

# COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.147  
18 August 1981  
ENGLISH

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-SEVENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 18 August 1981, at 10.30 a.m. and 3 p.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Ch.A. SANTI

(Indonesia)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Algeria:</u>	Mr. A. SALAH-BEY
<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. J.C. CARASALES Mr. J.F. GOMENSORO Ms. N. NASCIMBENE
<u>Australia:</u>	Mr. R.A. WALKER Mr. R. STEELE
<u>Belgium:</u>	Mr. A. ONKELINX Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. P. VOUTOV Mr. I. SOTIROV
<u>Burma:</u>	U SAW HLAING U HCAVE WIN U THAN HTUN
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. D.S. McPHAIL Mr. C.R. SKINNER
<u>China:</u>	Mr. YU Peiwen Mr. YU Hengjia Mrs. WANG Zhiyun Mr. LIN Chen Mr. PAN Jusheng
<u>Cuba:</u>	Mr. Pelegrin TORRAS Mr. L. SOLA VILA Mr. P. MUÑOZ MOSQUERA
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. RUZEK Mr. P. LUKES Mr. J. FRANEK

Egypt:

Mr. I.A. HASSAN

Mr. N. FAHMY

Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE

Mr. F. YOHANNES

Miss Kongit SINEGIORGIS

France:

Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE

Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER

Mr. H. THIELICKE

Mr. M. KAULFUSS

Mrs. H. HOPPE

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. G. PFEIFFER

Mr. F. RUTH

Mr. N. KLINGLER

Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES

Mr. C. GYORFFY

India:

Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN

Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. A. SANI

Mr. M. SIDIK

Mr. HARYONATARAH

Mr. F. QASIM

Mr. W. ACHDIK

Mr. E. SOEPRAPTO

Iran:

Mr. A. JALALI

Mr. D. AMERI

Italy:

Mr. A. CIARRAPICO

Mr. M. BARENGHI

Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA  
Mr. H. TAKAHASHI  
Mr. K. TANIKA  
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya:Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDENBILEG  
Mr. S. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. H. ARRASSEN  
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. R.H. FEIN  
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria:

Mr. M.B. BRINAH  
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA  
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD  
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Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Mr. J. DEHAVIDES

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA  
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Romania:

Mr. M. IALITA  
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. T. JAYAKODDY  
Mr. H.H.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD  
Mr. L. NORBERG  
Mr. H. BERGLUND  
Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN  
Mr. V.A. SEMIONOV  
Mr. L.A. NAUMOV  
Mr. V.M. GANJA  
Mr. V.F. PRYAKHIN  
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. D. SUMMERHAYES  
Mr. N.H. MARSHALL  
Mrs. J. LINK

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. FLOWERREE  
Mr. F. DESIMONE  
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER  
Mr. R.F. SCOTT  
Miss L. SHEA  
Mr. W. HECKROTTE

Venezuela:

Mr. R. RODRIGUEZ NAVARRO  
Mr. O. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Zaire:

Mr. B.A. NZENGEYA  
Mr. C.O. GNOK

Secretary of the Committee and  
Personal Representative of  
the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the  
Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: In accordance with its programme of work for the present week, the Committee continues today its consideration of the item dealing with reports of subsidiary bodies as well as the annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations. Of course, in conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, members are at liberty to make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee.

May I extend a warm welcome to His Excellency, the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cuba, Dr. Pelegrin Torras, who has come today to address the Committee. I wish him a successful visit to Geneva, where I understand he is also dealing with other important problems for the international community.

Before we listen to the statements of members inscribed to speak today, I would like to invite the Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Working Groups on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons and on Radiological Weapons to introduce briefly the reports of those working groups. The reports are contained in document CD/215 for the Ad Hoc Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, and in document CD/218 for the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons. The reports of the Ad Hoc Working Groups on Chemical Weapons and on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which concluded their work yesterday, will be introduced by their Chairmen at our plenary meeting on Thursday.

As I announced at our last plenary meeting, I intend to put before the Committee for its approval the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, contained in document CD/210. I will proceed to do so at the end of this plenary meeting, so that delegations wishing to comment on the report may make their views known.

I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Minister Ciarrapico.

Mr. CIARRAPICO (Italy): Mr. Chairman, it is my honour and pleasure to present to the Committee on Disarmament the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group to continue to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The report is contained in document CD/215, which consists of four sections, namely: (1) Introduction; (2) Organization of work and documentation; (3) Substantive negotiations; and (4) Conclusions and recommendations.

In carrying out the task entrusted to it, the Ad Hoc Working Group took note of the extensive discussions on the subject and intensive negotiations on the elements that took place during the period of the previous Working Group with a view to reaching agreement on a common approach acceptable to all which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. At the beginning of its work, the Group decided to concentrate its attention essentially on the examination of the substance of the assurances given, on the understanding that an agreement on the substance could facilitate an agreement on form. Accordingly, a programme of work

(Mr. Ciarrapico, Italy)

(CD/SA/WP.5) was submitted by the Chairman as a general guideline for deliberations and negotiations, taking into account various views expressed and proposals submitted. It contained principally two stages of work for the current session, namely, (1) stage one: identification of the various features of the assurances not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States; (2) stage two: consideration of possible alternatives which can be explored in the search for a "common approach" or "formula". After extensive consideration of stage one of the programme of work, it was generally felt that deeper understanding of the various positions held by delegations, their similarities and differences, had been reached as a result of the discussion. In carrying out the task outlined in stage two of the programme of work the Working Group examined thoroughly, in the manner of a comparative analysis, possible alternatives for a "common approach" or "formula" with a view to concentrating efforts on the most promising among them. Subsequently, without prejudice to further exploration of other alternatives, which could be elaborated in the future, the Working Group decided to concentrate its efforts at this stage of consideration, on alternative D in conjunction with alternative E contained in stage two of the programme of work. These alternatives called for "a 'common formula' for security assurances containing such elements as may be raised in the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament and agreed upon by all concerned" and "a 'common formula' which could reconcile the elements contained in the existing unilateral undertakings of the nuclear-weapon States".

