



VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 30TH MEETING

Chairman: Mr. GOLOB (Yugoslavia)

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DISARMAMENT ITEMS

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Mr. La Rocca (Italy) - A/C.1/36/L.7
Mr. Garcia Robles (Mexico) - A/C.1/36/L.11

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The meeting was called to order at 10.50 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 39 to 56, 128 and 135 (continued)

Mr. AYEWAH (Nigeria): The concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones as a collateral measure of disarmament has been widely accepted by the international community. The objective of such a concept is to create conditions in which a group of countries can undertake a collective responsibility to promote the purposes of the non-proliferation régime. In other words, they would seek to establish appropriate conditions and modalities mutually agreed upon by the States within the group that would outlaw any attempt by any State within the group or outside it to introduce in any manner whatsoever nuclear weapons into the territory of any of the members of the group. Such efforts have been undertaken in Latin America, with happy results, in the Treaty of Tlatelolco of 1967.

In line with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations to contribute to efforts "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war", as well as to promote international peace and security, African countries have largely regarded the nuclear-weapon option as inconsistent with their development aspirations.

It was against that background that the first regular session of the Assembly of Heads of State or Government of the Organization of African Unity, held from 17 to 24 July 1964 in Cairo, solemnly adopted a Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, in which it called upon all States to respect the continent of Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

It is my privilege to introduce the draft resolution on the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, contained in document A/C.1/36/L.16. I do so on behalf of the delegations of Algeria, Angola, Cape Verde, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, Togo, the United Republic of Cameroon and Zambia.

In presenting this draft resolution, the sponsors would like to reaffirm that the objective of a denuclearized Africa remains fundamental to the efforts

(Mr. Ayewah, Nigeria)

of the continent towards collective self-defence. In other words, African countries desire to live in peace and to contribute to the construction of the peace process. They would consider it not only an unfriendly act but also an act of interference in its internal affairs if it became possible for countries outside Africa to wish to dictate to it the pattern of its domestic policies.

The sponsors would also like to underscore the fact that it is still the basic intention of African countries to realize the objective of a denuclearized Africa but that they consider that the sole impediment to that possibility in the present circumstances resides in the overt attempt by the racist régime of South Africa to introduce nuclear weapons into the continent. We express the hope that all countries, both nuclear and non-nuclear alike, will consider and respect the continent of Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone and refrain from any action or inaction which might help to frustrate that objective.

The question of the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa took an ominous turn with the development of a nuclear capability by South Africa. The reported detonation of a nuclear device on 22 September 1979 merely confirmed earlier suspicions which were already evident in 1977 that South Africa indeed intended to adopt a nuclear-weapon option in order to pursue its abhorrent policies of apartheid. It is for this reason that the delegations of Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, the United Republic of Cameroon and Zambia have decided to present yet another draft resolution (A/C.1/36/L.15) specifically on the question of the nuclear capability of South Africa.

South Africa's capacity to produce nuclear weapons has been established beyond all doubt by the content and increased sophistication of its nuclear programme and by the Secretary-General's report on the régime's plans and capability in the nuclear field, contained in document A/35/402 and Corr.1.

(Mr. Ayewah, Nigeria)

What is even more disturbing is that the massive build-up of South Africa's military machine and its frenzied acquisition of nuclear-weapon capability has increasingly been used for repressive and aggressive purposes and in particular as an instrument of blackmail.

This Committee cannot be unaware that South Africa, in flagrant violation of international law and the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter, has continued its military attacks on independent States of southern Africa. The particular case of the invasion of the sovereign State of Angola and the continued occupation of part of its territory stares us defiantly in the face. Furthermore, South Africa has increased its acts of subversion aimed at destabilizing those States. I hardly need to recapitulate its record of violence in the past few years, information on which is common knowledge to the international community.

We therefore call on those countries which have continued to give solace and support to South Africa, particularly in the nuclear field, to change course in line with their deeply held convictions of decency, democratic principles and rationality. It is unacceptable that the glitter of gold or other geo-political or geo-strategic interests of such countries should become a more convincing consideration than the lives, the liberty and the well-being of Africans.

The draft resolution calls upon the Security Council in particular to intensify its efforts to institute enforcement measures against South Africa so as to make the arms embargo more effective. It is the duty and obligation of that Council under the Charter to promote international peace and security.

