necessary to envisage some sort of listing of chemical agents which would be the object of prohibition or other control under the convention. Whether such a list should be annexed to the convention or not should be the object of careful study. Of course, it would be impossible to draw up a comprehensive list of such chemicals, but at least an illustrative list of chemicals that are known to be used or are likely to be used as CW agents would be both feasible and useful -- useful in making clear, in an illustrative manner, what chemicals would be prohibited and also in facilitating the process of verification.

I now turn to the question of verification, which is one of the keystones of a chemical weapons ban. The method or means of verifying whether obligations under the convention are being lived up to will vary according to what is to be verified. Different techniques will need to be employed for different situations. This is why our consideration of the multiple problems related to verification has a very close relationship to the scope of the prohibition under the convention. This point is recognized in paragraph 10 of the report of last year's Working Group on Chemical Weapons, where it is stated in section B: "It was held that verification measures should be commensurate with the scope of prohibition and other aspects of a convention". In the view of my delegation this is a point of practical importance that needs to be borne in mind.

It was also recognized last year that the verification system could be based on an appropriate combination of national and international measures. We think we could envisage national organs that would be responsible, inter alia, for observing and supervising national activities related to the subject matter of the convention, the collection of statistical and other information, and the preparation of periodic reports that would be presented to a consultative committee or other international verification organ to be established by the parties to the convention. The

(Mr. Okawa, Japan)

international organ would analyse and evaluate the periodic reports and statistical and other information submitted by the national organs of States parties, and be invited to send observers to be present when stocks are being destroyed or when production facilities are being dismantled. In connection with the obligation not to engage in the production of prohibited chemical agents, the international organ would request explanations from States parties and conduct inquiries as well as inspections, if necessary, upon invitation or with the agreement of the State party concerned.

What should the international verification system be expected to verify? The destruction of existing stocks of chemical weapons and of chemical warfare agents for hostile military purposes, and the destruction, dismantling or conversion to peaceful purposes of the facilities for the production of the above, as well as filling facilities and storage facilities are the principal items that immediately come to mind. One might also envisage the moth-balling of these facilities in the intermediate stage that could occur after the declaration of plans to destroy or dismantle facilities and before their actual destruction. The task of effectively verifying all this would already seem to be an enormous responsibility and the successful execution of the highly complicated and costly operations that this would entail would be a significant achievement, to say the least. Setting aside for the time being the question of how stringent the verification measures should be, my delegation feels that we should initially aim at the early establishment of a verification system that would cover the items or activities I have just mentioned to the extent that would be realistic and feasible -- both from the technical and from the financial points of view.

One of the most difficult problems in the field of verification will be the way in which a reasonable system could be applied to so-called dual purpose chemical agents. No mention is made of dual purpose chemicals in the USSR-United States joint report, and my delegation understands that the distinction between single purpose and dual purpose chemicals is only relative. A number of valuable technical suggestions have been made in this Committee and its predecessor regarding this problem, and we feel that, regardless of whether these terms will or will not appear in the text of our CW convention, the problem that so-called dual purpose chemicals would pose in the context of an effective chemical weapons ban cannot be avoided. We consider this important question to merit continued in-depth study in the Committee on Disarmament. At this stage I would simply say that it would be helpful if, with the help of experts, we could identify and list the principal chemical agents that could be used for both peaceful and hostile military purposes.

My Government considers that the verification measures to be provided for under the convention should be primarily directed against military or chemical-warfare-oriented activities, and that any intrusion into the normal operations of the chemical industries should be limited to the minimum necessary. My delegation fully shares the view expressed two weeks ago by the distinguished delegate of Brazil, Ambassador de Souza e Silva, that "the convention should be conceived according to the principle that civil industrial activities and the full use of technology for peaceful purposes should not only be allowed but actually encouraged; the production, development, stock-piling and transfer of chemical agents for warlike purposes is the exception that must be prohibited, rather than the other way around". Let me also quote a sentence from our own working paper CCD/430 of July 1974, in which we spoke of "the need to satisfy two conflicting requirements:

(Mr. Okawa, Japan)

to obtain verification results reliable enough to be able to deter non-compliance with the Convention and at the same time to minimize the burden of States parties to the Convention".

In the view of my delegation, the activities of chemical industries for peaceful purposes should not be submitted to on-site inspection, for instance, except in cases where the industry is suspected of producing prohibited chemical agents and no convincing explanations to the contrary have been put forward.

May I also express my delegation's appreciation to the delegation of Canada for its recent paper on verification, contained in document CD/167, as well, of course, as for its many contributions to the Committee on this subject over the years

I would now like to touch upon the relationship between our CW convention and the Geneva Protocol of 1925. That document has played a most important role during the 50-odd years that it has been in force and my delegation has not the slightest intention of querying its usefulness. However, as has been pointed out by many delegations, there is room for reinforcing the Geneva Protocol. Several delegations have pointed out the possible duplication of legal obligations that would arise if the new convention were to embrace a prohibition of "use". On the other hand, we must also bear in mind that the scope of the prohibition under the new convention may not necessarily coincide exactly with the scope of the prohibition under the 1925 Protocol, that is to say: asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all other analogous liquids, materials or devices. Furthermore, no provisions for verification are included in the Protocol. We can therefore understand the argument in favour of the use of chemical weapons also being covered in some form in the new convention.

Incidentally, my delegation listened with interest to the statement made two weeks ago by you yourself, Mr. Chairman, in your capacity as representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, in which you suggested the inclusion in the chemical weapons convention of a verification procedure that would aim at ensuring observation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. We would like to give this suggestion careful consideration.

Much has been said about confidence-building measures that could be incorporated into the proposed convention, or could be implemented even before we have such a convention. My delegation agrees on their usefulness, but today I shall limit myself to saying that a workable and reliable verification system would be the greatest and most effective of all confidence-building measures.

In concluding my statement, may I express the hope of my delegation that, by the time of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament to be held next year, this Committee will be in a position to report some meaningful progress on a chemical weapons convention, the conclusion of which was said in paragraph 75 of the Final Document of 1973 to be "one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral negotiations".

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Japan for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the chair.

Mr. VENKATESWARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, it is a matter of great satisfaction to my delegation to see you, the representative of a country with which India has close and friendly links, as the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of April. We are convinced that under your able guidance the work of this Committee will be significantly advanced and the basis laid for achieving further concrete results during the rest of our 1981 session. We would also like to take this opportunity to express our appreciation to Ambassador Gerhard Horder of the German Democratic Republic, who guided the work of this Committee before you in a skilful and effective manner.

My delegation would today like to address itself to the problem of new weapons of mass destruction and radiological weapons. As far as new weapons of mass destruction are concerned, we have consistently taken the position that in the long run it would be necessary to evolve a mechanism whereby military applications of new advances in science and technology are put under general and effective control. What we are witnessing today is a phenomenon where the pace of progress in weapons technology is constantly outstripping the slow and halting pace of disarmament negotiations. It is a fact that the increasing complexity of new weapons systems which are introduced makes the task of adequate verification more difficult. The paradox is that the technological arms race has not resulted in greater security for any of its votaries. If nothing is done soon to ensure that the development of science and technology is used only for the advancement of human welfare and economic and social development, the arms race is bound to go out of control.

It has been argued by some in this Committee that it is unrealistic to evolve a mechanism to prevent the development of new weapons systems until such systems have already been identified. This point has once again been mentioned by the distinguished delegate of Italy this morning. However, in doing so, one should not neglect the historical experience of the last several decades. Time and again we have seen that once a new weapon system has been evolved or a new military application of some scientific or technological breakthrough has been identified, efforts to apply control or restraint to them have been largely discouraged. To those who have developed them, new and apparently more sophisticated weapons systems appear to provide the instrument for obtaining an edge over a potential adversary or in redressing a perceived military imbalance. Even if this is not the case, there have been occasions where new weapons systems have been used as bargaining counters in negotiations on arms control.

My delegation has noted with interest the proposal made by the Soviet Union for the setting up of an ad hoc group of experts under the aegis of this Committee to consider both a general prohibition on new weapons of mass destruction as well as specific measures in regard to the prohibition of specific potential weapons which have been identified. We regard this proposal as a constructive one meriting attention. As the only multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament, the Committee on Disarmament cannot shirk its responsibility in

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

dealing with a problem which is at the very heart of the continuing and escalating arms race. Of course, an ad hoc group of experts is perhaps not the only way in which we can deal with this problem. We could, for example, hold periodic meetings at which scientists and technologists could acquaint the Committee with new military applications of recent advances in science and technology. At some stage we could even think in terms of setting up an ad hoc working group of this Committee itself to negotiate effective international arrangements to deal with the problem.

In this connection, I would like to quote from a thoughtful paper presented by Lord Zuckerman at the Colloquium on Science and Disarmament held in Paris in January 1981. Lord Zuckerman pointed out that "the technological arms race has no finishing post, and because of its increasing cost and of the increasing cost of the use of its products in terms of trained manpower, it erodes the military establishment itself". Lord Zuckerman formulated what he has called the "ineluctable law of Research and Development". Some aspects of the law read as follows:

"Since the cost of developing a weapon system of a given degree of sophistication is much the same in all advanced industrialized countries, considerations of the absolute size of the economy come into play when a country wishes its forces to live up to the standards set by the arms race between the super-Powers and when it has to re-equip at frequent intervals with weapons which are more sophisticated and correspondingly much more expensive than those they replace. If we suppose that the percentage of the Gross Domestic Product that can be devoted to defence remains roughly the same from year to year, and that the GDP is rising steadily, it inevitably follows that the greater amount of money that goes to defence each year would be unlikely to buy more defence".

"A more expensive offensive system is countered by an even more expensive defence. The net result is an increase in expenditure on defence equipment by both parties, and usually an increase in the security of neither".

These remarks, of course, apply to all the major Powers.

Lord Zuckerman accordingly concluded that "the long-term consequences are, therefore, inescapable. If we are to be efficient in defence, we cannot plan on allowing our equipment to become obsolete. Equally, we cannot assume that a rising share of the Gross Domestic Product will be allotted to defence. Therefore, the alternatives between which we are forced to choose are to alter our commitments so as to avoid the need to introduce some of the most expensive new weapon systems; or to make our forces smaller; or a combination of both these measures".

At the end of his interesting paper, Lord Zuckerman expressed the view that scientists and technologists have much to contribute by explaining to their respective political and military leaders the facts of life of the arms race.

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As he pointed out, what has happened over the past 20 years, far from adding to the security of nations, has made the world a much more dangerous place in which to live. One cannot but agree with his assessment that "the momentum of the technological arms race carries along not only the seeds of its own frustration, but of national bankruptcy -- or of worse, war itself."

It is therefore obvious that we in this Committee should be made aware of the so-called facts of life of the technological arms race. It is for this reason that we commend the Soviet proposal.

The Indian delegation has already put before this Committee its views concerning the proposed treaty prohibiting radiological weapons. We are prepared to engage in serious negotiations in the elaboration of such a treaty. However, it is only natural that as individual delegations we should seek to ensure that the treaty text does not contradict or undermine the positions of principle that our countries have taken with respect to certain fundamental political issues. India has consistently held that the possession and use of nuclear weapons cannot be a legitimate instrument of ensuring the security of States. As early as 1961 the General Assembly declared that the use of nuclear weapons would be a crime against humanity. The same declaration was reiterated in subsequent resolutions of the General Assembly, most recently in resolution 35/152 D. It is this fundamental stand on principle which underlies our objection to a definition of radiological weapons which resorts to an exclusion clause with respect to nuclear weapons. This stand has the support of several delegations in this Committee. The distinguished Ambassador of Brazil, in his thought-provoking statement at our plenary meeting of 7 April 1981, quite rightly pointed out:

"My delegation favours the suggestions that have been made in the Committee and in the Working Group, according to which it would be advisable to define radiological weapons by their characteristics rather than by explicitly excluding nuclear weapons from the purview of the convention. There seems to be little point in adopting a definition that amounts to a legitimization of nuclear weapons, only to have the following article disclaim that fact by stating that nothing in the convention can be interpreted as legitimizing nuclear weapons. Such a disclaimer would, in fact, only underline the assumption that the very real nuclear weapons are, indeed, considered as a viable option, while the non-existent radiological weapons are prohibited. The exclusion clause, as it has been described, is, for those reasons, unacceptable to my delegation".

The constructive manner in which delegations have engaged in the negotiations on a ban on radiological weapons has been amply demonstrated in the several contributions that have been made to overcome the problem of definition which we have referred to. Yugoslavia, for example, has put forward before the Ad Hoc Working Group a possible alternative definition which does not resort to an exclusion clause with respect to nuclear weapons. The distinguished

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Ambassador of Yugoslavia made a full and convincing case in support of his proposal at our last plenary meeting. My delegation would like to express its deep appreciation to Ambassador Vrhunec for the efforts his delegation has made to seek a reasonable solution to a problem that, in our view, is fundamental for ensuring the success of our negotiations.

My delegation has suggested some precise and specific formulations for inclusion in a future treaty on radiological weapons. We are grateful to the distinguished Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, Ambassador Komives of Hungary, who has, in the texts that he has so carefully and meticulously prepared for the consideration of the Working Group, taken account of these concerns. He should receive our full support in the difficult and sometimes frustrating task that he has so graciously undertaken.

The distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Lidgard, made a thought-provoking and convincing statement on radiological weapons at our last plenary meeting. We wish to express our gratitude to the Swedish delegation for the timely reminder that this Committee should not compromise its credibility in a hasty attempt to produce an agreement, which would not meet, even in a limited manner, the hopes and aspirations of the international community. Like the Swedish delegation, we too are not quite clear as to what we are trying to prohibit as the present text stands. The specific possibilities that have been suggested in the Committee appear to be exceedingly hypothetical when scrutinized closely. However, we are still prepared to negotiate a ban on such potential weapons, provided their specific technical attributes are made explicit and clear.

We have also taken careful note of the proposal made by Sweden that the proposed treaty on radiological weapons should also prohibit attacks on civilian nuclear facilities. Such a prohibition would certainly add to the validity of the convention which we are seeking to negotiate. The Swedish proposal will receive the most serious consideration by our Government.

In conclusion, my delegation is of the view that the Committee on Disarmament must first and foremost focus attention on priority items on its agenda. The cessation of the nuclear arms race and the achievement of nuclear disarmament are the most urgent and critical questions facing mankind. Our credibility, our relevance as a multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament, will be judged in the final analysis by our ability to negotiate concrete measures in the field of nuclear disarmament. A treaty banning radiological weapons could only have value if it is regarded as a step towards the eventual prohibition of all weapons causing death and destruction by radiation, including nuclear weapons themselves, which pose the greatest danger to human survival.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of India for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the chair.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, at the beginning of my statement I should like to express satisfaction at the fact that during this highly crucial month which concludes the spring part of the 1981 session of the Committee of Disarmament, the chairmanship of the Committee has devolved upon you. We hope that your experience and profound knowledge of the problems discussed in the Committee will make for the efficient organization of our work in the days that remain and will enable us to come closer to a solution of the issues entrusted to our Committee. I should also like to address some words of sincere gratitude to Ambassador Herder, Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament during the past month. To him fell the difficult task of harmonizing the approaches of various delegations on the question of how work should be continued within the Committee on questions relating to the limitation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and to the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

Today the Soviet delegation would like to touch upon a number of issues.

The Soviet Union's approach to the problem of the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons is well known to the members of the Committee on Disarmament. This approach was confirmed once again in the report by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the 26th Congress of the CPSU in which, as regards the problem under discussion the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, L.I. Brezhnev, noted the following important point:

"The pivotal line of the foreign policy of our Party and Government has been and continues to be the struggle to reduce the danger of war and to curb the arms race. At the present time, this objective has acquired particular significance and urgency. The fact is that rapid and profound changes are taking place in the development of military technology. Qualitatively new types of weapons, and first and foremost weapons of mass destruction, are being developed. These new types of weapons are such as to make control over them and, consequently also, an agreed limitation of these weapons an extremely difficult if not impossible undertaking. A new phase in the arms race will undermine international stability and greatly increase the danger of the outbreak of war."

As you know, we are in favour of a comprehensive agreement prohibiting the development and production of any new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. At the same time, we do not exclude the possibility of concluding particular agreements also.

We continue to believe that it would be more proper to act in such a way as to forestall, through an appropriate agreement, the threat of the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction well before they are developed or are converted into some material means of warfare. Time does not wait!

The problem we are discussing today has been on the agenda of the sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, the Committee on Disarmament and other international forums for about five years. The Committee on Disarmament periodically holds debates on the question of new types of weapons of mass destruction. Occasionally experts from certain countries participate in them. Up to now, things have not gone further than that. At the same time, unlike other disarmament problems, the question of the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction possesses distinctive and unique features peculiar only to it.

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Among the first of these specific features is the fact that one of the crucial elements in the discussion of the question of new types of weapons of mass destruction is the elaboration of agreed scientific and technological concepts which must underlie the subject of the prohibition in a future agreement or agreements. This in turn means that, if this question is to be examined in the Committee, it should obviously be appropriately informed, bearing in mind the importance for the Committee to adopt political decisions on the basis of a strict scientific analysis of all the most complex facets of the problem.

In our view, what is needed in this case is a preliminary stage of discussion when, at the level of experts, an agreed opinion would be worked out on the scientific and technological aspects of the issue and this opinion would be presented to the Committee for its consideration.

The available experience of the discussion of the issue of new types of weapons of mass destruction shows that an expert speaking at a meeting of the Committee is compelled by the very nature of his audience to try to make his statement as easily understood as possible, sometimes prejudicing its scientific accuracy. This may lead either to a not altogether correct understanding of a given problem, as is shown, in particular, for instance, by the proposals of some delegations to include in the scope of the prohibition of radiological weapons the so-called particle beam weapons also, or to the distortion of the substance of the matter.

These considerations warrant the assertion that the effectiveness of the discussion of such a scientifically complex problem as that of new types of weapons of mass destruction would be much higher if the members of the Committee had at their disposal the views not merely of one expert, even if highly qualified, but of a group of experts from various countries which would be worked out on the basis of a procedure recognized by the scientific world. This is precisely the purpose of the proposal of the USSR delegation for the setting up of an ad hoc group of experts. We have heard with interest the statement of the Hungarian delegation of 7 April and we support its proposal to hold informal meetings, which would also serve the same goal.

The group we are proposing could present authoritative opinions on those developments in science and technology which pose a potential danger from the point of view of the devising of new types of weapons of mass destruction and also provide the Committee with surveys of the current situation in this matter from the scientific and technological standpoint. The mandate of such a group could be agreed on in greater detail at the informal meetings of the Committee with the participation of experts proposed by the delegation of Hungary.

Thus, the existence of such a group would ensure that the Committee receives objective scientific and technological information on the subject of weapons of mass destruction, and would provide it with an important practical means for a regular monitoring of the status of this problem.

I should now like to dwell briefly on the question of the prohibition of radiological weapons. First of all, I wish to express our appreciation to Ambassador Kómives for his skilful and efficient stewardship of the Working Group on Radiological Weapons.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

At the Committee's plenary meeting on 7 April we listened attentively to the statements of a number of delegations on this subject. In some of them -- and not for the first time -- the question was raised as to whether there is any need at all to deal with the problem of the banning of radiological weapons (meaning, precisely, weapons as such) in view of the fact that there are other unresolved issues in the sphere of the limitation of armaments and generally in the field of the lessening of the danger of war. The Soviet delegation believes that, since the introduction of the joint Soviet-United States document on the basic elements of a treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons, the authors of this document and representatives of other delegations have devoted much attention to explaining and substantiating the idea, purposes, subject and scope of the prohibition in the proposed treaty. In particular, the danger of the development of radiological weapons has been demonstrated on the basis of the existence of a possibility in principle of using radiation produced by the decay of radioactive materials. Mention has been made of a possibility in principle of producing such weapons in the form of bombs, shells, fougasses, etc., intended for the dissemination of radioactive materials by means of an explosion. The possibility has also been indicated of developing special devices or equipment for the purpose of disseminating radioactive materials in a non-explosive manner, for instance, through their dispersion in the form of liquid or solid particles. Other possibilities, also, have been noted for the use for hostile purposes of radioactive materials which may be at the disposal of a State.

Many delegations have made references, among other things, to the United Nations definition of 1948 in which, even at that time, radiological weapons were identified as weapons of mass destruction. We wish also to recall the decisions adopted quite recently -- at the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held in 1978, and at the last regular session of the General Assembly, in 1980. Thus, paragraph 76 of the Final Document of the special session says the following: "A convention should be concluded prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons". This provision is echoed in General Assembly resolution 35/156 G of 12 December 1980. Both texts, as you know, were adopted by consensus.

Certain other comments have been made replies to which, it seems to us, have already been given by the Soviet delegation both at the plenary meetings of the Committee on Disarmament and in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons and in the course of the bilateral consultations.

The Soviet delegation, like many of the other delegations which are in favour of the earliest completion of the work on the text of a convention banning radiological weapons, has never, of course, contended that this is a priority question or that it should be considered and resolved before all the other issues. However, while we show our interest and actively participate in the examination of such crucial disarmament questions as the curtailment of the nuclear arms race, the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests, the prohibition of chemical weapons and a number of other issues, we at the same time believe that blocking any direction for the arms race, even a modest one, would be a step forward. And if there is the possibility of reaching such a decision now, we ought not artificially to slow down this work by introducing questions which, although important ones, bear no direct relation to the subject under discussion. We are prompted by the belief that the entire world community is interested in equal degree in achieving the prohibition of radiological weapons since every country will benefit in equal measure from the realization of this measure.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

At our last meeting, on Tuesday, we already gave our assessment of the statement by the United States delegation of 7 April as an unconstructive one that was not in the interests of the tasks confronting this Committee. The American delegation galloped headlong, as it were, through various complex international problems and in the process trampled on subjects having nothing to do with foreign policy. We, too, of course, could cite many examples -- and real examples, not invented ones -- touching on various facets of the social, economic and political life of the United States which, in our view, call for serious criticism. However, we are not in favour of wasting the Committee's work time, which is already extremely limited. In short, we will not follow the American delegation's example but will speak about certain questions of substance.

First of all, hard as the American representative tried, he did not succeed in refuting the obvious fact that it is the United States which has been the initiator of every round in the arms race during the entire post-war period. After all, who was the first to develop nuclear weapons? The United States! Who was the initiator in the development of nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles aboard, the equipping of intercontinental missiles with multiple warheads and the creation of a whole series of the most destructive types of weapons of mass destruction? Again, the United States! Who is taking the lead now in the development of neutron weapons, new types of supertoxic lethal chemical weapons and other dangerous means of warfare? Once more, the United States!

The current military preparations in the United States, which the United States Secretary of Defense, C. Weinberger, calls "the start of America's rearmament" are nothing but an unprecedented super-armament of the United States the aim of which is to achieve preponderance in every category of strategic and conventional armaments.

For instance, the Pentagon has long been boasting about the superiority of its naval forces. What, then, is the purpose, it may be asked, of the decision to increase the total number of warships from 456 to 600, with an increase to 15 in the number of aircraft-carrier groups? And in view of all these facts, how can it be contended that it is the Soviet Union that is responsible for the arms race?

As has been authoritatively stated more than once by the leaders of the Soviet Union, our country is not striving to achieve military supremacy. The military potential of the USSR does not exceed what is required for necessary defence purposes, this being fully in line with the defensive character of Soviet military doctrine. Is our good will not shown by such facts as the unilateral withdrawal from the German Democratic Republic of 20,000 Soviet servicemen, 1,000 tanks and other military equipment which was completed last year?

The American representative tried to confuse the issue as regards the correlation of forces on the European continent, to put it mildly, freely interpreting various facts and juggling with some data. The best response to these attempts is to be found in the statement made by the head of our State, L.I. Brezhnev, at the Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on 7 April of this year. The Soviet delegation would like to read out the relevant passage from that statement. We are doing this also because, in spite of the claims made here about the so-called "free" Western press, many of its organs have not considered it necessary even to mention this most important part of L.I. Brezhnev's speech. I quote:

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

[speaking in English]

"The unbridled nuclear arms race in Europe is becoming lethally dangerous for all European peoples. In order to start in some way the practical solution of this problem, we propose that, for the time being at least, a line be drawn under what exists, that is, to put an end to the further deployment of new, and replacement of both Soviet and NATO medium-range nuclear missiles stationed in Europe. This includes, naturally, the American nuclear forward-based systems in that region. The moratorium could be valid until a permanent treaty is concluded on the limitation and, still better, on the reduction of the above-mentioned nuclear means of both sides in Europe.

"Naturally, our proposal for the moratorium is not an end in itself. It has been made with the intention of creating a more favourable atmosphere for talks. We regard as the objective in this question -- I have stated this before and repeat it now -- precisely the reduction by both sides of the amount of nuclear means accumulated in Europe. This it is quite possible to do without worsening the conditions of security of either East or West.

"Our proposal has, as is known, met with a very positive response in broad political circles and among the public in Western Europe. However, the reaction of those who apparently did not like it was not slow either.

"It is alleged that the new Soviet proposal has the aim of consolidating a supposed advantage of the forces of the Warsaw Treaty member countries. This is certainly not so. I spoke about this in detail at the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. If one casts a glance at the nuclear potentials which both sides now have in the area of Europe, what is obvious is the approximate balance of the forces of both sides. That has, by the way, repeatedly been admitted in the West. For example, Chancellor Schmidt of the Federal Republic of Germany, in one of his public speeches in February of this year, denied that the East-West balance of forces in Europe had been violated. The Chancellor, however, expressed the apprehension that the 'Russians might be on the point of violating it'. The United States Secretary of State Haig also recently spoke about 'the relative balance and parity'. He expressed anxiety, however, that this balance might change in favour of the USSR allegedly by the middle of this decade.

"With such an appraisal of the present-day situation and the prospects of its development, leaders of Western countries should logically have jumped at our proposal. Instead, some of them are trying to minimize its significance, and this is certainly not because the correlation of forces in Europe has changed in the course of a few days. They are doing so because they would like to change that correlation in favour of the West and are unwilling to bind themselves by a moratorium.

"But such attempts -- and this should be clearly understood -- will only impel the other side to take retaliatory steps. A vicious circle will be witnessed again and the situation in Europe will become more precarious for all. Is it so difficult for the Governments of western Powers to understand that?

"As a whole, our proposals mean the settlement of the most urgent international problems which are of paramount significance for the consolidation of peace. We propose that the parties concerned should have business-like, constructive negotiations on these issues -- at any level, without any preliminary strings attached. If anybody has other reasonable proposals, we are ready to consider them also.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

"But, frankly speaking, so far we do not see a particular readiness for negotiations on the part of the Governments of the western Powers.

"Sometimes we are told that all this is very interesting but calls for a long study and there is supposedly no reason to be in a hurry. At the same time it is implied that the definition of the attitude taken does not depend on the Government in question but on others. Meanwhile the arms race continues to escalate and the international situation continues to worsen.

"In other cases, there are attempts to make claims on us, to impose preliminary conditions. There are claims to some 'right' to rule the roost in nearly all parts of the planet, together with demands that as 'payment' for the Western consent to negotiations we should stop considering the interests of our own security and give no assistance to our friends when they are subjected to aggression or a threat of attack.

"A strange stand, to say the least.

"Let us suppose for a minute that the Soviet Union should declare: 'Before opening negotiations on the settlement of some overdue international problems, let the Western Powers change their policy in the sphere which we, and many others, definitely do not like. Let the United States, say, first withdraw its troops from such and such a country, from such and such military bases abroad. And let it terminate support to and the arming of certain dictatorial terroristic régimes.'

"Would anybody seriously accept such an approach to the question of negotiations? That is hardly possible. We would be called simpletons, people who are insufficiently versed in politics or who deliberately raise obstacles and cause procrastinations, who avoid negotiations because they have different but by no means peaceful intentions.

"The experience of history, including that of recent decades, convincingly shows us that success in talks between States comes only when attempts to dictate terms to each other are discarded, when there is a real will for peace and mutual respect for the parties' interests. It is precisely on this basis that major international agreements which have helped to consolidate peace and the security of peoples have been achieved."

[resuming in Russian]

This is our response to the statement made by the distinguished representative of the United States.

Allow me now to respond to the questions of the British delegation. The distinguished representative of the United Kingdom has repeatedly asked us about the character of the statement by the Soviet Union that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon countries which do not permit the stationing of such weapons on their territories. A similar question was put to L.I. Brezhnev a few days ago by the Greek newspaper Ta Nea. I will now quote L.I. Brezhnev's answer: "The Soviet Union has already declared more than once that it will never use nuclear weapons against those countries which renounce the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and which do not have such weapons in their territory. This alone is a sufficiently firm guarantee. But we are prepared to go further and to conclude at any time a special agreement with any of the non-nuclear countries, including, of course, Greece, if that country in its turn undertakes not to have nuclear weapons in its territory".

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of the USSR for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the chair.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, first of all permit me to welcome you warmly upon your accession to the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of April. The Mongolian delegation hopes that you may follow the splendid example of your predecessor, Ambassador G. Herder, and so bring the work of the first part of the Committee's session to a successful conclusion.

I should like to take this opportunity again to express my delegation's gratitude to Ambassador G. Herder, the representative of the German Democratic Republic, for his constructive contribution to the Committee's work.

Much time has elapsed since the Soviet Union first came forward with the proposal to prohibit the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and submitted a draft international agreement to that effect to the United Nations General Assembly.

The Soviet proposal received wide support in the international community. As you know, the General Assembly resolution on that subject, resolution 3479 (XXX), was adopted by an overwhelming majority.

Since that date, the question of the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction has been constantly on the agenda both of the General Assembly and of the Committee on Disarmament as a priority task.

However, it has so far been impossible to reach agreement on this problem -- an agreement which would spare mankind from the threat of the emergence of new and terrible weapons of mass destruction -- even though all the necessary prerequisites to that end appear to exist.

The Mongolian People's Republic, which from the very outset has resolutely supported this proposal, together with others, has consistently spoken in favour of reaching a generally acceptable agreement in this field as soon as possible.

Its reason for doing so is that until such time as an agreement strictly prohibiting the development and production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction has been reached, the possibility of using the achievements of modern scientific and technical progress for military purposes will remain.

Particularly clear evidence of this is the constantly accelerating pace of technological improvement of types of weapons of mass destruction and the marked increase in recent years in the appropriations for military research and development in the military budgets of the NATO States and their allies.

Attention should also be drawn to the figures showing that an average of 15-20 new inventions, many of which are used for military purposes, appear in the world every hour.

Thus the acceleration of the arms race is accompanied by continuing improvement in existing types of weapons, resulting in the unchecked development of new and even more destructive means of mass destruction.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

The conclusion to be drawn from this is obvious: if a solid barrier to the appearance of new types of weapons of mass destruction is not erected in time, a serious situation may arise in which the arms race reaches a point of no return, as a result of which the measures achieved so far in the sphere of the limitation of the arms race and disarmament will be brought to nought, and the negotiations currently being conducted in this field will be useless.

That is why the conclusion of an international agreement on the prohibition of the development and production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction will contribute, inter alia, to the supremely important task of putting a stop to the dangerous escalation in the qualitative improvement of weapons of mass destruction, which would undoubtedly constitute a major step towards the halting and reversing of the arms race. It is precisely in this that we see the importance and urgency of achieving an agreement on the prohibition of the development and production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.

Extremely important in this connection would be the conclusion of an international convention on the complete prohibition of the production of neutron weapons.

As you know, three years ago, eight socialist countries, including Mongolia, submitted to the Committee on Disarmament a joint draft international convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons.

This initiative, like other specific proposals made by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries aimed at halting the dangerous arms race and achieving disarmament, is in keeping with the vital interests of all peoples and with the aim of preserving and strengthening peace and international security and warding off the threat of a nuclear catastrophe.

Deep concern and anxiety has been aroused by the recent talk in the United States of renewing plans for manufacturing nuclear neutron weapons and stationing them in western Europe.

It is almost impossible to grasp to the full how harmful the consequences of such plans might be.

The reason and conscience of the peoples demand that the authors of this criminal plan renounce its implementation for ever. Otherwise, such an action on the part of those who like to play with fire could provoke a counteraction. There is an eastern proverb which says: "He who throws a stone into the air risks getting a bump on the head".

The whole course of the discussion being pursued here on the question of prohibiting new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction shows that there is emerging in the Committee to a sufficient degree the outline of a general understanding that it is much easier to achieve an agreement on the preventive prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction than it will be to prohibit them after they have already been developed, tested and included in the arsenals of States.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

Given this approach to the problem of the prohibition of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction and, most important, given sufficient political will on the part first and foremost of the nuclear-weapon States and other countries with a developed military and industrial potential, it will be possible to solve this problem by working out a comprehensive agreement and also, if necessary, agree on individual new types of weapons of mass destruction. The draft treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons under preparation in the Ad Hoc Working Group could serve as a model for such an agreement.

It would be very useful, both as regards a comprehensive agreement and as regards individual agreements on the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction to adopt the proposal of a group of socialist countries for the establishment, under the aegis of the Committee on Disarmament, of an ad hoc group of qualified experts which could undertake an examination of this problem. We believe that the Committee could consider this suggestion and adopt an appropriate decision on it before the end of the first part of the present session so that the group of experts may begin its work during the summer part of the Committee's session.

Now permit me to turn briefly to the question of the prohibition of radiological weapons.

We note with satisfaction that the Ad Hoc Working Group was able to renew negotiations at the very outset of the current session and has already begun to agree on certain provisions for a future treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. The Mongolian delegation fully supports the active and pioneering efforts of the distinguished Chairman of the Working Group, Ambassador I. Komives.

As the progress made in this auxiliary body at the present stage shows, the conditions are favourable for the successful completion of the negotiations towards the elaboration of a draft convention. Unfortunately, however, there are also certain difficulties, mainly in connection with the scope and object of the prohibition.

There is still no general agreement on the formulation and definition of the term radiological weapon, especially the "exclusionary provision" which defines it as any radioactive material "other than that produced by a nuclear explosive device". Many arguments were adduced in the Working Group in favour of the inclusion of the provision contained in the joint USSR-United States proposal in documents CD/31 and CD/32. The Mongolian delegation is inclined to the view that the future convention should have a clear aim: the prohibition of radiological weapons. The inclusion in the future convention of various elements connected with nuclear weapons might, in our view, create additional obstacles to reaching a general agreement on this question.

In connection also to some extent with the question of the scope and object of the prohibition, there is the proposal for the prohibition of what has been called the waging of radiological war, in other words, an attack on nuclear power facilities. The Mongolian delegation's position regarding that proposal is based on its understanding that the convention is to prohibit radiological weapons and not the manner of waging war, whether radiological or other. As you know, the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 prohibited attacks on nuclear power facilities.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

We should like to make several observations on the use of sources of radiation for peaceful purposes. The Mongolian delegation regards the main purpose of the future treaty to be the prohibition of radiological weapons. Of course we do not in the least disagree that the provisions of the treaty should not prevent the peaceful use of nuclear energy for the benefit of mankind. However, we consider that it would be pointless for the States parties to the future treaty to commit themselves again to obligations already undertaken by them under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as is proposed by certain delegations.

At the last plenary meeting, during consideration of the question of weapons of mass destruction, doubt was expressed as to the desirability of and even the need for the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons, on the grounds that the development of such weapons was a matter of the unforeseeable future. It is hardly possible to agree with this view of things. We believe that the threat of radiological war will sooner or later become real and that today's fears regarding the possible development of this type of weapon are therefore fully justified. We consider that the adoption of anticipatory measures to prohibit radiological weapons and other new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction will without doubt constitute important steps towards the curbing of the arms race, the prevention of the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction, and consequently, towards the achievement of the final goal, that of complete and general disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Mongolia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the chair.

Mr. FLOWERREE (United States of America): If I can address myself just for a moment to the statement made by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, I would like to say that, while there are individual points in the Soviet statement of today and that of 26 March that I could rebut, I am satisfied that my statement of 7 April adequately put the position of my Government on record. The United States delegation will therefore show its readiness to put an end to a possible action-reaction circle in this Committee by resisting that temptation and resting its case.

The CHAIRMAN: The Secretariat has circulated today, at my request, the timetable for meetings to be held by the Committee and its subsidiary organs during the coming week. As agreed by the Committee at its 118th plenary meeting, the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will meet on Monday, 13 April, at 10.30 a.m. instead of Thursday afternoon. If there are no objections, I will consider that the Committee adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 14 April, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.

CD/PV.124
14 April 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FOURTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 14 April 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. G. Pfeiffer (Federal Republic of Germany)

GE.81-61423

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. A. SALAH-BEY

Mr. M. MATI

Argentina:

Mr. F. JIMENEZ DAVILA

Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD

Australia:

Mr. R.A. WALKER

Mr. R. STEELE

Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium:

Mr. A. OMKELINK

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA

Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Dr. P. VOUTOV

Mr. I. SOTIROV

Mr. R. DEYANOV

Burma:

U SAW LAING

U NGWE WIN

U THAN HTUN

Canada:

Mr. D.S. MCPHAIL

Mr. C. CACCIA, M.P.