In this connection, various proposals were submitted by some delegations as a basis for further consideration of a "common formula". Different approaches to the question of developing a "common formula" became apparent in the course of discussions, and divergent views on these approaches and the pertinent issues, particularly the question of eligibility for the assurances and the desirability and the nature of a possible "suspension clause", continued to be maintained.

In considering the possible "common approach" or "formula", the question of an appropriate form was also raised. Although there was no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention, the difficulties involved were also pointed out. Furthermore, the idea of interim arrangements was considered, particularly taking note of the proposals for an appropriate Security Council resolution on which divergent views were expressed. At the same time, it was pointed out that the value of any interim arrangement would depend on its substance. A number of delegations believed that interim measures should not be a substitute for an international convention or other international arrangements of a legally binding character.

It was the conclusion of the Working Group that non-nuclear-weapon States should be effectively assured by the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. There was continuing recognition of the urgent need to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, especially in view of the goal of nuclear disarmament and of general and complete disarmament. Negotiations on the substance of the effective arrangements revealed that specific difficulties were related to differing perceptions of some nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States as well as to the complex nature of the issues involved in evolving a "common formula" acceptable to all which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. The Working Group recognized that adequate consideration needed to be given to the security interests of non-nuclear-weapon States. It regarded the efforts devoted to the search for a "common approach" or "formula" as a positive step towards the agreement on the question of security assurances.

(Mr. Ciarrapico, Italy)

Against this background, the Working Group recommends to the Committee on Disarmament that various alternative approaches, including in particular those considered during the 1981 session, should be further explored in order to overcome the difficulties encountered. In this context further efforts should be devoted to the search for a "common approach" acceptable to all, and in particular for a "common formula" which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. Accordingly, a working group should be established at the beginning of the 1982 session for the purpose, as recommended in United Nations General Assembly resolution 35/46, "urgently to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement, and to submit agreed texts where possible before the second special session devoted to disarmament", on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

In concluding my introductory statement, I would like to express my deep appreciation and gratitude to the members of the Ad Hoc Working Group for their co-operation and their spirit of compromise and flexibility, which were indispensable for the work of the Group, especially as demonstrated during the course of considering and adopting this report. I would also like, on behalf of the Ad Hoc Working Group, to note with appreciation the assistance provided to the Group by Mr. Lin, the Secretary of the Working Group, as well as the entire secretariat staff.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons for his statement introducing the report of the Working Group. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, Ambassador Komives.

Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): Mr. Chairman, in my capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group which was re-established by the Committee to continue negotiations with a view to elaborating a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, I have the honour to present to the Committee on Disarmament the report on the progress of the Group's work as approved by the Working Group last Friday and distributed in document CD/218. During both parts of this annual session of the Committee on Disarmament, the Ad Hoc Working Group, in fulfilling its mandate, gave intensive consideration to the main elements of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons on the basis of the joint USSR/United States proposal, the Chairman's consolidated text, and other documents and proposals submitted with a view to elaborating draft provisions for the future treaty. The substantive discussions which took place in the Working Group demonstrated that some progress had been made in narrowing down the differences between the participants in our negotiations. With regard to the whole range of the treaty provisions, a number of new concrete amendments and proposals were submitted during this session. However, the activities of the Working Group showed that divergencies still exist, particularly on such questions as the scope of prohibition, the definition of radiological weapons, the procedure for verifying compliance, peaceful uses and the relationship of the treaty on radiological weapons with other international agreements and disarmament measures. Taking into account the widespread desire to accomplish the



(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

elaboration of the treaty before the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, may I express my hope that the Working Group will be able to overcome these divergencies during the next round of our work.

Bearing this in mind, the Working Group recommends that the Committee on Disarmament set up, at the beginning of next year's session, an ad hoc working group, under an appropriate mandate, to continue negotiations on the elaboration of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons. The Ad Hoc Working Group also agreed to recommend to the Committee on Disarmament that it consider whether the Group should resume its work early, that is, on 18 January 1982.

Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to all members of the Working Group for their co-operation and their spirit of compromise, without which we could not have progressed towards the conclusion of our work. I would like also, on behalf of the Working Group, to acknowledge with appreciation the assistance provided to the Group by Mr. Efimov, the Secretary of the Working Group, as well as the entire Secretariat staff.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons for his statement introducing the report of the Working Group. Distinguished colleagues, in view of the long list of speakers for this plenary meeting, we might need to suspend the plenary and to continue this afternoon. Immediately following the afternoon meeting, I intend to convene an informal meeting of the Committee to continue our consideration of Working Paper No. 44 containing the draft report to the United Nations General Assembly, as well as Working Paper No. 45 entitled, "Draft decision containing proposals for the functioning of the Committee on Disarmament."

Mr. TORRAS (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, allow me to congratulate you, on your accession to the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of August. The Cuban delegation will co-operate with you, Ambassador Anwar Sani, so that we can bring our work to a successful conclusion. At the same time I should like to express our appreciation to Ambassador Venkateswaran of India for the very intelligent, firm and consistent way in which he conducted the work of the Committee during July.

The Republic of Cuba is paying particular attention to the work of the Committee on Disarmament. As this is the only multilateral negotiating body on these topics, it is obvious that great responsibility devolves on each of its members; hence the importance of the negotiations conducted here with a view to achieving concrete disarmament agreements designed to put an end to the arms race which already involves expenditures of some \$500 billion, an intolerable burden which swallows up resources needed to remedy the distressing situation of hundreds of millions of human beings in the underdeveloped world.

However, if we take stock of what we have achieved as we approach the end of our 1981 session, we find that the results are not very encouraging. To take merely items 1 and 2 of the Committee's agenda, on a nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament respectively, the priority importance of which has repeatedly been recognized by the United Nations General Assembly -- these have formed the subject of informal exchanges only.

(Mr. Torras, Cuba)

It is regrettable that two delegations have, so to speak, vetoed the start of concrete negotiations on these important items on the Committee's agenda.

This situation is the more critical because never, since the so-called "October crisis," has the danger of nuclear war been greater. Then, as now, it was the aggressive and arrogant policy of imperialism which was responsible for such a situation.

The reasons why two States have prevented the start of negotiations on those items in the Committee on Disarmament are the same as those which have paralysed the SALT negotiations, the bilateral negotiations on chemical weapons and the trilateral negotiations on nuclear tests. They are the same as have halted the process of détente and made the international situation difficult.