We cannot but draw attention to an ominous an ominous trend in which it is increasingly becoming the rule rather than the exception for a number of countries to have a ready recourse to the use of the veto any time issues of southern Africa are discussed within the United Nations system. It is the hope of the co-sponsors that such countries will rethink the development of their policy and attitude, in the realization that a destabilized Africa is a danger to international peace and security.

(Mr. Ayewah, Nigeria)

The sponsors would like to submit for the Committee's adoption the two draft resolutions contained in documents A/C.1/36/L.15 and A/C.1/36/L.16, which they have very carefully worked out on the basis of existing reality in southern Africa, the mood of the African people, and the sensitivities of the various interest groups which bear on the subject.

Mr. LA ROCCA (Italy): I wish to speak in order to introduce the draft resolution entitled "Preventing an arms race in outer space", contained in document A/C.1/36/L.7 of 10 November 1981, presented by the following States: Australia, Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

The interest shown by a very large number of delegations in the problems of arms control and disarmament in outer space has constituted a distinctive feature of our deliberations in the First Committee.

The numerous statements which have so far dealt with this subject have shown that there is a widely shared conviction that further efforts are needed by the international community to keep outer space a peaceful environment and to prevent the possibility of an arms race in this new dimension of human activity.

This aspect of our deliberations is considered particularly important by the delegations on whose behalf I have the honour to speak. Many of us have long stressed the need to give timely consideration to these problems. It is appropriate in this context to note the proposal of the USSR contained in document A/36/192 of 20 August 1981, which has contributed to focusing the attention of our Committee on outer space.

Like many other delegations which have expressed their views on the subject, the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.7 are convinced that a much broader involvement of the international community is desirable on an issue which is liable to affect the future security of the whole world. The draft resolution is an attempt to contribute to promoting such an involvement; it is a determined initiative to put on the agenda of multilateral

(Mr. La Rocca, Italy)

negotiations related to disarmament an item which has been conspicuously absent until now. It goes in a direction which our countries have consistently advocated over the years, ever since the adoption of the 1967 outer space Treaty. It flows directly from the commitment embodied in paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, which reads:

"In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies." (S-10/2, para. 80)

The fast pace of technological developments in space and the prospective increase in the number of countries which will benefit from them bring both new opportunities and new risks. Space capabilities are increasingly used for beneficial activities, such as remote sensing, communications, scientific research, climatology and, not least, in verifying arms control and disarmament agreements. Such activities contribute substantially to promoting progress in international co-operation, peace and stability.

On the other hand, though it is not easy to predict the likely consequences of an arms race in outer space, it is fair to assume that such a race would prove immensely expensive, disruptive of the exploitation of space for peaceful purposes and detrimental to international peace and security.

The heightened levels of insecurity, instability and expenditure that would follow the development of an arms race in outer space dictate that a determined attempt should be made to prevent this possibility. The prospects in this regard may become more limited as the pace of technological development increases; swift action is therefore imperative before conditions for negotiating meaningful agreements become more difficult.

(Mr. La Rocca, Italy)

The draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/36/L.7 is aimed at promoting such action. Operative paragraph 3

"Requests the Committee on Disarmament to consider, as from the beginning of its session in 1982, the question of negotiating effective and verifiable agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space, taking into account all existing and future proposals designed to meet this objective".

The achievement of the ultimate goal of preserving this common heritage of mankind and preventing an arms race in outer space will require a negotiating process based - as stated in paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly - on

"further measures ... and appropriate international negotiations ... in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies." (Ibid.)

(Mr. La Rocca, Italy)

Such a constructive approach to this very complex subject matter should enable us to single out those elements which, because of their urgency, should be tackled as a matter of priority.

In this regard, it is a widely held view that the most urgent space-related problem of international concern is at present the development of operational systems designed to impair the functioning of, interfere with, damage or destroy satellites of other nations. We have heard several statements underlining this concern in the First Committee. In this context, we are aware that the restraint of anti satellite systems has already been a subject of negotiations between the United States and the USSR.

The development of anti-satellite systems is fundamentally destabilizing and calls for prompt international action. Were it to remain uncontrolled, it could open up outer space as yet another area of military confrontation, with all the inherent dangers of escalation. The fact that anti-satellite capabilities are as yet in a comparatively early stage of development presents the international community with an opportunity to negotiate a realistic and verifiable agreement and thereby initiate a process leading eventually to permanently securing outer space as a peaceful environment.

