

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

APPENDIX III

VOLUME III

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and Verbatim Records of the Committee on Disarmament
in 1981

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Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

Mr. MALITA (Romania) (translated from French): The Romanian delegation has already had an opportunity to state its position on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, its objectives and its structure. Since the establishment of the Ad Hoc Working Group on this topic, our delegation has also taken part in the concrete negotiations being conducted in that subsidiary body. Consequently, my statement today will be confined to certain observations which I would like to make at this stage of our work.

First of all, I would like to refer in a general way to the importance which Romania attaches to the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. As was stressed by the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu, "gradual progress towards the achievement of mankind's highest goal, namely, general and complete disarmament, is, in our opinion, a noble cause which deserves the combined efforts of all peoples". The disarmament negotiations of the early 1960s, as you know, focused on the elaboration of partial agreements and the initial efforts to negotiate a treaty on general and complete disarmament were abandoned. Although some results were achieved, it is obvious that disparate measures unrelated to any balanced over-all plan and frequently peripheral to the real problems of the arms race could not set in motion a genuine disarmament process or bring forth the efforts of States to that end. On the contrary, as you know, the arms race has continued at an ever-increasing speed, reaching levels that defy all reason.

It should, however, be stressed that the objective of general and complete disarmament has not, for all that been abandoned. Acceptance of the idea of giving priority to partial measures is nothing but a tactical adjustment, because they hold out greater promise of practical success. It is not intended as a rejection of the ultimate objective, namely, the achievement of general and complete disarmament.

This is why the speedy elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament takes pride of place among the basic objectives set at the first special mission of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. In this connection, I would like to point out that, in his book on the elaboration of a world disarmament programme, Philip Noël-Baker quotes the following revealing sentence by John Stuart Mill: "Against a great evil, a small remedy does not produce a small result; it produces no result at all".

It is quite obvious that the goal of general and complete disarmament can never be achieved through unco-ordinated actions. Its achievement requires a negotiated structure of comprehensive objectives in the form of a programme of disarmament. The main positive consequences of such a programme will, in our opinion, be the following:

First, only a comprehensive programme can meet all countries' ever-increasing security requirements, which are difficult to satisfy through agreements prohibiting specific weapons and much easier to satisfy through a complete set of measures;

Secondly, every disarmament agreement concluded or measure adopted will have a beneficial influence on the next series of negotiations. Instead of unco-ordinated and contradictory actions, we shall have linked measures, the implementation of each creating the conditions for going on to a higher phase; and

(Mr. Malita, Romania)

Thirdly, there will be a lasting basis for the implementation of each disarmament agreement since it will form an integral part of a single process; similarly, the programme will provide all those who do not take part in the negotiations with information on what they may expect and what stage has been reached in the implementation of disarmament measures.

During our discussions, some delegations have said that we should not be too specific in the elaboration of the programme for in fact it represents an attempt to plan the unplannable, since disarmament depends on developments in international relations, which are unforeseeable. In a situation where there is a danger of the arms race becoming completely uncontrollable, the idea of a specific disarmament measure necessarily implies an element of planning and order. I would recall that in 1932, at the Geneva Conference on the reduction and limitation of armaments, Mr. Tardieu, the French Minister of War, who was head of the French delegation, said that, before the growing danger of war, the choice was between peace through self-discipline and anarchy through egoism.

We may well wonder why the arms race can be planned without reference to international developments. Is it likely that, if we allow the disarmament negotiations to limp along, at the mercy of international developments, we shall succeed in halting the arms race? In military affairs, every development is the subject of careful and even long-term planning. Is it not more to the point and more realistic to counter such tendencies with a genuine disarmament strategy?

It has also been said in this Committee that the inclusion of detailed measures in the programme is unrealistic because they cannot all be implemented. In our opinion, the risk does not lie in the non-implementation of one measure or another, but, rather, in the inability to set in motion a genuine disarmament programme.

The negotiations in the Working Group have revealed the existence of certain problems of principle on which the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament depends.

Differing opinions have been expressed as regards the time-frames for the implementation of the programme. All are agreed, however, that the disarmament measures included in the programme should be grouped in stages, and that between one stage and the next there should be a review process to assess how far the measures have been carried out.

In our delegation's opinion, the planning element is absolutely essential to the effectiveness of the programme. I should like to stress that it is not a question of fixing rigid dates but rather of indicating certain time-periods, purely as a guide, so as to offer the prospect of a gradual process capable of generating ever new situations and leading to practical results. We consider that the most appropriate solution is to group the measures in three categories, namely, long-term, medium-term and short-term measures.

The category of long-term measures should include those which imply structural changes in the present situation, such as general and complete disarmament. Our rate of negotiation will be determined by the rate of improvement in military arsenals as well as by the rate at which the international situation in this sphere becomes increasingly complicated, with the risk of getting out of control.

(Mr. Malita, Romania)

Medium-term or intermediate measures should include actions designed to prepare the way for the structural changes which necessitate long-term measures. The prohibition and outlawing of the use of specific weapons which exist in the arsenals of States belong in this category.

Lastly, the category of short-term or immediate measures should include those matters on which specific negotiations are already now being conducted, and any others that may be agreed on and that are considered necessary for the building of the climate of confidence needed for the later phases.

To give an idea of the time-periods which our delegation has in mind, I would like to say that, in our view, the programme for the Second Disarmament Decade adopted by the United Nations General Assembly comprises immediate and intermediate measures. The stage of long-term measures should cover a further period of 10 years after the end of the Decade. Envisaging the Programme over such a period of time would also offer the advantage of making it possible for each stage to be assessed during the special sessions of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

It has become customary in the United Nations, in areas of vital interest, to set practical objectives for the year 2000. Such objectives exist in the areas of development, industrialization, protection of the environment, health, labour, etc. Why not follow this example and set realistic objectives for the disarmament negotiations for the same period as that of others already formulated and whose implementation depends largely on the progress we shall make in the disarmament negotiations?

Another basic question on which there are different positions is that of the legal nature of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. As can be seen from the Committee's report for 1980, the idea that the Programme should be embodied in an international convention has been put forward. In our view, that implies the reaching of an agreement on general and complete disarmament, comprising a set of intermediate disarmament measures leading to the ultimate objective, along the lines of the draft texts submitted by the Soviet Union and the United States in 1962. Although this approach offers definite advantages, our delegation doubts whether such an agreement could be reached in the time available to us, namely, up to the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

At the same time, our delegation could not agree to the idea that the comprehensive programme of disarmament should be a mere list of measures having no legal force.

We are of the opinion that the programme should provide for a basic commitment by all States to endeavour to bring about a situation in which their security is ensured at lower and lower levels of military arsenals. Without this basic commitment, which is part of the very philosophy of the programme, the programme will not be an instrument for mobilizing the political will of States in favour of disarmament, which is what it was intended to do. Likewise, the programme must include commitments concerning the way in which the principle of equal security is to be given effect and the priorities for the disarmament negotiations to be included in the draft we are to prepare.

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The last subject to which I would like to refer today is the machinery for the implementation of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. It is obvious that the programme will cover more than the activities of our Committee. Even though the Committee is the only multilateral body for disarmament negotiations, negotiations are taking place in other, bilateral and plurilateral, forums. Although these different negotiating forums can and should, in their specific fields, contribute to the implementation of the programme, the fact that they exist makes it necessary, we think, to designate a body for the co-ordination and control of the implementation of the various measures in the programme. We think that there will be no objections to this body being the United Nations which, because of its universal membership, the tasks entrusted to it and the means available to it, is the only body capable of performing such functions.

In this connection, I wish to point out that, in my delegation's view, the United Nations has a role of primary importance to play in keeping all States and public opinion informed of the implementation of the objectives embodied in the comprehensive programme of disarmament, with a view to mobilizing all efforts for the halting of the arms race and, in particular, the nuclear arms race.

These are the observations we wished to make at this stage in our work. It should not be forgotten that we are all, in fact, confronted at present with two races: the arms race, with its terrifying prospects and rapid escalation, and the race for disarmament and the peaceful settlement of disputes, which we absolutely must win.

The Romanian delegation reserves the right to submit specific proposals in the Working Group, which is presided over, with his customary competence and authority, by H.E. Ambassador Alfonso García Robles of Mexico.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Romania for his statement. As a matter of fact, our first contacts go back to 1953, when we met for the first time in the capital of his country. It is therefore a particular pleasure to thank him for the kind welcome he addressed to me on the occasion of my assumption of the Chairmanship of this body.

Mr. ONKELINX (Belgium) (translated from French): The Belgian delegation has been struck by the very keen and very legitimate interest that has been shown at recent sessions of the Committee in the subject of nuclear disarmament.

In fact, in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, held in 1978, all our Governments recognized that "nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization" and that it was "essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons".

Our Governments express their views on this subject very frequently, and a good many of us -- for example, at the General Assembly or at the Review Conference of the Parties to the non-proliferation Treaty -- have had occasion to express their disappointment and concern at the slow pace and complexity of the negotiations on nuclear questions, whether concerning SALT, the halting of nuclear tests or other subjects.

I will say at once that the Belgian delegation is particularly satisfied at the support that has been given to the proposal made by certain delegations for the convening of informal meetings of our Committee, to be devoted initially to questions

(H. Onkelinx, Belgium)

of substance concerning nuclear disarmament. This proposal has formed the subject of a draft decision of the Committee, submitted informally by the Federal Republic of Germany and supported in principle by many delegations, including our delegation.

It appears to us that such a decision -- whose political importance should not be underestimated -- would enable us to affirm the importance attached by our Committee to this matter and to draw attention to the Committee's responsibilities in all fields having to do with disarmament. The Belgian delegation has always been open-minded as to the choice of the methods for discussing nuclear matters in our Committee. It hopes that, in present circumstances, the proposal initiated by India and Venezuela will receive the necessary consensus.

The nuclear discussion covers so many areas, both in its theoretical aspects and in its practical implications, that it would appear appropriate to define the subjects to be discussed at the informal meetings it is proposed to hold within the Committee.

Our delegation fears that if we fail to proceed in a certain order and with some organization of these informal meetings, our discussions may prove to be very disjointed and to have no practical result for the work of our Committee. With this in mind, some delegations have already proposed that the exchange of views should begin on the basis of the report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the comprehensive study on nuclear weapons. Although my delegation does not agree with everything in this study -- and in fact Belgium abstained in the vote on General Assembly resolution 35/156 F -- certain suggestions echoed by many delegations have the merit of trying to bring order into our discussions and thus of enabling us perhaps to avoid the danger of excessively theoretical and diffuse debate in a Committee whose character as a negotiating forum it is important to uphold.

I have followed with interest, but not without some concern, the debate that has been taking place in the Committee in recent weeks around certain elements of strategic doctrine such as deterrence, the parity of forces and essential equivalence. For a country like ours -- a non-nuclear-weapon State that is a Party to the non-proliferation Treaty but at the same time committed to a mutual assistance agreement based, among other things, on the nuclear guarantee -- it would be unwise to stand aside from this debate and to make no contribution.

We would not wish this debate to have the result, as it were, of setting nuclear disarmament over against conventional disarmament; nor would we wish that our Governments should appear to be confronted with a tragic choice between deterrence and nuclear disarmament.

Moreover, the idea of deterrence is not confined to the nuclear sphere. Governments can very well practise the same policy in the conventional sphere also, and it often forms the very essence of a defence policy. Its purpose is to make war or the threat of war impracticable as an instrument of policy, and thus to give peace and dialogue among nations a stable basis. The report of the Secretary-General on the comprehensive study on nuclear weapons (A/35/392) says, in paragraph 285, that "the phenomenon of deterrence probably existed already at very early stages of human existence".

If they were merely bluff, nuclear and conventional deterrence would be neither effective nor credible. It is such deterrence, however, that has largely ensured peace in Europe for nearly three decades. Nuclear weapons are not viewed in Europe as a substitute for conventional weapons as at least one delegation has suggested. They are regarded as providing an additional guarantee, complementing that provided

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

by conventional deterrence, the removal of which could be contemplated only if there were an assurance of a stable and evident conventional balance sufficient by itself to discourage any aggression.

The present situation in Europe is the product of the political history of the post-war years on our continent. This situation is perhaps to be deplored and regretted, but it has to be admitted that it has ensured peace. We must formulate our policy on the basis of the facts as they exist, and endeavour, through negotiations based on the principle of parity, to bring about a situation ensuring undiminished security for all, at a lower level of arms. Moreover, we should not forget that stability in Europe forms one of the elements -- one among others -- that determine security in other continents. Certainly, we respect the right of every State to decide on its own defence policy. However, we consider that every State also has a responsibility to recognize the effects its decisions will have for its neighbours and, more generally, for the security of the members of the international community as a whole. We consider in particular that the addition of new nuclear-weapon Powers to the five that already exist would in no way serve the cause of international security but rather, on the contrary, would endanger it all the more. It is for that reason that Belgium -- and with it the vast majority of States -- decided to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty. However, Belgium views horizontal non-proliferation only as a temporary phase and not in any way as a system for the perpetuation of the division of the world into nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon Powers.

So long as nuclear weapons continue to exist, it seems to us essential that the Powers holding such weapons should base their policy on the balance and parity of forces rather than on a bid for strategic superiority. The stabilization of strategic weapons is, moreover, one of the basic concepts of the SALT negotiations and a concept without which it would be vain to hope for substantial progress towards the reduction and elimination of strategic weapons.

I have just referred to stabilization. This stage usually appears to be necessary before any reduction or elimination of weapons in a particular sector becomes possible. But the legal stabilization of a situation in the sphere of armaments by means of an agreement very often seems difficult to achieve. The effort is frustrated by mistrust so long as the perception of the threat is confused and based on a subjective impression rather than on an objective and agreed establishment of the facts.

That is why a more sustained flow of information and more openness in the programmes and military doctrines of States could help to eliminate mistrust and thus make it possible to achieve the necessary balances at lower levels of armaments. When there is a lack of such openness, uncertain efforts to maintain or re-establish such balances can sow the seeds of destabilization and bring about a resurgence of the arms race. Thus, apart from their intrinsic merits, negotiations of the SALT or MBFR type have the advantage of opening the way to an increase in information about the forces and weapons of the various partners to the negotiations.

Those are a few general and preliminary comments which the Belgian delegation felt it should make after hearing various statements in the Committee, particularly at its meetings on 19 and 26 February. Belgium shares the concerns of many delegations which are anxious to give an impetus to the negotiations in the nuclear sphere. It therefore welcomes the efforts being made in the Committee to activate our work in this direction. It is prepared to make its contribution in the hope that our discussions will help to clarify certain points and will bring speedy and practical results that may contribute to progress in the near future in the negotiation towards nuclear disarmament.

Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): Comrade Chairman, today I would like to deal with item 6 of our agenda, the comprehensive programme of disarmament. The Hungarian delegation during the last session of the Committee emphasized already the importance it attaches to this question. Now I intend to refer very briefly to some questions related to the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Before turning to the concrete questions I would like to express the deep satisfaction of my delegation to see Ambassador García Robles of Mexico in the chair of the Working Group on CPD which has resumed its work and has already engaged in substantive negotiation aimed at the elaboration of a comprehensive programme. In the opinion of my delegation the Working Group, under the able guidance of its Chairman and with the co-operation of all delegations, will be able to complete its work in due course. To this I offer the co-operation of the Hungarian delegation.

In the opinion of many delegations, and my delegation shares this view, the question of the comprehensive programme disarmament will be one of the most important items on the agenda of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Thus our Committee has to give special attention to this question. For a conclusive work we have already not only the most appropriate framework, the Ad Hoc Working Group on CPD, under excellent guidance, but also valuable documents like the Final Document of the first special session. The recommendations of the Disarmament Commission and the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade. I would like to add to these documents the Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace, which was initiated by Poland, and the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament, which was initiated by Czechoslovakia. There is also a widely shared view in our Committee that the programme should contain the following main parts: an introduction or preamble and chapters on objectives, principles, priorities, measures, stages or phases of implementation and machinery.

Now I turn to the question of the nature of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. This programme as a "carefully worked out package of interrelated measures in the field of disarmament, which could lead the international community towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control" has received in the Committee varying interpretations. The Hungarian delegation shares the opinion of those delegations which do not consider that the programme could realistically achieve the form of an international convention with a legally binding character. My delegation envisages the programme to be adopted by the General Assembly at its second special session on disarmament in the form of a multilateral declaration containing and expressing the political intentions of States. By its very nature this will be a declaration of a special character committing States to further concrete actions on disarmament issues.

In connection with the stages of implementation, the Hungarian delegation advocates a flexible, realistic approach.

In the view of the Hungarian delegation the international community rightly attributes great importance to and has great expectations of the second special session on disarmament. It is incumbent upon this Committee to contribute efficiently to the efforts that would have the potential of meeting these expectations. A contribution of extreme value would be the elaboration and approval by consensus of a realistic comprehensive programme of disarmament which could be instrumental to the implementation of the basic ideas of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament, namely, the strengthening of international security through disarmament.

Mr. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, in his statement in the plenary on 12 February, the head of the Brazilian delegation had the occasion to offer general considerations on the contribution of the Committee on Disarmament to the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We consider the comprehensive programme of disarmament to be a very important aspect of that contribution. The process of negotiation of the programme started during the 1979 session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, and should be finalized by the Committee on Disarmament in time for the General Assembly's second special session on disarmament.

During the process of that negotiation, the General Assembly also adopted the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, and most of us had the opportunity then to discuss in depth some of the issues that now confront us with regard to the programme. We are confident that the experience gained from those discussions will be of considerable help to the work of the Working Group that now deals with the subject.

The Brazilian delegation attaches great significance to the adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. We view the programme as an agreed, balanced framework for negotiations on disarmament, which will provide the main guidelines for the conduct of such negotiations in the appropriate forums. In setting forth the main principles, purposes and objectives of the programme, we must avail ourselves of the conceptual basis contained in the Final Document of the first special session, so as to finally adopt a programme which will effectively chart the course of the actual process of disarmament for the future. The programme should represent a step forward as related to the Final Document, in so far as it must provide the opportunity to translate into reality the conceptual ground covered by the Final Document.

Among the main concepts embodied in the Final Document, the Brazilian delegation attaches special significance to the following basic principles, which in our opinion should guide the process of negotiations toward the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control:

- (1) The recognition of the primary role and responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament;
- (2) The recognition of the urgency and priority of nuclear disarmament;
- (3) The special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon Powers for nuclear disarmament, which does not exclude the fundamental and legitimate interest of the entire international community in all questions of disarmament, on an equal basis and without discrimination;
- (4) The channelling of the resources freed by disarmament measures towards the promotion of economic and social development, particularly in developing countries;
- (5) The need to ensure that disarmament and arms control measures do not hamper in any way the absorption and development of technology for peaceful purposes;
- (6) The need to ensure that commitments entered into in the sphere of disarmament are adequately balanced between nuclear-weapon Powers and non-nuclear-weapon countries, so as to avoid measures of a discriminatory character or which tend to perpetuate existing imbalances;

(Mr. de Queiroz Duarte, Brazil)

(7) The need to ensure the maintenance of the security of all States during the disarmament process, at progressively lower levels of armament. The need for the maintenance of security, however, should not be construed as justification for the stepping up of the armaments race, particularly in the nuclear field;

(8) Respect for the priorities established by the United Nations for disarmament measures;

(9) Adoption of adequate verification mechanisms to ensure compliance with agreements;

(10) Adequate utilization of the multilateral machinery of the United Nations.

Since the comprehensive programme of disarmament should, to our mind, be based on such principles, it follows that the programme cannot be conceived as a mere compilation of measures; by the same token, it cannot be dissociated from the reality of current relations among nations. But it is precisely because the programme must perforce take into account what is generally understood by the expression "realities", that it must also reflect the very real commitment of the world community to the goals of disarmament, as expressed in the Final Document and in innumerable United Nations resolutions. Indeed, if the programme does not contain a concrete expression of such a commitment, its significance and its practical consequences will be severely limited.

This brings me to the very useful discussion which took place in the Working Group chaired by Ambassador Garcia Robles on the nature of the programme. Several delegations stressed the need for the programme to give clear expression to that commitment. Others deplored the fact that it will probably not be possible to vest in the programme the full binding effect that a treaty might have. Still others, and very few at that, argued that the "realities" of international life do not make it possible for them to accept such a clear commitment. My delegation is convinced that a comprehensive programme of disarmament is to be considered as part and parcel of the set of features and circumstances of international life to which some delegations refer as the "realities". The commitment to disarmament, and the responsibilities, duties and rights that it entails, must be recognized on the same footing, and be seen in the same light, as those other features and circumstances of international life. Whether we like them or not, we cannot ignore the realities as they stand; but it is precisely because of their increasingly ominous character that we are more acutely aware of the need for disarmament. And the urgent need for concrete steps towards disarmament is, whether we like it or not, another reality of the current international scene. This fact alone would seem to be reason enough for nations to endeavour to strengthen their commitment, so many times expressed in a declaratory fashion. In other words, we conceive the nature of the programme as the unequivocal expression of the international community to give concrete, operational meaning to its political will to achieve the objectives of disarmament. In this context, the question of setting time-frames for the execution of the different phases of the programme should not be seen, as some have stated, as rigid or artificial, and hence unacceptable; but rather

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as indicative parameters without which the implementation of the measures contained in the programme would be completely dissociated from reality. It stands to reason, in the view of my delegation, that the programme cannot have any operational meaning if it stands in a vacuum, as if it were to be nothing but an artificial intellectual conception designed only to exist within the chambers of the United Nations. On the contrary, to accede to the realm of reality, the programme must be conceived and adopted in such a way that its principles and objectives become also the principles and objectives of the States that adopt it, together with their also very real concerns with defence and security, with bilateral or regional relations, and with economic and social development. For it seems obvious that in the nuclear age, which has also become the age of the nuclear arms race, the age when the very real threat of extinction looms ahead, nothing can be more closely connected with reality than a concerted effort to achieve real security through real disarmament. The comprehensive programme of disarmament must be, in our opinion, the clear expression of the joint commitment to disarmament, so as to function as the effective instrument of that effort. Otherwise, the programme would add nothing to the conceptual work already done since the General Assembly's first special session devoted to disarmament.

Mr. VOUTOV (Bulgaria): Comrade Chairman, since this is the first time our delegation is taking the floor under your chairmanship, may I first of all extend to you, the representative of the fraternal German Democratic Republic, the most cordial felicitations upon your assumption of this responsible and demanding post. Your vast diplomatic experience in the field of multilateral disarmament negotiations will no doubt contribute to the activities of the Committee, while at the same time we have already noted with satisfaction some touches of your personal style to the organizational aspects of our work.

I should not fail to address a word of respect and appreciation to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador de la Gorce.

In my statement today I would like to present some general observations of the Bulgarian delegation on item 6 of our agenda, "Comprehensive programme of disarmament", and to make some brief comments on items 1 and 2.

We have come a long way during the last session and, after the positive achievements in 1980 under the chairmanship of Ambassador Adeniji and the good start of the Working Group under the wise and energetic leadership of Ambassador Garcia Robles, we are well set on a course to the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament before the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament. In the opinion of our delegation, the elaboration of the programme is an important task of the Committee and we should spare no effort to fulfil it in a timely and practical manner.

We share the view that our efforts are to be based on the consensus documents we have at our disposal, that is, the Final Document of the General Assembly's first special session on disarmament, the documents of the Disarmament Commission, etc. At the same time, it would be only fair and useful to take into due account all forward-looking ideas and concrete proposals which have been presented to the Committee, and here I would like to stress the importance of the document that my delegation co-sponsored together with a group of socialist countries -- CD/128, and of such essential documents of a truly fundamental nature as CD/92 and CD/160.

(Mr. de Queiroz Duarte, Brazil)

As to the main parameters of the future comprehensive programme of disarmament, our delegation would like to present the following considerations.

1. The main objectives and principles of the programme should underline, inter alia, that the disarmament negotiations should be continuous and should proceed at a rapid pace so as to outstrip the qualitative development and build-up of the armaments forming the subject of the negotiations and, where possible, to prevent the development of new types and systems of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons. Another important principle should be the refraining by all States from armament acts which might adversely affect disarmament efforts. We should not lose sight of the lofty goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.
2. Undoubtedly, the hard core of the programme will be the measures it is to comprise. While we will utilize in our work the above-mentioned consensus documents, we see the elaboration of the programme as an impetus to those few delegations who have lacked the necessary degree of political will to contribute to the initiation and acceleration of urgent negotiations on items that are too high on our agenda to be circumvented or ignored.
3. Concerning the stages of implementation, we believe that some indicative, realistic time-frames could be worked out, depending upon the measures we incorporate in the programme.
4. As to the nature of the programme, it would hardly be the best course to endeavour to come out with a treaty on general and complete disarmament, with a legally binding character. The programme, in the opinion of our delegation, should represent a basis for concrete negotiations on a whole range of disarmament problems.

Speaking of a comprehensive programme of disarmament involves, naturally, questions of philosophy, of attitudes, of concepts and of the future generations. Working on the programme, while keeping in touch with realities, we should demonstrate a far-sighted approach and a new vision of the grave dangers confronting human civilization. In this line of thinking the words of the first Bulgarian cosmonaut come to mind: "Our planet is so beautiful when viewed from above ... Do we all have to orbit in space in order to learn that our responsibilities and duties are somewhat greater and heavier than those we have on Earth?"

I venture to say that this new concept materializes perfectly in the words of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Leonid Brezhnev, from the high rostrum of the 26th Congress of the CPSU, when he said: "Not war preparations that doom the peoples to a senseless squandering of their material and spiritual wealth, but the consolidation of peace -- that is the clue to the future" (document CD/160, p. 6). The concrete proposals in several crucial directions at the present stage of international relations and especially with regard to the problems of the arms race and disarmament, which are emphasized in

(Mr. de Queiroz Duarte, Brazil)

that report, are of such a nature that they will certainly be reflected both in the elaboration of the comprehensive programme and in our work on other disarmament problems facing the Committee and in the first place different aspects of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament. It is absolutely clear that these problems must be given a central place in the elaboration of the programme.

In this connection, may I briefly revert to items 1 and 2 of our agenda. Our delegation has taken an active part in the series of informal meetings on the creation of working groups on these two items. The discussion has amply demonstrated the growing support for the initiatives of the socialist countries presented in documents CD/4, CD/109 and CD/162, directed towards a beginning of multilateral negotiations on the key disarmament problem -- nuclear disarmament. In this field as in that of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests we shall be expected to accord high priority to these issues on the eve of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

No amount of attachment to the old concepts of security or to the old-fashioned dreams of military supremacy should blur the vision of the growing danger posed by nuclear weapons. Without a meaningful beginning of multilateral negotiations on these items on our agenda, all other efforts of the Committee will be lessened in effect and weight.

Here, I quote once again from the report of L.I. Brezhnev to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: "... the new measures we are proposing embrace a wide range of issues All these proposals pursue a single aim, our one over-all aspiration -- to do everything possible to relieve the peoples of the threat of a nuclear war, to preserve world peace".

Concluding my statement today, I would like to express the hope that the overwhelming support for the idea of creating two additional ad hoc working groups will influence positively those few delegations which are still turning a cold shoulder to the obvious necessity to start at least negotiations on preparing the negotiations on the most important problems of disarmament. This is to be a meaningful contribution to the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament and to the future of the world.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the Ambassador of Bulgaria, Comrade Voutov, for his statement. I thank him also for his very kind words addressed to me personally.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Distinguished Comrade Chairman, today, the Soviet delegation would like to express some observations on the issue of the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

As you know, the Soviet Union attaches very great importance to the questions of the limitation of the arms race and disarmament. In the report to the 26th Congress of our Party the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, L.I. Brezhnev, noted: "The pivotal line of the foreign policy of our Party and Government has been and continues to be the struggle to reduce the danger of war and to curb the arms race". It is from this perspective also that the Soviet delegation approaches the questions of the elaboration and the contents of a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

We do not have to start from scratch. The general exchange of views held last summer both at plenary meetings and in the Working Group afforded an opportunity to identify the positions of the parties and their approach to the nature and contents of the programme. The discussions show that there are certain differences in the positions of the participants in the negotiations on some of the elements of the CPD. But at the same time we have clear-cut and generally recognized reference points which will, if we follow them, enable us to complete the task successfully, without straying from the broad main path onto side-tracks.

What are these reference points? First and foremost there is the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which constitutes a good foundation for working out a comprehensive programme of disarmament since it reflects all the principal proposals and ideas put forward by many countries on questions relating to the limitation of the arms race and disarmament. We therefore believe that in drawing up the programme it is essential to adhere to the provisions of this fundamental document and strictly to maintain the balance of formulations based on compromises which was in fact achieved only with great difficulty through the efforts of more than 100 States Members of the United Nations.

Another thing which can be of great help to us in our work is the report of the United Nations Disarmament Commission adopted at the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly, which embodies the basic elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. Furthermore, we now have the text of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade which, as you know, contains a considerable section specifically devoted to the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

It can be noted with satisfaction that the participants in the negotiations have reached general agreement to the effect that the ultimate objective of the programme should be general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

In this connection I should like to set forth some considerations of a general nature. There exist many approaches to the solution of the problem of disarmament. Among them there is the approach of those whose objective is to exclude from the arsenals of States only specific types of weapons or to set qualitative or quantitative limits on them. We are well aware of the efforts to limit the armaments of only those States that are most developed militarily or to work out measures

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

restraining the arms race on a regional scale. This approach underlies the numerous disarmament negotiations held in the post-war period. It has contributed to the conclusion of a good many bilateral and multilateral agreements of various kinds which are justly valued as important steps towards the limitation of the arms race and disarmament. There are about 20 such agreements. However, the most effective approach to the solution of this problem, the one which would best assure mankind of lasting peace and security is that of complete and general disarmament.

What, in our view, are the main advantages of this approach? First and foremost, there is the fact that it completely precludes the possibility of one State or some States securing superiority over others through the fact that they have retained certain types of armaments or military forces. While all the existing multilateral and bilateral agreements in the field of the limitation of armaments and disarmament apply only to a larger or smaller group of States and cannot but create a risk of a potential disruption of the present balance of forces and of a possible destabilization of the international situation, general and complete disarmament provides for the participation of all the States of the world, both large and small, belonging to any social systems, in the process of complete disarmament. Thus the universal nature of disarmament precludes the possibility of any State whatsoever preserving its military potential, which would imperil the security of other States.

In the conditions of general and complete disarmament, the problem of verifying compliance with the appropriate universal agreement acquires a qualitatively different character. While major difficulties in reaching agreement on various verification measures occur in the negotiations on partial limitations of armaments and armed forces because of the legitimate fears of States that those measures could be utilized for the purpose of gathering intelligence data on the nature, scope and possibilities of the military activities of a State which are not subject to prohibition under the agreement concluded, such apprehensions will be irrelevant in the conditions of general and complete disarmament since the complete prohibition will cover the entire range of the military activities of States.

As has been stated in one of the documents of the Soviet Government, States will have nothing to hide from each other. It will be fully possible to carry out any verification measure or any inspection to remove any doubts as to how faithfully this or that State is fulfilling its disarmament obligations.

General and complete disarmament implies the equal disarmament of all States of the world, without any hidden advantages for any party and without prejudice to the national security interests of any one whatsoever, while affording every opportunity for comprehensive and effective international control.

There is still another important aspect to this. General and complete disarmament will lead to the release of all the material and human resources involved in the military activities of States. The diversion of these resources to peaceful purposes will create extremely favourable conditions for a radical solution of many fundamental social and economic problems in the world.

Finally, demilitarization -- and I mean universal demilitarization -- will undoubtedly bring about a change in the nature of international relations on the whole. There will be the amplest opportunity for the application of the principles of the peaceful coexistence of States with different social systems.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

I would like to remind you that the call for general and complete disarmament has been repeatedly made in the past by various pacifist, anti-war movements. But as the subject of negotiations at international conferences it was proposed for the first time by the Soviet Union in the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference in February 1928. In the post-war period the Soviet Union again proposed consideration of the possibility of a radical and universal solution of the disarmament problem. At the request of the USSR the question of general and complete disarmament was, for the first time in the history of the United Nations, put on the agenda of the fourteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, held in 1959. At that session of the General Assembly, the Soviet Union submitted a declaration on general and complete disarmament and one year later a proposal for the basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. Approval of the Soviet proposal would have led to the implementation of concrete measures which would ultimately have brought about general and complete disarmament.

However, the realities of international life have shown that the attainment of this lofty objective -- general and complete disarmament -- at one stroke or, as they say, at one go is a difficult matter which has so far proved to be impossible. As you know, the attainment of agreements does not depend on one party or even on two or three parties but on the consent of all the participants in the negotiations, and as members of the Committee know, even within our relatively small body, the achievement of consensus even on questions of a secondary character proves at times to be quite a difficult matter. We must stick to realities and seek an agreement in those areas and on those issues where such an agreement is possible. The Soviet Union has been systematically introducing various proposals directed at attaining accords on certain concrete measures. If a possibility is found which, when realized, would open up the prospect of solving any question in the field of disarmament, it will be enough to call, "Eureka!" and the Soviet Union will be prepared to react positively to corresponding ideas or proposals, no matter from whom they may emanate. The Soviet Union by no means claims a monopoly in putting forward such initiatives. The main thing is that these initiatives and proposals should help to resolve this or that specific disarmament issue. We say this not to belittle the importance of our ongoing work in the Committee on the comprehensive programme of disarmament but only to ensure that the document we are negotiating does not turn out to be just another piece of paper which will suffer the same unenviable lot as many solemn declarations which have never been put into practice.

We share the views of many delegations in the Committee which have advocated that the CPD should reflect, not only its ultimate goal but also the nearest, immediate objective. It should guide States towards the solution of those urgent and long-ripe disarmament issues which are at the top of the agenda of international life and call insistently for solution. In present conditions, when the world situation has seriously deteriorated, it is especially important to preserve, consolidate and develop further all the positive achievements of past years in the sphere of the curbing of the arms race, and to secure the implementation of measures aimed at removing the threat of a nuclear war.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The delegations present here are, of course, well aware of the fact that the immediate objectives of the CPD, as formulated in paragraph 8 of the elements of a comprehensive programme contained in the report of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, should be in particular to initiate and expedite urgent negotiations on halting the arms race in all its aspects, to open a process of genuine disarmament on an internationally agreed basis and to increase international confidence and the relaxation of international tension.

As regards the principles which should be at the basis of the elaboration and implementation of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, the Soviet delegation wishes to name as one of the major principles -- one which essentially is a generally recognized norm -- the principle of undiminished security for all parties to an agreement, i.e. the principle of equality and equal security.

The above principle, as you know is mentioned more than once in the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Furthermore, the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade adopted at the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly says in so many words that at each stage of disarmament "the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces". There is every reason for saying that the strict and unwavering observation of the principle of equality and equal security, with a renunciation of unilateral advantages and illusory attempts to secure a military supremacy, constitute the most important condition for the effective elaboration of the CPD, as they do for any other disarmament agreement generally.

Of exceptional importance also is the universal confirmation and development of the principle of the non-use of force in international relations. It is also essential to seek to ensure in practice that the maximum possible number of States, especially nuclear-weapon Powers and States with the most powerful armaments and armed forces, participate in the negotiations and in agreements under preparation. The participation of all nuclear-weapon Powers in the efforts to curtail the nuclear arms race and to reduce and eliminate all stockpiles of such armaments is necessary for the attainment of complete success in this endeavour. The adherence of all States to the international agreements now in force which are aimed at limiting the arms race and disarmament is an essential and substantial prerequisite for further progress in this area. In other words, the principle of universality is one of the most important prerequisites for progress in the disarmament field.

Also of importance is the principle of reciprocity in working out disarmament agreements. All the above-said, in our view, is worth reflecting in the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

It goes without saying that agreements in the disarmament sphere should also provide for effective control over disarmament measures, the scope and nature of which should be determined by the scope, nature and specific features of the concrete measures provided for in these agreements. The comprehensive programme of disarmament built upon such principles will be a genuinely stable, viable and realistic one.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

As for the specific measures which would make up the contents of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, the Soviet Union, as you know, has repeatedly put forward and continues to put forward various proposals on that score. The letter of 11 April 1980 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, A.A. Gromyko, to the United Nations Secretary-General concerning the tasks of the Second Disarmament Decade states: "The Soviet Union is prepared to limit and to prohibit, on a mutually agreed basis with other States, any type of weapon without, of course, prejudicing the security of anyone and on the basis of complete reciprocity between the States possessing the weapon in question". This letter, which was issued as an official document of the Committee, also enumerates specific measures whose implementation would, in our view, give the Second Disarmament Decade real meaning.

Very important proposals concerning disarmament are contained in the Declaration of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, which was adopted last May in Warsaw.

We would also like to draw the attention of the members of the Committee to still another document, namely, the memorandum of the Soviet Union entitled "For peace and disarmament, for international security guarantees" which was submitted by the USSR delegation to the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session. This document sets out a broad programme for the cessation of the arms race and the transition to genuine disarmament measures all the way to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

We would particularly like to stress the extreme importance and urgency of the specific and constructive disarmament measures proposed by L.I. Brezhnev at the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Soviet delegation has already described these measures in its statement at one of the Committee's plenaries. We now once again draw the attention of the participants in the negotiations to the initiatives and proposals on disarmament which were put forward at that Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. We hope that these proposals will be duly reflected in the comprehensive programme of disarmament being negotiated.

In the course of the debate both last year and at the current session of the Committee a number of delegations of the group of non-aligned countries have raised the question of the dates, the time-frames, for the implementation of the comprehensive programme of disarmament and its individual stages. In this connection the Soviet delegation would like to state that we are in favour of the setting of tentative time-frames for the implementation of any agreements in the field of the limitation of the arms race. This matter can, of course, be resolved in concrete terms according to the scope and nature of the measures we succeed in agreeing upon. This is one more manifestation of our goodwill and desire to attain agreements.

As far as the nature of the programme is concerned, that is, whether it should be legally binding or not, we believe that this programme should be -- as is stated in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament -- a basis for negotiations on the measures to be incorporated in the programme. The outcome of these negotiations will, indeed, be appropriate international treaties, agreements and convention.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

What is required to achieve practical results towards halting the arms race and disarmament is to hold constructive negotiations among the States concerned, in the course of which mutually acceptable solutions are found and worked out. In our view, States should use all the available channels for conducting negotiations as well as all the opportunities for a broad exchange of views on these matters within the framework of the United Nations.

The Soviet Union believes that thorough preparations are needed for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. After that it will be necessary to convene a world disarmament conference with the participation of all States, which could fully examine the issues of both nuclear and conventional disarmament.

We have more than once underlined the paramount importance of this forum which has been persistently called for by a wide range of States. The advantage of a world disarmament conference over special sessions of the United Nations General Assembly lies in the fact that such a conference, as a result of the negotiations on specific disarmament issues, would adopt decisions binding upon all States rather than recommendations, thus undoubtedly facilitating a successful move towards genuine disarmament. We are firmly convinced that the holding of a world disarmament conference should form an integral part of the measures envisaged in the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

These are the observations we wished to make today regarding the contents and nature of the comprehensive programme of disarmament which we are to elaborate.

U SAW HLAING (Burma): Mr. Chairman, allow me, first of all, to express the deep satisfaction of my delegation to see you assume the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the second month of its spring session. I feel sure that your wealth of experience and able guidance will lead us on the way to the meaningful conclusion of our work and the achievement of our avowed objectives. My delegation for its part would like to extend its pledge to co-operate with you fully in the discharge of your responsibilities. May I also express our deep appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador de la Gorce of France, who conducted the proceedings of the Committee with speed and skill.

Today, I shall try to confine my statement to item 6 of the agenda, Comprehensive programme of disarmament. CPD is a subject which disarmament negotiating bodies past and present have discussed for decades. We have invested much of our time and efforts into drawing up such a programme. In spite of these well-meaning and painstaking labours, the noble objectives we sought after continue to remain elusive.

However, my delegation is particularly pleased at the establishment without hesitation of an Ad hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and at the fact that serious work has begun to be undertaken under the wise leadership of Ambassador García Robles of Mexico.

(U Saw Hlaing, Burma)

The Final Document in its paragraph 109, the relevant recommendations of the United Nations Disarmament Commission and General Assembly resolution 35/46 declaring the 1980s as the Second Decade of Disarmament, enjoined this Committee to undertake the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. In particular resolution 35/46 set a time-frame by requesting this Committee to expedite its work on the programme with a view to its adoption no later than at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, scheduled for 1982. These documents confirmed the extent of the responsibility which the international community placed on this Committee.

My delegation, in its statement of 24 February 1981 before the plenary of this Committee, emphasized that the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control could be achieved through employment of the method of seeking gradual and phased agreements. Aggregation of limited gains would then generate a process towards the totality of achievement. My delegation feels that if we are to achieve a meaningful and realistic programme of disarmament, it should be a package of interrelated measures to be realized on a step-by-step basis of logical sequence.

In this regard, my delegation is of the opinion that the formulation contained in the Final Document, the recommendations of the United Nations Disarmament Commission and General Assembly resolution 35/46 provide us with the necessary elements for a comprehensive programme of disarmament. In particular, the Final Document, conceived and acclaimed by consensus, should form the principal basis on which a CPD should be structured and built up. A number of measures set out in it and the carefully negotiated outline of measures enumerated in the report of the United Nations Disarmament Commission of 1979 (A/34/42) provide us with a list of elements for negotiation. We must identify and classify clusters of measures to draw up a priority list. These measures should be linked to each other in a chain of living units. Currently, the Committee on Disarmament is deeply engaged in at least four disarmament subjects on which negotiations are in progress. My delegation considers them as positive achievements in the direction of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. My delegation on the other hand feels that there remains one area to which the CD needs to address itself more urgently. Cessation of the nuclear arms race in all its aspects and nuclear disarmament on the one hand and a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing on the other, have been placed on the list of priorities in our work. The international community has time and again urged this Committee to deal with the two extremely urgent disarmament issues without further hesitation. My delegation, together with the members of the Group of 21 in the CD, have called for the establishment of appropriate negotiating mechanisms at the earliest possible date. It is to be hoped that this call will be responded to as soon as possible.

In formulating a comprehensive programme of disarmament, it will be necessary to constitute a clear and agreed framework for substantive negotiations. Moreover, the framework for sustained international action should also be an integral constituent of the programme. At the same time, a comprehensive programme of

(U Saw Hlaing, Burma)

disarmament should ensure that it does not contain the seeds of insecurity of any State. It will, therefore, be necessary to give due consideration to the right of each State to security at every level of negotiation and at all stages of implementation of the programme.

We believe that the recommendations of the United Nations Disarmament Commission provide a good basis on which further negotiations in drawing up a list of priority measures for implementation could be made. We hope that common views could be reached through the process of these negotiations. By virtue of their annihilative power imposing a perpetual threat of destruction and death upon mankind, all measures relating to nuclear weapons should be accorded a higher degree of priority over the rest of other disarmament measures. By this, my delegation does not mean that the various degrees of priority accorded to current negotiations on specific issues should imply any diminution in their respective levels of importance.

A comprehensive programme of disarmament, in the strict legal sense, may not be conceived of as an instrument comparable to an international convention or treaty. On the other hand, it should not be regarded merely as an expression of intentions by States. We are also convinced that it is not a mere programme in the ordinary sense, but a document having far-reaching political and security implications and carrying short, medium and long-term commitments for all countries. In all possible clarity, it must be a programme which should enjoy the full commitment of all countries for implementation especially by those States with the largest military arsenals.

Adequate provisions for verification of compliance with disarmament agreements facilitate their conclusion, ratification and implementation, and promote the building of mutual confidence. As such, my delegation feels that verification constitutes an essential element of a CPD and methods and procedures of verification corresponding to the needs and peculiarities of specific disarmament measures should be appropriately devised.

As stated in my earlier intervention, research and development in the field of weapons technology have been in progress at a rate outpacing the speed of disarmament negotiations at all levels and in all categories. If we fail to accelerate progress in measures of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, and sustain it at a steady level, our cherished objectives will suffer irreversible defeat and remain illusory. In the opinion of my delegation, the longer it takes to achieve progress, the harder it will be to attain our ultimate goals. The growing destructive capability and qualitative refinement of weapons systems will render our work irrelevant and meaningless, unless we can strike a rough equity of progress. All disarmament measures to be contained in a CPD should be bound within a realistic but non-rigid time frame and if we fail to have this, I am afraid the final objectives of disarmament negotiations will remain beyond our reach. In our view, therefore, a realistic time-reference for certain stages, wherever relevant, could be very useful as an indication necessary for the further negotiation and implementation of the programme. My delegation feels that a review mechanism at all levels and stages of the programme will provide the conditions for necessary adjustments as required by any circumstances.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador U Saw Hlaing, the representative of Burma, for his statement. I thank him also for the kind words of congratulations he addressed to me.

Mr. PEELIFFER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. Chairman, may I at the outset of my intervention today congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship of our Committee for the month of March. You take up your duties on the basis and in continuation of the excellent work which has been done by your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador de la Gorce of France, who, during the month of February, truly acted as Chairman of the entire Committee. I wish you every success in the performance of your difficult task and I assure you of the full co-operation of my delegation.

First of all I should like to support strongly what has been said on nuclear deterrence in the very important statement made by the distinguished delegate of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Summerhayes, on 5 March 1980. His observations are shared fully by my Government.

In this context I should like to reiterate that the Federal Republic of Germany attaches great importance to the concept of a stable nuclear balance as a requirement for peace and security. It is for this reason that we were and are concerned about the significant imbalance in the field of nuclear medium-range systems in favour of the Soviet Union which has arisen in the past years and is still growing. The West's answer to this destabilizing development was the double-track decision of December 1979. This decision is aimed on the one hand at a measured and limited modernization of certain nuclear systems of the United States and their future deployment in Europe, and, on the other hand, at arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union which have as their objective equal and verifiable limitations for land-based medium-range nuclear systems on both sides at the lowest possible level. The United States Secretary of State, Mr. Haig, and Federal Foreign Minister Genscher have just reiterated their full support for both elements of this approach.

I shall now come to the question of the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. First of all, I should like to welcome the early reconvening of the Ad Hoc Working Group which deals with this subject. Under the guidance of its Chairman, Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, it has already started substantive negotiations on the contents of the programme. My delegation will continue to participate actively in these negotiations, thus making its contribution to the achievement of the aim which we all pursue, namely, the elaboration of the comprehensive programme in time to be submitted to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The Federal Republic of Germany has from the very outset taken an active interest in the consideration and preparation of the negotiations on the programme. May I in this connection recall the reply submitted to the Secretary-General by my country containing our views and suggestions on the programme (A/CN.10/1 of 19 April 1979) and the working paper which we submitted on behalf of a number of countries on the elements of a comprehensive programme during the 1979 session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (A/CN.10/3 of 22 May 1979). The proposals which have been put forward in these documents still reflect the position of my Government.

(Mr. Pfeiffer, Federal Republic of Germany)

In order to conclude the negotiations within the Committee in time, we have to base our work on the elements which were adopted at the first substantive session of the Disarmament Commission. I need hardly say that we always have to take into account the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, but it may be useful to recall also that the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade (General Assembly resolution 35/46) contains valuable elements from which we might draw during our work. If we structure our work according to these documents, which have all been adopted by consensus, we can hardly fail to elaborate a realistic and well-balanced programme.

I shall not attempt to outline, let alone describe, the comprehensive programme as it should be set up in the opinion of my Government. I will limit myself to some brief remarks concerning a few basic principles which, however, are of importance for the programme's framework and implementation.

The realization of the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control will take time. All of us are aware of this. Yet we cannot wait until one day this goal will seem within easy reach. We have to do what we can do now. Therefore, we have to follow a step-by-step approach which must contain a series of measures in different fields. A programme designed eventually to achieve measures to reduce the size of military arsenals and armed forces should begin with the introduction of measures which increase confidence between States and which, in our view, would thus be an effective first step in order to create the climate which is necessary for progress towards comprehensive disarmament.

A comprehensive programme, which is to be a framework for substantive negotiations in the field of disarmament, must -- according to paragraph 4 of the elements which were adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission -- be "a carefully worked out package of interrelated measures in the field of disarmament". In a working paper submitted to the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme by the distinguished Ambassador of Nigeria (CD/CPD/WP.18), he calls for "an orderly, well-balanced package of interrelated measures".

My delegation fully endorses this concept. We do indeed hold the view that we must not single out any specific disarmament measure to the detriment of the whole set of measures. We cannot reach substantive results if we do not recognize that disarmament measures must be seen in connection with their impact on peace and security in general. It is only in following this line that we can avoid destabilizing effects as a result and during the realization of the programme. Therefore, the programme must be drawn up so as to safeguard the undiminished security of all States at all stages of the disarmament process.

This, in turn, requires effective international and, as appropriate, national verification measures which ensure the strict observance by all parties of agreements in the field of arms control and disarmament, thereby enhancing the mutual trust and confidence of States. The question of verification is, in our opinion, the cornerstone of all efforts aimed at disarmament, and this should be expressed in the comprehensive programme.

One word concerning the stages of implementation: it is obvious that some measures -- like, let us say, some measures designed to build confidence -- have to be implemented at an earlier stage than, for example, the abolition of certain types of weapons. But it will be difficult to put each and every measure into its correct pigeon-hole as long as we have not agreed on the whole set of measures which are to be comprised in the programme.

(Mr. Pfeiffer, Federal Republic of Germany)

What seems to be most important is a regular review of the achievements, taking into account the results of international and impartial verification of the implementation of specific measures. Only such a review can create the necessary confidence and thus prepare the ground for the continuation of the process of disarmament envisaged by the comprehensive programme.

The reservations which my delegation has with regard to the inclusion of time-frames in the comprehensive programme are well known. In our view, these reservations are justified by the fact that the development of the international situation is quite unforeseeable. In this connection, I may perhaps be allowed to quote from the Final Declaration of the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers' Conference held at New Delhi from 9 to 13 February of this year: "The Ministers noted with grave concern the situation in South West Asia and agreed that it carries dangerous consequences for the peace and stability of the region. They agreed that the continuation of this situation poses serious implications for international peace and security."

Such developments as the one referred to in this Declaration, which have an impact on the international political and security situation, may continue to happen. They can complicate or even delay the implementation of the programme; others, to the contrary, might expedite it. In any case, it is evidently not realistic to connect the realization of specific disarmament measures with a given time-frame.

My delegation, however, is willing to consider other approaches to the organization of a comprehensive programme. As I have just pointed out, appropriate procedures for a continuing review of the programme could contribute to maintaining and strengthening the necessary momentum of this common effort.

Before concluding, let me make one brief remark concerning the nature of the programme. It is obvious that a programme the adoption of which is not an expression of the will of States to abide by it would be of limited value. On the other hand one must see that, the stronger the commitment of States to the implementation of the programme is to be, the more difficult it will be to agree on its contents. We should, therefore, adopt a balanced approach which does not deter States from accepting the inclusion of meaningful disarmament and arms control measures in the programme. My Government feels that on the basis of such an approach it will be possible to work out a comprehensive programme which has a real chance of being implemented by all States.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Pfeiffer, the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, for his statement and for the words of welcome he addressed to me.

This concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this juncture? That seems not to be the case.

May I then put before you the time-table for the work of our Committee next week. At my request, the Secretariat has circulated today a time-table of meetings to be held by the Committee and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. As usual, that time-table is only indicative and contains basically the same programme of activities as carried out during the present week. If there are no objections, I shall consider that the Committee is prepared to accept the time-table as suggested by the Chairman.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: May I now give the floor to Ambassador Jaipal, the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, who will answer the question raised at our last plenary meeting by Ambassador Issraelyan, concerning the circulation of documents.

Mr. JAIPAL (Secretary of the Committee and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General): At our 113th plenary meeting last Tuesday, the distinguished representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Issraelyan, addressed a question to the Secretariat concerning the circulation and distribution of documentation, particularly in regard to documents CD/160 and CD/162.

In response to his question I should like to take this opportunity to inform the members of the Committee about the procedures generally followed by the Secretariat for circulation of documentation. In conformity with past practice, official documents of the Committee are regularly placed in the delegations' boxes in the quantities requested by each delegation.

When official documents are issued the evening before a plenary meeting or on the morning of the plenary meeting itself, they are placed on the delegations' tables in the Council Chamber. Official documents are also circulated in the Council Chamber when the members submitting them request the Secretariat to do so. Official documents requiring action by the Committee, as well as draft decisions, working papers, non-papers, etc., are also placed on the table at the meeting at which they are considered, if not earlier.

Documents of working groups are usually distributed in the Council Chamber when the working groups meet. Sometimes, at the request of its Chairman, documents of a Working Group are circulated at a plenary or informal meeting in order to save time, especially when that Working Group meets on the same or the next day, or when the document in question has to reach the delegations before the Working Group's next meeting.

Official documents of the Committee and documents of working groups are also available in the Council Chamber in numbered boxes, in case delegations wish to have additional copies. Documents of working groups are also available in the small room adjacent to the Czech Salon at the left of the entrance to the Council Chamber.

Official records of the Committee are placed in the delegations' boxes.

The informal papers containing the weekly time-tables of the Committee are distributed in the Council Chamber the Thursday preceding the week covered by the time-tables.

As regards the particular question raised by the distinguished representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning two documents handed over to the Secretariat last week, I would like to inform him that document CD/160, which was submitted by his delegation on 3 March, was processed the same day and was available for the plenary meeting held on Thursday 5 March in English, French, Russian and Spanish. That document was also placed in the delegations' boxes and circulated during the plenary meeting of 5 March. The Chinese and Arabic versions, however, were available only on 9 March.

(Mr. Jaipal, Secretary of the Committee and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General)

Document CD/162, submitted by a group of Socialist countries on 5 March, was made available in the delegations' boxes on 9 March, in Arabic, Chinese, French and Spanish, and was also placed on the table on the morning of Tuesday 10 March, at the 112th plenary meeting. Distribution was made in all languages, with the exception of English which was withdrawn from the Council Chamber because of an error made by the technical services. The English text of that document, which was reissued this morning, has been placed on the table today.

Any suggestions from the members for improvements in the present procedure would be most welcome. The Secretariat tries to do its best with a limited staff. Mistakes and delays do occur from time to time but I would assure the members of the Committee that they are neither deliberate nor discriminatory.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the Secretary of the Committee for his statement. Are there any comments? That is not the case.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 17 March 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.

CD/PV.115
17 March 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTEENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 17 March 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. G. HERDER (German Democratic Republic)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. SALAH-BEY
Mr. A. BENYAMINA

Argentina: Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD

Australia: Mr. R. STEELE
Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUMOV
Mr. R. DEYANOV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U NGWE WIN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL
Mr. G. SKINNER

China: Mr. YU Peiwen
Mr. YU Mengjia
Mrs. WANG Zhiyun
Mrs. GE Yiyun

Cuba: Mrs. V. BOROWDOSKY JACKIEWICH
Mr. C. PAZOS
Mr. F. CUSPINERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. RUZEK
Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. A. CIMA
Mr. J. JIRUSEK

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M.N. FAHMY

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. de la GORCE
Mr. J. de BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Mr. P. BUNTIG

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. G. FEIFFER
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India:

Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. S. DARUSMAN
Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. F. QASIM
Mr. KARYONO
Mr. I. DAMANIK
Mr. J. HADI

Iran:

Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA

Italy:

Mr. V.C. DI MONTEZEMOLO
Mr. A. CIARRAPICO
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI
Mr. L. SALAZAR

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. R. ISHII
Mr. K. SHIMADA
Mr. K. ODA

Kenya: Mr. S. SHITEMI
Mr. G. MUNIU

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mr. M.A. CACERES

Mongolia: Mr. S.H. LKHASHID
Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco: Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. M. AKRAM
Mr. T. ALTAUF

Peru: Mr. A. THORNBERRY

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS
Mr. K. TOMASZEWSKI

Romania: Mr. M. MALITA
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARE
Mr. I. NORBERG
Mr. B. EKHOLM

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. MOSHKOV
Mr. A.G. DOULYAN

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES

United States of America:

Mr. C. FLOVERGEE

Mr. F. DESIMONE

Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER

Mr. J.A. MISKEL

Mr. H. WILSON

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT

Mr. H. ARTEAGA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:

Secretary of the Committee
and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

Mr. VOUTOV (Bulgaria): Comrade Chairman, today I wish to speak on item 3 of our agenda, the subject of our discussion in plenary this week, which is, "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". In my opening statement of the session I mentioned that Bulgaria as a non-nuclear-weapon State attaches a particular importance to the efforts aimed at strengthening in most effective forms the security guarantees to the non-nuclear-weapon States. My delegation has also put forward suggestions pertaining to the need for a proper structuring of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances in a way that would hopefully lead us to some further steps in this respect. Today, I should like to take the opportunity of our plenary meeting to set out my delegation's general approach to this important subject.

We consider the problem of providing effective and credible guarantees for the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States as part and parcel of the wider task of strengthening international peace and security, and enhancing the political and juridical foundations for the observance of the principle of the non-use of force in international relations. Its early solution has a direct bearing on securing adequate conditions to avert a further spread of nuclear weapons and to reduce the danger of a nuclear war. It is also our firm belief that non-nuclear-weapon States which cannot become a source of nuclear threat do have the moral right to obtain guarantees that would spare their populations and territories from the appalling consequences of a nuclear holocaust.

It has been generally recognized that the most effective guarantee that nuclear weapons will never be used against the non-nuclear-weapon States, and indeed all nations, is nuclear disarmament. That is why we vigorously support an early commencement in the Committee on Disarmament of meaningful negotiations that would lead us to a cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and a gradual reduction of the stockpiles of such weapons up to their ultimate elimination from the military arsenals. Pending the achievement of this objective, my country favours any initiative aimed at banning the use of nuclear weapons concurrently with the renunciation of the use of force in international relations. Until this comes about as a radical way of ruling out the possibility of any use of nuclear weapons, we are anxious to contribute to negotiating measures designed to strengthen the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States in the whole spectrum of their possible forms.

It is a well-known fact that Bulgaria is among the countries which support solving the problem of strengthening the security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States by the most effective and credible means of an international convention. To this end my country, together with a group of socialist States, sponsored document CD/23 containing a draft of such a convention. In view of the difficulties revealed in building up a consensus on an early solution along these lines, however, we have also expressed our wish to consider another parallel solution which could be considered as a step conducive to the achievement of our final objective.

The Bulgarian delegation, therefore, believes that in the present circumstances progress may be looked for in practical terms, provided that the problem would be dealt with in a step-by-step manner, going perhaps first through some appropriate interim measures which could additionally enhance the non-nuclear-weapon States' security and demonstrate the political will of the nuclear-weapon States to contribute

(Mr. Voutov, Bulgaria)

to this effect. In doing so we should not, however, lose sight of the ultimate objective of our common efforts, namely, the conclusion of an international convention. On the contrary, we believe that in parallel with pursuing interim aims, the Committee on Disarmament should continue to search for a common approach to the substance of negative security guarantees with a view to evolving the basis for such an agreement.

In the light of the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament it becomes even more urgent for this Committee to address constructively the problem of how it should best proceed in its endeavour to help develop further what is now available as regards guarantees for the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States. The Bulgarian delegation believes that at this stage progress could be searched for in several directions simultaneously with a view to concentrating, at an appropriate time, on the one that is most promising for an agreement on possible interim or more durable forms of international arrangements. Since the crux of our task undoubtedly is to find solutions on the substance of negative security guarantees, we welcome the determination of the Ad Hoc Working Group to address first this most important aspect of the over-all problem. There are, however, different avenues that could be concurrently followed in the pursuit of such a task.

One avenue of examining substance at this stage which is quite promising to produce prompt results is, for example, the exploration of the existing similarities in the general approaches of the States to the problem of negative security guarantees. This was a new idea put forward in the Ad Hoc Working Group by some delegations.

We have welcomed this useful suggestion, since it seems to be a realistic attempt to identify and develop in general categories what, at present, unifies us all, and first of all the States that are supposed to extend guarantees, in our common willingness to bring about a change for the better in the existing system of negative security guarantees. At least five such similarities in the general approaches have already been pointed out in the Working Group and perhaps some more can also be specified in a common effort during our substantive consideration later on. The result of such an exploration, as we see it, might become a future basis for possible further steps of a political significance, such as an interim Security Council resolution, or a joint declaration or statement, or another appropriate form of giving some kind of impetus to our future pursuits on this subject.

The Bulgarian delegation is one of those delegations in the Committee on Disarmament which are willing to make a constructive effort in exploring also the possibility of evolving a common approach to the substance of negative security guarantees at a deeper level, sometimes called a "common formula". As we stated in our working paper contained in document CD/153, the basic elements of such a common approach may become a general basis for an international instrument of a legally binding character, or for unilateral declarations identical in substance which the nuclear-weapon States might wish to make on their own initiative, taking into due account the results achieved in the negotiations.

(Mr. Voutov, Bulgaria)

I do not intend to speak now on how we see the prospect of evolving such a general basis since we shall have such an opportunity when the Working Group will be exploring this second avenue. At this juncture I only wish to touch on aspects that might have some bearing on the implementation of the idea of solemn, identical in substance declarations by the nuclear-weapon States concerning guarantees not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

As all members are well aware, the nuclear-weapon States have already been called upon by the General Assembly in its resolution 35/154 to come out with declarations of this kind which may later be approved by the Security Council. In our view, such a development could well also be considered as an important contribution to a step-by-step implementation of paragraph 59 of the Final Document, in which the General Assembly urged the nuclear-weapon States "to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". We believe that the Committee on Disarmament and its Working Group could play an invaluable role in preparing the ground for the above-mentioned declarations to be considered as identical or very close in their substance. This would be a significant step forward in meeting the wish of the non-nuclear-weapon States to be effectively guaranteed against the use of nuclear weapons in a more uniform way. Such a development could also be regarded as a move ahead towards concluding an international convention. Our delegation believes, therefore, that it would be useful if we could have a clear picture of what kind of remedy the existing system of negative security guarantees, already in force, might need at the first stage of the process of improving it.

We are aware that the unilateral declarations on non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, made in connection with the General Assembly's first special session on disarmament in 1978, are quite divergent in their nature and contain different degrees of commitment. That is why in considering their content, we tend to distinguish between the elements pertaining to the general approach of the nuclear-weapon States and those stipulating the actual undertakings by these States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. These undertakings form the existing system of negative security guarantees already in force. The present system, however, is far from being perfect enough. It is rightly considered not to have the maximum possible credibility and effectiveness owing to its unilateral character, divergence in scope of application and to the fact that some of the non-use undertakings are quite conditional and susceptible of varying interpretations.

In our view, only one of the actual undertakings provides for security guarantees for those non-nuclear-weapon States which can in no way become a source of a nuclear threat and, therefore, have the right to be guaranteed. The minimal necessary qualifications of the States to be assured are stipulated therein in objective clear-cut terms. The requirement relating to the non-nuclear-weapon status of the States to be guaranteed offers different options to them. The right of self-defence of the State extending the guarantee is stipulated therein, not in a conditional

(Mr. Voutov, Bulgaria)

form but rather as an additional qualification, namely, absence of nuclear weapons on the territory of the State to be assured. This undertaking already now covers practically all non-aligned countries, which as a rule do not accept nuclear weapons on their territories. At the same time, this guarantee applies also to Europe, a continent overloaded with nuclear weapons, where the need to prevent a possible use of nuclear weapons is most acute. This formula contains the minimal requirements that in one form or another may be found in all other non-use undertakings already in force.

The other two non-use declarations already in force, which are almost identical to each other are, in our view, the crux of the difficulty of finding easily a common approach to the substance of negative security guarantees, since they contain certain conditions envisaging possible exemptions from the non-use pledge with a language which is too open to subjective interpretations. The right of self-defence of the State extending the assurances is reflected in these undertakings in a way that seems to be contradictory to the basic idea of negative security guarantees, namely, that nuclear weapons may not be used against the non-nuclear-weapon States which cannot be a source of a nuclear threat. There could be some room for improvement in these two pledges, which would perhaps take into account the fact that the right of self-defence can be formulated in a non-conditional way, and also the fact that no mention of the alliance status of the State to be assured was made in similar guarantees by the same two States extended under the Treaty of Tlatelolco or in the global-scope-guarantee offered by the President of one of them in a 1977 declaration.

The present system of negative security guarantees already in force with respect to non-nuclear-weapon States is also incomplete as regards the participation of all nuclear-weapon States in it. This fact may be properly assessed by analysing the separate non-use declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States as included with their endorsement in the basic document of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances, CD/SA/WP.2, incorporated in the report of the Group for its 1980 session (document CD/125).

We welcome the willingness of one of the nuclear-weapon States, as expressed in this document, "to negotiate with nuclear-free zones participants in order to contract effective and binding commitments, as appropriate, precluding any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of these zones". We cannot overlook, however, the fact that this is a declaration with a regional rather than a global application, which could not be considered as an undertaking already in force with respect to the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. It is our belief, therefore, that it would be highly appreciated by these States if this nuclear-weapon State could unilaterally make a solemn declaration with a global application to the effect that it would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against a clearly specified category of non-nuclear weapon States, preferably those not having nuclear weapons on their territories.

As regards the declaration of the nuclear-weapon State that stands first in the document I have referred to, we welcome the support that this State has given to

(Mr. Voutov, Bulgaria)

the idea of an international convention. We are aware also of the appeal, or the recommendation made by this nuclear-weapon State, as reflected in the same document, to the effect that "the nuclear-weapon States should at least undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-free-zones". If this position should be taken as an expression of the readiness on the part of this nuclear-weapon State to extend negative security guarantees to all non-nuclear-weapon States, then I believe that those States will only welcome it, if it is coupled with a corresponding unilateral undertaking at a highly respectable level, which would undoubtedly fill an apparent shortcoming in the security assurances system already in force. If, however, this position of the nuclear-weapon State I am referring to, is to be taken as being conditioned on the same attitude by the other nuclear-weapon States, then I am afraid that, in view of the position on the scope of application held by some of them, the extension of such a kind of unlimited guarantees is unlikely to be a matter for the immediate future.

At the same time, as reflected in document CD/SA/WP.2, to which I have repeatedly referred, the same nuclear-weapon State, on its own initiative and unilaterally, declared long ago that at no time and in no circumstances would it be the first to use nuclear weapons. We are afraid, however, that this non-first-use undertaking, which I admit is already in force, is perhaps more relevant to the relations between the nuclear-weapon States than to those with a non-nuclear-weapon status. If this pledge may be considered as a non-use undertaking with respect to non-nuclear-weapon States, there is nothing in it that could preclude this nuclear-weapon State from possibly using nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State, provided that another nuclear-weapon State has used such weapons first.

It is our view, therefore, that it would be a very positive step forward and a contribution to completing the present system of negative security guarantees in respect of non-nuclear-weapon States, if this nuclear-weapon State could also consider the possibility of making unilaterally a solemn declaration which spells out its commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against a clearly specified category of non-nuclear-weapon States.

The Bulgarian delegation believes that the period prior to and during the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament could, as in 1978, be considered as an opportunity for the nuclear-weapon States to contribute to a further development of the existing system of negative security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States along the lines I have just tried to outline.

These are some of the thoughts we wanted to share today as regards possible avenues of strengthening the guarantees for the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States which could be kept in mind while examining the substance of the problem in the Ad Hoc Working Group.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, my delegation would like to offer its views regarding the comprehensive programme of disarmament and to introduce the working paper submitted by us in document CD/161 on "effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

The Pakistan delegation is convinced that in the context of the current disturbed international situation the elaboration of a comprehensive programme for disarmament has assumed even greater importance. We believe that a genuine agreement, on a meaningful comprehensive programme can influence the policies of the great Powers towards restraint, as well as realize concrete disarmament measures.

The Pakistan delegation therefore welcomes the resumption of the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Working Group set up last year to elaborate a comprehensive programme. We note with satisfaction that serious work has commenced, under the most experienced guidance of Ambassador Garcia Robles of Mexico, to build upon the outline of the programme agreed upon at the last session. The Pakistan delegation would like to take this opportunity to reiterate what we regard should be some of the main features of the comprehensive programme.

We believe that the central objective of the comprehensive programme must be the achievement of general and complete disarmament and the elimination of war as an instrument of State policy. The specific measures in the programme must be logical parts of an integral process leading to general and complete disarmament. The programme could, of course, additionally include secondary objectives such as that of decreasing the danger of nuclear war and the acceleration of negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

A most important issue upon which agreement is to be reached is the nature of the comprehensive programme. The Pakistan delegation believes that the CPD must be both a programme of action as well as a commitment to act. It must create obligations of a legally binding character on the part of all States to negotiate in good faith and implement measures which are included in the programme. As Ambassador Issraelyan of the Soviet Union stated at our last meeting, the comprehensive programme should not be another "hollow paper which will suffer the same unenviable fate of the many solemn declarations which have never been put into practice". My delegation, of course, recognizes, as the distinguished Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany stated here on 12 March 1981, that "the stronger the commitment of States to the implementation of the programme is to be, the more difficult it would be to agree on its contents". Yet to us the choice appears obvious. It would be better to confront the difficulties in the way of agreement to specific measures in the programme here and now rather than elaborate a programme which, from the start, States may have no intention of observing.

We recognize that the realities of the present day do appear daunting. But this should in no way imply that the Committee on Disarmament must accept these realities as unchangeable or lower its sights with regard to the comprehensive programme because of the possible "unforeseeable turn of developments of the international situation". For my delegation the comprehensive programme should indeed be a serious attempt on the part of the international community to ensure that the turn of developments in the international situation are in the direction of disarmament rather than of an unbridled and unpredictable arms race.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

That the comprehensive programme should create legal obligations for States appears to my delegation to be inherent in the fact that the task of elaborating the programme has been assigned to the Committee on Disarmament. This is a body entrusted with conducting negotiations for concrete disarmament agreements as distinct from the General Assembly or other forums which usually issue documents of a solemn but essentially exhortative character. By itself, a political commitment to the comprehensive programme would not be sufficient, since such political commitments are given by Governments and usually do not bind their successors in power. On the other hand, a legal commitment is binding on States.

A second feature of the comprehensive programme about which various views have been advanced concerns its time-frame and stages of implementation. We can all agree that the comprehensive programme will be a step-by-step process which could begin with the tasks that are urgent and possible and proceed to others which are most ambitious and difficult. This step-by-step process will have to be defined in the programme as clearly as possible and set within a temporal perspective. Unfortunately, there still appears to be considerable confusion about the question of a time-frame. Pakistan has suggested that the target of the comprehensive programme should be to achieve the goal of general and complete disarmament by the year 2000. We do not believe that this is an overly ambitious date for the achievement of our ultimate objective. Nor is it an inflexible target; rather, we envisage it as an indicative time-frame for the completion of the process of disarmament set out in the comprehensive programme. We are sure that no one would chide the Governments of the world if the programme is in fact not accomplished by that date if, during this time-period, substantial progress has been made towards the final goal. On the other hand, to elaborate a programme which provides no indication of the urgency of achieving the measures incorporated therein may well consign our endeavours to oblivion.

For the sake of convenience, a comprehensive programme could be categorized into various phases for implementation. These phases could be three, four or more depending on the criteria used for the categorization. The Pakistan delegation has proposed that the comprehensive programme could be divided into three broad phases: first, immediate measures; second, short-term measures, and third, final or concluding measures.

The first and immediate phase, in our view, would include those measures that are indispensable to prevent the further escalation of the arms race, to bring it to a halt, as well as those measures on which an international consensus has been evolved. Thus, measures such as the comprehensive test ban, the prohibition of chemical weapons, security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, the elaboration of the international consensus on non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear technology as well as the promotion of nuclear-weapon-free zones, would fall within the category of immediate disarmament measures. The identification of the measures to be included in the first phase of the programme should not be too difficult since most of them have in fact been incorporated in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in the "elements" of the comprehensive programme elaborated by the Disarmament Commission and in the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade. What would be of importance in the context of immediate measures is to give greater precision and direction to the agreements that are to be achieved on these disarmament issues.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

The second phase, or short-term measures, should, in our view, comprise those designed to reduce the existing arsenals of nuclear, conventional and other weapons. The Pakistan delegation has previously identified some of the possible steps which could be included in this phase, e.g. the conclusion of a third agreement on the limitation of strategic arms between the Superpowers, the conclusion of an agreement on medium-range nuclear weapons and an agreement among the nuclear Powers not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. However, we believe that the measures in this phase of the comprehensive programme need to be more clearly identified and elaborated since the guidance available, e.g. in paragraph 50 of the Final Document with respect to nuclear disarmament, although helpful, is not sufficient. We have in our statement of 10 March 1981 spelt out our ideas concerning the necessity of further elaborating the provisions of paragraph 50 of the Final Document. We believe that a similar exercise would also be necessary in relation to conventional and other weapons. Since guidance in this respect is lacking in existing programmes and declarations, my delegation would submit that this may be sought from the proposals which have been submitted in the past, including the draft treaties on general and complete disarmament submitted by the United States of America and the Soviet Union in 1961.

It is natural that the measures to be incorporated in the comprehensive programme regarding the third and final stage are more difficult to envisage and to agree upon. My delegation therefore believes that the final measures relating to the complete elimination and destruction of nuclear, conventional and other weapons, and for the establishment of an international authority and other mechanisms to supervise the implementation of disarmament measures, could perhaps be identified in the comprehensive programme in more general terms than the measures to be included in the first and second phases.

The Pakistan delegation agrees that the comprehensive programme will have to be reviewed periodically to provide impetus to such negotiations as might have lagged behind, or to elaborate with greater precision those measures which, because of circumstances, were defined in general terms in the programme as initially adopted. Conferences to review the comprehensive programme could be scheduled to coincide with each phase of the programme that has been agreed upon.

In categorizing various measures, another principle which will have to be borne in mind is that of maintaining a balance of security between various States at each stage of the disarmament process. However, this balance should not be construed as a maintenance of the present inequitable distribution of military capability among various countries of the world. Therefore, the measures under the comprehensive programme would necessarily place primary responsibility for the achievement of disarmament measures, at least in the initial phase, on the two major nuclear-weapon Powers which possess predominant military capability in the world today. Further, the measures included in the various phases of the process leading to general and complete disarmament must keep in view the linkages which exist between different kinds of disarmament negotiations. In our view, three kinds of linkages seem inevitable: first, between nuclear and conventional disarmament; secondly, between global and regional measures, and thirdly, between disarmament and measures to promote international security and confidence among States. Several speakers, particularly the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, have referred to these points.

The Pakistan delegation will continue to contribute to the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Working Group on the CPD with a view to completing an international legal instrument for submission to the General Assembly at its second special session on disarmament. We believe that at this stage the Ad Hoc Working Group could most

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

usefully prepare a complete list of measures to be included in the programme. At the second stage these measures could be placed in the various phases of the comprehensive programme that may be agreed upon. Thereafter, negotiations could focus on the fundamental issues, namely, the nature of the programme and the question of its time-frame.

The Committee is today resuming its plenary consideration of the item on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pakistan's position on the subject has been elaborated at previous meetings of the Committee, most recently in my statement of 17 February this year. I will not repeat our views except to state that we are most disappointed that with one exception the nuclear-weapon Powers have continued to exhibit a lack of sensitivity to the security concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

Nevertheless, some progress has been made in the negotiations held so far. Regarding the form of the assurances, there is no objection, in principle, to an international convention, although the difficulties involved have also been pointed out. On the substance or nature of the assurances, the advance in negotiations has been less evident; indeed, there may have been a retrogression in the positions of certain major nuclear-weapon Powers. However, in its report to the Committee at the last session, the Ad Hoc Working Group stressed the need to continue the search for "a common approach acceptable to all which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character".

The working paper submitted by the Pakistan delegation in document CD/161 represents a sincere effort on our part to bring into the negotiations the various alternatives that could be explored in the search for a "common approach". So far, negotiations have been restricted to only one of the alternatives -- the fourth alternative listed in our working paper -- and have been confronted by the unyielding positions of the nuclear-weapon Powers reflected in their unilateral declarations. What we have suggested in our working paper is that all possibilities for evolving a common approach should be fully explored.

The working paper in CD/161 is largely self-explanatory. I would like to add only a few comments by way of further clarification.

First, the consideration of one or other of the alternatives identified in the paper would not compromise the position of any State. As far as Pakistan is concerned, we believe that the search for a "common approach" must commence from the fundamental proposition that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved, the nuclear-weapon Powers are under an obligation to assure all non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear power. Thus our preference and, I feel, that of most non-nuclear-weapon States is for the first alternative identified in our working paper. Yet, in a spirit of accommodation, we are prepared to take into account the legitimate security preoccupations of the nuclear-weapon States, provided these do not negate the effectiveness and credibility of the assurances provided to the non-nuclear-weapon States.

Secondly, some of the alternatives identified in the working paper, especially the second alternative, have not been explored at all in our negotiations so far. Although the impact of the approach outlined in the second alternative on the security of non-nuclear-weapon States may be eroded to a certain extent by the reservations that would be made by some of the nuclear-weapon Powers, we believe that it would be

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

preferable to certain other courses of action that have been suggested. The third alternative in our paper would also imply that efforts to evolve a common approach be based on certain new premises, one that would define the legitimate security interests of the nuclear-weapon Powers through negotiations and more narrowly than they have themselves done in their existing unilateral declarations. An illustration of the kind of new premises that could be examined is provided by the statement of President Brezhnev of 25 April 1978, in which it was declared that the Soviet Union would be obliged to use nuclear weapons only in case of an aggression against it by a nuclear-weapon Power.

Thirdly, although the Ad Hoc Working Group has already made efforts to reconcile the unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon Powers, perhaps some fresh ideas may be forthcoming to break the impasse. My delegation, of course, continues to believe that the compromise formula contained in Pakistan's draft convention in document CD/10, providing for an undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States "not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the nuclear security arrangements of some nuclear-weapon States" is a most realistic basis for reconciling the positions reflected in the unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon Powers. But we are open to suggestions for further refinement of this formula.

Fourthly, the last alternative in our paper will not involve the development of a "common formula" on security assurances; although it could be portrayed as a "common approach" to the question. This alternative, in our view, represents the lowest common denominator of what can be achieved on the question of security assurances.

There may well be additional alternatives to a common approach apart from the ones identified in document CD/161. We have carefully examined the ideas contained in document CD/153 submitted by the delegation of Bulgaria. The Pakistan delegation is prepared to examine all possible avenues to evolving a "common approach" which offers credible and effective assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat posed by nuclear weapons.

Mr. OKAWA (Japan): Mr. Chairman, I finally have pleasure in congratulating you officially on behalf of the Japanese delegation on your assumption of the chair of our Committee for the month of March. I wish you well in your very important function and pledge to you the fullest co-operation of my delegation. I have already praised your distinguished predecessor for the most efficient manner in which he got us started last month and it remains for me to express to Ambassador de la Gorce the deep gratitude of my delegation.

Today I wish to make a few remarks on behalf of my Government regarding the comprehensive programme of disarmament that is now under consideration in the Ad Hoc Working Group under the most distinguished chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador García Robles.

Disarmament issues are closely related to the international political situation which, by nature, is changing at all times and is hardly predictable even a year beforehand, let alone several years in advance. They are also vitally connected with the security framework of each State whether at the regional or at the global level.

(Mr. Okawa, Japan)

Consequently, my delegation considers that the disarmament process has to be conceived in the context of the ever-evolving international situation in the widest sense of the word, including, inter alia, its political and security aspects; more specifically, the disarmament process can only be conceived to the extent that it takes into consideration the individual and collective security requirements of the States involved.

From this point of view, my delegation is not convinced of the merits of attempting to set up specific target-dates for the implementation of individual disarmament measures that are to be included in the comprehensive programme of disarmament. Such target-dates will not prove to be workable in the light of realities.

The concept of an indicative time-frame divided into a number of successive phases has also been advanced by certain delegations. Basically this concept can be said to be a corollary of the idea of target-dates and my delegation fears that this will be just as unrealistic and unworkable as the original idea of target-dates. We can, however, associate ourselves with the idea of some sort of logical sequence being envisaged for a number of specific disarmament measures: those measures which could be conceived to be attainable in the short term -- without specifying the number of years that the short term would encompass -- to be followed by those which could possibly be realized in subsequent terms. These measures would thus be set forth in a sequence that would be logical but only indicative. In this connection, my delegation would like to draw the attention of the Committee to the "Draft programme of action" prepared by a number of countries, including Japan, and presented to the Preparatory Committee for the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, contained in document A/AC.187/96 dated 1 February 1978. Our basic thoughts on envisaged programmes of disarmament were clearly presented in this document and are still viable and could be conducive to our task in formulating the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

My delegation also shares the view of those many delegations who have pointed out that the comprehensive programme of disarmament should not be of a legally binding nature. For obvious reasons, a legally binding programme would be neither realistic nor appropriate.

What is much more important, indeed essential, is that each specific disarmament measure listed in the comprehensive programme should be accompanied by an effective verification system so as to ensure that the measure will be duly observed, thus enhancing confidence in its credibility.

Our comprehensive programme should be nothing more and nothing less than a workable framework within which our aspirations for disarmament can be transformed and geared into a series of concrete actions taking the form of specific and practical measures on disarmament--measures that are feasible at given moments in the course of time.

Furthermore, the programme should be designed so as to permit the various disarmament measures included therein to be implemented without breaking the delicate balance of the organic interrelationship among the different measures. This also means that each measure must be achieved without eroding the existing framework of international security.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Japan for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

You will recall that, at the end of the informal meeting held yesterday afternoon, I announced that I would hold open-ended informal consultations on the subjects discussed during the series of informal meetings held under items 1 and 2 of the Committee's agenda. I wish now to inform members that those open-ended consultations will start tomorrow, Wednesday, at 3 p.m., in Conference Room 1, which is adjacent to the Council Chamber.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 19 March 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.

CD/PV.116
19 March 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTEENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 19 March 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. G. Herder (German Democratic Republic)

GE.81.60828

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. BENYAMINA

Argentina: Mr. F. JIMENEZ DAVILA
Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD

Australia: Mr. R. STEELE

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. R. DEYANOV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U NGWE WIN
U THAN HTUN

Canada: Mr. D.S. MCPHAIL
Mr. G. SKINNER

China: Mr. YU Peiwen
Mr. LIANG Yufan
Mr. YU Mengjia
Mrs. WANG Zhiyun
Mrs. GE Yiyun

Cuba: Mrs. V. BOROWDOSKY JACKIEWICH
Mr. C. PAZOS
Mr. F. CUSPINERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. RUZEK
Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt: Mr. E. A. EL REEDY
Mr. I. A. HASSAN
Mr. M. N. FAHMY

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
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Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. G. PFEIFFER
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Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES
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Mr. A. LAKATOS

India: Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. S. DARUSMAN
Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. F. QASIM
Mr. J. HADI

Iran: Mr. D. AMERI

Italy: Mr. V. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO
Mr. B. CABRAS
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Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. R. ISHII
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Kenya: Mr. S. SHITIMI
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Mr. M. A. CACERES

Mongolia: Mr. S.H. LKHASHID
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. M. CIRAJBI

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Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS
Mr. K. TOMASZEWSKI

Romania: Mr. M. MALITA
Mr. O. IONESCU
Mr. T. MELESCANU
Mr. L. TOADER

Sri Lanka: Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD
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Mr. C. PIERCY

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT
Mr. H. ARTEAGA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC
Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. N'KONGO DONTONI BWANDA

Secretary of the Committee
and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

NON-MEMBER REPRESENTATIVESFinland:

Mr. P. KEISALO
Mr. V. SORALAHTI

Switzerland:

Mr. PICTET

Mr. VRHUNEC (Yugoslavia): Mr. Chairman, Yugoslavia attaches great importance to the establishment of international guarantees that nuclear weapons will not be used against non-nuclear-weapon States and will not serve as a means of threat. In the world we live in, with all the contradictions that characterize it, where the arms race, particularly nuclear, still continues, and in which the weapons for mass destruction are becoming increasingly sophisticated, the security of all countries, regardless of their military power, is directly imperilled. However, the small and militarily weak countries which do not possess nuclear weapons are particularly jeopardized.

We are aware that only global security that would be founded on mutual confidence and co-operation can stop the arms race and lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control, a decrease in military effectives and the destruction of all nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Only such security can contribute to an alteration of the existing international relations and the creation of conditions for lasting peace and the further unimpeded and equitable development of all countries. As long as a single country possesses nuclear weapons, peace, confidence and international security cannot be established for any country, regardless whether it does or does not possess nuclear weapons. Nevertheless while this situation lasts, and it will clearly not be settled very soon, the non-nuclear-weapon States, and among them Yugoslavia, rightfully demand that the nuclear Powers agree, through a particularly binding document, to offer the guarantees we are discussing.

For these reasons, this issue has rightfully been given priority in the work of the Committee on Disarmament. In our opinion, the negotiations we have organized must be conducive to the establishment of clear and firm guarantees to which the nuclear Powers will adhere most strictly. In order to achieve this, the guarantees must contain the following basic elements:

First, they must be unconditional, because every condition, even if it is a minor one, will undermine the firmness and substance of the guarantees and thus create the possibility for the use of nuclear weapons or the threat of using them under certain conditions.

Secondly, they must be given by all (five) nuclear-weapon States to all the non-nuclear-weapon States, large and small, and both developed and developing countries.

Thirdly, they must cover all types of nuclear weapons, and the existing and possible new types or systems, both strategic and tactical.

Fourthly, they must be valid for all areas of the globe, whether the sea, the air or outer space be used for this.

Fifthly, they must firmly and irrevocably bind the nuclear-weapon States, regardless of the legal form the assurances will assume,

Sixthly, they must constitute an integral part of the general process of nuclear disarmament, and should enhance it.

(Mr. Vrhunec, Yugoslavia)

Only guarantees which contain these elements would have a strong effect and would ensure a real security for the non-nuclear-weapon States. Only guarantees based on those elements would contribute to general security, the strengthening of confidence and, thus, to the cessation of the arms race.

Such an agreement on the adoption of these guarantees would in a corresponding manner be complementary to the NPT. Both agreements would have the same objective, which is to prevent the continuation of the nuclear arms race. As is known, by adopting the NPT, the countries which do not possess nuclear weapons have assumed the obligation not to acquire or produce nuclear weapons in any circumstances. However, by the same treaty, the nuclear-weapon Powers also assumed their own share of the responsibilities. This, of course, logically requires that they assume the obligation not to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States. This is why the NPT and such guarantees must be complementary international instruments. The NPT Review Conference held in 1980 demonstrated that the obligations of the nuclear-weapon States have not been fulfilled, while the non-nuclear-weapon States have completely fulfilled theirs. By assuming the obligations of the NPT, the non-nuclear-weapon States are fully entitled to demand not only the fulfilment of the obligations of the nuclear-weapon States according to the NPT, but also to be given firm guarantees that nuclear weapons will not be used against them nor will they be threatened with them. By disregarding their obligations, the nuclear-weapon Powers want in fact to retain their monopoly in nuclear armament.

On the other hand, through a more consistent implementation of the NPT and the giving of unconditional guarantees to the non-nuclear-weapon States, strong encouragement could be given to the process of using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to a freer transfer of nuclear technology to the developing countries, in order that they may have a more rapid socio-economic development.

How great a significance the non-aligned countries attach to this issue is best illustrated by the results of the recent meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs that was held in New Delhi, at which the following was said:

"The Ministers declared that the most effective assurance of security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was nuclear disarmament and prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States must refrain from any activity in the nuclear field which would jeopardize the security and well-being of the peoples of non-nuclear States. The nuclear-weapon States have the obligation to guarantee that the non-nuclear-weapon States will not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons. They noted with satisfaction that proposals on that subject had been submitted to the Committee on Disarmament, and that there had been no objection in principle in the Committee to an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States."

In view of the above, Yugoslavia strives for the acceleration by the CD of negotiations on this issue. We express the hope that the Committee will be able to reach, in the nearest future, an agreement on concrete solutions that will give to the non-nuclear-weapon States unconditional guarantees against nuclear aggression or the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, which will be of great importance for their security, independence and sovereignty. My delegation will spare no effort to make its contribution to the positive settlement of this issue.

Mr. MALITA (Romania) (translated from French): The granting of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon countries has been one of the most heavily debated subjects in the sphere of nuclear disarmament. The large number of statements and proposals made by States at least shows that a considerable effort has been made to bring this issue to the point of resolution. The discussions which have taken place have, we believe, sufficiently revealed the importance of the place occupied by security assurances in the general policy concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States. How, indeed, could it be otherwise when, more than 20 years after the resumption of the multilateral negotiations during which the granting of security assurances has so often appeared within reach, these countries see not only that no progress has been made but furthermore, that the nuclear danger has reached unprecedented proportions? These countries cannot accept the idea that their territory, their dwellings and their people are possible targets on maps of strategic objectives, theatres of operation in various conflict scenarios, and involuntary actors in various military theories.

What is more legitimate, just and reasonable than that these States should wish to be removed from the list of nuclear-weapon objectives to be given the assurance that they will not be attacked or threatened with the use of these weapons?

In the Committee we discuss many subjects connected with international security, all of which are important. But, is it possible to imagine a greater source of insecurity for a small or medium-sized country than the possibility of being completely destroyed by the simple pressing of a button on a weapons system, and never knowing when or for what reason it may be triggered?

Our attitude is based on a fact that exists and is widely recognized, namely that correction of the imbalance in security between those who can use and those who may be the victims of nuclear weapons is not only important, but still more, urgent.

If negative security assurances had come into being, as was expected for a brief period after the positive assurances of 1968, the world would have been different today, for we would have succeeded in eliminating a source of the insecurity, anxiety and uncertainty that are behind the reactions to the present situation.

The non-nuclear-weapon States are naturally concerned that their renunciation of atomic weapons should lead, not to a reduction in their security but rather, on the contrary, to the strengthening of their security. Thus their request that they should be given security assurances until such time as nuclear weapons are totally eliminated and the nuclear danger completely removed is fair, logical and realistic. An international instrument containing the requisite assurances would be a normal continuation of a number of important documents among which I would like to mention the Charter of the United Nations, the principle of non-resort to force and the Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 24 November 1961. Under the terms

(Mr. Malita, Romania)

of this Declaration the use of nuclear weapons is described as being contrary to the spirit and aims of the Charter of the United Nations and, as such, a direct violation of the Charter. The Declaration emphasizes that any State using such weapons is to be considered as violating the Charter of the United Nations, as acting contrary to the laws of humanity and as committing a crime against mankind and civilization. Romania believes that a logical continuation of this process is possible and considers that a new instrument can be drafted, as an integral part of the efforts to increase the security of all. Our position was clearly presented by Nicolae Ceausescu, President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, who declared that any State renouncing nuclear weapons had a legitimate right to be given the assurance that no one would threaten its national independence and sovereignty.

It was on the basis of this position that in the course of the negotiations towards the drawing up of the non-proliferation Treaty, Romania proposed the inclusion of a special article setting forth the obligation of the nuclear-weapon countries never and under no circumstances to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against States not possessing such weapons. At the first Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT in 1975, Romania, together with other delegations, submitted a draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the subject of security assurances, a proposal that was repeated at the second NPT Review Conference held last year. In keeping with the same fundamental position, Romania welcomed the initiative of the USSR when it submitted to the United Nations a draft multilateral international convention on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. At the same time we have also noted with interest the efforts made in this area by Pakistan, as well as proposals by India concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons.

The first conclusion that our delegation has drawn from last year's Report of the Committee and from the agenda of this session is that there is a consensus on the need for the adoption of urgent measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, which would have beneficial effects both for those States and for international security as a whole as well as for the nuclear non-proliferation régime. The declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States at the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to Disarmament with respect to the non-use of these weapons strengthen this conviction.

The second conclusion that can be drawn is that the diversity of situations existing in different areas of the world, the specific conditions, are reflected in the varying approaches of the nuclear-weapon States and certain non-nuclear-weapon States as regards the form and content of a universal undertaking on the non-use of nuclear weapons. Whatever the angle from which this question is approached, there is an evident concern lest the final wording of the general undertaking leaves room for the recognition of some kind of right to use nuclear weapons, even if only in certain specific cases.

(Mr. Malita, Romania)

The Romanian delegation for its part considers that from the point of view of the process of negotiation, our Committee has concluded the stage of finding out the positions of all concerned and has now reached the phase of defining the purpose of its future work in this connection. The report of the Ad Hoc Working Group shows that at the present stage, the most realistic direction for our efforts could be the formulation of interim arrangements with respect to security assurances, until agreement is reached on the incorporation in an international convention of an undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States never and under no circumstances to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons, or force in general, against non-nuclear-weapon States. As a contribution to clarification of the concept of interim arrangements, our delegation would like to make a few remarks.

In our opinion, the idea of interim arrangements must take into consideration two elements:

In the first place, recognition of the fact that the final objective remains an undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to enter into a general commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons, or force in general, against non-nuclear-weapon countries. The formulation of the undertaking of the nuclear-weapon States must be objective and unambiguous and leave no room for subjective interpretations as to which States are to benefit from the security arrangements.

Consequently, an interim arrangement can be acceptable to the extent that it is designed as a partial solution in an irreversible and obligatory process of improvement, with achievement of the final objective constantly in view.

Secondly, whatever the form the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States will take (a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly or the Security Council, a joint solemn declaration by the nuclear-weapon States at the next special session devoted to disarmament, etc.), it must offer all concerned the certainty that their security has been considerably improved and that it represents a practical step forward in the reduction of the danger of a nuclear war.

We are aware that the security of States and of the world in general lies in nuclear disarmament and the outlawing of arsenals of atomic weapons. But until this objective is achieved, an undertaking not to use nuclear weapons would be a solution that would have considerable influence on international life. We see the search for effective international arrangements to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States as part of this effort also. Our work towards this end should prove fruitful, for all the conditions necessary for that purpose now exist in the Committee and in the Ad Hoc Working Group.

Like many other delegations, we entered into these negotiations with all the requisite flexibility and receptivity and with a sincere desire to find, in due course, a unanimously acceptable solution.

Mr. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, my delegation would like to make a few remarks today on the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, which our Committee is taking up this week under item 3 of its agenda.

This issue has been under consideration in multilateral forums for quite some time now. Brazil has consistently supported the view that the only effective assurance against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament itself. From the history of armament, and from the history of military doctrines, it is possible to derive one general trend, and this is that once a new weapon finds its way into the arsenals, that weapon, sooner or later, will also find its way into the battlefield. Modern strategic thinking is predicated upon deterrence, which means that the possibility and the willingness actually to use nuclear weapons must be made credible to potential adversaries; even if such use is presented as a last resort, it must remain, nevertheless, a very real and concrete option. In their continuous effort to make the deterrent power of their arsenals increasingly credible, the nuclear-weapon Powers seem to have overlooked the right of the international community, and particularly of the non-nuclear-weapon countries, to live in a peaceful and secure world. For those reasons, there can certainly be no foolproof guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons as long as there are nuclear weapons in the arsenals of States.

Nuclear disarmament, however, continues to elude the determination of the international community, and those who possess such weapons have been lately more prone to advocate the concept of "controlling" such armament, rather than taking concrete steps to reduce their stockpiles until their complete elimination. So, in the absence of meaningful progress towards nuclear disarmament, and as an interim measure designed at least to provide some kind of assurance to non-nuclear-weapon States, Brazil has supported the idea of a commitment by the nuclear-weapon Powers not to use such weapons. This idea stems from the very nature of the nuclear weapon, and from the fact that the consequences of its use would not be confined to the belligerents alone. It is not by mere fancy that the United Nations has condemned the use of nuclear weapons in the strongest terms. But a commitment not to use nuclear weapons, however, is organically linked to the goal of disarmament, and must be conceived as a two-fold obligation: first, an engagement to enter into concrete negotiations toward nuclear disarmament; secondly, in the period between the acceptance of that obligation and the achievement of nuclear disarmament, an engagement not to use nuclear weapons in any circumstances.

In the absence even of some progress in that direction, proposals have been made, throughout the years, in an effort to achieve an interim solution to the question of negative guarantees. In essence, such proposals have been of two kinds: international conventions and unilateral declarations. The former would spell out the conditions, or circumstances, under which nuclear-weapon Powers and non-nuclear-weapon nations together would set limitations to the use of nuclear weapons by those who possess them; the latter would amount to no more than individual statements, by the nuclear-weapon Powers alone, of the conditions under which they would accept self-imposed limitations. Whether such declarations are made individually, or bunched together in a Security Council resolution, would add little to their binding

(Mr. De Souza E Silva, Brazil)

character. Yet, there seems to be very little sensitivity, on the part of the nuclear-weapon Powers, even for interim measures of the two kinds described above, that would partially respond to the legitimate claims of the international community. In the case of the two Superpowers, for instance, their individual declarations set conditions for self-restraint in the use of their nuclear weapons; but those conditions appear designed to suit rather their own strategic interests than the views and aspirations of the overwhelming majority of nations.

The idea of an international convention has been favoured by non-nuclear-weapon States. Brazil has usually supported General Assembly resolutions endorsing that purpose, although in some cases we have abstained, taking into consideration some important elements of the specific proposals.

Any international convention must establish the rights and obligations of its parties, in a balanced and mutually acceptable way, and much more so when it deals with disarmament, security and related matters. In a convention of the type proposed, however, balance could only be struck if the commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons, on the part of the nuclear-weapon Powers, is matched with the non-nuclear status of non-nuclear-weapon countries. In other words, any country not possessing nuclear weapons would, by virtue of its non-nuclear-weapon status, be entitled to exact from the nuclear-weapon Powers the commitment, embodied in the Convention, not to make such non-nuclear-weapon country the object of nuclear attack or threat of attack. The main difficulty in that kind of approach is the characterization of a country as a non-nuclear-weapon State for the purpose of being entitled to the assurance, or negative guarantee. Such a characterization, in our view, derives from a statement of fact and should not entail the imposition of further obligations on the non-nuclear-weapon State, in order to become entitled to the assurances, such as, for instance, participation in any other specific international instruments.

It is the considered opinion of the Brazilian delegation that the obligation not to use, and not to threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, derives simply and directly from the existence of nuclear armaments and from their possession by a handful of States. It would perhaps be in order to emphasize here that the use of such armaments has already been defined in United Nations General Assembly resolution 33/71 B as "a crime against humanity". It follows that non-nuclear-weapon States, which have taken a sovereign decision to forego the nuclear military option, should not be asked to accept new obligations in order to be assured against the use or threat of use of weapons they have of their own will decided not to acquire, and the use of which has been condemned in such a strong way by the international community.

The nuclear option, and even the nuclear military option, is certainly a sovereign right, which a State can only renounce by its own sovereign decision. For such renunciation to become operative, it is obvious that the conditions of national security must have been satisfied, as assessed by the renouncing State. So far, only five nations have exercised their nuclear military option, and their decision to acquire nuclear weapons and continuously to add to their destructive power has been predicated on, and even explained by, their own perception of their security

(Mr. De Souza E. Silva, Brazil)

needs. But because of the very nature of the nuclear weapon, the mere possibility that such arsenals might ever be unleashed entails a situation of growing insecurity for every nation on earth, nuclear and non-nuclear alike. The nations that have chosen not to take the nuclear military option have become increasingly insecure, since their decision prevents them from opposing to a would-be attacker the shield of nuclear deterrence; on the other hand, a decision to go nuclear might add to global insecurity. Yet we have been listening, of late, to the curious argument that nuclear deterrence must be credited for the maintenance of peace in the post-war world. Peace would thus be at the mercy of the arsenals of a few Powers. In today's world, peace has therefore become a hostage to nuclear deterrence.

The primary responsibility for this situation rests squarely on the nuclear-weapon Powers, and it is incumbent upon them to take positive steps to achieve universally acceptable solutions for the dilemma caused by their option. Such solutions must be directed towards the elimination of their nuclear arsenals, because their possession runs counter to the fundamental security interests of humanity as a whole and of every single nation. The capability, and the willingness, to wage nuclear war, let alone the ceaseless improvement of the destructive power of such weapons, results inevitably in a situation of instability and inequality, which is utterly incompatible with the fundamental premises of peaceful international relations.

With regard to the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, Brazil remains, therefore, firmly convinced that nuclear disarmament is still the only permanent and valid form of assurance. The non-use and non-threat of use might be conceived as interim measures, provided such measures would also contain a commitment to nuclear disarmament. The extension of negative assurances must be viewed as a unilateral commitment, on the part of the nuclear-weapon Powers, to be matched by the ascertainable fact of the non-possession of nuclear weapons on the part of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

In the light of these considerations, the Brazilian delegation believes that the proposals currently under examination in the Ad Hoc Working Group established by the Committee should constitute initial steps in the direction of the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament, and in this spirit we continue to participate in that effort. But the modalities and possibilities under scrutiny must not in any way serve the purpose of becoming instruments to legitimize the possession of nuclear weapons or be construed as a justification for the possibility of their utilization.

Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, my intervention this morning is on item 3 of our agenda, effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. This is an item on our agenda which I believe capable of rather rapid conclusion, given the determination of the nuclear-weapon States to arrive at a compromise.

At our 112th plenary meeting on 5 March 1981, I stated: "The retention of nuclear weapons by the Powers which currently possess them constitutes one of the greatest disservices that can be done to world security because it encourages others

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

to believe in the efficacy of nuclear weapons. Security for all countries will either have to be sought in ways other than the possession of nuclear weapons, or all countries should be accorded the right to determine the means, including the possession of nuclear weapons, for protecting their security". My delegation does not believe in the efficacy of nuclear weapons; rather we firmly hold that since nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization, security based on these weapons is dangerous and must be discarded. In its stead, security for all countries will be effectively enhanced through the renunciation by all nuclear-weapon States of the use of nuclear weapons. Such a renunciation will not only encourage the cessation of the nuclear arms race among the nuclear-weapon States, it will also promote horizontal nuclear non-proliferation among non-nuclear-weapon States.

