



VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 29TH MEETING

Chairman: Mr. GOLOB (Yugoslavia)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.50 a.m.

EXPRESSION OF WELCOME TO ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA

The PRESIDENT: Permit me to express the sentiments of the entire Committee in extending the most cordial and most friendly welcome to the 157th Member of our Organization, Antigua and Barbuda. We are confident that Antigua and Barbuda will make a significant contribution to the progress of our work in this important body, as well in the service of the ideals of the United Nations and its Charter.

AGENDA ITEMS 39 to 56, 128 and 135 (continued)

Mr. BALETA (Albania) (interpretation from French): The Albanian delegation has asked to speak in order to state its views on Agenda item 135, entitled "Prevention of nuclear catastrophe: declaration of the General Assembly" and on the text of the draft declaration in document A/36/241.

We should like to state at the outset that we would have preferred item 135 not to have appeared on the Committee's agenda, because we are certain that the Soviet proposal is not in the least inspired by sincere motives or good desires. It is a proposal of a purely propagandistic character which will cause this Committee to lose valuable time.

(Mr. Baleta, Albania)

Four years ago, the Soviet social-imperialists made a great fuss here about the "prevention of nuclear war". This year, they have made use of the same hollow words and stale slogans to wage a propaganda campaign on an item entitled "Prevention of nuclear catastrophe". And it could very well be that two or three years from now our Committee will still find itself engaged in discussing, at the instance of the Soviet Union, the need to prevent a nuclear cataclysm or a nuclear nightmare.

The Soviet proposal, the draft declaration before us, and the arguments served up to us in their support are full of innuendos, crafty traps, evil intentions and dangerous ulterior motives.

There is no doubt that the sermons of the Soviet social-imperialists on the need to prevent nuclear catastrophe are not intended to make a genuine contribution to the reduction or elimination of the nuclear danger, or to dissipate the horror aroused by the existence of nuclear weapons and the idea of their use. On the contrary, they want, through their proposal, to create a false impression that all we need to do is adopt a declaration proclaiming the State or statesmen that decide to make first use of nuclear weapons to be criminals for the peoples to be able to rest on their laurels and to dismiss from their minds the danger of nuclear weapons. The Soviet social-imperialists and the American imperialists have often performed such deceptive manoeuvres to disguise somewhat their aggressive policies and to justify the augmentation and development of their nuclear arsenals.

It is perfectly obvious that Soviet harping on the need to prevent nuclear catastrophe is aimed primarily at diverting the attention of peace-loving peoples and countries from the true substance of the problem and to pass in silence over the real causes of the danger of a nuclear catastrophe.

The simplest logic requires that when the problem of preventing nuclear catastrophe is posed it is necessary first of all to point to the causes and factors that threaten to give rise to such a phenomenon, clearly to identify the supporters of policies moving the world towards catastrophe, and to reveal the methods and means used in the preparations for nuclear war. Any declaration adopted by the General Assembly on this subject, if it is to be taken seriously, must provide clear answers to certain unavoidable questions: who is preparing for nuclear war? In whose advantage would it be, and who intends, to unleash

a nuclear war? In what circumstances could such a war be unleashed? Who is practising nuclear blackmail? It is impossible to find - and useless to seek - in document A/36/241 anything that could constitute a satisfactory reply to those questions. The authors of that document avoid them deliberately, because they are afraid of the truth. All we find is a few vague phrases, which are used rather in the context of the polemics now being engaged in by the imperialist super-Powers, each blaming the other for the rapid pace of the nuclear and conventional arms race. That is why it is necessary, in our view, to refute the sophistries of the imperialist super-Powers.

The People's Socialist Republic of Albania has always stated that in its opinion the principal source of wars of aggression - local or general, conventional or nuclear - is the two imperialist super-Powers, the United States of America and the Soviet Union, who are pursuing an aggressive policy to divide and dominate the world. The United States of America and the Soviet Union must be held primarily responsible for the preparations for and the danger of nuclear warfare, without, however, forgetting social-imperialist China and other nuclear Powers. But it is precisely the two super-Powers that have the greatest nuclear potential, that have manifest superiority over the other nuclear-weapon countries, and that are the leaders in the nuclear arms race, creating and manufacturing modern weapons in ever growing quantities. When they wish to terrify the world, the two super-Powers themselves admit to having amassed in their arsenals colossal quantities of strategic and tactical atomic weapons of monstrous destructive power, and capable of putting an end to civilization, life and the human race on earth were they ever to be used. The nuclear threat has become the highest form of political blackmail by the United States of America and the Soviet Union and is an essential element in their warlike doctrines. Imperialist China too has taken this course. Its possibilities are still limited, but its appetite for atomic weapons is great.

It seems to us to be utterly improbable and inconceivable that all this destructive atomic potential at the disposal of the super-Powers will ever be put out of action by the mere adoption of a declaration like the one presented to us in document A/36/241. Those who produce and hold atomic weapons are also thinking of using them one day, or are determined to retain them as a permanent means of intimidation against the peoples. If we are called upon to admit that

(Mr. Baleta, Albania)

two or three sentences such as those contained in the Soviet draft declaration are enough to solve the problem of the prevention of nuclear war, then we are also entitled to wonder why this miracle has come about so late, and why an attempt is being made to create such an illusion of preventing nuclear war.

Our reply to these questions is the following: the imperialist super-Powers are talking about the prevention of nuclear war because they are trying to hide their preparations for such a war. The proposal to adopt a draft declaration like the one that has been presented to this Committee shows the obsession of the super-Powers with the idea of the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict between them or in an attack against others. It is that fact that has prompted them to find excuses in advance, and that has caused the Soviet Union once again to speak in the United Nations about the prevention of nuclear war at a time when American imperialism has hardened its policy and its attitudes and intensified its arms efforts.

