

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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21 August 1981

ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

APPENDIX III

VOLUME II

Index of Statements by Country and Subject
and Verbatim Records of the Committee on Disarmament
in 1981

CD/PV.107
17 February 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 17 February 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. F. de la Gorce (France)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. SALAH-BEY
Mr. M. MATI

Argentina: Mr. F. JIMENEZ DAVILA
Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD

Australia: Mr. R.A. WALKER
Mr. R. STEELE
Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. J.-M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. R. DEYANOV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U THAN HPUN
U NGWE WIN

Canada: Mr. G. SKINNER
Mr. B. THACKER

China: Mr. YU Peiwen
Mr. YU Mengjia
Mrs. WANG Zhiyun
Mr. PAN Jusheng

Cuba: Mrs. V. BOROWDOSKY JACKIEWICH

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. RUZEK
Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. A. CIMA
Mr. L. STAVINOHA

Egypt: Mr. E.S.A.R. EL REEDY
Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M.N. FAHMY
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Mr. P. BUNTIG

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. H. MÜLLER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. C. GYORFFY
Mr. A. LAKATOS

India: Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. E. SOEPRAPTO
Mr. KARYONO
Mr. F. QASIM
Mr. HARYOMATARAM

Iran: Mr. D. AMERI

Italy: Mr. V. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO
Mr. A. CIARRAPICO
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. R. ISHII
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya: Mr. S. SHITEMI
Mr. G.N. MUNIU

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mr. M.A. CACERES

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. S.-O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. O. ADENIJI
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. S. KONIK
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. M. MALITA
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. S. STROMBACK
Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. V.A. SEMLONOV
Mr. L.A. NJUMOV
Mr. V.A. PERFILIEV
Mr. L.S. MOSHKOV
Mr. V.M. GAIJA
Mr. V.V. LOSHCHININE
Mr. A.G. DOULYAN
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES
Mr. N.H. MARSHALL
Mrs. J.I. LINK

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. FLOWERREE
Mr. L.R. FLEISCHER
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. J.A. MISKEL
Mr. H. WILSON
Mr. S. FITZGERALD

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT
Mr. O.A. AGUILAR
Miss G. DA SILVA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC
Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. N.D. BWANDA
Mr. C. GNOK

Secretary of the Committee
and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I should like first of all to express our pleasure in welcoming among us Mr. Sytenko, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Security Council Affairs, who is visiting us today. I wish him an interesting stay in Geneva, and useful contacts with the members of the Committee on Disarmament.

I should now like, with your permission, to put before you for nomination as Chairmen of the ad hoc working groups we have already decided to set up, the following names:

For the Ad Hoc Working Group on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, Mr. Ciarrapico, Minister Plenipotentiary, of Italy;

For the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden;

For the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, Ambassador Komives of Hungary;

For the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, Ambassador García Robles of Mexico.

In the absence of observations I will take it that there is a consensus in the Committee on the nomination of these persons to the chairmanships of the working groups and would offer our colleagues the warm congratulations of the Committee and assure them of our full confidence and our best wishes for the complete success of the work they will be called upon to guide.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I would remind you that according to the programme of work set out in document CD/144, the Committee ought today to begin considering item 1 of its agenda, nuclear test ban. As you know, this programme is in no way binding and under our rules of procedure delegations are at all times free to refer to other items on the agenda.

Mr. PALIHAKKARA (Sri Lanka): Mr. Chairman, may I, at the outset, join the previous speakers in expressing the great pleasure of my delegation to see you in the Chair of our Committee. I am confident that your proven efficiency and skill will guide the work of the Committee in a most constructive manner, and I wish to pledge to you the fullest co-operation of my delegation.

May I also take this opportunity to express the appreciation of my delegation to your predecessor, Ambassador Terrefe of Ethiopia who very ably guided the work of the Committee during the last month of the 1980 session. My delegation also wishes to join the other delegations in welcoming the new heads of the delegations of Egypt, Pakistan, Romania and Zaire.

The 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament which you declared open two weeks ago will be its last full session before the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament scheduled for 1982. As we enter the Second Disarmament Decade and the third year of the CD's endeavours in disarmament,

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negotiations, it is evident that the international community's anxiety over the danger of nuclear holocaust has not been dispelled to any considerable degree. On the contrary, we are witnessing continued developments in qualitative improvements to existing nuclear explosive devices and their delivery systems which, according to the "Comprehensive study on nuclear weapons" submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session already possess "an energy greater than that of all conventional explosives ever used since gunpowder was invented", not to speak of their fall-out effects, which will condemn the human race to gradual and painful disintegration. Pronouncements by nuclear Powers of their commitment to disarmament notwithstanding, these refinements of instruments of death and catastrophe and ever-spiralling expenditure of human and other resources on armaments, particularly nuclear armaments, have seriously eroded the credibility of these pronouncements. As the Secretary-General of the United Nations in his message to this Committee has stated, "the goal of disarmament remains as elusive as ever". We also hear of "concepts" which advocate the waging of "limited nuclear wars" that can be won. How such theories are conceivable is beyond imagination, for it has been proved beyond any doubt by Hiroshima, Nagasaki and subsequent test explosions that no barrier will stand in the way of nuclear blast and subsequent contamination. We are up against an absolute weapon, the unleashing of which, however limited that may appear to those who advocate it, will leave neither the victor nor the vanquished and therefore does not serve any realistic political or military purpose. The only purpose such a "feasible" nuclear war would serve could be a precipitation of a global nuclear conflagration with unprecedented destruction and misery for mankind. Nuclear deterrence and the further refining of it, which we see today, are said to be required for the national security of major nuclear Powers. This concept of security, which is claimed to assure the security of a country or a few countries by increasing the anxiety and insecurity of a vast majority of other nations, will not be justified or acceptable to the international community. The international community, in the words of the Final Document of the United Nations General Assembly's first special session devoted to disarmament, had already declared unanimously that "the increase in weapons, especially nuclear weapons, far from helping to strengthen international security, on the contrary weakens it. The vast stockpiles and tremendous build-up of arms and armed forces and the competition for qualitative refinement of weapons of all kinds, to which scientific resources and technological advances are diverted, pose incalculable threats to peace".

The United Nations General Assembly, at its thirty-fifth session recently concluded, adopted no less than 43 resolutions on matters relating to disarmament, of which, 17 resolutions call for specific action by the Committee on Disarmament. As the detailed analysis presented by the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico in his statement would indicate, these resolutions also set out priorities for the current session of the Committee in carrying out substantive negotiations in order to achieve progress towards solving the most pressing problem of mankind.

We are all aware of the set-backs suffered by détente and SALT II and we can only hope that many years of painstaking efforts will not be reversed. This situation will make the responsibility of our Committee, the only multilateral body engaged in disarmament negotiations, that much greater because there is no viable alternative to disarmament.

It is in this context that my delegation has been looking forward to tangible progress in substantive negotiations during the 1981 session of our Committee. While I do not wish to minimize the importance of the procedural and organizational tasks accomplished, it would be true to say that the last two years of the

(Mr. Palihakkara, Sri Lanka)

Committee's work have not presented the international community with a substantially significant achievement towards effective disarmament. In this connection, last year's session proved to be most educative. It proved the value of ad hoc working groups as the best available mechanisms for concrete negotiations within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament and that, given the necessary time, the working groups are capable of advancing substantive negotiations in an effective manner as was noticed towards the end of last year's session.

It is a matter for satisfaction that the Committee has already been able to take the decision, without much delay, that the four ad hoc working groups should resume work on the basis of their former mandates, a solution which became possible through your able guidance and the flexibility displayed by all delegations concerned in order to expedite substantive work. It is to be hoped that the same approach and spirit will prevail during the remaining part of our session, particularly with regard to the setting up of two new working groups, on two very important items on our agenda for the 1981 session, namely, a comprehensive test-ban treaty and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Last year, the Committee spent valuable time on lengthy procedural and other deliberations, time which the Committee can ill afford in view of the urgency and the nature of the task it is entrusted with. As the distinguished leader of the Swedish delegation mentioned in her statement, the time factor is not in our favour. This is not merely because the Committee has to make a report to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament in 1982 but purely because of the dire necessity and urgency of the task before it. The danger of continued and rapid developments in weapon technology, particularly nuclear weapon technology, outpacing the negotiation process and the influence of such developments on so-called defence policies are realities which should guide the Committee's work towards speedy and concrete progress in negotiations.

Moreover, the world military expenditure has now reached a staggering \$500 billion a year and present trends point towards further escalation of this expenditure. The more we delay in achieving tangible progress towards genuine disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, the more will be invested in destruction, thus siphoning away the vital resources needed elsewhere for economic development and the elimination of hunger and disease. As the distinguished leader of the Swedish delegation has pointed out, the doomsday clock has moved closer to zero hour, a movement which symbolizes the urgency with which this Committee, the single multilateral negotiation forum for disarmament, has to discharge its enormous responsibility.

As regards our agenda, the first item on it for the 1981 session is the nuclear test ban, a subject which has been under consideration in various forums for more than 25 years and on which the General Assembly has adopted more than 40 resolutions, reflecting the international community's impatience over the failure on the part of nuclear-weapon States to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty. This was in spite of the undertaking to seek the achievement of "the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time" given by three nuclear-weapon States in the partial test-ban Treaty, which was reiterated again in the non-proliferation Treaty of 1968. One need hardly stress the utmost importance of a comprehensive test-ban treaty towards preventing qualitative improvements in existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of weapons as well as maintaining a viable non-proliferation régime. As regards the so-called inadequacy of existing verification measures relating to monitoring of test explosions, the international community will no longer believe that to be a major obstacle or an excuse for further delay in embarking on negotiations towards a CTBT. Suffice it to mention here that the General Assembly, at its thirty-fifth session, recalled in resolution 35/145 A, a

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resolution which was co-sponsored by Sri Lanka, "that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve final agreement, that when the existing means of verification are taken into account, it is difficult to understand further delay in achieving agreement on an underground test ban and that the potential risks of continuing underground nuclear-weapon tests would far outweigh any possible risks from ending such tests". Resolution 35/145 B requests the Committee on Disarmament to take the necessary steps, including the establishment of a working group, to initiate substantive negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty as a matter of the highest priority, which the Group of 21 has been emphasizing time and again in this Committee. It is to be hoped that the nuclear-weapon States will contribute to the consensus necessary to establish an ad hoc working group on a CTBT, a contribution which will no doubt give some credibility to nuclear-weapon States' commitment to disarmament and also to the role of the Committee on Disarmament as the single multilateral body for disarmament negotiations.

The cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament is the other important item on our agenda on which action to initiate substantive negotiations is still pending. It is also an item to which the General Assembly, in its resolution 35/152 B, has attached high priority for negotiations upon the resumption of the CD's work in 1981. During the last session of the Committee, the Group of 21 submitted a proposal calling for the establishment of an ad hoc working group on this subject, the necessity of which was reiterated by the General Assembly in its resolution 35/152 C. It is the hope of my delegation that an ad hoc working group will now be established by this Committee, in order to "involve" itself in substantive negotiations on issues relating to the cessation of the arms race and nuclear disarmament.

My delegation does not intend to dwell at length on each agenda item at this stage. With regard to other items on our agenda, it is encouraging that within a relatively short time, the Committee was able to take the decision that the four ad hoc working groups on a comprehensive programme of disarmament, security assurances, chemical weapons and radiological weapons should resume their work. It is to be hoped that the degree of flexibility and desire for tangible progress expressed by many delegations during the last two weeks will prevail and contribute towards achieving further progress on the basis of a convergence of views and the constructive work accomplished in these areas last year.

Many delegations have made reference to the strained international relations which are apparent today and which, one might say, create circumstances hardly auspicious for disarmament negotiations. My delegation would only say that these, paradoxically, are the very circumstances which should provide the impetus to pursue more resolutely the negotiations in this Committee for the reason that we have no other choice. To quote those oft-quoted words of the United Nations General Assembly: "Mankind is confronted with a choice: we must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation". Given the necessary political will of all concerned, that of the nuclear-weapon Powers in particular, this Committee has the tools to accomplish its task.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka for his statement and I should also like to thank him for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. EL REEDY (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin my first statement in this Committee by expressing our high esteem for you personally. In addition to the respect in which we hold your distinguished country, France, my colleagues and I in the Egyptian delegation have observed your endeavours and have seen that you possess the best talents and capabilities needed to direct the work of this Committee successfully during its first and always difficult stage. I would also like to take this opportunity to express my delegation's gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador Tadesse Terrefe, the representative of Ethiopia and previous Chairman of this Committee.

Please also allow me to express my gratitude to you and to my colleagues who welcomed me as my country's representative in this distinguished Committee. I assure you that my colleagues and I are looking forward to co-operating with you and will do our utmost to ensure the success of our work and the fulfilment of our task.

My delegation has listened to the important statements made in this Committee during the past two weeks, containing information and ideas which confirm only too clearly the seriousness of the present situation resulting from the alarming continuation of the arms race, particularly in the field of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, at a time when achievements in the field of disarmament or the cessation or control of the arms race are insignificant, not to say non-existent.

There is no need for me to add to what has already been said in this respect. Nor is there any need for me to re-emphasize Egypt's staunch and continuing role in the endeavours to put an end to the arms race in general and to the nuclear arms race in particular. Egypt's role has been well known from the very beginning, when this subject was first discussed in United Nations forums and at the numerous international conferences, beginning with the Bandung Conference of 1955 which gave rise to the Non-Aligned Movement whose twentieth anniversary we are currently celebrating, all of which played a pioneering role in this respect.

Several distinguished colleagues have already discussed the theories underlying the policies of the nuclear-weapon States in their constant attempts to win nuclear superiority, together with the dangerous implications of this race, which can never reach a reasonable conclusion and which is now threatening not only the parties participating therein but also every living being on this earth since the shadow of nuclear war is a terrifying spectre for everyone and the dangers of nuclear armament no longer recognize political or continental boundaries.

It might be appropriate to refer to the last meeting of the Pugwash Conference held at Breukelen in the Netherlands in August of last year. That Conference, which was attended by a select group of international scientists and thinkers, reached the following conclusions:

"1. It is a fallacy to believe that nuclear war can be limited in quantity or quality, or even that nuclear war can be won.

2. It is a fallacy to believe that, in nuclear war, Civil Defence can provide a chance of survival of the community.

(Mr. El Reedy, Egypt)

3. It is a fallacy to believe that a counterforce strategy can destroy the retaliatory capacity of the other side. (Even if it were to become technically feasible to destroy all fixed land-based missiles of the adversary, this would leave submarine and aircraft-carried weapons.)
4. It is a fallacy to claim that parity in nuclear weapons is necessary for effective deterrence."

On the other hand, if the funds and human and natural resources currently devoted to armament, with all its implications in the way of environmental imbalance, were utilized for purposes of socio-economic development, they could eliminate poverty and hunger throughout the world and ensure a better life for mankind at a time when we are facing difficulties and obstacles in the establishment of a new and equitable international economic order which would give the developing countries an opportunity to escape from the circle of poverty and backwardness. In this respect, we look forward to the study which is being prepared by the Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. We hope that that study will contain specific practical proposals for the re-channelling of resources from military to development purposes.

It has become clear that mankind is today facing a new and unprecedented phenomenon, namely, man's possession of the means of self-destruction. This phenomenon is the basic cause of the present international crisis which is not only manifested in the absence of security and stability and the deterioration of economic conditions, especially in the countries of the third world, but also involves the survival and continuance of the human race on earth.

Although, on a serious and important subject such as this, we do not wish to apportion blame hastily among any particular States, from an impartial standpoint the responsibility for putting an end to this trend lies primarily with those who possess, develop and produce nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction. Consequently, it is also their responsibility to lead the way by taking effective steps and measures to halt the frantic arms race and by taking real measures for disarmament.

Many of my colleagues here have already spoken of the relationship between the adoption of radical measures to save the world from the arms race and the prevailing international climate. Although it is, of course, impossible to differentiate between these two issues, we are among those who believe that the international situation should not be used as an excuse for failure to take decisive measures to halt the arms race or for the renunciation of agreements already concluded. However, we also believe in the importance of efforts to create an appropriate international climate through respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States and for non-interference in their internal affairs. In this context, the military intervention in Afghanistan was, and still is, a negative factor in the shaping of the current international climate.

I have already referred to our fundamental positions regarding efforts for the achievement of disarmament and the need for the major Powers to curtail and put an end to the nuclear danger and to use the new energy for the greater good and

(Mr. El Reedy, Egypt)

happiness of mankind. In this connection, Egypt was among the first States to call for the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Egypt played a basic role in the preparatory negotiations and subsequently signed the Treaty on the first day on which it was opened for signature, namely, 1 July 1968. Egypt continued its support for the non-proliferation system and participated in all the endeavours aimed at the establishment of an effective system of guarantees within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, including the two review conferences held in 1975 and in the summer of last year.

Today I have pleasure in announcing that the Egyptian Government has requested the legislative institutions to approve ratification of the non-proliferation Treaty and this question is currently being studied by both the People's Assembly and the Advisory Council in Egypt. On this occasion, I would like to express my gratitude to Mrs. Inga Thorsson, the representative of Sweden, and to Ambassador Okawa, Ambassador of Japan, for their kind words welcoming the Egyptian measures in this respect.

In taking this step, the Egyptian Government hopes that it will be an incentive to the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their pledges to halt the nuclear arms race, to achieve nuclear disarmament in accordance with the provisions of article VI of the Treaty and to put a final and total end to nuclear tests. The termination of such tests is not only an urgent requirement for mankind and the environment but would also constitute a fundamental step towards the curbing of the nuclear arms race.

Egypt is also paying special attention to the undertaking, under the terms of article IV of the Treaty, on the part of States Parties in a position to do so, to contribute to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

We also see that Security Council resolution 255 is still, in effect, unable to provide a real guarantee of the non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States against non-nuclear-weapon States. In this connection, I would like to take this opportunity to record our special interest in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances which we hope will be able to conclude its work in an effective manner, which we believe will help to support the system of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and will constitute a major step towards the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and towards nuclear disarmament.

The implementation of these measures is in keeping with the basic principles formulated by the General Assembly for the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and, in particular, the principle of a balance of responsibilities and duties between States possessing nuclear weapons and States which do not possess such weapons, and the principle that the Treaty should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, in particular, nuclear disarmament.

In view of the dangers posed by the nuclear arms race, and being convinced that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will more effectively achieve its goals and objectives through the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world, we believe that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and in Africa is a matter of vital importance.

(Mr. El Reedy, Egypt)

It was to this end that our initiative was taken during the last session of the United Nations General Assembly through General Assembly resolution 35/147, adopted by consensus of the countries of the Middle East, as a first step towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, and which called upon those countries solemnly to declare their support for the achievement of this goal, to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or possessing nuclear weapons or permitting them to be stationed on their territory and to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. The resolution also called for those declarations to be deposited with the Security Council.

It is our belief that adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty by all countries of the region, their implementation of the General Assembly resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and support by the nuclear-weapon States for those steps would avert the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in this important and sensitive part of the world, thereby helping to promote peace, security and prosperity for mankind as a whole.

This session is being held at a crossroads with regard to United Nations endeavours to achieve general and complete disarmament. It is taking place at the end of the first United Nations Disarmament Decade, which unfortunately has not produced tangible results, and also at the beginning of the Second Disarmament Decade. At the same time, as noted by several of my colleagues, it is the last plenary session of the Committee before the holding of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We therefore have a special responsibility to do our utmost to achieve definite and positive results during the current session.

In this regard, I am in agreement with those who believe that the Committee must set to work immediately, get to the core of the issues under consideration, resume its work from the point at which it was left last year and overcome any obstacles that may arise, including those relating to the review of the tasks of the working groups. At the same time, we believe that there is a need to establish two other working groups on the complete discontinuance of nuclear tests and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and that these two groups should be established as a matter of urgency in view of the fact that these two issues are among the extremely important issues to which the Committee must turn its attention and in which it must achieve real progress.

Since the Committee on Disarmament has an important function and a considerable responsibility with regard to the achievement of tangible progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, the prohibition of nuclear tests and the provision of effective guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States, we are also duty-bound to make a serious endeavour to conclude an agreement on the prohibition of the production, development and stockpiling of chemical weapons in view of the special priority which the international community has assigned to the prohibition of such weapons. In the framework of its preparations for the second special session of the General Assembly, the Committee must also formulate a comprehensive programme of disarmament which we hope will be of a practical and specific nature with regard to the timing of its implementation.

It is my belief that there is nothing more serious than the task assigned to us here by the international community. We must begin this session with hope and with the aim of achieving tangible results.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Egypt for his statement and I should like to express to him my warm gratitude for his very friendly words about myself and also -- I was very touched by them -- about my country.

Mr. SALAH-BEY (Algeria) (translated from French): Allow me, on behalf of my delegation and of myself personally, to offer you my sincere congratulations on the occasion of your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee for the month of February.

You represent a country with which Algeria maintains close and fruitful relations, both for historical reasons and as a neighbour.

The Chairman's personal role at the start of this Committee's work can be a highly influential one, when, as in your case, he enjoys wide diplomatic experience, constructive savoir-faire and also the confidence of his colleagues.

Allow me to suggest that your personal intervention was partly responsible for the positive start that has been made in our work.

I should also like to address my warm and friendly congratulations to Ambassador Tereffe, the representative of Ethiopia, who successfully completed the delicate task of presiding over the concluding stages of our work at the last session.

The Committee on Disarmament has some new members and it is my pleasant duty to welcome the Ambassadors of Egypt, Zaire, Pakistan and Romania.

It has become almost a tradition to describe and assess the international situation at the moment when the Committee on Disarmament resumes its work. To say that the state of international relations could be more satisfactory would be an understatement. Is the situation worse now or is it the same as at the beginning of 1980? We did not meet here to discuss this point, but it would be unrealistic to ignore the reality of the international relations against the background of which the discussions and efforts with a view to disarmament must necessarily take place.

Some use the aggravation of international tensions as an argument to justify enhanced efforts to secure qualitative improvements and quantitative increases in the means of mass destruction.

We cannot agree with such an approach, which would have an immediate paralysing effect on the entire international effort towards disarmament. It seems to us that it is precisely when things seem most difficult that our efforts to slow down and halt the arms race should be greatest.

In order to see how specious is the reasoning that seeks to justify an increase in efforts to arm by the aggravation of international tension, we have only to ask ourselves the following question: has there ever been a reduction in armaments when there was a relaxation of international tension? The answer to this question is unfortunately in the negative, for the countries or military alliances concerned are always preparing for the next period of tension with the presumed enemy. Thus the relationship between the international climate and the strengthening of capacities for mass destruction is a one-way relationship, and the realistic approach is not to wait for a hypothetical relaxation of international tensions but to get to work

(Mr. Salah-Bey, Algeria)

truly on what is primarily responsible for maintaining those tensions, namely, the more and more advanced research in the matter of weapons of mass destruction, their accelerated production, their incessant testing and their stockpiling-- all of which maintain the upward spiral which has been called the "balance of terror".

If we are all agreed in considering this situation truly "terrible", how can we fail to be outraged at the waste of the absolutely prodigious resources, financial, technical and intellectual, that are expended on perfecting this terror day by day, and on augmenting not only its dimensions but also its quality?

As for the question whether the terror is equal on both sides, perusal of the numerous studies devoted to this subject leaves us in doubt. The possibilities for appraisal appear extremely subjective, and when the human mind's capacity for evaluation and reasoning proves too weak or too slow to supply a reliable judgement, then the computer is used and this, as a number of recent incidents have shown, is subject to breakdowns and false alarms.

In the last analysis, the concept of balance or parity in the sphere of weapons of mass destruction seems to us illusory, inasmuch as the arms race feeds on its own absurd logic and is sustained by its own dynamics in the insane hope of reaching a level of absolute terror-- which can, of course, only be proven by testing in real-life conditions.

The idea entertained in certain quarters that a new nuclear war, whether limited or not, can be waged and won is not only extraordinarily dangerous because of the risks it imposes on mankind but also logically unacceptable because it is based on the assumption that the adversary's response will remain within rational limits. There is no need to be a great theoretician to foresee that, when that stage has been reached, the behaviour of the opposing camps will defy all the laws of rationality that we are today in a position to identify.

Furthermore, the hypothesis of a nuclear war, even if limited, is of concern not only to the countries directly involved but also to the countries and regions in the vicinity of the theatre of operations and even those more distant from it. It is doubtful whether the weapons of destruction in existence today will respect the frontiers which States have agreed on to mark the areas of their sovereignty.

And apart from the question of the responsibility of Governments, the peoples of the world, and especially those in the poorest regions, are entitled to demand the cessation of an arms race that is as absurd as it is costly, while a large part of humanity is still living in hunger and want.

These, in my delegation's view, are the most cogent arguments for our speeding up our work and seeking better means of making headway towards genuine disarmament.

Three or perhaps four sessions of the Committee on Disarmament separate us from the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Thus we have an opportunity to evaluate the progress made within our Committee as well as that which may be achieved by the 1982 deadline. Of course that date should not be regarded as completely ineluctable. But when it arrives, how will the States members of the Committee on Disarmament be able to reconcile themselves with the thought that their work has not led to any real progress towards effective disarmament measures?

(Mr. Salah-Bey, Algeria)

Responsibility for such a failure would be principally imputable to those of the States members of this Committee which, possessing nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction, had been unable to agree on ways and means of limiting the level of their destructive capabilities and perhaps reducing them until they had completely disappeared. Moral responsibility would also rest, however, although to a lesser extent, on all the non-aligned and neutral countries which had failed to find the means of persuasion, of pressure, even, sufficient to impose reasonable measures that would have led us towards effective disarmament.

The non-possession of nuclear weapons cannot be regarded as the ultimately convincing argument for giving up efforts aimed at their non-utilization, even experimentally.

My delegation therefore feels that the responsibility of each State member of the Committee on Disarmament is engaged in the efforts that must be made and the measures that must be taken if we are to achieve progress in the accomplishment of the task that has been entrusted to us.

The initiation of our work at this session has taken place in an atmosphere more promising than the one that prevailed at the opening of our first session for the year 1980. My delegation has had occasion to express its disappointment at the procedural wrangles which bedevilled many of the Committee's meetings. We were not convinced of the practical usefulness of such discussions then and we are no more convinced of it today. My delegation will therefore oppose any attempt to provoke in our Committee discussions unrelated to the central theme of our deliberations, disarmament.

Allow me now to turn to more specific issues. Without attaching disproportionate importance to the decision taken by the Committee last year to set up four working groups, it must be recognized that this measure has been of practical value. How, in fact, could the Committee have organized its work on specific issues otherwise than by confining within a negotiated and well-defined framework the approach to the subjects for negotiations which appear on its agenda? My delegation would have wished the working groups in question to resume their meetings without awaiting the outcome of new discussions on their terms of reference. We would still like to express the hope that the four working groups may resume their work immediately, while the Committee is discussing the possibility of new mandates for them.

At the last session the group known as the Group of 21 proposed that two working groups should be set up for the purpose of discussing, respectively, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and a nuclear test ban.

We feel that the over-all credibility of the Committee on Disarmament will remain in question until substantial progress has been achieved towards the establishment of working groups responsible for negotiating effective measures in those two fields.

Bearing in mind the guidance and priorities given to the Committee on Disarmament by the General Assembly, and bearing in mind also the need for an organization of our work which, because of its volume, must be spread over several sessions, we consider that the Committee should concentrate its efforts on a small number of questions on which we can reasonably hope to make significant progress. It seems to us that only by achieving a measurable advance in certain areas of disarmament shall we be able

(Mr. Salah-Bey, Algeria)

to communicate an atmosphere of serious negotiations to other areas where the very idea of negotiations appears impossible today. In other words, we must create the conditions conducive to the establishment of a trend in the opposite direction from the present frantic race towards the illusory goal of superiority based on terror.

The progress made towards a convention on chemical weapons means that we are already in a position to identify points of convergence and areas where divergencies still exist. The generally positive spirit in which the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons conducted its work at the last session augurs well for a favourable conclusion at what we hope will be the earliest possible date.

The priority accorded by the General Assembly to the preparation and conclusion of a treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear tests seems to us entirely correct. Only the political will of the States concerned by such a measure to commit themselves to a constructive line of action can really prove their readiness to negotiate genuine measures of disarmament. The persistence of the present situation, in which nuclear tests continue not only to threaten the future of mankind through their unpredictable consequences but also to increase the existing potentials for destruction, can only put off further and further the day when reason may finally prevail over the will to dominate.

The trilateral negotiations which are taking place outside the Committee on Disarmament and about which the Committee was kept informed last year do not seem to have made appreciable progress. My delegation wishes to express the two-fold hope that the discussions will yield more promising results than they have done up to now, and that the Committee on Disarmament will, at the very least, be kept informed of the progress of these negotiations.

Failing progress as regards the cessation of nuclear tests and the nuclear arms race, the non-nuclear-weapon States must be given effective assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. At the Committee's first session we said that the assurances in question could not be accompanied by restrictions. We continue to uphold the view that the assurances must be given without conditions or restrictions, particularly to non-nuclear-weapon States which pursue a line of foreign policy independent of the alliances organized around the principal nuclear-weapon powers. As a member of the non-aligned movement, Algeria attaches special importance to the conclusion of effective arrangements that would really prevent the nuclear-weapon States from carrying their military superiority into the political field.

The possibility of progress in the negotiations on the elaboration of a treaty on chemical weapons, developments in the positions of the States concerned with regard to the cessation of nuclear tests, and the defining of assurances acceptable to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of use of such weapons in respect of them -- these, in my delegation's view, are the points on which genuine negotiations on the cessation of the race to develop nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction and on general and complete disarmament could be based.

My delegation will adopt a flexible attitude, however, as regards the precise order of the various stages of the negotiations which should take place within the Committee on Disarmament, provided there is evidence of a genuine desire to seek to resolve the vast and innumerable difficulties that lie before us rather than a continuing preference for sterile debates and empty oratory.

(Mr. Salah-Bey, Algeria)

At this stage in my statement I feel that it might be useful to emphasize once again the particular importance which my delegation attaches to the preservation of the fundamental character of the Committee on Disarmament. The Committee must remain, as its terms of reference indicate, a body for genuine negotiations based on the equal participation of all the States of which it is composed. There is little need to add that we shall applaud any progress that may be made by the great Powers towards disarmament in forums other than that of our Committee. Nevertheless, we think it would be dangerous for the international institutions created by those same Powers if their organs could not fulfil the tasks entrusted to them because they were stricken by paralysis as a result of the attitude of the Powers in question.

Allow me to express the fear that the Committee on Disarmament is threatened by yet another danger. My delegation refuses to accept the idea of a body turned in upon itself and closed to the outside world. One of the great contradictions of our time is that the population of our planet, while generally aware of the dangers of mass destruction threatening it, has come to accept not only the present situation but also the probability that it will continue to worsen. It is true that, beyond a certain level, the worsening of the nuclear threat loses practical significance. Nevertheless, voices are raised to reject the inevitability of nuclear war.

The members of the Committee on Disarmament will not succeed in accomplishing the task entrusted to them if the voices raised against the very idea of a nuclear war do not find their echo in our deliberations.

The theme of our discussions covers vast areas whose complexity and gravity in part explain the difficulties we are encountering. The fact remains, however, that the Committee on Disarmament owes it to itself to make its own contribution to the accomplishment of the tremendous task of achieving general and complete disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Algeria for his statement and also for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. AHMED (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, the members of the Pakistan delegation and I are very happy to see you preside over the proceedings of the Committee on Disarmament at this crucial phase of its work. We believe that the high qualities of wisdom and patience which you have so effectively demonstrated during the past two weeks will enable the CD to resume its negotiations very quickly and create the necessary conditions for moving towards the formulation of concrete agreements on the various items on its agenda.

I would also like to take this opportunity to express our deep appreciation for the constructive efforts of your predecessor, Ambassador Terrefe of Ethiopia,

I have been greatly touched by the warm welcome extended to me by you and my colleagues on the Committee. While reciprocating their sentiments, may I add that I feel honoured to be a part of this assembly of distinguished diplomats from whose vast experience and wisdom I shall seek to benefit in the course of our joint endeavours in the CD.

(Mr. Ahmed, Pakistan)

The first year in the decade of the 1980s has witnessed a quantum increase in the level of international tensions, the outbreak and aggravation of conflicts in various areas of the world, the emergence of a pervasive climate of insecurity and an atmosphere of confrontation between States and ideologies.

The continued foreign military occupation of Afghanistan, a non-aligned and Islamic country, is cause for special concern. As the Foreign Minister of Pakistan stated on 9 February at the Conference of the non-aligned countries held in New Delhi, "this occupation is tantamount not only to a violation of (Afghanistan's) political independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity but also a threat to the stability of the region. It has heightened international tension; it has damaged détente and resulted in the intensification of Superpower rivalry and competition in the region of the Indian Ocean and the Gulf". Pakistan favours a political solution to the situation in Afghanistan. As a sponsor of the relevant General Assembly resolution of 20 November 1980, Pakistan will be guided by its provisions in the trilateral talks between itself, Iran and representatives of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, to be organized and held by the United Nations Secretary-General.

My delegation shares the concern which has been expressed in the Committee and elsewhere about the serious escalation in the global arms race, especially among the major nuclear-weapon Powers. That \$500 billion are squandered annually on weapons of increasingly greater destructive capability, while the majority of mankind subsists in conditions of poverty and destitution, is a sad commentary on modern civilization. Even more tragic is the dangerous possibility that the perverse logic of a "balance of terror" may lead mankind to commit deliberate or accidental suicide. The world cannot but witness with rising trepidation the evolution of strategies envisaging a "limited" nuclear war, the development of new weapons systems, such as the cruise and mobile missiles and the neutron bomb, and the contemplation of a renewed programme for anti-ballistic missiles. If these projections are translated into actual policy, a new and complex dimension will be added to the nuclear arms race, making the task of future negotiations more difficult, if not impossible.

Yet, the representatives on this Committee are practitioners of peace and we cannot afford to lose hope, despite the sobering realities of our world today. We can derive some comfort from the fact that neither of the Superpowers has ruled out the need for further talks on strategic or medium-range nuclear weapons. My delegation believes that, whatever the judgements about SALT II, it is indispensable for the revival of a climate of international stability that the dialogue between the United States of America and the Soviet Union on the limitation and reduction of nuclear armaments be continued and intensified. We hope that until such time as these talks are renewed, both sides will observe the limitations accepted in the SALT II agreements.

It is quite understandable, of course, that the outcome of the negotiations on nuclear weapons between the Superpowers will be largely influenced by a demonstration by each of its commitment to abide by the accepted norms of international conduct enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, especially in relation to various situations of tension and conflict that exist around the world.

(Mr. Ahmed, Pakistan)

In the framework of current realities, it is indispensable to revive mutual trust and confidence, not only between the Superpowers and their military alliances, but also between them and the majority of the small and medium States of the third world. A major element of the present international atmosphere of confrontation is the fact that the two Superpowers have much too large a conception of their "legitimate security interests". The security of the States in a given region, such as the Persian Gulf, is a matter of concern exclusively of these States. The intervention of "limited military contingents" or "rapid deployment forces" both constitute unwarranted interference in the affairs of these States. Pakistan believes that the cause of peace and security in such regions would be enhanced by the establishment of a military equilibrium between the States in the region, including our part of the world. Pakistan has offered to enter into negotiations with one of its neighbours to reach agreement on a mutually acceptable and balanced ratio of forces between the two countries. We are prepared to pursue such negotiations together with other States in the region.

Despite the self-evident importance of the relations between the two Superpowers and their respective military alliances, my delegation is convinced that genuine disarmament can only be achieved by a process which takes into account the security concerns of all States, large and small. Such a process can be evolved only in the Committee on Disarmament. Unfortunately, the former co-Chairmen of the CCD do not seem to have taken the necessary political decisions to repose their faith in this Committee to undertake substantive disarmament negotiations.

The plight of the nuclear-test-ban treaty is perhaps the best illustration of this approach. For several years negotiations on this subject, accorded the highest priority by the international community, have been removed from the multilateral framework to restricted talks between three of the nuclear-weapon States. The progress in these trilateral negotiations has been extremely slow because of differences in perceptions between the two Superpowers regarding the impact of a test ban on their security. From the information made available so far about these talks, it appears that the treaty being assembled by the three Powers will bear little or no resemblance to the comprehensive test ban which the General Assembly has demanded for so long; nor is it likely to attract the wide adherence emphasized by the General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament. In the circumstances, we feel that this agreement under negotiation should be recognized for what it is -- a temporary moratorium on nuclear testing by the United States, the United Kingdom and the USSR, and should be implemented by them as an indication of their commitment to the goal of nuclear disarmament. At the same time, the CD should be enabled to initiate negotiations on a truly comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

The Pakistan delegation expresses the hope that the Committee on Disarmament will also be enabled to undertake substantive negotiations on the question of nuclear disarmament during its 1981 session. We believe that an ad hoc working group should be set up for this purpose and charged with the following specific tasks: first, to define with greater clarity some of the concepts such as "mutual balance", "equal security" and "strategic equivalence", which are so frequently utilized in relation to nuclear disarmament; secondly, to elaborate the various stages in the process of nuclear disarmament identified in paragraph 50 of the Final Document and the responsibilities of each of the nuclear-weapon Powers at each stage in the process; thirdly, to clarify the relationship between nuclear

(Mr. Ahmed, Pakistan)

and conventional disarmament, and fourthly, to identify the various kinds of machinery that would be required to verify and monitor, in an effective way and on a non-discriminatory basis, the implementation of various measures of nuclear disarmament. It is our conviction that such a contribution by the CD will, among other things, assist in the further talks on nuclear disarmament which we hope will take place between the Superpowers. On the other hand, if the CD were to be prevented from making even such a preliminary exploration of the subject, it will inevitably increase the growing and widespread scepticism among non-nuclear-weapon States about the sincerity of the Superpowers' commitment to pursue in good faith the goal of nuclear disarmament.

The Pakistan delegation also attaches considerable importance to the vital objective of preventing a nuclear war. We share the view that this can be achieved through an international agreement for the complete prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Of course, we recognize that the current perceptions about the need for a balance of conventional forces in Europe impinges on the prospects of a nuclear non-use agreement. We hope, therefore, that the ongoing talks in Vienna will lead to mutual understanding about a balance of conventional forces in Europe in the very near future. We have noted with interest the proposals which have been made at the review meeting in Madrid of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe regarding measures to promote confidence and security in that region.

My delegation continues to believe that there are no insuperable political or technical obstacles to the nuclear-weapon States' assuring the non-nuclear-weapon States, especially the non-aligned countries, that they will not be threatened or attacked by nuclear weapons. Pakistan has sought to evolve an international agreement on this proposition for nearly a decade and we are gratified that this objective was endorsed by the General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament and by this Committee. The proposal to formulate an international convention to provide effective assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States has received overwhelming support from the Non-Aligned Movement and the Islamic Conference as well as by the United Nations General Assembly.

Unfortunately, in the negotiations undertaken under the aegis of the CD, it has not been possible to achieve very substantial progress towards this goal, although it has been recognized that renewed efforts are necessary "to reach agreement on a common approach acceptable to all which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character". The most fundamental difficulty in evolving a common approach is that some of the nuclear-weapon Powers do not seem to be prepared to go beyond the unilateral declarations they made at the General Assembly's special session on disarmament, even though the Final Document adopted at that session, "noted" these declarations and, after doing so, urged the nuclear-weapon Powers to conclude effective arrangements to assure the non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

At the current session of the CD, the Pakistan delegation will make yet another effort to evolve a "common approach" which could be included in an "international instrument of a legally binding character". The search for such a "common approach" must start from the fundamental proposition that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved, the nuclear-weapon Powers are under an obligation to assure all non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Any condition or restriction which one or more nuclear-weapon Powers wish to attach to such assurances must be examined from the standpoint of whether or not such conditions negate the effectiveness and credibility of their assurances and if these are

(Mr. Ahmed, Pakistan)

acceptable to the other nuclear-weapon Powers and the non-nuclear-weapon States. Taking into account the fact that all the limitations contained in the unilateral declarations of some of the nuclear-weapon Powers are related to their preoccupations with their nuclear security alliances, Pakistan has proposed that at the initial stage, the assurances of non-use should be provided to the vast majority of non-nuclear-weapon countries which are outside these alliance systems, i.e. the non-aligned and neutral countries of the world. We hope that this proposition will receive close attention this year as the means to evolve a compromise on a 'common approach'.

Another difficulty encountered in the negotiations is the effort of some of the nuclear-weapon Powers to utilize this subject to extract further obligations regarding nuclear non-proliferation from non-nuclear-weapon countries. Pakistan is not opposed to giving commitments regarding non-proliferation, if this can be done on a universal and on a non-discriminatory basis. We have made several proposals for this purpose, including the idea of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. But we do not believe that the subject of security assurances is the appropriate modality for the extension of such non-proliferation obligations, although the elaboration of effective and credible security assurances will have an important and positive impact on the prospects for non-proliferation.

While adhering to the position that the most appropriate modality for such assurances is an international convention, my delegation is prepared to explore other possible alternatives, including the adoption, as an interim measure, of an appropriate resolution of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. In our view, the most effective action which the Security Council could take on the issue is to call on the nuclear-weapon Powers to give categorical and unconditional assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them. Any approach based on some of the present conditional and restricted declarations made by the nuclear-weapon Powers would not be productive or acceptable to my delegation.

Reports alleging that chemical weapons have been used in certain current conflicts, together with the contemplated decisions by some States to refurbish their chemical weapon arsenals, have made this Committee's efforts to prohibit chemical weapons more urgent but also, I suspect, more difficult. My delegation was quite encouraged by the progress made last year in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons in defining the issues involved in the negotiation of a convention. We feel that although, owing to circumstances which are well known, it has not been possible as yet to give the Working Group a more precise mandate, it should be able to build on the work accomplished last year by further elaborating the areas of agreement and attempting to narrow the differences on other points. My delegation will participate to the best of its ability in these efforts and seek to explain the suggestions and ideas which it advanced in the Committee last year regarding the contents of a multilateral convention banning chemical weapons. My delegation is of the view that the Ad Hoc Working Group should as soon as possible be entrusted with the specific task of negotiating such a multilateral convention.

Pakistan will also support the effort to reach agreement on a convention prohibiting radiological weapons. However, we do hope that during this session the sponsors of the "main elements" of an RW convention will prove more responsive to the concerns and proposals advanced by other States and in particular by members of the Group of 21. We believe that close attention to the elaboration of an RW convention is necessary not only because of whatever may be the intrinsic value of the instrument but also, and even more importantly, because of its inevitable influence on the negotiation of other multilateral disarmament measures on the agenda of the CD, such as the test-ban treaty.

(Mr. Ahmed, Pakistan)

During its 1981 session, the CD will have to intensify its negotiations on a comprehensive programme of disarmament. My delegation believes that by drawing upon the various general documents on disarmament elaborated recently within the United Nations, it should not prove overly difficult to identify the measures of disarmament which should be included in the comprehensive programme. Perhaps the first task of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the item should be precisely to prepare a list of such measures. Yet the comprehensive programme will be truly meaningful if it contains two essential features. First, it should constitute a political and binding commitment on all States to implement the measures that are set out in the programme. Secondly, the programme should include at least an indicative target for its final implementation -- which Pakistan has suggested should be the year 2000 -- as well as time-frames for the accomplishment of the various stages of the process of disarmament envisaged therein. Apart from these two fundamental issues, negotiations in the Working Group would also need to address such matters as the specificity with which each disarmament measure will be set out in the comprehensive programme and the linkages, both political and temporal, between such disarmament measures.

The comprehensive programme of disarmament, if it is elaborated as a politically meaningful instrument, will constitute the centre-piece of the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The CD would make a crucial contribution to the second special session if it were to achieve agreement on the comprehensive programme and on the priority items on its agenda, particularly the comprehensive test-ban treaty, a convention on chemical weapons and an international instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. At its second special session devoted to disarmament, the General Assembly will no doubt pass judgement on this Committee on the basis of the results achieved on these matters, especially in the context of the review of its membership.

There are also some other questions regarding the CD which the General Assembly ought to consider at its forthcoming special session. The most fundamental among these is the specific relationship between this body and the United Nations General Assembly. The insistence by some States on the fiction that the CD is an organ entirely outside the framework of the United Nations has created situations, particularly with regard to the participation in its work of non-member States, which are entirely contrary to the consensus reached at the General Assembly's first special session devoted to disarmament that all States Members of the United Nations should be able to participate fully in the work of the CD, to circulate documents and attend its meetings.

The 1981 session of the CD is taking place at a time of grave peril to international peace and security. Today, the large and mighty nations of the world seem to have reached the judgement that military force can be successfully used to achieve their national objectives. The world is poised for a new and more dangerous spiral in the arms race. It should be our endeavour in this Committee to reverse such judgements, to utilize our collective wisdom to arrest the impulse towards mutual annihilation, to breathe life into the search for security through disarmament. Let me assure you that the Pakistan delegation will not lag behind in this noble and yet desperate endeavour which is in the fundamental common interest of all nations.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Pakistan for his statement and I should also like to thank him for his kind words addressed to the Chair.

Mr. TERREFFE (Ethiopia): Mr. Chairman, I should like first of all to congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the current month. Your diplomatic skill and tact have already contributed to a speedy decision on the difficult task of organizing the work of the Committee and enabling the four ad hoc working groups established last year to continue their work without delay. My delegation extends its appreciation and pledges its full co-operation with you in discharging your responsibility during this crucial month.

I would also like to extend a warm welcome to our new colleagues and distinguished representatives in the Committee on Disarmament, Ambassador El Reedy of Egypt, Ambassador Mansur Ahmad of Pakistan, Ambassador Malita of Romania and Ambassador Bagbeni of Zaire. May I also renew my appreciation to Mr. Jaipal, Secretary of the Committee and Representative of the Secretary-General, and to his colleagues in the Secretariat for their valuable assistance during my chairmanship. Finally, I would like to express my sincere appreciation for the kind words that you Mr. Chairman, and so many other distinguished representatives have addressed to me for serving as Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament during the month of August 1980 and the interim period extending to the commencement of the 1981 session. It was a rewarding experience and a great privilege for me to have served as your Chairman and to present the report of the Committee for 1980 to the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

This year's session of the Committee on Disarmament has started at a time when renewed international tensions have exacerbated the arms race, dangerously leading to the reversal of the process of détente and revival of the cold war, while at the same time the risk of nuclear confrontation continues to persist.

One cannot fail to note the extensive military build-ups in the various regions of the world. The ratification of SALT II has been delayed; a hard-line policy and higher military budgets are being advocated, and the deployment of the neutron bomb is again being recommended by a nuclear-weapon Power, despite the fact that this move was condemned by the international community when it was first announced. My delegation is distressed by the deteriorating international scene and the increasing military activities in the regions of the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. The decisions of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the United Nations and the Non-Aligned Movement declaring the Indian Ocean a zone of peace have been completely ignored. The so-called "quick intervention force" poses a grave concern to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of certain States in these regions and their rights freely to engage in peaceful development are thus constrained by the current international climate. The frantic efforts in establishing and expanding a network of military bases and facilities in the countries of the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf areas is giving rise to serious tension. In the light of such developments, my delegation cannot but express its deep concern at the deterioration of peace and stability in the region as well as the policy of increasing interference in the internal affairs of States.

(Mr. Terrefe, Ethiopia)

My delegation will actively participate in the work on the various items of our agenda at the appropriate time. But let me point out here the importance we attach to the preparations for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and the items concerned with the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, the conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present.

Ethiopia, together with other States, has for a long time called for a moratorium on nuclear explosions of all types as a major step toward halting the arms race and gradually reversing its course until general and complete disarmament can be achieved.

My delegation has therefore supported the idea of negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed.

The ratification of the SALT II Treaty and the commencement of negotiations for a SALT III agreement, as well as early negotiations on the nuclear weapons situation in general, remain of paramount importance and urgency.

In numerous resolutions the General Assembly has urged the nuclear-weapon Powers to work towards the goal of general and complete disarmament and to respond to the pressing need for an end to the arms race and the prevention of nuclear war. Renewed commitments to implement these resolutions will, I am sure, facilitate the work of the Committee on Disarmament.

In its resolution 35/46 entitled, "Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade", the United Nations General Assembly entrusted the Committee on Disarmament "urgently to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement, and to submit agreed texts where possible before the second special session devoted to disarmament", and lists four priority items on three of which, namely, chemical weapons, radiological weapons and security assurances, ad hoc working groups had been established, the fourth item being that of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. My delegation draws attention to this resolution in order to underline the necessity of pressing for sustained efforts during this year's session and to underscore the heavy responsibility that awaits the Committee.

While we express satisfaction at the decision of the Committee that the four ad hoc working groups established last year should continue their work, the Ethiopian delegation would like to emphasize the urgent need for the establishment of two further ad hoc working groups, namely, on a nuclear-test ban and on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, important items on which the United Nations General Assembly has entrusted the Committee with a clear mandate.

(Mr. Terrefe, Ethiopia)

In considering the question of nuclear disarmament, we cannot ignore the frequent number of nuclear false alarms which have been painfully highlighted and brought to our attention by a number of statements made in this Committee. In view of the some 17,000 nuclear warheads possessed by the major nuclear-weapon Powers, the magnitude of such reported system failures is indeed frightening.

Authoritative studies have shown that a comprehensive test-ban treaty can be concluded, given genuine willingness and sincere commitment by all the parties involved. The creation of an ad hoc working group for this purpose can facilitate negotiations toward this goal. The working groups established last year have already proved useful in initiating modest substantive work in their respective areas. In the present circumstances, we are convinced of the importance of starting serious negotiations and we feel the establishment of these additional working groups would in no way hinder or interfere with the trilateral negotiations.

The expeditious manner in which the Committee has taken a decision on its agenda and programme of work during the past two weeks has resulted in a saving of a full month as compared with the position of the Committee a year ago at this time. Encouraged by this performance, my delegation would like the Committee to give early consideration to the proposals which call for the creation of other additional working groups.

In his message to this Committee, the Secretary-General of the United Nations pointed to the preoccupation of all of us when he stated: "What we need now are co-operative endeavours by all nations, and in particular the major military Powers, to enter into serious negotiations based upon concrete proposals in order to reach genuine disarmament agreements." Speaking about a nuclear-test ban and nuclear disarmament, the Secretary-General said, "It has often been stressed that in a nuclear war there can be no winners, but only losers. As we now enter the Second Disarmament Decade, there is real need to prove that we are seriously addressing ourselves to the most pressing problems on the disarmament agenda."

It is also our view that these issues deserve priority attention by the Committee.

Such are the preliminary comments we wish to make at this stage. My delegation accordingly will dwell further upon the items of negotiations when they are considered in formal as well as informal meetings of the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Ethiopia for his statement and I should also like to express my gratitude to him for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, the first item on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament and on our work programme for this week is the item entitled, "Nuclear test ban". This item is so important that one is tempted, each time it recurs on our agenda, to make an elaborate statement. However, I shall be brief this morning because I believe that almost everything that ought to be said in support of the urgent conclusion of a nuclear-test-ban treaty has been stated at one time or the other during the past 25 years of its consideration by the United Nations General Assembly, by the old Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, by the CCD (our predecessor), and now by the CD itself. If a treaty banning all nuclear tests has not been concluded up till now, it is solely because of the lack of political will on the part of the nuclear-weapon States that should take the lead in the negotiation of such a treaty. Technical barriers to the conclusion of such a treaty have been fully explored; the central importance of such a treaty in the task of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons and its central importance in the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons have been universally acknowledged in the consensus view expressed in paragraph 51 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. All the nuclear-weapon States subscribed to that consensus view that the tripartite negotiations then in progress (in 1978) should be concluded urgently and the result submitted for full consideration by the multilateral negotiating body with a view to submitting a draft treaty to the General Assembly at the earliest possible date. This was the consensus to which all the nuclear-weapon States subscribed in 1978.

At the tail end of the 1980 session of the Committee on Disarmament, the three nuclear-weapon States which have been conducting negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban submitted to the Committee a report which for the first time was quite substantive. Unfortunately, the timing of the report did not enable the Committee to discuss it in any great detail. However, several delegations did welcome the substantive nature of the report and emphasized the need to make rapid progress on the road to the multilateral negotiation of such a treaty. The delegations of India, Netherlands, Australia, Mexico and indeed my own, to mention only a few, made some very pertinent comments and asked some very relevant questions. Unfortunately, the comments and the questions turned out to be no more than monologues on the part of those who made the comments and asked the questions, since the tripartite negotiators could not respond. Of course, they had no time. But even if they had had the time, in the context of the discussions which we have been conducting in the past on this subject, I doubt if they would have responded anyhow.