China:

Mr. YU Peiwen

Mr. LIN Chen

Mr. PAN Jusheng

Mr. YU Mengjia

Cuba:

Mr. L. SOLA VILA

Mrs. V. BOROWDOSKY JACKIEWICH

Mr. F. CUSPINERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. A. CIMA
Mr. L. STAVINOHA

Egypt:

Mr. EL SAYED ABDEL RAOUF EL REEDY
Mr. I. ALI HASSAN
Mr. M.N. FAHMY

Ethiopia:

Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Mr. P. BUNTIG

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. F. RUTH
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. H. MULLER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India:

Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. CH. ANWAR SANI
Mr. M. SIDIK
Mr. I. DAMANIK

Iran:

Mr. M. DABIRI
Mr. D. AMERI
Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA

Italy:

Mr. V. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. R. ISHII
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya:

Mr. S. SHITEMI
Mr. G. MUNIU

Mexico:

Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
Mr. C. HELLER

Mongolia:

Mr. L. BAYART
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. R.H. FEIN

Nigeria:

Mr. O. ADENIJI
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. M. MALITA
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. G. EKHOLM
Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. V.A. PERFILIEV
Mr. L.A. NAUMOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES
Mr. N.H. MARSHALL

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. FLOWERREE
Mr. F.P. DESIMONE
Miss K. CRITTENBURGER
Mr. J. MISKEL
Mr. C. PEARCY
Mr. S. FITZGERALD

Venezuela:

Mr. H. ARTEAGA
Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. O. GNOK

Secretary of the Committee
and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

Mr. SOLA VILA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, allow me first to congratulate you, on behalf of my delegation, on your accession to the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of April, the last month of our spring session, and to assure you that you can count on my delegation's full co-operation towards bringing this stage of our work to a successful conclusion.

Allow me also to express my delegation's sincere gratitude for the work carried out by your predecessor, Ambassador Herder of the German Democratic Republic, who so ably discharged the duties of Chairman of the Committee during the month of March.

Now that we are reaching the end of this first stage of the work of the Committee on Disarmament in 1981, I would like to make some comments in this connection on behalf of my delegation.

It is undoubtedly true that the world is at present passing through a difficult and doubtful period from all points of view, political, economic, social and military; various centres of tension, which are detrimental to the establishment and consolidation of international détente, unbridled acts of violence within some countries, the return to the so-called "cold war" phase, and more particularly the constant frenzied acceleration of the arms race are bringing our planet to the brink of an indescribable cataclysm. Never in the history of mankind has a comparable situation existed.

During this year, the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries, held in New Delhi, convincingly expressed its concern regarding the current situation in which the frenzied nuclear arms race is the greatest danger facing the world today and the only solution for survival in a world racked by disturbances and anxieties is to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race.

And even more recently, on the occasion of the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, our supreme leader and Commander-in-Chief, Fidel Castro, said that "the beginning of a new arms race and a return to the cold war would acutely worsen the serious crisis affecting the world economy today. The hopes that economic and social development will triumph over hunger, ignorance and disease, in a climate of peace and international co-operation, would be dashed for the vast majority of the inhabitants of the earth... Social conflicts, centres of tension and the danger of war would multiply. It would be a great crime against humanity".

Current developments in international politics have indeed shown that certain reactionary circles are pursuing a policy which is endangering the achievements of détente and plunging the world into a new "cold war" era.

The increase in the military budgets of the NATO countries, the deployment of 572 medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, the stagnation of the SALT II talks, all give cause for concern to those who merely wish to live in a peaceful world where the principles hallowed in the Charter of the United Nations are respected.

That is why the Committee on Disarmament must now play a very active role in carrying out its work as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament in order to bring about specific measures of disarmament, bearing in mind, furthermore, the fact that all the other types of disarmament negotiations are at present virtually paralysed, and that the Committee on Disarmament must therefore fill the gap left by the failure of other negotiating machinery to function.

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

Furthermore, this will be the last full session of the Committee before the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and we therefore have a major responsibility to achieve positive results by then.

The holding of this important session -- the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament -- should constitute a prelude to the convening of a world disarmament conference, which would provide an appropriate framework for moving towards genuine general and complete disarmament, not only because of the recommendations that would be made but also because of the decisions that would be adopted and would be binding upon States, and especially the States which possess the largest stocks of weapons of all kinds in their arsenals.

At its thirty-fifth session, the United Nations General Assembly adopted by consensus resolution 35/46 which declares the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade. It states:

"The decade of the 1980s should witness renewed intensification by all Governments and the United Nations of their efforts to reach agreement and to implement effective measures that will lead to discernible progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. In this connexion, special attention should be focused on certain identifiable elements in the Programme of Action as adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session which should, as a minimum, be accomplished during the Second Disarmament Decade both through negotiations in the multilateral negotiating forum, the Committee on Disarmament, and in other appropriate forums. Adequate methods and procedures of verification should be considered in the context of international disarmament negotiations."

That is why it is absolutely essential for the Committee on Disarmament to speed up its current disarmament negotiations.

Numerous resolutions on disarmament were adopted at the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly, many of them closely connected with the work of the Committee. Document CD/140, in which the Secretary-General of the United Nations transmitted those resolutions to the Committee on Disarmament, calls upon us to work with still greater intensity during the current year.

It is encouraging to note that this year a constructive atmosphere has prevailed within the Committee, and we are confident that we shall continue in this way, since this will benefit not only the Committee, by enabling us to dedicate ourselves to our appointed task, that of negotiating, so that we do not waste time on matters which should be raised and dealt with in other appropriate forums -- the constructive spirit, I repeat, which should prevail in this body will bring positive results not only for us, but, what is more important, for the international community, which is aware that the hundreds of thousands of millions of dollars that are being squandered on the arms race could be used to solve the most pressing needs of the world today such as hunger, poverty, disease and illiteracy, from which the developing countries suffer most. The reversal of the arms race would provide ample opportunities for the establishment of a new international economic order.

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

The Committee on Disarmament was able to get down to its substantive work speedily this year and three working groups were re-established on (1) chemical weapons, (2) radiological weapons and (3) effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament has also continued its work. It has thus been demonstrated that working groups are the appropriate forum for dealing with the items on our Committee's agenda. This has been stated by many delegations, and in particular by the Group of 21, both in statements and in documents submitted to the Committee, for example document CD/64, which states in one of its paragraphs:

"In the view of the Group of 21, the adoption of the annual agenda is general recognition by the Committee that all the items included therein should be the subject of concrete negotiation. It also represents a commitment by all members to pursue in good faith negotiations to reach agreement on concrete binding and effective disarmament measures on these items."

The Working Group on Chemical Weapons has worked hard and effectively under the leadership of Mr. Lidgard, the distinguished Ambassador of Sweden. Many delegations, particularly those of the Soviet Union, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Egypt and others, have made valuable contributions from the technical point of view. This has enabled the experts from my delegation to reach a comprehensive judgement on the subject of chemical weapons.

My delegation considers that a future convention on chemical weapons should provide at least for the following: (a) the destruction of existing stockpiles of such weapons; (b) the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling for hostile purposes; and (c) the encouragement of co-operation between States parties to the convention for peaceful and non-hostile military purposes.

My delegation is of the view that such a convention should not be discriminatory but should give equal opportunities to all States parties.

We believe that sufficient bases exist for the Committee to initiate discussions on the possible content and scope of such a convention and we hope that this will be possible during the summer part of our session.

The Committee can count on my delegation's co-operation with the participation of experts on the subject.

Allow me now to make some comments on the proposals submitted here by various delegations, and particularly on the work suggested by yourself.

My delegation greatly appreciates the efforts made by all delegations to offer proposals that are generally acceptable and we also value the content of the documents presented by yourself as Chairman of the Working Group. We consider the joint United States-USSR proposals in document CD/112 extremely valuable, and we believe that this document should serve as the basis for all the other proposals.

In my delegation's view, the definition of chemical weapons should be based on the general purpose criterion combined with the toxicity criterion, as indicated in document CD/112.

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

Cuba, which is an independent and non-aligned country, whose defence is designed to protect its sovereignty and the progress achieved in the building of socialism, cannot but be concerned lest a future convention on chemical weapons should contain loopholes that might enable a State party to find ways of violating it.

That is why my delegation considers that a future convention such as the one we are considering should contain references to the use of certain herbicides and defoliants which, in given circumstances and quantities, could constitute chemical warfare agents. Experiences during the recent war in Viet Nam justify this concern on the part of my delegation.

The development of the chemical industry for peaceful purposes is very closely linked to its development for purposes of chemical warfare. The interrelationship is so close that in many cases it is difficult to draw a line which will not affect the development of the first category of chemicals. History has shown that discoveries in the field of chemical weapons have sometimes been made indirectly and accidentally. It is for this reason that my delegation attaches great importance to the statements and proposals made in the Working Group which you have presided over so capably with respect to what are called the binary chemical weapons.

My delegation understands that the development, production and stockpiling of this kind of chemical warfare agent complicates the treaty we are contemplating because of the difficulty of defining the relationship between the so-called chemical warfare agent precursor and the chemical warfare agent itself -- the final product.

We believe that this aspect should be the subject of more thorough study by the experts, but our preliminary view is that chemical warfare agent precursors should be considered to be those substances, toxic or non-toxic, which in their final phase lead to the formation of a chemical warfare agent.

Some delegations have expressed their concern about certain of the definitions given, especially as regards the concepts of single-purpose and dual-purpose agents.

At a certain stage in scientific and technological development, a chemical agent may have only one purpose, either peaceful or connected with warfare. But the great speed of advance in making discoveries nowadays in the chemical industry in general can mean that a substance which at one time had only a hostile use may now be economically essential to a State for peaceful purposes. Consequently the prohibitions and obligations contained in a future treaty should in no way hamper the development of those countries which have large-scale plans in that branch of industry.

I should like now to make some comments on the matter of the control and verification of compliance with undertakings and obligations under the future convention, and in so doing to indicate my delegation's position.

We realize that there are considerable difficulties in reaching agreement on the methods and systems for verification, which is only natural in view of the complexity and diversity of chemical industry technology and the great number of chemical industry installations in many countries.

As a matter of principle, no verification measure should affect the right of every country to provide for its own defence nor endanger its sovereignty.

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

We believe that national verification measures should form the basis of the verification system as a whole, but that they should be organized at the level of the State, State bodies being responsible for carrying them out. Nevertheless, we have no doubt that a wise and fitting combination of national measures with effective and appropriate international measures could provide a solution to this complex problem.

Furthermore, we consider it essential that the adoption of a convention on the prohibition of the production, development and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, should in no way undermine the importance of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 with regard specifically to the use of chemical weapons.

We also consider that the declarations by States parties to build or increase confidence, under paragraph 4.2.1 of part IV of the Chairman's outline, should be made after the convention has entered into force and not before.

We support the principle that verification should not be discriminatory, and that its results should be communicated to all States parties and should constitute a solid manifestation of confidence.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons has worked extremely hard under the able guidance of the Ambassador of Hungary, Comrade Komives.

The matter of radiological weapons is as important as it is complex for the following reasons:

(a) The continued acceleration and diversification of scientific and technological progress show that it is possible for such a weapons system to be developed, the more so as it has not been possible to find a peaceful use for the radioactive waste from the nuclear industry, which has been stockpiled by the nuclear nations for many years.

(b) Radiological weapons are not yet defined as such; they have never yet been used, and there are many conflicting views among military experts as regards their effectiveness from the military point of view. Some of these aspects were explained by the Swedish delegation in the statement made by the Swedish Ambassador on 7 April.

However, my delegation believes that the possibility that radiological weapons will be developed cannot be totally excluded and it therefore urges the need for a treaty to prohibit such weapons, although such a treaty should not be prejudicial to the development by any State party of its nuclear industry for peaceful purposes.

I should like to make some general comments based on my delegation's study of the various documents which the Ad Hoc Working Group had before it, to give the Committee an idea of my delegation's position.

We believe that in principle an agreement can be reached on a treaty for the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

We consider that the contributions made by various delegations are positive and we greatly appreciate document CD/31 of 9 July 1979, presented by the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

We support the view that the relationship between so-called radiological weapons and existing weapons of mass destruction must be defined. My delegation has reached the preliminary conclusion that the only destructive factor in so-called radiological weapons is the action of ionizing radiation on living organisms, which creates a certain confusion when a comparison is made with the destructive factors of a nuclear explosion produced in the field. We listened very attentively to the statement of the Ambassador of Sweden in this connection and we shall study it carefully.

On the other hand, the definitions of so-called radiological weapons which have been proposed, and particularly that in document CD/31 of 1979 submitted by the USSR and the United States, are, my delegation believes, based on the idea of the dispersion or dissemination over an objective -- which may be the land -- of radioactive material which then exposes the human beings residing in the region or passing through it to external radiation.

We wonder what difference there is from the point of view of the term "dissemination" between the deliberate dispersion of radioactive materials over a country for military purposes and the "dissemination" of radioactive materials within that same country as a result of the bombing of nuclear power plants in the course of conventional hostilities.

Our small country is making great efforts towards and hopes to develop a programme for the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. My delegation is therefore anxious that a future treaty on radiological weapons should include a provision on the protection of nuclear power plants for peaceful means, whether on land or at sea.

My delegation believes that the basic elements of a future convention on so-called radiological weapons are the definitions and the scope of that convention.

My delegation is against the idea that the problem of radiological weapons can be solved through nuclear disarmament. We understand and support the proposals on general and complete nuclear disarmament, but we feel that the one topic does not include the other, for technically demonstrable reasons.

In my delegation's view, what is important on this subject is to secure a treaty on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.

We are in favour of a future convention on radiological weapons which would make it compulsory for States parties to provide all the necessary information to prove that they are fulfilling the obligations they have assumed under the convention.

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

My delegation is perfectly willing to co-operate in this Committee in finding a solution to the differences which are still an obstacle to an agreement. We are in favour of consultations with experts during the summer part of the session so as to obtain all the necessary scientific information for the complete clarification of this issue.

We agree that this is not one of the highest priority matters within the context of general and complete disarmament, but we cannot ignore the importance that would attach to the Committee's achievement of some concrete measure in this connection.

With regard to the consideration of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, Cuba considers the question important and believes that agreement on a treaty on the subject would be a positive achievement, although undoubtedly this question is closely linked with such matters as the total prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the non-utilization of force -- and consequently of nuclear force -- in international relations, and is thus something implicit in the negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

While awaiting the outcome of this process of negotiations on nuclear disarmament, as the only effective and sure way for all non-nuclear-weapon States and for the nuclear-weapon States themselves, since a nuclear conflagration would lead to a crisis which would extend beyond the boundaries of the countries involved in the conflict and would constitute a serious danger for the very survival of mankind, my country believes that agreement on an international instrument would be an intermediate step towards the ultimate solution and that, more importantly, if a common formula could be found which would guarantee the security of the nuclear-weapon States, this could provide a temporary solution at the present time.

Cuba considers that an extremely important part of the Committee's work is the preparation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. The Final Document is undoubtedly a valuable source for the preparation of such a programme, but there should be no going back on the achievements of that document, which was approved by consensus.

The various phases in the implementation of the programme should be realistic and objective, and each phase should include a process of review and evaluation.

As regards the nature of the programme, it should include an undertaking by States with respect to its implementation. Very interesting and constructive proposals have been made in that connection which would undoubtedly make this feasible. We are certain that the Ad Hoc Working Group under the chairmanship of Ambassador García Robles will complete its work successfully.

My country, as a member of the Group of 21, has expressed its concern that, on the eve of the celebration of the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, the Committee on Disarmament has not yet been able to form two working groups: the one on nuclear disarmament and the other on a general nuclear-weapons test ban.

Many proposals have been submitted to the Committee on Disarmament by the countries of the Group of 21 and the socialist countries, and there have also been positive reactions from some of the western countries, on the setting up of working groups on nuclear disarmament issues. The Committee on Disarmament is at present holding periodical informal meetings on these issues, and we hope that they will achieve concrete results and will not become mere academic exercises.

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

It would be extremely regrettable if our next report to the United Nations General Assembly shows that no progress has been achieved on the problem of nuclear disarmament, for the doctrine of nuclear deterrence does not convince those who are steadfastly fighting for a genuine and lasting peace.

The Committee on Disarmament must fulfil its mandate. The Final Document, in paragraph 50, clearly sets out the priorities established in the field of disarmament. In my delegation's view, the informal meetings which have been taking place, first under the competent guidance of Ambassador Herder and now under your guidance, should be of help to us in meeting the international community's expectations concerning our work. The Committee on Disarmament already possesses a large body of substantive material as the basis for its work; all that is lacking is the political will of certain members of the Committee which would enable it to carry out its inescapable duty.

At the last session of the General Assembly, Cuba co-sponsored draft resolution 35/152 G entitled "Paragraph 125 of the Final Document", paragraph 2 of which reads:

"Invites the appropriate international bodies in the field of disarmament to continue, in accordance with the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, efforts aimed at achieving positive results in curbing the arms race in accordance with the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document and the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade."

The Committee on Disarmament is primarily responsible for carrying out the disarmament negotiations referred to in the Programme of Action. That same resolution expresses concern over the fact that the current negotiations on arms limitation and on disarmament are being protracted and that some of them have been suspended or terminated.

At the Second Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba, held recently, our Commander-in-Chief, Comrade Fidel Castro, said the following:

"The arms race must be stopped. Existing stocks of nuclear weapons are already sufficient to destroy the world many times over . . . At the present time, for each one of us, for each inhabitant of the planet, some \$90 are spent each year on armaments, that is, more than the per capita annual income of hundreds of millions of persons in the under-developed world.

"Those expenditures benefit no one; they are totally unproductive and their results, which have periodically to be discarded, can only be used as scrap. This situation is shocking when contrasted with the financial requirements for the solution of some of the most acute problems of the world's population.

"The senseless arms race, which could at any moment erupt into the most destructive and universal holocaust, cannot continue. We must put an end to this suicidal policy if we want to guarantee a future with peace and well-being for all mankind.".

The Committee on Disarmament is required to play a very important part in this context as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament and it is therefore our inescapable duty to fulfil the mandate entrusted to us by the international community.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Cuba for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the chair.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): Mr. Chairman, taking the floor for the first time in plenary in the month of April, I wish to congratulate you warmly on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament and to wish you every success in guiding its work at, perhaps, crucial moments of this part of its 1981 session. Let me also express our admiration for Ambassador Herder of the German Democratic Republic for his excellent performance, particularly for his skilful and efficient leadership of the Committee in March.

Although the item concerning new types of weapons of mass destruction and radiological weapons is not on our agenda for this week, allow me to deal shortly with it and more precisely with radiological weapons. I do not want to enter into the details of a wide and constructive discussion which has been taking place recently in the Working Group on the principal elements of the future radiological convention. Thanking Ambassador Komives for his unremitting efforts in working out the draft text of the convention by the Working Group and pledging the full support of the delegation of Poland for his endeavours, I would like to refer now to the discussion on the subject matter that has been under way in the last plenary meetings. In fact, I feel somewhat alarmed by a certain tendency towards diminishing, if not totally negating, the importance of any document to be worked out on the prohibition of radiological weapons, which was noticed in the interventions of several delegations on 7 and 9 April.

Speaking about radiological weapons, I have in mind -- like many other speakers -- especially the radioactive waste materials. Let me put this straight question: what is the problem with radioactive waste materials in the world today? While reading some generally accessible sources, one may easily come to the conclusion, and I do not say that it is a particularly comforting one, that the quantity of these wastes is steadily growing. Thus, for example, the quantity of high-level wastes in the form of solutions of radioactive chemicals left over from the reprocessing of nuclear reactor fuels to retrieve plutonium, coming from military activities, only totals today tens of thousands of cubic metres. These radioactive high-level wastes emit gamma rays and atomic particles that can injure or kill living creatures. Radiation, as all of us here probably know, kills cells or damages the genetic material for reproduction. It is equally clear to anybody dealing with the problems of nuclear energy that the quantity of high-level wastes will still be increasing. Some reasons: the radioactive wastes come from nuclear power plants producing plutonium which, in turn, is needed for the production of different types of nuclear weapons. Besides, there is no doubt that the rapid development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes will result in a growing quantity of high-level wastes in many countries coming from civilian activities.

Taking duly into account the dangerous aspects of the above-mentioned facts, the USSR and the United States of America presented in 1979 an agreed joint proposal on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, published in documents CD/31 and CD/32.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

The scientific researchers in some countries are considering the question of what form the radioactive waste should be converted to for further disposal. They are studying a variety of ways of putting nuclear wastes into solid forms that will resist dissemination into the environment. One of the methods, for example, would be calcination, heating the waste until it turns to ash. Other methods include embedding the waste in glass or ceramics or in some kind of synthetic materials. What is most important in these considerations is the fact that the research is directed towards the substantial reduction of the size of waste and the condensation of the radioactive material. Bringing up the above, I simply wish to recall that at the time of conducting such experiments there might at the same time be considered or there might come out autonomously some ideas on the utilization and/or processing of the high-level wastes also for military purposes. The interventions pronounced by several delegations last Friday in the Working Group on Radiological Weapons, calling for review conferences of the future radiological convention every five years and justifying it by the development of science and technology in this respect seems precisely to confirm the assumption that one day may, indeed, bring unexpected qualitative changes in the development of radiological weapons. How can we reconcile this with statements considering radiological weapons as purely hypothetical ones.

To what I have already said I want to add only that radioactive wastes can be produced — with the present development of knowledge in this respect — either in liquid or in solid form. May I also add that today's medicine does not offer us any efficient medicaments against either acute or chronic radiotoxemia.

Taking all the above into account it would seem rather short-sighted to neglect or deny the possibility of conducting further research on radiological weapons. Such research may simply result one day in an improved form of this weapon. In other words, considering the entirety of anti-human aspects of the probability of use of radiological weapons, we should manifest a maximum of goodwill to reach preventive agreement prohibiting its production and use. Besides its importance in the preventive military domain, the convention would provide an advantageous climate in all actions leading to effective isolation of radioactive materials from the environment — an equally important aspect of the convention's role in the situation of growing utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

We have been listening with great attention to the discussion and the arguments which were put forward in the Committee on the purposefulness and the significance of signing a convention prohibiting radiological weapons. I would like to say that my delegation is not convinced about the validity of the arguments minimizing the aim and the importance of signing such a convention. Of course, we realize and we have often pointed out that the prohibition of radiological weapons has only relative importance in comparison with the evidence and the primordial problem of e.g. the prohibition of nuclear and chemical weapons. Therefore, it is not a matter to be settled at the cost of or in exchange for other problems. We are of the opinion, though, that we cannot neglect any chance to make however modest a step towards eliminating what is still a concrete danger. Such a step would have significance for paving the way for further measures, surely of more importance. This opportunity exists and in our opinion should not be wasted only because there are more important goals. It will be the disregarding of such an opportunity that will put us in a bad light, and not the taking of this initiative. In brief, we still strongly believe that it would be better to achieve something, however modest, than to achieve nothing.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

Let me now say a few words on other systems of weapons of mass destruction. The Soviet Union put forward last year a proposal supported by socialist countries, as well as by many non-aligned countries, to establish under the auspices of the Committee on Disarmament a special group of experts to work out the draft of a comprehensive agreement or partial agreements prohibiting the research on and the development of new systems of weapons of mass destruction. The basic task of such a group would be to follow developments in the field of potentially dangerous directions in scientific research, in order to take as early as possible appropriate preventive steps against emerging new weapons. We still hold the view that this Committee should pay due attention to the said proposal and examine the possibility of the establishing of such a group during the summer part of this session.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Poland for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the chair.

Mr. FEIN (Netherlands): Two years ago, on 26 June 1979, the Netherlands delegation in the Committee on Disarmament attempted an analysis of the problems posed by the question of negative security assurances. Our interest in this question has remained undiminished.

We are still convinced -- as, I believe, are all of us here -- that effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would have a valuable confidence-building effect, as well as a positive bearing on the concept of non-proliferation, thus strengthening peace and security.

We welcomed the unilateral declarations on negative security assurances at the time they were given by the Governments of the five nuclear-weapon States. The effectiveness of those commitments would, however, be significantly augmented if the five separate declarations could be developed into a single, meaningful common guarantee. You may recall that in my statement two years ago I submitted to you the proposition that such a common formula was feasible. Today we remain convinced of this possibility. But we are no less convinced that the road to the magic formula is a difficult one.

We are therefore grateful for the work done in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances, both last year under Mr. El-Baradei and this year under the guidance of Mr. Ciarrapico. The experience in the Working Group has shown that we can only achieve progress if we apply realism and restraint. Thus, an important lesson in realism that we learned was that it is unlikely that we can achieve a consensus on a convention as the legal framework in which the common formula might be incorporated. We would therefore do better to concentrate our efforts on the elaboration of the terms of a common formula.

And as to restraint, we have learned that we should not try to achieve more than this agenda item asks from us, i.e. safeguarding a State which has given up the nuclear option against nuclear attack. No more.

(Mr. Fair, Netherlands)

In other words, we see it as our collective duty to conceive the effective international arrangements under negotiation here as concrete and specific measures, limited to one goal, i.e. providing adequate assurance to a State which has renounced the acquisition or possession of nuclear weapons. Allowing the present negotiations to be side-tracked into a debate on questions such as whether or not nuclear warfare is legitimate cannot but interfere with the essence of the problem we have to solve and therefore the effectiveness of our work. That other question -- whether or not nuclear warfare is legitimate -- is not at stake under this agenda item and it confuses the issue.

The fact that we decline to be drawn into an argument concerning the validity of nuclear deterrence, in certain circumstances and places, is not because of any reluctance on our side to discuss that issue, but because it falls beyond the scope of the negotiations on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Let us now look at the heart of the matter, i.e. the terms of the existing unilateral assurances, starting with the negative security assurances of the United Kingdom and of the United States and the Soviet Union, and in this connection the declaration made by the Soviet Union when ratifying Protocol II of the Tlatelolco Treaty and furthermore a certain statement made by the President of the Soviet Union. Later on I shall have some remarks to make about the French and Chinese positions in this respect.

There are -- we are pleased to note -- quite a few similarities between the positions of the first three nuclear-weapon States. Simply said, security assurances would be given to non-nuclear-weapon States who have, in one way or the other, formally accepted the non-nuclear-weapon status. The guarantee would, however, not apply in certain circumstances, viz. when a non-nuclear-weapon State engaged in an act of aggression against -- that is an attack on -- a nuclear-weapon State while at the same time being supported by another nuclear-weapon State. On these two points all three negative security assurances are similar.

But the main difficulty in our analysis of these three negative security assurances is the view put forward by the Soviet Union that a negative security guarantee cannot be given to a non-nuclear-weapon State that has nuclear weapons stationed on its territory. Since this non-stationing clause is the main stumbling block, we should take a closer look at it.

Negative security assurances should be designed for those circumstances prevailing when hostilities are taking place. It is in those circumstances -- and specifically in those circumstances -- that non-nuclear-weapon States must be assured that they will not be attacked with nuclear weapons. On the other hand, non-nuclear-weapon States which are supported by a nuclear-weapon State in military activities against another nuclear-weapon State cannot, of course, expect to be a safe haven.

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

A clear perception of circumstances of this kind is the basis for the British and American guarantee formulas, as well as -- so it appears -- for certain Soviet statements and declarations. I have already mentioned the Soviet declarations at the time of the ratification of Protocol II of the Tlatelolco Treaty. I can also quote the statement made by the President of the Soviet Union in which he stated: "The Soviet Union for its part, wishes to state as emphatically as it can that we are against the use of nuclear weapons, that only extraordinary circumstances, only aggression against our country or its allies by another nuclear Power, could compel us to have recourse to that extreme means of self defence."

Taking these two Soviet statements into account, I would say that agreement on a sound and realistic guarantee formula could be reached, provided no additional, extraneous objectives are sought. One may wonder if precisely such a "bonus" objective is not envisaged when the Soviet Union puts forward the non-stationing clause.

As I understand it, the Soviet Union seeks to justify the non-stationing requirement with the argument that a nuclear attack could be launched from the territory of a non-nuclear-weapon State where nuclear weapons are stationed. For argument's sake I shall recognize this as a valid consideration. But we should distinguish between a static definition of a non-nuclear-weapon State as such, enjoying a negative security guarantee, and a dynamic conception of the circumstances in which assurances should become operational..

Speaking in operational terms -- and taking into account that security guarantees should be drafted on the basis of strategic analysis -- I cannot but conclude that all possible contingencies would be covered by the reservation concerning aggression -- an attack -- supported by a nuclear-weapon State.

After all, the situation that the Soviet non-stationing requirement seeks to cover is none other than a conflict between nuclear-weapon States. This non-stationing requirement is therefore a distortion of the subject-matter of our discussions: assurances by nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States. It seeks to interfere with internal alliance affairs and that, of course, is unacceptable. Furthermore, it makes no sense in strategic terms because it introduces an artificial distinction between allies of a nuclear-weapon State: if and when there should be a nuclear war -- which God forbid -- there are only friends and foes.

Let us now look at the non-stationing requirement from another angle. As a consideration of a different nature, but of no less importance, I submit that the stationing or non-stationing of nuclear weapons -- nuclear warheads -- can hardly be verified adequately. Given the existence of, for example, dual purpose delivery systems, how is one to know that the other side

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

has not hidden, somewhere in the territory of a non-nuclear ally, a stock of nuclear weapons that could be launched by those dual purpose delivery systems? And even if nuclear warheads were not stored in peacetime on the territory of an ally, what is to prevent one of the parties on the eve of war or at the time of an armed conflict, flying in such warheads overnight? What, then, is the practical value -- in the circumstances we are talking about -- of assurances that a certain non-nuclear-weapon ally does not -- in peacetime, mind you -- have nuclear weapons stationed on its territory? We come therefore unavoidably to the conclusion that the non-stationing clause is not only difficult -- to say the least -- to verify in peacetime, but impossible to verify in wartime, precisely when it counts. The non-stationing requirement is just not a viable construction.

I wonder whether the Soviet Union itself is really convinced of the validity of the non-stationing clause. The Tlatelolco Treaty prohibits the stationing of nuclear weapons in the territories of the Latin-American countries for which the Treaty entered into force. There you have a real non-stationing situation. That non-stationing situation par excellence should have been sufficient for the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union, when ratifying Protocol II of the said Treaty, deemed it necessary to make a reservation which, inter alia, implies that the non-use obligation (concerning nuclear weapons) could be reconsidered in case of "the commission by one or several States Party to the treaty of an act of aggression with the backing of a State possessing nuclear weapons or jointly with such a State". There you have the non-attack requirement plain and simple! One wonders, therefore, whether in the view of the Soviet Union, non-stationing is really the crux of the matter in a situation in which the security assurance must be relevant, that is, on the eve of or during an armed conflict.

I have stated my case: the non-stationing requirement is superfluous, because all theoretically dangerous situations for the Soviet Union and its allies are covered by the kind of formula adopted by the United Kingdom and the United States, and by the Soviet Union itself when it had to define its position in relation to the Latin-American nuclear-weapon-free zone. The non-stationing requirement is uncalled for because it implicitly legalizes the threat and the use of nuclear weapons against certain non-nuclear-weapon States, even when not engaged in an armed conflict. The non-stationing requirement is non-verifiable, in particular on the eve of and during such conflicts, when it really matters. And finally, the Soviet Union itself apparently does not believe in the formula.

Why, then, does the Soviet Union put forward such a requirement? A look at the map is sufficient for even those who are not schooled in nuclear strategy to understand the situation and I can therefore deal with it very briefly. While the Warsaw Pact countries are geographically a solid block, a contiguous land-mass, the members of the NATO alliance are divided, separated by an ocean. The strategic interests of both sides are therefore

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

obviously different. The Soviet non-stationing requirement would leave Western Europe at a serious disadvantage, unable to match the Soviet Union's massive capability to inflict destruction on Western Europe. The integrity of NATO's defence forces as a deterrent lies in the alliance's ability to defend its collective territory by all the means at its disposal at whatever point it is threatened. This posture must include the ability to deploy weapons wherever they would be most effective against the threat.

Our conclusion is, therefore, as far as this part of the argument is concerned, that the Soviet Union, by introducing the non-stationing requirement into the -- supposedly global -- negative security assurances, is trying, in the Committee on Disarmament (and in the General Assembly for that matter) to obtain a strategic advantage over NATO. While we would not deny the Soviet Union the right to negotiate on these matters -- in fact we would encourage them to do so -- I would suggest that neither this Committee, nor the subject of negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States is the proper place to do so. Such aims might be pursued in the context of East-West negotiations and should then be matched by equivalent counter-offers. In fact, we welcome and encourage serious negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the subject of nuclear weapons in Europe, and elsewhere for that matter.

We can therefore eliminate the concept of non-stationing and focus on the degree of congruence between the positions of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union and compare -- as I did in my statement of 26 June 1979 -- the negative security assurances of the first two States with the declaration given by the Soviet Union when signing Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco as well as President Brezhnev's declaration which I quoted. All truly relevant elements from these three declarations can then be brought together into one common formula and we have solved our problem. I shall return to this in a moment.

If I have so far dealt mainly with the negative security assurances of the three major nuclear-weapon Powers, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union, it is not only because these are the three principal nuclear-weapon States but also because their negative security assurances are closest to each other. However, it would of course also be desirable to harmonize the French and Chinese positions with the other three. I shall say only a few words about that in this statement. As to the French position, we note that it is also the French desire to arrive at a common formula, as stated by President Giscard d'Estaing on 25 May 1978. And as to the Chinese position, the present negative security assurance of the People's Republic of China as it now stands appears to be generous enough -- although perhaps not altogether precise -- to allow acceptance of the common formula containing

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

the two basic elements which I have discussed (the non-nuclear-weapon status and the non-attack requirement) and should therefore cause no problems to China.

Before going on to the common formula, I must also say a few words about the format in which the common formula could be presented. Although several members of this Committee still believe that a convention would be the most desirable format, we must all realize that it is not likely that a convention could be concluded in the near future. We therefore must turn our minds to the Security Council resolution option.

Now, what would be the procedure in the Security Council? It would seem to us that one might follow the usual procedure as in all or nearly all cases where the Security Council has to deal with matters on which there are views more or less common in substance but different in detail.

First, the interested parties will state their positions, which would mean, in this case, that the five nuclear-weapon States would each place on record their own views on negative security assurances. These views need not necessarily be identical. It happens seldom that all the major Powers hold identical views on international questions. The essential requirement is, however, that each of the statements should contain certain common elements, which can be put in a resolution, representing that which they have in common. From all possible precedents I would like to cite the Security Council resolution of 19 June 1968 on positive security guarantees.

In the particular case we are discussing now, such common ground would be the two elements we have referred to before, viz. the non-nuclear-weapon status and the non-attack provision. If the Soviet Union wishes in its own national statement also to include remarks on the non-stationing issue, that would have to make no difference to the validity of the common formula, for as long as a non-nuclear-weapon State does not attack the Soviet Union, it would fall under the negative security assurance whether there are nuclear weapons stationed on its territory or not. Provided the national statements do not undermine the common formula, such a solution seems possible.

In the resolution, the Security Council would then, after a suitable preamble, welcome, or accept, or approve the solemn undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States, e.g. not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State that has committed itself not to manufacture or receive such weapons, or other nuclear explosive devices, or to acquire control over them, provided that State does not undertake or partake in an attack upon a nuclear-weapon State or its allies with the support of another nuclear-weapon State.

Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, my statement today will be devoted to item 5 of our agenda: new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.

It is a matter of satisfaction to my delegation that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons has got off to a good start this session under the able guidance of Ambassador Komives of Hungary. The identification of the basic elements of a future treaty, and the elaboration of their alternative texts will enable the Working Group to harmonize views that would lead to an agreed text. My delegation believes that this is a subject on which the CD should be able to report positive results in the form of a convention to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session as demanded in resolution 35/149. The Committee can thereafter concentrate its work during its spring session next year on achieving agreement on more significant measures for submission to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Various views have been expressed within this Committee and in the Working Group on the non-existence of radiological weapons, and the narrow chances of their being used in warfare. My delegation has no reason to doubt this view of the experts; however, I believe that agreement on the prohibition of such weapons of mass destruction as radiological weapons can be a step in the right direction. Prevention, they say, is better than cure. In any case we all subscribed to paragraph 76 of the Final Document of the General Assembly's first special session on disarmament which states: "A convention should be concluded prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons."

The argument therefore in the Committee should not be why we should exert effort on this non-existent weapon; we did not set up a Working Group for such procedural arguments. Rather, our concentration should be two-fold: first, how to make our agreement on radiological weapons relevant to the whole process of our efforts in the wide field of disarmament, especially in the related field of arms that rely for their effect on radioactive materials -- the most lethal mass destruction weapons, and secondly, how to ensure that we complement agreement on non-existent weapons with agreement on existing weapons so as to avoid exposing the CD to universal ridicule for being incapable of reaching agreement on positive disarmament measures.