Recently, the leaders of American imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism, in their respective polemic statements, have made it clear that the two super-Powers will be further preparing themselves for the possibility of nuclear war. According to their most recent military doctrines, nuclear conflict seems highly probable, even desirable, especially in circumstances where the territories of the super-Powers would not be the target of a direct nuclear attack. The statements of the American imperialists that tactical atomic weapons could be used in a limited nuclear war and that Europe could become the theatre of a nuclear war, as well as the ambitions of the United States and the Soviet Union to increase their nuclear potential in Europe, have rightly aroused the hatred and the protests of European public opinion, because the peoples of that continent do not wish to be the victims of the super-Powers' gruesome dreams of world domination.

The draft declaration on the prevention of nuclear catastrophe is an attempt to make us forget a very simple fact: that as long as stockpiles of nuclear weapons remain intact and the manufacture and development of such weapons continues, the danger of a nuclear conflict remains real and threatening. Therefore, the draft declaration is an attempt to replace efforts for genuine disarmament with the symbolic, abstract punishment of the State or person that decides to make first use of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Baleta, Albania)

The Soviet social imperialists are trying in vain to have us believe that the existence of nuclear weapons does not pose a major threat and that nuclear arms can be justified if a declaration is adopted to the effect that there can never be any justification or excuse for whoever decides to use them first.

But one can easily imagine that the aggressor who decides to use nuclear weapons will invent excuses "to justify" his action or not even bother to do so. And, in case of a nuclear conflict, who will settle the problem of ascertaining which State or which leader decided to use nuclear weapons first? Thanks to existing technical means, this weapon can be used in the briefest periods of time by two or several aggressors simultaneously, and it would be a waste of time to try to decide who acted first after the start of the conflict.

It is really ridiculous to claim that nuclear-weapon States and their leaders will refrain from unleashing a nuclear conflict because they might be terrified by the idea of being called unpardonable criminals. And since we are on the subject, why should we have to accept limitations regarding the application of the concept of crimes against mankind, as the Soviet draft declaration seeks to impose on us? If we still wish to adopt a declaration, it will be necessary to introduce relevant provisions to stress that it is a very serious crime against humanity to maintain and refuse to destroy stockpiles of nuclear weapons and to continue the manufacture and improvement of such weapons. Instead of talking about potential criminals, it would be better to identify here and now those who have already well deserved the title and to stress that there is no, and there can never be any, justification or forgiveness for States or their leaders that continue to sabotage nuclear disarmament and pursue the nuclear arms race. The imperialist super-Powers already fall under this category, and there is no reason to wait and see who will press the button first.

The draft declaration considers that States and statesmen using atomic weapons first will never be pardoned or justified. The language of the draft declaration suggests that only those who use atomic weapons first will never be pardoned. We reject this wily statement. According to us, any aggressor, any State

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and any leader engaging in acts of aggression, in occupying other countries or in slaughtering peoples has committed an unpardonable crime, even if recourse has not been had to atomic weapons but only to conventional means of warfare. The peoples are against nuclear war, but they are also against any other war of aggression, regardless of the type of weapons used.

Taking into account the reasons I have just given, the Albanian delegation believes that it is useless for the General Assembly to adopt a declaration like the one set forth in document A/36/241.

Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): On behalf of the delegation of the Hungarian People's Republic, I have the honour to introduce the draft resolution entitled "Conclusion of an international convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons", contained in document A/C.1/36/L.6.

Although radiological weapons had already in 1948 been classified as weapons of mass destruction in a resolution adopted by the Commission for Conventional Armaments, the prohibition of these weapons has come to the fore only in recent years. This development is closely connected with the spread of nuclear-energy production. As a consequence of this development, the material which could be used in radiological weapons is found today in many facilities and in many countries. Thus the prevention of the appearance of a new type of weapon of mass destruction, namely, radiological weapons, has become a timely and important task. The importance of the prohibition of radiological weapons needs no lengthy elaboration. The devastating and long-term effects of intensive radiation on human beings and on the environment are already well known.

The fact that the threat of radiological weapons is, fortunately, still a potential threat does not diminish its danger and importance because it is a real threat. That is why the Committee on Disarmament responded favourably to the submission in July 1979 of the joint USSR-USA proposal on major elements of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons. It was against this background that the General Assembly in 1979 adopted resolution 34/87 A and in 1980 resolution 35/156 G by consensus. Both resolutions requested the Committee on

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

Disarmament to proceed to, or continue, negotiations with a view to elaborating a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons and to report to the General Assembly on the results achieved.

The Committee on Disarmament has dealt with this question intensively in the framework of an Ad Hoc Working Group, of which I had the honour to be Chairman. The work done by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons is clearly reflected in its report, which is an integral part of the report on the Committee on Disarmament. The report shows that the Ad Hoc Working Group was able to make some progress towards the elaboration of a treaty banning radiological weapons. But, to be quite frank, the report also shows that the bulk of the work remains to be completed. Considerable divergences continue to exist in connexion with such fundamental provisions of a future treaty on radiological weapons as those referring to the scope of prohibition and compliance and verification, to mention but these two problems.

In their statements, some delegations paid considerable attention to the question of banning radiological weapons. The statements made have also reflected the divergent views concerning the importance and, above all, the scope of a future treaty banning radiological weapons.

The representative of Sweden, Mrs. Thorsson, on 26 October said:

"The negotiations have to a considerable degree focused on the Swedish proposal to include the prohibition of attack against civilian nuclear installations, in order to prevent the massive release of radioactive material. In fact, apart from nuclear explosions, such an attack appears to be the only existing plausible method of waging radiological warfare. The Swedish proposal was submitted as a serious effort to improve the USA-USSR 'agreed joint proposal'..."

(A/C.1/36/PV.12, p. 24-25)

This Swedish proposal was supported by some other delegations when they touched upon this question.