The objection during the 1980 session of the Committee on Disarmament to the commencement of multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty in the Committee was sustained throughout the session by two of the three nuclear-weapon States which have been conducting the tripartite negotiations. It is widely known now that during the Review Conference of the Parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, which took place in Geneva from 11 August to 7 September 1980, all three nuclear-weapon States, indicated informally that they would support multilateral negotiation at this session of the Committee on Disarmament. Nothing has happened since the Review Conference to warrant a change of position on the part of any of the three nuclear-weapon States concerned. Indeed, it seems to me that the fact that the second Review Conference of the Parties to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty failed to adopt a

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

final document must introduce greater urgency to the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The NPT was conceived as an important measure to be complemented by other measures for an effective régime of non-proliferation. It was not meant to constitute the whole structure. Failure to adopt the necessary complementary measures has created a sharp division among the Parties to the NPT and is no doubt likely to reduce its effectiveness.

The requirement of non-proliferation for the 1980s demands the urgent conclusion of some of these additional measures, of which a comprehensive test-ban treaty is perhaps the most basic.

At its thirty-fifth session, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted two resolutions on the subject of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. In these resolutions it reaffirmed its conviction that "a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear-test explosions by all States for all time is a matter of the highest priority and constitutes a vital element for the success of efforts to prevent both vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons". The General Assembly also affirmed its conviction that the conclusion of such a treaty would create a favourable international climate for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to be held in 1982. The General Assembly then requested the Committee on Disarmament to take the necessary steps, including the establishment of a working group, to initiate substantive negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty as a matter of the highest priority at the beginning of its session to be held in 1981. It urged all States members of the Committee to support the creation of such an ad hoc working group which should begin the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests. One of the two resolutions adopted urged members of the Committee to use their best endeavours in order that the Committee may transmit to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session the multilaterally negotiated text of such a treaty. The other resolution called upon the Committee on Disarmament to exert all efforts in order that a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty may be submitted to the General Assembly no later than at its second special session devoted to disarmament, to be held in 1982.

Need I mention another resolution, to which my distinguished colleague from Ethiopia referred just a short while ago, that containing the declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, in which the General Assembly listed, among the measures on which the Committee on Disarmament should submit agreed texts by the time of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the subject of "A comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty".

Thus the General Assembly has set a time-frame of just about 18 months, at the most generous, for the Committee on Disarmament to undertake and complete negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. I do not believe that this is an unrealistic time-frame, given the enormous amount of material with which the Committee can proceed if it does decide to discharge this priority responsibility. I should recall what I said at our plenary meeting on 10 February, that a comprehensive test-ban treaty would be an indispensable contribution of this Committee to the success of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

A consensus having been reached in the Committee on the efficacy of working groups as the best method of undertaking negotiations and arriving at decisions on issues before the Committee, I believe that we will be able to take this first step necessary to embark on a real dialogue and on negotiation on a CTB. Such a working group will no doubt give us the opportunity of exchanging views and obtaining clarifications from the tripartite negotiators who, my delegation appreciates, did submit a somewhat substantive report. It is, however, a report that has to be discussed; the negotiators cannot expect us to swallow, "hook, line and sinker", all that is contained in their report.

For a start, and in the light of the informal undertaking given by the three nuclear-weapon States during the Review Conference of the Parties to the non-proliferation Treaty that they would support multilateral negotiation, my delegation would hope that the view expressed in the report of the trilateral negotiators submitted to the CD before the Review Conference, in which they indicated their belief that their separate negotiations or separate negotiating forums provided the best way forward, has now been discarded; it has been overtaken by the informal undertaking which they gave during the Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT.

In any case, if the brief comments made by some members in the one-day debate which we had on the report of the trilateral negotiators are accepted as an indication, then it should be clear to the trilateral negotiators that the members of the Committee do have ideas as to the nature and content of an effective multilateral instrument on the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing. The earlier these views can be discussed, other views exchanged and negotiations conducted the better it seems to me it will be for all concerned.

I gave an example during our last session, and I repeat it now: the fate of the submission made by the nuclear-weapon States on the subject of radiological weapons should make it clear that the Committee cannot be taken for granted and that the depository of ideas in these matters does not lie exclusively with the nuclear-weapon States. It is my hope, therefore, that, at the conclusion of the plenary discussion of this item we can, under your wise guidance, embark on informal consultations to reach quick agreement on the setting up of a working group whose objective will be to assist the Committee to fulfil the hope reposed in it by the General Assembly and produce the text of a comprehensive test-ban treaty not later than at its second special session devoted to disarmament.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): The representatives of the States members of the Committee on Disarmament, like those who represented their countries in the multilateral negotiating bodies known by the abbreviations ENDC and CCD and all who have taken part in discussions in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament questions, no doubt know very well the particular importance Mexico attaches to the limitation of nuclear weapons, not as an end in itself but as a first step towards what is described in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament as the "progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time".

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

This interest has invariably been borne out by the actions of the representatives of Mexico in all multilateral and regional bodies that are concerned with disarmament, whether deliberative or negotiating bodies. To quote but one example as an illustration, it is only necessary to recall the active participation of the delegation of Mexico, ever since 1969, when the United States of America and the Soviet Union began at Helsinki the talks on the limitation of strategic arms known by the abbreviation SALT, in the negotiations conducted annually in the United Nations which led to the approval of numerous General Assembly resolutions on that subject, the last of which, resolution 35/156 K, was adopted by consensus on 12 December 1980.

In view of the foregoing and of the obvious impact that the success or failure of the SALT talks will have as regards nuclear disarmament which, according to the Final Document, merits the highest priority in the negotiations entrusted to the Committee, the delegation of Mexico feels that the Committee should at all times be kept duly informed of any events of any significance which may occur at the international level in matters relating to those talks. This would appear the more advisable if it is borne in mind that the General Assembly, at its special session in 1978, stated unambiguously that in the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, "all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility".

The Mexican delegation accordingly considers it appropriate to draw the attention of the Committee on Disarmament, for its information, to the Declaration approved by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues at the conclusion of its third session which was held recently in Vienna, from 6 to 8 February 1981, and was presided over by Mr. Olof Palme, the former Prime Minister of Sweden, and in which a number of other distinguished statesmen from Europe, America, Africa and Asia participated.

It is for this reason that we have asked the secretariat to reproduce, as a working paper of the Committee -- which it has done in Document CD/143 -- the text of that declaration preceded by a brief explanatory introduction and with an annex containing a complete list of the members of the Commission.

Since the declaration -- which is entitled "The SALT process: the global stakes" -- is one of those that it is customary rightly to describe as self-explanatory, I shall merely mention, by way of epilogue, my delegation's pleasure in associating itself with what is stated in the first paragraph of the declaration which reads:

"The future of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) is a global issue and not simply an issue in Soviet-American relations. It is, therefore, the duty of peoples everywhere to make known their views about the vital importance of an early and serious resumption of the SALT process."

The point of view thus expressed by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues furthermore faithfully reflects what the United Nations General Assembly stressed in its last resolution on the subject of the SALT talks -- one to which I have already referred and which I quoted in my statement at our opening meeting, on 3 February -- when it urged the two States participating in the talks always to take "particularly into account that not only their national interests but also the vital interests of all the peoples are at stake" in these negotiations.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Mexico for his statement. The list of speakers I have before me for this morning's meeting is exhausted. I should like to know if any other delegation wishes to speak. Apparently not.

I should like now, before adjourning the meeting, to revert briefly to the subject of the ad hoc working groups whose Chairmen we have appointed today. These groups are now in a position to begin their work, and I am planning to hold a consultation meeting with the Chairmen this afternoon in order to discuss informally with them how the groups should embark on their work. I presume the Committee agrees with me that the groups should meet as soon as possible, and the Secretariat has prepared the informal document you have before you, dated 17 February, containing a time-table of meetings for this week. These are, of course, purely tentative suggestions on the part of the Secretariat, which can be discussed this afternoon at the meeting with the Chairmen of the working groups.

I should like to state that the meeting I am proposing to hold with the Chairmen of the working groups can be held on the sixth floor of the Secretariat building, above door 9, near the offices of the Disarmament Centre, where we can make use of a small conference room.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.

CD/PV.108
19 February 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 19 February 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. F. de la Gorce (France)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. M. NIATI

Argentina: Mr. F. JIMENEZ DAVILA
Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD

Australia: Mr. R.A. WALKER
Mr. R. STEELE
Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. R. DEYANOV
Mr. K. PRAMOV

Burma: U NGWE WIN
U THAN HIFUN

Canada: Mr. G. SKINNER
Mr. D. THACKLER
Mr. C. CACCIA

China: Mr. LIANG Yufan
Mr. PAN Jusheng
Mr. SA Benwang

Cuba: Mrs. V. BROWDOSKY JACKIEWICH

Czechoslovakia: Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. A. CIMA
Mr. L. STAVINOHA

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. H.N. FAHMY
Miss N. BASSIH

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERLIFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. J. DE BLAUSSE
Mr. N. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. H. KAULFUSS
Mr. P. BUNTIG

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. H. MÜLLER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOHIVES
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India:

Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAI

Indonesia:

Mr. E. SOEPRAPTO
Mr. HARYONATARAI
Mr. F. QASIH
Mr. KARYONO

Iran:

Mr. H. DABIRI
Mr. D. AMERI

Italy:

Mr. A. CIARRAPICO
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. R. ISHII
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya: Mr. S. SHITEMI
Mr. G. MUNIU

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mr. H.A. CACERES

Mongolia: Mr. S.H. LKHASHID

Morocco: Mr. H. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN

Nigeria: Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru: Mr. F. VALDIVIESO

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA

Romania: Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. S. STROMBACH
Mr. J. LUNDIN
Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics: Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. L.A. NAUMOV
Mr. V.A. PERFILIEV
Mr. L.S. MOSHKOV
Mr. V.M. GANJA
Mr. A.G. DOULYAN
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO
Mr. S.N. RIUKHINE

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES
Mr. N.H. MARSHALL
Mr. B. NOBLE
Mrs. J.I. LINK
Mr. E. YEO

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. FLOWERTREE
Mrs. K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. J.A. MISKEL
Mr. H. WILSON
Mr. S. FITZGERALD
Mr. F. DE SIMONE
Mr. L. FLEISCHER

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT
Mr. O.A. AGUILAR
Miss G. DA SILVA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. H. VRHUNEC
Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. LONGO B. NDAGA
Mr. O. GNOK

Secretary of the Committee and
Personal Representative of
the Secretary General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

Mr. VRHUNEC (Yugoslavia): Mr. Chairman, it is not necessary to enter into a detailed analysis of the general debate conducted in the Committee, in order to arrive at the conclusion that the comprehensive nuclear test ban is one of the key issues of disarmament, nuclear in particular. In their remarks, all the delegations present here have invariably expressed an unequivocal desire and demand for the halting of the nuclear arms race and the cessation of further tests aimed at achieving a greater sophistication of these weapons.

What is it that should be done right away in order to move this problem, which is of primary importance for the halting of the nuclear arms race, from its deadlock and to achieve concrete positive results as soon as possible? The first and most important step is an urgent opening by the Committee on Disarmament of concrete negotiations for the reaching of a corresponding agreement on the ban. This item has been on the Committee's agenda for quite a while now but without any particular results, despite the fact that it is one of the first tasks for all of us present here, and not only for us but the entire international community. United Nations General Assembly resolutions clearly indicate this and there is much reason for discussing this in the Committee where corresponding proposals do exist.

We are witnessing the negotiations under way between the United States of America, the USSR and the United Kingdom and from time to time also have the possibility of obtaining reports on the development of their negotiations. What we have heard so far may sound encouraging but does not mean too much in practical terms. No progress has been made and the reconciliation of the positions of the three nuclear-weapon Powers is extremely slow. In our opinion the tripartite negotiations should not be an obstacle for parallel work both here and there with regard to an international convention on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. These are two complementary actions which must take place simultaneously and for which the only important thing is that they are both conducted towards a successful solution. It is our assessment that the standstill in the negotiations and the unresolved problems between the nuclear-weapon Powers primarily rest with the problem of verification. However, in several reports of the Ad Hoc Expert Group on Seismic Events it is clearly indicated that verification problems can be overcome successfully if there is a desire to do so. That is why we think that we should embark upon the road of a more comprehensive consideration of the nuclear test ban, for which the Committee, apart from the trilateral negotiations, is both competent and responsible. Full use should be made of the fact that we are prepared, as members of the Committee, to give our full contribution to the settlement of this issue. According to our statements, we all aim to achieve the same goal and this is the halting of the nuclear arms race. We should, therefore, all give an adequate contribution to this end.

The Yugoslav delegation considers as fundamental the question of a corresponding political will to arrive as soon as possible and comprehensively at a consensus regarding the adoption of an international agreement on a nuclear test ban. If such political will is not shown immediately, in both options of the negotiations, one can rightfully cast doubt upon statements to that effect or remarks of the nuclear-weapon Powers in which these countries expressed the will to endeavour for the cessation of the nuclear arms race. The expressed desire does not mean much by itself if it is not really implemented and if it is not accompanied by adequate behaviour that will assure all of us that there is readiness for the undertaking of corresponding action.

(Mr. Vrhunec, Yugoslavia)

On the basis of what I have already said, my delegation most resolutely strives for an urgent initiation of negotiations on the comprehensive nuclear test ban within the framework of the Committee now, at this spring session. We propose that the Committee consider the possibility of introducing, in the meantime, while negotiations are under way, a moratorium on all nuclear-weapon tests. In view of this, we consider that there is a most urgent need for the creation of a working group within the Committee aimed at opening negotiations on the international instrument that would prohibit all nuclear-weapon tests, in all environments and unconditionally, which, in fact, was a proposal tabled by the Group of 21 non-aligned and neutral countries both last year as well as this year.

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, it is a very sincere pleasure for me to add my voice to those which have greeted your assumption of the Chair of the Committee. Your chairmanship sets the seal on the most welcome participation of France in the work of this Committee following the decision taken at the time of the General Assembly's first special session on disarmament. Your country's contribution to our work has indeed been of growing significance and importance. May I assure you personally of the continued support of myself and my delegation in fulfilling your present role.

I should also like to express to Ambassador Terrefe of Ethiopia my delegation's appreciation for his stalwart work last summer, when he chaired the Committee through the difficult task of drawing up its annual report. And I join most warmly in the welcome already given by many colleagues to the distinguished Ambassadors of Egypt, Pakistan, Romania and Zaire. As a depositary of the treaty we were particularly glad to hear that our new Egyptian colleague has taken his place among us at a time when his country is completing the process of ratification of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty.

Turning to the work of the Committee in our new session of 1981, it is very satisfactory to note that within two weeks of reassembling we have approved our agenda and our programme of work and have also reached agreement on the tasks for the Committee's immediate attention which will be taken up in our four existing working groups. I give due credit to you, Mr. Chairman, for this result and I would like to comment generally on some of the items of the business now before us.

In a statement which I made at the beginning of our 1980 session, I affirmed my Government's commitment to the search for balanced and verifiable measures of arms control. I will start today by reaffirming that commitment. As the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, said in a speech on United Nations Day, arms control is an integral part of Britain's national security policy. We pursue negotiations because we believe they can enhance our security. However, we do not favour high-sounding declarations which add little, if anything, to the commitments already included in the Charter of the United Nations. Nor do we favour the negotiation of agreements which would leave one side with an advantage over the other or which, through the absence of appropriate methods of verification, would lead to suspicion and uncertainty. In the coming year, therefore, my delegation will play a full and constructive part in the search for realistic and verifiable agreements which will enhance the security of all members of this Committee, and of the wider world community.

My Government also attaches great importance to the relationship between arms control and international security. Arms control cannot be isolated from its wider international context. Those who wish us to proceed as if our work here was in some sense autonomous are being disingenuous. For the fact is, and here I quote the Final Document of the United Nations General Assembly's first special session devoted to disarmament, that:

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

"Disarmament, relaxation of international tension, respect for the right to self-determination and national independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the strengthening of international peace and security are directly related to each other. Progress in any one of these spheres has a beneficial effect on all of them..."

We therefore firmly believe that prospects for arms control in the coming year will be closely related to progress towards restoring international confidence. We cannot escape this. We have seen the relationship demonstrated directly in the events of the past year. None of us can ignore the effects on international confidence of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the implications for the arms control process. Its shadow continues to fall on the work of this Committee. It is, alas, not the only such shadow. For us in Europe, ability to make progress in arms control will inevitably tend to reflect the state of East/West relations. We hope that all States will refrain from any action that could further damage those relations and inevitably undermine the prospects for arms control.

For many people the turn of world affairs in the last year has reawakened fears of war. There has been anxiety that the deterioration in East/West relations to which I have referred may have dragged us all a little closer to the nuclear abyss. Some of my distinguished colleagues have already at this session commented on the possibility of nuclear war breaking out by accident; others have expressed fears about a doctrine of limited nuclear war.

My Government shares the deep sense of horror at the devastating potential of nuclear weapons. But we are also all too conscious of the appalling loss of life that a conventional war can cause. It is precisely to prevent the outbreak in Europe of any war -- conventional or nuclear -- that the United Kingdom belongs to the NATO alliance and adheres to the alliance strategy of deterrence. My Government have considered all the issues very fully in the light of the particular threat -- both conventional and nuclear -- to our security and that of our allies. Our aim is to convince any adversary who might hope to advance a political objective by launching a conventional or nuclear attack against us that the risks would far outweigh any potential benefits. It is in order that we may be able to fulfil that broad aim that we maintain nuclear and conventional forces. I would stress that our aim is to prevent war by being seen to be able to defend ourselves. No one need fear that we would seek to impose our political objectives on another country through the use of these weapons. My country is a member of a purely defensive alliance. We fully realize that if nuclear exchanges began there would be an appalling risk of escalation into all-out nuclear war -- in which there would be no winners. It is, of course, inconceivable that anyone could win even a limited nuclear war. We need no convincing of this. It is the logic on which nuclear deterrence has always been based. The policy of deterrence has kept the peace in Europe for 35 years and it remains valid today.

Several of my distinguished colleagues have drawn attention in vivid terms to the dangers of accidental nuclear war. By way of comment on this I want to point out that any decision to use nuclear weapons would only be taken at the highest political level. Nuclear weapons would never be used automatically in response to an alarm from an early warning system on its own. Furthermore, there are agreements, including the use of "hot lines", between France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other specifically to prevent the outbreak of accidental nuclear war. We believe these agreements are an important factor in preventing possible misunderstandings and maintaining confidence.

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

I shall be returning again to these points in a later intervention and I shall then also comment in more detail on some of the issues raised by the statement of the distinguished representative of India on 3 February. I have mentioned them now because they form an important part of the background against which our discussions in this Committee are held. Nuclear weapons, whether we like it or not, are inextricably bound up with the security relationship between East and West. Those who advocate the alternative, a Europe free of nuclear weapons, must make an absolutely convincing case that their alternative would bring less uncertainty and greater stability and would enhance security in Europe. That has not been done; and when proposals for negotiations on sweeping measures of nuclear disarmament are advanced by a country which enjoys, with its allies, superiority in central Europe over the NATO alliance of 3:1 in tanks and artillery and some 150,000 in ground-force manpower it is right that we should be deeply sceptical. It should be no surprise that we in the western alliance should argue that nuclear arms control cannot be pursued without regard to the conventional imbalance in central Europe.

My Government believes that the only secure route to nuclear arms control lies through negotiations between the nuclear-weapon Powers, and in particular between the United States and the Soviet Union. This is why we attach great importance to a continuation of the SALT process. We welcome the recent statements of President Reagan in this respect. The relationship between the United States and Soviet Union is clearly central to our endeavours in the field of nuclear arms control. We recognize that there is bound to be a pause while the new United States Administration reviews its vital security interests. We must be realistic about this. This is nowhere more true than for the question of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban. My country has played a full and active part in these negotiations in the past. We continue to believe that a comprehensive test-ban is a worthwhile objective. We have maintained that the confidential tripartite negotiations are the best way forward on an issue which is vital to the security of the negotiating parties. It follows that we do not support the setting up of a working group in the CD at the present time.

I have spoken at some length on nuclear questions partly in response to other comments by distinguished colleagues. But we should not give undue prominence to nuclear weapons. After all, four-fifths of world military expenditure is on conventional arms and armed forces. I therefore want to conclude with some comment on the non-nuclear items on our agenda. Since these are to be the subject of our work in the ad hoc groups, I shall not go into details now and we shall make our main contribution in the groups themselves. Foremost among these items is that of chemical weapons. The United Kingdom neither possesses the means to conduct offensive chemical warfare at any level nor does it have plans to acquire such a capability. I wish to make this absolutely clear. Furthermore, my Government remains firmly committed to seeking a verifiable arms control agreement banning chemical weapons. We welcomed the establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons during the last session of the Committee under the very able chairmanship of Ambassador Okawa of Japan, and we played an active part in its discussions. We are pleased that this Group has been re-established and held its first meeting of the new session yesterday.

My delegation will also play an active role in other areas of this Committee's work. We do not wish to overstate the importance of an agreement banning the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. But such an agreement would be a useful achievement. We intend to offer detailed comments on language in the texts which have been submitted. Likewise, we attach importance to the negotiations on a comprehensive programme of disarmament. Agreement on this subject in the Committee would be a valuable step in preparing for the General Assembly's second special session on disarmament. We intend to play a full part in the discussions on this question.

All in all, it seems to me that the agenda we have adopted provides us with plenty of useful work to undertake. We may find that the time available will be barely enough to complete all that we have to do.

Mr. VENKATESWARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, today we are considering the very first substantive item on our agenda, entitled, "Nuclear test ban". The views of my delegation on this subject are well known and accordingly I shall be brief in setting forth what we see as the role of the Committee in the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, during the current session.

We recognize that the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests would not in itself result in a reduction of the existing nuclear arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States. However, such a prohibition applicable to all States on a non-discriminatory basis would firstly result in some restraint on the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, and secondly, create a more conducive climate for the determined pursuit of the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. We fully agree with the distinguished Ambassador of Brazil who, in his statement on 12 February 1981 stressed that a treaty prohibiting the further testing of nuclear weapons would be a meaningful step on the path of nuclear disarmament. We also agree with him that multilateral negotiations in this Committee on a comprehensive test ban treaty cannot be viewed as a hindrance to the ongoing negotiations among three nuclear-weapon Powers. As he rightly pointed out, and I quote, "a condition of success for a measure of this kind would be precisely its universal character, that is, the achievement of a treaty which would contain provisions designed to attract the widest possible adherence".

During our last plenary meeting held on Tuesday, 17 February, the distinguished Ambassador of Nigeria made some pertinent observations. Several delegations, including my own, welcomed the submission by the United States of America, the USSR and the United Kingdom of a joint report on the progress of their negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, submitted towards the end of the summer session of the Committee on Disarmament last year. During the preliminary discussion that was held, several important questions were put to the trilateral negotiators concerning certain aspects of their report. We fully agree with the Ambassador of Nigeria that these questions must find an adequate response from the delegations concerned. We would therefore join him in requesting the parties engaged in the trilateral negotiations to make available to this Committee, as soon as possible, a well-considered response, either jointly or separately, to the questions raised by several delegations including mine. Of particular relevance to my delegation would be a clear and forthright presentation and elaboration of the "important areas where substantial work is still to be done", referred to in the report of the trilateral negotiators.

It is our view that the negotiation of a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon testing is today essentially a political problem. Adequate technical means of verification already exist to ensure compliance with the provisions of the treaty. This has been stressed once again in the report on the subject by the United Nations Secretary-General which stated, inter alia: "Verification of compliance no longer seems to be an obstacle to reaching agreement". The risks involved in the possibility of surreptitious testing of nuclear warheads of less than 2 to 3 kilotonnes would be far outweighed by the increased security that would result for all States due to a qualitative restraint on the nuclear arms race and the increased sense of confidence and mutual trust that such a prohibition would bring about in relations among States. We must not forget that any further delay in the conclusion of such a treaty may well make our efforts in that direction irrelevant. As in other areas of weapons technology,

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

the regrettably slow pace of disarmament negotiations is always in danger of being outstripped by the speed of technological change. One must reflect over the very real possibility that the verification system available to us today to enforce compliance with a prohibition of nuclear-weapon testing at the present level of technology may be the best we may ever get. Further advance in such technology may soon make satisfactory verification technically impossible, if we continue to drag our feet. We therefore appeal to the countries which continue to insist on a foolproof verification system, to display a sense of pragmatism and political wisdom in dealing with this issue of concern to all of us. If, however, the parties engaged in trilateral negotiations feel that there is inadequate appreciation of the problems involved in this respect, surely the blame must lie with them for not providing this Committee with adequate information in order to enable it to form a proper judgement.

During the 1980 session of the Committee on Disarmament, the Group of 21 strongly urged the setting up without delay of an ad hoc working group to undertake multilateral negotiations on the complete cessation of nuclear weapons testing in all environments. We regret that it was not possible to achieve a consensus on this proposal last year. It is our earnest hope that those delegations which earlier expressed reservations about this proposal will heed the call of the international community and join the mainstream of opinion in this Committee in agreeing to the immediate setting up of such a working group during this present phase of the Committee's deliberations.

A suggestion has been made that such an ad hoc working group should begin its work with a limited mandate which would focus on the institutional and administrative steps necessary for establishing, testing and operating an international seismic monitoring network and effective verification system. My delegation cannot agree to such a limited and narrow approach, for the following reasons. Firstly, the verification system that would be adopted in relation to a comprehensive test-ban treaty cannot be predetermined. The nature of the verification system would depend upon the kind of treaty which we are able to negotiate in a multilateral context within this Committee. Secondly, the details of an international seismic monitoring network which would form part of the verification system of a future comprehensive test-ban treaty is already the subject of intensive discussion within the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on Seismic Events set up under the aegis of this Committee. The Committee on Disarmament, on the other hand, is a political body, and must function and be seen to function as such, although it may be assisted in its work by technical experts. As in the case of our negotiations on chemical weapons or radiological weapons, we should get down to concrete work on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, bringing in experts whenever we feel it necessary to advise us on various aspects or elements of the treaty, including those relating to verification.

In conclusion, I would once again reiterate a suggestion that has been made by my delegation several times in the past. We have recommended that pending the conclusion of a truly universal and comprehensive treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons testing, nuclear-weapon States should immediately agree to an indefinite moratorium on their nuclear weapons tests. Such a moratorium would help to convince the international community that nuclear-weapon States are indeed serious in their commitment to the eventual goal of nuclear disarmament.

Mr. DABIRI (Iran) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, allow me first of all to join my voice to the voices of all those speakers who have already congratulated you on your accession to the Chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament at the opening of the present session. Your competence and the exemplary way in which you are conducting our deliberations offer the best guarantees for the success of the work of the Committee.

I should also like to congratulate Ambassador Terrefe of Ethiopia who presided over the work of the Committee during a particularly difficult period and whose sense of responsibility enabled us to complete our work.

I should also like to welcome the presence at our meetings of the new heads of delegations whose participation will, we are sure, enrich our debates and facilitate our task.

Lastly, I cannot end this part of my statement without expressing our gratitude to Mr. Jaipal, Secretary of the Committee, and Mr. Berasategui, Deputy Secretary, and all the members of their team, for helping us to work in the best possible conditions.

(continuing in English)

At the very moment when the negotiations on disarmament are taking place in the Committee on Disarmament my country, as a victim of a blatant aggression, is engaged in a war which was initiated by the cruel and despotic regime of Iraq.

The Iraqi regime, using ridiculous pretexts, has abrogated unilaterally a valid treaty and committed an act of aggression against my country, violating the fundamental principles of international law, the Charter of the United Nations and the spirit of non-alignment.

This devastating war imposed on us has destroyed parts of cities and many centres of economy as well as hospitals and schools. A great number of our compatriots have been victims of the savagery and the violation of basic principles of international humanitarian law practised daily by the Iraqi regime. The launching of a series of ground-to-ground missiles against the residential areas of cities is only one example of such inhuman practices. This cruel regime is today still continuing its inhuman deeds without mercy and pity.

It is therefore surprising that members of the international community who profess belief in justice and dignity have remained aloof and have not condemned the open aggression and savage and criminal acts of the Iraqi regime. Instead, many countries secretly and some, like France, openly, in flagrant violation of international moral principles, are pouring armaments and sophisticated war material into Iraq. These actions will certainly contribute to the realization of the evil intentions of this cruel regime in killing innocent people through continued aggression and occupation of our territories.

France, in order to assist the obvious aggressor more effectively, has not only provided the Iraqi regime with the most devastating arms in advance of the time, but has also refused to deliver Iranian patrol boats under different pretexts which they change according to circumstances. As a result of this policy the mortal capacity of the aggressor's army is being increased to the detriment of the Iranian nation, a victim of aggression, which is only fighting

(Mr. Dabiri, Iran)

to liberate its territories from foreign occupation and exercises its legitimate right of self-defence in accordance with article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. Whatever the French pretexts might be, this hostile act of the French Government can by no means be justified because it permits an obvious aggressor to intensify its aggression. In this context we believe that the war cannot be won only by sophisticated arms and munitions such as French Mirages and Soviet T-55 tanks but by the faith and morale of the nation. An army that does not draw its moral strength from popular support is an army that does not have real strength. Such an army even with the latest innovations in weapon gadgetry is doomed to failure. Our nation is resolute and determined to continue the fight until the last Iraqi soldier is expelled from our holy territory.

It is against this background that we have resumed our seat in this familiar chamber. For the past several days this august body has been once again the forum for one of the most vital negotiations. The historic challenge to mankind inherent in the issue of war and peace makes disarmament an important objective in the present grave international situation.

Iran, being involved, against its will, in a war of aggression and paying dearly for the maintenance of its territorial integrity and sovereignty is deeply aware of the full meaning of the search for peace and the ways of promoting it in all possible areas, in particular through striving for disarmament. Experiencing at present the ravages of a war of aggression, the debate on disarmament conveys to us a particular sense of realism and urgency.

The immutable objective of the United Nations as defined by its Charter is: to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. But in this respect the system of renunciation of force and of peaceful settlement of disputes embodied in the Charter of the United Nations has not proved effective. New tensions and new conflicts have led to an arms race unprecedented in human history. Nuclear deterrence and the balance of power and terror, based on unimaginable destructive power of thermonuclear weapons, are now the main elements of the precarious stability between the two major military blocs. This precarious stability is constantly jeopardized by destabilizing elements inherent in an arms race characterized by continuous competitive accumulation of sophisticated arsenals and their constant refinement. With the growing importance of the problem of economic development, increasing attention is being paid to the unjustifiable waste of financial resources, research capacity and raw material devoted to the arms race. It is therefore necessary to intensify our efforts with a view to strengthening the basic principles of the Charter of the United Nations, especially those of the renunciation of force and of peaceful settlement of disputes and thereby increase the mutual confidence and release the necessary resources for a more rapid economic development leading to an international order based on greater security, justice and prosperity.

Today at the beginning of the 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament we have to look back on our efforts during the first two years of existence of the CD. During the past two years we have absorbed the literature put out by the international arms control élite and applied our minds to it. New procedures and guidelines were devised to create new momentum. And finally last year we were able to reach consensus on the question of the establishment

(Mr. Dabiri, Iran)

of ad hoc working groups in four areas of the activities of the CD. These meagre achievements were only made possible due to greater efforts made by peace-loving members of the Committee on Disarmament. The agreement on the establishment of the working groups was even hailed as a historic event. Yet the balance-sheet of our cumulative efforts on the substance of disarmament has remained a record of consistent failures.

This, needless to say, has been due to no lack of enthusiasm, dearth of talent or absence of an abundance of ideas, proposals or solutions. The simple truth is that we have been operating in an international enclave with little or no input into the mainstream of political decisions. The voices which echo in this room vanish into stacks of documents, never allowed to bother the conscience of those whose judgements and decisions matter in shaping world events.

To be sure, disarmament as a goal has been given support by the great Powers at a high level of rhetorical consistency. But the political will to act has failed to emerge through their powerful military bureaucracies, influential weapon industries, lobbies and captive legislators.

This basic truism remains central to the evaluation of the performance of the great Powers, whose representatives here often try to infuse the illusion of a forward movement into a process that is essentially retreating.

This is best illustrated in the balance-sheet of the results of the immense efforts of the international community during the first Disarmament Decade. Those results, although combined with a favourable international climate, were not encouraging. But we did not submit to despair and disillusionment because the process of disarmament did continue due to the existence of a favourable international climate.

As a result of the continued military occupation and repression of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, the Second Disarmament Decade has started in an atmosphere marked by serious deterioration of the international climate.

In this connection we believe that the implementation of resolution 35/37 of the General Assembly of the United Nations and the recent decision of the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the non-aligned countries in New Delhi on the withdrawal of Soviet armed forces from Afghanistan is an important step for the improvement of the international climate enabling the international community to pursue realistic disarmament measures.

Another source of constant tension and concern has been the continued occupation of Arab territories by Israel and denial of the inalienable national rights of Palestinians. The United Nations General Assembly, while condemning Israel, has, in its resolution 35/207, clearly set the basis for a just and durable solution of the Middle East and Palestinian problem, calling for the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of Israel from the Arab and Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, and affirming the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, national independence and the establishment of its independent State in Palestine. Obviously the realization of the above-mentioned resolution will also reduce tensions and enhance mutual security, facilitating the difficult task of disarmament negotiations.

(Mr. Dabiri, Iran)

In our statement to the Committee on Disarmament on 19 February 1980 (CD/PV.61, dated 19 February 1980), we emphasized the interlocking relationship between the international climate and disarmament and expressed our deep concern about the increasing deterioration of the international situation. It is obvious that the aggravation or improvement of the international climate depends above all on the behaviour of the two Superpowers and their unique roles and responsibilities in the maintenance of international peace and security cannot be overemphasized.

The two Superpowers, instead of acknowledging their responsibilities by engaging in a fruitful dialogue, have intensified their rivalry and competition. As one of the consequences of this rivalry the United States, by resorting to all kinds of pretexts is increasing its military presence in all possible parts of the world and especially in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Ominous statements and indications point to the revival of a psychology reminiscent of the cold war era. Absurd theories that nuclear war is wageable and even winnable are being aired and publicly advocated. In the same vein the possibility of the deployment of neutron warheads in Europe is being once again discussed. There is also no inhibition on the part of responsible officials to show off capabilities for the deployment of brute force under the heading of "rapid deployment force". In short, the propensity for adventurism seems more pronounced than at any time in the past. It is clear that such actions do not contribute to the creation of a climate of peace, stability and understanding. It heightens only mutual suspicions and leads to further aggravation of the arms race at both the global and regional levels. A very sad feature of this power play is the part imposed on the third world countries that often unwillingly are dragged into similar arms race patterns.

Turning to the items on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament, the question of nuclear disarmament has undoubtedly the highest priority. Paragraph 45 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament makes this abundantly clear. The priority is not new. It started with the beginning of the nuclear age. But as time passes the widening gap between ever more sophisticated weapons and the failure of efforts to control or eliminate them becomes more and more alarming and important. The Final Document of the first special session states, inter alia, that "nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization" (para. 47), and that "in the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility" (para. 48).

In this connection, it is disturbing to note that SALT II has not yet been ratified, notwithstanding the fact that it was signed on 18 June 1979. Ominous voices are being raised to destroy the results of eight years of hard bargaining in a vain and adventurous effort aimed at obtaining a so-called nuclear superiority. The General Assembly of the United Nations, in resolution 35/156 K dated 16 January 1981, deplores the present situation of SALT II and urges "the two signatory States not to delay any further the implementation of the procedure provided for in article XIX of the Treaty ..., taking particularly into account that not only their national interests but also the vital interests of all the peoples are at stake in this question".

(Mr. Dabiri, Iran)

In the important field of nuclear disarmament, only the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons stands out as a really significant multilateral arms control measure. The failure of the second Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT to adopt a final declaration is still fresh in our memories. Although the importance of the NPT was not called into question and the NPT Parties expressed their continued support for the Treaty, failure to adopt a final declaration, mainly due to dissatisfactions with the implementation of Article VI, clearly shows that substantial progress on nuclear disarmament is of critical importance to the future and survival of the NPT regime. It is therefore necessary that the Committee on Disarmament in discharging its responsibilities as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body should start negotiations on nuclear disarmament immediately. In the same vein, a comprehensive test-ban treaty should remain the primary objective of the Committee on Disarmament. Agreement to halt all nuclear explosions is an essential step in the field of nuclear disarmament. It is also an important element in the non-proliferation regime. Above all, the CTBT has become a symbol of a negotiation breakthrough. Failure to reach agreement on this issue would seriously undermine the prospects of further arms limitations. The Group of 21 has repeatedly stated its view that working groups are the most suitable machinery for conducting negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament. Taking into consideration the extraordinary importance and urgency of the questions of nuclear disarmament and a comprehensive test-ban treaty and the positive experience of the Committee on the utility of the establishment of ad hoc working groups from last year we hope that ad hoc working groups on these two items of the Committee's agenda will be established soon.

At its thirty-fifth session the General Assembly, in resolutions 35/145 A and 35/152 B, expressed its support for the setting up of ad hoc working groups on the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests and on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

As a result of the business-like approach of the Committee on Disarmament we succeeded in deciding expeditiously on the re-establishment of the four ad hoc working groups which were set up last year. We consider this decision as the expression of the will of all members of the Committee to enter into substantive negotiations and to contribute more directly to the accomplishment of the mandate entrusted to us by the international community. In the same vein, we hope that decision on the establishment of ad hoc working groups on nuclear disarmament and a CTBT will follow soon. Agreement on the establishment of the working groups in question will certainly strengthen the business-like atmosphere of the Committee.

At the beginning of the Second Disarmament Decade and with the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament already in sight for next year it is imperative to use our last session of the CD before the special session for constructive negotiations and to concentrate on substantive issues rather than procedural rhapsody.

Throughout our disarmament debate there is a great lack of sense of reality. One feels that even the bitterest and hardest realities such as war, destruction and bloodshed are all being reduced to statistical abstractions. One tends to forget that while we are dealing intellectually and without much sense of realism with those abstractions, the dynamics of war and armament continue their accelerating course. Our sense of these negotiations is different because we are experiencing the ravages of a war of aggression. We are therefore prepared to contribute effectively to disarmament negotiations with a special sense of realism and urgency.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I should like to speak for a moment as the representative of France. The statement made by the representative of Iran justifies the exercise of the right of reply by the French delegation. This it will do at the end of the meeting.

Mr. SKINNER (Canada): I would like to put before the Committee this morning some thoughts on the Canadian position on the first item on our agenda, the comprehensive test-ban. The fact that it is the first substantive item of our work programme clearly reflects the consideration that it is one of our highest priorities. In deciding on our work programme we agreed that the Committee will conduct its work bearing in mind the contribution that it should make to the success of the United Nations General Assembly's second special session on disarmament. One of the two comprehensive test-ban resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session recognized that the conclusion of such a treaty would create a favourable international climate for the second special session: we could also envisage the second special session as confirming the universal importance of the treaty.

It is sobering to recall that none of the five nuclear-weapon States was able to endorse fully the recommendations of the First Committee last year on a nuclear test-ban, one of the few specific measures of a multilateral nature which could hold the promise of successful negotiation. The realization of a comprehensive test-ban treaty would be the most significant development in the field of nuclear weapons non-proliferation since the conclusion of the non-proliferation treaty in 1968: it is essential to slow, halt and begin to reverse the momentum of nuclear weapons development. The urgency of the early realization of an effective, multilateral comprehensive test-ban treaty continues to be underlined by the ongoing rapid pace of nuclear-weapons testing, about 40 such tests having been conducted during 1980, including one in the atmosphere.

Some States have suggested, partly, no doubt, due to the apparent deadlock in the trilateral negotiations, that a moratorium on testing may be the answer in the interim period before a comprehensive test ban. Indeed, this was alluded to this morning by an earlier speaker. We do not think so. In reiterating Canadian policy, the Canadian representative on the First Committee of the General Assembly said that we should not settle for a moratorium on nuclear testing, which would not be verifiable and which could delay the negotiations, and consequently the conclusion of such a treaty.

Canada welcomed the tripartite report contained in document CD/130 of 30 July 1980 as an important step toward the elaboration of an effective multilateral comprehensive test-ban treaty. Such a treaty will become a permanent restriction on the development of nuclear weapons only if an agreement among three of the nuclear-weapon States, which we are now urging, rapidly results in the ending of all testing. Recognizing that several political as well as technical problems are still at issue -- and these problems have been discussed in this Committee -- in the trilateral negotiations which will have to be resolved before the three negotiators table the key elements of a treaty to this Committee on Disarmament, we urge the United States of America, the USSR and the United Kingdom to resume their negotiations in the immediate future. Not only must the trilateral negotiations

(Mr. Skinner, Canada)

continue, but it is important that this Committee begin, now, to take a substantive part in the elaboration of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Work by the Committee on Disarmament could be both useful and helpful in accelerating the conclusion of the multilateral negotiation of a treaty when the basic elements of that treaty are tabled in the Committee on Disarmament by the three negotiating States. My delegation will be glad to contribute to discussions leading to the definition of the Committee's substantive role in the realization of a nuclear test-ban treaty in time for the second United Nations special session on disarmament.

Mr. SOEPRAPTO (Indonesia): Mr. Chairman, taking the floor for the first time at a formal meeting of the current session of the Committee, may I avail myself of this opportunity to join previous speakers in expressing the great pleasure of the Indonesian delegation to see you preside over this Committee at this very important stage of its work. During these last two weeks you have demonstrated your great ability, flexibility and patience in conducting the deliberations of this Committee. May I also extend the appreciation and gratitude of my delegation to Ambassador Terrefe of Ethiopia, your predecessor, who presided over the Committee during the month of August last year, for his valuable contribution to the work of the Committee. My delegation also wishes to associate itself with the other delegations in welcoming to this Committee this year the new heads of delegations of Egypt, Pakistan, Romania and Zaire.

As has been stated by other delegations, the 1981 session of the Committee has a particular importance because it is the last full session before the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to which the Committee has to submit a report on the progress of its work since its establishment. It is also significant because it coincides with the beginning of the Second Disarmament Decade. When the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament meets next year, it would not only consider the report to be submitted by the Committee but would also assess whether the Committee has successfully discharged its function as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament.

Thanks to your wise chairmanship and the spirit of co-operation prevailing in this Committee, we have made a sound start to our work by solving problems of a procedural nature and by the reactivation or re-establishment of the working groups that existed last year. My delegation wishes to congratulate the Chairmen of these working groups and to assure them of its full co-operation.

The question now under consideration by this Committee as the first item on its agenda, a nuclear test ban, has been the subject of examination by the international community, the United Nations and other international forums, for more than a quarter of a century. Partial solutions to the problem have indeed been arrived at by, inter alia, the conclusion of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water in 1963 and of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1968. In spite of these treaties, the objectives of which include, inter alia, the reduction of the number of nuclear-weapon tests, such tests have nevertheless continued unabated. It is an irony that the number of nuclear explosions that have taken place since the conclusion of the 1963 test-ban Treaty is much higher than the number that took place before the conclusion of the Treaty. Whereas between 1945 and 1963, or in 18 years, there were

(Mr. Soeprapto, Indonesia)

only 488 explosions, in the 16 years since the conclusion of the test-ban Treaty in 1963, 733 explosions have been registered (CD/86, p. 57). Needless to affirm that the carrying out of such explosions runs counter to the efforts made by the international community to prevent vertical and horizontal proliferations of nuclear weapons, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the attainment of nuclear disarmament.

One may argue that banning nuclear-weapon tests is not an effective disarmament measure because it does not lead to a reduction in the volume of existing nuclear weapons or prevent the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Indonesia, which is a party to both the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty and the 1968 non-proliferation Treaty, believes that the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests constitutes an important step towards the prevention of vertical and horizontal proliferations of nuclear weapons, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the attainment of nuclear disarmament. It is a matter of disappointment that, 18 years after the conclusion of the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty whereby the Parties to the Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States in particular, expressed their determination to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, the negotiations among the nuclear-weapon States Parties to that Treaty have not produced concrete results. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim stated in 1972 before the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem of a nuclear test ban had been fully explored and that only a political decision was necessary to achieve agreement. Where do we stand now in 1981, nine years after that statement, 13 years after the conclusion of the 1968 non-proliferation Treaty and 18 years after the signing of the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty?

During the Committee's session of last year, nuclear test ban was included in the agenda as its first item. The proposal for the creation of an ad hoc working group, on which very much depends the progress of the substantive negotiations on the matter, did not unfortunately materialize. The report submitted by the three nuclear-weapon States involved in the trilateral negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon test explosions to the Committee in 1980 contains very useful information on the status of the negotiations. In spite of the fact that the Committee stated in its report to the General Assembly that it would continue to treat the question as a matter of the highest priority during its 1981 session (CD/139, para. 36), and although the General Assembly, in its resolution 35/145 B, requested the Committee to take the necessary steps, including the establishment of a working group, to initiate substantive negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty as a matter of the highest priority at the beginning of its 1981 session, and that, following that resolution, proposals were made accordingly in this Committee to establish such a working group, it is a matter of regret that the immediate creation of the proposed working group was not agreed upon by the Committee during the early stages of our work this year. Given the importance of the establishment of such a working group in order that we can really engage in business-like and substantive negotiations on the matter, it is the hope of my delegation that, pursuant to the fourth paragraph of the decision taken by the Committee on 12 February 1981 (document CD/151), and following consultations to be held in the Committee, the two working groups relating to items 1 and 2 of the agenda will finally be created during the current session.

(Mr. Soepranto, Indonesia)

As I stated earlier, it was as early as 1972 that the Secretary-General of the United Nations stated that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem of a nuclear test ban had been fully explored and that only a political decision was necessary in order to achieve agreement on the subject. During our last year's session, not less than eight documents relating to the matter were submitted to the Committee. As was reiterated by the Group of 21 in its statement at the conclusion of the 1980 session of the Committee, it is also the position of my delegation that this Committee provides the best framework for negotiations on the matter which has been the subject of consideration by the United Nations and other international forums for more than 25 years and of more than 40 resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Considering that the current session is the last full session of the Committee prior to the convening of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and that the Committee has been called upon by the General Assembly to exert all efforts urgently to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement and submitting agreed texts where possible to the General Assembly at its special session on questions of priority including, inter alia, a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (resolution 35/46, annex, para. 12 (a)), my delegation thinks that we should spare no efforts in taking all possible steps which would lead to the commencement of substantive negotiations.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Indonesia for his statement and also for his kind words regarding myself.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): Today my statement is devoted to one specific problem inscribed in our programme of work for this week, the complete and general prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests.

The delegation of the German Democratic Republic welcomes the consideration of the question of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests already at the very beginning of our negotiations on the main agenda items within the Committee on Disarmament. The importance of reaching an agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests becomes ever more evident. It would without any doubt contribute to curbing the nuclear arms race and to making headway in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Strictly speaking, this would be an important measure in the field of nuclear disarmament.

Therefore it is not surprising that at present especially those forces striving for the continuation of the arms race and military superiority are attacking such an agreement, putting new obstacles on the road to an effective ban of all nuclear-weapon tests.

My delegation would like to express its concern over the fact that resulting from the policy of confrontation pursued by imperialist and hegemonistic forces the conditions for the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests have become more complicated. Seeking to obtain the material basis for a "counter-force" strategy or a strategy of a "limited nuclear war", the promoters of this policy are intensifying the arms race, especially in the nuclear field. This includes such well-known programmes -- to mention only some of them -- as MX, Trident II, cruise missiles, Pershing II and others.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

At the same time the forces interested in those programmes are trying, against their better judgement, to justify the continuation of nuclear-weapon testing with the pretence that tests are needed to maintain confidence in the reliability of their stockpiled weapons. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, however, in his report on a comprehensive nuclear test ban (CD/86) justly points out that the state of stockpiled nuclear weapons can be checked without nuclear testing. One also has to approve the view expressed in this report that the less confidence there is in nuclear weapons, the less would be the temptation to rely on them. It is only all too obvious that the forces interested in "reliable" nuclear weapons need tests in order to be able to wage a nuclear war effectively.

In the process of efforts to stop all nuclear-weapon tests great importance should be attached to the trilateral negotiations. We hope they will be resumed soon and will be brought to a rapid and successful conclusion. The tripartite report presented last year shows that considerable progress has been achieved in the course of the negotiations. But at the same time there are a number of undoubtedly complicated issues still to be solved. We share the view that these primarily technical problems should not be used as a pretext for a further delay in achieving an urgently needed agreement on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. There must be political will on all sides. We state with satisfaction that the USSR has manifested this will with quite a number of constructive steps with regard to verification, peaceful nuclear explosions and participation. If all the parties concerned had this political will, an agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests could be achieved still in the immediate future.

My delegation shares the repeatedly expressed view that the Committee on Disarmament should play a more active part in the solution of tasks of complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. This could be done in our view in particular through the creation of a corresponding ad hoc working group. We are gratified to note that at the outset of this year's session not only the Group of socialist countries and the Group of 21 but also a number of other CD member States expressed their interest in such a step. We refer in this regard to the recent statements of Canada, Japan, Australia, Belgium and Italy. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic expresses its hope that the other States, too, will join this promising trend. In the course of our debate numerous valuable suggestions have been made concerning the mandate of the ad hoc working group to be set up. There is obviously general agreement on its objective, i.e., to reach a long-lasting agreement on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States. In particular, I should like to stress the following points expressed in our debate concerning the ad hoc working group on a comprehensive nuclear-weapon test ban to be set up:

The ad hoc working group should be established immediately, as was said, on the basis of a realistic mandate;

All nuclear-weapon States should be members of that group: this would open up favourable opportunities for all of them to take a more precise position on their approach to the question of the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests;

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

The group should not interfere in the trilateral negotiations but complement them effectively.

Some delegations have expressed the view that the Committee should concentrate on the institutional and administrative measures which are necessary for an international seismic monitoring network and for an effective verification system. These questions are no doubt of great importance. However, they cannot be discussed separately from the basic question, namely, the scope of the treaty. As to the scope, the German Democratic Republic holds the view that all nuclear-weapon tests of all nuclear-weapon States have to be prohibited. We would be interested in listening to the views of all the nuclear-weapon States on this idea.

Like other delegations, we attach great importance to effective measures of verification of compliance with a future CTBT. But under no circumstances should the verification issue serve as a pretext for delaying the conclusion of such a treaty. We reject any attempt to look endlessly for new verification "shortcomings" in order to block the way to a comprehensive test ban. Of course, as was already said, verification cannot be foolproof. However, the national technical means of verification existing nowadays, a system of international exchange of seismic data to be established and certain procedures of international co-operation, including on-site verification on a voluntary basis, would ensure to a sufficient extent compliance with a corresponding treaty. My delegation fully shares the view expressed on 3 February in this Committee by Mrs. Thorsson, the distinguished representative of Sweden, that the likelihood of the detection of clandestine nuclear-weapon tests is very high, and that the existing verification means are adequate. We must ask the opponents of a nuclear-weapon test ban: is not the risk of a violation of the treaty much less than the threat caused by the absence of such a treaty?

Concluding my statement, I should like to make some brief remarks on the activities of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. Its progress report (CD/150) presented last week shows that the Group has worked intensively. Valuable findings have been made as to a number of detailed problems, which eventually will be auspicious for establishing an international monitoring network within the framework of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. In particular we support the demand expressed in the report for the inclusion of additional seismic stations located in the southern hemisphere in the global network. This would increase considerably the effectiveness of such a system. It goes without saying that a global system for international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events could be established only after the conclusion of a CTBT. In our view the seismic Group constitutes the appropriate framework for a more comprehensive consideration of the administrative and institutional aspects of a global data exchange. Progress towards the solution of the essential questions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests would make it possible to specify the mandate in this respect and to enhance further the role of the Group.

We hope that the Committee will live up to its responsibilities and undertake the necessary efforts with a view to achieving -- already during this session -- concrete results on the way to the effective prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement and I should like now to apologise to His Excellency Ambassador Voutov, the distinguished representative of Bulgaria, for not giving him the floor when his turn came according to the list of speakers. I hope that he will be good enough to forgive me.

Mr. VOUTOV (Bulgaria): I think that it is not necessary for you to apologise, Mr. Chairman, since today we are discussing the question which has the highest priority in the work of the Committee and I listen with great interest to all the statements made. However, at this stage, it is not my intention to discuss this question. In my statement of 12 February, I dealt with the problem of a nuclear test ban and I reserve the right of my delegation to deal with this question again. Today I would like to present the document which was circulated this morning in the Committee, document CD/153.

