

*United Nations*  
**GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY**  
**THIRTY-SIXTH SESSION**  
*Official Records\**

FIRST COMMITTEE  
36th meeting  
held on  
Thursday, 19 November 1981  
at 3 p.m.  
New York

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VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 36TH MEETING

Chairman: Mr. GOLOB (Yugoslavia)

later: Mr. CARIAS (Honduras)  
(Vice-Chairman)

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81-64212

**Distr. GENERAL**  
A/C.1/36/PV.36  
24 November 1981

ENGLISH

The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 39 TO 56, 128 AND 135 (continued)

The CHAIRMAN: Before calling on the first speaker inscribed on the list of speakers for this afternoon, I should like to call on the Secretary of the Committee, who is going to inform the members of the Committee about the sponsorship of the draft resolutions.

Mr. RATHORE (Secretary of the Committee): The following are now sponsors of the draft resolutions: for A/C.1/36/L.3, Jordan; for A/C.1/36/L.9, Federal Republic of Germany and Sri Lanka; for A/C.1/36/L.15, Cape Verde and Kenya; for A/C.1/36/L.16, Kenya; for A/C.1/36/L.19, Congo, Guinea and Madagascar; for A/C.1/36/L.21, Rwanda; for A/C.1/36/L.26, Congo; for A/C.1/36/L.27, Madagascar; for A/C.1/36/L.28, Romania; for A/C.1/36/L.29, Congo, Rwanda and Ghana; for A/C.1/36/L.33, Ethiopia, Angola and Lao People's Democratic Republic; for A/C.1/36/L.35, Congo and Qatar; for A/C.1/36/L.37, Viet Nam and Ireland; for A/C.1/36/L.39, Rwanda; for A/C.1/36/L.42, Congo; and for A/C.1/36/L.44, Mauritania.

Mr. ERSUN (Turkey): On behalf of 18 delegations, I have the honour of introducing the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/36/L.44 concerning the review of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament.

We have all certainly discussed and elaborated at length on this matter in the last few years. First, at the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, it was agreed in the Final Document that

"... the membership of the Committee on Disarmament will be reviewed at regular intervals". (resolution S-10/2, part III, para. 120)

(Mr. Ersun, Turkey)

Secondly, at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly, through the adoption of resolution 33/91 G by an overwhelming majority, the first review of the membership of the Committee was deferred to the next special session devoted to disarmament.

At that time, of course, the general feeling was that it was still too early for a review and we all foresaw a reasonable interval such as four years before action could be taken on this important matter.

If I may briefly remind my colleagues, sponsors showed at that time a maximum of flexibility and understanding in preparing revised versions of their initial proposals in the light of various amendments, in order to arrive at consensus on the resolution.

Likewise, to satisfy the reasonable concerns of some delegations and to provide sufficient time for the Committee on Disarmament to elaborate the modalities of the review of its membership, resolution 33/91 G asked for the inclusion of the question in the agenda of the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly and not the thirty-fourth, as had been initially proposed.

In fact, at the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly, the remarkable vote of 135 to none with 10 abstentions on resolution 35/156 I implied almost full approval on the part of all delegations for the very essence of that resolution and provided adequate grounds for the sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/36/L.44 to be hopeful for a consensus this year.

In presenting the draft resolution at last year's session of the General Assembly, we stated that the Committee on Disarmament would have a last chance to make a "detailed report" on this subject to the thirty-sixth session. Now, while looking at the matter this year, we do actually have the expected report, but unfortunately, one has to admit, not in any satisfactory form or with any satisfactory substance.

(Mr. Ersun, Turkey)

In fact, in the 1981 report of the Committee on Disarmament we find less than a full page -- or seven short paragraphs -- devoted to this question. Out of those seven paragraphs, the first three and the last two are of a procedural or factual nature. Thus, the actual results of the work done by the Committee on Disarmament on this question are condensed into two short paragraphs, namely, paragraphs 18 and 19 of the report. I should like to read the first of those two "substantive" paragraphs:

In considering the modalities of the review of its membership, the Committee kept in mind paragraph 113 of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament, which declared, inter alia, that the negotiating body for the sake of convenience should have a relatively small membership. The Committee also took into account paragraph 28 of the Final Document which says, inter alia, that all States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations, as well as paragraphs 120 (g) and (h) of the Final Document. (A/36/27, para. 18)

Undoubtedly, all of our colleagues noticed that when I earlier referred to paragraph 120 of the Final Document, I was referring to the consensus reached to review the membership of the Committee on Disarmament at regular intervals. Curiously, in paragraph 18 of the report of the Committee, the main references are to sub-paragraphs (g) and (h) of that paragraph, which deal with the invitations to be extended to non-member States.

Furthermore, although the content of paragraph 113 of the Final Document, namely, the need to have a small membership, has been explicitly mentioned in a restrictive clause, the reference to paragraph 120 is no more than an allusion, with a number and two letters.

The sponsors of the present draft resolution do not entertain any doubts about the sincerity and constructive approach of the members of the Committee on Disarmament, but in their view, the formulation of paragraph 18 appears somewhat discordant. I shall, of course, not dwell any longer on this unimportant technical drafting detail. However, it is evident that this "substantial" paragraph is no more than a reference to the Final Document.

(Mr. Ersun, Turkey)

Allow me, then, to quote the only - and I would emphasize the word "only" - remaining substantive paragraph, namely, paragraph 19 of the Committee's report:

"Many members were of the opinion that the Committee's present membership was adequate and representative of the world community of States, and that an expansion was premature as the Committee had been in operation for only three years. Some members expressed themselves in favour of a very small increase in the Committee's membership. The view was expressed that any eventual change in membership could take the form of either expansion, or reduction, or rotation of members within the respective regions or groups. However, many delegations were of the view that there was no strong reason at the moment for modifying the present membership." (Ibid., para. 19)

This marked tendency by the actual members of the Committee to prefer to conserve its present composition is understandable. However, as it stands, such a conservative approach fails to comply with the consensus reached in the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament. Although such an approach may be formulated or qualified in several ways, the sponsors took note of it by merely using the words "various options" and "different views" in operative paragraph 1 of draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.44.

It is appropriate at this point for me to quote from paragraph 28 of the Final Document:

"All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations. Consequently, all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament. All States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations. They have the right to participate on an equal footing in those multilateral disarmament negotiations which have a direct bearing on their national security. While disarmament is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear weapon States have the primary responsibility for nuclear

(Mr. Ersun, Turkey)

disarmament and, together with other militarily significant States, for halting and reversing the arms race. It is therefore important to secure their active participation." (S-10/2, part II, para. 28)

We would like to make two remarks here. First, in our opinion a four-year interval after the first special session on disarmament can be considered to be a "regular" one. That was the understanding when this matter was discussed during our deliberations at the thirty-third regular session of the General Assembly. Our second observation is that we agree with the statement:

"The main reason for the stagnation of disarmament negotiations is the lack of political will on the part of certain States ..." (CD/200, p.1)

Based on all those considerations, the sponsors are submitting to the Committee a resolution identical to that of last year. Operative paragraphs 2 and 5 of last year's resolution, the former asking the Committee on Disarmament to continue to consider this question and the latter requesting the inclusion of the matter in the agenda of the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, are deleted from the present draft resolution. Those are the only important changes.

We have deleted those paragraphs for two basic reasons: first, because further consideration by the Committee on Disarmament during the next six months, after the last three and a half years, would probably fall short of achieving a better conclusion to the review issue and, secondly, because we see no sense in cluttering up the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament in the short period of time remaining before the second special session on disarmament.

Furthermore, we are not requesting the inclusion of the review issue in the provisional agenda of the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly. I must say that this may be based on the somewhat optimistic assumption that a solution satisfactory to all will be found to this question at next year's special session on disarmament.

The preambular part of the draft resolution is identical to that of last year, excepting that the third paragraph now mentions General Assembly resolution 35/156 I as well as resolution 33/91 G.

(Mr. Ersun, Turkey)

Operative paragraph 1 takes note of the fact that at the 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament, "various options and different views were stated" on the matter.

Operative paragraph 2 is taken unchanged from last year's resolution, and paragraph 3 is once again a factual one taken, in a shortened form, from last year's resolution, implying the need to continue the invitation process.

With the exception of those minor technical changes, this year's text is, then, identical to that of last year. It constitutes a restatement of the desire for a periodical review of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament, as was expressly stated in paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament.

We remain confident in our belief that on the very question of principle, namely, the right of all States to take an active part in disarmament negotiations on an equal footing, we have consensus among us. We believe, therefore, that we have every right strongly to urge the First Committee to adopt draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.44 by consensus this year.

Mr. ROMULO (Philippines): Mr. Chairman, when I last appeared before this Committee, you were absent and the Vice-Chairman had taken your place. I want to avail myself of this opportunity, therefore, to congratulate the First Committee on having elected you as its Chairman and on having selected Yugoslavia, the country you represent, to the chairmanship of this Committee. Yugoslavia has a record of an independent foreign-policy and is really the founding member of the Non-Aligned Group. You, Mr. Chairman, with your diplomatic skill and experience, are really worthy of being the Chairman of this Committee.

I am very happy this afternoon to be able to present the final report of the Group of Experts on the Relationship between Disarmament and International Security (A/36/597). The Group of Experts met frequently, beginning in June 1979, and I was honoured to serve as Chairman of that ten-member Group.

The present study has its origins in resolution 32/87 C of the 1977 General Assembly, which requests the Secretary-General to undertake such a study and submit an interim report, and in resolution 33/91 I of the General Assembly of 1978 which requested him to "expedite action for the continuation of the study" with the help of consultant experts.

In his initial report submitted to the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, document A/S-10/7, the Secretary-General pointed out that an examination of the issues underlying the link between security and disarmament would be of value in connexion with a comprehensive programme of disarmament, inasmuch as at an advanced stage in the disarmament process, the adoption of further disarmament measures would become interwoven with the task of establishing and developing adequate machinery and procedures for keeping the peace and settling disputes by peaceful means. "A closer study of the interrelationship between disarmament and international security", he concluded, "might therefore be of assistance to efforts to translate over-all principles and priorities into a coherent, effective and realistic strategy ...".