The scope of such an agreement would be a most important issue for the parties to the negotiations to deal with. We feel, however, that a prohibition limited to use would not be sufficient.

Operative paragraph 4 of this draft resolution requests the Committee on Disarmament to consider, as a matter of priority, the question of negotiating an effective and verifiable agreement to prohibit anti-satellite systems as an important step towards the fulfilment of the objective of preventing an arms race in outer space.

(Mr. La Rocca Italy)

I should like to draw the attention of the members of this Committee to the fact that the words 'as a matter of priority' refer exclusively to the context of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. They do not imply any change in the existing priorities of the Committee on Disarmament as a whole: this issue clearly falls within the competence of the Committee on Disarmament, which should decide upon it.

In concluding my statement, I wish to express, also on behalf of the other sponsors, the sincere hope that the members of this Committee will give their full support to the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/36/L.7.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): I have the honour today to present, on behalf of the delegations of Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Yugoslavia and Mexico, the draft resolution sponsored by them contained in document A/C.1/36/L.11.

The World Disarmament Campaign, which is the subject of this draft resolution, is undoubtedly one of the issues of the present session of the General Assembly which, however modest it may appear, offers more serious prospects of contributing to the effectiveness of the ceaseless efforts made for so many years now -- unfortunately, **without success** -- to halt and to reverse the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, which has acquired such alarming momentum recently.

The study referred to in the draft resolution is the one that the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a small group of experts, has prepared pursuant to resolution 35/152 of 12 December 1980, which describes in articulate and concise fashion the organization and functioning of the Campaign as well the procedure that it might be advisable to follow to ensure its financing.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

The general purpose of the Campaign would be that stated in the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, namely, "to mobilize world public opinion on behalf of disarmament". As will be recalled, these are the terms used in the Document. The study therefore sets forth various conclusions, the validity and advisability of which are axiomatic: for example, that in order to achieve the general objective earlier referred to, it is necessary to attain the three following partial objectives -- to inform, to educate and to generate public understanding and support. Such are the conclusions proposed in the draft resolution for adoption now by the General Assembly, which at the same time would note with satisfaction the contents of the study.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

As regards the implementation of the other recommendations contained in the study, it was thought that the most appropriate procedure would be to invite all Member States to transmit to the Secretary-General the suggestions and comments they deemed appropriate. It is suggested that the deadline for receiving such communications would be 15 April 1982, so that they may be transmitted, together with the study, by the Secretary-General to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, beginning 7 June 1982, to enable the Assembly to take appropriate decisions in that regard.

The draft resolution provides that one of the principle acts for the solemn launching of the campaign would be the convening of a pledging conference at the opening of the special session in New York, at which it is hoped there will be as many Heads of State and Ministers of Foreign Affairs as attended the first special session in 1978.

The sponsors of the resolution hope that the draft resolution can be adopted by consensus, since the Secretary-General's study contains sufficient elements on the one hand to stress the clear importance and usefulness of the World Disarmament Campaign, and on the other to dispel any apprehensions of those delegations which abstained last year in the vote on General Assembly resolution 35/152.

We believe that it will be obvious to anybody who examines the matter objectively that the benefits of the campaign will be felt equally in all parts of the world irrespective of the political, economic and social systems of States. The fact that the Secretary-General would be responsible for the general orientation and co-ordination of the campaign, as is stated in the text, should be sufficient to dispel any doubt in that regard. In addition, the Secretary-General would present annual reports on its progress to the General Assembly.

Mr. de SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): My delegation would like to comment on draft resolutions I/C.1/36/L.3, introduced by the delegation of Denmark, and A/C.1/36/L.4, introduced by the representative of Egypt, which deal with item 51(a) of our agenda, the report of the 1981 session of the Disarmament Commission.

Brazil regards the machinery set up by the first special session on disarmament as an adequate arrangement, namely, a negotiating body, the Committee on Disarmament, and a deliberative body, the Disarmament Commission. The latter, composed of all Member States of the Organization, has a very important task to fulfil. We deem it important that it be allowed to continue its work in 1982. In its 1981 session, the Disarmament Commission had before it a negotiated agenda, which comprised six substantive items. According to the report of the Commission, now before the First Committee, no agreement was reached on any of those items. The non-aligned, neutral and other countries participated very actively in the 1981 session and presented timely proposals on all the substantive items discussed so that balanced compromises could be reached on the questions at hand. They expected that the time available to the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) would be allotted in a way which would permit full consideration of all the substantive items in an atmosphere of constructive deliberations. Yet, despite the efforts of many delegations, the Commission could do nothing but record disagreement on the substantive decisions.