With reference to my statement on 12 February may I draw the attention of the Committee to this document, CD/153, submitted by the Bulgarian delegation under item 3 of our agenda, namely, "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". I do not intend now to repeat what I said in my previous statement on the substance of that document, as well as on the way we see the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances this year. At this juncture, I only wish to express our belief that the Working Group will soon embark on substantive negotiations with a view to making, in the last year before the General Assembly's second special session devoted to disarmament, significant progress towards further strengthening the security guarantees for the non-nuclear-weapon States. To this end, the Bulgarian delegation will be happy to co-operate with other interested delegations in the search for a common approach to agreeing on a meaningful solution.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): This statement will probably be one of the shortest I have ever made in the Committee on Disarmament. This is for various reasons, one of the main ones being that I do not wish to waste my time or, even less, the time of the Committee. In fact, the question of the cessation of all nuclear-weapon test explosions which, according to the time-table we approved, we are to consider at today's meeting, has been considered exhaustively in all its aspects for more than a quarter of a century. Since my delegation has had the opportunity to contribute its grain of sand to the consideration of this question in many international forums, including the First Committee of the General Assembly, the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and this Committee, I wish to confine myself today simply to mentioning the statements on this matter that we have made in this Committee during the two years of its existence. These statements can be readily referred to in the verbatim records of the meetings whose numbers I shall now list, together with the dates on which they took place:

1979

1. Second meeting, held on 24 January;
2. 34th meeting, held on 21 June;

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

1980

3. 61st meeting, held on 19 February;
4. 69th meeting, held on 17 March;
5. 80th meeting, held on 22 April;
6. 81st meeting, held on 24 April;
7. 87th meeting, held on 26 June;
8. 94th meeting, held on 24 July;
9. 97th meeting, held on 5 August;

1981

10. 101st meeting, held on 3 February.

In these 10 statements you will find fully set forth the reasons which undoubtedly prompted the United Nations General Assembly, in its resolution 35/145 A of 12 December 1980, to urge all States members of the Committee on Disarmament "to support the creation by the Committee, upon initiation of its session to be held in 1981, of an ad hoc working group which should begin the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests".

My delegation dares to hope that this appeal, in the same vein as that launched by the Group of 21 and supported by the Group of socialist States and by various members of the Western group of States and others, will now at last be heeded by all the States that are represented in this Committee.

Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, my statement this morning consists of two parts, two different sections: first, a statement I shall make on behalf of the members of the Group of 21, and then a statement I shall make as the representative of Venezuela.

As co-ordinator of the Group of 21, I should like to reiterate today most emphatically the firm conviction of all the members of that Group that the Committee should proceed without delay to the establishment of two ad hoc working groups to concern themselves with items 1 and 2 of the Committee's agenda, entitled, respectively, "Nuclear test ban" and "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". That is the statement I wished to make on behalf of the members of the Group of 21.

I shall now proceed to make a statement on behalf of Venezuela. Today, when the Committee is to consider the item on a nuclear test ban and intends to examine additional proposals concerning working groups, I must express the anxiety and impatience of my delegation at the fact that it has not yet proved possible to adopt decisions for the setting up of working groups on agenda items 1 and 2.

My delegation hoped that, in accordance with the decision adopted at the 105th plenary meeting held on 12 February, the Committee would proceed as soon as possible to the urgent consideration, as the decision puts it, of the proposals for

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

the establishment of those working groups, and that such consideration would give all States members of the Committee the opportunity to show the necessary political will to proceed to the establishment of these groups which are so necessary for the substantive consideration of these two most urgent and priority items on our agenda.

My delegation heard with genuine sorrow the categorical statement made this morning by one of the nuclear-weapon Powers participating in the tripartite negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests that his country was not in favour of the establishment of a working group on the subject of a nuclear test ban. I cannot but admit that this statement is a source of deep disappointment to my delegation.

My delegation, together with those of the other countries members of the Group of 21, has consistently advocated the setting up of working groups in connection with items 1 and 2 of the Committee's agenda. It feels that it might be useful at this time briefly to recall the various statements made on this subject by the Group of 21, statements to which my delegation, as a member of that Group gave its full support.

First, in document CD/64 of 27 February 1980, the Group of 21 expressed its conviction that working groups represented the best available machinery for the conduct of concrete negotiations within the Committee on Disarmament. Although the Committee has set up four working groups on four agenda items, nevertheless, despite the repeated urgings not only of the Group of 21 but also of other sectors of the Committee, it has, as you know, not so far been possible to achieve a consensus for the establishment of similar machinery with respect to the two other priority items on the Committee's agenda. I should also like to recall the statement contained in document CD/72, of 4 March 1980, in which the Group of 21 urged the establishment of a working group to undertake the negotiation of a treaty for the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. Subsequently, in document CD/134 of 6 August 1980, in which it gave its assessment of the work of the Committee's 1980 session, the Group of 21 expressed its regret that it had not been possible to initiate multilateral negotiations on that subject within the Committee on Disarmament, and it expressed the hope that a working group would be set up at the opening of this current spring session in order to undertake without delay substantive negotiations on the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon testing in all environments.

Furthermore, in document CD/116 of 9 July 1980 -- and I am here referring to the proposals made in that document on the establishment of a working group on agenda item 2 -- the Group of 21 proposed that the Committee on Disarmament should set up an ad hoc working group to begin negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on various issues which would contribute to progress towards achievement of the disarmament measures envisaged in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Similarly, in document CD/134, to which I have already referred, containing an evaluation of the Committee's 1980 session, the Group of 21 stressed the urgent need to initiate negotiations on nuclear disarmament and on measures to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race, and it recalled its proposal, which I have already mentioned, for the setting up of a working group for that purpose.

I wanted to recall these background facts at this stage because in the document circulated by the Chairman containing the programme of work provision was made after this meeting -- and I imagine that it would be in the very near future -- for an informal meeting of the Committee to consider the question of the establishment of new working groups or the proposals for new working groups that have been submitted. It was with this circumstance in mind that I wanted to go over the background to this matter and reiterate the position of my delegation.

Mr. VALDIVIESO (Peru) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, I intend to be extremely brief. In the statements we have heard during the general debate, the delegations from all the groups have all declared that in order to make our work more effective we must be pragmatic and flexible and act like business men -- "in a business-like manner", as it is said. I think that up to now we have all done this, and especially the countries of the Group of 21. However, the flexibility we have shown should not be confused with docility. And in this connection my delegation believes that the countries which do not possess nuclear weapons ought to act as permanent judges of the behaviour of the nuclear-weapon Powers and also that they are under an obligation to insist on the fulfilment of undertakings with respect to the attainment of full and complete disarmament and to ensure the carrying out of the mandate given to the Committee on Disarmament, as the sole multilateral negotiating body, to promote the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. We therefore believe that working groups on a nuclear test-ban treaty and on nuclear disarmament should quickly be set up and to this end we urge the distinguished representatives of the nuclear-weapon Powers to inform the authorities of their respective countries of the anxiety expressed by the Group of 21 through its Chairman, so that, paying heed to this expression of concern, their Governments may give them the instructions they need for the setting up of the working groups in question.

We make this appeal because we are sure that the establishment of these working groups will satisfy, at least in part, the expectations which the Committee on Disarmament and the General Assembly have helped rouse in world public opinion through the convening of special sessions devoted to disarmament and the naming of decades to the same end. We believe that failure to do this will increase the scepticism with which the world at large views the work of the Committee on Disarmament and the General Assembly in this matter.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I should like for a moment to take the floor as the representative of France. The French delegation wishes to express its regret concerning certain remarks made during this meeting by the distinguished representative of Iran, and it obviously cannot accept them. The distinguished representative of Iran has questioned the attitude of the French Government in matters falling exclusively within its sovereignty. The French delegation reserves its right to revert to this point if its national authorities consider that necessary.

I should like now to pass on to the matter we considered at an informal meeting a short while ago, namely, the request submitted by the Government of Switzerland regarding its participation in the discussions of the Committee. Working Paper No. 29, which has been distributed to you, contains a draft decision with respect to this request. I call your attention to the fact that the participation of States non-members of the Committee in the working groups is to be considered later. The draft decision contained in Working Paper No. 29 must, in accordance with our practice, be read out by the Chairman before being adopted. The working paper reads as follows:

"In response to the request of Switzerland [CD/154] and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Switzerland to participate during 1981 in the discussions on the items relating to effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and chemical weapons, at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee.

(The Chairman)

"The decision in regard to participation in the meetings of the two ad hoc working groups dealing with those items will be communicated later."

In the absence of objections or observations I shall take it that there is a consensus in the Committee on this decision.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): We had planned to hold an informal meeting today to consider the proposals submitted for the establishment of other ad hoc working groups on items 1 and 2 of the Committee's agenda and also to consider the possible need for the setting up of other subsidiary bodies. It is too late now to embark on a discussion of this matter. The Chair would therefore suggest -- and you will find this suggestion in the informal document distributed to you today -- that the Committee should hold an informal meeting to consider this matter next Monday at 3.30 p.m. The time-table distributed, and to which I am referring, is, of course, merely for guidance, and we can adjust it in accordance with the progress of our work. I should like to know if the Committee agrees to my suggestion regarding an informal meeting for an exchange of views on certain proposals that we know about, a consideration of those proposals -- something we have not yet undertaken.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): The next plenary meeting of the Committee will therefore be held on Tuesday, 24 February, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.

CD/PV.109
24 February 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND NINTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 24 February 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman : Mr. F. de la Gorce (France)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. M. MATI
Mr. M. DJABALLAH

Argentina: Mr. F. JIMENEZ DAVILA
Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD

Australia: Mr. R.A. WALKER
Mr. R. STEELE
Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. I. SOTIROV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U NGWE WIN
U THAN HTUN

Canada: Mr. G. SKINNER

China: Mr. YU Peiwen
Mr. LIANG Yufan
Mr. PAN Jusheng
Mr. SA Benwang

Cuba: Mrs. V. BOROWDOSKY JACKIEWICH

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. RUZEK
Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. A. CIMA
Mr. L. STAVINOHÁ

Egypt:

Mr. E.A. EL RADDY
Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M.N. FAHMY
Miss H. BASSIM

Ethiopia:

Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. J. DE BLAUSSE
Mr. H. COUTHURLS

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Mr. P. BUNTIG

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India:

Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. E. SOEPRAPTO
Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. F. CASIM
Mr. KARYONO

Iran:

Mr. D. AMERI

Italy:

Mr. V. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. R. ISHII
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya: Mr. S. SHITEMI
Mr. G. MUNDU

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mr. M.A. CACERES

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG

Morocco: Mr. H. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. O. ADENIJI
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. M. NALITA
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. H.H.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. S. STROMBACH
Mr. J. LUNDIN
Mr. G. EKHOLI

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. V.A. PERFILLEV
Mr. L.S. MOSHKOV
Mr. V.H. GANJA
Mr. A.G. DOULYAN
Mr. S.N. RIUKHINE

United Kingdom: Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES
Mrs. J.I. LINK

United States of America: Mr. C.C. FLOWERREE
Mr. L.R. FLEISCHER
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. J.A. HUSKEL
Mr. H. WILSON
Mr. F.P. DeStILLONE

Venezuela: Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT
Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia: Mr. H. VRIJUNEK
Mr. B. BRAJKOVIC

Zaire: Mr. LONGO B. NDAGA

Secretary of the Committee
and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General: Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the Committee: Mr. V. BIRASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I declare open the 109th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament. According to our programme of work, as contained in document CD/144, the Committee should today begin considering item 2 of its agenda, Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

Mr. OKAWA (Japan): Mr. Chairman, so much has been said, in this room and elsewhere, about the urgency of achieving a comprehensive test ban that there is really little more to say. Nevertheless, my delegation does not feel it should remain silent on this particular subject. I know that under our programme of work I should have taken the floor last week, but I ask your indulgence for my addressing it today.

In the first place, my delegation wishes to express the hope of the Japanese Government that the trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban will be resumed in the very near future. We very much appreciated the presentation last summer of the fairly detailed progress report on those negotiations, and we think we can understand the difficult and delicate nature of the problems that remain to be solved. We are also fully aware that one of the trilateral negotiators is yet in the process of reviewing its policy in the whole field of arms control and disarmament. As an outsider to these trilateral negotiations, we may not be in a position to set the pace or to propose dates for the negotiators, but as the representative of one non-nuclear-weapon State which places the highest priority on the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban, I sincerely hope -- and I am sure I am entitled to hope -- that the three Governments concerned will be able to agree on the early resumption of their negotiations.

In the statement I made to the Committee on 10 February, I urged that the Committee on Disarmament take up the question of a comprehensive test ban at its present session as the agenda item of the highest priority. And I suggested that we might study the possibility of establishing a working group to deal with the matter, if a consensus could be reached on this point. Suggestions have been put forward as to what kind of work the working group could usefully undertake. May I repeat a sentence that was contained in my statement of the other day: "It goes without saying that the work on the CTE to be undertaken in this Committee should be conducted in a manner and to the extent that would be complementary to and not prejudicial to the ongoing trilateral negotiations". My delegation would be very much interested in listening to the views of the tripartite negotiators themselves regarding the issues which they would think could be usefully taken up in the Committee or a subsidiary organ such as a working group. In particular, we would be pleased to hear the views of the party which has expressed explicit support for the creation of the working group. In any case the mandate would be of crucial importance and we should take into account the views of the tripartite negotiators. My delegation would be willing to put forward its own ideas regarding the language. We already have four precedents, the mandates of the four existing working groups, and perhaps the language of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons may be of some use to us when we try to elaborate a text that could be acceptable to the Committee as a whole. My delegation hopes that, if and when a consensus could be reached on the establishment of a working group, the two other nuclear-weapon States, China and France, which are not participating in the tripartite negotiations, would not only join in such a consensus but would also take part in and contribute to the work of the working group.

One of the beneficial effects of discussions on a comprehensive test ban taking place in a working group would be to give the 37 other members of this Committee who do not sit in on the tripartite talks a certain sense of participation, however limited it might be, in the efforts to produce something that is after all of vital interest to all of us.

The final product of the negotiations must be a multilaterally negotiated treaty, a multilateral treaty in the true sense of the word.

(Mr. Okawa, Japan)

The distinguished Ambassadors of Nigeria and India, among others, have urged the delegations of the three countries participating in the tripartite negotiations to respond to the questions which were put to them by many delegations towards the end of the session last year in connection with the tripartite report contained in document CD/130. I associate myself with that request and hope that the early resumption of the tripartite talks will facilitate their responding to that request. My own delegation raised a number of points in the statement I made in the Committee on 7 August last, among which was my delegation's concern that the international exchange of seismic data will not be put into operation for quite some time even after the entry into force of the treaty. This concern was revived the other day when I heard the distinguished Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic say that "It goes without saying that a global system for international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events could be established only after the conclusion of a CTBT". My delegation continues to feel that the detailed arrangements for the international exchange should be elaborated before the entry into force of the treaty. We also maintain that a global experimental exercise of the exchange system should be implemented in advance of the entry into force of the treaty so that we can be certain that it will work effectively and that it can be put into operation immediately after the treaty enters into force. We find it difficult to understand why one of the tripartite negotiators which has expressed its support for the establishment of the CTBT working group is reluctant to take part in such a global experimental exercise, and did not find it possible to participate even in the recent trial exchange that was conducted on a regional basis in October and November 1980. I reiterate my delegation's hope that all countries represented in the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts will be able to participate in future trial exchanges and also in an experimental exercise on a global scale that would greatly contribute to the smooth and immediate implementation of the exchange system upon the entry into force of the treaty.

Finally, I am instructed to reiterate my Government's interest in seeing all States voluntarily refraining from all nuclear-test explosions, including all nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, during the period prior to the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Let me conclude these brief remarks by saying that a comprehensive nuclear test ban is not an end in itself. It has been so long delayed that its achievement has indeed come to be of special importance and significance. But it should be seen in the wider and longer perspective: it is an essential ingredient in the NPT framework, and if we wish to preserve and strengthen the non-proliferation régime we must have a comprehensive test-ban treaty, and it would constitute the first specific, concrete step on the long road leading us to the ultimate goal -- nuclear disarmament.

Mr. SHITEMI (Kenya): Mr. Chairman, it is a matter of deep satisfaction to my delegation to see you in the Chair of this Committee. You bring to your assignment very wide and relevant experience which you have applied competently in the course of your chairmanship. I also wish to express our gratitude to His Excellency Ambassador Tadesse Terrefe of Ethiopia, a neighbour and a close friend of Kenya, for a job well done during his tenure of office as Chairman of this Committee.

On behalf of the Kenyan delegation, I welcome in our midst the four Ambassadors of Egypt, Pakistan, Romania and Zaire. We are confident that their presence in this Committee will add to the voice of reason and understanding without which the work of the Committee would falter.

All that needs to be said about starting negotiations in this Committee towards a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament has been said. Ambassador Okawa of Japan put it appropriately

(Mr. Shitemi, Kenya)

for us when he said: "Japan has pleaded time and again that the task of the greatest urgency in the field of disarmament is the achievement of nuclear disarmament" (his speech at the plenary meeting of 10 February 1981).

This point was brought up at the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly which, in resolution 35/152 B, called upon the Committee on Disarmament, "as a matter of priority and for the purpose of an early commencement of the negotiations on the substance of the problem, to undertake consultations in which to consider, inter alia, the establishment of an ad hoc working group on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and of nuclear disarmament, with a clearly defined mandate". The mandate to establish an ad hoc working group within the Committee on Disarmament on CTBT has already been given by the General Assembly in its resolution 35/145 A in which it reaffirmed its "conviction that a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear-test explosions by all States for all time is a matter of the highest priority".

This Committee has not acted on these urgent requests from the United Nations General Assembly. The reasons for the delay are becoming a little clearer now; these are due to mounting fears and suspicions among the nations of the two military alliances -- the NATO and Warsaw alliances. A distinguished Ambassador from one of the alliances, quoting his own Minister for Foreign Affairs, put his finger on the problem when he said: "Nor do we favour the negotiation of agreements which would leave one side with an advantage over the other or, through the absence of verification, would lead to suspicion and uncertainty". And so, out of ignorance of what the other party is up to, the best policy would seem to be, at least from the viewpoint of one of the parties, to increase your weaponry of all types until the other side is outpaced (this is of course not possible, neither is a position of parity or balance possible). The position of overkill reached a thousand times over by both sides makes the two positions illogical and indefensible. It is for this very reason that we should get started and discuss how to end the testing and manufacture of nuclear weapons, even if it takes ten years. Such discussions, involving all of us in this Committee, will help to focus the attention of the whole world on the plight of humanity trapped by its own fears and suspicions of its neighbours, trapped by the erroneous belief that arms offer the only realistic deterrent to would-be enemies. In 1975, an arms salesman, Sir Raymond Smith, confirmed this erroneous position in a BBC interview in Venezuela, when he said: "We recognize arms not as a means to starting a war, but as a means to stopping a war." The question raised by His Excellency Ambassador Adeniji of Nigeria cannot be avoided. He asked: "How much further destructive capacity is required on either side of the nuclear divide before it is considered sufficient to deter?" This question was answered by the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth: "Yet the truth is that even more sophisticated terror weapons, once explained away as intended to deter, are becoming, through their cycles of development, destabilizing elements that make nuclear holocaust more, rather than less likely. The truth is that the nuclear arms race has lost its rationality and become a monstrous menace." The Minister of State of Sweden, Mrs. Inga Thorsson, articulate and clear as usual, provided an answer to this question also: "It must be demonstrated that the nuclear-weapons mystique, the notion that a nuclear weapon in any way can increase the national security of any State is a fraud, what I have earlier called the greatest fallacy of our time, which, far from increasing anybody's security, is certain to reduce it for all." Mrs. Thorsson is right and we should support that position; she has already become the conscience of this Committee and we want her to know she is not alone in her campaign to see a more secure and safer world realized.

(Mr. Shitemi, Kenya)

We are not oblivious of the fact that there is injustice in the world. We ask for a sober assessment and not panic in the face of the arms race. The present international economic system is not working for the benefit of all nations. Repeated calls for a new international economic order have fallen on deaf ears. Those who have economic advantages derived from the past want to retain these at all costs. We are not oblivious of the situation brought out in a statement by His Excellency Ambassador Summerhayes when he said: "None of us can ignore the effects on international confidence of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the implications for the arms control process. Its shadow continues to fall on the work of this Committee." Ambassador Summerhayes acknowledged the fact that it is not the only such shadow; he did indirectly imply too that that shadow continues to fall on bilateral and SALT negotiations. There is therefore very little to be expected out of trilateral negotiations. All the more reason for the world community to continue to press for negotiations to begin in this Committee.

The other shadow that threatens world peace and stability is that cast by the racist régime of South Africa. We will not let anybody forget the fact that South Africa is the military and economic power she is because of the support she continues to receive from certain western States. She now sends troops to Angola, Mozambique and Zambia to kill and destroy at will while within her own borders one of the most violent racist police States has made the lives of the majority of blacks miserable and short-lived. The idea that the Cape sea route is of strategic value to western defence systems and must be protected is a myth: there is no such thing as the Cape sea route; there is only a vast sea between South Africa and the Antarctic, and to call that a sea route is like calling the Atlantic a sea route. We ask the friends of South Africa to know that the time for hypocrisy is running out. South Africa is the main cause of the rivalry between the Superpowers in Africa; it is likely to become the reason for nuclear proliferation in that continent, if it is confirmed that South Africa has nuclear weapons. The recent report of the Secretary-General on this subject makes very disturbing reading.

One of the most worrying problems of a runaway arms race is, of course, its economic and social consequences. A United Nations study of 1978 which examined the relationship between military expenditure and current economic problems of inflation, recession and low growth, regards high military expenditure as a contributory factor to the depletion of natural resources. Inflation is a by-product of militarization, which overheats the economy. In a statement to the non-governmental organizations gathering at the United Nations in New York on 23 October 1980, Mr. S.S. Ramphal, the Commonwealth Secretary-General, said: "Unemployment in the industrialized countries in 1980 is twice what it was at the end of the 1960s with 20 million jobless according to OECD figures. Four hundred and fifty million unemployed is the ILO figure for developing countries excluding China ... The arms race does not provide more jobs, it prevents more jobs being provided." A prominent former President of the United States of America, Dwight D. Eisenhower, a military man, put it well: "Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies in a final sense a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, from those who are cold and are not clothed."

We ask for one thing: that we should start meaningful negotiations in whatever groups we form in this Committee to seek ways and means of ending the mad rush to the abyss of destruction which is quite apparent in the runaway nuclear arms race; the accumulation of huge stockpiles of various types of weapons heightens, not minimizes, our insecurity, and will never be a permanent and reliable deterrent.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Kenya for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. FEIN (Netherlands): I shall not hide from you the fact that my speaking today, before the month runs out, is not divorced from my wish to address some words to you, while you are still holding the high office of the chairmanship of this Committee.

The other day one of our colleagues very aptly mentioned that your chairmanship sets the seal on the most welcome participation of France in the work of this Committee following the decision taken at the time of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Speaking in that same spirit and relating your chairmanship to the participation of your country, France, in this negotiating body, I am very much aware that I must choose my words with care. For France holds its own, rather puritanical views of the origins of this body: how did it come into existence; is it or is it not the result of what went before? This question, as you know, is sometimes referred to as "the theological question".

I personally, when contemplating the French views on the origins of this Committee, am reminded of the more orthodox theories of the immaculate conception. In that spirit, your ascent to the chairmanship does indeed acquire a special significance. And it is in that same spirit that I salute you as a wise leader; your chairmanship in this month of February, which regrettably has only 28 days, augurs well for this year's work of the CD.

Allow me now to descend to the more mundane business of the order of the day and say a word or two on behalf of my Government about CTB and CW.

But first I wish to welcome in our midst our new colleagues in the quest for disarmament, the distinguished Ambassadors of Egypt, Pakistan, Romania and Zaire.

Today I wish to place on record, once again, the urgent desire of my Government that a CTBT be concluded as soon as possible — in the near future. On more than one occasion, here in Geneva and elsewhere, Netherlands representatives have expressed the disappointment of the Netherlands Government that such a treaty has not yet been concluded. Today the conclusion of a CTBT seems as remote as ever, notwithstanding the fact that the main technical problems are apparently ripe for solution. We regret this as much as we regret that the CD has remained virtually passive with regard to such an important issue.

While stressing the importance of the trilateral negotiations, we believe at the same time that it is equally necessary for the CD to translate that trilateral agreement into a multilateral CTB treaty. Only genuine multilateral parameters can make a CTBT sufficiently significant to other States for them to adhere to the treaty. If not, the CTB might lose part of its value as an arms control measure.

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

As we hold that the CD should build upon the results of the trilateral talks, we call upon the three negotiating Powers to bring their negotiations to a speedy and positive conclusion. When I mention three negotiating Powers, I should add that we would expect the two other nuclear-weapon Powers to follow suit, soon after the CTBT has been submitted to the CD.

Already too much time has been wasted in aimless discussions. We would want this Committee to start taking positive action this year. That the Committee need not remain completely passive has been proven by the successful discussions and preparatory work undertaken by the seismic experts group, in which also my country participates.

We believe that the best method of undertaking positive action would be by establishing a working group on the CTB as asked for by many other members of the negotiating body. At the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Netherlands delegation already indicated that we are in favour of such a step.

I should like to point out, as did the distinguished Ambassador from Nigeria the other day, that the participation of members of this Committee in the discussions on a CTBT could be helpful. I believe this has already been proven to be the case, for example in the negotiations on chemical weapons. We believe, therefore, that any fears of undue interference are unfounded.

Perhaps the hesitation to accept a working group is also based on uncertainty with regard to the mandate of a CTB working group. If such were the case then this difficulty could best be solved by informal discussions of the terms of such a mandate.

I would therefore suggest to you, Mr. Chairman, and to the other members of this Committee, that we set up some kind of informal consultation machinery to explore the possible terms of a mandate acceptable to the nuclear-weapon Powers.

Such an informal contact group, possibly consisting of a few interested representatives from each of the three groups and of course the representatives of the nuclear-weapon Powers, could discuss the proposals already made so far concerning working groups to deal with (certain aspects of) a CTB and could possibly also draw upon the experience of the existing working groups, such as the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons.

We are confident, or at least hopeful, that such informal discussions could lead to agreement on the terms of reference of a CTB working group. The Netherlands would be willing to participate in and contribute its best efforts in such informal discussions.

I now also wish to say a few words on CW. I do not at this stage intend to enter into the substance, but rather to make a suggestion of an organizational character.

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

This Committee has already decided to reserve the period of 23 March - 3 April for debate on CW. We have chosen that period in order to make it possible for us to profit from the presence in Geneva of a significant number of CW experts, who will attend a meeting of the Pugwash movement during the week following that period.

I would like to make sure, however, that all the CW experts from States members of the CD who are interested, as well as those of non-member States interested in CW, are actually informed as soon as possible of our wish to see them participate in our work during this period. It is my hope that the Secretariat, possibly in consultation with the Chairman of the CW Working Group, will take the necessary steps to ensure that all parties concerned are informed through the proper channels of the correct dates and of our intentions.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished Ambassador of the Netherlands for his statement and I thank him also for his friendly remarks about myself and my country.

U SAW HLAING (Burma): Mr. Chairman, allow me first to join those speakers before me, who have welcomed you to the Chair of the Committee on Disarmament. Having had the privilege of following your discreet and effective work in this Committee over the past two years, my delegation has great satisfaction in seeing you presiding over the proceedings of the Committee at the beginning of its 1981 session. We are convinced that the qualities of tact and wisdom which you have amply demonstrated during the past weeks promise a very effective result of our start for the year.

May I take this opportunity to express our deep appreciation and gratitude to Ambassador Terrefe of Ethiopia who chaired the Committee since last August for his fruitful efforts during the final stages of our work last year.

May I also take this opportunity to extend our warm greetings and best wishes to the distinguished heads of the delegations of Egypt, Pakistan, Romania and Zaire who have recently joined us in this Committee.

We are at the beginning of our third year since this negotiating body was restructured in accordance with the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. What we have achieved so far in the work of the Committee is still far from the goal set out in the Final Document with regard to final objectives and priorities of general and complete disarmament. What we have reached -- agreements on the rules of procedure, the agenda and the programme of work -- are only the basic elements with which the Committee has to start their negotiation. No one can deny that our progress has been very slow and the results, whatever we have at present, do not meet the expectations of the world community.

(U Saw Hlaing, Burma)

However, my delegation has deep satisfaction to see that at the later part of our last session, we were able to achieve progress which previous disarmament negotiating bodies had failed to reach, especially on the establishment of four ad hoc working groups which we believe are the best possible mechanism to advance effective and substantive negotiations. As a result of substantive negotiations in the four working groups, the Committee has been able initially to identify issues, their scopes and nature, methods and forms of negotiation and various negotiating positions. These are the bases we have now for further negotiations on the four priority items without consuming much of our time on procedural matters.

These modest results were achieved last year despite all the talk of deterioration in the international climate. We have no doubt that turns of international politics and world events have a direct bearing and impact on any disarmament negotiations. The events of last year showed us how delicate and fragile are détente and the structure of peace. In spite of these, with a sense of compromise and conciliation, the Committee on Disarmament was able to achieve some measures of progress.

Again at the beginning of this year, the international climate needed to help forward speedy negotiations in the Committee is not much nearer existing than it was last year. There is no doubt that world events will influence the work of the Committee, but in no way should they be allowed to hamper the work of this Committee. On the contrary, all these events have shown us that our work is more than ever necessary and the needs for disarmament agreements are more urgent now. They once again emphasize the urgency of concluding effective disarmament measures and the necessary and indispensable role of the Committee on Disarmament. No doubt, these impacts will make our negotiations harder. We should continue our effort with perseverance to achieve our objectives under the mandate assigned to this Committee.

National security is of primary importance to all nations as much as disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, is to the world community. It is with this in mind that we have pleaded time and again to look for alternative measures in building up national security by developing co-operation and understanding between States. My delegation is convinced that genuine disarmament can only be achieved by these measures. I believe there is no short cut to disarmament, particularly to nuclear disarmament.

An examination of the disarmament proposals, reports, negotiation proceedings in the past and at present reveals that the difficulties which stand in the way of a disarmament agreement are not scientific and technical any more, but political and psychological. What we are lacking is a political climate derived from harmonious international relations free of fear and suspicions among States. It is therefore necessary for all nations strictly to refrain from actions that would aggravate international tension and undermine harmony among nations.

(U Saw Hlaing, Burma)

In the fulfilment of the goals of general and complete disarmament, my country's basic approach to disarmament remains that we should proceed through the method of seeking gradual and phased agreements and by an aggregation of limited gains reach totality of achievement. But we must also bear in mind that to keep in pace with arms race, research and the qualitative improvement of a wide range of weapons, all disarmament negotiations need to keep abreast of the new developments and they must be pursued in a realistic manner.

I congratulate you for your ability and leadership, Mr. Chairman, as a result of which the Committee has been able in a very short time to re-establish and to resume the ad hoc working groups which were in operation last year. Within this short time we were able to establish an agenda and programme of work for this year. I believe the need for urgency is felt among all of us around this table in the light of the unpredictable nature of the international climate and the approaching special session which is only a year away from us now. If we are to fulfil the tasks assigned to us and meet some of our obligations, we will have to achieve them within the next few months.

There are two items on the Committee's agenda which in our consideration have been accorded highest priority. Regrettably, we have not yet succeeded in reaching consensus on establishing subsidiary bodies for these highest priority items. I wish to express the hope of the delegation of Burma that the proposal of the Group of 21 for the establishment of ad hoc working groups on these two items will be successfully materialized this year.

Nuclear weapons are the most destructive of all weapons now in existence and a nuclear war with the existing accumulated explosive power could annihilate all forms of life on earth. In total disregard of this destructive power, nuclear-weapon States continue to commit themselves to a further and more dangerous escalation in the quantity and quality of nuclear weapons in their arsenals. It will be sheer insanity if these weapons of mass destruction are deployed either by accident or by intention. For, in the final reckoning, as the Secretary-General has said, there will be no winners, only human civilization will be wiped off this planet. It is for this reason that the further escalation of nuclear armament and further steps towards self-destruction should be stopped.

My delegation attaches importance to an early achievement of progress in the area of nuclear disarmament. This is the most dangerous area for mankind and the area where progress is most urgently needed. In our view this item deserves the urgent attention of the Committee during this session. At its thirty-fifth session the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 35/152 C,

(U Saw Hlaing, Burma)

urged the Committee on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc working group on this subject upon the initiation of its present session, and advised that it should begin its negotiations on this vital question affecting the security of all nations of the world. If this Committee is to discharge the mandate assigned to it by the international community, it is necessary for us to undertake negotiations using the best available machinery and methods within this Committee. In this regard the Group of 21 submitted in 1980 a working paper (CD/116), in which substantive issues were outlined for our negotiations. My delegation is of the view that the Committee on Disarmament should reach an early consensus on the setting up of the ad hoc working group and embark upon negotiations in accordance with paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

My delegation also attaches importance to the question of the realization of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, which is an essential measure to halt the momentum of nuclear-weapons development. During the last session of the Committee on Disarmament the Group of 21 submitted several working papers, including document CD/64, in which it proposed the establishment of an ad hoc working group on this item. At its thirty-fifth session the United Nations General Assembly, in its resolution 35/145 B requested the Committee on Disarmament to take the necessary steps, including the establishment of a working group, to initiate substantive negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty at the beginning of its 1981 session and to submit a draft treaty to the General Assembly not later than at its second special session devoted to disarmament. It is the hope of my delegation that the Committee will reach consensus without further delay on the establishment of an ad hoc working group on the subject of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Last year we were somewhat heartened by the strong political commitment of the three negotiating Powers to completion of a CTBT. We are aware of the ongoing nature of their negotiations on this subject.

In our opinion the trilateral negotiations should not stand in the way of positive developments in the work of this Committee. It is the considered view of my delegation that the negotiation processes in this multilateral forum in no way detract from the work of other disarmament negotiating bodies outside its framework. On the contrary, a complementarity of basic objectives exists, and the work of the CD could be much enhanced by positive contributions from them.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished Ambassador of Burma for his statement and also for his kind words regarding myself. Do any other delegations wish to take the floor in this debate? It seems not.

In that case I should like to say a few words as the representative of France. I should like to give a brief explanation in reply to a statement made at our last plenary meeting by the distinguished representative of Iran. I hope that this explanation will be considered as being non-polemical. The remarks made by the distinguished representative of Iran contained accusations against the French Government which the latter, as I have said, regrets, and which it can naturally not accept. I would add that the Committee on Disarmament does not seem to us to be the place for bringing up problems of a bilateral character. I should like to say that the remarks to which I am referring, with respect to the relations between France and Iran as regards certain deliveries about which the two countries had reached an agreement, do not correspond to the facts as we know them and as the Iranian Government too, of course, knows them. The French authorities fulfil contracts they have signed, but the Iranian representative declared that they had refused, under various pretexts, to deliver a number of patrol boats to his country. I should like to state that after the lifting of the embargo consequent to certain events about which you all know, the French authorities immediately informed the Iranian authorities that they were prepared to hand over to them the three naval vessels the construction and delivery of which had formed the subject of a contract, as soon as certain financial and technical problems relating to the contract had been settled. The French authorities have no intention whatever of delaying this delivery. That is all I wanted to say.

Mr. AMERI (Iran): I would like to reserve the right of my delegation to respond to the statement of the distinguished representative of France when we have received the text of his statement, studied it and consulted our Government.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I take note of the statement of the representative of Iran. If there are no other speakers, I would suggest that we hold an informal meeting for just a very few minutes to consider questions concerning the participation of States not members of the Committee.

The meeting was suspended at 11.40 a.m. and resumed at 11.45 a.m.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): We have just considered in informal meeting the requests submitted on behalf of three States not members of the Committee regarding their participation in meetings of some of the Committee's ad hoc working groups. In accordance with our practice I propose to take up these requests one after the other in chronological order. The relevant draft decisions appear in working papers Nos. 30, 31 and 32.

(The Chairman)

The first request comes from Switzerland. The corresponding draft decision is in working paper No. 30. 1/ If there are no observations I shall consider that the draft decision is adopted. There are no observations.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): The second request is that of Finland, and the corresponding draft decision is in Working Paper No. 31. 2/ If there are no objections I shall consider that the draft decision is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): The third request is on behalf of Denmark, and the corresponding draft decision is in Working Paper No. 32. 3/ If there are no objections I shall consider that the draft decision is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): The next plenary meeting of the Committee will be held, as planned, on Thursday, 26 February, at 10.30 a.m.

Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, following the informal meeting which was held yesterday in which we took decisions which have now been confirmed, it appears to me that it would be useful to request the Secretariat to prepare a transcript of the useful discussions which we had on the question of the two additional working groups that were proposed. I would, therefore, wish to ask if you would consider the possibility of the Committee requesting the Secretariat to make the transcript for distribution, on an informal basis, of course.

1/ "In response to the request of Switzerland [CD/154] and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Switzerland to participate during 1981 in the meetings of the ad hoc working groups on chemical weapons and on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons."

2/ "In response to the request of Finland [CD/145 and CD/156] and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Finland to participate during 1981 in the meetings of the ad hoc working groups on chemical weapons and on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons."

3/ "In response to the request of Denmark [CD/146 and CD/157] and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Denmark to participate during 1981 in the meetings of the ad hoc working group on chemical weapons."

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished Ambassador of Nigeria. I presume that this request would not present the Secretariat with any practical or material difficulties and it is one, moreover, for which there are certain precedents with which we are all familiar in the Committee. We can therefore decide that a transcript of that meeting should be distributed informally.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): Are there any other comments or questions? It would seem not.

The meeting rose at 11.50 a.m.

CD/PV.110
26 February 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND TENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 26 February 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. F. de la Gorce (France)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. M. MATI
Mr. M. DJABALLAH

Argentina: Mr. F. JIMENEZ DAVILA
Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD

Australia: Mr. R.A. WALKER
Mr. R. STEELE
Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium: Mr. A. ONGELINX

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. R. DEYANOV
Miss V. LOTIZOV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U THAN HTUN

Canada: Mr. G. SKINNER
Mr. C. VACHON

China: Mr. YU Peiwen
Mr. LIANG Yufan
Mrs. WANG Zhiyun

Cuba: Mrs. V. BOROWDOSKY JACKIEWICH

Czechoslovakia: Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. L. STAVINCHA

Egypt:

Mr. D.A. EL REEDY

Mr. I.A. HASSAN

Mr. H.N. FAHMY

Ethiopia:

Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA CORCE

Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE

Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HEIDER

Mr. H. THEELICKE

Mr. M. KAULFUSS

Mr. P. BUNTIG

Germany, Federal Republic of

Mr. G. PFEIFFER

Mr. N. KLINGLER

Mr. H. MULLER

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES

Mr. C. GYORFFY

India:

Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN

Mr. S. SARAN

Mr. S. SINGH

Indonesia:

Mr. E. SOEPRAPTO

Mr. HARYOMATARAN

Mr. F. QASIM

Mr. KARYONO

Iran:

Mr. D. AMERI

Italy:

Mr. V.C. DI MONTEZEMOLO

Mr. A. CIARRAPICO

Mr. B. CABRAS

Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. R. ICHII
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya:

Mr. S. SHITEMI
Mr. G. MUNIU

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mr. M.A. CACERES

Mongolia:

Mr. S.H. LKHASHID
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria:

Mr. O. ADENIJI
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. M. AKRAM
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. T. MALITA
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. S. STROMBACH
Mr. J. LUNDIN
Mr. B. EKHOLI

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. L.A. NAUKOV
Mr. L.S. MOSHKOV
Mr. V.M. GAIJA
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO
Mr. S.N. RIUKHINE

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMTERHAYES
Mr. N.H. MARSHALL
Mrs. J.I. LINK

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. FLOWERREE
Mr. L. FLEISCHER
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. J.A. MISKEL
Mr. H. WILSON
Mr. S. FITZGERALD
Mr. F. DE SIMONE

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT
Mr. O.A. AGUILLAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC
Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. LONGO B. NDAGA

Secretary of the Committee
and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): The 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament has got off to a good start and, most important, it seems at first glance to have struck out on a business-like course. In your capacity as Chairman of the Committee for the month of February, you have made an undeniable contribution towards achieving this state of affairs. In sincerely welcoming you as the distinguished representative of France, a country with which Mongolia maintains friendly relations, we share your concern that the Committee should start serious negotiations on the substance of the items on its agenda.

Allow me to express the Mongolian delegation's warm thanks to Ambassador T. Terrefe, the distinguished representative of Ethiopia, under whose guidance the Committee successfully completed its last year's session.

The Mongolian delegation would like to take the opportunity to welcome the new representatives of a number of countries and to assure them of our readiness to co-operate with them in accomplishing our common tasks.

The Mongolian People's Republic has always pinned great hopes upon the activities of the Committee on Disarmament, and continues to do so today. In doing so it proceeds from the consideration that vitally important questions which disturb the whole of mankind must find urgent solution within this forum, this multilateral negotiating body unique of its kind. The Mongolian delegation, aware of its responsibility to assist in the achievement of tangible results towards the halting of the arms race and the adoption of effective measures in the sphere of disarmament, has once more embarked upon its continuing efforts within the framework of this important body.

At its present session, the Committee, as many speakers have rightly pointed out in the course of the general debate, is charged with special responsibility. The second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament scheduled for 1982 imposes on all States, and especially on members of the Committee, a responsibility to work out solutions to priority problems which should help achieve progress towards the curbing of the arms race.

At the same time we ask ourselves whether the Committee on Disarmament will be able to come to the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament with concrete agreements and understandings in the sphere of the limitation of the arms race and disarmament, or whether it will be obliged to acknowledge the absence of any real advance in the consideration of its agenda.

It is our view that the effectiveness and efficiency of this multilateral negotiating body on disarmament questions should be measured by the existence of positive decisions on the substance of these questions. The Committee should not be satisfied with measures of a procedural and organizational nature. The States members of the Committee which are still not ready to show their willingness to join in the common effort should become aware of their great responsibility and display a maximum of political will and determination to conduct constructive negotiations so as to enable a positive contribution to be made towards the achievement of practical steps in the disarmament field.

Together with the delegations of other socialist countries, the Mongolian delegation is prepared to make every effort to continue, to the best of its ability, to contribute towards progress in this direction.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

An important aspect of the Committee's 1981 session for the Mongolian delegation is the fact that it coincides with significant events in the history of present-day Mongolia. The sixtieth anniversary of the establishment of the people's power in Mongolia will be commemorated next July. In the last part of May will be held the 18th Congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, which, like the congresses of other Communist and Workers' parties of the socialist countries, will lay down the tasks ahead in the spheres of domestic and foreign policy for the purposes of strengthening the positions of socialism, preserving international peace and détente, developing peaceful co-operation among States, halting the arms race and achieving disarmament.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the principal feature of whose foreign policy activities is their consistent and active championing of effective measures towards the attainment of détente and genuine disarmament, have made and are continuing to make constructive and original proposals.

It is already widely known to all that at the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union now taking place, Comrade L.I. Brezhnev has made a number of important new proposals which represent a further creative development and expansion of the principal ideas of the well-known Peace Programme being successfully implemented by the Soviet Union together with other fraternal countries of the socialist community. The new Soviet initiatives are aimed at the relaxation of the current international tension, the removal of the threat of war and the strengthening of world peace and the security of nations.

The measures proposed by the Soviet Union for increasing confidence between the States of the European continent, between interested countries of the Far East and in other regions of the world are exceptionally important and timely. Their object is the creation of favourable preconditions for progress in the cause of disarmament.

Fidelity and consistency in pursuit of the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons are vividly reflected in the Soviet Union's new proposals for the limitation of the deployment of new submarines and the prohibition of the production of new ballistic missiles for such submarines and the modernization of existing ones.

We are convinced that the Soviet proposal for moratoria on the deployment in Europe of new medium-range nuclear missiles by the NATO countries and the Soviet Union is of great immediate significance. The implementation of this proposal would represent a concrete step towards curbing the nuclear arms race and the bringing about of military détente in Europe.

In referring to this far from complete list of new constructive proposals by the Soviet Union, the Mongolian delegation would like to emphasize the importance and urgency of putting into effect these and many other proposals by the socialist countries, which would fully coincide with the long-term interests of all peoples.

Attempts have been made in the statements of certain delegations in the general debate in our Committee to connect the causes for the deterioration of the present international situation with the Afghanistan and other questions, as was done at the last session of the General Assembly and in the forums of other international organizations.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

We are convinced that the prime cause for the worsening of the international situation resides, above all, in the attempt of certain NATO circles to disrupt the existing military and strategic balance in favour of their "position of strength" policy, to seek military superiority by giving a new, dangerous twist to the arms race spiral, stepping up military preparations in the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and other areas of the world, sharply increasing arms expenditure and deploying qualitatively new medium-range nuclear missile weapons on the territories of a number of west European countries.

The opponents of peace and international détente have gone so far as to make extremely dangerous plans concerned with the "possibility" and "admissibility" of waging a "limited" nuclear war and the resumption of the production of neutron weapons and their deployment in western Europe.

The actions of certain circles in the West aimed at creating obstacles to the entry into force of the new Soviet-United States strategic arms limitation treaty are causing deep concern to world public opinion. The same circles are to blame for the marked stagnation in a number of bilateral and multilateral negotiations.

In the present complex international situation which has resulted among other things in certain difficulties in disarmament negotiations, the Mongolian delegation believes that maximum efforts should be made to achieve all the more continuity in serious negotiations in the disarmament field and to see to it that these negotiations are constructive and effective. We are convinced that the Committee on Disarmament has a special part to play, and that, with this important aim in mind, it should proceed immediately to a business-like and concrete consideration of the items on its agenda.

The conduct of business-like negotiations undoubtedly requires all participants to display political will and determination. The Mongolian delegation's position on that score is clearly and fully reflected in document CD/141, jointly submitted at the present session of the Committee on Disarmament by the delegations of a group of socialist countries.

I should like to note that the Committee succeeded this year within a relatively short time in adopting decisions on a number of complex organizational issues, despite the blatant attempts made by some delegations to involve it in futile discussions on questions having no direct relation to the agenda.

The problem of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament is regarded as an urgent task and deserves priority attention in the work of our Committee. From this point of view, the Mongolian delegation continues to regard the socialist countries' proposal submitted to the Committee in February 1979 on ending the production of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed (document CD/4) as a good basis for the conduct of multilateral negotiations.

The sponsors of that proposal have repeatedly come forward with explanations of their position in response to the desire of individual members of the Committee for additional information. The delegations of the socialist countries, in turn, of course, expressed their willingness to hear specific comments from their negotiating partners. It seems to us essential that the Committee should turn from a rather protracted discussion of a general character to a detailed consideration of the substance of questions. According to its programme of work the Committee has embarked upon the consideration of questions relating to nuclear disarmament. However, at the present stage of our work we fail to see any substantial shift in that direction.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

In that connection we are regretfully obliged to note that there is at the present stage in the Committee's work, no consensus as regards the adoption of a decision to set up ad hoc working groups for the examination of items 1 and 2 of the agenda of the Committee's present session.

Taking into account the important recommendations, especially in resolutions 35/152 B and 35/152 C, made by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session, the Mongolian delegation is fully in favour of starting real negotiations on nuclear disarmament. We continue to support the establishment of an ad hoc group on that problem in application of the provisions of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It is extremely important, in our view, that all the nuclear-weapon Powers should participate in such negotiations. In that connection I should like once again to express our disagreement with the view that questions of nuclear disarmament should form the subject of negotiations solely among the nuclear-weapon Powers, and that it should be left to the States which are dominant in the nuclear-weapons sphere to take the initiative in the reduction of their nuclear arsenals, while others should adopt a wait-and-see attitude. Such an approach to nuclear disarmament problems is hardly likely to serve as a real basis for reaching a mutually acceptable solution of this very difficult problem, since it radically contravenes the spirit and principle of guaranteeing equal and identical security to all countries.

We also consider it important that the Committee should at the present stage consider the question of the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present. The group of socialist countries has proposed that an appropriate item should be included in the present session's agenda in accordance with resolution 35/156 C of the United Nations General Assembly and that consideration should be given to the setting up of an ad hoc working group on this question. In making this proposal we were guided by the fact that the Committee on Disarmament is called upon to elaborate effective measures for the prevention of the further proliferation of nuclear weapons in any direction and the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime.

As you know, the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session adopted a resolution recommending that the Committee on Disarmament should actively continue the negotiations aimed at achieving agreement and concluding effective international arrangements on security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States. The Mongolian delegation's position on this issue was stated during last year's session. We are in favour of the conclusion of a multilateral convention the object of which would be to provide non-nuclear-weapon States with effective assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We do not consider individual declarations by nuclear-weapon States concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons to be a sufficiently effective or wholly reliable means that could be qualified as "interim measures". Taking into account the proposals made concerning the need for the adoption of interim measures, we support the idea that an appropriate agreement should be formulated in the form of a Security Council resolution. The Mongolian delegation intends to speak on this point at a later stage of our work.

The Mongolian People's Republic is no less interested than others in finding an immediate solution to the question of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. China's persistence in conducting nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere in the immediate vicinity of Mongolia's southern frontiers continues to arouse the profound indignation and concern of the Mongolian people and other peace-loving peoples. We resolutely demand from the Chinese People's Republic that it should immediately cease nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, respect the rules of international law now in force and constructively join in the multilateral efforts to achieve a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

We believe in general that the non-participation of States, particularly nuclear-weapon States, in negotiations on questions of nuclear disarmament to justify their negativist attitude towards a particular international instrument in the disarmament field does not give them the right to act with impunity with the aim of gaining unilateral advantage or obtaining an individual benefit. We think that the achievement of an effective international agreement on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban will be difficult, if not impossible, if one or two nuclear-weapon Powers persistently strive to preserve outsider status.

The interests of the common cause demand that all nuclear-weapon States should refrain from conducting nuclear explosions for a specified period and should make appropriate declarations to that effect, as the Soviet delegation proposed at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly. The proposed moratorium, whose time-frame should be agreed from the outset, should apply to all nuclear-weapon States without exception.

The Mongolian delegation considers it essential that the Committee on Disarmament, taking into account the relevant General Assembly resolution, should make the necessary efforts to establish an ad hoc working group for the thorough consideration of the question of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban and the drafting of an appropriate treaty, with the participation of all the nuclear-weapon Powers. It seems to us that the consideration of this matter within the framework of the Committee should not complicate the process of the trilateral negotiations in progress between the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the United Kingdom but should assist and promote their successful completion in every possible way.

The Committee on Disarmament is the most suitable body for negotiations in which it could not only ascertain what further progress had been made in the trilateral efforts in this field but also confirm its ability to adopt a decision mutually acceptable to all parties; with the participation of the other two nuclear-weapon Powers which for one reason or another have not up to now shown a desire to participate in the negotiations in progress between nuclear-weapon States.

There is no doubt that if the Committee on Disarmament as at present constituted achieves consensus in the preparation of an international agreement on a comprehensive nuclear-weapon test ban, this will not only represent a historic event in the sense that the draft of the first international instrument with the participation of all the nuclear-weapon Powers and other, non-nuclear-weapon States will have been agreed on within this body, but will also serve to create favourable preconditions for the achievement of positive decisions on other important issues on the Committee's agenda, and in particular questions relating to the limitation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

The Mongolian delegation attaches great importance to the constructive examination of the question of the prohibition of the development and production of new types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

The socialist countries have already made a proposal for the establishment of an ad hoc group of experts on this problem and have expressed their readiness to discuss the question of the group's mandate.

With regard to radiological weapons, one of the new types of weapons of mass destruction, we consider that the requisite conditions now exist for practical work to be done to reach definitive agreement on a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. The Committee could, in our view, direct the work of the ad hoc group on radiological weapons in such a way that it might successfully complete its work by the conclusion of the current session.

In this context I should like to recall that in March 1978 the socialist countries submitted a proposal for the prohibition of neutron weapons. The proposal for the conclusion of an appropriate convention is of considerable importance today, as I have already pointed out, in the light of new attempts to revive plans for the production of this lethal weapon and its deployment in a number of west European States.

Assessing the present position in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, we share the view that a certain amount of progress has been made. The principal task at the present stage is to concentrate attention on those provisions in respect of which a general convergence of views has become apparent, and so to move forward gradually towards practical agreement on specific formulations for the draft of a future international convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

The Mongolian delegation hopes that in the discussion of the question of the elaboration of a comprehensive disarmament programme account will be taken of the appeal made by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session that such a programme should be drafted with a view to its adoption not later than at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The Mongolian delegation is willing to continue actively co-operating with the delegations of other countries with a view to finding constructive solutions to the urgent problems before the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished Ambassador of Mongolia for his statement and for the kind words he was good enough to address to the Chair.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): Mr. Chairman, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic is gratified to note that the overwhelming majority of the States members of the Committee on Disarmament attach foremost importance to the priority question of disarmament negotiations -- the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The peoples of the world rightfully expect the Committee to decide urgently upon measures which would contribute to translating into concrete agreements the provisions on nuclear disarmament contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. This objective is, as is well known, also reflected in important resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

The urgent necessity for concrete measures is accentuated by the actions of certain circles that have lately whipped up the nuclear arms race in order to develop new "invulnerable" and precise weapons. Expenditures for new systems of nuclear weapons are soaring immeasurably. As a consequence of this, the risk of the outbreak of a nuclear war is steadily increasing. The declaration of the so-called Palme Commission (CD/143) introduced some days ago by the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, convincingly points out the serious consequences of the intensified nuclear arms race and, thus, deserves our attention.