It is a well-known fact that the rate of scientific and technological research leading to breakthrough in and development of armaments far outpaces disarmament negotiations. The rapid quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear weapons and new systems of such weapons by the nuclear-weapon States continues to throw into sharp relief the very slow pace of negotiations both in this Committee and in other forums, be they bilateral or trilateral. The hope of the non-nuclear-weapon States is to see man's ingenuity which results in these scientific and technological progress converted to peaceful purposes.

It is gratifying that at the current session, the Ad Hoc Working Group has addressed itself to issues of substance in drafting a future convention. I would like to touch on some of these questions. Although the draft United States-USSR joint proposal submitted to the CD in 1979 provides a basis for negotiations, it needs to be broadened to meet the realities of the present day, as well as to reflect the

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

pertinent suggestions that have been made within this multilateral body. Progress in the completion of negotiations on radiological weapons depends, therefore, to a large extent on the willingness of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to accept constructive suggestions made by other members of the Committee on Disarmament. I hope the break before our summer session will give us all a time for serious reflection. To make a preventive convention such as the radiological convention relevant, it should be conceived in the over-all context of nuclear disarmament. Thus an explicit provision to this end should be an indispensable part. Its placing should not be beyond our imagination to reach consensus on.

In the same vein, the Swedish proposal that a future radiological weapons convention should cover prohibition from attacks on nuclear reactor plants and electrical installations is important. Ambassador Lidgard's statement on 7 April, a week ago today, was a major contribution to our work, for it showed the in-depth study undertaken on this question, thus enabling this Committee to understand the issues more clearly. The possibility of attack on nuclear reactor plants with consequent risk of dispersal of radioactive substances and the considerable destruction of lives farther and wider than the immediate theatre of conflict makes the proposal worthy of serious consideration. Even if Additional Protocols I and II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions contain certain provisions, these are conceived in a very different context -- the humanitarian. The CD cannot abandon its responsibility for disarmament measures in a comprehensive way, on the argument that a Red Cross instrument has made some references to a particular question.

As regards the peaceful uses of radioactive materials or sources of radiation, it is the view of my delegation that the convention should, in a positive manner, reflect the important link between disarmament and development. The provisions of article V as contained in working paper CD/RW/WP.18/Add.1 appears to my delegation too generalized to make the desired impact. My delegation prefers the inclusion of peaceful-use clauses, stating in clear and positive terms the right of all States to peaceful uses of nuclear energy for development. Nigeria, as a developing country, places a high premium on scientific and technological co-operation among States. This principle guided my delegation in introducing on behalf of the co-sponsors resolution 32/50, which recognizes the need for international co-operation in the field of nuclear energy, and also the desire to promote the transfer and utilization of nuclear technology for economic and social development, especially among the developing countries.

In a world situation characterized by growing tension and uncertainties, by feverish research and development in the military field, the emergence of an agreed text on even "non-existent" but not totally inconceivable weapons of mass destruction can be a useful contribution by this single multilateral negotiating body, if only to prevent activities in this regard and to save part of resources, human and material, from a further unproductive pursuit of the arms race. However, such a "negative" disarmament measure has to be supplemented quickly by positive measures

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

of disarmament if the CD is to justify its existence. On 10 April, only a few days ago, the Convention on the prohibition or restriction of use of particularly inhumane weapons was opened for signature in New York. To the Convention, there are annexed three Protocols. One of those Protocols covers weapons that are not known ever to have been used. This did not prevent its being the subject of a Protocol as a preventive measure. However, no one would have thought of opening for signature a Convention with only that particular Protocol. The value of the success of the United Nations Conference on inhumane weapons lies in its reaching agreement on two other Protocols concerning existing weapons which have actually been used in wars. The agreement on these two other Protocols placed the Protocol on the non-existent weapon on a different footing which intrinsically it does not on its own possess.

Let us bear this in mind in the CD. In fact, I should say to the CD, "Go and do thou likewise", i.e. like the United Nations Conference on inhumane weapons. Balance one, non-existent weapon with agreement on at least two existing weapons.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I should like to touch upon some of the issues raised at today's meeting.

First, I refer to the statement made by the distinguished representative of the Netherlands on the question of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. Let me recall the position of the Soviet Union. It is a clear-cut and coherent one: we have advocated and still advocate the earliest elaboration of a draft international convention on this issue, a convention which would have binding force. Such a convention would, of course, contain a formula acceptable to all parties, which would not infringe the interests of any of the parties to the convention. We have submitted a draft of such a convention and are ready for it to be examined article by article. In the course of such article-by-article examination there would be an opportunity to settle, among others, the issues raised by the representative of the Netherlands, in particular how to detect whether or not nuclear weapons belonging to some nuclear-weapon State are stationed on the territory of a non-nuclear-weapon State. We are deeply convinced that it is precisely the elaboration and conclusion of a convention which would represent the most effective means of solving this important and urgent problem. In this we have also been guided by the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and of related General Assembly resolutions.

We have no objection, either, to examining, parallel with the elaboration of the convention, other alternative means of providing security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States, whereby all nuclear-weapon States would make declarations either identical or similar in content, which would then be approved by a decision of the United Nations Security Council.

We regard such an action as entirely realistic, even under conditions of aggravation of the international situation. We have said that we are willing to

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

show flexibility in the elaboration of such a formula provided the other nuclear-weapon Powers adopt the same approach. We have not heard comparable statements from the other nuclear-weapon States. We await their reply: are they willing to show flexibility in the search for an acceptable formula?

As you see, there is no lack of constructive ideas and proposals of various kinds on the part of the Soviet Union in the search for a solution to this urgent problem. As for the formula proposed by the Soviet Union and those proposed by the United States and the United Kingdom, we have already spoken on that subject more than once. I do not want to take up the Committee's time; I can only confirm that the Soviet Union is prepared to provide guarantees to all non-nuclear-weapon States which have no nuclear weapons on their territories, irrespective of whether or not they are members of a military alliance. Thus the Soviet Union is willing to give guarantees of the non-use of nuclear weapons to, among others, those non-nuclear-weapon NATO countries on whose territories no nuclear weapons are stationed. As for the formulas of the United Kingdom and the United States, the main difference between those formulas and the Soviet Union's formula consists, as we see, in the fact that the United States and the United Kingdom are not prepared to give security guarantees to those non-nuclear-weapon States which are in a military alliance with another nuclear-weapon Power.

Here the situation is perfectly clear: the range of States to which we are prepared to provide guarantees is wider than that to which the United States and the United Kingdom are willing to provide such guarantees. Can an acceptable solution be found even under such conditions? Surely it can, and, I repeat, we are ready to seek such a solution in a constructive spirit, a spirit of co-operation, and not in a spirit of suspicion and a misrepresentation of situations. For that was the tone of the Netherlands representative's remarks when he said that the Soviet Union's formula is aimed at disturbing the existing parity and that the USSR is trying to obtain some kind of advantage. One cannot help thinking here of the Russian saying that a frightened cow is scared of every bush.

I repeat: we are prepared to continue to co-operate in the search for a solution acceptable to all, but only on condition that flexibility and an interest in solving the problem are shown not by the Soviet side alone, but also by the other parties participating in such a search.

Secondly, I should like to address a request through you, Mr. Chairman, to all my colleagues to make their statements a little more slowly. Otherwise, as happened today, the interpreters cannot keep up with them. All of us, including my delegation, are sometimes guilty in this respect. In the interests of more efficient work, we should bear in mind the difficulties of simultaneous interpretation.

My third and last point is this. We would ask the Secretariat to be more careful in the matter of documentation. Document CD/176, distributed today at the Soviet delegation's request, has an inadmissible defect in the Russian version. We hope that this error will immediately be rectified and that such mistakes will not recur in the future.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan, for his statement and I may tell him that I have been able to understand the translations of his statements very well. He spoke slowly enough for me to follow what he was saying to us. At the same time, I think the Ambassador has been notified by the Secretariat about the missing second page of the document referred to. As you rightly said, Ambassador Issraelyan, on my English version the second page fortunately is not missing.

Mr. SARAN (India): Several comments have been made today concerning the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. My delegation would like to express its views concerning this issue.

The question of negotiating effective international assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is presumably designed to protect the security of those States which have renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons, should a nuclear conflict break out involving some or all nuclear-weapon States and their allies. What, after all, would be the nature of such a conflict? Can the nuclear-weapon States and their allies guarantee that the effects of such a nuclear war can be contained within their national boundaries? Can the non-nuclear-weapon States rest content with the assurance that they would not be the object of a direct hit by nuclear warheads, when extensive fall-out and radioactive contamination would have serious and adverse effects on the well-being of their populations? And even if such an assurance would give some limited comfort to non-nuclear-weapon States, the subjective conditions and qualifications attached to the assurances make them virtually meaningless. How does one judge, for example, whether a non-nuclear-weapon State is "associated" with a nuclear-weapon State in an attack on another nuclear-weapon State or its ally? The delegation of the United Kingdom I think, stated at one of our earlier meetings that, in practice, this would always be quite obvious. But how? Could this argument perhaps be used to justify a pre-emptive attack on a non-nuclear-weapon State which may have friendly relations with one or another nuclear-weapon State? Can one who is subject to a law be allowed to be a judge as well?

And what about a situation in which the territory of a non-nuclear-weapon State is, in case of a war, used, against its will, by a nuclear-weapon State for military activity? Experience of the last World War shows that this is quite possible. Should that State be punished for its inability to withstand the superior military might of a major military Power and be subject to a nuclear attack? After all, these assurances are relevant in scenarios of conflict, not in peacetime and, therefore, must take such possibilities into account.

These considerations have led our delegation to conclude that the only effective assurance to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons lies in the achievement of nuclear disarmament, and pending nuclear disarmament in the conclusion of an agreement on the total prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. In no way can this position taken by our delegation be considered outside the scope of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances.

In this connection, I would like to draw the attention of the Committee to paragraph 32 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, which reads:

"All States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, should consider various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, and the prevention of nuclear war. In this context, while noting the declarations made by nuclear-weapon States, effective arrangements, as appropriate, to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons could strengthen the security of those States and international peace and security.".

(Mr. Saran, India)

The context in which, therefore, we are negotiating so-called negative security guarantees involves the consideration of all proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear war.

The CHAIRMAN: I now call on the Secretary of the Committee and personal representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Jaipal, who will make a short statement to inform the Committee on communications received by the Secretariat.

Mr. JAIPAL (Secretary of the Committee and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General): First of all, in reply to the comments made by the distinguished Ambassador of the Soviet Union, on behalf of the Secretariat, I would like to convey our apologies for failing to publish the enclosure in the Russian version of document CD/176. This was clearly an omission. There is really no excuse for it and I shall bring it to the notice of the appropriate authority. I would like to inform the Ambassador of the Soviet Union that this document in Russian will be reissued.

As I said on an earlier occasion, from time to time I intend to keep the Committee informed of communications received by the Secretariat. Four communications were received from non-governmental organizations during the current session and they contain views, statements and declarations relating to the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. They are from the Labour action for Peace, the Women's International Democratic Federation, the Quakers Organization and Co-operation for Disarmament. They are all intended for the information of the members of the Committee and we shall be circulating them informally to the members.

We have also received so far nearly 1,000 communications from mainly women and children in Denmark, Sweden, Norway, the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Mexico, Turkey and the United States of America. They are all brief and contain the inscription, "EARTH FOR LIFE". The average daily intake in the last few days has been about 100 letters. They are all addressed to the CD, Geneva. To give the members an idea of their contents, it is enough for me to read out two letters, one from Denmark and the other from the United States.

The letter from Denmark is from a lady and it reads as follows:

"TO UNITED NATIONS - Committee on Disarmament - 3.4.81 Denmark

"I write to you because I get scared and desperate when I learn about how much money is spent on war material, and how many times we are able to kill each other, and still some people say that we must have even more war-material.

"I used to keep my desperation to myself, but I cannot anymore, and a lot of people are beginning to make some sort of protest against the growing armament, because this is not a trend that we/she, man/woman in the street want, it is a threat against our lives and all what we live for.

(Mr. Jaipal, Secretary of the Committee and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General)

"How can you expect us to be able to bring up the coming generation, when we are scared ourselves? I am the mother of three children. The oldest is only 5 years old, and he already knows about the A-bomb and he has to grow with the fear of it.

"What can I say to him when he asks me questions?

"Can I tell him not to worry, that we have got wise men who govern the world, and that we can trust that they will see to it, that the armaments do not end up in a disaster?

"Don't you think that he can sense that I am not sure myself?

"The UNITED NATIONS must do more than they do at the present time to suggest new ways to solve the problems concerning international disagreements."

The second letter is from a lady from the United States of America and it reads as follows:

"In the middle of the day, at work or at home, I am suddenly aware of the growing fear that some day there will no longer be a home or a place to work.

"No individual, no organization, no country can alone stop the insanity of the arms race. But if many people work together in organizations and in the countries, and they are being encouraged and supported by all of us, then there might be a hope: We do not want nuclear war! We will not accept the production of still more numerous and more horrible weapons!"

"We want to protect the earth so that people, animals and plants can live!

EARTH FOR LIFE

"We have to tell each other, so that it is not misunderstood, and so that the politicians and generals will understand that we do not dare let them have the power to destroy the earth. This power must be demolished. The weapons of doomsday must be destroyed."

The CHAIRMAN: As announced at our informal meeting yesterday, I intend to hold informal open-ended consultations on the questions I referred to in our meeting yesterday.

These informal open-ended consultations will take place tomorrow, 15 April, at 3 p.m., in Conference Room No. 1.

The next plenary meeting of the CD will be held on Thursday, 16 April, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.

CD/PV.125
16 April 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FIFTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 16 April 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. G. PFEIFFER (Federal Republic of Germany)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. SALAH-BEY

Mr. M. MATI

Argentina: Mr. F.J. DAVILA
Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD
Miss N. NASCIRBENE

Australia: Mr. R.A. WALKER
Mr. R. STEBLE
Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. R. DEYANOV
Mr. K. PRAMOV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U NGWE WIN
U THAN HTUN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL
Mr. G. SKINNER
Mr. J. GAUDREAU

China: Mr. YU MENGJIA
Mr. SA BENWANG
Mr. LIN Chen

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLA VILLA
Mrs. V. BOROWDOSKY JACKIEWICH
Mr. F. CUSPINERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. A. CIIIA
Mr. L. STAVINCHA

Egypt:

Mr. EL SAYED ABDEL RACUF EL REEDY
Mr. M.N. PAHMY

Ethiopia:France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. G. PFEIFTER
Mr. N. KLINGER
Mr. H. MULLER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India:

Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. CH. A. SANI
Mr. I. DAMANIK
Mr. S. HADI
Mr. F. QASIM
Mr. KARYONO

Iran:

Mr. M. DABIRI
Mr. D. ATERI
Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA

Italy:

Mr. A. CIARRAPICO
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. R. ISHII
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya:

Mr. S. SHITEMI
Mr. G. MUNIU

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA-ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
Mr. C. HELLER

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. L. BAYART
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria:

Mr. Olu ADENIJI
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD

Peru:

Mr. A. THORNBERRY

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD

Mr. G. EKHOIM

Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN

Mr. V.A. PERFILIEV

Mr. V.M. GANJA

Mr. A.G. DOULYAN

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES

Mrs. J.I. LINK

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. FLOWERREE

Mr. F.P. DESILIONE

Miss K. CRITTENBERGER

Mr. C. PEARCY

Venezuela:

Mr. H. ARTEAGA

Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. O. GNOK

Secretary of the Committee
and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): In my intervention today, I am going to address item 3 on our agenda: "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". And I want to state that we have listened with the greatest interest to the preceding interventions on this subject. It is a matter of great satisfaction to my delegation that the CD's Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances has been re-established and that the group is now working effectively on substantive issues under the able guidance of its Chairman, Mr. Ciarrapico of Italy. We fervently hope that the ongoing efforts will yield some concrete results. Outwardly, the prerequisites necessary for progress seem to exist; all the five nuclear-weapon States are actively participating in the negotiations in the Working Group. They have furthermore recognized the legitimacy of the claims for effective and binding assurances not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. The discussion in the Working Group has so far made some progress in clarifying the issues involved. It is now time to commence a new phase of serious negotiations, which, given sufficient determination and political will, can result in a solution acceptable to all.

Before going into the details of the matter, I would like to make two points of a general nature, which I hope will shed some light on the approach of the Swedish delegation with respect to negative security assurances.

My first point relates to a specific aspect of Sweden's policy of neutrality. One basic feature of this policy is that it is not founded on any kind of international agreement. Consistent with this fundamental consideration we have rejected the idea of relying -- for our security -- on international guarantees, which in our view might place us in a state of dependence and interference from the outside. In view of this, it is natural that we act with caution in relation to the concept of security assurances. It is also understandable that we have some reservations as to the very terms "security assurances" and "security guarantees", which have connotations incompatible with the basic principles of our foreign policy.

The second general remark is that in our view an international security system cannot in the long-term perspective be built on the existence of nuclear weapons. As long as these weapons are in the arsenals of States no one is secure, neither the States which have these weapons nor those which do not have them. The only totally reliable assurance against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is their complete elimination. It is generally recognized that this is a final objective. However, until this has been achieved we are unfortunately compelled to take into account the role of nuclear weapons in our efforts to promote peace and to diminish the risk of a nuclear tragedy. This does not mean that we in any sense approve or legitimate the existence of nuclear weapons, but only that they represent a reality that cannot be disregarded. Consequently, whatever the arrangement that might eventually be agreed upon, it must be clarified that it represents an interim measure pending nuclear disarmament.

Having said this, I wish again to emphasize that the Swedish delegation is strongly committed to the efforts in the CD to arrive at a solution on security assurances acceptable to all. We consider it an urgent task to exert every effort in order to meet the claims of the non-nuclear-weapon States in this question.

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

Those claims derive from the fact that a few States -- in their own perceived security interest -- have acquired nuclear weapons which constitute a threat to all countries -- both the haves and the have-nots. There can, in our opinion, be no justification for this situation. I share the view expressed by Ambassador Adeniji a couple of weeks ago. He said: "After all, if nuclear-weapon States, in spite of all they know of the horror of nuclear weapons and the catastrophic effect of their use, still choose to flirt with self-destruction, then the least service they can render the rest of the world is an acceptance of the fact that their suicidal desire need not be forced on the rest of us".

It goes without saying that the responsibility to diminish and eventually eliminate this threat primarily rests with the nuclear-weapon States themselves. Sweden for its part is anxious to contribute to the efforts to achieve acceptable solutions. However, no progress is possible unless the nuclear-weapon States are willing to take some further action in the true interest of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

The task of the Ad Hoc Working Group is --- as stated in its mandate --- "to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". I would like to emphasize that the objective of these negotiations is to do something in the interest of the non-nuclear-weapon States. Although we recognize the security concerns of the nuclear-weapon States, we think that this aspect of the matter should not be permitted to overshadow the needs and aspirations of the non-nuclear-weapon States. It is therefore essential that the Working Group, in accordance with its mandate, should focus its attention on what can be done in the interest of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

As to the deliberations in the Working Group, it is inevitable that the existing five declarations form an integral part of the discussions. The in-depth analysis of these formulae which was carried out has helped us to clarify the various positions and to identify the similarities and differences in the unilateral declarations. As has been pointed out by other delegations, this examination shows that the unilateral declarations are shaped rather to suit the military doctrines of the nuclear-weapon States themselves than to meet the claims of the non-nuclear-weapon States. I agree with the representative of Finland, who said a few weeks ago -- with respect to the major nuclear Powers -- that the unilateral declarations essentially "are functions of the respective military doctrines".

Considerable efforts have been made by the Working Group in explaining ways and means of reaching agreement on a common formula which could be transformed into some kind of international arrangements. The Swedish delegation supports these efforts. This does not mean that a common formula is an end in itself, nor that we are prepared to agree to such a formula at any price. To be acceptable, a common formula must include certain basic requirements corresponding to the interest of the non-nuclear-weapon States. In the course of its deliberations the Working Group has been able to identify the similarities in the existing unilateral declarations and thereby to extract the common denominator in all the

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

five formulae. It has been suggested that this common denominator could serve as the basis for the efforts to evolve one common formula on negative security assurances. However, this approach gives rise to serious reservations on the part of my delegation. Such a common formula would in fact be equal to the lowest common denominator and would be burdened with all the conditions and limitations included in the existing declarations. In addition it could be conclusive for further restrictions and conditions on certain commitments already made by some of the nuclear-weapon States. Such an approach would be in contradiction with the objective to reach agreement on international arrangements in the interest of the non-nuclear-weapon States. The efforts should therefore be directed towards an unambiguous formula which should be based on objective criteria and should not be burdened with restrictions and conditions.

With respect to the question of the nature and scope of negative security assurances, my delegation is of the view that there are basically three categories of issues that will have to be considered.

The most fundamental element of an effective security assurance is obviously legally binding undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. The obligations by the nuclear-weapon States should be as simple and clear as that.

The non-nuclear-weapon States should not be obliged to make any further commitments if, by adhering to the NPT, a treaty on a nuclear-weapon-free zone or another internationally binding instrument, they have undertaken not to develop or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. In this context I might add that in our view the non-proliferation aspect is an important feature of negative security assurances and we have noted with satisfaction that this view is generally shared by all members of the CD.

With respect to the legal framework for negative security assurances, I wish to reiterate that we have serious reservations as to the idea of an international convention which would impose obligations on non-nuclear-weapon States. For reasons that I referred to at the beginning of my intervention we would also find it difficult to enter into any kind of bilateral agreement.

The most crucial and most difficult issue involved is the claim by certain nuclear-weapon States, primarily the two major nuclear-weapon Powers, to certain exceptions from their obligations. The purpose of these exceptions, the so-called "self-defence clauses", is in certain circumstances to justify the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. The discussion has focused particularly on two kinds of exceptions, namely, with respect to non-nuclear-weapon States that either have nuclear weapons on their territories or are involved in a military operation in alliance or association with another nuclear-weapon State. It has time and again been pointed out that such exceptions create considerable ambiguity as to the exact applicability of the assurances, and give room for

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subjective interpretations by the nuclear-weapon States. Who can determine whether a non-nuclear-weapon State which is involved in a military operation against a nuclear-weapon State at a given moment is acting in "association" with another such State? And what are the exact implications of the provision "have not nuclear weapons on their territory" at a time when aircraft, naval vessels and armed vehicles capable of carrying nuclear warheads can easily move from one country into the territory of another State, especially if the nuclear-weapon State previously had other large military forces in that territory?

Although fully aware of the complexity of these matters, we are of the view that without any exceptions all non-nuclear-weapon States which are legally committed to their nuclear-weapon-free status are entitled to unambiguous assurances that nuclear weapons will not be used against them. We have in this regard noted that representatives of both the major alliances have made statements recognizing that the utmost restraint is imperative. President Brezhnev stated on 25 April 1978 that "only extraordinary circumstances ... could compel us to have recourse to" nuclear weapons. The Ambassador of the United Kingdom made a similar statement here in the CD on 19 March. He said that the British assurance is valid in all circumstances "except self-defence in extreme circumstances".

Even if it can be argued that certain exceptions may be justifiable in the context of military alliances and similar binding agreements, there is no reason why such exceptions should also apply to non-nuclear-weapon States, which are outside all nuclear security arrangements. As long as such States are legally committed to their nuclear-weapon-free status there is no reason why they should be subjected to any limitations and additional conditions in their inherent right to the freedom from being the object of use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Nor can it be accepted that with respect to such States the validity of the assurances are subject to any interpretations by the nuclear-weapon States.

As I have already stated, our discussion has demonstrated that the unilateral assurances are primarily framed to serve the security interests of the nuclear-weapon States themselves and their allies. Only in the second place have the legitimate concerns of States non-parties to nuclear security arrangements been taken into consideration. We have for our part understood the intentions behind the existing unilateral declarations to be that such States -- provided they are committed to a nuclear-weapon-free status -- should permanently enjoy freedom from being the subject of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We take it for granted, therefore, that a country like Sweden, with its non-alliance status and its non-nuclear-weapon record, as embodied inter alia in its adherence to the NPT, is covered, without any exception, by the unilateral assurances made by the nuclear-weapon States, in so far as they relate to individual non-nuclear-weapon States. I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to ask the representatives of the nuclear-weapon States to confirm that our understanding of the applicability of their respective assurances with respect to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is correct.

Mr. McPHAIL (Canada): Mr. Chairman, let me congratulate you on your chairmanship of the Committee this month. It is, of course, customary to make a comment of that kind, but as you well know, the comment is not a perfunctory one. The orderly dispatch of the business of the Committee is essential to its functioning. This orderly dispatch is frequently a difficult task and you ought to be congratulated, Sir, on your performance, and naturally I take the occasion to acknowledge as well the success of Ambassador Herder in conducting our affairs during the previous month.

The item of business for this week is a composite one, the further consideration of agenda items, and it is my intention this morning to make brief references to various items on our agenda on which my delegation has not intervened in plenary during this session.

The first half of the 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament approaches its conclusion. It is a good time to take stock. While our conclusions must still be tentative, the pattern which is emerging is not cause for unbridled satisfaction. It would be wise for the Committee to make an objective assessment of the direction in which we are moving and why, since, while it is true that the Committee on Disarmament is the sole multilateral negotiating body of this kind and it therefore possesses unique authority, in the long run its authority -- and indeed its existence -- will depend upon the results it produces.

At the beginning of this year's session, we were bold enough to set out what we thought the Committee's objectives should be this year as we move towards the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, and thus in commenting on several agenda items today I wish also to attempt an assessment, the kind that I suggest we now need, or to make a kind of trial balance-sheet of where we stand as we approach the mid-point of the 1981 session.

Today I wish to attempt such an assessment or trial balance-sheet.

Nature of the balance-sheet

Before I deal with certain of the substantive issues before the Committee, I should like to make some general comments:

(a) There have been a number of welcome developments lately in the Committee. The most significant, early in the session, was the rapidity with which procedural items were dealt with. The general willingness to get down to business, we hope, will become a practice which in most instances eluded those institutions of which this is the successor.

(b) The concentrated session on chemical weapons was a success in that it laid the groundwork, by means of the application of technical expertise, for progress on a number of problems standing in the way of the conclusion of a treaty. The two Canadian working papers, we hope, made a practical contribution along these lines. We hope also that the enhanced understanding of the issues involved enabled a common conclusion to be reached that verification need not be an insurmountable problem, assuming, of course, that agreement can be reached on sufficient measures to reassure all States. We agree with those who have noted that adequate measures of verification are indispensable for confidence in a treaty: inadequate verification measures will surely create or add to mistrust, and undermine the value of any accord.

(c) Deliberations on nuclear issues have shed necessary light on some matters: while the positions advanced cannot be reconciled through negotiation within the Committee on Disarmament nevertheless, the debate provided an opportunity for national

(Mr. McPhail, Canada)

security concerns to be presented: and these concerns must be understood if positions on specific arms control measures are to be fully appreciated. Without such an appreciation, negotiation is surely bound to be hollow.

However, other methods of work of the Committee on Disarmament should be considered carefully to determine whether they contribute to the goals we collectively seek:

(a) Undue emphasis on procedure threatens to immobilize the substantive work of the Committee. (At one point, one sitting was devoted to the question of written records.) This is symptomatic of a larger problem which it is in our common interest to resist: i.e. the growing tendency for the Committee on Disarmament to become the forum for the presentation of national positions in a static way rather than the translation of those positions into real negotiating terms. It is right and proper that national positions be put forward, especially in plenary and perhaps even in what are styled as our informal sessions: but it is not right and proper that such positions simply be restated in working groups where negotiation is supposed to take place.

(b) Secondly, the proliferation of meetings has placed a strain on all delegations with little appreciable impact on our rate of progress. We need to examine ways in which this situation can be rectified: the success of the concentrated meetings of chemical weapons experts may provide a clue to enhancing our effectiveness and efficiency. Let us acknowledge that increasing the quantity of meetings is no substitute for improving the quality of substantive negotiations.

(c) Thirdly, and I will touch on this only briefly, the continuing debate -- and indeed concern -- about the relationship of this Committee to other, more restricted negotiations is worrying. This problem has been most evident in our discussion about a CTB treaty. But rather than adopting a theological approach to this question -- which will not advance matters in any practical way -- we believe that it would be in our common interest to focus on areas where the Committee on Disarmament might reasonably be expected to play a constructive role. I emphasize the word constructive: the yardstick should be the degree to which we can make a positive contribution to the matter at hand, i.e. in this illustrative case, how we can assist, support and go beyond the trilateral negotiations. I will return to this point later.

We are not here to debate resolutions, but rather to negotiate arms control agreements. This is the standard against which the Committee on Disarmament will be judged. I do not underestimate the value of debate -- I mentioned the debate on nuclear disarmament: if such a debate puts into sharper focus concerns about the strategic nuclear equation, then so much the better. The debate reflected accurately the nature of the international climate, and this climate must be taken into account. It is in this sense that we use the word realism. But in our more precise endeavours, we must work within the realm of the possible. The record of the Committee on Disarmament so far suggests that this is perhaps the most urgent and abiding over-all requirement if progress is to be made in the Committee.

Matters before the Committee on Disarmament

I now wish to turn to a number of matters on our agenda.

Agenda items 1 and 2: nuclear disarmament and CTB

Nuclear issues should indeed rank first on our agenda, for they are of paramount concern.

(Mr. McPhail, Canada)

(a) At the outset I wish to reiterate the Canadian position that the CTB trilateral talks should be resumed at the earliest possible moment. We share the overwhelming desire of the international community in this regard. I need not repeat what is at stake. Others have expressed it well. We believe that the Committee on Disarmament can play a useful role in the process leading to a CTB treaty: valuable suggestions have been advanced, particularly in the area of seismic data exchange, about what the Committee might now examine, thereby contributing to the realization of a multilateral treaty.

(b) At the same time, we doubt that much purpose can be served by repeatedly presenting the Committee with verbatim quotes from successive General Assembly resolutions. Similarly, while it may be an effective means to proceed in a debate, we doubt that matters are much advanced by putting repeatedly to the partners in those negotiations questions which they are not yet in a position to answer. We think the best role for the Committee on Disarmament is to focus on areas where it can make a positive contribution to or act in support of negotiations for a CTB.

(c) Questions have been raised about a moratorium on peaceful nuclear explosions, as envisaged in last year's trilateral report, as part of an over-all CTB package. We consider that a moratorium on so-called peaceful nuclear explosions -- leading to a complete ban -- is indispensable. We are against peaceful nuclear explosions and remain unconvinced by those who defend them, arguing unsuccessfully, in our view, that "peaceful explosions" can somehow be separated from those which are not. Unless and until some effective means can be devised to make absolutely sure that there would be no weapons-related benefits from a peaceful nuclear explosion, no such explosions should be contemplated under a CTB treaty.

(d) The relationship of the non-proliferation Treaty to the conclusion of a CTB has been raised. The results of the second non-proliferation treaty review conference highlighted the concerns of many States in this regard. While in a number of respects we share those concerns, we do not believe that they should be used as an excuse to prevent the further strengthening of the Treaty or adherence to the Treaty by other States.

(e) Discussions on the nature of the nuclear strategic relationship have been enlightening, but also incomplete. Canada is a member of a nuclear alliance but has deliberately chosen not to produce its own nuclear weapons. We belong to a nuclear alliance because we and our allies are subject to a nuclear threat. Our concern is just that. Thus, we cannot dismiss what we consider to be the asymmetrical disposition of nuclear forces in Europe; and we are therefore party to the NATO decision of 1979 on redressing this balance. This balance is fundamental to the maintenance of the peace. While we recognize the expressed Soviet interest in arms control, we note that the Soviet proposal for a moratorium would only perpetuate an unacceptable imbalance, contrary to the principle of equality. The NATO offer for talks on European theatre nuclear forces aimed at balanced, equitable and verifiable arms control agreements limiting such forces is of fundamental importance, and the holding of such talks is in the mutual interest of all parties concerned, be they nuclear Powers, non-nuclear Powers allied with nuclear Powers or non-nuclear Powers which are non-aligned.

Agenda item 3: negative security assurances

Assurances to non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons through effective international arrangements are important. Arguments have been advanced pointing to the relationship of such assurances to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. But with the history of the treatment of this

(Mr. McPhail, Canada)

question at last year's session and in the light of the fact that we have not registered much progress this year, we remain sceptical about the outlook. Each assurance has its own purpose, and has been issued under certain specific conditions. There is not much evidence that those purposes can be reconciled by drafting. This said, we will with others seek to find means for a suitable outcome.

Agenda item 5: radiological weapons

Reservations have been expressed by a number of delegations concerning the utility of negotiations to ban a type of weapon which does not exist at present, and for which there appears to be little practical application in the foreseeable future. Concern to bring into the text under discussion the practical consideration of the bombing of nuclear power stations has also been registered. This latter point will have to be seriously considered to see whether it can readily be incorporated into the text of the draft treaty under discussion. Inclusion of suitable wording on peaceful uses of radiological substances will also have to be considered. In the meantime the draft treaty as it stands does have the great advantage of closing off a weapons option and prospects for its development.

Agenda item 6: comprehensive programme of disarmament

The underlying requirement in arms control and disarmament agreements is, we believe, verifiability of compliance with the terms of the agreement in question. In other words, our view is that we should look at measures in relation to each other, capable of realization. A step-by-step approach means exactly that: building on what has already been accomplished. We can, of course, set priorities and goals and establish principles, as has been done in the final document of the first Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament, a text which we continue to endorse and uphold. While there are indeed stages in the process of arms control and disarmament, they are not related to time per se but to confidence, or the lack of it, in existing security arrangements. The selection of arms control measures because they are important, without recognizing why arms are in place, is not realistic. The imposition of unattainable deadlines is also unrealistic, and the continuing credibility of this Committee depends on realism. In its turn, realism is a vital component in building confidence; and the uninterrupted cultivation of confidence is essential before progress in the pursuit of an arms control and disarmament programme can be realistic in both political and military terms.

In conclusion, I wish to comment on the notion of political will. This term has been used increasingly in this Committee of late: Indeed, it appears in the Final Document of the General Assembly's first special session on disarmament. It has perhaps been insufficiently examined by the Committee. Political will must be developed by an understanding of positions and confidence-building along the lines I have just noted, and then must be nurtured through the process of negotiations. If negotiations falter, simple exhortations to political will will be insufficient to revive them. Political will is fragile, and depends for its existence on factors outside the confines of these chambers: its real meaning is the desire to understand, and to agree. It implies balance, reciprocity, and confidence. It is not a unilateral phenomenon. Appealing to political will in the abstract does not produce results.

In our view, particularly in the period leading up to the General Assembly's second special session on disarmament, the Committee must look to those measures which show prospects of realization, where real progress can be made. Our objectives should be modest but realizable, for it is better for us to devote ourselves to measures whose prospects for success are greatest, rather than to measures whose prospects are doubtful.

(Mr. McPhail, Canada)

My assessment today of the work thus far of this session of the Committee on Disarmament is not much cause for comfort. But there are areas where progress can be made, provided we work together.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Canada for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the chair.

Mr. JIMENEZ DAVILA (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, the congratulations offered to those who preside over the work of the Committee on Disarmament are of great significance, given the importance of this forum, the trust which the international community places in it and, essentially, the obligations inherent in its task.

These three elements constitute a heavy burden and at the same time an incentive in carrying out the duties of Chairman.

This is why my delegation, mindful of the excellent record of your distinguished predecessors in this office -- Ambassador de la Gorce, the representative of France, and Ambassador Herder, the representative of the German Democratic Republic -- associates itself with the remarks made during these last two weeks recognizing your wise leadership, your untiring dedication and your determination to advance our work.

In only a few days' time, you will be called upon to close this first part of the 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament. My delegation may perhaps not be the only one to refer during the time that remains to the results of these three months of meetings, especially as these meetings and those to be held in the summer months together make up the last full session of this body before the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament to be held in 1982.

The first part of my statement will be of a general character, and it is my delegation's intention that it should be so and to recall certain facts and ideas which from the beginning have been essential to the process of negotiation.

Each new session of the Committee brings a new hope and the desire to achieve some measure of progress, not only within the negotiating body itself but also within the various internal forums which in one way or another have the same objective -- that the negotiations should produce concrete results.

Unfortunately, the world political situation over the past 35 years has accustomed us to a political "TIME" perspective (with capital letters and inverted commas) which is frighteningly unchanging in the matter of disarmament. I am referring to that vast slow-moving mass of arguments, prevarications and suspicions that have taken the place of negotiation, and made progress virtually impossible.

I am not referring to those well-known historic moments when there has been a positive development in the disarmament negotiations, moments which, by their very rarity, have confirmed the principle of the legitimacy of the negotiations as the appropriate means for removing the grave threat of nuclear war.

I have to say that the thought of that slow-moving mass, to which I referred a moment ago, conjures up anew in my delegation's mind those old philosophical notions of the earthly existence of living beings, material and mortal, as being merely a

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reflection of "IDEAS" (again in capital letters and between inverted commas) -- celestial, pre-existent, immutable and eternal.

This digression, which is not really one, in fact makes me think that general and complete disarmament is rather like one of those abstract and elusive ideal states, and that it will become real only on the day when the negotiators, by their efforts, find that angle of reflection which gives life to what in fact exists, and is within our grasp but which, for countless reasons, we are unable to attain.