In the report before the Committee, A/36/597, the Group of Experts appointed by the Secretary-General took his observations and charges very



(Mr. Romulo, Philippines)

seriously, and considered the various aspects of the question under the following chapter headings:

- I. The Detrimental Consequences of the Arms Race;
- II. Analysis of the Interrelationship of Disarmament and International Security;
- III. The Process of Disarmament and International Security;
- IV. Détente and International Co-operation as Means of Strengthening International Security and Promoting Disarmament;
- V. The Relationship Between Specific Disarmament Measures and International Security;
- VI. Disarmament, International Security and the Role of the United Nations in the Maintenance of Peace and in the Implementation of the System of International Legal Order and Security as Provided for in the Charter of the United Nations; and
- VII. Conclusions.

The report carries within it a large number of most interesting points. I should like briefly to enumerate a few of them.

The "parallelism" between disarmament and international security is stressed throughout the report. The view that the one cannot proceed to any substantial extent without progress in the other was endorsed. It was recognized that as a first step towards the parallel achievement of substantial measures of international security and substantial measures of disarmament, progress will be required in the development of détente and confidence-building measures. The report notes that "A fully functioning system of international security would bring about fundamental changes in relationships among States", and that they would be more willing to conduct their relations on a peaceful basis. The practice of regular, direct, high-level contacts is regarded as an important instrument for developing effective collective action. The Group of Experts calls for the full implementation of the security arrangements required in the Charter of the United Nations and, in particular, states that the agreements to be initiated under Article 43 "would provide the Security Council with the resources for the maintenance of international peace

(Mr. Romulo, Philippines)

and security ...". It is suggested it "might be useful if Member States so willing would once again display their readiness" to conclude such agreements.

Furthermore, the report states that "measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and for the settlement of international disputes by pacific means ... would facilitate further progress in disarmament ...". Particular interest was shown by some, but not all, of the experts in the holding of a special session of the General Assembly on international security to develop the necessary balance in progress between the two parallel areas of security and disarmament. The report states that achieving a state of reliable and lasting peace and security "must include the full implementation of the security system of the United Nations Charter and general and complete disarmament".

The Group of Experts addresses itself to the hope that the coming special session on disarmament will give particular attention to those matters, and points out the value of and the need for a better flow of information as regards the role of collective measures in the implementation of international security. Specifically in this respect; the report stresses the role of the public and notes that "it is important the public understand that measures for disarmament and international security are linked, and that, consequently, the public should press for rapid and substantial progress in both fields".

In conclusion, I should like to note that the Group of Experts emphasized the following:

"Progress in disarmament and in the strengthening of international security must be looked upon as parallel means in the effort to preserve peace and prevent war. ... Parallelism and co-ordination of measures in both the disarmament and the security fields are the only logical and practical solutions for the problem". (A/36/597, para. 43)

If I may add an emphasis of my own, I shall draw upon a statement of the Group of Experts to the effect that "there is room for more efforts" and that "the problems of disarmament and international security and their interrelationship require persistent attention and consideration ...". Suggestions are made regarding various forums in which that attention might be developed further. With that sentiment I wholly agree.

(Mr. Romulo, Philippines)

This report is only a first effort by the United Nations membership to come to a clearer understanding of the security and disarmament relationship; it can only be regarded as a first general review of this difficult but rewarding question. In my view, it is imperative that these efforts be pursued, particularly at a more technical and detailed level, now that the general principles have been essentially agreed upon. The value of this report, as I see it, is that it has initiated a process which now must be vigorously pursued for the benefit of the global community and world peace. We need to know more about what kind of United Nations security system will prove acceptable and adequate to assure compliance as disarmament proceeds, and sufficiently effective to assume the burden of maintenance of peace as arms are dispensed with. We must, I think, make an effort now to see that this work is continued in some depth in a suitable framework.

In so difficult and complex an area, it is not surprising that the conclusions adopted by the Group in some respects fall short of the wishes of all members of the Group. In particular, Ambassador Zenon Rossides has framed a complementary set of conclusions and recommendations giving stronger emphasis to certain points.

Having completed my presentation on the study on the relationship between disarmament and international security, I should like now to introduce the draft resolution related to it, bearing the symbol A/C.1/36/L.46. The draft resolution is along traditional lines and avoids any possible controversy. It notes the study with satisfaction and commends it to the attention of all Member States; it expresses appreciation to the Secretary-General and to the group of consultant experts who assisted him in the preparation of the study; it invites all Member States to inform the Secretary-General, no later than 15 April 1982, of their views regarding the study; it requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements for the reproduction of the report as a United Nations publication and give it the widest possible distribution; it further requests the Secretary-General to transmit the study, together with the views of Member States, to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to be held in 1982.

(Mr. Romulo, Philippines)

In consideration of the vital importance of the subject of the study I have introduced and the uncontroversial nature of the draft resolution, I trust that it will be adopted by consensus.

Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): The subject matter of this study is of very great importance, particularly because 35 years after the establishment of the United Nations there has been no study about international security, even though the Charter is based on it. "International security" is repeated over 30 times within the system of international security provided by the Charter.

Now, this is a signally characteristic event. It seems as though - and we observed this today too - in many forums there is a reluctance to hear about or to act upon international security. The question is: why? We have had that experience even in the work on the study: why shy away from international security? Because international security implies law and order. And we do not want law and order. We accept law and order within the State or within the nation, but internationally we want it to be the law of the jungle. And we are now in a world of near-anarchy because the Charter, in view of non-compliance with its basic provisions for effective Security Council decisions, has been truncated in its main purpose - that of maintaining international peace and security, the very purpose for which the United Nations was established.

Now, let me say one thing: progress in international security is halting, the reason is protracted lack of action, like holding back a child who wants to walk. The result will be a limping child. Therefore, I request the indulgence of Member States with regard to any lack of effective presentation of the important aspect of international security in the conclusions. The latter do not answer the purpose of the study. That is why I thought it necessary to implement what was lacking and needed, in order to make it a more complete presentation, as far as possible, of the conclusions, because most people will not take the trouble to give attention to the whole study. They will confine themselves to the conclusions. And if these do not reflect the purpose of the study entirely, then we find ourselves in difficulty.

(Mr. Rossides, Cyprus)

Now, I would advise Members to read, if not all, at least the pertinent parts of the study relating to the relationship between disarmament and international security, which are in chapters II and VI.

Now, as for the document that was very kindly submitted by the Chairman of the Group, to whom we are very grateful for his efforts in this study, I wish to make the following basic points: the first is: what is the purpose of this study? Secondly, what are the findings of the study? Thirdly, what are the conclusions on the basis of those findings? That is what a study should cover - the purpose, the findings and the conclusions.

Let us see what the purpose is. This study emerged from the special session on disarmament, not from a special session on international security. Therefore, the purpose of this study was to help promote disarmament through international security. That is obvious. The study is intended to facilitate effective international security and must be approached from the aspect of compliance with the provisions of the Charter through the relevant system of international security.

(Mr. Rossides, Cyprus)

But this system is not respected; consequently, we have decisions of the Security Council with no effect. The main purpose of the study is to provide alternative means of security for nations instead of relying entirely on weapons in an escalating arms race. We feel strongly that this is the rational approach to the problem - making clear the interrelationship between international security and disarmament.

In stating the principle that:

"Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example" (resolution S-10/2, para. 13)

the Final Document of the tenth special session on disarmament sets out in appropriate sequence the two essential elements for peace and security, and enunciates the interrelationship between disarmament and international security. This is not duly reflected in the conclusions. They have to be completed by my statement in this Committee as part of the report on the study.

The necessary implication from this Final Document is that there can be no effective progress on disarmament without the implementation of the Charter system of international security and, conversely, that there can be no comprehensive international security without a halt in the arms race and disarmament. These two objectives for international security and disarmament should be pursued in parallel efforts.

In face of the growing dangers from the arms race, the purpose of the study is to seek rational and effective means of overcoming it through the United Nations and to make relevant recommendations lacking from the conclusions.

The study deals adequately with its main theme - the relationship between disarmament and international security. In its Chapter II it states:

"The Charter of the United Nations provides the basic framework for the relationship between disarmament and international security".

(A/36/597, para. 36)

Chapter II further elaborates fully on the subject and Chapter VI also deals with it effectively. Yet the conclusions fail to refer to this important part of

(Mr. Rossides, Cyprus)

the study or to reflect their content. The reference in the conclusions of the Final Document of the special session on disarmament is to a part which deals with balanced disarmament measures (paragraph 29) and not with their relationship to international security under the Charter which is contained in paragraph 13. We do not object to that reference in the Final Document but let there also be included in the conclusions the pertinent reference made in this Committee to paragraph 13 of the Final Document.

This Chapter II refers to Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Charter which specifies the main purpose of the United Nations to be the maintenance of international peace and security. The study emphasizes that the principal means of realizing this purpose is collective measures of security.

Why the conclusions are inadequate is a matter that I do not wish to enter into. They were drafted under pressure of time and they were almost left unfinished. In any case, the study is good and sound and should be followed by further studies on this subject because, as I said before, it is really astonishing that there was no attempt to carry out a study on this subject earlier and it would perhaps be advisable to look further into this vital subject for peace and security.

The CHAIRMAN: I hope that that statement by the representative of Cyprus will be taken into account when the Committee deals with draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.46, which is the draft resolution that refers to the study on the relationship between disarmament and international security.

I should like to urge the sponsors of the following draft resolutions kindly to introduce them as soon as possible, today if they so desire:

(The Chairman)

I am referring to draft resolutions A/C.1/36/L.23, L.25, L.27, L.30, L.32, L.34, L.35, L.37, L.45, L.46 and L.47. To make this point clear, these draft resolutions have not been introduced; perhaps the sponsors of some of them do not want to introduce them. But if they do want to introduce them it would be desirable for them to inscribe their names on the list of speakers because when we embark upon the process of voting we shall no longer have time for such introductions.

Mr. ANDERSON (Australia): I wish to address the Committee on item 49 of our agenda, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean.

It would be misleading to suggest that the Ad Hoc Committee has conducted a round of successful meetings during 1981. It would, however, be correct to say that the Committee has passed through a particularly difficult and contentious period and that it has survived, thereby demonstrating that in spite of the enormous difficulties confronting it there remains a basic willingness to continue to work towards the achievement of the implementation of the declaration of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean.

Last year the General Assembly adopted by consensus a resolution which, inter alia, called for the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean in 1981. That resolution made it clear, however, that if a conference were to be convened this year it would first be necessary to achieve a sufficient degree of harmonization of views on the various issues related to the declaration of a zone of peace.



(Mr. Anderson, Australia)

In addition, the resolution acknowledged that before a successful conference could be held the political and security climate in the area would have to be conducive. It was upon these points that the Ad Hoc Committee spent much of its time this year until it became evident that there was not agreement that these requirements had been met.