The decision to station new medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, the postponement of the ratification of the SALT II agreement, the military escalation and the despatch of rapid deployment intervention forces to various regions of the world, including the Caribbean, are vivid demonstrations of the warmongering and hegemonistic policy of those who are hindering the disarmament negotiations and doing their utmost to return to the times of the cold war.

It should be borne in mind that next year will see the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and our Committee should endeavour to have some positive results to show from its negotiations. The existence of political will is therefore of fundamental importance for this negotiating forum.

In view of the priority attaching to agenda items 1 and 2, I should like to make some brief comments on them.

The Cuban delegation considers that although the exchange of views which took place in the informal consultations was quite useful, it is essential for working groups to be set up on those items without delay so that the Committee can embark on serious negotiations in that regard.

In view, again, of the urgency of nuclear disarmament matters and of the fact that the Committee on Disarmament has not been able to make a start on negotiations in this sphere, I wish also to stress once more the need for the earliest possible resumption of the trilateral negotiations which have been taking place outside the framework of the Committee on Disarmament, the importance of which goes without saying.

The Committee on Disarmament is undoubtedly in a position to initiate concrete negotiations on these items: in the first place, a number of working papers have been submitted, including documents from the group of socialist countries and from the Group of 21; and secondly, all the nuclear-weapon States are represented in the Committee. It is clear that there is no justification whatsoever for further delay.

(Mr. Torras, Cuba)

I should now like to make some comments on an item which is on the Committee's agenda and with regard to which the Committee could do more than it has done up to date: I am referring to the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.

The importance of this subject has increased considerably in recent years. Both the United Nations General Assembly and other forums outside the United Nations, such as the meetings of the movement of non-aligned countries, have stressed the importance and necessity of reaching an agreement to prohibit new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.

In connection with this topic, artificial obstacles have been created such as the need for the prior identification of such weapons and all the difficulties raised with respect to the problem of verification. The Cuban delegation believes that it is necessary to grasp the need to reach an agreement which will prevent the appearance of such weapons.

Experience has shown that once a given type of weapon exists, it is very difficult to prohibit it. We are, therefore, convinced that the initiation of negotiations on this subject is also very important for the international community.

What is necessary is to prevent the use of scientific and technological advances for destructive purposes. The Committee on Disarmament can do a great deal in this regard.

We have already expressed our support for the setting up of a group of qualified governmental experts to meet periodically and keep the Committee informed on all matters concerning scientific discoveries and their possible use for military purposes.

Another item which appears on the Committee's agenda and which is of particular importance to the Cuban delegation is the one relating to security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States.

As a non-nuclear-weapon State Cuba is profoundly interested in protecting its national security as well as that of other non-nuclear-weapon States. In the present circumstances, in which the warmongers are again baring their teeth, the need to find a broad solution to this problem is becoming increasingly urgent.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on this question, assiduously presided over by Minister Ciarrapico of Italy, has concentrated on seeking a common formula negotiated in the Committee on Disarmament which will be acceptable to all. The Cuban delegation has already had an opportunity of expressing its views in this regard.

(Mr. Torras, Cuba)

We believe that it is essential to adopt a treaty on this question and that that would be a step forward in the disarmament negotiations; we therefore fully support it.

On the other hand, although we recognize the importance which the adoption of a Security Council resolution in this regard would have, we have said that it must be identical for all the nuclear-weapon States and that it cannot constitute an end in itself but should be followed by the adoption of an international instrument of a binding character.

As regards the different alternatives considered, we are against the inclusion of unjustified requirements which tend to delay the reaching of any agreement. We consider that the assurances should be granted without further requirements, particularly to non-nuclear-weapon States which do not have weapons of this kind on their territories. This is a broad position which could serve as a basis in the search for a solution on this important item.

We should also like to stress once again that it must be borne in mind that this question is very closely linked to the complete prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the non-use of force in international relations, and should therefore be dealt with in that context.

One subject which I cannot fail to mention in my statement is that of chemical weapons, the Ad Hoc Working Group on which is skilfully presided over by the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Lidgard.

The negotiations which have so far taken place have brought out the complexities of this topic, particularly in view of its links in some aspects with the use of chemicals for peaceful purposes in the economies of States. However, the Committee on Disarmament should redouble its efforts towards achieving an agreement with respect to chemical weapons.

This is another topic which has also been dealt with outside the context of the United Nations. Paragraph 220 of the Final Declaration of the Sixth Conference of Heads of States or Government of Non-Aligned Countries calls, inter alia, for the urgent conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction. Hence my delegation's position.

We consider that the Committee's efforts should be basically aimed at determining the most relevant aspects of the future convention, such as its content and scope. This done, it would be possible to go on to other questions which, although they are not secondary, nevertheless depend to a large extent on the content and scope of the convention.

The work which the Working Group is doing has shown that there is an adequate basis for serious negotiations to be conducted on this important item, and we hope that the negotiations will continue at their present pace.

(Mr. Torras, Cuba)

I should now like to refer to the item concerning the prohibition of radiological weapons, the Ad Hoc Working Group on which is wisely presided over by Ambassador Komives of Hungary.

The drafting of a treaty for the prohibition of radiological weapons has been requested in several General Assembly resolutions, and in the Final Document of the 1978 special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The Cuban delegation firmly believes that this is a task which can be completed before the convening of the second special session of the General Assembly, scheduled for next year.

The conclusion of a treaty on radiological weapons, particularly at this time, would be a praiseworthy achievement by the Committee on Disarmament in its negotiations, and would also create a serious obstacle to the development of weapons of mass destruction. It is undeniable that the submission of a treaty on radiological weapons by this Committee would be very well received by the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament.

I should now like to refer to an item which I have deliberately left to the end. It is that of the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, for which this Committee decided to set up a Working Group, which has been presided over in a most noteworthy manner by Ambassador García-Robles, the representative of Mexico.

The urgency of this question is due in part to the fact that the Committee has to submit this programme for consideration by the United Nations General Assembly, at its second special session devoted to disarmament, next year.