The subject of disarmament, as a political topic, is perhaps the one which has taken up most discussion time both in the Security Council and in the General Assembly as well as in its First Committee and in many committees and commissions and bodies of all kinds whose composition has ranged from the small number of two members to the fullness of membership of the Disarmament Commission.

I wonder whether our predecessors in negotiation foresaw, in the 1940s, when the Atomic Energy Commission was set up, the extreme technical and political complexity of the problems inherent in atomic weapons, in their prohibition and their destruction, in everything which is still being considered by our Committee today in the 1980s.

Despite the fact that the very first resolution of the General Assembly, adopted by consensus in 1946, called for the elimination of nuclear weapons from the arsenals of States, we see today that no progress has been made in nuclear disarmament. On the contrary, what we have today is the idea of security based on nuclear weapons -- a hopeless contradiction of principle -- a resort to the absurd to demonstrate the reasonable.

The men of 1946, still very much aware of the miseries of war, based their reasoning on a few simple and wise principles, self-evident and indisputable. They believed in the exchange of scientific information in the interests of the peaceful utilization of atomic energy; it seemed natural to them to establish adequate controls over atomic energy in order to ensure that it was used for peaceful purposes; they were ready to look for effective safeguards.

But the scientific revolution born of the discovery and application of atomic energy moved at a quicker pace than the application of the principles. The political problems of security swamped the good intentions of the negotiators.

Time was creating, by dint of failed encounters or contrived non-encounters, a veritable labyrinth of roads leading inevitably to what are known as "priorities", which are the basic constants of any discussion on disarmament. Some of the questions have today to a certain extent been answered: questions were asked about the priority

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between arms control and disarmament, about partial measures as a means of achieving general and complete disarmament, about the possibility of aiming directly at general disarmament. And always, with respect to alternative priorities, there was the question whether ensuring conditions of international trust was a prerequisite to the implementation of disarmament measures, or vice versa.

In the light of these general reflections, and in a desire to co-operate in your efforts, Mr. Chairman, my delegation ventures to submit, in a preliminary way, some comments on the course of our work at this first part of the present session.

We believe, in the first place, that the Committee should be congratulated on the speed with which it managed to adopt its agenda, organize its work and appoint its working groups. In 1980 this took the Committee almost all of the first part of the session.

We believe that the value of working groups as the most appropriate machinery for the initiation of negotiations in this forum has been demonstrated. As for the question of negative guarantees, we note that the efforts to analyse the substance of the matter have not succeeded in narrowing the differences between the various positions. In our view, negative guarantees are merely a temporary palliative, for the only real guarantee is the elimination of nuclear arsenals. But we nevertheless support the conclusion of a legally binding international instrument whereby the nuclear-weapon States would provide States which do not possess such weapons with a guarantee against the use or the threat of use of such weapons.

With regard to chemical weapons, the Working Group's concentrated effort was complemented by the valuable participation of experts and it has without any doubt fully discharged the mandate conferred upon it, which means that it will be necessary at the second part of this session to broaden this mandate so that it can begin negotiations on the text of a convention, bearing in mind that identification of its elements has been the subject of extensive consideration.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons has managed to initiate negotiations on the text of a convention in a satisfactory manner although certain basic difficulties remain as regards the definition of such weapons and the scope of the convention. Argentina believes that in any event the definition of radiological weapons should in no way legitimize nuclear weapons and it also believes that the text of the convention should include the obligation to proceed to nuclear disarmament, as well as recognition of the right of States to the peaceful use of radioactive materials and an undertaking by States parties to strengthen international co-operation in this field.

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The magnitude of the task of the Working Group responsible for formulating the comprehensive programme of disarmament bears a direct relationship to the expectations created by the need for the Committee to be in a position to submit the said programme to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, in 1982.

The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, with his customary tenacity and application, has succeeded in laying the bases for the programme, with some very valuable preparatory and preliminary work. This work will, we hope, facilitate the analysis and definition, during the second part of this session of the Committee, of the measures to be included in the programme and its organization.

As regards priorities, the Argentine position, which has been clearly stated on many occasions, is that absolute priority should be given to nuclear disarmament.

If it is felt that we should draw up a timetable, with a view to hastening the implementation of what was agreed upon in the Final Document of the first special session, my delegation would be inclined to favour tentative periods or some other flexible machinery, if there is no agreement on setting successive dates for the attainment of the objectives by stages, with consideration of the results at the end of each stage.

Before concluding my statement, I should like to refer to the proposals, which the Group of 21 has strongly supported since the start of the Committee's work, that two working groups should be set up to initiate negotiations on the two items of highest priority on our agenda, namely, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and a nuclear-weapon test ban.

It is indeed regrettable that even today we have gone no further towards meeting this very legitimate and urgent request than to offer the palliative of informal Monday afternoon meetings.

It is with the deepest concern that I have conveyed to you my delegation's views, in the hope that the earlier negative attitudes of certain countries are likewise replaced, but by a greater sense of international realism and co-operation.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Davila for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the chair.

Mr. SALAH-BEY (Algeria): At the outset Mr. Chairman, I would like to congratulate you on your assumption of the chair of our Committee for this month. I would also wish to express our gratitude to Ambassador Herder, the outgoing Chairman, for his important service to the Committee during the previous month. I would also wish to welcome our colleague, the new representative of Indonesia.

I have the honour, as Co-ordinator of the non-aligned and neutral countries of the Group of 21, to make the following statement on item 2 of the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament.

On the initiative of the Group of 21, the Committee on Disarmament engaged, during the latter part of its 1981 spring session, in a substantive examination of concrete issues relating to item 2 of its agenda (cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament). In the course of this process, the Committee concentrated on the "pre-conditions for negotiations on nuclear disarmament as well as on doctrines of deterrence and other theories concerning nuclear weapons".

In assessing the discussions that took place within that framework, the Group of 21 is convinced that the need for urgent multilateral action on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, through the adoption of concrete measures, has been once again amply demonstrated. In the opinion of the Group of 21, multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament have long been overdue, and the fundamental prerequisite for their success is the political will of States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to engage in such negotiations.

The discussions, for which chapters V and VI and the conclusions of the Secretary-General's "Comprehensive study on nuclear weapons" (A/35/392) provided useful background material, have confirmed the conviction of the Group of 21 that the nuclear arms race runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tensions; that progress in the field of nuclear disarmament would be beneficial to the strengthening of international peace and security and to the improvement of the international climate, which in turn would facilitate further progress; and that all nations, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, have a vital interest in measures of nuclear disarmament, because the existence of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of a handful of Powers directly and fundamentally jeopardizes the security of the whole world. The promotion of nuclear disarmament would be facilitated by strict adherence by all States to the principles of the United Nations Charter, and in particular by measures that would bring about the relaxation of international tensions and the peaceful settlement of disputes among States.

The Group of 21 is further convinced, as a result of the discussions, that doctrines of nuclear deterrence, far from being responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, lie at the root of the continuing escalation of the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear armaments and lead to greater insecurity and instability in international relations. Moreover, such

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doctrines, which in the ultimate analysis are predicated upon the willingness to use nuclear weapons, cannot be the basis for preventing the outbreak of a nuclear war, a war which would affect belligerents and non-belligerents alike. The competitive accumulation of nuclear arms by the nuclear-weapon States cannot be condoned on grounds that it is indispensable to their security. Such an argument is patently false considering that the increase in nuclear arsenals, far from contributing to the strengthening of the security of all States on the contrary weakens it, and increases the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war. Moreover, the Group of 21 rejects as politically and morally unjustifiable that the security of the whole world should be made to depend on the state of relations existing among nuclear-weapon States.

In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility. That responsibility entails the fulfilment of commitments entered into in international instruments in the field of disarmament, respect for the security concerns of the non-nuclear nations, refraining from any action conducive to the intensification of the nuclear arms race and to the increase of international tensions, and above all the duty to take positive and practical steps towards the adoption and implementation of concrete measures of nuclear disarmament.

In the light of this assessment, the Group of 21 firmly believes that the Committee on Disarmament, in which all nuclear-weapon States as well as non-nuclear-weapon States participate, must continue and intensify the search for a common approach that will enable it to discharge the mandate entrusted to it by the General Assembly of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. In particular, the Group of 21 expects that a growing awareness of the urgency of progress toward nuclear disarmament will facilitate the task of the Committee. Bilateral and regional negotiations, especially with regard to specific areas where the concentration of nuclear armaments increases the danger of confrontation, are useful and should be intensified, but multilateral negotiations on questions of vital interest to nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States alike should be initiated without delay in the Committee on Disarmament, the only multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament.

The Group of 21 believes, in accordance with its considered view already expressed in document CD/64, of 1980, that the immediate objective of the consideration of item 2 by the Committee, at the start of the second part of its 1981 session, should be the establishment of an ad hoc working group with the mandate to elaborate on paragraph 50 of the Final Document and to identify substantive issues for multilateral negotiations, as suggested in document CD/116, as follows:

- (i) The elaboration and clarification of the stages of nuclear disarmament envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document, including identification of the responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States and the role of the non-nuclear-weapon States in the process of achieving nuclear disarmament;
- (ii) Clarification of the issues involved in prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, pending nuclear disarmament and in the prevention of nuclear war;

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- (iii) Clarification of the issues involved in eliminating reliance on doctrines of nuclear deterrence;
- (iv) Measures to ensure an effective discharge by the CD of its role as the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament and in this context its relationship with negotiations relating to nuclear disarmament conducted in bilateral, regional and other restricted forums.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Algeria for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the chair.

Mr. SOLA VILLA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): We have now reached the last week but one of the spring part of this session, and my delegation would like to make just a brief statement, for we have already referred in our statement of 14 April to a number of items on the Committee's agenda. That same day, document CD/174, submitted by the delegation of Hungary, was circulated officially. Although the Ambassador of Hungary had already presented that document at a formal meeting of the Committee, my delegation did not have an opportunity to comment on the proposal contained in it. That is why I would like to make these comments. Cuba, as a developing country whose foreign policy is based, inter alia, on the struggle for peace, international security, and cessation of the arms race, considers that the senseless expenditures of scientific, technical, material and other resources, that are squandered on the arms race in daily increasing quantities should be invested in the economic development of all peoples of the world and especially those in the so-called third world. That is why we welcome and strongly support the Hungarian proposal in document CD/174, since, as there is no consensus on the proposal to set up a working group of governmental experts, a proposal we have always endorsed, we believe that informal meetings will make it possible to give support to an idea that is consistently approved in so many international forums, and especially in the United Nations, namely, that the new scientific and technological discoveries, which are being made at a more rapid rate every day, should be devoted to just and noble causes.

Furthermore, the holding of informal meetings at this spring session on agenda items 1 and 2 has proved useful and, more importantly, has demonstrated the responsible attitude which the Committee on Disarmament should adopt with regard to such important agenda items. We cannot therefore evade consideration of such an important question in the field of disarmament, which is clearly set forth in paragraph 77 of the Final Document.

In conclusion, I should like to say that my delegation appreciated, as something very pertinent and positive, the reading out by our distinguished colleague, Ambassador Jaipal, the Secretary of our Committee and Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, of letters from men, women and children who want to live in a world of peace, progress and co-operation among States.

The CHAIRMAN: I would like to take up the question of the closing date for the first part of the 1981 session of the Committee, as well as the opening date for the second part.

In accordance with rule 7 of the rules of procedure, the Committee shall decide on those dates as soon as practically possible, taking into account the requirements of its work. I have conducted consultations on this question and there seems to be a consensus in favour of closing this part of the session on Friday, 24 April, with a plenary meeting that morning. The Thursday plenary meeting of 23 April would not then take place and instead there would be a meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons.

As regards the opening date for the second part of the 1981 session, it seems to me that Thursday, 11 June, is generally acceptable.

If there are no objections, I will take it that the Committee agrees with the suggestions I have just made.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: In accordance with the decision just taken by the Committee, the Secretariat has circulated today an informal paper containing the timetable for meetings of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. May I take it that you have taken note of that paper?

If there are no objections, I will consider that the Committee adopts the timetable as circulated.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 21 April, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.

CD/PV.126
21 April 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SIXTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 21 April 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. G. PFEIFFER (Federal Republic of Germany)

GE.81-61495

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. A. SALAH-BEY

Mr. M. MATI

Argentina:

Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD

Australia:

Mr. R.A. WALKER

Mr. R. STEELE

Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium:

Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA

Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. I. SOTIROV

Mr. R. DEYANOV

Mr. K. PRAMOV

Burma:

U SAW HLAING

U NGWE WIN

U THAN HTUN

Canada:

Mr. D.S. McPHAIL

Mr. G. SKINNER

China:

Mr. YU Peiwen

Mr. LIANG Yufan

Mr. YU Mengjia

Mr. SA Benwang

Cuba:

Mr. L. SOLA VILA

Mrs. V. BOROWDOSKY JACKIEWICH

Mr. C. PAZOS

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. A. CIMA
Mr. L. STAVINOLHA

Egypt:

Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M.N. FAHMY

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Mr. P. BUNTIG

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. N. KLINGIER
Mr. H. MULLER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOHIVES
Mr. C. GYORFY
Mr. A. LAKATOS

India:

Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. A. SANI
Mr. F. QASIM
Mr. KARYONO
Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. J. HADI

Iran:

Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA
Mr. M. DABIRI

Italy: Mr. A. CIARRAPICO
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. H. TAKAHASHI
Mr. R. ISHII
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya: Mr. S. SHITEMI
Mr. G. MUNIU

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
Mr. C. HELLER

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco: Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru: Mr. A. THORNBERRY

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. G. EKHOLM
Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. V.A. PERFILIEV
Mr. V.V. LOSHCHININE
Mr. KUZENDO
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO
Mr. S.N. RIUKHINE
Mr. A.G. DOULYAN

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMMERSAYES
Mr. H.H. MARSHALL
Mrs. J.I. LINK

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. FLOWERREE
Mr. F.P. DESIMONE
Miss K. CRITTEMBERGER
Mr. J. MISKEL
Mr. C. PEARCY
Mr. S. FITZGERALD

Venezuela:

Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC
Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:Secretary of the Committee
and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: In accordance with its programme of work, the Committee should start today its consideration of interim reports of ad hoc working groups, if any. May I also note that, in conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, it is the right of any Member State of the Committee to raise any subject relevant to the work of the Committee at a plenary meeting and to have full opportunity of presenting its views on any subject which it may consider to merit attention.

Mr. SALAH-BEY (Algeria) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, during the months of March and April of this session, informal meetings of the Committee on Disarmament have been devoted to a thorough consideration of items 1 and 2 of the Committee's agenda, respectively on a nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

I would like to recall that these meetings were held at the request and on the initiative of the Group of 21. They have made it possible to focus attention on some of the concerns of the members of the Committee and especially those who are members of the Group of 21.

In view of the importance of these discussions and their obvious interest for the future work of the Committee, the Group of 21 has asked me to request the Secretariat, through you, to prepare a document containing a summary of the informal discussions held on agenda items 1 and 2 during the meetings devoted to those items.

The document need not do more than indicate the general trends that emerged during the exchanges of views which took place at the different meetings. The Group of 21 feels that there would be no need to mention the names of the delegations which took part in the debate in the summary document we are requesting.

I would add that the Secretariat could use the period between the two sessions of the Committee to prepare this document.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the Ambassador of Algeria, Ambassador Salah-Bey, for the statement on behalf of the Group of 21. In connection with the request to the Secretariat, I shall ask Ambassador Jaipal if this can be done.

Mr. VENKATESWARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, as the 1981 spring session of our Committee draws to a close, my delegation, like several others around this table, looks back with a degree of satisfaction at the considerable amount of substantive work that has been accomplished. Bearing in mind that the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament is only a year away, it is necessary for us at this stage to take stock of the situation and order our future work in a manner that would produce credible and concrete disarmament measures in time for that session.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has undertaken an exhaustive and detailed analysis of several key issues involved in the negotiation of a prohibition on chemical weapons. There have been very useful and enlightening discussions with the active participation of experts. Issues have been identified, defined and

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examined with great care and differences of opinion have emerged on some vital issues. However, there is general agreement that the ban should be comprehensive in scope, that existing stockpiles should be destroyed, that production and storage facilities should be dismantled, and that verification should consist of a combination of national and international measures. It is our view that the time has now come to identify the areas of agreement and translate them into treaty language. At the same time, areas of disagreement need to be explored in greater depth to see whether and what compromises are possible from the point of view of translating them also into treaty language.

As regards the vexed question of verification, if we were to give overwhelming importance to the establishment of a foolproof verification system, we should never be able to agree on any measure of disarmament. It is also important to avoid any infringement upon the sovereignty of States, which is a fundamental requirement of the United Nations Charter. This dilemma underlines the primary importance of political decisions to be made on technical and scientific matters.

The verification question inevitably assumes magnified importance when there is mutual distrust among nations. Our aim should be to retain a proper perspective and secure reasonably adequate, practical and realistic measures of verification involving a balanced mix of national and international control. The Ad Hoc Working Group should continue to explore such measures.

In order to facilitate progress in the areas that I have indicated, it is essential that the mandate of the Working Group should be updated in the light of the work which remains to be accomplished, as also to permit the commencement of drafting of certain provisions of the treaty on which there is agreement. Further delay may well encourage a new and dangerous chemical weapons race among the major Powers which may prove difficult to halt and reverse.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons has further advanced its work during the 1981 session. In my plenary statement of 9 April 1981 I had occasion to comment upon some of the more important issues involved in the negotiation of a draft treaty prohibiting radiological weapons. We are optimistic that the pending differences over the scope of the future treaty and over the most appropriate definition to be adopted for radiological weapons will be satisfactorily resolved in the coming months. The question of the legitimacy of the possession and use of nuclear weapons is a key issue, and cannot be brushed aside as being extraneous. For is it not obvious that in a nuclear war the nuclear weapon itself would become a radiological weapon for the non-aligned and neutral nations, whose people would suffer death and injury from radioactive contamination and fall-out? The least that one may expect, therefore, is that a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons should not sanction the use of nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament has systematically reviewed the list of measures that would be included in the programme. A preliminary discussion of the basic principles that would underlie the programme has also taken place. However, the measures to be included must be further elaborated, and the actual formulations to be used need careful negotiations. This would be a difficult exercise, particularly since there would always be a tendency

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to reproduce the existing consensus formulations to be found in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We do not believe that a mere listing of the measures contained in the Final Document would suffice for a truly meaningful comprehensive programme of disarmament. To the extent possible, measures of disarmament have to be elaborated so that the actual process of their implementation is clearly delineated. And lastly, controversial questions concerning stages of implementation and time-frames need to be resolved. I must also add that the programme must first and foremost concern itself with measures to safeguard the survival of the human species and prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war. Without such immediate and urgent measures which concern the security and well-being of all States, the comprehensive programme would remain largely an academic exercise.

It is unfortunate that the Ad Hoc Working Group on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was unable to accomplish any substantive results during the spring session. This is not entirely surprising if we seek to analyse the deeper causes behind what may appear at first sight to be a failure to agree upon procedure. The original scenario in which the demand was made for assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons appears to have been forgotten. Once upon a time, on the presumption that negotiations on nuclear disarmament would begin and make steady progress, and pending nuclear disarmament, some non-nuclear-weapon States sought such assurances as one aspect of the general demand for a prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Their original presumption has proved to be unjustified, and furthermore, no nuclear-weapon State is prepared, at the present time, to give an unconditional commitment never to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances. We shall, therefore, have to look at this question from a more realistic angle.

What are the present circumstances? We find that nuclear-weapon States have their own different definitions of a "non-nuclear-weapon State" for purposes of assuring it against an attack using nuclear weapons. To earn their security assurances, States must either be signatories to the non-proliferation Treaty or be part of a nuclear-weapon-free zone and should not be militarily aligned to a nuclear-weapon State or be "associated" with it in an attack on a nuclear-weapon State. I would like to ask: are we now considering negative security assurances for nuclear-weapon States instead of non-nuclear-weapon States? What an extraordinary metamorphosis! A variety of conditions have been proposed as if non-nuclear-weapon States posed some kind of potential nuclear threat to nuclear-weapon States! All these conditions should, of course, be rejected as unworthy.

Even if unconditional assurances of the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States were forthcoming, what security would there be for them in the event of an all-out nuclear war among nuclear-weapon States? None at all. The use of nuclear weapons, because of their very nature, would affect countries not even remotely involved in an armed conflict among nuclear-weapon States and their allies.

The spring session also witnessed a strong upsurge of concern among member delegations of this Committee over the accelerating pace of the nuclear arms race and the failure to negotiate a general and complete cessation of all nuclear-weapon testing. It was this concern which led the Group of 21 to recommend the setting up

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of two additional ad hoc working groups on items 1 and 2 of the Committee's agenda. Unfortunately, no consensus could be evolved on these recommendations. In the absence of such a consensus, the Group of 21 took the lead in suggesting that informal meetings of the Committee be convened to carry out a substantive examination of concrete issues relating to items 1 and 2 of its agenda, with a view to facilitating a positive decision on the question of the setting up of ad hoc working groups to undertake multilateral negotiations on these items. The distinguished Ambassador of Algeria, in his statement of 16 April 1981, has presented to the Committee the assessment of the Group of 21 of the informal meetings of the Committee devoted to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. We earnestly believe that the time has come for this Committee to undertake, without further delay, multilateral negotiations on certain specific measures of nuclear disarmament as already identified in the Group of 21 assessment.

One delegation has enquired what the role of the Committee should be in negotiations concerning nuclear disarmament. It is clearly not intended to negotiate SALT III. The Committee should, in fact, move away from the SALT concept of arms limitation and control. That concept may have a validity for the two major nuclear-weapon States. Our business here has been clearly identified by the Group of 21, not only in its assessment presented at the last plenary meeting, but already last year in document CD/116.

We have heard that one nuclear-weapon State was able at one time "by virtue of its nuclear superiority to achieve stability and peace in the world". Is this proposition true of the present time also? If so, the prospects of halting the nuclear arms race are bleak indeed for one or the other major nuclear-weapon Power may seek nuclear superiority in order once again to "achieve stability and peace in the world". Similarly, the reliance on so-called strategic parity and nuclear deterrence have also proved totally ineffective in either containing the nuclear arms race or making measures of nuclear disarmament possible. And as we have repeatedly stated, without argument to the contrary being expressed here in this Committee, questions concerning nuclear weapons are not the concern merely of a handful of nuclear-weapon States and their allies. These are questions concerning the vital security concerns of all States. It is extremely dangerous to leave such vital matters to over-armed nuclear-weapon States that are in a state of heated ideological and political conflict. This, I submit, is the rationale for our seeking multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament. And lest this seem to be merely the expression of concern felt by non-nuclear-weapon States, I must add that it is in the interest of nuclear-weapon States themselves to involve non-nuclear-weapon States in a common endeavour and responsibility to survive in peace with honour, without becoming prisoners of the state of relations existing among them.

My delegation would also like to put forward, in some detail, its views concerning the proposal to negotiate a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. No one in this Committee would deny that a nuclear war, if it ever broke out, could not reasonably be expected to be confined to belligerents alone. We have heard the proposition that nuclear weapons are intended for self-defence. How can they be regarded as such when the consequences of their use will extend far beyond the areas of conflict? Nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction that do not and cannot discriminate between belligerents and non-belligerents, combatants and innocent civilians and military targets and civilian

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installations. Can Article 51 of the United Nations Charter be justifiably invoked to sanction the use of such weapons in exercise of the right of individual and collective self-defence? It would perhaps be interesting for the United Nations General Assembly to seek the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice under Article 96 of the Charter, on the legal interpretation of Article 51, and to clarify whether the use of nuclear weapons in exercise of the right of self-defence is permissible even if their use could endanger the survival of mankind.

It is a recognized principle of international law that in any armed conflict the right of the parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited. It is also a recognized principle of international law that in any armed conflict the parties concerned cannot employ means of warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment. These principles have most recently been enshrined in the preamble of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, which was opened for signature by States in New York only a short while ago. Now I would like to ask the representatives of those nuclear-weapon States which reserve unto themselves the right to use nuclear weapons in the defence of their security, does not this right contravene both the letter and the spirit of these well-recognized principles of international law? Is not the choice of nuclear weapons to wage war truly a recourse to unlimited means of warfare? And could anyone here argue that the use of nuclear weapons would not cause "widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment", not to speak of the millions of innocent civilians who would be massacred? Is it not somewhat ironical, and perhaps cynical, that we ban land-mines and booby traps on the grounds that their use contravenes humanitarian law, and yet continue to suffer the threat of the use of nuclear weapons? If the nuclear-weapon States are truly sincere in their commitment to these principles of international law, then we see no reason why they cannot agree to a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. Such a convention would certainly be more relevant than a prohibition on the use of booby traps. It is not my intention here to belittle the importance of the inhumane weapons Convention. I am merely trying to show that the same principles of international and humanitarian law which made it possible to negotiate the inhumane weapons Convention apply with far greater force and relevance to nuclear weapons.

It has been argued in this Committee that, whether we like it or not, nuclear weapons are a component of a delicate military balance between the two major alliance systems in the world today. Further, that the doctrine of nuclear deterrence is an essential element preserving international peace, and especially peace in Europe. A convention on the non-use of nuclear weapons, it is said, would upset the existing military balance, therefore, and make war more likely.

My delegation has, in contrast, argued that the concepts of strategic parity, military balance and nuclear deterrence are at the very heart of the escalating nuclear arms race. And this accelerating escalation, unless arrested, will one day result in a nuclear catastrophe. If parity could keep the peace, why is there today a scene of growing confrontation and mutual distrust between the two major military alliances? Has the achievement of parity or balance in the military sense created the conditions for greater mutual understanding and trust among the countries concerned? For if mutual mistrust and suspicion fuel the arms race, then the achievement or maintenance of strategic parity or military balance has clearly failed to create conditions of enduring peace and stability. Many delegations here argue fervently for confidence-building measures, transparency of intentions and verification. Efforts are made to subject military manoeuvres involving armed forces

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

and conventional armaments to mutual observation and surveillance. But what about nuclear weapons? Can trust and confidence be generated at all if the parties concerned rely on the threat of use of nuclear weapons as an insurance for their security? Can mutual trust coexist with a policy of keeping the other side guessing as to when and at what so-called "threshold" nuclear weapons would be used in an armed conflict? To put it bluntly, the so-called doctrine of nuclear deterrence and confidence-building are contradictory aims. The pursuit of one effectively precludes the other.

Leaders of all the nuclear-weapon States have affirmed time and again that they are conscious of the catastrophic consequences of a nuclear war and that a decision to use nuclear weapons would not be taken lightly. It has also been affirmed by them that only in extreme circumstances, in situations involving extraordinary dangers to national survival would an option to use nuclear weapons be considered. We believe that these statements have been made in all sincerity. If, for all the nuclear-weapon States, nuclear weapons truly represent a weapon of the last resort, how can there be opposition to a mutual agreement among them to forswear their use?

It has been argued that a declaration on the non-use of nuclear weapons could prove to be positively dangerous since it might breed the false impression that aggression could be undertaken without the risk of nuclear war. The opposite could also be true. The risk of a nuclear war may lead to aggression in the belief that limited conventional conflicts and particularly local regional conflicts would have to be tolerated precisely because no one would like to risk a nuclear war. Not to mention the fact that, despite the existence of so-called strategic parity and nuclear deterrence, the major Powers have not at all been inhibited from intervening militarily in and extending their influence over regions of the world not covered by their alliance systems. And if it is argued that the use of nuclear weapons would be threatened even if a limited conventional conflict were to break out, then nuclear war becomes far more likely. Then it would not be possible to say that the use of nuclear weapons is contemplated only in extreme and exceptional circumstances.

A convention on the non-use of nuclear weapons would not by itself eliminate the threat posed by the very existence of nuclear weapons. However, such an agreement would be an important confidence-building measure and would make the task of eventually eliminating nuclear weapons much easier to achieve. If the nuclear-weapon States, without exception, recognize the utility of an interim measure such as extending guarantees of non-use of nuclear weapons to a selected category of non-nuclear-weapon States, surely they cannot argue that a total prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, pending the elimination of existing nuclear arsenals, is of lesser utility.

There is a further argument in favour of a prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Once the illegitimacy of the use of nuclear weapons is recognized, there will be greater credibility to international efforts to stop the horizontal proliferation of such weapons. At present, the continued insistence by some States that they have a right to use nuclear weapons in the pursuit of their security interests makes it more difficult to convince other States that it is in their interest to forswear the acquisition of such weapons.

I hope my intervention today will enable members of the Committee, particularly the representatives of the nuclear-weapon States, to gain a better understanding of our proposal for an agreement on a prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. We recognize that it is only the achievement of nuclear disarmament that would effectively remove the threat of a nuclear war. In the interim, however, a prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons could be a measure of some political significance. It would not only increase confidence and trust among States but would also make the task of negotiating measures of nuclear disarmament easier. The ICBMs of war should be replaced by the ICBMs of peace, by which I mean that the threat posed by nuclear

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missiles and by the nuclear arms race can only be alleviated by international confidence-building measures which would create the necessary atmosphere of trust within which nuclear disarmament can be pursued as a credible goal. A convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons will be one such ICBM of peace. We earnestly hope that multilateral negotiations on such a convention will begin in this Committee at an early date.

The CHAIRMAN: You will remember that a request was made by the distinguished representative of Algeria, Ambassador Salah-Bey, for summary records of the informal meetings which we had on items 1 and 2 of the agenda. I find that for this, a decision of the Committee is required as to whether we will allow the Secretariat to produce these summaries. I will come back to this question at the end of our meeting.

Mr. JAIPAL (Secretary of the Committee and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General): At our 117th plenary meeting on 24 March, the distinguished representative of France made a statement in connection with the distribution of documentation in the official languages of the Committee.

First of all, may I assure the distinguished representative of France that the Secretariat continues to attach particular importance to the timely circulation of documentation in French and other languages. As the distinguished representative of France said in his statement, the distribution of documentation in the official languages should, as far as possible, be simultaneous, and it is on that understanding that the Secretariat has been working. There are, however, exceptional cases when delays in distribution in one or another language do occur, for reasons beyond our control.

In the case of the documents mentioned by the distinguished representative of France, may I note that document CD/164 presented by Finland was in fact circulated also in French at the plenary meeting on 24 March. I regret that the French translation did not reach the desk of the distinguished representative of France: this was probably the result of a mistake during the actual circulation at the meeting; we have, however, established beyond doubt that the French text was in fact distributed during that meeting.

With regard to document CD/166 presented by the USSR, I would like to state that this document was received by the Secretariat on Monday, 23 March, in the afternoon, with a request from the sponsor that it be circulated at the plenary meeting the following morning, that of 24 March. This was a long document of 13 pages and it was circulated as and when the various translations were ready. The French text of that document was available only early in the afternoon of 24 March, together with the other official languages. Although the document in question had already been translated in New York, it had to be reissued as an official document of this Committee.

The Secretariat is sometimes requested, at short notice, to circulate documents at a particular meeting, while the technical services are at the same time required to meet the urgent requests of other bodies. In those circumstances it is difficult to ensure simultaneous distribution, since the Committee does not have exclusive control over the services for the typing, production and distribution of documentation. In the case of documents requiring translation, which are the majority issued by the Committee, there is bound to be some delay.

In spite of these technical problems, I wish to assure the distinguished representative of France and the other members of the Committee that the Secretariat is conscious of the need to ensure, as far as possible, the simultaneous distribution of documentation in all the official languages of the Committee. If the Secretariat were to be given adequate notice, simultaneous distribution of documentation in all official languages should always be possible.

Mr. de la GORCE (France) (translated from French): I should like to thank Ambassador Jaipal, the distinguished Secretary of the Committee, for his statement. We are fully persuaded of the serious attention given to these problems by the Secretariat. When, on 24 March, we drew attention to two cases in which it seemed to us that the normal procedure could have been followed more rigorously, it was, of course, precisely because we were concerned for the punctilious observance of the rules we have adopted, especially as regards document CD/166, to which Ambassador Jaipal has just referred. We were astonished that a document already distributed in October in New York, in all the languages, should need to be re-translated or retyped, when in fact the text was already available. However, I do not wish to dwell further on this matter. I would simply like to state and to confirm my delegation's satisfaction on hearing the Secretary of the Committee give us assurances which appear to us entirely satisfactory and for which we thank him and also the Secretariat as a whole.

The CHAIRMAN: May I be allowed to come back to the request that we heard from the distinguished representative of Algeria, Ambassador Salah-Bey, as spokesman of the Group of 21. For clarity I would like to re-read the French original of his request:

"Le groupe des 21 m'a chargé de demander, par votre entremise, au Secrétariat de préparer un document qui présenterait la synthèse des discussions officieuses qui se sont tenues sur les points 1 et 2 au cours des réunions consacrées à ces questions.

"Ce document pourrait se limiter à indiquer les tendances générales qui sont apparues lors des échanges de vues qui se sont instaurées lors de ces différentes occasions. Dans l'esprit du Groupe des 21, il ne serait pas utile que les délégations qui ont pris part au débat soient citées dans le document de synthèse dont nous demandons l'établissement."

This was the request read out this morning to the Secretariat, and I think that we need a decision of the Committee to ask the Secretariat to take up this matter. May I ask the Committee if there is a consensus that the Secretariat be asked to produce these summaries, as requested in the text I have just read out, so that they may be ready at the beginning of our summer session.

Mr. FLOWERREE (United States of America): I take the floor simply to ask for clarification concerning the summaries. Would the summaries as prepared by the Secretariat have the same status as, for example, the transcripts that were asked for, earlier in our sessions? That is, would they be documents circulated for the private use of delegations or would the summaries become documents of the Committee?

Mr. JAIPAL (Secretary of the Committee and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General): I would like to draw the attention of members to rule 22 of our rules of procedure. I presume it is in terms of this rule that this request has been made. Rule 22 reads as follows: "The Committee may hold informal meetings, with or without experts, to consider as appropriate substantive matters as well as questions concerning its organization of work. When requested by the Committee, the Secretariat shall provide unofficial summaries of those meetings in the working languages." I presume that it would be right to interpret these unofficial summaries as being intended strictly for circulation among the members of this Committee for their use.

The CHAIRMAN: I hope Ambassador Jaipal's statement answered the question raised by Ambassador Flowerree. I draw the conclusion that we all agree that, on the basis of the request made this morning by Ambassador Salah-Bey of Algeria on behalf of the Group of 21, the Secretariat is asked to proceed in accordance with that request.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: You will recall that at our 125th plenary meeting the Committee agreed to hold the next plenary meeting on Friday, 24 April, at 10.30 a.m. It was also decided that the Thursday plenary meeting would not take place this week and that instead there would be a meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons. Therefore, we will meet in plenary meeting on Friday at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.35 a.m.

CD/PV.127
24 April 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SEVENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday, 24 April 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. G. Pfeiffer (Federal Republic of Germany)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. SALAH-BEY
Mr. M. MIFI

Argentina: Mr. F. JIMENEZ DAVILA
Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD

Australia: Mr. R. A. WALKER
Mr. R. STEELE
Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium: Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. R. DEYANOV
Mr. K. PRAMOV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U THAN HTUN

Canada: Mr. D.S. MCPHAIL
Mr. G. SKINNER

China: Mr. YU Peiwen
Mr. LIANG Yufan
Mr. YU Mengjia
Mrs. WANG Zhiyun
Mr. LIN Chen
Mrs. GE Yiyun

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLA VILA
Mrs. V. BOROWDOSKY JACKIEWICH
Mr. F. CUSPINERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. A. CIMA
Mr. L. STAVINOHA

Egypt:

Mr. EL S.A.R. EL REEDY
Mr. M.N. FAHMY

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES
Miss K. SINEGIORGIS

France:

Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. N. KLINGER
Mr. H. MULLER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. C. GYORFFY
Mr. A. LAKATOS

India:

Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. M. SIDIK
Mr. I. DAMANIK
Mr. F. QASIM
Mr. KARYONO
Mr. S. HADI

Iran:

Mr. M. DABIRI
Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA

Italy: Mr. A. CIARRAPICO
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. R. ISHII
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya: Mr. S. SHITEMI
Mr. G. MUNIU

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
Mr. C. HELLER

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. L. BAYART
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. O. ADINIJI
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. M. AKRAM
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru: Mr. A. THORNBERRY

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mrs. I. THORSSON
Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. G. EKHOLM
Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. V.P. PERFILIEV
Mr. A.G. DOULYAN
Mr. V.V. LOSHCHININE
Mr. S.N. RIUKHINE

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES
Mr. N.H. MARSHALL

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. FLOWERREE
Mr. F.P. DESIMONE
Miss K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. C. PEARCY
Mr. S. FITZGERALD

Venezuela:

Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC
Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. L.B. NDAGA

Secretary of the Committee
and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: In accordance with its programme of work, the Committee continues its consideration of interim reports of ad hoc working groups, if any. May I also note that, in conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, it is the right of any Member State of the Committee to raise any subject relevant to the work of the Committee at a plenary meeting and to have full opportunity of presenting its views on any subject which it may consider to merit attention.