During 1981 the Committee has been the scene of a number of polemical exchanges which, although unfortunate, were inevitable in the light of the security and political situation in the region. Although these exchanges contributed little to enhancing the prospects for the early implementation of the declaration, they did demonstrate the need for a greater degree of stability and understanding in the region before a successful conference could be held. It is difficult to imagine how an international conference could be expected to succeed on such a sensitive issue as a zone of peace when the Ad Hoc Committee, which had been created to work towards that objective, spent so much of its time in polemical exchanges and experienced such difficulty in adopting its annual report and resolution. As my delegation has continued to emphasize both in this forum and in the Ad Hoc Committee, a conference held in the present political and security climate would be most unlikely to succeed, while failure at such a conference would almost certainly end the prospect of achieving a zone of peace, at least for the foreseeable future.

I shall not dwell on all the events which have affected the security and political climate in the area in recent years. These, unfortunately, are all too numerous. But it is worth asking how a conference could be expected to succeed when one of the major Powers, whose co-operation in the implementation of a zone of peace would be essential, has invaded and remains in armed occupation of a non-aligned hinterland State. So long as that occupation continues against the wishes of the Afghan people and in violation of the Charter of this Organization, the security and political climate in the region must remain clouded.

It is also obvious that before a successful conference could be convened it would be necessary for adequate preparations to be concluded. It is hard to imagine that a conference of such political sensitivity and

(Mr. Anderson, Australia)

covering so diverse an area could succeed unless there was a high degree of harmonization of views on the issues related to the implementation of a zone of peace. Both at and since the 1979 meeting of littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean strenuous efforts have been made to harmonize views. Thus far it is not possible to say that complete harmonization has been achieved on a single issue. Indeed, the Ad Hoc Committee is still some way from reaching agreement on the fundamental issue of the limits of the Indian Ocean which would be included in a zone of peace. There clearly remains a considerable amount of work to be done before a sufficient degree of harmonization has been attained. The Australian delegation will continue to play an active part in the work of the Committee in helping to achieve this result. Until it is achieved, however, we consider that it would be premature to try to set the dates for a conference.

On a more positive note, Australia remains committed to the concept of a conference - a single conference which would have as its attainable goal the declaration of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. We are hopeful that the difficulties which the Ad Hoc Committee experienced this year will not be repeated at its sessions next year and that delegations will be able to concentrate more fully and in a more constructive manner on the issues necessary to bring about their common goal. Greater consideration will have to be given to the objectives for the 1980s for the declaration of a zone of peace. For a number of years the Ad Hoc Committee has proceeded on the rather loose assumption that resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 1971 provides the sole mandate on which the Committee should proceed. But the situation in the world, and more particularly in the Indian Ocean, has changed dramatically since 1971. The concerns of the littoral and hinterland States of the region cannot be confined simply to the escalation of great-Power presence in the region, important and indeed fundamental as that preoccupation is. Events in the last 10 years have demonstrated all too clearly that the activities of many States besides the great Powers need to be carefully considered, first by the Ad Hoc Committee and eventually by a conference if a meaningful zone of peace is to be established. It will therefore be necessary next year for the Ad Hoc Committee to look more

(Mr. Anderson, Australia)

closely at its mandate and to consider how this may best be developed and broadened to enable it more effectively to deal with its important task. The Australian delegation is eager to co-operate with other members of the Committee in examining this question.

Looking now to the draft resolution before this body, I am pleased to confirm that it has the support of the Australian delegation. It is a consensus document of the Ad Hoc Committee, a document which was arrived at only with great difficulty. In the view of my delegation, the main thrust of the draft resolution is for the Ad Hoc Committee to continue consideration of the harmonization of views and the political and security climate in the area with a view to giving consideration to the convening of a conference. As I have already stated, it will be necessary for the Ad Hoc Committee to examine these questions carefully before finally agreeing on the dates for a conference. We remain concerned that a conference held prematurely would frustrate the desires of all regional States to bring about an effective zone of peace in the region.

Before concluding my remarks may I pay a special tribute to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Fonseka of Sri Lanka, for his tireless and patient chairing of the meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee. There is little doubt that without his wise guidance the Ad Hoc Committee would not have been able to agree on a consensus resolution or even on a report. Ambassador Fonseka's efforts have made an important, indeed an indispensable contribution to the future functioning of the Ad Hoc Committee.

I should also like to express my delegation's appreciation to the Secretary of the Committee, Mr. Kheradi, and to his staff, whose dedication has helped the Committee through a most difficult year.

Mr. MENZIES (Canada): Today I wish to introduce, under agenda item 42, draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.35, dealing with chemical weapons and negotiations leading towards an eventual agreement. I also wish to make some comments on agenda item 49, concerning the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean area.

Before doing so, however, I should like to touch briefly upon the two studies treated under agenda items 51 (d) and 55 (c), dealing with disarmament and development, and confidence-building measures respectively.

On the disarmament and development study, Canada, in company with more than 20 other countries, has sponsored draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.21, which proposes that the report of the Secretary-General dated 5 October be transmitted to the second special session devoted to disarmament for its substantive consideration and appropriate action. This draft resolution also recommends to all Governments the widest possible distribution of the report. A Canadian expert participated in the study, and Canada is proud of the contribution it is making to its dissemination through the production of a version of the report suitable for widespread distribution. A Canadian author is now working on this version. We have undertaken to assist in its publication in English, and possibilities are now being explored for its production in French. If, as I hope, arrangements can be made to publish a French version in Canada, I will ensure that the Secretary-General is informed by letter, with a request that copies be passed on to all Member Governments.

We believe that one finding of the study in particular is of universal importance: that is, that military spending cannot benefit the economy of any given country any more than any alternative economic endeavour. In other words, and the study clearly shows that, for developed and developing countries alike, military spending represents a wastage of resources. Such spending does not generate or contribute to the enhancement of capital assets; on the contrary, such spending is in fact inflationary. Another important element in the study is its emphasis on a broad concept of security, which extends beyond

(Mr. Menzies, Canada)

purely military relationships but addresses the problem of interdependence as a whole, particularly in its economic aspects. The study on the relationship between disarmament and development, therefore, represents a serious approach to a complex problem, and we are encouraged that it has produced such tangible results. In this, the Chairman of the Study Group, Mrs. Thorsson, is to be commended for her role in bringing this enterprise to such a successful conclusion.

My Government, which participated in the work of the Group of Governmental Experts, welcomes the study on confidence-building measures now before us in document A/36/474 dated 6 October 1981. It has the agreement of all the governmental experts who participated. Both the promptness of the study and the unanimity of its drafters are real achievements. This study has been conducted in a spirit of seriousness and prudence, as indeed the results attest. Confidence-building measures are measures which may make it possible to move to other measures, elusive up to now, which do in fact limit the growth of armaments or actually reduce existing armaments, but by themselves confidence-building measures are of little value. Therefore let us examine the report, conscious of its modest objectives and prepared for its modest achievements.

We believe that the only way to build confidence in the military realm is to reduce fear and suspicion about the military intentions of potential adversaries, and the way to do that, we think, is to open the door to the maximum not only on military activity but on military planning and thinking and even military philosophy or doctrine. The report before us stops short of recommending anything of this kind - which, in our view, is unfortunate. We had hoped that in the field of military confidence-building the door could be opened wider than the very small crack provided for European States by the Final Act of Helsinki. Nevertheless, one of the main points of interest about the study was that for the first time an international group examined the applicability of confidence-building measures beyond as well as in Europe and in the non-military as well as the military sphere. In our view, the military conclusions of the study are disappointing, since they leave

the question much where it already is in the context of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. There are also non-military confidence-building measures, and their application to Europe and to other areas of the world deserves further examination and study.

Despite these reservations, my Government thinks that the exercise has been useful and the result valuable. The First Committee should, in our view, recommend the adoption of the report by the General Assembly. We think the report is a valuable addition to the literature now existing on confidence-building, and for this reason we support and commend to members of this Committee the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/36/L.23.

I now wish to turn to agenda item 42 and draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.35, dealing with chemical weapons and negotiations leading towards an eventual agreement.

It has been an established practice that the General Assembly each year adopts a resolution urging that work be continued in the endeavour to make further progress towards a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction. We believe it appropriate that such a resolution be reaffirmed again this year. For this purpose, the delegations of Japan, Poland, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and Canada, in company with more than 30 other sponsors, representing all regional groupings, have jointly submitted draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.35 for the consideration of this Committee.

(Mr. Menzies, Canada)

There are a number of developments which have taken place since resolution 35/144 B of 12 December 1980 was adopted by consensus by last year's General Assembly. This year, since the bilateral negotiations on chemical weapons between the Soviet Union and the United States have not yet resumed, the draft resolution which I am introducing cannot, of course, refer to any progress achieved in the bilateral talks. In its stead, the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/36/L.35, which is being introduced today, indicates in one of its preambular paragraphs the necessity for all efforts to be exerted for the resumption and successful conclusion of negotiations, both multilateral and bilateral.

The draft resolution, furthermore, refers to the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons to the Committee on Disarmament. That report recommended that at the beginning of its 1982 session the Committee should re-establish the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons with an appropriately revised mandate. The words of the report are also reflected in the draft resolution being introduced today.

The purpose of this draft resolution is to embody a text which can be agreed by consensus. For many, the text may not go far enough. For some, the General Assembly should give direction to the Committee on Disarmament in an appropriate form of words, more precisely to define the nature of the mandate of the Working Group. For others, the draft resolution should be strengthened on the question of resuming bilateral discussions. As the text stands, however, we believe that both these elements have been suitably taken into account.

The revision of the mandate of the Working Group is properly a matter for the Committee on Disarmament itself and while we ourselves support such a revision, it is not desirable to have the purposes of a resolution in the General Assembly diverted through a discussion in this Committee over the precise relationship of the Assembly to the Committee on Disarmament. We doubt, furthermore, if it is realistic to expect that progress can be wrung out of the negotiations, either in the Committee on Disarmament or elsewhere, by recourse to divisive vote, however morally satisfying such a course of action might be.

(Mr. Menzies, Canada)

There is general agreement that the bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States should begin as soon as possible and we believe that the language in this consensus-seeking draft resolution should be such as to encourage the two negotiating partners to move in this direction and not to put obstacles in the way, even if unintentionally, which would certainly be the consequence of any resolution or amendment not adopted by consensus. In our view, any resolution which is adopted by anything less than consensus in this critical area of arms control would represent a step backward, rather than forward.