In a situation in which the nuclear-weapon States continue to show reluctance either to undertake nuclear disarmament or even to renounce the use of nuclear weapons as a step towards halting the arms race, the means of safeguarding the security of non-nuclear-weapon States is of increasing concern. The greater the degree of tension between the nuclear-weapon States, the higher the race in the development and deployment of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States in their own territories as well as the territories of some of their allies, the more the fear entertained by non-nuclear-weapon States for their security. After all, if nuclear-weapon States, in spite of all they know of the horror of nuclear weapons and the catastrophic effect of their use, still choose to flirt with self-destruction, then the least service they can render the rest of the world is an acceptance of the fact that their suicidal desire need not be forced on the rest of us. This is particularly relevant in the case where countries have formally committed themselves to a renunciation of their sovereign right to the development, production or acquisition of nuclear weapons. These countries having made the sacrifice are entitled to a credible commitment by the nuclear-weapon States that advantage will not be taken of the sacrifice they have made in the interests of nuclear non-proliferation and world peace and security to subject them to nuclear attack or nuclear blackmail.

The commitment of the Nigerian Government to the non-proliferation regime has been firm and deep. Indeed, Nigeria was one of the very first to sign the non-proliferation Treaty, and second only to Ireland in ratifying that Treaty. There are at present about 110 Parties to the Treaty that are non-nuclear-weapon States. Yet, in spite of two review conferences of the Parties to the Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States Parties have refused to commit themselves legally, even within the context of NPT and to the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty, never and in no circumstances to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT. This is a most unsatisfactory situation.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

I am aware, of course, that the consideration of this item in the Committee goes beyond the specific context of the NPT. Indeed, paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the General Assembly's first special session on disarmament, which forms the major point of departure of the Ad Hoc Working Group which was conceived in the context of nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, called upon nuclear-weapon States to take steps to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

As at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Nigerian delegation has on many occasions made observations on the unilateral declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States. These declarations were helpful but are no substitute for a legally binding instrument which, of course, is the aim of negotiations on this subject in the Committee on Disarmament. It is pertinent here to recall that the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on this subject for 1980 stated that there was no objection in principle to the idea of an international convention. The Ad Hoc Working Group should therefore concentrate its efforts at the initial stage of its work this year on reaching agreement on a common approach acceptable to all which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. We have no doubt that under the able chairmanship of the representative of Italy, the Ad Hoc Working Group will make progress.

I should like to draw attention at this juncture to the time-frame within which the General Assembly expects the Committee to conclude its work on this item. In resolution 35/46 entitled, "Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade", the General Assembly agreed by consensus thus:

"All efforts should be exerted, therefore, by the Committee on Disarmament urgently to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement, and to submit agreed texts where possible before the second special session devoted to disarmament on:

...
(d) Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons ...".

If we cannot reach agreement before the General Assembly's second special session devoted to disarmament, the Committee should at least be able to present agreed texts to the Assembly at that session.

Turning to the question of a common approach, it seems to me that three elements will have to be borne in mind, namely:

(i) The nature of the obligation to be undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States;

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

- (ii) The nature of the obligation expected to be assumed by non-nuclear-weapon States; and
- (iii) The safeguarding of the security of nuclear-weapon States.

With respect to the obligation to be undertaken by nuclear-weapon States, it is obvious that they have to commit themselves in a legally binding manner not to use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, in any circumstances, subject, of course, to my third point which is the question of safeguarding the security of the nuclear-weapon States.

As a corollary to the legally binding assurance that they will not be attacked or threatened by nuclear weapons, the non-nuclear-weapon States will have to undertake an obligation not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. This undertaking should be embodied in at least one legally binding instrument but can also be expressed by a non-nuclear-weapon State in more than one instrument. Thus a non-nuclear-weapon State party to an instrument such as the NPT or a nuclear-weapon-free-zone Treaty shall be presumed to have fulfilled the necessary obligation, even if such a country is not party to the legal instrument which will embody the security assurances. You will appreciate that a country like mine in a region where the development of nuclear-weapon capability is being clandestinely developed by South Africa cannot presume that a country is a non-nuclear-weapon State just because it says so. South Africa continues to deny that it is developing nuclear weapons even in spite of the obvious and overwhelming evidence. If it continues to persist in its refusal to undertake a legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons, then it cannot hope to enjoy the benefits of the security assurance which we are negotiating.

The point therefore is that the obligation to be assumed in a legally binding instrument on security guarantees will constitute, for those non-nuclear-weapon States that have not done so, an undertaking regarding horizontal non-proliferation.

My third point, i.e., the security of nuclear-weapon States, is linked inextricably with the peculiar cases of those non-nuclear-weapon States that have nuclear weapons on their territories and from which, therefore, conceivably, nuclear attack can be launched by a nuclear-weapon State against another. In consideration of their non-nuclear-weapon status, if expressed in a binding instrument, I believe that in principle such countries may benefit from security guarantees. Nevertheless, their guarantee may be the subject of interpretative statement by nuclear-weapon States other than those nuclear-weapon States which have stationed nuclear weapons on a territory.

Mr. ISSRAELIYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Today we should like to deal with one of the priority items on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament — the item on the strengthening of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

The Soviet Union, as is well known, has attached, and continues to attach, exceptional importance to this item, taking the view that its prompt and effective solution would meet the security interests not only of the non-nuclear-weapon States, which are directly concerned in it, but in fact of all States in the world. A settlement of this question would constitute a substantial contribution towards halting the nuclear arms race and in favour of nuclear disarmament, and would do much to help strengthen the régime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The USSR's position on the question of strengthening security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States is well known. It has been repeatedly set forth in the course of the discussions that have been taking place for nearly three years now in the Committee and in its Working Group. We are in favour of the total exclusion of the use of force in international relations and in favour of nuclear disarmament. This, in our view, would be a really effective measure in the process of strengthening world peace and the security of all States. As Mr. L.I. Brezhnev said in a statement made in 1978: "The Soviet Union is doing and will do everything possible to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war and to prevent peoples from falling victim to nuclear strikes — whether first or subsequent. This is our firm position, and we will act in accordance with it." However, in the conditions of a continuing nuclear arms race, the problem of strengthening security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is becoming increasingly urgent.

The Soviet Union has unilaterally committed itself not to use, and not to threaten to use, nuclear weapons against those States which do not have such weapons on their territory, under their jurisdiction and control. This commitment was reaffirmed at the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Addressing the Congress, Mr. L.I. Brezhnev said: "We have taken the important step of stating and confirming that we will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which do not allow them to be deployed on their territory".

We still consider that the most effective way of strengthening security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States is the conclusion of an appropriate international legal document of a binding nature, such as a convention. As you know, a draft of such an international convention has already been submitted for the Committee's consideration by a group of Socialist countries, including the USSR, in document CD/23. We again affirm that our proposals are still valid. We did not fully understand a statement made by one of the previous speakers to the effect that the idea of an international convention on security assurances is supported only by non-nuclear-weapon States. I should like to remind the Committee that the USSR submitted the draft of such a convention at the thirty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1978

We listened with interest to the statements made by the Ambassadors of Brazil and Nigeria, and we consider that the views expressed by them should be carefully studied in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

In view of the circumstances, while remaining a firm supporter of the conclusion of an international convention the Soviet Union has at the same time expressed its willingness, if the other nuclear Powers adopt the same approach, to give simultaneous consideration to another possible way of solving this problem, although we still think that the most effective form of assurances would be an international convention.

In a statement made at the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Mr. A.A. Gromyko, specifically called upon all the nuclear-weapon States to make solemn declarations, identical in their substance, concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States having no such weapons on their territories. Such declarations, if they are to serve their purpose, could be confirmed by an authoritative decision of the Security Council.

Last year the Committee on Disarmament and its Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances did some useful work, even though that work was not completed. Several aspects of the problem were considered in detail, and formulae for security assurances proposed both by the nuclear-weapon States and by non-nuclear-weapon States were studied. We are glad to note that as a result of that discussion many delegations stated that the formula proposed by the Soviet Union is the most comprehensive and objective. In the opinion of other States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, their formulae seem to them to be the most appropriate. For example, I have no doubt that the Ambassador of the United Kingdom, who is due to speak after me, will claim that his formula is the most effective. And if we continue in this fashion, basing ourselves on the immutable positions of the major parties, we run the risk of finding ourselves in a blind alley or of being caught up in an unproductive discussion. The question is how to proceed further, in which direction to continue the search for reliable security assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon States.

It is possible, of course, to continue work on identifying the common elements in the various formulae, classifying them, and finally finding a common formula. In this connection some interesting observations have been put forward in the Committee by a number of delegations, including statements made at the last meeting.

As far as our delegation is concerned, we declare that we are ready to display flexibility, to take a definite step towards bringing the various positions together -- but on condition, of course, that such steps are also taken by our partners, primarily those from the nuclear-weapon States. Subsequent negotiations will no doubt show how real are the chances of success in this matter.

The non-nuclear-weapon States -- and, let it be said, not only those States -- expect the Committee on Disarmament to adopt specific measures, however slight, that will mark some progress towards the strengthening of their security assurances. And this task is all the more urgent in so far as we are on the threshold of the second special session of the United Nations General on disarmament.

We therefore consider that, in order to achieve progress in this matter, the Committee on Disarmament should concentrate its main attention on those factors which, as far as the strengthening of security assurances to non-nuclear States is concerned, either bring the participants in the negotiations together or are capable of bringing them together, and not on those factors which separate and divide them one from another.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

In other words, it is a question of identifying the common or nearly common elements to be found in the approaches of States to this problem as a whole. As Ambassador P. Voutov, the representative of Bulgaria, remarked in his interesting statement of 17 March, the final result of such efforts could be a resolution of the United Nations Security Council containing a joint declaration by nuclear-weapon Powers, or a series of identical statements by them. This would undoubtedly serve as a positive contribution and stimulate definite progress towards strengthening security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

We think that the basis for such a concordance of approaches to the problem exists and that it is entirely realistic. In the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances, a group of socialist States had submitted some informal observations in this connection. We believe that they constitute a sound basis for further negotiations aimed at the working out of a generally acceptable document.

The finding of a common denominator in the approaches and positions of States, while not an end in itself, would, it seems to us, help to break the deadlock and definitely advance the Committee's work towards the effective strengthening of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet delegation is willing to listen to and to study any observations which other delegations may make for the purpose of a really businesslike consideration of this and other vital disarmament problems.

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, I wish this morning to say a few words about the British Government's policy on negative security assurances, which we are considering under item 3 of our agenda.

First, let me emphasize that as a nuclear-weapon State Britain recognizes the point made by the distinguished representative of Nigeria in his statement a few minutes ago, namely, that non-nuclear-weapon States are entitled to a guarantee that they will not be the object of attack by weapons which they themselves have forsworn. My Government initially responded to this concern of non-nuclear-weapon States by giving a solemn assurance on the subject in June 1978. Since then my Government has also maintained its response to that concern by participating in this Committee in the further search for any effective international arrangements on which it may be found possible to agree. Furthermore, we have made clear that we have an open mind as to what such international arrangements might consist of.

As a way of handling our subject, I should like to recall that in the Ad Hoc Working Group my delegation has said on several occasions during the session that, within reason, we are willing to accept any method of work which commends itself to the rest of the membership, particularly to the delegations of the non-nuclear-weapon States, for whose benefit the exercise is in progress.

I now turn to the assurance given by the British Government at the time of the first United Nations General Assembly special session on disarmament in 1978. My delegation has described and explained the very clear basis of this assurance on several occasions and I do not intend to repeat today all the points we have previously made. But I think it may help delegations to have some commentary on the record. My delegation will accordingly be circulating shortly -- perhaps next week -- a CD document on the subject. The document will examine aspects of the British assurance in relation to other security assurances and to the various proposals for further action which have been put forward.

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

I will confine myself now to recalling that the security assurance, announced in the British Parliament in June 1978 by the then Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, reads as follows -- and here I am going to read the full text, slightly longer than the one which is being circulated. The text reads:

"We are now ready to give the following assurance to non-nuclear-weapon States which are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or to other internationally binding commitments not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices." The assurance was that: "Britain undertakes not to use nuclear weapons against such States except in the case of an attack on the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its armed forces or its allies by such a State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State."

I can add only three brief comments on this text. The first is that this assurance has been in force since it was made in 1978 and remains fully operative today.

Secondly, the assurance contains a definition of the non-nuclear-weapon States to which it applies that is both precise and reasonable: it applies to all States which have accepted commitments constituting a clear demonstration that they are indeed non-nuclear-weapon States.

Thirdly, the only qualification to the application of the British assurance is that the States to which it applies do not engage in hostilities against us in alliance or in association with a nuclear-weapon Power. It goes without saying that this does not diminish the value of the assurance for those States whose intentions are peaceful. Indeed, the assurance would still apply to any State which actually entered into conflict with us, provided that it was not allied to or associated with a nuclear-weapon State.

I should like here to respond to a comment on the British assurance which was made in our plenary meeting on 17 March by the distinguished representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Voutov. Although he did not mention my country by name, Britain's assurance is evidently one of the "two almost identical" assurances to which he referred at one point in his statement. Ambassador Voutov commented on two aspects of the feature of the British assurance that I have just mentioned, which he called a "self-defence clause". This seems to me a useful phrase.

First he queried the discrepancy in language between the British security assurance, which has in its "self-defence clause" a reference to the alliance status of a non-nuclear-weapon Power, and the analogous statement in the declaration made by my Government on signature of the additional Protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which have no such reference. The simple answer is that there is no difference in substance. At the time of the signature of Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the British Government stated that it would be free to reconsider its commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against a contracting party in the event of any act of aggression by a party when that party was supported by a nuclear-weapon State. The exception in our negative security assurance is "in the case of an attack ... by a State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State". The language of our negative security assurance was designed to clarify what we meant by a nuclear-weapon State "supporting" a non-nuclear-weapon State.

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

Ambassador Voutov's second point was that our self-defence clause was open to what he called "subjective interpretations". In the first place I should point out that our qualification only applies in the event of an actual attack on the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its armed forces or its allies. The qualification is designed to guard against the situation where a non-nuclear-weapon State attacked us or an ally, falsely claiming that it was doing so without the support of a nuclear-weapon State. In such a case we reserve the right to respond at an appropriate level, if necessary with the use of nuclear weapons. There is inevitably an element of subjectivity in this since ultimately we would have to make our own decision. But in practice it will always be clear whether a non-nuclear-weapon State is acting in association with a nuclear-weapon State. And if it did so act, it is difficult in logic to see why such a State should continue to enjoy the advantages of non-nuclear-weapon status.

Furthermore, unlike the Soviet assurance, the British assurance contains no provision excluding a non-nuclear-weapon State from its scope only on the grounds that nuclear weapons are situated on its territory. The British assurance, on the other hand, is valid, as I have just pointed out, in all circumstances except self-defence in extreme circumstances.

All this said, I have noted Ambassador Voutov's suggestion that the right of self-defence could be formulated "in a non-conditional way". My delegation would naturally be interested to look at any language which he may propose to that end.

I have one other point to make arising from the distinguished Ambassador's statement. At several points he referred to "the security assurances already in force". As I have already said, my own Government's assurance is most certainly one of those which are already in force. But I should like to avail myself of the opportunity to put a question, through you Sir, to the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union about the Soviet assurance.

After making its statement in May 1978 which contemplated the negotiation of bilateral agreements -- and I noticed that Ambassador Issraelyan did not refer to this aspect in the statement he has just made -- the Soviet Government proposed a multilateral convention on negative security assurances. Since then the Soviet Union has also suggested the possibility of co-ordinated unilateral action by the nuclear-weapon States. This we note duly. From the statements of the Soviet Government and from the exchanges in this Committee, the current Soviet position appears to be that in the absence of a multilateral convention, or of joint action by the nuclear-weapon States, the Soviet offer of bilateral arrangements remains on the table. Our understanding is therefore that the Soviet assurance is not yet fully operative since, so far as we are aware, no bilateral negotiations have taken place. But the position is not altogether clear. And my question to my distinguished Soviet colleague is therefore as follows: are there specific countries for which the Soviet assurance is already in operation; or is some further action, multilateral or bilateral, needed to bring it into effect?

In conclusion, I should like to emphasize a point I made at the beginning of my statement. My delegation has already, since the beginning of this session, started work on a substantive examination of a way forward and we remain entirely flexible about the structure of the activity in the Working Group on this subject. We have, however, noted a number of different and in part contradictory proposals for the Group's approach to its work. We have indicated which of these approaches seem to us more likely to be productive than others. But we have not raised objection to any of the proposals which have been made which deal with the problem of security assurances. And I repeat that we shall be ready to accept whatever method of work is thought best to meet the particular concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

Mr. EL REEDY (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Mr. Chairman, the subject of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of those weapons against them is of such importance and seriousness that my delegation believes that we must once again reaffirm our concern and our desire to participate in the endeavours being made in this Committee with a view to the furtherance of this issue.

Please allow me, Mr. Chairman, before beginning my comments in this regard, to congratulate you and to express our esteem and appreciation for the sincere and skilful efforts which you are making with a view to ensuring the success of this Committee's work. On the basis of what we have witnessed during the last three weeks, we believe that your chairmanship will be a successful one by virtue of your customary impartial and knowledgeable approach when directing the affairs of the Committee.

While on the subject of security arrangements, I would like to thank all the members of the Committee who commended the efforts of my colleague Dr. Mohamed El-Baradei who presided over the Working Group established in this connection during the last two sessions.

The subject which we are currently considering is undoubtedly a delicate and complicated one since, in one way or another, it affects not only a number of the basic principles governing the thinking of the nuclear-weapon States in general and the two Superpowers in particular, but also the multilateral security systems which they have established, their view of the probabilities of conflict and deterrence and other considerations relating to the phenomenon of nuclear saturation in the shadow of which the world is at present living.

However, we are at the same time working on the basis that there is at least a sincere desire and a definite interest on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and we wish to support the endeavours which are being made in this respect. In our view, the most effective approach would be for those States to look seriously into the question of the guarantees which might be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States and to come up with a reasonable formula capable of reassuring the non-nuclear-weapon States and encouraging them to continue to renounce the nuclear option, thereby promoting the regime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and encouraging those countries which have not yet done so to adhere to this regime.

Although there is a risk that what we will be saying on this occasion may be regarded as reiteration, it is perhaps the kind of reiteration which we should not tire of hearing. We must remember that our discussions in this Committee in fact relate only to the use of the most murderous weapons of mass destruction.

We are talking about weapons which have been rejected by international public opinion. Their use should therefore be prohibited and they should not, under any circumstances, constitute a legitimate tool.

Naturally, a real guarantee can only be provided through the conclusion of an international agreement absolutely prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. However, pending the achievement of this objective, the States which are continuing to manufacture, develop and stockpile those weapons in their arsenals should at least undertake not to use them against non-nuclear-weapon States.

(Mr. El Reedy, Egypt)

In actual fact, the matter should not be regarded as one of reciprocal duties and obligations between the nuclear-weapon States on the one hand and the non-nuclear-weapon States on the other. It should not be interpreted in this way since the dangers of nuclear weapons stem from the policies of States which have chosen to avail themselves of the nuclear option. Those States pursuing those policies should assume the consequent responsibilities vis-à-vis the non-nuclear-weapon States which have renounced the nuclear option.

It is not my intention to discuss the five declarations issued by the nuclear-weapon States although there is a general belief shared by the vast majority that those declarations are, in general, inadequate with regard to both their content and the extent to which they can be regarded as legally binding. This was the reason for our repeated demands in the past for the provision of adequate and binding guarantees. Our ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons makes us even more determined to continue to demand the provision of effective and binding guarantees for the non-nuclear-weapon States.

I do not wish to enter into a discussion on the papers submitted to the working groups or on specific proposals -- our delegation will continue to study them and to participate in the endeavours being made to reach a generally acceptable formula -- but I would like to urge the nuclear-weapon States to adopt a serious approach and to increase their efforts with a view to the achievement of real progress at this session so that effective international arrangements can be made to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador El Reedy, the representative of Egypt, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me, on my assumption of the chairmanship of this Committee.

In accordance with the decision taken by the Committee at its 104th plenary meeting, I now call on the representative of Finland, Mr. Keisalo.

Mr. KEISALO (Finland): Mr. Chairman, my Government wishes to place on record its satisfaction at the business-like solution of the question of the participation of Finland in the work of the Committee. We have noted in this regard the positive attitude of all members. In particular, we should like to thank the distinguished representative of France, the Chairman in February, for the manner in which he conducted the proceedings in this matter.

It is also a pleasure for me to express to you, Mr. Chairman, my best wishes for a successful term as the Chairman during the month of March.

May I also be allowed to use this opportunity to welcome the Arab Republic of Egypt as a new Party to the NPT.

(Mr. Keisalo, Finland)

The Government of Finland notes with satisfaction that the Committee on Disarmament, already at its 1979 session, began the substantial consideration of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It is furthermore encouraging that all five nuclear-weapon States have recognized in this respect the legitimacy of the security concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States and declared their willingness to meet those concerns. Finland had the opportunity to communicate to the CD its general views on the matter in a working document (CD/75) of 14 March 1980. As a further expression of the importance my Government attaches to this question, I would like to state the following.

Our interest in the questions concerning the security assurances stems from the fact that Finland is a non-nuclear-weapon State. As a party to the NPT Finland has given up the so-called nuclear-weapon option. As a country pursuing a policy of neutrality and being outside military alliances, Finland has neither nuclear weapons of other States nor any foreign bases or foreign troops on its territory. Instead, as a small European country, Finland has endeavoured to strengthen its security through measures aimed at promoting détente, disarmament and co-operation in the Nordic, the European and the global framework. Finland has both the right and the responsibility before its people to seek to stay aloof from the sphere of threats and speculations to which the new development of nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy in particular has given rise and ensure that Finland remains outside international tensions. At the same time, we desire to work in such a way that our policy of neutrality also serves the cause of peace, which corresponds to both our own security interests and those of other States. This is more vital today than ever.

Pending achievement of effective measures of nuclear arms limitation and nuclear disarmament, Finland welcomes all measures aimed at reducing the potential use of nuclear arms. One such measure is today under discussion in this Committee. The negative security assurances are a facet of the broader question of the strengthening of the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States. Such assurances are interrelated, inter alia, with the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The question of formal guarantees for the security of non-nuclear-weapon States was raised in the negotiation stages of the NPT. Subsequently, the Security Council adopted resolution 255 (1968). The resolution was the companion piece of the pledges by the three nuclear-weapon Powers of their intention to provide positive security guarantees through action by the Security Council. While these declarations were contributions to the collective security system provided for in the United Nations Charter, it remains a political reality that a vast majority of non-nuclear-weapon States have called for additional security assurances by the nuclear-weapon States.

Security assurances are a vital element of the nuclear-weapon-free zones and their establishment. The Treaty of Tlatelolco with its Additional Protocol II is a telling case, providing formal undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against Parties to the Treaty. It is necessary, however, to note in this context the interpretative declarations made by some nuclear-weapon States.

(Mr. Keisalo, Finland)

As the main objective of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone is the strengthening of the security of the zonal States, it is indeed inherent in the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone that as a minimum, its status is respected by all extra-zonal States, and especially by nuclear-weapon States. Equally important, if not more so, is the provision for appropriate assurances by nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against members of the zone. This was also recognized in the findings of the comprehensive study on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones carried out by the ad hoc group of qualified governmental experts under the auspices of the CCD in 1975.

The development, production and deployment of new generations of most sophisticated weapons systems is arousing particular concern. A new armaments spiral, the commencement of which is already in evidence as far as Europe is concerned, might threaten the continuation of a situation which has become established in Northern Europe. Therefore, more than ever before Finland believes that in the Nordic region of Europe special arrangements for arms control would be useful and conceivable. The goal of such arrangements, in conjunction with other measures concerning the whole of Europe, and in accordance with the security needs of all Governments concerned, would be to alleviate, and if possible to do away with, the dangers evoked by nuclear weapons and especially by the new nuclear weapons technology.

Accordingly, Finland has endeavoured to give effect to these ideas by making several proposals both of a general nature and in more specific contexts. In 1963, the President of Finland proposed the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in northern Europe. In 1978, he proposed a Nordic arms control arrangement as a further elaboration of the basic idea. The aim is to isolate the Nordic countries as completely as possible from the effects of nuclear strategy in general and of the consequences of the new nuclear weapons technology in particular. The idea presented in 1963 and elaborated in 1978 has remained pertinent. Although there are differences of opinion as to the form of a suitable approach there seems to be a shared concern in the Nordic countries as to the need for enhancing the security in northern Europe through some kind of arms control arrangement. This fact is reflected in the ongoing debate about a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone.

The position of my Government on the question of security assurances has been clearly expressed on previous occasions in the following way: if certain small States or groups of States knowingly and absolutely commit themselves not to acquire or station in their territories certain types of weapons, they clearly have to receive an assurance that these weapons will not be turned against them and that they will not be threatened with these weapons. The countries entering into an arms control arrangement render a service not only to themselves but also to the international community as a whole. They have the right to expect and demand reciprocation by others.

Moreover, in the view of my Government, the security assurances should be as comprehensive as possible in order to take into account the new and developing nuclear-weapon technology and the threat thereof to the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. Thus, in addition to the need for general non-use assurances, the nuclear-weapon States are obligated to respect the sovereignty of non-nuclear-weapon States. Consequently, their territories, including the air-space, must not be violated in delivering nuclear weapons to their targets.

(Mr. Keisalo, Finland)

All nuclear-weapon States have recently made unilateral statements describing situations in which and States against which they would not use nuclear weapons. Finland, like most other States, has welcomed the unilateral declarations. These declarations do, however, differ from each other to a considerable extent and their amalgamation into one common statement has not, for the time being, proved possible. Furthermore, as these declarations are not attached to any multilateral instrument they remain unilateral and political and can be modified or withdrawn in the same way as they were made. We can acknowledge that they contribute to the further consideration of the question, although they obviously fall short of our goal of effective international arrangements, not to speak of a legally binding instrument. They are functions of the respective military doctrines and based on differing political perceptions. They reflect much less the wishes of the non-nuclear-weapon States and are, besides, diluted by political and legal reservations.

The assurances should be as binding as possible. In principle, there appears to be no objection to the idea of an international convention on the subject, although difficulties remain. A multilateral instrument would be possible if a common formula can be devised that would be acceptable to all nuclear-weapon States and satisfactory to non-nuclear-weapon States.

All approaches to achieving arrangements for non-use assurances should continue to be explored. All interested Governments should be involved in the process and have the opportunity to express their particular security concerns. As a measure in the direction of effective international arrangements the Security Council could appropriately act upon the question, as a number of both nuclear and non-nuclear States have suggested.

To conclude, I wish to reiterate the interest that my Government attaches to the question of negative security assurances, which we consider as one of the most urgent items on the agenda of the CD. We are prepared to contribute to the best of our abilities to the efforts of the Committee and its Ad Hoc Working Group on this subject. We believe that several valuable proposals have already been made during this session and earlier, and that the CD will be able to make considerable progress this year.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Finland for his statement and for his words of welcome addressed to the Chair.

In accordance with the decision taken by the Committee at its 104th plenary meeting, I now give the floor to Ambassador Pictet, the representative of Switzerland.

Mr. PICTET (Switzerland) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, may I first thank you, and through you, all the members of the Committee on Disarmament, for allowing my country to take part in some of your activities during the present session.

Switzerland has always followed the work of the Committee with attention and welcomes the opportunity to take a more active part in it.

I should like also to express my best wishes to you, Mr. Chairman, in the exacting office you have assumed for this month of March.

The question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons has been a matter of concern to the Swiss authorities for nearly 14 years.

This concern was shown, first of all, in the context of the formulation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). For example, in a memorandum of November 1967 to the United Nations General Assembly, my Government expressed its conviction that an effective non-proliferation régime was inseparable from adequate guarantees for States renouncing nuclear weapons against the use or threat of use of such weapons. This viewpoint was reaffirmed in a memorandum sent by the Swiss authorities in May 1968 to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

As we all know, the NPT failed to resolve this important question. The inequality established by the Treaty between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, which violates a fundamental principle of the law of nations, has still not been corrected. It will continue to exist until the negotiations on effective measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and for nuclear disarmament, to which article VI of the Treaty refers, and in particular negotiations towards the conclusion of a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear tests, have produced positive results. A system of effective guarantees for the non-nuclear-weapon countries would also help to correct this inequality and thus to strengthen the NPT, to which Switzerland attaches very great importance. It would, in addition, have considerable impact at the level of international security in general. Switzerland regrets that the two review conferences of the Parties to the NPT produced no result in this connection.

Security Council resolution 255 of 1968, adopted, as it was, with five abstentions, fails to meet the expectations of the non-nuclear-weapon countries as far as security guarantees are concerned. In fact, the operative part of this resolution contains no undertaking on the part of the nuclear-weapon States not to use such weapons. Nor is paragraph 2, in which the Council "welcomes the intention expressed by certain States that they will provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used", satisfactory to a neutral State like Switzerland. For, in accordance with its obligations under the law of nations, Switzerland considers that it alone is responsible, in peace-time, for the organization of its own defence. The preservation of its security cannot be entrusted to any third party. The Swiss authorities therefore share the reservations made by various States, including Sweden and Austria, with regard to a system of so-called "positive" guarantees. In any event, a decision to provide assistance of this nature would have such far-reaching consequences, starting with the danger of the spread of nuclear conflict, that the credibility of such a system may well be doubted.

(Mr. Pictet, Switzerland)

So-called "negative" security guarantees whereby the nuclear-weapon States would undertake never to use nuclear weapons against States not possessing such weapons or not having such weapons on their territory would have no such disadvantages.

Switzerland has followed with great attention the work done in this sphere by the Committee on Disarmament. While fully appreciating the complexity of negotiations on this subject, it believes that it might be useful if it were to inform the Committee of its views on this matter.

Two approaches appear to be open to the Committee: either the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States together enter into a convention, or the nuclear-weapon States give the non-nuclear-weapon States unilateral assurances.

As far as the formulation of a convention is concerned, it could be argued that, since the non-nuclear-weapon States have committed themselves by a treaty to the renunciation of nuclear weapons, it is in the form of a treaty that the nuclear-weapon States ought to give them the security assurances to which they feel entitled. At the first NPT Review Conference in 1975, Switzerland expressed a certain interest in such a solution, since it would satisfy a desire for symmetry in obligations. On reflection, however, the Swiss authorities came to share the doubts on the subject expressed in the Committee by Sweden and Austria in particular. My country now considers that, in acceding to the NPT, the non-nuclear-weapon States have assumed all the obligations that can reasonably be expected of them.

Moreover, Switzerland sees no possibility of its agreeing to commit itself, under such a convention, to any machinery for consultations. Again, the question of the guaranteeing of respect for the convention in the event of a State Party having reason to believe that another State Party, whether a nuclear-weapon State or a non-nuclear-weapon State, has violated its undertakings would also call for very careful consideration by a neutral State like Switzerland.

The unilateral declarations which have so far been made by the five nuclear-weapon States represent progress as compared with the 1968 situation which Switzerland notes with satisfaction. It is true that these declarations were made in varying circumstances and that their content is not identical. The Swiss authorities nevertheless consider that all these declarations constitute legal undertakings which bind their authors vis-à-vis all the non-nuclear-weapon States. As you know, the International Court of Justice, in a recent judgement, recognized that declarations constituting unilateral acts can create legal obligations. In the Court's opinion, there is no need, in such cases, for any counterpart before the declaration takes effect, nor even for a response or reaction from the other States.

It would however, be highly desirable, to strengthen these undertakings further, and in particular to remove the ambiguities from which some of them suffer.

Switzerland sincerely hopes that the Committee on Disarmament will succeed in distilling a common formula from these five declarations. My authorities have noted with interest the comments made on this subject by the representative of the Netherlands in his statement of 26 June 1979. It seems that it would indeed be possible, by careful analysis of the five texts, to find a certain number of common elements. There is however, the risk that a common formula would reflect only the lowest common denominator and would thus result in a reduction of the scope of the undertakings given by some of the five nuclear-weapon States. The form that might be taken by a possible common declaration, free from ambiguity and with the broadest possible scope, remains to be determined.

(Mr. Pictet, Switzerland)

If the development of this text requires some further time, the Swiss authorities wonder, like others, whether it would not be useful meanwhile provisionally to incorporate the five declarations, of which the General Assembly, at its first special session on disarmament, merely took note, in a single document. While not being identical in content, these declarations would thereby at least assume the same form, a clearer and more solemn one.

Switzerland would like to repeat here the hope it expressed last year at the second Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT. At that time it proposed in a working document (NPT/CONF.II/C.I/5) that the Conference should confirm that the five unilateral declarations constituted legal undertakings that were absolutely binding on their originators. As you know, the Review Conference did not succeed in agreeing on a final document in which this proposal might have been included. The Swiss authorities therefore hope that any document containing a joint declaration of assurances or setting forth the five separate declarations that have so far been made, will make express reference to their legally binding character.

In thanking you for giving me the opportunity to address your Committee, I wish to express the good wishes of the Swiss authorities for the success of its work.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Switzerland, our host country, for his statement and for his congratulations addressed to me.

Distinguished delegates, as representatives are aware, the Committee has held several informal meetings to consider proposals for the establishment of ad hoc working groups on items 1 and 2 of the Committee's agenda, as well as the establishment of other subsidiary bodies. After having assessed the present situation of our work in this area, the Chairman has come to the conclusion that it would be appropriate to put forward certain thoughts which could guide the further activities of the Committee on items 1 and 2 during the remaining part of our spring session. In this context, I would like to make the following statement:

With a view to accelerating the pace in dealing with items 1 and 2 of its agenda, the Committee will regularly hold informal meetings to undertake a substantive examination of concrete issues relating to these items. In the course of this substantive examination, proposals to set up ad hoc working groups under these two items for conducting multilateral negotiations may also be considered.

The Chairman considers that it would be useful to concentrate at the forthcoming regular informal meetings on the consideration of substantive issues to be agreed upon by the Committee through consultations on the basis of proposals that have been or may be submitted.

The first informal meeting, on Monday 23 March, under item 2 of the agenda, will be devoted to the examination of the preconditions for negotiations on nuclear disarmament as well as doctrines of deterrence and other theories concerning nuclear weapons. The specific issues relating to item 1 of the agenda, to be taken up at the subsequent informal meeting during the following week, will be the subject of informal consultations to be conducted by the Chairman.

In accordance with established practice, the Chairman intends to hold informal consultations, whenever necessary, to advance the consideration of the issues related to agenda items 1 and 2.

(The Chairman)

In this connection, the Chairman has requested the Secretariat to prepare a tabulation of all proposals on nuclear disarmament submitted since the General Assembly's first special session devoted to disarmament held in 1978. This will be complemented subsequently by a similar tabulation of all proposals on nuclear disarmament submitted between the establishment of the United Nations in 1945 and the holding of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978.

Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela)(translated from Spanish): My delegation has taken note of and welcomes the statement which you have just made to the effect that the Committee will hold regular informal meetings to examine agenda items 1 and 2, with a view to embarking on a substantive consideration of specific issues related to these two items.

This statement is consonant with the position taken by my delegation that the lack of consensus on the establishment of working groups on these two items should not prevent the Committee from performing its task or from discharging its responsibility as a multilateral negotiating body and that, while these working groups are being set up, we should devote as many informal meetings of the Committee as possible to trying to move ahead in the consideration of the substantive issues arising in connection with agenda items 1 and 2.

I should also like to draw **attention** to that part of your statement in which you said that the various proposals relating to the setting up of the working groups may also be considered at the informal meetings.

This part of your statement is of particular importance to my delegation for several reasons. In the first place, as I have already had occasion to state, my delegation believes, and continues to believe, that working groups are the most suitable machinery for the conduct of concrete negotiations on the items on our agenda. Secondly, we consider this procedure of taking up items 1 and 2 at informal meetings is purely exceptional and temporary, and thirdly, in accordance with the decision adopted at the 105th plenary meeting, the Committee must continue to give urgent consideration to the proposals relating to the establishment of the working groups which should undertake the substantive negotiations on agenda items 1 and 2.

I should like to add that my delegation considers that the third and fourth paragraphs of your statement should be interpreted with all due flexibility, and that although they are intended to give a certain amount of order and organization to the informal meetings, at the same time they should not prevent a delegation which considers it necessary and useful to do so from referring at an informal meeting to a question connected with items 1 and 2 other than those you have suggested or may suggest in the light of the consultations you intend to hold.

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, I have listened carefully to your statement about our future work on nuclear disarmament and a nuclear test ban, and I agree with the main lines of it.

However, for reasons which I have explained on a number of occasions, I am obliged to reserve my delegation's position on the proposal to include in our work consultations on specific topics to be taken up under a comprehensive test ban.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): We have noted with satisfaction, Mr. Chairman, your observations concerning the holding of informal meetings of the Committee on Disarmament to consider items 1 and 2 of the Committee's agenda.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries are consistent supporters and proponents of measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race, the halting of the production of nuclear weapons and their destruction, and a general and complete ban on nuclear-weapon tests. For many years past the Soviet Union has consistently advocated the speediest possible initiation in the Committee of business-like negotiations on the question of nuclear disarmament.

We take it that the informal meetings of the Committee on these matters will be aimed at the earliest possible commencement of such negotiations and will facilitate their due preparation. In the course of these meetings we might, in particular, define the range of topics for consideration, resolve organizational aspects of the negotiations, and also discuss certain particular matters having a direct bearing on negotiations concerning nuclear disarmament.

We are opposed to there being any academic debate at the informal meetings; the whole of our deliberations must be aimed at the successful preparation of negotiations on the substance of this problem, rather than at diverting the attention of members of the Committee to other matters unrelated to such negotiations and deflecting the Committee from this priority task.

Mr. VRHUNEC (Yugoslavia): I have listened with great attention to the statement you made a few minutes ago, Mr. Chairman, and would like to make a few remarks on behalf of my delegation.

We do not consider the negotiations which are going to start on 23 March as a substitute for the possible establishment of working groups on items 1 and 2, and we still consider that we should try our best to establish those working groups as soon as possible, as we think that they are the best method of negotiating on items 1 and 2.

I have to say that my delegation has some difficulties with the text which you read, which says that the meeting on 23 March will be devoted to the examination of the preconditions for negotiations on nuclear disarmament, and so on. In fulfilling our duties as members of this Committee I feel that none of us should place any preconditions on the negotiations, even if we have to proceed with negotiations on nuclear disarmament. I would prefer to have had some kind of understanding which could perhaps be the examination of the basic elements for negotiations. But as I see that the statement you have read is a compromise, with which it is possible to achieve consensus in the Committee, my delegation will not press for a possible amendment and will go along, in a spirit of compromise, with the statement you have just made.

Mr. FLOWERREE (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, my delegation is in accord with the general approach to our informal discussions of questions under agenda items 1 and 2 as you have described it. We appreciate very much the efforts you have made to find a mutually acceptable basis for our discussions, and trust that your statement today signals the end of our concentration on procedural aspects, and that we have overcome the final hurdle before we turn to substance.

(Mr. Flowerree, United States of America)

As my Yugoslav colleague mentioned, there are particular points in your statement which might have been formulated in a way more acceptable to my delegation, but I accept the formulation as the best compromise that could be achieved.

In regard to the selection of specific topics to be discussed on item 1 of the agenda, I must remind the Committee that my delegation's participation will be circumscribed by the same factors that underlay the inability of the United States to agree to a consensus on the establishment of a working group on a comprehensive test ban.

With that understanding, my delegation is prepared to proceed along the lines you have suggested.

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, the Pakistan delegation also welcomes the statement which you have just read out to us, because it does constitute a step forward in the direction which we all desire, that is, towards concrete negotiations on the items regarding a nuclear test ban and nuclear disarmament.

My delegation would like to take this occasion to state that we too consider that the best modality for embarking on negotiations under these two items is through the establishment of ad hoc working groups, and we are happy to note that your statement indicates that in these informal meetings consideration may also be given, again, to the proposals regarding the creation of these working groups.

We should also like to say that we construe these informal meetings that will be held as being designed to lay the foundations for negotiations on both these items, and we shall be guided by this consideration in our participation in these meetings.

We have agreed that the first meeting to be held in this series would consider, under item 2, the subject of preconditions for negotiations and the strategies of nuclear deterrence. At the same time, I should like to express the hope and expectation that the other subjects which will be chosen for consideration in these informal meetings will take into account the proposals that have been submitted by various delegations, including the Pakistan delegation, with regard to both items 1 and 2.

Finally, I should like to state that it is our interpretation of your statement that equal consideration will be given to subjects under both items 1 and 2, and while we have agreed to take up at our next meeting the consideration of the subject under item 2, we note with satisfaction that the subsequent meeting will be devoted to a consideration of subjects under item 1 of our agenda. We hope that at the informal consultations which are envisaged we shall be able, in the nearest possible future, to agree upon a specific issue to be considered under item 1 at the following meeting in this series.

Mr. DE LA GORCE (France) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, as this is the first time my delegation has taken the floor in plenary meeting since the beginning of the month, I should like first to congratulate you and offer my good wishes for your period of chairmanship, which has so far been most successful, and to express our gratitude for the courtesy and efficiency with which you are conducting our work. My delegation appreciates the effort you have made as regards the organization of these informal discussions, to which it gave its support. We consider it in

(Mr. De La Gorce, France)

fact most useful to devote our attention to two items on our agenda, the fundamental importance of which my delegation fully recognizes, for discussions on questions of substance which will enable us to explore each others' views and to draw conclusions -- we hope positive -- about the sequel to this examination. We think this operation should be handled flexibly; it is an experiment and we hope, of course, that it will be conclusive. The subjects you have suggested for the start of these discussions on agenda item 2 are acceptable to my delegation. I should like, however, to note that they are not strictly speaking questions of substance; but in view of the importance they have for the preliminary exploration of this matter, we think that it will in fact be useful to examine them and hope that the examination will bring out clearly and realistically the conditions for achieving the goals we have in mind.

Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, I also would like to thank you for the statement you have made, which has also been circulated. I have asked for the floor only to underline one point, made a few minutes ago by the distinguished representative of Pakistan, a point which is very dear to my delegation as well. It is that we should always bear in mind that we are grouping two items for consideration, items 1 and 2, and therefore there should be no attempt to discuss one to the total exclusion of the other.

My delegation would certainly be most happy if, as you suggested, while discussing item 2 at the meeting on the 23rd, we bear in mind that at the subsequent meeting we shall discuss item 1, which is just as important.

The CHAIRMAN: Before concluding, I should like to make the following announcement:

I have requested the Secretariat to circulate today an informal paper containing the timetable for the meetings to be held by the Committee on Disarmament and its subsidiary bodies during the week 25-27 March 1981. As usual, this timetable is indicative and can be adjusted as we proceed.

In that connection, may I note that next week the Committee will start its consideration of item 4 on its agenda, dealing with chemical weapons. I have so far received nine communications from members of the Committee informing me of the presence of their experts who will participate as members of their national delegations. I have also been informed by Ambassador Lidgard, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, that he would like to hold an additional weekly meeting of that Working Group. Accordingly, provision has been made for an additional meeting of the Working Group next Friday, 27 March, at 3 p.m.

Since there are no objections, I will take it that the Committee agrees with this timetable.

Mr. GYORFFY (Hungary): On behalf of Dr. Imre Kómvics, Ambassador, Chairman of the Working Group on Radiological Weapons, I should like to make a short statement in connection with the timetable of meetings to be held by the Committee and its subsidiary bodies which has just been distributed.

(Mr. Gyorffy, Hungary)

On behalf of the Chairman of the Working Group on Radiological Weapons, I wish to state that my delegation has no difficulty in agreeing to the proposed timetable for next week, which allocates two meetings to the Working Group on Chemical Weapons. However, at the same time, I should like to emphasize that the same possibility should be accorded to the Working Group on Radiological Weapons, which is now entering its drafting stage and which inevitably will require more meetings.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to request you to take this into account.

The CHAIRMAN: I have taken note of your observations.

Mr. SARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, I would like to request one point of clarification: is our understanding correct that the meeting with experts will be only in the context of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, or is it contemplated also to hold informal meetings of the Committee with the participation of experts?

Secondly, with respect to the proposal that we might have additional meetings of the Working Group on Radiological Weapons, I must once again emphasize something which I have said before, that for delegations like mine, which are very short-staffed and have to attend meetings both morning and afternoon, throughout the entire week, it would not be possible to visualize additional meetings of any other Working Group.

The CHAIRMAN: With regard to your first question, I can say that experts will have the possibility to participate in the plenary meetings that we are going to hold on chemical weapons, and in the Working Groups. That was the understanding reached after consultations with various delegations and the sponsors of the proposal to have additional informal meetings on chemical weapons. It was a compromise.

Mr. SARAN (India): Therefore, is my understanding correct, that there will be no informal meetings of the Committee with chemical weapons experts, but that the experts will be making their presentations in the plenary meeting devoted to chemical weapons?

The CHAIRMAN: Your understanding is correct. Can I then conclude that we have agreement on the timetable?

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 24 March 1961, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.

CD/PV.117
24 March 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTEENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 24 March 1981 at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. G. Herder (German Democratic Republic)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. SALAH-BEY
Mr. M. MEDKOUR
Mr. A. ABBA

Argentina: Mr. F. JIMENEZ DAVILA
Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD

Australia: Mr. R. STEELE

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE
Miss G. VAN DEN BERGH
Mr. DE BISSCHOP

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U NGWE WIN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL
Mr. G. SKINNER

China: Mr. YU Peiwen
Mr. YU Mengjia
Mr. LIN Chen
Mr. LI Weimin

Cuba: Mr. C. PAZOS
Mr. F. CUSPINERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. RUZEK
Mr. J. FRANIK
Mr. J. MORAVIC

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M.N. FAHMY
Mr. ESSMAT EZZ

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. GESBERT
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. K.H. LOLIS
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Mr. P. BUNTIG

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. H. MULLER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. C. GYORFFY
Mr. A. LAKATOS

India: Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. S. DARUSMAN
Mr. I. DAMANIK
Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. F. QASIM
Mr. J. HADI
Mr. KARYONO

Iran: Mr. D. AMERI

Italy: Mr. V.C. DI MONTEZEMOLO
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI
Mr. L. SALAZAR

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. R. ISHII
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya: Mr. S. SHITEMI
Mr. G. MUNIU

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mr. M.A. CACERES

Mongolia: Mr. S.H. LKHASHID
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. A. SKALLI
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS
Mr. A.G.B. OOMS

Nigeria: Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. M. AKRAM
Mr. T. ALFAF

Peru: Mr. P. PAREDES PORTELLA

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. SPROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. T. MELESCANU

Mr. A. SASUV

Sri Lanka:

Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD

Mr. L. NORBERG

Mr. J. LUNDIN

Miss G. PUU

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN

Mr. B.P. PROKOFLEV

Mr. L.A. NAUMOV

Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO

Mr. J.N. RIUKHINE

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES

Mrs. J.I. LINK

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. FLOWEREE

Mr. F. DESIMONE

Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER

Mr. J.A. MISKEL

Mr. M. SANCHES

Mr. C. PIERCY

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT

Mr. H. ARTEAGA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. V. VOIVODIC

Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:Secretary of the Committee
and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JATPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee:

Mr. V. BIRASAMUGUI

NON-MEMBER REPRESENTATIVESDenmark:

Mr. P. MICHAELSEN

Finland:

Mr. J.L. HILTTINEN

Mr. YU Peiwen (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a brief statement on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

For a long period of time, the many non-nuclear-weapon States have been making ceaseless efforts against nuclear threats and for security assurances. In recent years, following the acceleration of the nuclear arms race and the heightening of the danger of nuclear warfare, the non-nuclear-weapon States have voiced an ever stronger call for the adoption of effective measures to ensure their security. The final declaration adopted at the meeting of Foreign Ministers of non-aligned countries held in New Delhi recently, also expressed grave concern over the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, demanded in strong terms that nuclear-weapon States refrain from any activities detrimental to the security and well-being of non-nuclear-weapon States and commit themselves to guaranteeing the non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat of nuclear weapons and nuclear attacks. Now, I would like to give my views on the following points.

First, in the world of today, nuclear weapons with their massive destructive power are piled sky-high, while the Superpowers, relying on their military might, are engaged in hegemonist activities, seriously threatening world peace and the securities of the States of the world. The many non-nuclear-weapon States, in particular, lack assurances for their independence, sovereignty and security. That is why the adoption of effective measures for security assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon States is considered an urgent task in the field of disarmament.

All nuclear-weapon States are responsible for providing security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. Before the realization of comprehensive nuclear disarmament, it is the bounden duty of nuclear-weapon States to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons so as to allay this nuclear threat over non-nuclear-weapon States. The major nuclear-weapon Powers possess the greatest nuclear arsenals. Indeed, only they are capable of launching nuclear warfare. Therefore they should bear the main responsibility for giving assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, a responsibility not to be shirked. The above basic approach should be our point of departure in the consideration of the issue of security assurances.

Secondly, since non-nuclear-weapon States possess no nuclear weapons, and most of them are in circumstances where their defences are seriously below par, they cannot constitute a nuclear threat to the nuclear-weapon States and it follows that there is no question of demanding security assurances from them for the nuclear-weapon States. As a matter of fact, quite a number of non-nuclear-weapon States have already, through some international arrangements, assumed concrete obligations. It would be unfair and also irrational to further require the non-nuclear-weapon States to undertake new, additional obligations, particularly those affecting their self-defence rights, which are essential in safeguarding their sovereignty and security. It is perfectly justifiable for non-nuclear-weapon States to require that the nuclear-weapon States should, without attaching any conditions, assume clear-cut obligations against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them. As was pointed out by Ambassador Vrhunec of Yugoslavia at the plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament on 19 March 1981: "Every condition, even if it is a minor one, will undermine the firmness and substance of the guarantees, which thus creates the possibility for the use of nuclear weapons or threat to use them under certain conditions." Since the question of security guarantees touches upon vital interests of the non-nuclear-weapon States, the nuclear-weapon States should give such requests and wishes full consideration.

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Thirdly, the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons will be the best guarantees to non-nuclear weapon States. To provide negative security guarantees is only a measure of a transitional nature. If negotiations on such a transitional measure are dragged out so that agreement cannot be reached, how then can the nuclear-weapon States show their good faith towards security guarantees for the non-nuclear-weapon States? We should do our best to implement our task pointed out in the report of the last session of the Committee on Disarmament, that is, to continue to look for a "common approach acceptable to all which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character". At present, the working paper of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances has listed for us various formulas and alternatives. We would like to take part in serious discussions with the delegates present here so as to find a common approach acceptable to all which conforms to the requirements of the non-nuclear-weapon States. It is our belief that whatever agreement or arrangement we may be able to reach at the present time, it should be, essentially, or most importantly, the kind of security assurance which in substance and content can genuinely be a guarantee of security to the non-nuclear-weapon States instead of a mere empty document, devoid of content.