There is abundant material which can serve as a basis for the drawing up of the programme. Suffice it to mention, on account of their importance, the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the elements identified by the Disarmament Commission in this regard, and the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade.

At the same time, all States, whether or not they are members of the Committee on Disarmament, have an interest in the adoption of the programme in view of the importance which such a document would have. The conditions therefore exist for the Committee to be able to have the programme ready by the end of its spring session next year.

The Cuban delegation intends to continue, as it has been doing in the past, striving to expedite the activities of the Working Group, and it hopes that obstacles will not arise to complicate the drafting of the comprehensive programme.

The comprehensive programme of disarmament is to constitute the basis for future negotiations in this connection, and it ought therefore to be drawn up in a realistic manner, bearing in mind the need for concrete measures in this field.

Before concluding, I should like to refer to a subject of topical interest, one which is of necessity bound up with the work of this Committee. That is the recent decision of the United States Administration to authorize the manufacture of neutron weapons.

I wish to express the Cuban delegation's most energetic condemnation of this decision.

(Mr. Torras, Cuba)

While the initiation of concrete negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on urgent matters of nuclear disarmament has been blocked on flimsy pretexts which have not succeeded in convincing anyone, a decision has now been adopted which in itself represents the beginning of a new upward spiral in the arms race.

The manufacture of the neutron bomb, as has been stressed on more than one occasion in this Committee, brings new aspects to nuclear war and increases its horrors. We must not forget that the aim is to destroy people while reducing to a minimum the destruction of buildings -- a feature which makes clear its anti-human nature.

Such a decision constitutes a mockery of the work of the Committee on Disarmament and a challenge to world public opinion, particularly as it was adopted in the context of yet another anniversary of the Hiroshima massacre.

I wish to urge the Committee on Disarmament, in addition to redoubling its efforts in its consideration of the items which have high priority on its agenda, to adopt such measures as may be necessary so that it may consider the documents submitted to it concerning neutron weapons.

The decision to begin the manufacture of neutron weapons opens up the possibility that similar decisions will be taken by these same reactionary sectors with regard to other types of weapons. In this connection the Cuban delegation has considered it pertinent to submit to the Secretariat of the Committee a document reproducing some paragraphs of a statement made by President Fidel Castro on 26 July last, which we hope will be useful for the work of the Committee in the accomplishment of its noble task.

To conclude, I should like to quote some remarks from another statement by our President, Comrade Fidel Castro, made on the occasion of the meeting of the presiding officers of the World Peace Council in our country, when he compared the present situation in the sphere of nuclear weapons with that existing at the time of the October crisis. He said the following:

"Although in 1962 the arsenals already contained more than enough megatons to wipe out the last vestige of life on earth, today the numbers, power and effectiveness of strategic weapons systems have multiplied to a frightening degree. The frontiers of terror were long ago left behind, and no new means of mass destruction that may be added today can instil greater terror in its eventual victims. Mankind can only be exterminated once. No person in his senses has any doubt that in a nuclear war, under present conditions, the results would be equally cruel for attackers and attacked, for the belligerents and for neutral countries, for the atomic Powers and for all the nations which do not possess such weapons. There is even the risk that a technical fault, a human error or mere carelessness may precipitate a reaction with catastrophic consequences".

He went on:

"We are not and we shall never be fatalists. We do not and we shall never accept the idea that a world holocaust is inevitable. Mankind must have a nobler destiny."

In man's struggle to avoid this holocaust a particular responsibility devolves on the Committee on Disarmament, which is called upon to find the means to put an end to the uncontrolled arms race. In this noble but difficult task, in which we must all make an effort, you may count on the steadfast participation of Cuba.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Cuba for his statement and for the kind reference he made to the Chair.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, as this is the first opportunity which the Pakistan delegation has had to intervene in the Committee this month, let me first express to you our very sincere satisfaction in seeing you, the representative of a brotherly country, Indonesia, presiding over our deliberations. We have no doubt that the work of the Committee in this important concluding part of our annual session will be greatly facilitated by the firm guidance of a Chairman whose diplomatic experience and wisdom have already made a deep impression in the past two weeks.

May I also avail myself of this opportunity to express our deep appreciation to Ambassador Venkataswaran, the distinguished representative of India, for the efficiency and good humour with which he guided the deliberations of the Committee during the month of July.

The 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament will draw to a close in the next few days. It is possible at this stage to offer some reflections of the Pakistan delegation on the work of the Committee this year.

This year, just as the preceding one, was not particularly propitious for progress in disarmament. The climate of mutual trust and confidence among States so necessary for disarmament is obviously not present today. Such a climate can be created only when all States, and especially the militarily significant States, demonstrate in word and deed that they are prepared to adhere strictly to the principles of the United Nations Charter, and especially those regarding respect for the territorial integrity of States and non-intervention in their internal affairs. These principles are being violated at present with impunity in various parts of the world, including our own region.

In this context, some members of the Committee have spoken about the importance of bringing to an end the foreign military intervention in Afghanistan. Pakistan has a direct and self-evident interest in this objective, not least because of our desire to restore stability and peace to our region and enable the 2 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan to return to their homeland in safety and honour. My Government has taken several important initiatives to promote a political solution of the tragic conflict within Afghanistan in the framework of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, the Islamic Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement. Pakistan is persisting with these endeavours.

We feel, nevertheless, that the current climate of confrontation should not be allowed to lead to an unbridled escalation in the arms race, especially in nuclear weapons. Our concern is aroused, whether such escalation in the arms race is quantitative or qualitative in nature, whether it involves the deployment of the SS-20 mobile missile or the production of the enhanced radiation weapon.

The present is not the time for self-serving postures or proposals; it is a time for resolute and wise statesmanship. Pakistan considers that in the present international circumstances there is an indispensable need to undertake serious negotiations on a broad spectrum of interrelated issues that could help in promoting a climate of international security and create the right conditions for disarmament. We welcome indications that a dialogue between the Superpowers may commence in the near future. At the same time we consider it equally important that efforts to bring about a climate of peace and security in the world and to facilitate disarmament should be conducted under the aegis of the United Nations so that the vital security interests of the small and medium-sized States and the non-aligned countries are taken fully into account.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

The Committee on Disarmament possesses the potential to make a significant contribution to promoting international security and arresting and reversing the arms race. Unfortunately, as yet there seems to be no readiness on the part of the major Powers to exploit this potential. Despite the intensive pace at which the Committee has worked during 1981, it has achieved very little in terms of concrete progress towards evolving agreements on the various items on its agenda.