This draft resolution is therefore commended to the consideration of all members of this Committee with the objective of reaching consensus on it. Such a consensus resolution would be a valuable instrument in support of progress towards the conclusion of an agreement on banning chemical weapons.

I should like now to turn to item 49 of our agenda, the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean area.

My delegation is most pleased to be in a position to support the draft resolution which has been approved by the Ad Hoc Committee on this item. The elaboration of a text which has received the agreement of all 44 members of the Ad Hoc Committee is itself indicative of a general willingness existing in the Committee to seek conciliation and compromise on this complex question. My delegation wishes to pay a special tribute to the untiring efforts of the Sri Lankan Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Fonseka. His constant patience, often sorely tried, his imaginative proposals to overcome seemingly insurmountable road-blocks and his unfailing courtesy in adversity were rewarded with success. Indeed, it is a source of satisfaction to my delegation that those qualities should have found a response in the Ad Hoc Committee when, during some difficult moments, flexibility and a sense of constructive accommodation were demonstrated by those delegations whose security interests are most immediately involved in the Indian Ocean region.



(Mr. Hienzies, Canada)

While my delegation recognizes that the draft resolution which will appear before us falls somewhat short of realizing the goals set by certain members of the Ad Hoc Committee at the outset of 1981, agreement on its terms, nevertheless, highlights a fundamental international reality. questions of security must be based on the consensus of all parties involved. This is an immutable feature of international relations for, without consensus there can, of course, be no real security for all parties. The accomplishment of consensus in the Ad Hoc Committee is all the more noteworthy because of the large number of parties involved.

The draft resolution which will be placed before us will emphasize the necessity to continue efforts for the necessary harmonization of views on the remaining issues related to the convening of an international conference on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. In the view of my delegation, harmonization is an organic process requiring systematic effort, expert technical support and an evolving degree of political will.

It requires the identification, definition and general understanding of certain principles which are fundamental to the establishment of any viable concept of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean area. My delegation finds the following principles particularly important: first, the concept should be based on proposals which emanate from and are agreed to by countries in the area concerned, secondly, the concept should apply to a well-defined and agreed geographical area, thirdly, the concept should conform with the universally recognized right of all nations to the free use of the high seas and to over-flights; and fourthly, it should not infringe on the rights of all States as recognized in the United Nations Charter, to individual or collective self-defence.

These principles, taken either singly or in combination, must undergo rigorous analysis of a legal and technical nature. This is what the process of harmonization is all about. It is the view of my delegation that the premature convening of a high-level international conference before this process is completed could have serious adverse consequences for the concept itself.

(Mr. Menzies, Canada)

Nor do we believe that an international conference should be convened merely to continue the process of harmonization; it should be the culmination of the process of harmonization in order to arrive at some tangible decisions regarding implementation based on solid groundwork to arrive at commonly accepted principles.

The work of harmonization properly belongs to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, as has been stated in previous resolutions and confirmed by the draft resolution before us. Indeed, there are many devices which the Committee might adopt in order better to accomplish this task: variously, informal committees of the whole, an agenda structured around more concrete topics, possible recourse to working groups, greater participation in the Committee's work by national experts dealing with each one of the major principles and so forth. The mechanisms are many and known to all of us and I need not take up the time of the First Committee in elaborating them further. However, the critical point, in our view, is to organize better the work of the Ad Hoc Committee to deal with the question of harmonization.

(Mr. Menzies, Canada)

I should now like to say a few words concerning the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee. The concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace is not itself unidimensional or single-faceted. It touches on a wide variety of factors, and it is highly vulnerable - as we have sadly seen - to outside actions and influences. Thus, while General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI), which provided the original impetus for the Ad Hoc Committee, retains certain valid elements, it should not in our view be the exclusive basis for that Committee's work. The viability of a zone of peace cannot count just on controlled levels and types of armaments and military activities. To be effective, the concept itself must be situated within a broader framework of economic, social and political understandings designed to contribute towards removing some of the root causes of tension and insecurity: poverty, lack of mutual comprehension and communication, unequal treatment of individual dignity and rights, as well as other important concerns.

We believe, therefore, that the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee should be broadened to explore those elements which can make up the framework of the zone of peace and facilitate co-operation both within the region and between the region and outside Powers. Indeed, any decision pertaining to the elements comprising the framework for the concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace should be made in the light of accompanying measures designed to improve trust and confidence in the region. In the view of my delegation, the creation of a mechanism for regional co-operation, including carefully elaborated and designed assurances, is an integral part of the total process of harmonization with which the Ad Hoc Committee is entrusted.

The draft resolution before us also makes reference to the necessity for the establishment of an adequate political and security climate before any conference should be convened. After all, the concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace is also the question of the political and security climate of the region. Accordingly, it is a source of deepest regret to my delegation that this climate was brutally shattered by the invasion by the Soviet Union of its neighbour, Afghanistan, in 1979. It is even more unfortunate that the violation

(Mr. Menzies, Canada)

of Afghanistan's territorial integrity and sovereignty continues today through occupation by tens of thousands of highly equipped Soviet troops. This has caused untold suffering to Afghanistan's inhabitants and has created a huge outward flight of refugees, which adds enormously to the burden of the region, in particular of Pakistan. Continued Soviet occupation of Afghanistan constitutes a serious destabilizing factor for the security of the region as a whole, and preparations for holding a conference must take into account the urgent necessity of restoring an independent and non-aligned Government in Afghanistan which genuinely reflects the will of the people.

Nevertheless, throughout the coming year my delegation intends to work in a constructive and positive manner towards the realization of the concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. As I have said before, this effort must be based on fundamental principles which must be defined and elaborated in a structured and workmanlike fashion. These principles do not relate exclusively to military security questions. They must include the development of economic, social and political elements that can set the acceptable framework within which military and arms-control discussions can be more effectively undertaken and negotiated.

This year the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean has demonstrated the necessary flexibility with which progress can be undertaken. Let us build on this spirit of accommodation and go forward in the quest of establishing a zone of peace, one not based on rhetoric and empty promises, but on a solid foundation of carefully worked-out agreements based on mutual trust and confidence. My delegation will be pleased to do its part in the realization of that worthy endeavour.

Mr. ELIAN (Israel): I am speaking in the discussion of draft resolutions, and I wish to address myself to draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.30, submitted by Iraq.

(Mr. Eilan, Israel)

Preambular parts of draft resolutions usually explain why the General Assembly recommends to Member States the employment of a certain course of action contained in the operative part of a proposal. In the draft resolution before us, the second preambular paragraph, recalling previous resolutions of the General Assembly, should be read in conjunction with the last paragraph of the operative part, which demands the inclusion of the same item on the provisional agenda of the next session of the General Assembly. Read together, the second and last paragraphs of the draft resolution reveal its true purpose and the intentions of its sponsor, Iraq.

The purpose is obvious. Having in 1978 injected an anti-Israel element into the discussions of the world armaments race, the Iraqis clearly intend to perpetuate that bias and to transform this Committee into yet another propaganda platform.

In the second preambular paragraph, the draft resolution mentions General Assembly resolution 33/71 of 1978, and I shall have to recall in some detail the circumstances that led up to its introduction, because the resolution of 1978 was the watershed that marked the change in the character of resolutions adopted by this Committee over the past 32 years.

The resolution of 1978 was a break with an honourable tradition and tacit understanding that had permitted this Committee to deal with disarmament and international security as world problems without the singling out of local and regional disputes. It should be noted that that tradition had continued throughout the years, in spite of numerous military conflicts that had engaged different States Members of the United Nations. In none of those conflicts did either side ever demand a debate in the First Committee. This Committee's reluctance to break with that tradition was noted in the 1979 Yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) at page 507, where it was stated that the overwhelming feeling among delegations was that the highly controversial Iraqi resolution

"would diffuse the focus of the session and undermine the consensus on the Final Document."

(Mr. Eilan, Israel)

The various procedural and substantive votes taken in 1978 on the Iraqi draft showed that the usual majority at the disposal of the Arab States and Soviet supporters had either vanished or been greatly reduced.

The Iraqi persistence in pursuing a course so palpably out of step with United Nations practice in this field could only be understood if viewed against the background not only of Iraq's maniacal hostility towards Israel, but also against the flux of inter-Arab rivalry and of Iraq's ambition for dominance in the Arab world.

(Mr. Eilan, Israel)

Iraq decided on 14 May 1978 to submit an anti-Israel resolution to the special session on disarmament to demonstrate Iraq's leadership in the political war against Israel. Having failed to have the special session on disarmament consider that item, Iraq was determined that the thirty third regular session of the General Assembly discuss and vote on its draft resolution before the convening of the Baghdad Conference. The First Committee was, therefore, subjected to incessant Iraqi demands to have its draft resolution voted on at the beginning of the session. The First Committee rejected the Iraqi move by a decisive majority.

I am recalling the political background of the original Iraqi initiative in detail, because item 56 on our agenda is the continuation of that same Iraqi attempt to manipulate the United Nations, and this Committee, for the attainment of its own political aims in the Middle East.

Iraq, having learned the lesson of the unpopularity accorded to its initiative, introduced a draft resolution at the thirty-fourth session, which concentrated solely on the nuclear issue. That draft resolution asked the General Assembly to set up a committee of experts to study Israel's nuclear armament.

Israel opposed that draft resolution, pointing out that it amounted to a discriminatory singling out of Israel from a list of more than 50 Member States - one third of the membership of the United Nations - that have not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty or have signed but have not ratified it or not complied with the full-scope safeguards agreement. Among those States, there were 13 States which belong to the region of the Middle East. The sheer hypocrisy of that resolution was revealed in a breakdown of the list of its sponsors. Out of the 34 sponsors of resolution 34/89, 20 States have, in one way or another, not done what Israel was asked to do.

In 1980, out of 22 sponsors of resolution 35/157, nine had not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty at all, two had not ratified it and four had not yet complied with the full-scope safeguards. Of the sponsors of this year's draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.30, as presented on 17 November, nearly half are not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Among States which either have not signed or have not ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty, there are countries from every region of the world, States of all political persuasions, belonging to the developed and developing world alike. Some of those countries have been involved in military conflicts in the recent past.