In dealing with the question of banning radiological weapons, the representative of the Soviet Union stated the following:

"It would be advisable for the General Assembly to express its support for an acceleration of the talks on the subject in the Committee on Disarmament

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in order that a draft treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons could be presented to the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament in 1982. The conclusion of the talks on radiological weapons would promote the success of the second special session on disarmament and would indicate that, even in the present complicated international situation, it is possible to solve problems of disarmament." (A/C.1/36/PV.9, p. 43)

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

On 21 October the representative of the United States said:

"The United States is prepared also to participate constructively in the work of the Committee on Disarmament, with a view to concluding successfully the negotiation of a convention prohibiting radiological weapons" (A/C.1/36/PV.6, p. 31).

In summarizing the statements made in connexion with the prohibition of radiological weapons, one can state that, despite the different views, there is a widespread desire to conclude an international treaty banning this potential weapon.

The draft resolution that I introduce now is of a procedural nature. It would enable the Committee on Disarmament to continue its work in this field in 1982. It is practically a reproduction of last year's resolution, which was adopted without vote.

The preambular part of the draft resolution recalls the aforementioned 1948 resolution of the Commission for Conventional Armaments. It recalls also General Assembly resolution 2602 C (XXIV) and paragraph 76 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which deals with the prohibition of radiological weapons. It reaffirms resolutions 34/87 A and 35/156 G on the conclusion of such a convention. It expresses the conviction that a convention on radiological weapons would serve to spare mankind the potential dangers of the use of radiological weapons and thereby contribute to strengthening peace. It takes note that negotiations have been conducted in the Committee on Disarmament aimed at the conclusion of an international convention banning radiological weapons and of the part of that Committee's report which deals with those negotiations, including the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group.

The next preambular paragraph recognizes that divergent views continue to exist in connexion with various aspects relating to a convention on radiological weapons. Finally, the last paragraph of the preamble notes with satisfaction the wide recognition of the need to reach agreement on the text of a treaty banning radiological weapons.

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

The first operative paragraph calls upon the Committee on Disarmament to continue negotiations with a view to elaborating a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons, if possible before the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. This is a reflection of the desire and hope expressed by some delegations that this should and could be an important contribution to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The next operative paragraph takes note of the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Working Group adopted by the Committee on Disarmament to set up at the beginning of that Committee's 1982 session a further ad hoc working group, under an appropriate mandate to be determined at that time, to continue negotiations on the elaboration of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons. The third operative paragraph requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament all documents relating to the discussion, by the General Assembly at its present session, of the prohibition of radiological weapons. The fourth and last operative paragraph decides to include this item in the provisional agenda of the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly.

In conclusion, I should like to express the hope of the Hungarian delegation that the draft resolution, which is purely procedural, will receive careful and positive consideration and will be adopted by consensus, as was the case with last year's similar resolution.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Since active consultations are proceeding in the Committee on item 42 of the agenda of this session of the General Assembly, my delegation would like to dwell on some matters relating to the prohibition of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union has consistently advocated, and continues to advocate, that chemical methods of warfare should be outlawed and eliminated. It did so even in the period before the Second World War as well as in the post-war period.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

As early as March 1972 the Soviet Union, together with other socialist countries, submitted in the Committee on Disarmament a draft international convention on the subject. For four years, from 1976 to 1980, the Soviet Union negotiated with the United States on this matter. Fairly detailed information on these talks was presented to the Committee on Disarmament in 1979 and 1980.

From the very outset the Soviet Union has been an active participant in the multilateral talks in the Committee on Disarmament on a ban on chemical weapons. Notwithstanding all these efforts, however, to date it has not been possible to conclude an international convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

I should like to deal with the reasons why there have been such disappointing results, despite the clearly expressed desire of the majority of States Members of the United Nations to exclude chemical weapons from the arsenals of States. The point is that there are forces that are not interested in prohibiting chemical weapons. In fact, they are proceeding in the opposite direction, attempting to confront mankind with the threat of a qualitatively new spiral in the chemical arms race.

Let us examine the facts. It is generally recognized that no State throughout the entire history of international relations has ever made such wide use of chemical weapons as the United States. During the shameful war in Viet Nam the Americans used chemical weapons on such a scale as to amount to a veritable ecological crime. Only after defeat in Viet Nam did Washington agree to ratify the 1925 Protocol, and then only with reservations.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

However, the process of further development of American chemical weapons went on. Laboratory experimentation to perfect and to create new types of chemical and bacteriological devices for waging war is part and parcel both of the United States programmes and of programmes carried out in co-operation with other States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

In order not to waste words, I should like to provide some data in that connexion. The centre for the experiments being carried out is the United States Army laboratory in Maryland. The scope of the work being done at the laboratory can be judged by the fact that 1,400 highly qualified specialists are involved in it. In other, similar centres, every year experiments are carried out on approximately 5,000 synthesized toxic substances. The most potent and the most lethal forms of those poisonous substances are selected.

For the same purpose, considerable use is made of civilian organizations, and of various private firms. As a result, the United States now possesses tremendous stocks of chemical weapons.

Here are a few more facts. United States arsenals contain about 400,000 tons of lethal poisonous substances, about half of them being sarin and nerve-gas, and the remainder yperite. About three quarters of the chemical munitions have paralysing effects. In sum, this equals almost three million artillery shells, several thousand aerial bombs, also loaded with sarin, hundreds of thousands of mines, each containing two gallons of VX agent, and approximately 1,500 aerial sprayers, each having a capacity of 160 gallons of VX. Total chemical munitions which have been manufactured by the United States amount to approximately one quarter of the conventional explosive munitions at present in the possession of the American army in Europe.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

A significant portion, namely about 40 per cent, of these poisonous paralyzing nerve agents and yperite is stored in the Army depot at Tooele, Utah.

Last year, the West German periodical Stern devoted an article entitled "Dozing Death" to the depot - the depot of death - I just mentioned. That depot contains such a vast quantity of poisonous chemical substances that it would be possible to annihilate mankind several thousand times over. According to the article in Stern:

"Under the open sky there are barrels containing almost four million litres of sarin. One drop of this substance is enough to kill a person." There are also the spray containers, which are filled with nerve gas of the VX type, with a toxicity which is 2.5 to 3 times greater than the toxicity of sarin. Bunkers are filled with 888 Wet-Eye bombs ready for use, which are loaded with 156 litres of sarin.