The disappointment felt about our failure even to commence negotiations on the nuclear test ban, the item which has the highest priority on the multilateral disarmament agenda, is genuine and widespread. We would have thought that the suspension of the trilateral negotiations on this subject was an additional reason to open multilateral talks in the Committee. It is apparent from the progress report submitted by the trilateral negotiators last year that the perspective of these negotiations is seriously flawed. Even if these restricted negotiations were to be resumed, it is unlikely that they would produce a treaty which can gain general support and wide adherence. The failure of the trilateral negotiators to respond, jointly or individually, to the fundamental questions posed by members of the Group of 21 regarding the treaty that was being negotiated confirms this assessment. The major nuclear-weapon Powers should realize that they cannot repeat the NPT experience and impose an unequal arrangement on the non-nuclear-weapon States. They must also ponder carefully the consequences of a continued delay in negotiating an equitable and generally acceptable nuclear-test-ban treaty.

The discussions in the Committee this year on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament have been interesting if only because they have shown in sharp relief the divergent approaches of various States on this subject. It seems to us that all the nuclear-weapon States adhere, explicitly or implicitly, to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and accord an important place to nuclear weapons in the preservation of their security and that of their allies. It is also quite apparent that each of the two major nuclear-weapon Powers is afraid to fall even a fraction behind the other in their nuclear equation and that both wish to preserve the advantage they enjoy over the other nuclear-weapon Powers. And, of course, none of the nuclear-weapon Powers would like to lose the military edge they have over the non-nuclear-weapon States. These are, in simple terms, the impulses behind the nuclear arms spiral and the main obstacles to nuclear disarmament.

Common sense also indicates that the first steps in the process of nuclear disarmament will have to be taken by the two nuclear-weapon Powers whose arsenals are, in size and sophistication, immensely superior to those of the other nuclear-weapon States. The SALT negotiations were a recognition of this special responsibility. We hope that the SALT agreements signed by the United States and the USSR will continue to be observed and that early negotiations will be undertaken by the two sides with the aim of reducing rather than limiting their strategic and medium-range nuclear weapons. Progress in these negotiations can open the way for multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament in the Committee on Disarmament. In the meantime, the Committee can actively assist the process of nuclear disarmament by further clarifying and harmonizing the divergent approaches of the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States on this question and setting out the agreed stages in which the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons can be achieved. We hope the Committee will seriously address itself to this task next year in accordance with the proposals of the Group of 21.



(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

While the nuclear-weapon States reserve the right to expand and improve their nuclear and conventional arsenals on the questionable assumption that this will enhance their security, they have so far proved to be entirely insensitive to the security concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States. The negotiations in the Working Group on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons have, if nothing else, confirmed this evaluation.

Under the able guidance of Minister Ciarrapico of Italy, the Working Group, for the first time, made a concrete effort this year to bridge the political and conceptual difficulties in developing a "common formula" for an obligation to be undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States. Although certain delegations, such as that of the Netherlands and my own, made serious suggestions regarding the possible ways of evolving a common formula, the nuclear-weapon States, apart from China, did not demonstrate any readiness to contemplate even a slight modification of their respective positions. The proposals for a possible compromise were in fact excluded from the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group. Each of the four nuclear-weapon States clung to its own narrowly conceived nuclear doctrine designed to serve national interests that are most broadly defined. It should be quite clear by now that the unilateral declarations made in 1978 by these nuclear-weapon Powers cannot serve as a basis for a genuine response to the quest of the non-nuclear-weapon States for security against the nuclear threat. Pakistan will continue its efforts to promote an agreement on this question; but I must say quite categorically that we shall not be prepared to accept a cosmetic solution which provides the illusion rather than the substance of security assurances while extracting additional obligations from the non-nuclear-weapon States.

The contradiction between the desire of the major nuclear-weapon Powers and their allies to keep open their own nuclear options and their overriding concern to interdict the options of other States is very difficult to justify. While we could endorse many of the preoccupations about nuclear proliferation expressed by the Canadian delegation on 16 July 1981, I must confess that we share, to an even larger extent, the considerations outlined in the response to this statement by the distinguished representative of India. The inordinate preoccupation of certain States with the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty leads them into adopting positions that contradict fundamental international norms. The responses to the Israeli attack against the Tammuz nuclear research centre demonstrate this in practice.

It has been stated here and elsewhere that the Israeli attack is a cause for deep concern especially because Iraq is a party to the non-proliferation Treaty and accepts IAEA safeguards. Is it by any chance implied that if a State is not a party to this unequal Treaty, it should be considered fair game for such attacks in the cause of nuclear non-proliferation? It is ironic that the occasion of the Israeli attack has been used to underline the importance of securing wider adherence to the NPT. The fact that the action has demonstrated that adherence to this Treaty is obviously not sufficient to prevent an adversary from making subjective and unilateral judgements about another country's nuclear programme has been conveniently passed over. What has also been ignored is that the justification used for the aggression, howsoever implausible, was in fact provided by the campaign of propaganda, launched and sustained in those very countries which are the most ardent advocates of the NPT,

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

about the purported danger of nuclear proliferation from the peaceful nuclear facilities of various developing countries including Iraq. Indeed, the Israeli military raid can be seen as the ultimate step in the escalating process of unacceptable pressures and punitive actions that have been employed by certain supplier States to impede the normal development of the peaceful nuclear programmes of a number of developing countries. We note, of course, that the Israeli aggression has been roundly condemned, although the aggressor has not paid any price for the aggression. No sanctions were imposed on it by the Security Council, and no reparations were demanded of it. On the contrary, further military supplies to Israel are to be promptly resumed. And what of the victim of the aggression? The State which supplied the destroyed facility, while it has rightly defended its exclusively peaceful nature, now reportedly expects additional obligations to be assumed by the aggrieved State as a condition for the reconstruction of the plant.