(Mr. Eilan, Israel)

A few of those 50 Member States either possess nuclear capabilities or are known to possess what has come to be known as the nuclear option. Why was Israel alone singled out for censure? The answer to this question has nothing to do with disarmament or arms control, which is the business of this Committee; it has, however, a great deal to do with the business of paying for oil imports. If the fluctuations of the price of oil on the spot market are to guide the attitude of Member States towards questions of arms control, the United Nations would be well advised to abandon its debates on disarmament until a time when Member States are free to vote without fear of blackmail.

If resolution 34/89 was discriminatory in singling out Israel for investigation, the terms of reference of the Committee were clearly prejudicial in asking the Secretary-General "to prepare a study on Israeli nuclear armament". The wording made impartial research impossible by prejudging the issue with the assumption that such nuclear armament in fact existed.

Under those terms it is hardly surprising that reputable nuclear scientists, when approached, refused to participate in the work of the "group of experts".

It is certainly interesting to note that a report which dwells upon technological and scientific aspects of nuclear capability was written by five experts, four of whom are political scientists, while the only nuclear physicist happens to be an Arab. It is also worth noting that the expert who submitted the report on behalf of the Group is a well-known proponent of the development of the so-called "Islamic bomb", and has called several times for further proliferation of nuclear weapons. Ironically, that did not prevent the Group from expressing concern over the dangers of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. In light of the composition of the Group of Experts and of its terms of reference, the conclusions of the report were not unexpected.

Iraq's initiative which gave birth to the Committee of Experts must be seen against the background of Iraq's own quest for nuclear capability. A great deal of information has been made public in the last few years about Iraq's frenetic quest for the acquisition of nuclear arms.

The Permanent Representative of Israel gave a detailed description of Iraq's attempt to go nuclear in his statements in the Security Council, the plenary General Assembly and in the document attached to his letter, document A/36/610, to the Secretary-General.



(Mr. Eilan, Israel)

Now, in retrospect, as I said, there can be little doubt that the Iraqi insistence in forcing resolutions condemning Israel in the First Committee during the last three years were inspired not only by the contingencies of inter-Arab rivalry, but also by the need to divert the world's attention from its own energetic nuclear activities.

The action of the Israel Air Force against the Iraqi nuclear reactor has been discussed in the Security Council, in the plenary General Assembly in the framework of the annual report of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and again in the plenary General Assembly under item 130. Its inclusion in operative paragraph 4 of this draft resolution is therefore superfluous and would have been justified only if the General Assembly had also asked the Committee of Experts to investigate Iraqi nuclear armament. Unfortunately, that was not done, and operative paragraph 4 is therefore out of place in this draft resolution. Nevertheless, in the circumstances, I am obliged to refer to it, in all brevity, by quoting the following questions posed by the Permanent Representative of Israel in the Security Council debate in June, and again during the debate in the plenary General Assembly last week:

First, why did Iraq first try in 1974 to acquire a 500-megawatt nuclear reactor, of a kind designed, inter alia, to produce large quantities of plutonium for military use?

Secondly, why the continued efforts to buy an upgraded, plutogenic power reactor, whose military use is clear, but whose commercial use is not proven?

Thirdly, why did Iraq insist on receiving a 70-megawatt reactor which has no usable application as an energy source?

Fourthly, why did Iraq insist on receiving weapons-grade nuclear fuel, rather than the less proliferant alternative of Caramel fuel which it was offered?

(Mr. Eilan, Israel)

Fifthly, what is Iraq's demonstrable need for nuclear energy, given its abundant oil reserves? If Iraq has a need of this kind, for either the short or long term, why has it not developed a commercial nuclear energy programme? Why has it not made any transactions which would be relevant to such a programme?

Sixthly, why, if it is genuinely interested in nuclear research, did it rush to buy plutonium separation technology and equipment that cannot be justified on scientific or economic grounds?

Seventhly, why has Iraq been making frenetic efforts to acquire large quantities of natural uranium, which is not under IAEA safeguards? Why has Iraq taken the highly unusual step of stockpiling uranium before it has built power reactors?

When the Iraqi representative was again asked at a plenary meeting to provide satisfactory answers to these urgent questions, he angrily left his seat, saying that Iraq would never answer them.

In 1978 Iraq proposed in a main committee of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament that Israel, and Israel alone, be completely disarmed. After that resolution had been railroaded through a reluctant General Assembly, Iraq asked the next session of the General Assembly to investigate Israel's alleged nuclear armaments.

I shall quote from statements made by a number of representatives in their explanations of vote in 1979 with regard to resolution 34/89 and, a year later, with reference to resolution 35/157.

A number of representatives at the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly had protested in this Committee against the singling out of Israel for censure by Iraq.

On 23 November 1979 a representative had the following to say:

"... we do not regard it as prudent, productive or just to single out as a special case the problem of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in Israel, while other related regional aspects of the proliferation problem are not treated in the present draft resolution under this agenda item. Therefore, that the present text serves to introduce an imbalance into the

(Mr. Eilan, Israel)

international debate on this question is clear, and it thereby complicates efforts to bring the global proliferation problem under control."

(A/C.1/34/PV.41, p. 13-15)

Further on in the debate, another representative expressed himself as follows:

"... the selective approach of singling out a particular country -- in this case, Israel -- for censure and as a target for collective sanctions is not, in our view, an appropriate approach to the goal of non-proliferation. In fact, we seriously doubt that the draft resolution is really designed to discourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons. As has been pointed out by others, only about half of the sponsors of the draft resolution are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty who have themselves accepted full-scope safeguards." (Ibid., p. 17)

And again in that debate, a representative expressed the same sentiments with utmost clarity by saying:

"Moreover, it singles out Israel for censure and prejudices its nuclear intentions on the basis of unreliable evidence. It assumes Israeli nuclear armament as an already existing fact." (Ibid, p. 27)

These statements and the unofficial comments of representatives who thought it more prudent to remain publicly silent left no doubt that many representatives in this Committee were fully aware that they were witnessing, and were participating in, an act of blatant discrimination against a Member State of the United Nations.

There is room for several committees of experts to investigate the nuclear activities of quite a number of Member States. The dictates of Realpolitik, however, make it very unlikely that representatives who now piously intone their abhorrence of the spread of nuclear weapons would dare submit a draft resolution demanding the investigation of the development of a so-called Islamic bomb in its various metamorphoses.

At the beginning of my statement I drew the attention of the members of this Committee to the significance of the second preambular paragraph of the draft resolution, recalling previous resolutions, and the inscription of the item on the agenda of the next General Assembly session.

(Mr. Eilan, Israel)

Given the automatic voting majority at the disposal of the Arab States, the presence of an accusation against Israel in a resolution of the General Assembly also ensures its almost automatic adoption, although, of course, it is in itself no proof of its veracity. The circle thus created is truly vicious. First, an accusation - however unfounded and however untrue - is railroaded through the General Assembly; later, the authors of the slander need only quote a United Nations resolution to substantiate, as it were, their originally false allegations.

This year's Iraqi resolution, if adopted, will no doubt be recalled in an Iraqi resolution next year, and thus the tangled web of lies will be woven until a time when no one can any longer remember that it all originated because of a momentary need by Iraq in 1978 to display its superiority over political rivals in the Arab world.

It has become customary in the United Nations that long before draft resolutions are formally submitted they are distributed as working papers.

The three elements added to the original Iraqi working paper deserve special mention. A paragraph was inserted referring to the alleged collaboration between Israel and South Africa. As I do every year in this Assembly, I repeat that there is no truth whatsoever in these allegations. They have been officially denied in Jerusalem on several occasions.

The second addition concerns the draft resolution of the General Conference of the IIAE. The reference to a certain paragraph of that draft resolution has been deliberately misrepresented.

In addition, references to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the original draft have been deleted from the operative part of the draft resolution to accommodate many of Iraq's supporters who themselves have not adhered to the Treaty and have instead been discreetly moved to a less conspicuous position in the preambular part of the resolution.

All these three changes are yet another proof, if one were needed, of the exercise of political expediency and the unashamed hypocrisy of the original sponsor of the draft resolution.

(Mr. Eilan, Israel)

The draft resolution before us, in its first preambular paragraph, refers in a vague sort of way to resolutions on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. At first glance there seems to be little connexion between this paragraph and other preambular and operative paragraphs of the draft resolution. It can only be understood as an answer to an anticipated charge by Israel that Iraq refused to negotiate a treaty to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Iraq anticipated the charge correctly, but the inclusion of this lame paragraph does nothing to diminish Iraq's culpability.

Last year Israel submitted in this Committee a draft resolution which called on all Member States of the region to negotiate a treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Iraq was foremost among those Arab States which rejected Israel's offer. On that occasion the representative of Israel in the Committee stated:

"That offer was turned down. No rhetoric, no explanations, no excuses, nor the repetition of odious and mendacious clichés can do away with that central fact. Israel said: 'Let us set aside, temporarily at least, our differences for the sake of saving the region from a nuclear calamity'. Most Arab States in this Committee have replied, 'No'."

"The whole world knows that Iraq and Libya are making enormous efforts to acquire the nuclear option for the price of oil. Do the rulers of those countries ever realize that the particles which make up nuclear fall-out know not the difference between Jew and Arab, between Moslem and Christian? Those who have refused Israel's offer in this Committee must bear a heavy responsibility in the eyes of mankind." (A/C.1/35/PV.36, p. 7)

I mentioned Iraq's refusal to consider Israel's offer because it is this refusal which makes nonsense of Iraq's contention in the third preambular paragraph. If Iraq were really "Alarmed":

"by the increasing evidence regarding Israel's attempt to acquire nuclear weapons ..." (A/C.1/36/L.30)

what better way would there be to put Israel to a test than to agree to negotiate with it, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone?

(Mr. Eilan, Israel)

I put it to you, Mr. Chairman, and to this Committee, that Iraq is not at all interested in removing causes for concern and tension in the Middle East; on the contrary, it seeks to increase them here in the United Nations. It is merely engaged in the usual exercise of political warfare. Those in this Committee who support Iraq and this draft resolution must therefore bear some responsibility for encouraging conflict and strife in the Middle East.

Instead of engaging in sterile debates and contentious draft resolutions, those truly interested in a better future for the Middle East can best serve that end by encouraging Iraq to agree to negotiate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. By doing so, a positive contribution would be made to the peace of the Middle East and the world.

Mr. HANDL (Czechoslovakia): The Czechoslovak delegation would like today to return briefly to the problem of nuclear weapons and the related threat of a nuclear catastrophe. The priority nature of nuclear disarmament should be obvious and beyond any doubt. After all, questions relating to the limitation of nuclear weapons, the halting of the nuclear arms race and the reduction of the risks inherent in these weapons have for several decades now been the natural focus of all disarmament negotiations, whether bilateral, trilateral or multilateral. This, of course, fully applies also to the work of the United Nations. The urgent need for nuclear disarmament and the prevention of a nuclear war was unequivocally embodied in the Final Document and in the Programme of Action of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held in 1978.