Such a disappointing outcome was not due to a lack of willingness on the part of those countries to examine thoroughly the items inscribed on the agenda of the Commission. Rather, we have noticed the absence of any disposition on the part of some other delegations to come to grips with the substance of the questions under discussion.

The chairmen of the Working Groups held several informal meetings in an attempt to harmonize views, but the intransigence of a handful of delegations, and some confused procedural arrangements, prevented agreement. A text on item 4, on nuclear and conventional disarmament, was painfully negotiated in an informal group rather than in a formally constituted subsidiary body. Even that text was subject to a last-minute reservation by

(Mr. de Souza e Silva - Brazil)

one delegation, notwithstanding the fact that it had participated in those negotiations. Curiously, that delegation was the only one allowed to speak at the final meeting of the Commission; the timing and the organization of the meeting was such that despite the existence of a list of speakers, no other delegation could in effect voice its views on the adoption of the report.

It is the belief of my delegation that such practices and procedures will not constitute a precedent for future sessions of the Disarmament Commission.

Assessing in retrospect the performance of the 1981 session of the Commission, and taking account of the circumstances described, my delegation is convinced that any further attempt to belittle the Disarmament Commission must not be condoned by the General Assembly.

At the 1981 session of the Commission, the non-aligned, neutral and other countries were not given a fair chance to discuss the substance of the items of the agenda and to have their opinions fully recognized and duly taken into account. Divergent views must also be thoroughly discussed and final decisions should reflect those views and opinions in negotiated agreements so that no individual delegation or groups of delegations feel compelled to resort to last minute reservations or dilatory tactics to block the work of the Commission. It seems obvious to us that any suggestion aimed at taking away from the purview of the Disarmament Commission questions which the Assembly has entrusted to it would only detract from the role the Commission must play in the multilateral machinery for disarmament. We must not permit the UNDC to be discredited.

For those reasons, my delegation fully agrees with the proposal put forward by Egypt in draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.4. If adopted by consensus, the First Committee would do much to show that the international community stands by its resolve to support the deliberative body and to create favourable conditions that will permit it to continue to discharge the responsibilities assigned to it by the General Assembly.

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

In this connexion, my delegation is convinced that draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.3 is incompatible with draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.4. The procedural suggestion yesterday by the delegation of India seems, therefore, to be the most advisable path to follow, in order to avoid the further exacerbation of the divergent views reflected in the report of the UNDC. The withdrawal of draft resolution L.3 would serve to enhance the role of the UNDC as the deliberative body in matters of disarmament, a role that should be strengthened rather than diminished and downgraded.

Mr. de LAIGLESIA (Spain) (interpretation from Spanish): My remarks will be very brief, for two reasons: first, because at this phase of our work we should be concentrating exclusively on those questions which have been brought before us for consideration, and secondly, because my delegation has spoken exhaustively on the subject of conventional disarmament and a recapitulation of our previous remarks would be both monotonous and inappropriate. The purpose of my remarks is to comment on document A/C.1/36/L.3 which contains the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of Denmark in which it proposes a study on conventional disarmament. I wish to take this opportunity to pay a tribute to the delegation responsible for this draft resolution. It showed such admirable dedication and patience in bringing before us once more a subject to which the Spanish Government attaches great importance.

As members of the Committee are aware, the problem treated in the draft resolution has been the subject of detailed examination. Indeed, the Disarmament Commission at its two most recent substantive meetings spent much of its time on this item, although we must admit that it did so with scant results. We therefore believe that the time has come to take a decision. The General Assembly is the sovereign master of its decisions and it is therefore fully empowered to adopt whatever measures it feels are appropriate. Of course, we do not wish to prejudge the sense of the Assembly's resolutions on the matter, but we feel that referring this item to another body is really a covert way of preventing the study from being carried out at all.

We should like to reiterate our well-known view that, in the sphere of disarmament, nuclear disarmament has absolute priority, and our entire policy on all of the items before the Committee bears out this view. None the less, we emphasize the need for a certain balance between nuclear disarmament and conventional disarmament, since conventional weapons account for the bulk of the disturbing arms race which currently afflicts mankind.