The distinguished Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Working Groups on Effective International Arrangements to Ensure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, on Chemical Weapons and on Radiological Weapons are also inscribed to speak today in connection with the activities of their respective groups. I shall give them the floor after we have exhausted our list of speakers.

Mrs. THORSSON (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, this week's plenary discussions are, as we all know, devoted to the possible reception of interim reports of the CD's ad hoc groups.

However, in accordance with paragraph 30 in section VIII of the CD's rules of procedure, I want to use a short part of today's plenary meeting to address once again the priority one item of the CD 1981 agenda, namely, the achievement of a CTBT. I regret that because of my duties as Chairman of the United Nations Expert Group on Disarmament and Development I shall have to leave before the end of the meeting.

First, however, a few words on another and deeply troublesome issue that has recently become an acute warning signal to the disarmament community, i.e., the threatening possibility of space warfare.

The recent, first and successful space shuttle voyage has been hailed, probably rightly, as new evidence of the triumphs of technology. In the background, however, expressions of unease have been heard. The important military elements of this venture have been directly referred to. In the aftermath of this technological success, rumours tell us about ambitious plans in one of the Superpowers to establish, in various ways, a permanent and active military presence in space. Understandably, the leader of the other Superpower a few days ago suggested a complete ban on the militarization of outer space. This suggestion would, of course, have been all the more welcome had that Superpower not for years been pursuing equally active technological preparations for the military use of space.

A source of immediate concern is the development of so-called anti-satellite systems for which, as we understand it, research and development is ongoing in both Superpowers, but press reports have also appeared about the possibility that other weapons systems, inter alia in the ABM field, may be under consideration.

I mention these facts because they present, in my view, another warning signal to this Committee. We should prepare ourselves for considering, at short notice, the urgency of preserving outer space, another "common heritage of mankind", for peaceful activities in accordance with paragraph 30 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and of keeping intact, in letter and in spirit, the Outer Space Treaty.

To raise, on the very last day of the first half of the 1981 CD session, the matter of the continuously unfulfilled promises of a CTBT seems indeed highly appropriate, as this issue has been the unsolved item number one for far too many sessions of the CCD and the CD. We have in the past used every available opportunity

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

to face three nuclear-weapon States with the responsibility which they have undertaken by pledging themselves to achieve a CTBT, in Moscow 18 years ago and in Geneva 13 years ago. The obligation to live up to those solemn pledges, thereby upholding the sanctity of international agreements freely entered into, has not been denied; the legally binding character of their signatures and ratification acts has not been repudiated by these nuclear-weapon States. Moreover, these very same States, by a vote in the United Nations General Assembly three and a half years ago in support of a detailed time-table for achieving a CTBT by the time of the first special session of the General Assembly in 1978, gave a promise to the international community which now, in the year 1981, is still unfulfilled.

In little more than one year from now the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament will be convened in New York. One of its main tasks will be to review and assess the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the first special session. As matters now stand this looks like being a gloomy process, to say the least. This is particularly true as regards the high priority items relating to nuclear disarmament, including the question of a CTBT. Unless the situation is rapidly remedied there is considerable risk that the year 1981 will serve as an illustration of the near total failure of disarmament negotiations and will gravely erode the credibility of this body, which was created by the General Assembly at its first special session on disarmament.

Who, Mr. Chairman, is to blame?

As the CD is the sole multilateral negotiating body for disarmament and is formally charged with specific tasks by the United Nations General Assembly, it is of course the duty of all of us around this table to use the remaining time up to June 1982 to try to remedy the dismal situation of today, inter alia by exerting every effort to initiate the only too long overdue multilateral treaty negotiations -- in this context, on a CTBT. But this duty rests much more heavily with those of us who are undertaking over the years an increasingly larger number of underground tests while, at the same time, engaged in preparatory trilateral talks on a CTBT.

I do not need to repeat the sad history of the CTBT efforts, nor the arguments in favour of such a treaty, advocated over the years by all those genuinely concerned with reversing the long-lasting and serious trends in the global arms race, including nuclear proliferation. I have only to pose some pertinent questions.

Why is it that the whole CTBT process seems to have come to a standstill, in spite of its tremendous urgency and the shortness of time available to us? Why is it that some States can refuse to live up to solemn obligations? Why is it that the CD is unable to agree on a procedural decision to establish the appropriate organizational framework for the highest priority item on its agenda?

We know the answers. In spite of urgent requests by the Group of 21 -- to which Sweden belongs, by a number of Western States and by the East European States, two nuclear-weapon States persist in their resistance to such a move, thereby challenging the requests of responsible Governments and world public opinion.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

The delay caused by this attitude cannot be tolerated. An ad hoc working group on a CTBT must be established at the very beginning of the summer session to enable concrete multilateral negotiations then to start immediately.

I therefore urge, in all earnestness, the delegations of these two nuclear-weapon States to convey to their Governments the ardent request of the overwhelming majority of this Committee to reconsider their position and to accept the establishing of an ad hoc working group of the CD on a CTBT. They will thereby pave the way for the CD to fulfil the agelong aspiration of the disarmament community: the achievement of a CTBT.

Mr. WALKER (Australia): My delegation, like others who have already spoken at the last two or three meetings, would like to make a few comments on the stage we have reached at the end of our spring session.

Several delegations have noted that mercifully we have avoided last year's near-paralysis at the spring session over procedural issues. It is right to pay tribute to the spirit of accommodation which all delegations have shown in this regard. But it is a sad commentary on last year's effort that this should now be hailed as an achievement.

My delegation feels that still this year too much time has been spent on procedural issues, and especially on debating how the CD should organize its work. We join Canada in believing that this has been given disproportionate importance. We are not so naive as to fail to understand that such procedural debate is often a form of advocacy. But we also feel that the CD has been at some risk of devoting too much time to advocacy of what this or that group of delegations would like the CD to be doing. It is fair to state our national positions; but to devote too much of our effort to advocacy -- advocacy often destined for ears outside this chamber -- risks undermining the CD's true task as the single multilateral negotiating body, negotiating on issues which Governments have decided to make the subject of negotiations here.

Of all the items on our agenda, for Australia the first priority is the comprehensive test ban. We regret that it has not yet been possible for the CD to engage in substantive negotiations on this issue. We welcomed the initiative of the Group of 21 which has led to our holding informal meetings on this issue and we believe that the exchanges in these meetings have been useful in foreshadowing the attitudes which delegations will take when substantive negotiations begin. We also believe that the group of seismic experts has continued to do useful work. My Government believes that the CD could and should be doing a great deal more to prepare the way for an international seismic detection network in support of a comprehensive test ban treaty. We have made specific proposals to this end. All arrangements for such a network must be fully worked out before a CTB can come into full effect and it is in our view wrong not to undertake this essential work now. We see no valid reason for delay on the grounds that the CTB itself is not yet the subject of detailed negotiations in this Committee.

(Mr. Walker, Australia)

My delegation also shares the concern expressed by that of Canada about the use that has been made of the phrase "political will". The concept appears in paragraph 10 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament in quotation marks and it is there made distinct from the significant role that can also be played by the effective functioning of international disarmament machinery. It appears again in paragraph 41, where it is given a positive and objective connotation as one of the elements contributing to favourable conditions for success in the disarmament process. We regret its having been used since in this Committee so often in a subjective and accusatory vein. I say subjective because what one man regards as a lack of political will to accept a particular concession is, to another man, the political will to preserve that which he regards as essential. No country is represented here to be told that it lacks the political will to disarm; all of us are here to find out how we can maintain or enhance our security through arms control and disarmament.

For Australia, the other priority item on our agenda is the proposed chemical weapons convention. In the Working Group, under the dynamic and able leadership of Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden and in the Committee itself, notably during the period of concentration of work on chemical weapons, we have made good progress in defining the issues to be covered in a chemical weapons convention. Australia wants work to proceed rapidly, bringing us closer towards the conclusion of a convention. We have made specific proposals to this end. Our work so far has thrown up a wide range of ideas. We hope that as we progress in the summer session it will be possible to condense this broad spectrum of ideas, to build on the substantial extent of convergence which has already been identified and to come much closer to agreement as to the contents of the future convention.

Another urgent task, because the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament is rapidly approaching, is for us to draft together a comprehensive programme of disarmament. For Australia the most important requirement of the Committee's endeavour on this topic is that we should develop a programme that will positively assist the future course of international work on disarmament.

In our view the comprehensive programme of disarmament must be realistic. It must not raise false expectations. For the CD to draft a programme such as we might wish it could be, rather than one attuned to the harsh realities of this world, would be to set the scene for further disappointment. That would be a disservice to the cause of disarmament. If we are to encourage nations to seek security through disarmament, we must propose a programme that all can believe in.

Secondly, it would in our view be a wholly negative development if the comprehensive programme were itself to become a divisive element. And it would be wrong for any country to join discussions on disarmament in the hope of making other countries look bad; or to promote proposals designed to strengthen its own position to the detriment of that of others. In Australia's view, the only valid and genuine measures of disarmament are those which add to the security of all concerned.

(Mr. Walker, Australia)

We do not believe that the pace of disarmament negotiations can be forced or conventions prematurely induced. Therefore we welcome the emerging consensus which sees the CPD as a guide rather than a binding legal obligation. For the same reasons we think it unhelpful to try to cast a CPD in terms of target dates for specific measures. We know all too well from recent experience that the pace of negotiations on arms control and disarmament is hostage to the general international climate and to the way nations behave towards each other. And no one can predict the pace at which it will be possible to negotiate to a conclusion on delicate and sensitive issues of national and world security. Far from helping, arbitrary deadlines could actually complicate and impede the task.

So much for what we do not want. I now turn in positive terms to the CPD which the Australian delegation hopes this Committee is in the process of elaborating. We see the CPD, as I have said, as a guide for all concerned with disarmament, as a means of placing disarmament efforts into a long-term perspective and as a gauge by which current and future efforts may be judged.

We are heartened to note the existence of a wide measure of international agreement as to the nature of the major issues on the international disarmament agenda. We must make full use of this basis of agreement established through years of negotiation. I refer particularly to the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the conclusions of the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade. Without reopening old disputes we might at the same time cast a critical eye on some of the items, asking ourselves: is such and such a proposal truly realistic and constructive?

My delegation will have specific proposals to make in this regard. In particular we believe that the CPD must give due weight to the responsibilities of non-nuclear-weapon States, notably to strengthen the very important existing measures against the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. We are often reminded that the nuclear-weapon States must make progress towards nuclear arms control and disarmament for the sake of that objective. My delegation fully agrees; but it also believes in the other side of the same coin, namely, that further effective measures against horizontal proliferation can help progress against vertical proliferation.

Distinguished previous speakers have said, in effect, that a CPD should be more than a Programme of Action, more than a Final Document and more than a mere listing of objectives. We agree with this approach. Australia has always believed that the only productive way to work on disarmament is a gradual, step-by-step, brick-by-brick approach in which each step achieved provides the basis for future progress. We believe the history to date of international arms control efforts vindicates this approach. In our view, therefore, a CPD should comprise a series of logically related disarmament steps grouped into phases. Within each phase could be enumerated not only concrete disarmament measures but also measures that would complement the negotiation of disarmament agreements, studies that can facilitate smooth negotiations in the subsequent phase and confidence-building measures designed to create a more relaxed atmosphere and thereby make future progress possible.

(Mr. Walker, Australia)

The Working Group still has much to do. It must still negotiate in detail on each of the measures to be included in the programme and, as a parallel task closely related to this, it must develop a clear concept of what is meant by stages or phases in the programme. To guide us through this task we will need all the experience, authority and dedication which the distinguished Chairman of the Working Group, Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, brings to his heavy responsibilities. So far the Working Group has been marked by a spirit of moderation and co-operation on the part of all participants. If this spirit carries over, as we hope, into the summer session, it may be possible for the CD to develop a constructive and realistic CPD -- a CPD that would merit the moral currency that we believe it should have -- in short, a CPD such that nations of all persuasions could say: this programme can and must be implemented.

Turning quickly to negative security assurances, my delegation joins in the unanimous expressions of appreciation extended by the members of the Working Group to its able Chairman, Minister Ciarrapico of Italy. We also wish to join in the compliments extended to Ambassador Fein of the Netherlands for the incisive analysis of the issues involved which he gave us at last week's plenary meeting. Others have pointed out that the five different formulations of the negative security assurances given by each of the nuclear-weapon States reflect the strategic situation and the strategic doctrines of each of the States concerned. We should be surprised if it were otherwise. Each of the non-nuclear-weapon States also has its particular strategic concerns. Some seek security in neutrality or non-alignment; others, like Australia, have chosen alliance with nuclear-weapon States as the most appropriate means for ensuring their own security and that of others as well. Countries in this latter category view the negative security assurances offered by the nuclear-weapon States from their own perspective of wishing to see the full effectiveness of their alliances maintained. From this viewpoint, we appreciate the value that negative security assurances, given by the nuclear-weapon States, can have for the non-aligned and neutral States to which they are directed and thereby for the international community as a whole.

The last item on our active agenda is the proposed radiological weapons convention. This matter does not intrinsically have the same pressing urgency as the other agenda items. My delegation believes that the CD should nevertheless dispatch it promptly. The road to this category of possible weapons should be closed and, because of the high degree of accord as to the essential substance of the convention, we believe that we should be able to wrap it up quickly, hopefully this year. Here again, heavy burdens are laid on the shoulders of the distinguished Chairman of the Working Group, Ambassador Kömives of Hungary. Fortunately, they are broad shoulders.

In conclusion, I had the pleasure to be the first to welcome you to the onerous task of chairing our Committee this month; I now have the further pleasure of being one of the first -- the first of many, I am sure -- to congratulate you on the way you have discharged this duty. The energy, the sense of responsibility, the experience and the know-how you have brought to the task have earned the gratitude of all delegations.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Australia for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the chair.

Mr. SALAH BEY (Algeria): Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Group of 21, I have the privilege of making the following statement and I should like to request that it be circulated as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament.

At the initiative of the Group of 21, the Committee on Disarmament held informal meetings during the first part of its 1981 session to undertake a substantive examination of concrete issues relating to item 1 of its agenda, entitled: nuclear test ban.

The discussions which took place in these informal meetings have further reinforced the conviction held by the Group of 21 that the Committee on Disarmament should proceed without delay to undertake multilateral negotiations on the question of a nuclear test ban. In its working paper CD/64 of 27 February 1980, the Group of 21 stated that in its considered view working groups are the best available machinery for the conduct of concrete negotiations within the Committee on Disarmament. Therefore, the Group of 21 in principle supported the establishment of working groups on all items of the Committee's agenda.

In a subsequent working paper, CD/72 dated 4 March 1980, the Group of 21 urged the setting up of an ad hoc working group of the Committee on its agenda item entitled nuclear test ban, during the first part of the 1980 session. Unfortunately, no consensus could be reached on this proposal during the entire 1980 session of the Committee on Disarmament.

The Group of 21 would recommend that in the light of the discussions held in informal meetings of the Committee, the Committee on Disarmament should, at the beginning of the second part of its 1981 session, decide to set up an ad hoc working group on item 1 of its agenda. In order to facilitate the adoption of this decision, the Group of 21 would suggest the following mandate for the ad hoc working group:

"The Committee on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of the second part of its 1981 session, an ad hoc working group of the Committee to negotiate on provisions relating to the scope, verification of compliance, and the final clauses of a draft treaty relating to item 1 of its agenda, entitled 'nuclear test ban'. The ad hoc working group will report to the Committee on Disarmament on the progress of its work at an appropriate time and in any case before the conclusion of its 1981 session.

"During the course of negotiations on this item, the ad hoc working group will take into account existing proposals and future initiatives, including the reports on the trilateral negotiations among the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States on this subject presented during the 1979 and 1980 sessions of the Committee on Disarmament, as well as any future reports on the trilateral negotiations that may be submitted to the Committee by the parties concerned during the remainder of its 1981 session".

(Mr. Salah Bey, Algeria)

The Group of 21 firmly believes that the Committee on Disarmament is entitled to know without further delay the specific reasons that have so far prevented the three nuclear-weapon States, which have been carrying out among themselves separate negotiations for the past four years, from heeding the often repeated and pressing appeals of the General Assembly for the expediting of such negotiations "with a view to bringing them to a positive conclusion as a matter of urgency" and transmitting the results to the Committee on Disarmament.

As a further contribution to the work of the Committee on Disarmament on a nuclear test ban, the Group of 21 would like to draw attention to specific questions which have been addressed jointly or separately to the parties engaged in the trilateral negotiations, in the course of both formal and informal meetings of the Committee during the first part of its 1981 session. The questions which are still awaiting suitable response from the negotiating States, are of relevance to the concerns of the international community, which has repeatedly deplored the continuance of the testing of nuclear weapons and has called for the early conclusion of a nuclear test ban. Clarifications and further information have been requested from the States engaged in trilateral negotiations on the following key issues:

I. Conduct of multilateral negotiations

1. What is the role that the trilateral negotiators envisage for the Committee on Disarmament to play in the multilateral negotiation of a treaty on the nuclear test ban, given the consensus reached in paragraph 51 of the Final Document that the trilateral negotiations should be concluded urgently and the result submitted to the Committee on Disarmament for full consideration by the multilateral negotiating body with a view to the submission of a draft treaty to the General Assembly at the earliest possible date?
2. What are, in the view of the trilateral negotiators, the main obstacles to the conclusion of the trilateral negotiations?
3. When do the trilateral negotiators believe that their negotiations will be resumed and by what time are they likely to be concluded?

II. Scope

4. Do the trilateral negotiators consider the scope of the treaty under negotiation broad enough to contribute effectively to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament?
5. Does the treaty under negotiation make provision for the promotion of the peaceful applications of nuclear technology, especially in the developing countries?
6. What specific arrangements, if any, are envisaged to provide for the conduct of peaceful nuclear explosions under the treaty they are negotiating? Would the framework within which each State party could conduct peaceful nuclear explosions under the future treaty be the subject of multilateral negotiation?

(Mr. Salah Bey, Algeria)

7. Do the trilateral negotiators intend the treaty under negotiation among them to be an adequate basis for a truly comprehensive and universal ban on nuclear weapon testing by all States in all environments for all time to come, which is the goal of the international community as expressed in several resolutions of the General Assembly?

III. Verification of compliance

8. How would the trilateral negotiators reconcile the dual system of verification measures that they are negotiating with the principle that a multilateral treaty should create equal rights and obligations for all its parties?

9. What are the "special concerns and circumstances" that make additional measures of verification necessary?

10. Would the trilateral negotiators clarify as to what specific measures are included under "national technical means of verification"? Would the information gathered by such means be available, without discrimination, to all States parties to the treaty?

IV. Other clauses

11. The international community has repeatedly expressed its conviction that a treaty on a nuclear test ban must be of unlimited duration. Will the trilateral negotiators conform with that conviction and, if that were not the case, clarify what is the duration they have in mind?

12. Since it is highly desirable that the future treaty should attract universal adherence, and should be based on the principle of equal rights for all its parties, what special reasons do the trilateral negotiators have to accord the permanent members of the Security Council a virtual veto over the amendment procedure to be included in the treaty?

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): At the beginning of the month, at one of the informal meetings the Committee has been holding on Mondays, I had occasion to express my delegation's particular satisfaction that it was your turn to assume the chairmanship of the Committee. Since this is the first time I have had occasion to speak at a formal meeting, it is a great pleasure for me to express our satisfaction again and to tell you that, the way you have guided our discussions during the month of April, continuing the valuable work done by your two immediate predecessors, Ambassador de la Gorce and Ambassador Herder, has been another demonstration to us of the experience and skill that all of us are familiar with who have had an opportunity to work with you both in this multilateral negotiating body and in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly.

We offer you, therefore, Mr. Chairman, our sincerest congratulations.

As we near the end of the first part -- the spring part, as it is usually called -- of the 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament, I should like to offer some observations, which I shall try to make as brief as possible, on the six items we have had on our agenda.

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

I shall begin by referring to the item on the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, but I would explain that in making some brief remarks, primarily of an informative nature, I shall be speaking, not as the representative of Mexico but as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, an office to which I had the honour of being appointed by the Committee last February.

Between 19 February and 23 April the Working Group held ten meetings, which means that, with the ten held last year, the meeting which took place yesterday, Thursday, 23 April, was the twentieth. During these ten meetings, it has been possible to complete preliminary examination of all the documents submitted to the Working Group before 6 April on "measures" and "stages of implementation", which, of all the proposals contained in the seven parts of the outline approved last year, will no doubt be the ones which will require the greatest efforts in order to achieve the requisite consensus.

A very advanced stage has also been reached in the preliminary examination of the working papers relating to the chapter dealing with "principles". At the beginning of the second part of the current session, I intend to suggest to the Working Group that we should continue our first reading of the contents of the remaining chapters, beginning with the one dealing with "objectives", then turning to those on "priorities" and "machinery" and ending, as agreed last year, with a preliminary consideration of what might be included in the introduction.

I would not like to conclude this part of my statement without expressing my sincere appreciation to all members of the Working Group for the valuable contributions they have made to the discussions. I should also like to appeal to all delegations or groups of delegations which intend to submit proposals on any of the chapters contained in the outline of the programme or on the programme as a whole to take full advantage of the seven weeks' recess starting today so that, at the beginning of the so-called summer part of the session, they will be in a position to submit them to the Secretariat for immediate reproduction and distribution in all the working languages of the Committee. We must always be very much aware of the fact that the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament is the only one of the four working groups so far set up which has a definite time-limit for the completion of the task entrusted to it and that the time-limit is not very far off, since barely a year separates us from the opening of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Speaking as the representative of Mexico, I would now like to refer very briefly to the five other items on the Committee's agenda, starting with the three for which we were also able to set up ad hoc working groups, as in the case of the item on the comprehensive programme of disarmament to which I have just referred.

With regard to the agenda item on "effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", usually referred to much more briefly as the "negative guarantees" item, my delegation still considers that, if it is the intention that such guarantees should be embodied in a completely legally binding international instrument, the most feasible and effective procedure is the one used in Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

As regards the elimination of chemical weapons, we have noted with genuine satisfaction that the progress made last year in the relevant Working Group has gained greater impetus this year and that the Working Group has nearly completed the task, entrusted to it by the Committee on 17 March 1980, of defining, through substantive examination, the issues to be dealt with in the negotiation and elaboration of a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. In view of this fact, and because this is a matter of high priority, we consider that the Committee should modify the mandate approved earlier for the Working Group to suit present conditions and, at the second part of the current session, request it immediately to initiate negotiations for the drafting of the provisions of the convention in question.

With regard to efforts to reach agreement on the text of a convention "prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons", our position is based on the fact that this item is, relatively speaking, one of the least important on the Committee's agenda. For this reason, and in order to make the best possible use of the short time available to the so-called "single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum", we are inclined to think that we should not be too demanding about the form and content of the international instrument with respect to which we received, nearly two years ago, a joint proposal by the United States and the Soviet Union -- Powers which do not often give us an opportunity to see them reaching agreement in matters of disarmament.

We therefore consider that, in this instance, it would be wise, to be content with what we have, without, however, sacrificing any element involving questions of principle. Thus, for example, we consider it essential that the text of the convention should make it quite clear that none of its provisions may be interpreted to the detriment of any obligations relating to the limitation, reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons which may flow from treaties, conventions, protocols and other such international instruments, or from resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly that have been adopted by consensus.

Contrary to what many delegations have been advocating -- and the delegation of Mexico, as you will recall, has been doing so with particular emphasis ever since the opening of the current session on 3 February 1981 -- it has unfortunately, and paradoxically, been impossible to establish ad hoc working groups on items 1 and 2, which are those which presumably merit the highest priority in our work.

As regards the first of those items, the opposition to the setting up of a working group rests solely, it seems, in the objections of two of the nuclear-weapon Powers. We therefore fully share the view of the Group of 21 on this matter, as described in the statement read out today which states, inter alia, that:

"The Group of 21 firmly believes that the Committee on Disarmament is entitled to know without further delay the specific reasons that have so far prevented the three nuclear-weapon States, which have been carrying out among themselves separate negotiations for the past four years, from

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

heeding the often repeated and pressing appeals of the General Assembly for the expediting of such negotiations 'with a view to bringing them to a positive conclusion as a matter of urgency' and transmitting the results to the Committee on Disarmament".

Although, as in the previous case, it has also been impossible to reach consensus on the establishment of an ad hoc working group on agenda item 2, on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, the informal discussions that we have been having each week have shown the justification for the position which has from the beginning been upheld by many delegations, including that of Mexico, and which was defined in terms similar to those I have just quoted in the statement of the Group of 21 read out in this room last week by the distinguished representative of Algeria, in his capacity as co-ordinator of the Group, in which the Group of 21 reiterated its belief that "all nations, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, have a vital interest in measures of nuclear disarmament because the existence of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of a handful of Powers directly and fundamentally jeopardizes the security of the whole world" and went on to say that:

"The Group of 21 is further convinced; as a result of the discussions, that doctrines of nuclear deterrence, far from being responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, lie at the root of the continuing escalation of the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear armaments and lead to greater insecurity and instability in international relations. Moreover, such doctrines, which in the ultimate analysis are predicated upon the willingness to use nuclear weapons, cannot be the basis for preventing the outbreak of a nuclear war, a war which would affect belligerents and non-belligerents alike. The competitive accumulation of nuclear arms by the nuclear-weapon States cannot be condoned on grounds that it is indispensable to their security. Such an argument is patently false considering that the increase in nuclear arsenals, far from contributing to the strengthening of the security of all States, on the contrary, weakens it, and increases the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war. Moreover, the Group of 21 rejects as politically and morally unjustifiable that the security of the whole world should be made to depend on the state of relations existing among nuclear-weapon States."

For the reasons I have just given and which were so convincingly set forth by the Group of 21 my delegation hopes that, when the Committee resumes its work next June, it will finally be possible to establish ad hoc working groups to deal with the first two items on the agenda, which, as the United Nations General Assembly and the Committee itself have recognized, not once but many times, warrant the highest priority.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, for his statement which he also made in his capacity as the Chairman of the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. I thank him also for the kind words addressed to the chair.

Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): I have the honour to make a statement on behalf of a group of socialist countries on the results of the first part of the 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament.

This year the work of the Committee on Disarmament has been proceeding in a notable period. The 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has been an event of historic dimensions. The Congress has put forward a broad and multifaceted programme for the invigoration of the international situation comprising a wide range of constructive ideas and initiatives very important for the cause of peace. These new major ideas and initiatives are an organic continuation and elaboration of the Programme of Peace moved by the 24th and 25th Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union with regard to the most urgent problems of the contemporary international relations. Pride of place among them belongs to the proposals aimed at curbing the arms race and at disarmament, that is, the proposals concerning the key problems of present-day international life. These initiatives are concrete and realistic and they cover the main aspects and directions of military détente.

The implementation of the programme advanced at the Congress would open the way for the solution of the most acute and long-ripe international issues and the creation of a climate of mutual trust and peaceful co-operation among States for the sake of peace and the security of all peoples. All this would undoubtedly contribute to the productive work of the Committee on Disarmament and would have the most favourable impact on the settlement of the responsible and important tasks facing it.

Congresses of Communist Parties which have a great international import have also taken place in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic. The decisions adopted by all these congresses, like the decisions of the previously held congresses of other fraternal socialist States, convincingly demonstrate the unshakeable allegiance of the countries of the socialist community to the lofty ideals of peace, détente and disarmament. This foreign policy course of the socialist countries is of a long-term nature and is not susceptible to momentary trends.

Many of the disarmament proposals put forward at the congresses have the most direct bearing on the activities of the Committee. In the course of the session the delegations of the socialist countries have been drawing the attention of the participants in the negotiations to the decisions of the congresses pertaining to the disarmament issues, have been explaining in detail their contents, and have been stressing the importance of these decisions for the fulfilment of the tasks facing the Committee. We note with satisfaction that many delegations in the Committee -- as a reflection of the most vivid response in the world produced by the work of the congresses -- have shown profound interest in their materials.

(Mr. KÖMIVES, Hungary)

It is undoubtedly a positive fact that this year the session of the Committee has gotten under way and has been proceeding, on the whole, in a business-like and constructive manner. Attempts by certain delegations to poison the atmosphere of negotiations, to introduce in the work of the Committee questions of no relevance to its business have not yielded the desired results. It is essential to preserve in future as well the business-like trend in the work of the Committee and the constructive tone of the discussions.

On practically all agenda items of the Committee the socialist States have submitted concrete and realistic proposals dictated by their genuine concern for the advancement in the solution of the most important and long-ripe questions of disarmament. To this end, the delegations of the socialist countries have sought to assign the highest priority in the work of the Committee primarily to those questions which are of paramount importance for curbing the arms race, deepening the relaxation of tensions and relieving mankind of the threat of a nuclear war.

Proceeding from the belief that nuclear weapons constitute the gravest peril to the survival of humanity, the delegations of the socialist countries, just as at the previous sessions of the Committee, have consistently advocated the consideration of the questions related to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament as a matter of highest priority. As early as in February 1979 the socialist countries moved an initiative on that issue which has gained wide recognition. With a view to preparing negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race the socialist countries have proposed the holding of consultations within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament. They have also supported the proposal to establish an ad hoc working group. The socialist countries believe that it is necessary, first and foremost, to determine a set of questions to be examined and to resolve the questions connected with the organizational aspect of the negotiations. The subject matter of the negotiations must be, in the view of the socialist countries, the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of stockpiles of such weapons until they have been completely destroyed.

The socialist countries attach considerable importance to the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. They are in favour of the Committee playing an active part in the solution of this task and they express themselves in support of the proposal on setting up within the framework of the Committee an ad hoc working group on that issue on the condition of the participation in it of all the nuclear Powers.

The socialist countries continue to attach great significance to the trilateral negotiations on this issue. They take the view that the consideration of the problem of a nuclear test ban within the Committee must not complicate the course of the negotiations. The lack of political will on the part of the United States and the United Kingdom is the main reason why the treaty has not yet been concluded.

Taking into account the importance and urgency of the problem of the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present, the socialist countries moved a proposal to establish an ad hoc group on this subject.

(Mr. Köröves, Hungary)

In the circumstances which have developed in the Committee when, because of the lack of consensus, ad hoc working groups have not been established on the first and second items of its agenda, the socialist countries, seeking to initiate as early as possible business-like negotiations on the substance of the problems of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament as well as on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, supported the proposal on holding informal meetings of the Committee on Disarmament. While not regarding the holding of such meetings as a substitute for the establishment of corresponding working groups, the co-authors of this statement share the opinion of the usefulness of such a form of working in the Committee on Disarmament.

The vivid exchange of views which was held at the informal meetings has once again demonstrated in a very convincing manner the interest shown by the overwhelming majority of the delegations in ensuring that the Committee on Disarmament makes its own concrete and weighty contribution to the attainment of nuclear disarmament and the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests.

The socialist countries deem it imperative and advisable to go on, at the summer session of the Committee, with the consideration of questions related to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament, including the question of the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present, as well as the issue of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapons tests. A basis for such discussions may be found in the considerations of a group of socialist countries (document CD/162) as well as in the proposals by the Group of 21.

The socialist countries attach great importance to the problem of strengthening the security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States.

The socialist countries believe that one of the most effective means of strengthening the security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States would be the conclusion of a relevant international convention. In view of the negative position taken by certain States in this respect, however, and remaining at the same time staunch advocates of the idea of an international convention, the socialist countries have also expressed their willingness to consider another possible alternative of solving the problem, provided that a similar approach would be followed by all nuclear-weapon States. In particular, they have suggested that all nuclear-weapon States make solemn declarations, identical or similar in substance, concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which have no such weapons on their territories. Such declarations, if they meet the above-mentioned objective, could be backed up by an authoritative decision of the United Nations Security Council.

The socialist countries have proposed that the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances be organized on a constructive and realistic basis and the possibility of working out a common approach of the negotiating

(Mr. Kómives, Hungary)

parties, including all nuclear-weapon States, be considered in practical terms. The debate held in the Ad Hoc Working Group has contributed to clarifying further the positions of States and has given rise to some interesting observations on the substance of the security guarantees.

The delegations of the socialist countries continue to believe that the problem of strengthening the security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States retains its importance in the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament and they are determined to spare no efforts in order to resolve effectively this high-priority task.

An important direction in the work of the Committee, in the view of the delegations of the socialist countries, has been and continues to be the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. This issue, like all other items on the agenda of the Committee, should be discussed using the appropriate organizational structures. We welcome the fact that the advantages of a competent examination of this issue in a group of experts are becoming ever more obvious for many of the delegations in the Committee. The mandate of such a group could be agreed upon at informal meetings of the Committee on Disarmament with the participation of experts during the summer part of the current session, as proposed by the delegation of Hungary in its working paper CD/174.

In the opinion of the delegations of the socialist countries, at the spring part of the session of the Committee on Disarmament real opportunities have existed for reaching agreement on the text of a treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons. Regrettably, it has to be stated that, although the Ad Hoc Working Group on this issue has, indeed, succeeded in bringing somewhat closer the positions of the negotiating parties, nevertheless agreement has not yet been reached on the fundamental articles of a treaty. The delegations of the socialist countries intend to continue to work perseveringly for the earliest achievement of a final agreement on the text of a treaty, the importance of the conclusion of which is underlined both in the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament and in numerous resolutions adopted by the General Assembly.

The socialist countries resolutely condemn the revival of the plans for the production and deployment of neutron weapons in Western Europe. The realization of these plans would seriously exacerbate the danger of a nuclear war, and it is not by accident that the broadest possible masses of the world's public are opposing the neutron weapons.

It is demonstrative that the voices of protest against the plans for the production and deployment of neutron weapons in West European countries have been raised within the walls of the Committee on Disarmament as well. All the above stresses once again the urgency of the appeal to ban neutron weapons at the international level on a treaty basis as was suggested by the socialist countries in March 1978.

(Mr. KÖMIVES, Hungary)

During the consideration of questions related to the prohibition of chemical weapons, the socialist countries have directed their efforts to identifying such approaches to the solution of this problem which would lead to success. In particular, they have expressed their view on the question of the prohibition under the future convention in working papers tabled in the corresponding Ad Hoc Working Group.

The socialist countries note with satisfaction the business-like character of the examination of many aspects of the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons and of the identification of the more similar approaches to some of them. We share the opinion of those delegations which hold the view that the resumption of the Soviet-American talks on this subject would facilitate the earliest elaboration of a convention banning chemical weapons.

The socialist countries are fully determined to continue to act in the spirit of resolution 35/144 B adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session, which urged States to exert all efforts for the earliest successful conclusion of the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

The delegations of the socialist countries have actively participated in the consideration of the question of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. They consider that this programme can play an important part in stimulating disarmament negotiations. It is essential that in elaborating a comprehensive programme of disarmament all States should strictly adhere to the provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the report of the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade.

The programme will be viable if it has as its basis the principle of the undiminished security of all parties. The group of the socialist countries states its intention to continue its constructive co-operation with all members of the Committee on Disarmament in the elaboration of this document.

At the summer part of the Committee's session negotiations will have to be continued on the items on its agenda. It will be an especially responsible period owing to the fact that the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament is scheduled to be held in 1982. It is quite obvious that on the political will of the participants in the negotiations and on their readiness to reach concrete agreements in the disarmament sphere will depend the judgement passed on the Committee's activities at the special session.

As for the socialist States, they, being guided by the decisions of the congresses of the Communist Parties and relevant decisions of the Political Consultative Committee of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, will continue

(Mr. KÖMIVES, Hungary)

to exert all efforts to contribute to the productive work of the Committee, to the solution of the issues related to the curbing of the arms race and to disarmament and to the consolidation of peace and international security.

I should like to request you to circulate this statement as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament.

In concluding my statement, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the delegations for whom I am speaking, I should like to express our gratitude and appreciation to you for the manner in which you have guided our work during the month of April, keeping up the tradition set by your distinguished predecessors of providing a business-like atmosphere in our proceedings.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Hungary, Ambassador Komives, for the statement he has made on behalf of a group of socialist countries. I thank him also for the kind words he has addressed to the chair.

Mr. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, I would like to share with the Committee some thoughts on the work accomplished by this multilateral negotiating body during the first half of its 1981 session and to put forth a few general considerations on the direction in which we seem to be moving.

There is some cause for sober satisfaction, although there are no grounds for enthusiasm. The distinguished representative of Canada noted, last Thursday, the "general willingness to get down to business". In some areas, such as chemical weapons, the comprehensive programme of disarmament and radiological weapons, we did get down to business and have made some progress, albeit slow and sometimes uncertain. The debates on the question of negative security assurances have shed light on important conceptual points and on the deep reasons why the present situation is unsatisfactory for most States. It will take time and patience for negotiations and discussions on these four items to yield practical results. My delegation believes, however, that the experience gained within the four working groups has shown that the creation of subsidiary bodies with clear negotiating mandates is the best way to proceed forward in the tasks that were assigned to the Committee as a whole.