The problems connected with nuclear weapons, that are from year to year considered by both the United Nations General Assembly and by the Geneva Committee on Disarmament, represent a broad spectrum of issues, ranging from proposals for partial measures, such as non-deployment of nuclear weapons where such weapons as yet are not stationed and the conclusion of an agreement on the strengthening of the security guarantees of non-nuclear-weapon States, to measures of a more radical nature, such as,

(Mr. Handl, Czechoslovakia)

in the first place, the achievement of a general and complete nuclear-weapon test-ban treaty, and up to the proposal for complete nuclear disarmament and the liquidation of the accumulated stockpiles of nuclear weapons. It is not our intention today to analyse any of these questions nor assess the progress achieved in different areas of negotiations. The urgent need of their solution has this year once again been expressed in a number of convincing and constructive statements and has been reflected in many of the draft resolutions submitted. All this attests to the fact that the overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations well understand the growing danger of a nuclear catastrophe and are constructively striving to lessen that danger.

The main reason why we have touched upon these questions is to underscore the complex and many-faceted nature of the problem of nuclear disarmament and the related necessity to continue efforts for its comprehensive solution in all existing directions. We are convinced that the achievement of every specific result, of every even partial agreement, would represent an important break-through in the solution of the entire problem of nuclear disarmament, would remove one part of the existing threat of a nuclear war, and would facilitate negotiations on other aspects of disarmament.

The countries of the socialist community, including Czechoslovakia, have always come out in support of the speediest possible solution of the burning problem of nuclear disarmament and have, as is known, originated a whole series of constructive, balanced and realistic proposals in that respect. The achievement of the objectives of disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, represents the basic constant in the foreign policies of the States members of the Warsaw Treaty. Together with our allies, we have repeatedly declared and affirmed, even at the highest level, that we are willing - of course, on the basis of reciprocity and equal security - to negotiate the prohibition of any type of weapons, their limitation or even complete liquidation and to do this without any preconditions.

We have been all the more alarmed in recent days by the statements of some delegations of States Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) testifying to a lack of interest on their part in taking up constructive

(Mr. Handl, Czechoslovakia)

negotiations on problems of nuclear disarmament or in striving, in a positive spirit, to find mutually acceptable solutions. Referring to the alleged shortcomings of the Soviet proposal for the adoption of a declaration on preventing a nuclear catastrophe, these delegations based their arguments, among other things, on the allegation that the USSR is inconsistent in the question of the use of nuclear weapons.



(Mr. Handl, Czechoslovakia)

The statement of the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany even contained reflections to the effect that the prohibition of the first use of nuclear weapons would be tantamount to placing Western Europe in a position of helplessness, in which the countries of the Warsaw Treaty would easily make use of their so-called conventional superiority. These allegations are more than false, they are ridiculous. Moreover, they are being substantiated by data whose credibility is known to have been repeatedly refuted. Their real aim is by far not the defence of the West against a non-existent Warsaw Treaty danger; their sole endeavour is to acquire military superiority over the countries of the socialist community in an atmosphere of war psychosis. It is, simply speaking, an attempt at diktat in both European and world affairs from a position of military strength. It is clear that it is impossible on that basis to have serious disarmament talks and, even less, to strive for the safeguarding of international security and peace. The only thing that can be achieved in that way is a further deterioration of the international climate and the initiation of a new dangerous round of the arms race.

That reality was graphically pointed out by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, in an interview that he granted the West German magazine Der Spiegel, in which, in this context, he said:

"The Soviet Union does not claim any position of privilege. We only insist that the United States and the entire NATO alliance should measure our security and that of our allies by the same yardstick with which they measure their own security."

It would be very beneficial if this quite natural requirement were to be taken into account also by the authors of the statements to this Committee that I have mentioned. Surely those delegations will remember that the countries of the Warsaw Treaty proposed to their counterparts in NATO the conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of the first use not only of nuclear weapons but also of conventional weapons. Such a measure would certainly remove any fears of a conventional conflict, fears that are no less valid on our side than they are on the side of the NATO countries. It is therefore surprising

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that those who at an earlier time thwarted relevant negotiations now perceive one of the main shortcomings of the Soviet proposal to be the fact that it does not address conventional weapons. This is even more astonishing in view of the fact that the proposal of the Warsaw Treaty countries concerning the prohibition of the first use of both categories of weapons still remains valid.

Today, however, as a result of the well known decisions by the United States and other NATO States relating to the field of nuclear armaments, the threat of a nuclear catastrophe looms more prominently in the foreground than before. It is this fact that in our view, and, we believe, in the view of the overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations, fully substantiates the appeal for the outlawing of the first use of nuclear weapons as contained in the Soviet draft declaration -- with, of course, the understanding, which now also appears in the draft declaration, that this should be the first step towards a universally accepted objective: the complete elimination of the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons through cessation of their production followed by the destruction of their stockpiles. That is why we are convinced that this important proposal deserves the full support of the United Nations General Assembly.

It is understandable that the most effective way to complete and general nuclear disarmament would be to reach an agreement on halting the manufacture of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they are completely liquidated.

A realistic approach to solution of this question is contained in draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.14, of which the Czechoslovak delegation is a sponsor. Negotiations, for which the draft calls, can bring exceptionally valuable results corresponding to the vital interests of the peoples of all the countries of the world, provided of course that the political will of all the parties to reach the necessary agreement will prevail over the doubtful theory that without nuclear weapons it is impossible to guarantee the security of this or that country, of one or another grouping, as we hear from some States members of NATO. That draft resolution contains important recommendations addressed to the Committee on Disarmament concerning the method

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and content of further negotiations, particularly with regard to the establishment of a special working group of the Committee with a clearly delineated mandate, the consideration of possible stages of nuclear disarmament and their approximate content, and the idea of considering, in the first stage, the question of halting the development and manufacture of new types of nuclear weapons. We believe that these recommendations represent a well balanced working framework for the deliberations of the Committee on Disarmament on the given problems, which reflects their most topical aspects. We therefore express the hope that the draft resolution will receive the broadest support from the members of this Committee.

The question of nuclear disarmament is not a matter of rhetoric. It is a question on which the fate and future of human civilization depend. It therefore cannot be taken lightly. Its solution will not be furthered by vague proclamations or good intentions, or by studies and theoretical research, or by waiting fatalistically to see how things develop. Even less will it be furthered by intimidation, by looking for a threat where none exists, by inventing further unjustifiable preconditions and obstacles to progress. The impending threat of a world-wide nuclear catastrophe calls for radical steps and effective measures by the entire international community. We should like to believe that the current session of the General Assembly will create the necessary prerequisites for such measures.

Mr. FONSEKA (Sri Lanka): On 6 July 1981 the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference elected me as its new Chairman, replacing Ambassador Balasubramaniam, who had completed his mission in New York. It is my privilege to introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Committee to the First Committee. The report, as contained in document A/36/28, has been prepared in fulfilment of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee contained in resolution 35/151 of 12 December 1980.

In implementing this mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee held two sessions in 1981. In pursuance of a decision taken at the outset of its second session to entrust its open-ended Working Group with the task of drafting the report of the Ad Hoc Committee to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session, the Working Group held three meetings on 8 and 9 July 1981 under the able chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee's Rapporteur, Mr. Zelada of Spain.

The Working Group successfully concluded its work and made it possible for the Ad Hoc Committee to adopt the present report by consensus at its final meeting on 10 July. On this occasion I should like to acknowledge the important contribution made by Mr. Zelada and his colleagues in the Working Group. A spirit of co-operation and true dedication characterized all stages of their work.

With regard to the content of the Ad Hoc Committee's report, it is composed, as was the previous one, of three chapters entitled: "I. Introduction"; "II. Work of the Committee"; and "III. Conclusions and Recommendations". A significant part of the second chapter of the report reflects the fact that, in accordance with operative paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 35/151, the Committee continued to maintain, through its Chairman, close contact with the representatives of States possessing nuclear weapons in order to remain currently informed of their respective attitudes. The positions of the nuclear-weapon States are set out in paragraph 14 of the report.

The Ad Hoc Committee in its report holds the view that having regard for the important requirements of a world disarmament conference to be convened at the earliest appropriate time, with universal participation and with

(Mr. Fonseka, Sri Lanka)

adequate preparation, the General Assembly may wish to decide that, after its second special session devoted to disarmament, a world disarmament conference would take place as soon as the necessary consensus on convening has been reached.

I should now like to introduce the draft resolution on a world disarmament conference - document A/C.1/36/L.27 - sponsored by Burundi, Peru, Poland, Spain and Sri Lanka, which are members of the Bureau of the Ad Hoc Committee.

At this point I should like to ask the Secretariat to note that, in the first preambular paragraph of draft resolution 35/151, not 35/150. resolution referred to should be resolution 35/151, not 35/150.

The draft resolution is similar to that adopted last year with the difference that the seventh preambular paragraph, which refers to the draft agenda for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, includes the subject of the possible convening of a world disarmament conference. Accordingly, in operative paragraph 4, the Ad Hoc Committee is being asked to submit a report to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Successive Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference have presented to the Assembly a report and a draft resolution which admittedly is an enabling resolution to allow the Committee to continue its work. There may be a belief that the Committee is some distance away from gaining its objective, especially at a time like the present, when almost any approach on disarmament is viewed with scepticism. The world disarmament conference is no exception. It is no small undertaking, but the magnitude of the task itself should not discourage us.

In conclusion, I should like to thank all members of the Ad Hoc Committee for the spirit of co-operation and accommodation they have always shown during our meetings. I should also like to place on record my appreciation of the work of the Secretary of the Committee and his colleagues in the Secretariat for the assistance they have extended to the Committee at all times.

I commend the draft resolution in document A/C.1/36/L.27, which is before the Committee, for adoption by consensus.

Mr. MARTYNOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): My delegation would like to express its views on the problem of the neutron weapon, which was the subject of draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.33, submitted a few days ago. Over the past few years this question has been one of the most urgent and one of the problems fraught with the gravest consequences for international security. This problem has recently become even more threatening in character as a result of the decision by the United States Administration to manufacture the neutron weapon. As we know, this decision was taken in August last, on the day when we commemorated the victims of Hiroshima, and this once again goes to show the whole world that the authors of this idea are deaf to the voice of humanism. As a result of that decision, adopted with cynical disregard for the will and the interests of the people of the world, the already vast nuclear arsenal of the United States is being supplemented by a new and particularly barbarous means of mass destruction of human life.