(Mr. de Laiglesia, Spain)

Unfortunately, even if the creation of the expert group proposed by the Danish delegation is now approved, its work can make only a slight contribution to the work of the second special session devoted to disarmament. Despite this, we feel that the carrying out of the requested study is a positive factor which would certainly have a favourable impact on world public opinion, which fails to understand how the United Nations can ignore the problem posed by the conventional arms race, which fuels the unfortunately numerous warlike conflicts we are now witnessing.

Mr. KITTIKHOUN (Lao People's Democratic Republic) (interpretation from French): By way of the exercise of my right of reply to the representative of the United States, who yesterday referred to the use of chemical weapons in my country, my delegation would like to state the following.

This session of the First Committee has become a setting for polemics and accusations by the United States against certain sovereign States. If, in taking part in the debate on disarmament in the First Committee, the United States delegation sincerely wishes to do something positive during this session, it should have refrained from this kind of exercise, which only undermines the credibility of the United States, whose ambition it is to remain at the head of the so-called free world. Anyone wishing to play such a role should observe a minimum of decorum, particularly in statements and declarations, which should be based, in order to be taken into account, on serious and irrefutable evidence and on reason, rather than on an obsession to level charges based on inventions created entirely by the Government of the United States itself.

As regards the use of chemical weapons in my country, the United States Government based its accusations on a single so-called piece of evidence obtained from Moi refugees who fought as mercenaries of the United States in the war of aggression which that country waged against our people from

(Mr. Kittikhoun, Lao People's Democratic
Republic)

1958 to 1973. During that period the United States dropped 3 million tons of bombs on our territory and made abundant use, against our civilian population, of chemical weapons known as Agent Orange, Agent White and Agent Blue. This massive use of chemicals was corroborated and acknowledged in the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) review, on page 95.

Since 1976 the Lao People's Democratic Republic has not been in armed conflict with any country, least of all the Soviet Union, which is helping us to rebuild our State. Any assertion that the Soviet Union or any other country or even we ourselves have been using chemical weapons against our own people or our populations is the product of a singularly faulty imagination. My delegation strongly rejects these slanders, which are aimed at damaging my country and at absolving the United States armed forces of their crimes against our people.

On this occasion I would ask the Government of the United States through its delegation to the First Committee, no longer to indulge in sterile polemics but to undertake without further delay serious discussions with the Soviet Union and other partners in order to conclude a treaty which would effectively prohibit the production, use or stockpiling of chemical weapons, a treaty which the international community has been actively seeking for a long time.

It is in this way - and this way alone - that the world will be spared the use of these particularly inhuman weapons.

Mr. ADELMAN (United States of America): I wish to speak on item 42 of our agenda, entitled "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.

My delegation had not intended to speak on this item except perhaps in explanation of vote, should that have been appropriate. We saw no good purpose to be served in reiterating our position on the issue, which is very well known. Nor did we intend to hurl verbal thunderbolts at any other delegation since such an exercise is always non-productive. However, the Soviet representative yesterday sought to present the USSR as a champion of controlling chemical weapons and accused the West, and the United States in particular, of trying to divert attention away from our own intentions regarding chemical weapons by raising issues relating to the use of chemical weapons. We must respond and set the record straight for this Committee.

The fact is that the United States, conscious of the horrible suffering chemical weapons cause to human beings, voluntarily ceased production of such weapons 12 years ago, in 1969. As is well known, at that time the United States also unilaterally renounced biological weapons and today has no stocks of such biological weapons. In 1977 we began bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union to develop for submission to the Committee on Disarmament a joint initiative for a multilateral convention prohibiting the production, development and possession of chemical weapons. Despite unilateral action by the United States, the Soviet Union not only continued, but actually increased, its chemical-weapon programme in an effort to create a massive imbalance against the United States. Yesterday the Soviet representative spoke as if it were the Soviet Union, not the United States, which unilaterally and drastically had curtailed its chemical-warfare capability.

Here are the facts. At present the Soviet Union maintains and operates at least 14 chemical-weapons production facilities. The United States, on the other hand, currently has only one chemical-weapon production facility, and even that is inactive and in need of extensive renovation and repair.

The armed forces of the Soviet Union, as well as those of its Warsaw Pact allies, are better equipped, better organized and better trained to conduct chemical-warfare operations than any other military force in the world. A large offensive chemical-warfare organization is organic to the Soviet armed forces structure. Each combat unit down to the regimental level has a sizeable chemical-

(Mr. Adelman, United States)

warfare contingent and chemical specialists are also assigned at the company level. The Soviet forces include about 100,000 personnel with specialized chemical-warfare training and the Soviet Union has the potential to mobilize two or three times that number - meaning 200,000 or 300,000 troops. In 1981 the United States has only 5,700 troops trained in chemical-warfare defence.