The German Democratic Republic, situated in the centre of Europe at the dividing line between the two most powerful military alliances, has been working very actively for the safeguarding of peace in Europe. We are watching with particular attention the development of events in this part of the world. The implementation of NATO's decision to manufacture and deploy medium-range nuclear-missile weapons in western Europe would considerably raise the danger of a nuclear war on the European continent. Recent reports alleging that the world's biggest concentration of nuclear weapons exists already now on the territory of the western neighbour of the German Democratic Republic have become a matter of great concern. This deadly record would even be surpassed if the above-mentioned NATO decision were to be realized. It is obvious that such a concentration of nuclear weapons poses a serious threat to all countries in this region, including the German Democratic Republic. It cannot leave my country indifferent. This threat is recognized by more and more people in Europe, and not only there. We are also concerned about calls made by certain circles in the United States to declare obsolete such an important agreement as the Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of 1972, or to circumvent it by developing new weapons. I believe that we all here are conscious of the important role this Treaty plays in assuring strategic stability.

In view of these alarming signs, we felt particular satisfaction over the fact that one of the nuclear-weapon States, namely, the USSR, reiterated early this week its will to do everything in its power to bring about nuclear disarmament. The German Democratic Republic welcomes and supports the declaration made by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, L.I. Brezhnev, at the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that the Soviet Union intends to continue the policy of détente. This readiness has been borne out by new concrete proposals, in particular on the cessation of the nuclear arms race. Here I have especially in mind the proposals concerning the

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continuation of the negotiations with the United States on the limitation and reduction of strategic armaments, concerning the limitation of the deployment of new submarines and the corresponding missile systems, and concerning a moratorium on the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe.

We fully agree with the repeatedly expressed view that the Committee on Disarmament can and should play a more active part in the efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament. Under the prevailing conditions, a general exchange of views on the pros and cons of dealing with the cessation of the nuclear arms race and with nuclear disarmament no longer suffices. This subject must be tackled with the seriousness it deserves. The relevant objectives are clear; they are contained in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. In their working papers, CD/4, CD/36/Rev.1, CD/109 and CD/116, the Group of Socialist States and the Group of 21 put forward concrete proposals on the organization and substance of corresponding negotiations. Regrettably, we are still waiting for a definite reply of the western group and one nuclear-weapon State concerning the issues raised in these documents.

Now as before, we believe that the most appropriate means for making progress in this field would be the establishment as soon as possible of an ad hoc working group on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament. General Assembly resolutions 35/152 B and 35/152 C and the above-mentioned documents provide the principal guidelines for the elaboration of its mandate. The ad hoc working group should aim at initiating effective negotiations with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States. This goal could be reached in several intermediary stages. As a first step, consultations could be held with interested States in order to harmonize views on the approach to organizational problems and to the elaboration of the mandate for the ad hoc working group to be set up. A mandate to be worked out could involve the following aspects:

A manner of starting negotiations on nuclear disarmament;

The clarification of the stages of nuclear disarmament;

The identification of the responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States and the role of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

In this framework, the ad hoc working group should strive to reach agreement on the basic principles for negotiations on nuclear disarmament, the relationship between conventional and nuclear disarmament, and questions relating to the strengthening of political and legal guarantees for the security of States.

In the course of the discussions which have taken place hitherto the question of ending the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes has been raised. This problem should not be underestimated. But it cannot be separated from the set of issues relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Such an approach would not halt the qualitative arms race. New systems of nuclear weapons could be manufactured even with the existing stockpiles of fissionable material. Therefore, this question should be addressed by the

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

ad hoc working group to be set up within the framework of paragraph 50 of the Final Document. We express the hope that the States advocating the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes could go along with this more comprehensive approach.

Pursuant to resolution 35/156 C adopted at the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Committee on Disarmament has decided to consider the issue of the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present in the context of its agenda item on nuclear disarmament.

The attainment of an appropriate agreement would, in our view, strengthen the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and improve the conditions for agreeing on effective security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

An appropriate agreement should provide for the commitment of the nuclear-weapon States not to deploy nuclear weapons on the territories of countries where there are no such weapons at present, irrespective of whether or not these countries have allied relations with one or another nuclear-weapon State. The main elements of such an agreement could be defined at an initial stage of our work in this sphere. We are in favour of setting up an ad hoc working group on this question.

Concluding my statement, I would like to stress the willingness of my delegation to play an active part in the elaboration of concrete arrangements for solving the tasks in the field of nuclear disarmament fixed in the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Any progress in this direction, however limited it may be, would make an important contribution to a successful preparation of the second special session on disarmament.

Mr. SUMTERHAYES (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, today I wish to refer again to the question of nuclear disarmament, which we are now considering under item 2 of our agenda. The distinguished representative of India, in his interesting and thoughtful statement on 3 February, said that the nuclear-weapon States owed a duty to explain their attitude to nuclear defence and nuclear disarmament. His actual words were that we should explain "the inconsistencies and contradictions" of our policies. I think therefore that a response to these comments is in order, particularly as the policies pursued by my Government are certainly neither inconsistent nor contradictory. I also have in mind that earlier this week, in our informal meeting on the possibility of creating additional working groups, a number of delegations, among which the Indian delegation was again prominent, called for the CD to consider in more detail aspects of nuclear policy such as the concepts of deterrence, nuclear parity and the balance of power.

I shall start by dealing with one particular alleged inconsistency straight away. In his speech to which I have referred, the representative of India suggested that there is an inconsistency between the weapons policies of the nuclear Powers and their declared policy on nuclear disarmament. But, as he will know from his own country's policies, defence and disarmament are not in themselves incompatible

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

aims. The British Government takes exactly this view and has repeatedly committed itself to seeking measures of nuclear disarmament as part of a general disarmament process. But my Government has always taken care to say further that nuclear disarmament would be neither feasible nor desirable on its own. On the contrary, we believe this could result in serious military, and hence political, destabilization. For us it is a fundamental principle of disarmament negotiations that the results should not jeopardize the security of any party. This is recognized in paragraph 22 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which I will quote:

"Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, negotiations should be carried out on the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments, based on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security."

A preoccupation with nuclear affairs in the disarmament discussions has, however, tended to divert attention from the serious imbalance in conventional forces in Europe, which is the main obstacle to substantial conventional as well as nuclear arms reductions by the west.

I am not sure how far it is appropriate for this Committee to become a forum for debates on strategic theory, but since my Indian colleague made a number of comments about the strategy of deterrence, I think it reasonable, as a representative of a country which practises nuclear deterrence, to explain the basic concept underlying our policy. First, let me bring this theoretical subject down to very simple terms. If I see a risk that my house may be broken into, I install a burglar alarm, find myself a guard dog and then put up a notice on my front gate advertising this. I do not wish to hurt a possible intruder; instead, I hope that my preparations will make him reconsider and leave me in peace. In other words, I am trying to deter him. The strategic principle is exactly the same -- and I would venture to say that it is a principle on which many States base their defence. Each country must consider what external threat it faces and what level of defence is necessary to prevent any threat from developing into outright aggression. We all try to achieve the same aim -- to prevent war.

Let me now turn more particularly to the situation in Europe. The NATO alliance faces a situation where there is a growing conventional and nuclear potential ranged against it. The basis of our alliance is that we are pledged to defend each other if attacked. We threaten aggression against no one. Yet we perceive a threat to our security stemming from both conventional and nuclear forces, and the conventional forces which threaten us are far larger than those that we ourselves now deploy. We reject the idea of being blackmailed into a choice of being destroyed in war or surrendering our freedom, and so we have tried to find a way of ensuring that we are not attacked. To achieve this, we make it clear that any possible adversary who might contemplate aggression against us would suffer more than he could possibly hope to gain.

As I said last week, my Government shares with all other Governments a deep sense of horror at the appalling consequences that would flow from any nuclear war. We completely accept that there could be no winners in such a war. Our aim is to ensure that it never happens. So we must have the capability to demonstrate to a would-be aggressor that at whatever level he attacked us, we could defend ourselves in the most appropriate way -- conventional or nuclear.

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

No one need fear that we in the west would willingly take a single step to initiate a war -- conventional or nuclear. No one need fear that we will use our possession of nuclear weapons to impose our political objectives on another country. Nor that we have some misguided belief that a limited nuclear war would in some way be to our advantage. How could we believe such a thing when it is our own homes that would be devastated? We need no convincing on this score. Our aim, and that of our allies, is solely to prevent any risk of violence being exerted against us. It is my Government's belief that in the light of the particular threat -- conventional as well as nuclear -- to our security, the best way to achieve this, the best way to preserve peace, is by a strategy of deterrence -- conventional as well as nuclear.

But that is not the end of it: otherwise we would admittedly be condemning ourselves to an endless arms race. We hope and try to prevent this. Hence my Government's commitment to arms control and disarmament. By seeking arms control agreements, slow and difficult though the process is, we attempt to maintain the balance of forces. By seeking multilateral disarmament we attempt to bring down the appallingly high level of armaments on both sides. We see deterrence and disarmament as both being necessary, and as complementary ways of securing our over-all objective of peace and security.

The second main contention, or contradiction, on which I should like to comment in the statement by the distinguished representative of India is that the nuclear balance is inherently unstable and contains, as it were, the seeds of its own imbalance. This is an arguable proposition. As in any other field of military technology, there is always an incentive to improve equipment and thus to keep ahead of, or not to fall behind, a potential opponent. This tendency to competition exists in all situations of armed confrontation and is not only a characteristic of nuclear armouries. What is true is that as a result of this technical competition there is a fear that the approximate equilibrium or balance which serves as a mutual restraint will be disturbed. It is not difficult to see the danger inherent in this. It is a major reason for giving priority to seeking to cap the nuclear arms race. And that in turn is precisely why we attach so much importance to the SALT process.

Against this background I should like to reiterate what I said at the informal meeting held on 23 February about the handling of these subjects in this Committee. It is our view that as things now stand, the only States which can participate effectively in the process of capping the strategic arms race are those with the predominant nuclear armouries. That is why we believe that at this stage it is sensible for this question to be dealt with bilaterally through the SALT process. My Government is, however, a party to the negotiations on the question of the cessation of nuclear testing.

It is a fundamental characteristic of negotiations of this kind that they involve highly technical issues affecting the security of the participants. It is for this reason that my Government does not see how the negotiation of nuclear arms control agreements could in the first instance be conducted within this Committee. It follows from this that we do not believe that it would be useful as the initial step to set up working groups on these agenda items. This certainly does not mean, however, either that my Government is satisfied with the way things are or that it is insensitive to the awesome responsibility on the shoulders of nuclear-weapon States.

Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): The latest issue of the monthly journal, Disarmament Times, published under the auspices of the NGO Disarmament Committee, carries on its first page a news item entitled, "'Doomsday Clock' Advances Toward Midnight". This clock, conceived by a group of nuclear scientists in 1947, measures the time that separates us from nuclear disaster, with divisions from 12 to 0. At the time at which the news item in the Disarmament Times was written, as a result of the latest events that had made the danger of a nuclear war much greater, the hands on the clock had been moved to four minutes to "midnight"--- the day of destruction. Since then the hands must have moved still nearer to zero hour. Let us hope that the developments that have occurred in the last two days have delayed the inexorable hour of the end of mankind by a few minutes.

International events in recent times have highlighted the profound changes that have occurred in the world scene as a result of the instability of certain regions and the changes in the interests and strategic objectives of the Superpowers and of the principal military Powers generally.

The transformation of a regional conflict into a world conflict in which the use of nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out becomes increasingly likely. The most recent events in different parts of the world show clearly how delicate is the balance on which international peace and security depend and how the rivalries between the great Powers seem increasingly likely to lead to a large-scale conflict. A local conflict which might begin as a civil war or a war among neighbours could easily drag the great Powers into a direct confrontation and subsequently into a nuclear war.

At the same time, new types and systems of nuclear weapons have recently appeared that by their characteristics increase the probability of a nuclear war rather than consolidate the security of their owners. The development of guided missiles, ever more accurate and less vulnerable, particularly at the level of tactical armaments and new systems designed to prevent detection of the sites where such weapons are installed, make the use of these nuclear weapons more feasible. This dangerous trend has been stimulated by the emergence of new doctrines of dissuasion based on the assumption that it is possible to wage a limited nuclear war for some weeks, and so avoid unleashing a full-scale nuclear war. This assumption we reject as completely crazy and we further consider it absurd and dangerous. Who can guarantee that the detonation of a nuclear device in the territory of either of the two combatants, carried by a tactical means of delivery, or a medium-range ballistic missile will not provoke reprisals or a counter-attack with strategic weapons? Furthermore, in order to appreciate what a tactical nuclear war would mean, it is enough to remember that the most inoffensive of the nuclear devices which would be employed in such a conflict would in any case be several times more powerful than the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima or Nagasaki. And again, in even a limited nuclear war, not one but perhaps many of these devices would be used.

In the statement he made at the 108th plenary meeting, Ambassador Summerhayes, the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, said that his Government "believes that the only secure route to nuclear arms control lies through negotiations between the nuclear-weapon Powers, and in particular between the United States and the Soviet Union". I believe no one would dispute that the nuclear-weapon Powers have primary responsibility in the matter of nuclear disarmament. That is one of the basic principles of disarmament embodied in the Final Document of the General Assembly's first special session devoted to

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

disarmament. But although we recognize, and indeed, insist on this responsibility, we cannot agree that those States which hold the monopoly of power to destroy this planet can also arrogate to themselves the monopoly of exclusive decision on an issue in which the fate of mankind is at stake. The right of the non-nuclear countries to demand nuclear disarmament and to insist on participating in the negotiations on disarmament derives precisely from their need to ensure their own survival. As a result of the growing accumulation of nuclear weapons, mankind is confronted with the real danger of its own annihilation.

In order to understand this, it is enough to read paragraph 495 of the "Comprehensive study on nuclear weapons" submitted by the Secretary-General to the United Nations General Assembly at its last session, and circulated in document A/35/392. I shall venture to presume for a few moments on the patience of my colleagues and read this paragraph which is somewhat lengthy but which in our opinion is very pertinent.

"In a nuclear war, the nuclear-weapon States themselves may suffer the heaviest casualties and the most extensive damage. However, all nations in the world would experience grave physical consequences. Radio-active fall-out could be a serious problem especially in countries adjacent to the belligerent States, and during the decades after a major nuclear war, fall-out would take a toll of millions world-wide, in present and future generations. Even more serious than radio-active fall-out, however, would be the global consequences of a large nuclear war on the world economy and on vital functions of the international community. The sudden collapse of many of the world's leading trading nations as well as of established mechanisms for international transactions would lead to profound disorganization in world affairs and leave most other nations, even if physically intact, in desperate circumstances. Widespread famines could occur, both in poor developing countries and in industrialized nations. Those starving to death might eventually outnumber the direct fatalities in the belligerent countries. Even non-belligerent States might enter a downward spiral leading to utter misery for their populations, and almost all would suffer a loss of standards corresponding to many decades of progress. Economic conditions such as these might trigger latent political instabilities, causing upheavals and civil and local wars."

Briefly, no one on earth would escape the direct or indirect consequences of a nuclear war. How, then, can an attempt be made to deny the non-nuclear-weapon countries, which represent over two thirds of the world population, the right to participate in negotiations where what is at stake and what is being decided is their own destiny?

Of the items on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament, the question of nuclear disarmament in its various aspects is undoubtedly the most important and urgent. As is stated in the Final Document of the General Assembly's first special session devoted to disarmament, effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority among all disarmament measures. Venezuela, together with the other countries in the Group of 21, considers that the Committee should undertake without delay substantive negotiations directed towards the adoption of concrete and effective measures on nuclear disarmament. To the world at large it is incomprehensible that the Committee on Disarmament, the single multilateral disarmament forum, to which the members of the international community entrusted the task of negotiating measures of disarmament, should still, after two years' existence, not really have begun to concern itself seriously with the most important question in the field of disarmament— nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

Although we would not rule out the possibility, or the desirability of negotiations on nuclear disarmament being held in more limited forums, in which the countries most directly involved might participate, we consider that the Committee on Disarmament is the most suitable forum for the preparation and conduct of negotiations on nuclear disarmament. We therefore consider it imperative and urgent that the Committee should begin to discharge its responsibility in the sphere of nuclear disarmament.

In our view, the main basis for the task to be accomplished by the Committee on Disarmament in this sphere is to be found in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the General Assembly's first special session, which sets forth the programme of action to be undertaken in the matter of nuclear disarmament. Moreover that paragraph is one of those that were adopted by consensus at the special session. Like the other countries in the Group of 21, we consider that the Committee's efforts should be directed towards achieving the realization of the objectives specified in this paragraph, which are as follows:

Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems;

Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

A comprehensive, phased programme with agreed time-frames, whenever feasible, for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time.

We also consider that in conducting substantive negotiations on nuclear disarmament, the Committee should take due account of the various concrete proposals which have been submitted. I am referring to the proposal of the socialist countries which appears in document CD/4 and the proposal of Australia and Canada on the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, contained in document CD/90.

Similarly, we consider that, as the Group of 21 has proposed, in the negotiations on nuclear disarmament the Committee should address itself particularly to the following issues, which are mentioned in document CD/116:

- (i) The elaboration and clarification of the stages of nuclear disarmament envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document, which I quoted a moment ago;
- (ii) Clarification of the issues involved in prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, pending nuclear disarmament and in the prevention of nuclear war;
- (iii) Clarification of the issues involved in eliminating reliance on doctrines of nuclear deterrence;
- (iv) Measures to ensure an effective discharge by the Committee on Disarmament of its role as negotiating body in the field of disarmament and in this context the relationship between the Committee and other restricted forums conducting negotiations relating to nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

Together with the Group of 21 we have been advocating the setting up of an ad hoc working group to begin negotiations on the issues I have just mentioned. As will be recalled, my delegation has from the beginning of the Committee's activities been one of the main protagonists of the establishment of working groups. We have maintained, and we continue to maintain, that working groups constitute a form of institutional machinery which, as has been shown in practice, offers the advantage of permitting a rapid and direct dialogue in which, as a result, the positions of countries can be less rigid, less intransigent and more conciliatory, in an atmosphere of serious and constructive work. It is for this reason that we heard with genuine disappointment the statements made by two of the nuclear-weapon Powers to the effect that they did not support the establishment of a working group on the subject of nuclear disarmament. We hope that this position is not unchangeable and that in the near future these countries will show a readiness to go along with the great majority of the members of the Committee in order to form the consensus necessary for the setting up of the working group. But as I said at the informal meeting the Committee held last Monday, when this question was discussed in detail, the rejection by these two countries of the idea of a working group should not prevent the Committee from discharging the responsibility with which it has been entrusted. The Committee is, as its rules of procedure state, "a disarmament negotiating forum". Among the questions which should be the subject of negotiation, the Committee has included in its agenda the item on the cessation of the arms race and nuclear disarmament. The Committee is not obliged to establish working groups for each of the items on the agenda. We believe that when, as in the present instance, the Committee is unable to achieve the necessary consensus to be able to proceed with the setting up of one of these groups, the Committee should take over directly the task of conducting negotiations.

We think, therefore, that for the remainder of this part of the session, the Committee should, in keeping with its programme of work, devote as many informal or unofficial meetings as possible to the subject of nuclear disarmament. At these meetings it should give a preliminary consideration to the specific issues set out in the Group of 21's working paper, document CD/116, as a first step to moving towards a more advanced stage of negotiations which should be conducted during the summer session, let us hope in a working group.

To conclude my statement, I wish to draw attention to the fervent appeal on behalf of nuclear disarmament that Pope John Paul II has just made from Hiroshima, one of the cities martyred by nuclear terror. I think that no place is more appropriate than the Committee on Disarmament in which to recall the following paragraph from the Pope's message:

"To the Heads of State and Government, to those who hold political and economic power, I say, 'Let us pledge ourselves to peace through justice, let us take a solemn decision now that war will never be tolerated as a means of resolving differences. Let us promise the rest of mankind that we will work tirelessly for disarmament and for the prohibition of nuclear weapons'."

The Pope's message, with its deep spiritual content, and with the authority conferred upon it by its genuinely pacifist and human tenor, should be the subject of profound reflection by all the rulers of the world and especially those of the nuclear-weapon Powers, whether believers or non-believers.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished Ambassador of Venezuela for his statement and I should also like to express my gratitude for his very cordial remarks about myself.

Mr. VENKATESWARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, in my statement at the plenary meeting of the Committee held on 3 February 1981, I raised certain doubts concerning the concept of deterrence in a nuclear age and the unfortunate relationship between this concept and the escalating nuclear arms race. In sharing our thoughts on this question with the Committee, we had hoped to be able to initiate an intensive exchange of views on what the famous Danish nuclear physicist and Nobel laureate, Neils Bohr, called a "perpetual menace to society". We are grateful to the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom as also to others around this table for reacting to some of the views expressed by my delegation. We await the detailed comments he has promised on the issues raised by us. Today, Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to develop further some of the ideas put forward by us and also respond in a preliminary way to the arguments contained in the statement of my distinguished British colleague.

Let me first of all take up the points raised by the representative of the United Kingdom. In his statement he asserted that his Government "shares the deep sense of horror at the devastating potential of nuclear weapons". However, he went on to say that "we are all-too-conscious of the appalling loss of life that a conventional war can cause". If by this he meant that we ought to focus attention on the need for conventional disarmament as well, we are at one with him. But I do hope that he will agree that in terms of destructive power, nuclear weapons are a class apart. In the words of the report of the Secretary-General on nuclear weapons, "never before has the destructive capacity of weapons been so immediate, complete and universal". And if the Ambassador of the United Kingdom agrees with this judgement, then surely he should also agree that the first order of business in any disarmament negotiations must be the achievement of nuclear disarmament.

However, he has stated that "we should not give undue prominence to nuclear weapons". How can we not give undue prominence to such monstrous weapons of mass destruction? In fact, my delegation believes that, far from giving undue prominence to such weapons, we have, in fact, neglected the cataclysmic danger they pose. In 1965 Lord Chalfont, the British Disarmament Minister, in a statement before the ENDC made on 19 August, quoted the following words from Shakespeare's Julius Caesar:

There is a tide in the affairs of men,
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;
Omitted, all the voyage of their life
Is bound in shallows and in miseries.

Lord Chalfont went on to say:

"I believe, quite simply and without any wish to over-dramatize the dangers, that unless we can stop and set back the nuclear arms race before many more months have passed, we may have little to look forward to but shallows and miseries."

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

It is 16 years since then and can we doubt that we are indeed looking into shallows and miseries? It is small comfort that only one-fifth of the world's military expenditure is on nuclear weapons. And if we wish to play with statistics, then I would like to point out that when there are only five nuclear-weapon States, it is not such a great surprise that only 20 per cent of global military expenditure is on such weapons. Further, one should also not forget that 80 per cent of the total military expenditure is incurred by five or six militarily significant States, including the very same nuclear-weapon States. So, if conventional disarmament should be a matter of concern, it is again on these States that the major responsibility falls.

The distinguished representative of the United Kingdom also sought to justify the doctrine of deterrence by asserting that its purpose is the prevention of war. This aim is served, he argued, by "being seen to be able to defend ourselves", and by convincing a potential adversary that a conventional or nuclear attack would entail risks that would far outweigh any potential benefits. On the face of it, the argument appears reasonable. However, as I argued in my earlier statement, in a nuclear age, deterrence involves not only the theoretical ability of a State to impose unacceptable destruction on its adversary, but at the same time its willingness to withstand massive destruction, perhaps even to the point of self-annihilation. Deterrence in this context, as I stated, is in the last analysis based on dangerous bluff. My colleague from the United Kingdom argues that the "policy of deterrence has kept the peace in Europe for 35 years and it remains valid today". We regard this as an oversimplified conclusion. As the Secretary-General's report on nuclear weapons observes, "it is a truism to say that deterrence works because that statement will hold true only until history disproves it". And I need not comment on what would happen if deterrence failed. My British colleague himself has acknowledged that even in a limited nuclear war there would be no winners or losers.

We cannot share the optimism regarding the ability of nuclear-weapon Powers to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war. The more so if this were to happen by accident. The fact that the decision to use nuclear weapons would be taken at the highest political level does not necessarily mean that such a decision need be taken with appropriate caution. Human beings are fallible and they are subject to stresses and strains. Leaders at the highest political level are no exceptions to this rule. And should they turn out to be fallible, the consequences of their actions would be visited upon the entire globe. Let us imagine for a moment that a nuclear missile from country X has been accidentally triggered off and is on its way to a target in country Y. Suppose, further, that the President or Prime Minister of country X gets on the "hot line" and calls his counterpart in country Y and says, "I am terribly sorry, but one of these crazy nukes has been triggered off accidentally. Since this is all a mistake, I do hope you will not retaliate". When the relations between the States concerned are avowedly strained and there is lack of trust generally, it would be difficult to believe that the matter would end there.

It has frequently been argued that at least in the European theatre, nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament cannot be pursued without regard to the conventional imbalance in Central Europe. We do not concede this view since in essence this means that nuclear weapons are to serve as a substitute for

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

conventional weapons. To rephrase something that Lord Canning said many years ago, weapons of the new age have been brought in to redress the balance of the old. However, would the proponents of this argument limit its applicability only to Europe? There are several regions of the world where a particular nation may feel threatened by a neighbour with larger conventional armaments and forces. The perception of threat may not be based on objective criteria, but then perceptions, especially when they concern national security, very rarely are. In other regions of the world, therefore, where similar perceptions of conventional imbalance may prevail, would the recourse to nuclear weaponry to redress the balance be considered valid and justified? The strong support for horizontal non-proliferation of nuclear weapons that emanates from countries of Europe would lead us to believe otherwise. And this is precisely because nuclear weapons cannot in any manner be equated to conventional weapons. But the force of example is important, and it is for the nuclear-weapon States and their allies to demonstrate that it is not valid for other countries to seek to balance their conventional arms accounts by recourse to nuclear overdrafts.

This is how we look at some of the points raised by the delegation of the United Kingdom. I am willing to admit that the problem has to be examined in all its aspects and that perhaps we may have overlooked certain important factors relevant to our discussion. We are willing as ever to be educated on this as well as other matters in our negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament.

I would now like to turn to the question of halting the nuclear arms race. In my previous statement, I put forward the proposition that at the heart of the phenomenon was the concept of deterrence and related to that concept the notion of strategic parity. In developing this theme I would like to commence by quoting from the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on a comprehensive study on nuclear weapons:

"Peace resting on the system of deterrence has been said to require approximate parity or balance between the forces of the States involved. The view is held that parity ceases to exist if one side acquires a 'first-strike capability', i.e. the capacity to deliver a nuclear strike against the other without risking an intolerable reprisal. In these conditions, the general fear is that deterrence can or may fail. Yet the concept of parity rests on a situation which is inherently difficult to evaluate. Each Superpower's nuclear arsenal consists of many components of different size, function and importance. Since each of these components may be subject to constant technological development on both sides, but not always simultaneously, parity is a process whose equilibrium must continuously be re-established. Hence, the notion of balance is then, by definition almost, unstable."

My delegation has argued that reliance on the doctrine of deterrence inherently involves the search for superiority over a potential adversary. However, even if it is argued that deterrence involves merely the establishment of a parity and not a search for superiority, that parity cannot be a stable one. In the present situation, no objective and quantifiable criteria have been found in order to take "parity" or "balance" from the realm of subjective security perceptions to the world of objective and mutually acceptable judgement. And the more complex and sophisticated nuclear weapons become, the more difficult it would be to create such objective criteria. Furthermore, in practice, there is always a tendency to overestimate an adversary's capabilities while under-estimating one's own in order to allow for miscalculation or lack of information.

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This factor alone could keep fuelling a nuclear arms race. In a recent article in the Washington Post, General Maxwell Taylor stated that a weapons programme to achieve parity or superiority was "too ill-defined" and in any case, the location of the finish line, even if it is discernible, could be changed at will by the adversary. Recent developments in nuclear-weapon technology, including the testing of more accurate warheads and anti-satellite systems, indeed makes one wonder if there is a finish line at all in the nuclear arms race, except the inexorable occurrence of what is intended to be deterred, a global nuclear war.

It should be clear from this that the concept of parity and any arms control negotiations that are built around it cannot therefore serve to preserve the peace among the nuclear-weapon Powers. Perhaps if a nuclear war could be limited to the nuclear-weapon States and their allies alone, the rest of the world could hopefully still survive. However, as we have pointed out time and again, the problem of the continuing nuclear arms race and the danger of nuclear war are issues which deeply affect the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. It is clearly impermissible for a handful of nuclear-weapon States to seek to promote their own perceived narrow security concerns and thereby hold the rest of the world hostage to the threat of total annihilation. It is, therefore, both right and necessary that non-nuclear-weapon States should actively participate in negotiations to remove what is a major and appalling threat to their security. Nuclear-weapon States must acknowledge these legitimate concerns of the world community. They must respond to the doubts and misgivings that have been expressed in this and other forums over the cynical pursuit of a competitive accumulation of ever-more sophisticated weapons of mass destruction. National security or the security of competing alliances can no longer serve as a pretext for deferring debate and concrete negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

It has been stated here in this Committee that the stage has not yet arrived for our undertaking multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament. I would like to ask, when will that stage arrive? Will the proponents of such a view enlighten us as to what specific circumstances, what specific developments, what conjunction of stars would make the situation ripe for multilateral negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament? It is not enough to say that the situation is not ripe. We would like to know as rational beings why the situation is not ripe, now at this very moment?

The nuclear-weapon States have had more than three decades in which to deal with the problem of nuclear disarmament. A whole new generation has grown up and what we have witnessed is an unrestrained nuclear arms race, the dimensions of which have become increasingly difficult for the human mind to comprehend. The subject was complex to start with. The main actors involved have done their best to complicate the subject further. And at every stage, the complexity of the subject has been used to prevent the non-nuclear-weapon States from bringing their justifiable concerns to bear on negotiation concerning nuclear weapons. At the same time, the goal of nuclear disarmament has been pushed more and more into the background, while arms limitation and arms control have become the catchwords of the present time. Perhaps it would be useful to recall what a delegate from France, a nuclear-weapon State, said in a statement to the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on 9 November 1970 concerning the nature of arms control measures. I quote:

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"But who can fail to see that the policy of the mastery of armaments, whether it is devoted to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, to their non-dissemination in new environments, or to the limitation of strategic weapons, tends mainly to cause the present situation to harden, and does not constitute a step towards true disarmament? This is so because, on the contrary, it postulates that, in the name of the virtues of mutual dissuasion, stockpiles of armaments can be maintained at a sufficiently high level. Is it really, as is claimed, a realistic policy, even if it is considered -- at least by the two greatest Powers -- as the only one possible under present conditions ...? For who would doubt the precarious nature of a balance that is always at the mercy of a technological breakthrough, a mistake in calculation, even an adventurous decision, as a monopoly of armaments would not necessarily ensure a monopoly of wisdom, even in the case of the most sophisticated weapons.

"Moreover, the policy of armaments control adds to the risk of unavowed renunciation of nuclear disarmament, that of a sharing of power between the States responsible for the balance -- a sharing or distribution which Mr. Maurice Schumann denounced recently from the rostrum of the United Nations General Assembly, and which he declared would, if we are not careful, perpetuate the division of the world".

Prophetic words, uttered more than a decade ago. Is it necessary to argue the case further for this Committee's undertaking multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament forthwith, so that the risk of the unavowed renunciation of nuclear disarmament and the perpetuation of the division of the world into nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States does not become a permanent reality?

Some members of this Committee have referred to the unfavourable international situation which could inevitably affect our work in this forum. I would respond by saying that it is precisely when growing suspicions and mistrust characterize the relations among the major Powers, including the nuclear-weapon States that this Committee provides a forum where hopefully some of that suspicion and mistrust can be dissipated. Perhaps an exposure to the security concerns and genuine apprehensions of the non-nuclear-weapon States, especially those belonging to the developing world, would enable the nuclear-weapon States and their allies to break out of the narrow confines of their security perceptions and become aware of their responsibilities to the rest of the world. This itself would have a sobering and positive impact on their separate negotiations. For what I argue for is not that this Committee should supplant their restricted negotiations but that it should supplement them. It is for this reason that we recommended the setting up of an ad hoc working group of this Committee to consider certain concrete issues relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. We regret that we have so far been unable to reach a consensus on this proposal. For the present, therefore, my delegation would support the suggestion that we schedule a sufficient number of informal meetings of the Committee devoted to this agenda item. We could begin with a substantive examination of the report of the Secretary-General on a comprehensive study on nuclear weapons. Perhaps the first few informal meetings could be devoted to an in-depth discussion of chapter V of the report which is entitled "The doctrines of deterrence and other theories concerning nuclear weapons". We could then

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

move on to chapter VI, which deals with the security implications of the continued quantitative increase and qualitative improvement of nuclear-weapon systems. Another round of discussions could be centred upon the main conclusions of the report. What we have in mind is that members of the Committee, and especially nuclear-weapon States, put forward their considered views on each of the chapters, explaining why they agree or disagree with the observations contained in the report. By commencing our discussions in this manner, we may be able to impart a degree of specificity to our debate. We could then structure our subsequent negotiations on the basis of the preliminary examination of the main issues involved. I hope that this very modest proposal will find favour with all members of the Committee.

This month in New Delhi the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the non-aligned States observed the twentieth anniversary of the first Conference of Heads of States and Governments of Non-Aligned Countries which had issued a Declaration in which they had stressed the danger posed by nuclear weapons and called for "the total prohibition of the production, possession and utilization of nuclear and thermonuclear arms and bacteriological and chemical weapons as well as the elimination of equipment and installations for the delivery and placement and operational use of weapons of mass destruction on national territories". May we hope that these words will be heeded at least now by the nuclear-weapon Powers and will engage especially the attention of members of this Committee, which is the only multilateral negotiating body in which such an agreement can be reached?

To conclude, I would like once again to emphasize that unless we are able to make some progress in the most urgent of items on our agenda, the Committee's credibility as a multilateral negotiating body will suffer irreparable harm. Let us do everything possible, therefore, to ensure that we go to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament with some tangible results in this area and demonstrate that we have not neglected what the first special session considered to be a problem affecting the very survival of mankind.

Mr. SOEPRAPTO (Indonesia): Mr. Chairman, addressing myself to the second item of our agenda "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", may I begin by referring to the final Declaration of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of May 1975 which states, inter alia, as follows:

"While welcoming the various agreements on arms limitation and disarmament elaborated and concluded over the last few years as steps contributing to the implementation of article VI of the Treaty, the Conference expresses its serious concern that the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, is continuing unabated.

The Conference therefore urges constant and resolute efforts by each of the Parties to the Treaty, in particular by the nuclear-weapon States, to achieve an early and effective implementation of article VI of the Treaty."

(Mr. Soeprapto, Indonesia)

During the years that have followed since the adoption of the said Declaration, there has been an increasing concern on the part of the international community in general and the developing nations in particular due to the fact that, despite the Declaration referred to, the nuclear arms race has continued to take place, not only quantitatively but also qualitatively, as a result of technical innovations that have led to the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems. The necessity of the fulfilment of balanced obligations and responsibilities on the part both of nuclear-weapon States and of non-nuclear-weapon States for the attainment of the two-fold purposes of the NPT, namely, the prevention of the emergence of additional nuclear-weapon States (envisaged in article II) and to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons (article VI), was emphasized, three years after the first NPT Review Conference, by the General Assembly at its tenth special session, held in 1978 (para. 65 of the Final Document).

When the parties to the NPT met again in August last year, the developing States parties to the Treaty participating in the Conference, all of them non-nuclear-weapon States, did not hide their disappointment at the continued non-implementation of the provisions of article VI of the Treaty by the nuclear-weapon States parties to it, despite the two instruments I referred to earlier (the Final Declaration of the first NPT Review Conference, of 1975, and the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, of 1978).

Taking a close look at the pertinent provisions of various documents relating to the questions of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, such as paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, the Committee's report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session (A/35/27, paras. 37-44), paragraphs 7 (a) and (b) and 14 (a) of General Assembly resolution 35/46 on the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, paragraph 3 of resolution 35/152 B and paragraph 2 of resolution 35/152 C, the endeavours aiming at the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament suggested in those documents could perhaps be listed as follows:

1. With regard to the existing nuclear weapons, the endeavours suggested consist of:

- (a) Reduction of nuclear weapon stockpiles;
- (b) Limitation of nuclear weapon stockpiles.

2. Regarding the ongoing process leading to increases in the quality and quantity of nuclear weapons, the proposed endeavours include:

- (a) Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapon systems;

(Mr. Soeprapto, Indonesia)

- (b) Cessation of production of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery;
- (c) Cessation of production of fissionable material for weapon purposes.

3. The tasks to be performed by the Committee on Disarmament during its 1981 session consist of:

- (a) Commencing negotiations on the substance of the problem of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament;
- (b) Undertaking consultations to consider, inter alia, the establishment of an ad hoc working group; and
- (c) If such an ad hoc working group could eventually be established, beginning negotiations on the following questions:
 - (1) The stages of nuclear disarmament (envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly) which comprise:
 - (a) Elaboration of the envisaged stages;
 - (b) Clarification of the said stages;
 - (2) Identification, in the process of achieving nuclear disarmament, of:
 - (a) The responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States; and
 - (b) The role of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

In the view of my delegation, the issues I have just listed may perhaps be used as a basis for the further work of our Committee in dealing with item 2 of its agenda. But since this Committee is a negotiating body, and since negotiations can be conducted most effectively in working groups, it is therefore the hope of my delegation that an ad hoc working group on the subject could finally be established, if not immediately then perhaps at a later stage of the current session.

Reportedly, there may exist today some 50,000 nuclear weapons in the world's arsenals, with a combined explosive power of more than one million Hiroshima bombs, representing not less than 3 tons of TNT for every individual in the world. If the nuclear arms race is not halted and if nuclear disarmament is not attained the world will therefore be confronted with a most serious danger, one unprecedented in the history of mankind.

Mr. DI MONTEZEMOLO (Italy) (translated from French): I have asked for the floor today in order briefly to introduce working paper CD/155, dated 24 February 1981, on behalf of my delegation.

This working paper represents a first contribution by the Italian delegation to this year's work on the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. It contains a text which will, we hope, be of use in the drafting of the section of the comprehensive programme entitled "Objectives".

We submit it today so that it may be placed immediately at the disposal of the Ad Hoc Working Group which is meeting this afternoon.

In drafting it, my delegation took into account, of course, last year's contributions on the same subject by other delegations, in particular those of Mexico, Pakistan and Czechoslovakia.

It has not failed to seek common ground with those contributions, even as regards actual wordings.

I do not think there is any need for additional comments; however, I should like to stress the concept contained in the first paragraph of the paper in question, namely, that it should be one of the objectives of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, whose elaboration has been entrusted to our Committee, to pursue simultaneously the two approaches which have, from the beginning, marked the international community's disarmament efforts -- the one aimed at promoting general and complete disarmament and the other aimed at achieving specific and limited measures. This idea derives, moreover, from paragraph 109 of the Final Document which states: "Negotiations on general and complete disarmament shall be conducted concurrently with negotiations on partial measures of disarmament. With this purpose in mind, the Committee on Disarmament will undertake the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament ..."

The Italian delegation has always had a special interest in the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. In his statement at the plenary meeting held on 3 February last, Mr. Speranza, our Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, explained the reasons for that interest. For many countries, including my own, the criterion of balance in the disarmament process is a fundamental one, and one of the principal attractions of a programme which sets out to be comprehensive consists precisely in the possibility of adopting a balanced approach which minimizes the risks of unilateral advantages at every stage of the disarmament process and guarantees that every step forward shall correspond to the same logic of balance and stability.

Mr. MALITA (Romania) (translated from French): In my statement today, I would like to put forward some observations of the Romanian delegation on the agenda item concerning the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Malita, Romania)

Romania has always maintained that the outlawing of nuclear weapons, the halting of their production and the liquidation of existing stocks are a fundamental requirement of international life and that, consequently, nuclear disarmament negotiations must have the highest priority in our Committee.

Priority for nuclear disarmament is required by the very nature of these weapons -- weapons of mass destruction -- in fact, the absolute weapon of total annihilation. A concern to eliminate the most deadly weapons from the arsenals of States has always been at the core of an elementary human reaction, that of ensuring survival.

The urgency of such measures has been recognized by the United Nations in more than 100 resolutions, beginning with resolution 1 (I) of 24 January 1946, which spoke of the elimination of atomic weapons from the arsenals of all States. However, it has never proved possible to initiate multilateral negotiations on the subject of nuclear weapons. That is why the Romanian delegation considers that our Committee has an exceptionally important task before it.

We do not wish to repeat here the well-founded arguments that the non-nuclear-weapon States have invoked in support of their demand that negotiations on nuclear weapons should begin without further delay.

The dangers imposed on those States as a result of the existence of stocks of nuclear weapons, held by others -- weapons over which they have no control -- the bitter division that such weapons create in an already divided world which aspires to equality, their role as a means of pressure and threat and their negative influence on the peaceful uses of the atom of which the whole world is in need -- these are only some of the reasons to which a vast literature has been devoted.

Negotiation has, however, a fundamental rule, which is, that an attempt must be made to understand and study the arguments of the other parties to the negotiation. While having no pretension to reasoning in the place of others, it appears to us useful to recall that the commencement of negotiations would to a large extent meet the interests of all countries, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, even if their attitude as to a desire to negotiate is not the same.

Firstly, negotiations provide an opportunity for the nuclear countries to fulfil a moral, and, for some of them a legal obligation towards the rest of the world. Reference has rightly been made in this connection to the undertakings assumed under article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty. The present position with regard to nuclear weapons is based on an undertaking to continue in good faith negotiations on effective measures to halt the arms race at an early date.

Secondly, it is obvious that the unanimously recognized threat of nuclear weapons is no less for those who possess and stockpile them. We are given assurances about the safety of handling such weapons despite proof to the contrary and doubts based on elementary calculations of risk which highlight the danger of accidents, errors and miscalculation. In our opinion, it is necessary to deal openly with these subjects.

(Mr. Malita, Romania)

Thirdly, no weapon has shown such a propensity for growth. Despite the claim that the aim is to maintain a balance, this is constantly being pushed to higher levels, with no limit in sight. The development of nuclear weapons shows no pause. Moreover, technological improvements, and more particularly electronic innovations clearly have a destabilizing effect.

It has been asked whether the balance could not be maintained at lower levels. Where can this theme of universal interest be discussed?

The argument of a link between nuclear and conventional arsenals and of the fact that these two elements are inseparable for the security of certain States has also been advanced. Our delegation does not deny the existence of a link between nuclear and conventional weapons. But we believe that this fact should be the subject of a discussion with a view to elucidating all the implications. The bald statement of the fact without any consequent action merely strengthens the arguments of other States for undertaking the production of nuclear weapons in order to ensure their security.

Lastly, many references have been made to the complexity of disarmament. Our delegation is far from minimizing the complexity of the subject. But Romania has always maintained that international questions, no matter how difficult, can and must be settled through negotiation and talks, for we believe that there is no alternative in the nuclear age. Consequently, the complexity of nuclear disarmament, in our view, calls for negotiations on the subject to be started without further delay, without indefinite postponement.

We have not put forward all these arguments with a view to ignoring other types of reasoning but rather to stress the indisputable fact that they represent specific questions which call for an adequate approach with the instruments that are appropriate to any negotiation.

For all these reasons, our delegation considers that there are no valid arguments against the start of negotiations on nuclear disarmament. Moreover, the Committee on Disarmament, in which all the nuclear-weapon States are represented, together with a number of non-nuclear-weapon States, offers the most appropriate forum for the conduct of such negotiations. Specific proposals on this subject have been put forward by the socialist countries, in document CD/4, and by the countries members of the Group of 21, in document CD/116, as well as by other delegations. Other ideas may and, we are convinced, will appear during the negotiations.

All these arguments favour the establishment of a working group on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament at the Committee's present session.

The terms of reference of such a group could include the holding of a broad exchange of views and opinions on ways of initiating negotiations on nuclear disarmament in the Committee. This is all the more necessary in that, as we have already seen, a number of delegations have raised questions which, in their view, we should take up in order to facilitate the start of negotiations on nuclear matters.

(Mr. Malita, Romania)

It is quite obvious that such a dialogue cannot take place solely at plenary meetings, where the only working instrument is the presentation of positions by means of statements. For the achievement of our aims, a real dialogue is necessary, and persevering and informal work, and it was for this purpose that the negotiating groups were set up.

As we have already had occasion to state, the Romanian delegation does not consider the establishment of a working group as an end in itself. We regret the fact that some delegations attach a special connotation to what ought to be a simple organizational decision. The Romanian delegation is of the view that a request by any delegation for the establishment of such a group on the items on the agenda cannot be refused. We firmly support the idea of establishing a working group on the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests. On this subject, as on that of nuclear disarmament, we cannot agree to the Committee's again this year putting off the start of a structured activity.

It is our duty to tackle these questions and try to go into their substance.

In view of all these arguments, the Romanian delegation endorses the Indian delegation's proposal for the holding of a special meeting to be devoted to an examination of the conclusions of the report of the United Nations Secretary-General containing the comprehensive study on nuclear weapons.

We also propose the organization, under the auspices of the Chairman of the Committee, of a number of informal meetings with the participation of experts, during which each State member of the Committee should have an opportunity to submit its views on specific questions relating to the start of negotiations on nuclear disarmament in the Committee. A constructive dialogue on this subject, imbued with a sincere desire to identify the real obstacles in the way of such negotiations, would constitute a valuable contribution by our Committee to the starting of the process of nuclear disarmament.

There is no need to emphasize here the special importance that an affirmation of the political will to negotiate measures of nuclear disarmament would have in present international conditions. Not only would this in no way affect the military balance but, on the contrary, it would be likely to contribute to a strengthening of mutual political and military confidence.

For its part, the Romanian delegation is prepared to make a contribution to the initiation of this process. The ideas put forward in this statement are preliminary in nature. We are ready to consider any other working possibility that may be advanced with a view to mobilizing the constructive efforts of all members of the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: (translated from French) I thank the distinguished Ambassador of Romania for his statement. It is now 12.55 p.m. but we have a further request from a delegation which wishes to make a statement in plenary, and I was hoping to take up three particular points with you, very briefly, at an informal meeting. If you agree, we could go into an informal meeting now for just a few minutes. I suggest that we resume this plenary meeting or hold another, very short one, at 3 p.m., and if our distinguished colleague from Mexico so agrees, that meeting would be followed immediately about 20 minutes later, by the meeting of the Working Group of which Ambassador García Robles is Chairman.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, as you know, the Working Group of which I have the honour to be the Chairman has a strict schedule: it must finish its work in time for the comprehensive programme to be ready for consideration by the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament. The Working Group has only one meeting per week. I would therefore suggest that if it is necessary to resume this meeting or hold an extra meeting, this could be done tomorrow morning. I believe that the Working Group on Radiological Weapons, which is the one that is to meet tomorrow morning, is in a much better position than the Group of which I have the honour to be the Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank Ambassador García Robles for his statement. I think we really need to settle a few points at once in informal meeting. Of course there is no reason why -- I am in the hands of the Committee in this matter -- we should not hold the brief plenary meeting I am suggesting tomorrow morning, if Ambassador Komives so agrees. In fact, however, for this afternoon, it would be a matter of hearing two statements which would be short and would certainly not delay the work of the Group presided over by Ambassador García Robles very much. If the Committee agrees, can we meet in plenary meeting for a short time tomorrow at 10.30 a.m.? I am anxious that we should not spend more time discussing how we are going to discuss than in discussing what we have to discuss.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I propose that we now close the formal meeting and go into an informal one to consider these questions and also to decide the question of the next plenary meeting. I wonder really if anything is sufficiently urgent to interfere with the work either of the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament or of the Working Group on Radiological Weapons; perhaps we might discuss this point at the informal meeting and request the delegation which has not had time to speak to do so on Tuesday and to make its statement then.

The meeting was suspended at 1 p.m. and resumed on Friday, 27 February 1981, at 3 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I declare open the 110th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament. At our informal meeting yesterday, the Committee agreed on a draft decision concerning the participation of the representative of Norway in the meetings of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons. The Secretariat has distributed this draft decision in Working Paper No. 34. If there are no objections or comments, the Chair will note that there is consensus in this connection. There are no comments.

It was so decided.

Mr. EL REEDY (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): During my opening statement I mentioned that the Egyptian constitutional organs had agreed to ratify the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. I am now happy to inform you that yesterday, 26 February 1981, in the city of London, the instruments of ratification were deposited with the Government of the United Kingdom. On that occasion, the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued an official statement which I requested you, Mr. Chairman, to have circulated as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament. I thank you for complying with that request.

Egypt, which was one of the first States to call for the speedy conclusion of that Treaty, played a constructive role in the preparatory negotiations in [Eighteen-Nation] Committee on Disarmament here in Geneva. Egypt was also among the first States to sign the Treaty when it was opened for signature on 1 July 1968. Our ratification of that Treaty is an affirmation of our belief, which is shared by many others, that it is necessary to put an end to the proliferation of nuclear weapons which are threatening the security of mankind.

In taking this step and accepting the obligations arising out of its adherence to the Treaty, Egypt hopes that the nuclear-weapon States will also meet their obligations. In this connection, I would like to draw your attention to the reference made in the statement of the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the obligations of the nuclear-weapon States under the terms of article IV of the Treaty. I quote:

"Egypt's commitment by virtue of the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to refrain, in any way, from acquiring or manufacturing nuclear weapons shall not impair its inalienable right to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in conformity with the provisions of article IV of the Treaty, which affirms the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. The stipulation of that right in the Treaty itself is, in fact, a codification of a basic human right, which can neither be waived nor impaired.

From this premise, Egypt also views with special attention the provisions of article IV of the Treaty calling on the parties to the Treaty who are in a position to do so to co-operate in contributing to the further development of the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world."

With regard to article V of the Treaty, the statement notes that:

"Within the framework of the rights provided for in the Treaty for all parties thereto in as far as the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is concerned, Egypt wishes to refer to the provisions of article V of the Treaty, which state that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States party to this Treaty."

(Mr. El Reedy, Egypt)

Regarding the obligations of nuclear-weapon States with respect to the cessation of the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament and the achievement of a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests, the statement goes on to say:

"Egypt wishes to express its strong dissatisfaction at the nuclear-weapon States, in particular the two Superpowers, because of their failure to take effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. Although it welcomes the 1972 and 1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties, known as SALT I and SALT II, Egypt cannot but admit that the Treaties have failed to bring about an effective cessation of the nuclear arms race, quantitatively and qualitatively, and have even permitted the development of a new generation of weapons of mass destruction.

"Moreover, in spite of the fact that more than 17 years have elapsed since the conclusion of the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, the nuclear-weapon States are alleging that various difficulties still stand in the way of a permanent ban on all nuclear-weapon tests, when there is only need for a political will to achieve that end.

"Consequently, Egypt avails itself of this opportunity, namely the deposit of its instruments of ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to appeal to the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to fulfil their obligation whereby the nuclear arms race will be stopped and nuclear disarmament achieved.

"Egypt also calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to exert all possible efforts so as to achieve a permanent ban of all nuclear-weapon tests at an early date. This will bring to an end the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction, inasmuch as the cutoff of fissionable material for military purposes will curb the quantitative increase of nuclear weapons."

In addition to the above, there are two issues to which I would like to refer in spite of the fact that they are not the subject at present under consideration by the Committee. These two issues, namely, international assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States and the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, are directly related to and have a positive impact on the cessation of the nuclear arms race. I quote from the statement:

"As regards the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, Egypt deems that Security Council resolution 255 of 19 June 1968 does not provide non-nuclear-weapon States with a genuine guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States. Egypt therefore appeals to the nuclear-weapon States to exert their effort with a view to concluding an agreement prohibiting once and for all the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any State.

"In this respect, Egypt expresses its great satisfaction with the United Nations General Assembly resolution adopted by consensus at its thirty-fifth session inviting the countries of the Middle East, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the area, to declare solemnly their support for the achievement of this objective, that they will refrain on a reciprocal basis from producing, acquiring or possessing nuclear weapons, and to deposit their declarations with the United Nations Security Council."

(Mr. El Reedy, Egypt)

In our view, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would represent a tangible contribution towards the achievement of the over-all objective, namely, the cessation of the nuclear arms race. This step would also contribute towards the achievement of peace and prosperity for the peoples of the region of the Middle East. We hope that the nuclear-weapon States, together with all the other States concerned, will support these endeavours.