The author of the article goes on to state that each bomb of this kind can have a death-dealing effect on 156 million people. It follows that in order to kill one million people, all that is needed is one litre of sarin, which costs \$5.

However, this is not all. Just now, the United States, which already possesses tremendous stocks of chemical and poisonous substances, has embarked on the creation and manufacture of qualitatively new types of chemical weapons. As recently as October of last year, the United States Congress appropriated \$3.15 million to start building installations where it is intended to produce the so-called binary chemical weapon. I am referring to the military construction appropriations legislation for the 1981 fiscal year, PL-96-436.

May I dwell in some more detail on this matter? Firstly, what kind of weapon is this binary weapon? One can state with certainty that this is a new type of highly toxic, lethal chemical weapon, mainly characterized by the fact that it contains two chemical substances - two chemical components, if you will - which react and form a deadly nerve-gas only when the shell containing them explodes, causing the two substances to mix.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Thus, according to a report in the British journal New Scientist, the binary weapon is less dangerous for those manufacturing it, but the gases that it contains are fatal at even very low concentrations. Approximately one milligram would be sufficient to kill a person. Furthermore, a particular danger is that it is possible to circumvent international agreements on the prohibition of chemical weapons when producing and stockpiling the binary weapon. Since these substances, separately, may be used also for non-military purposes, it is extremely difficult to devise control measures already complicated enough in the area of chemical weapons.

Even today the military arsenals of the United States contain binary artillery shells of various calibre, and work is being completed on new howitzer shells fitted with binary weapons. After completion of a new factory, the armed forces of the United States will be able to receive chemical munitions for the main artillery systems, aerial chemical bombs, lens-type missiles, winged missiles, and so on. It is planned to modernize and considerably expand storage facilities for chemical weapons.

The immense scale of these plans is confirmed by the fact that the cost of revamping the chemical arsenal of the United States Army is estimated at between \$2 and \$4 billion. I am referring to data taken from The Congressional Record of 21 May 1981. For scientific research work alone, on the development of chemical weapons, over the next five years \$2.5 billion is being allocated to the United States Department of Defense. The facts I have cited demonstrate irrefutably the far-reaching preparations of the United States for chemical warfare.

We cannot fail to be alarmed by frequent reports that the United States is concocting dangerous plans for turning Western Europe into a chemical weapons arsenal. If we judge by these reports, this matter is a subject of discussion also within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Obviously,

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

it was with some foundation that New Scientist, to which I have just referred, stated that to keep chemical weapons in the United States, i.e. far from a potential theatre of hostilities would be rather senseless and that to be able to use artillery shells with binary weapons in the European theatre, such weapons would have to be stored in Western Europe.

In order to implement those plans, the Pentagon had to create conditions that would make it easier to circumvent legislative difficulties hampering appropriations for the production of chemical weapons unless the President of the United States assures Congress that such action is dictated by the interests of national security. It was also necessary to prepare the allies of the United States for the prospect of the possible stationing of such weapons on their territories, especially as it is easy to assume that such a prospect might spark opposition in those countries. Lastly, due account had to be taken of world public opinion, including American public opinion, which has been demanding the elimination of chemical weapons.

In order to resolve those internal and external problems, it was necessary to create the myth of a "Soviet chemical threat" - which has been bandied about so much recently - that the United States was lagging behind the Soviet Union in the chemical weapons field.

The creation of such myths is by no means a new phenomenon. The entire post-war history of the United States military policy is brimming with examples of various myths which have been concocted, the end result of which has always been a new spiral in the arms race.

According to the well-known American researcher, George Kistiakowsky, formerly an adviser to the President of the United States, the military leaders of the United States at one time opened a vociferous campaign concerning a "menacing bomber gap" of the United States. As a result, first the B-47 heavy bomber programme was created and then that of the B-52 intercontinental bomber, with nuclear weapons aboard. This is what George Kistiakowsky wrote about that:

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

"A few years later it was recognized that the bomber gap was a myth."

Later on, the myth of a missile gap was created and, although the White House was convinced that the missile gap was in fact a myth, the programme for producing Minuteman strategic missiles and Polaris missiles was considerably expanded.

A similar myth accompanied the creation of the new MIRV missile system.

The unsavoury manoeuvres frequently resorted to by the Pentagon in order to obtain additional funds have led, as has now been irrefutably established, to a new round in the arms race. In this connexion one cannot fail to agree with the opinion of Senator MacIntyre, chairman of one of the sub-committees of the Senate Armed Services Committee, when he said that when the stakes are large, the Pentagon's testimony is full of intimidation and exaggeration, but you will rarely find it straightforward and objective.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

And how many times have we heard this wearisome conclusion about the "Soviet threat" which is now the Soviet chemical threat? By creating the myth that the United States is allegedly "lagging behind" the Soviet Union in the chemical weapon field, the Pentagon, as we might have expected, intends to overcome this so-called "gap". Very indicative in this connexion is the recent interview by the Voice of America of the Secretary of Defense of the United States, Mr. Weinberger, who made it quite clear that the Reagan Administration is considering the desirability of revising international treaties and agreements which prohibit the utilization of both chemical and bacteriological weapons. He stated that the United States:

"...has already embarked on a course which will remedy the lack of balance in this field."

Under these circumstances, it becomes crystal-clear why there has been such delay and then why a complete halt was put to the talks on the prohibition of chemical weapons between the Soviet Union and the United States and, finally, why talks on this question of chemical weapons in the Committee on Disarmament are being stubbornly blocked.

