



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1998/1173
15 December 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 15 DECEMBER 1998 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to convey the attached communication from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations, dated 14 December 1998, transmitting a letter from the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, His Excellency Mr. Tariq Aziz, on the activities of the Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Iraq from 18 November to 12 December 1998.

I should be grateful if you would bring this letter, with its enclosures, to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN



Annex

[Original: Arabic]

Letter dated 14 December 1998 from the Permanent Representative of
Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 14 December 1998 from Mr. Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, enclosing a full report on the activities undertaken in Iraq since 18 November 1998 by the Special Commission and International Atomic Energy Agency teams, and Iraq's comments thereon.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Enclosure

[Original: Arabic]

Letter dated 14 December 1998 from the Deputy Prime Minister
of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General

In view of the fact that the Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency will shortly submit to you reports on their activities during the period subsequent to our decision of 14 November 1998, I am pleased to enclose a full report on the activities undertaken in Iraq from 18 November to 13 December 1998 by the Special Commission and International Atomic Energy Agency teams, and Iraq's comments thereon.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) - Tariq AZIZ
Deputy Prime Minister

Baghdad, 14 December 1998

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**UNSCOM and the IAEA Activities
from 18 November to 12 December 1998**

1. Monitoring Activities

- The Special Commission resumed its activities on 18 November 1998 with noticeable intensity, through the monitoring groups specialized in missiles, chemical, biological, imports, air surveillance areas and cameras maintenance group as well as the nuclear group of the IAEA.
- UNSCOM and the IAEA activities were focused first on examining the system of cameras, sensors and communications. All of these equipment were intact and no damage was inflicted on them.
- The National Monitoring Directorate (NMD) informed the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Center (BMVC) of all the changes happened during the absence of the inspectors from Iraq, including the movement or modification of dual-use equipment and materials or tests which are subject to monitoring. UNSCOM made sure of the transparency and accuracy of the Iraqi declarations and the good-will of the Iraqi side, which was unfortunately met, sometimes, with trivial and provocative questions. Annex-A and Annex-B show these activities.

2. Inspection Teams Activities

This period is characterized by dispatching inspection teams to conduct interviews and discussions, inspect the sites in a strict and doubts-casting manner. The teams were able to interview all the individuals required and to reach all the sites they wished to inspect, as follows:

A. Chemical Activity

UNSCOM-257 inspection team was dispatched to Iraq from 22-28 November 1998 without sending an advance notification to the Iraqi side. The team composed of five inspectors and was headed by Kais Walterik (Netherlands). The other four inspectors were Americans. They selectively visited 11 sites, using FTIR to evaluate the monitoring system of the sites which are subject to chemical monitoring. The measurements did not detect any violation at those sites.

B. Biological Activity

In this area, the activity was very intensive during this period. The UNSCOM sent four inspection teams in overlapping times:

1. UNSCOM-253 from 1-6/12/1998.
2. UNSCOM-261 from 3-10/12/1998.
3. UNSCOM-260 from 6-10/12/1998.
4. UNSCOM-256 from 10-18/12/1998.

The first team UNSCOM-253 conducted lengthy interviews and discussions on R&D in the past biological programme.

The second team UNSCOM-261 visited 8 sites which are subject to monitoring in order to verify its daily activities. The team did not find any indication of proscribed activity or what contravened Iraq's declarations.

The third team UNSCOM-260 conducted interviews and discussions on the growth media imported for the past biological programme. Iraq has fully cooperated with the team by making available all the relevant individuals and answering all the questions and inquiries raised during the discussions although all the questions had been addressed previously by UNSCOM and answered by the Iraqi side. It was surprising that the team mentioned that it was not certain that the growth media destroyed by UNSCOM in 1992 truly represented the remaining growth media. If the case was as such, why UNSCOM destroyed those growth media.

The task of the fourth team UNSCOM-256 was focused on the growth media (yeast essence) imported by Samara Drugs Factory to use them in the manufacturing of medicine. UNSCOM claimed that this material was imported for the purposes of the past biological programme, an allegation which was refuted during the TEM held in Vienna in March 1998. On 11 December 1998, the chief inspector entrusted with this task stated that he could make sure that what Iraq said during the TEM was correct, but the team wanted to make sure of the consumption of this material in Samara Drugs Factory (although Iraq has already provided all the required documents relating to this subject!).

c. Missile Activity

- The Special Commission dispatched the inspection team (UNSCOM - 229) from 3 December to 20 December 1998.

The team used advanced and very specialized eavesdropping equipment, which the Special Commission claims that it wanted to make use of in tracing Al-Sumood Missile, whose range is less than (150) Km, during free flight tests. In fact, the equipment used by the team constitutes a serious violation of the security of communications used by Iraq, since there is no convincing technical justification for using these equipment especially that the monitoring teams follow up the research, production, assembling and test activities concerning the said missile. In addition to that, the monitoring teams attend the free tests and take the geographical coordinate readings by (GPS) for both launching and falling down points, an act which ensures verification that the missile will not exceed the range limited to it under the monitoring plan.