At the same time, we believe that the provision of effective security guarantees will also encourage other States to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In conclusion, I would like to refer to a point which we regard as essential, namely, that we on this Committee have a special responsibility as the body to which the General Assembly of the United Nations has assigned the task of conducting the necessary negotiations in connection with the cessation of the arms race and the achievement of disarmament. Since the international community attaches high priority to the two topics for discussion under the first and second items of our agenda, we have the additional responsibility of ensuring progress in those two fields.

Although the important negotiations which are taking place among the nuclear-weapon States are indispensable if there are to be any real achievements in the field of disarmament, they do not absolve this Committee of its responsibility under the terms of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The useful negotiations conducted within the framework of the working groups established last year prove the validity of the argument that working groups constitute the most appropriate method of negotiation in connection with the items on our agenda. We therefore believe that the establishment of two working groups on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the prohibition of nuclear tests, as called for by the Group of 21, would provide us with the machinery whereby we would be able to fulfil the task assigned to us by the General Assembly. Therefore, I wish to express support, once again, for my colleagues who have already called for the establishment of the two above-mentioned working groups. In the meantime, we ought to devote a number of informal meetings to the discussion of those topics.

Having followed the work of this Committee during the month of your chairmanship, please allow me, Mr. Chairman, before you hand over your office, to express the admiration and esteem in which my colleagues and I hold you personally for your outstanding skill in directing the work of this Committee and for your remarkable humanitarian qualities which complement your technical and diplomatic abilities. You have attained this lofty position not only in the annals of the Chairmen of this Committee, but also in the hearts of every one of its members.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Egypt for his statement and I also wish to express my warm appreciation for his kind and friendly words with regard to myself.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, the Committee on Disarmament has started its current session with the consideration of the issues concerning the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests as well as the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament -- issues which undoubtedly have priority both in the work of our Committee and among the tasks in the sphere of the limitation of the arms race and disarmament as a whole. The speediest solution of these issues would be of immense importance for the fate of all mankind.

We feel particular satisfaction at the fact that these issues are being raised by many members of the Committee in a very firm and resolute way owing to their genuine interest in the earliest practical solution of these problems. The Soviet Union has every reason to consider itself a country which took the initiative in raising the question of nuclear disarmament in its various aspects and in its entirety on a broad international scale; our country has for a long time been a staunch advocate of the settlement of this global problem. For the Soviet Union, the active and purposeful struggle for nuclear disarmament is a fundamental and consistent policy.

As early as 1946 the Soviet Union put forward a proposal for the conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition for all time of the production and use of atomic weapons, so that the great scientific discoveries associated with the fission of an atomic nucleus might be used exclusively for the purposes of increasing the well-being and raising the living standards of the peoples of the world, as well as for developing culture and science to the benefit of mankind.

However, in response to this, certain Powers took the course of accelerating the nuclear arms race.

Today again, an analysis of the situation in the sphere of nuclear disarmament clearly shows that in this matter the effect of the passage of time is such that the opportunities let slip today cannot be recovered tomorrow. The later negotiations on nuclear disarmament are started, the more difficult it will be to conduct them.

We are wholly in accord with those who are now concerned about the existing situation and who are searching for ways and means to bring about the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapons testing, tangible progress in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, the limitation of the race in strategic and other armaments, and the strengthening of world peace and the security of States. We wish the States members of the Committee to have no doubts on that score.

The deliberations in the Committee on Disarmament on the questions of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and nuclear disarmament have also revealed, regrettably, another tendency -- the tendency, in the face of the slow progress in finding a solution to these problems and of the difficulties which have arisen in defining the role of the Committee on Disarmament in these areas, to try to create the impression that certain Powers bear some collective responsibility for this and, ignoring the facts, to overlook the substantial and, sometimes, fundamental differences in their positions, thus confusing the objective picture and hampering the correct understanding of the tasks facing the Committee. This applies both to the question of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and to that of nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Allow me to dwell on the question of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

There are some who contend, for example, that the Soviet Union is opposed to the active consideration of the question of the prohibition of nuclear-weapons testing within the framework of our multilateral body and prefers to conduct tripartite negotiations on that matter. I would remind you that in 1975 the Soviet Union proposed the establishment within the United Nations of a special committee with the participation of all five nuclear-weapon Powers and 25-30 non-nuclear-weapon States for the purpose of working out a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, a draft of which was submitted by the Soviet Union. The following non-nuclear-weapon States agreed to participate in the work of the committee: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Bolivia, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, Grenada, Egypt, Zaire, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Cyprus, Cuba, Morocco, Mexico, Mongolia, Nigeria, the United Republic of Tanzania, Peru, Poland, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Sudan, Finland, Czechoslovakia and Ethiopia. Of the nuclear-weapon States only the Soviet Union expressed its willingness to initiate, within the framework of the proposed committee, negotiations on a complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. However, multilateral negotiations were not started because of the positions of the other nuclear-weapon States and certain western countries which refused to take part in the committee's work. In 1977 the Soviet Union, together with other socialist countries, submitted a draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests for consideration by the Committee on Disarmament. I should like to underline that the above-mentioned document is still lying on the negotiating table in the Committee. In the light of these facts how can it be contended that the Soviet Union is opposed to the active participation of the Committee on Disarmament in the negotiations on this issue?

Sometimes, assertions of the opposite kind can also be heard, namely, that the Soviet Union is disappointed with the trilateral negotiations and now wants to abandon them. In this context we, together with the United States and the United Kingdom, have been called upon, as was done, for example, by the representative of Canada on 19 February, to resume these negotiations forthwith. I will be straightforward: these calls are addressed to the wrong party. As to the Soviet Union, it has been ready to start the next round of the negotiations and its willingness continues to hold good. The responsibility for the failure to resume the tripartite negotiations does not rest with us.

There are some who have expressed "a fear" that the United States and the United Kingdom succeeded in "twisting the arm" of the Soviet Union so that the joint report on the tripartite negotiations submitted to the Committee on Disarmament should emphasize the importance of these negotiations. Well, for my part I can only express my sympathy to the creator of those fears who has such a poor knowledge of the Soviet Union and its position. As is well known, attempts to "twist the arm" or to "bring pressure to bear" on the USSR have never been successful.

Some delegations, including the representative of Japan, have in their statements asked us to explain our position. We will willingly reiterate it, although I believe that the majority of the Committee's members are well aware of our position.

We should like to stress once again that the Soviet Union attaches very great importance to the attainment of agreements on the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. This approach of ours has been embodied in a large number of documents including those which we have tabled in the United Nations and in the

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Committee on Disarmament. The prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, established in 1963 with the direct and active participation of the Soviet Union, has been in force for 18 years. In the bilateral agreement between the USSR and the United States of America limits were set on the power of underground nuclear explosions, and, although up to now this agreement has been in force only on a de facto basis, we are not to blame for the fact that it has not yet been ratified.

We have attached and we continue to attach foremost importance to the trilateral negotiations between the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union on a treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests in all environments. Why to these negotiations in particular? We are convinced that in present-day conditions this is the most dependable way to make substantial progress towards the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests within the shortest possible span of time. In the course of the negotiations the Soviet Union has taken important steps to meet its partners half-way. Among other things, it gave its assent to the establishment of a moratorium on peaceful nuclear explosions and agreed that the treaty would enter into force even if initially only three of the five nuclear-weapon Powers, namely, the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom, become parties to it. However, to the great disappointment of the world at large, a tendency to drag things out has become apparent in the trilateral negotiations and as I have already said, it does not come from our side. We wish to emphasize that the Soviet Union is willing to continue to display a constructive approach with a view to using the tripartite negotiations for the successful completion of the task of achieving a complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

At the same time, from the point of view of ensuring a really universal prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests for all time, the Committee on Disarmament could, in our view, play a substantial and active part also. In his statement on 17 February, the representative of Pakistan gave his evaluation of the possible results of the tripartite negotiations, calling them a "temporary" moratorium on nuclear testing by the United States, the United Kingdom and the USSR, and an "indication of their commitment to the goal of nuclear disarmament". He also said: "At the same time, the CD should be enabled to initiate negotiations on a truly comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty". Well, one can agree to such an approach. We ourselves have already more than once pointed out the positive aspects which discussion of the problem of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests in the Committee on Disarmament might have, especially in view of the participation in it of all five nuclear-weapon Powers. Many non-nuclear-weapon countries also are represented in the Committee, and they have a vital interest in the elimination of the threat of a nuclear cataclysm and are in a position to help find the necessary solutions both in word and in deed.

Obviously, an agreement on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, formalized in an appropriate international treaty with the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States, would contribute greatly to the improvement of the human environment which unfortunately continues to suffer from the pernicious consequences of the continuing nuclear explosions, especially in the atmosphere. But of course the main purpose of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is to limit and reduce to the minimum the possibility of the further improvement of nuclear weapons and of the development of newer and still more lethal types of such weapons.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

To sum up: the Soviet Union has been consistently in favour of the Committee on Disarmament playing an active part in dealing with the matter of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. The non-aligned and neutral countries have put forward a proposal for the setting up within the Committee of an ad hoc working group on this question. The Soviet delegation supports the proposal on the establishment of such an ad hoc group provided all the nuclear-weapon Powers participate in its work. We have been asked what are our thoughts about the mandate of such a working group.

Speaking now in general terms, without going into detail as to what this group could deal with, we believe that its task should be to explore the problem of nuclear tests in all its aspects with a view to the earliest possible conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests with the participation of all the nuclear-weapon Powers.

Naturally, the examination of the issue of a nuclear-weapon test-ban within the Committee and its working group ought not to complicate the process of the trilateral negotiations on this matter. Indeed it is obvious that if this were to happen, instead of helping to achieve the speediest possible prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, it would cause serious and perhaps irreparable harm.

Some delegations in the Committee on Disarmament have expressed a certain misunderstanding of the position of the Soviet Union as regards the testing of an international global network to detect and identify seismic events. The question is sometimes asked why the Soviet Union is in favour of establishing such a network only after a treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests has been concluded and not in the immediate future. Let us ask frankly what is this network required for? The answer is, to verify compliance with the treaty. And if there is no treaty? Let us suppose for a moment that we fail to reach agreement on such a treaty, then what will be the use of establishing such a network, spending huge sums of money on it and carrying out an extremely expensive global testing of it to boot? And will this not be a weakening factor, will it not cause States to slacken their efforts to achieve a complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests?

We sometimes have the impression that certain delegations instead of mobilizing all their energies and efforts towards the attainment of a treaty with the participation of the five nuclear-weapon Powers, are directing them at a secondary matter and exaggerating the importance of the difficulties of ensuring in the future the reliable operation of a global international network. We are anxious that there should be no doubts as to the position of the USSR in this regard and that it should be clear to everyone that we see the network as being useful once the treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests is in existence. At the same time, we want to emphasize that we are not against a consideration of the institutional and administrative steps necessary for the establishment, testing and operation of an international global network for the detection of seismic events. This issue also could be considered within the framework of the proposed working group. Of course, the network itself could be established only after a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests has been concluded.

Those are some observations the Soviet delegation wished to make concerning the consideration of the question of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests in the Committee on Disarmament. We reserve the right to express our views on the role of the Committee in negotiations on nuclear disarmament at one of its future meetings.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished Ambassador of the Soviet Union for his statement and I wish to thank him, too, for his kind words about myself.

Mr. WALKER (Australia): Mr. Chairman, a country dedicated, as Australia is, to nuclear non-proliferation, and which values the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, could not take the floor today without first saluting the announcement which has been made today by the distinguished Ambassador El Reedy of Egypt, informing us of his country's ratification of the Treaty. I am sure my Government will respond more formally to mark this important development. It is a courageous and wise decision of his country, which will add to the strength of the Treaty and help to achieve its objectives which, I venture to suggest, despite differences that may exist among us in this room, are objectives to which we are all committed, and I therefore applaud that decision and thank the Ambassador for its announcement. I would like to show it physically by joining hands.

You will recall, Mr. Chairman, as will members of the Committee, that at our first plenary meeting, almost a month ago, the distinguished representative of the Netherlands raised an idea which my delegation later made its own. This was that, given the considerable success of the holding last year of informal meetings between this Committee and experts on chemical weapons it might be valuable to try to repeat this experience again this year. A long discussion on this subject was held more than a week ago in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons and, at that time, several delegations made helpful suggestions concerning the proper role of experts in the work of the CD and their proper relationship to the work of the Working Group. I think most of us here will recall, in that connection, interventions by the representatives of Egypt, India, Pakistan and Sweden. My delegation then had extensive discussions with these delegates which enabled us to prepare Working Paper No. 33 which was circulated yesterday for consideration today. Also, about a week ago, I showed a draft of this paper to your distinguished successor and obtained his concurrence. I did not, however, at that time, raise with him the question of which particular days might be possible, or the details of possible arrangements, because I think that is a question which is better discussed when he enters into his functions and which I feel also require discussion with others including, of course, the distinguished Chairman of the Working Group.

One Ambassador has raised with me some uncertainties about the readiness of the Committee to consider this question at this stage, but as we had previously explained in the Committee, this matter is of special importance to countries like mine which are at great geographical distance from Geneva, and for which a month's notice is the bare minimum necessary to arrange for an expert to come. For that reason, I would pray the indulgence of the Ambassador who has had some hesitation about the Committee discussing and finalizing the matter at this stage, and I was hoping that we might be able to come to a decision this afternoon, both before I myself leave Geneva for a while and in time to enable other representatives of distant countries to report to Headquarters and to prepare accordingly. Therefore, I would seek your guidance, Mr. Chairman, as to whether the appropriate way of doing so would be to pass briefly into an informal meeting at which we could discuss any remaining questions that still need to be refined in connection with this proposal, or whether you feel it is the sentiment of the Committee that we discuss it in plenary. My delegation, I must say, is very open on this matter.

Mr. PFEIFFER (Federal Republic of Germany): On behalf of my delegation I would like to express our deep satisfaction that Egypt has ratified the non-proliferation Treaty and by doing so has joined the States signatories of this important Treaty. We see this decision of the Egyptian Government as a confirmation of the fundamental importance which the non-proliferation Treaty has, in the view of my delegation, in preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, I should like to make some brief remarks on three topics: first, I should like to express my delegation's satisfaction at the announcement the distinguished representative of Egypt has made to us concerning his country's ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

In this connection, although we have not specifically been asked to do so, my delegation wishes to endorse the statements made by Egypt when it deposited its instrument of ratification, and in particular the following:

"Moreover, in spite of the fact that more than 17 years have elapsed since the conclusion of the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear-Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, the nuclear-weapon States are alleging that various difficulties still stand in the way of a permanent ban on all nuclear-weapon tests, when there is only need for a political will to achieve that end.

"Consequently, Egypt avails itself of this opportunity, namely, the deposit of its instruments of ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to appeal to the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to fulfil their obligation whereby the nuclear arms race will be stopped and nuclear disarmament achieved.

"Egypt also calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to exert all possible efforts so as to achieve a permanent ban of all nuclear-weapon tests at an early date."

My delegation endorses this statement because it has always considered that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was concluded for the purpose of preventing not only the horizontal proliferation but also the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. That was the first point to which I wished to refer.

The second is much shorter, and concerns the statements we have heard this afternoon from the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union. My delegation fully appreciates the concessions the Soviet Union has made in the tripartite talks, and I have already referred to these in earlier statements. With respect to one of them, of which Ambassador Issraelyan has reminded us here today, I should like to say that this is a concession the importance of which can certainly not be overstated if we remember the USSR's previous position, and it consists in acceptance of the idea that a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests can take effect -- can come into force -- even if at first only three of the nuclear-weapon Powers are parties to that treaty.

On this matter, I would like to make the following observation: to my delegation -- and my delegation is one of the members of the Group of 21 which have fought most persistently for the establishment of an ad hoc working group to deal with this subject -- to my delegation, I say, a working group concerned

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

with the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests would not mean a nullification of this concession by the Soviet Union. We thus envisage the possibility that a working group of the Committee on Disarmament might succeed in achieving a nuclear-test-ban treaty which would come into force, at first, if it were not possible to secure the participation of the five nuclear-weapon States, then with the initial participation of three of them. If this were not to be the case, we should be taking a step backward as regards the extremely important concession made by the Soviet Union in the tripartite talks.

That was my second point; the third thing I wish to say, and the most agreeable, is simply a matter of reiterating to you, Mr. Chairman, the very sincere congratulations I offered you in the first statement I had the pleasure of making under your distinguished chairmanship.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico for his statement and for the kind words he has just addressed to myself. I am very grateful to him for them.

Mr. SARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, I would simply like to touch upon the question of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty which has been referred to at this meeting today. Of course, the sovereign decision has been taken by the Government of Egypt to sign and ratify this Treaty and should be recognized as such. I would like to refer to some comments which have been made in applauding Egypt's decision to the effect that this would be an example for other countries to follow. I would like to put on record that my country considers the non-proliferation Treaty as an unequal Treaty which imposes unequal obligations on States and addresses itself only to the problem of the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and not to the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons which we consider to be equally if not far more important.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): If the Netherlands representative wishes to continue to extend greetings and congratulations to the Egyptian delegation, then I have already done this and I will give up my turn to him because I should like to reply to the Ambassador of Australia. If not, then I will continue. There seems to have been some misunderstanding here. I have spoken to the Ambassador of Australia and have addressed to him, speaking on behalf of a group of delegations -- let me stress: not on behalf of one country, as he tried to suggest, but on behalf of a group of delegations -- a request not to insist, not only on the adoption of a decision on the question of inviting experts, but also on discussing this issue today, at an informal meeting. The group of delegations which I have the honour to represent wishes to say once again that we are not ready to adopt a decision on this question as suggested in the document which, as the Ambassador of Australia rightly pointed out, was circulated yesterday and is dated 24 February. We wanted to consider this request, this proposal by Australia and the Netherlands, at our Group's meeting next Wednesday and then give our reply. In conclusion, we note the Australian representative's statement that he will shortly be going away, and I would like to wish him, on behalf simply of the Soviet delegation, bon voyage and a speedy return. We shall be glad to see him back and by that time we shall in all probability have given an answer.

Mr. WAGENMAKERS (Netherlands): Mr. Chairman, first of all, I would like to salute the important statement which has been made this afternoon by the distinguished representative of Egypt. Indeed, we are very happy about this major decision taken by the Government of Egypt, and we express the hope that this example might give an impetus for a further increase in membership of the non-proliferation Treaty.

Secondly, I would like to associate my delegation with the statement made by the distinguished representative of Australia, which was further to an informal proposal by our delegation. I would like to state that as far as we and our expert, Dr. Ooms are concerned, we found the informal discussions on chemical weapons in the Committee in 1980 very useful and indeed conducive to an increase in the tempo of the deliberations of the Working Group, and we would ask the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, and the Group that he represents, kindly to take into account our interest in their deliberations, which I now understand are going to take place next Wednesday. My delegation would indeed have preferred this afternoon to enter into an informal exchange of views on this matter. We think that the distinguished Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons has already given us a useful tool to guide our informal deliberations in a very informal document which was circulated in the Working Group and which gave us some five or six subjects on which our future informal meetings might focus as regards chemical weapons. In conclusion, I would like to express the very great interest that my delegation attaches to the Committee deciding once again to hold these informal meetings, hoping that, as in 1980, they would have a positive overspill on the work of the Group on Chemical Weapons.

Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): Mr. Chairman, first of all, I would like to express the deep satisfaction of the Hungarian delegation for the statement made by the distinguished representative of Egypt, informing us of the depositing of the instrument of ratification of the non-proliferation Treaty by Egypt. Secondly, my delegation fully agrees with the statement made by Ambassador Issraelyan on behalf of the group of the socialist countries, for it too considers that the proposal contained in Working Paper No. 33 requires more detailed and substantive consideration.

Mr. SARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, I would like to comment briefly on Working Paper No. 33 which has been presented by the delegations of Australia and the Netherlands. As we have stated earlier in discussions of this question, we do not wish to give the impression that the Committee itself would be holding sessions with chemical weapons experts, like a panel, to examine certain questions. We said that the experts who would come to Geneva to attend the Pugwash meeting, could perhaps make presentations in their capacity as members of individual delegations. This is perhaps a more correctly worded decision. What we are really deciding upon is whether to hold a series of informal meetings where the chemical weapons experts attached to various delegations may make presentations on various specific issues. We feel that this decision could be reworded in a manner that would reflect this point of view because, as I stated earlier, for my delegation a matter of principle is concerned.

Mr. WALKER (Australia): Mr. Chairman, allow me, through you, to thank the distinguished representative of India for his constructive comments. I am sure that the concern which he expresses is one which can be readily accommodated, at least as far as my own delegation is concerned.

On the matter raised by the distinguished Ambassador of the Soviet Union and supported by the distinguished Ambassador of Hungary, it is obvious that if there are groups of countries which are not yet ready to address this matter, and who wish to discuss it within their group, then it would be absurd for me to raise any obstacle. I am sorry that I misunderstood my informal conversation with Ambassador Issraelyan before the meeting and gained the impression that he was speaking only for himself rather than on behalf of the group. This came from my understanding of the terms he used and from my recollection of the fact that all members of his group had been represented in earlier discussions in the Working Group, and since he himself has only just rejoined Geneva, I had assumed that what was concerned was the personal situation of the Ambassador, who had not been present in person during these discussions. I would just like to repeat that my delegation and a number of others have an urgent practical interest in this matter and therefore, as regards the delegations which still want to clarify their thoughts, we would be grateful if they would be so kind as to bear in mind that some of us do have to consider the practical element of urgency in this matter.

Mr. EL REEDY (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Mr. Chairman, since you have always been generous with me, I will appeal to your generosity to allow me to speak briefly once again, just to express my deep gratitude and appreciation, on behalf of my country's delegation, for the expressions of esteem which I have heard from all my colleagues. I refer in particular to the kind and generous words of congratulation on Egypt's ratification of the non-proliferation Treaty, and would especially like to thank Mrs. Thorsson, who was the first to congratulate Egypt in this respect, Ambassador Okawa of Japan, Ambassador Summerhayes, representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Issraelyan, representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Walker, representative of Australia, Ambassador Pfeiffer, representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador García Robles, representative of Mexico and also Mr. Wagenmakers; representative of the Netherlands and Ambassador Komives, representative of Hungary. I thank them all for their kind words of congratulation and for the esteem which they have expressed towards my country and my delegation. My sincere thanks to them and to you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished Ambassador of Egypt for his statement. The Committee will recall that at our informal meeting yesterday we agreed to invite the Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research to make a short statement in plenary. I therefore welcome Mr. Liviu Bota, Director of the Institute, and I give him the floor.

Mr. BOTA (Director, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research): The General Assembly has recognized that negotiations on disarmament and the continuing effort to ensure greater security must be based on objective in-depth technical studies. The Assembly has expressed the view that sustained research and study activity by the United Nations in the field of disarmament would promote informed participation by all States in disarmament efforts, and has considered that it is advisable to undertake more forward-looking research within the framework of the United Nations. The General Assembly has repeatedly stressed the need of the International Community to be provided with more diversified and complete information on problems relating to disarmament as well as the importance of ensuring that disarmament studies should be conducted in accordance with the criteria of scientific independence. Disarmament research is in fact an integral part of disarmament efforts.

(Mr. Bota, UNIDIR)

It is against this background that the General Assembly decided to establish the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). The Institute was established with effect from 1 October 1980 at Geneva within the framework of UNITAR on an interim basis until the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and is subject to review at that session.

The Institute's mandate is simple and pragmatic. It is to carry out research for the purpose of assisting ongoing negotiations in the field of disarmament and arms limitation, stimulating initiatives for new negotiations and providing a general insight into the problems involved. In carrying out its mandate, the Institute will be guided by the provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. In short, the Institute is basically meant to conduct objective, scientific research aimed at facilitating progress towards disarmament and to facilitate the access of a large number of States, in particular the developing ones, to existing information, studies and research on disarmament.

UNIDIR has an Advisory Council. As the Secretary-General stated in his report to the General Assembly (A/35/574), the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament is an ex officio member of the Institute's Advisory Council, whose membership also includes a number of other eminent persons. The Advisory Council will meet in New York at the beginning of May 1981.

The Institute has already started work on a number of projects, which I should like briefly to describe to you:

(a) "Disarmament". This will be a general analysis of the field of disarmament, defining it in the general context of contemporary international relations, presenting its goals, principles and institutions as well as the efforts to reach its objectives, including national and international machinery for disarmament, procedures, etc. It could be completed by autumn this year.

(b) "Repertory of disarmament research". This should be completed by next June. The repertory will list, under separate headings, major research efforts already completed or under way, all over the world, on disarmament affairs during the past decade, specialized bibliographies and basic United Nations documents containing research papers prepared by the United Nations or submitted by Member States. It will also list major disarmament research centres and specialized periodicals. An attempt will be made to analyse the factual material contained in the Repertory.

(c) "Security and Disarmament: Security of States and lowering of levels of armaments". The objective of this project is to analyse the presently prevailing security concepts and doctrines, the extent to which these are guiding the foreign policies of States and their role in disarmament efforts, with a view to finding possible new ways and means to strengthen the security of States through disarmament. The project, the title of which is provisional, could be completed by the end of this year or the beginning of 1982.

(d) "Prevention of war by accident". We assume that the possibility of a nuclear war by design is remote. However, a nuclear war might start because of an accident or miscalculation/misperception (technological or political). This problem, which is to be considered as part of the more general preoccupations relating to crisis management and prevention of nuclear war, is topical. No date for the completion of the study is set.

(Mr. Bota, UNIDIR)

(e) "Science and technology for disarmament". The disarmament process requires adequate technologies. The availability of technologies to verify compliance with agreements might be, in some instances, a condition for the conclusion of an agreement. Technologies used so far for verification purposes were those originally produced for other, particularly military pursuits. It is felt that a study on the availability of technologies and the indication of needs in areas that are presently or are likely to be the subject for negotiations might have a positive impact on the progress of disarmament efforts. The disarmament community should be in a position, when necessary, to request scientists and industry to work for the elaboration and production of such technologies. This project will only start this year and will be completed in 1982.

In addition to the above-mentioned projects, on which we have already started work, we have prepared a list of some 17 projects which will be submitted to the Advisory Council of the Institute when it meets next May.

All over the world there are other institutes, centres and universities engaged in disarmament research. We proposed to co-operate with them to our mutual benefit. UNIDIR therefore intends to convene, in the autumn of this year, a conference of directors of disarmament research institutes to exchange views and information on disarmament research. It is hoped that this first meeting will bring about the institutionalization of such gatherings with the purpose of better using the material and intellectual resources available and of strengthening the efficiency of research in terms of impact on policies and negotiations.

I should also like to mention the financial aspect of the Institute. UNIDIR is a United Nations organ which forms an integral part of the modernization of disarmament structures undertaken by the special session of the General Assembly. Nevertheless, its budget is financed by voluntary contributions. I hope that Member States will encourage the Institute's activities by making voluntary contributions.

In the present international situation, when most disarmament discussions and negotiations are deadlocked, it is particularly important to encourage reflection and to explore all possibilities of restarting bilateral and multilateral talks. Our Institute offers a framework for activities of this kind and I hope that it will be used accordingly.

In conclusion, I should like to thank the members of the Committee for inviting me and giving me this opportunity to introduce briefly the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. I am also grateful to Mr. Jaipal, Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, for the support so generously provided to UNIDIR. It has been a particular pleasure to make this introduction under your Chairmanship, the Chairmanship of France, the country which proposed the establishment of UNIDIR and on whose support we are counting so much.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, it was not my intention to intervene unless you had finished with all other business as I just wanted to make a brief announcement. Although I have made this announcement already I would like to be certain that it reaches all delegations, so I should like to repeat it. In my capacity as Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, I will hold an open-ended informal consultation on Monday, 2 March, at 11 a.m. in this Council Chamber, in order to present working paper CD/CW/WP.8 which has been distributed and which contains Part 2 of the suggested outline of the work of the Working Group.

Mr. FLOWERREE (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, I would like to add my delegations's congratulations to those that have already been made to the delegation of Egypt. I have remained silent only because I had expected there to be another occasion but I understand that the distinguished representative of Egypt will be leaving and when the roll is called up in heaven I did not want the United States to be absent from the list of those who had congratulated him. I also wish to assure the distinguished representative of Egypt that I was listening carefully and understood the statements made at the time of the deposit of the instrument of ratification by his Government, even before they were read to us again by the distinguished representative of Mexico. I respect those statements of views of sovereign States and take them in the spirit in which we all deal with each other in this forum. I would like to add my congratulations to his Government for taking what we regard as a courageous and statesman-like act in ratifying the NPT.

Mr. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a few brief comments on the paper that has been read by the distinguished representative of the Disarmament Research Institute

We attach great importance to this question and that is why I should like to say a few words about it. The new Institute runs three different risks: the first one is the possibility of repetition or overlapping. If we read the bibliography on disarmament and related matters, we are aware of the hundreds of publications issued by other institutes, organizations and universities on this question. This means that the new Institute will have to find its own way, in order to avoid the risk of repeating what has already been done by other older, richer and more experienced sources.

The second risk, which I should perhaps call scholasticism or academism, is that research progress reports may be well prepared, but sometimes with little contact with our daily realities. In this field of disarmament we know that one can go from science fiction to metaphysics, but in print there must be a middle of the road that will lead to the right path to be followed by the Institute in its activities.

The third risk is that of a proliferation of targets both in the horizontal and in the vertical sense. I think that what we need is concrete objectives, condensed in papers that might help us in our actual work as well as in our long range endeavours.

However, I did not come here to bury the Institute but to praise it. I have had the opportunity of holding a long conversation with Mr. Bota and was favourably impressed by the objective, practical and meaningful direction he wants to impart to the Institute as well as the useful and helpful assistance we shall gain from this new organ. Finally, I should like to express the gratitude of my delegation for the initiative taken by the French Government in this respect.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): If no other delegation wishes to take the floor I shall close this meeting, but before concluding, since this is the last time I shall be presiding over the Committee on Disarmament, I should of course like to take the opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to all my colleagues for the spirit of co-operation they have shown, for the very valuable support they have been kind enough to give the Chair, and also for their many demonstrations of friendship towards myself. Thanks to everyone's co-operation and the desire for

(The Chairman)

accommodation that has been shown, the Committee was able in a very short period of time to organize its third annual session and to take up its work on substantive questions without delay. I would also like to express my warm gratitude to Ambassador Jaipal, whose advice and assistance were most valuable to me, and also of course to Mr. Berasategui, whose help I particularly appreciated. I would also like to express my appreciation to all the members of the Committee's secretariat and to the interpreters and translators. I would also, of course, like to offer my successor, Ambassador Herder of the German Democratic Republic, my very warm wishes for success in the exercise of his mandate. I am certain that under his chairmanship and under that of the other colleagues who will assume the task after him during this session, the Committee will make progress in its work and more nearly meet the expectations of the international community this year.

The meeting rose at 5 p.m.

CD/PV.111
3 March 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND ELEVENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 3 March 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. G. Herder (German Democratic Republic)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:
Mr. M. MATI
Mr. M. DJABALLAH
Mr. A. BENYAMINA

Argentina:
Mr. F. JIENEZ DAVILA
Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD

Australia:
Mr. R. STEELE
Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium:
Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. J-M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil:
Mr. S.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:
Mr. I. VOUTOV
Mr. R. DEYANOV

Burma:
U SAW HLAING
U NGWE WIN

Canada:
Mr. G. SKINNER
Mr. G.K. VACHON

China:
Mr. YU Peiven
Mr. LIANG Yufan
Mr. PAN Jusheng
Mr. SA Benwang

Cuba:
Mr. L. SOLA VILA
Mrs. V. BORO/DOSKY JACKIEWICH

Czechoslovakia:
Mr. M. RUZEK
Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. J. JIRUSEK
Mr. L. STAVINOHA

Egypt:

Mr. I.A. HASSAN

Mr. H.N. FAHY

Ethiopia:

Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE

Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE

Mr. GESBERT

Mr. H. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER

Mr. H. THIELICKE

Mr. M. KAULFUSS

Mr. P. BUNTIG

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. G. PFLEIFER

Mr. W. KLINGLER

Mr. H. MULLER

Mr. V. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES

Mr. C. GYORFFY

Mr. A. LAKATOS

India:

Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. Ch. ANWAR SANI

Mr. E. SOEPRAPTO

Mr. HARYONIATARAM

Mr. F. QASIM

Mr. KARYONO

Iran:

Mr. M. DABIRI

Mr. D. AMERI

Italy:

Mr. V. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO

Mr. A. CIARRAPICO

Mr. B. CABRAS

Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. R. ISHII
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya: Mr. S. SHITEMI
Mr. G. MUNIU

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mr. M.A. CACERES

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. L. BAYART
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. O. ADENIJI
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan:

Peru:

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. K. TOMASZEWSKI

Romania: Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. S. STROMBACH
Mr. G. EKHOLM
Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. V.A. TERFILIEV
Mr. L.S. MOSHKOV
Mr. V.M. GANJA
Mr. V.V. LOSICHIVINE
Mr. A.G. DOULYAN
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO
Mr. S.N. RIUKHINE

United Kingdom: Mr. D.M. SUMTERHAYES
Mr. N.H. MARSHALL
Mr. B. NOBLE
Mrs. J.I. LINK

United States of America: Mr. C.C. FLOWERFREE
Mr. L. FLEISCHER
Mr. F. DESIMONE
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. J.A. MISKEL
Mr. H. WILSON

Venezuela: Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT
Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia: Mr. M. VRHUNEC
Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:

Secretary to the Committee
and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General: Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the Committee: Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

Distinguished delegates, it is indeed a great honour and privilege for the German Democratic Republic and for me personally to assume the chairmanship of this Committee for the month of March. As a socialist country and member of the socialist community of States my country has -- as it is well-known -- for years undertaken tremendous efforts with a view to contributing to halting the arms race and to bringing about effective disarmament. May I avail myself of this opportunity and assure you that, guided by these same objectives, I will spare no effort to fulfil the heavy responsibilities and duties entrusted to me by the rules of procedure of the Committee.

At the outset of my chairmanship, I would like to express to the distinguished representative of France, Ambassador François de la Gorce, my gratitude and, I am sure, that of our whole Committee for the skilful manner in which he conducted the work of the CD through the first month of this year's session. With patience, courtesy, dynamism and understanding which, as we all know, are so characteristic particularly for French diplomacy, he led us to remarkable progress. In less than a month we agreed on the agenda for our 1981 annual session, the programme of work for the spring session and the re-establishment or resumption of work of the four ad hoc working groups.

Thus, during the chairmanship of my predecessor the Committee has entered the phase of substantive work. At the same time, we have to be fully aware of the complicated situation and the tense international atmosphere. The intensification of the arms race, the absence of ratification of the SALT II Treaty, the discontinuance of almost all important channels of disarmament negotiations, have not made easier the solution of our tasks.

But this situation should not cause us to despair. In a spirit of goodwill and flexibility, so characteristic up to now of our Committee, we should intensify our efforts to accomplish the tasks on our agenda. Only in this way will we be in a position to justify the hope and expectations the world community has placed in us and live up to the special role of the CD as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. It stands to reason that any concrete agreement now in the disarmament field would have a favourable impact on the international situation as a whole.

The most important pre-condition for us to make headway in our work, is, no doubt, the political will on the part of all delegations sitting around this table. This applies especially to the delegations of the nuclear-weapon States. It seems to me that such a political will has again been demonstrated only a few days ago by the highest forum of one of those States -- by the USSR at the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The decision to continue to strive for further progress in the field of arms limitation and disarmament and the new concrete proposals submitted to this end will certainly have a positive impact on the work of the Committee.

(The Chairman)

Very little time is left before the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Not only our people, but all peoples of the world expect this Committee to live up to its responsibilities and to present the session with a balance-sheet reflecting tangible progress at least on some of the items on the Committee's agenda. To achieve this we have to intensify our work and use all the time at our disposal as efficiently as possible.

Thanks to the re-establishment of the ad hoc working groups on negative security assurances and chemical and radiological weapons and the resumption of the ad hoc working group on a comprehensive programme of disarmament, the CD is now in a position to proceed with substantive negotiations. I appeal to all member countries to use the opportunities provided by those ad hoc working groups fully, and to harmonize their positions with a view to achieving tangible progress at this session.

At the same time we should not lose sight of the fact that the CD is entrusted with tasks in other fields as well. Here I have in mind such items on its agenda as "Nuclear test ban", "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" and "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons". It is of deep regret to many delegations, including mine, that the Committee has not been able until now to establish corresponding ad hoc working groups or other subsidiary bodies to initiate substantive negotiations on those items too. Being conscious of this, I appeal to all partners, States members of the Committee and non-member States, to concentrate their efforts on these main items and to refrain from introducing into our debate highly political and controversial problems which have nothing to do with disarmament, thus further complicating our work.

As you all are aware, we face a heavy workload this month. Besides the negotiations in the ad hoc working groups, our programme of work provides for special meetings on nuclear disarmament, a comprehensive programme of disarmament, negative security assurances and chemical weapons. In these meetings, we hope, the delegations of such non-member States as Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Spain and Switzerland will make useful contributions.

To conduct our common efforts effectively, the Chair will always be available for contacts and consultations with all delegations. On the other hand, I know that I may count fully on your co-operation and assistance. Furthermore, I would like to express my gratitude to Ambassador Jaipal, Mr. Berasategui and their colleagues from the Secretariat for the highly qualified support they have lent to my predecessors. I count on their co-operation as well.

Concluding my opening remarks, I should like to emphasize my hope that during the month of March, too, the Committee will continue working as it has done up to now and that a constructive spirit will prevail thus allowing us to reach concrete results.

Mr. VRHUNEC (Yugoslavia): Mr. Chairman, permit me to extend to you on behalf of my delegation our most cordial congratulations on your taking up of the duties of Chairman of the Committee during the month of March. At the same time, I would also like to offer our congratulations to Ambassador de la Gorce for an exceptionally well-done job last month.

(Mr. Vrhunec, Yugoslavia)

It is very difficult to take the floor at a moment when the considerations of our Committee regarding the question of nuclear disarmament indicate that we are not able, at this session either, to make the first, concrete steps directed towards the taking of international measures in this, no doubt, most important issue in the field of disarmament. This is the third year that the Committee on Disarmament is not able to achieve anything with respect to nuclear disarmament while, in the meantime, the accelerated race in this field results in such astronomical expenditures and reaches frightening proportions as to become its own contradiction. There is no justification for this. And, as Mrs. Thorsson, head of the Swedish delegation, has said here: "It must be demonstrated that the nuclear weapons mystique, the notion that a nuclear weapon can in any way increase the national security of any State, is a fraud -- what I have earlier called 'the greatest fallacy of our time', which, far from increasing anybody's security, is certain to reduce it for all."

There are few world issues that have so many times been assessed as most important and most dangerous for the peace and survival of mankind as is the case with the question of nuclear disarmament. Few, also, are the global issues for which such a broad and convincing argumentation was developed as to how to take urgent and drastic measures. It is, therefore, unnecessary to reiterate here the decisions of various political forums and the numerous United Nations General Assembly resolutions adopted at both regular and special sessions. We, the members of the CD, are particularly well acquainted with this. Moreover, we have all solemnly and formally accepted the responsibility of having to initiate the process of nuclear disarmament on innumerable occasions. We all also decided, when the Committee on Disarmament was created, that we would start here concrete negotiations for the solution of these questions. I will also refrain from giving other arguments for our concrete work with regard to this issue. This has been convincingly done by the great majority of speakers that have preceded me, especially the members of the Group of 21 and it is not necessary to cite them.

However, owing to the resistance of some western powers, the settlement of this most important area of disarmament is at a standstill. In fact, it has not even begun, except for these verbal considerations of ours which, of course, are not capable of remedying this situation.

The whole world rightfully asks itself what it is that we are doing. Why is there no concrete beginning of nuclear disarmament? Where does this lead to? The non-aligned countries which, as they have been doing for 20 years already, attach particular importance to this question and consider that it is of the utmost priority, at the Ministerial meeting recently held in New Delhi accorded a particularly important place to disarmament problems, while special emphasis was placed on nuclear disarmament. On that occasion, the Ministers stated: "The greatest peril facing the world today is the threat of destruction as a result of nuclear war. The actions of the nuclear-weapon States, which are engaged in a new and frenzied round of the nuclear arms race, have created a situation in which mankind seems to have been condemned to live in the shadow of nuclear annihilation." To that effect, "the Ministers expressed their belief that the most effective way to eliminate the threat of a nuclear war, pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, was to prohibit the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons. The

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Ministers recognized the reluctance of nuclear-weapon States to agree to an international convention on banning the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons." On the other hand, the Ministers of non-aligned countries attached great importance to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, particularly for development purposes.

The Ministers of non-aligned countries have clearly pointed out the untenable positions and arguments used by those who do not want negotiations on nuclear disarmament. They have most energetically rejected the efforts aimed at justifying such positions based on the emergence of various theories such as the one regarding the deterrent or the possibility of conducting a so-called limited nuclear war which, in essence, only opens wide the door to the continuation of the nuclear arms race. The application of the theory of deterrence among the Superpowers has, indeed, succeeded in preventing their direct involvement in regional conflicts. However, the competition with regard to the deterrent has in no way succeeded in removing the possibility of a nuclear catastrophe. On the contrary, it has even increased the insecurity and uncertainty, since the arms race continues precisely on the basis of the positions of the use of force aimed at maintaining the status quo in international relations. This is because the deterrent theory is a theory of force, a theory of interference in the internal affairs of other countries and of founding security on the untenable bases of the strengthening of military power. These and similar theories are aimed at encouraging the rivalry between nuclear-weapon States and blocs and attempt to justify the further unimpeded development of even more lethal and destructive technology for new weapons and systems as well as installations, instead of having all of man's riches used for the progress and prosperity of all people in the world.

Every thought about the possibility of conducting a limited nuclear war is beyond sane logic and resembles the madness of terrorism. It was sufficient for the danger of possible errors in manipulation to appear, of which we are all witnesses, in order to observe how quickly humanity can be brought to the brink of catastrophe. Apart from the need to take every measure in order to prevent accidents that could be catastrophic and to ensure that the stocks of nuclear weapons are out of reach for possible use for terrorist purposes, the only answer that can be lasting and satisfactory is the most urgent destruction of all the existing stocks of nuclear weapons and the prohibition of their further production.

There are no negotiations on nuclear disarmament in the true sense of the word. All negotiations conducted on this subject today outside the Committee's framework do not essentially encompass disarmament measures but rather the control of armaments, which only allows for an unhindered continuation of the nuclear arms race. This is why our Committee has a particular responsibility, as the only negotiating body, to make concrete as soon as possible the item on its agenda concerning the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. However, this should not be approached with rhetoric but with genuine agreement on the beginning of concrete negotiations without delay. Yugoslavia strives for the urgent initiation of negotiations on the basis of what was said in the statement of the Group of 21 non-aligned and neutral countries dated 9 July 1980 and which is

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contained in document CD/116. We consider that the basis given in the document with regard to the beginning of negotiations on nuclear disarmament is good and offers a possibility for compromise. The non-aligned and neutral countries members of the Committee think it indispensable to work out the main stages of nuclear disarmament envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament in such a way that the responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States would be clearly defined, as well as the role of non-nuclear weapon States in the process of achieving nuclear disarmament. Non-aligned and neutral countries also consider it imperative to identify as clearly as possible the questions concerning the prohibition of the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons in the process of nuclear disarmament. It is certain that a particular place is also occupied by the effort to identify the issues whose aim it will be to eliminate the reliance on the doctrine of deterrence for reasons that have already been frequently cited in the remarks by the non-aligned and neutral countries members of the Committee. In order to fulfil the principal task in this area which stands before the Committee, the non-aligned and neutral countries strive for the taking of such measures as will enable the Committee fully to carry out its responsibilities as the only multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament and to make possible the realization of a corresponding relationship of the Committee and the negotiations on nuclear disarmament which are conducted in bilateral, regional or other limited forums.

There is no doubt that this basic approach of the non-aligned and neutral countries does not neglect or render more difficult the conducting of negotiations at any level (bilateral, regional or multilateral) if those negotiations give their corresponding contribution to nuclear disarmament. We think that the SALT negotiations should continue and that the idea of holding a European disarmament conference, which is a subject at present being considered at the conference on European security and co-operation being held in Madrid, should be carried out.

The first thing which is clear, if this Committee is to assume its responsibilities with regard to nuclear disarmament, is the fact that some western powers should change their attitude and agree to the initiation of multilateral negotiations. To this end, my delegation strives for the creation of a corresponding working group which should begin work immediately. We take the refusal to create the working group as a violation of the basic right of the members of the Committee to participate, in an equitable and democratic manner, in this difficult and responsible task which we all took upon ourselves to perform, and not the nuclear-weapon States alone. Is the initiation of multilateral negotiations on this question not to the advantage of bilateral negotiations which will, of course, be conducted in parallel? Does not the failure of bilateral negotiations so far clearly call for the need to make use of multilateral possibilities as well, where the creativity and political will of a large number of countries will have a positive influence on the solution of such an important issue?

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It is clear that the working group should have a well-defined mandate, an elaborated programme of action and clearly established stages of negotiation. This is because the process of nuclear disarmament is a lasting one and requires time but at the same time also there should be a clearly expressed willingness resolutely to go forward on the basis of the agreed programme. As a basis for discussion, the working group could take documents CD/116 and CD/4 as well as all other relevant documents. In the initial phase of work the group would concentrate on the identification of the various aspects of this issue and would gradually go on to the solution of the main problems. Without such a concrete approach to the question of nuclear disarmament, this Committee will not fulfil its main task and all eventual progress that we make with regard to other issues would not be of corresponding consequence.

According to the programme of work of the Committee, today is the last day of debate on this item of the agenda. This does not mean that the further consideration of the problems of nuclear disarmament ceases. We consider that the Committee should continue with the consideration of this issue, and very intensively. There is a sufficient basis for this, while the forms can vary -- from informal meetings of the Committee through informal groups and meetings to informal consultations.

Yugoslavia, in pursuance of its policy of peaceful and active co-existence and the decisions of the non-aligned movement, will spare no effort in order that we achieve success in nuclear disarmament. We cannot and will never reconcile ourselves to the existing deadlock in the consideration of nuclear disarmament in the Committee and will constantly strive to achieve an understanding and acceptance by all that we are here in order to solve all disarmament questions in a concrete manner. We do not wish to assume the responsibility for any possible failure. This responsibility must be fully borne by those who, despite the demands of all mankind, prevent nuclear technology being used for the prosperity instead of for the destruction of the world.

The CHAIRMAN: I would like to thank Ambassador Vrhunec for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair.

Mr. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, our Committee has devoted three plenary meetings, starting last Tuesday, to item 2 of our agenda, namely, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The week before we discussed item 1, nuclear test ban. I propose to deal today with both subjects, for reasons of principle as well as for practical considerations. In my statement in the plenary on 12 February I had the occasion to state the position of Brazil with regard to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Since we conceive the nuclear test ban as a step towards nuclear disarmament, I would also like to elaborate today on the Brazilian stand regarding a treaty banning the further testing of nuclear weapons. At the same time, I have in mind the interesting debate we had yesterday on the establishment of working groups to deal with items 1 and 2 of our agenda. As my delegation made specific suggestions on the matter, which were supported and commented on by other delegations, I believe that some clarification, for the record, of the issues discussed yesterday would be in order.

Let me start by repeating what seems to be the view of the almost unanimity of the members of this Committee, concerning the urgent need for our Committee to engage in substantive negotiations on those two items. The continuation of the nuclear arms race is a major concern for all nations in the world, and not just for those Powers that still engage in the unabated proliferation of their nuclear arsenals, in numbers and in quality. We have been confronted with the argument that nuclear disarmament is of "vital importance" to the security of the Superpowers, or that the subject is "too sensitive" or "too complex" to be dealt with multilaterally. We contend, however, that this question is also vitally important to our own security, and that its very complexity and sensitivity warrant the early start of negotiations. A nuclear war would wipe out not only those who believe they can wage it, but the rest of the world as well. It is thus clearly within the purview and the duty of this Committee to negotiate urgently on the substance of the matter.

At our informal meeting of yesterday, my delegation suggested that the Secretariat provide us with a listing of all concrete proposals made to date, since the inception of the Committee on Disarmament, on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The delegation of India had previously made a proposal that we start from the discussion, in informal meetings, of chapter 5 of the Secretary-General's report on nuclear weapons. Many delegations argued for the continuation of informal meetings to deal with nuclear disarmament, and yesterday Ambassador Taylhardat of Venezuela made complementary suggestions to my proposal. Other delegations, including those of Nigeria, Kenya, Argentina, Peru, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sweden and Yugoslavia, from the Group of 21, had constructive comments to make on the question at hand. All those suggestions made yesterday are complementary to each other. My own delegation is entirely flexible on the details of the format which we hopefully may decide upon, to focus the negotiations envisaged. We still think that a listing of all proposals made in the United Nations dealing with nuclear disarmament might prove too long and too cumbersome; maybe we should start with a less encyclopaedic catalogue, to which delegations could propose the addition of other official documents presented before 1979 and which are still relevant today. The important point, however, and it is one on which I feel there was a convergence of views, is that this exercise must have two main purposes: first, to create the conditions for a meaningful, substantive dialogue within the Committee, and secondly to aim at pin-pointing issues on which concrete multilateral negotiations may be started. With this understanding, my

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delegation is ready to continue exploring, in informal meetings, the organization of our work on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. In this connection, I still believe that the proposal of the Group of 21 provides us with the best option for success. If, however, the suggestions made by my delegation and by several others continue to be met with dismissal, silence or a refusal even to start a dialogue, then we, and all members of the United Nations, can do little else than draw the appropriate conclusions.

Much the same reasoning applies to the proposals dealing with the establishment of a working group to negotiate a treaty on the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon testing, for all time, in all environments. We heard no objection, during yesterday's meeting, to the continuation of an informal discussion on the substance of the matter; not more than two delegations are on the record as having opposed the establishment of the working group on item 1 proposed by the Group of 21. One of those delegations explained that its Government was engaged in an over-all review of its defence policies, and that only after this process had been completed could it sit in the Committee with the benefit of clear instructions. The other, however, had unconvincing objections of principle, which are still unclear to my delegation. Be that as it may, the consequences are, to say the least, disappointing. At any rate, this situation should not prevent the trilateral negotiators from responding to questions that have been addressed to them in this Committee, in the search for clarification of issues raised by their report to the Committee last year. The fact that the tripartite talks have been suspended, and for reasons unrelated to the tasks assigned to this Committee, should not prevent the three negotiators from providing the Committee with substantive responses. In this connection, the delegation of the Soviet Union has devoted one statement in the plenary to substantive aspects of the CTB, and has also expressed its support for the Group of 21. Would it be too much to ask the other two Powers to state the reasons why they believe that success would be impaired if consensus were attained in the Committee?

It might be pertinent to recall the recent example of the establishment, last year, of a working group on chemical weapons. The experience of the Committee in this connection has shown that the work of the CD in no way brought prejudice to the bilateral negotiations, which, incidentally, have also been suspended for reasons pertaining to the bilateral relations between the Superpowers. May I add here, as an afterthought, that since the inception of the nuclear age, 35 years of restricted negotiations on disarmament have now elapsed; but no single measure of disarmament has ever been produced by those select forums; on the contrary, for 35 years, at a most wicked speed, a massive arms build-up has taken place.

In making the proposal for the continuation of informal discussions on how to organize meaningful negotiations on the nuclear test ban, my delegation keeps an open mind with regard to details. But we do believe that the suggested exercise must also take the form of a dialogue, so that out of it there could emerge the substantive material to form a basis for a mandate of the working group proposed by the Group of 21.

My delegation is firmly convinced that a CTBT cannot be pursued as an end in itself; further, we think that its urgency does not derive merely from the fact that many Parties to the non-proliferation Treaty are now voicing doubts as to the effectiveness of, or the compliance with, that instrument. On the contrary, as Brazil has consistently stated, the CTBT must be conceived as a step towards nuclear disarmament. To be truly effective and lasting, a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests must be acceptable to as wide a number of parties as possible,

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particularly to the five nuclear-weapon Powers, which continue to conduct tests to increase the destructive power of their arsenals. But the condition of universality will not be fulfilled if the legitimate concerns and interests of other nations are not taken into account. Agreements resulting from closed negotiations cannot be expected automatically to suit the interests of those who were not allowed an opportunity to state their concerns and to see that they were adequately reflected.

As for Brazil, we do have basic views in connection with a treaty to prohibit nuclear-weapon testing. We would like to see a treaty which would contain a clear commitment to the goal of nuclear disarmament, and which would serve as an effective tool for the promotion of international co-operation in the field of the full use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, a treaty which would not contain imbalances and discrimination, and one which would not bestow on a few parties a privileged status, even if such parties consider themselves to be more concerned than the others. I have in mind both the substantive articles of the treaty and the clauses relating to the complaints procedure, to the verification mechanism, to ratification and entry into force and the provisions for its periodical review. We would further like to see a treaty which would effectively result in the ceasing of all nuclear-weapon testing for all time in all environments, and which does not become a tool for political pressure or, even worse, an instrument of legitimization for the resumption of testing after a limited number of years.