That general willingness to get down to business must also be credited for the wise avoidance, during the spring session, of sterile debate on a number of controversial issues which, although very important matters of principle for the delegations concerned, cannot be solved within the province of this body. We respect the national positions at stake and we are grateful for the fact that the controversy on those issues was not allowed to become a stumbling block for our substantive debate. Although there has been a tendency to refer to questions of that kind as "procedural", I believe we all recognize that deeper considerations of national policy lie at the root of the matter. We should all recognize that the restraint and spirit of conciliation displayed by the most interested delegations bespeaks their genuine concern with the need for this Committee to discharge its functions in the most practical way possible.

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As Ambassador McPhail put it in the statement I referred to, the authority of the CD, and indeed its very existence, will depend on its performance. While we all agree on the need to obtain results, we may differ on the most adequate ways to organize our discussions toward the achievement of results. In this sense, procedural debate and the search for the best structure for our work are important, indeed essential. The issues under the aegis of the Committee are ample, complex and delicate; they touch on matters of vital concern to all States. We must conduct our work on a sound procedural framework in order to ensure the best possible basis on which to march forward on substance.

I think that one example will illustrate this point. For the first time in the history of the Committee and its predecessors, we had the opportunity to engage in an open, informal exchange of views on the two topmost items of our agenda, namely the ban on nuclear weapon testing and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Despite the circumstances that have been explained to us by one of the delegations most directly concerned, and which have prevented a more meaningful discussion of the conceptual questions involved, the assessment of those four informal meetings must be a positive one, in the view of my delegation. We lacked, unfortunately, a definite, clear framework that would permit us to build on the clarification of those concepts and positions. Because of the nature of the compromise which made such an exchange of views possible, we now run the risk of losing the opportunity to move ahead in the consideration of those two priority items. My delegation is firmly convinced that the collective determination of members of this Committee can, and should, be applied constructively to provide the possibility of progress. We have been assured, however, that the views and concerns expressed here are being duly taken into account by those who shape the policies that are, in many respects, the key to the security and survival of the whole world. We sincerely hope that that assurance will find a concrete and positive reflection in the performance of our Committee as from the start of the second part of the 1981 session.

This brings me to the question of political will. Policy depends on perception; and the will of States in their multilateral dealings, as reflected in their policies, is inevitably predicated on their perception of their national interests and of the contemporary realities. My delegation hopes that the debate that took place here from February to late April will have shown beyond any doubt that the contemporary realities are not restricted to the relationship between the Superpowers. When we hear the argument that the international climate must be taken into account in disarmament negotiations, we cannot help but agreeing; the international climate, however, is much broader than what the advocates of that argument would care to admit. The concern of the majority of nations with the current trends in the nuclear arms race and with the apparent lack of sensitivity for those concerns on the part of the nuclear-weapon Powers is also an integral part of the international climate, and a very important one at that. Apart from the reflections of Superpower rivalries across the globe, especially in the areas where the confrontation of those two Powers is active or latent, much of the rest of the world might live without the tensions and fears stemming from such rivalries. If "realism" entails the impossibility to engage in serious multilateral efforts, but rather enhances

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rivalry and competition, then such a brand of realism in fact negates the very principles on which the United Nations, and this Committee, were evolved. We have been repeatedly reminded, during this first part of our session, that the Committee must concentrate on what is "possible"; but what is presented to us as being "possible" are measures that will not hamper the continuing arms build-up, especially in the nuclear field. We are told of the frightful consequences of the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, but those who continue to proliferate vertically do not seem anxious to fulfil the commitments they have entered into, both of a declaratory character and of binding legal force. The resolutions passed by the General Assembly in the field of disarmament, particularly the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament are the political expression of such commitments, and their reiteration in the forum of the CD should not be taken as a nuisance, but simply as a reminder of the goals which all of us agreed to pursue. To downgrade the value of the obligations and responsibilities embodied in the Final Document and to restrict the scope of what is considered to be "possible" constitutes, in fact, a step backwards that could eventually undermine the credibility and authority of the Committee on Disarmament.

Obviously political will is not a unilateral phenomenon, and abstract appeals will not produce results. During the first part of this session of the Committee on Disarmament, my delegation and many others have tried to make the case for urgent measures of nuclear disarmament, not only because all members of the Committee have solemnly agreed that such measures are urgently needed, but because they are in the interest of the world community, or to use a much-repeated expression, because the vital interests of each of the nations of the world are involved. The strategic nuclear equation is not a matter of parochial concern; whether we like it or not, all nations have a vital stake in questions of security, because the existence of the nuclear weapon renders the whole world insecure. "Realism" must embrace those considerations, as much as it must take into account the bilateral relationships that have generated the present situation. As long as these ideas and concepts are not understood for what they really mean -- that is, the legitimate expression of the concern of mankind in general and of every State in particular for its security and survival -- the multilateral machinery for disarmament negotiations will continue to struggle within the vicious circle of the "possible" and the "realistic".

My delegation dares to hope that the first part of the 1981 session of the CD will prove to have been a step forward in this conceptual direction, and that the very important debate on the nuclear test ban and on nuclear disarmament will have some impact on the political will, and hence on the policies, of all members of the Committee, particularly the nuclear-weapon Powers and the members of the two main military alliances. We further hope that this trend, which we consider positive, will continue to develop in the second half of the session. If such hopes materialize, we may indeed consider the result of these past weeks to have been fruitful. If not, the concern of the international community may quickly turn into alarm.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Ambassador Kömives, the distinguished representative of Hungary, today introduced on behalf of a group of socialist countries a document containing a detailed statement by the socialist countries on the results of the spring part of the 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament.

The Soviet delegation is taking the floor principally in order to thank the delegations which have shown an interest in the work of the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and in the new initiatives put forward by L.I. Brezhnev, initiatives aimed at achieving concrete measures of disarmament.

During the present session we have continued to work towards the earliest achievement of agreement on all issues discussed in the Committee; this is stated in detail in the document circulated in the Committee on behalf of the socialist countries.

With regard to the negotiations on specific disarmament measures which are taking place in various working groups of the Committee, the Soviet delegation has endeavoured to contribute to the earliest possible achievement of the objectives reflected in the group's mandates. We believe that the adoption of a politically realistic approach to matters would result in considerably greater progress being made towards a solution of the questions of the prohibition of nuclear, chemical and radiological weapons and other new types of weapons of mass destruction and the strengthening of security guarantees for non-nuclear States. The socialist countries' common approach to these questions is also reflected in detail in the document I have mentioned.

I should like to say a few words about the organization of the Committee's work. Ambassador McPhail of Canada, Ambassador Walker of Australia and Ambassador de Souza e Silva of Brazil, speaking before me, have already opened what amounts to a serious discussion on this subject. I should like to continue that discussion.

It is not uncommon to hear criticisms of the Committee's work during the 1960s and 1970s, up to the latest expansion of the Committee's membership in 1979. Yet more than two years have already passed since then, and no specific disarmament measures have been added to those agreed upon during the 1960s and 1970s.

What, then, is the matter? Perhaps the changes made within the Committee were inadequate? Perhaps its membership -- only 40 States -- is too small? Perhaps the Committee's members have run out of ideas and cannot imagine what type of weapons could be prohibited in the foreseeable future? Perhaps there are shortcomings in the technical services provided by the Secretariat?

None of those things, of course, is the answer. Many changes have been introduced in the Committee's work, and the Committee is continuing to perfect its working methods. The informal meetings which have become common practice, consultations by the Chairman of the Committee, placing the centre of gravity of disarmament negotiations in the ad hoc working groups -- all these are very important aids to productive work.

As for the Committee's membership, 40 States is not such a small number, the more so as the delegations represent all the principal groups of States in the world.

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The fact that socialist countries and western countries are represented here in the Committee on an equal footing, and the fact that an authoritative group of non-aligned and neutral countries is taking part in our work, create the conditions for working out measures that faithfully reflect the world community's aspirations. It is important that we continue to work on a consensus basis. It goes without saying that to introduce such words as a "majority" or a "minority" of delegations, "many" or "few" delegations, into the Committee's vocabulary is altogether out of place. It does not help the Committee in its work.

Furthermore, a not inconsiderable number of representatives of countries which are not members of the Committee take part in our meetings, and this, of course, gives the Committee's work still greater weight and authority. In fact, nearly 50 States have taken part in the spring part of the Committee's current session.

Nor should we belittle the Committee members' powers of imagination. A number of extremely pertinent proposals have been tabled and are awaiting decision, and further proposals of the same kind are being made in statements by the representatives of States.

Nor is there anything wrong in general with the technical servicing of the Committee. We are being assisted by highly qualified specialists in the Secretariat, and I should like to take the opportunity of thanking them on behalf of the Soviet delegation.

The main reason why we have not achieved results that might justly be regarded as a fresh contribution to mankind's storehouse of attainments in the field of disarmament is, of course, the fact that those who want to raise tension in international relations and conduct affairs from positions of confrontation are once more at work.

We do not propose to speak about political will or the significance of that factor in negotiations, for we have expressed our views on this subject in a number of previous statements. The Brazilian representative spoke on the subject today and to a large extent we share his views.

I only want to say that it is difficult to expect success in the struggle against the arms race when decisions are being taken to step up the arms race and when the implementation of agreements already reached is being hampered.

Unless we overcome these negative trends that have appeared of late in international life we are, of course, unlikely to see substantial or dramatic advances in the Committee's work.

However, even in today's difficult conditions, more effective use could be made of the possibilities available to us in the Committee by mobilizing the will of those who participate in its work. Every time we gather for another session we hear in almost every speech expressions of the desire urgently to tackle the solution of the most pressing disarmament problems. Military expenditures devour

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the funds that could go to meet peaceful needs. The ever new attainments of science and technology are used to feed the fires of war, and the flames are perpetually being fanned by the proponents of various theories of the balance of terror. And how is the Committee fighting these fires? Is it, perhaps, skilfully isolating areas of conflagration and extinguishing the blaze with a powerful jet of water? No, we seem rather to be trying to put out the flames with tumblersful of water poured once a week onto one or another seat of fire in rhythm with the work of the Working Groups.

In this connection I should like to draw my colleagues' attention to the following facts. Despite the urgency and priority nature of disarmament problems, despite the world community's appeals for the speeding up of disarmament negotiations — which are illustrated, incidentally, in the letters addressed to the Committee, some of which Ambassador Jaipal has read to us — of the 52 weeks in the year, the Committee on Disarmament meets, on the average, for 20 weeks, and conducts negotiations, which is what it is strictly required to do, for a considerably shorter period — 10 to 12 weeks. In view of the urgency of the problem, is not the time we spend negotiating, gentlemen, a little on the short side? And what particularly disturbs us — the Soviet delegation — is the tendency to curtail the period of work of the Committee. To be precise, in 1979 the Committee met for 21 weeks and in 1980 the period was already reduced to 19 weeks; the 1981 spring session of the Committee on Disarmament has been the shortest, two weeks shorter than the 1979 session and two days shorter than the 1980 spring session. What is the matter, gentlemen? How can we explain this trend? We are going to have to explain it to the world community.

We have too many organizational shortcomings. The representatives of Canada, Australia and Brazil have already spoken about them. We are, to put it bluntly, frittering away our time on all kinds of secondary issues, on prolonged and futile procedural discussions. All this is substantially impeding progress in disarmament negotiations even under existing conditions. We must resolutely eliminate the shortcomings in the organization of our work.

We believe that these shortcomings can be corrected with the help of our rules of procedure. And this depends largely on us, on the delegations in the Committee. The Soviet delegation proposes that all these questions should be specially discussed at the summer session, more particularly in the light of the discussion on the agenda item concerning the consideration of methods of reviewing the membership of the Committee.

The Soviet delegation has a number of specific ideas for improving the efficiency of the Committee's work. These ideas also relate to the question of what should be the duration of the work of the Committee as a multilateral negotiating body. We have ideas concerning the level of representation of States in the Committee and measures for increasing the effectiveness of negotiations in the ad hoc working groups. We shall expound these ideas in detail in the course of the summer part of this year's session. We would ask other delegations, too, to think about these questions.

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The Soviet delegation is prepared to continue to co-operate actively with all participants in our multilateral negotiating body on disarmament issues. We have in our hands a reliable compass to help us find the way towards the attainment of new, substantial results in the sphere of the limitation of the arms race and disarmament. I am speaking of the decision of the recent 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. We are convinced that productive work by the Committee on Disarmament will facilitate the implementation of the initiatives put forward at that Congress.

In conclusion, I should like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your efficient conduct of the Committee's work during the month of April, and to take the opportunity of expressing our gratitude to the Chairmen of the Working Groups -- Ambassador Kömives of the Hungarian People's Republic, Ambassador Garcia Robles of Mexico, Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden and Minister Ciarrapico of Italy -- for their important contribution to the Committee's work. At the same time, I should like to convey our gratitude to all delegations for co-operating with us during the spring part of the session.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the chair and also to the Chairmen of the Working Groups.

Mr. MOHAMAD SIDIK (Indonesia): Mr. Chairman, as we are approaching the end of the first part of the 1981 session of this Committee, I would like to review briefly the progress we have made during the last few months. In doing so I would like to limit myself to certain aspects which in the view of my delegation merit the special attention of the Committee. Though some progress has been made on some issues, it is sad to note that the on going negotiations on items 1 and 2 of the agenda on a nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, have not led to the establishment of the respective ad hoc working groups as proposed by the Group of 21 at the very beginning of this year's session. Although the distinguished Ambassador of Algeria in his intervention on 16 April stated the views of the Group of 21, in view of the highest priority accorded to these two items I would like to emphasize once again the urgent need to come to grips with the matter. Other delegations have stressed this need in their eloquent interventions. It is the earnest hope of my delegation that at the beginning of the second part of this year's session, we shall be able to agree on the establishment of the working groups. If it fails to do this the Committee on Disarmament will probably not be able to report anything concrete to the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly to be held in 1982, when the performance of the Committee on Disarmament is certainly going to be assessed -- whether its existence can be justified or not.

As is well known, the question of nuclear disarmament has been the deep concern of the international community since the inception of the United Nations. To disregard the growing international concern, especially of the non-nuclear-weapon States, at the danger of nuclear arms is tantamount to denying mankind's right. For the right to live in peace and security is a fundamental human right. The accumulation of nuclear weapons has reached a point at which the world military balance is so extremely dangerous that an accident is all that is needed to wipe out

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world civilization. This situation is further aggravated by recent political and military developments which are generating a new upward spiral in the nuclear arms race. It has been said again and again that perception of national security by building up military might and continuously increasing nuclear weapons, quantitatively as well as qualitatively, would only give a semblance of security. For the other major militarily significant States would surely not remain idle if, according to their perception such a military build-up by one of them had exceeded their own. Therefore my delegation continues to share the view of many others that the maintenance of international peace and security should not be based on the balance of terror, on parity of nuclear capability. Pending genuine nuclear disarmament, which alone can remove the threat of a nuclear war, we would like to see among the initial measures the discontinuance of all nuclear-weapon tests in all environments, the cessation of the further accumulation of additional nuclear weapons and the conclusion of a SALT III agreement on real disarmament measures and the non-use of nuclear weapons.

Stressing the importance of the general phase of nuclear disarmament, the Honorable Gerard Smith, the former United States chief negotiator in the SALT I agreements, in his keynote speech delivered on 17 December 1980 to the annual meeting of the Arms Control Association stated: "If humans are to survive much longer, there is no other way than that of international control of nuclear weapons". And he continued that, "it is my conviction that the ultimate linkage lies in the relationship between the two Super-Powers which between them can destroy civilization and are thus in a sense common trustees for the control over the explosive power of the sun."

Such assertions reflect the dangerous situation that threatens us and the need for drastic measures to overcome the threat and implicitly acquiesce in the heavy responsibility to be shouldered by the Superpowers on the question of maintaining international peace and security.

Aware that delegations have already familiarized themselves with the contents of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and with the report of the United Nations Secretary-General containing a comprehensive study on nuclear weapons by experts, my delegation feels that it might also be useful to bring to the attention of the Committee an article which appeared in the International Herald Tribune of 24 March 1981 containing a physician's opinion on nuclear war.

In that article it was reported that more than 100 well known and outstanding physicians from the United States, the Soviet Union, France, Great Britain and other countries had come together recently in Warrenton, Virginia (United States of America). The most important and remarkable fact was that from the meeting of physicians from States with different social systems, an agreed message emerged, i.e. "that society cannot survive nuclear war and that no strategic policy should be based on the idea that physicians will somehow save enough people to continue civilized life". The article further reported that among the 11 high-ranking physicians from the Soviet Union was a Dr. Chazov, a cardiologist, who was the Director General of the National Cardiology Research Centre in Moscow. In his statement Dr. Chazov said -- and I quote again from the same source: "Some of the military and public functionaries and even scientists are trying to diminish the

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danger of the nuclear arms race, to minimize the possible consequences of a nuclear war. Statements appear that a nuclear war can be won, that a limited nuclear war can be waged, that humanity and the biosphere will still persist even in conditions of total catastrophe". And he added further that Soviet studies have shown that a one-megaton nuclear explosion in a Soviet city will kill about 300,000 people immediately and wound or burn another 300,000. "Eighty percent of the doctors will be killed, hospitals will be ruined and drugs will be destroyed" said Dr. Chazov of such a nuclear attack. Similar remarks made by a Dr. Bernard Lown, a Harvard University cardiologist, who is the president of the physicians' group, said *inter alia*: "A 'mythology' is being created that nuclear war will not occur, or that if it does, it will not be extensive. A nuclear attack on just one United States city the size of Boston would more than exhaust the entire medical resources of the nation just in treating burn victims".

I have quoted the article in the International Herald Tribune at some length because it reflects views other than the political and military ones with which we are mainly familiar.

The international meeting of physicians in Warrenton spoke about a one-megaton nuclear-bomb explosion; the question now is how many megatons are the destructive power of the nuclear bombs now stacked in the military arsenals of nuclear-weapon States?

The message emanating from the international meeting of physicians was quite clear, i.e. that there will be no hope for us if a nuclear war breaks out. The tragedy and the damage that such a war will engender cannot be imagined. The use of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world would have a global impact, their devastating effects in terms of nuclear fall-out, world-wide economic and social disruption, ecological changes, etc., etc., would not be confined to the belligerents alone. In this connection I should like to cite a pertinent question which was raised by the leader of the Indian delegation, Ambassador Venkateswaran, in his statement on 24 March last: "Is it permissible, under any recognized principle of international law or accepted norms of international behaviour, to pursue one's security interests in a manner that endangers the security of third States which are not politically or militarily involved in the confrontation? The answer is clearly in the negative." It is therefore understandable that non-nuclear-weapon States do not share, indeed oppose, a concept of national security based on the philosophy and perception of nuclear arms as a deterrent and for defensive purposes. It also explains why the militarily less significant States insist on participating in negotiations affecting international peace and security.

Let me say a few words on the CTBT. We are told that the trilateral forum offers the best way to pursue the matter. My delegation does not doubt the importance of that forum; however, this should not preclude the Committee on Disarmament from initiating the process of negotiation on this matter, taking of course into account the results achieved so far by the States involved in the trilateral talks. The Group of 21 has already indicated that paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly should be used as a point of departure in these negotiations. Let us remind ourselves that in the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, which was adopted by the General Assembly by consensus, we have undertaken to implement its provisions through concrete actions.

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In his address to the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Foreign Minister of Indonesia, H.E. Prof. Dr. Mochtar Kusumaatmadja inter alia said:

"Total disarmament would be possible in a perfect world. As we are living in a less than perfect world it is necessary to lower our sights and to be content with the second best solution.

"Bared to its essentials the problem of disarmament or the arms race comprises three fundamental aspects:

- (1) the spiritual, cultural or motivational aspects,
- (2) the physical or mechanical aspects and
- (3) the spatial aspects of the problem.

"It is striking, if not symbolic of the limitation of our role as statesmen and diplomats, that this special session is mainly, if not only concerned with the physical and spatial aspects of the problems, leaving the examination of the causes of human conflict unattended.

"We are thus in a way skirting the real or fundamental issues of the resolution of human conflicts.

"If we examine the various international instruments or agreements dealing with the easing of international tension and conflict, the Helsinki agreement appears to be the only one dealing also with the non-physical aspects of the problem.

"Our task being restricted to (1) the reduction of arms or the physical means of conflict and (2) the spatial aspects of disarmament, let us take stock of these problems and the various ways we have dealt with them.

"In our present efforts the highest priority must of necessity be given to nuclear disarmament. If limitation of conventional arms is not given the emphasis it perhaps deserves, the matter is, given the recognition of the legitimate right of self defence, not as pressing as the case of nuclear disarmament, simply because of the immense destructive power of nuclear arms."

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I should like to convey to you a message from Ambassador Sani, the leader of this delegation, that he regrets very much not being able to attend this meeting, owing to circumstances beyond his control. But I am sure I will be reflecting his sentiments in availing myself of this opportunity to express to you and the distinguished Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Working Groups, my delegation's deepest appreciation and profound gratitude for the efficient and effective way our negotiations have been conducted, and also my sincere thanks to my distinguished colleagues for their contributions during the discussions during the first part of this session.

My delegation's gratitude also goes to Ambassador Jaipal and all the members of the Secretariat, including the interpreters, without whose dedication this spring session would not have proceeded as smoothly as it did.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Indonesia, Mr. Mohamad Sidik, for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me, to the Chairmen of the Working Groups and to the Secretariat as well.

The next, and I would propose the last, speaker during our morning meeting is the distinguished representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Ahmad. I give him the floor, and afterwards I would propose that we adjourn and take up our meeting again in the afternoon, at a time I shall announce after Mr. Ahmad has delivered his intervention.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to convey to you the satisfaction of the Pakistan delegation at seeing you preside over the Committee on Disarmament. During the past three weeks you have demonstrated in full measure imagination and firmness, both indispensable for guiding our work towards concrete and genuine progress on the various items on the agenda of the CD.

This concluding meeting of our spring session is an appropriate occasion briefly to review the work done in the Committee during the past 11 weeks. We welcome the prompt resumption of negotiations in ad hoc working groups on four of our agenda items and the sincere efforts made by the Chairmen of these working groups and by the majority of delegations to register progress in these negotiations. On the other hand, my delegation shares the general disappointment that it did not prove possible to establish negotiating mechanisms on two items of the agenda which have the highest priority and importance. Moreover, even on the issues under negotiation, the CD was prevented from achieving any substantial advance towards agreement.

My delegation had expected that by this time the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States would have made considerable progress towards evolving a common approach which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. Pakistan submitted a working paper, contained in document CD/161, to facilitate this process of elaborating a "common approach". However, some delegations insisted that a preliminary exercise should be conducted to identify "various features" of the existing unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon States and other proposals on the subject. We agreed to this in a spirit of accommodation. The negotiations in the Working Group and the untiring efforts of its Chairman led to the evolution of a paper on which a consensus was apparently possible. Unfortunately, at the eleventh hour, one of the delegations which had initiated the exercise chose to abandon it simply because the outcome of the negotiations did not fully conform to its own preconceived notions of what ought to be the result of the exercise. I have referred to this unfortunate sequence not merely because it has resulted in an inordinate waste of time and effort of the Working Group but because it has shaken confidence in the claims of certain major Powers that they possess the political will to develop negotiated agreements in this Committee on various disarmament issues.

We hope that when we resume our session in the summer, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances will turn to the task of negotiating a "common approach" to be included in an international instrument. Several interesting statements have been made at our recent meetings on this subject, including those by the representatives of the Netherlands and Sweden. I would like to reiterate three points which my delegation considers as being fundamental to the question of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

First, it is essential that the obligation of the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States should be categorical and unambiguous. The only existing declaration which is satisfactory from this point of view is the one made by the People's Republic of China. The other four declarations reflect, in the words of the Swedish representative, not "the interests" of the non-nuclear-weapon States but the security preoccupations of the nuclear-weapon States themselves. The debate in the Committee and the Working Group, especially the statement made here by the Netherlands on 14 April and the response of the Soviet Union, indicate that the qualifications and exceptions included in the declarations of the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States are mutually unacceptable. Nor are they acceptable to the majority of non-nuclear-weapon States. Therefore, if an agreement is to be achieved on a "common approach", other alternatives need to be explored. The formulation contained in the draft convention presented by the Pakistan delegation in document CD/10 is one such alternative. Another possible approach is the one indicated by my delegation in its statement of 24 March 1981 in the Committee to the effect that the only qualification to be made by the nuclear-weapon States should be one reserving the right of self-defence against an attack by another nuclear-weapon State. The representatives of the Netherlands and Sweden, in their statements of 14 and 16 April respectively, have also noted this as a common preoccupation of the major nuclear Powers.

Secondly, as a matter of principle, the arrangement for security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States should not be yet another instrument of nuclear non-proliferation. I have dwelt on this point in previous statements and will not, therefore, repeat our views. What I would like to say is that the non-participation of certain non-nuclear-weapon States in arrangements such as the NPT or nuclear-weapon-free zones is the consequence of diverse political and other considerations. If such non-nuclear-weapon States are excluded from an international arrangement on security assurances, as they would be under the United States and United Kingdom declarations, would they not be within their rights to deduce that the threat of use of nuclear weapons is held out against them at least implicitly by the nuclear-weapon States? Thus the overriding preoccupation of certain States with non-proliferation may in fact fuel rather than frustrate the possibilities of nuclear proliferation.

Thirdly, we consider it indispensable that security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States should be extended in an international instrument of a legally binding character. Unilateral declarations, no matter how solemnly made are, after all, statements of governmental policy and can be changed or withdrawn unilaterally. An international instrument can take various forms, ranging from an international convention to a resolution of the Security Council under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. However, a Council resolution which merely notes the unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon States would not create the legal commitments that are essential for any credible arrangement to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States.

Another item on which progress is possible is that of chemical weapons. Owing in large measure to the energetic and imaginative leadership provided by Ambassador Lidgard, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has held in-depth discussions on all the important aspects of a future chemical weapons convention. These discussions reveal a considerable broadening of the areas of agreement and much better understanding of differences wherever they exist. It is the considered view of my delegation -- a view which is shared by many other members -- that progress

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

towards reconciling the existing differences and building upon the areas of agreement will not be possible unless the Working Group is provided with a specific mandate to commence negotiations on the text of a multilateral convention for the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. Such matters as the scope of the treaty, the declaration and destruction of stocks, the system of verification and complaints and measures for protection and confidence-building require political decisions, on the basis of which technical solutions would have to be elaborated. My delegation joins in sharing the hope expressed by the distinguished Ambassador of the Netherlands that the major Powers will in this context take the same "courageous political decision at the highest level that opened the road in the late 1960s to a breakthrough with regard to a biological weapons convention".

The Pakistan delegation has participated actively in the negotiations to elaborate a convention prohibiting radiological weapons. The most fundamental difficulty in these negotiations is that the sponsors of the proposals have not been able convincingly to define a radiological weapon or to demonstrate that such a weapon can in fact be developed and actually used. I believe that the members of this Committee have a right to be assured that what we are seeking to prohibit is indeed a real rather than an imaginary weapon. Pakistan also shares the preoccupation of those who have stated that the provisions of a radiological weapons convention should not in any way legitimize the existence or possible use of nuclear weapons.

My delegation also shares the view of the Swedish delegation that the most feasible way in which radiation could be used for hostile purposes, without recourse to nuclear weapons, is through an attack on nuclear power facilities. Such facilities, which are in a nascent stage in most developing countries, would provide an attractive and vulnerable target in any armed conflict and produce the very effects which the joint proposal of the United States and the USSR on radiological weapons seeks to prohibit. Therefore, the convention on radiological weapons must include a provision prohibiting an attack on civilian nuclear facilities. Indeed, my delegation is of the view that the proposal deserves adoption as a legal norm in its own right.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, under the able leadership of Ambassador García Robles, has rightly devoted most of its time to consideration of the measures of disarmament to be included in the programme. This exercise has, unfortunately, demonstrated that some members of the CD would like to restrict the comprehensive programme to a mere reiteration of the provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly on Disarmament and of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade. My delegation agrees that these two documents will provide valuable inputs into the

(Hir. Ahmad, Pakistan)

comprehensive programme. But it is apparent from the concept and objective of the programme that more far-reaching measures, which go beyond the immediate and short-term phase and cover the stage of the reduction and the elimination of the means of warfare, are also essential. The draft treaties on general and complete disarmament submitted in 1962 by the United States and the Soviet Union provide valuable guidance for the elaboration of such measures as would ensure the comprehensiveness of the programme. My delegation will make specific proposals on this aspect when the Committee resumes its work in the summer.

The Pakistan delegation shares the disappointment expressed by the Group of 21 that the Committee did not find it possible to establish ad hoc working groups to undertake negotiations on two items of the highest importance for the CD -- the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and a nuclear test ban. Nevertheless, we consider that the informal meetings held on this subject have been important for both symbolic and substantive reasons. There can be no question about the urgency of nuclear disarmament and the danger of continued reliance on the uncertain and inequitable doctrines of nuclear deterrence and strategic parity between the Superpowers and their allies. We continue to hope that at the summer session the Committee will find it possible to approve the creation of an ad hoc working group on nuclear disarmament with the realistic mandate that has been proposed by the Group of 21.

The discussion regarding the item on the nuclear test ban has also been interesting, if incomplete. During these discussions a number of specific questions were addressed to the three nuclear-weapon States which have been engaged in separate negotiations on this subject. We are disappointed that these States did not find it possible to respond to these queries. These questions have been circulated by the Group of 21 in the Committee this morning. I hope that in the not too distant future the trilateral negotiators will, individually and collectively, break their studied silence and enlighten the Committee by a response to these questions which reflect the legitimate concerns of the members of the Group of 21. A failure of communication on these important issues would represent a significant setback to the evolution of mutual trust and confidence between the major nuclear Powers and the community of non-aligned and neutral States.

When we commenced this session, the expectations of my delegation about the possibilities of progress were not overly optimistic. We understand that the present international situation is not the most suitable for rapid progress in disarmament negotiations. It is our hope that international relations, especially the relations between the two Superpowers, will develop in a more positive direction in the coming months. Pakistan favours a resumption of the dialogue on arms control and disarmament as well as the resolution of outstanding disputes and conflicts that have recently exacerbated international tensions.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

In this context, we have noted with satisfaction the affirmation made by Ambassador Flowerree of the United States in this Committee that the United States will continue to observe the provisions of the SALT II agreement provided the Soviet Union does so as well.

Yet, despite the difficult international situation, it remains the conviction of my delegation that sufficiently broad political parameters exist within which the CD can make progress towards the objectives of disarmament. We have sought to identify these possibilities in our statements in the formal and informal sessions of the Committee. Unfortunately, the major Powers do not seem to be in the frame of mind to grasp these realistic possibilities for progress on the items on the CD's agenda. On the contrary, we have noted an unfortunate penchant among certain delegations to exploit the present situation for the purposes of propaganda and posturing. This is not the purpose for which we are convened in this multilateral negotiating forum. The CD must live up to the trust which was reposed in its membership by the international community and respond to the sincere desire of the peoples of the world to move away from the threat of doomsday through a process of genuine disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Ahmad, for his statement. I thank him also for the kind words he addressed to me.

This exhausts the time available to us during this morning meeting. I thank Mr. Shitemi, the representative of Kenya, who would be the next speaker on my list, for being prepared to be the first speaker at our afternoon meeting.

It is now 1.15 p.m.; we have overrun our time by 15 minutes, which I think is a first response to some speakers we have heard during our morning meeting who have said that we should work more and longer. May I then suggest to the Committee that we make it possible to continue our plenary meeting this afternoon at 3.15 sharp? I would ask you to assist me in being in a position to open the meeting at that time, as I have proposed -- 3.15 p.m. -- and I will then give the floor to the next speaker on our list, the representative of Kenya, Mr. Shitemi. After that, we shall have the summary reports of the Chairmen of the Working Groups. May I take it that this is acceptable to the Committee?

It was so decided.

The meeting was suspended at 1.15 p.m. and resumed at 3.15 p.m.

Mr. SHITEMI (Kenya): Mr. Chairman, permit me right from the outset to reaffirm what we have already said before, that the work of this Committee has been very much enhanced by the skilful and mature way in which you have guided it during the tenure of your chairmanship.

As the first part of the 1981 session of this Committee comes to an end, it seems to me to be an appropriate time to look back and attempt an assessment of the achievements of the Committee on Disarmament. While expressing our satisfaction and appreciation for the considerable amount of substantive work that has been accomplished by the four ad hoc working groups, my delegation cannot hide its disappointment with the slow rate at which the discussions on items 1 and 2 of the Committee's agenda are progressing. We had sincerely hoped that the Committee would be able to establish the two ad hoc working groups on the two items before the end of the spring session. Unfortunately, and for the reasons that are known to all delegations in this Committee, this was not possible. We remain hopeful, however, that wiser counsels will prevail and that when we reconvene in June we shall be able to establish the two ad hoc working groups to start discussions with appropriate mandates.

Let me now direct my attention to one aspect of the spring session that has been of considerable interest and concern during our deliberations regarding the doctrine of military deterrence. We return to this difficult and delicate subject because we know it as a central factor in understanding national security as a concept. The entire history of the human race is interspersed with wars and military deterrence and there seems to be no end in sight. Even as I speak now, there are several nations at war.

The concept of military deterrence was probably born when a national or tribal council first realized that its security did not lie in periodically defeating unfriendly neighbouring nations or tribes, but in having the undoubted capability of doing so. Deterrence as a doctrine, therefore, is perhaps as old as man himself. But what is new is man's present capacity to destroy almost every living thing on planet earth, including himself.

It has been suggested to us that the main reason for having such destructive nuclear weapons in one's arsenals is to deter would-be aggressors. Having, as it were, put in place guard dogs and alarms, the would-be aggressor would hopefully not dare to attack. All nations face this dilemma of how effective and what size of national defence against external threat they should maintain. My delegation is grateful for the frankness with which this subject was tackled by one of the delegations in this Committee and for the courage of that delegation in admitting this serious dilemma. It is our view that the insecurity that drives nations to arm themselves against external threats ought to be identified and dealt with through the machinery of the United Nations. We are all victims of insecurity, and whether our reaction to it is to develop nuclear weapons or stock huge supplies of conventional weapons (the alarms and the watch dogs, if you like), the intention is the same: namely, to deter an external aggressor. There is really, therefore, no reason for self-righteousness on the part of any one of us.

(Mr. Shitemi, Kenya)

National insecurity has led to the belief that instant readiness in defence or retaliation can offer the only security alternative to international peace-keeping machinery which does not yet really exist. This instant readiness in defence and retaliation is fraught with enormous dangers. The weapons involved are terminal and we have already reached overkill levels. If these weapons are ever used again and on a large universal scale, that will be the end of human life as we know it. To lean on such weapons that have the capacity to destroy not only the aggressor but the owner as well, is a mirage, in fact, a straw. This is the reason why we urge the nuclear-weapon States to join us in this multilateral negotiating body to elaborate a treaty that would ban these terrible weapons from the face of the earth, so that national security based on mutual trust can be helped in the process to grow. We cannot continue for very long along this perilous road of deterrence and mistrust and the subsequent arms race, without coming to serious grief. We have the means of our own utter destruction and, like the honey bee, if ever we are foolish enough to use the ultimate weapon, we shall perish.

Let me now direct my brief observations to the work of some of the ad hoc working groups. We all recognize the obvious fact that, apart from nuclear weapons, chemical weapons are the next most destructive weapons in existence today and, consequently, deserve the Committee's urgent attention. In this connection, my delegation would like to pay very warm tribute to Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden for the leadership, devotion and the contribution that he has made as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. Under his chairmanship, the Working Group has made a detailed examination of the elements to be included in the convention. The Working Group has explored various alternatives on the scope of the convention. Although none of these alternatives commanded the support of all delegations, my delegation is of the view that the scope of prohibition should be comprehensive, that is, a convention on chemical weapons should prohibit development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, retention and transfer of chemical weapons. We also support the inclusion of the ban on the use of chemical weapons. We do not share views expressed by certain delegations to the effect that the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons would detract from the obligations assumed by States under the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The question of verification of compliance has been, and still remains, the most difficult to resolve, owing to the rather complicated nature of the issues involved. We have listened with great interest to the views expressed by various delegations on this particular subject in the Ad Hoc Working Group, as well as in this Committee. We have noted the reservations made by a number of delegations on the proposal for international on-site verification measures. It has been argued that these measures might be used to the detriment of the national interests of States; others have supported a combination of national and international means of verification. My delegation supports the latter position and reiterates the indispensability of the international character of the system of verification to be embodied in the convention. This will give assurances to the parties to the convention that its provisions will be observed. It will be the surest way to establish trust and confidence among the parties affected.

(Mr. Shitemi, Kenya)

A retrospective examination of the discussions on this subject in the Working Group, as well as with the participation of experts, clearly shows that the question of chemical weapons has been extensively explored and issues have now been identified and clarified. My delegation feels that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons already has enough material and working papers to move to the next level of negotiation. To start serious negotiations on this item, the Working Group will need to be equipped with an expanded mandate. We hope this will be our first order of business when the Committee resumes its work this coming summer.