The Chinese Government has always adopted a positive approach towards the question of security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States. We hold that an international convention giving effective assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States should be concluded. We have reiterated on many occasions that we will not be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances. In connection with this basic stand of ours, we are committed unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. This is an obligation we assume unilaterally. On the basis of this stand of ours we would like to explore, with other delegates, various avenues so as to contribute towards earlier agreement on an effective international arrangement for security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, this is the first time I have made a formal statement in the Committee this month, and I should therefore like to take this opportunity to congratulate you, not only on the assumption of your chairmanship, but also on the success you have achieved in exercising your functions. You have shown skill and ingenuity, and I am quite certain that the month of March will be remembered as a productive and constructive month in the history of this Committee.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I should also like to address myself to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador de la Gorce, and to take this opportunity to express to him, too, our great appreciation of the way in which he conducted our work during the month of February. With a judicious mixture of authority, humour and affability, he succeeded in creating among us an atmosphere of maximum efficiency and optimum co-operativeness.

I should now like to address myself to the subject for this week, namely, chemical weapons.

In my statement today my remarks partly reflect the official Swedish position and partly my thinking and feelings as Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons.

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

The negotiations on chemical weapons now going on in this Committee have a long -- but not always so glorious -- history. The neutral and non-aligned countries held a common position, originally shared by the group of socialist States, about the inseparability of biological and chemical weapons prohibitions, but had to give up after the leading military Powers agreed in 1971 on a narrow Treaty dealing only with biological weapons. This Convention was furthermore provided with an unsatisfactory treatment of the verification problems. I think one can say that the neutral and non-aligned countries have been vindicated in the stand they took already then, namely, that the biological weapons Convention is deficient in this respect.

From that period it is worth while to recall one important step, namely, United Nations General Assembly resolution 2603 A (XXIV), of 16 December 1969, which was sponsored by the then 12 neutral and non-aligned members of CCD and which affirmed "that the Geneva Protocol embodies the generally recognized rules of international law prohibiting the use in international armed conflicts of all biological and chemical methods of warfare, regardless of any technical developments". The resolution went on to declare "as contrary to the generally recognized rules of international law, as embodied in the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, the use in international armed conflicts of: (a) any chemical agents of warfare -- chemical substances, whether gaseous, liquid or solid -- which might be employed because of their direct toxic effects on man, animals or plants; ..."

The discussion of a chemical weapons convention continued in CCD after the biological weapons Convention had been concluded. The course these deliberations took was far from straight. At times the leading Powers seemed to tend towards narrowing the scope of a CW convention so that it would include only certain categories of chemical warfare agents. The majority view prevailed, however, that the ban on the use of chemical weapons should be applied to the total spectrum. A number of technical and scientific reports were presented and discussed in the CCD, and the consideration of the issues were enlightened through the submission of four different draft conventions.

We have also witnessed the bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States, which started in 1976 and last took place in the summer of 1980, when a report was presented to the CD which now serves as a valuable basis for our ongoing negotiations.

A chemical weapons convention could, of course, have been concluded a long time ago. The time may, however, not have been entirely lost. It is fair to say that knowledge of the problems involved in the elaboration of a convention, which for ever would abolish chemical weapons, has been considerably deepened over the years. The technological means for verifying compliance with such a convention also have been developed and refined. One could add that the acceptability of certain means of verification has also increased, which would make it easier to come to an agreement.

The substance of a future convention has by now been well penetrated and all main elements have been elucidated. The complexities of the problems involved have also become increasingly evident. The four draft conventions which have been presented since 1972 show differences of opinion between the proposers. They also reflect an evolution from, as we consider it today, a rather simplistic view of the elements of a convention to a growing awareness of the multitude of technically and politically complex problems which have to be agreed upon in order to make a chemical weapons convention fully comprehensive and reliable, if the intention is to abolish chemical warfare for ever.

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

Possibilities for dealing with the relevant technical, legal and other problems changed significantly when CD last year decided to set up a working group on chemical weapons. The issues were then examined in a more structured and systematic way under the chairmanship of my distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Okawa of Japan. The informal meetings which took place with the participation of a large number of experts in June last year added a considerable amount of valuable knowledge to the work of the Committee.

Naturally, the bilateral negotiations which started in 1976 have also improved the basis for the multilateral negotiations through the two reports which they have produced. The willingness of the two bilateral negotiators to share with us their knowledge and considered views is appreciated.

With the very good start of our negotiations last year, the work has continued at a brisk pace this year. As Chairman of the Working Group I wish to express my great appreciation of the preparedness on all sides to participate actively and constructively in the negotiations. The unavoidable discussions of procedure have been reduced to a minimum.

As to the delegations' views on the substance, the mandate of the Working Group has not made it possible to find out in a more precise way where compromise positions can be established. Our main task has till now been limited to defining the issues and to examining them. Nevertheless, there has emerged a large convergence of views concerning issues such as the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, transfer and acquisition of chemical weapons and the obligations to declare possession, plans of destruction etc. and -- what is not least important -- actually to destroy stocks and production facilities.

Two major issues have so far not been solved concerning the scope, namely, the issues as to the concept of chemical warfare capability and the inclusion of the prohibition of use in the convention.

The Swedish Delegation - and I am now speaking for it - is somewhat disappointed at the fact that some reactions have been negative as to our proposal to broaden the scope of a CW convention. We have, however, noted that the objections and reservations so far expressed basically are of a practical and procedural nature. We are therefore not yet aware of any substantive arguments that contradict the reasoning that has convinced us of the need for a comprehensive conceptual scope for the convention. We certainly realize the practical problems involved in the negotiating process, but we do not think that such obstacles should be permitted to stand in the way of efforts to evolve a truly effective agreement.

Against this background and the fact that a number of delegations support our approach, we feel encouraged to pursue it.

I wish to take this opportunity to express our appreciation of the statements which have expressed agreement with and understanding of our arguments. We hope that the future negotiations will be fruitful and bring forth an agreement which will effectively prohibit and abolish the capability to use chemical weapons, in our view the self-evident aim of the convention.

A commonly accepted solution has to be found also to the question of the inclusion in the convention of a prohibition of use. There seems to be general agreement that nothing should be done to detract from the importance and authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Possibilities will therefore have to be tried in order to establish

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satisfactory links with the Geneva Protocol in the preamble, the operative provisions of the convention, or in a text closely related to it. Adequate links with the Convention on biological weapons will also have to be included.

There are details in the scope which require further negotiations, for instance, questions concerning tear gases, herbicides and binary chemical weapons. Different views have also been expressed concerning the exceptions to the convention. In some cases a specific provision may be required concerning exceptions, whereas in other cases the items should perhaps not be mentioned in the convention at all. Whether protective measures against chemical weapons should be dealt with as exceptions from the prohibition or as express permissions will have to be solved at a later stage. Maybe the concept of chemical weapons capability can play a role in resolving this problem.

On the question of verification, the reports from the bilateral negotiations have unfortunately not been of very great help. We note, however, with satisfaction that verification by challenge seems to be a concept which the bilateral negotiators have accepted. It can also be safely assumed that everybody by now is entirely aware of the crucial importance of a system of adequate verification. Laborious negotiations on this subject are still ahead of us, and difficult political decisions may be required to arrive at mutually and generally acceptable solutions. The will which so far has been shown in the CD this year gives me, however, confidence that the problems will in the end be overcome. The Swedish delegation attaches great importance to the role confidence-building measures will play in this connection, already in the course of our negotiations.

The technical problems connected with verification will no doubt also require much further work. I am referring both to such verification measures as may be required for the control of the destruction of stockpiles, and to such measures as will subsequently give assurance about compliance with the convention. The consultative committee, which most probably will be set up under the convention, will have important tasks in that connection. The complaints procedure will also have to be worked out carefully in order to facilitate the handling of any problems that may arise.

Last year's report of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons as well as the Group's continued work this year have shown that there is a convergence of views on the substantive issues which is sufficiently broad for starting the actual elaboration of a convention. As has been strongly emphasized by my delegation already long ago: the Working Group should without delay be provided with a mandate to carry out such a task in an appropriate way.

A well-known expert on chemical weapons, Julian Perry Robinson, commented upon the negotiations on chemical warfare arms control in an article with that title a year ago (Arms Control, Vol. 1, May 1980, Number 1). He stated therein that the search for a CW convention warranted wider and closer attention than it had so far attracted, not least because of the precedents it could set for negotiations in other fields. First, he said, the negotiating objective subscribed to by all of the participants is not a mere reduction or ceiling, but a full-blown measure of disarmament. In accepting this objective, Governments are, according to his view, tacitly acknowledging that in some circumstances arms control may serve not only as an adjunct but also as an alternative to military strength as a determinant of security. Secondly, he continued, because of the nature of CW weapons, success in

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the negotiations now appears contingent upon general agreement to accept on-site inspection as a verification technique. Thirdly, a successful outcome may also depend upon agreement that specific confidence-building measures should play a concrete role in the régime to be established by the CW convention. The author concluded with the remark that it may be no exaggeration, then, to view the CW talks as a proving ground for the future of arms control.

Even if this last terminology may not be the first choice of everyone here, I think we would all generally agree with his characterizations. There is no need for further underlining the importance of our task.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the Ambassador of Sweden, Ambassador Lidgard, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me in connection with my assumption of the chairmanship for the month of March.

Mr. VENKATESWARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, since I am speaking for the first time after your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament, I would like, at the outset, to convey my sincere felicitations and admiration for your qualities of head and heart, as well as to assure you of the fullest co-operation of my delegation. We have entire confidence in your able helmsmanship.

My statement today will be of a general nature. I intend to speak upon some of the more salient issues concerning nuclear disarmament and the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. I shall also offer my delegation's comments on the comprehensive programme on disarmament.

In our Committee we have had an interesting debate on the question of providing effective assurance to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons. Why is it that non-nuclear-weapon States perceive the need for such assurances? It is first of all because nuclear weapons have introduced an entirely new phenomenon into the technology of war. The nature and destructive power of even a single nuclear warhead far exceeds that of any known conventional weapon. Secondly, the destructive effect of the use of nuclear weapons would encompass not only the States directly involved in a conflict but also those who are not involved at all. That is to say, the impact of the use of nuclear weapons would recognize no national boundaries, no limits drawn between competing alliance systems. Thirdly, we live in an interdependent and ever-shrinking planet, and the massive destruction caused by the use of nuclear weapons in any one part of the world would have incalculable effects on the rest of the world by disrupting the economic, social and political logistics that bind us all together. Nuclear-weapon States and those allied to them constantly remind us of their vital security interests and the role that nuclear weapons supposedly play in safeguarding those security interests. They need to reflect on whether, by any rational standard of security that they may wish to adopt, their continued reliance on nuclear weapons as an instrument of State policy and their espousal of this or that doctrine concerning the use of such weapons are not blatantly endangering the vital security interests of non-nuclear-weapon States. As was recently pointed out in a paper presented by W.K.H. Panofsky at the Colloquium on Science and Disarmament held in Paris in January this year:

"Once nuclear war is initiated by any Power, under any doctrine, in any theatre, or for any strategic or tactical purpose, the outcome will involve truly massive casualties and devastation, leading to incalculable effects on the future of mankind. The predictions of science concerning the effects on large segments of the world's population of large-scale use of nuclear weapons are extremely uncertain."

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What is therefore at issue is in essence, a very simple question: is it permissible, under any recognized principle of international law or any accepted norms of international behaviour, to pursue one's security interests in a manner that endangers the security of third States which are not politically or militarily involved in the confrontation? The answer is clearly in the negative.

How should non-nuclear-weapon States respond to this situation? It has been argued that the present situation of a balance of nuclear terror and the peculiar security environment in Europe where nuclear weapons are claimed to play a peace-keeping role is the result of many historical factors. On the other hand, it is said that the same logic of deterrence and the reliance on nuclear weapons to offset a perceived imbalance in conventional forces would not apply elsewhere, primarily because the acquisition of nuclear weapons by one State would result in insecurity for its neighbours and further endanger international peace and security. But Europe does not exist on another planet. We in Asia or Africa or Latin America are all Europe's neighbours, the more so since the age of intercontinental nuclear missiles has brought us closer to each other in one neighbourhood in more ways than one. We all live in regions that are in close proximity to nuclear-weapon States, and over the past few years we have witnessed the growth of the military reach of the major nuclear-weapon Powers into areas far beyond their own shores. What is currently happening in the Indian Ocean area is a case in point. We must not forget that it is one world that we live in; it is one fate that we all share. I might also add that it is one and the same responsibility that we all shoulder, that is, to ensure the survival and further advancement of the human race.

If this game of brinkmanship were being played merely with guns, perhaps those of us on the sidelines would witness merely a double suicide. But it is not simple guns that will be used in this meaningless game of brinkmanship, but weapons that could easily mean the annihilation of the entire globe.

It is entirely legitimate and understandable that in a world that is threatened by nuclear disaster non-nuclear-weapon States should seek ways and means to protect themselves against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons. Some have espoused proposals for declaring entire regions of the world as nuclear-weapon-free zones in respect of which nuclear-weapon States have pledged not to use nuclear weapons. A nuclear-weapon-free zone already exists in Latin America. Other States have put forward the concept of negative security assurances. The concept is based on the premise that while nuclear weapons continue to exist, non-nuclear-weapon States have the right to guarantees from nuclear-weapon States that they will not be subjected to the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons. We do not question the right of any State or group of States to seek security through such means. However, in our view, the use of nuclear weapons anywhere would have a global impact. A war in which nuclear weapons are used could not, by its very nature, be limited to clear-cut national or regional boundaries. Even if certain regions of the world were not directly hit by nuclear weapons, the effects of a nuclear war involving

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the major Powers and industrialized countries of the North would be incalculable in terms of nuclear fall-out, massive and global economic and social disruption, ecological changes and genetic impairment. In such a situation, it would be small comfort, therefore, that one's country or region had not been the target of a direct nuclear hit. The security of non-nuclear-weapon States which may be part of a nuclear-weapon-free zone or the recipient of guarantees of the non-use of nuclear weapons would still be severely affected. It is for this reason that my Government has taken the consistent position of principle that the only credible and effective guarantee against the use of nuclear weapons is the achievement of nuclear disarmament. Recognizing, however, that the achievement of nuclear disarmament is a complex issue, we have suggested, as a first step, a convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons on the lines of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. This suggestion has also been endorsed by the Foreign Ministers of the non-aligned countries at their meeting in New Delhi last month and we trust that the Committee on Disarmament will be able to give this proposal its consideration.

In this context, my delegation has noted with satisfaction that at least one nuclear-weapon State, China, has commented favourably on this proposal and encouraged its further examination. The distinguished Ambassador of China, in his statement of 10 March 1981, stated:

"The goal of nuclear disarmament should be the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons. Pending the attainment of this lofty goal, partial measures are obviously necessary. Here it should be pointed out that the mere cessation of the testing, development and production of nuclear weapons could only curb their quantitative increase and qualitative improvement, but it alone would not remove the danger of a nuclear war, because there would remain the serious threats posed by the enormous nuclear arsenals of the Superpowers. As a result, a number of small and medium-sized countries have called for the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament. This represents a reasonable demand which, in our view, merits our serious attention in the course of our consideration of the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race."

Coming as it does after China's positive vote on resolution 35/152 D entitled "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war" adopted at the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly, this is a useful and constructive development. We would call upon all the other nuclear-weapon States to co-operate with the rest of the world community in negotiating a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

With respect to the comprehensive programme of disarmament, my country's views are already well known. We favour a programme that embodies not merely the intentions of States to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control, but the genuine political will of States to implement all its provisions. The document cannot be yet another listing of measures that are desirable goals, but should reflect the commitment of States to realize these goals. It is in this context that we feel it is essential for the programme to be set within a

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realistic time-frame. We need not be rigid about such a time-frame, but an absence of even an indicative time-table would be a confession that the basic political will to implement the programme is lacking. It would be relevant to recall that in the Final Document of the General Assembly's first special session on disarmament, it was stated that the Programme of Action constituted measures that ought to be implemented in the "next few years" (para. 44). How can we now go back on this consensus document and reject the concept of time-frames as unrealistic? This would be a step backwards from the consensus arrived at during the first special session.

Several delegations have argued that in a world where the international environment is constantly in flux, progress in disarmament measures cannot be predictable, much less subject to artificial deadlines. On a number of occasions our delegation has pointed out that while the so-called international environment has an impact on disarmament negotiations, the absence of or failure to achieve disarmament equally affects the international climate. Progress in disarmament can have a distinct beneficial impact on the relations among States, just as the creation of confidence and trust among States can in turn accelerate the achievement of disarmament measures. To use the pretext of the worsening international climate to delay the achievement of disarmament would betray a lack of political determination to achieve genuine disarmament.

In any event what is the so-called "international environment" which we so easily speak about as the basis for our implementation of disarmament measures? Does this environment only imply the erratic zigzag of the relations existing among the major Powers? Does it only imply the state of relations existing at a given moment among the nuclear-weapon States and their allies? What about the rest of the world? Do not the rest of the countries of the world and the relations existing among them also form part of the "international environment"? The success of the recent Ministerial Conference of the non-aligned countries held in New Delhi is an example of how the majority of the countries of the world, belonging to Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe itself, have, despite their differences, been able to unite together in the pursuit of the larger interest. Throughout the history of the Movement, non-aligned countries have been able to transcend their own particular security and political concerns in the cause of international peace and security. Do they not form part, perhaps the most important part, of the "international environment"? Therefore, in speaking of the impact of the international climate on disarmament negotiations, one should not become hostage to the fickle course of relations existing among the major Powers and their allies. A truly global and comprehensive programme of disarmament must also take account of the other "international environment" as well, an environment which we, the large numbers of non-aligned countries, have created and seek to strengthen further -- an environment that has proved to be stable and predictable.

It is equally clear to us that any comprehensive programme of disarmament must have, as its first priority task, the prevention of nuclear war and the achievement of nuclear disarmament. Weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear weapons, cannot in any sense be equated to conventional weapons. We cannot accept that nuclear and conventional disarmament go hand in hand, that reduction in nuclear arms

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can in any manner be related to parallel reduction in conventional arms. We are not against conventional disarmament. We would welcome a reduction in conventional forces and armaments. But we do not accept that such reductions are to be interrelated to progress in nuclear disarmament. Time and again we have argued that nuclear armaments are weapons of global destruction, of mass slaughter. Their use would probably lead to the end of human civilization. How can it be argued that their elimination must be predicated upon reduction in conventional armaments? For my delegation, a comprehensive programme of disarmament which does not recognize the urgent priority of nuclear disarmament and which does not set forth credible and immediate measures to prevent a nuclear war, would be a programme that would not serve the collective security interests of all nations of the world.

In this context, my delegation views with great concern attempts to consign the achievement of nuclear disarmament to the latter phase of the programme and link it with the achievement of conventional disarmament. It has even been implied, but not clearly stated, that the achievement of nuclear disarmament must be considered coterminous with conventional disarmament or the achievement of general and complete disarmament. We reject such an approach and regard it as an attempt to reverse the priority in disarmament measures already accepted by the international community and so clearly embodied in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

My final comment relates to measures of regional disarmament. Such measures may have relevance in certain given situations, but their value should not be unduly exaggerated. We live on an ever-shrinking planet. What happens in one part of the world affects another. Regional conflicts are exacerbated by the ambitions of the great Powers and their desire to extend their influence and control. To try to concentrate on certain regions of the world without due regard to the global situation would be unrealistic. Measures for regional disarmament, therefore, must, first and foremost, address themselves to the removal of foreign military presence and interference by outside Powers, particularly the major Powers in regions far away from their shores. It is only in an environment free from such outside interference that the States in a region can evolve a security framework relevant to their common concerns.

It is our hope that under the able guidance of its distinguished Chairman, Ambassador García Robles, the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament would be able to evolve a mutually acceptable text that would truly reflect the concerns and aspirations of the entire international community. While holding firm to our principles, we are willing to contribute to the best of our ability, in a flexible manner, to the process of evolving a consensus on this important issue.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Venkateswaran, representative of India, for his statement and for the kind words of welcome he addressed to me as Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, I have asked for the floor this morning to comment briefly on some of the interesting statements we have heard in the debate regarding effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The Pakistan delegation welcomes the reaffirmation in almost all statements of the principle that non-nuclear-weapon States have the right to be assured against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and that the Committee on Disarmament must continue its efforts to evolve an agreement on this question.

The general approach which Pakistan favours is the one set out in the Declaration of the non-aligned countries adopted at New Delhi a few weeks ago which was quoted in extenso by the distinguished representative of Yugoslavia. We also agree with those delegations, such as Brazil and Yugoslavia, which have stated that security assurances should be organically linked to nuclear disarmament which is the best guarantee against the nuclear threat. A provision calling for a commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to achieve nuclear disarmament is contained in the draft international convention submitted by Pakistan in document CD/10.

We share the view expressed by the distinguished Ambassador of Nigeria that during this session, the Ad Hoc Working Group should concentrate on reaching agreement on a common approach which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. The working paper submitted by my delegation (CD/161) identifies five alternatives that could be explored in the search for a common approach or a common formula. After an examination of these alternatives, as suggested by Bulgaria, we could concentrate on the one that is most promising. This does not mean that Pakistan will be prepared to accept anything that it is possible to agree upon. The outcome of our negotiations will have to be judged by the criterion of whether or not this assures the non-nuclear-weapon States effectively and credibly against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

In this connection, I must confess that my delegation was somewhat puzzled by the suggestion of the distinguished Ambassador of Bulgaria that the Committee should "explore existing similarities" in the "general approach" of various States to this question. I am of the view that by now everyone here is quite familiar with each other's "general approach" on the subject of security assurances. Of course, the identification of similarities and differences in the unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon States and in other proposals, is an integral part of an exercise to evolve a common formula or a common approach. We have therefore agreed to such an exercise which would open the substantive proceedings of the Ad Hoc Working Group this year.

My delegation also has some doubts about the idea of "evolving identical or in substance similar unilateral declarations" by the nuclear-weapon States. Unilateral declarations are, in our view, the prerogative of each State and are not normally negotiated before issue. If identical or similar declarations could be recommended by this Committee to the nuclear-weapon States, and accepted by them, surely it should also be possible to negotiate in this Committee a

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

common formula to be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. We would regard this suggestion as even less attractive if the unilateral declarations that are contemplated would attach conditions and limitations to the single existing declaration which is categorical and unconditional.

In this context it is necessary to say that a subjective evaluation of any of the unilateral declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States is perhaps not the most helpful way of seeking the evolution of a common approach. What we can all agree upon, as the representative of Brazil has stated, is that each of these declarations is conceived in the context of the security perceptions of the nuclear-weapon State concerned rather than the security preoccupations of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

I would like to comment on three important issues which have been raised in the debate relating to the substance or nature of the assurances to be extended to non-nuclear-weapon States. First, Pakistan shares the view expressed by Yugoslavia and other non-nuclear-weapon States that the assurances to be provided should be unconditional and legally binding in character. However, we are prepared to take into account the legitimate security interests of the nuclear-weapon States, provided these do not negate the effectiveness and credibility of the assurances which they are called upon to provide to the non-nuclear-weapon States. My delegation believes that an effort must be made in the Working Group to examine whether the conditions and limitations included in the unilateral declarations of four nuclear-weapon States are of such a fundamental nature that they must form an integral part of the provisions of an international instrument and whether these could not be expressed in some other way. Two kinds of limitations are reflected in the unilateral declarations: first, those relating to the non-nuclear status of States and secondly, those concerning the circumstances in which the use of nuclear weapons is contemplated even against non-nuclear-weapon States.

As regards the first condition, it has been argued by certain States that non-nuclear-weapon countries, in order to qualify for security assurances, must give a reciprocal commitment not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons because, as the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom stated, such assurances would only be extended to States which "clearly demonstrate their non-nuclear status".

This is a fundamental point and should be examined in perspective. First of all, I would like to state that Pakistan is not opposed to the extension of international commitments by non-nuclear-weapon States that they will not acquire or develop nuclear weapons, provided such commitments are universal and non-discriminatory in nature. As far as the Non-Proliferation Treaty is concerned, other representatives in this Committee have noted that it is "basically flawed" and inherently discriminatory. I do not need to add anything to this evaluation. Another option, which would be non-discriminatory, is the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions. However, the difficulty in this context is that the creation of such regional arrangements can be stalled by the opposition of even one State in the region. Pakistan remains prepared to explore other avenues in the context of the efforts to evolve a new international consensus on nuclear non-proliferation as envisaged in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

On the other hand, we object, as a matter of principle, to the transforming of the legitimate quest of non-nuclear-weapon States for assurances against the threat of nuclear weapons into another instrument of non-proliferation. As the representative of India stated in the Security Council at the time of the adoption of its resolution 255 in 1968:

"Any security assurances that might be offered by nuclear-weapon States could not and should not be regarded as a quid pro quo for the signature of a non-proliferation treaty ... The assurance of security to non-nuclear-weapon States is an obligation on the nuclear-weapon States, and not something which they could or should offer in return for the signature by non-nuclear-weapon States of a non-proliferation treaty."

A similar view was expressed by the distinguished representative of Brazil the other day in this Committee when he stated that the characterization of a country as a non-nuclear-weapon State "derives from a statement of fact and should not entail the imposition of further obligations on the non-nuclear-weapon State in order to become entitled to the assurances, such as, for instance, participation in any other specific international instruments". He went on to say that the obligation not to use and not to threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States derives simply and directly from the existence of nuclear armaments and from their possession by a handful of States. My delegation shares this view and the assertion that non-nuclear-weapon States should not be asked to accept new obligations merely in exchange for an agreement by the nuclear-weapon Powers not to commit an act -- that is, the use of nuclear weapons -- which has been described by the United Nations as a "crime against humanity".

Of course, we acknowledge the legitimacy of the concern felt by Nigeria and other States of Africa regarding the nuclear ambitions of South Africa. Yet, it is a fact that this concern is aroused not so much by the prospect of a nuclear-armed Pretoria as by the fact of the inherently aggressive nature of the South African entity. My delegation believes that the case of South Africa, and that of Israel, should be considered as constituting exceptional cases of States which have placed themselves beyond the pale of international law as a result of their aggressive policies and actions. In our view, the danger posed by nuclear weapons in the hands of these States can best be dealt with through the Security Council and other international machinery available to ensure the preservation of international peace and security. Pakistan will continue to support such measures in the United Nations.

However, for the purposes of the international instrument of security assurances, we think that the non-nuclear-weapon status of the non-nuclear-weapon countries has been established in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NPT recognizes only five nuclear-weapon States. It is the submission of my delegation that it would be a disservice to the very objective which is sought, if at this time even de facto recognition were given to the aspirations of certain States for a place in the nuclear club.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

The second category of qualifications is, of course, the crux of the problem in evolving a common formula or common approach to the question of security assurances. I will not enter into the debate as to whether the exception to the principles of non-use contained in the unilateral declarations constitute a "self-defence clause" or are merely a reflection of the narrow national interests of the State concerned, although I would lean to the latter opinion. Leaving aside for the moment the French declaration, which has unique characteristics, the other declarations contain two different kinds of exceptions. The unilateral declarations of the United States of America and the United Kingdom would reserve the right to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States which attack these Powers, their allies or forces in alliance or association with a nuclear-weapon State. We have previously pointed to the ambiguity of the reference to the question of "association" with a nuclear-weapon State. This condition also suffers from the characteristic of subjectivity to which reference was made by the representative of Bulgaria. This was not denied by the representative of the United Kingdom. At the same time, we have noted the important point made by the representative of the United Kingdom that ipso facto that country's unilateral declaration does not exclude any non-nuclear-weapon State and that the qualification relates only to exceptional circumstances. In examining this qualification, one is led to the conclusion that what is being referred to here is not so much an attack by a non-nuclear-weapon State with the support of a nuclear-weapon Power but rather an attack which, under current international circumstances, would be by a nuclear-weapon State together with one or more non-nuclear-weapon States. Formulated in this way, the qualification would be very similar to the statement made by the President of the Soviet Union in 1968 to the effect that "only extraordinary circumstances, only aggression against our country or its allies by another nuclear Power, could compel us to have recourse to that extreme means of self-defence".

The qualifications contained in the declaration of the Soviet Union would exclude non-nuclear-weapon States which have nuclear weapons stationed on their territory. The distinguished representative of Bulgaria formulated this condition in a slightly different way when he stated that only those non-nuclear-weapon countries should be excluded which "can be a source of nuclear attack". On the face of it, this argument has merit. However, it must be taken into account that the nuclear weapons which are present on the territories of certain non-nuclear-weapon States remain under the control of the nuclear-weapon State concerned and a decision to use them would be that of the nuclear-weapon State and not of the non-nuclear-weapon State. In the circumstances, we wonder whether the formulation of the qualifications contained in the Soviet declaration is the best means of expressing the preoccupation that a nuclear attack can be launched from the territory of a non-nuclear-weapon State. Since the object of nuclear retaliation would be not simply to punish the State which is the source of attack, but to pre-empt the possibilities of an attack, the difference between defence and offence becomes blurred. In our view, the concern reflected in the Soviet declaration is better expressed in the statement of President Brezhnev to which I have referred earlier and which is, in substance, similar to the underlying preoccupations of the United States and the United Kingdom.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

With regard to the so-called self-defence clauses in the declarations of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, two general comments could be made. First, the qualifications both in the United States and United Kingdom declarations and in the Soviet declaration are related to strategic considerations in central Europe. These strategic considerations should not be elevated to the status of general prescriptions in the common formula to be included in an international instrument. Secondly, these strategic considerations do not erode the general principle that non-nuclear-weapon States are entitled to assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

In the circumstances, we believe that it is possible to achieve agreement on a formula which would have as its central provision the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States concerning the non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States. The security preoccupations of the nuclear-weapon States relating to the peculiar situation in Europe could be reflected as an adjunct to this general principle. More than one of the alternatives identified in the working paper submitted by Pakistan provides an answer to evolving a common formula along these lines which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character.

Mr. DARUSMAN (Indonesia): Mr. Chairman, since the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons under the chairmanship of Ambassador Curt Lidgard is now progressing, I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to present the general position of my delegation on some pertinent questions relating to the matter.

Although the term "chemical weapons" has been used only since the Second World War, the destructive effects to nature and human beings of various agents that may be considered as belonging to the category of "chemical weapons" and the use of which should be prohibited, has been the subject of concern of the international community for more than a century. The term "poison or poisoned weapons" was used in the Brussels Declaration of 1874, "asphyxiating or deleterious gases" was used by the First Hague Declaration of 1899, and, between the two world war periods, the term "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or devices", was used in the preambular paragraph of the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

Now that we are drafting a convention on the prohibition of a type of weapons called "chemical weapons", we should naturally agree on what we actually mean by that term. As I started earlier, the pre-war international instruments did not use the term "chemical weapons" and the agents prohibited by those instruments were not defined as such ("chemical weapons"). A number of suggestions on the matter have been made by some delegations, including mine, in document CD/124, during the 1980 session of the Committee, which may be useful to the relevant Working Group. We are aware, though, that drawing up a definition on a particular subject in a convention is always a difficult exercise.

(Mr. Darusman, Indonesia)

As regards the aim of the proposed convention, it is the view of my delegation that it should not only prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, but that it should also comprise the prohibition of the use of such weapons. A new convention prohibiting the use of chemical weapons would not only complement the Geneva Protocol of 1925 but would also strengthen it. Chemical weapons that are to be defined by the new convention may cover not only gases, liquids, materials or devices referred to in that Protocol; it may include other agents for warfare as well. In addition to this, and as has been stated by my delegation during the meeting of the Working Group on 5 March, the existence of more than one international instrument having a number of provisions identical in content is not unusual. As an example, the Indonesian delegation referred to the 1910 Brussels Convention, the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, and the draft Caracas convention on the law of the sea. All of them contain provisions imposing obligations on shipmasters to render assistance to persons at sea whose life is in danger. If the definition of "chemical weapons" in the new convention to be negotiated in the Ad Hoc Working Group is to cover agents or substances other than those prohibited in the 1925 Protocol, this will have the effect that States parties to the 1925 Protocol are at liberty to use such agents or substances for non-peaceful purposes, while legally complying with the provisions of the Protocol. My delegation therefore recommends that the new convention should not only aim at the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, but should also aim at prohibiting the use of them.

One of the weaknesses of the 1925 Protocol is the absence of a verification machinery to ensure that the provisions of the instrument are complied with by the parties to it.

As stated in the Indonesian working paper, CD/124, we support the idea of an international as well as a national system of verification for the new convention for all the prohibited activities, namely, the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. As regards the international aspect of the verification system, a variety of mechanisms has been proposed. My delegation will continue to co-operate with other delegations in trying to arrive at an agreed machinery.

These were some more aspects of the question of the banning of chemical weapons which I wished to mention in a brief and general manner. I did not go into detail, because the most suitable forum to do so is the Working Group. We hope to be able to do this, in the Working Group, at a later stage.

The CHAIRMAN: Distinguished representatives, in accordance with the decision taken by the Committee at its 104th plenary meeting, I take pleasure in calling on the distinguished representative of Denmark, Ambassador Peter Michaelsen. Ambassador Michaelsen is the Special Adviser on Disarmament to the Danish Government and is currently Chairman of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, a position to which he was elected in December 1980.

Mr. MICHAELSEN (Denmark): Mr. Chairman, since this is the first time I have the honour to address this Committee, allow me first of all to pay tribute to you in your capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament for this month.

I should furthermore like to express to the members of the CD our appreciation for the decision to let my country take part in the work of the Committee in the capacity of observer. I might add that we are following with the greatest interest the discussions on a possible extension of the membership of the CD which have been initiated lately in connection with the starting of preparations for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

It is our intention to contribute to the work of this Committee especially with regard to efforts to reach agreement on the contents of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons and to a treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests. During this session Denmark is participating in the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons and in the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events.

Since, as I have said, this is the first time Denmark has taken the floor in this Committee during the current session I beg your indulgence for making a few remarks of a general nature before dealing with today's agenda item -- chemical weapons.

Unfortunately the present international climate is not favourable for disarmament and arms control. The tension in the world remains for the time being an impediment to progress in the international negotiations on these problems.

In the perspective of the present economic world crisis and the problems it creates, especially for the poorest countries, the enormous requirements of the military budgets seem even more meaningless. Experiencing an energy crisis, it seems highly unsatisfactory that a proportionally large part of the total world research and development is bound in the military field instead of being used for generating new sources of energy. These two paradoxes are evident to all of us. It is easy to moralize and to give reasons for the present standstill in international negotiations on disarmament and arms control. Though difficult, it is nevertheless most necessary to find a way to ease the tension and obtain progress in these negotiations in the future.

In fact both the nuclear and the conventional arms race are heavily concentrated in a limited number of countries which account for the major part of the world's military arsenals. These Powers carry a special responsibility for setting an international example of good conduct in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, born from a will not to use force in international relations and inspiring confidence by openness.

(Mr. Michaelsen, Denmark)

We cannot afford to neglect, however, that local armed conflicts in many regions of the world present grave risks of escalation. Such local conflicts and regional arms races do furthermore imply deleterious consequences for the economic and social development of the countries concerned and of other countries in their regions.

One may ask what the small or medium-sized countries can do to contribute to a positive course of events?

Obviously any realistic solution to the problems facing us must take into account the fundamental interests of the leading military Powers. The discussions in this Committee have to reflect this fact, however strong the feelings for purely multilateral negotiations might be.

On the other hand, the vital problems of disarmament and arms control concern the lives of all of us and cannot be left exclusively to the discretion of the Superpowers, especially not when year after year only limited progress can be observed. Consequently, the duty of the small countries is to act as the bad conscience of the Superpowers and to contribute with constructive ideas and proposals which can help keep the process going also in areas subject to negotiations among a limited number of directly involved States. The Committee on Disarmament has proved to be an expedient instrument to this end.

The negotiations in the CD on a comprehensive programme for disarmament have shown considerable progress, and it is our hope that the Committee in the course of the present session will be able to agree on such a programme, which could form a major input to the discussions at the General Assembly's second special session on disarmament next year. Given our well-known interest in conventional disarmament alongside nuclear disarmament I express our expectations with regard to the proper inclusion of this aspect in the programme.

Though recognizing the differences of opinion which have to be reflected, it is the opinion of my Government that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons should expedite its work on the text of a convention regarding these weapons of mass destruction. We have noted with satisfaction the agreement reached between the United States of America and the Soviet Union in 1979, and I should like to take this opportunity to urge the Committee to make full use of the work accomplished by the two Superpowers. Though limited in scope, such a convention would represent a highly welcome achievement in a period marked by tension and lack of confidence.

Two subjects on the agenda are, as I have already said, of particular interest to Denmark, i.e. the efforts to reach agreement on a comprehensive test ban and the work on the elements to be included in a future convention on chemical weapons.

In the field of a CTB the CD, in our opinion, could fruitfully initiate active considerations on the detailed institutional framework for the effective verification of a treaty. In this respect the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts which is expected to be finalized later this year could form a constructive point of departure.

(Mr. Michaelsen, Denmark)

Let me take this opportunity to state that we regard the work accomplished in the Ad Hoc Group of Experts up till now highly valuable and we consider the discussions and experimental tests carried out by the group as a major contribution to paving the way for a future comprehensive test-ban treaty. A Danish expert is actively participating in the work of the Ad Hoc Group and we are prepared to give the Group our fullest support in its future work. In this connection let me recall the offer made by the Prime Minister of Denmark in his general intervention at the General Assembly's first special session on disarmament, when he said that Danish experts and seismic installations in Greenland might prove useful in solving the problems of verifying compliance with a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Thus, Denmark is prepared to participate in a multilateral seismic co-operation system.

At its first special session devoted to disarmament the United Nations General Assembly declared the prohibition of chemical weapons to be one of the most vital and urgent problems in the area of disarmament. In paragraph 75 of the Final Document of that special session, the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction are described as one of the most urgent measures of disarmament, and the conclusion of a convention to this end is emphasized as one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral negotiations.

Since the first special session on disarmament, chemical weapons have apparently assumed a growing importance in military planning. It is, therefore, most urgent to obtain progress in the Committee's work in order to prevent the start of an intense chemical arms race like the one we have seen in the nuclear area.

A great amount of work has been done to prepare the conclusion of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons. A considerable number of proposals and working papers have been tabled in the CD and the two reports on the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union indicate active efforts to reach an agreement. It seems that the technical basis for the agreement has been rather well surveyed but still no agreement is in sight, mainly because the extremely important problem of verification is not fully solved.

The Danish Government, being opposed to the storage of chemical weapons on Danish territory under present circumstances, i.e. in time of peace, firmly supports the early conclusion of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons. The recent debate on the alleged use of chemical weapons in some parts of the world has shown that the 1925 Protocol prohibiting the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases in war is not comprehensive enough, especially but not only because it lacks an instrument of verification. As for the scope of the convention, it is our view that it should be as comprehensive as possible and from the start include development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, retention, transfer, assistance and use. This corresponds to alternatives 1 and 3 in the working paper CD/CW/WP.7 of 16 February 1981, circulated by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on CW. We thus prefer a ban on the use of chemical weapons be included in the convention, though already prohibited by the 1925 Protocol, in order to ensure that the use of CW is also subjected to verification. However, we do see advantages in a less comprehensive convention -- if more ambitious proposals prove impossible to realize -- in order to get the process started now.

(Mr. Michaelsen, Denmark)

As mentioned before, experiences with the 1925 Protocol -- and, I might add, the Convention on biological weapons -- have proved that reliable verification procedures are a must.

Adequate verification of a CW ban must cover the following areas in particular:

- (a) Destruction of existing stocks of chemical weapons;
- (b) Destruction or closing down of existing production facilities for such weapons;
- (c) Control of current production of sensitive chemical agents to the extent necessary for the observance of a production ban.

In a number of working papers and documents tabled in the CD it is anticipated that the parties upon accession to a CW convention will be obliged to declare stocks and means of CW as well as the means of production of chemicals covered by the convention. Further, the plans for the destruction of CW stockpiles and for the destruction or dismantling of production facilities will have to be declared. I might add that Denmark takes a special interest in the question of means and procedures for destruction with regard to CW.

In view of the extremely complicated nature of the issues raised by verification of a CW convention it is felt that consideration should be given to the development of verification procedures which would involve the minimum element of intrusion. For the time being it appears, however, that on-site inspections constitute the only fully effective means of verification. Accordingly, such visits require the expertise of a highly qualified international agency which can ensure that inspections are properly arranged and carried out without unwarranted intrusion.

I have touched upon some topics under consideration in this Committee, all of them important and extremely difficult questions involving varying points of view among member States and in the international community as a whole. It is encouraging, however, that the proceedings of the Committee, despite world tension and recession, are still progressing.

Since it was reorganized pursuant to the recommendations of the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly, the CD has evolved into a true negotiating body. The work of the four ad hoc working groups established indicates a positive will to discuss openly and frankly the differences of opinion. This leaves considerable hope for the future.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Michaelsen, the representative of Denmark, for his statement and for the congratulations he addressed to me.

In accordance with the decision taken by the Committee at its 104th plenary meeting, I now give the floor to the representative of Finland, Mr. Miettinen, Professor of Radio-chemistry and Director of the Finnish Project on Chemical Weapons Verification.

Mr. MIETTINEN (Finland): Mr. Chairman, although there is unanimity about the ultimate goal of the disarmament negotiation, namely, complete and general disarmament, there is also a common understanding that the first practical step to be taken would be to limit and ban nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Among these other weapons, chemical weapons appear to be by far the most dangerous. Consequently, their prohibition is really an urgent task before the CD.

This fact is recognized in the agenda of the CD. It is the subject of intensive and, we are glad to state, constructive discussion in an ad hoc working group. It is also being discussed bilaterally between the United States of America and the USSR. We hope that the latter discussions will soon be resumed and that they will result in a joint draft for a convention.

The Finnish delegation has followed closely the debate in this Committee and its Working Group. In our view, work is proceeding in a good atmosphere. Thanks to the commendable efforts of its Chairman, Ambassador Lidgard, the Working Group can work in a structured way and tackle real practical problems. The Chairman has circulated to the Group several working papers which we find generally very useful.

The main outstanding problems are questions pertaining to the scope, definitions, criteria and verification. This is not surprising, since the same problems are equally difficult in any arms control or other agreements. But as they have been solved elsewhere they cannot be impossible here either.

In all these deliberations the problem of verifying compliance with an eventual treaty has often been on the forefront. Finland as a neutral country has a natural interest in disarmament and has thus endeavoured to make its contribution also to the efforts to solve this problem. As early as in 1972 Finland took a decision to create, on a national basis, a chemical warfare control capacity for a possible future international use. A working group of chemists has been employed to study analytical methods for chemical warfare agents for the purpose of such a control capacity.

Against this background, Finland has tried to develop its project on the role of instrumental analysis of chemical warfare agents and their verification. A working document (CD/164) has been distributed today to the members of this Committee which explains the present stage of the project we have under way. The project has been conceived as a multipurpose one, both substantively and functionally. Substantively, the planned control capacity could be used in three different verification activities: verification of the destruction of stocks, of the non-production of chemical weapons, and of alleged use. Functionally, the capacity could be used regardless of the modalities of agreed verification. This means that it could be used for national verification or any combination of national and international inspection; it could be used in connection with an investigation ordered by an appropriate international authority, and finally it could meet some of the concerns expressed by some developing countries about possible difficulties in carrying out verification by their national means only.

The progress of the Finnish project has been described in working papers and handbooks that Finland has annually presented to the CCD and the CD. These are listed in the working document we are presenting today.

(Mr. Miettinen, Finland)

The Finnish project concentrates on the development of the methodology necessary for a detailed trace analysis of any control samples that could be collected to verify a ban of chemical weapons. After the development of satisfactory methodology and the corresponding data bank, problems connected with the collection and preparation of samples for analysis will be studied.

The first step in the Finnish project was to synthesize model nerve agents and related chemical compounds, and examine their relevant properties with respect to possible verification analyses. After that, the suitability of available instrumental techniques for the identification of CW agents was studied. By using the most suitable techniques, and selected repeatable measuring conditions, an initial data base was recorded for about 150 agents and their degradation products. The selected techniques were arranged in the form of a system of microanalytical methods, and this system was proposed for consideration as a basis of international standardization of CW verification analysis. The proposed system was published by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland in 1979 and 1980 in the form of handbooks as referred to earlier (CD/14 and CD/103).

The Finnish project has also trained several research workers in the field of CW verification analysis. The head laboratory of the project is located at the Department of Chemistry of the University of Helsinki but the research is carried out in close co-operation with several other Finnish laboratories.

The primary goal of the first phase of the Finnish project was reached in summer 1980. It was a sensitive identification system for the most important supertoxic agents. The goal of the next phase is the development of detailed procedures for sample pre-preparation and quantitative organic determination on the trace level of known and potential agents. Accurate methods are necessary for obtaining useful information also on complex and metabolized sample matrices. Parallel with these studies, the Finnish project concentrates on the automation of the verification analysis, including the development of automatic monitoring instrumentation. Automated verification analysis makes possible sensitive monitoring of the prohibited chemicals alone, decreasing the fear of revealing commercial and industrial secrets from industrial samples by unnecessary revelation of other, peaceful compounds. The third future goal is the extension of the original data base to any chemical compound relevant to a CW ban.

Detailed studies on sample collection can be initiated only after completing the present methodological development of trace analysis. Such studies are, however, of primary importance in preparing detailed instructions for sample collection for verification analysis. Miniature field tests in the open air are necessary, and are being planned. They will include experiments for remote monitoring of air and water.

During the eight years when the Finnish project has been functioning, the sensitivity and specificity of analysis of organic chemical compounds has improved tremendously, by many orders of magnitude. Ten years ago one had to be happy if one could identify by comparison a known substance of which only a millionth of a gram, $10^{-6}g$, was present in the sample. Today one can identify and structurally elucidate unknown compounds in 10^{-9} , or -- in favourable cases -- $10^{-12}g$ -- amounts which means up to a million times higher sensitivity. And there is still much room for improvement because $10^{-12}g$ contains a million times a million, or 10^{12} , molecules of the average molecular weight of nerve agents. It is quite possible and even probable that during the next 10 years the sensitivity of organic analysis will further increase by several orders of magnitude.

(Mr. Miettinen, Finland)

What was said above concerns the sensitivity of instrumental analysis. One can further increase the sensitivity of the total, i.e. environmental analysis, by increasing the size of the environmental sample. One can, for instance, instead of the customary few litres of air pump many cubic metres, even thousands of cubic metres, of air through a trap where the desired compounds are captured, and process the condensate for analysis. The more complex the matrix -- a condensate of air, clean surface water, polluted water or a sample of soil, plant or animal tissue, etc. -- the more complicated the preparation, enrichment and pre-fractionation of the sample. This is a vast and demanding field which will require a lot of research in the coming years.

But soon it will be possible to identify any use of chemical agents in the open air like field testing, anti-insurgency activities or chemical warfare -- from distances of hundreds or thousands of kilometres below the wind. If good meteorological data are available, as is today the case for large parts of the globe, a trajectory can be calculated for the air package containing the agent and with known wind speeds its approximate location of origin can be calculated. If satellite observations are available from this region, an idea of the nature of the release may be formed.

The eight years' experience of the Finnish project shows that continuous research is needed to keep the methodology of analysis of CW agents abreast of the rapid technical development in instrumental technology. Even more demanding is the sample collection and pre-treatment. However, soon it will be possible to verify any wide area use (covering hectares) of CW agents in the open air from great distances but not production or destruction of such agents in hermetic facilities or their stockpiling in hermetic shelters. Verification of these activities will require on-site inspection, the terms of which have to be defined in the convention. This is the political part of the total problem of verification. Organo-analytical research cannot solve the political part of the problem but it can guarantee that the samples can be adequately analysed if they can be obtained.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, I should like to take this opportunity to confirm the announcement which I made previously, that I shall hold an open-ended informal consultation this afternoon at 3 o'clock in Room 1, in order to discuss the organization of the work of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons tomorrow.

Mr. de la GORCE (France) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, the French delegation wishes to make a brief observation on the question of the distribution of documents in the official languages, and it would like to do so in plenary meeting.

This morning we received two documents both of which were distributed to us in English: one of them, the one submitted by the Finnish delegation, is obviously a recent text -- it is dated 19 March -- and it is only two pages long, and I think it could probably have been distributed to us in French and in the other languages of the Committee this morning.

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

But I would like to point out another example: document CD/166, the original of which is in Russian and which was distributed to us this morning in English. This text, except for the covering letter by Ambassador Issraelyan, which is only one line long, was presented by His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union to the United Nations General Assembly on 23 September 1980. It must therefore exist in all the official languages of the United Nations. We have some difficulty in understanding why this document has not been distributed to us today in all the working languages. I should like to know incidentally, if the Soviet delegation has received this text in Russian.

Mr. Chairman, I wish very seriously to draw the attention of the secretariat to the importance of its issuing documents, so far as possible simultaneously -- and they ought normally to be issued simultaneously -- in the languages of the Committee. My delegation has very strict permanent instructions on this point, and we shall be obliged to reiterate it very emphatically.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you for your statement. I and the secretariat have taken note of your request and we shall give you an appropriate answer at a later stage.

Distinguished delegates, I should like to record that the Chair will conduct informal consultations in connection with the consideration of issues relating to agenda items 1 and 2 tomorrow, Wednesday, at 3 p.m. in Conference Room I. I would now suggest that immediately after this plenary meeting the Committee hold a short informal meeting to listen to a brief statement by Ambassador Jaipal, the Secretary of the Committee and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, who will provide information to the Committee on some pending matters.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 26 March 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.