May I close my remarks by making one point absolutely clear. We recognize the right of every nation to conduct, with whatever partners it chooses, whatever talks it considers necessary to safeguard its legitimate interests. But we cannot accept the argument that substantive talks in this Committee, on questions which all of us agreed to inscribe on its agenda, could prejudice or in any way preclude restricted talks on the same subjects. In our opinion, by simply performing the negotiating task for which it was created, this Committee would be carrying out the invaluable work of clarifying issues of vital importance, both for the nuclear-weapon States and for the non-nuclear-weapon States, in order to ensure the effectiveness and universality of the instruments to be multilaterally agreed upon.

Let us not be misled into believing that it is wise to act internationally as if the world were composed of two categories of nations, one of which would accept no responsibility towards the other. All members of this Committee have agreed to negotiate urgent measures of nuclear disarmament. Talks may be conducted separately, in small groups, within alliances, between alliances, without alliances; but we must also negotiate within the framework that we ourselves have established for that purpose. To preclude multilateral negotiations in this Committee might have serious consequences, for it is only within its framework that we will be able to negotiate disarmament agreements which will prove equitable, universal and lasting.

Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): Comrade Chairman, at the outset let me congratulate you on your succession to the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of March and wish you the utmost success in discharging your responsibilities. The Hungarian delegation is especially pleased to welcome in the Chair the representative of the German Democratic Republic, with which the Hungarian People's Republic has strong ties of friendship, deep-rooted co-operation in all the fields of life and a profound common interest in strengthening world peace and security. Your personal capabilities and experience in multilateral diplomacy represent a reliable guarantee that the Committee will continue its work in a business-like,

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

constructive atmosphere generated during the chairmanship of your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador François de la Gorce, to whom I would like to express my deep appreciation for his constructive contribution to our work.

It is evident that the main task of the Committee during this year, particularly during this month, is to achieve advance in the broad and vital field of nuclear disarmament, especially in creating the necessary organizational framework for such negotiations. Your role as Chairman is instrumental in it and my delegation will do its utmost to assist you to achieve that end.

Exchanges of views in connection with various aspects of nuclear disarmament held in the Committee as a whole gives me some encouragement. The majority of the delegations represented here expressed their readiness and strong desire to start concrete negotiations on vital aspects of nuclear disarmament which have been so far considered only at the level of deliberations; I have in mind the questions of the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. However, my delegation cannot hide its profound disappointment that in view of the refusal of a few delegations the Committee is unable to settle the procedural phase and set itself to substantive negotiations. The agreement in principle on setting up working groups on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament has been long overdue. Even late last year the rigid resistance by one delegation on these issues led to the deplorable consequence that the second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons could not achieve consensus on a substantive final document.

My delegation continues to be convinced that substantive negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament within the framework of ad hoc working groups on concrete aspects of nuclear disarmament are not only feasible and desirable, but an unavoidable task if the Committee on Disarmament really adheres to the consensus reached during the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, as contained in the key paragraph 50 of its Final Document.

In my previous statement, of 12 February, I made preliminary comments in connection with the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. Although the discussion of the item was to have ended last week, I would like to make further observations in view of the discussion which took place in the Committee. My delegation highly appreciates the comprehensive statement made by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan, last Friday on the position of the Soviet Union concerning the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests in relation to the tripartite negotiations as well as the negotiations to be conducted in the Committee. I consider that the flexible position of the USSR could contribute to a substantial advance in both forums. My delegation fully shares the position of the Soviet delegation concerning a moratorium and an international global network to detect and identify seismic events. I would like to reiterate the hope of my delegation that the other two interested parties in the tripartite negotiations will soon find it possible to resume the talks and will reach positive results.

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

My delegation remains convinced that, parallel with the trilateral talks, the Committee on Disarmament has also a role to play in achieving a genuinely universal CTBT. The majority of the delegations represented here agree that an ad hoc working group should be created with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States. As far as the concrete task of such a group is concerned, I think that more than enough proposals have been put forward even during our debates held since the beginning of the session, apart from the proposals which had been made earlier. What is to be done at this stage is to formulate these proposals into a realistic mandate acceptable to all, and to start the substantive negotiations in the ad hoc working group.

The Committee is to complete in this meeting the consideration of item 2 of its agenda: the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The urgency of the need to find a way to stop the nuclear arms race has been explained in dramatic terms by many delegations who took the floor on this item. It is evident from the present state of the international situation that the continuing nuclear arms race is becoming a more and more dangerous destabilizing factor in international relations. The prevention of the outbreak of a nuclear war and making a substantive headway towards nuclear disarmament is the highest priority task facing the peoples of the world and to an increased extent the Committee on Disarmament. The socialist countries have always been advocating and promoting wide-ranging proposals and concrete negotiations to put an end to the nuclear arms race, the latest of them being those made by L.I. Brezhnev in his statement to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Hungarian Government fully supports these proposals and is convinced that the implementation of these proposals is in the best interests of the peoples of the world, particularly those in Europe. We do hope these proposals will be given due and responsible consideration by those to whom they are addressed.

The Committee on Disarmament has before it also concrete tasks in the field of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Ever since the submission by the socialist delegations of the proposals in document CD/4 on negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until their complete destruction, the Committee on Disarmament has had wide-ranging discussions on this issue. As a consequence of these debates the majority of the delegations came to the conclusion and explicitly expressed their opinion that the Committee on Disarmament is the most suitable forum for the preparation and conducting of such negotiations.

A number of concrete proposals have been made for the translation into practice of this right conclusion. Working paper CD/109 submitted by the delegation of the German Democratic Republic last June proposed, among other things, the establishment of an ad hoc working group on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and the working out of an appropriate mandate for it. A similar initiative was made by the Group of 21 in working paper CD/116 which proposed the setting up of a working group and also gave an indicative description of the concrete tasks such a group could deal with. In the final analysis both proposals can be conceived as practical efforts to translate into practice paragraph 50 and other relevant provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

In the discussion on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament some delegations have shown special interest in the question of ending the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. The Hungarian delegation is of the opinion that this question should be considered together with other issues relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament within the framework of an ad hoc working group to be established.

It is a matter of regret that, despite the insistence of the majority of delegations, the Committee has not made even one small step towards discharging its extraordinary responsibilities in this crucial field. My delegation is determined that the Committee should at the latest during this part of its session take a decision to set up an appropriate subsidiary body and start on a priority basis preparatory work for substantive negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament.

Before concluding, I would like to deal with the question of the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present. As you may recall this question, in conformity with the decision taken by our Committee, belongs to item 2 of our agenda.

My delegation, like many others, attaches great importance to strengthening the system of political and international legal guarantees for the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. The idea of concluding an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present is, in the opinion of many delegations, one of the possible actions to serve this goal.

The conclusion of an agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present would considerably strengthen the non-proliferation régime, and could contribute to reducing the danger of nuclear war and the nuclear arms race, and could enhance the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Such an undertaking would make a significant contribution to increasing confidence and to strengthening international peace and security. For these reasons my delegation considers that the conclusion of such an agreement is both possible and necessary, not to mention the timeliness of the question.

In paragraph 1 of resolution 35/156 C adopted at its last session the General Assembly "Requests the Committee on Disarmament to proceed without delay to talks with a view to elaborating an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present". In paragraph 3 of this resolution our Committee is requested to submit a report on the question to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.

Taking into account the importance and timeliness of the question, the establishment of a working group would be the best way to carry out this task as proposed in document CD/141 submitted by the socialist countries on 5 February. The Hungarian delegation is ready to co-operate with every delegation in the elaboration of a mandate for such a working group.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to thank Ambassador Komives for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. SOLA VILA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Comrade Chairman, it gives my delegation great satisfaction to see you presiding over the Committee on Disarmament during the month of March. You are a worthy representative of a country that is united with my own by strong ties of brotherhood, fraternity and solidarity. The German Democratic Republic is a country which has played and continues to play an active and militant part in the effort to achieve general and complete disarmament as a way of strengthening international peace and security.

We are aware of your great ability and we are confident that, under your able and skilful guidance, we shall end this month -- the longest in our spring session -- successfully and with positive results. You may be assured of the utmost support and co-operation from our delegation.

I should like, through you, to offer our congratulations to the Ambassador of France on the results achieved in the month of February when our Committee worked under his chairmanship.

It may seem unnecessary to repeat that working groups provide the best framework for dealing with the various items on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament, but when a fact is really incontrovertible and objective, it has to be repeated, and reality has convincingly demonstrated that this is so. Consideration of the items before us in the context of working groups is the best way of clarifying their many and complex facets; this is what makes some of the arguments adduced here regarding this question unacceptable.

With regard to the forestalling of attacks, considerations of security, defence, protection and so on, the example was given here of a person who equips his house with alarms, warning signs, fences and dogs for his protection. But what about those who cannot afford to install alarms or buy dogs, or those who do not even own houses? Are they then to be left open to attack, without protection of any kind?

No one can deny that it would be useful to set up two working groups on such pressing and urgent items on our agenda as (1) a comprehensive nuclear test-ban; and (2) the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

All members of the Committee, including those delegations which are opposed to the establishment of such groups, know that the discussion of these items in working groups would not mean the immediate conclusion of treaties. We all know that these items require thorough, meticulous and detailed consideration, but if we continue to do nothing in this matter, time will pass and the task will become all the more difficult. Even more important, what explanation will this single multilateral disarmament negotiating body give to the international community? What shall we tell the General Assembly at its second special session on disarmament?

The Final Document adopted at the first special session on disarmament, which is talked about so much, was adopted by consensus. We shall be taking stock of its results at the second special session on disarmament; we shall note what has been done and what has not been done. What will happen when paragraphs 47 onwards are considered? These are the paragraphs referring to questions about nuclear weapons -- unavoidable issues which we are duty bound to take up.

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

My delegation is deeply concerned lest we conclude our work this year without setting up these working groups. This will be the Committee's last full session before the second special session on disarmament, and we must not come to it "empty-handed". Both the Group of 21, to which my country belongs and the socialist group, together with many delegations in the so-called western group are in agreement that these working groups should be set up. This has been reflected in statements, documents submitted, and so on.

For instance, I should like to draw attention to:

Document CD/4, submitted as early as in 1979 by the socialist countries, concerning negotiations on nuclear weapons;

Document CD/36/Rev.1 of the Group of 21, also concerning the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament;

Document CD/72 of the Group of 21, containing an appeal for the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests and urging the establishment of a working group without delay;

Document CD/116 of the Group of 21, on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament;

Document CD/134, the Statement of the Group of 21 on the conclusion of the annual session of the Committee on Disarmament in 1980, which contains the following passage:

"... it is a matter of regret that despite the greater responsibility thus placed on the Committee on Disarmament as the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament, it has been prevented during its 1980 session from adequately discharging its mandate, particularly with regard to that part of its responsibilities which has been assigned the highest priority by the General Assembly, namely, the Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament including the initial step of a Nuclear Test Ban.";

Document CD/135, submitted by the group of socialist States, which states, in one of its paragraphs:

"The delegations of the socialist countries have attached and continue to attach primary importance to the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. They submitted specific proposals to the session of the Committee concerning negotiations on the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons of all kinds and the gradual reduction of stockpiles of such weapons culminating in their complete elimination. In addition, it was proposed that an ad hoc working group on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament should be set up within the Committee, and that the group's terms of reference should be determined during the current session of the Committee on Disarmament." That meant, in 1980.

As regards statements, there have been many, including more than one by the Group of 21 reiterating this urgency, that of the socialist countries and, more particularly, the statement by Comrade Issraelyan of the USSR on 27 February, as well as statements by the Netherlands, Japan, Belgium, Australia, Canada and Italy: all objectively reflect the importance of setting up these working groups.

In addition, at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly, various resolutions to this effect were adopted.

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

In conclusion, I should like to refer to document A/35/392 entitled "Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons". The delegation of India proposed that we should discuss, at informal meetings, chapter V of this report, entitled "The doctrines of deterrence and other theories concerning nuclear weapons". My delegation supports this proposal. The entire report is extremely useful and important and we ought in particular to take note of chapter VIII, "The perpetual menace to human society", and especially paragraph 494, which I should like to quote:

"If this report has proved nothing else, it should at least have served to demonstrate the catastrophic consequences which would result if the nuclear arsenals of today or tomorrow were ever unleashed in war. There are perhaps some who wish to draw comfort from calculations that it may be difficult to kill outright every man, woman and child on earth even in a nuclear war. But such calculations are empty exercises. The danger of the annihilation of human civilization should not be made the subject of theoretical arguments, but be used as a basis for creating a common awareness of the alarming situation the world is facing today and of the need for exercising the political will to search for acceptable solutions".

At their six Summit Conferences, the non-aligned countries have reiterated the need for nuclear disarmament. Thus, at the recent Ministerial Conference held in New Delhi, the Foreign Ministers of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries stated that "the greatest danger confronting the world today is the threat of destruction resulting from a nuclear war. The actions of the nuclear-weapon countries, which have embarked on a new and frenzied phase in the arms race, have created a situation in which mankind appears to be condemned to live in the shadow of nuclear annihilation. Some of the nuclear-weapon countries have been trying to promote the highly dangerous theory of a limited nuclear war and to minimize the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons. At the same time, the so-called 'balance of deterrence' between the great Powers has not prevented them from taking part in regional conflicts. The competition in deterrence has in no way created a sure means of averting the imminent catastrophe. Only the nightmare of uncertainty and fear that today characterize international relations have increased, for the arms race is due primarily to the persistent recourse to the use of force to maintain the status quo in international relations. There is only one real deterrent: mankind's desire to survive. As unswerving advocates of world peace, the non-aligned countries should, therefore, co-ordinate their actions so as to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race with a view to eventually achieving the complete elimination of such weapons from the arsenals of States".

Let us co-ordinate our actions to achieve concrete negotiations on the cessation of nuclear tests and nuclear disarmament.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): Distinguished Comrade Chairman, first of all, I should like on behalf of the Soviet delegation and on my own behalf cordially to congratulate you on your assumption of the functions of Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament for the current month. We are particularly pleased to do this since you represent here a country which is linked with the Soviet Union by the indissoluble ties of friendship and fraternity. May I wish you, distinguished Comrade Herder, success in discharging your responsible task as Chairman of this Committee.

(Mr. Israelyan, USSR)

We should also like to express our gratitude to Ambassador de la Gorce of France, who was the Chairman of the Committee during the month of February.

Today, the Soviet delegation would like to draw the attention of the members of the Committee on Disarmament to an event of major international import -- the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which is now in process of concluding its work. The Report to the Congress, delivered by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, L.I. Brezhnev, contains a thorough and comprehensive analysis of the present international situation, confirms the invariability of the foreign policy course of the Soviet Union towards safeguarding peace and strengthening international security, and puts forward new and important proposals aimed at curbing the arms race and improving the international climate.

Reflecting the most vivid response produced in the world by the work of the Congress, many delegations in the Committee -- and they have told us about this quite frankly -- have displayed a keen interest in the materials emerging from it. The Soviet delegation has submitted as an official document of the Committee the section of the report by L.I. Brezhnev which focuses on the tasks of the consolidation of peace, the settlement of urgent international issues and, in the first place, the problem of disarmament.

Many of the provisions of the report, new constructive proposals put forward at the Congress, bear the most direct relation to the work of our Committee, to those issues which have been raised in the statements of a number of delegations in the course of the general debate.

In this connection, the Soviet delegation would like to draw the attention of the Committee to certain questions touched upon in the report of L.I. Brezhnev.

"The pivotal line of the foreign policy of our Party and Government," -- stated L.I. Brezhnev in his report to the Congress -- "has been and continues to be the struggle to reduce the danger of war and to curb the arms race." The Soviet State, like many other countries -- as has, in particular, been clear from the work of the current session of the Committee -- singles out within the entire sphere of disarmament the issue of the limitation and elimination of nuclear weapons, which are the most dangerous to humanity.

As is well known, the Soviet Union stands for the radical solution of this issue, that is, for ending the production of nuclear weapons and reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed. The relevant concrete proposal was submitted to the Committee by the Soviet delegation together with the delegations of other socialist countries over two years ago. The Congress noted the efforts made by our country to try to secure the adoption of individual measures in the sphere of nuclear disarmament and in particular the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, the strengthening of security guarantees for non-nuclear weapon States, the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons across our planet, and a number of other measures.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Numerous statements in the Committee reflected serious anxiety over the fact that the process of strategic arms limitation by the USSR and the United States of America has been artificially held back and, as you know, through no fault of ours. But there is something more behind this, namely, concern over how Soviet-American relations are going to develop in future. This concern is understandable. During the general debate in the Committee many delegations have rightly emphasized the fact that the entire international situation as well as the solution of a good many problems, including, naturally, disarmament issues depend to a large extent on the policies of the USSR and the United States. The report made by L.I. Brezhnev to the Congress says, clearly and explicitly, that the state of Soviet-American relations at present and the acuteness of problems requiring a solution necessitates a dialogue, and an active dialogue, at all levels. This is also true of the state of affairs here, in the Committee on Disarmament.

Attaching extremely important significance to the limitation of strategic armaments, L.I. Brezhnev urged the continuation, without delay, of the relevant negotiations with the United States, preserving all the positive elements that have so far been achieved in this area. He underlined anew that the only sensible and acceptable basis for such negotiations, in which -- and we would draw attention to this -- all the other nuclear-weapon Powers should participate, at an appropriate time, is observation of the principle of equality and equal security.

L.I. Brezhnev declared that the USSR is prepared to come to terms on limiting the deployment of the new submarines -- the Ohio type by the United States and similar ones by the USSR, and to agree to the banning of the modernization of existing and the development of new ballistic missiles for these submarines.

The proposal contained in the report by L.I. Brezhnev to set up a competent international committee which could be composed of the most eminent scientists from various countries is aimed at intensifying the struggle against the nuclear peril and at increasing opportunities for the dissemination of truthful information about the disastrous consequences for mankind of a nuclear war.

One of the important items on the agenda of our Committee is that of the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. The report to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union stressed once again that the Soviet Union has actively sought the prohibition of all other types of such weapons also, and that certain results have been achieved in this field. In particular, the Convention on the Prohibition of Military Use of Environmental Modification Techniques has entered into force. Considerable useful work has been done towards the drawing up of a treaty for the banning of radiological weapons. We hope that this work will be successfully completed in the near future. Negotiations are continuing in the Committee, for the second year already, with a view to the exclusion of chemical weapons from the arsenals of States, but in truth they are proceeding too slowly, and we sincerely regret it.

The report to the Congress stressed that thanks to the actions of the peace-loving forces it was possible to check the implementation of plans for the deployment of neutron weapons in western Europe. For our part we reaffirm, said L.I. Brezhnev, that

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

we will not begin production of this weapon unless it appears in other States, and that we are prepared to conclude an agreement banning this weapon once and for all. I would recall that a draft treaty on the prohibition of neutron weapons tabled by the group of socialist countries in March 1973 is lying on the negotiating table in the Committee. The Committee should tackle this issue also.

The Soviet delegation feels that it is its duty to draw attention also to new proposals put forward at the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and aimed at a radical improvement of the international situation. Let me say at once that these proposals are not meant to form the subject of negotiations in the Committee, and we shall not introduce them for that purpose, but there is no doubt that their adoption and implementation would improve the situation in the world and would create a more propitious climate for disarmament negotiations also, including here, in this Committee.

It is hardly necessary to explain that it is far easier to prevent this or that conflict threatening to transcend local limits than to put a stop to a conflagration that has already broken out. As far as Europe is concerned, the purpose of preventive action of this kind is served by the confidence-building measures provided for in the decision of the All-European Conference, such as notification of military exercises of ground troops and the invitation to them of observers from other countries. As you know, these measures apply to the territory of the European States, including the western regions of the USSR. In the past the Soviet side has already proposed that the system of notification should cover naval and air force exercises as well as large-scale troop movements.

At the 26th Congress it was proposed that the zone of application of such measures should be substantially extended, and it was emphasized that our country is prepared to apply them to the entire European part of the USSR, provided the western States, too, extend the confidence zone correspondingly. Furthermore, a proposal was put forward to check the build-up of nuclear-missile weapons in Europe.

The Far East is another region where the elaboration and application of confidence-building measures, with due consideration for its specific features, could not only defuse the situation locally but also contribute to the strengthening of the foundations of universal peace. There, such Powers as the USSR, China and Japan border on each other and there are also United States military bases in this region. As far as this region is concerned, our country has also taken a new initiative. In his report L.I. Brezhnev expressed the readiness of the Soviet Union to hold concrete negotiations on confidence-building measures in the Far East with all interested countries. We stand for stability in this region, just as in all other regions of the globe.

The implementation of all these far-reaching proposals on confidence-building measures will facilitate progress in the field of disarmament as well. We wish to emphasize the realistic and meaningful nature of these proposals from the point of view of the strengthening of peace and the settlement of urgent disarmament issues.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Considerable attention was given in the report by L.I. Brezhnev to what are usually called "flash-points"; that is, the hotbeds of military conflicts and tensions, and in the first instance to the Persian Gulf area. At the end of last year the Soviet Union proposed to the United States of America, other western Powers, China, Japan and all other States which might be interested, the reaching of an agreement on a wide range of mutual obligations providing, first of all, that in the Persian Gulf area and on the adjacent islands no foreign military bases should be established and no nuclear or any other type of weapons of mass destruction should be stationed. Another step would be an obligation not to use or threaten to use force against the countries of the Persian Gulf area and not to interfere in their domestic affairs. The Soviet Union also proposed that agreement should be reached to respect the non-aligned status chosen by the Persian Gulf States and not to draw those States into military groupings in which nuclear-weapon Powers participate. We also urged respect for the sovereign right of the States of this region to their natural resources. And finally, the Soviet side proposed that it should be agreed not to create any obstacles or threats whatsoever to normal commerce and the use of maritime communications connecting the States in this region with the rest of the world.

It has sometimes been said about these proposals, which have met with a strong response in the world, that they cannot be divorced from the question of the Soviet military contingent in Afghanistan. In this connection, it was made clear at the Congress that the Soviet Union is prepared to negotiate with respect to the Persian Gulf as an independent problem, and also to participate in a separate settlement of the situation around Afghanistan. At the same time our country, as L.I. Brezhnev stated, does not object to the questions connected with Afghanistan being discussed in conjunction with questions of Persian Gulf security. It goes without saying that in that connection only the international aspects of the Afghanistan problem could be discussed, and not internal Afghan affairs.

It is common knowledge that there are quite a few other urgent problems in the world. They are also awaiting a sensible solution, which requires, as L.I. Brezhnev put it, a far-sighted approach, political will and courage, authority and influence. In this connection, L.I. Brezhnev put forward a proposal for the convening of a special meeting of the Security Council with the participation of the top leaders of its member States in order to look for ways of improving the international situation and preventing war. Leaders of other States could obviously also take part in the meeting, which would, of course, require thorough preparation.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Thus, the new measures and proposals put forward at the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union cover a wide range of both political and military issues. All these proposals pursue a single aim, our one over-all aspiration -- to do everything possible to relieve the peoples of the threat of a nuclear war and to preserve world peace.

"Not war preparations that doom the peoples to a senseless squandering of their material and spiritual wealth, but the consolidation of peace -- that is the clue to the future", L.I. Brezhnev emphasized.

In conclusion, I should like to stress once again that all the main directions of the activities of our State in the field of foreign policy as outlined at the Congress, convincingly demonstrate that the course of the Soviet Union towards the preservation and consolidation of peace, and towards détente, the curbing of the arms race and disarmament is consistent and steadfast. This is a long-term policy not subject to momentary trends. The conclusions and proposals of the Congress, whether relating to the problem of disarmament or to any other international issue, constitute guidelines for Soviet foreign policy and diplomacy, and we shall follow them strictly and unswervingly. The objectives proclaimed by the Congress fill us with a feeling of optimism, and we hope that the new Soviet proposals will have a favourable impact on our common work and will facilitate the solution of the practical tasks facing our responsible negotiating forum.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Russian): I should like to thank Ambassador Issraelyan, the representative of the Soviet Union, for his detailed explanation of his country's latest proposals in the sphere of the cessation of the arms race and disarmament, which were adopted at the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Bearing in mind the part that the Soviet Union as one of the foremost nuclear-weapon Powers is called upon to play in the implementation of measures of disarmament, and in particular nuclear disarmament, I am convinced that these proposals will be given due attention also by the members of this Committee. I should like to inform the members of the Committee that at the request of the delegation of the Soviet Union appropriate extracts from the report to the 26th Congress will be distributed to the Committee as a working document. I should like also to thank Ambassador Issraelyan for the kind words he addressed to myself.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): My delegation is happy to see you in the office of Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament. Your clear perception of the problems with which this multilateral negotiating body deals -- or with which it will inevitably have to deal, sooner or later -- and your skill in finding compromise solutions are features of inestimable value for the successful guidance of our work during the month that lies ahead.

I should also like to take this opportunity to reiterate to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador de la Gorce, our gratitude and great appreciation for the outstanding role that he played during the month of February.

Turning to the item we agreed to continue considering at this meeting -- the item on the Committee's agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" -- I shall begin by reminding you that my delegation has already had the opportunity to state in this forum the basic points of its position on this matter at the meetings -- the verbatim records of which can easily be consulted -- that I shall now list together with the dates on which they were held:

1979

1. 28th meeting, held on 19 April;

1980

2. 80th meeting, held on 22 April;
3. 87th meeting, held on 26 June;

1981

4. 101st meeting, held on 3 February;
5. 107th meeting, held on 17 February.

To supplement this list, I should like in the first place to emphasize that not only do we still consider it "inconceivable", as we have been saying here for almost two years, that any attempt should be made to prevent the Committee on Disarmament from discharging its duty with respect to nuclear disarmament, which, as has been said and repeated endlessly, should have the highest priority in our work; we find the persistence of such an attitude wholly unacceptable.

Since this Committee is the "single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum", it is obvious that it has not only the right, but also the inescapable duty to tackle an issue which, as the United Nations has so rightly said, is of "vital" interest to all peoples because what is at stake is nothing less than the very survival of mankind. The fact of the Committee's doing so will not, of course, create any obstacle to the continuation of the bilateral negotiations between the two Superpowers but will rather, on the contrary, be a useful complement to those talks.

It is no doubt for this reason that, at its last session, the General Assembly gave its full support in not one but two resolutions, resolutions 35/152 C and 35/152 D, both adopted on 12 December 1980, to the proposal made last year by the Group of 21 that there should be set up, during this first part of the Committee's 1981 session, an ad hoc working group that would begin its work by considering the

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

question of the "elaboration and clarification of the stages of nuclear disarmament envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, including identification of the responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States and the role of the non-nuclear-weapon States in the process of achieving nuclear disarmament".

My delegation could not accept as a valid argument against the establishment of a working group on nuclear disarmament the alleged need of some regions to possess nuclear weapons in order "to deter potential aggressors". It is already 12 years since we had an opportunity to state our carefully considered conclusion on this matter, an honour that fell to me, at the 395th meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, held on 18 March 1969, when I said, inter alia:

"We refuse to believe that the so-called deterrent power -- a formula that has regrettably been much abused -- of such weapons can be regarded as a positive factor justifying their existence. The fact that in the past 20 years we have had a precarious peace based on a frightening balance of terror is for us far from being a convincing argument.

"In the millions of years of pre-history which are usually divided into the Stone Age, the Bronze Age, and the Iron Age it was enough for man to have the deterrent power of primitive weapons made from such materials; and during thousands of years of recorded history in which, we must not forget, for many periods over half a century long peace prevailed and the deterrent power never until quite recently went any further than the instruments of destruction, quite terrifying enough, that were based on TNT and dynamite. We cannot understand why today international peace and security should have to depend on weapons such as the nuclear weapons, the very existence of which entails the danger of universal suicide. Against the presumed need for the deterrent power of nuclear weapons we must set the very real need to evaluate the moral dissuasive power of all peoples of the world, who demand every day with greater urgency and less patience that an end be put to a situation which endangers nothing less than the very survival of the human species."

Ambassador Venkateswaran, the distinguished representative of India, in the excellent statement he made last week, on 26 February, highlighted the numerous reasons why recourse to nuclear weapons to avoid or remedy imbalances, either real or imaginary, in conventional weapons is unjustifiable.

I have nothing to add on that point. I would, however, like to express my surprise at something that was said by another distinguished representative, the representative of the United Kingdom, who told us, in his statement on 19 February, that the Warsaw Pact countries have a "superiority in Central Europe over the NATO alliance of 3:1 in tanks and artillery and some 150,000 in ground-force manpower".

It is understandable and, I would say, even natural, that, when a Government is trying to persuade its own Parliament to be generous with regard to the military budget, it should not be too demanding with respect to the accuracy of the estimates it submits. On the other hand, it seems to us indispensable that, in as august an international body as the Committee on Disarmament, the starting point should be the fact that the members of the Committee do not have a vote in their respective Parliaments and, furthermore, that they should be fully cognizant at

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least of what might be termed the basic information regarding the status of armaments and armed forces in the world. For example, I do not think that I shall be teaching any of the representatives in this room anything new with a few quotations, all taken from public statements by officials of the most important member of NATO, who, in view of the functions they held when they spoke, may unquestionably be considered as among the most knowledgeable persons in the world on matters of this kind. These statements, as will be seen, give a very different picture from that painted for us by Ambassador Summerhayes.

In January 1980, Mr. Harold Brown, then United States Defense Secretary, declared:

"What are called static measures of assessment, in which, for example, Soviet and American missile or tank inventories are compared in isolation, are rarely illuminating about the expected outcome of a battle or instructive as to the defence posture we should adopt....

"In the central region of Europe, a rough numerical balance exists between the immediately available non-nuclear forces of NATO (including France) and those of the Warsaw Pact."

Last year again none other than the then United States Under-Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, Dr. William Perry, stated that NATO led in the "lethality" of tanks, artillery and rocket-launchers, as well as in the quantity and quality of anti-tank missiles and combat aircraft. With regard to precision-guided weapons, which he described as the "most significant application of technology to modern warfare since the development of radar", Dr. Perry believed that the United States had a "substantial lead".

Dr. Perry also believed that the improvement of NATO's anti-tank capability had so accelerated in recent years that "the technology balance is shifting in favour of the anti-tank systems". He added that NATO had over 193,000 very effective anti-tank missiles and an enormous variety of methods of firing them from the ground or from aircraft. As regards the military budgets of the two main alliances, a careful comparative study led Mr. Arthur M. Cox, a former official of the United States Central Intelligence Agency, to the following conclusion, which was published on 21 August 1980 in the International Herald Tribune:

"The combined NATO defence budgets are greater than the combined Soviet-Warsaw Pact defence budgets and, if the China factor is included, the Soviet proportion of defence facing the United States and its allies is less than 75 per cent of that of the NATO powers".

In view of these statements, which could easily be supplemented by others of a similar nature, we believe that exaggerating the size and the dangers of arsenals of conventional weapons is certainly not the best way of achieving the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Perhaps the best course would be to reflect seriously on the words of a man as familiar with strategic questions and as free from suspicion of bias as General Douglas MacArthur, who, speaking before the Philippines Congress on 5 July 1961, declared:

"Global war has become a Frankenstein to destroy both sides. No longer does it possess even the chance of the winner of a duel. It contains now only the germs of double suicide.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

"The present tensions with their threat of national annihilation are fostered by two great illusions. The one, a complete belief on the part of the Soviet world that the capitalistic countries are preparing to attack them; that sooner or later we intend to strike. And the other, a complete belief on the part of the capitalistic countries that the Soviets are preparing to attack us; that sooner or later they intend to strike.

"Both are wrong. Each side, so far as the masses are concerned, is desirous of peace. Both dread war. But the constant acceleration of preparation may, without specific intent, ultimately precipitate a kind of spontaneous combustion."

To supplement this statement made nearly 20 years ago, and since it seems to be fashionable to speak of the balance of nuclear deterrence, I will now go on to quote two of the main conclusions of the recent comprehensive study on nuclear weapons prepared by the United Nations, to the great merits of which I have repeatedly drawn attention since I first became familiar with its contents in October last year:

"In order to claim that it is possible to continue, forever, to live with nuclear weapons, the balance must be maintained at all times irrespective of any technological challenges that may present themselves as a result of the arms race. In addition, there must be no accidents of a human or technical nature, which is an impossible requirement as shown by the various incidents of false alarms and computer malfunctioning that are reported from time to time. Sooner or later one of these incidents may give rise to a real accident with untold consequences. For these and other reasons it is not possible to offer a blanket guarantee of eternal stability of the deterrence balance and no one should be permitted to issue calming declarations to this effect ...

"Even if the balance of deterrence was an entirely stable phenomenon, there are strong moral and political arguments against a continued reliance on this balance. It is inadmissible that the prospect of the annihilation of human civilization is used by some States to promote their security. The future of mankind is then made hostage to the perceived security of a few nuclear-weapon States and most notably that of the two Superpowers. It is furthermore not acceptable to establish, for the indefinite future, a world system of nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. This very system carries within it the seed of nuclear-weapon proliferation. In the long run, therefore, it is a system that contains the origins of its own destruction."

I am convinced that an objective analysis of the opinions which I have read out will inevitably lead to the conclusion that the Committee on Disarmament must lose no more time in beginning multilateral negotiations between its members on nuclear disarmament -- negotiations the conduct of which is endorsed in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of 1978 and for the initiation of which we continue to believe, with the Group of 21, that the best available machinery would be the immediate establishment of an ad hoc working group.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.

CD/PV.112
5 March 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND TWELFTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 5 March 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. G. Herder (German Democratic Republic)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. M. DJABALLAH
Mr. A. BENYAITINA

Argentina: Mr. F. JIMENEZ DAVILA
Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD

Australia: Mr. R. STEELE
Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. R. DEYANOV
Mr. K. PRAMOV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U THAN HTUN

Canada: Mr. G. SKINNER
Mr. C. VACHON

China: Mr. YU Peiven
Mr. YU Mengjia
Mr. SA Benwang

Cuba: Mrs. V. BOROWDOSKY JACKLEWICH

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. RUZEK
Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. E. ZAPOTOCKY

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M.N. FAHMY

Ethiopia: Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Mr. P. BUNFIG

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. N. KLINGER
Mr. H. MULLER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. C. GYORFFY
Mr. A. LAKATOS

India: Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. E. SOEPRAPTO
Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. F. QASIM
Mr. KARYONO

Iran: Mr. M. DABIRI

Italy: Mr. V.C. DI MONTEZEMOLO
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. R. ISHII
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya: Mr. S. SHITEMI
Mr. G. MUNIU

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mr. A. CACERES

Mongolia: Mr. S.H. LKHASHID
Mr. S.O. BOLD
Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco: Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. O. ADENIJI
Mr. V.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru: Mr. F. VALDIVIESO
Mr. A. THORNBERRY

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS
Mr. K. TOMASZEWSKI

Romania: Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. S. STROMBACH
Mr. J. LUNDIN
Mr. B. EKHOLF

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. L.S. MOSHKOV
Mr. S.N. RIUKHINE

<u>United Kingdom:</u>	Mr. D.M. SUMNERHAYES Mr. J.I. LINK
<u>United States of America:</u>	Mr. C.C. FLOWERREE Mr. L. FLEISCHER Mr. F. DE SIMONE Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER Mr. J.A. MISKEL Mr. H. WILSON
<u>Venezuela:</u>	Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT Mr. O.A. AGUILAR
<u>Yugoslavia:</u>	Mr. M. VRHUNEC Mr. B. BRANKOVIC
<u>Zaire:</u>	Mr. LONGO B. NDAGA
<u>Secretary of the Committee and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General:</u>	Mr. R. JAIPAL
<u>Deputy Secretary of the Committee:</u>	Mr. V. BERASATEGUI
<u>Non-Member Representatives</u>	
<u>Spain:</u>	Mr. DE LAIGLESIA

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): Comrade Chairman, the Committee on Disarmament is entering a decisive phase in its work of the spring session. In this connection, wishing you at this important junction every success, I would like to express my conviction that, thanks to your political skill and diplomatic experience, we have every reason to expect further progress in our work, taking advantage of the results achieved in February under the chairmanship of Ambassador de la Gorce whom I once again have the pleasure to congratulate.

My delegation wishes to devote today's intervention to the comprehensive programme of disarmament, that is, to the subject which, in accordance with our programme of work, is to be discussed from today till 13 March.

Having attentively followed the interesting discussions that have been going on during the plenary so far, I have come to the conclusion that they should be based on a somewhat wider ground. It appears so because the Disarmament Committee as a forum of concrete negotiations cannot do without certain considerations of a theoretical or even philosophical nature. In such a context, it is understandable that our approach towards specific disarmament objectives cannot be separated from the state of our own awareness, from a certain package of philosophical beliefs which are held by every one of us, and which obviously differ, sometimes substantially. Such a package contains not only different views of the world presented here by the various delegations but also the different historical background of each of the nations represented in this room. What must be emphasized, however, is that our task here under the prevailing circumstances, is to know how to find out what is common in the approach of the different delegations sitting around this table. Based on such knowledge, our further task is to try hard to work out such common solutions that could possibly be accepted by all of us. This reflection came to my mind after I had listened to the polemic which went on last month between the distinguished representatives of India and the United Kingdom. It was further reinforced by the ideas contained in the interesting intervention by Ambassador García Robles of Mexico the day before yesterday.

We should realize that the polemic concerned not only those two delegations. It was, in fact, an exchange of views on two different concepts represented not only by the two aforementioned delegations. This is the reason why I would also like to put in my oar here.

Indeed, we should utilize the plenary meetings, inter alia, to explain to each other thoroughly the general premises of our approach to the details of the negotiation process under way in the Committee on Disarmament.

In his polemic with the representative of India, Ambassador Venkateswaran, the leader of the United Kingdom delegation, Ambassador Summerhayes, in his intervention on 26 February, presented an interpretation of the concept of "strategy of deterrence" on the basis, as I understand, of the policy of his own country. To make the general and theoretical considerations more emphatic, he supported them with a practical example. May I be allowed to quote: "If I see a risk that my house may be broken into, I install a burglar alarm, find myself a guard dog and then put up a notice on my front gate advertising this. I do not wish to hurt a possible intruder -- instead I hope that my preparations will make him reconsider and leave me in peace. In other words, I am trying to deter him."

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

The strategy of deterrence has its own long history. Trying to avoid long quotations, I just wish to recall two sentences from the report of the Secretary-General containing the comprehensive study on nuclear weapons (document A/35/392). "In the nuclear age, however, the meaning of deterrence has acquired totally new dimensions." And again: "In the nuclear age, however, the very cornerstone of what is projected as defence is offensive capability, while defensive capabilities-- in the true sense of the word -- are very limited." (Paras. 285 and 287, respectively, of the report).

In this context, the example offered by Ambassador Summerhayes brings to mind many questions. Let me ask, at the moment, only two of them. First has not just this kind of strategy of deterrence caused a five-fold increase in military expenditure since the Second World War? And, again, does having five guard dogs instead of one make a man five times more secure?

The solutions proposed by Ambassador Summerhayes, besides being well known from the past, have in fact created the situation which President Leonid I. Brezhnev had in mind when he said to the twenty-sixth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: "What has become a reality is a certain vicious circle: the actions of one side provoke counteractions by the other ...".

The next question I would like to ask is the following: does not that vicious circle mean that the balance of power is being sought on the ground of the balance of fear? "How can this chain be broken?" asks President Brezhnev. Having suggested numerous specific measures which, by the way, were reflected in a recent intervention here by Ambassador Issraelyan of the Soviet Union, President Leonid I. Brezhnev stated: "What is, however, indispensable to this end is a far-sighted approach, political will and, also, political courage ...". This means in practice that the balance of security must be sought through the parity of forces but not on the ground of balance of fear and only on the ground of balance of reason and courage. On this philosophical premise are founded the many disarmament proposals which the Soviet Union, Poland and other socialist countries have been putting forward during the post-war years. At this juncture, I would like to pose another question: instead of installing -- out of fear -- ever new "burglar alarms" and getting ever new "guard dogs", would we not be better off if we considered the proposals and tried to reach agreement on diminishing the number of these deterrence measures as they are at present more than enough to blow up several times not only the guarded house but also our common home that is our planet?

How can a permanent build-up of the system of "burglar alarm" -- to use this illustrative although not very accurate expression -- be reconciled with the obstinate rejection of an outstretched hand of someone who is, a priori, called a "possible intruder"? And what if the one who comes up with an outstretched hand is not the "possible intruder"? Having stretched out a hand so many times, that is, having put forward so many disarmament initiatives, we ultimately do not ask for, we call for talks -- not out of fear -- but governed by courage and trust, in a strong conviction that the time must come when these initiatives will be regarded neither as unripe for negotiations nor as mere propaganda but as serious offers in the hope of ensuring a comprehensive security for all homes.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

Such a programme should be worked out and presented to the United Nations General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, to be held next year. It should stipulate specific steps to fight the philosophy of fear and distrust among nations. At the same time, it should propagate a courage to compromise, a will to understand, and it should show the obvious advantages coming from a gradual lowering of the level of armaments, in other words, create the indispensable psychological infrastructure for the disarmament process, enhance a search for common solutions as well as counteract the operation of locking up nations in ever deeper pillboxes with ever more numerous armies of "guard dogs".

Let me now pass to some specific remarks on the subject-matter by asking these questions. How do we conceive the comprehensive programme of disarmament? What -- our minds -- ought such a document to be, and what can it simply not become? We agree in principle with many views that were largely expressed during the discussions in the Working Group last year, and during the first two meetings of this Group that have taken place so far during this session, that the comprehensive programme of disarmament, by providing the necessary framework for substantive negotiations in the field of disarmament, should be "... a carefully worked-out package of interrelated measures in the field of disarmament, which would lead the international community towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control...". We also agree that it should lay down an agreed framework for sustained international action in the field of disarmament, that is, through negotiations at multilateral, bilateral and regional levels on specific measures of disarmament. In other words, we conceive the programme to be approved by the United Nations as a multilateral declaration of the political intentions of States. We must, at the same time, add that it should be a particular declaration. A particular declaration in the sense that it should not be a general but a specific document committing the States to a further, concrete action, as stated above.

Furthermore, we share the view expressed last year that the said programme should contain the following basic chapters: an introduction or preamble; chapters on objectives, principles, priorities, measures and stages or phases of implementation and a chapter describing the procedural machinery.

I do not wish to elaborate now on all the chapters I have just listed. The delegation of Poland will be prepared to present its views in detail during the forthcoming meetings of the ad hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. I cannot fail, however, to emphasize here that this programme must not only point out the political and military implications of the arms race, but also clearly show its economic implications. We cannot fail to remind the Committee and point out again that the hundreds of billions of dollars which are spent annually on the manufacture or improvement of weapons stand sharply and dramatically in contrast with the poverty of the overwhelming majority of the world's population. I cannot emphasize strongly enough the direct link which exists between development and disarmament. I can only repeat after the declaration contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament that the economic and social consequences of the arms race are so detrimental that its continuation is simply incompatible with the implementation of the new international economic order.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

One other point which I wish to raise in connection with the comprehensive programme of disarmament relates specifically to what I called, in my previous statement in plenary, a psychological infrastructure of disarmament. Indeed, the comprehensive programme of disarmament we want to work out will not really be comprehensive if it does not include building up an infrastructure of peace. The maintenance of peace and security in the world today ultimately means not only a partial truce among separate nations, but above all a permanent way of life for all mankind. What is needed for making such a way of life is, inter alia, a long-term effort to help to plant in the minds of men a strong awareness of the supreme need for a solid foundation of peace. It also means that peace and international security, to be durable, have to be built concurrently — in the practice of international relations and in the mind of every man as, in fact, the first real line of defence against war is man himself. With this in view, the delegation of Poland submitted during the thirty-third session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1978 a draft resolution which was later adopted at the said session as a Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace. I am confident that the principles and recommendations of this Declaration provide an extremely important and valid guidance for our deliberations on the contents of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. As a matter of fact the ultimate goal of the said programme and of the Declaration is the same: to create conditions of mutual understanding among the nations of the world so that future generations will no longer have to overcome the legacies of ignorance, prejudice and hostility which are still present within the international community. In other words, the comprehensive programme of disarmament, to be effectively implemented, must encompass and enhance deep involvement in the entire process of disarmament, however long and thorny it may prove to be, on the part not only of the Governments but also of the nations of the world. Needless to say, many other speakers before me have already emphasized to this Committee the same point, to recall only a recent working document, CD/155, introduced by the delegation of Italy, or the intervention by Ambassador García Robles already mentioned.

The delegation of Poland pledges, therefore, its full support and flexible approach towards negotiating the framework of the CPD. In more specific terms, we are for a programme which would design the process of disarmament from today to a state of general and complete disarmament. As such it should encompass all disarmament and other measures related in any way to the disarmament process. Trying to avoid at present merely listing these measures, I just wish to emphasize again our flexibility in undertaking an active discussion in which we shall be guided by the documents adopted by the United Nations General Assembly: the Final Document of its first special session devoted to disarmament, the recommendations of the Disarmament Commission, the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade and, as I mentioned above, the Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Sujka, the representative of Poland, for his statement as well as for the congratulations he addressed to me in connection with my assumption of the Chair.

Mr. ADENLJI (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, I wish to address myself today to item 2 of the Committee's 1981 agenda, namely, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". Before going into the substance, however, allow me to extend to you my sincere congratulations on your assumption of the office of Chairman of this Committee. Your vast experience in diplomacy and particularly in multilateral diplomacy and your knowledge of disarmament issues will contribute greatly to progress in our work. My delegation will co-operate closely with you.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

The necessity to take urgent measures for stopping the nuclear arms race is definitely the most important subject to which the Committee on Disarmament should address itself. There is universal consensus on the irrationality both of the basic reasoning behind the accumulation of nuclear weapons and the sheer volume of those weapons in the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States, and particularly of the most advanced nuclear-weapon States. The rationale behind the nuclear arms race is said to derive from the insecurity of the nuclear-weapon States. However, the need for the preservation of national security is not limited only to the nuclear-weapon States. Moreover, nuclear weapons as a protection of that security represent the end of a spectrum which goes far beyond the necessity for national protection. In light of the destructive power of nuclear weapons and the impossibility of confining the effects of the use of nuclear weapons to a prescribed area, it is obvious that reliance on nuclear weapons as a means of national defence jeopardizes the very survival of other countries — friends and foes alike. In any case, it is clear that the continuing insecurity of even the two most advanced nuclear-weapon States, in spite of the period of over 30 years in which they have developed nuclear arsenals, is an indication that the mere accumulation of these weapons does not and will not ensure that security.

The solution of the problem of ensuring security, according to the nuclear-weapon States themselves, cannot be found in the increase of the number of States possessing nuclear weapons. This is why the nuclear-weapon States are in the vanguard of prohibiting the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is therefore incomprehensible that these same nuclear-weapon States who preach to other States that national and world security can only be gravely endangered by the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons, will turn round to defend their own possession of nuclear weapons on the excuse of preserving national security.

If the nuclear-weapon States still believe themselves to be part of the world, then their possession of nuclear weapons is no less a danger to world security than the possession of these weapons by other States. Indeed, the retention of nuclear weapons by the Powers which currently possess them constitutes one of the greatest disservices that can be done to world security because it encourages others to believe in the efficacy of nuclear weapons. Security for all countries will either have to be sought in ways other than the possession of nuclear weapons, or all countries should be accorded the right to determine the means, including the possession of nuclear weapons, for protecting their security.

The deterrent effect of the possession of nuclear weapons in preventing a world war has been used as justification for the retention of these weapons. As I said in my statement at our 103rd meeting on Friday, 10 February, the world will not know until the present nuclear arsenals have been dismantled as a result of disarmament agreements that nuclear weapons have in fact acted as a deterrent. In as much as the modernization of nuclear-weapon systems persists, the world can only marvel at the logic of those who believe in stepping up constantly the level of deterrence. For it will always be a matter of conjecture, how much further destructive capacity is required by the nuclear-weapon States before they consider that they have accumulated sufficient fire-power to serve the avowed purpose. Deterrence naturally rests on the perception of each of the nuclear-weapon States of the capability of the other side. It depends on the assessment of the attainment of parity or balance which is capable of various interpretations depending on what conclusion one wishes to arrive at.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

If the carefully negotiated Salt II agreement has become a matter of dispute in one of the negotiating States as to whether it does or does not assure parity and balance, it is obvious that the security of the world is being made dependent on the subjective interpretations of those who are not necessarily disinterested in stepping up the arms race. The result can only be greater insecurity, inasmuch as further accumulation or even modernization on one side inevitably leads to a reaction from the other side. Indeed, security based on higher levels of nuclear arms will ever remain uncertain and dangerous both to the nuclear-weapon States and to the world at large.

I spoke earlier of the irrationality of the sheer volume of the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States, particularly the Superpowers. They possess enough to destroy the whole world, not just the territories of their adversaries, several times over. Yet there is no end in sight of the accumulation and the further refinement of these weapons. Can this process be justified by the argument of deterrence? My delegation believes, with the experts who conducted the latest comprehensive study on nuclear weapons that the concept of the maintenance of world peace, stability and balance through the process of deterrence is perhaps the most dangerous collective fallacy that exists.

The continuation of the nuclear arms race, echoes of which abound this week, poses very grave threats to world security, at a time when we should all be directing our minds to positive steps towards disarmament. A ban on nuclear-weapon testing as a first step to stop the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons still remains illusory; and this is in spite of the world opinion as formulated in paragraph 51 of the Final Document of the special session on disarmament and several resolutions of the General Assembly. What is required is not a temporary moratorium on nuclear testing, as envisaged in the trilateral negotiations; rather we demand a truly verifiable and comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty negotiated by the Committee on Disarmament. We are all aware that only the political will of two nuclear-weapon States is required in order for this objective to be achieved.

Apart from a comprehensive test-ban treaty, my delegation believes that the following measures can be considered as a beginning in the series of measures for nuclear disarmament:

- (i) Agreement on freezing of nuclear arsenals at the present level;
- (ii) A ban on production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons; and
- (iii) Agreement to place existing storage of fissionable materials under international safeguards.

The time is now "ripe" for nuclear disarmament to be negotiated in an ad hoc working group of the Committee on Disarmament. Paragraph 50 of the Final Document gives a framework for the negotiations. Ample documentation is available for a working group to initiate substantive negotiations. The initiatives of the Group of 21 contained in documents CD/36 and CD/116 of 1980 proposed the following concrete measures that the Group could engage in:

- (1) Elaboration of the stages of nuclear disarmament envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document;

- (2) Issues involved in the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war;

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

(3) Issues involved in eliminating reliance on doctrines of nuclear deterrence; and

(4) Measures to ensure an effective discharge by the Committee on Disarmament of its role as the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament.

Mention should also be made of the initiative contained in document CD/4 which made concrete suggestions for the commencement of negotiations.

Here, as in the case of the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban, only the absence of the political will of certain nuclear-weapon States constitutes an obstacle. My delegation calls on these States to reconsider their position and to co-operate with other members of the Committee to enable it to fulfil its sacred task to humanity.

I shall devote the second part of my statement to the item on the comprehensive programme of disarmament. The history of the efforts to draw up such a programme is well known. In declaring the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade, the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969 requested "... the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, while continuing intensive negotiations with a view to reaching the widest possible agreement on collateral measures, to work out at the same time a comprehensive programme, dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective control".

Seeing that the CCD did not discharge this responsibility, the Nigerian delegation took advantage of the mid-term review of the Decade in 1975 to press for action. However, the struggle for the setting up of an ad hoc working group was not won until March 1978. As a contribution to the substantive work of the Working Group, my delegation submitted working paper CCD/555, which was later updated and submitted to the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

The Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament consolidated the universal consensus on the need for a comprehensive programme. In its paragraph 109 the Final Document enjoined on the Committee on Disarmament to undertake the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated.

General Assembly resolution 34/83 B fixed the time-frame for the elaboration of the programme. The CD, according to that resolution, should complete the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament before the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Obviously, therefore, this is one item on our agenda which has to be concluded in the next 12 months. I am confident that under the wise guidance of Ambassador García Robles, the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme will succeed.

The comprehensive programme of disarmament to be elaborated by this Committee for adoption by the General Assembly at its second special session should provide a clear framework for substantive negotiations, over a number of years, in the field of disarmament. It should contain an orderly, well-balanced package of interrelated measures in the field of disarmament, complete with a system of priorities and co-ordination that will ensure constant discernible progress towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Since the programme will be a once and for all agenda for negotiation leading to the ultimate goal, it should constitute an agreed, and I stress agreed, framework for sustained international action

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

in the field of disarmament divorced from the vagaries of bilateral relations between States. Therefore the comprehensive programme should, from the beginning, enjoy the full commitment of all countries, and a means of ensuring full compliance by all should be devised. Even if it may not be conceived as a legally binding instrument, it should nevertheless not be downgraded to a document which States may or may not implement according to convenience. I believe that a solemn declaration by each country of commitment to implement the programme should be made on its adoption.