Soviet tactical doctrine provides for large-scale employment of offensive chemical weapons. A variety of modern agents and multiple-delivery systems have been deployed and a significant portion of all Soviet delivery systems - including missiles and rockets, aerial bombs and artillery - are capable of delivering chemical weapons. Soviet artillery units are regularly equipped with chemical-weapon shells.

Against this background, one of massive and increasing Soviet chemical-warfare capability and unilateral restraint by the United States in the chemical-weapon field for more than the past decade, the charges we heard yesterday here in the First Committee are simply ridiculous. The Soviet representative mentioned a \$3.15 million allocation for chemical weapons in last year's United States military budget request. Not surprisingly he did not mention the fact that since 1969 there had been no allocation in the United States military budget for any chemical munitions. Even less surprisingly he failed to indicate how many millions or billions of roubles the Soviet Union has spent on its huge chemical-warfare establishment.

I would ask: why has the Soviet Union developed its formidable capability? Why did the Soviet Union not respond in kind to American action to reduce voluntarily its capacity to engage in warfare with these weapons of mass destruction? And why are we now subjected to a barrage of Soviet propaganda on chemical weapons? I think the answer is obvious to everybody.

Another point is pertinent. In his statement the Soviet representative cited selectively a number of articles from the United States and Western press. Chemical weapons are a controversial subject, one that is discussed freely and openly in Western countries. But is there anything comparable in the Soviet Union? Of course not. The military programmes of the Soviet Union are shrouded in deep secrecy designed to hide them from the scrutiny not only of other nations but also of the Soviet people themselves. But the outside world

(Mr. Adelman, United States)

is not blind and we all have a fairly good picture of what is going on in the Soviet Union. One can only wonder whether the Soviet people realize how much of their hard-earned loaf is sliced off by the Government to pay for its tremendous and expanding military machine.

The Soviet statement yesterday was an attempt to convince this Committee that the United States is engaged in a massive build-up of chemical weapons while the peace-loving Soviet Union sits by helplessly. As we have seen, this is utter nonsense. I should like to ask the Soviet representative if he really meant to imply that, having stopped its chemical-weapon production 12 years ago and seen its existing chemical-weapon stockpile progressively deteriorating, the United States should be sitting on its hands and passively watching the constant build-up of the Soviet chemical-warfare capabilities. If so, he could not be serious. No responsible policy-maker could take any such course of action.

Nor could he be serious about his proposal that the production of binary weapons should be banned, although the reasoning behind such a blatantly self-serving proposal is, of course, obvious. Binary weapons are designed specifically to protect the personnel handling them as well as the environment. Since binary weapons become toxic only upon being launched, any leakage of their contents that might occur in storage or in transit would be non-toxic and harmless. The Soviet representative alleged that such weapons would render a ban on chemical weapons unverifiable. His concern about the verifiability of arms control agreements is commendable. We wish it were also reflected in the Soviet approach to verification. The fact is that the Soviet Union is and always has been the strongest opponent of effective verification. If one accepts the Soviet concept of so-called "national" verification, no prohibition of chemical weapons, whatever their type, would be verifiable. While no arms control agreement may be 100 per cent foolproof, concrete co-operative verification measures can be devised which will bring confidence on compliance to an acceptable level. Acceptance by the Soviet Union of meaningful co-operative international verification arrangements would greatly contribute to progress in many arms control areas and to the achievement of the objective that mankind so earnestly desires.

The CHAIRMAN: I now call on the Secretary of the Committee to read out some announcements.

Mr. RATHORE (Secretary of the Committee): I should like to announce that the following countries have become sponsors of the following draft resolutions: for draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.1, Greece and Philippines; for draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.5, Canada, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Philippines, Qatar and Sudan; for draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.7, Denmark, Greece, Japan, Norway and Spain; for draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.8, Angola; and for draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.9, Greece, Ireland and Philippines.

The CHAIRMAN: Before adjourning the meeting I should like to remind the members of the Committee that the deadline for the submission of draft resolutions is 1.00 p.m. on Monday, 16 November.

The meeting rose at 11.50 a.m.