CD/PV.118
26 March 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTEENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 26 March 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. G. Herder (German Democratic Republic)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. SALAH-BEY
Mr. M. MEDKOUR
Mr. A. ABBA
Mr. M. MATI

Argentina: Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD

Australia: Mr. R. STEELE

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Miss G. van den BERGH
Mr. de BISSCHOP

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. R. DEYANOV
Mr. V. SOTIZOV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U NGWE WIN
U THAN HTUN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL
Mr. G. SKINNER
Mr. M.C. HAMBLIN

China: Mr. YU Peiwen
Mr. LIANG Yufan
Mr. LIN Chen
Mr. LI Weimin

Cuba: Mrs. V. BOROWDOSKY JACKIEWICH
Mr. C. PAZOS

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. L. STAVIMOHA
Mr. J. FRANIK
Mr. J. MORAVIC

Egypt:

Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M.N. FAHMY

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. GESBERT
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. K.H. LOLIS
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Mr. P. BUNTIG

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. H. MULLER
Mr. W. ROHR
Mr. J. PFIRSCHKE

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. C. GYORFFY
Mr. A. LAKATOS

India:

Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. M. SIDIK
Mr. I. DAMANIK
Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. F. QASIM
Mr. KARYONO

Iran: Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA

Italy: Mr. V. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI
Mr. L. SALAZAR

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. R. ISHII
Mr. K. SHIMADA
Mr. K. ODA

Kenya: Mr. S. SHITEMI
Mr. G. MUNIU

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
Mr. M.A. CACERES

Mongolia: Mr. S.H. LKHASHID
Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco: Mr. A. SKALLI
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS
Mr. A. OOMS

Nigeria: Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. M. AKRAM

Peru: Mr. P. PAREDES PORTELLA

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. A. SASU

Sri Lanka: Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. L. NORBERG
Mrs. I. SUNDBERG
Mr. J. LUNDIN
Ms. G. PUJ

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. L.S. MOSHKOV
Mr. V.V. LOSHCHININE
Mr. A.G. DOULYAN
Mr. S.N. RIUKHINE

United Kingdom: Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES
Mrs. J.I. LINK

United States of America: Mr. C.C. FLOWERREE
Mr. F. DESIMONE
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. J.A. MISKEL
Mr. C. PIERCY
Mr. M. SANCHES
Mr. MIKULAK

Venezuela: Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT
Mr. H. ARTEAGA

Yugoslavia: Mr. V. VOIVODIC
Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire: Mr. LONGO B. NDAGA

Secretary of the Committee and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General: Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the Committee: Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

Mr. PFEIFFER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. Chairman, today I want to offer a few remarks on item 4 of our agenda, namely on chemical weapons. Before turning to questions of substance, however, I want to express my Government's satisfaction that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has taken up its work at an early date and that, under the guidance of the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Lidgard, the definition of issues to be dealt with in the negotiation on a convention on chemical weapons is proceeding in a business-like manner. My delegation is of the opinion that the discussion in the Group has not yet exhausted the present mandate and that further useful work can be done within its scope.

One need hardly stress the importance of a convention on a comprehensive, effective and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. All delegations around this table have spoken out in favour of it. I have on several occasions had the opportunity to point out the priority which my Government accords to such a ban on an already existing and particularly insidious weapon of mass destruction.

Among others, the agreement on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction showed that multilateral negotiations can lead to substantive results, if they are focused on a specific disarmament measure. It is true that the Convention which I just mentioned cannot serve as a model for a ban on chemical weapons. This applies to various fields, but in particular to that of verification. Nevertheless, this important achievement should encourage us to solve the problem--much more difficult but, at the same time, much more important -- of a chemical weapons convention.

As early as 1954, the Federal Republic of Germany unilaterally renounced the production and possession of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Together with the majority of States, it is a party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use in war of bacteriological and chemical weapons to which it adhered without reservations. That is why, after there had been several reports on the use of chemical weapons in various regions of the world, it co-sponsored resolution 35/144 C which was adopted by the General Assembly at its last session. My Government hopes that the impartial investigation which the General Assembly in this resolution decided to carry out will get under way at an early date.

I should like to focus my observations on some aspects of a chemical weapons ban which have been the object of a particularly detailed discussion in the chemical weapons Working Group.

One of these aspects is the question of the activities to be prohibited. For those familiar with the jargon of the Working Group, I can summarize my Government's position as being in favour of "Alternative 1". Let me briefly outline the reasons for this position.

A chemical weapons convention must, in our opinion, be comprehensive. Parties to it should undertake never to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain munitions or devices specifically designed to cause death or other harm to man through the toxic properties of chemical agents which have been released as a result of the employment of these munitions or devices.

(Mr. Pfeiffer, Federal Republic of Germany)

Furthermore, the convention should provide for the destruction of existing stockpiles within a reasonable period. In this connection, and with reference to certain reports in the press alleging a very high cost of the destruction of chemical weapons, I should like to mention that in the Federal Republic of Germany an installation has been developed and constructed to destroy toxic agents remaining from the first and second world wars, which have inadvertently not been destroyed and are occasionally still being discovered today. This installation allows a destruction at a reasonable cost and without danger to the environment.

A repetition as such of the prohibition contained in the 1925 Geneva Protocol, namely, not to use chemical weapons, would in our opinion not enhance a future convention. We feel that a duplication of this prohibition might lead to doubts concerning the obligation of States which have adhered to the Geneva Protocol but not yet to the Convention. Both agreements should complement rather than be in concurrence to each other. Moreover, the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons is universally accepted as international customary law.

This position is, furthermore, in agreement with the general view of the Federal Government that purely declaratory measures such as, e.g. the mere duplication of legal obligations should be avoided. We therefore welcome that our opinion is shared by many delegations, and we hope that this policy will also be pursued in other areas.

We feel, however, that there could be one connecting link between the two instruments; but that is a question to which I shall come back later in this intervention.

My Government does not support the view that a chemical weapons convention should include the prohibition of protective activities, facilities and materials. In our opinion, the convention should aim solely at the prohibition of the munitions and devices defined above without undermining elementary protective measures.

I hope that the presence of experts will facilitate our work concerning the difficult question of the definition of chemical weapons. In this connection I should like to refer to a working paper dated 22 July 1975 (CCD/458) in which the Federal Republic of Germany outlined a definition of chemical warfare agents.

The most important and, at the same time, the most difficult problem to be solved is that of adequate verification. We feel, however, that the time has come seriously to try to find a solution which is acceptable to all States. We are encouraged by the fact that two important and comparatively recent documents mention the need for verification.

(Mr. Pfeiffer, Federal Republic of Germany)

First, the joint USSR -- United States report on progress in the bilateral negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons of 7 July 1980 (CD/112) states that both negotiating parties "believe that the fulfilment of the obligations assumed under the future convention must be subject to the important requirement of adequate verification".

Secondly, the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons to the Committee on Disarmament of 4 August 1980 (CD/131/Rev.1) refers to a general convergence of views among the delegations who participated in the discussion in recognizing "the importance of adequate verification" and believing that "verification measures should be commensurate with the scope of the prohibition and other aspects of a convention".

Unfortunately, there still seems to be a rather wide gap between those delegations favouring an approach which primarily relies on national verification measures and those which are of the view that verification should be essentially based on international measures. This question will be further discussed in the Working Group but it is pertinent to express one important point already now: as long as the signature of a State under a treaty is not sufficient to convince all parties that it is indeed observing all the stipulations of the treaty -- and if this were not the case today and in the foreseeable future, there would be no need for verification at all -- so long will the signature of the president of a national verification agency confirming that the State which employs him is not cheating have just as little value. One may deplore this state of affairs, but one cannot deny it.

That is why my Government is firmly convinced that only international verification measures can give States a credible assurance that a ban on chemical weapons is indeed being observed by all parties. To be effective, however, such measures have to include mandatory on-site inspections, which are, as of today, indispensable if a verification body is to satisfy itself as to the non-existence of activities contrary to a convention. My Government therefore welcomes the convergence of views, stated in the report of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, that on-site inspections under certain conditions and procedures should be included in the convention.

Under the Brussels Treaty of 1954, the Federal Republic of Germany renounced the manufacture of chemical weapons. Since then, a special Treaty agency has verified the observance of this commitment. Regular checks are being carried out in chemical plants in the form of on-site inspections in order to verify that no substances which are classified as chemical weapons are produced. The experience of well over twenty years shows that it is possible adequately to verify a ban on the production of chemical weapons with reasonable means and without prejudice to the commercial interests of the chemical industry.

(Mr. Pfeiffer, Federal Republic of Germany)

My Government has, in a workshop which was held in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1979, acquainted a group of 55 experts from 24 States with our experience in the field of on-site verification. The results of this workshop have been submitted to the Committee on Disarmament as a working paper (CD/37 of 12 July 1979). Some more recent considerations were presented last year to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons as CD/CW/WP.5 entitled, "The impact of on-site inspections of current civilian production on the chemical industry". Furthermore, my delegation had the occasion to give a detailed account of the experience of the Federal Republic of Germany in the field of on-site inspections in an informal meeting outside the purview of the Working Group.

From the considerable interest with which these activities have met, we infer a growing appreciation of our position. We hope that the discussions in the Working Group will lead to a further narrowing of the still existing gap between opinions on this matter.

Let me come back to the connecting link --which I mentioned earlier-- between the Geneva Protocol and a chemical weapons ban. My Government feels that this link could be provided by an inclusion in the chemical weapons ban of a verification procedure ensuring the observation of the Protocol. Considering the widespread recognition of the necessity of adequate verification and the fact that the Geneva Protocol does not, in fact, provide for any verification at all, such a provision should not pose insuperable difficulties.

A verification mechanism concerning the Geneva Protocol would, in particular, be of importance in two events:

During the period necessary for the destruction of chemical weapons there could be allegations that a State had used chemical weapons; these would require verification.

After the expiration of this period there could be a need for verification that States had not used any stockpiles which inadvertently or on purpose had not been destroyed.

My delegation would welcome any suggestions which delegations might have concerning this very preliminary proposal which I have just put forward.

Before concluding, I should like to make one remark with reference to the organization of our work. Already in my intervention in plenary on 7 August 1980 I expressed some doubts as to whether the Committee made the best possible use of the time available to it. Even with the presence of experts, and even with a duplication of the sessions of the Working Group, I wonder whether we will be able to solve all the existing problems within an appropriate span of time. If we really think that we are nearing a solution of the outstanding problems, we should perhaps consider setting aside some time of the Committee to deal exclusively with a chemical weapons ban. I know that there are other items on our agenda, and I know that these also are to be dealt with on a priority basis. But if a different organization of our work could significantly accelerate progress in this field, I think it would be worth considering it.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Today the Soviet delegation would like to speak on item 2 of the agenda.

Statements by representatives of a number of States have reflected serious concern over the continuing nuclear arms race. This is a clear indication of growing alarm throughout the world over the fact that an end has not yet been put to the process of further accumulation and refinement of this most dangerous, most lethal type of weapon.

There is, of course, no need to prove that the greatest threat to peace and security of peoples arises from the insane arms race, and more precisely from the nuclear arms race. As has been rightly pointed out, the pace of disarmament negotiations and the results derived from them lag considerably behind the accelerating pace and scope of the arms race, and first and foremost the nuclear arms race. The absence of tangible progress towards a limitation of the arms race is giving rise to an unprecedented growth in world military expenditure, which, as was emphasized in the Secretary-General's message, has now reached \$500 billion a year.

There can be no doubt that the problem of halting the nuclear arms race is an exceedingly complex one. But it must be solved, and solved without delay.

The very first duty of the Committee on Disarmament -- if, of course, it is to adopt a serious and responsible approach -- is to occupy itself forthwith with questions connected with the curbing of the nuclear arms race.

It is perfectly evident that the problem of prohibiting nuclear weapons could have been solved a great deal more easily at the time when such weapons had only just come upon the scene. As you know, at that time, in 1946, the Soviet Union put forward a proposal for the conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition for all time of the production and use of atomic weapons. In the years which followed, the Soviet Union made various other concrete proposals also, the implementation of which could have ensured the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and halted the accumulation of stockpiles of such weapons.

The response to the Soviet proposals was to adopt a policy of speeding up the nuclear arms race, based on what proved to be the completely unrealistic desire to retain and perpetuate a nuclear monopoly.

Our country has never slackened its efforts to put an end to the nuclear arms race and ensure nuclear disarmament.

Thus, in 1978 the Soviet Union together with a number of socialist countries came forward with a proposal for starting negotiations on ending the production of nuclear weapons and destroying such weapons. Concrete proposals were submitted for the consideration of the Committee on Disarmament concerning negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed. I am referring to document CD/4. In making this proposal, we emphasized that the implementation of measures in the field of nuclear disarmament should be buttressed by the parallel strengthening of political and international legal guarantees of the security of all States.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

In advocating the application of radical measures in the field of nuclear disarmament, the Soviet Union has also proposed and is proposing partial measures designed to block, one by one, the avenues of development of the nuclear arms race. In particular, the Soviet Union attaches great importance to the question of a complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, the elaboration of measures for the prevention of the possibility of sudden attack and unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons, measures for strengthening the régime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the problem of providing security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States.

As you know, the recently concluded 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union put forward new large-scale constructive proposals for strengthening peace, deepening détente and curbing the arms race, including the nuclear arms race. These constructive proposals are designed to guide international events into a course of developing mutual understanding and co-operation in the interests of reducing and eliminating the threat of war and ensuring security for all States and peoples.

In the course of the past few weeks many representatives speaking on item 2 of the agenda have referred to general questions, including the principle of national security, the concept of deterrence, parity of strategic forces, and others.

Today the Soviet delegation, in turn, would like to speak on these matters.

The problem of disarmament is one of the most complex problems of contemporary world politics. This is due above all to the fact that, more than any others, it touches upon the security interests of States. Negotiations on this problem involve questions not only of a political but also of a military, scientific and technical nature, as well as others. Concepts of military strategy as well as different approaches to the evaluation of key factors in the development of human society have to be taken into account in this context. This explains, in particular, why the attainment of agreement in the field of disarmament is, as experience shows -- including experience in the Committee on Disarmament -- an extremely difficult matter.

One of the most important preconditions for successful negotiations on the question of disarmament is observance of the principle of non-impairment of the national security interests of countries participating in the negotiations. This principle, as the basis for disarmament agreements, is set forth in a number of international documents. For example, the joint Soviet-United States statement of agreed principles for negotiations on disarmament issued in September 1961 states: "All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and so that security is ensured equally for all".

The final communiqué of the preparatory consultations relating to negotiations on mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

records agreement among the participants in the Vienna talks that concrete measures "should be carefully worked out as regards scope and time so that, in every respect and at every moment, they meet the principle of the non-impairment of the security of any of the parties".

During the preparations for the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and at the session itself, many States emphasized that the most important precondition for the success of disarmament negotiations is that they should be based on the principle of non-impairment of the security interests of States. The importance of observance of this principle was stressed in the document by the socialist countries submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the session.

"The adoption of disarmament measures", says the Final Document of the special session, "should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage. At each stage the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces".

Thus the principle of non-impairment of the security interests of States as a basis of international agreements on disarmament issues has received the widest recognition. At the same time, the most widely divergent points of view may be encountered in the actual interpretation of the concept of "national security interests". Views have even been expressed to the effect that this concept does not lend itself to clear definition at all. The American author J. Frankel, who has written a special study on this question, asserts that the vagueness of this concept and the total lack of agreement on a definition of it and of empirical criteria of any kind make its strict application impossible. The well-known American politician J. Fulbright also considers that the concept of national interests is an extremely subjective one, and is composed of a mixture of elements such as national pride, group emotions, the personal vanity of leaders and various others.

The American writer Lester Brown in his paper, Redefining National Security, asserts that today the concept of guaranteeing national security interests should go far beyond the consideration of military aspects only. "The overwhelmingly military approach to national security", he writes, "is based on the assumption that the principal threat to security comes from other nations. But the threats to security may now arise less from the relationship of nation to nation and more from the relationship of man to nature". In this connection he notes the growing significance for the future of mankind as a whole and of individual States in particular of such factors as environmental pollution, shortages of the most important raw material resources, especially energy sources, etc. In his view, the need for States to confront these threats and to address them co-operatively "suggests that the military's role in securing a nation's well being and survival is relatively less important than it once was".

Of course, environmental pollution and the predatory use of natural resources cause serious prejudice to the interests of the economic development

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

of States and their international co-operation, provoke local conflicts in some cases and may, in certain circumstances, lead to a deterioration of the international situation as a whole. At the same time, under present conditions, when the world is armed to the teeth and the arms race, as is pointed out in one of the documents of the United Nations, has brought mankind to the brink of self-annihilation, universal peace and the national security interests of States are threatened, above all, by the possibility of the use of force or the threat of such use by another State or other States. To put this threat on the same level as the negative effects of any other factors of international life, such as ecological ones, is not only to fail to see the realities of the contemporary world but also to underestimate the urgency and the vital importance of the struggle against the arms race -- the main danger of our time.

How, then, in fact ought we to interpret the concept of guaranteeing the security interests of States? In our view, this concept implies first and foremost the protection of a State's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and the inviolability of its frontiers, and the non-admissibility under any pretext of intervention in its domestic affairs.

The Constitution of the USSR proclaims the defence of the State interests of the Soviet Union as one of the principal tasks of our country's foreign policy. The safeguarding of the national security interests of States is guaranteed by a wide range of ideological, economic, political, scientific, technological and military factors. The application of these factors depends directly on the social, economic and class characteristics of a given State, on its potential capabilities and, lastly, on its role and responsibility in world affairs, its political and strategic interests, and so on.

Thus the guaranteeing of the security interests of States is inseparably linked with their defensive capacity. That is why the Soviet Union so vigorously and insistently demands the strict observance of the principle of the non-impairment of security interests in negotiations on the limitation of the arms race and on disarmament.

The diametrical opposite of the principle of non-impairment of the national security interests of States is the concept of military superiority. This represents one of the principal obstacles to the successful progress of negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament. And yet certain participants in those negotiations make periodic bids for agreements that would give them a military advantage, a superiority over the other party to the negotiations. Such attempts, as we all know, have been foiled more than once; they have merely put additional difficulties in the way of the attainment of agreement. Nevertheless, there are still some who are not yet ready to throw concepts of military superiority, useless as they are in disarmament negotiations, on the scrap-heap.

In politics, reliance on the force of arms, on military superiority over others, cannot guarantee lasting and prolonged peace and universal security, nor, by that token, the security of each individual State. History has demonstrated over and over again that every action produces a reaction. The appearance of

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

a new type of weapons in the possession of one party has inevitably led to the same weapons, if not still more highly developed ones, appearing in the possession of the other. Suffice it to recall, by way of example, some well-known facts in this sphere. In the United States of America, the atom bomb was developed and put into use in 1945. The Soviet Union responded to this by developing its own atom bomb four years after the rejection of its proposal for a prohibition of the military use of atomic energy, i.e. in 1950. The first thermonuclear explosion was carried out in the United States of America in 1952; a year later, i.e. in 1953, the Soviet Union was obliged to develop a thermonuclear weapon. In 1960 the United States of America was the initiator of the development of a nuclear submarine with ballistic missiles on board; four years later, the USSR brought similar submarines into service. In 1970 the United States of America began to equip its intercontinental missiles with multi-charge warheads; a few years later, the Soviet Union was obliged to reciprocate by developing systems of the same kind.

And here is a still more recent example. A short time ago our country suggested prohibiting the development of the "Trident" naval missile system in the United States of America, and of a corresponding system in the USSR. This proposal was not accepted, and, as a result, the new "Ohio" submarine equipped with "Trident-1" missiles was developed in the United States and the similar "Taifun" system in the Soviet Union.

The same also applies to the continent of Europe. After all, if there were no forward-based American weapons in Europe and no medium-range nuclear missiles belonging to other NATO countries, the Soviet Union would not be faced with the need to counterbalance these weapons.

And yet attempts continue to be made to secure military superiority over the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. A clear proof of this are the plans being made concerning the production and the deployment in Europe of neutron weapons. This was recently advocated, by, among others, General B. Rogers, Commander-in-Chief of the NATO forces.

All these examples, the number of which could be multiplied, testify to the complete pointlessness of attempts to rely on the possibility of sole possession of any type or system of modern weapons in a situation of scientific and technological revolution when immense scientific resources are put into the development and improvement of military technology. The challenge to the Soviet Union in the sphere of the build-up of weapons has forced it to respond in kind.

The report of a group of experts entitled "Comprehensive study on nuclear weapons" notes that "the conventional view is ... that the military capabilities of the two States (USSR and United States of America) are perceived to increase by a process of action-reaction, the end result being status quo but on a higher level of armaments. This is often referred to as the arms-race spiral". With this observation we can entirely agree. The experts who prepared the study on nuclear weapons I have just mentioned rightly point out that it would seem virtually impossible to obtain nuclear superiority when the strategic forces are as numerous, dispersed and protected as at present.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The only sensible course under such conditions is to halt the costly arms race and to conduct negotiations designed to ensure observance of the principle of equality and equal security of the parties at a lower level.

The arms race does not guarantee the security of any one State or group of States. On the contrary, with every new step in the improvement of modern weapons and the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, the world becomes increasingly unstable and the danger of war draws nearer.

The security interests of States can best be guaranteed in conditions of peace and the relaxation of international tension, supplemented by concrete measures in the sphere of arms limitation and disarmament. The more peace is durable and stable, the greater will be the security in which States and peoples will live. This conclusion emerges from all the many centuries of the history of mankind. The way towards the strengthening of universal peace and security lies, not in attempts to secure military superiority over other States nor in the much-vaunted policy of acting "from a position of strength", but in a sober, responsible approach to the evaluation of the events of international life, in a readiness to adopt effective, concrete measures in the field of disarmament based on the strict observance of the principle of the non-impairment of the security interests of all parties.

The position-of-strength policy and the desire to gain military superiority are vividly reflected in the so-called doctrine of deterrence. In their statements, a number of delegations on the Committee have expressed their views on this doctrine. The representatives of the United Kingdom, Belgium and the Federal Republic of Germany have come forward with vindications of the doctrine. On 26 February the representative of the United Kingdom, in trying to expound the doctrine of deterrence in, so to speak, popular form, compared it with a warning system using a burglar alarm and a guard dog which would help the respectable householder to protect his domestic property from the designs of evil-doers. It seems to us that the example itself is inappropriate both in form and in substance. After all, when we move to the level of relations between States, a different quality comes into play and the principles applying are of a different order from those in the example given.

We take a different approach to this question. The problem should not be seen in terms of respectable householders and burglars but as a matter of ensuring the safety of neighbours living in a single building, the name of which is our planet Earth. We consider that guaranteeing the safety of each of the inhabitants of this house would be facilitated by the elaboration of general measures that would not infringe on anyone's interests and that would not arouse in one neighbour fear of another. Although the United Kingdom representative said that what lies at the basis of the doctrine of deterrence is the desire to "scare off" a potential "burglar", the real truth is that the doctrine of deterrence envisages the possibility of an attack by one neighbour on another and leads to the irreversible exacerbation of the conflict and, to come back to the topic of our discussion, to the unleashing of nuclear war. That the doctrine envisages the possibility of attack can be seen from a number of the practical measures taken by the States which have espoused it.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Take, for example, the now widely-known United States presidential order No. 59. This is essentially inspired by the possibility of carrying out the "preventive" nuclear attack by means of which the inventors of the doctrine hope to win a nuclear war.

Reference to the fact that the doctrine of deterrence is far from defensive in nature can, indeed, be found in a document which has already been mentioned, the "Comprehensive study on nuclear weapons". This observes in particular that deterrence is "based fundamentally on offensive capability, meaning the ability to inflict intolerable damage on the adversary. This holds true also in a situation where deterrence by denial, e.g., by the threat of use of tactical nuclear weapons in a limited battlefield conflict situation, is considered, as this involves a risk of escalation to higher levels of nuclear engagement and thus in itself from the beginning carries an element of deterrence by punishment, which always risks becoming the dominating feature".

The doctrine of nuclear deterrence has been criticized on many accounts: because of the huge degree of risk it creates of the unleashing of a world-wide thermonuclear disaster, because it constitutes a threat principally to vast numbers of civilians and because it is based on an essentially unstable balance. Finally, the doctrine does not provide for any acceptable solution in the event that deterrence proves ineffectual.

Naturally, the delegations present here are well aware that the doctrines of deterrence and of military superiority are condemned in the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. In particular, paragraph 13 of that document states: "Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority". Numerous representatives have made the very same point here in the Committee.

Speaking on 3 February, the representative of India said: "My delegation would submit that inherent in the concept of deterrence is an implicit commitment to a continuing and accelerating nuclear arms race."

It must be obvious now to everyone, if we do not deliberately close our eyes to the reality of the modern world, that the increased stockpiling of nuclear devices -- for it is this that the doctrine of deterrence implies -- cannot contribute in any way to the preservation of a state of peace or the prevention of war. It is equally illusory to count on achieving superiority in nuclear arms when there is parity between strategic armed forces on the international scene. The experience of recent decades has shown how unsuccessful are attempts by one party to outstrip the other in the accumulation of nuclear potential.

We agree with the view expressed by the representative of Mexico on 3 March, when he said that he refused to believe that the so-called "deterrent power" of nuclear weapons could be regarded as justifying their existence. He rightly described as unconvincing the argument that the precarious peace of the past 20 years had been based on a frightening balance of terror.

Doctrines of this kind can only -- and do in fact -- serve to whip up the arms race, including the nuclear arms race, and to postpone indefinitely, if not altogether preclude, the possibility of fulfilling the urgent tasks in the sphere of disarmament.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

As has been pointed out in many authoritative studies, the practical pursuit of such doctrines leads to an increase in the risk of nuclear war, with the tremendously destructive consequences for mankind with which it is fraught. Order No. 59 which I have mentioned is aimed at "legalizing" in some degree the idea of the acceptability of nuclear war, and at forcing mankind to come to terms with this sombre prospect. At the same time, even the initiators of the concept themselves -- I am thinking in particular of the former United States Secretary of Defense -- basically recognize the unsoundness of the thesis that it will be possible to contain a nuclear war within limited boundaries and that it will not develop into a full-scale nuclear conflict with all the consequences that would entail.

The doctrine of deterrence and nuclear superiority also includes the intention of implementing plans for the deployment of neutron weapons in Europe. Of course, according to the United States Secretary of Defense, the deployment of neutron warheads in Europe is intended to help "strengthen the tactical nuclear forces" of the United States on the European mainland. It is easy to see what impact such plans might have on the situation in Europe and, more generally, on the over-all world situation. It is no accident if these intentions have given rise to widespread international condemnation and to the reflection thereof in statements by many members of the Committee, particularly the statement made by Mrs. Thorsson at the Committee's plenary meeting on 5 February. Further evidence of this condemnation can be found in the recent statement by the Netherlands Minister of Defence to the effect that the Netherlands Government will not permit the stationing of neutron weapons on its territory.

In his statement, the United Kingdom representative said that "the policy of deterrence has kept the peace in Europe for 35 years and remains valid today". We flatly disagree with this opinion. The consequence of the policy of deterrence has been an unceasing arms race, the flooding of the European continent with the latest, most dangerous types of nuclear weapon, and the bringing of Europe to the brink of a potential nuclear confrontation.

If there has been peace in Europe for 35 years, it is thanks to the policy of détente, to the striving of all peace-loving peoples to prevent nuclear war and curb the nuclear arms race.

A favourite trick of those who shy away from the solution of disarmament problems and steadily build up their military potential under the cover of a doctrine of deterrence and on the basis of an assortment of theoretical inventions is to allege that the Soviet Union is seeking military supremacy, that such supremacy had already been achieved, and that everybody else is virtually obliged to top up their arsenals in order to catch up with the USSR.

We have even heard statements of this kind in the Committee on Disarmament. At one of our meetings for example, the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany expressed concern at the "substantial imbalance" that he claimed exists "in the field of nuclear medium-range systems in favour of the Soviet Union". This, it would seem, was necessary in order to give justification in practice to the decision taken by NATO in December 1979 to modernize certain types of United States nuclear device and to deploy them in Europe. We had no intention of touching on this question, but now that it has been done, we should like to draw attention to the enormous concentration of nuclear weapons of various kinds in Western Europe, and especially in the Federal Republic of Germany, that are aimed at the USSR and its allies in the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

In just a few minutes, according to an article published recently in the magazine Der Stern, under the very revealing title, "The Federal Republic of Germany - a disguised nuclear Power", the Bundeswehr and the United States forces can launch against pre-programmed targets warheads with a total capacity equivalent to 6 million tonnes of conventional explosive. According to data in the "White Book" of the Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, there are already 386 nuclear-tipped missiles with a range of over 1,000 kilometres stationed in the territory of that country alone. But according to information issued by Harvard University, there are in the Federal Republic of Germany 1,428 nuclear missiles with a range of over 1,000 kilometres. To these must be added the no less than 512 nuclear warheads that can be launched on strategic missiles from the four submarines under NATO control.

No comment is needed on these figures.

As a number of commentators have noted, the planned rearmament of NATO in Western Europe means, from the military point of view, the creation of the capacity to make a first "disabling strike" against the USSR, following which, it is hoped, that country would be unable to launch any retaliatory attack. This leads to the justified conclusion that "the possibility of nuclear war is increasing". I should like to quote in this respect a statement by Dieter Lutz of the Hamburg University Institute concerned with problems of peace and security policy to the effect that "even now, the quantity of nuclear weapons in the form of long-range missiles in Europe is sufficient to thrust the Soviet Union back into the Stone Age".

In a series of statements containing reasoned criticism of the doctrines of deterrence, military superiority and limited nuclear war which have been made in our Committee, it has been conclusively demonstrated that claims that the existing military-strategic balance has been destroyed are unfounded and at variance with numerous assessments by authoritative political and military leaders, including leaders of the United States military establishment. I should like to draw your attention in this connection to the speech by the representative of Mexico which I have already mentioned and which contains precisely this sort of statement. The speaker referred in particular to the conclusion reached after careful study by Mr. A.M. Cox, a former official of the CIA, that "the combined NATO defense budget is greater than the combined Soviet-Warsaw Pact defense budget which, if the China factor is included, ... is less than 75 per cent of that of the NATO powers".

Evidence of the lack of justification for assertions of the need to restore the allegedly shattered balance in the military-strategic field is provided in particular by a statement made by the former United States Defense Secretary in January 1981, when he recognized the existence of a roughly equivalent over-all strategic balance between the Soviet Union and the United States.

It is perfectly understandable that someone might not like the parity with respect to armed forces that has grown up and that exists between the two main military-political alliances of the modern world. But a military and strategic balance is a fact of contemporary international life and one that cannot be ignored.

Many delegations have also touched on the question of parity, and, in doing so, some speakers have endeavoured to call generally into question the possibility of defining a military-strategic balance. What is there to say about this?

Naturally a military-strategic balance or parity is not something that can be weighed on apothecaries' scales and does not imply that the quantitative and qualitative indicators for all types of armed forces and weapons exactly coincide

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

for the two sides. That would, to put it mildly, be a simplistic approach. The military potential of each of the parties naturally consists of items that are defined by a whole complex of varying factors, each of which has its own special significance. The problem must be viewed as a whole, taking due account of all its constituent parts.

Comparing even equivalent items of the military potentials of different parties is sometimes extremely difficult. When the term "balance" is employed with respect to the relationship of forces between two States or between groups of States, what is meant is that, from the point of view of over-all military-strategic capacity, both parties are in approximately the same position, with neither of them enjoying military superiority over the other. That is precisely the situation today.

If we look, for example, at strategic nuclear weapons or medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, we find that in both cases there is an approximate balance between the parties concerned. There are not infrequent arguments about tanks, about their numbers. We make no secret of the fact that the Soviet Union has substantially more of them. But after all, the NATO countries have quite a few tanks too. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that, as those States themselves admit, they have significantly more anti-tank devices. Here, too, then, the situation may be considered as mutually balanced. Affirmations of "Soviet superiority" in total numbers of armed forces are mistaken. If we stick strictly to facts, there can be only one conclusion: the total size of the armed forces of the United States of America and the other NATO countries is actually somewhat greater than that of the forces of the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Treaty countries.

Attempts to distort the content of the concept of equal security and military parity do nothing to advance the cause of disarmament. Some people would apparently like to close their eyes to one of the main political realities of the world today, namely, the presence of two opposing military-political blocs, one of which comprises three nuclear-weapon States and many large militarily-prominent States. Furthermore, yet another nuclear-weapon Power acts in parallel with this bloc on the international scene. Would anyone care to deny this?

Hence, attempts to exclude any nuclear-weapon States from the process of nuclear disarmament, without taking into account the entire range of factors I have mentioned, are entirely indefensible. Nor is it possible to take seriously assertions that there exists some category of minor nuclear States whose weapons are of no account. Let us turn once again to the evidence provided by the experts who prepared the comprehensive study on nuclear weapons. This is what they say: that the nuclear arsenals of China, France and the United Kingdom "are far from insignificant and include both fission and fusion weapons that could cause vast damage, particularly if used against urban targets".

We should like to state clearly that those who attempt to limit the process of nuclear disarmament to certain States, whether they intend to or not, create a serious, or, to be frank, an insuperable obstacle to negotiations on nuclear disarmament. This position has been set out quite clearly in the document submitted by the socialist countries. There are still further extremely important military, geographical, economic and other factors which must be taken into account in assessing the state of the military-strategic balance.

It is our basic belief that destruction of the existing balance of military forces would have an adverse effect on the totality of international relations and could lead to a serious aggravation of the international situation and create

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

a threat to peace and universal security. It is no accident that the West's hard-headed statesmen and politicians, as well as many influential scientists, are urging in particular that no attempts should be made in disarmament negotiations to destroy the existing balance of forces.

I should like especially to emphasize that while being opposed to attempts to shatter the existing military-strategic balance the Soviet Union by no means considers that this balance, with its high level of military confrontation, should be maintained in the future. The essence of our entire policy in disarmament matters -- as has repeatedly been emphasized at the highest level -- is to seek to bring about a reduction in the level of military confrontation and to lead things towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control. We consider that the genuine security of States, and indeed international security in general, can be guaranteed, not through a continuation of the arms race but through a limitation of it. This is the very point that is driven home by every Soviet proposal on disarmament.

As L.I. Brezhnev observed in a statement made on 2 November 1977, "It goes without saying that the maintenance of the existing balance is not an end in itself. In order to begin to turn the curve of the arms race downwards, we are in favour of the gradual lowering of the level of military confrontation. We wish substantially to reduce, and subsequently to eliminate, the threat of nuclear war, which is the most terrible danger facing mankind".

Our country has never been an advocate of "a balance of terror", of peace propped up by mountains of arms. As regards Soviet military doctrine, it is -- and this deserves particular emphasis -- of a profoundly defensive nature. As was stated in the message of greetings from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the foundation of the Soviet Army and Navy, "the essence of our military policy lies entirely in effective defence, and nothing more. The Soviet Union has never armed itself for the sake of doing so and has never been, and never will be, the instigator of an arms race".

It is precisely for this reason that the central theme of Soviet foreign policy is the curbing of the arms race and the achievement of disarmament. The USSR has consistently called for the lowering of the level of military confrontation in the world, with the unconditional maintenance of equality and identical security, if for the time being it is not possible to eliminate that confrontation completely. The Soviet Union is active in putting forward concrete proposals concerning the most vital disarmament questions and is ready to respond positively to any other initiatives in this area, whether they are of a fundamental or of a partial nature.

Finally, my last point. Many delegations have rightly referred to the recent increase in the threat of war. This threat indeed hangs over all the countries in the world, but its source is not the Soviet Union, nor its mythical superiority, but the arms race itself, the continuing tension in the world. "This genuine, and not imaginary, threat", declared L.I. Brezhnev at the 26th Congress of the CPSU, "we are ready to combat -- hand in hand with America, with the European States, with all the countries on our planet".

Mr. McPHAIL (Canada): This is my first intervention in the Committee during the month of March and I would like to congratulate you on taking the Chair and on your effective and imaginative leadership of the Committee during the month, which you have already displayed and which, I know will continue during the remaining days of your office. I take this opportunity to pay my respects to Ambassador de la Gorce for his skilful efforts in launching the Committee so successfully on its 1981 session.

This morning I want to offer some comments on the principal topic on the agenda of the Committee during this period, item 4: chemical weapons. I would like to make a suggestion or two, in relation to substance, and to make what I trust will be regarded as a particular contribution, in the form of a documentary analysis which we shall table in the Committee to further its substantive work on this subject.

I would first of all like to express my Government's satisfaction at the speedy reconvening of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons. We are also pleased to see that the Working Group has wasted no time in getting into the substance of the issues involved in the elaboration of an international agreement on the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons and on their destruction. In this regard, Ambassador Lidgard is to be commended for his devoted and knowledgeable efforts in conducting and inspiring the proceedings of the Working Group.

Secondly, I want to express my authorities' appreciation for the significant and valuable reports which the Soviet Union and the United States of America have made on their bilateral negotiations.

Thirdly, I would like to put on record the importance Canada attaches to this concentrated period of work on chemical weapons, especially as it is providing an opportunity for experts to participate as members of their delegations. We are confident that we can benefit from their presence to make progress on some of the technical issues before us.

We note that during the past year some differences have come to light concerning both the definition of chemical weapon agents and the criteria such as that of toxicity. It is of the utmost importance that these definitions be agreed upon in order to achieve further progress on the scope of a convention.

The conclusion of a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons is of the utmost priority. Canada is prepared to devote all efforts which may be needed for the elaboration of such an agreement.

There is now an urgency in this matter which we cannot ignore. This urgency is reflected in the newspapers every day. Chemical weapons are capable of being used effectively on the battlefield. Chemical weapons exist at this moment, and are being improved still further through ongoing research and development. In terms of the military balance they are as much a consideration as any other weapon of massive destructive power. In the absence of agreement, a chemical arms race is possible, and events in the next several years will determine whether or not this happens.

The successful implementation of an agreement on chemical weapons is going to depend in part on the degree of confidence each party has that the other parties are complying with the agreement -- particularly with one in which weapons systems are to be destroyed. Verification will play a pivotal role. Its adequacy in the eyes of all signatories will be a prerequisite to an agreement. To insist upon verification is not to question the good faith of any countries entering into an agreement but rather, through the reciprocity of the provisions, to build confidence and ultimately strengthen mutual trust amongst all parties.

(Mr. McPhail, Canada)

I would therefore suggest that members now centre their efforts on an analysis of adequate verification procedures and ways by which they could be implemented. These questions remain major stumbling blocks. National experts who are with us can make an important contribution to resolving them.

First and foremost amongst these questions is the form that verification will take and the interrelationship between the concepts of international and national methods. I am tabling today (as CD/167, which will be distributed in all languages) a first step by Canadian experts to consider some of the implications of this aspect. I trust that this analysis in support of the Working Group's overall mandate will form a useful basis for discussion.

Our preliminary analysis suggests that each signatory must maintain a national verification group, and of course knowledge of its organization and responsibilities would be most useful. For nations without stocks of weapons and without production facilities this national commitment would be very small.

There must be as well an international verification agency. Thoughts on this have been advanced by a variety of nations in the past. Our analysis suggests that adequate assurance to the international community should be achievable through available resources. It is clear, however, that for certain activities some form of on-site inspection will have to be accepted to provide this assurance, since remote sensing by national technical means will be insufficient.

I invite other members to comment and to build on this paper. Canada agrees with the Chairman of the Chemical Weapons Working Group, Ambassador Lidgard, that problems related to verification are not insurmountable and that ways can always be found to deal with them.

Finally, I would like to make a suggestion which could lead to a clarification of the issues and of States' views on these issues. The suggestion is not meant to supplant the present efforts of the Working Group under Ambassador Lidgard's leadership, but would be supplementary to them. More than 150 working papers on aspects of the chemical weapons problem have been submitted to this Committee and its predecessors since 1960 by 17 member nations directly and by many others indirectly in the form of multinational working papers. To our knowledge, little has been done to co-ordinate and consolidate this information into a useful working document.

All Governments and not only those directly concerned with the negotiations, have a vital interest in being fully informed of the issues at stake, and the attitudes of those in this Committee towards those issues. We therefore suggest that the Secretariat compile all working papers on chemical weapons which have been submitted to date and to present an analysis of the views on the most difficult issues such as scope, definitions and the verification problem.

Such a measure, we believe, would be a valuable contribution to progress on one of the most complex, yet most promising, fields of our endeavour.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Canada, Ambassador McPhail, for his statement and for the kind words of welcome he addressed to me as Chairman of this Committee. The chair has received your working paper. It will be circulated as document CD/167.

Mr. YU Peiven (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons has been one of universal concern to the peoples of the world for a long time. It is also an important item in the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament Paragraph 75 of the Final Document adopted by the General Assembly at its first special session on disarmament points out: "The complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represent one of the most urgent measures of disarmament. Consequently, the conclusion of a convention to this end, on which negotiations have been going on for several years, is one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral negotiations."

As is well known, during the First World War nearly 1,300,000 people were injured or killed by poisonous gases. Since then, the chemical weapons developed have been more numerous in type and characterized by their greater capacity for mass destruction.

The Geneva Protocol of 1925 already provides for the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in war; nevertheless, in many wars, including some wars that took place recently in the Asian region, chemical weapons have been used all along.

Chemical weapons possess these characteristics: they are multiple in their effects, low in cost, easy to manufacture and convenient to proliferate. The rapid development of modern science and technology has provided various necessary conditions and new possibilities for the production of chemical weapons. The appearance of new chemical warfare agents of higher toxicity that are more rapid in their effects, and whose physical and chemical characteristics are more suitable to the requirements of utilization, and the improvement of dissemination techniques will all substantially increase the lethal and injurious capabilities of chemical weapons. In particular, after the emergence of binary chemical weapon technology: the production of chemical warfare agents has already become part of general chemical and industrial production, thus enabling preparations for chemical warfare to be conducted in greater secrecy and with greater ease. The Superpowers are developing and stockpiling large quantities of chemical weapons and have made chemical weapons one of their important means of warfare. Under these circumstances, it is all the more urgent that a convention completely prohibiting chemical weapons be concluded.

The Chinese Government has always attached great importance to the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. In various United Nations forums, the Chinese delegation has clearly stood for the complete prohibition and total destruction of all chemical weapons, and the conclusion, as soon as possible, of an international convention on the complete prohibition and total destruction of all chemical weapons. In 1980, after participating for the first time in the work of the Committee on Disarmament, the Chinese delegation put forward working paper CD/102 in which we clearly indicated our basic position on the main contents of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons. Today, I wish to make some further comments on certain substantive issues relating to the prohibition of chemical weapons:

The Chinese delegation proposes that the scope of the future convention prohibiting chemical weapons should include the prohibition of their development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, transfer and use. Today I would like to speak more specifically on the question of the prohibition of the use of these weapons. Our proposal to include use in the scope of prohibition of the future convention is based on the following considerations.

(Mr. YU Peiwen, China)

Firstly, we are engaged in negotiations on the conclusion of a separate convention which has not been in existence, aimed at the complete prohibition of chemical weapons. It is very important that such a convention should be truly comprehensive in nature.

Secondly, the 1925 Geneva Protocol only provides for the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in war, but does not provide for the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in other armed conflicts apart from wars. This no longer responds to the realities of the international situation.

Thirdly, from a juridical point of view, with the ceaseless development and evolution of military technology and methods of warfare, there can be found many examples of international treaties regulating wars reaffirming and supplementing each other. For example, in the two Additional Protocols to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 on the protection of victims of international armed conflicts, which were elaborated in 1977, there are some articles which reaffirm the provisions of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, and others which supplement and develop the Geneva Conventions. The 1925 Geneva Protocol itself is also a reaffirmation of and complement to the 1907 Hague Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Poison and Poisoned Weapons. It can thus be seen that the strengthening of existing protocols or treaties by reaffirming and supplementing them with new international instruments is after all a normal phenomenon in the constant development of international treaties regulating wars. This has been done in the past, and will certainly be done again in future.

In accordance with the above considerations, we believe that the inclusion of use in the scope of prohibition of the future convention prohibiting chemical weapons could only strengthen the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Such a convention will strengthen trust between countries, and we believe that more countries will accede to it as a result.

The Chinese delegation is of the view that in drafting a convention on the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons, it is imperative first to arrive at a clear definition of the chemical warfare agents to be prohibited. The question of definition not only concerns the scope of prohibition and the contents of the convention, but also has a bearing upon the relevant means and methods of verification. Many delegations have already made quite a number of useful suggestions in respect of the question of definition, and I would now also like to briefly state our views on this subject.

In our view, the definition of a chemical warfare agent must be both comprehensive and accurate. Its comprehensiveness is designed to ensure that all chemical warfare agents which should be prohibited are brought within the scope of prohibition. It should not only include supertoxic lethal agents, but also include incapacitating agents and irritant agents; it should not only include single-purpose chemical warfare agents but also dual-purpose chemical warfare agents and precursors which can turn into chemical warfare agents during the process of their use; it should not only include existing chemical warfare agents but also potential chemical warfare agents. The accuracy of the definition is designed to avoid erroneously including in the scope of prohibition chemical substances which should not be prohibited, since that would adversely affect the development of the industrial and agricultural production of States and their scientific and technological progress. In this connection, the Chinese delegation intends to submit to the plenary Committee a working paper on the definition of chemical warfare agents.

(Mr. YU Peiwen, China)

The Chinese delegation, like many other delegations, has consistently favoured stringent and effective international monitoring and verification measures for prohibiting chemical weapons. We share the view expressed in working paper CD/106 put forward by the French delegation that "it would be more dangerous for the security of the countries affected to prohibit the manufacture and possession of chemical agents and weapons without providing means of verifying the strict application of the prohibition than to have no agreement whatsoever." This is completely in accord with the actual situation. The fact that the 1925 Geneva Protocol does not contain articles on complaint and verification procedures with regard to violations of the convention prohibiting the use of chemical weapons has resulted in no investigation and confirmation of chemical weapons having been used in many wars and armed conflicts. This has emboldened some countries to use chemical weapons unbridled.

In its working paper CD/102, the Chinese delegation also clearly states that there should be stringent and effective measures for international control and supervision to ensure the strict implementation of the provisions of the convention. An appropriate organ of international control should be set up for this purpose charged with the responsibility of verifying the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles and the dismantling of facilities for their production. The organ should also be empowered to investigate charges on the use of chemical weapons and on any other violations of the convention. Appropriate measures should be spelled out to deal with verified cases of violations of the convention with a view to bringing about their prompt cessation. Moreover, the organ should provide strong assistance to imperilled contracting parties.

How then can the organ of international control be enabled to carry out "stringent and effective" verification? In a statement which I made at the plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament on 3 July 1980, I clearly stated the position of the Chinese delegation: "In view of the uneven levels of scientific and technological development of the contracting parties, there is a great disparity between the parties in verification techniques and devices. If we depend on the parties themselves to monitor each other with the verification devices which they possess, this could prejudice the effectiveness and authoritativeness of such verification." Therefore, the organ of international control "should have qualified experts and advanced and effective verification techniques and devices to enable it to discharge the function of clear verification with which it is charged. In this way all contracting parties will be subject to equal control thereby ensuring the strict implementation of the convention."

Many delegations attach very great importance to the question of on-site inspection, and have put forward quite a number of specific proposals. The Chinese delegation is of the view that in order to ensure strict implementation of the articles of a convention on the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons, provision must be made for certain necessary on-site inspection measures. For instance, there should be international on-site inspection measures with regard to charges on the use of chemical weapons, the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles and the dismantling of facilities for their production.

Various delegations have suggested three methods of dealing with the question of production facilities for chemical weapons: dismantling, conversion to peaceful purposes and shutting them down. We consider dismantling to be conducive to enhancing a sense of security and trust between States and is the most appropriate method for dealing with facilities for the production of chemical weapons. Converting them to peaceful production and shutting them down are not ideal measures, since they would not only make verification more difficult, but would also carry the potential risk of the facilities being utilized again within a short period of time to renew production of chemical weapons.

(Mr. YU Peiwen, China)

If it is argued that the dismantling of production facilities for chemical weapons could take years, and that an interim measure is required, we can agree to consider the use of the method of shutting down the facilities as an auxiliary measure of supervision. In this connection also, the Chinese delegation intends to submit a working paper on the dismantling of production facilities/means of production for chemical weapons.

In some disarmament negotiating bodies, the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons has been discussed for many years. In 1980 the Committee on Disarmament established for the first time an Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. Under the chairmanship of Ambassador Okawa of Japan, it carried out substantive deliberations on the scope of prohibition of the future convention, verification and other related issues and achieved fairly good progress. At this session the Committee on Disarmament has once again set up this Ad Hoc Working Group which, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden, is continuing its deliberations on substantive issues. The Chinese delegation believes that, through the co-operation of all delegations, the Ad Hoc Working Group will certainly make new progress this year.

Finally, I would like to welcome the chemical weapon experts of various delegations that are participating in discussions on this question. Their participation in deliberations will enable us better to understand technical questions related to the convention. The Working Group will be focusing its discussions this year on several technical issues directly relevant to the convention, and it is in this area that the experts will be playing their due role.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of China, Ambassador Yu Peiwen, for his statement. The documents he mentioned will be circulated as soon as the chair receives them.

Mr. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, I would like to make some comments to-day on item 4 of the Committee's agenda, chemical weapons. The Brazilian delegation has been participating actively in the Working Group that is currently examining, through substantive negotiation, issues to be dealt with in a convention on the subject. I wish to pay tribute here to Ambassador Lidgard, Chairman of the Working Group, for his efforts to achieve progress during this session of the Committee, as well as to Ambassador Okawa, the former Chairman of the Group.

Brazil attaches particular importance to the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the production, development and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. Together with the other members of the Group of 21, my delegation played an active part in the efforts made in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to achieve progress in this field. The basic stand of those delegations is contained in document CCD/400 of 1973. We believe that a convention to ban chemical weapons can be a significant measure of disarmament, in so far as it is aimed at eliminating a whole category of weapons in the armouries of some States, as opposed to measures designed merely to prevent the development of certain kinds of weapons that have not yet gone beyond the blueprint stage. For this reason, my delegation believes that the most salient feature of the proposed convention is the destruction of existing stockpiles of chemical weapons, besides the prohibition of their production, development, stockpiling and transfer.

(Mr. De Souza E Silva, Brazil)

The scope of the convention, thus, to our mind, embraces two sets of obligations: a positive obligation to destroy existing stocks and the facilities for the production of chemical weapons, or their conversion to peaceful applications, coupled with the negative obligation not to manufacture, stock up, develop or transfer such weapons. To fulfil those obligations, States should be required to declare in detail, at the time of their signature of the instrument, all stocks in their possession, their nature, quantities and places of storage, as well as the plans, methods and timing for their destruction. Facilities used for the production of chemicals for warfare purposes and of delivery systems specifically designed for use in chemical war should also be the object of the declaration, together with precise information on their location and production capacity, and on plans for their destruction, mothballing or conversion. Additional information to be provided should include means of research and testing of chemical weapons, special military units and programmes and activities in the field of training. There should be no reason for delay in the presentation of such declarations since they would embrace information already available to the Governments of the few States which possess such weapons and facilities.

The destruction of stocks, to be strictly enforced by adequate measures of verification, will ensure that no discrimination arises from the proposed convention, in as much as the few States which possess chemical weapons in their arsenals will undertake to dispose of such armaments in exchange for the commitment, on the part of those who do not possess them, not to manufacture, develop and stockpile their own chemical weapons in the future. Since there must necessarily be a time-lag between the entry into force of the convention and the completion of the process of destruction, Brazil deems it imperative that the mechanism of implementation of the convention be designed in such a way as to permit the full realization of the twofold objectives of the instrument in the shortest possible delay. Fulfilment of the obligation to destroy the stocks currently in the possession of only a few Powers must then be seen as a necessary corollary to the obligation undertaken by the large majority of States, which do not possess chemical weapons, not to acquire them. Brazil is therefore of the opinion that the provisions and the title of the convention should adequately reflect that concern, and this is why my delegation proposed, at the 105th meeting of the Committee on 12 February, that the convention be titled "Convention on the destruction of chemical weapons and on the prohibition of their production, development, stockpiling and transfer".