An important factor in the comprehensive programme is that of time. It should reflect the alarming fact that unless progress in disarmament negotiations is rapid and sustained, developments in weapons research and development may always render agreements irrelevant. The basic concept on which the programme will be based is the step-by-step approach to disarmament. It should be clearly understood, however, that if negotiations on partial measures of disarmament are to be effective cumulatively, there has to be reflected in the CD the commitment to move without delay to reach agreements that are not rendered meaningless by developments in weapons technology. Otherwise, the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament will for ever be illusory.

Considering, therefore, that the longer the negotiations take, the more difficult it will be to attain the goal of general and complete disarmament, it is essential to demonstrate from the beginning the political will to accomplish the whole process in the shortest possible time. I venture to suggest that the whole programme should be conceived within a time-frame of 20 years, divided into five phases of four years each. If nuclear-weapon States make 20-year plans for modernization stretching to the beginning of the twenty-first century, the comprehensive programme should ensure that another modernization competition is forestalled through general and complete disarmament.

As I said earlier, the 20-year time-frame of the comprehensive programme of disarmament should be divided into five phases of four years each. At the end of each phase a review should be carried out to assess the accomplishment and determine what measures may be needed to stimulate further progress. The four-year review could take the form of a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, thus permitting all States Members of the United Nations to participate actively in the review and follow closely progress in the implementation of the programme.

Naturally, the measures to be accomplished in each phase will be a mixture of nuclear and conventional disarmament, as well as related and other measures bearing on international peace and security and on contributions to the creation and consolidation of the New International Economic Order. Since the measures will constitute an orderly well-balanced package, it goes without saying that no State or group of States will be at a disadvantage as a result of disarmament measures. The States with the largest arsenals, nuclear as well as conventional, will naturally bear a special responsibility for facilitating negotiations at every phase, but particularly in the initial phases.

Finally, the comprehensive programme of disarmament should address itself to the institutional requirements for promoting, facilitating and following up the negotiations and agreements envisaged in it.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Adeniji, the representative of Nigeria, for his statement. I also thank him for the very kind words he addressed to me.

Mr. SHITEMI (Kenya): Mr. Chairman, permit me, right from the outset, to congratulate you on your assumption of the Chair of the Committee on Disarmament. You bring to your assignment wide and relevant experience; we feel confident the work of the Committee is in capable hands. We also want to extend our sincere and warm gratitude to the outgoing Chairman, Ambassador F. de la Gorce of France, for the excellent job he did in guiding this Committee over the complicated first part of this spring session.

For more than three decades the international community has continued to seek ways and means of slowing the arms race and achieving the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Although a number of agreements have been reached with a view to limiting nuclear armaments and their proliferation, reducing military tension and creating a political climate conducive to further and more significant achievements in the field of nuclear disarmament, negotiations on genuine disarmament issues have been very discouraging.

As this Committee engages in futile debates on whether certain items on its agenda are ready for negotiation, the international community continues to witness the unprecedented growth of nuclear arsenals and the deployment of new and increasingly sophisticated nuclear-weapon systems, as well as some increase in the number of States with either nuclear-weapon capability or possessing nuclear weapons.

My delegation is therefore deeply concerned that, unless our efforts towards slowing the arms race are successful, the 1980s, which the General Assembly proclaimed as the Second Disarmament Decade, could witness the emergence of additional nuclear-weapon States. This would not be of any help to our disarmament efforts, but it appears inevitable, given the prevailing disillusionment at the pace of nuclear disarmament negotiations and the apparent reluctance on the part of nuclear-weapon States, particularly the two leading nuclear-weapon States, to come to grips with the truth that they no longer have the monopoly in nuclear technology.

Kenya is strongly opposed to nuclear weapons retention and their proliferation, both horizontal and vertical. The international instruments which we have signed and ratified in the field of disarmament stand as clear testimony of our dedication to the course of disarmament.

We welcome Egypt into this club; it was in Cairo that the Organization of African Unity, under the Chairmanship of Egypt, first declared Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Egypt, being at the crossroads of two continents, took the courageous decision to introduce a resolution in the last General Assembly declaring the Middle East as a nuclear-weapon-free zone; with this background as a clear indication of Egypt's intention, it was a logical consequence that Egypt should become a member of the non-proliferation treaty club.

The failure of the second Review Conference of the Parties to the non-proliferation Treaty to reach consensus on the contents of a final declaration raises serious questions about the future of the NPT as the central element of the international régime to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. If that falters, we will be left on very shaky ground indeed.

(Mr. Shitemi, Kenya)

The desire of the people of the continent of Africa, which has been expressed through numerous resolutions of the Organization of African Unity, as well as in those of the United Nations General Assembly, to see their continent free of nuclear weapons is regrettably being frustrated by the actions of certain countries which consider themselves among the strong non-proliferation advocates. The economic self-interest of these countries, among others, seem to have overridden the vital environmental and security interests of the people of the region, as well as those of the world community.

The quiet but steady nuclear collaboration between the racist régime in Pretoria and some nuclear exporting countries Parties to the NPT casts some doubt on the credibility of their pronouncements and efforts towards genuine nuclear disarmament. We have every reason to believe that this collaboration has given South Africa the necessary nuclear technology to enable it to produce nuclear weapons at any time it deems appropriate. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Pretoria régime would have a reverberating political and security effect on the part of African States and would further erode the importance of the NPT.

To expect the rest of Africa to sit idle and watch the nuclear drama unfold in their continent without responding appropriately would be unrealistic. Let us put our minds together to ensure that that drama will never unfold, for, when -- and if -- it indeed materializes, it would be almost impossible to control the chain reaction.

The proclamation by the General Assembly of the 1990s as both a Second Disarmament Decade and a Third United Nations Development Decade calls for a more active pursuit of negotiations by the Committee on Disarmament on disarmament measures with a view to completing the priority items by the end of the decade. It also calls for specific arrangements for the transfer of resources from military to social and economic purposes.

We are all aware of the fact that the resolution by which the General Assembly declared the decade of the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade envisaged a relationship between disarmament and development, anticipating that the resources saved would be diverted to social and economic development for the benefit of the international community. The link between disarmament and development was also underscored in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which stated that resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be devoted to the economic and social development of all nations and contribute to the bridging of the economic gap between the developed and developing countries. It is regrettable that that objective has not been achieved because considerable human and natural resources have been diverted to the manufacture of armaments.

My delegation welcomes the quick decisions reached to re-establish the four ad hoc working groups. We very much hope that the mandate of some of the groups will be made more comprehensive to enable the Committee to come to grips with the real issues of deliberating international conventions. We extend our congratulations and our support to the Chairmen of the ad hoc working groups.

(Mr. Shitemi, Kenya)

The question of the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests has been discussed as a highly important measure of disarmament for more than two decades, and yet no substantial progress has been made to slow down or even reduce the number of testings. Since the conclusion of the partial test-ban Treaty, concerted international efforts towards a comprehensive test-ban have been made, particularly through the General Assembly and the negotiating bodies, predecessors of the CD.

Both the first and the second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have appealed to the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty to take the lead in solving the technical and political difficulties involved and to make every effort to achieve a comprehensive ban at an early date.

Since its establishment in 1976, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events has submitted several reports to this Committee in the hope that they could contribute to the solution of the verification question.

The General Assembly has, through its numerous resolutions, called upon all the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from conducting any testing. That the Assembly attaches the highest priority to this question is indicated in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the special session devoted to disarmament and in its latest resolution, 35/46, in which it called upon the Committee on Disarmament to exert all efforts in order that a draft comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty may be submitted to the General Assembly no later than at its second special session devoted to disarmament to be held in 1982.

Since the beginning, the discussions on this question have been faced by three problems which the nuclear-weapon States appeared to have had difficulties in resolving satisfactorily, namely, the questions of whether the adoption of a comprehensive test-ban should be made contingent upon the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, the control of the conduct of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under a ban, and that of effective means of verification. It is the understanding of my delegation that the first two problems have been solved and that the only major remaining issue is that of verification.

Without dwelling on this subject any longer, I think it would not be unreasonable to conclude that the question of the nuclear test-ban has been discussed exhaustively and that any further deliberations of a general nature will not contribute or even improve the work already done. What we need at this juncture is political will to begin concrete negotiations on the subject in the hope that we will have a draft ready to submit to the Assembly at its second special session on disarmament. We strongly urge the members of this Committee to show their good-will to facilitate the establishment of the two ad hoc working groups, on a nuclear test-ban and on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. We have already expressed our support for the formation of these ad hoc working groups in all our earlier interventions in plenary meetings of this Committee.

We very much hope that the collective stand on this subject taken by the Group of 21 will be heeded.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Mr. Shitemi, the representative of Kenya, for his statement. I thank him also for the friendly welcome he addressed to me in my capacity as Chairman of this Committee.

Mr. RUZEK (Czechoslovakia): Comrade Chairman, my intention today is to deal with items 1 and 2 of the agenda and to touch on agenda item 6 as well. In connection with items 1 and 2 I intend to introduce new proposals of the group of socialist countries and ask you to circulate the paper as an official document of the CD.

But let me, Comrade Chairman, first of all express my deep and sincere satisfaction in seeing you, the representative of a neighbouring socialist country, as the Chairman of our Committee during the month of March. I am fully convinced that your Chairmanship will be marked by further important results of our work. I would like also to assure you of the readiness of my delegation to be of as much help as would be needed in connection with the needs of our common work.

My congratulations go also to your predecessor, the distinguished Ambassador of France, François de la Gorce. During his Chairmanship our Committee succeeded in overcoming the difficulties which usually mark the beginning of every session. The positive results of his term of office are clearly reflected in the work of our Committee and its subsidiary bodies.

Allow me, furthermore, to take this opportunity to extend my warmest greetings to our new colleague from Argentina, Ambassador Jiménez Dávila. Some of us have already had the pleasure and honour of working with him in the past and I am sure we may look forward to a continuation of this co-operation.

The effort to reach the goal of general and complete disarmament fully reflects one of the basic aspirations of the foreign policy of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. We have always in the past supported all constructive initiatives and proposals directed towards this end. We also added our voice to all common peace initiatives of the socialist countries, which provided for partial disarmament measures, the realization of which would pave the way towards general and complete disarmament. We have always attached primary importance in this regard to the question of nuclear disarmament in all its aspects. We thoroughly studied all relevant proposals and together with other socialist countries spared no effort aimed at resolving this key disarmament problem.

We therefore note with a feeling of deep satisfaction that to the numerous existing initiatives of socialist countries, including those submitted in the Committee on Disarmament, new, far-reaching proposals have been made at the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Leonid Brezhnev, stressed that "the new measures we are proposing embrace a wide range of issues. All of them pursue a single aim, our common aspiration -- to do everything possible to relieve the peoples of the danger of a nuclear war, to preserve world peace. This, if you like, is an organic continuation and development of our peace programme in reference to the most burning, topical problems of present-day international life".

We regard the initiatives raised by President Brezhnev, as a strong impetus for the activation of present negotiations on disarmament.

(Mr. Ruzek, Czechoslovakia)

In view of the fact that our Committee has not been able until now to engage in substantive negotiations on items 1 and 2 of its agenda, the group of socialist countries has formulated new proposals in a paper with the title:

"Considerations of a group of socialist countries in the Committee on Disarmament concerning negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and also on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests".

With your permission I would like to read the text in full:

"The socialist countries attach very great importance to the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and also to the question of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, in the belief that nuclear weapons constitute the most serious threat to the existence of mankind.

"Everyone is aware of the many initiatives which have consistently been taken by these countries with a view to the effective solution of the above-mentioned problems, both in the Committee on Disarmament and in the United Nations and other international fora. A group of socialist countries has submitted to the Committee on Disarmament documents CD/4 and CD/109 which contain a specific programme of measures aimed at the solution of the nuclear disarmament problem. These proposals still remain in force.

"The course of the deliberations in the Committee on Disarmament provides evidence of increasing support for these initiatives of the socialist countries. Many delegations in the Committee on Disarmament are expressing serious concern at the unceasing nuclear arms race, and at the continuation of the process of perfecting and accumulating nuclear weapons. An ever wider and more weighty appeal is being made in the Committee for the immediate commencement of negotiations on these questions which are of vital importance for the future of mankind. General Assembly resolution 35/152 B and C and also General Assembly resolution 35/145 A and B -- with respect to the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests -- likewise call upon the members of the Committee to discuss these issues as a matter of priority.

"In the opinion of a group of socialist countries, one constructive contribution to the discussion of the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and also of the problem of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests would be the establishment of two working groups on these topics in the Committee on Disarmament. Proposals to set up such groups have been contained in the statements made by the representatives of socialist countries. They were formulated in document CD/141 tabled at the current session by the delegation of the German Democratic Republic on behalf of a group of socialist countries. Similar ideas have also been expressed by the representatives of many other States. And this is precisely what the above-mentioned resolutions of the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly require the Committee to do.

(Mr. Ruzek, Czechoslovakia)

"Unfortunately, because of the unconstructive positions of certain delegations, the Committee is at present unable to solve positively the question of the establishment of working groups. In these circumstances, a group of socialist countries represented in the Committee, displaying flexibility and the desire to start business-like negotiations on the substance of the above-mentioned questions as soon as possible, proposes that:

1. Informal consultations with the participation of all the nuclear Powers should be started forthwith in the Committee on Disarmament, under the guidance of the Chairman of the Committee, with a view to preparing specific negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament;
2. Informal consultations with the participation of all the nuclear Powers should be initiated without delay, under the guidance of the Chairman of the Committee, for the purpose and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests with a view to the conclusion of a treaty on this matter at the earliest possible date;
3. Informal meetings of the Committee should be held at least once a week on the substantive issues of the cessation of the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament, and the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

"In making this proposal to the Committee on Disarmament, the delegation of a group of socialist countries express the hope that it will serve as a basis for constructive negotiations on the above-mentioned priority questions of disarmament which appear as items 1 and 2 in the agenda for the current session of the Committee on Disarmament."

Let me express our firm conviction that the proposals I have just introduced will contribute to our common endeavours in dealing with the problem of nuclear disarmament. We ask the Chair to distribute the introduced paper as an official document.

Permit me now to say a few words about item 6. My delegation attaches great importance to the question of the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. Today, when practically only a year separates us from the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, we believe that our negotiations on the comprehensive programme should lead to realistic and useful results.

As far as the scope of the programme is concerned, it is our view that it should be broad enough to embrace all main directions of negotiations. At the same time it should duly reflect all major issues which have to be resolved. As regards the principles of the programme, the basic one should be that of equality and equal security. We deem it of outstanding importance that the programme should

(Mr. Ruzek, Czechoslovakia)

unite the efforts of States for the resolution of the basic problems of disarmament in an atmosphere of constructive co-operation. Here I am speaking of the same concern that led the Czechoslovak delegation at the thirty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly to initiate the elaboration and adoption of the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament.

During last year's negotiations the Czechoslovak delegation actively participated in the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. We accordingly submitted four working papers dealing with the subjects of "objectives", "general guidelines", "principles" and "forms and machinery". Then, on behalf of a group of socialist countries we submitted document CD/128 entitled "Proposal for the main elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament". My delegation is of the opinion that together with the documents, working papers and views expressed by many other delegations a solid basis has been created for the preparation of the preliminary drafting of the programme.

At our present session the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, under the experienced guidance of Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, has already engaged in substantive negotiations. Some important questions have already been discussed. At the present stage, the group is considering the chapter, "Measures", of the "Outline of a comprehensive programme of disarmament". We welcome the fact that the working group has turned to this important aspect at this early phase of its proceedings. The content of the future programme will undoubtedly have its bearing on other sections of the "Outline". It therefore, in our view, merits our primary attention and thorough examination. We have at our disposal a set of valuable documents, that are of considerable help to our common work. The Final Document of the first special session on disarmament, the recommendations of the Disarmament Commission concerning elements of the CPD and the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade were all adopted by consensus. For this reason we believe that these documents represent a solid and constructive basis for our further work with the aim of the elaboration and adoption of a mutually acceptable and useful document.

As regards the nature of the programme, we do not think that it should take the form of an international convention or treaty. In fact, we are of the opinion that commitments of this form should materialize in the process of the realization of partial disarmament measures that would be included in the comprehensive programme.

Concerning the stages of implementation, we believe that these stages would primarily depend upon measures we are going to incorporate into the programme. At the same time we do not think it advisable that we try to divide the measures concerned into sharp, clear-cut and unrealistically short stages. However, we can agree with the assumption that some indicative, realistic stages of implementation probably could be agreed upon.

These are some of our thoughts regarding the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Ruzek, the representative of Czechoslovakia, for his statement and for the congratulations he addressed to me on the occasion of my assumption of the Chairmanship. The working paper he submitted will be translated into all working languages and circulated as an official document as soon as possible.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Today the Soviet delegation would like to outline its position on the consideration of the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament. We have already pointed out more than once that among the whole set of disarmament problems the Soviet Union specially singles out those relating to nuclear disarmament; the same point was made once more at the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which concluded its work a few days ago.

Without delving into past history and without going beyond the limits of the work of the Committee on Disarmament, I should like to recall that the Soviet Union, together with other socialist countries, is in favour of our multilateral negotiating body occupying itself, as a matter of first priority and without delay, with the issues which relate to curbing the nuclear arms race. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, I should like to make it clear that we are not proposing simply a discussion of these issues but their business-like examination, the conduct of concrete negotiations with the participation of all nuclear-weapon Powers and also of non-nuclear-weapon States. In doing so we understand and emphasize that the problem of nuclear disarmament is a complex one whose solution will require a great deal of time. We have no illusions on this score and we would not wish such illusions to be entertained by others.

In 1979, document CD/4 entitled "Negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed", which is known to us all, was submitted to the Committee. That document naturally retains all its force and has lost none of its urgency. Its sponsors -- the Soviet Union and other socialist countries -- pointed out that progress towards the final goal -- the complete destruction of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons -- could take place by stages on a mutually acceptable and agreed basis. In this connection it was envisaged that the existing balance in the field of nuclear strength should remain undisturbed at all stages, with the levels of nuclear strength being constantly reduced. The proposal in document CD/4 to the effect that the implementation of measures in the field of nuclear disarmament should proceed parallel with the adoption of international political and legal guarantees strengthening the security of all States without exception is also of fundamental significance.

At meetings of the Committee in 1979 and 1980 the Soviet delegation explained and clarified its position on the subject of document CD/4. That document also provides an answer to the question of fissionable materials which has been raised by some delegations. We consider that the question of the prohibition of the

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

production of fissionable materials for military purposes should not be considered in isolation but in conjunction with the whole set of nuclear disarmament problems, in particular that of gradual reduction of the accumulated stockpiles of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. Let me remind you that, in development of this theme, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic also submitted document CD/109.

Our position on various subjects, including that of problems of nuclear disarmament, is also stated in document CD/141, submitted to the Committee at its present session. The document emphasizes the urgent need for the setting up of an appropriate working group as soon as possible. The activities of such a group with the participation of all nuclear-weapon Powers as well as non-nuclear-weapon countries should, we are firmly convinced, facilitate the earliest start of negotiations -- and I say negotiations, let me emphasize it once more -- on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed.

The Soviet delegation has heard with great attention and interest the statements made by representatives of various countries on the first and second items of our agenda. It seems to us that common to all those statements, with rare exceptions, was the absolutely clearly and unambiguously displayed desire to embark at last upon negotiations, upon a business-like examination of the principal aspects of nuclear disarmament within the framework of our Committee.

The grounds and motives underlying this proposal have been convincingly and comprehensively expounded by representatives of both the socialist and the developing countries, as well as by some western States. It therefore seems to us that there is no need to adduce fresh arguments -- although one could, if one wished, advance many -- in favour of the setting up of an appropriate working group. In that connection, I should like to refer to the statement by the Cuban representative on 3 March, in which he reviewed a large number of official documents of the Committee on Disarmament relating to this topic. Among them, mention was made in particular, of document CD/116, referred to by representatives of the "Group of 21". In that connection, we should like to support the statement by the Yugoslav delegation on 3 March suggesting that documents CD/116 and CD/4, as well as other documents, should form the basis of the activities of the working group on nuclear disarmament.

To our great regret, however, we are obliged to note that in the Committee there is no unanimity, no consensus on the question of using the Committee for negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament or, accordingly, on the setting up of an ad hoc working group. The statements by the United Kingdom and United States delegations on that subject have been subjected to what we consider to be just criticism.

The Soviet delegation would also like to support those delegations which entirely disagree with assertions to the effect that the time has not yet come for negotiations on nuclear disarmament, that conditions for this are not yet ripe. For the nuclear arms race itself -- the accumulation of nuclear weapons itself, as has been convincingly demonstrated in the statements of many delegations including that made by the Nigerian Ambassador today -- is fraught with the gravest danger to mankind,

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

to say nothing of the sombre prospect of their use. In our view, which, as we see, is shared by many members of the Committee, it is never too soon to curb the arms race and, first and foremost, the nuclear arms race. On the contrary, this must be done as quickly as possible, while the possibility of exercising control and, consequently, of agreed arms limitation has not yet been completely lost.

In the absence of consensus on the establishment of a working group on nuclear disarmament, many representatives of the "Group of 21" have said that they are in favour of keeping open the possibility of discussing nuclear disarmament issues through the holding of informal meetings or consultations. Without, of course, objecting to this, we should like to stress once more that the obligatory and principal purpose of work of such a kind done by us under the guidance of the Chairman of the Committee should be to prepare the ground for negotiations on the substance of this problem. Otherwise such work would be, to put it mildly, a waste of time, and could degenerate into a fruitless academic debate.

In the statement by my esteemed Indian colleague, supported by other delegations, it was proposed that the basis of discussion at the informal meetings should be the report of a group of experts on a comprehensive study on nuclear weapons. Let me recall that mention was made of chapters V and VI and of the conclusion. We have some reservations on this document as a whole, but we are not opposed to the discussion of a number of topics connected with nuclear disarmament questions. However, it does not seem desirable that we should confine ourselves to this one document. The delegations of the various countries are entitled -- and that, I believe, is what will actually happen -- to make use of all possible sources and studies relating to that subject.

The representative of Brazil, supported by the delegation of Venezuela, suggested that the Secretariat should prepare a list of proposals on nuclear disarmament. While recognizing the usefulness of that idea, we should merely like to point out that in the interests of saving time and funds it might be worth while to look through the United Nations archives for a document of that kind and simply make the necessary additions to it. Something similar was prepared before the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The representative of Czechoslovakia, speaking just before me, submitted for the Committee's examination a paper entitled "Considerations of a group of socialist countries in the Committee on Disarmament concerning negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and also on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests". In associating myself with the statement made by the Ambassador of Czechoslovakia, I wish to stress that this document also reflects the Soviet delegation's position on the questions concerned in the light of the situation which has come about in the Committee.

We hope that the views of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries stated in that document will prove useful for our common work and will be studied with due attention by other delegations.

Mr. VRHUNEC (Yugoslavia): We have examined the situation that has been created in the Committee in connection with the setting up of working groups for the comprehensive test ban and nuclear disarmament and with regard to the opening of negotiations within the framework of the Committee on the complex of nuclear disarmament questions. We believe that the creation of the corresponding working groups is the most effective way to initiate negotiations as soon as possible. In view of the fact that, owing to the refusal of a few countries, it was not possible so far for the Committee to reach a consensus to this effect, we think it is imperative to continue the informal meetings for consideration of the proposals for the establishment of ad hoc working groups on items 1 and 2 of the Committee's agenda, as well as for consideration of the establishment of other subsidiary bodies.

We consider it indispensable most urgently to open a discussion at the informal meetings of the Committee with regard to the report of the Secretary-General containing the comprehensive study on nuclear weapons which was presented at the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly, and particularly chapters V and VI and the conclusions.

In order to have as effective as possible a consideration of the problems under the agenda item, Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, we think it would be useful that the Committee's secretariat prepare as soon as possible the materials compiled with regard to the proposals on nuclear disarmament that were submitted to the Committee from 1979 until the present as well as all other proposals on this subject (including resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly). In our opinion this task should be carried out in two stages. However, the materials having to do with the proposals submitted to the Committee from 1979 until the present should be presented as soon as possible.

We consider that the complex of nuclear disarmament questions, as one of the most important issues of disarmament, should constantly be the subject of consideration in the Committee and we therefore propose that the Committee proceed, as soon as possible, with the consideration of and negotiations on concrete arrangements and solutions for nuclear disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: Distinguished delegates, in accordance with the decision taken by the Committee at its 104th plenary meeting, the distinguished representative of Spain, Ambassador de Laiglesia, has asked for the floor. Thus, he has become the first representative of a State non-member of the Committee to address a plenary meeting of our Committee during this session. I extend to him a warm welcome. May I invite you, Ambassador, to take the floor.

Mr. de LAIGLESIA (Spain) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, allow me first to express my gratitude for your kind words and my pleasure in seeing you discharging the office of Chairman of this Committee and also my appreciation of the opportunity you have given me to speak at this plenary meeting. This is the third time that I have had the honour of addressing this Committee, for Spain attaches the greatest importance to its work. Although hitherto in this forum we have been particularly concerned with chemical weapons, all aspects of its activities deserve our attention.

In the first place, we wish to make it clear that we share the conviction that nuclear disarmament should be the primary concern of the international community, for these weapons are a "sword of Damocles" hanging over the heads of all human beings in this period of history. It is of fundamental importance to check the proliferation of nuclear weapons, both horizontally and in the growth of the arsenals of such weapons held by the five nuclear-weapon Powers.

(Mr. de Laiglesia, Spain)

Along this line of thinking, we followed with great interest the trilateral negotiations directed towards the preparation of a convention to ban all nuclear explosions. We believe that verification is the most complex problem in that connection and we therefore hope that the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events will have favourable repercussions on the work of the Committee on this subject and will facilitate the achievement of positive results.

We are also concerned with the question of radiological weapons and for this reason we welcome the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Working Group which is to examine all aspects connected with such weapons and to prepare proposals that would facilitate the elaboration of a draft treaty designed to check their development. It is our view that with regard to weapons of mass destruction, it is necessary to avoid drafting texts that are too general and that it is also necessary to delimit the sphere of their application. In this connection, in our view, the result of the work of the Conference last autumn on the subject of weapons deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects constitutes an example which should be borne in mind because, if subjects can be divided up and limited protocols drafted, it may be possible to achieve partial progress that will simplify the solution of the problems deriving from such weapons.

As for the negotiations towards the preparation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, we should like to recall that this programme is to be submitted to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament which will be held in the spring of 1932. Thus, there is very little time and it will be necessary to speed up the work if it is hoped to achieve the objective that the Committee has set itself.

I also wish to mention briefly the question of effective safeguards for non-nuclear-weapon States. So far there has been little progress in this field and the Ad Hoc Working Group on this subject reached the conclusion that it was not possible to achieve a common approach. We hope that it will prove possible at this session to resolve this issue so that the next report to the General Assembly may include some conclusions offering hope that, in the not too distant future, draft arrangements will be worked out which will help alleviate the nuclear threat that weighs heavily on non-nuclear-weapon States.

We would again like to express our conviction that pragmatic criteria must prevail and that if it does not prove possible to work out treaties on a high international level, instruments should be prepared in the form deemed viable since that would enable us to make progress towards the entry into force of the effective safeguards that we all wish to see implemented.

In addition to what I have just said, I wish to refer at greater length in this statement to a particular aspect of the problem of chemical weapons since, as I have already said, these constitute the part of the Committee's work to which we have devoted special attention. This is the question of verification within the framework of a system of measures to prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of such weapons. In fact, I spoke about this question in my statement in this Committee on 1 July 1930.

(Mr. de Laiglesia, Spain)

Furthermore, at the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly, we co-sponsored resolution 35/144.C which, under agenda item 34, requested the Secretary-General to carry out an impartial investigation to ascertain the significance of reports on activities prohibited by the General Protocol, signed at Geneva in 1925 which deals with the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare. It is our belief that all measures which may help increase compliance with international instruments on disarmament and related matters deserve all our attention.

Today I should like to mention a point referred to in the interesting report submitted by the Ad Hoc Working Group which was given the task of defining the issues to be dealt with in the negotiation of a convention to prohibit the production of chemical weapons --- the Group that was presided over very efficiently by Ambassador Okawa. This involves the question of confidence-building measures, and especially those which might be adopted prior to the entry into force of a treaty on the subject. Indeed, if it were possible to put before the international community a set of voluntary rules in that sense, it is clear that a very favourable climate would be created for the acceptance by the greater part of the community of an agreement that might subsequently be submitted to it.

When the General Assembly was drawing up the Final Document on its first special session devoted to disarmament, our delegation stressed the importance of unilateral measures in the sphere of the limitation of the arms race. We thus consider that any confidence-building measures that may be adopted as regards restrictions on the development of chemical weapons would have an extremely positive effect and would pave the way for the negotiation of the relevant treaty.

It has been said that the objective of these measures is to restrain the urge to competition provoked by ignorance about the extent of possible threats, and in fact the race which we are unfortunately witnessing at this time in the chemical weapons sector is in large measure the fruit of the profound mistrust which exists about the possibility of attack by one side or the other with such weapons.

All these facts, in our opinion, make it essential for us to dispel this atmosphere and in order to do so it is important that confidence-building measures should be adopted. Since it cannot be anticipated that within a short space of time a treaty including such measures will enter into force, it seems to us useful to propose some measures which States might adopt voluntarily. In this connection we wish to recall once more the proposals of the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany which, although they referred particularly to the problems of verification, could also to a certain extent be regarded as voluntary confidence-building measures.

The close relationship between chemical weapons and the industry which manufactures the whole range of products required by mankind in this productive sector, makes it necessary in studying the matter to take account of the interests of the industry and to seek its direct co-operation.

The Chairman's aide-mémoire, annexed to the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group --- includes among pre-convention measures the declaration of stocks and production facilities and the possibility of invitations to visit CW facilities.

(Mr. de Laiglesia, Spain)

Undoubtedly, if countries which are in a position to do so were to adopt measures of this kind, that would be extremely useful, for a very precise knowledge of the offensive capacity of this type of weapon of mass destruction would reduce the interest in it of countries which, lacking such knowledge, might wish not to be in a position of inferiority in respect of such weapons.

However, we think that these declarations and visits should not be confined to the purely military sector but should also include civilian facilities in view of the close relationship these may have with production for warlike purposes.

We therefore believe that it would be very desirable to promote an exchange of information which, without compromising the right of factories to preserve their industrial secrets, would provide greater information about their potential for the production of chemical weapons. To this end, we suggest that international congresses should be organized with the participation of enterprises in the chemical sector so that they can, so far as they are willing and able, exchange information on the various aspects of the development, production, destruction and conversion of chemical weapons of all classes.

Probably the various participants in "symposia" of this kind would react very differently according to the security requirements of their countries or their own economic interests; nevertheless, in our view, the more information the international community has on this category of weapons, the fewer will be the chances that their manufacture will become widespread, since their purely tactical nature gives them limited value as a deterrent and the difficulties involved in their use make them militarily less useful than other conventional weapons, which is the reason why they have been used relatively little since the first world war.

Another aspect of confidence-building measures on which I wish to comment is that of the precautions taken by countries to defend themselves against possible attacks with chemical weapons. Here again we believe that it would be useful to hold international meetings for exchanges of information about protection against asphyxiating and poisonous gases both as regards the armed forces and as regards the protection of civilian populations. It is clear that everything that tends to reduce the effectiveness of chemical weapons will help to reduce interest in the possession of this type of weapon.

I also wish to point out the very great importance of the joint United States-USSR report of 7 July 1980 on progress in the bilateral negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which was circulated to the Committee in document CD/112. The report reiterates the desirability of setting up a consultative committee to exercise functions connected with the verification of compliance with a future convention.

In view of what was agreed in resolution 35/144 C, which I mentioned earlier, it seems to us that it would be desirable for Member States voluntarily to accept the competence of the United Nations Secretary-General as regards the conduct of investigations to clear up situations of doubt resulting from reports that may circulate on the use, or even the existence, of stocks and on the production of chemical weapons. We believe that everything that may serve to increase the information of States with respect to the offensive capacity, as regards this category of weapons, of other members of the international community would have very favourable repercussions for the acceptance by it of a convention on the total prohibition of everything associated with such weapons.

(Mr. de Laiglesia, Spain)

Confidence-building measures are relatively new in the field of disarmament and arms control, although they pre-date the Final Act of Helsinki, since it may be said that the settlements after the first world war which provided for the demilitarization of the Rhineland had such a character. Nevertheless, their increase in popularity began, precisely at Helsinki, and although they have not developed as much as could be wished, we believe that their future is promising. To this end, we urge that a study should be made of their application in the field of chemical weapons, where we believe that they would be perfectly appropriate, owing to the particular characteristic of these weapons of mass destruction.

We believe in the value of the voluntary character of confidence-building measures that might precede the adoption of a convention on the subject, because the necessarily asymmetrical nature of such measures would imply unilateral decisions not susceptible of strict reciprocity, although logically their adoption by some countries could give rise to similar reactions on the part of others.

Similarly, we think this approach limits the risk of escalation which is the great problem always affecting everything connected with arms control and disarmament. We must also state that the problems relating to chemical weapons are very different from those relating to other conventional weapons and thus the characteristics of possible confidence-building measures in this sector must of necessity differ from those concerned with other aspects of the war potential of States.

Finally, I wish to notify the Committee on Disarmament of my Government's desire to participate not only in plenary meetings of the Committee but also in the other bodies negotiating issues which appear on its agenda, in accordance, naturally, with the possibilities offered by its rules of procedure to non-member countries.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador de Laiglesia for his statement; we will take note of his suggestions and examine them in accordance with the rules of procedure.

Mr. SARAN (India): Permit me, Mr. Chairman, first of all to extend to you, the warm congratulations and best wishes of my delegation on your assumption of the Chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of March, and offer you the full co-operation of our delegation in the discharge of your heavy responsibilities. My delegation would also like to express its deep admiration for His Excellency, Ambassador de la Gorce of France, who so skilfully guided the work of our Committee in the month of February. But for his invaluable contribution, our Committee might not have been able to get down to substantive work at such an early phase of our spring session.

I have taken the floor to associate my delegation fully with the recommendation made by the distinguished Ambassador of Yugoslavia. We continue to believe that an ad hoc working group would offer the best mechanism for the conduct of substantive negotiations on nuclear disarmament. However, until the States which are opposed to this recommendation change their position, we feel that we must get down to a substantive examination of concrete issues in informal meetings of the CD.

(Mr. Saran, India)

I would also like to address myself briefly to the comments made by the distinguished Ambassador of the Soviet Union on the proposal of our delegation that we initiate substantive discussions by concentrating on some of the issues which have been raised in the comprehensive study on nuclear weapons which was prepared by a group of experts. In making this recommendation, we did not imply that our discussions should somehow be fenced in within the four walls of the study. If we have specifically referred to chapters 5 and 6 and the conclusions of the study, it is in order to ensure that our substantive debate may have a certain focus and structure; otherwise, we would merely hold a repetitive and general debate. We have supported the proposals made by the delegations of Brazil and Venezuela; the documentation made available to the Committee could form the basis of our future discussions. And it goes without saying that any delegation may raise issues it considers valuable to the discussion.

Mr. ALTAF (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, I have requested the floor primarily to offer our congratulations to you on your accession to the Chairmanship of the Committee. We are confident that the Committee will benefit from your able guidance of its affairs as much as it did during the Chairmanship of your very distinguished predecessor, the Ambassador of France, to whom we offer our thanks and felicitations.

My delegation agrees with the distinguished Ambassador of Yugoslavia that we should continue to work for the establishment of the two ad hoc working groups on items 1 and 2 of our agenda. We also feel that it may be useful to begin with a study of chapters 5 and 6 of the Secretary-General's report, but there are many other documents and compilations which may be of equal usefulness. My delegation is in agreement with the distinguished Ambassador of the USSR that, in his words, we should not fence ourselves in within the ambit of one single document, and I am glad that the distinguished representative of India has also expressed his agreement with that. There are other documents mentioned by the distinguished Soviet Ambassador, such as the working paper of the Group of 21 in document CD/116, which contain important proposals meriting our renewed consideration. We should also occupy ourselves with the preparation of negotiations on the substantive question of the ad hoc working groups on items 1 and 2. It could be helpful to express our views on the specific tasks of these two proposed working groups. That, we believe, will advance the work entrusted to this Committee, especially in view of the limited time available before we have to report progress in our negotiations to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament.

Mr. de QUEIROZ DUARTE (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, my delegation wishes to put on record that it supports the proposals made by the distinguished representative of Yugoslavia. We believe that the time is more than ripe for this Committee to take decisions that will enable it to organize meaningful, concrete negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. In our view, a discussion of substantive issues in informal meetings of the Committee should start immediately and should focus on chapters 5 and 6 and the conclusions of the Secretary-General's report on the comprehensive study on nuclear weapons as well as

(Mr. de Queiroz Duarte, Brazil)

on proposals presented since the inception of the CD, to be compiled by the Secretariat and on other relevant material presented in the United Nations that could be added to the compilation at a second stage. We realize that there might be other sensible ways of providing substantive material for the informal meetings, but the important point, to our delegation, is that the Committee should succeed in establishing a meaningful dialogue aimed at setting up a working group on item 2, as has been proposed by the Group of 21.

The CHAIRMAN: Distinguished delegates, I had the intention to suggest holding a short informal meeting to discuss some questions. Unfortunately, our time has run out, so that I am obliged to take up these matters at our next informal meeting on Monday, to be able to formalize these questions at our next plenary meeting.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 10 March 1981, at 10.30 a.m. The meeting is closed.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.

CD/PV.113
10 March 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTEENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 10 March 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. G. Herder (German Democratic Republic)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. BENYAMINA

Argentina: Mr. F. JIMENEZ DAVILA
Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD

Australia: Mr. R. STEELE
Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. R. DEYANOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. K. PRAMOV

Burma: U SAW HLAING

Canada: Mr. G. SKINNER

China: Mr. YU Peiwen
Mr. SA Benwang
Mr. YU Mengjia

Cuba: Mrs. V. BOROWDOSKY JACKIEWICH

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. RUZEK
Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. J. JIRUSEK
Mr. J. FRANIK

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN

Ethiopia: Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Mr. P. BUNTIG

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. H. MULLER

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India:

Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. E. SOEPRAPTO
Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. F. QASIM
Mr. KARYONO

Iran:

Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA

Italy:

Mr. V. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO
Mr. A. CIARRAPICO
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. R. ISHII
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya:

Mr. S. SHITEMI
Mr. G. MUNIU

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES

Mr. M.A. CACERES

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG

Mr. L. BAYRAT

Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI

Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. R.H. FEIN

Mr. H. VAGENMAKERS

Mr. N.H. BIEGMAN

Nigeria:

Mr. M.B. BRIMAH

Mr. V.O. AKINSANYA

Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD

Mr. N. AKRAM

Mr. T. ALPAF

Peru:

Mr. F. VALDIVIESO

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA

Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Mr. K. TOIASZEWSKI

Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD

Mr. L. NORBERG

Mr. S. STROMBACH

Mr. G. EKHOLM

Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO
Mr. L.A. NAUMOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMTERHAYES
Mr. J.I. LINK

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. FLOWERREE
Mr. F. DESIMONE
Mr. K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. J.A. MISKEL
Mr. H. WILSON

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT
Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC
Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. N'KONGO DONTONI BWANDA

Secretary to the Committee
and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

NON-MEMBER REPRESENTATIVES

Norway:

Mr. J. HOLST
Mr. O. VAERNO

The CHAIRMAN: Distinguished delegates, I declare open the 113th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament. The Committee continues today its consideration of item 6 of its agenda, "Comprehensive programme of disarmament".

Before giving the floor to the representatives inscribed in the list of speakers, I would like to deal with two subjects which require action by the Committee. As the members are aware, we considered at our informal meeting yesterday the communication received from Austria informing us of questions of particular concern to it on the agenda of the Committee. According to previous practice, the Secretariat has circulated the relevant draft decision, which is contained in Working Paper No. 35. 1/ If there is no objection, I will consider that the draft decision is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: I would like now to turn to another subject. Members of the Committee will recall that, at our 106th plenary meeting, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events introduced the progress report on the Group's eleventh session. In accordance with previous practice, I intend now to submit that progress report, contained in document CD/150, for approval by the Committee. Before I proceed, I would like to ask members if they would like to comment on that report.

Mr. FLOWERREE (United States of America): My intervention is simply to ask, since this is the first time I have seen document CD/150 and I have not had a chance to compare it with the one which was circulated informally earlier, if there are any changes in this document from the one the seismic experts presented earlier and, if there are, would you be so good as to point them out to us. If the report is unchanged, I would have no difficulty in approving it.

The CHAIRMAN: I can confirm that this document has not been changed. It is the same as the one circulated earlier.

Mr. LEDGARD (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to recall that, as a matter of fact, I did introduce this paper two weeks ago.

The CHAIRMAN: If there are no objections, I will consider the progress report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, as contained in document CD/150, adopted by the Committee.

It was so decided.

1/ "In response to the request of Austria [CD/148 and CD/163] and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Austria to participate during 1981 in the meetings of the Ad hoc working groups on chemical weapons and on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons."

Mr. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO (Italy) (translated from French): I should like first, on behalf of my delegation, to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, on your accession to the chairmanship of the Committee for the month of March. I am certain that your human and professional qualities and your long experience in multilateral diplomacy will prove most valuable for the progress of our work.

I also wish to say how much we appreciated the masterly way in which your predecessor, Ambassador François de la Gorce, carried out his duties in February. Under his exemplary guidance, the Committee completed an important stage in its work.

My intention today is to discuss item 6 of our agenda, comprehensive programme of disarmament, in accordance with our agreed programme of work. However, in view of the course taken by our discussions and the interconnections between the questions we are to deal with, I should like also to touch on item 2, Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. I will begin with that subject.

My delegation shares with others an awareness of the importance and urgency attaching to the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. It therefore earnestly hopes that there will be progress in this matter in all the forums concerned, those of a multilateral character, such as this Committee, and those of a bilateral character directly involving the two Powers which possess the largest military arsenals.

Although it is clear that there is not, at this stage, a consensus on the setting up of an ad hoc working group on the subject of nuclear disarmament problems, that does not mean the end of our efforts in that direction: in an area of such importance and complexity, the Committee itself, at the more strictly political level, constitutes a working group. We are positive that the Committee on Disarmament cannot dissociate itself from the search for solutions to one of the fundamental problems of our time and that it may have a part to play, at the appropriate stages, in the nuclear disarmament process. It has already done so in the past, as is evident from the existence of the non-proliferation Treaty, the Treaty concerning the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the partial test-ban treaty. In those cases, two prior conditions were fulfilled: the purpose of the negotiation had been clearly defined and the role of the Committee clearly identified. We have not yet reached that point as regards item 2 of our agenda, a question that everyone agrees is "complex", that is, one which has many different aspects and is closely connected with other matters that go beyond its limits, touching upon the very foundations of the international system as it at present exists.

Even if we are not at the stage of being able realistically to contemplate the establishment of an ad hoc working group, we ought nevertheless to continue to examine this subject of vital importance for all mankind, with all the attention and urgency it deserves. My delegation notes with satisfaction a general feeling in favour of holding informal meetings of the Committee on this subject during this first part of our annual session, as well as on the question of the total prohibition of nuclear tests. In that connection it supports the draft declaration by the Chair which the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany submitted yesterday, at the Committee's informal meeting. We would regard this as not simply a school exercise or purely theoretical, but rather a preliminary effort related to this Committee's essential function, which is still that of negotiating concrete measures.

(Mr. Cordero Di Montezemolo, Italy)

Some delegations have suggested that such discussions should centre on a well-defined focal point. My delegation in general shares this concern for methodology, but it wonders whether the more appropriate starting point for discussions on matters of substance might not still be the relevant paragraphs of the Programme of Action contained in the Final Document. Those paragraphs, which were the subject of a consensus, reflect the various elements and various standpoints in a balanced, carefully-negotiated whole. If we started from there, we should be going in the right direction. So far as agenda item 2 is concerned, the practical difficulty hampering our efforts is the fact that the Programme of Action constitutes a broad framework of a general character, whereas the Committee's purpose, and the task for which it was set up, are to negotiate specific measures of a multilateral nature. To overcome this contradiction, the Committee should try to analyse in detail the various aspects of a question which objectively is "complex". This would mean seeking to identify, one by one, its constituent elements and to define their correlation with other factors determining the disarmament process: my delegation is thinking in particular of the relationship between nuclear disarmament and the security of States, between nuclear disarmament and conventional disarmament, and between measures which could be implemented and the possibilities for their verification.

There is one specific measure that has already been identified and to which we have all attributed the highest priority: the complete prohibition of nuclear tests, which appears as item 1 of our agenda. Other measures could be identified; many valuable contributions have in past years been made towards that end; I would recall, among others, those of the delegations of Canada and Australia.

This brings me back to the points I wanted to make in connection with agenda item 6 entitled, "Comprehensive programme of disarmament". Here again, what we must do is to break down the general subject of nuclear disarmament. I would add that the Committee's informal meetings on nuclear disarmament might also be of value for the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group which is concerned with the comprehensive programme.

My delegation has always taken a special interest in the preparation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. Mr. Speranza, Secretary of State at Italy's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, once again pointed to the basic reasons for this in his speech to this Committee on 3 February 1981.

I wish today to refer to various aspects of a more general kind, leaving consideration of specific problems to later occasions.

I would emphasize, above all, that my delegation hopes it will be possible to complete the preparation of a draft comprehensive programme within the Committee before the General Assembly's second special session devoted to disarmament. Although it is for the General Assembly to say the final word on the comprehensive programme, my delegation would very much regret any suggestion of the Committee's being unable to agree on a draft programme, for that would undermine its credibility. In order to prevent such a possibility arising, we must all show the utmost flexibility.

(Mr. Cordono Di Montezemolo, Italy)

The Ad Hoc Working Group which is under the chairmanship of Mr. Garcia Robles has identified two points on which there appears to be a consensus: (a) the comprehensive programme should consist of a series of phases; (b) there should be a review at the end of each phase. It seems to me important to stress these two elements, since they serve, inter alia, to distinguish the comprehensive programme from the Programme of Action outlined in the Final Document, and from other documents similar in content. For no one wants the comprehensive programme to be merely one more list of disarmament measures. However, we do not believe that this difference can be created artificially by conferring on the comprehensive programme a legally binding character which is inappropriate to it. While it is true that the task for which the Committee was set up is to negotiate agreed texts, it does not necessarily follow that such texts need be conventions or treaties. In fact, the purpose of the programme, as we pointed out in our working paper CD/155, is to establish "an agreed framework for substantive negotiations in the field of disarmament".

Similar observations are called for with regard to the time-frames which, it is proposed, should accompany each phase or stage of application of the programme: this proposal -- although it springs from a concern which we well understand -- seems to us to reflect a legal rather than a political approach. In law, an obligation is virtually pointless without a time-limit for its fulfilment. But the comprehensive programme can hardly take the form of a legal instrument; it is, rather, a political undertaking. In this context, a pre-determined time-table would not of itself make it more effective.

I would point out that both those who support the idea of fixing time-frames and those who are opposed to that idea agree on the fact that the political will of States is the decisive factor. The first group, however, would like this will to be taken out of the sphere of fluctuations in the international situation and be tied from the outset to a time-table covering every step and every phase leading to general and complete disarmament under effective control.

My delegation is convinced that it would be possible to pursue the same aim, that of giving the comprehensive programme real and lasting effect, by undertaking, side by side with the programme, a sustained political effort to eliminate the sources of tension and injustice in the world and to increase the effectiveness of the international machinery provided, both within and outside the United Nations, for the peaceful settlement of disputes and the promotion of the political, civil, social and economic rights of human beings. Herein lies the value of the so-called collateral measures which are at each stage to form an integral part of the comprehensive programme, alongside the measures specifically concerned with arms control and disarmament: their implementation, and the strengthening of international security and confidence which would follow, would contribute far more to safeguarding that "political will" of States from the vagaries of the international situation than would the setting of a detailed time-table.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Italy for his statement and for the congratulations he addressed to me on the occasion of my assumption of the chairmanship.

Mr. SOEPRAPTO (Indonesia): Mr. Chairman, paragraph 11 of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade states that the comprehensive programme for disarmament, recognized as an important element in an international disarmament strategy, "should be elaborated with the utmost urgency". It further states that "the Committee on Disarmament should expedite its work on the elaboration of the programme with a view to its adoption no later than at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, scheduled for 1982". Our Committee has acted accordingly by deciding on 12 February that the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which was established last year, should resume its work, and the Working Group, under the chairmanship of Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, has already engaged in substantive negotiations on the matter.

Now that the working group, the most suitable organ for negotiations, has already started its substantive work, and since my delegation stated the general position of my Government on matters relating to the CPD last year in this Committee, I shall confine myself to the question of the possible form of the instrument elaborating the programme and the question of a time-frame.

With regard to the first question, while the CPD, being a programme, may not take the form of an international instrument of a legally binding character such as a convention or a treaty, it should not, however, be considered as a simple recommendation. It must have a certain degree of binding force which would be higher than that of a mere declaration, although perhaps lower than that of a convention or a treaty. The programme should not be just an expression of intentions by States; it should also clearly set forth commitments by States to implement the programme in good faith.

As to the second question, it is also the view of my delegation that the programme should be conceived within a specific time-frame and, to enable the international community to take stock of the progress of the implementation of the programme, periodic reviews should be foreseen.

Needless to re-emphasize that every proposed measure in the programme should not be considered as an end in itself. It is only one of the steps leading to the ultimate goal of the disarmament process, i.e., general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Even general and complete disarmament under effective international control is not an end in itself either. It is a means to achieve another objective, i.e., a genuine and lasting international peace.

I cannot conclude my brief statement without extending to you, Mr. Chairman, the warmest congratulation of my delegation for your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee for this month. Your task is heavy and difficult but I am confident that you can always count on the co-operation of all the members of the Committee. My delegation is also convinced that the Committee will benefit from your vast experience and that we can continue to move forward in our work to make further progress. I should also like to express the sincere gratitude of my delegation to your predecessor, Ambassador François de la Gorce of France, who presided over our work during the month of February. Thanks to his flexibility and firmness, his patience and efficiency, the Committee was able to deal with procedural matters quickly and to begin negotiations on most of the items on its agenda.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Indonesia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me.

Mr. YU Peiwen (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, before I come to the substantive part of my statement, I wish first to extend you my congratulations for your assumption of the Chair during this month. With your vast experience on the subject of disarmament and your great skill, I believe that under your chairmanship good results and progress will be achieved in the work of the Committee on Disarmament. The Chinese delegation pledges its full co-operation with you. At the same time I wish to take this opportunity to express our sincere gratitude to the Ambassador of France who presided over the meetings of the Committee last month. Like others present here, I admire Ambassador de la Gorce for his diplomatic skill and his devotion to the cause of disarmament. His efforts had a great deal to do with the good beginning we have made in our work this year. I also wish to thank him for his friendship towards all of us and his spirit of co-operation.

Today I would like to state our views on the two agenda items, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" and "Comprehensive programme of disarmament".

Like many others, the Chinese delegation attaches great importance to the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, because it has a direct bearing on the major issue of eliminating the danger of nuclear war and maintaining international peace and security.

The statements made by many representatives have reflected their apprehension and serious concern over the present situation with regard to world nuclear armaments. Having engaged in testing, development and production over a long period of time, each of the two Superpowers has accumulated an enormous number of nuclear weapons. According to the estimates made in the "Comprehensive study on nuclear weapons" presented by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly, these two Superpowers together possess a total of 48,000 nuclear warheads of various kinds which account for 97 per cent of the total number of nuclear warheads in the world, or, in terms of nuclear warhead yield, they have in their hands a total of 19 billion tons or 96 per cent of the world's total nuclear yield. The above figures have made it amply clear that the two Superpowers with the largest nuclear arsenals in the world are posing threats to international peace and the security of all the countries in the world. Only they have the capability to wage a nuclear war.

Moreover, in their contention for nuclear superiority, the two Superpowers are now starting a new round in the nuclear arms race centred on qualitative improvement, which has given cause for added apprehension. Having attained numerical superiority in strategic weapons, that late-coming Superpower is now working feverishly to improve the quality of its nuclear weapons, with particular emphasis being given to the strengthening of its counterforce capabilities so as to achieve across-the-board nuclear superiority. Meanwhile, the other Superpower has also accelerated its pace

(Mr. Yu Peiwen, China)

of nuclear expansion and intensified its efforts to develop new types of strategic weapons. The fierce race between the two Superpowers for nuclear superiority constitutes the key factor which accounts for the lack of substantive progress in disarmament.