In order to give the "Soviet threat" some semblance of reality, they have taken out of the blue or simply fabricated information about the alleged use of chemical weapons by the Soviet Union or their allies. All this must be seen as part and parcel of the over-all anti-Soviet campaign which has been initiated by the United States in order to make it impossible to achieve agreement in the field of disarmament, to sow seeds of mistrust towards the Soviet Union and to undermine any faith in international agreements.

We have clearly understood the real purpose of this campaign, in which the United States has, as it were, launched into the orbit of the United Nations its anti-Soviet duck with its chemical feathers. Judging by what we read in the American press, all this hullabaloo will continue. Attempts will be made to involve the United Nations further in this unworthy and unsavoury affair, and at the same time work will go on to introduce new forms of chemical weapons, primarily binary ones.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

In this connexion, it is also obvious that any efforts made by States to prohibit chemical weapons will be further undermined. In particular, talks on this burning issue - whether bilateral or multilateral - will be blocked. However, it is important to bear in mind that the introduction of binary weapons may catastrophically destroy any prospects for the conclusion of an international agreement prohibiting nuclear weapons since, as we have heretofore stated, the already complex problems of chemical weapon control and chemical disarmament might become completely insoluble because of the binary weapon.

We would point particularly to the fact that the United States, which has alleged that it is seeking to resolve problems of control, sometimes completely submerges practical measures of disarmament in these matters, which should really be under control. It is seeking, under the camouflage of this lie, further to sow terror at the prospect of uncontrolled disarmament and, at the same time, to introduce a weapon which might become virtually uncontrollable, so that any question of banning it would be completely beyond control.

We cannot fail to conclude from all this that the real threat looming over mankind lies in the new round in the spiralling chemical-weapon race which was started by the United States when it adopted its plans to produce a binary weapon and possibly to emplace it on the territories of other States. This will completely reverse any possible hope that we can draw up and conclude a convention which would prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction.

We wish to be completely frank and blunt in our remarks about this matter. The international community should have a clear picture of the threat inherent in the creation of new, essentially uncontrollable forms of chemical weapons. We believe that a firm barrier should be placed in the way of such a course of events and that, in this connexion, the General Assembly should promote

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

the prohibition of the manufacture and development of binary weapons and other new types of chemical weapons as well as the emplacement of chemical weapons on the territories of States where there are none at present as an activity, which runs counter to the will of Member States of the United Nations which favour instead the speedy conclusion of an international agreement which would prohibit chemical weapons.

For its part, the Soviet Union is prepared, as it always has been, to make every effort to ensure that constructive talks are reopened in order to draft a convention prohibiting chemical weapons.

Mr. KRISHNA (India): In my statement today I should like to comment briefly on draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.3, entitled "A study on conventional weapons".

It will be recalled that at the thirty-fifth session the General Assembly requested the United Nations Disarmament Commission to work out the general approach to the study, its structure and its scope. At its session in May this year, the United Nations Disarmament Commission held intensive deliberations on the subject but was unable to reach a consensus on the parameters of the study. In view of the circumstances, the Commission recommended to Member States that they give the matter further consideration, taking into account the views expressed in working papers presented by several delegations, with the aim of reconciling the differences of view.

(Mr. Krishna, India)

Nothing has happened since the last session of the Disarmament Commission to indicate that the divergences of approach among Member States have been reconciled. If an expert group were to be set up to go ahead with the study in any case, what would be the scope of such a study, what would be its terms of reference? Draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.3 states that the group should take its guidance:

"...the deliberations at the 1981 substantive session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, in particular reflected in paragraph 21 and annex III of the report of that session to the General Assembly".

But in sub-paragraph 6 of paragraph 21, the report of the Disarmament Commission states:

"The intensive discussions and consultations revealed a significant divergence of views on the matters before the Commission on this item and it became clear that it was not possible at this stage for the Commission to discharge the responsibility assigned to it by the General Assembly in resolution 35/156 A in 1980". (A/36/42, para.21, sub-para.6)

What guidance can the group of experts possibly obtain from the deliberations of the Disarmament Commission on the subject, when it is acknowledged in the report that there was "a significant divergence of views" and not a near consensus as some delegations seem to suggest?

There is also a point of principle involved. Resolution 35/156 A had assigned the responsibility for working out the approach and scope of the study to the Disarmament Commission. The Commission, in its report, has indicated that Member States needed further time to consider the nature of the study. Why then this unseemly haste to bypass the Disarmament Commission and deny Member States an opportunity to carry out further consultations among themselves in order to reconcile their differences? The Disarmament Commission was set up at the first special session on disarmament as the deliberative organ for disarmament affairs. Should it not be given an opportunity to discharge the role assigned to it by the international community? The adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.3 would directly undermine the role of the Disarmament Commission and would imply that the deliberative machinery set up by consensus can no longer be entrusted to carry out its mandate. My delegation feels that it is our collective responsibility to avoid taking any action which would carry serious and adverse implications with regard to the role of the Disarmament

(Mr. Krishna, India)

Commission. We are convinced that the proper course for us to adopt is to allow the Disarmament Commission, at its subsequent session, to give further consideration to this question and work out an approach to the study which would meet with the approval of all Member States.

We are aware of the concern of many delegations that the second special session should look into questions relating to conventional weapons. Would a hastily prepared interim report from a group of experts serve that purpose, especially when there are still significant divergences of views among Member States concerning the parameters of such a study? A study conducted without clear-cut guidelines on which all Member States are agreed would have limited relevance and virtually no practical impact. Surely those who wish to put emphasis on measures of conventional disarmament would like to forge a broad consensus of views on such a question. We are of the opinion that the approach manifest in draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.3 would be counter-productive and instead of working towards a reconciliation of views on this question, it would, in fact, serve to exacerbate further existing divergences. We would therefore recommend that the draft resolution be withdrawn and that Member States in the Disarmament Commission be given another opportunity to seek a reconciliation of their views concerning the study on conventional weapons. Pending the elaboration of an agreed approach to the study, member delegations represented at the second special session on disarmament would have the fullest opportunity to put forward their own ideas and recommendations on measures of conventional disarmament. The consideration of such measures should not and must not be linked to the carrying out of an expert study on conventional weapons.