So, there is no technical or professional reason for dispatching such a team, particularly in this period.

- From 1-13 December 1998, the Special Commission dispatched the inspection team (MG-19A) which consisted of (8) inspectors with a view to verifying the missiles which are subject to monitoring (Volga, Ababil/50 and Lona missiles) and making sure that they have not been modified to ranges more than (150) Km, through checking the tags fixed to missiles chosen randomly by the Special Commission in different areas of Iraq. Iraq has cooperated with the aforesaid team so as to facilitate its task.

At the end of the team's task, on 12 December 1998, the chief inspector pointed out that the team had fulfilled its task successfully and that all the missiles required by UNSCOM had been verified and they were in conformity with Iraq's declarations.

D. Nuclear Activity

The IAEA dispatched a delegation headed by the Chief of the Action Team at the agency from 9-13 December 1998. The delegation

discussed with the Iraqi side issues most of which had been already discussed and mentioned in the IAEA reports of July and October, 1998. These issues concern:

- Documents the IAEA claims that they are in the possession of the Iraqi side. In fact these documents are non-existent, and Iraq had already confirmed this fact and repeatedly told the IAEA about it.
- The accounting for uranium metal production and making sure of the accounts of its exact production. This issue has been conclusively settled in these discussions.
- Several issues concerning monitoring have been discussed as well.

3. Concealment Allegations.

A large inspection team (UNSCOM --258) has been dispatched from 7-13 December 1998, without advance notification pursuant to the joint working rules which stipulate that the Iraqi side should be notified of the arrival of the inspection teams (48) hours before their arrival. This team consisted of (30) inspectors headed by Roger Hill (Australia), twenty of the inspectors, the main members in the team, were American, British and Australian.

The team carried out its work in an intrusive and provocative manner showing no respect for the procedures agreed upon between Iraq and UNSCOM, especially those relating to the inspection of sensitive sites. It was obvious that the team has sought, since the beginning, to create problems by applying provocative methods in its work. For example, in the preparatory meeting on 1 December 1998, the day the team arrived, the chief inspector said that he did not recognize the modalities of the inspection of sensitive sites agreed upon 22 June 1996 with the former Executive Chairman, and that he only worked under "Butler's instructions". In addition, during the inspections, particularly after inspecting the Special Security Service's Guest House on 10 December 1998, he had publicly stated that he sought to look into the Service's documents which are closely related to Iraq's national security. On the following day, the team inspected a residential house in Baghdad, which indicates that the team has no specific target related to disarmament which is the essential goal of UNSCOM work. On the contrary, the team relied on false and misleading information

meant to provoke the Iraqi side and in violation of UNSCOM commitments to respect Iraq's dignity, sovereignty and national security, thereby abolishing the Joint Programme of Action agreed upon by the two parties on 22 June 1996. This also implies no respect for the Memorandum of Understanding signed with the UN Secretary-General on 23 February 1998 which stressed UNSCOM's obligation to act in accordance with the procedures hitherto followed by the two sides and to show respect for Iraq's dignity, sovereignty and security during inspections (for details see Annex-C which show activities of the inspection teams).

4. Air Surveillance

- A) Since UNSCOM resumed its activities in Iraq on 18 November 1998, air surveillance has been conducted at 2 flights per day. The flight zone sometimes covered large areas of the country amounting to 40,000 square kilometers. In some cases a flight box is presented to the Iraqi side in such a large size that causes concern for the Iraqi air defences. On 5 December 1998, for example, the area of the flight box presented by UNSCOM was 36,000 square kilometers and a part of which was in Iranian territory. BMVC was officially notified in order to consider the size and locations of flight zones in a logical and objective manner. Yet the flight boxes sent to us on 7 December 1998 were even larger (The areas of which exceeded 50,000 km²) with parts falling within Syrian and Jordanian territories.
- B) UNSCOM has shown no respect for the modalities of common understanding between the two sides, especially those relating to avoiding flights over Baghdad city and the residential areas in accordance with procedures agreed upon since 1992. On 2 December 1998, for example, an air surveillance team flew over a site within the boundaries of the city of Baghdad. BMVC was notified accordingly. Besides, UNSCOM's pilots did not abide by flight routes already agreed upon nor by timings of take off and coming back, as was the case on 20 and 22 November 1998.
- C) During this period the American spy plane U-2 conducted three air surveillance flights for 13 hours. (Details are contained in Annex-D).