In its resolution 35/156 G, the General Assembly, inter alia, called upon the Committee on Disarmament "to continue negotiations with a view to elaborating a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons and to report on the results to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session". We are also reminded that the second special session devoted to disarmament is approaching, and we are therefore expected to show the fruits of our efforts. The conclusion of a treaty on radiological weapons, although it is not a disarmament measure in the real sense of the word, will contribute to our disarmament efforts. My delegation has noted with satisfaction that since the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons was established last year, it has held extensive discussions on the main elements to be included in a future treaty on radiological weapons. The Working Group has already concluded an extensive analysis on areas such as the definition of radiological weapons, the scope of prohibition, activities and obligations, as well as compliance and verification. We have observed that despite the efforts, many problems still remain to be resolved. The Ad Hoc Working Group has yet to find a suitable definition of radiological weapons that would meet the interests of all the delegations. My delegation shares the concern and the anxiety shown by many delegations that the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons should not be viewed as legalizing or conferring legitimacy upon the possession of nuclear weapons. Indeed, we consider the conclusion of a treaty on radiological weapons as the first step towards the banning of nuclear weapons themselves. We have studied the working paper contained in CD/RW/WP.20, in which the Chairman has consolidated various proposals in a single text, and we find it to be a suitable document which can, and hopefully will, form the basis of our negotiations during the second part of the Committee's 1981 session. We want to take this opportunity to express our satisfaction and our sincere gratitude at the way Ambassador Kömives has conducted the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Working Group in his capacity as Chairman. I agree he has wide shoulders.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons has spent considerable time discussing the issues involved. My delegation appreciates the tactful and fair manner in which the Chairman of this Group, Mr. Antonio Ciarrapico, handled his assignment. We are nevertheless disappointed with the fact that nuclear-weapon States have not been able to revise the unilateral stands they have taken. We believe that non-nuclear-weapon States which have declared their region a nuclear-weapon-free zone and are Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty have indicated quite clearly their abhorrence of possession of nuclear weapons and have

(Mr. Shitemi, Kenya)

surrendered part of their right to self-defence. Further conditions being imposed on them is an evident lack of sensitivity to their obvious position of disadvantage; whatever their worth, these assurances should be unequivocal and legally binding. The surest way to secure lasting security assurances must be through verifiable nuclear disarmament to ensure compliance. Nations which have proved untrustworthy in the past cannot expect to be trusted in the future, however sincere their promises. Who -- if I may be allowed to digress a little -- would trust security guarantees from the Republic of South Africa against nuclear attack or threat of attack of a neighbour now that it is believed to be a nuclear-weapon State? It continues its aggression against its neighbours; it kills and destroys property at will. At the birth of the nation of Angola, South Africa tried by military means to install a puppet régime and was rebuffed by Angolans supported by the rest of Africa and its brave Cuban friends.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, if I may move on to this subject, has been working quite well, and we believe that it is on the right path under the able chairmanship of Ambassador García Robles, and given a spirit of compromise and accommodation and goodwill, we should have a document proclaiming a programme of disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Kenya, Mr. Shitemi, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me.

The distinguished Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Working Group on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons and of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons are also inscribed to speak today in connection with the activities of their respective Groups, giving their assessment of the work done in those Groups.

I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, Minister Ciarrapico.

Mr. CIARRAPICO (Italy): Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure and an honour to present orally to the Committee on Disarmament a summary account by the Chairman on the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances during the first part of the 1981 session.

In accordance with the decision adopted by the Committee on ad hoc working groups at its 105th plenary meeting on 12 February 1981 (CD/151), the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances was re-established to continue to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Working Group held 10 meetings between 17 February and 21 April 1981 and also conducted informal consultations through its Chairman during that period. In carrying out its mandate, the Working Group took into account the relevant provision contained in paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and also took note of the relevant General Assembly resolutions, 35/154 and 35/155, as contained in document CD/140. At its first meeting, on 17 February 1981, the Working Group decided that all documentation which had been before the previous ad hoc working groups should continue to serve as reference material for the current session, as listed in document CD/SA/WP.1/Rev.1. It also

(Mr. Ciarrapico, Italy)

decided at the same meeting to focus its attention on the examination of the substance of the assurances given, on the understanding that an agreement on substance could facilitate an agreement on form. After a general exchange of views at subsequent meetings, the Chairman submitted to the Working Group a programme of work for the current session, taking into account various views expressed and proposals submitted during the course of deliberations, including proposals made by Bulgaria and Pakistan, as contained in documents CD/153 and CD/161 respectively. The programme of work proposed by the Chairman was adopted by the Working Group at its sixth meeting, on 24 March, as document CD/SA/WP.5, principally containing two stages of work, namely, stage one: identification of the various features of the assurances not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, and stage two: consideration of possible alternatives which can be explored in the search for a "common approach" or "formula". In an interpretative statement of the Chairman, it was pointed out that this document would provide a flexible framework for future negotiations within the Group and allow any view which is relevant in the search for a "common approach" or "common formula" to be expressed.

Subsequently the Working Group embarked on its substantive work, beginning with stage one of the programme of work. In the course of deliberations, various views were expressed and different proposals, including some tabulations and outlines, were submitted, with a view to assisting in the identification of the various elements contained in the unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon States and in the proposals made by non-nuclear-weapon States. In order to facilitate the work of the Group, the Chairman was asked to produce a paper which might synthesize the views and positions held by delegations. The Chairman took up the task entrusted to him and after intensive consultations with delegations, particularly with those most concerned, the Chairman's working paper CD/SA/CRP.5 was submitted to the Working Group for consideration. This paper received wide support among the delegations in the Group and certain amendments were suggested, including the simplification of its structure and contents. Bearing those suggestions in mind, the Chairman continued to conduct consultations and subsequently submitted a revised version (CD/SA/CRP.5/Rev.1) to the Group for consideration at its 9th meeting on 14 April. Many delegations expressed their support for this revised paper. However, owing to some conceptual differences, the Group was not able to agree fully on the manner of categorization of the various elements of the assurances and, consequently, to adopt it as a common working paper. Nevertheless it was generally recognized that the Working Group had given extensive consideration to and had had useful discussions on the questions and elements contained in stage one, identifying various features of the assurances, and that the Chairman's paper had served as a useful basis in this regard. It was also generally felt that deeper understanding of the positions of various delegations and the similarities and differences between them had been reached as a result of the discussion held under stage one, which had paved the way for work on stage two.

On the suggestion of the Chairman, as well as of many delegations, at its 10th meeting on 21 April, the Working Group decided to conclude its consideration of stage one and move forward to engage in the substantive work of stage two, with a view to examining one by one all the alternatives contemplated. It is expected that such an examination will be conducted in the manner of a comparative analysis, with a view to concentrating efforts on the most promising. Hopefully, one common approach acceptable to all could emerge in the course of deliberations and could subsequently be incorporated into an appropriate form of effective international arrangement to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Ciarrapico, Italy)

In view of such a prospect, it is my sincere hope that, with the full co-operation and spirit of compromise of all delegations, as well as good will in their deliberations on the subject, the Ad Hoc Working Group may expect a successful and fruitful result during the second part of the 1981 session.

In concluding my statement, I wish to express my sincere thanks and gratitude to all delegations for their full co-operation, spirit of flexibility and mutual understanding in the conduct of our work.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, I can be relatively brief since I can refer you to document CD/179 which has been circulated today, containing the progress report which the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has authorized me to submit to the Committee on Disarmament on its work.

I should, however, like to take this opportunity to express my thanks for the kind remarks which have been addressed to me by various delegations about the work which has been done so far this year in the Working Group. In my turn, I should like to express my sincere appreciation for the very constructive co-operation that I have received from all delegations, as well as for the presence of a number of experts which contributed in a most valuable way to our dealing with the very complicated and scientific issues involved in the substance of a convention on chemical weapons. Further, I should like to thank the Secretary of the Working Group and her collaborators for their valuable contribution to our common effort. Before concluding, I should like, on behalf of my delegation and of the Under-Secretary of State, Mrs. Thorsson, who has asked me specifically to mention that she joins me in so doing, to express our genuine satisfaction at the way in which you, Mr. Chairman, have accomplished your task this month. You have applied all the tact and skill necessary to make the month of April both efficient and constructive for the work of this Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Lidgard for his statement and also for the kind words he addressed, also on behalf of Mrs. Thorsson, to the chair.

Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): Mr. Chairman, like my colleagues the Chairmen of the other Working Groups I also would like briefly to inform the Committee on Disarmament about the activity of the Working Group on Radiological Weapons. The work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons is well known to every delegation, and I consider that there is no necessity for me to go into details.

As members of the Committee will recall, the Committee, at its 105th plenary meeting on 12 February, by its decision contained in document CD/151,

(Mr. KÖMIVES, Hungary)

re-established the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons on the basis of its former mandate which entrusts the Working Group with the task of "reaching agreement on a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons" (document CD/79 of 17 March 1980).

In carrying out its mandate the Ad Hoc Working Group took into account paragraph 76 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament, the relevant part of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade and resolution 35/156 G of the United Nations General Assembly, which calls upon the Committee on Disarmament to continue negotiations with a view to elaborating a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons.

The Working Group held 10 meetings between 20 February and 23 April 1981.

Working papers have been submitted to the Working Group by the delegations of India, Indonesia, Yugoslavia and Sweden. Working papers have also been submitted by the Chairman of the Working Group containing alternative texts for the articles of a future treaty on radiological weapons.

In accomplishing its task, the Working Group, from February to April 1981, carried out another substantive and more detailed examination of the issues related to the elaboration of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.

The examination of the issues relating to the elaboration of a treaty banning radiological weapons has shown that differing approaches and views continue to exist in connection with some important parts of a future treaty on radiological weapons.

To overcome these differences requires additional efforts from every delegation. It is my firm belief that the Working Group would be able to make decisive progress during the summer session provided that the necessary political will, increased co-operation and spirit of compromise prevailed. The conclusion of a draft treaty on radiological weapons would be a concrete contribution to the second special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament.

In conclusion, I would like to appeal to all delegations to make use of the interval between the end of the spring and the beginning of the summer parts of the Committee's session to reconsider their positions and continue consultations with a view to achieving decisive progress in the elaboration of a treaty on radiological weapons during the summer period.

Mr. VOUTOV (Bulgaria): Mr. Chairman, since the plenary is considering today what has been accomplished in the Working Groups during the first part of the session, I wish to say a few words with regard to the work done in the group on security assurances under the able chairmanship of Mr. Ciarrapico of Italy.

Thanks to the commendable efforts of its Chairman, and indeed of all delegations, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances has enjoyed a constructive atmosphere of mutual co-operation both at the regular meetings and during the informal consultations held on various aspects of the subject under consideration. We are all aware of how difficult, and sometimes highly controversial, this subject is. This fact gives us all the more reasons to consider encouraging even the slightest move forward in a direction of most effectively strengthening the security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States. Although we might differ in some details with what has been offered today as an assessment of the proceedings of the Working Group, the socialist countries share the view expressed by the Chairman of the Group that, as a whole, the work done during the first part of the session was very useful, and to some extent, as he said, it has paved the way for the work to be done next summer.

As evident from the statement of the Chairman, the Group was able to agree on its programme of work. It has been structured in several stages, which hopefully would lead us to a common approach that could form the basis of an international convention, or to an appropriate resolution of the Security Council as an interim arrangement. We have been glad to note that, as the Chairman of the Group has pointed out today, document CD/SA/WP.5, containing the programme of work, should be interpreted as providing a flexible framework for the future negotiations, which would allow any relevant view or proposal to be taken up in the course of the ~~search~~ in the Group for a common approach. In this regard, I should like to recall that the group of the socialist countries has presented in the Working Group its views and concrete suggestions, which we believe will accordingly be taken into account at an appropriate stage of the negotiations later on.

As regards the extensive work done so far in examining substance under stage one, as outlined by the Chairman of the Group, we have every reason to believe that the discussion held on the identification of various features of the assurances has been useful. It has helped the Working Group to clarify further some important aspects of the unilateral undertakings assumed by nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. As a result, as the Chairman of the Working Group pointed out today, the Group has reached a deeper understanding of the various positions, their similarities and differences, a result which we regard, at the present stage of the work, as something practically useful in preparing the negotiations on a common approach in the summer.

(Mr. Voutov, Bulgaria)

During the consideration of stage one, several papers were submitted in order to assist the Group in concentrating on important aspects of the problem, and we have heard reference to some of them in the statements read today. Although we might not fully agree with every detail in this respect, we certainly share the thought expressed by the Chairman of the Group to the effect that all ideas presented in a written form have served as a useful basis for identifying the basic elements of the positions. As regards one point made this morning by the distinguished Ambassador of Pakistan with reference to the same aspect, I should like to recall that the socialist countries do not belong to the group that has chosen not to agree on having the legitimate security concerns of all States objectively and factually reflected in a possible written result. The whole statement of the distinguished Ambassador of Pakistan has quite rightly been preoccupied with similar security concerns, which we do not deny, and we expect, therefore, the same from the others. The socialist countries have been glad to note that many delegations have actually recognized as legitimate, and supported here in plenary as well as in the Working Group, our serious security concerns relating to the possibility of using the territory of non-nuclear-weapon States for launching an aggression against other countries. How can one seriously think that such States could remain outside of a possible nuclear conflict and be, therefore, guaranteed. I shall now refrain from any further comments, mentioning only the pertinent observations made in this regard by the distinguished head of the delegation of Nigeria, Ambassador Adeniji, in his statement in plenary on 19 March 1981.

On behalf of the socialist countries, I should like to reassure my colleague from Pakistan that we do remain firm supporters of the idea of most effectively strengthening the security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States, and that we do possess the political will to develop negotiated agreements on all disarmament issues, including on the one under consideration now.

The Committee and its Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances have now entered into the second, more substantive part of the search for a common approach. We have been glad to hear some interesting suggestions in this respect, which deserve to be examined thoroughly if they are to form a part of the ground for future success.

The socialist countries believe that all positive results contributing to a general convergence of views should be carefully kept in mind with a view to gradually widening the basis of our negotiations. It is our belief that what can be marked as a positive development during the first part of the work in the Working Group on Security Assurances will be appropriately reflected in the final report of the Group at the end of the summer session, when all delegations will certainly have their say in faithfully assessing the results accomplished this year.

Expressing once again appreciation for the skilful manner in which the Working Group on Security Assurances has been guided by its Chairman, Mr. Ciarrapico, I should like to voice the belief of the socialist countries that this Working Group will be able to make substantial progress in its search for a common approach towards further strengthening the security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States. For our part, we are determined, as usual, to spare no efforts in co-operating with other interested groups and individual delegations in a common attempt to bring about a solution which would meet expectations before the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament next year.

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): It was not the intention of my delegation to take the floor twice on the same day in this Committee, especially since this is the last meeting of our spring session. I have asked for the floor very briefly to respond to a point that was just made by the distinguished Ambassador of Bulgaria, and I thought that I would do so at this moment, in order to set at rest any misunderstanding that he may have with regard to the statement which was made by my delegation this morning.

I should like to say that my delegation is very gratified at the statement which has just been made by the distinguished Ambassador of Bulgaria, in which he has reassured my delegation by name that the socialist countries -- I believe he was speaking on behalf of the socialist countries at that time -- remained firm supporters of the idea of security assurances, and that they do possess the political will to negotiate agreements on this item as well as on other matters of disarmament. My delegation is very gratified to hear this, especially in the light of developments in the Working Group during the past few meetings.

The distinguished Ambassador of Bulgaria said -- and I think this was also in the statement of my delegation this morning -- that we had pointed out that, at the eleventh hour in the Working Group, one of those delegations which had initiated the exercise of what was called stage one, i.e. identification of the various features of the declarations, chose to abandon it because the paper evolved did not conform to its own views. The point that I would merely wish to convey to the distinguished Ambassador of Bulgaria is that it was not the Bulgarian delegation to which we were referring at this point in our statement.

Mr. PROKOFIEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I must confess we were not intending to speak again today, but the statement made by the delegation of Pakistan forces us to do so. Today, we have heard statements by the Chairman of the Working Group on security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States and also by the delegation of Pakistan. Ambassador Issraelyan, the head of the Soviet delegation, has already expressed our gratitude to the Chairmen of the working groups, including Mr. Ciarrapico, who in his oral statement has, for the most part, correctly reflected the course of negotiations within the Group on the important and urgent problem of the strengthening of security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States -- although we cannot fully agree with everything he said. My second point is that we fully subscribe to the statement just made by the distinguished head of the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Ambassador Comrade Voutov. I confess we were surprised by today's statement by the representative of Pakistan, in which he gave a sweeping interpretation of the state and progress of the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances. A group of States did, it is true, have doubts concerning the method of work adopted by the Ad Hoc Working Group on this question. But, unfortunately, our views did not receive sufficient attention. Further discussion of this question showed that our fears were justified. Attempts to present the facts in distorted form are unjustified. As is known, we were prepared to agree to the working paper of the Chairman of the Group -- I am referring to document CD/SA/CRP.5 of 7 April 1981. But other delegations -- delegations whose identity should be well known to the representative of Pakistan -- started introducing amendments to this paper, which we could not accept. So far as the Soviet delegation and the delegations of the other socialist countries are concerned, we are, as the head of the Bulgarian delegation said, prepared for constructive work. We shall not be the ones to hold matters up. Those are the remarks I wish to make and I propose to confine myself to them.

The CHAIRMAN: In accordance with the consultations that I have conducted in connection with the telegram received from Mr. Davidson Nicol, Executive Director of UNITAR, which was circulated informally to all members of the Committee, I wish to make the following statement:

"The Committee on Disarmament requests, in accordance with Rule 16 of its Rules of Procedure, its Secretary, Ambassador Jaipal, to attend the first meeting of the Advisory Council of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, taking place from 4-6 May 1981 in New York. The Executive Director of UNITAR, Mr. Davidson Nicol, will be informed accordingly.

"At the same time the Committee requests its Chairman to continue his consultations with member delegations on the representation of the Committee on Disarmament in the Advisory Council."

I take it that the Committee agrees with this procedure.

It was so decided.

Mr. JAIPAL (Secretary of the Committee and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General): As Secretary of this Committee, I am bound to comply with decisions taken under rule 16 of its rules of procedure. Since I expect to be in New York in early May, it will be possible for me to attend the meeting of the Advisory Council. As I understand my role, I am expected to be the eyes and the ears of the Committee and not its mouthpiece or its spokesman. I shall of course report to the Committee on the proceedings of the Advisory Council.

The CHAIRMAN: This concludes our business for the spring session. I feel inspired by those delegates who have given in today's plenary meeting their evaluation of our negotiations in the first part of this year to add some personal remarks, too. This session has, on the whole, been a satisfactory one. The four working groups which the Committee set up last year began almost immediately with their substantive work. The reports of the Chairmen of the working groups have reflected the developments in the respective fields. Positions were clarified, problems were identified and, by and large, a good basis has been laid for the continuation of the work of the groups during the summer session. The system of establishing working groups for specific items on our agenda has proven its utility. Demands for additional working groups have so far not met with the consensus of the Committee. These requests are still on the table.

In this connection I should like to touch briefly upon the question of the workload the Committee can possibly carry. This important question was touched upon by quite a number of delegations today. Taking into account the already existing workload of the Committee, the mere creation of additional working groups cannot lead in my view to the required results. A change in the organization of the Committee's work may be necessary. Perhaps the Committee will have to establish priorities, thereby taking into account existing obligations and the particular situation prevailing in specific fields. While maintaining the established system of one meeting per week for every working group, the Committee could perhaps set aside some additional time, for example, for dealing with the comprehensive programme of disarmament or radiological weapons. By dealing with these items, where there exists a time-limit or where solutions seem to be within reach first, the Committee could in fact gain time for the other important items on its agenda.

(The Chairman)

The informal meetings on items 1 (comprehensive test ban) and 2 (nuclear disarmament) of the agenda have helped to clarify the positions on these important issues. Delegations had the opportunity to present their security concerns and concepts. The Committee will have to decide on whether follow-up measures during the summer session are to be taken.

On the whole, the spring session has been held in a business-like atmosphere. This was due to the active and constructive participation of delegations in the meetings of the Committee and its subsidiary organs. We have to bear in mind that the world community expects the Committee to contribute to the establishment of a climate and of conditions in which disarmament and arms control negotiations can successfully be conducted bilaterally, regionally or internationally with the firm intention and the firm political will of all participating delegations to achieve tangible results. This is of particular importance on the eve of the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, which will take place in 1982.

Before concluding the spring session, may I thank all delegations for their helpful support which I have received. May I also thank the Secretariat and its staff and the interpreters for their co-operation.

This concludes my remarks. The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 11 June 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 4.20 p.m.

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.128
11 June 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-EIGHTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 11 June 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. I. KOMIVES

(Hungary)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. M. MITI

Argentina:

Mr. Julio C. CARASALES

Miss N. NASCIMBENE

Australia:

Mr. R. STEELE

Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium:

Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE.

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA

Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. I. SOTIROV

Mr. K. PRAMOV

Burma:

U SAW HLAING

U NGWE WIN

U THAN HTUN

Canada:

Mr. D.S. McPHAIL

Mr. G. SKINNER

Mr. J. GAUDREAU

China:

Mr. YU Peiwen

Mr. LIANG Yufan

Mr. YU Mengjia

Mr. LI Changhe

Mr. SA Benwang

Cuba:

Mr. L. SOLA VILA

Mr. PREDO NUNEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. RUSEK
Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. A. CIMA
Mr. J. FRANEK

Egypt:

Mr. EL S.A.R. EL REEDY
Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M.N. FAHTY
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE
Miss K. SINEGIORGIS
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. de la GORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. N. KLINGER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. F. GAJDA
Mr. C. GYORFFY
Mr. A. LAKATOS

India:

Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. S. DARUSIANT

Iran:

Mr. A. JALALI
Mr. D. AMERI

Italy:

Mr. A. CLARAPICO
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI
Mr. M. BARENGHI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya:

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
Miss LUZ MARIA GARCIA

Mongolia:

Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI
Mr. H. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria:

Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. M. AKRAM
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Mr. A. DE SOTO
Mr. J. BENAVIDES
Mr. A. THORUBERRY

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. M. MALITA
Mr. O. IONESCU
Mr. T. MELESCAIU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. A.T. JAYAKODDY
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. G. EKHOLM

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. V.P. PERFILIEV
Mr. V.M. GANJA
Mr. S.N. RIUKHINE

United Kingdom:

Mr. N.H. MARSHALL
Mrs. J.I. LINK

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. FLOWERREE
Mr. F.P. DESIREE
Miss K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. J. MISKEL
Mr. S. FITZGERALD
Mr. R. SCOTT

Venezuela:

Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC
Mr. B. BRAJKOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. B.A. NZENGEYA
Mr. L.B. NDAGA
Mr. O. GNOK

Secretary of the Committee
and Personal Representative
of the Secretary General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Assistant Secretary-General
Centre for Disarmament:

Mr. J. MARTENSON

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee:

Mr. V. BERMASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I wish to extend a most cordial welcome to all members of the Committee, to non-members participating under the rules of procedure and also to others attending the meeting. In particular, I would like to welcome our new colleagues, Ambassador Julio Cesar Carasales of Argentina, Ambassador Ahmad Jalali of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Ambassador Tissa Jayakoddy of Sri Lanka. I extend to them my congratulations on their appointments and my good wishes for their success in the performance of their duties.

I wish also to extend my welcome to Mr. Jan Martenson, Assistant-Secretary-General of the Centre for Disarmament, who is present with us today. His continuing interest in our work is, I am sure, noted with satisfaction by all of us.

I should like, on behalf of all of us, to convey to the outgoing Chairman, Ambassador Pfeiffer of the Federal Republic of Germany, our warm congratulations for the courteous, efficient and dedicated manner in which he discharged his responsibilities during the month of April.

Distinguished delegates, it is a matter of honour and privilege for the Hungarian People's Republic and for me personally to assume the chairmanship for the month of June in the Committee on Disarmament. My Government attributes special significance to this Committee in promoting disarmament and thereby strengthening international peace and security. The Hungarian People's Republic, a member of the community of the socialist States, is of the strong conviction that everything should be done to consolidate and further strengthen the achievements of détente, to prevent a new wave of the arms race, to diminish the threat of a new world war and to make real progress towards genuine disarmament. Starting from this conviction, the Hungarian People's Republic, in concert with its allies, the Soviet Union and other member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, resolutely supports all proposals aimed at halting the arms race and at bringing about equal security at a lower level of armaments.

This being also the goal of our activities in the Committee on Disarmament, I will do my utmost from the Chair to promote this aim.

Distinguished members, I am looking forward to your co-operation and assistance in discharging my duties as Chairman for the month of June. In that capacity I shall try to ascertain the general consensus of the Committee on all matters, and to that end I shall be consulting you regularly, individually as well as collectively. For my part, I can assure you that I will always be at the disposal of the Committee, and will do my best to carry out my duties in accordance with our rules of procedure.

As you know, we have a great deal of unfinished business ahead of us and I am sure you will agree with me that we should all try to achieve as much as we can through mutual accommodation and understanding, despite the vagaries of the international climate. I say this because "disarmament" today has come to mean in the first instance the safeguarding of the survival of mankind, and without contradiction that is in the interests of all nations and peoples.

At its first special session devoted to disarmament the General Assembly declared that "removing the threat of nuclear war is the most acute and urgent task of the present day". We are also being reminded daily of this supreme task by various organizations as well as individuals, and particularly by women, who are known as the better half of mankind. Clearly, nuclear questions should receive the highest priority not only in this Committee but also in other negotiating forums.

(The Chairman)

Let us resolve therefore to take practical actions that will lead us step by step from one small measure to broader measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament. In this context the importance of an immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race cannot be over-emphasized. The development of new weapons of mass destruction is another area that demands our urgent attention and I hope we shall take meaningful steps to prevent the further misuse of scientific discoveries.

One often hears the argument that progress towards disarmament is impeded by international tensions, but we should certainly discuss and try to reach agreement on measures of disarmament. We are not expected to wait until the international atmosphere improves. Despite the unfavourable international climate and perhaps even because of it, members of the Committee have presented a number of far-reaching proposals relating to disarmament. As a negotiating body, it is surely our duty to give the most serious consideration to those proposals and prepare draft agreements, treaties, etc., in anticipation of the day when the nation States of the world will be ready to sign them.

I believe that the Committee is in a position to proceed towards negotiations on a number of priority items on our agenda. The four working groups that have been set up will no doubt want to resume their work as quickly as possible, perhaps according to the timetable already established, subject to minor adjustments where necessary.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): My delegation is pleased to see you assuming the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for this opening month of its so-called "summer session" for 1981. Having had the opportunity to follow closely your constructive work both in this multilateral negotiating body and as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, we are sure that you will guide our discussions wisely and efficiently, and we take pleasure in offering you the wholehearted co-operation of the delegation of Mexico in the discharge of your important functions.

At the same time, I should like to say once again how much we appreciated the exemplary manner in which the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Pfeiffer, guided the Committee's work in the month of April when the "spring session" for the present year was concluded.

As you all know, the Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament has just held its second session, from 4 to 15 May 1981, at United Nations Headquarters, New York.

On that occasion, the delegation of Mexico submitted to the Preparatory Committee a working paper containing an "annotated preliminary draft" of the provisional agenda for the special session of the General Assembly which I have just mentioned, which has been reproduced as document A/AC.206/13.

Since that working paper can easily be consulted by members of the Committee on Disarmament interested in this matter, I shall confine myself on this occasion to outlining our objective in preparing the document, namely, to turn to full account the lessons of the first special session devoted to disarmament.

We believe that the experience of the 1978 session underscored how useful it is in dealing with a wide-ranging item whose various elements are closely interrelated, to do everything possible to prevent a dissipation of effort and to seek instead

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a concentration of effort, with a view to maximum effectiveness and co-ordination. Such an approach is particularly advisable considering that the key item on the agenda of the 1982 special session will undoubtedly be the comprehensive programme of disarmament; the programme's structure and content are very similar in several respects to those of the Final Document. Even more than the latter, they will require a sustained unity and the necessary correlation between the various components.

It therefore seems to us imperative to avoid a proliferation of items on the agenda of the forthcoming second special session devoted to disarmament, which would rob it of its distinctiveness as a "special" session and make it rather like a regular session. That would be all the more regrettable considering the frequency of regular sessions: the thirty-sixth session will take place six months before the special session under consideration, and the thirty-seventh session barely three months or so after the end of the special session.

Thus the preliminary draft agenda which we have ventured to submit to the Preparatory Committee contains, apart from what we may call the ritual or customary items such as those concerning credentials, elections, general debate, adoption of the Final Act and so forth, only three substantive items: the item on "consideration and adoption of the comprehensive programme of disarmament"; the item entitled "consideration, adoption and opening for signature of draft treaties or conventions on disarmament submitted by the Committee on Disarmament"; and the item entitled "Solemn launching of the World Disarmament Campaign and holding of the first pledging conference for the Campaign".

With regard to the purpose of the third of the items which I have just mentioned, the annotation in our working document states the following:

"In line with the provisions of resolution 35/152 I of 12 December 1980, it appears very likely that the report prepared by the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of experts, on the organization and financing of a World Disarmament Campaign under the auspices of the United Nations will be submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session. It also appears very likely that, at that session, the General Assembly will take the necessary action for the solemn launching of the Campaign and the holding of the first pledging conference at the second special session, with a view to giving the Campaign the exposure and prominence it undoubtedly deserves."

With regard to the item I mentioned in second place, the Mexican working paper included the following commentary:

"The discussions in the Preparatory Committee showed that, on the basis of the relevant General Assembly resolutions, its members felt that the conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear-weapon tests -- an issue which the United Nations has been considering for more than a quarter of a century and to which the General Assembly has repeatedly accorded "the highest priority" -- and the conclusion of a convention on the elimination of chemical weapons -- an issue to which the Assembly has also repeatedly accorded "high priority" -- would provide the two instruments which could have most beneficial effects for the General Assembly".

While I would not wish to minimize the importance those two items may acquire, it nevertheless seems to me undeniable that the central item on the agenda of the General Assembly's special session in 1982 will be the one concerning the

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comprehensive programme of disarmament, the elaboration of which was expressly provided for in paragraph 109 of the Final Document of 1978, in which it was agreed that the programme should encompass "all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated". Taking into account the breadth of the final objective thus set out, as well as the significance and scope of the term "comprehensive" and the statement made by the relevant Working Group of the Committee on Disarmament and endorsed by the latter to the effect that the programme ought to be "self-contained", it is obvious not only that the programme should encompass all the elements included in the above-mentioned Final Document, but also that it will have to go further than the Final Document in some respects.

Moreover, the fact that the consideration and adoption of the programme will constitute the fundamental item on the agenda of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will in no way exclude the consideration of other related items of lower priority. We are convinced, on the contrary, that a detailed review and analysis of the content of the comprehensive programme by the special session of the General Assembly, which is essential if it is to be adopted by consensus, will necessitate the consideration of such items, even if this occurs — as happened with respect to similar items when the Final Document of 1978 was being considered — within the context of the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Among the various items of this kind which are specifically mentioned in the corresponding annotations of the working paper to which I have been referring, I shall mention, not as a complete list but merely as an illustration, the review of the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the previous special session devoted to disarmament, and a review of the status of disarmament negotiations envisaged in the Programme of Action, particularly those relating to nuclear disarmament; the recommendations made and the follow-up to studies initiated by the General Assembly during or after that session; the initiatives and proposals of Member States; the manner of implementation of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, and the strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.

If, as I venture to hope, there is consensus in the Committee as to the paramount importance that the comprehensive programme of disarmament will have, I hope that there will also be consensus in recognizing that it is extremely important that this multilateral negotiating body, with the help of the Ad Hoc Working Group set up by it, should be able to carry to a successful conclusion with all possible speed the noble task entrusted to it by the United Nations General Assembly, that of elaborating the draft comprehensive programme which is to be submitted to it for consideration next year and on whose fate will undoubtedly depend in the final analysis the success or failure of the second special session which the most representative organ of the international community will devote to disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair.

Mr. VENKATESWARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, permit me first of all to offer you the warm felicitations of my delegation on your assumption of the office of Chairman of the Committee for the month of June. We are convinced that under your able and skilful guidance the Committee will be able to build further on the results achieved during the spring session. On behalf of the delegation of India, I offer you our full and sincere co-operation in the discharge of your heavy responsibilities.

May I also take this opportunity to welcome in our midst two new heads of delegation, Ambassador Jayakoddy of our close and friendly neighbour Sri Lanka and Ambassador Carasales of Argentina. We have no doubt that the Committee's work will benefit greatly from the rich experience and diplomatic skill for which our new colleagues already enjoy a well-deserved reputation.

Our summer session for 1981 takes place under the shadow of a blatant act of aggression and disregard for norms of international behaviour. The unprovoked Israeli attack on the Iraqi atomic reactor brings home to us once again how fragile is the **structure** of international peace and security in the present-day world. The Government of India has strongly condemned the attack and the official spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs has made the following statement:

"The Government of India have learnt with grave concern and a sense of deep indignation about the destruction of the Iraqi Osirak atomic reactor by Israeli war planes on 8 June. This Israeli action is stark adventurism and blatant intervention and aggression deserving condemnation.

Iraq has repeatedly stated that its programme in the nuclear field is confined to the utilization of nuclear energy and technology for peaceful purposes. There is, therefore, no basis for the Israeli contention that Iraq was on the verge of producing atomic weapons.

The aggressive, expansionist and anti-Arab policies of Israel have been a source of instability and tension in the region. This highly reprehensible, unprovoked and unjustified attack on the Iraqi atomic reactor has made a mockery of accepted norms of international conduct and behaviour and sets a most unfortunate precedent."

At the beginning of the second half of the 1981 session of the Committee, our thoughts turn quite inevitably to the issues left outstanding and unresolved at the end of the spring part of the session. While the four ad hoc working groups, re-established at the beginning of this year's session, have continued to carry out their negotiating tasks, with mixed results, under the terms of reference carried over from last year, the question of reviewing some of the mandates is clearly overdue. In particular, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has managed to reach a new stage in its negotiating tasks and further progress in our view could be clearly facilitated by the adoption of a fresh and more specific mandate. During the second half of the current year's session, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons should be enabled to begin the drafting of an actual treaty text taking into account the views expressed by States on the various issues involved. Alternative

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formulations, wherever necessary, could appear in square brackets in a first draft. At a later stage, negotiations could concentrate upon the removal of such brackets through a reconciliation of differing views. We would therefore request you, Mr. Chairman, to conduct informal consultations and perhaps convene informal meetings of the Committee to give serious consideration to this question.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament already has a mandate valid for the entire duration of its work, i.e. until it has elaborated the draft elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament to be submitted to the General Assembly's second special session on disarmament, scheduled to be held in mid-1982. The mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons is, in our view, adequate to the tasks that lie before it during the rest of the 1981 session. We would, therefore, not recommend any revision in its mandate at this stage.

During the early part of the current year's session, there were moves to seek a revision of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances. We would be willing to consider any proposals in this regard provided that the revised formulation would not preclude the consideration of all initiatives designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons. This Committee has been engaged in negotiating effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, pursuant to the provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Paragraph 32 of the Final Document states:

"All States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, should consider various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, and the prevention of nuclear war. In this context, while noting the declarations made by nuclear-weapon States, effective arrangements, as appropriate, to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons could strengthen the security of those States and international peace and security."

It is, therefore, quite unambiguously clear that all proposals "designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear war" should clearly be within the terms of reference of the Ad Hoc Working Group on negative security guarantees.

It is extremely unfortunate that the Committee was unable to take a positive decision on the proposals put forward by the Group of 21 for the creation of two additional ad hoc working groups on items 1 and 2 of its agenda. With respect to item 1, the Group of 21 put forward, towards the end of the spring session, the text of a possible mandate for an ad hoc working group on a nuclear-test ban. In his statement on 24 April on behalf of the Group of 21, the distinguished Ambassador of Algeria recommended the following mandate:

"The Committee on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of the second part of its 1981 session, an ad hoc working group of the Committee to negotiate on provisions relating to the scope, verification of compliance, and the final clauses of a draft treaty relating to item 1 of its agenda, entitled 'Nuclear test ban'. The ad hoc working group will report to the Committee on Disarmament on the progress of its work at an appropriate time and in any case before the conclusion of its 1981 session."

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"During the course of negotiations on this item, the ad hoc working group will take into account existing proposals and future initiatives, including the reports on the trilateral negotiations among the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States on this subject presented during the 1979 and 1980 sessions of the Committee on Disarmament, as well as any future reports on the trilateral negotiations that may be submitted to the Committee by the parties concerned during the remainder of its 1981 session."

Now that a concrete proposal for a mandate of a possible ad hoc working group on a nuclear test ban is before the Committee, it is the considered view of my delegation that informal consultations as well as informal meetings of the Committee should be convened to negotiate the terms to set up the ad hoc working group as early as possible.

I might add that the draft mandate put forward by the Group of 21 is designed to take into full account the results already achieved in the trilateral negotiations among the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. It is now up to the countries concerned to demonstrate their political commitment to the goal of a nuclear test ban by contributing fully to multilateral negotiations in the Committee.