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): I have asked to speak to introduce the draft resolution that has been distributed this morning in document A/C.1/36/L.9, entitled "Institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament". It is my honour to introduce this on behalf of the following delegations which are sponsoring it: Bahamas, Bangladesh, Cuba, Finland, France, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Romania, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Yugoslavia and, of course, my own delegation.

This is basically a procedural draft resolution which has taken into account the fact that the report presented on the subject by the Secretary-General was submitted to the General Assembly on the day of the opening of the Assembly; that means that really there was no time for Governments of Member States to have considered it carefully.

The basic purpose of this draft resolution is to recommend Governments of Member States to pay attention to the study by the group of experts and to inform the Secretary-General of their points of views on the subject. The idea is to have this subject studied in depth at the next special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

In addition, it is obvious that during the debates in this Committee there has not been nor will there be time for delegations to state their views on matters of substance contained in this study. That is why the delegation of Argentina will not make any substantive comments on this occasion.

On the other hand, by submitting this study to the next special session of the General Assembly, account was taken of what was said by the Chairman of the group of experts on 22 October in this Committee, when he noted that the group, in carrying out the respective evaluation of the items assigned to it, had taken particular note of the fact that next year the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament would be held and that that would be a propitious occasion for the study to be discussed and considered in depth.

The same idea is set forth in the study itself, in paragraph 6, which appears on page 6 of document A/36/392 - that is, the report of the Secretary-General.

In connexion with the text of the draft resolution which I am introducing, it is normal practice to say that such texts are self-explanatory, and this one really is.

The draft contains two preambular paragraphs. The first merely recalls resolution 34/37 E of 11 December 1979, in which the Secretary-General was requested to carry out a study with the assistance of qualified governmental experts.

The second preambular paragraph is limited to noting that the Assembly has considered the report of the Secretary-General which contains the study.

As for the operative paragraphs, paragraph 1 takes note of the report of the Secretary-General and of the study contained therein. Paragraph 2 expresses the Assembly's appreciation to the Secretary-General and the experts who assisted him for the efficient manner in which the report was prepared. Paragraph 3 recommends that all Member States study the report. Paragraph 4 invites all Member States to transmit to the Secretary-General by 31 March 1982 their comments on the study and its conclusions and recommendations. Paragraph 5 requests the Secretary-General to transmit the study to the Committee on Disarmament. Paragraph 6, which is perhaps the fundamental paragraph, decides to transmit the report and the comments of Member States to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament for substantive consideration and the adoption of appropriate decisions. Finally, since it may be necessary to continue the consideration of this item, in paragraph 7 the Assembly further decides to include the item in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session.

As I have already stated, this is merely a procedural draft resolution, aimed at ensuring that a report as important as the one contained in document A/36/392 -- with all its implications for the future of the disarmament process in the institutional arrangements that will aid in its development -- receive the consideration it deserves from the Governments of Member States and from the Assembly itself, which, at next year's special session devoted to disarmament, will have ample opportunity fully to consider this report and, if possible, to adopt appropriate decisions on the subject.

It is the hope of my delegation and of the other sponsors that this draft resolution will be adopted by the First Committee, if possible by consensus.

Mr. MEGALOKONOMOS (Greece): Mr. Chairman, as this is my first opportunity to speak in this Committee, I should like to congratulate you and the other officers, and to assure you that my delegation will be at your disposal in every

(Mr. Megalokonomos, Greece)

effort aimed at the attainment of the Committee's objectives. I should like to add that my delegation is especially gratified by the fact that the work of our Committee has been placed under the chairmanship of such a distinguished personality, the representative of a neighbouring and friendly country, Yugoslavia, whose policies have an impact on our region and which plays an internationally recognized constructive role.

Whenever a speaker must deal with only one side of a single problem, he could be considered as trying to downgrade the other side. Sometimes that is true and in other cases it is false. It is especially false when one is dealing with armaments: each and every aspect of armaments has, in our opinion, the same grave consequences about which we all know - deadly and final consequences for peoples and countries. If I have chosen today to deal with conventional armaments it is because dozens of local wars have taken place since the Second World War with the use of those classical means. It is also because, while nuclear weapons carry with them their own self-prohibitive character, human destructive trends, on the contrary, too often find justification for the use of conventional weapons instead of trying harder to solve existing problems peacefully.

The security of all countries, and especially of the smaller countries, also depends on conventional disarmament. Unfortunately, we have seen in the last few years several examples of small countries suffering from the superior weaponry of larger States. I shall not mention the extremely favourable consequences for the economies of our countries and for their development that would come about as a result of our making considerable progress in the field of conventional disarmament. I shall refer to only one other reason among those that cause my country to be especially interested in the process of conventional disarmament.

We all feel that it is indispensable that we make progress in the field of nuclear disarmament. We all urge this - from different points of view, no doubt, but with the clear and declared objective of taking steps, and if possible sincere steps, forward in that field. Nevertheless, although we all urge, all recommend, all keep trying, the final decisions will be taken only by a very small number of nuclear Powers among us. The others, small and medium-sized countries, will be able only to enjoy or suffer the consequences of our success or failure.

Contrary to that strange relationship, conventional disarmament could, if we so wished, remain almost entirely in the hands of the whole world community. In this

field we all share practically equal possibilities and opportunities to show good or ill will.