5- Requests

On 26 November, Iraq made three requests to UNSCOM namely, one to send a team to assist Iraqi counterparts in investigating the fate of the 155-mm shells filled with mustard; second, to send a team to verify the tail units of the R-400; and, thirdly to entrust a team with the task of looking at the precise location of the pits which were used for the field storage of the special warheads at Fallujah Forest and the Tigris canal. The task envisaged by the third request was completed. As for the first two, and despite sending the required information which UNSCOM requested, are still pending. UNSCOM promised to carry out these tasks "as soon as is practically possible."

It should be noted that these tasks, which are very important for the material balance of the chemical file, could have been commenced with during the current period. It is especially significant to note that the second task related to the R-400 simply requires a few number of inspectors from the BMVC to count the tail units of these bombs which are at the Iraqi Air Force stores.

Annex-A

The Sites Inspected by the Monitoring Groups
 from 18 November to 13 December 1998

Serial	Activity	Number of Sites which are subject to Monitoring	Number of Sites which are not subject to Monitoring
1.	Missiles	44	2
2.	Chemical	47	2
3.	Biological	41	-
4.	Nuclear	52	87*
5.	Import/Export	36	1
6.	Air Surveillance	22	9
7.	Cameras Team	55	-
8.	Joint Groups	2	27
	Sub-Total	299	128
	Grand Total	427	

* The sites which are not subject to monitoring in the nuclear area are 87 sites throughout the Iraqi territories and waters from which various environmental samples are taken (water, mud deposits, herbs, grass, swabs, air). These locations are selected by the IAEA. Annex-B shows the activities conducted by the joint groups referred to in item 8 above.

Annex-B

The Sites Inspected by the Joint Monitoring Groups from 18 November to 13 December 1998

Serial	The Joint Group	Site's Name	Date of the Visit	Notes
1.	chemical+biological+nuclear	1. U'bour State Company-Military Industrialization	22/11/1198	The site is subject to monitoring.
2.	chemical+biological+nuclear	1. The State Company for Tobacco and Cigarettes-Nasr Factory/Ministry of Industry	23/11/1998	The site is subject to monitoring.
3.	chemical+nuclear+imports	1. The Iraqi Company for Carton Manufacturing-Mixed sector. 2. Light Industries Company-Mixed sector 3. Baghdad Company for Insulating Materials-Private sector. 4. Sewage Pipes and Accessories Company-Private sector. 5. Hilal Industrial Company-Mixed sector 6. Karwan Company for Soft Drinks Drinks-Private sector.	1/12/1998	The sites are not subject to monitoring.

4.	chemical+biological+nuclear+ imports	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The Baghdadi Company for Steel Poles and Pipes/Private sector. 2. Ahmed Aluminum Company/Private Sector. 3. The Private Company for Washing Machines/Private Sector. 4. Nova Ice Cream Plant/Private Sector. 5. Spare Parts Reconstruction Plant for the Armed Forces/Ministry of Defence. 	2/12/1998	The sites are not subject to monitoring.
5.	missile+biological+nuclear+ Imports	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The Base Electronic Repairing Plant-Ministry of Defence 	3/12/1998	The site is not subject to monitoring.
6.	missile+chemical+biological	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Languages and Translation Institute 2. Tahiri Shop for Identity Cards Compression. 3. The office of the singer Karim Al-Khaliji. 4. Al-Harith Office for Printing and Translation. 5. The office of the singer Mohammed Al-Ralal. 6. The office for computer services. 7. Ma'rifa Office for Agricultural Supplies. 	5/12/1998	The sites are not subject to monitoring.

		<p>8. Office and Plant of Saqar Leathers. 9. Hattim Office of General Contracting. 10. Akhatir Office for Decoration and Designs. 11. Shop of Calligrapher Ibrahim Al-Qaysi. 12. Office of Lawyer Marid Al-A'aridhi. 13. Shahad Supermarket. 14. Suna Supermarket. 15. Office of Sabal Al-Muhana for agricultural lands.</p>	
		<p>29 sites (27 sites are subject to monitoring and 2 sites are not subject to monitoring.</p>	

Annex-C

The Inspection Teams Dispatched by the UNSCOM from 18 November to 13 December 1998

Activity	Team's Name	Period of Time	The Team's members	Number of Inspections	The Team's Task	Notes
Missiles	1. MG-19A Headed by the British Paul Kliford	1/12- 13/12/1998	8	13	To check the tags put on 250 missiles which are subject to monitoring. The missiles have been selected randomly according to the procedures agreed upon between the two sides.	All the tags checked, at all the sites, were in good condition. This means that there are no actions to modify or develop these missiles in order to increase their ranges.
	2. UNSCOM-259 Headed by the French Corin Hirode	3/12- 20/12/1998	13	5	To prepare for building a missile tracking system relating to the missiles with range less than 150 km, which are subject to monitoring during flight tests. This required the team to survey the	We think that the task of this team is unnecessary and infringes upon the communications security in Iraq, especially most members of the team are Americans and British.