Motivated by their desire for the removal of the danger of nuclear war, many small and medium-sized countries have put forward a series of reasonable views and proposals. They call for the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapon systems and cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and drastic reduction of the stockpile of nuclear weapons leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible date. They have called upon the two Superpowers to implement in earnest the provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which affirm the special responsibility in the task of achieving nuclear disarmament to be assumed by countries with the most important nuclear arsenals. They have also proposed that appropriate and reliable verification measures be provided for various stages and aspects of the nuclear disarmament process, so as to ensure the implementation of the agreements reached. These views and proposals deserve our serious attention and close study.

China has consistently stood for nuclear disarmament and resolutely opposes nuclear war. We are ready to work with other countries in our common search for practical measures to halt the nuclear arms race and to attain nuclear disarmament. In our view, when exploring in a concrete manner how to attain our common goal, we should identify approaches effective for the resolution of disarmament problems based on the salient features of world balance, or rather the world imbalance in matters of armaments. As I mentioned earlier, the two Superpowers at present have the largest nuclear arsenals. Added together, their nuclear warheads are at least 50 times the total warheads of the rest of the nuclear countries combined. The overwhelming majority of countries in the world have no nuclear weapons. Under such circumstances, it is impossible to talk about equal security among the countries of the world. Consequently, in order to remove the very real threats to world peace and to assure all the countries of equal security, it is necessary for the countries with the largest nuclear arsenals to take actions in advance of other countries by halting the nuclear arms race, ceasing the testing, production and development of all types of nuclear weapons and drastically reducing their stockpiles of nuclear weapons. To take such steps is their unshirkable responsibility. Here also lies the litmus test as to whether they are willing to reduce the danger of nuclear war by taking concrete actions. It goes without saying that on the question of nuclear disarmament, the other nuclear-weapon countries must bear their share of the responsibility. At a certain stage of the nuclear disarmament process, they should also take actions. But in our view, it is neither practical nor fair to make the same demands on the other nuclear-weapon countries as on the two Superpowers. This can only help the latter countries maintain and increase their immense military superiority and hegemonic threats.

(Mr. Yu Peiwen, China)

The goal of nuclear disarmament should be the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons. Pending the attainment of this lofty goal, partial measures are obviously necessary. Here it should be pointed out that the mere cessation of the testing development and production of nuclear weapons could only curb their quantitative increase and qualitative improvement, but it alone would not remove the danger of a nuclear war, because there would remain the serious threats posed by the enormous nuclear arsenals of the Superpowers. As a result, a number of small and medium-sized countries have called for the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament. This represents a reasonable demand which, in our view, merits our serious attention in the course of our consideration of the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race.

The cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament is a very broad and complex issue which involves many specific questions requiring study and effective actions. We will join the other delegations in an exploration of this complex issue. In view of the existing difference of views on various aspects of this issue, we are in favour of the proposal made by the non-aligned and the neutral countries at this session of the Committee that an ad hoc working group on nuclear disarmament be formed to discuss various stages of nuclear disarmament as envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and other related issues. It remains the sincere hope of this delegation that progress conducive to nuclear disarmament can be made through serious discussions and negotiations.

I would like now to turn briefly to the question of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. The Chinese delegation has always attached great importance to the formulation of the programme. China submitted to the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its first session in May 1979 the "Proposal on the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament" (A/CN.10/5). In July 1980, we again put forward a working paper containing "Proposals on the main principles of a comprehensive programme of disarmament" (CD/CPD/WP.3). We will continue our efforts at this session and we stand ready to co-operate with other delegations.

The United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 35/46 states: "The Committee on Disarmament should expedite its work on the elaboration of the programme with a view to its adoption no later than at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, scheduled for 1982". There is not much time left, and the Committee on Disarmament will have to intensify its work on this item. We earnestly hope that this session of our Committee will succeed in formulating a draft programme acceptable to all countries so as to contribute to the success of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

(Mr. Yu Peiwen, China)

We are of the view that in order to enable the programme to guide the future disarmament process in a positive way, its formulation must constantly take into account the present international realities marked by a world-wide arms race and particularly the Superpowers' intensified arms expansion and war preparations. Both the principles guiding the disarmament process and the priority order of the various disarmament measures should be determined on the basis of international realities. Only thus can future disarmament negotiations be propelled forward in the right direction.

In view of the continuous exacerbation of international tension, the programme should clearly stress that the objective of disarmament is to oppose by effective means all acts of armed aggression and in particular the outbreak of a new world war, and to maintain international peace and security. All the disarmament measures must be evaluated and determined on the basis of this fundamental objective. While pursuing this basic objective we share the view that the practical results of the disarmament process should be conducive to the economic and social development of the various countries concerned; and it is in line with the basic interests and pressing demands of the developing countries to specify that the promotion of the New International Economic Order is also one of the important objectives of the disarmament process.

As a nuclear war poses serious threats to mankind, the importance of effective measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament undoubtedly need to be fully reflected in the programme. At the same time, we should attach the importance they deserve to the questions of reducing conventional armaments and the prohibition and destruction of biological and chemical weapons. In the post-war period, conventional wars have been waged year in and year out in some parts of the world, a fact we must bear in mind when formulating the programme.

We are also of the view that while formulating comprehensive disarmament measures we need also to give serious attention to partial measures, including regional measures. To exclude any form of foreign military presence from the zones of peace or the nuclear-free zones and to do away with all forms of armed aggression and military threats would contribute greatly to international peace and security.

The comprehensive programme of disarmament is to define the orientation and stages of future disarmament activities. It would give impetus to future disarmament work. The programme is not equivalent to a convention or a treaty; nonetheless, it is to be formulated by way of serious negotiations. All the countries should make their efforts for its implementation and realization, and in this sense, all the countries are to make full commitments to the programme. Our work on the programme is very important and it is our hope that good results will be achieved through the joint efforts of all the delegations here.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of China for his statement and the words of welcome he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. VRIHUNEC (Yugoslavia) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, the entire complex of questions relating to disarmament that are on our Committee's agenda have a single fundamental goal, namely, general and complete disarmament under effective international control. In this connection it is our Committee's duty to reach agreement, before the next special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, on a comprehensive programme of disarmament which should make possible the attainment of this goal.

Beginning last year, the Committee has undertaken intensive work on this task and an ad hoc working group with a precise mandate was established for this purpose. Nevertheless, the work has been proceeding fairly slowly and the results achieved have not been such as to give cause for satisfaction. It is clear, however, that progress is being made, even if many questions are still open. It is important to have a constructive basis for the specific negotiations which are to follow. It remains to be seen whether we are prepared to complete the task entrusted to us by the Final Document of the tenth special session.

In my delegation's view, we must all, at this time, make maximum efforts to succeed in completing these negotiations by the next special session and thus to create the basis and the framework for the conduct of the disarmament process, in which everyone will assume his share of responsibility. Since it is in the vital interests of all the peoples in the world to ensure the success of the disarmament negotiations, it goes without saying that each country also has the obligation to play as active a role in this process as it can. This will be possible only if the political will exists to initiate the disarmament process on the basis of this programme and to establish the principle of equitable participation, taking into account the requirements of all countries, regardless of their size, level of development or military power. It must be borne in mind by all countries and, in particular, by those which possess nuclear weapons, that the arms race has direct negative effects on the security of all and on the possibility of economic development. It is also true that no one will escape the consequences of a possible outbreak of nuclear war. Despite the fact that this is the responsibility of all countries, the nuclear-weapon Powers have by far the greatest responsibility for the immediate initiation of the process of disarmament and in particular, nuclear disarmament. It is therefore essential that those countries should participate as actively as possible in the work of our Committee on all the agenda items before it -- something which is not always the case. All this applies also, of course, to the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

On the basis of the decisions taken at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the United Nations Disarmament Commission defined the main elements which now serve as the starting-point for the Committee's negotiations. This means that all the States Members of the United Nations have made their contributions. In view of all the statements that have been made, my delegation considers that the time has now come to prepare the text of the programme so that it might be ready for the next special session.

(Mr. Vrhunec, Yugoslavia)

My delegation's views on this matter have been expressed on various occasions in the United Nations Disarmament Commission and in this Committee. At this time, I would merely like to list some of the main elements on which, in our view, the programme should be based. First, we shall continue to regard as a valid approach the elements of the programme specified in the working paper which was submitted to the United Nations Disarmament Commission by Sri Lanka on behalf of all the non-aligned countries and which is contained in document A/CN.10/6. It is not necessary to point out that Yugoslavia supports this proposal, which reflects the joint positions of the non-aligned countries on this matter.

The comprehensive programme of disarmament must, above all, fully reflect its title. In other words it must, in substance, be a complex, well-planned and action-oriented document covering all the measures and phases necessary to ensure the strict implementation of actions designed to lead gradually to the achievement of the ultimate objective, namely, general and complete disarmament under effective international control. This presupposes a series of elements which we will have to negotiate and determine. The adoption of such a comprehensive programme of action would provide ample proof of the existence of the political will to implement it. Without that, in our view, there will be no question of organized, conscious and lasting international action to halt the arms race. Thus, the programme will be an important means of overcoming existing "realities", which are not adequate and which we would all like to see changed.

A very important aspect of the programme is the urgent need to take specific measures. There is no doubt that nuclear disarmament is a matter of the highest priority. We have all agreed on this, although the other disarmament measures are also, up to a point, priority matters. For each of the priorities established, within the framework of disarmament measures, there should be stages for the application and practical implementation of disarmament. The implementation of disarmament measures by stages should permit a more general review of the implementation process at each stage and the appropriate adjustment of subsequent stages, in conformity with the programme adopted.

Another matter of particular importance is that of establishing the framework for the programme, which should be as flexible as possible and should take account of the actual situation and of the possibilities for the effective implementation of the measures contemplated, so that the agreement reached on the over-all time-table for, and stages in, the implementation of the programme can be carried out without hitch. In so doing, we must be very clear about the wording of the programme because any ambiguity in that respect and any arbitrary interpretation of the application of the measures, both as regards their content and as regards a given time-limit, might lead to misunderstanding and distortion, as has, unfortunately, occurred in the application of some of the provisions of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament.

I would like to stress that particular attention should be given to the legal aspect of the programme. A number of proposals have been submitted on the possible international legal obligations to be embodied in the programme. In this connection, we consider that the programme should contain some essential elements of obligation. First, there is the political will clearly expressed in what has been adopted, and the will to work as actively as possible for its consistent implementation. Secondly, we should establish rules of conduct for the implementation process, with specific responsibilities for each country. There should also be appropriate machinery for monitoring implementation. It will have to be decided during the negotiations whether this will take the form of an

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instrument creating obligations for the international community or whether it will be in a form setting out specific obligations for all countries. In any event, it is very important to define responsibilities, so that they may be unconditionally accepted by all countries and fully assumed in accordance with an appropriate procedure.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that the Committee's responsibility to the international community to establish the comprehensive programme of disarmament is a challenge to all of us and that we should respond in a positive manner, sparing no effort to reach agreement on this programme so that it may be submitted for adoption at the General Assembly's second special session on disarmament.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, may I begin by saying that the Pakistan delegation is happy to see you preside over the Committee on Disarmament during the month of March. We have no doubt that your vast experience and special acumen in the diplomacy of disarmament will guide the work of the CD towards the constructive path of concrete negotiations on important items on our agenda.

With respect to your predecessor, Ambassador de la Gorce of France, I cannot but express deep admiration for the skill and serenity with which he conducted the proceedings of the CD in the difficult opening phase of its 1981 session and in dealing with the organizational and other questions which were resolved so speedily under his guidance. This has established a solid foundation upon which we can endeavour to construct substantive agreements during the current year's negotiations.

My delegation has requested the floor today to express some thoughts on two of the most important items on the CD's agenda, the nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. My intervention on those items is delayed, for which I ask the Committee's indulgence.

Almost five years have elapsed since multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty were interrupted by the agreement of three of the nuclear-weapon Powers to conduct separate talks on the subject. The trilateral negotiations have as yet to produce a nuclear test-ban treaty; indeed, the prospects for an early conclusion of the trilateral negotiations have, if anything, receded since last year. Even more distressing, from the admittedly limited information provided to this Committee about the trilateral negotiations in the progress report submitted last July, is the indication that the treaty which is under formulation will be substantially different in conception and scope from the comprehensive test-ban treaty which the international community has called for year after year. For one thing, the treaty will accept a distinction between nuclear-weapon tests and peaceful nuclear explosions, with all the attendant problems for nuclear non-proliferation and verification of the test ban. From all accounts, even nuclear-weapon tests would not be prohibited for all time but merely placed under a moratorium for a relatively brief period. Furthermore, the expected provisions of the treaty would in several respects entail unequal treatment of the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States and discriminate even among the nuclear-weapon States.

Such an arrangement is not likely to attract the wide adherence which was one of the expected features of the test-ban treaty according to the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Under the circumstances, the most that can be expected of the

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trilateral negotiations is an agreement for a moratorium on nuclear testing by the three negotiating parties. However regrettable this may be, even such a limited agreement would provide some measure of satisfaction since those States which have been responsible for over 90 per cent of nuclear tests would have undertaken to halt these tests, albeit for a limited period of time. If they prove sincere in this undertaking, it could prove possible during this time to evolve a test-ban treaty which is both comprehensive and equitable. We do not think it is a great concession for any of the three negotiating parties to agree to abide by the temporary ban which they have themselves suggested even if at present one or both of the other nuclear-weapon Powers do not find themselves in a position to join this trilateral arrangement.

Such a commitment by the three negotiating parties to the concept of a nuclear test-ban is necessary when one adds up the cost of the delay in the conclusion of a test-ban treaty as a result of the protracted tripartite talks. For one thing, the hundreds of nuclear tests which have been conducted during the past five years have greatly enhanced the sophistication of the nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the major nuclear-weapon Powers. It is as yet not even certain whether the trilateral treaty will effectively prevent the continued qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons possible through laboratory tests and simulation techniques. As a consequence of the delay, the quantity of unsafeguarded fissionable material at the disposal of a number of States has increased manifold, eroding the impact of any test-ban treaty on the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Besides, during this time, nuclear explosions have been conducted by two non-nuclear-weapon States, either for declared "peaceful purposes" or clandestinely, raising further questions about the eventual prospects and effectiveness of a nuclear test-ban treaty.

Despite these difficulties, the Pakistan delegation remains prepared to engage in multilateral negotiations on a nuclear test ban and to make every effort to overcome the difficulties in the way of an equitable and genuine agreement to ban nuclear testing. We do not believe that the continuation or otherwise of the trilateral negotiations is any reason to prevent the CD from making an attempt to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty, since the outcome of those negotiations is not likely to provide a useful basis for a multilateral agreement on the question.

The Pakistan delegation therefore continues to hope that agreement will be reached in the near future for the establishment of an ad hoc working group of the Committee to open negotiations on a nuclear-test-ban treaty. Further delay in initiating such negotiations will increase the complexities surrounding the test ban and may well render the task, which is now admittedly difficult, well nigh impossible to accomplish. The creation of an ad hoc working group of the CD would provide every State member of this Committee with the opportunity to participate in its work. The manner in which each State chooses to do so, and the intensity of its involvement in the negotiations, is something which must be left to the State concerned and cannot be dictated by others as a precondition for their own participation in the negotiations.

Pakistan shares the general view expressed in our Committee and elsewhere, that the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament is the most

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important and most urgent task in the field of disarmament. The Committee on Disarmament has an important contribution to make to the success of this objective. It is, of course, obvious that given the present state of international relations and differences among the nuclear-weapon States, the CD is not in a position actually to negotiate concrete agreements on nuclear disarmament, apart from such measures as the CTB, control over fissionable materials and security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. Nor would my delegation wish in any way to pre-empt or obstruct the bilateral and restricted negotiations on nuclear issues between the two Superpowers. These negotiations, we hope, will be resumed as soon as possible and will be accompanied by measures to resolve outstanding political disputes and sources of tension. We also hope that they will lead to genuine control over the nuclear arms race between the Superpowers and early and substantial reductions in their nuclear arsenals.

However, there are two distinct reasons why we believe that the CD should be enabled at this session to undertake at least exploratory talks on the subject of nuclear disarmament. In the first instance, we believe that such exploratory talks in the Committee could provide very useful clarifications of concepts and issues which could materially assist the conduct of bilateral or restrictive negotiations between the Superpowers and their alliances, especially at this time when one of these Powers is reviewing its policy and the other has advanced a number of proposals pertaining to nuclear disarmament. Secondly, such an examination could help to elaborate a useful framework for nuclear disarmament on the basis of paragraph 50 of the Final Document. It will be necessary in any case to attempt such an elaboration in the context of the comprehensive programme on disarmament which will not be meaningful without greater precision in regard to nuclear disarmament. Such an approach would also contribute to the success of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

In the statements made in the Committee, many interesting ideas have been put forward regarding the purpose of the examination of nuclear issues. In the view of the Pakistan delegation, there are at least four broad issues which need to be addressed in some depth.

The first area of interest concerns the implications of the concepts and doctrines relating to the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. For instance, there has been a most interesting exchange of views between the distinguished representatives of India and the United Kingdom on the concepts of "mutual deterrence" and "strategic equivalence" between the two Superpowers and their respective alliances. The Pakistan delegation shares the view that it is most dangerous to extrapolate the doctrine of deterrence, evolved from the experience of a past era, to the qualitatively new situation created by the development and deployment of nuclear weapons. Nuclear deterrence may or may not have prevented a general conflict during the last three decades, which is but a minute in history. We have yet to disprove the dictum that a weapon, once it is developed and deployed, will be used sooner or later.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

Similarly, there are certain implications of the concept of "strategic parity" or equivalence between the Superpowers which require closer consideration. First, experience indicates -- and the debate about the SALT II agreement is the most recent example -- that it is extremely difficult for even the two major nuclear-weapon Powers to reach agreement on what precisely constitutes such "parity" or "equivalence". The combination of mutual distrust, technical innovation and bureaucratic inertia continues to push the balance of power to ever higher levels. Secondly the search for strategic parity between the Superpowers results in a significant disparity of power between them and the other States of the world. It is reasonable to expect that the latter will, sooner or later, attempt to reduce the growing asymmetry in military capability vis-à-vis the Superpowers through whatever means are available to them. The calculation of a "strategic equivalence" between three or more centres of power will be a difficult if not an impossible task. To place absolute reliance on nuclear deterrence in such circumstances, is to play Russian roulette with the future of mankind.

Another area which requires close examination and further elaboration is the process of nuclear disarmament, which is defined in rather elliptical terms in paragraph 50 of the Final Document. We have agreed in that paragraph that the first step in nuclear disarmament would be to "halt the nuclear arms race". What does this phrase imply? Does it mean that all programmes related to nuclear weapons should be simultaneously halted by all nuclear-weapon Powers? But this would not eliminate the existing disparities which are an important motive for the continued development of nuclear weapons. Would it imply a halt in the current programmes of the major nuclear-weapon Powers for the development and deployment of new nuclear weapons and weapons systems? In this case also, the perceptions about existing or potential disparities and vulnerabilities would have to be taken into account. The second stage of nuclear disarmament, as defined in paragraph 50 of the Final Document, calls for a reduction in the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear-weapon Powers. There are at least two ways in which such reductions could be sought. One way would be to ask the major nuclear-weapon Powers to achieve significant reductions to reduce asymmetries with other nuclear States before the latter join in the process of such reductions. Alternatively, it could be prescribed that each nuclear-weapon Power undertake a proportional reduction by stages of its nuclear weapons arsenal. Similar questions arise with regard to the third and final stage of the process of nuclear disarmament outlined in paragraph 50 of the Final Document entailing a phased and time-bound programme for the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

Some principles and guidelines are available to provide answers to the kinds of questions which I have raised. For instance, the Final Document refers to the primary responsibility of the two major nuclear-weapon Powers in the context of nuclear disarmament. It is evident from their quantitative and qualitative superiority in nuclear armaments that they must assume the lead in promoting the process of nuclear disarmament. Indeed, they have acknowledged this responsibility in undertaking the negotiations on strategic nuclear armaments and, more recently,

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on medium-range nuclear weapons as well. Yet the present level of agreement on these issues is ambiguous at best and is manifested quite often in lack of understanding between the nuclear-weapon Powers, and between them and non-nuclear-weapon States, thus contributing to the climate of mutual distrust and suspicion.

A third and important area which the Committee should address is the relationship between nuclear and conventional weapons. From all accounts, the current assessment of the western alliance about its alleged inferiority in conventional weapons in Europe has led it to place extraordinary reliance on nuclear weapons as a deterrent. This has produced difficulties in promoting nuclear disarmament as well as an agreement on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the members of the Warsaw Treaty contend that there is no imbalance in conventional forces in Europe. The best answer to the problem would be, of course, for the two sides to reach an agreement which could establish a mutual balance at a lower level of conventional armaments. But such an agreement has proved difficult because of different perceptions of the present situation. A more in-depth explanation of these different perceptions about the balance of forces in Europe could produce a fuller understanding of the difficulties which confront the Vienna talks and assist in the evolution of more precise guidelines regarding the relationship between nuclear and conventional disarmament. In this context, further examination of the proposals presented to the Madrid Conference, e.g., extending confidence-building measures, could provide some ways and means of modifying the threat perceptions which are at the root of the hesitation to negotiate measures for nuclear disarmament.

Finally, the question of verification will assume special importance in the context of multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament. At present, reasonably effective measures of verification are available to only two or three advanced States. For instance, the SALT II agreement provides for some novel techniques to ensure compliance, such as non-interference with national means of verification. The question arises as to how such measures for effective verification can be developed at the international level. In this context, the proposals for the International Satellite Monitoring Agency and the seismic monitoring system envisaged assume special importance.

The Pakistan delegation is disappointed that certain members of the Committee on Disarmament are as yet not prepared to accept the establishment of an ad hoc working group on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Because of this situation, my delegation is prepared to accept a more flexible modality for exploratory talks on nuclear disarmament and could go along with the view that these talks be conducted in informal meetings of the Committee, as was done at the Committee's 1979 session. However, this time the discussions on the subject should be more structured and should address in depth some of the specific points I have mentioned. A few meetings of the Committee could also be devoted to the consideration of important parts of the United Nations study on nuclear weapons.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Ahmad, for his statement and for the words of welcome he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): Allow me to begin my statement by offering you our sincere congratulations on your assumption of the Chair during the month of March. We are acquainted with your personal and professional qualities and we know they are a guarantee for the good progress and successful development of the Committee's work. You can fully rely on the modest co-operation of my delegation in everything that may help you to discharge your delicate task as Chairman, in which we predict you will be completely successful.

In my statement today I wish to refer to two of the items on our agenda. In the first place, availing myself of the provision in paragraph 30 of the rules of procedure, I will touch on the subject of a nuclear test ban. I shall then turn to the item which appears on the agenda for today, a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

With regard to the former subject, I wish to begin by expressing my delegation's satisfaction at the fact that the Committee is close to reaching a consensus on the idea of devoting a series of informal meetings to a consideration of substantive aspects related to a nuclear test ban and nuclear disarmament.

It is not my intention to claim a right of authorship, but I think it would be useful to recall that the idea of holding informal meetings on these two subjects originated in a statement I made at the informal meeting held in the afternoon of 19 February last. On that occasion and as a reaction to the announcement made on the morning of that same day and repeated at the afternoon meeting by the representative of the United Kingdom to the effect that his delegation did not support the establishment of a working group on a nuclear-test-ban treaty, I said that in our opinion the Committee could not fail to discharge its responsibility as a negotiating body because there was opposition to the setting up of a working group. I stated that in view of the impossibility of setting up working groups in connection with agenda items 1 and 2, the Committee should consider the advisability of itself undertaking the task of negotiation and that to that end the Committee should allot itself in its programme of work the time necessary for the conduct of substantive negotiations on the two agenda items at informal meetings.

We are gratified to observe that Venezuela's idea inspired the formulation of various specific proposals such as those submitted by India, Brazil, the socialist countries and the Federal Republic of Germany. We trust that the Committee will very soon reach a consensus on this idea.

However, these informal meetings must not become a monologue in which only one sector of the Committee takes part. For them to be really fruitful, it is essential that the largest possible number of countries should participate in them, and especially those possessing nuclear weapons, and that the latter should make their contribution and reply to the questions and arguments which may be put forward on the two items.

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

Along this line of thinking, I should like to take the occasion to formulate some observations on the question of a nuclear test ban, on which we would like to have the reactions of the Powers participating in the tripartite negotiations. These reactions could be given at one of the informal meetings.

As you know, my delegation is among those which maintain that the treaty to be negotiated should have the objective of banning all nuclear tests, of any magnitude, in all environments and for all time. In other words, the ban on testing, on nuclear tests, should be comprehensive and global. In our opinion, a partial ban would make it difficult to achieve the goal of a general and universal acceptance of the treaty which should clearly be aimed at.

This position of ours is based on the fact that any test allegedly or ostensibly carried out for peaceful purposes will always make it possible to obtain information for military purposes. In this connection I would like to quote a paragraph from the book by Alva Myrdal entitled The Game of Disarmament (Pantheon Books, New York, 1976, p.213):

"The truth, to be kept firmly in mind, is that there is no distinction possible between nuclear explosive devices for military or for civilian purposes, one for bombing some place on earth and one for engineering work to mine or excavate it. All nuclear devices are potential bombs, and of a destructive force way beyond conventional explosives. The sole difference that can be claimed is the doubtful one of intent."

To all this should be added that it is precisely at the testing stage that a nuclear explosive device can demonstrate its potential in the military sphere.

We therefore consider that the ban on tests should be absolute and should cover all experimental nuclear explosions.

This does not mean that we are opposed to the peaceful use of nuclear explosions. As far as such use is concerned, our view is that in very special circumstances and under very strict control by an international authority, a State could be authorized to explode a nuclear device when the purpose of the explosion is demonstrably peaceful and if appropriate measures are taken to prevent such an explosion being used to secure benefits or information of a military nature.

On this issue, the tripartite report submitted last year by the nuclear-weapon Powers which are conducting negotiations on a nuclear-test-ban treaty states in its paragraph 10 that these countries have agreed that the treaty will be accompanied by a protocol on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and that this protocol will be an integral part of the treaty.

We understand this to mean that the treaty that is being negotiated is in fact a comprehensive treaty, that it will ban any type of test including those that are ostensibly for peaceful purposes, and that the possibility of conducting, not indeed tests, but peaceful nuclear explosions will be regulated by the protocol. If this interpretation is correct, we are pleased to state that this way of dealing with the matter is satisfactory to us since it corresponds with the Venezuelan position outlined earlier.

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

We would, however, like to receive from the Powers participating in the trilateral negotiations fuller and more comprehensive information about the protocol. The tripartite report, in the same paragraph from which I have just quoted, says that the protocol will take into account the provisions of article V of the non-proliferation Treaty. Can we take it that this means that the protocol will serve as the special international agreement to which article V of the NPT refers and that it will regulate all the issues referred to in this article? If the reply is in the affirmative, has due account been taken of the need to ensure non-discriminatory treatment for the non-nuclear-weapon countries and of the need to keep the promise that such countries will benefit free of charge from the results of research and the development of technology derived from peaceful nuclear explosions?

It would also interest my delegation to know how it is proposed to approach in the protocol the question of procedures and mechanisms designed to ensure that peaceful explosions are in fact peaceful. In this connection, I should like to recall that the Treaty of Tlatelolco contains in article 13 fairly full provisions which could serve as a basis for working out an appropriate system to regulate the use, exclusively for peaceful purposes, of nuclear explosions.

To sum up, we would like to receive from the Powers participating in the trilateral negotiations full and, if possible, detailed information on the proposed protocol relating to peaceful nuclear explosions.

So far my delegation has not expressed its views as regards the comprehensive programme of disarmament the elaboration of which has been entrusted to us by the General Assembly. We should like to take advantage of the fact that the Committee has put this item on its schedule of plenary meetings to make a few comments and to give our views on some of the issues which arise in connection with the comprehensive programme.

In the first place, we wish to state our agreement with, and support of, the recommendations on this subject which the Disarmament Commission formulated in chapter IV of its report submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session (document A/34/42). In its proposals on the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, the Commission has offered a very full preliminary sketch of what the programme should be.

In the second place, we wish to place on record that my delegation attributes particular importance and priority to the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group which is responsible for negotiations on this subject since, as we know, the results are to be submitted for consideration and approval by the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, which is to be held next year. Last year the Group did a great deal of work under the chairmanship of Ambassador Adeniji. This year, with Ambassador García Robles in the chair, it is steadily advancing towards the fulfilment of its mandate.

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

As proposed by the Disarmament Commission, the comprehensive programme should provide the necessary framework for substantive negotiations in the field of disarmament. That is to say that it should serve as a framework and guide for the substantive negotiations on disarmament so as to ensure that they lead to the emergence of a balanced and orderly set-- the largest number possible-- of concrete disarmament measures within the shortest possible time.

My delegation also understands this set of measures must of necessity observe a reciprocal interrelationship and is to be achieved through a gradual but sustained process of negotiation that will guarantee security to all States. The programme should be carried out in such a way that instead of decreasing the security of States, it progressively strengthens that security as its implementation proceeds. That is to say, the programme must contain as one of its intrinsic elements the objective of security through disarmament.

Furthermore, the programme must be designed in such a way that it is not exposed to the uncertainties of the international situation. Its implementation must not be subject to the changes that relations between States frequently undergo and that often lead to the interruption, suspension or deferment of ongoing negotiating processes. To that end, the participating States must agree that once the negotiation of a certain issue, among those provided for under the programme, has begun, they will make all necessary efforts to ensure that external events do not affect the conduct, rhythm or results of such negotiations.

With regard to the nature of the instrument in which the programme should be cast, we would prefer, like the majority of the members of the Committee, that it should be a legally binding instrument. We understand, however, that this will not be accepted by some countries. For that reason we hope that the programme will take the form of a document whose nature is such that it imposes a solemn undertaking that is as binding as possible. One way of achieving this, as Ambassador Adeniji has suggested, might be for the programme to be incorporated in, or preceded by, a declaration which would be adopted during the second special session of the General Assembly. This declaration should contain a clause which embodies an undertaking to conduct in good faith the negotiations provided for in the programme and to contribute to the implementation of all the disarmament measures established therein.

With regard to the measures that should be included in the programme, we note, with other delegations, that the Final Document on the first special session of the General Assembly and the report of the Disarmament Commission contain a list of measures in respect of which there is a consensus. The comprehensive programme should include at least all these measures. As one of our colleagues has said, the programme cannot involve any retreat from what has already been adopted in the Final Document and what also has been accepted by the Disarmament Commission. The same criterion applies to the question of priorities. The priorities set in the programme should be the same as those set out in paragraph 45 of the Final Document without that preventing the conduct of negotiations simultaneously on a number of priority measures or on all of them.

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

In this connection we wish to reiterate our support of the view expressed in paragraph 11 of the report of the Disarmament Commission to the effect that from the very beginning of the implementation of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, special attention should be given to the immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race and the removal of the threat of a nuclear war.

With regard to the time-frame of the programme, it is clear that no one expects a rigid schedule to be established or arbitrary dates to be set for the implementation of the disarmament measures envisaged. On the other hand, we have maintained and we continue to think that any programme, by its very nature, must be related to some period of time. A programme and time are two virtually inseparable concepts. For that reason, we think that the comprehensive disarmament programme must have a time reference even if it is merely indicative of what constitutes the common hope of countries about the period within which they wish to see it completed. On this subject various suggestions have been made: 25 years, the end of the century, etc. Any of them is acceptable. Let us bear in mind that the time factor, even when it is only an indicative element, always plays an important role as a psychological stimulus. The job we have to do on this very subject is itself a demonstration of this. We must complete the elaboration of the draft programme in time for it to be considered by the second special session of the General Assembly. This circumstance puts pressure on us which is beneficial for the completion of our task.

Although we maintain a flexible position as regards the time-frame, we consider it essential that the programme should envisage various phases or stages of execution. The number of phases or stages will have to be determined in relation to the measures, priorities and time-frame, although each stage should be planned in such a way as to ensure an appropriate balance and harmony between the measures it covers. We also consider it essential that each phase should be subject to an evaluation and review process that would make it possible to check the rate of implementation so that the necessary decisions could be taken to speed up the process where delays were detected or to introduce the necessary corrective measures when cases of non-fulfilment were identified. The review process could, as has been suggested, be carried out at special sessions of the General Assembly convened for that purpose. We therefore share the view of the Disarmament Commission that the programme must establish an adequate procedure for its implementation and for the constant monitoring of that implementation, and that for that purpose the United Nations should play a central role.

In conclusion, we wish to place on record our readiness to co-operate with the Working Group responsible for preparing the draft programme, and to promise our support to its Chairman, Ambassador García Robles, in the efforts he is making to ensure that the Group fully discharges the mandate it has been given so that the Committee may submit in due time the comprehensive programme of disarmament the elaboration of which has been entrusted to it.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Venezuela, Ambassador Taylhardat, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me.

Mr. SUMNERHAYES (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, before making a few brief remarks about the comprehensive programme of disarmament, I should like to take this opportunity to congratulate you on your assumption of the chair for the month of March. I am sure that the Committee will be well served by your practised and capable direction. I should also like to pay tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador de la Gorce, who gave us such a good start along the road this year. I should like to offer him my delegation's sincere thanks for his skilful and impartial chairmanship.

I shall now turn to item 6 of our agenda, which is the subject of our discussions in plenary this week, the comprehensive programme on disarmament. As I mentioned in my opening statement of the session, it is not my intention to spend a great deal of time in discussing in plenary those items which are the subject of negotiation in the working groups and in fact my delegation has already made a contribution to the discussions of detail in our CPD Working Group. I nevertheless take the opportunity of our Plenary meeting to set out my delegation's general approach to this subject.

We are all aware that the drawing up of a CPD was a task entrusted to this Committee by the General Assembly at its first special session on disarmament in 1978. We are requested to submit our final version to the second special session in just over a year's time. Given this relatively short time-table, my delegation welcomes the brisk and business-like approach taken by Ambassador García Robles in the CPD Working Group. We think a completed comprehensive programme would be a useful contribution from this Committee to the second special session. It will act as a spur to progress in arms control negotiations at all levels and in all spheres, by setting out a clear pattern for us to follow.

It is not, however, in our view feasible for the programme to be legally binding, as has been suggested in the past by some delegations. Nor can we see how States can expect us to predict, at this stage, the time it will take to complete such a far-reaching and complicated programme. I have said in the paper I submitted on this point in the Working Group that there is no purpose in trying to set unrealistic and artificial deadlines. By this, of course, I mean that the setting of any specific deadline is unrealistic and artificial. The requirements and complexities of the arms control negotiations which we are listing in our programme are such that we cannot predict at this time how soon we could complete even some of the tasks we have already begun, let alone the measures for which no preparations have as yet been made. Nevertheless, it will, I feel sure, be possible to reach agreement on the drawing up of a series of interrelated phases or stages in which to organize the fulfilment of the tasks already identified by the United Nations General Assembly at its first special session on disarmament and by the Disarmament Commission.

The programme will help us to see the often difficult path ahead of us and to raise our eyes to our ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. It will also demonstrate the sincere political commitment of the world community to the pursuit of serious and verifiable measures of arms control. We should not belittle

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

the importance of such a demonstration at a time when international confidence needs to be restored. For this reason my delegation will play an active and constructive part in the negotiations in the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. We hope that the programme which the Committee produces will be a practical and flexible guide, so that it will not fall by the wayside as earlier exercises of this nature have done. We should aim to prepare a programme which will be of lasting value to future negotiators, until our final objective is achieved.

Before concluding, I should like just to add that I listened with much interest to the arguments put forward in the statement of the distinguished Ambassador of Italy earlier on at this morning's meeting. He explained much better than I had done, the vital connection between the CPD and wider collateral measures designed to establish the international climate in which a CPD could succeed.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Summerhayes, for his statement and for the kind words of welcome addressed to the Chair.

Distinguished representatives, in accordance with the decision taken by the Committee at its 104th plenary meeting, I take pleasure in calling on the distinguished representative of Norway, H.E. the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Johan Jorgen Holst. Mr. Holst was appointed Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1979. In the period between 1976 and 1979 he held the position of Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Defence. Until 1976 he was Director of Research at the Norwegian Institute of International Relations. Mr. Holst is one of Norway's most prominent experts on disarmament.

Mr. HOLST (Norway): Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure and privilege to be the first Norwegian representative to address the Committee on Disarmament in our new role as an active observer in this important negotiating forum. We are pleased that agreed procedures enable interested non-members to participate in the work of the Committee on Disarmament. Small nations like Norway are hampered by limited resources. We nevertheless have an important stake in the negotiating process here in Geneva, and shall attempt in our role as an observer State to make a useful contribution to the work of the Committee. I sincerely hope that this will be but a beginning and that Norway will in due course become a full member of the Committee on Disarmament.

Allow me also, Mr. Chairman, to pay tribute to you, the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic, in the responsible post of Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of March, and I want to thank you most sincerely for the kind and warm words of welcome which you addressed to me concerning my personal qualifications. I hope that upon the completion of my remarks, you will not be accused of misleading advertising.

There are two issues of special concern on the CD agenda to which I want to address myself in some detail: a complete nuclear test ban, and a chemical weapons convention.

These agenda items, in addition to that of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, have been given highest priority by the General Assembly for the period leading up to the second special session on disarmament next year.

(Mr. Holst, (Norway))

Since a comprehensive programme on disarmament is on our agenda this morning, I want to offer a few remarks and observations concerning the purposes and contents of such a programme.

It is generally recognized, I believe, that disarmament is of central importance to the future of international society and that it will not be accomplished in the immediate future. Progress has to come in concrete and limited fields establishing specific ceilings and constraints with respect to particular weapons or military activities. In actual fact the accomplishments during the last two decades have not been unimpressive, when compared for example to what was done during the between-the-war years. I make this point not because progress has been satisfactory. Far from it. But it is important to maintain public credibility -- belief in the proposition that disarmament and arms control constitute realistic and practical objectives, and not just rhetorical reference points in diplomatic discourse.

While we must focus negotiating efforts inside and outside this Committee on specific and limited issues, it is at the same time important to create a framework for assessing priorities, linkages and progression. This is important from the point of view of preserving coherence for the total negotiating effort. Even more important is the political task of preserving and projecting a vision of the ultimate goal and the roads to be travelled to reach it, and obtaining commitments on behalf of the major Powers to pursue the goals and travel the roads.

The arms race in its many aspects and dimensions amounts to an enormous misallocation of resources in a world replete with poverty and inequity. It contains dangers also of miscalculation, accelerated competition and accident. We must introduce greater certainty and predictability into a dangerously competitive situation. This will necessitate greater openness with respect to military programmes and budgetary allocations. Secrecy has become to a large extent an anachronism in the era of satellite photography and observation. But satellites can only register the results of budgetary decisions made several years ago. Budgetary secrecy is dangerous because it breeds uncertainty, stimulates anticipatory reactions and reduces predictability.

A comprehensive programme of disarmament must include confidence-building measures, commitments to specific reductions and abstention from specific activities, agreed procedures of implementation, verification and appropriate security arrangements

The threat from nuclear weapons constitutes the primary challenge. It has to receive priority attention in negotiations on arms control and disarmament.

Let me offer a few remarks on some of the elements of the comprehensive programme to which my Government attaches particular importance.

The nuclear-weapon States carry not only the responsibility but a true obligation to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their strategies and arsenals. The time has come to break the spiral of upward trends and re-establish confidence in the will and ability of man to break the nuclear bondage.

(Mr. Holst, Norway)

Experience suggests that the convertibility of nuclear-weapon power into politically useful currency is very limited indeed. The nuclear-weapon States must refrain from attempting to increase their convertibility and from incorporating nuclear threats into their diplomatic conduct. Experience suggests, furthermore, that any advantage which may be attained in the nuclear weapons competition is at best of incremental utility and always short-lived. It is incumbent upon the nuclear-weapon States to arrive at agreements and arrangements between them which can dampen the incentives and propensities to strive for unilateral advantage.

Disarmament efforts, in my view, should be undertaken also with the aim of contributing to the establishment of the new international economic order through the reallocation of scarce human and material resources from military purposes to social and economic development, particularly for the benefit of the developing nations.

A complete test ban in my view is a cardinal measure for halting the nuclear arms race. A comprehensive test-ban agreement would constitute a non-discriminatory instrument of essential relevance to the promotion of non-proliferation. By concluding such a treaty, the nuclear-weapon States would take a significant step in the direction of meeting their obligations under article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty.

Progress towards a CTB agreement has been all too slow, but I want to join those who welcome the joint progress report which was submitted in Geneva on 30 July 1980 by the participants in the tripartite negotiations.

That report, of course, is no substitute for an agreement. Testing continues; during the 1970s, more than 400 nuclear explosions were reported.

The technical issues are complex, especially those which relate to verification. However, the benefits of an agreement and the risks involved in violating such an agreement should in my view now outweigh the technical obstacles to an agreement.

An adequate verification system is a necessary component in a total test-ban regime, both in order to ensure compliance and to build confidence. It is precisely in that area, concerning the question of an adequate verification system, that my country is making its contribution through the expertise and instrumentation provided by the Norwegian seismic array (NORSAR).

A major part of such a verification system will be an effective international exchange of seismic data. In recent years most important progress has been made towards the establishment of a system for international seismic data exchange by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. This Group was originally established by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in July 1976 following a Swedish initiative, and later maintained by the Committee on Disarmament. Norwegian scientists have participated actively in the work of the Ad Hoc Group which, in its reports CCD/558 and CD/43, recommended the establishment of a global seismological system in order to facilitate verification of a CTB. As the scientific secretary of the Ad Hoc Group, a Norwegian scientist has been responsible for co-ordinating the technical activities of the Group. Another Norwegian expert is currently heading one of five study groups set up by the Ad Hoc Group with special responsibility for co-ordination of the groups' efforts to achieve a flexible and efficient international exchange of seismic waveform data.

(Mr. Holst, Norway)

The seismological observatory NORSAR, which comprises more than 50 seismometers distributed over the south-eastern part of Norway, has for more than 10 years been recording signals from earthquakes and underground nuclear explosions. Experts from many countries have participated in the research activities at NORSAR. These have resulted in improved methods for distinguishing the signals of explosions from those of earthquakes. This work has contributed to the technical feasibility of verifying a comprehensive test-ban agreement. In my view Norway is in a position to make significant contributions to the control system associated with such a treaty, by making NORSAR data available for a global seismological system, and by assisting in the scientific evaluation of the recorded data in order to verify adherence to the treaty.

In his address to the United Nations General Assembly's first special session on disarmament in 1978, the Norwegian Foreign Minister stated Norway's willingness to make NORSAR available as one of the stations in a global seismic verification system to monitor adherence to a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban agreement. NORSAR's detection capability for several important areas of the world is superior to that of any other of the seismic stations listed in document CCD/558.

During the past 10 years, Norwegian scientists have conducted extensive studies and completed large-scale research projects relevant to the problem of the detection, location and identification of underground nuclear explosions. Results from the most recent research have been presented to the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on Seismic Events for inclusion in the Group's report.

Under the Ad Hoc Group's current mandate the following technical contributions have been presented by Norwegian experts:

- (1) Magnitude estimates of earthquakes and underground explosions. This study was undertaken to obtain improved magnitude estimates at stations close to a given seismic event. It is recommended that the currently used magnitude-correction factors should be revised in order to obtain uniform determination of magnitude for earthquakes and explosions.
- (2) Identification of seismic phases from regional events. This study is based on data from an experimental small array which has been in operation at NORSAR since 1979. It is shown that seismic phases can be identified with high reliability from such an array, by use of specially developed signal processing techniques.
- (3) Location procedures for regional seismic events. This study describes a location procedure for a small array that can provide location estimates for regional seismic events with an error of less than 30 km. Such location data, although preliminary in character, would be most useful for event definition when reported to the international data centres of a global surveillance network.
- (4) Options for high-speed exchange of seismic waveform data. This study aims at evaluating the possibilities of using modern data communication technology to achieve fast and reliable exchange of seismic waveform data in digital form. The study recommends that practical experiments be carried out in this connection. Norway is willing to co-ordinate such experiments.

I understand that in its efforts to design a global surveillance system most of the work of the Ad Hoc Group has been based on currently available technology. In the coming years we hope to participate actively in upgrading such a global system to include the most advanced communications and computer systems available.

(Mr. Holst, Norway)

Let me reiterate that we will make every effort, politically as well as through our technical expertise and instruments, to facilitate agreement on an international verification system for a treaty banning all nuclear tests.

Let me turn to a few other measures relating to the challenge from nuclear weapons.

Top priority must be given to preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. If we do not succeed in dissuading the emergence of new nuclear-weapon States, we may face the risk of nuclear anarchy. It is fundamentally in the interest of all States to prevent a further spread of nuclear weapons. But all States face security problems. In order to refrain from exercising the nuclear option they have to be given reasonable assurances that States which figure in their security calculus will exhibit similar restraint. The NPT contributes to such reassurance, as would nuclear-weapon-free zones in the proper circumstances and configurations. But perceptions of the utility of a nuclear option will be influenced very largely by the policies pursued by the nuclear-weapon States and the role which nuclear weapons play in their conduct and postures.

Linkages at this level were clearly demonstrated when the second Review Conference of the Parties to the non-proliferation Treaty ended in Geneva last September without reaching agreement on a final declaration. Norway regrets this failure, especially since in fact general agreement was attained in many significant areas of concern.

The Conference, however, did accomplish what it set out to do, namely, review the operation of the Treaty during the last five years. Virtually every delegation maintained that this important arms control Treaty, designed to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, represents a unique accomplishment in the arms control field, and that it continues to serve the security interests of every party to the Treaty.

The basic disagreements during the Review Conference related to the ability and determination of the nuclear-weapon States to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in the process of international relations by negotiating real reductions in their arsenals. A large number of States felt that the nuclear-weapon States had not fulfilled their obligations under the non-proliferation Treaty to pursue negotiations aimed at nuclear reductions with sufficient determination and vigour.

In this connection I want to emphasize the importance of a vigorous continuation of the SALT process aiming at agreements which will result in substantial reduction in the arsenals and deployments of strategic nuclear arms. The ground has been prepared for such breakthroughs and the two major nuclear-weapon Powers now have the responsibility for reaching beyond the incremental approaches of the past. Norway attaches particular importance to a rapid and determined reopening of the negotiations with the aim of averting a new arms race on the continent of Europe with competitive deployments of theatre nuclear forces. An increased nuclear emphasis in the management of the security order in Europe is in my view largely incompatible with the consolidation of a non-proliferation regime in the global context.

My Government would like also to see the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes halted altogether.

(Mr. Holst, Norway)

A ban on the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes would place nuclear-weapon States on a more equal basis with non-nuclear-weapon States than has been the case till now. The nuclear-weapon States would then have to accept much the same IAEA safeguards as are required of non-nuclear-weapon States, thereby eliminating one element of apparent discrimination between the two categories of States.

The question of assuring the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States has so far not received a satisfactory solution. Norway accepts the arguments of those States which hold that Security Council resolution 255 of 19 June 1968 does not provide sufficient guarantees to non-aligned States.

Those States that are not parties to alliance security systems involving nuclear security guarantees and which have been asked to renounce their option to acquire nuclear weapons have a legitimate claim to guarantees against being attacked or threatened by attack with nuclear weapons.

Therefore the nuclear-weapon States bear a special responsibility for finding a solution to this problem, which indeed is of crucial significance to the entire non-proliferation regime. The recipients of assurances on their part should be prepared to consider constructively alternative options for promoting an internationally acceptable non-nuclear-weapons regime.

Norway considers that on the subject of negative security assurances some significant progress has been achieved by the declarations on the subject by the nuclear-weapon States at the United Nations General Assembly's first special session on disarmament held in 1978. They could be further strengthened and formalized.

Let me turn now to the problem of a chemical weapons convention. Progress is urgently needed in this matter. The potential for chemical warfare is spreading. We have seen reports that such weapons may have been used in recent conflicts. It is important to build obstacles against a broader acceptability of the use of such weapons. The most useful instrument in this connection would be a chemical weapons convention. The reports tabled by the United States and the Soviet Union on their bilateral negotiations in 1979 and 1980 (documents CD/48 and CD/112) provide a constructive basis for further efforts.

Inspiration may be drawn from last year's Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention banning the development, manufacture and storage of bacteriological (biological) weapons and their destruction. This Conference was chaired by Norway. In my view it is encouraging to note that by the time of the Review Conference, 81 States had ratified the Convention, six new States had acceded to it and 37 other States had signed the Convention but still not completed the process of ratification. In the final consensus declaration, the States Parties to the Convention reaffirmed their strong determination to exclude completely the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins as weapons.

A similar convention concerning chemical weapons is of very high urgency at the present time. Hopefully, the Ad Hoc Working Group set up on that subject by the Committee on Disarmament will be able to present positive results to that end in the near future. My Government is in strong support of such endeavours, and hopes to contribute constructively to the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group.

(Mr. Holst, Norway)

We recognize the paramount importance of the issue of verification. In spite of the technical complexities, the task must be one of designing around the obstacles, and also of defining the commitments in ways which are compatible with technical solutions to the problem of verification of compliance. Political will is needed in order to establish the proper designs. It is necessary also in order to produce a balanced assessment of the risks of cheating, with the dangers of an uncontrolled situation for the future of international relations.

The first objective must be the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stocks. We do recognize, however, that an effective abolition of chemical weapons and chemical warfare will require in addition the prohibition of activities, facilities, organization and planning intended for the use of chemical weapons. A convention must take this matter into account. We are inclined, therefore, to favour a comprehensive approach.

In this connection we consider the definitions of "chemical warfare capability" as presented by Sweden and outlined in documents CD/97 and CD/142 a useful conceptualization of the issues.

A comprehensive solution is important and urgent. Binary components may be more generally available in future, thus drastically reducing the lead-times involved in the acquisition of chemical warfare agents. The concept does, however, raise some problems of definition regarding "preparation for warfare" on the one hand and "protection against such warfare" on the other.

Let me mention that in April 1980 it was announced that Norway will not allow the stationing or storage of chemical weapons on its territory. This policy parallels Norway's policy banning the stationing and storage of nuclear weapons on its territory.

We are now approaching the General Assembly's second special session on disarmament. The outcome of the next session will in great measure depend on the extent to which by that time effective steps have been taken to implement the Programme of Action adopted at the first special session.

An important factor in this connection is the comprehensive programme of disarmament which is the subject matter of one of the four working groups of this committee. We are confident that in this area as well as in other areas of relevance for the success of the next special session this Committee will take those initiatives which are most urgent with respect to the follow-up of the Programme of Action.

In addition to the great number of highly important matters which need to be dealt with at the second special session, my Government wishes attention to be paid to a proposal which we put forward at the first special session and which was in part reflected in the Final Document (paragraph 125 (q)). This concerns the proposal that countries adopt procedures for assessing the impact of major weapons procurements and military programmes on arms control and disarmament. The idea of restricting the arms race in its genesis was reflected to some extent in the Final Document of the first special session by a recommendation that States assess the possible implications of their military research and development for existing agreements.

(Mr. Holst, Norway)

Norway has drawn attention to a general management problem and does not want to suggest the imposition of particular solutions. The approach must be the flexible one of aligning commitments with the decision procedures of the States involved. The goal of building arms control considerations and their explicit evaluation into national decisions on arms procurement is, we believe, an important one. Conversely, arms control and disarmament proposals should be assessed through a similar process in order to provide the basis for a coherent over-all policy on national security.

Indeed, the perspective should be broadened beyond that perspective as well. No State can assess such matters only in terms of national interest. We have to develop a concept of and commitment to international security. In this context my Government considers the work of the Committee on Disarmament of paramount importance.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, in extending my thanks to you for granting me this opportunity to address the Committee, I want to offer my best wishes for a successful outcome of the deliberations in the Committee on Disarmament in the months to come.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Norway, Mr. Holst, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, for his statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. I am convinced that the members of the Committee on Disarmament have listened with great interest to the explanations of his country's position on certain disarmament items which are now being considered by this body.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Comrade Chairman, I have a question to ask. A week ago -- last Tuesday, that is -- we handed the Secretariat a document with the request that it should be circulated. I should like to know why the process of circulating documents takes so long. Furthermore, last Thursday -- five days ago -- a document was submitted on behalf of a group of socialist countries which we unfortunately have not received. In the two cases, both Russian and English texts of the documents were handed to the Secretariat.

The CHAIRMAN: I have taken note of the request of Ambassador Issraelyan and will check this with the Secretariat. I will do my best to ensure the circulation of these documents as soon as possible.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 12 March 1981, at 10.30 a.m. The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.

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