The Israeli attack against the Tammuz nuclear research centre reinforced the opinion of most members of this Committee that resolute measures must be taken to prohibit such attacks in the future. In the course of negotiations on the convention to ban radiological weapons, which have been guided with dedication and energy by Ambassador Komives of Hungary, it was pointed out that such attacks against nuclear facilities are the most realistic and perhaps the only means by which radiological warfare can be waged. The Working Group has clearly recognized the risk of mass destruction through attacks on nuclear facilities. The necessity for the elaboration of an international legal norm to prohibit such attacks is also not contested, although reservations have been expressed to the inclusion of such a provision in the radiological weapons convention. My delegation considers that the conclusion of this convention will be facilitated if a satisfactory solution can be found to the question of prohibiting attacks against nuclear facilities. Of course, there are other important differences regarding the scope of the convention and the peaceful uses of radioactive substances and nuclear energy which need to be resolved taking into account the position of the non-aligned and neutral States. We hope that the sponsors of the "joint elements" will exhibit greater flexibility in the resumed negotiations on this subject next year.

My delegation derives a measure of satisfaction from the outcome of the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. Despite the Committee's failure to agree on a broader mandate for the Working Group, it has succeeded, largely owing to the imaginative leadership of its Chairman, Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden, in building onto the work done last year and creating a solid basis for substantive negotiations on the text of a chemical weapons convention. The draft elements formulated by the Chairman have taken into account the substance of the views expressed by various delegations and, together with the comments made on these elements, provide a valuable repertoire for the conduct of future negotiations on the text of the treaty. Admittedly, differences persist even on such basic issues as the scope of the convention and the question of verification and compliance. However, the agreement reached to give an appropriately revised

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

mandate to the Working Group next year that would enable it to build upon the areas of convergence and to resolve the differences is a welcome development. Negotiations on the text of a chemical weapons convention should commence at our next session and, we believe, the existing differences can be overcome if the necessary political decisions are taken, particularly by the two major Powers. We fervently hope that their policies will not take us in the opposite direction.

Under the patient and experienced direction of Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament has identified the main issues to be addressed under relevant parts of the programme and drawn together the various proposals for the disarmament measures to be included in it. My delegation considers that, in accordance with paragraph 38 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the comprehensive programme should be an international instrument which would create legal obligations on the part of all States to implement and achieve the measures included therein. These disarmament measures should be set out in defined stages and lead to the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament within a specific and agreed time-frame. The working paper submitted by the Group of 21 on disarmament measures to be included in the programme broadly reflects this approach. We consider that efforts to conceive the comprehensive programme in the restricted framework of existing documents are incompatible with the fundamental purposes for which the instrument was remitted to this Committee for negotiation. My delegation hopes that the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme will be enabled to undertake intensive negotiations next year and to finalize the programme for submission to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament.

The failure of the Committee to make substantive progress on any of the items on its agenda has prompted an examination of our procedures and methods of work. Some interesting proposals were put forward for improving the negotiating role and procedures of the Committee. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the failure to make progress in negotiations is in no way due to organizational or procedural difficulties. Quite frankly, there has been no willingness on the part of the major military Powers to engage in genuine give and take and to allow the Committee to undertake negotiations on various agenda items including those on which working groups have been established for the express purpose of conducting such negotiations. One major Power has said in so many words that the Committee should await the outcome of its policy review. Another has used the Committee to extol its own "positive" approach while it remained unyielding on the substance of the issues under consideration. The Committee on Disarmament should not allow itself to become the handmaiden of the Superpowers.

The Pakistan delegation believes that unless the Committee is able early next year to conduct substantive negotiations on the priority items on its agenda, it should report its impotence to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament. At that session, we will have to give serious consideration to ways and means of ensuring the effective conduct of multilateral negotiations on disarmament within the framework of the United Nations.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Pakistan for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. WALKER (Australia): Mr. Chairman, I intend to be extremely brief this morning but I do wish to tell you of the great pleasure my delegation feels at working in this Committee under the chairmanship of someone of your great personal distinction. For an Australian, of course, it is also a particular pleasure that you should be the representative of Indonesia, our great neighbour and close friend. I also wish for the sake of brevity to associate my delegation with the many deserved compliments which have been paid to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Venkateswaran.

In this short statement I will be talking about the several different matters before the Committee on Disarmament. In the first place I wish, on this occasion to say that I believe it appropriate for the Committee once again to thank the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts under its Chairman, Dr. Ericsson, for their continuing excellent work. My delegation greatly appreciates the progress report submitted to the Committee last Thursday, and we look forward in due course to receiving the full, third report of the Group of Seismic Experts. It is evident from the report which we received on Thursday that all five of the study groups are making important contributions to the Group's task of considering international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events. I wish in particular to mention the study group assessing national investigations into the sending of seismological messages around the globe, involving the use of the communications network of the World Meteorological Organization. Mr. McGregor of Australia and Mr. Ichikawa of Japan are the co-convenors of this group. At the February meeting of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, this study group assessed a preliminary and limited test of the feasibility of sending such messages in this way and agreed on a more elaborate test for later this year.

The Ad Hoc Group has now put in train preparations for a test to cover six weeks in November and December of the present year. This test will build on last year's work. In particular it will assess the transit time of messages and their accuracy, by detailed comparison with other conventional methods of transmission. In this exercise the experts are receiving the enthusiastic co-operation of the World Meteorological Organization, to which body, I submit, the Committee should express its warm appreciation. Equally satisfactory is the indication that this test will have markedly wider participation than did last year's. I join Dr. Ericsson in placing particular value on the prospect of participation by one or more new States from the southern hemisphere. Ideally, of course, there would be participation from both Latin America and Africa. We also welcome other new participants from amongst the Ad Hoc Group's members themselves. The report of this exercise will be considered at the next meeting of the full Group. With good co-operation in this test, I have every hope that the report will show that the global telecommunications system of WMO is indeed an effective method of conveying around the world the seismic messages which are central to the purposes of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts and the Committee on Disarmament.

I believe that the Committee should take special note of the progress that is being made in this area, which has direct relevance to our future work in addressing item 1 of the Committee's agenda, a nuclear test ban.