The other proposal of the Group of 21 relates to the setting up of an ad hoc working group of the Committee on item 2 of its agenda, namely, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". In the absence of a consensus on this proposal, a series of informal meetings of the Committee were held, upon the initiative of the Group of 21, to undertake a substantive examination of the concrete issues relating to this agenda item. The object of this exercise was to pave the way for a positive decision on the proposal. In his statement of 16 April 1981 on behalf of the Group of 21, the distinguished Ambassador of Algeria made an assessment of the informal meeting devoted to nuclear disarmament and once again put forward some of the concrete issues that could be taken up in multilateral negotiations.

We are surprised that in the opinion of some delegations there were hardly any specific and concrete issues that could be considered appropriate or "ripe" for multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament. During the informal meetings on nuclear issues held in March this year, one delegation asked whether the Group of 21 was suggesting that the Committee should take up negotiation of a SALT-III. That certainly was not the intention of the Group of 21, which has already identified certain concrete issues which could be the subject of multilateral negotiations in an ad hoc working group on nuclear disarmament. These issues were clearly defined in document CD/116, and negotiations on these issues are certainly not designed to supplant the SALT process. The SALT concept is concerned with the limitation of certain categories of strategic nuclear weapons; we are concerned with the reduction and eventual elimination of all categories of nuclear weapons. The SALT concept is based on the management of nuclear arms competition between the United States and the USSR; we are concerned with the much broader objective of halting and reversing the nuclear arms race and finally achieving nuclear disarmament. We are, therefore, not demanding that the Committee on Disarmament should engage in SALT-type negotiations.

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What, then, is the basis for our proposal to undertake multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament in this Committee? Quite simply, the basis rests on the incontrovertible fact that the very existence of nuclear weapons and the espousal of strategic doctrines concerning their use, directly and fundamentally threaten the vital security interests of nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. The Final Document of the General Assembly's first special session on disarmament recognizes as a fundamental principle that all States have a right to participate in negotiations for measures of disarmament that affect their security interests. This is the principle on which our proposal is based.

Secondly, a multilateral negotiating body such as the Committee on Disarmament must concern itself with the urgent and most pressing task of preventing the outbreak of a nuclear war, which would affect belligerents and non-belligerents, nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. The proposal to negotiate an agreement on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is a step in that direction.

When we speak of elaborating the various stages of nuclear disarmament set forth in paragraph 50 of the Final Document, are we suggesting that the Committee on Disarmament should enter the arcane and complex world of multiple independently-targeted vehicles, ground-launched and air-launched cruise missiles, backfire bombers and "stealth" aircraft? Are we suggesting that the Committee on Disarmament also play the mystical and esoteric game of comparing the throw-weight of guided missiles, the circular error probability which distinguishes one generation of missiles from another or how many backfires are equal to how many cruise aircraft? This certainly is not what we have in mind. And how could we, when we have made it abundantly clear that we consider such games as having little relevance in an age of "nuclear overkill"? We, all of us here, are concerned with a simple and yet crucial question — in a world where a handful of major Powers possess the means of global destruction, how can the rest of us ensure the survival of our people, the integrity and independence of our countries and progress towards a just and equitable régime of peace and international security? This is what we wish to negotiate here in this Committee. The SALT process may be designed to reconcile the security perceptions of the United States and the USSR. The negotiations on long-range theatre nuclear forces in Europe may attempt to harmonize the security interests of the European States. But these negotiations, important in themselves, do not deal with the vital security concerns of the majority of non-aligned and neutral non-nuclear-weapon States. Should not there be a mechanism whereby the security interests of the vast majority of countries of the world, already jeopardized by the continued existence and accumulation of nuclear weapons and the growing threat of a nuclear war, receive the serious consideration they deserve? Or are these countries beyond the pale, since they do not possess nuclear weapons or are not allied to a nuclear-weapon State and therefore do not count? The distinguished Ambassador of Canada, in his statement of 16 April 1981, explained that Canada belongs to a nuclear alliance because "we and our allies are subject to a nuclear threat". What choice is being given to the neutral and non-aligned countries which have no nuclear weapons, but whose security is all the same threatened by the danger of a nuclear war? Should they have to decide between joining a nuclear alliance or acquiring nuclear weapons

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themselves? If the answer to this question is in the negative, then is it not imperative that the security concerns of these countries should be given due weight? Before dismissing the proposal of the Group of 21 as unrealistic or impractical, the members of the Committee, especially those who still harbour reservations about the principle of multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament, should reflect carefully on these questions.

Some of the measures of nuclear disarmament are admittedly complex. But this complexity is not the result of actions taken by the non-nuclear-weapon States. Nor is it the result of some independent, blind force over which human beings have no control. Decisions regarding the development and refinement of nuclear-weapon systems have been taken by decision-makers in nuclear-weapon States themselves. Even as I speak, research laboratories in nuclear-weapon States are busy developing new and more sophisticated nuclear weapons and delivery systems, making the problem even more complex. To say that urgent measures of nuclear disarmament cannot be undertaken because the problem is complex, to say that issues of nuclear disarmament must be left to the nuclear-weapon States themselves because the issues involved would be technically incomprehensible except to the initiated few, **merely** begs the question. This is no argument. Who, after all, is responsible for taking decisions which are contributing to making the problem more and more complex day by day? Why has nothing been done to halt the trend towards the increasing complexity and sophistication of nuclear-weapon arsenals if the decision-makers involved were aware of the fact that such developments would make the achievement of nuclear disarmament more difficult in future? Paragraph 93(b) of the Final Document of the General Assembly's first special session on disarmament states that "States should assess the possible implications of their military research and development for existing agreements as well as for further efforts in the field of disarmament".

Could the representatives of the nuclear-weapon States, especially those with the largest nuclear arsenals, enlighten the Committee as to how seriously they have implemented this appeal of the General Assembly to which they themselves were a party?

If complexity is a key problem in progress towards achieving nuclear disarmament, then the rational thing to do, first and foremost, is to cease the qualitative development and refinement of nuclear weapons forthwith. And this is what the first stage of nuclear disarmament is designed to achieve, as set forth in paragraph 50 of the Final Document which reads: "Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems". Under this heading one may consider several concrete measures, e.g. (i) a complete and immediate freeze on the deployment of new types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, (ii) a complete and immediate halt to the replacement of existing missiles, aircraft and other nuclear delivery vehicles by new and modernized versions, (iii) a ban on the increase of the megatonnage of existing nuclear warheads, irrespective of the delivery vehicle on which they are mounted. Other measures could also be considered under this heading. Since the votaries of the nuclear arms race have been so quick and alert in detecting improvements and refinements

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in the weapons systems of their potential adversaries, using existing and available means of verification, to justify their own plans for modernization, my delegation is convinced that verification of compliance should not be a problem. However, such specific details would have to be worked out in the course of negotiations. Right now the question is whether an essentially political decision on the part of all the countries concerned to agree to an immediate halt to the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapon systems is possible. If the answer is "Yes", then an ad hoc working group on nuclear disarmament can begin to look into this aspect forthwith.

I have gone into this matter at some length in order to dispel the notion that there are no specific and concrete measures of nuclear disarmament upon which this Committee could usefully negotiate. Counting the number and types of nuclear missiles is not the only exercise relevant to nuclear disarmament. And lest it be forgotten, I would like to recall to the Committee that in its predecessor body, the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, the two major nuclear-weapon States themselves put forward several concrete and detailed proposals on measures of nuclear disarmament for multilateral negotiations. In 1962, the United States and the USSR submitted draft treaties on general and complete disarmament which contained specific provisions for the reduction and total elimination of nuclear weapons. In 1964, both the United States and the USSR came forward with proposals concerning the reduction and elimination of bomber aircraft, while the United States proposed a verified freeze on the number and characteristics of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. In those days, it was not considered unusual by the nuclear-weapon States to submit proposals concerning nuclear weapons to a multilateral negotiating body. Today, the worsening state of confrontation among the major Powers makes it even more necessary for the non-aligned and neutral countries to play an active role in the prevention of a nuclear war and the negotiation of urgent measures of nuclear disarmament. This would be in the obvious interest of the major Powers and their allies themselves just as it would be in the interest of the non-aligned and neutral countries. Instead of arguing against multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament, would it not be more reassuring to the international community if the nuclear-weapon States and their allies put forward their own specific and concrete proposals to the Committee for consideration, just as the Group of non-aligned and neutral countries have done? I recall that in the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament submitted in 1962, the United States recommended the setting up of an international commission on the reduction of the risk of war through accident, miscalculation or failure of communication, whose structure and mandate was to be negotiated multilaterally. Agreements have been concluded among some but not all of the nuclear-weapon States which partially deal with the problem of an outbreak of nuclear war through accident, miscalculation or failure of communications. The technology of war has today heightened these dangers considerably. Does not the United States or for that matter any other nuclear-weapon State have any fresh

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ideas to offer concerning this vital issue? Do not non-nuclear non-aligned States and neutral States have a role to play in this regard, especially in periods of heightened tensions among the nuclear-weapon Powers? These are questions which multilateral negotiations can attempt to answer with the help of ideas from nuclear-weapon States. Instead of always demanding that the non-nuclear-weapon States demonstrate the practicability of multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament, instead of challenging the non-aligned neutral States to come forward with concrete and specific measures for such an exercise, it would be better if the nuclear-weapon States themselves came forward with their own initiatives and ideas in this regard. As countries possessing nuclear weapons, they are in a position to offer constructive proposals for consideration in this Committee. We urge them to assume their responsibilities, mindful of the fact that the non-aligned and neutral countries are always ready to shoulder their part of the burden and to engage in a constructive and fruitful dialogue on ensuring what, after all, is a common aim of all the countries of the world -- the survival of the human species.

My delegation and many others have consistently put forward serious and practical proposals which, in our view, would make the goal of nuclear disarmament less distant than it has become today. It would indeed be tragic if the international community has to acknowledge that the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons is no longer a credible one. The consequences of such an abandonment of faith would be disastrous. Coming back to Geneva from New York after attending the United Nations Disarmament Commission session there which ended on the fifth of this month, my delegation, like many others which participated in it, cannot but express its deep concern at certain negative trends which have manifested themselves. We must strive to correct these trends before we are overtaken by pessimism or cynicism which it is too easy to fall prey to in the vital area of disarmament. If we are to show the vision expected of us by the international community, we have to work dedicatedly not merely to overcome the pain of today nor to safeguard against the pain of tomorrow which we may be able to envisage, but to work to avoid the pain that is yet to come and that threatens the future of our children and our children's children. The nuclear arms race has not resulted in greater security for the nuclear-weapon States and their allies. It has certainly brought about greater insecurity for them as well as for the non-aligned and neutral countries. It is time, therefore, to give a chance to a different conception of international security, one which is based on a world free of nuclear weapons. For it is only if nuclear disarmament is achieved that efforts to evolve a new, just and equitable régime of international peace and security and development, based on general and complete disarmament, would have a chance of success.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Venkateswaran for his statement and kind words addressed to the Chair.

Mr. McPHAIL (Canada): Mr. Chairman, at the beginning of the 1981 session, I indicated my intention to speak on the subject of verification and its significance to the arms control process, particularly as it relates to this Committee.

It is appropriate to do so today because it is almost one year since the Compendium of arms control verification proposals (CD/99) was tabled. The Compendium was followed by a second paper (CD/127) which served to quantify some of the research upon which the Compendium was based. Today, I have the honour to submit to this Committee the third and final working paper which deals with the subject in a generic fashion. It is entitled "A conceptual working paper on arms control verification".

More importantly, however, it is appropriate to consider verification as this Committee resumes its work because if priorities are oriented properly, 1981 could prove to be one of the most productive sessions in many years. Leading up to the United Nations General Assembly's second special session on disarmament, this Committee's negotiations could prove influential by achieving progress in areas where the verification aspects of the problem have taken on a particular significance. There are two areas where positive action could be taken.

In the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, there is an opportunity to explore verification at the top end of the spectrum. By that I mean that chemical weapons, which exist in great numbers and therefore constitute a real and present threat, must of consequence be subject to a high level of verification in such areas as non-production, facility dismantling and weapons destruction. The Canadian working paper on verification and control requirements tabled on 26 March 1981 (CD/167) provides an overview of the problem. While we are aware that there have been fears expressed concerning intrusiveness and the possibility of compromising civilian industrial secrets, our appreciation is that such inspections are possible without detriment to legitimate commercial sensitivities. This is the conclusion pointed to by the 1979 workshop conducted by the Federal Republic of Germany (in terms of non-production) and of the subsequent British workshop (from the standpoint of dismantling and destruction of facilities). Results were presented in documents CD/37 and CD/15 respectively. Working papers documenting the Canadian experience in destruction of existing agents support this line of reasoning as well.

This Committee has not really come to grips with the verification issue vis-à-vis chemical weapons. I suggest, therefore, that during the second period of concentration of the chemical weapons Working Group, this aspect be explored. Such work would constitute a positive and realistic contribution in support of the bilateral negotiations.

While this Committee has not been involved in direct negotiations concerning a possible comprehensive test ban, many members, myself included, have registered our interest and concern. Progress toward a CTB agreement has been considered by all to be painfully slow, but we have recognized at the same time the complexity of the technical issues involved, particularly those relating to verification. The Norwegian representative underscored this fact for all of us, I think, when he pointed out on 10 March 1981 (CD/PV.113) that "an adequate verification system is a necessary component in a total test-ban régime, both in order to ensure

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compliance and to build confidence". In highlighting his own country's contribution through "NORSAR" in the area of seismic verification, he acknowledged the important progress achieved by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events.

Canada considers the work accomplished by the Ad Hoc Group to be of singular significance in practical terms toward the realization of a comprehensive test ban. A ban is one of the four elements in the "Strategy of suffocation" which Prime Minister Trudeau outlined at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1978. Beyond that, however, it is an area of interest to Canada precisely because it is one in which advanced technology, unfettered by other considerations, could provide adequate verification with practical and almost immediate results. I need hardly point out that as far back as in 1962, it was the Soviet Union which declared that, in the interests of seismic verification, it was "prepared to agree to two to three inspections a year being carried out in the territory of each of the nuclear powers" and that the proposal it had put forward for "automatic seismic stations" included "elements of international control" (ENDC/73).

Eighteen years later the negotiating States, in their tripartite report to this Committee (CD/130), acknowledged the contribution which co-operative seismic monitoring measures could make in verifying compliance with a treaty. The report accepted conditional "on-site" inspection as a co-operative measure. We strongly believe that this Committee and the seismic experts Group could supplement in a very practical manner the efforts of the negotiating States.

These two areas of negotiations -- CTB and CW -- are representative of those in which verification plays a pivotal role. Very often it appeared that difficulties in verification issues were based on preconceived differences regarding purpose, methodology and definition. It was in part the frustration of being so close to and yet so far from a number of agreements which prompted the initiation of the basic research programme of which this conceptual paper is a result.

We accept the argument put forth very often that specific terms of verification cannot be negotiated before the arms control problem itself is defined. It has been our view, however, that there are similarities in the concept of verification which extend across the spectrum of the arms control problem. Hence we can and should learn from our experience. It is in this spirit that we developed the "Compendium", to see what had actually been proposed and why, with the objective of developing a common perspective and verification typology. There has been a virtual revolution in terms of verification technology. Yet, argumentation has remained largely unchanged. On the one hand, information which might have been kept from hand-held cameras in 1960 is now made available, often by mutual agreement through national technical means today. On the other hand, while intrusion has indeed changed, in any practical sense we tend here to be rather historical, and updating is needed.

Prior to the Second World War -- the 1922 naval accords and the 1925 Geneva Protocol were examples -- arms control and disarmament agreements negotiated under comparatively normal peace-time conditions did not normally make provision for systematic and effective verification of compliance with obligations. In post-World War II negotiations, however, provision has generally been made for some type

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of verification. In fact, verification in some form is now normally a part of almost any significant agreement, whether public or private. As members of this Committee, we must recognize therefore, that to insist upon verification in an arms control agreement is not necessarily to question the good faith of any one of the negotiators entering into an agreement, but rather through the reciprocal nature of the provision, to build confidence and ultimately strengthen mutual trust.

I believe that it will be apparent to you upon reading the conceptual paper that the rationale which has been developed is without bias -- that has certainly been our intention. The definition of verification, for example, was selected not from any political document, but rather from the Oxford Concise Dictionary. It is a particularly apt definition in that it included "demonstration" as an equal, and in my view preferable, method of verification to "inspection".

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko warned last autumn that the arms race "is approaching a point beyond which it may become impossible to curb it effectively by means of agreements based on mutual verification". If mutual verification encompasses the principle of reciprocity in its broadest sense, then of course all of us can support his reasoning and his concern. That being said, members of the Committee have the right to believe that it should apply not only to verification means now in use internationally (such as national technical means), but also to all methods of verification, existing and potential. It means that preconceptions of "mutual verification" of the last 20 years must be reassessed, in the light of the necessities today. Should not the requirement for secrecy within national borders and the claim of intrusiveness as an argument against adequate verification be reviewed? Indeed it could be argued that national technical means, a verification method accepted by treaty in the SALT process, is the most intrusive method in terms of national security assets. I commend to you the discussion on intrusion contained in Canada's conceptual paper being tabled today.

In submitting this latest working paper on verification, Canada continues on a course set 20 years ago, in the then multilateral negotiating body here in Geneva. Canada then took a special interest in the verification provisions of the Sea-Bed Treaty; and today, we apply the same concept of verification to other subjects, recognizing the special requirements of each area.

We hope that this conceptual working paper will lead to greater consideration of verification in this body. We are not looking to the Committee to conduct a study of verification, which would be inappropriate for the Committee. We are looking to others to contribute to greater consideration of this subject: we hope others will choose to table papers on aspects of verification in which they may have special expertise and which can contribute to common understanding.

Finally, in the spirit of the commencement of the Second Disarmament Decade, and in the approach to the United Nations General Assembly's second special session on disarmament, I hope this Committee will allocate to itself a period within which to discuss briefly the unique and vital significance of verification to arms control agreements. This would serve to highlight the importance which has been accorded to this subject by the Committee in including it in item IX of its permanent agenda. In this connection I am pleased to offer, on behalf of my Government, to provide a briefing on the conceptual paper and on the research behind it by experts from Ottawa who are ready to share their experiences with you.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador McPhail of Canada for his statement and kind words addressed to the Chair.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, the Pakistan delegation wishes to congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of June. We are confident that under your able guidance the Committee will be able to achieve substantive progress in its work during this summer part of its 1981 session.

Since we adjourned in the spring, international political circumstances have not improved substantively. Indeed, new sources of tension continue to emerge as a result of the even more frequent resort to the use or threat of force by a number of countries, in flagrant violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter. We are all the more convinced of the need for a political dialogue, especially between the major Powers, to reverse the precipitous decline towards a disastrous conflagration and to restore confidence in a world order based on principles rather than on a balance of terror.

The Committee on Disarmament can make a positive contribution to these objectives. The potential inherent in the CD has so far remained to be fully exploited because of the reticence of some of its members to engage in a concrete dialogue on specific matters. We hope such positions will be reviewed, since participation in negotiations does not and cannot prejudge or prejudice the position of any State or group of States. Even if such negotiations are unsuccessful, the exposition of various points of view cannot but add to mutual comprehension and understanding. At this moment in time, this in itself may be a contribution to peace.

As we open this summer session, we are confronted with a number of important proposals and issues on which early decisions are necessary. My delegation hopes that as a first order of business, this session of the CD will take up consideration of the proposals of the Group of 21, contained in documents CD/180 and CD/181, for the establishment of ad hoc working groups on the two highest-priority items, viz., the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and the nuclear test ban. A positive response to these proposals would be an important indication of the political will of the major nuclear-weapon Powers to promote the agreed goals of disarmament.

Another decision which seems essential is to adjust the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. In our view, further progress on this item will be possible only if the Working Group is able to commence the actual process of considering and negotiating concrete and substantive provisions for inclusion in a chemical weapons convention.

The Pakistan delegation would like to reiterate its desire to see the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States turn immediately to exploring the "alternative approaches" that have been identified by it in the search for a common formula which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. My delegation will submit specific views at a subsequent stage about those alternatives which may provide a feasible basis for agreement on such a common formula.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

Considerable work remains to be done on the comprehensive programme of disarmament if it is to be adopted at the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. In particular, we hope that the Ad Hoc Working Group on that subject will find it possible to reach agreement regarding the nature and scope of the programme and to rationalize and elaborate the measures for inclusion in it, only some of which have been tentatively identified so far.

The "elements" relating to a convention to ban radiological weapons proposed by the Soviet Union and the United States, have been substantively analysed earlier this year. A number of important issues remain to be resolved in relation to this convention. When speaking on this item in the Committee on 24 April this year I stated that we shared the view of the Swedish delegation "that the most feasible way in which radiation could be used for hostile purposes, without recourse to nuclear weapons, is through an attack on nuclear power facilities". I added: "Such facilities, which are in a nascent stage in most developing countries, would provide an attractive and vulnerable target in any armed conflict ... Therefore, the convention on radiological weapons must include a provision prohibiting an attack on civilian nuclear facilities. Indeed, my delegation is of the view that the proposal deserves adoption as a legal norm in its own right".

These words assume special poignancy in the wake of the wanton air attack by Israel on the Iraqi atomic reactor last Sunday. In a statement issued on 9 June, the Government of Pakistan has condemned this unprovoked Israeli aggression against Iraq in the strongest terms. We expect that this unprecedented action which has violated all norms of international conduct and threatened peace and security in the volatile region of the Middle East will be unanimously condemned by the international community, including the Security Council.

This Israeli aggression is of special concern to the Committee on Disarmament for more than one reason. Apart from flouting the principles of the United Nations Charter, it violates humanitarian norms, specifically article 56 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention regarding the "protection of works and installations containing dangerous forces" including "nuclear electrical generating stations". Secondly, it demonstrates most vividly the inherent weakness of the proposed "elements" of the convention on radiological weapons and brings into sharp focus the relevance and indispensability of the Swedish proposal to prohibit attacks against civilian nuclear installations under any circumstances.

Most importantly, it calls into question the very foundations of the understanding on which it is sought to promote nuclear non-proliferation as a universal objective. The majority of non-nuclear-weapon States have made a sovereign choice not to develop nuclear weapons. Many have adhered to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, and most have accepted IAEA safeguards on the transfer of nuclear technology and materials as a manifestation of this sovereign option. But every State has the inherent right — and this is confirmed by the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament — to acquire and develop nuclear technology for economic and social development. What the Israeli air attack against Iraq has done is to challenge this basic and fundamental right of every country to acquire and develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. And this challenge has been defiantly repeated in the form of threats of similar aggression against any of Israel's neighbours which seeks to develop a nuclear energy programme.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

There are, of course, other aspects in the unprecedented action which must give pause. There is the spectacle of a country which has itself, clandestinely, and through fair means and foul, developed a nuclear capability outside any international control, asserting the right to prevent another State from developing even a modest nuclear energy programme and portraying this as a threat to its national security and survival.

The action has exposed the hollow rhetoric of the claim that adherence by a State to the NPT would be regarded as proof of a country's commitment not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. Its impact on the IAEA safeguards also cannot be disregarded. As the Director-General of the IAEA stated at a meeting of the Board of Governors the day before yesterday: "From a point of principle, one can only conclude that it is the Agency's safeguards régime which has also been attacked".

In the context of nuclear non-proliferation and the development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, one cannot but share the views of the Director-General of the IAEA when he stated: "During my long time here, I do not think we have been faced with a more serious question than the implications of this development". Yet, if the adverse implications of this development are to be reversed, it is necessary to go beyond the crude logic of terror and intimidation which appears to impel the Israeli leadership. There can be no question that the *raison d'être* built by Israel is drawn from the popular and misconceived images that have been painted by certain circles in some of the advanced nations regarding the imminent danger in the development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes by the developing countries. While shrugging off the calamitous consequences of the escalating accumulation of nuclear armaments by the Superpowers, while pushing under the rug the frenzied nuclear preparations by South Africa and by Israel itself, the so-called international news media have spread rumours and deliberate concoctions regarding the alleged danger of nuclear arms development by States in the Arab Middle East, in South Asia and in Latin America. The effect, if not the design, of such a campaign of propaganda has been to numb international public opinion to the kind of blatant aggression which was launched last Sunday by Israel against Iraq.

It is the responsibility of the Committee on Disarmament to comprehend this development in all its gravity. The Committee, after due deliberation, should adopt a decision which would help to reverse the adverse consequences of this development for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and to ensure that such actions are not repeated in the future.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement and kind words addressed to the Chair.

Mr. OKAWA (Japan): Mr. Chairman, it is with great pleasure that I congratulate you on behalf of the Japanese delegation on your assumption of the chairmanship of our Committee for this month. My delegation has full confidence in your ability to guide us in our work and you may count on our fullest co-operation.

I also wish to express my delegation's deep appreciation to Ambassador Pfeiffer of the Federal Republic of Germany for presiding so effectively over our Committee in the month of April.

My delegation also warmly welcomes in our midst the newly arrived distinguished representatives of Argentina and Sri Lanka.

My delegation, on the eve of the opening of the second part of the current session of the CD, was shocked by the extremely disturbing news that nuclear facilities in the territory of Iraq were attacked by the Israeli Air Force. Iraq is a party to the NPT, and a country which accepts IAEA safeguards.

Japan is deeply concerned about the possible repercussions of this attack on international relations in general, and negotiations on disarmament in particular.

I regret that my first intervention at this second part of this year's session of CD has to be a statement deplored the Israeli attack. I am to read out the provisional translation of the statement issued by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan on 9 June 1981.

The statement is as follows:

"1. Concerning the attack of the Israeli air force on the nuclear reactor in the vicinity of Baghdad on 7 June, the Government of Japan considers it extremely regrettable that Israel should have resorted to such an outrageous action. This action of Israel violating the territorial air of Iraq and destroying its facilities, can never be justified for whatever cause.

"2. The Government of Japan is deeply concerned that tensions between the Arab States and Israel may be further heightened by this incident and hopes that all the nations concerned will exert utmost restraint in order not to further deteriorate the situation.

"3. On this occasion, the Government of Japan reconfirms its position that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a threat to world peace and that countries which are not party to the non-proliferation Treaty should accede to it as soon as possible."

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Japan for his statement and kind words addressed to the Chair.

Mr. YU Peiwen (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, first of all let me extend you my congratulations on your assuming the Chair at the summer session of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of June. I believe that under your able and experienced chairmanship the Committee will carry on its work successfully. You can count on the full co-operation of the Chinese delegation. At the same time, I wish to express my respects to Ambassador Pfeiffer of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman of the Committee in April, who presided excellently over the meetings of the Committee in that month and made positive contributions. I wish also to express my warm welcome to His Excellency Ambassador Carasales of Argentina and His Excellency Ambassador Jayakoddy of Sri Lanka who have newly joined in the work of the Committee. I believe that they will make useful contributions to the work of the Committee.

(Mr. Yu Peiwen, China)

We have listened to the statements made by the distinguished Ambassadors of India, Pakistan and Japan regarding Israel's air raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor on 7 June. The Chinese delegation holds similar views on this serious event. We consider that this act of flagrant invasion of a sovereign State committed by Israel seriously trampled on the norms of international law and aggravated tensions in the Middle East. Mr. Huang Hua, Vice-Premier of the State Council and Foreign Minister of China, in a statement on 9 June said that the Chinese Government and people strongly condemn this new act of aggression committed by Israel and give their firm support to the just struggle of Iraq and other Arab countries in safeguarding State sovereignty, recovering lost territories, restoring the national rights of the Palestinian people and opposing Israeli aggression and expansion.

We consider that Israel's bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor constitutes another serious provocation further aggravating the tension in the Middle East following its bombing of Lebanon. This session of the Committee should follow closely the development of this event.

At the beginning of the summer part of the session, we shall discuss organizational questions, i.e. the programme of work of the session, and questions concerning the mandates and activities of the ad hoc working groups, etc. We shall consider suggestions made by various sides and make relevant decisions. The Chinese delegation will take a positive and practical attitude towards all questions that the session will be faced with and work together with other delegations for their solution.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of China for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair.

I have prepared, with the assistance of the Secretary, a working paper numbered 37 containing a draft programme of work, which has been circulated this morning. Since we shall have some time left after this plenary meeting, I suggest that we hold an informal meeting of the Committee so that I may have the opportunity to introduce and explain the draft programme of work I have circulated to you. The Committee might also wish to continue discussions on the programme of work at an informal meeting tomorrow, Friday, 12 June, at 10.30 a.m.

If there are no objections, I will convene an informal meeting five minutes after the closing of this plenary meeting, on the understanding that our discussion will continue at another informal meeting tomorrow at 10.30 a.m.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 16 June, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.

CD/PV.129
16 June 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-NINTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 16 June 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. I. KOMIVES (Hungary)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. M. MATI

Argentina:

Mr. C. CARASALES

Mr. J.F. GOMENSORO

Australia:

Mr. R.A. WALKER

Mr. R. STEELE

Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium:

Mr. A. ONKELINX

Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA

Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. I. SOTIROV

Mr. R. DEYANOV

Mr. K. PRAMOV

Mr. P. POPTCHEV

Burma:

U SAW HLAING

U NGWE WIN

U THAN HTUN

Canada:

Mr. D.S. McPHAIL

Mr. G. SKINNER

Mr. P.J. DAGLISH

China:

Mr. YU Peiwen

Mr. YU Mengjia

Mr. LI Changhe

Mr. PAN Jusheng

Cuba:

Mr. PREDO NUNEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. RUZEK

Mr. P. LUKES

Mr. A. CIMA

Mr. J. FRANEK

Egypt:

Mr. EL S.A.M. AL-REEDY
Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M.N. FAHMY
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. de la GORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Miss H. HOPPE

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. N. KLINGER

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. F. GAJDA
Mr. C. GYORFY
Mr. A. LAKATOS

India:

Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. S. DARUSMAN
Mr. E. SOEPRAPTO
Mr. F. QASIM
Mr. ACHDIAT

Iran:

Mr. M. JALALI
Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA
Mr. H. SHARIFIY

Italy:

Mr. A. CIARRAPICO
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI
Mr. M. BARENCHI

Japan:

Mr. I. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANAKA
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya:Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI
Mr. M. CHRAIBI
Mr. L. ABDELHAMID

Netherlands:

Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria:

Mr. O. ADENIJI
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUTIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. M. AKRAM
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Mr. A. DE SOTO
Mr. A. THORNBERRY

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. M. MALITA
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. A.T. JAYAKODDY
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. G. EKHOLM
Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN

Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV

Mr. V.A. SEMIONOV

Mr. L.A. NAUMOV

Mr. V.M. GANJA

Mr. V.V. LOSHCHININE

Mr. S.N. RIUKHINE

United Kingdom: Mr. N.H. MARSHALL

Mrs. J.I. LINK

United States of America: Mr. C.C. FLOWERRREE

Mr. F.P. DESIMONE

Miss K. CRITTENBERGER

Mr. J. MISKEL

Mr. S. FITZGERALD

Mr. R. SCOTT

Venezuela: Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia: Mr. M. VRHUNEC

Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire: Mr. O. GNOK

Secretary of the Committee and
Personal Representative of the
Secretary-General: Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the Committee: Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 129th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament. I have no speaker on the list of speakers today. The distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan, has informed me that he is postponing his intervention until Thursday in order to facilitate the work of the Committee in connection with the adoption of the programme of work. I thank Ambassador Issraelyan for his gesture. Does any representative wish to take the floor?

Mr. EL REEDY (Egypt): Mr. Chairman, at the outset I would like to congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship of our Committee for this month, and to express to you our appreciation and confidence that you will guide our proceedings with wisdom and skill. May I also take this opportunity to express our thanks to Ambassador Pfeiffer, the head of the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, for his excellent chairmanship of the Committee during the month of April.

I wish also to extend a welcome to our new colleagues.

It was with a deep sense of concern and alarm that we received in Egypt the news of the Israeli attack against the Iraqi nuclear reactor on 7 June 1981. In a communiqué issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Egypt condemned this attack as an irresponsible act that tends to escalate tension in our region, is contrary to the peace efforts, and violates the general principles of international behaviour. Speaking before the National Assembly, the Foreign Minister of Egypt stated that "the Israeli attack against the Iraqi nuclear reactor is an attack against all peace-loving countries and those who have joined the non-proliferation Treaty and accepted its obligations, including the obligation to submit their nuclear activities to international inspection".

Sharp reactions came out from our region and from capitals all over the world condemning this act of aggression. Moreover, the Security Council is being convened to consider the question, while the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency has already adopted an appropriate resolution on the matter.

We here in the Committee on Disarmament cannot be indifferent to this event, which casts dark shadows on the atmosphere in which we work, the objectives which we seek to achieve and the subject matters with which we are seized. For we are faced with an act of aggression by a State which has refused to join the non-proliferation Treaty, and to submit its nuclear facilities to international or bilateral safeguards, against the nuclear facilities of a State that has joined the NPT and submitted its facilities to the safeguard system of the IAEA.

If the non-proliferation régime is predicated on the confidence of the non-nuclear Powers in that régime, and on the guarantees as well as advantages enjoyed by them in return for their relinquishing the nuclear option, then the Israeli aggression against the peaceful nuclear facility in Iraq poses indeed a serious challenge to the international efforts that are being pursued to enhance and consolidate the non-proliferation régime.

Israel's attack therefore is a test of the seriousness with which the nuclear Powers parties to the NPT are ready to back their commitment to the non-proliferation régime, and of their determination not to allow this régime to suffer a setback whose consequences could be far-reaching.

(Mr. El Reedy, Egypt)

Any step that has been achieved in the field of disarmament and arms control is being made through a terribly slow and painstaking effort. It is therefore with a sense of indignation that we view every attempt to strike at these achievements in disregard of the universal interests underlining them.

The Israeli attack against the peaceful nuclear facilities in Iraq constitutes a dangerous development which we believe should be taken with the utmost seriousness by the international community and by our Committee. It is obvious that such an attack should never be allowed to become a precedent if we are to avoid anarchy and chaos in international relations and to ensure international peace and stability in an already complex world.

It is for these considerations, Mr. Chairman, that we believe that our Committee should be concerned with this question and should ponder on the steps that can be taken to remedy any damage and to draw the proper lessons and conclusions in the pursuit of its endeavours.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Egypt, Ambassador El Reedy, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

The only pending business before the Committee is the consideration of the request of Spain. You will recall that at our informal meeting yesterday we considered the request made by the permanent representative of Spain concerning participation in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons. As I noted yesterday, the Committee has already invited Spain to participate in the ad hoc working groups on chemical weapons and effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Secretariat has circulated today the relevant draft decision contained in Working Paper No. 38, which is identical to other decisions adopted by the Committee concerning the participation in subsidiary bodies of States non-members of the Committee invited to participate in its work. Is there any comment in connection with the draft decision contained in Working Paper No. 38? I see none. I take it that the Committee decides to invite the representative of Spain to participate during 1981 in the meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons.

It was so decided. 1/

The meeting was suspended at 11.10 a.m. and resumed at 1.05 p.m.

1/ "In response to the request of Spain [CD/147 and CD/185] and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Spain to participate during 1981 in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons."

The CHAIRMAN: I declare the 129th plenary meeting reopened.

Working Paper No. 37/Rev.1 as amended is before the Committee. Before submitting it for adoption, I would like to state the following.

In connection with the adoption of the programme of work of the Committee for the second part of its 1981 session, the following understanding will be kept in mind:

1. The closing date of the session will be in August and will not go beyond 27 August. The actual closing date will be determined not later than 31 July, taking into account the requirements of the Committee's work as required by rule 7 of the rules of procedure.
2. The Committee will meet in plenary sessions ordinarily twice a week, on Tuesdays and Thursdays, subject to the understanding that if no speakers have been inscribed for a particular plenary meeting 24 hours in advance, that meeting will be cancelled and the time thus obtained reallocated by the Chairman after appropriate consultations
3. The following questions relating to the organization of work would be considered at informal meetings during the week ending 19 June as well as subsequently:
 - (a) The proposal to revise the existing mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons;
 - (b) The proposal to establish additional subsidiary bodies, and
 - (c) The proposal to hold informal meetings with the participation of experts to consider the item "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons".
4. The following additional questions relating to the organization of work would also be considered at informal meetings to be scheduled by the Chairman during the session:
 - (a) Consideration of the modalities of the review of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament, including the views expressed by members concerning the improved and effective functioning of the Committee;
 - (b) Amendments to section IX of the rules of procedure;
 - (c) Format of the report of the Committee on Disarmament to the General Assembly, taking into account the need for economy in documentation.
5. It is envisaged that the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events will be duly considered at a plenary meeting in August after its submission.

If there is no objection, I shall consider that Working Paper No. 37/Rev.1, as amended, is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: Members will recall that, at our informal meeting on Friday, I circulated the time-table for meetings to be held by the Committee and its subsidiary bodies during the present week. I noted on that occasion that the time-table was indicative and had been circulated solely for the purpose of facilitating the preparations of delegations for meetings to be held during this week. If there are no objections, we will continue to be guided by it, subject to the addition of an informal meeting on Friday afternoon at 3 p.m.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 18 June, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.

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