We are aware of the interest of some delegations in our proposal, and we look forward to hearing the views of other members of the Committee, in the plenary and in the Working Group, on that idea. My delegation would be particularly interested in learning from the bilateral negotiators their opinion on the technical and practical questions related to the process of destruction, especially as regards the timing for the implementation of obligations entered into and any specific problems connected with the substance of the declarations.

Another important feature of the convention, in the view of the Brazilian delegation, is its role as an instrument for the promotion of international co-operation in the field of the peaceful uses of chemical technology. In this connection, the convention should be conceived according to the principle that civil industrial activities and the full use of technology for peaceful purposes should not only be allowed but actually encouraged; the production, development, stockpiling and transfer of chemical agents for warlike purposes is the exception that must be prohibited, rather than the other way around. Since the convention will hopefully result in the cessation of activities currently under way in certain countries, it is also important that it contains provisions to ensure that savings generated from the process of chemical disarmament will be channelled to peaceful objectives, especially in developing countries, in accordance with the principles embodied in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

(Mr. De Souza E Silva, Brazil)

Other issues currently under examination by the Working Group include the system of measures designed to ensure compliance with the provisions of the convention, through a combination of national and international means of verification. Brazil believes that an independent international control authority should be established under the convention on an egalitarian basis, and entrusted with the administration of the international verification system. Its duties would include the compilation of data provided to it by the national systems organized by each State party, the analysis and circulation of such data to all States party, as well as co-operation and assistance to the parties with regard to the national mechanism of control and verification. On-site inspections, on a voluntary basis, could be performed by the international authority, subject, in each case, to express agreement by the State party in question. Furthermore, the international procedures of verification should be periodically reviewed, taking into account new scientific and technological developments. The complaints procedure and the mechanism of periodical review of the Convention should not result in discriminatory arrangements; all States party to the instrument are entitled to equal treatment and equal rights.

These are the main ideas that the Brazilian delegation wished to share today with the members of this Committee, in connection with the current work on a convention on the destruction of chemical weapons and on the prohibition of their production, development, stockpiling and transfer. My delegation continues to support the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons and will elaborate on the suggestions presented above as the occasion arises in that subsidiary body. We fully agree with the assessment made by Ambassador Lidgard at our last plenary meeting to the effect that the convergence of views on substantive issues pertaining to the convention is sufficiently broad to warrant the start of work on the actual drafting in the very near future. We are confident that with the invaluable assistance of Ambassadors Lidgard and Okawa and in consultation with all delegations, the necessary steps will be taken by the Chair of the Committee, actually during the current spring session, to lay the basis for providing the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons with a more precise and objective mandate so as to enable the Committee to discharge the task entrusted to it by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Mr. PFEIFFER (Federal Republic of Germany) I should like to make a brief remark with respect to the intervention of the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan, in which he dealt with nuclear disarmament. In the course of his statement, he based some of his remarks on an article in the German weekly magazine, Der Stern. It goes without saying that the figures and conclusions which he quoted from this magazine have no official character, nor do they reflect the position of the Federal Government. This position has been stated on several occasions in interventions of my delegation in this Committee, as well as in other official documents.

My delegation has repeated that the decision taken by NATO in December 1979 is a "double check" decision, with the special specific aim of avoiding another turn of the arms spiral, which was referred to by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union. My country, together with its allies, has asked for early negotiations on the limitation and reduction of long-range theatre nuclear missiles in Europe. This offer is still valid and on the table.

The CHAIRMAN: Before concluding, I should like to make a few announcements.

I have requested the Secretariat to circulate today an informal paper containing the timetable for the meetings to be held by the Committee on Disarmament and its subsidiary bodies during the week 30 March to 3 April. You will note that the informal paper follows the programme of activities of previous weeks, with the exception of an additional meeting for the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, which will be held on Monday at 10.30 a.m.

In that connection, I should also like to inform the Committee that, after consultation with the Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Working Groups and bearing in mind that some meetings of Working Groups might not be held on certain dates in April when the Palais des Nations will be closed, it was agreed that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons will meet on Monday, 6 April, at 10.30 a.m., and the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will be convened on Monday, 13 April, also at 10.30 a.m.

If there are no objections, I will consider that the Committee agrees with the timetable and with the recommendation I have just made on the basis of consultations with the Chairmen of these Working Groups.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: I should now like to turn to another subject. At our 117th plenary meeting, I convened informal consultations in connection with the consideration of issues relating to agenda items 1 and 2. As a result of those informal consultations, I have reached the conclusion that there is general agreement that the informal meeting on Monday 30 March should continue to examine, under item 2 of the agenda, the prerequisites for negotiations on nuclear disarmament, as well as doctrines of deterrence and other theories concerning nuclear weapons.

I have also taken note of the wish that the informal meetings on 6 and 13 April should be devoted to the examination, under item 1 of the agenda, of specific issues relating to that item.

In the course of informal consultations, five concrete issues were proposed under item 1 for examination at informal meetings. No consensus has so far been reached, and it is therefore my intention to continue informal consultations with a view to reaching agreement on the specific subjects to be examined under item 1 at the forthcoming informal meetings on that subject. I shall keep the Committee informed of the results of my consultations.

Finally, you will recall that at our informal meeting on Tuesday, I announced the intention of holding an informal meeting today, immediately after the plenary meeting, in order to discuss a question which is still pending and on which the secretariat of the Committee has provided us with the relevant information. As we have run out of time I propose to consider this request, if possible, on Monday. I therefore appeal to delegations to conclude their consultations on that request, if possible before these informal meetings on Monday.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 31 March, at 10.30 a.m.

The Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will meet this afternoon at 3.15 p.m. instead of 3 o'clock.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND NINETEENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 31 March 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. G. Herder (German Democratic Republic)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. M. MEDKOUR
Mr. A. ABBA
Mr. M. MATI

Argentina: Mr. F. JIMENEZ DAVILA
Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD
Miss N. NASCIMBENE

Australia: Mr. R. STEELE
Mr. T. FINDLAY
Ms Shirley FREEMAN

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE
Mr. de BISSCHOP

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. R. DEYANOV
Mrs. V. SOTIZOV

Burma: U SAW LAING
U NGWE WIN
U THAN HTUN

Canada: Mr. G. SKINNER
Mr. M.C. HAMBLIN

China: Mr. YU Peiwen
Mr. YU Mengjia
Mr. YANG Mingliang
Mr. LI Weimin

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLA VILA
Mr. C. PLAZOS

Czechoslovakia: Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. A. CIMA
Mr. J. JIRUSEK
Mr. L. STAVINCHA
Mr. J. FRANIK
Mr. J. MORAVIC

Egypt: Mr. M.N. FAHMY

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. GESBERT
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. K.H. LOLIS
Mr. H. THIEBLICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Mr. P. BUNTIG

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. H. MULLER
Mr. W. ROHR
Mr. J. PFISCHKE

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. A. LAKATOS

India: Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. S. DARUSMAN
Mr. I. DAMANIK
Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. F. QILSIM
Mr. J. HADI
Mr. KARYONO

Iran:

Mr. M. DABIRI
Mr. D. AMERI

Italy:

Mr. V.C. DI MONTEZEMOLO
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI
Mr. L. SALAZAR

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. R. ISHII
Mr. K. SHIMADA
Mr. K. ODA

Kenya:

Mr. S. SHITEMI
Mr. G. MUNIU

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. L. BAYART
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS
Mr. A.G.B. OOMS

Nigeria:

Mr. O. ADENIJI
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD

Mr. M. AKRAM

Peru:

Mr. F. VALDIVIESO

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA

Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. M. MALITA

Mr. T. MELESCANU

Mr. A. SASUV

Sri Lanka:

Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD

Mr. L. NORBERG

Mr. S. ERICSON

Mr. J. LUNDIN

Miss G. PUU

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN

Mr. L.A. NAUMOV

Mr. L.S. MOSHKOV

Mr. V.V. LOSHCININE

Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES

Mrs. J.I. LINK

United States of America:

Mr. F. DESIMONE

Miss K. CRITTENBERGER

Mr. J.A. MISKEL

Mr. M. SANCHES

Mr. C. PEARCY

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT

Mr. H. ARTEAGA

Mr. O.A. AGUIR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. B.A. NZENGEYA

Mr. L.B. NDAGA

Secretary of the Committee
and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 119th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

At the outset, allow me to convey to the delegation of the United States of America my sentiments and, I am sure, those of the Committee in connection with the attempt on President Reagan's life. We wish the President a speedy recovery, and I request the delegation of the United States to transmit those wishes to its Government.

The Committee continues today its consideration of item 4 on its agenda, entitled "Chemical weapons".

Before giving the floor to Ambassador Erdembileg, I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to congratulate him and the Soviet Union on the successful conclusion of the first space flight of a citizen of Mongolia. I have learned that the Soviet-Mongolian team returned successfully to earth yesterday.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Comrade Chairman, the delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic would like to associate itself fully with the high praise of your activities and the words of sincere gratitude which many members of the Committee have addressed to you.

Under your skilful and enterprising leadership the Committee has made great efforts during the month of March to find mutually acceptable solutions to the priority issues on its agenda.

I am particularly pleased to note that much of the credit for this is due to you, the representative of the German Democratic Republic, with which Mongolia is bound by durable ties of fraternal friendship and close and extensive co-operation.

Comrade Chairman, allow me on behalf of the Mongolian delegation to express to you our most sincere thanks for the warm words of greeting and congratulation addressed to us on the occasion of the joint space flight of the Mongolian-Soviet crew of the orbital scientific research unit "Salyut-6" -- "Soyuz-T-4" -- "Soyuz-39" under the long-term "Interkosmos" research programme.

The Mongolian people, together with the peoples of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and with its friends abroad, is experiencing days of great joy and pride.

Yesterday the Soviet-Mongolian crew returned safely to their native earth. In the space of a week they had conducted an extensive programme of scientific research which is, in particular, of immense importance to Mongolia's national economy.

It is significant that this event of historic importance took place shortly before the twentieth anniversary of the legendary flight by Yury Gagarin and immediately before the 18th Congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and the glorious sixtieth anniversary of the establishment of people's power on Mongolia's ancient land. It convincingly demonstrates the remarkable attainments of the countries of the socialist community in the conquest of space in the interests of peace and progress and for the good of all the peoples of our planet.

(Mr. Erdembiler, Mongolia)

We note with profound satisfaction that the impressive results of the first Soviet-Mongolian space flight will not only add a luminous page to the chronicle of Mongolian-Soviet friendship and all-round co-operation, but will also make a worthy contribution to the cause of the peaceful use of space for the good of all mankind.

In my statement today I should like to refer to the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons, on the discussion of which the Committee embarked last week.

The Mongolian People's Republic is one of the consistent advocates of the achievement of practical measures in the sphere of the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons. It has invariably supported and still supports the complete destruction of the material base for the conduct of chemical warfare, the effective prohibition of all types of chemical weapons and the elimination of stockpiles of such weapons of mass destruction.

It may be recalled that in 1972 the Mongolian delegation was a co-author, with the delegations of Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian SSR and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of a draft convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons (CCD/361) which was submitted to the Committee. Our position is unambiguous; it is clear and it has a specific goal.

At the beginning of its 1981 session, the Committee on Disarmament, bearing in mind resolution 35/144 B adopted at the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly, decided to re-establish the Ad Hoc Working Group with a view to the continuation of the all-round examination of the substance of the problems involved and the earliest possible completion of negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Last year a certain degree of progress was achieved in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons. We recall, however, that not all questions were considered in depth owing to shortage of time. At the present stage, the Working Group, having already embarked upon the continuation of its work, has set itself the goal of striving for concrete results. Many speakers have rightly pointed out that it should engage in a more detailed examination of the issues on which there already appears to be a more or less general convergence of views. That applies, above all, to the scope of a prohibition.

In the course of discussion of that issue, the delegations of the Soviet Union, Poland and Mongolia jointly submitted to the Working Group document CD/CW/WP.11, which reflects our approach to the question of the scope of a prohibition. I should like to recall that in working document CD/123 the Mongolian delegation demonstrated the unacceptable nature of the proposal by some delegations for the inclusion in the convention of the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. In that connection, allow me to say that our point of view remains unchanged. The use of chemical weapons is prohibited under the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and, consequently, its duplication in another international instrument would lead to the injuring and revision of existing agreements and would be detrimental to authoritative treaties which represent important norms of international law.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

The proposal to extend the scope of the prohibition of chemical weapons to include planning, organization and training for the use of such weapons of mass destruction is also unacceptable to us. The Mongolian delegation has repeatedly adduced arguments in support of its position within the Working Group and, more particularly, in working paper CD/CW/WP.11. We consider that this proposal not only does not make for a "comprehensive" prohibition of chemical weapons but also renders negotiations considerably more complex and creates new, additional difficulties in the elaboration of an appropriate convention.

With regard to the question of what should be prohibited and the principal definitions that should be worked out and included in the text of the convention, the Mongolian delegation fully supports the idea that the convention should prohibit such things as chemical warfare agents, chemical munitions, precursors, chemical weapons, equipment or systems and production means or facilities. As for the formulation of specific definitions, our view is that the definitions agreed on by the Soviet Union and the United States of America for such basic terms as chemical weapons, super-toxic lethal chemical, harmful chemical, etc., would be of considerable help in this respect.

We are generally of the opinion that negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons within the framework of the Committee should follow the lines of the general provisions worked out by the Soviet Union and the United States of America and contained in their joint report dated 7 July 1980. The multilateral efforts undertaken in the Committee on Disarmament should facilitate the resumption and continuation of bilateral negotiations in that field.

Allow me now to make some observations on the question of the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

Mongolia's position on this issue is reflected in document CD/23, jointly prepared by a group of socialist countries, whose contents are well known to Committee members. I shall therefore confine myself simply to reminding the Committee of the central idea of that proposal. In our view, the most effective way of strengthening security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States would be to conclude an appropriate international document of a legally binding character.

As you know, General Assembly resolution 35/154, of which Mongolia was one of the original sponsors, calls upon States participating in talks on the question of providing guarantees to non-nuclear States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to make efforts for the speedy elaboration and conclusion of an international convention on this matter.

Without going into the details of the discussion which has taken place in the past and is continuing at the present stage of the Committee's work, we should like, apart from anything else, to note that in the Ad Hoc Working Group set up by the Committee, efforts are being made to identify the common elements contained in unilateral declarations by nuclear-weapon States with a view to finding eventually a common formula which might serve as the basis for international arrangements on so-called negative guarantees.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

In that connection we note the constructive approach of the Soviet delegation, which recently stated in this forum that it was prepared to display flexibility and to take a definite step towards bringing the various positions together, on condition that such steps are also taken by its negotiating partners and especially those from among the nuclear-weapon States.

The Mongolian delegation, like many others, considers that the Committee on Disarmament can continue studying the proposal concerning the possibility that the Security Council might, upon the recommendation of the General Assembly, consider the question of concrete steps to provide guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

I should add that this, being an interim arrangement, should not take the place of the necessary efforts to reach agreement on a common approach acceptable to all, which could be reflected in an international document of a binding character.

We think it would be useful in this connection if the Ad Hoc Working Group were to make efforts to identify common or similar elements in the approaches of States as a whole to the problem of the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

The General Assembly resolution I have mentioned also calls upon all nuclear-weapon States, as a first step towards the conclusion of such an international convention, to make solemn declarations, identical in substance, concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States having no such weapons on their territories. The resolution further recommends that the Security Council should examine declarations which may be made by nuclear States regarding the strengthening of security guarantees for non-nuclear States and, if all these declarations are found consistent with the above-mentioned objective, should adopt an appropriate resolution approving them.

I should like to remind the Committee that in the voting on this resolution as a whole in the First Committee of the General Assembly, the United States of America voted against, France and the United Kingdom and their allies abstained and China did not participate at all.

It seems to us that positive results in this important matter can be achieved only if all participants in the negotiations, and especially all nuclear-weapon States, display the necessary political will and sufficient determination.

We think that judgements as to the greater or lesser responsibility of certain nuclear Powers are inadmissible, as is a differentiated approach to them as major or secondary Powers depending on the might of their nuclear arsenals. In the matter of strengthening security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States, all nuclear-weapon States should bear equal responsibility in the provision of these guarantees to non-nuclear States.

On this point the Mongolian delegation cannot agree with the representative of one nuclear-weapon Power who, in his recent statement in the Committee, tried to maintain that the major nuclear-weapon Powers alone should bear the basic responsibility for the provision of negative guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

The Mongolian People's Republic proceeds on the principle that the elaboration and application of measures in connection with the limitation of the nuclear arms race and with nuclear disarmament are indissolubly linked with the strengthening of political and international legal guarantees of the security of States.

We continue to attach exceptionally great importance to the question of the renunciation of the use of force in international relations, which is inseparably linked with the prohibition for all time of the use of nuclear weapons. In that connection I should like to draw attention to the timeliness of the Soviet Union's proposal for the elaboration and conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations. It must be said that because of the position adopted by those who do not wish to renounce the use of force and diktat in international relations, that important initiative has not as yet met with a positive solution.

It is Mongolia's view that implementation of the proposal by States members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization for the conclusion among all States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe of a treaty under which each party would undertake not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons against the other parties, as well as their proposal for the holding of an international conference on military détente and disarmament in Europe, would greatly assist the solution of problems connected with the strengthening of security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States.

Among the constructive initiatives aimed at strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation régime and the achievement of a universally acceptable solution directly connected with providing security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States should be counted the Soviet proposal concerning the conclusion of an agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of States where there are no such weapons at present.

In addition to the above, I should like to draw attention to General Assembly resolution 33/91 F of 16 December 1978, which calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to refrain from stationing nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present, and also calls upon all non-nuclear-weapon States which do not have nuclear weapons on their territory to refrain from any steps which would directly or indirectly result in the stationing of such weapons on their territories.

Committee members will also be familiar with General Assembly resolution 35/156 C which contains a request to our Committee to proceed without delay to talks with a view to elaborating an international agreement on this subject and to submit a report on the question to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.

There can be no doubt that the conclusion of an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present would represent an important step towards the strengthening of peace and international security, and, more particularly, towards the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation régime.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

In this connection I should like to point out that the Committee has yet to examine the question of the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present. We think it would also be useful to discuss the proposal by a group of socialist countries that an ad hoc working group on this question should be set up within the Committee.

We are all aware that nuclear weapons pose an extremely grave danger for the whole of mankind. Few will dispute the truth that the achievement of genuine measures of nuclear disarmament would be the best guarantee of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

That is why the task of reaching agreement on ending the production of nuclear weapons and destroying them is at present coming to the fore.

It is a known fact that the socialist countries have always been and remain firm and consistent advocates of nuclear disarmament. They were responsible for the well-known initiatives reflected in document CD/4 concerning an immediate start to talks in preparation for genuine negotiations on nuclear disarmament. In that document it is stated that appropriate negotiations should be conducted with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States as well as of a certain number of non-nuclear-weapon States and that agreement on ending the production of nuclear weapons and destroying them can be reached only provided there is strict observance of the principle of non-impairment of the security interests of the parties.

The importance of the observance of this principle in disarmament negotiations was once again emphasized in the recent statement by the representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador V. Issraelyan. In particular, he stated with the utmost clarity the Soviet delegation's position on the subject of the currently existing parity of military forces and the military and strategic balance between two States or between the major military-political groupings. The representative of the Soviet Union stated that "Attempts to distort the content of the concept of equal security and military parity do nothing to advance the cause of disarmament. Some people would apparently like to close their eyes to one of the main political realities of the world today, namely, the presence of two opposing military-political blocs, one of which comprises three nuclear-weapon States and many large militarily-prominent States. Furthermore, yet another nuclear-weapon Power acts in parallel with this bloc on the international scene".

I should like to stress once again that the constructive participation of all nuclear-weapon States without exception in negotiations on halting the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, with strict observance of the principles underlying those negotiations, could only lead to a positive solution of that vitally important problem of modern times which is the difficult and complex problem of general and complete disarmament.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Comrade Chairman, we should like to devote our statement today to the issue of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The Soviet Union has been consistently speaking in favour of outlawing and eliminating chemical warfare means. It has endeavoured to reach this objective both before the Second World War and during the post-war period. In March 1972, the USSR together with other socialist countries submitted to the Committee a draft of an international convention to this end. In recent years the Soviet side has been conducting negotiations with the United States on this matter, and sufficiently detailed information thereon was presented to the Committee on Disarmament in 1979 and 1980. From the very outset we have been actively participating in the multilateral negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament. It appears to us that the Ad Hoc Working Group of the Committee on this question has achieved a certain amount of progress. Discussions held in the Group have revealed the closeness of views on some aspects of this complex problem, although so far there are more divergences in views than convergences. Nevertheless, it is to be hoped that eventually the realistic approach will prevail and the work done in the Group will make a useful contribution to the process of working out the convention.

In this context, the Soviet delegation would like to emphasize that it concurs with the opinion of those delegations which deem it particularly necessary to adopt the correct approach to one of the most complex issues, namely, that of ensuring the fulfilment by the States parties to the future convention of the obligations they have assumed.

The question of verification is an important issue. It is well known that in the course of the numerous negotiations on disarmament issues during the post-war period the failure to agree on this particular question was the root cause of the lack of success in the negotiations. We are more and more often facing a situation where the question of verification acts as a brake, hampering the achievement of genuine results. This applies, inter alia, to measures which could substantially limit the sphere of the arms race, and in the first place the qualitative arms race, and reverse it. As a result of the artificial magnification of the verification issues, the attainment of agreements is rendered more difficult, if not impossible. Moreover, there have even been certain attempts to take advantage of the verification issue by making use of the fact that verification is linked with a multitude of complex technical, military and other questions which are difficult for the general public to understand and can therefore be presented in a light that is advantageous to a country which does not want the agreement in question.

The Soviet delegation feels it necessary to present certain general considerations on the verification issue. First of all, we wish to recall certain basic approaches and concepts relating to these matters, some of which in the past have undermined the possibility of reaching agreements in the disarmament field.

What are these concepts? First and foremost, there is the concept which could be expressed in the following words: first verification and then disarmament, that is, essentially, the establishment of verification without disarmament. This

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

~~concept was widely and persistently~~ advocated by our partners in disarmament negotiations at the end of the 1940s and in the early 1950s. Some proposals which are being advanced even now are in a certain measure an echo of this kind of approach which has turned out to be unsound and has in the past led a number of disarmament negotiations to a deadlock.

Close to this concept is an approach which is based on the assumption that the possibilities of verification determine the scope of an agreement in the disarmament field. What is being suggested is to move from verification to disarmament, and not the other way round -- from agreement on the scope of disarmament to control. Special emphasis is laid on the extensive discussion of every possible technical detail of the verification issues even when the principal questions regarding the scope of a specific disarmament measure have not yet been defined and resolved. Thus, room is created for manoeuvring in the negotiations. One issue is made dependent on another; one technical problem gives rise to many others, and instead of the substantive resolution of major issues, the negotiations become mired down in fruitless and lengthy deliberations on various technical questions.

The "arms control" concept has gained wide dissemination in the West. This concept plays a certain part in the implementation of some measures to restrain the arms race. However, the great drawback of this concept is that control over existing armaments takes the place of verification of disarmament. It would be possible, under this concept, for things to reach the point where the development of new types of weaponry could be interpreted as a positive factor. It must be observed, furthermore, that, under the pretext of arms control, attempts have repeatedly been made to damage the defence interests of the other side.

We wish particularly to speak of what might be called the "concept of distrust" which we quite frequently encounter in the Committee on Disarmament also. Under this concept, every party to a convention is regarded as a potential violator of its provisions, as one who will do everything possible to ensure that his neighbours ban and destroy their weapons while he himself keeps his so that he can use them either for deterrence or for a direct attack. On the basis of this approach, the significance of intrusive international verification is being exaggerated in every possible way and comprehensive, systematic and total international on-site inspections are being proposed, while at the same time the effectiveness of the contemporary national means of verification is being underestimated and neglected.

Let us examine what this concept of distrust can lead to, using as an example the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

As everyone knows, modern industrial chemical production is characterized by its tremendous scale. Already now in some countries the number of enterprises amounts to many thousands. Moreover, we are witnessing an extremely complex interlinkage of chemical production with other branches of industry, in particular mechanical engineering. In these conditions, if we proceed on the basis of the concept of distrust, no matter how much we expand and complicate the verification system, no matter how comprehensive we strive to render it, we shall never reach the point at which we can be sure that no uncertainties have been left concerning some important aspect or other of the activities of States related to the observance of all the provisions of a convention banning chemical weapons.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

To take another example, in the debates on questions of the prohibition of chemical weapons, mention has frequently been made of such chemicals as phosgene and hydrogen cyanide, which were used to fill munitions during the First World War. Incidentally, these chemicals are also mentioned in the working paper by the Chinese delegation which was distributed today. At the same time, their production for peaceful purposes at present is measured in hundreds of thousands of tons. It appears neither possible nor advisable to restrict the use of phosgene and hydrogen cyanide for peaceful purposes. Well, do we have now to place under control the entire production of these substances? Or do we have to fill enterprises with hundreds and thousands of foreign inspectors? And once again the same question arises: guided by the concept of distrust, can we be sure that a suspect State is not using these chemicals for prohibited purposes?

One more example. Many delegations have rightly pointed to the need to destroy chemical munitions and to end their development and production. Certainly, appropriate provisions should be included in the future convention, but it is also clear that there are probably nowhere in the world metalworking industries whose sole object is to produce unfilled munitions exclusively and only for chemical weapons. What follows from this? Would we really have to place under control all metalworking enterprises?

Further, the need to verify the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles is obvious. But what kind of verification, and in what forms? Let us suppose, for example, that through the conduct of systematic international on-site inspections with the help of a whole army of inspectors we manage to confirm accurately enough that States have indeed destroyed the declared stocks of chemical weapons. But since those inspections would be based on the concept of distrust, on a presumption of the inclination of States to cheat, then we would have to be consistent and assume that States would try not to declare all the chemical weapons at their disposal. In that case, we may ask, what would be gained by such verification of the destruction of the declared stocks?

There is also the question as to how it would be possible to check whether or not this or that State was developing new types of chemical weapons, such as binary or multicomponent weapons. In her book entitled The Game of Disarmament, Alva Myrdal writes that it is virtually impossible to control binary weapons because their components are not weapons as such until they are combined. Of course, binary weapons will be subject to prohibition, but how will it be in this case? Do we have to ensure that all chemical production is the subject of on-site verification involving a countless number of inspectors? Obviously not.

Or again, for example, what about a situation where a State which is a potential violator of the convention is preparing for a chemical war by using the production capacities of its allies, which are not parties to the convention, or is using their territories for activities prohibited under the convention?

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Many other examples could be given to demonstrate the unsoundness of the "concept of distrust" and of the proposals it gives rise to regarding intrusive verification.

What, then, is the position of the Soviet Union on the question of verification? We wish to stress that we are in favour of strict and effective international control. The many proposals put forward by the Soviet Union with regard to the limitation of the arms race and disarmament have always provided for some form of verification of the implementation of the measure we have proposed. We are parties to agreements which provide for both national and international measures of verification and some of them envisage a combination of these.

I should like to point out that we have no reason for trusting others any more than others trust us. The Soviet Union believes that the main function of a system for ensuring compliance with disarmament agreements -- of which verification is an integral part -- is to give the parties to these agreements assurance of their observance by other parties, and through the employment of certain forms of co-operation to facilitate the resolution of questions in dispute thus ensuring the implementation by the States parties in good faith of the obligations they have assumed and building confidence between them. At the same time, the elaboration of specific forms of verification and other elements of the system for ensuring compliance with the relevant agreements, so that they fulfil their ultimate purpose, should be based on a number of important political principles.

Certain basic principles underlying our approach to questions of verification may be summarized as follows: (1) the conduct of verification should in no way prejudice the sovereign rights of States or permit interference in their internal affairs; (2) verification cannot exist without disarmament but must stem from a precise and clear agreement on measures for the limitation of armaments and for disarmament; (3) the scope and forms of verification should be commensurate with the character and scope of the specific obligations established in the relevant agreement relating to the limitation of armaments and disarmament; (4) the detailed elaboration of the verification provisions is possible only after an agreement on the scope of the prohibition has been mapped out; (5) we proceed from the assumption that a State becomes a party to a convention not in order to violate it but in order to abide strictly by the obligations it has assumed under it, and therefore that verification should not be built upon the principle of total distrust by States of one another, and should not take the form of global suspiciousness, but should simply be a link -- perhaps a very important one but still only a link -- in the chain of other measures ensuring confidence in the observance of the convention by all its parties; (6) international forms of verification should be limited; and lastly, (7) we also take into account the very

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

important circumstance that in the conditions of the present-day development of science and technology, any fairly less serious violation of an agreement in the field of disarmament, including the sphere of chemical weapons, has no chance of remaining undetected for very long.

Past experience shows that the settlement of verification issues has always depended on whether or not the various parties have the political will to conclude the relevant agreement. In spite of the difficulties involved in the solution of the complex technical problems of verification, it has proved possible for treaties to be concluded between the USSR and the United States of America on, for example, the limitation of strategic armaments and on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, which contain appropriate provisions relating to verification.

We resolutely oppose the elaboration of verification measures in isolation from the specific contents of this or that measure pertaining to the limitation of armaments or disarmament, its nature and significance in a broader context of disarmament, in isolation from the possible existence of other international norms or agreements ensuring the observance of the measure in question, and without seeing in due proportion the danger of non-compliance with this measure as compared with the negative consequences of superfluous interference in the peaceful activities of States and of the disclosure of commercial and technical secrets in certain spheres of industry. In other words, we are against giving absolute pre-eminence to verification and carrying it to absurd lengths; we are in favour of reasonable, balanced verification on the scale that is truly necessary -- no more, no less.

This is not merely our own point of view. As a result of the discussions held last year in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, agreement has been reached on a balanced approach to questions of verifying compliance with obligations under a convention on the prohibition of such weapons. The statements at the plenary meetings of the Committee on Disarmament and the papers presented by a number of States also contain quite a number of interesting thoughts on this subject. They were expressed, in particular, by the delegations of Brazil, Netherlands, France, Canada, Belgium and a number of others.

We believe that we should listen to the voice of all those who are in favour of well-founded moderation in the approach to the scope, forms, nature and methods of verification, and of ensuring that verification is a means of guaranteeing compliance with the convention and not an end in itself.

The Soviet Union delegation, for its part, intends to be guided by this precise approach, remembering that it alone leads to a success.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, the Pakistan delegation would like to offer a few comments regarding the item on chemical weapons which the Committee is currently examining in plenary.

My delegation appreciates the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons and admires the energetic efforts made by Ambassador Lidgard to structure its deliberations with a view to resolving the numerous issues that are involved in the elaboration of an international convention. The discussions in the Ad Hoc Working Group, including in particular the contributions made by experts from various countries, have been illuminating. However, it remains the position of my delegation that the first order of business is to reach political decisions on the major issues involved in the elaboration of a chemical weapon convention. But these political decisions can be reached only once the Ad Hoc Working Group is entrusted with the task of actually negotiating an international convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons. We are, therefore, happy to note the statement of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group that he perceives a sufficient degree of convergence in views to enable the group to commence the task of negotiating a CW convention in the very near future. We hope that the appropriate mandate will be given to the Working Group before the end of our spring session.

I wish to elaborate Pakistan's views on some of the major issues on which political decisions will be necessary in the course of elaborating a CW convention.

A most important issue on which there is as yet considerable divergence of views concerns the scope of the proposed convention. Pakistan favours a comprehensive, effective and equitable treaty which would prohibit the development, stockpiling, acquisition and use of CW and entail the total destruction of existing stockpiles, facilities and delivery systems of chemical weapons.

Certain delegations have reservations regarding the inclusion of the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in this convention. My delegation does not consider that this would in any way erode the effectiveness of the 1925 Geneva Protocol to which the CW convention should constitute an essential supplement. Such a reaffirmation of the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons is necessary if the convention is to be truly comprehensive in nature. However, my delegation remains flexible about the precise manner in which the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons can be reflected in the convention. This could be included in the definition of its scope, separately, in a Protocol or in an annex, or in some way linked with the provisions relating to verification of the obligations entailed in the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

In seeking the most comprehensive scope for a CW convention we reacted positively towards the proposal submitted by Sweden also to ban "chemical warfare capabilities". But we are prepared to be convinced that a ban on such activities cannot be realistically verified. At the same time, my delegation would reject any partial approach to the prohibition of chemical weapons, since this would leave open the danger of the use of CW and discriminate against the developing countries which do not at present possess the capability to produce such weapons.

Therefore, in the definition of chemical warfare, we would accept the inclusion of all kinds of chemical weapons whose toxic properties can be used to cause death, injury or harm to human beings, animals and plant life as a means of securing military or political objectives. The ban should encompass not only lethal chemical agents but also incapacitants. The latter can also prove to be lethal if used in concentrated forms or against unprotected populations. Reports about the use of chemical agents in certain current conflicts bear out this contention.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

While the convention would have to allow certain "permitted uses", these should be defined as clearly as possible and, if necessary, a list of permitted uses should be included in an annex to the convention. Obviously, the maintenance of law and order would be one of the permitted uses; but this should not be interpreted so broadly as to include even armed conflicts as defined in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Protocols to those Conventions adopted recently.

The central provision of the chemical weapons convention will be the one requiring the declaration and early destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles, facilities and means of delivery. We share the view expressed by the representative of Brazil that the CW convention should constitute an exchange of obligations between States which agree not to acquire such weapons and those States which possess such chemical weapons and are in turn expected to destroy them completely. In agreeing to the destruction of chemical stockpiles, facilities and delivery systems, those States which currently possess chemical weapons would do well to bear in mind that such weapons, in contrast with other weapons of mass destruction, are relatively cheap and easy to manufacture and could be acquired by more than a score of States should the prohibition and destruction of such weapons be inordinately delayed.

Ideally, the declarations to be made by States possessing chemical weapons should be made even before the signature of the convention as a confidence building measure in order to induce and encourage other States to adhere to the convention. In any case, there would be no justification for delaying such declarations beyond the signature by the States concerned of the convention. Secondly, these declarations should be detailed and comprehensive, covering the size, nature and location of stockpiles, production facilities, munition-filling facilities and delivery systems, together with an indication of the timing and methods for their destruction or mothballing. The time between the declaration and the destruction of stocks and facilities should not be too long and should commence as soon as possible after the treaty comes into force.

The Pakistan delegation is as yet to be convinced by the assertion in the joint report of the United States of America and the USSR that the destruction of stocks and facilities would take up to 10 years, especially in the light of the statement made by a distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany last week that installations have been developed to destroy toxic agents "at a reasonable cost and without danger to the environment". If the destruction of stocks and facilities is to involve a long period, we would propose that in the interim between their declaration and destruction, they should be placed under some sort of direct or indirect international control. We realize that certain technical and conceptual problems relating to the destruction of stocks and facilities have to be resolved and that agreement is still pending on such questions as the definition of production facilities, the problem of precursors and so forth, but we do not believe that these technical problems are insurmountable.

The procedures for verification included in the convention would constitute its backbone, and will be essential to give assurance that the obligations regarding the destruction of stockpiles and facilities and for the non-acquisition of chemical weapons are being complied with by all parties. There is agreement that verification would involve a combination of national and international means and that international verification would, in certain circumstances, entail intrusive procedures to ensure compliance. It is necessary to build on this broad agreement of principle. As regards national verification procedures, it is obvious that they will differ from State to State in accordance with the level of development and nature of its chemical industry. On the other hand, the nature and intrusiveness of international

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

verification procedures would have to be determined in relation to the kind of activity that is to be verified. For instance, it is clear that some form of on-site inspection would be required to oversee the destruction of stockpiles and facilities. We believe that it would be beneficial to conduct an in-depth examination of the contention reiterated by the Federal Republic of Germany that it is possible to conduct on-site verification without compromising the commercial secrets of the chemical industry.

As regards international procedures for verification, we favour the establishment of an independent international organization which would have the technical and financial resources to undertake the collection and dissemination of information and to conduct on-site and off-site inspection as well as to investigate suspected violations of the convention. One essential feature of the verification system should be to provide equal access for all parties to information regarding compliance, and equal opportunity to raise complaints regarding suspected violations of the convention. Therefore, my delegation could not agree to place ultimate reliance on the Security Council for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the convention, in view of the inherent inequality entailed in the procedures of the Council between the five permanent members and other States.

The convention should include provisions relating to protective measures. Such measures would have to distinguish carefully between offensive and defensive capabilities. An important aspect of such protective measures is to redress the disadvantage of the developing countries with respect to a CW capability. The developing countries have virtually no protection against even a low-level chemical attack. The convention should create categorical obligations for assistance to developing countries in training and equipping them with protective measures. It should commit specific resources for this purpose. The universal availability of at least some basic measures of protection would provide an added assurance that the use of chemical weapons will not be contemplated since a potential aggressor would have to use more sophisticated chemical weapons and consequently increase the risk of detection and retaliation.

But protection should not be restricted only to the technical measures. My delegation believes that until the chemical weapons stocks and facilities in the possession of some States have been completely destroyed, the convention should contain a reaffirmation of the obligation of States under Article 51 of the Charter, whereby a State which is the victim of a chemical attack, or threat of attack, should be assisted by other States, jointly or individually, in exercising its right of self-defence.

Finally, my delegation shares the views expressed by many non-aligned and neutral countries that the chemical weapons convention should include specific provisions regarding the promotion of international co-operation in the field of chemical technology. It should also include a provision for the transfer of resources released as a result of chemical disarmament for the economic and social development of the developing countries.

In conclusion, let me once again express the hope that after the conclusion of the current phase of its work, the Ad Hoc Working Group will be given a mandate to commence concrete negotiations for the elaboration of an international convention to ban chemical weapons.

Mr. LUKES (Czechoslovakia): Comrade Chairman, our plenary meeting today is the last one of our Committee in the month of March. It is also the last one under your effective guidance. Let me therefore express the highest appreciation of my delegation for your wisdom and skill in acting as Chairman during this important period. It is of great significance that our Committee has succeeded in moving forward on the important agenda items on CTB and nuclear disarmament. We are sure that a fair basis for the creation of working groups on these two items has been formed. This gives me one more reason to congratulate you, the representative of a neighbouring socialist country, the German Democratic Republic, once again.

My delegation is firmly convinced that your endeavour will be of great assistance to your successor, Ambassador Pfeiffer, the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany. We are looking forward to co-operating with him in the month of April.

In my intervention today, which is going to be a brief one, I would like to comment on agenda items 4 and 5, dealing with chemical weapons and new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons and radiological weapons.

My delegation attaches an extreme importance to the negotiations of the CD devoted to the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, and otherwise acquiring or retaining of chemical warfare agents and chemical munitions.

The rapid development of the natural sciences as well as a deeper understanding of biochemical processes in living organisms and the development of the chemical industry provide new possibilities for increasing the destructiveness of these means of mass destruction. This makes them more accessible and more effective and creates possibilities for producing and accumulating enormous quantities of these chemical warfare agents.

Therefore there is an increasing need to conclude the convention under negotiation.

In this connection we appreciate the report on the USSR-United States bilateral negotiations in document CD/112. This report is evidently based on detailed technical analysis and should be evaluated as a distinct progress in the preparation of the convention.

It has become also a most useful background for discussion in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. We are hopeful that a new round of bilateral negotiations will start in the nearest future in order to help the Committee to proceed to the final discussion with a view to the early conclusion of the convention.

We must be aware that while the discussion in the CD is going on, new chemical weapons and new improved chemical warfare agents are being developed, according to press reports. Discussion on starting the production of chemical warfare agents seems to be proceeding in countries which have stopped their production. Higher amounts of military budgets are being devoted to research into how to increase the destructiveness of chemical weapons and chemical warfare agents. We have to make a historic choice. Either we succeed in banning all the chemical weapons or the accumulation of more destructive chemical warfare agents, which even now are a serious menace to mankind, will continue in a new spiral of the arms race.

(Mr. Lukes, Czechoslovakia)

Our country attaches a great importance to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which provides for the prohibition of the use of chemical warfare agents. The validity of this significant agreement, which was signed by more than 100 countries, should be emphasized in the future treaty.

Our delegation welcomed the establishment of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons and appreciates the efforts of Ambassador Lidgard in the post of its Chairman.

According to ongoing discussions in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, there exists a consensus of many delegations on some problems, particularly on the relevance of the use of the general purpose criterion and the additional criteria of toxicity and the basic classification of chemicals, which would enable us to adopt different degrees of verification of compliance with the future treaty. In this connection we would like to stress the role of States parties to the future treaty which will evidently have the obligation to take internal legislative measures ensuring the observance of the treaty.

By application of the general purpose criterion the State party to the treaty should elaborate a method of control of toxic chemicals produced, with special emphasis on control of the amount and the final use. All States parties to the treaty should guarantee the evaluation of all toxic chemicals which are to be brought into production.

The evaluation of chemicals as well as the control of production can be realized with the help of national control organs. The national control could, if necessary, be supplemented by certain international procedures in the case of allegations.

The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, like other socialist countries, has already for a long time been stressing the need to agree as soon as possible on effective measures aimed at preventing further misuse of new scientific and technological achievements for military purposes in general and for the development and production of still more destructive and sophisticated types of weapons of mass destruction in particular. It cannot be denied that science and technology have now reached such a level that the danger of the creation of more and more sophisticated and dangerous weapons than those already existing is really very grave and acute. We therefore cannot accept arguments asking for further postponement of the solution of this essential and vital problem.

This attitude leads us to voice once again our full support for last year's proposal by the Soviet Union for the establishment of a special group of qualified governmental experts which should meet on a regular basis and consider either the preparation of the general prohibition treaty or specific agreements on banning individual types of new weapons of mass destruction. My delegation, as was already stressed in our statement of 10 April 1980, is ready to participate in such a group as soon as necessary. The sooner this necessity arrives the better.

At present, when the world community is fearfully following NATO's plans as regards neutron weapons, the proposal for a convention prohibiting the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of neutron weapons is more and more urgent. The CD has been waiting for the initiation of negotiations on this vital problem for three successive years.

(Mr. Lukes, Czechoslovakia)

May I now turn to the next main item on the agenda, the prohibition of radiological weapons. The item has been dealt with in the Working Group under the skilled chairmanship of Ambassador Kómives. We appreciate the positive approach of the majority of delegations, enabling the Working Group to carry out substantive deliberations on the definition of radiological weapons, the scope of the prohibition and some other main elements of the future convention. However, in spite of a considerable effort, only a modest progress has been achieved in drafting a commonly acceptable text for the main paragraphs.

In the view of the Czechoslovak delegation, one of the main obstacles is the controversy regarding the understanding of the scope of the convention, as well as its role within the general context of disarmament negotiations.

In spite of the fact that we are dealing with a potential weapons system we are convinced that the existing information does allow the establishment of a reasonably sound framework for the convention.

At the same time it should be clear that the convention cannot become a substitute for urgently needed efforts in various other fields. It certainly cannot solve the much more complex problem of the prohibition of nuclear weapons. Within this context it has, however, an important supporting role, eliminating all other uses of radioactive material for military purposes.

Nor can a convention prohibiting radiological weapons solve the extremely complicated complex of questions regarding the peaceful deployment of nuclear energy, including also such problems as the risk of nuclear reactor accidents in wartime.

The importance of the last problem has been well recognized, and it has been reflected in important documents of international law, specifically in the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. This fact has already been stressed by a number of delegations, and we share the view that the Additional Protocols are the most adequate instrument of international law in this case.

Trying to examine the problem with regard to the disarmament negotiations and the RW Convention we find the situation rather confusing.

According to the qualified opinion of experts, the operations of nuclear reactors have several important characteristics. Reactor operations must to a large extent go on indefinitely, whether the plant produces power or not. The cooling system cannot be switched off. If the cooling and the emergency cooling systems stopped, disaster would follow, resulting in widespread contamination of the environment with radionuclides. This would probably be the most likely mechanism of serious accidents.

Under normal conditions the nuclear installation can be kept under reliable control. This requires, however, sophisticated systems of technical measures and devices, as well as perfectly organized work by highly qualified personnel.

There seems little doubt that under the conditions of a modern total war the vulnerability of the nuclear reactors, that is, the probability of such accidents, would be enormous. No direct attack would be needed. The over-all destruction

(Mr. Lukes, Czechoslovakia)

of water-supply, communications and other systems, so common during a war, could make the normal maintenance of the reactor, including the measures needed for safety, impossible. It seems evident that a number of largely unpredictable factors might play the fatal role. We consider it really impossible to include all such complex and variable elements in one specific convention prohibiting radiological weapons.

The problem of nuclear reactors makes it once more clear that in a highly developed society war can no more be a means of solving the problems of international life. The risk of annihilation of the whole of civilization has become too high. The disarmament negotiations are aimed at the abolition of such a risk. It seems clear enough, however, that a step-by-step solution of different concrete questions is the only way to reach the general goal.

In the view of the Czechoslovak delegation, the conclusion of an IAW convention will be a valuable contribution to this process. We are ready to work with all other delegations to solve the problems still existing as efficiently as possible. We should like to express our sincere belief that the Committee will be in a position to submit a draft treaty to the General Assembly in the near future.

The convention must have a clearly formulated scope, corresponding to the general principles of disarmament negotiations and to the mandate of this Committee. That is, it should be aimed at prohibiting well-defined radiological weapons, their development, production, stockpiling and use.

As already mentioned in one of the Czechoslovak delegation's statements in the Working Group, the term radiological weapons has a specific historical background and a distinct, broadly accepted meaning.

In a contemporary war, weapons are used for different purposes, and not only for their immediate effect against man on the battlefield. They are also employed to make the enemy unable to use the human and material resources of the country. The rear, large population centres, transportation systems, industrial bases, etc., are equally or even more important targets. If these aspects and the dimensions of the total war are taken into consideration, the possible military deployment of radiological weapons might be assessed more realistically.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Lukes, the representative of Czechoslovakia, for his statement, as well as for the very kind words he addressed to me.

Mr. DESIMOIE (United States of America): I wanted to take the floor to respond, on behalf of the delegation of the United States of America, to the remarks that you made at the beginning of this meeting. I should like to convey to you, Mr. Chairman, and through you to all my distinguished colleagues here present, our appreciation and gratitude for the numerous expressions of concern, good wishes and encouragement concerning the incident to which you referred in your remarks.

As all the distinguished representatives here are, no doubt, aware, President Reagan sustained a gunshot wound yesterday in Washington, as a result of a senseless act of violence against a small group in a public place. I am pleased to convey to you, to be able to say, that we have received a most optimistic report, that the President is in a good, stable condition, and that the medical prognosis is for a complete and speedy recovery.

(Mr. DeSimone, United States)

Mr. Chairman, I should also like to take this opportunity to assure you and, through you, my distinguished colleagues here that, of course, the continuity of the Government of the United States of America is ensured, and that that Government is functioning fully and effectively in spite of this unfortunate circumstance.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, thank you again. We shall convey your message to Washington and in closing, in passing, I should like to say that the absence of Ambassador Flowerree this morning of course has nothing to do with the subject of your remarks and mine: he is temporarily indisposed owing to the effect of what is apparently a virus of local origin and he hopes to be back in his place here very soon.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. Our greetings to Ambassador Flowerree, we wish him a good recovery.

Distinguished delegates, since this is the last plenary meeting in the month of March, I wish to express my gratitude to all of you for your co-operation with the chair during a period of very intensive work in the Committee on Disarmament. Thanks to the spirit of co-operation and flexibility which prevailed in this Committee during this month, very useful exchanges of views and negotiations took place on quite a number of substantive questions.

Thus, the CD was able to move one step forward -- although a very limited one -- in discharging its responsibilities concerning its priority items, namely, a nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The four ad hoc working groups, re-established or resumed under the able guidance of my predecessor, have intensified their negotiations.

It is a matter of satisfaction to me, and I trust to all delegations sitting around this table, that after a series of informal meetings and consultations by the chair, agreement was achieved on starting our substantive work concerning items 1 and 2 of the Committee's agenda. During two informal meetings the Committee held an exchange of views on prerequisites for international negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and the doctrine of deterrence.

In these informal meetings as well as at plenary meetings devoted to nuclear disarmament, many delegations have expressed interesting thoughts and tabled important proposals. In this regard let me just mention the initiatives of the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which have been submitted to the CD by the Soviet delegation. These proposals refer to the main items inscribed in our agenda. There can be no doubt that they will be thoroughly studied and taken into consideration in our future work.

Distinguished delegates, I think our exchange of views on items 1 and 2 has demonstrated that even in a tense international situation it was possible to start and to proceed with a business-like discussion of very complicated questions in the field of disarmament.

Most delegations held the view that this exercise should lead the Committee to a very practical aim -- the preparation of concrete negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

(The Chairman)

Today it is certainly too early to draw any definite conclusion from the discussions mentioned. This will have to be done later in the framework of preparations for the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Allow me, therefore, at this stage to make only some very preliminary remarks.

In the meetings on agenda items 1 and 2, virtually all delegations emphasized the urgency of effective steps to remove the threat of a nuclear war and to achieve nuclear disarmament. Many delegations rejected the doctrine of deterrence as well as other theories justifying any use of nuclear weapons.

The importance of the early starting of concrete negotiations on nuclear disarmament was widely recognized. It was stressed that this question is closely connected with the international environment. In this regard many delegations emphasized the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, stipulating that the increase in weapons, especially nuclear weapons, weakens international security, and that lasting peace can only be created through the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces. Quite a few delegations deemed the time ripe for negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

There was a widely shared view that the CD should play an active part in clarifying issues for and starting those negotiations. But it is a matter of deep regret that no consensus could be reached on the establishment of ad hoc working groups on items 1 and 2. The CD will have to deal with the corresponding proposals later on.

The failure to react quickly in a positive manner on this question should not prevent us from addressing in a more detailed manner and in the immediate future such issues as the identification of prerequisites for negotiations and the definition of their main elements.

To my mind, the first exchange of views held so far revealed the following main problems in this respect:

Which States should take part in the negotiations, and to what extent?

How should the principle of undiminished security find its application?

What relationship should exist between measures of nuclear disarmament and steps of conventional disarmament and strengthening international security?

My distinguished successors and our whole Committee will have to respond to these questions in the further course of our session. Here, as in other cases, we should bear in mind the relevant principles of the Final Document. As to participation, it states in paragraph 28: "While disarmament is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear-weapon States have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and, together with other militarily significant States, for halting and reversing the arms race. It is therefore important to secure their active participation".

I think these questions are also of relevance to the issue of a nuclear test ban which the CD will address in the forthcoming two informal meetings. Consultations by the chair will be very useful in defining the concrete items for these meetings.