In conclusion, my delegation considers that the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should try to deal substantively with conventional disarmament together with the undoubtedly most important matter of nuclear disarmament and other aspects of disarmament. To do so, the 1982 special session will have to have at its disposal sufficient materials, among them the anticipated report of the Secretary-General assisted by a group of experts approved by General Assembly resolution 35/156 A of 12 December 1980. In our opinion that group of experts should start its work as soon as possible in order to study aspects of the conventional arms race, as this activity is not only necessary, but also in compliance with the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and will permit the second special session devoted to disarmament to deal with the question of conventional disarmament with a supplementary sound basis of technical information. The fact is that the group of experts will have to deal with this question as soon as possible in order to permit the Secretary-General to submit an interim report to the General Assembly at the second special session devoted to disarmament

For those reasons, we heartily support the draft resolution in document A/C.1/36/L.3 presented by the Danish delegation. My delegation will also vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.4, presented by the Egyptian delegation and sponsored also by many other delegations. We believe that voting in favour of both these draft resolutions is not inconsistent, and that it is the only way not to diminish any existing institutions while at the same time securing a mandate for the group of experts which, otherwise, will not be able to start work in this important field before the second special session devoted to disarmament.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): I have asked to speak to make a few comments in connexion with the draft resolution the representative of Argentina has just introduced concerning the study on the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament (A/C.1/36/L.9). I am speaking on a matter to which the Swedish Government has given particular attention and which has been the subject of many statements from my delegation in this Committee in the past. It was also on the suggestion of this delegation that the study of the international arrangements was initiated. I am therefore particularly glad to express our great appreciation for the way in which Mr. Ortiz de Rozas, with his well-known excellent qualities and great experience, fulfilled his difficult task as Chairman of the study group.

In our general statement in this Committee on 26 October, we did not hide the fact that the expectations my Government originally had attached to this study had not been fully met by the recommendations of the present report. We are somewhat disappointed at the lack of concrete recommendations on the key issues. In the light of our strongly felt views on this matter, this should come as a surprise to no one.

In our view, high goals must be set for the United Nations efforts in the field of disarmament. A more effective disarmament machinery needs to be established to correspond to such goals. A United Nations disarmament agency is the body proposed to contribute to the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the second special session devoted to disarmament.

We have already, in the Group of Governmental Experts and in other forums, in great detail explained our views on the various functions intended for the United Nations disarmament agency. On this occasion I should like only to reiterate a few of them.

At present there is a tendency to establish separate and independent organizations within the field of disarmament, each body with its own advisory board or committee. The creation of a United Nations disarmament agency would provide an obvious possibility to streamline and co-ordinate these various activities.

The special requirements in the area of disarmament negotiations call for both general knowledge of conference servicing and for knowledge on the substance under discussion or negotiation. The first of these two functions

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

necessitates the availability of a group of generalists, political officers and supportive staff. The second calls for a range of specialists. It would seem practical that a separate committee and conference division be established, such as in the present Centre for Disarmament, in order to provide the generalists needed. The need for specialist staff in any one committee, commission or conference will, however, vary over time and between bodies.

In view of the central role of the United Nations in disarmament, among other things, the role of the Secretary-General as depositary of disarmament agreements, implementation and verification, including the organization of review conferences and Secretariat functions in relation to complaints procedures, would be among the most important functions of the United Nations disarmament agency.

In this area there is a need to build a much stronger machinery for the 1980s and beyond. On the one hand, it must be assumed that a number of agreements that have long been under negotiation will be concluded in the not too distant future, involving important provisions concerning implementation and verification, for instance, a test-ban treaty and a convention on chemical weapons. These tasks cannot be performed unless there exist sufficient organizational resources to handle often quite complex procedural and technical problems. Furthermore, the adoption at the second special session on disarmament of a comprehensive programme of disarmament will require that long-term perspectives be taken into account in planning an organ which must be able to fulfil the tasks envisaged in the programme. Also, the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Expert Group on the Establishment of an International Satellite Monitoring Agency should receive due attention in planning the organizational set-up within the United Nations disarmament agency for implementation and verification purposes.

The basic elements of the views of my Government are included in the report of the Group of Experts.

For the sake of clarity, I should like to quote from the report the one paragraph that sums up the Swedish proposal in the following way:

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

"A specific proposal was put forward for the establishment of a United Nations Disarmament Agency. According to the proposal it was generally agreed that the need for progress in disarmament and arms control in the 1980s was more urgent than ever and that the United Nations must set high goals in the field of disarmament in the coming decade. The agency would be an organization for an effective disarmament machinery to correspond to those more ambitious goals. The agency should have a sufficiently independent position within the United Nations system, established in a manner similar to IAEA, with a governing council, funded in the same manner as other agencies, and reporting directly to the General Assembly. This major organization was envisaged to facilitate co-ordination of disarmament activities within the framework of the United Nations at the level of the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination, as well as to assist in the setting of priorities and achievement of common aims. Its functions should include services for deliberation, negotiation, implementation, verification, information, research and study, disarmament and development and training. It was felt that the practical thinking needed to develop the proper organizational framework of such an agency be an important part of the preparations for the second special session devoted to disarmament, and of that session itself."

(A/36/392, annex, para. 84)

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

The study does not recommend specific action in this direction. The Group of Experts is correct, of course, in stating in the opening paragraph of the concluding chapter of the report that, whatever the adequacy of the means provided by the United Nations in the service of the task of disarmament, it is ultimately the will of States to make use of them and their political readiness to negotiate which will determine how much progress can be made. We are, however, convinced that the institutional arrangements also play an important part in this process, and this prompts us to propose the establishment of a United Nations disarmament agency. Our proposal has received valuable support from a number of States. Consultations here in this Committee since the study was presented have convinced us that our views concerning the need for an institutional reform of United Nations involvement in disarmament matters are more widely shared than is indicated by the recommendations of the report.