This step on the part of the United States Administration is one more striking example of the extremely dangerous approach it has to international affairs. Indeed, if we were to line up in a single row all the measures taken by the United States in recent years - the sharp increase in military expenditures; the preparations for the deployment in Western Europe of new medium-range nuclear missiles; the decision to create new offensive systems of the Triad strategic nuclear missiles, that is, intercontinental ballistic missiles of the MX type; new missile-equipped submarines; the new B-1 strategic bomber; and, finally, the decision to produce the neutron weapon - it becomes clear beyond any doubt that Washington is bent on an unrestrained arms race and the destabilization of the world situation.

It is no accident that the decision by the United States Administration regarding the neutron weapon was greeted with particular indignation and alarm in many countries of the world, even in the majority of the countries of western Europe. In an attempt to mislead world opinion and to blunt the edge of this outburst of indignation, it is being asserted that the neutron warheads which are being produced will be stationed on United States territory and

(Mr. Martynov, Byelorussian SSR)

therefore, it is claimed, it is a purely internal matter of the United States. However, at the same time, the Secretary of State of that same Power has stated that neutron bombs, if necessary, may be taken to Europe in the space of only a few hours. So the legitimate question arises: who is going to determine whether or not this need exists? Is it going to be the European peoples? Hardly. In any case the history of the question of the neutron weapon does not encourage optimism on this score.

Furthermore, the same official personage stated that the deployment of the neutron weapon would not necessarily be confined to Europe and that it might be deployed in "any theatre where the need might arise for repelling superior forces". This formulation is rather elastic - elastic enough to allow the deployment of the weapon in any part of the world at the discretion of that Power. Furthermore, as we can see, that formula completely fails to take into account the views on the subject of the countries in question.

Attempts are being made to convince us that the neutron weapon is an exclusively defensive weapon whose use would have very limited consequences and that only its tactical use is being contemplated. However, this is the conclusion which was reached about the neutron weapon by the New York Times Magazine of 15 November this year after recent interviews with representatives of the Pentagon:

"Like any other nuclear weapon, it is clearly an instrument of mass destruction". (New York Times Magazine, 15 November 1981, p. 53)

In so far as concerns its tactical use, the present Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Helmut Schmidt, stated as far back as 1962 that the use of tactical nuclear weapons, and I quote from the same issue of the New York Times Magazine, "...would not defend Europe, but destroy it". (ibid., p. 56) A report recently published in London by the Institute of Strategic Studies states that in the case of a "tactical" nuclear war in Europe, as many as 200 million people would lose their lives.

So, what today is being described as "an internal affair of the United States" may very well become a matter of the death of millions of people in other continents.

The inclusion of the neutron weapon in military arsenals will lead to a dangerous lowering of the so-called nuclear threshold, or, to put the matter simply, an increase in the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war and for this the United States bears the entire responsibility.

A dangerous illusion, which an attempt is being made to plant in the minds of people by American strategists, is their assertion that the neutron warhead is a kind of "clean", practically "humane" weapon. And this is being said about a weapon which is especially designed to destroy human life and the effects of whose use, according to scientists, will persist for an extremely long period of time and be extremely harmful for future generations.



(Mr. Martynov, Byelorussian SSR)

It is the business of all people concerned by the fate of the world and the future of civilization to take practical steps to defend what is, after all, the paramount human right - the right to life. The accumulation of ever newer means of waging war must be vigorously countered by the alternative of limiting, reducing and ultimately doing away with weapons, including nuclear weapons. It is precisely for this that the socialist countries have been consistently working.

As far back as 1978 the socialist countries submitted for the consideration of the Committee on Disarmament a draft international convention on the prohibition of the manufacture, stockpiling, deployment and use of the nuclear neutron weapon. Unfortunately, because of resistance from a number of States, this document has still not been duly considered by the Committee on Disarmament and the creation of a special working group for negotiations on this question has been blocked by the United States and its closest allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

In the light of the most dangerous recent developments connected with the question of the neutron weapon, draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.33, submitted by the delegation of the German Democratic Republic, could not have come at a more appropriate time. The existing situation makes it imperative for the Committee on Disarmament, as the draft resolution itself proposes, to start negotiations without delay in an appropriate organizational framework with a view to concluding a convention prohibiting the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of the neutron weapons.

In so far as concerns the organizational framework for such talks, the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR shares the view expressed in the Committee on Disarmament by socialist countries regarding the advisability of creating in the Committee a special working group to draft a convention on the subject. The question of the neutron weapon, so dangerous for the fate of the world, in our view calls urgently for immediate and effective talks which could best be conducted in a working group especially created for the purpose.

The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR, as a co-sponsor of this draft resolution, calls upon other delegations to ensure that it is adopted and by so doing promote the beginning of concrete talks on this important question.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): In their thoughtful and incisive statements, a number of delegations, in particular those of the Netherlands, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany, have exposed the inconsistencies between the Soviet proposals in the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/36/L.2 and the USSR's statements on the issue of the employment of its nuclear weapons. The serious questions raised in those statements have yet to be answered by the Soviet delegation.

Like my colleague from the Soviet Union, who occasionally draws upon his medical background in framing his remarks, I shall utilize my legal background to discuss the general pattern of alleged major disarmament proposals which the Soviet Union has been introducing, almost ritualistically, over the years. The draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/36/L.2 epitomizes this pattern.

To present my case, I must go briefly back into history. In the mid-1950s, the Soviet Union advanced numerous proposals aimed primarily at preventing the Western European countries from organizing their defences against massive Soviet forces remaining in Eastern Europe at the conclusion of the Second World War. In presenting those proposals, the USSR sought to portray itself as the champion of peace and disarmament. Screened from the world's scrutiny by its cloak of secrecy, it was free to speak of peace while engaged in an intensive effort to develop weapons designed to achieve primacy over the major military Powers. Thus, a few days after the successful test of its first intercontinental ballistic missile in the summer of 1957, the Soviet Union stalked out of the five-nation sub-committee of the Disarmament Commission, then the main body for disarmament negotiations. Not long thereafter, the Kremlin leaders began a programme of intimidation by announcing that they had an orbital missile capable of reaching every point on the globe.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

During this same period, the Soviet Union repeatedly proposed a moratorium on nuclear tests, which were then conducted in the atmosphere. Its purpose, thinly veiled, was to arrest the development of an effective United States deterrent against this growing Soviet nuclear-weapon capability. In its campaign, the Soviet Union sought to exploit the mounting concern in many parts of the world over the effects of atmospheric tests on humans and the environment. Conscious of the potential hazards of such testing, the United States agreed to a moratorium. In so doing, we assumed that the Soviet Union would honour the moratorium it had so vigorously pressed for -- but it obviously had different plans. A year after its commitment to the moratorium -- with the indignant denials of its representatives to the test-ban negotiations that there *was* never any Soviet intention to violate that pledge still vivid in the minds of the negotiators -- the Soviet Union, on 30 August 1961, initiated a series of approximately 50 atmospheric tests of unprecedented magnitude.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

Moreover, in a statement attempting to justify this breach of faith, the Soviet Union revealed that - the moratorium notwithstanding - it had "worked out designs for creating a series of super-powerful nuclear bombs of 20, 30, 50 and 100 million tons of T.N.T." Such, then, is the reliability of Soviet pledges.

With this past history of Soviet conduct in mind, let us turn to more recent years. In 1978, the Soviet Union made a proposal for a cessation of nuclear weapon production. This came a time when, following the SALT I agreement, the United States exercised extreme restraint in its nuclear defence programme. But it was also at a time when the Soviet Union was embarked upon a massive build-up of its nuclear arsenal, particularly the SS-20 missiles, which it produced and is still producing - to use a Soviet phrase - "like sausages." Again, the Soviet words were at variance with its actions and intentions. In fact, the Soviet proposal sought to mask those actions in order to forestall the development of deterrent countermeasures by the Western alliance.

In 1979, the USSR introduced, with its customary fanfare, a proposal to condemn "hegemony." Whose hegemony? That of a super-Power about to subjugate a small, neighbouring non-aligned country? No. According to the Soviet Union, only others are capable of such nefarious deeds. After all, how could anyone allege such tendencies against a country which had proposed condemnation of hegemonism?

The height of cynicism reflected in these Soviet propaganda proposals was probably reached in the draft resolution on "Urgent Measures to Prevent War" introduced by the USSR last year. Having invaded Afghanistan and engaged in the brutal suppression of the brave people of that country, the Soviet Union was hardly fit to talk about preventing war. Nor was it the right party to oppose expansion of alliances - or is the imported Government of Afghanistan not a Soviet ally? One can only wonder how the Soviet representatives could manage to introduce and advocate this proposal with any conscience at all when

(Mr. Fields, United States)

their very words were played against the sounds of their invading army and the cries of beleaguered people seeing their fragile freedom wrested from them.

In his address to this Committee, Mr. Rostow lamented the declining influence of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter. He pointed to the inescapable relationship between that decline and the eclipse of effective arms control. Can such a climate of aggression do anything but seriously impede realistic consideration of arms control measures? The maintenance of national security is, after all, the most important duty of any Government to its people, and meaningful arms control therefore becomes prudently feasible only when all Member States of the United Nations strictly adhere to their solemn obligation to abide by Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter.

The true nature of Soviet initiatives is evident to everybody. The fate of the last two I mentioned is ample proof of that fact. This year, we are being asked to approve a resolution which would make the first use of nuclear weapons an international crime, but in a nuclear holocaust, who would be the judge of the criminal in the dock? Historical evidence demonstrates that words can never substitute for deeds. All of us can engage in lofty rhetoric, but the world will not be safer for that. On the contrary, those of us who place value on moral obligations can be put in great jeopardy if we rely solely on verbal pronouncements or on pious but hollow initiatives, rather than on specific and verifiable arms control arrangements.

President Reagan yesterday described his personal vision for genuine peace and international security. He outlined a concrete programme to achieve that vision and called upon the Soviet leadership to join the United States in making his vision a reality. The President proposed that the powerful nuclear States sit down together and negotiate an agreement for arms reduction - not just arms limitation. Such a negotiation would indeed be a "giant step for mankind."