(The Chairman)

They have proved their value in the month of March. May I assure my successor, Ambassador Pfeiffer of the Federal Republic of Germany, of my full co-operation in this as in other matters.

At the outset of my statement I emphasized the great importance of the negotiations taking place in our four ad hoc working groups. The Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons has entered a new stage of work in negotiating draft texts submitted by its Chairman. We all hope that this exercise will lead to a quick elaboration of a corresponding draft treaty. The Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament is in the midst of a preliminary consideration of the concrete phases and measures of the programme which will be of great importance for the forthcoming special session devoted to disarmament. Certain progress was made by the ad hoc working groups on chemical weapons and negative security guarantees in identifying the main elements of corresponding international agreements or other measures.

In this connection the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons was ably supported by well-known experts, present in these days in our midst.

Distinguished delegates, may I avail myself of this opportunity to appeal to all of you to advance by all means the negotiations in the ad hoc working groups in order to achieve tangible results before the General Assembly's second special session devoted to disarmament. I would also like to take this occasion to thank the Chairmen of the working groups for their close and fruitful co-operation with me.

In recognizing the progress in our work I cannot but express my concern that the CD has not been able to respond in an adequate manner to proposals for the establishment of an ad hoc working group on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present and an ad hoc group of experts on new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. These as well as other complicated issues can be solved if there is the corresponding political will on all sides.

In conclusion, allow me once again to express my thanks to all delegations for their understanding of my difficult tasks. I also wish to thank Ambassador Jaipal, representative of the United Nations Secretary-General and Secretary of the CD, Mr. Berasategui, his deputy, and all the staff of the Secretariat, including the interpreters and translators. Through their persistent work they have greatly assisted me in the performance of my duties.

I wish my successor, Ambassador Pfeiffer, good luck in discharging his responsible post during the month of April.

I have been requested by the incoming Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Pfeiffer, of the Federal Republic of Germany, to announce that he will hold informal consultations in Conference Room I tomorrow, Wednesday, at 3 p.m., with a view to reaching agreement on the specific subjects to be examined under item 1 at the informal meetings on 6 and 13 April, and also to exchange views on some organizational matters.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 2 April, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTIETH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 2 April 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. G. Pfeiffer (Federal Republic of Germany)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. SALAH-BEY
Mr. M. MEDKOUR
Mr. A. ABBA
Mr. M. MATI

Argentina: Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD

Australia: Mr. R.A. WALKER
Mr. R. STEELE

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. R. DEYANOV
Mrs. V. SOTIZOV

Burma: U THAN HTUN

Canada: Mr. G. SKINNER

China: Mr. YU Peiwen
Mr. LIN Chen
Mr. PAN Jusheng

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLA VILA
Mr. C. PAZOS

Czechoslovakia: Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. J. JIRUSEK
Mr. L. STAVINOHÁ
Mr. J. MORAVIC

Egypt: Mr. E.S.A.R. EL REEDY
Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. E. EZZ

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. GESBERT
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Mr. P. BUNTIG

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. H. MULLER
Mr. W. ROHR
Mr. J. PFISCHKE

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. C. GYORFFY
Mr. A. LAKATOS

India:

Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. S. DARUSMAN
Mr. F. QASIM
Mr. J. HADI
Mr. KARYONO

Iran:

Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA

Italy:

Mr. V.C. DI MONTEZEMOLO
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. R. ISHII
Mr. K. SHIMADA
Mr. K. ODA

Kenya: Mr. S. SHITEMI
Mr. G. MUNIU

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALES Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco: Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS
Mr. A.G.B. OOMS
Ms. A. AMERANGEN

Nigeria: Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA

Pakistan: Mr. M. AKRAM

Peru: Mr. P. PARESES PORTELLA

Poland: Mr. J. WIEJACZ
Mr. WYZNER
Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. A. SASUV

Sri Lanka: Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. S. ERICSON
Mr. G. EKHOLM
Mr. J. LUNDIN
Mr. H. BERGLUND

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. L.A. NAUMOV
Mr. V.A. PERFILIEV
Mr. L.S. MOSHKOV
Mr. V.V. LOSHCHININE
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO
Mr. S.N. RIUKHINE

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES
Mrs. J.I. LINK
Mr. T.D. INCH

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. FLOWERREE
Mr. F.P. DESIMONE
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. J.A. MISKEL
Mr. C. PEARCY

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT
Mr. H. ARTEAGA
Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC
Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. L.B. NDAGA

Secretary of the Committee and
Personal Representative of
the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 120th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

As this is the first time I am taking the floor in my capacity as Chairman for the month of April, I should like to use the occasion to thank my two predecessors in the chair this year, Ambassador Dr. Gerhard Herder of the German Democratic Republic and Ambassador François de la Gorce of France, for their outstanding work. Thanks to their untiring efforts the Committee was able to solve its procedural questions in a remarkably short time and start its substantive work immediately.

The Committee has been working hard since the opening of its session on 3 February 1981. The work was resumed in all the four working groups which the Committee had set up in 1980. Under their devoted and able Chairmen, the working groups on chemical weapons, radiological weapons, negative security assurances and the comprehensive programme of disarmament have already covered much ground. In some cases the process of formulating concrete texts has in fact started.

At the same time, the substantial debate on various items of the agenda has continued in plenary meetings. In informal meetings of the Committee additional requests were taken up and compromise solutions were found. They provided for a possibility to continue exchanges of views on items 1 and 2 of the agenda.

This means in practice that delegations have to deal with nearly all the items on our agenda at the same time. A glance at the weekly time-table for meetings to be held shows the immense workload the Committee and each individual delegation are carrying. It will be my endeavour to maintain this active working spirit and to see to it that equitable and practical solutions are found.

According to paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the General Assembly's first special session devoted to disarmament, our Committee is the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body. It is therefore expected to negotiate, i.e., to agree on and to formulate treaty texts and other documents as, for example, the comprehensive programme of disarmament. I am confident that as a result of our continued and, I hope, still intensifying co-operation we shall be able to submit concrete texts and proposals for further action to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session and at its second special session devoted entirely to questions of disarmament and arms control.

It is obvious that the work of the Committee on Disarmament will make an impact on the debates to be held during these sessions. The international community expects the Committee to make a substantive contribution to the arms control and disarmament dialogue. Not much time is left; that is why we have to use it to the best of our abilities. I entreat every delegation to co-operate with others in a spirit of compromise so as to enable the Committee to reach concrete results. I for my part pledge myself to do everything to further such co-operation which will hopefully lead to the speedy attainment of the solutions which the international community expects from us.

I would like now to extend a warm welcome in the Committee to His Excellency Mr. Józef Wiejacz, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Polish People's Republic.

Mr. Józef Wiejacz was appointed Vice-Minister in December 1980. Since 1977 he held the position of Director of the Department of Political Studies and Programming at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Wiejacz is a career diplomat.

(The Chairman)

with a wide experience in the foreign service. He served in Turkey, Iran, Norway and, as a minister plenipotentiary, in the United States of America. He also participated in the preparations for the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and at the CSCE meeting in Belgrade.

Mr. Wiejacz was also a member of his country's delegation to many sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations. He is the author of many articles on different aspects of international relations and a member of the Scientific Council of the Polish Institute of International Affairs.

He is listed to speak today and it will be my pleasure to give him the floor as second speaker.

The Secretariat is circulating today, at my request, the informal paper containing the time-table for meetings to be held by the Committee and its subsidiary bodies during the week 6 to 10 April. The informal paper follows the programme of activities of previous weeks, with the exception of an additional meeting for the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons which will be held next Monday at 10.30 a.m. You will recall that, at our 118th plenary meeting, the Committee decided to allocate that meeting to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, bearing in mind that on 17 and 20 April the Palais des Nations will be closed.

If there are no objections, I will consider that the Committee agrees with the time-table.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: In this connection, may I note that no meetings of the Committee or its working groups will be held between the afternoon of 16 April and the plenary meeting scheduled for 21 April. In view of the reallocation of meetings for the ad hoc working groups on radiological weapons and the comprehensive programme of disarmament decided at our 118th plenary meeting, no meetings of working groups will be lost. ~~Since~~ no plenary meetings are regularly scheduled for Fridays and ~~Mondays~~, there is no need to cancel any plenary meeting.

I would like now to make the following statement:

In continuation of its informal meetings devoted to the substantial examination of concrete issues relating to items 1 and 2 of its agenda, the Committee on Disarmament will, on Monday, 6 April 1981, hold an informal meeting devoted to item 1 (nuclear test ban), taking into account paragraph 51 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in particular the Assembly's recommendation that the trilateral negotiations should be concluded urgently and the result submitted for full consideration by the multilateral negotiating body with a view to the submission of a draft treaty to the General Assembly at the earliest possible date.

Mr. WALKER (Australia): It is the courteous tradition of the Committee on Disarmament for each delegate when he first takes the floor in each month to welcome to the chair the delegate who has been brought there by the march of the alphabet and our monthly rotation of the chairmanship of our Committee. This is the first plenary meeting over which you are presiding as our Chairman for April and I am the first speaker. Therefore the Committee knows that I am under an obligation to congratulate

(Mr. Walker, Australia)

you on your assumption of the chair. You may be assured, Mr. Chairman, that I do so with the greatest of sincerity because of the high regard which my delegation has developed over the years for your personal qualities and the distinctive contribution which you personally have brought to the work of the Committee with your unfailing energy and enthusiasm. We are also very conscious of the constructive approach to disarmament taken by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. It is also my pleasant duty to compliment the outgoing Chairman, the distinguished Ambassador for the German Democratic Republic, on his conduct of our work during March. Here also I discharge my duty with great sincerity.

We are now in the final month of the spring session and it is clear that the momentum in the Committee has picked up. During the middle of March, in what may come to be seen as something of a turning point, there was a clear shift towards substance and away from procedure. All four working groups appear now to have resolved problems related to their methods of operation and are focusing on specific work, in some cases including drafting. Even items 1 and 2 of the agenda have found a temporary vehicle to move consideration of the issues further. All of this is of satisfaction to my delegation.

Today I want to speak on agenda item 4, chemical weapons, and here we have a clear example of where the Committee has got down to work. The Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has always had in clear view the objective of an eventual convention banning this major category of weapons and it has had, in Ambassador Okawa last year and Ambassador Lidgard this year, extremely effective Chairmen. Furthermore, the Committee in its work on CW has on two occasions made special arrangements to enable the expertise available to many delegations to bridge the otherwise insurmountable gap between the will to negotiate and the highly complex issues to be included in a convention. It is not enough to have the will to negotiate towards a convention: the issues are complex and we need the technical means to address them if we are to have a convention that will satisfy the concerns of all States.

My delegation was associated last year with an experiment to have experts present in informal meetings of the Committee: this was educative and very useful. This year with the Netherlands, and with advice from others, notably India, we did something similarly inspired but different in form: we have sought to have experts present in delegations during the period of concentration of work on chemical weapons. This period of concentration is now drawing to a close but I am sure all those who have participated in it will agree that it has been of particular value. The Working Group discussions have become a technical dialogue in which delegations without experts present have also contributed, generally by interrogation, as constructively as those whose experts have taken the front seat. Again, my delegation finds this most encouraging.

The paradox in our efforts for a chemical weapons convention is that although, on the one hand, one could say that the hard part has already been covered -- the most difficult general obstacles have been surmounted -- on the other hand, the hard, specific part lies ahead. The general obstacles in disarmament are usually political will, military and security considerations, and the legal framework. I would like to focus on these for a moment.

There is a political consensus that we need a chemical weapons convention: this first pre-condition is the most important one for our negotiations. Every delegation that has spoken on this item in this Committee has expressed the desire for a negotiated ban on chemical weapons. A second necessary pre-condition is the

(Mr. Walker, Australia)

extent to which the political desire to ban these weapons can be reconciled with the requirements of national security, including military requirements: here again there appears to be a community of views. In many ways the situation is more favourable than at any time since chemical weapons were first used on a large scale, 65 years ago. Very few countries today possess chemical weapons and, relatively, as compared with other categories of weapons, there has been very little refinement and modernization of CW. Although there is agreement that chemical weapons can be most effective militarily, it is also the case that they are mainly effective against the defenceless or in surprise attack and that in all circumstances their use vastly complicates the command and control of military operations by the army which uses them. The practical difficulties of conducting military operations once an exchange of CW attacks has been initiated are such as to daunt any commander. Finally, there is a basis for consensus in the existing legal framework: the 1925 Protocol, the Biological Weapons Convention, work in the CD and its predecessor body and in a great number of United Nations resolutions; there are also the bilateral negotiations reported most recently in CD/112. It would be too much to say that customary international law already comprehensively prohibits the use of chemical weapons: although there are prohibitions, there has not been agreement so far on all circumstances in which the use of CW is outlawed or even as to the chemical agents covered by the ban. The fact that chemical weapons have not been used more than they have probably owes as much to fear of retaliation as it does to international law. There are reports, moreover, that what international custom exists has been flouted in recent years.

Three sizable problems remain, apart from those associated with eventual drafting. They are those of scope, definitions and verification. I wonder whether these problems are truly as formidable as they appear.

If we look at the concerns and broad intentions which underlie the positions delegations have taken on the issue of scope, we can identify significant convergence. Delegations appear divided on how our convention might relate to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, but all would concede that the Protocol has major weaknesses—indeed, were it adequate, we would have no real concern today. It is precisely because the 1925 Protocol covers only some uses of some agents in some circumstances, omits acquisition and possession, and does not provide for either destruction of stocks or even verification of compliance that we now have the task of drawing up something which will effectively and permanently outlaw this form of warfare. My delegation would not contest the assertion that the 1925 Protocol must in no way be prejudiced, but it does not see this as an argument against having provisions relating to use in the convention which we are developing. Many treaties develop and update existing international law. Many new treaties relate to other international agreements whatever their appellation, without doing any damage to the integrity of existing agreements which they partially overlap. The Biological Weapons Convention, to take just one example, specifically relates to the 1925 Protocol. It would not do damage to the 1925 Protocol for us to add to our intended ban on development, production and stockpiling a ban on use. We could specifically note in the new convention that the 1925 Protocol remains in force. There would not thereby be suddenly opened up new ambiguities—on the contrary, ambiguity would end: any CW use would clearly fall into the new comprehensive convention and for States parties to the Protocol but not the new convention, it might be covered by the Protocol. The ambiguity about customary international law, for example, would be resolved once and for all.

(Mr. Walker, Australia)

I do not intend to say much about definitions themselves, although I will in a moment have a suggestion on how we might agree on them. It is clear that we cannot have a treaty until we have defined our terms, and equally clear that this task is initially one for the experts. The problem is a very technical and complex one, but one that is capable of solution.

Verification is clearly the greatest outstanding problem over this convention. But even here the differences may not be as serious as they at first appear. For Australia, verification is of cardinal importance. In developing a CW convention we are, in effect, asking some countries to divest themselves of a category of weapons which they currently have, and we are asking the other countries to deny themselves the possibility of acquiring these weapons. My delegation believes we can realistically expect each nation to accede to this proposal only if it can be made confident that others will also respect the requirements of the future convention. My delegation sees verification measures as central to achieving this confidence.

The verification issue has been the subject of intensive discussion in the Working Group, notably yesterday afternoon, and the distinguished Ambassador of the Soviet Union devoted an important intervention to it at our last plenary meeting. There were many statements in that address with which my delegation agrees. We were glad to hear restated, for example, that the Soviet Union stands for strict and effective international control. We share the view expressed by the distinguished Soviet delegate that verification should not be carried to absurd lengths, that there is no need, in his words, to "fill enterprises with hundreds and thousands of foreign inspectors", no call for superfluous interference in peaceful activities, or for the disclosure of commercial and technical secrets. There may be differences as to the interpretations our two delegations might put on these general statements and the concrete consequences that we would see flowing from them. After all, there are major differences between our two societies -- notably as to the dissemination of information. But we must aim to devise concrete measures of verification that will inspire the necessary level of confidence on the part of all countries; and at the same time avoid the potential problems to which the distinguished Soviet delegate referred. This is the balance that must be achieved.

There were also several points in that statement on which I cannot join the distinguished Soviet delegate. He warned, for example, against "verification without disarmament". But is that really such an aberration? We, alas, do not have nuclear disarmament, but we benefit from the confidence generated by IAEA safeguards on civil nuclear industries. Under a CW convention, Australia and other countries which do not have CW will not actually disarm, but they will be subject to verification. Ambassador Issraelyan warned against "the principle of distrust". We deplore the mistrust which unfortunately exists between nations, and the causes of that mistrust. We think good verification measures in agreements such as the CW convention are one way of reducing that mistrust.

There are other points on which my delegation does not agree with that of the Soviet Union; but we are not here to try to pick holes in each other's arguments. Let me return instead to welcoming the Soviet reiteration of its acknowledgement, with the United States, in CD/112, that there must be adequate verification, based on a combination of national and international measures. My delegation is encouraged by

(Mr. Walker, Australia)

this convergence of views. We are well aware of the wide range of possibilities that exist for verification and of the excellent work done in this field by, for example, Finland and Canada. The essential question is: how much verification is enough? In the view of my delegation the answer must be, enough to deter infractions, enough to satisfy the international community that the Treaty is being observed faithfully and enough to clear up definitively false reports of violations-- over-all, enough to generate the confidence that must exist if nations are to be expected to adhere to the convention. We believe this can be achieved without giving rise to the problems described by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union.

I said at the outset that we had the paradox of a large measure of agreement and yet much that is difficult still lying ahead. Although I have tried to show that these difficulties may not be as great as they seem, I recognize that they may yet frustrate us. For instance, it is not possible to solve the remaining technical problems in isolation from the more "political" problems or the drafting problems: quite simply, each of the latter groups of problems will throw up technical issues requiring particular solutions. How can we proceed, given the possibility of frustration difficulties in our road and the certainty of time passing rapidly before our next over-all disarmament review at the special session of the General Assembly next year? I have two suggestions, two alternatives, to place before the Committee for its consideration.

The first is that we proceed step by step. We have, or will have by the end of this spring session, covered all the basic elements of a convention and the associated problems. How do we proceed from this position towards actual drafting? Rather than an article by article approach, which will constantly force us to leave issues open until agreement is reached on later articles, we might seek to tackle major groups of issues, and exhaust each in turn. Clearly, scope is one such group, and definitions and verification are others. Even if we take all summer to resolve the question of scope, it would in fact be a major achievement to get that far.

The second alternative, and it may be preferable, is to divide our task into two: one general and one on detailed technical issues. We may be able to take advantage of the very large measure of consensus on what we are aiming for that I have already mentioned and, relatively quickly, draw up the basic general framework of a chemical weapons convention covering the political engagements it would embody, including provisions for verification. There are several models for this, and again we can note the Biological Weapons Convention. The second facet of the convention would, on this scheme, take the form of technical protocols covering, for example, definitions (including toxicity criteria) and the technical specifications of verification devices. We do not envisage that the main body of the convention be drafted without regard to the technical considerations but that the technical specifics of these matters mentioned above be spelt out in the protocols. Obviously, agreement on the main body of the convention would be contingent on agreement being reached on these technical issues. This dual approach also has a number of models, both bilateral and multilateral.

Let me make clear that my delegation is not pressing for one or other of those particular work methods. Our central concern is that the momentum which has been built up over the years towards a CW convention and especially the present momentum in the CD be sustained.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Australia, Ambassador Walker, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the chair.

Mr. WIEJACZ (Poland): First of all, let me thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your kind words of welcome.

It is a great pleasure and a privilege for me to be able to address the Committee on Disarmament, a prestigious and important disarmament negotiating forum where all the nuclear-weapon Powers together with non-nuclear-weapon States pursue their common, vitally important objectives.

First, however, I should like to take this opportunity to express to you, Sir, our congratulations and good wishes on your assumption of the important and demanding office of Chairman for the month of April. May I also be allowed to address to your predecessor, the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic, our appreciation for the able and wise leadership which he gave the Committee last month. In fact, much credit for the constructive atmosphere prevailing at the current session of the Committee is also due to the distinguished representative of France who was in the chair in February.

It is, indeed, satisfying to know that the Committee on Disarmament -- a commendable exception -- has been able to pursue its goals at this session with a sense of purpose and dedication, despite the fact that the international climate beyond this conference room has not been altogether propitious or conducive to meaningful progress in the field of arms limitation and disarmament.

Public opinion in my country, Poland, and I presume in many other countries in Europe and elsewhere is now increasingly and understandably concerned over the growing threat to peace and international security, posed not only by the freeze on the SALT process but also by the upward swing of the spiral of the nuclear arms race. People everywhere are rightly alarmed at the staggering human and material cost of that race -- the global daily expenditure of well over one billion dollars. This vast sum spent on the implements of war means that urgently needed funds are being denied to meet the pressing requirements of the socio-economic development of States.

As we in Poland see it, the international situation is aggravated by the distinct tendency to supplant by a policy of confrontation and distrust that of co-operation and détente, a tendency which is at odds with the spirit and specific stipulations of the Helsinki document. It will not be far-fetched to observe in this connection that the true source of the spreading malaise lies in the repudiation of the principles of military parity and equal security in favour of strategic superiority and attempts to act from a position of strength.

(Mr. Wiejacz, Poland)

In the considered view of Poland — and I am sure I can speak also for other socialist countries — what the world needs most at this point in time is neither superiority nor even a balance of nuclear terror. What we need is a balance of reason and a balance of security at the lowest possible level of military force. In a word, we badly need to sustain détente and to promote it also in the military sphere. This is particularly true of central Europe, the part of the globe which has the sad distinction of having the highest concentration of nuclear hardware, the largest arsenals of the most sophisticated and destructive weapons man has ever known.

The decision to deploy in a number of West European countries a new generation of middle-range nuclear missile weapons and the recurrent suggestions that they should be perhaps reinforced with neutron weapons is a wrong remedy. Indeed, they set a trend which unless checked and reversed can well ruin the positive accomplishments of détente and co-operation which proved so beneficial to millions of Europeans and to their countries. We therefore firmly believe that such a development must be resolutely opposed and prevented at all cost.

It was precisely to this end that Leonid Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in his report to the recent 26th Congress of the Party, formulated an impressive set of new, significant proposals for negotiation. We believe that these imaginative initiatives, especially in respect of strategic arms limitation, nuclear missile weapons in Europe, neutron weapons and confidence building measures in Europe and elsewhere — to mention just a few — open up new vistas for a vitally important and constructive disarmament dialogue. Poland accords them its full support. We would wish to see them taken up and considered urgently with all due attention.

In the firm view of my Government, the checking of the nuclear arms race and averting military confrontation, especially in Europe, is at this time the supreme task in our common struggle for peace in Europe and throughout the world. Seeking to contribute to political and military détente in Europe, my Government has declared its readiness to host in Warsaw a conference on military détente and disarmament in Europe. We believe that a decision in this regard will be taken shortly at the Madrid meeting of the States which took part in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

Apart from seeking such a conference, Poland is invariably interested in and dedicated to early progress in the Vienna talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe.

Meaningful arms limitation and disarmament have always been priority objectives of Poland's foreign policy. At this particular time in history, we attach to it even greater significance. For never before has the threat of a nuclear conflict been so real; never before was so much at stake for so many. We therefore badly need to muster all possible imagination and courage in facing the difficulties ahead. The sense of responsibility for our common heritage and for the future generations should be compelling enough to induce Governments to explore and resolve their differences at the conference table, not out there in the field.

(Mr. Wiejacz, Poland)

Public opinion in Poland deems it imperative to utilize all negotiating possibilities open through bilateral channels. We likewise believe it necessary to expand and intensify the ongoing disarmament negotiating process, or open new avenues where useful dialogue is desirable and possible. It is our firm view that in disarmament negotiations no stone must be left unturned.

Meaningful disarmament efforts, whether bilateral, regional or global, are essential for the preservation of peace, for sustained détente, for co-operation between nations. Indeed, they are indispensable if we are to face and succeed in resolving the complex and difficult problems of the material and spiritual development of both individuals and societies.

With your indulgence, Mr. Chairman, I should like to turn now to some more specific topics on which I would like to comment in my statement today. I propose to deal briefly with the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and the question of chemical weapons, the latter being the topic which, in accordance with the Committee's programme of work, is currently the focus of its attention. As is well known, it is an issue of long-standing and traditional interest to Poland. Finally, I would also have an observation or two on the question of the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

We all recognize that, as it was stressed by the General Assembly in the Final Document of its first special session devoted to disarmament: "Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons."

The above statement from the consensus Final Document leaves no doubt in anybody's mind that here we are dealing with a subject which rightly has pride of place among all disarmament priorities. As indicated by the General Assembly in its most recent resolutions 35/152 B and C, the top priority status of nuclear disarmament has again been confirmed by the Members of the United Nations. There can be no excuse whatsoever for further delaying resolute, mutual negotiations in that regard, if only because it would inevitably postpone effective counter-action to the continued, unchecked development and sophistication of the most devastating weapons that exist today. Certainly, it is a long and arduous way which leads to that objective. The negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament are bound to be complex, protracted and perhaps frustrating. But we must embark on the negotiating process in the conviction that the longest march has to begin with the first step. Let us take that step here and now, as has been proposed by the socialist countries in their numerous working documents, notably CD/4, CD/109 and the most recent one -- CD/162.

While, regrettably, no consensus has so far proved possible concerning the establishment of a special ad hoc working group or groups, the Polish delegation welcomes with satisfaction the compromise working arrangement whereby the examination of the prerequisites for negotiations on nuclear disarmament and related matters would be taken up at regular, informal meetings of the Committee.

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We believe that such meetings would also provide a suitable framework for informal consultations, with the active participation of all the nuclear-weapon Powers, with a view to preparing for constructive, multilateral negotiations on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and the conclusion of an international legal instrument in that respect.

With all the nuclear-weapon Powers present around this conference table, the Committee can neither afford nor justify its failure to act on nuclear disarmament, especially in view of the fact that the current session is the last full working period the Committee has before it reports to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

As I indicated just a moment ago, the question of the total and effective elimination of chemical weapons has been an issue of traditional and active interest to Poland for quite some time. I am sure that the records of the Committee on Disarmament and the United Nations will amply bear out the contribution which the delegation of Poland -- alongside those of socialist and many other countries -- has been making to the efforts of the international community to outlaw this and, indeed, all other categories of weapons of mass annihilation.

Let me observe that, apart from the intrinsic merit of an early agreement on the total prohibition of chemical weapons, one compelling consideration motivating my country in that regard has been the concern that further delay in the proscription of chemical weapons could not only add to the existing stocks of these weapons but also work to encourage a technological race in CW laboratories. As we can guess, research and development programmes would not be limited only to perfecting binary weapons; they might also succeed in adding new and still more abhorrent items to the inventory of chemical warfare agents.

After years of sustained and often frustrating efforts in the field of CW negotiations, an important and promising break-through was made by the Committee in 1980. The establishment of the special Ad Hoc Working Group -- while procedural in nature -- marked also an important substantive departure point. By making it possible for the Committee to turn from general considerations to a more specific, pragmatic and constructive examination of concrete issues, it allowed the Committee to live up to its designation as the single multilateral negotiating organ in the field of disarmament. Owing to the skilful and dedicated leadership of its first Chairman, Ambassador Okawa of Japan, and the current Chairman, Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden, the Working Group has been able to undertake and continue productive work. In keeping with its mandate, this work consisted in the identification and constructive examination of problems which could be dealt with in a negotiating process that, one day, would ultimately lead to the elaboration of a multilateral treaty on the prohibition of all chemical weapons.

In the view of my delegation, the multilateral effort proved successful largely because it did not seek to disregard but, on the contrary, to co-operate with and benefit from the simultaneous bilateral negotiations pursued in Geneva by the Soviet Union and the United States. Constituting part and parcel of the

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same endeavour to ban chemical weapons, the bilateral and multilateral process enjoyed a mutually stimulating feedback relationship. My delegation hopes that these vitally important bilateral negotiations in the field of chemical weapons will be resumed in Geneva at an early date.

The net effect of the new approach to the question of chemical weapons has been a clearer picture of the areas of convergence and divergence of views on the major issues of a future CW treaty or convention. My delegation and, I am sure, many other delegations in this conference room are gratified at the remarkable extent of agreement and convergence of opinions. As the Polish delegation sees it, the crucial question which should be answered at this time is what ought to be the most appropriate and promising procedure to follow next -- in the days and months ahead. In our opinion, it would be most appropriate and worth while to continue the in-depth examination of issues and areas on which views converge. With total clarity and understanding of these problems, the Committee would be better equipped and prepared to cope with the outstanding questions on which views still seem to differ. In our considered view, an opposite approach would neither facilitate nor accelerate our work but, on the contrary, it could play up the differences, thus holding back final agreement.

Since this is one of the series of meetings which the Committee's programme of work assigned to the consideration of chemical weapons, I believe it will not be inappropriate for me to state again briefly some of the key principles which have so far -- and will in the future -- guide the Polish delegation with respect to the prohibition of chemical weapons.

First, we must continue to uphold and foster the identity of purpose between the multilateral and bilateral negotiating effort, in a spirit of co-operation and not one of rivalry.

Secondly, the scope of the future CW convention must provide for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling as well as the destruction of existing stocks of chemical weapons. On the other hand, as far as the question of the use of chemical weapons is concerned, Poland firmly believes that it has been successfully and effectively solved in the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The issue of the prohibition of use should not be reopened, therefore, in any way in the future convention. We do not subscribe to the view that the introduction into the body of the Protocol of a verification formula would appreciably strengthen that instrument which represents one of the oldest and working arms limitation agreements. If anything, the likely result would be its considerable weakening for, naturally enough, many of the Protocol's present signatories would hesitate or take their time in its ratification.

Thirdly, the verification provisions must be effective and must adequately correspond to the scope of the prohibition. Among other things, they must take due account of the principle of the sovereignty and equality of parties and provide for the protection of industrial secrets in the peaceful chemical industries.

In turning to the last part of my statement -- the question of the comprehensive programme of disarmament -- I should like first of all to echo the satisfaction already voiced by other delegations at the fact that the Ad Hoc Working Group

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has been able -- under the skilful leadership of the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles -- to proceed to substantive negotiations. No doubt, this was rendered possible by the progress made by the Group last year when its work continued under the guidance of Ambassador Adeniji of Nigeria.

We share the views of those who argue that it would not be necessary for the programme to take the juridical form of a treaty or a convention or provide for definite, unrealistically short stages or target dates. At the same time, we are of the opinion that a practical and realistic programme should, inter alia, embody certain rules and principles which should be followed and observed in the process of disarmament negotiations. These include the principles of the undiminished security of all parties, the sovereign equality of States and a balance of rights and obligations.

Such a programme must, above all, clearly and distinctly convey the idea that in the nuclear age there is just no rational alternative to disarmament and to the peaceful coexistence of States. It should, accordingly, provide for mechanisms which would work to assure the peaceful coexistence of societies and individuals as well. This, in fact, should be the starting-point. The international community, individual Governments, parliaments and non-governmental organizations should co-operate to convince and persuade their societies that a disarmed and peaceful world will become a reality only if and when all individuals are willing and determined to make it happen.

The education of the younger generation so that it can appreciate the value of peace, understand the misery of war, and make the world better prepared for effective disarmament, was one of the essential considerations underlying the United Nations Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace, a document which -- as it will be recalled -- was adopted upon the initiative of my country. We believe, accordingly, that a comprehensive programme of disarmament must provide, in addition to the various specific measures and priorities, for a procedure and a mechanism translating the principles of the Declaration into practical disarmament-oriented actions which would ultimately render disarmament efforts easier, more effective and more appreciated everywhere.

In our preliminary view, such a procedure could envisage a broad-based campaign, perhaps under the auspices of the United Nations Secretariat, for instance, the Centre for Disarmament and the Office of Public Information, whereby educators, creative professions and conceivably media everywhere would publicize the ideals of peace and co-operation of nations while, at the same time, familiarizing public opinion in the world at large with the objectives, difficulties and rewards of a world where human and material resources are not diverted to wasteful military purposes but meet the daily needs of every human being.

Some of these considerations may, perhaps, be developed further in a working paper, if the Polish delegation deems it desirable and possible at some later date.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Poland, His Excellency the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Józef Wiejacz. I thank him also for the kind words he addressed to the chair.

Mr. FEIN (Netherlands): Mr. Chairman, I consider it a privilege to take the floor in this first formal meeting under your chairmanship. The Netherlands delegation wishes to congratulate you on this occasion and to assure you of our fullest co-operation. Having had the privilege of working closely with you over the past three years, here in this Committee and in New York, I know your exceptional qualities as a negotiator and I also know your dedication to the course of disarmament, truly reflecting the policy of your Government, as well as mine. I wish you all success.

I also should like to thank Ambassador Herder, the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic, for his valuable efforts as our Chairman during the past month. Under his guidance the Committee made further progress towards our common goal.

Today I wish to make a statement on behalf of my Government concerning some aspects of a chemical weapons convention. I do so in the hope that this may be a modest contribution to our joint efforts to develop a multilateral CW convention. But we of course all realize that much depends on the outcome of the bilateral negotiations between the United States of America and the Soviet Union. We earnestly hope that these bilateral negotiations will be resumed in the near future.

May I recall that in the late 1960s it was a courageous political decision at the highest level, in the United States, that opened the road to a breakthrough with regard to the biological weapons Convention. Some years later, in 1974, the President of the United States and the President of the Soviet Union signed a joint communique in Moscow in which both sides reaffirmed their interest in an effective international agreement which would exclude from the arsenals of States such dangerous instruments of mass destruction as chemical weapons. Desiring to contribute to early progress in this direction, (I am quoting more or less from the communique) the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to consider a joint initiative in the Committee on Disarmament with respect to the conclusion of an international convention dealing with chemical warfare.

It is our sincere hope that the same political courage and the same political wisdom will soon again prevail and lead to our common goal, a CW convention.

Let me now outline for you what would be, in our view, a reasonable, practical approach to a total ban on chemical weapons, for all time.

First and foremost the Protocol of Geneva of 1925 prohibiting the use in war of chemical and biological weapons should be universally adhered to and, if feasible, strengthened in order to preclude any possibility of chemical warfare. This implies that we have to renounce the option of retaliating in kind if a State is attacked with chemical weapons. As we all know, many countries made reservations to keep this option open when ratifying the Protocol. In any case, it is essential that a link be established between the Geneva Protocol and the new chemical weapons convention.

Secondly negotiations should be started on a clearly-worded convention to prohibit the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, transfer and retention of chemicals and dispersion devices with the intention of using them in

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chemical warfare activities. This convention should have a general purpose criterion as its basis. A great many building blocks have become available during the last two years and especially during the last two weeks. And here a word of sincere gratitude to the CW experts who have assisted us in the last two weeks, is called for. Their presence here has helped us to clarify several aspects, and inspired us to renewed efforts. We are grateful to them. Many of the definitions mentioned in document CD/112 of 7 July 1980 can be used for the convention, as is the case with other definitions proposed by several delegations in the last few weeks. The convention should specify that, once it has entered into force, parties should declare their stockpiles, their means or facilities for production and their plans and procedures for stockpile destruction and for the dismantling of their production facilities.

Thirdly, there will be a need for a reasonable system of verification. Although national verification agencies can play an important role as clearing-houses for information, national means of verification cannot cover all aspects of the convention. Some kind of international verification machinery will have to be established, the core of which would be a small permanent secretariat that can rely on the co-operation of a great number of scientific and technical experts in all parts of the world. Two important activities that call for international verification are: the destruction of stockpiles of existing chemical weapons and the confirmation that CW production facilities have in fact been closed down and eventually dismantled. Further discussion is necessary on how to verify that in the presumably peaceful chemical industry no chemical weapons agents are being produced, in particular the most dangerous single purpose agents.

A moment ago I used the words "reasonable verification". That brings to mind the same words used by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union a few days ago. He also stressed that verification should not become an objective in itself, that it should be closely related to the scope of a convention. I wholeheartedly agree. But verification -- "reasonable" verification -- is just one component of the system which I am putting forward to you today. We have to be careful with that word "reasonable". It should not be used to imply a lack of importance of this component. A chain is only as strong as its weakest link and therefore we should aim for such "reasonable" verification that it is of the same strength and importance as the other links, namely, the convention and the state of protection against the results of chemical attacks. And such a strong link would have to include, as I stated earlier, some on-site inspections.

In any case, the convention should provide for a system allowing for inspections on challenge. The basis for a request for such an inspection could vary quite significantly. It could be for example, that a chemical analysis of river water indicated residues of nerve agents (cf. the Netherlands working paper CCD/533 of 22 April 1977 concerning the verification of the presence of nerve agents, their decomposition products or starting materials downstream of chemical production plants). Or, and this is another example, there could be indications that large amounts of phosphorus have disappeared from the peaceful chemical industry. Other contingencies to be taken care of are, for instance, a finding

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of some chemical munitions indications, that chemical weapons were used somewhere, etc. A flexible system seems necessary, allowing for consultations between parties as well as, wherever relevant, international inspections. Such verification activities would often require sensitive and specific analyses, which would have to be as non-intrusive as possible. States should be encouraged to carry out research efforts in this direction.

There have been quite some exchanges of views in this Committee on the question of whether the use of CW would have to be prohibited in the convention or not. Whatever the outcome of this somewhat academic discussion, it need not be argued that the use of CW would provide strong evidence that a party had not fulfilled its obligations under the CW convention. Such a finding could therefore form the basis for an inspection in accordance with procedures that will need further discussion in this Committee.

I now come to my fourth observation. The level of protection against the effects of chemical warfare should be kept at or be brought up to an adequate level. Only under such circumstances would a reasonable amount of verification free from unacceptable intrusiveness be sufficient. Therefore the production of reasonable small amounts of chemical warfare agents has to be allowed with adequate notification to the international verification agency. The results of research and development in these protective areas could be made available to other States and the international verification agency could provide an inventory of available equipment and of research efforts, thus laying the foundation for a whole set of confidence-building measures.

Last year I stated in this Committee that we should not overreach ourselves when dealing with each of the separate elements of the convention. I still think that this should be kept in mind. I should therefore like to repeat what I said last year in this respect.

I said I would like to make the following proposition for your consideration. As the end result of our work -- not this year, but at some time in the not too distant future -- we should achieve the following three results:

1. A good definition of scope;
2. A reasonable system of verification methods;
3. An adequate system of protection measures.

If this could be achieved, then we have the foundation for a CW convention that should be attractive to all nations. The advantages of such a convention, together with the auxiliary measures I mentioned, would outweigh all the tremendous disadvantages and risks involved in maintaining a chemical warfare capability for retaliation purposes. If this proposition is accepted, then the road to a CW convention might not be all that difficult.

But we should not overreach ourselves when dealing with each of the separate elements. We should not become "prisoners of perfection". And then I said last year -- just as I did at the beginning of this statement I am making now -- that there was a need for courageous political decisions at the highest level, as was the case with the biological weapons Convention.

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It has been said that the present circumstances and the international climate of today are not conducive to disarmament measures.

I disagree. In this respect I would also endorse what was said the other day by Ambassador Adeniji, the distinguished representative of Nigeria, that this is a two-way street. If circumstances influence the CD, the CD can also -- at least to a certain degree -- influence circumstances. Let us do away with chemical weapons as soon as we can.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador Fein, for his statement. I thank him also very much for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. VRHUNEC (Yugoslavia): Mr. Chairman, permit me, on behalf of the Yugoslav delegation, to extend to you the most sincere congratulations for your taking up of the duties of Chairman of the Committee for the month of April. For our part, we would like to say that you can count on our full co-operation. At the same time, I would also like to congratulate the Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic for an exceptionally well done job during the month of March when the Committee undoubtedly made a definite step forward.

At the very beginning of my statement on item 4 of the agenda, concerning the banning of chemical weapons, I would like to point out that the Yugoslav delegation has presented its positive position of principle with regard to the elaboration of an international convention on chemical weapons on repeated occasions, not only in the Committee but on other occasions as well. I would like to take this opportunity to emphasize that Yugoslavia strives for the adoption of an international instrument that will ban completely and effectively the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, transfer, use and other activities associated with chemical weapons.

The activity carried out thus far in the Committee with regard to this question indicates how urgent this problem is owing to the existence of a permanent danger of the use of these weapons if a ban is not agreed on very quickly.

I think that the work of the Committee on this issue should be accelerated and, while not wishing to enter into a detailed and complete establishment of priority problems, we propose that the consideration of this matter be divided into three groups of problems.

The first group must include problems which, in our opinion, should not be the subject of discussion within the Working Group any more since they were analysed in detail at formal and informal meetings in past years and clear formulations for them already exist. We consider that agreement in principle exists with regard to these formulations from a professional standpoint, and with the necessary stylistic and technical amendments they could become part of the convention. They are those, for example, covering the following issues:

- (a) Prohibition on the basis of general purpose criteria;
- (b) Toxicity criteria;
- (c) Categories of chemical weapons on the basis of general purpose and toxicity criteria;

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- (d) Prohibition of the transfer of chemical weapons or any kind of activity related to the proliferation of chemical weapons;
- (c) Necessary time of destruction of chemical weapons and facilities (or dismantling);
- (f) Creation of a consultative committee;
- (g) Exchange of (request for) information directly or through the consultative committee;
- (h) Sovereign rights in acceptance or non-acceptance of on-site inspection.

The second group of problems is comprised of those problems with respect to which political, scientific and professional disagreement in principle does not exist but for which there do not exist formulations that would substantively and terminologically be acceptable. These issues are, for instance:

- (a) Definition of chemical warfare agents and chemical weapons;
- (b) National verification and relationship with consultative committee;
- (c) "Time-table" of the prohibition (general prohibition) based on a "step-by-step" approach;
- (d) Exchange of information after the convention has entered into force;
- (e) "List of toxic chemicals" -- addendum to the Convention (for chemical warfare agents, intermediates, binary components, etc.);
- (f) Functions of the consultative committee -- rights and obligations;
- (g) Additional criteria for new synthetic compounds and toxins;
- (h) Declaration of accidents;
- (i) Delimitation criteria (except toxicity).

It seems to us that especially the existing proposals for the definition of chemical warfare agents contain many common elements which could make possible the elaboration of a working text on which consensus could be reached. However, it is our opinion that it should also be decided whether the definition should be accompanied by an enumeration of certain elements such as intention of use, quantity, manner of utilization, direct or indirect toxic effects, immediate or delayed toxic action, etc. It may also be asked whether this definition should also encompass those weapons where the toxic effect is of a secondary nature.

The next question that can be asked concerns the problem of national verification. Should national verification be given a general framework at all,

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or should it be left to each country individually? Should standard verification methods be prescribed? How can the underdeveloped countries be enabled to exercise national control?

The third group of questions is composed of problems which have not even tentatively been agreed upon and with respect to which there still exist substantive differences of approach regarding the manner in which they should be settled. These questions include, for example:

- (a) International verification;
- (b) Destruction;
- (c) Declaration of existing stocks and facilities;
- (d) Conditions for the entry of the convention into force, etc.

I would like to stress that my country also attaches particular importance to the problems of technical and medical protection with regard to chemical weapons, with the aim of decreasing the risks of the possible use of these weapons. This is why we cannot accept those positions which suggest the prohibition of activities concerning protection. And all the more so, in view of the fact that it has been predicted that the process of destruction of chemical weapons under the future convention will last about ten years.

We would like to stress that this division of ours into groups of problems should not be considered definite because logically, after an appropriate process of negotiations, a regrouping and a different categorization of certain problems may be necessary. In making this suggestion and with the aim of achieving maximum efficiency in our work, we merely wish to present that one of the possible methodologies for the work of the Working Group and, thus, for the work of the Committee as well, which appears the most appropriate to us at this moment.

This is why, in the opinion of my delegation, the work of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons has reached a level where we must begin to think very intensively about the co-ordination of the degree of results that have been achieved in its work with the contents of the mandate of the Working Group. We think that the existing mandate has been exhausted and that, in order to achieve a continued intensive progress in the harmonization of positions concerning particular parts of the future convention, we must urgently take measures to establish a corresponding new mandate. This would make possible the unhindered development of substantive negotiations aimed at reaching an agreement on the convention as soon as possible.

In conclusion, I wish to express our admiration to Ambassador Lidgard for his excellent chairmanship of the Working Group, as well as to Ambassador Okawa for his excellent work done last year.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Yugoslavia, Ambassador Vrhunec, for his statement and for the kind words he has addressed to the Chair.

Mr. de la GORCE (France) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, allow me, on behalf of my delegation and personally, to congratulate you and to offer you our best wishes for your period of office. All our colleagues know and appreciate your great abilities. We know that under your guidance the Committee on Disarmament will make all the progress in its work that is possible.

I should like to say also that the French delegation is particularly pleased to see in the chair the representative of a country with which France has particularly close, friendly and co-operative relations.

I should like also to express once more to our colleague from the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Herder, my delegation's congratulations and thanks for the efficiency and courtesy with which he conducted our work in March.

My delegation would like today to present its views on the state of our work on chemical weapons, and also briefly to recall its position on the question of nuclear disarmament, in connection with the discussions we are holding on this subject at informal meetings.

My Government attaches considerable importance to the question of chemical disarmament. Chemical weapons are a real menace, both because of their lethal power and because it is relatively easy to manufacture and use them.

It was for that reason that my delegation, at our first session, urged that the Committee should initiate negotiations on chemical disarmament and adopt the method which seemed to us the most suitable, namely, the establishment of a working group.

We are pleased to note the progress that has been made by the Working Group on Chemical Weapons and wish to pay tribute to its successive chairmen, Ambassador Okawa and Ambassador Lidgard, for their very efficient guidance of its work. The group has made the best possible use of the opportunities offered it by its mandate, which we would have preferred to be broader and which should undoubtedly be reconsidered when the time comes for the Group to embark on a more advanced stage in the negotiation process.

The latest discussions have brought out the many points of agreement that exist as regards definitions. They have also revealed the divergencies of opinion that remain as regards the scope of the convention and verification.

The first thing to be defined is the scope of the convention, since verification problems depend directly on it.

Some delegations have expressed a desire for the scope to be extended to include a prohibition on the use of chemical weapons, as prescribed in the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

In our view, it is essential to maintain the necessary distinction between two different areas and between the legal instruments of which they are respectively the subject: on the one hand the rules of warfare, under which comes the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons, which is the subject of the Geneva Protocol, and on the other hand the sphere of disarmament, under which comes the prohibition on the manufacture and possession of such weapons, which is the subject of the convention we are now discussing.

The Geneva Protocol lays down a general prohibition on the use of toxic substances in warfare, a prohibition which is a rule of the law of war.

The prohibition on the manufacture, acquisition or stockpiling of chemical weapons, which is a disarmament measure, can apply only to a limited number of products and equipment which are precisely defined; in the case of other products which, although capable of being used as chemical weapons, are currently and legitimately used in industry or agriculture, it is hardly possible to go beyond declarations by States in the form of statistics. Lastly, as regards the manufacture and stockpiling of innumerable chemical products with a lower level of toxicity, these will continue to escape any restriction.

If we were to include a clause prohibiting use in the convention we are to negotiate, we should inevitably have to choose between two solutions, either to repeat the general prohibition laid down in the Geneva Protocol, which would be pointless, or to adopt a more restricted definition, which it would be difficult to establish and would have the effect of weakening the authority of the Geneva Protocol. In the view of the French Government, which is the depositary of the Protocol, the rule of the law of war embodying a general prohibition on the use of chemical weapons is a valuable achievement which should be preserved intact.

My delegation understands and shares the concerns of those who would like to secure the adoption of provisions for the verification of possible breaches of the Geneva Protocol. We showed our active interest in this matter at the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly by co-sponsoring the resolution in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to verify, with the help of experts, certain allegations relating to possible violations. The French delegation wonders, however, what legal framework would be the most suitable for provisions of a permanent kind. Bearing in mind the distinction referred to above; it is not convinced that the convention we are discussing offers the best solution.

Another proposal has been put forward for the broadening of the scope of the convention to include a prohibition on the possession or acquisition of a "chemical warfare capability". My delegation has serious reservations with regard to that proposal.

The concept of a chemical warfare capability seems to us too difficult to define precisely, and liable to too broad a range of interpretations to be included in a legal text. Interpreted broadly, it might, for instance, be invoked, improperly, to justify criticism of certain activities essential for the maintenance of a capacity for protection against possible attacks with the use of chemical weapons -- a purely passive capacity, I would point out, which my country considers it very important to retain for reasons which our delegation has explained several times over. Furthermore, the concept of chemical warfare capability covers such matters as defence plans, research and the training of personnel, the prohibition of which would be unrealistic because it would be impossible to verify.

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

My delegation therefore considers that we should not be too ambitious about the scope of the future convention because it believes that only what can be verified can be prohibited or regulated.

The implementation of a rigorous system of verification of the non-manufacture or non-possession of chemical agents and weapons is likely to raise insoluble problems if it is to be applied to a large number of products. A distinction should therefore be made between super-toxic lethal chemical products and other lethal chemical products; such a distinction could be made on the basis of the definitions proposed in the joint United States-USSR report of 7 July 1980 (CD/112), which would, however, require supplementing as regards the modes of penetration of these products into the body.

As it has already explained in document CD/106 of 27 June 1980, my delegation proposes that only the manufacture of the super-toxic products and their specific precursors should be prohibited. It follows that very strict international control of such products should be contemplated. The other lethal products would be subject to national control, and every State should undertake to furnish, to an international body set up for the purpose, usable statistical data. Explanations could be asked for if excessive stocks were being built up, and international control should be provided for until unjustified stocks were eliminated. As for low-toxicity products such as weedkillers or irritants used for maintaining public order, my delegation feels that these should not be covered by the future convention.

The reason why my delegation wishes so stringently to define the scope of the convention and to restrict the list of prohibited products and of products subject merely to control is that it is anxious that verification of these provisions should be as effective and reliable as possible.

For the reasons explained here last week by the Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany, it would not be possible to rely exclusively on the national institutions of each State party to ensure the full implementation of all the provisions of the Convention. There must be international supervision, over and above national supervision, which should be entrusted to a committee set up for the purpose under the convention. Such a committee's duties would include the processing of the statistical data furnished by States parties under the convention. It should be provided with the necessary resources in staff and equipment; it might have access to data furnished by the national technical facilities of States parties, for instance in connection with remote sensing. It might perhaps in due course benefit from the assistance of the international satellite monitoring agency the establishment of which is under consideration. Lastly and more particularly, the committee should be authorized, where it considered it necessary, to have on-the-spot inspections conducted by experts recruited for the purpose, to investigate possible violations.

The purpose of international measures of verification would be to check compliance with two separate aspects of the Convention:

First, the fulfilment of undertakings to destroy stocks and dismantle specific production or munition filling facilities. Such measures would cease as soon as the subject of the action had been eliminated;

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

Secondly, the observance of undertakings prohibiting the manufacture and stockpiling of agents of chemical warfare or chemical weapons and stipulating the cessation of all activities connected therewith. These measures would be applied on a continuing basis so long as the convention remained in force.