(Mr. Walker, Australia)

I would also like to say a few words about the other positive development which we have recorded in the Committee on Disarmament this year. I am, of course, referring to our work towards a chemical weapons convention. Yesterday the Ad Hoc Working Group on this subject finalized its annual report. This report has two noteworthy aspects. It records the very real progress achieved this year towards our objective of a comprehensive chemical weapons convention. This year the Committee has built on the first-class work done last year in defining the issues to be covered in a chemical weapons convention. This year we have been able to consider draft elements for such a convention and to exchange views in considerable detail on these elements.

The second notable point about the Working Group report is that it indicates the willingness of all the members of the Committee on Disarmament to proceed further next year under an appropriately revised mandate to build on areas of convergence and to resolve the differences identified in the last two years so as to achieve agreement on a chemical weapons convention at the earliest possible date.

My delegation wishes to pay a heart-felt tribute to the Chairman of the Working Group, Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden, for his personal contribution to achieving this important result.

I would have preferred to end on this positive note, celebrating constructive work performed in the Committee at a time when external events have severely limited its ability to achieve agreements to which my Government attaches great importance. I feel impelled by the statements of other delegations, however, to say a very few words about what is commonly called the neutron bomb. Several distinguished delegates from socialist countries have spoken as if all of mankind shared the views expressed by their Governments on this topic. This is not the case. The Australian Prime Minister has pointed out that many people in many countries will feel that the United States had no choice but to take this decision. The Prime Minister pointed out that there is a widespread consensus in Western countries as to the need to strengthen their defences in view of the sustained Soviet arms build-up over recent years. The Prime Minister also said that he did not believe that this decision would increase tension between East and West.

On behalf of the Australian delegation, I express the fervent hope that next year will be a more productive one for the Committee on Disarmament. As in the past, my delegation stands ready, now and in the future, to do everything in its power to contribute to the early, successful outcome of the negotiations in this Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Australia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. MALITA (Romania) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, I should like to tell you what a pleasure it is to me to congratulate you on behalf of the Romanian delegation on the flawless way in which you have been discharging your responsibilities. I should like to add that you have followed the splendid example set by the series of excellent Chairmen we have had this year, each of whom has endeavoured to contribute some new achievement to the work of our Committee.

Through your competence and your tact you have increased respect for the active diplomacy of your country, which is engaged in the solution of numerous regional and international problems.

(Mr. Malita, Romania)

This year the task of our Committee has probably been one of the most unrewarding. For it is difficult to discuss disarmament at a time when the word is no longer used with conviction and is replaced by expressions such as "arms control", which in fact represents a different approach, and when the arms race is simultaneously undergoing an unprecedented intensification. Arms control is not the same thing as disarmament, for it accepts, instead of excluding, the idea of the use of force, and confirms the role of arms as a possible instrument of international policy. In spite of all that, however, the Romanian delegation feels profoundly that in 1981 the Committee on Disarmament has shown its maturity; it has not been side-tracked into useless disputes and has succeeded in maintaining a constructive atmosphere in spite of the circumstances, being virtually the only international forum where negotiations or at least discussions on disarmament have been conducted.

At a time when other international negotiations on this subject have regrettably been temporarily interrupted, the Committee has succeeded in consolidating its position as a forum for dialogue. While its capacity for influencing international relations should not be overestimated, it must be recognized that its activity has maintained a sense of hope and promise. This has expressed itself both in the character of the debates and in the general spirit in which they have been conducted, in the constructive approach, in the technical language, in the increased activities of the ad hoc negotiating groups. I would like to stress the attitude our delegation has adopted from the beginning, that is, one of a will to find ways and means of bringing the disarmament negotiations out of the deadlock and of increasing the effectiveness of the Committee's activities. There should also be positive appreciation of the fact that it has been possible to find practical ways, even if they have not been entirely satisfactory, of approaching the problems of nuclear disarmament and the halting of nuclear-weapon tests, discussing the subject of the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and taking a new step, even if not formally confirmed, towards the negotiation of an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Allow me to take this opportunity to thank the Chairmen of the four working groups, our distinguished colleagues, Ambassador A. García Robles of Mexico, Ambassador I. Komives of Hungary, Ambassador C. Lidgard of Sweden and Minister A. Ciarrapico of Italy, for their tireless efforts and dedication, which have brought positive elements into our work.

However, while taking note of their efforts and of the results achieved by the Committee this year, we cannot but recognize that in the context of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and, more generally, in that of the hopes placed in the activities of the Geneva Committee, the results obtained are far from fulfilling expectations, a fact which gives rise to those feelings of disappointment and legitimate impatience which have so often been mentioned during the session.

I should like to set forth some of the conclusions which, in our opinion, emerge from the Committee's activity this year:

(a) Flexibility of action. The process of multilateral negotiation, of which our Committee is by definition a part, has its demands. A partner cannot be refused the right to raise a problem or to propose a debate in depth. Even less is it possible to refuse to discuss in the Committee fundamental questions concerning the arms race, when such discussion is requested by the majority of delegations. Greater flexibility is therefore necessary for these demands to be accommodated. The establishment of subsidiary bodies is a practice we have ourselves adopted in order to help us in our daily activities and to enable us to make a careful study of the problems entrusted to us.

(Mr. Malita, Romania)

How is it possible, then, that on a subject like nuclear disarmament there is not a single concrete statement in our Committee's report, when this question is dealt with more closely and in greater detail in public discussions and in any newspaper? The Committee's inability really to tackle the problem of nuclear weapons, with their ever-increasing risks and implications for every country, and especially non-nuclear-weapon countries, constitutes the major deficiency of this session, in my delegation's view.

(b) Democratization of the Committee's work. Our delegation has repeatedly raised the question of the need to respect the right of all delegations to take part in the work as representatives of sovereign States with equal rights, regardless of their size, their stage of development, their economic, social or political system, the level of their armaments or their participation in military alliances. This position starts from the principle of equal security achieved through equal participation. The Committee's rules of procedure based on the recommendations contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament have constituted an important step in this direction. The analysis and adoption of measures to increase the effectiveness of the Committee have also contributed to this end. The interest shown by other States in taking part in the Committee's work and the constructive contribution some of them have made are further arguments in this direction and at the same time they confirm that the Disarmament Committee must be open to the widest possible participation.