Our views should be regarded not as a criticism of the functioning of the present Centre for Disarmament, but rather as a reflection of more ambitious goals and priorities, including the wish to ensure that the work programme which will be agreed by the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament in the guise of a comprehensive programme of disarmament be matched by adequate Secretariat resources. The second special session will, of course, consider a number of related organizational issues. One such very important issue relates to the follow-up to the study on an International Satellite Monitoring Agency and the verification aspects of arms control and disarmament agreements, another to the future role of the Advisory Board. It would seem obvious that those questions should also receive due attention in a discussion on establishing a United Nations disarmament agency.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (interpretation from Russian): The Mongolian delegation has asked to speak in order to present document A/C.1/36/L.8, dated 11 November 1981, which contains a draft resolution sponsored by Angola, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Poland, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Viet Nam and Mongolia.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

On 10 August the Soviet Union requested the inclusion in the agenda of the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly of an item entitled "Conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space". The request and a suggested draft treaty are to be found in document A/36/192, dated 20 August 1981. The purpose of that proposal was to ensure that the boundless ocean of outer space should not become an arena for the arms race or a source of further strained relations between States, by keeping outer space unsullied and free from any kind of weapons. That is a common objective of the sponsors of the draft resolution. We believe that it has won the support of many States whose representatives have spoken in our Committee. We were gratified to note that the representatives of practically all the main groups of States are concerned about the danger which would face mankind if outer space became an arena for the arms race.

The sponsors of the draft resolution also share the views expressed in the Committee that the existing system of treaties and agreements should be added to. Those treaties and agreements provide for the prohibition of placing in orbit around the earth or stationing on celestial bodies or in outer space of any objects carrying nuclear weapons or other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, but they do not preclude the possibility of stationing in outer space types of weapons that are not covered by the definition of weapons of mass destruction. Since, as the discussion has indicated and as representatives are aware, there is an ever-growing possibility of the appearance of new types of such weapons, there can be no doubt that it is desirable to draw up and conclude an international treaty on this subject, so that effective steps can be taken to prevent the spread of the nuclear arms race to outer space.

We believe that there is a generally held view that this important matter should be dealt with by the Committee on Disarmament. These are the basic ideas which are reflected in the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/36/L.8, whose purpose is essentially to draw the attention of States to the need to take effective steps to prevent the spread of the arms race to outer space, by concluding an international treaty on the subject, and to draw attention to existing opinions and ideas on the matter, particularly those in the draft treaty which would prohibit the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space, as stated in the draft treaty presented to the General Assembly by the Soviet Union.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

As States have put forward a number of ideas and proposals, as there are varying approaches as to how to tackle the problems, and in view of the provisional nature of the discussion that we have had and the complexity of the task of preventing the spread of the arms race to outer space, the sponsors of the draft resolution propose that the General Assembly should, without prejudging the content of a future agreement, request the Committee on Disarmament to embark on negotiations. It refers at the same time to the specific and general purposes of the talks, which would be to reach agreement on the text of an international treaty to make it possible to prevent the spread of the arms race to outer space.

The sponsors hope that the draft resolution will be supported in the Committee and that an important, albeit preliminary, step will thus be taken towards the achievement by the international community of the goal of preserving outer space, that common heritage of mankind, free from weapons of any kind and the subject of co-operation for peaceful purposes, to serve the well-being of all States and to develop friendly relations and mutual understanding among them.

Mr. ADELMAN (United States of America): The Soviet representative this morning urged all of us to be frank and blunt in our deliberations, and it would be negligent not to be so rather quickly - within half an hour of his speech - so that we may leave behind us the issue of the use of chemical and biological weapons in the world. It is an issue that we had not intended to bring up in this Committee, and we have not done so in any major way. However, I feel that the United States should respond quickly, and briefly.

(Mr. Adelman, United States)

Over the past five years, perhaps longer, weapons outlawed by mankind, weapons successfully banned from the battlefields of the industrialized world for over five decades, have been used against unsophisticated and defenceless people in campaigns of mounting extermination which are being conducted in Laos, Kampuchea and, more recently, in Afghanistan. Reports of the use of lethal chemical weapons in South-East Asia began to appear in 1976, although the initial attacks may in fact predate that by several years.

The sites of these first attacks were in remote highlands of Laos, six weeks by jungle track from the nearest neutral territory. The targets were the villages of the highland tribes, such as the Mong, traditionally resistant to the lowland Pathet Lao.

The victims were the inhabitants of these villages - men, women and children, particularly the children, who proved least able to resist the lethal effects of the poisons being employed against them.

As information accumulated since 1976, it became clear to the world community that something important and sinister was reportedly occurring. It was not clear precisely what was going on. For that very reason, an international group was formed to investigate the charges. The work of this group of experts is terribly important.

This issue is one that is related to the general posture of the United States and countries in the world to negotiations in general and to chemical and biological weapons. We shall speak on that point tomorrow, but wanted to speak on behalf of my delegation very quickly and very immediately on the whole question of chemical-weapon use, because I reiterate that this is not an issue we wanted to bring up while the group of experts is conducting its important work and it is an issue that we hope we can now leave in the First Committee, so that we can go on to the other issues in the disarmament field and to the larger picture of the status of negotiations and the status of conventions in this area.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): I think that the time has really come for the First Committee to express gratitude to the Soviet delegation. Actually, it appears to us that the United States is participating in the work of the First Committee mainly to deal with statements made by the Soviet delegation. All the Soviet delegation has to do is to make a statement and in the seats of the United States we suddenly have a very solid representation of the Mission -- advisors, ambassadors, and so on, who as a rule would otherwise be absent -- in other words, the heavy artillery.

If one peruses the contents of the numerous statements made by the American delegation, it becomes clear that these are basically replies to the Soviet delegation. I must say that we are quite satisfied with this. In fact, we welcome it. Obviously, in this way we are able to attract the attention of the United States delegation to the question of disarmament. This is a very constructive contribution, I think.

Now, regarding the reply made by the representative of the United States, he probably did not quite grasp the point and the content of the statement made by the Soviet delegation. I should like to remind him, we were talking about binary weapons -- the creation and manufacture of new forms of chemical weapons, and the fact that these should not be allowed to be placed in other territories. This, essentially, was the topic dealt with in the Soviet statement. So it would be a good idea, I think, if the American delegation were to give some thought to this at home, and we would be very pleased to hear the American representative's replies to the substance of what we were talking about.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.