Verification of the destruction of chemical agents and munitions and of the dismantling of specific production facilities would not be possible without on-the-spot inspection. The risks referred to by some who oppose such inspection (divulgence of the nature of the agents destroyed, violation of manufacturing secrecy if the destruction took place in proximity to industrial plants) seem slight. Most chemical warfare agents are in fact known, and for reasons of safety the installations for destruction would almost always need to be established in isolated areas away from large industrial complexes.

In order that these inspection operations should be effective, it would be desirable for international experts to be authorized to enquire into the destruction process and the plans for destruction facilities. They should then be authorized to observe and check the destruction operations carried out at each facility. No problem of secrecy need be involved, since the destruction facilities would be eliminated when their task was completed. Such verification, which would, by its nature, be temporary, would seem to be the easiest to carry out and the most acceptable.

The standing procedures to be devised for the verification of fulfilment of undertakings not to manufacture or stockpile would be of a different type. Such verification should not normally require the presence of international experts on the spot. It would be based mainly on the analysis by the international committee of the statistical data furnished by the States parties and of any other information which those States might provide. However, where the committee or a State party had any doubt about the behaviour of another State party with respect to the convention, the latter State should either furnish explanations of a kind which the committee deemed satisfactory or accept an on-the-spot inspection.

The insistence of many delegations, including our own, on the need for all parties to accept, where necessary, inspections on their territory, should not be interpreted as a sign of systematic distrust. On the contrary, we consider that the opening of frontiers to international inspection should be regarded by all as a pledge of the mutual trust there should be between the parties to a disarmament convention.

My Government attaches the greatest importance to the questions of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; it weighs the risks attaching to the existence of such weapons; it understands the legitimate concern felt in that respect within the international community. My delegation therefore welcomes the initiation of an examination of these questions by the Committee at informal meetings. We had already recommended discussions of this kind in the First Committee of the General Assembly.

The basic conditions for disarmament set out in the Final Document adopted by the General Assembly in 1970 apply to nuclear disarmament itself; I would refer in

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

that connection to the maintenance of equal security, the maintenance or re-establishment of a balance at a progressively lower level of armaments and the taking into account of regional factors.

Bearing in mind these premises, the situation as regards the problem we are concerned with is dominated by two fundamental realities: first, nuclear weapons are to an overwhelming degree in the hands of two Powers; and secondly, the existence of nuclear weapons is a fundamental element of balance and hence of security in the part of the world concerned.

Any progress towards the halting of the nuclear arms race and then towards nuclear disarmament therefore depends on a twofold effort, which has already been begun:

That of the two Powers, which must agree on the definition of balance and on ceilings -- that is the purpose of the SALT negotiations -- and then at a later stage, on the gradual lowering of those ceilings;

The effort to be made within the geographical area of Europe to improve conditions of security and then gradually to reduce the level of conventional weapons. This is the purpose of proposals submitted by France -- and discussed at the Madrid Conference -- for the convening of a conference on disarmament in Europe the first phase of which would be devoted to the adoption of confidence-building measures.

The objectives sought in the one case as in the other are very closely allied, for an over-all balance is inseparable from balance in the European theatre.

It is this twofold balance that ensures the deterrent effect. It is the produce, on the two sides, of a number of component elements: both nuclear and conventional weapons form part of it, whence the destabilizing effect which would be produced by a non-use undertaking applying to the nuclear component.

At the global level -- that of the two largest Powers -- we believe that nuclear deterrence must be based on the establishment of an over-all balance. Contrary to some, we do not consider that deterrence so conceived inevitably leads to an effort to achieve superiority and consequently to an arms race, with the resultant risks of destabilization. The maintenance of deterrence should normally lead to an endeavour to eliminate or prevent any destabilizing effect; it should be compatible with the halting of the armaments race and the gradual reduction of armaments. We hope that the negotiations between the two Powers will proceed in this direction.

France, for its part, does not, of course, seek parity, but it intends to reinforce its security, by increasing the risk, in any conflict in which it might be attacked, for a possible adversary; this within the framework of the existing political and strategic situation.

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

During our discussions at informal meetings, several delegations have raised questions about the Committee's role; they have emphasized that nuclear disarmament problems concern the international community as a whole. Since, in our view, disarmament is of interest to everyone, we consider that the Committee's competence covers the examination of those questions. The discussions we are engaged in with the participation of the five nuclear-weapon Powers is proof of this.

However, responsibilities as regards the undertaking of commitments rest principally with the nuclear-weapon countries. What we should consider here, depending on the course that future negotiations take, is how the Committee should express its views on the subject. I would recall, in that connection, that owing to the disproportion between existing arsenals, my country will contemplate an undertaking regarding its own weapons only if, as a result of negotiations between the two largest Powers, there is some change in that disproportion. We do not consider there is any justification for the idea of a proportional reduction on the basis of the present ratio of forces. Such a formula would merely perpetuate the present situation of bipolar advantage and extreme inequality that is not justified either by the scale of responsibilities or by the real needs of security.

Lastly, on this point, my delegation does not dispute either the inadequacies or the risks of a system of security based largely on nuclear deterrence. But this system has the merit of existing, and peace has been preserved for many years in the part of the world where it applies.

It would not be possible, without grave risk to stability, security and in the end peace, to eliminate or to render ineffective by an undertaking not to use it, the nuclear component of the over-all balance, or approximate parity, that exists in one part of the world. What we need to do, therefore, is to work towards changes which could lead gradually to the establishment of new conditions of security in which nuclear weapons would no longer have a place. We have referred to the twofold action, the dual effort which might lead to progress: the nuclear negotiations between the two largest Powers and the negotiations aimed at the strengthening of confidence and the reduction of conventional weapons in Europe. It is clear that success in those two enterprises is closely linked to success in parallel efforts to reduce tensions, remove threats, put an end to the use of force and restore confidence and a sense of security.

Such efforts and the progress which might ensue for international relations should also make it possible for the Committee on Disarmament to advance more decisively in its work.

Next week the Convention on the prohibition and limitation of the use of certain conventional weapons will be signed in New York. That is an important achievement in an area directly related to disarmament -- an area in which the competence of this Committee is, moreover, explicitly recognized in the preamble to the Convention. Let us hope that our work will also this year make a contribution to the difficult task of disarmament. On that contribution will to a large extent depend the success of the special session which the General Assembly is to hold next year, and also the confidence which the international community may still have in this Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of France, Ambassador de la Gorce, for his statement. I thank him also for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. ONKELINX (Belgium) (translated from French): I should like first of all, Mr. Chairman, to do what has become traditional in our Committee, which is to offer congratulations and good wishes to the successive Chairmen. As regards yourself, I do so all the more gladly and with all the more pleasure because the relations between our two States are particularly friendly, extensive, deep and untroubled, and because our personal relations are without the shadow of the slightest mistrust; and I am convinced that your skill, intelligence and knowledge of our problems -- of the problems we are discussing -- will enable you to carry out with great success your task as Chairman during the month of April, and that you will thus continue a certain tradition that has become established in our Committee, for since the beginning of this session we have had Chairmen of very high calibre, and in that connection I should like to take this opportunity to express our appreciation of the skilful and intelligent way in which Ambassador Herder, too, fulfilled the tasks of Chairman during the month of March. When we organized our work for this part of the 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament, we decided to concentrate our attention during these two weeks on the question of chemical weapons.

I should like to take advantage of the opportunity thus offered us to recall the very great importance attached by the international community to the efforts being made with a view to the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of these weapons and to arranging for their destruction. Furthermore, the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament stated that the conclusion of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons was one of the most urgent disarmament measures.

The efforts under way are at present being conducted in two different forums but, as the history of the negotiation of several international instruments has shown, these are perfectly complementary. In this connection, I would like to emphasize the importance of the first two reports submitted to the Committee on Disarmament, in 1979 and 1980 respectively, on the progress in the bilateral negotiations. I would also like to express my Government's satisfaction at the way in which the Working Group, which was established in 1980 and renewed this year, is conducting its work. The successive Chairmen of these working groups have played an important part in this context and I would like to tell Ambassadors Okawa and Lidgard how grateful we are to them for their work.

This Working Group is required by its mandate to "define, through substantive examination, issues to be dealt with in the negotiation on such a convention". It therefore seems essential that we should try to reconcile the different views which have been expressed up to now as to the matters which should be included in the convention.

With respect to the scope of the convention, it seems to us that we should concentrate on those elements which at this stage have the greatest chance of producing a consensus. These are, we believe, the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, retention and transfer of chemical weapons, and the consequent obligations, principally their destruction.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

In this connection, it is obviously important to clarify the question of definitions as soon as possible. Belgium made its contribution, as did other countries, when in 1980 it submitted working paper CD/94 which was the subject of some amendment this year, as indicated in document CD/CW/CRP.7. This is an extremely complex area, and we shall probably not be able to consider identifying all the substances which could constitute a chemical warfare agent. Sooner or later we shall have to stop considering definitions for incorporation in a convention.

Ought we not therefore to provide that the control body to be established under the convention, for example, the consultative committee envisaged by the bilateral negotiators, shall be responsible for such identification in cases not specifically provided for by the convention? The convention would not then be weighed down by an excessive number of definitions which would probably not in any case be exhaustive. Furthermore, experience has shown us that many international instruments in the sphere of disarmament have been drawn up without the inclusion, in the body of the convention, of a precise definition of the weapons or agents which are the subject of prohibition.

Another important question which has been brought up and debated is that of the inclusion of a prohibition on the use of chemical weapons in the convention we are contemplating. This suggestion is a matter of concern to my delegation, which is anxious not to tamper in any way, even indirectly, with the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Belgium feels that this is a matter of overriding political advisability.

Although it has not yet adopted a final position on the matter, Belgium has doubts as to whether in fact this proposal is feasible. Certainly, we should be able to agree to any formula if it met with a consensus in the Committee. Nevertheless, we would be inclined to think that if it appeared possible or necessary for the proposed convention to venture into the area of the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons, it should in that case confine itself to a simple reference to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 -- as is done in the Convention on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons -- and a renewed affirmation of its entire validity.

Some delegations feel on the other hand that this link between the Geneva Protocol and the convention on which we are working might be established rather by the provision in the convention of measures for the verification of use without, at the same time, use being included in the scope of the convention. We should be interested to hear other views held on this subject. As to ourselves, it appears to us more likely that we shall eventually give up the idea of including measures for the verification of use in the new convention. We thus feel that it would be more appropriate to look for similar measures under other auspices, starting from the 1925 Protocol which is silent on this matter.

In any case, we feel that the verification of international disarmament agreements is of primary importance. Why is this? Not because we attach any morbid inquisitorial value to it but rather because, as Jules Moch said, if there can be no control without disarmament -- an observation echoed recently by my Soviet colleague -- nor, he added, can there be disarmament without control. The two things are inseparable and it would be useless, we feel, to try to separate them and to deal with one before the other in the negotiations.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

We also feel that adequate verification measures -- under strict and effective international control, to use the sacred formula-- increase the credibility of treaties and help build confidence where it is lacking or insufficient, or where it is marred by an atmosphere of suspicion.

We listened to Ambassador Issraelyan's speech before the Committee on 31 March. We should like to tell him that our approach to the matter of verification is not based on a concept of systematic distrust. On the contrary, it is based on a presumption of progress in international co-operation and of trust in States which -- like individuals -- are to be considered innocent until they are proved guilty. However, we must provide for the possibility that violations may occur. In the same way as an individual under suspicion cannot be allowed to be his own judge, so it cannot be left to States -- in spite of the respect due to them -- to apply those measures of control to themselves. It is for this reason, too, that we think that national verification measures can do no more than supplement international measures. Furthermore there is, it seems to me, some confusion as regards national measures with respect to this aspect of the matter of chemical weapons. Such measures are not usually concerned with the verification of what is going on outside the State. Their primary object is that Governments should adopt the requisite internal legislation to enable them to secure full respect for the prohibitions in their territory. These measures are certainly important, but they do not really contribute to the attainment of the objectives of verification as I have just described them.

It is hardly useful, I feel, to engage in too abstract a discussion on the subject of verification. In the disarmament agreements concluded up to now, control measures have always been appropriate to the particular prohibition.

The prohibition of chemical weapons includes aspects which should obviously lend themselves to automatic and easy on-site inspection, for example, the matters of the destruction of stocks and the dismantling or even the conversion of production facilities.

On the other hand, as regards the much more complex question of the verification of non-production, an approach could be envisaged which would be gradually more "intrusive", that is, methods of control which would become more and more meticulous as doubt increased, in spite of control efforts. This system would have the advantage of avoiding unnecessarily strict control from the very beginning. Such a system might, for example, start with verification by satellite and if it became necessary because of suspicion might then move on to on-site surveillance from a distance and then, if necessary, to surveillance from nearby and lastly to on-site inspection with the taking of samples. For this purpose it would be necessary to evaluate the so-called "off-site" verification methods. The international co-operation that already to some extent exists with respect to environmental pollution could provide a useful basis for this joint evaluation. Furthermore, even in the case of the verification of non-production, on-site inspection should not be a means of last resort, bearing with it an element of dramatization. It could be seen as something more routine, carried out on the basis both of a challenge and of the spot checking of production facilities.

We are confident in approaching these problems of verification of the prohibition of chemical weapons, for although they are certainly difficult, they are far from being insurmountable.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

Thus, far from revealing distrust, a balanced and well thought out system for the verification of a disarmament agreement would, on the contrary, represent progress in international co-operation. There have been examples of disarmament agreements where the negotiators had perhaps not developed the verification measures sufficiently and where, because of that omission, some States have decided not to accede to those agreements. Recent experience has shown us that if those conventions had included provision for more elaborate verification machinery, the international community could perhaps have been spared accusations, suspicions and harsh exchanges. These are lessons which should guide us in our search for improvements in the development of future disarmament conventions.

In this matter of verification, as in other important aspects of the convention we are contemplating, the presence in Geneva, for two weeks, of experts from our various capitals will have helped to clarify many questions and to quicken the pace of our work.

Belgium will always be prepared to make its contribution towards the success of that work, which we hope will be rapid.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Belgium, Ambassador Onkelinx, for his statement and for the particularly kind words he addressed to the chair.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee, to continue discussion of item 4 of our agenda, will be held on Friday, 3 April 1981 at 3.30 p.m.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.

CD/PV.121
3 April 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FIRST MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday, 3 April 1981, at 3.30 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. G. PFEIFFER (Federal Republic of Germany)

GE.81-61176

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. M. MEDKOUR
Mr. M. MATI

Argentina: Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD

Australia: Mr. R.A. WALKER
Mr. R. STEELE

Belgium: Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. R. DEYANOV

Burma: U SAW LAING
U NGWE WIN
U THAN HTUN

Canada: Mr. G. SKINNER

China: Mr. YU Peiwen
Mr. LIN Chen
Mr. PAN Jusheng

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLA VILA
Mr. C. PAZOS

Czechoslovakia: Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. L. STAVINOHA

Egypt: Mr. M.N. FAHMY

Ethiopia: Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. H. THIELICKE

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. W. ROHR
Mr. J. PFISCHKE

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India: Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN

Indonesia: Mr. S. DARUSMAN
Mr. I. DAMANIK
Mr. KARYONO

Iran: Mr. T. AFSAR

Italy: Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya: Mr. S. SHITEMI
Mr. G. MUNIU

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
Mr. C. HELIER

Mongolia: Mr. L. BAYART
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. A. AMERONGEN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria Mr. O. ADENIJI
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan:
Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. M. AKRAM
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Poland:
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Sri Lanka:
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:
Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. L. NORBERG

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. L.A. NAUMOV
Mr. V.M. GANJA
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO

United Kingdom:
Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES
Mrs. J.I. LINK
Mr. T.D. INCH

United States of America:
Mr. C.C. FLOWERREE
Mr. F.P. DeSIMONE
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. C. PEARCY

Venezuela:
Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT
Mr. H. ARTEAGA
Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:
Mr. M. VRHUNEC

Zaire:
Mr. O. GNOK

Secretary of the Committee
and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General:
Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the Committee:
Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): Mr. Chairman, may I take this opportunity to welcome you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of April and express my conviction that you, like your distinguished predecessors during this year's session, will further keep up the constructive, business-like atmosphere prevailing in our Committee. To this end I offer you the full support of my delegation.

I would like to convey my appreciation to the outgoing Chairman for the previous month, Ambassador Gerhard Herder of the German Democratic Republic, for the efficient manner in which he guided the work of the Committee last month, especially his successful efforts made in channelling and speeding up our work concerning the questions of nuclear disarmament and the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. This has become a sort of positive tradition supported by all, and I hope that it will be developed further.

In my statement today I would like to deal with two subjects: first, the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and secondly, the problems of chemical weapons.

In dealing with the subject of strengthening the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, my delegation feels it appropriate to emphasize its connection with the general subject of nuclear disarmament, being a specific collateral measure until the highest priority task of nuclear disarmament on a universal basis is achieved. Any advances made in assuring the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would, in our understanding, have at least a three-fold significance. First, they would strengthen the non-proliferation régime by eliminating incentives for acquiring nuclear weapons by the non-nuclear-weapon States through guaranteeing their security by developing international legal measures. Secondly, they would also be an effective barrier to the geographical spread of nuclear weapons, preventing such weapons being introduced by nuclear-weapon States into the territory of States at present free from nuclear weapons. Thirdly, they would be a step towards a time when States will seek to strengthen their security on the basis of the principle of the non-use of force or the threat of force, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

My delegation is pleased to note that the Working Group on negative security guarantees has passed the procedural phase of its work and is concentrating its attention on the substance. It continues firmly to believe that the most effective way to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be an international convention, by virtue of its clear-cut binding character in terms of international law. However, my delegation is ready to go along with efforts to find possibilities for interim measures which would facilitate reaching our final aim. The crux of the matter is that our activities should, as contemplated in General Assembly resolution 35/154, assist "all nuclear-weapon States to make solemn declarations, identical in substance, concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States having no such weapons on their territories, as a first step towards the conclusion of such an international convention".

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

My delegation welcomes the efforts made in the Working Group on negative security guarantees to find a possible common approach or a common formula by an in-depth analysis of the unilateral declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States and the proposals made by several countries to this effect.

The Hungarian delegation is of the view that the scope of non-nuclear-weapon States to be guaranteed against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should be determined on the basis of objective criteria which do not lend themselves to subjective interpretations by the States offering such guarantees. Such criteria could be whether the States to be guaranteed are a source of nuclear threat to the nuclear-weapon States or not. This is comprised of two elements, such as the renunciation of the acquisition of nuclear weapons by that State and the non-deployment of the nuclear weapons of other States on its territory. Exceptions as contained in the formulas of the United Kingdom and the United States of America at first glance do not exclude any non-nuclear-weapon State from the guarantees. However, they do not include any of them unconditionally either, since they retain the right to decide that in case of an armed conflict the non-nuclear-weapon State in question "is in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State" or that it is "allied to a nuclear-weapon State or associated with a nuclear-weapon State in carrying out or sustaining the attack". As we see it, any non-nuclear-weapon State could "qualify" to be subjected to the use of nuclear weapons if it is so decided by those nuclear-weapon States in accordance with the criteria referred to above.

I would like to touch briefly upon the aspects of negative security guarantees concerning Europe. The distinguished representative of Pakistan in his statement of 24 March 1981 explained that "the so-called self-defence clauses" in the declarations of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union "are related to strategic considerations in central Europe" and as such "should not be elevated to the status of general prescriptions in the common formula". The Ambassador of Pakistan is right that these aspects relate also to Europe, though to the whole of it, but not only to that. First, the exceptions contained in the United Kingdom and United States declarations may well be valid in relation to any non-nuclear-weapon State. The fact that Europe and the two military alliances are in the focus of the international attention does not change the validity of such a conclusion. Secondly, the criteria contained in the formula of the USSR concerning non-nuclear-weapon States is related not only to Europe, since it is not only in Europe that there are non-nuclear-weapon States with foreign nuclear weapons on their territory, and it cannot be excluded that as a result of the possible geographic spread of nuclear weapons further countries may also be involved. The criteria contained in the Soviet formula to define the non-nuclear status of non-nuclear-weapon States also take good care of such cases as Israel and South Africa, which could be handled at best as "exceptional cases" according to other formulations.

I would also like to say a few words on the question whether non-nuclear-weapon States should or should not assume new obligations under a future convention. The answer is definitely no, in the sense that States with a real non-nuclear-weapon status should do nothing more than to undertake not to change it. To be more specific, non-nuclear-weapon States in the framework of such an international instrument might:

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

- (1) Reaffirm their undertaking not to acquire nuclear weapons or, possibly, renounce such weapons in cases where they have not yet done so;
- (2) Pledge themselves to continue to keep their territories free of the nuclear weapons of the nuclear-weapon States.

I think none of these contain any sort of new undertakings. If we think in terms of a future multilateral international convention a two-way commitment seems feasible.

In their turn the nuclear-weapon States could undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which have renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons and have no nuclear weapons of other States on their territory. Nuclear-weapon States could also pledge themselves not to initiate the emplacement of their nuclear weapons on the territory of States where there are no such weapons at present.

Giving serious consideration to such elements might have beneficial effects on a world-wide scale including Europe. The majority of States -- including the European countries -- are free of nuclear weapons. To maintain and possibly further strengthen their non-nuclear-weapon status is worth being given a try by guaranteeing them against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in an appropriately constructed international convention. I would like to lay special emphasis on the European connection of this issue. Any agreement which would leave the European continent aside, as has been suggested here and there, runs the risk of a gross deviation from the original aim of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States and missing the crux of the matter.

Turning to the question of the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction, I would like to express the satisfaction of my delegation at the detailed discussion taking place in the Ad Hoc Working Group concerned. Taking into consideration the detailed examination of issues and the highly technical character of the work being done I would like to touch upon only issues of a more general character in connection with certain questions which came up during the discussions in the Working Group.

My delegation continues to be in favour of a comprehensive CW convention which should provide for the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction, universally and adequately verified. It is the position of my delegation that we should adhere to the basic mandate we have and not extend the scope of the ban, however attractive it may seem sometimes. We feel it inappropriate to include in the scope of ban the use of chemical weapons, since this aspect has been settled in a satisfactory way in the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Repeating the same obligation in a new international instrument may cause confusion by casting doubts on effectively operating international instruments and setting an undesirable precedent. Thus by making our task even more difficult and complicated we gain nothing else than further complications.

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

Commenting briefly on other aspects of the scope and definitions, my delegation is of the view that the Committee and the Working Group in particular ought rather to keep as close as possible to our original aim and mandate on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the destruction of their stockpiles. My delegation cannot support initiatives to bring into it new elements which can only be vaguely defined and do not have a direct relation to the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, in order to avoid further complications of a political and technical character, of which I think we have enough.

It is clear from our earlier experience and that in the activities of the Working Group that the structuring of an adequate verification system for a future treaty is a crucial problem. In this connection let me refer to certain basic considerations which -- in the view of my delegation -- are instrumental from the point of view of the successful outcome of our efforts. As in the case of all agreements in the field of disarmament, the verification system should be commensurate with the scope of the prohibition; it should pursue the realistic aim of providing for adequate verification and should be simple in its structure and comprehensible in its dimensions so as to facilitate its implementation. It is also crucial in this respect that the verification system should be applicable to all parties to the treaty, equally to those who declared possession of chemical warfare agents and those who declared non-possession of such weapons. The verification system should ensure for all the parties that the convention is strictly implemented without unnecessary intrusion into the peaceful activities of the chemical industry or causing damage to the security interests of the participant not related to chemical warfare.

There is a growing understanding, and we fully support it, that such a verification system should be a combination of national and international means providing for the possibility of on-the-spot inspection whenever it is indispensable, on a voluntary basis. This aim can be achieved through a properly structured consultative committee of experts.

My delegation is of the view that to set such considerations into the basis of our work and build an appropriate system of verification around them would greatly facilitate the advance of our work and could speed up the attainment of a comprehensive prohibition on the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on the destruction of their stockpiles which has long been urged and hoped for by the international community.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Hungary, Ambassador Komives, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): We should like to take this opportunity to state our delegation's position on a number of questions connected with the topic of chemical weapons and to offer a few ideas and comments by way of contribution to the substantive review of this subject on which the Ad Hoc Working Group is now engaged.

1. Priority and importance

First of all, we wish to reiterate that Venezuela ascribes high priority to the task of negotiating and drawing up a convention on chemical weapons. It is for this reason that we have been participating actively in the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group, which last year, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Okawa of Japan, embarked on the task of defining the matters to be covered by the convention and which this year has steadily pursued its important undertaking under the guidance of Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden. We should like to take this opportunity to pay tribute both to the Group's current Chairman and to his predecessor for their valuable contribution to the work of the Committee in this sphere.

Venezuela also attaches very special importance to the proposed convention on chemical weapons. As I said in the statement I made during the Committee's first session, we consider that such a convention would be the first genuine and effective disarmament measure to have been adopted since the beginning of the United Nations efforts in this field because the States that sign the convention will, for the first time, pledge themselves to destroy a weapon which is not simply one that many of them have in their arsenals, but one that has actually been used in war. The need to complete the drafting of this convention as soon as possible is becoming increasingly urgent. This loathsome weapon appeared to have sunk into oblivion after the experience of its terrible effects during the First World War. But now increasingly there are signs of a resurgence of this weapon-- a menacing spectre. Television frequently shows us the armed forces of the two military alliances conducting manoeuvres involving troops equipped for chemical warfare. It is difficult to determine whether such exercises are designed to provide training for attack or for defence. Whatever the case, we believe that, as stated in document CD/167 submitted by Canada, no country needs chemical weapons for defensive purposes except for retaliation in kind. We also agree with what Ambassador McPhail said in his statement on Thursday last, 26 March, namely that "in the absence of [an] agreement, a chemical arms race is possible, and events in the next several years will determine whether or not this happens. This statement is lent force by the information frequently made public of the earmarking in the military budgets of certain countries of further funds for the modernization of chemical warfare equipment through the acquisition of weapons that are deadlier but less dangerous to handle.

2. Scope of the convention

In our opinion, the convention on chemical weapons should be comprehensive, that is to say, broad. It should cover all activities, resources and means capable of being employed in order to make use of the toxic properties of chemical substances for hostile purposes or in armed conflicts.

As Ambassador de Souza e Silva of Brazil and others have pointed out, the convention on chemical weapons should contain obligations of two different kinds, on the one hand positive obligations-- that is, obligations representing an undertaking to do something, and on the other hand negative obligations-- implying an undertaking to refrain from the performance of some activity.

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

To the first category belong those obligations whereby States will undertake to declare what stocks of weapons and what production facilities they possess. We think that, as urged by the delegation of Pakistan, such declarations should be made immediately upon the signing of the convention, as a confidence-building measure. In the same category is the obligation to destroy stocks and to dismantle, close or convert to peaceful uses facilities for the production of lethal chemical agents and chemical weapons and munitions.

We share the idea put forward by Brazil that there should be a change of emphasis in our work so as to give precedence to the obligations of an active kind, particularly those relating to the destruction of stocks, etc., since these are the ones that most directly concern the States which actually possess such weapons. It is these obligations which, as we have said, make the convention a true disarmament measure. Similarly, we also support the Brazilian proposal that this idea should be appropriately reflected in the name or title of the convention.

The second category of obligations -- the obligations of abstention -- include those whose aim is to prevent the exercise of any activity that might make it possible for a country to possess or to use chemical weapons. This category includes the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, retention or transfer of chemical weapons. This category also includes the obligations designed to prevent the carrying out of activities, such as offensive military training and the like, that could help a country to acquire the capacity to engage in acts of chemical warfare.

These considerations lead us to express our opinion on the controversial question of use. The recent reports and allegations of the presumed use of chemical weapons in conflicts in various parts of the world make us think that the prohibition laid down in the 1925 Geneva Protocol is not sufficiently effective. On the one hand, as the Committee knows, the prohibition laid down in this Protocol covers the use of chemical agents only when they are employed in the form of gases. It is true that this is the commonest method of employing chemical agents for warlike purposes, but it is not by any means the only method. Hence, while the Geneva Protocol remains fully valid and must be defended as a very worth-while instrument, it cannot be denied that it suffers from lacunae and weak points that lay it open to violation. On the other hand, while it is true that, as is stated in the preamble to the Protocol, the use of chemical weapons has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world, it cannot be claimed, as has been done, that the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons is universally accepted as a rule of customary international law. If that were so, we should not be encountering any difficulty in coming rapidly to an agreement on the text of the convention on chemical weapons.

We think, therefore, that the convention that emerges from the work of the Committee on Disarmament ought to strengthen the ban on use contained in the Geneva Protocol. We have no concrete proposal to make in this respect but we think that, as Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden has indicated, there are several possible ways of establishing a satisfactory link between the new convention and the Protocol. We would prefer that this link should be established in the operative provisions of the convention. We are flexible as to the solution that might be adopted in that respect. On the other hand, we consider it essential to include in the convention an adequate system for the verification of reports of the presumed use of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

3. Verification

With regard to verification, I should like to explain a few of my delegation's ideas on this important question, which, as no one will deny, is the most difficult of all those arising in connection with these or indeed with any other disarmament negotiations.

As has often been said, the fundamental requirement to be met by any procedure or system of verification is that it should be effective. In order to be effective, the method of verification must be compatible with the type or nature of the disarmament measure to which it is to be applied.

In the case of chemical weapons, the very fact that, as we have stated earlier, the convention now being prepared will include obligations of different kinds, some negative and others positive, some of action and others of abstention, makes the problem of verification particularly complicated to deal with. Moreover, the fact that this will be a genuine disarmament measure makes it necessary that the verification system should be very carefully thought out.

At the same time, it has to be recognized that it is not possible to achieve a perfect system of verification. It is precisely here that the political will and the spirit of compromise necessary in all negotiations will be called for. Bearing in mind the popular precept that the best is the enemy of the good, it will surely be necessary for us to accept a compromise and to agree on a method of verification that is, on the one hand, satisfactory and, on the other, as effective as possible.

In order to be compatible with the nature of the disarmament measure to which it is to be applied, and which includes obligations of two different kinds, the verification system will have to be -- to use an expression familiar to us from the terminology of chemical weapons -- dual-purpose. We might perhaps call it a binary system.

On the one hand, it ought to include a procedure -- one that should function automatically -- for verifying the fulfilment of the positive obligations. This would entail a system of inspections to confirm the veracity of declarations concerning arsenals or stockpiles of weapons, munitions, chemical agents, facilities, etc., and to verify that the destruction of such arsenals and the dismantling, closure or conversion of the facilities had actually been carried out.

The other verification procedure, which would be initiated by a complaint, would be designed to check the truth of any allegation that might be made of the breach of a negative obligation -- an obligation to refrain from a certain activity. What would be involved here would be cases in which one country accused another of producing or developing, stockpiling, acquiring or retaining chemical weapons or of carrying out any of the activities expressly prohibited under the convention. This category would, naturally, include the use or employment of chemical weapons.

We believe that the verification system should include an appropriate combination of national measures and international measures, the latter constituting a larger proportion than the former. Furthermore, on-site inspection should play a particularly important role. With respect, for example, to the verification of declarations and of measures of destruction, there seems no possibility of finding any more suitable method than that of direct observation. This observation or inspection should in any case be as unobtrusive as possible and compatible with respect for the sovereignty of States, avoiding unnecessary interference in their internal affairs. We consider that the main basis of the system of on-site verification should be a presumption of the good faith of all the contracting parties. If we start from the assumption that all States are fulfilling the obligations they have assumed, no State party should

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

feel offended if the control authority which it would, by its own sovereign will, have agreed to set up, were to request permission to carry out an inspection in order to confirm or verify that an obligation had been, or was being discharged. That is how we see the mutual trust that should prevail between the States parties to the convention.

With respect to the question of verification, we find the study submitted by the delegation of Canada in document CD/167 very helpful. We also consider the summary of questions relating to verification contained in working paper CD/CW/WP.10 prepared by the Chairman of the Working Group very interesting. Both documents contain material that will be very useful when we move on to the next stage of our work.

With respect to the control authority, our thinking runs along the lines suggested in the Canadian document, and we consider that the convention should provide for the establishment of an international committee of a political nature, with a limited, periodically renewable membership appointed by the General Assembly or by the conference of States parties. The committee could take it upon itself to carry out visits irregularly and at random for the purpose of verifying the discharge of obligations of commission, but it would also receive complaints and make the necessary arrangements for verifying alleged breaches of the convention. It would be answerable to the General Assembly or the conference of the parties and would report periodically to that body on its activities. The committee would be able to call upon experts for advice and assistance whenever necessary. Finally, we think that the committee should be designed to be as simple as possible and that its procedures should be flexible so that it can carry out its work with maximum efficiency.

We do not share the idea contained in the bilateral report by the United States and the Soviet Union that the main role as regards verification should be assigned to the Security Council. We would prefer the body entrusted with that important function to be one that was more democratic in its composition and representativity.

4. New mandate

Lastly, we should like to say that we share the view expressed by Ambassador Lidgard in his statement on 24 March that the Committee should without delay widen the mandate of the Working Group so as to enable it as soon as possible to start the actual elaboration of a convention. The Group will soon have completed its second review of the substantive questions of relevance to the convention. It will be recalled that the mandate given to the Working Group is extremely limited, confining it to the definition of the issues that should be covered by the convention. It will also be recalled that, from the beginning, a restrictive interpretation has been placed upon that mandate, which has prevented the Group from making progress towards genuine negotiations. It is, therefore, essential to give the Group a mandate broad enough to enable it to embark on the real work of negotiation that should lead to the drafting of an internationally binding instrument.

We should like to conclude our statement by expressing our hope that, with a new mandate, the Working Group may be able to move forward in its work sufficiently rapidly to enable the Committee to submit to the General Assembly, at its second special session on disarmament, if not a definitive text, at least a draft refined enough to show the world that we have been able to do something more than draw up treaties on non-existent weapons.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Venezuela, Ambassador Taylhardat, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): I shall be speaking today on item 4 of our agenda, on the question of chemical weapons. But before doing so, Mr. Chairman, I should like to express my pleasure at seeing you in the Chair of our Committee for the month of April. I am confident that under your sure guidance the Committee will continue to make progress in all the important areas upon which it is working, and I pledge to you the full support and co-operation of my delegation. I should also like to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Herder of the German Democratic Republic, who has worked so diligently as our Chairman for the last month.

Turning now to chemical weapons, I should like first of all to stress our gratitude to the distinguished representative of Sweden for the energy, resourcefulness and commitment he has shown in his chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. My Government considers that the elimination of chemical weapons from the arsenals of all States is of the greatest importance. We are determined to do all we can to assist in that process. We shall be giving further serious thought to the discussion that has been taking place in that Group. My comments now are intended to show the direction of our thinking.

In tackling the question of chemical weapons, we are dealing not with some potential future weapon, but with armaments which exist in the world and which have been used in the past to terrible effect. The United Kingdom has always taken the view that in any disarmament treaty there must be appropriate and adequate measures of verification. Where the arms concerned are actually in existence, that view is reinforced; it takes on increased importance. The United Kingdom Government believe that a CW convention must be adequately verifiable. Without adequate verification States will not have confidence that such a convention would be observed. Indeed, it is mainly because we have been unable so far to agree on provisions for verification in which all States would have confidence, that better progress has not been made. Verification is and will remain the keystone of progress.

I should like, therefore, to take a few minutes to examine further what my delegation means when we talk of adequate verification. Obviously we cannot realistically hope for agreement on a verification system that would provide a 100 per cent certainty of compliance. Desirable as it would be to devise such a system, we recognize that this would not be possible — and this fact was admirably demonstrated in document CD/CW/WP.9, submitted by Canada in the CW Working Group. But we must have provisions which will give all parties to a convention a good degree of confidence that all other States party are observing it. Moreover, if we incorporate such provisions, these will in themselves provide an incentive to all States to comply fully with the letter as well as the spirit of the agreement.

The question then is what activities will need to be verified if States are to such confidence in the convention, and what form should this verification take? The United Kingdom considers that verification measures would be necessary for each stage of implementation of all the provisions of the convention relating to the declaration and destruction of stockpiles and of production facilities, and thereafter for monitoring the compliance of States with the provisions banning development and production, including monitoring the use for permitted peaceful purposes of chemical warfare agents and dual purpose chemical agents. The United Kingdom Government also considers it essential that the convention should have an effective complaints procedure.

I am sure that the United Kingdom position on these issues is well known. But I should like to take a little time to elaborate on one or two of the fundamental aspects of that position. One of the main elements of an adequate verification régime

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would in our view be the establishment of a consultative committee. The committee would, in our view, be most efficient if it were limited in numbers, its composition being drawn from the States parties to the convention. Such a committee would have the central role in the verification régime. Experts from the States parties would be in a position to play a constructive part in ensuring that the convention was being observed. The concept of a multilateral consultative committee also implies a willingness on the part of States parties to share expertise and information, to be open on issues relating to this crucial subject. A high degree of openness, of frank exchange of information between States, will provide a basis of confidence. Indeed, I would go further and say that it is essential to the creation of the climate of confidence which would be necessary for a CW convention to be successfully implemented.

My country has already put forward ideas on what some of the functions of the consultative committee might be. We believe that it should analyse and evaluate reports and information provided by States parties; it should have the power to call for supplementary information as necessary and to conduct inquiries. It would carry out required measures of verification and also conduct on-site and other inspections as provided for in the convention. It would inform all States parties of its findings and it would consult and co-operate with national authorities charged with domestic activities in connection with the fulfilment of the provisions of the convention.

The consultative committee should not merely be a bureaucratic or administrative body, but would also provide a forum for consultation and co-operation between States parties. Through their participation States parties would have confidence in the committee itself; its international membership would mean that it would not represent one particular State or group of States, but would be independent and impartial. None of these provisions would, however, detract from the right of States parties which have complaints to pursue them at a higher political level. But it would be our hope that the procedures for consultation and co-operation would mean that such measures were necessary only in extreme circumstances. In all events, the consultative committee would be a means of fostering the greater openness and confidence between States which the United Kingdom so earnestly desires.

Of course, a consultative committee would not operate on its own. States parties would have rights and obligations too. I have already referred to the need for openness and I should like to set out in a little more detail the form such openness might take. In the first place, States would make declarations on signature of or accession to the Convention. It has been suggested that these declarations could be made prior to signature, perhaps even during the negotiation of a convention. That is a possibility: if any State wished to make such a declaration in advance of a convention I am sure my authorities would welcome it as a sign of increasing confidence and trust. But as was demonstrated in document CD/142, put forward by the Swedish delegation, the position of a State with regard to a CW capability could change very quickly. The United Kingdom therefore believes that the best time for declarations to be made is on the entry into force of the convention, or very shortly thereafter, so that at that time States acceding to it may make available and receive the most up-to-date information.

In our view, these declarations would need to be of a detailed and precise nature. They would need first to say whether a State possessed CW agents, precursors and munitions, and then to give details of the types of agents held and the quantity of

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each type. In addition, the location and types of all production facilities for CW would need to be listed. States would also need to make declarations either at the same time or soon after about the types and quantities of agents to be retained for permitted activities, and the production facilities to be maintained for that purpose. Until all CW stocks and facilities had been destroyed, further periodic declarations would need to be made; in the case of CW agents retained for peaceful purposes, declarations would probably need to be made annually. Such declarations would all be processed by the consultative committee, and would form the basis for their further work in verifying the convention.

The States parties would have various duties in respect of the consultative committee. In participating in the committee, States would be recognizing the value of co-operation. That co-operation would have to extend further than the straightforward exchange of data. There would also need to be provision for a degree of on-site inspection to ensure that the terms of the convention had been and were being complied with, that the declarations made were accurate and that stockpiles had been destroyed and production facilities dismantled. A few countries have considered it regrettable that such measures should be thought necessary. We believe they are needed -- but that they also offer a positive benefit in offering a way for States to remove any lingering doubts and to build confidence. The aim of the verification régime for a CW convention should, we believe, be to ensure that such doubts do not arise, or that if they do arise, they can be promptly allayed. Obviously we cannot hope to police the chemical industries of the world -- the resources required, and the expense, would be immense. But it is right that every consideration should be given to opening to impartial and conscientious inspection those specific areas of activity which could give rise to concern or doubt. If there is nothing to hide, what objection can there be to this?

It has been suggested that inspection would be unacceptable because it would involve a breach of commercial confidence. But I believe members of this Committee will agree that where such potentially fearful weapons are involved, where so much is at stake, we cannot allow ourselves to be deflected by this problem. We can accept that maintaining commercial confidence is important -- but I am sure that ways can be found of ensuring that commercial confidentiality is maintained, while all the steps necessary are taken to enhance the even more vital issue of confidence in a CW convention. The experience of the Federal Republic of Germany in the field of inspections of commercial production facilities will be valuable when detailed consideration is given to this subject. The United Kingdom will be further developing its ideas on this aspect at a later stage.

I should like to turn now to a relatively new concept which has been under serious discussion for the first time this year in the CW Working Group, namely, the Swedish proposal to extend the scope of the treaty to cover areas of offensive CW capability such as planning, organization and training. The ideas of the Swedish delegation are set out in some detail in document CD/142. This is an interesting and far-reaching proposal, although one which also presents a number of difficulties. My authorities are still giving it detailed consideration, but I should like today to offer some preliminary comments.

The banning of what I might describe as the doctrinal, as opposed to the material, elements of an offensive CW capability is not in our view central or fundamental to a CW convention. It is more in the nature of a measure for building confidence -- in this case confidence that a State party will not suddenly abrogate the Convention at some future date. As a first stage, as I understand it, States would make declarations of any aspects of a CW capability they might have. As a second stage, observers would be invited to attend military manoeuvres in general, and

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those involving NBC training in particular. In the latter case, observers would be permitted to monitor electronic communications. In the third stage, States would instruct their armed forces that no further activities specifically connected with the possession of a capability to conduct offensive CW operations were to take place. Finally, there could be provisions for the exchange of information and, most importantly, for on-site inspection of military installations, munitions stockpiles and airfields. That is how we have understood the proposals in CD/142, as elaborated in CD/CW/WP.7.

This is a complex and detailed proposal. The United Kingdom has in the past advocated the use of a confidence-building régime to help States to prepare for a CW convention, and to reassure States about compliance once such a convention has come into being. But the ideas contained in the Swedish paper are of a rather different nature from these earlier proposals, and need very careful thought. The United Kingdom is in favour of some kind of confidence-building régime in connection with a ban on chemical weapons — indeed, we have supported certain earlier proposals in this field. But we need to give this question careful thought. In the first place, I wonder whether the proposals are not too complex for inclusion in a convention the primary and vital function of which would be to prohibit the possession of chemical weapons. The negotiation of a convention limited to this purpose will be a most complicated task, as we have seen from the long discussions in this Committee and from the efforts of the two States members of this Committee which have been involved in bilateral negotiations. We should ask ourselves whether measures over and above those essential to the main function of the convention might not be better treated separately. In this way it might be possible to avoid the penalty of further delays in progress in negotiating a ban on chemical weapons.

Secondly, I think we must ask ourselves what the measures proposed by the Swedish delegation would achieve. Would they in fact build confidence in the treaty régime? We can see that, if all States parties to a convention were sure that all other States parties had entirely ceased all planning, training or organizing in relation to offensive CW operations, confidence would be increased. But, despite the high degree of openness required by the measures proposed in CD/142, we really doubt whether it would ever be possible to be certain that all doctrinal activities related to offensive CW had ceased.

Thirdly, in view of a number of statements already made in the CW Working Group, we think that there must also be some doubt whether the measures proposed would ever be acceptable to a number of States whose accession to a CW convention would be absolutely essential. We would urge that in pursuing negotiations for a CW convention, we would do well to limit ourselves to the basic issue of prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of these weapons.

Finally, I should like to say that the United Kingdom welcomes the work that has been done in the Ad Hoc Working Group during this session. In particular, we have found the Chairman's set of working papers particularly useful in structuring the discussion of this important subject. We feel, however, that the Working Group has not had sufficient opportunity to discuss these papers as fully as is needed, let alone arrive at firm conclusions. We shall be able to take advantage of the forthcoming recess to give further consideration to a number of important points and will hope to be able to make further detailed contributions in the next part of the session.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Summerhayes, for his statement as well as for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. SKINNER (Canada): Mr. Chairman, in 1974, Canada placed before the CCD, in document CCD/434 a preliminary account of its experience in the disposal of chemical weapons supplies which had remained from the Second World War. It is our intention today to bring the Committee on Disarmament up to date on this process by tabling a paper entitled "Disposal of chemical agents" (CD/173), which provides further details.

Canada believes that this paper will contribute to the substantive discussions we have had during this concentrated period of attention on chemical weapons and problems related to the conclusion of an eventual convention. Within this context we believe therefore, that the problems of stockpile destruction and the verification of such destruction are real enough to warrant the tabling of such a paper.

The Canadian paper also contains a brief survey of agent destruction methods. These indicate the variety of processes which may be involved and the complex nature of the sampling techniques and chemical analyses which would be necessary if intensive verification procedures are required to prove the quantity and identity of the material destroyed on a continuous basis.

In concluding my statement on tabling this paper, I would like to note that its content is technical. We believe that, wherever feasible, technical matters such as are contained in this paper should be brought before this forum to serve as a solid base upon which we can build further progress in the demanding field of arms control and disarmament.

Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, permit me to express to you the sincere congratulations of my delegation on your assumption of the post of Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of April. Your wealth of experience in diplomacy will be of considerable value to the Committee, and my delegation pledges its full support. I should also like to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Herder, for the tremendous work he carried out in the long month of March.

The many interventions the Committee has heard both from members and from observers is a testimony to the importance attached to item 4 on our agenda. Next only to nuclear weapons, chemical weapons constitute the most dangerous weapons of mass destruction. This view was also noted by the delegation of Finland at one of our meetings.

The latest General Assembly resolution on this issue, resolution 35/144 B, in its paragraph 3, urges the Committee on Disarmament to continue, as from the beginning of its session to be held in 1981, negotiations on a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction as a matter of high priority, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives. This carefully negotiated wording does not fully reflect the deep concern of international opinion that a chemical weapons convention has not been achieved to date.

It is pertinent to recall that in the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, the General Assembly called upon the Committee on Disarmament to exert all efforts urgently with a view to reaching agreement, and to submit agreed texts where possible before the second special session devoted to disarmament on a treaty on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

The problem of achieving a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons has been with us for a long time. The Committee has, since setting up a Working Group on Chemical Weapons last year, made considerable progress in clarifying many of the elements that should go into an agreement on the effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction. In this connection tribute should be accorded to Ambassador Lidgard for his energetic chairmanship. Ample materials and working papers are available for the Ad Hoc Working Group to commence a new phase of serious negotiations on this item. A convention will not be concluded unless negotiations on a text are commenced by the Working Group on this subject. A broadened mandate for the Working Group is now due.

I should recall the recognition so clearly stated in the eighth paragraph of the preamble to the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, that the Convention represented a first step towards the achievement of agreement on effective measures for a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

Obviously, one of the important issues in reaching agreement on a chemical weapons convention is verification. The presence of many experts in various delegations over the last two weeks has resulted in effective consideration of this topic and some interesting working papers have emerged, among which was CD/167 from Canada, which deserves careful study.

My delegation shares the view which found expression in paragraph 11 of the USSR-United States joint report on the progress in the bilateral negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons (document CD/112) that a combination of national and international means of verification should be embodied in any proposed convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Obviously the nature and combination of this dual verification system has to be more fully negotiated. We believe this can be done in the next phase of negotiations in the Working Group. We note the convergence of views on the technical feasibility of certain means of verification, though there is the problem of the amount of intrusion to be permitted. In this context the statement of Professor Pfirschke of the Federal Republic of Germany is quite instructive. He stated in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons on 1 April 1981:

"The Chemical industry of my country, which is the fourth largest in the world, has been subject to on-site inspection for a quarter of a century, without having to reveal production secrets."

This view should go a long way to allay the fears of those States which are apprehensive of the intrusive nature of on-site inspection.

My delegation attaches importance to the destruction of weapon stocks in a CW convention. On-site inspection for this activity is vital since national technical means carried out by national agencies will not give sufficient assurance and confidence to other parties to the convention and additional means may therefore be required.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

The declaration of existing stocks and production facilities is also a vital ingredient in an effective instrument. My delegation believes that signature of the convention by a State that possesses chemical weapons should be accompanied by a declaration of stocks and production facilities and if necessary by negative declarations by those States which do not possess stocks and production facilities. Once the convention enters into force, these production facilities should be dismantled. Conversion of production facilities, even if economically viable, would create grave verification problems, and possibly suspicions. Furthermore, once the convention enters into force, steps should be taken to commence the destruction of stockpiles so that they will be completely destroyed within the time-frame agreed upon in the convention. That time-frame will no doubt be the subject of negotiations in the next phase of the task of the Working Group.

The time-frame, as well as the link between the new convention and the 1925 Protocol, should have a bearing on the level of protective activities to be permitted by the convention. Notwithstanding the fact that the 1925 Protocol did prohibit the use of chemical weapons, my delegation sees no legal or other difficulty in including a ban on use in the proposed chemical weapons convention. Such a provision in our view will further strengthen the 1925 Protocol and will be relevant particularly since, even if the ban on production is immediate, these weapons will still be retained in the period between the coming into force of the convention and the time-frame for total destruction. We also share the views expressed by Australia on this issue. The only justification for defensive activities after the coming into force of the convention seems to my delegation to be the retention of chemical weapons by those who possess them for some time after the convention is in force. However, these defensive activities should not be permitted beyond the agreed time-frame for the destruction of all stockpiles.

Let me conclude with the words of the distinguished representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador Richard Fein. Addressing the Committee yesterday, 2 April 1981, he recalled the 1974 joint communique in which the Presidents of the United States and the Soviet Union reaffirmed their interest in an effective international instrument which would exclude from the arsenals of States such dangerous instruments of mass destruction as chemical weapons. "It is our sincere hope," Ambassador Fein said, "that the same political courage and the same political wisdom will soon again prevail and lead to our common goal, a chemical weapons convention."

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Nigeria for his statement as well as for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. FLOWERREE (United States of America): I have asked for the floor for two reasons. My first point, Mr. Chairman, is simply to note that while my delegation has not objected to the proposed topic for our informal meeting on 6 April devoted to item 1 of our agenda as contained in your statement yesterday morning, the contribution which the United States delegation will be able to make continues to be constrained by factors which I have explained on several occasions during this session.

(Mr. Flowerree, United States)

Secondly, I should like, on behalf of my delegation and my Government, to record our appreciation for the many expressions of sympathy that have come from all quarters of this Committee following the assassination attempt on President Reagan. We were particularly touched by the genuine concern evident in these expressions and are as relieved and pleased as we know you are that the President is apparently making such a splendid recovery.

The CHAIRMAN: Before adjourning the plenary meeting, I should like to suggest that we hold a short informal meeting afterwards to discuss a few pending procedural questions. If there are no objections, I shall consider that the Committee is prepared to continue its work informally.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next plenary meeting of the Committee will be held on Tuesday, 7 April 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 5.15 p.m.

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