(Mr. Fields, United States)

We strongly hope for a constructive Soviet response to the good-faith offer tendered by President Reagan. The world longs for that offer to be accepted. Again, deeds must replace mere words if we are to realize the deepest aspirations of mankind: to live in peace.

I rest my case.

Mr. TAKAHASHI (Japan). I should like to add a few words to the statement made by Mr. Menzies, the representative of Canada, on behalf of the sponsors in introducing draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.35, concerning chemical weapons.

In his statement in the general debate on 20 October 1981, Ambassador Okawa, of my delegation expressed in some detail the fundamental attitude of Japan on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Having reviewed the work of the Committee on Disarmament, Mr. Okawa expressed Japan's support for the proposal to revise the mandate of that Committee's Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. In our view, this would accelerate the recent momentum towards the conclusion of a chemical-weapons convention.

Mr. Okawa also expressed the hope that next year's session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons will concentrate its efforts on seeking solutions to the scope of the prohibition and to the problem of verification. In this connexion, we trust that in future discussions we can study the way to establish a verification system that would be both realistic and yet sufficiently effective to guarantee the viability of the convention.

Japan has urged that the Soviet Union and the United States respond to the desire of the international community that they exert their utmost efforts to reopen their suspended bilateral negotiations. The goal should be to allow the final outcome of their negotiations to be reflected, at an early date, in the deliberations of the Committee on Disarmament.

(Mr. Takahashi, Japan)

With those points in mind, my delegation has worked intensively with other delegations to produce a draft resolution on a chemical weapons convention acceptable to all Members, the result of which is now contained in document A/C.1/36/L.35, as formally introduced by the representative of Canada. The text we have proposed here is not exactly what we had originally hoped for nor what other delegations may have had in mind.

However, we believe this compromise text is the only text that appears under the prevailing circumstances, to have a possibility of adoption by consensus.

One of the prime purposes of our exercise here in New York is to encourage and help the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva in its efforts to achieve agreement on a chemical weapons convention at the earliest date. From that point of view, my delegation considers that it is imperative that we adopt a resolution on chemical weapons by consensus, as in the previous year. Any resolution on a chemical weapons convention without a consensus basis will drastically diminish its value.

Consequently, I wish to appeal through you, Mr. Chairman, to my fellow representatives to endorse and support the draft resolution presented, so that it may be adopted by consensus. By so doing, my delegation is convinced that it would constitute encouraging support to those who are working on the elaboration of a chemical weapons convention in the Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. KRUTZSCH (German Democratic Republic): In the general debate the German Democratic Republic already expressed its full support for the initiative of the Soviet Union concerning the conclusion of a "Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe".

As a State which is a neighbour of a country with the highest density of nuclear weapons, the German Democratic Republic is particularly interested in measures which are immediately and effectively directed against the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war.

(Mr. Krutzsch, German Democratic Republic)

But, as is generally known, some States oppose their doctrines on the use of nuclear weapons to the proposal to ban the first use of nuclear weapons by concluding a relevant declaration. As they put the matter, the threat of the uncertainty of the use of nuclear weapons should diminish the danger of an outbreak of war. That is, to put it mildly, a strange idea. How can the knowledge of an uncertainty of the use of nuclear weapons have a stabilizing and curbing effect? Such a threat could never create stability, but only fears of an unprovoked preventive strike.

Another objection against the proposal, which is not new to us, is that the danger of aggression with conventional weapons, particularly in Europe, would grow if an agreement on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons were to be concluded. The Soviet Union and the other socialist States have submitted a proposal to dispel such concern. We have in mind here the proposal made in 1979 to conclude with the Western States some kind of non-aggression treaty, that is, a treaty on the non-first use of both nuclear and conventional weapons. Characteristically enough, that initiative was rejected by those who today link the solution of the problem of the non-use of nuclear weapons with the non-use of force. They even oppose negotiations on that question. However, the proposal of the socialist States remains on the table. If the Western States are really afraid of the outbreak of a conflict involving conventional weapons and merely for that reason are not prepared to accept an obligation concerning the non-first-use of nuclear weapons, we cannot see why they object to the conclusion of a treaty as proposed by the socialist States in 1979.

Among other things, the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) try to justify their objection by using the theory of an alleged imbalance of conventional forces and armaments in Europe. In that context, we should like to recall that since 1973, now talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe have been under way in Vienna. In that forum, the socialist States have submitted quite a number of far-reaching proposals aimed at achieving a parity of armed forces and armaments on a lower level in the area.



(Mr. Krutzsch, German Democratic  
Republic)

However, all those proposals have met with stubborn rejection by the Western States. So far, they have not been prepared to accept, on the basis of reciprocity, any obligation concerning the reduction or limitation of their armed forces and armaments. The NATO countries motivate their negative attitude in this respect by the alleged lack of agreement on numerical data. When the socialist countries responded to excessive Western estimates of the numerical strength of the Warsaw Treaty armed forces by submitting official data on their own forces, the NATO countries reacted with another excessive estimate, speaking of an additional strength of over 50,000 men. To date, they have not given any reason for that new estimate, thus preventing urgently needed results in the negotiations. The Vienna talks are typical of the phenomenon that the demand for more openness and transparency sometimes is used as a pretext for covering up the lack of goodwill.

On the whole, we have the following picture: the solution of one task is made contingent on the solution of another. The solution of the second task is then linked to that of a third one. However, agreement on the third is simply rejected, thus destroying the basis for the solution of all the other problems.

In our statement we commented on certain objections to draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.2, that were linked to the situation in Europe. Looked at more closely, one can see that those objections are not well founded. We are firmly convinced that the prohibition of the first use of nuclear weapons is in the very own security interests of the States in Europe as well as in the other regions of the world and, therefore, we wish to reaffirm our full support for the proposal before us.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on those representatives who wish to exercise their right of reply.

Mr. AWANIS (Iraq) (interpretation from Arabic): In his statement today, the representative of the Zionist entity tried to misrepresent some positive facts which are well known to the members of the First Committee. In point of fact, the statement of that representative was a repetition of his previous claims put forward before this Committee, particularly with regard to the draft resolution he submitted last year, which he had to withdraw because he fully realized that it would meet with defeat.

My delegation will disregard most of the claims and allegations made by the representative of the Zionist entity simply because everyone is aware of the truth. That representative has questioned the singling out of Israel for censure. We would reply to him in accordance with the facts set forth in the report of the Group of Experts to Prepare a Study on Israeli Nuclear Armament (A/36/431), as that report reiterated that the Zionist entity has not announced formally its renunciation of atomic weapons and has refused to place its nuclear facilities under international control; it has also refused to sign and ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Moreover, it has the power and capability to produce nuclear weapons and has enough political reasons to motivate its recourse to the nuclear option.

As to the several queries raised about my country, I shall confine myself to recalling the statement of the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency made before the General Assembly a few days ago, when he confirmed that the Iraqi nuclear plant was designed for peaceful purposes and that inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency had inspected it and did not find any proof that the plant was intended for anything but peaceful purposes.

Mr. AL-HAMZAH (Democratic Yemen) (interpretation from Arabic): My delegation wishes to exercise its right of reply to the allegations made against Democratic Yemen this morning in the course of the statement of the representative of the United States before the First Committee.

We are used in this Committee to hearing allegations by the United States delegation, and we have heard enough such things this year. We have listened to previous statements in exercise of the right of reply, but we remain unconvinced of the validity of their argument as to general and complete disarmament or curbing their increasing ambitions to dominate, to create spheres of influence, plunder the riches of other countries and carry out open intervention and interference in the domestic affairs of other countries.

The United States delegation, speaking this morning about the special item on the Indian Ocean, referred to the practices of its country in the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, to the fact that it did not recognize the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI), of 16 December 1971, and to the further fact that it had held up the convening of the conference on the Indian Ocean that had been envisaged by the General Assembly at two consecutive sessions.

However, the United States representative said nothing about the aggressive intentions of the United States to dominate our area, or about its continued threats to occupy the oil fields and to expand its Diego Garcia base. Nor was there any mention of the installation of nuclear arms on that base, or of the United States attempts to establish other bases for aggression in the area.

There is also another factor: its continued support of the racist régimes in South Africa and occupied Palestine, and the fact that it has continued to equip those racist régimes with the necessary material and equipment. The United States representative also failed to mention Israel's racist nature as revealed by the Israeli raid against the Iraqi nuclear reactor, as well as by its continued shelling of Arab civilians in southern Lebanon, the continued occupation of Arab territories and the complete denial of the national rights of the Palestinian people.

(Mr. Al-Hamzah, Democratic Yemen)

Nor did the representative of the United States speak of its new alliance with Israel which has allowed Israel to become an extension of United States military might, in complete disregard of our unanimous wish to declare the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone. If the United States is really interested in proclaiming the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, its representative should have referred to all these important, vital aspects of its policy which has assumed alarming dimensions. He should have spoken of its intentions, demonstrated by the dispatch of various military units to carry out military manoeuvres in our area on the ninth day of this month. He should also have spoken about the other factors which led it to establish the rapid deployment forces to "stabilize" the area.

It is no surprise to hear the allegations of the United States delegation against my country, because we are used to these actions in our area, aimed at striking blows against our development. The United States has pursued its attempts to frustrate all development processes in Yemen.

As to the talk of so-called Soviet influence in the area to justify the aggressive moves of the United States, which have always been denounced by the countries of the area, if the United States is really keen on establishing peace and security in the Indian Ocean, it must halt its acts of aggression and take part in the international efforts to proclaim the Indian Ocean a zone of peace.

In conclusion, we categorically reject all allegations made by the United States representative against our country, which we consider as an extension of his country's acts of intervention and interference in our domestic affairs.

Mr. EILAN (Israel): I am speaking in exercise of my right of reply to a statement just made by the representative of Iraq.

There is a simple prescription for slander: accuse your adversary of every transgression in the world and then watch him deny the charges, hoping that the French proverb, qui s'excuse s'accuse, would apply and some at least of the accusations, however preposterous, will be remembered by the audience. The delegation of Israel has no intention of thus obliging the representative of Iraq. Suffice it to say that all the Iraqi allegations against Israel made this afternoon are a faithful recording of those made in the plenary Assembly this year, in this Committee a year ago, two years ago and so on. They were all answered by Israel.

Tonight Mr. Chairman, I should like to suggest, through you, as I did last year, that rather than exchange them in a repetitive altercation, Israel and Iraq should submit their rights of reply in writing, duly recorded in the verbatim records. We would save the United Nations much money and not try the patience of the Committee.

The meeting rose at 6.25 p.m.