					<p>frequencies operating in the desert area from 5/12/1998 up to now.</p> <p>To visit field storage of the special warheads where these warheads stored in 1990-1991 in Tigris area and Faloaja Forests. In addition to making visits to Karama State Company (Kadhemiya and Bin Al-Haitham sites), which is responsible for the development of Sumoud missile with a range less than 150 km.</p>	<p>The team surveyed the frequencies which they should observe according to the equipment they have. The team has been cautioned about this through a letter sent to BMVC.</p>
<p>Chemical</p>	<p>1. UNSCOM-257 Headed by the Dutch Cease Walterbik</p>	<p>22/11-28/11/1998</p>	<p>5</p>	<p>10</p>	<p>To evaluate the monitoring system at 10 sites, using FTIR equipment.</p>	<p>The results achieved by the team were positive. The measurements did not indicate any proscribed chemical agents.</p>

<p>Biological</p>	<p>1. UNSCOM-253 Headed by the British David Kelly</p>	<p>1/12-6/12/1998</p>	<p>13</p>	<p>Interviews and technical discussions</p>	<p>Interviews and discussions on R&D in the past biological programme.</p>	<p>The team held 8 morning and evening sessions for about four hours each. They interviewed 18 concerned persons for 32 hours during which they addressed detailed and repeated questions. However, the work was carried out with full cooperation of the Iraqi side.</p>
	<p>2. UNSCOM-261 Headed by the American Diyana Simon</p>	<p>3/12-10/12/1998</p>	<p>13</p>	<p>8</p>	<p>Inspecting sites which are subject to monitoring in order to evaluate their current activity.</p>	<p>The team did not detect any indication of proscribed activity or what contravened Iraq's declarations.</p>

	<p>3. UNSCOM- 260 Headed by the German Gabrel Wadsak</p>	<p>6/12- 10/12/1998</p>	<p>7</p>	<p>interviews and technical discussions</p>	<p>interviews and discussions on the growth media imported for the past biological programme.</p>	<p>Six morning and evening sessions were held, for about five hours each. During those meetings, the team interviewed 9 concerned persons for 30 hours during which very detailed questions were addressed, which the UNSCOM had already addressed and received the answer on them. However, the work was carried out with full cooperation of the Iraqi side.</p>
	<p>4. UNSCOM- 256 Headed by the British David Kelly</p>	<p>10/12- 18/12/1998</p>	<p>7</p>	<p>2</p>	<p>To follow up one of the growth media used in medicine production by Samara Drugs Factory.</p>	<p>The work is still continuous with full cooperation of the Iraqi side. It is expected that the work will continue during the coming two days at the same site. It is</p>

<p>Special Tasks (the so-called concealment)</p>	<p>1. UNSCOM-258 Headed by the Australian Roger Hill</p>	<p>7/12-13/12/1998</p>	<p>30</p>	<p>10</p>	<p>To visit civilian and military sensitive sites in a provocative manner on the basis of suspicions and false and misleading information in order to search for alleged proscribed documents and weapons.</p>	<p>noteworthy that this subject was discussed previously and Iraq provided the required supporting documents. The task of this team is to make sure of the information submitted by the Iraqi side.</p>
						<p>- The visits were provocative and intrusive. - The team tried not to implement the modalities of inspection of the sensitive sites. - The team tried to inspect Baghdad office of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party, without explaining the reason of this attempt. They withdrew when the Iraqi side requested them to present such explanation.</p>

						<p>It is noteworthy, that the chief inspector and three other members entered the site and toured it.</p> <p>- The team inspected a residential house belonging to an Iraqi citizen in Baghdad. This a precedent which reflects unprofessional and provocative manner.</p>
Total		8 teams		96 inspectors		48 inspections

Total hours of interviews and discussions: 62 hours
 Total number of the persons interviewed and discussed: 27 persons

Annex-D

The UNSCOM Air Surveillance Activities from 18 November to 13 December 1998

Activity	Team's Name	Period of Time	The Team's members	Number of Sites	The Team's Task	Notes
Air Surveillance by Helicopters	1. AIT-30 headed by the New Zealand Zealand John Weson	18/11-22/11/1998	3	9	The team made air surveillance for those sites throughout Iraq. They also photographed and video-taped them for 160 minutes. The team did not detect any indication of proscribed activities at those sites.	
	2. AIT-31 headed by the Australian Alen Aril	23/11-up to now	3	22	The team made air surveillance for those sites throughout Iraq. They photographed and video-taped the sites for 415 minutes. They did not detect any indication of proscribed activities at these sites.	Sometimes, the flight boxes were large, up to more than 40 thousands km. This puts the Air Defence System in confusion. Some flight boxes trespassed Iraq's international borders. They covered areas in neighbouring