(c) Realism of approach has been mentioned a number of times in our debates, with the idea that we should wait for the external signals that will enable us to work. In our delegation's view, it is disarmament which should form the primary aim of that work, before countries' economies are threatened, natural resources exhausted and international security endangered. In order to prevent such a situation arising, the Committee should act preventively and not merely watch helplessly the acceleration of the arms race. In view of the relation between political will and negotiated solutions, we ought to see to it that we are ready with all the requisite solutions. Then, the moment the political will appears, disarmament agreements can be adopted without further delay. This requires, among other things, a wider use of the necessary technical expertise and of the research facilities of the United Nations system, and even outside the latter, a closer link with contemporary science.

(d) Definition of the moment of the cessation of the arms race and the transition to disarmament. Defining this moment in the mechanism of the arms race which operates by inertia implies the determination of the point of inflexion of the process.

We are of the opinion that in spite of the broad approach in our debates to the problem of the acceleration of the arms race and of the need to proceed to disarmament, we have not dealt in practical terms with the point of linkage of these movements, that are in opposite directions. We believe that the definition of a package of complex measures based on the ideas of a freeze, limitation and discontinuance should be explored if we are to fulfil our mandate.

(e) Our work is affected by certain circular problems, real logical paradoxes, and once our negotiations have become entangled in one of these problems, they can remain blocked for ever. Attempts to resolve within the Committee such problems as the priority between security and disarmament, the relation between comprehensive measures and partial measures, the definition of a mathematical formula to measure the balance of forces, the priority between confidence-building measures and disarmament, and the place of verification in the different stages of disarmament -- none of this can lead to any practical results. The essential interconnection between all these elements is obvious, as is the fact that they are an intrinsic part of our efforts.

(Mr. Malita, Romania)

As regards the balance of forces, it should be recognized that it has existed for a long time and that it will continue to exist. But there are only two ways of achieving parity -- either through the action-reaction sequence and the constant increase in armaments, or through the negotiated reduction of arms and military expenditures. There is no other possibility. Clearly, verification is an integral part of the approach to disarmament, and must be carried out under appropriate international control, in order to ensure the maintenance of the balance of forces, together with the security and independence of each State. Verification and balance are to us essential elements in any disarmament measure and not merely the subjects for an endless debate.

As the representative of Romania in the Committee on Disarmament, I speak on behalf of a country which is convinced that the right of every people to free and independent development cannot be achieved without the adoption of concrete, effective measures to halt and reverse the arms race, and especially the nuclear arms race.

In the present complex and contradictory circumstances of international life, there is a need for concerted efforts to prevent the deterioration of the international situation and to promote the resumption of a policy of *détente*, co-operation, independence and peace. It is the duty of every Government not to do anything or take any step which might further aggravate the existing situation, or create new sources of tension and mistrust. This is why we believe that the United States' decision to start production of the neutron bomb is a negative and most regrettable measure, and one which entails a clear risk of provoking a new and powerful impetus in the senseless arms race.

Any rational analysis will show that such a measure not only fails to reduce the causes of conflict and sources of hostility but in fact on the contrary, merely complicates the solution of controversial international problems and makes it difficult to deal with them constructively.

Convinced of the responsibility of every State, regardless of its size, to contribute to the conditions needed for an increase in confidence and the start of a real disarmament process, Romania has always acted consistently towards this end. For several years running, my country has reduced and refrained from increasing its military budget.

Our decision in this respect is based on the conviction that it is within the power of every State to avoid seeing this phenomenon as something inevitable in human society. The Romanian delegation reaffirms its confidence in the disarmament process and in the substantial contribution which the Committee can make in this direction. When explaining this position which my country has adopted, the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu, said: "I do not agree with the old saying that if one wants peace, one must prepare for war. If everyone prepares for war, a state of affairs may arise in which we are no longer in control of the situation, and that would mean endangering the lives of many peoples. I would replace that saying by another one: if we want peace, we must work for peace, for disarmament, for understanding and co-operation between peoples and for the elimination of the military blocs. Romania wants peace, and it is acting accordingly."

It is this viewpoint which has guided our contribution to the work of the Committee this year, and we shall act similarly in the future also.

The CHAIRMAN {translated from French}: I thank the distinguished representative of Romania for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to myself.



Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, bearing in mind that we are now in the last week of our work, I shall be as brief as possible in making what I expect to be my concluding statement. As it is still appropriate, however, I take this opportunity to welcome you most warmly into the Chair and to say how impressed I have been with your expert and sure handling of the various problems that arise in winding up the session. I also want to thank and congratulate Ambassador Venkateswaran for the particular flair he brought to the conduct of our business in July.

I have asked for the floor to speak briefly on items of current business, as we draw to the end of the 1981 session. I shall start by commenting on some observations made at our meeting on 13 August by my neighbour, the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union. In the course of a statement in which he concentrated mainly on nuclear problems, Ambassador Issraelyan made several assertions which were misleading. It is not right that they should go uncorrected.

I wish to draw particular attention to three points. In the first place the Soviet statement presented an analysis of the nuclear dispositions in Europe without taking any account of the political and military background. Not surprisingly, perhaps, there was no mention at all of the fact that by comparison with the Soviet Union the States of western Europe devote rather modest resources to their defence, or of the fact that they are flanked to the east by States which have an overwhelming preponderance of conventional military capacity, particularly in armoured formations and artillery. Nor did it point out that, because our eastern neighbours operate closed societies and publish almost nothing about their military plans and activities, we in western Europe have to make the most prudent deductions we can from the observed military capacity of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the actions of its member States.

Against this background the question of the precise quantities of nuclear hardware deployed in Europe may seem a secondary matter to those not involved in the political confrontation in Europe. I would ask them, however, to be patient and to bear with me because the question does not look secondary to those of us in western Europe. It is our concern that the position should be accurately represented so that all may understand the apprehensions which underlie the attitude of our Governments.

In his speech on 13 August, Ambassador Issraelyan attempted to rebut the statement by Ambassador Ruth of the Federal Republic of Germany to the effect that nuclear forces in Europe were in disequilibrium in favour of the Warsaw Pact countries. He said that there were approximately 1,000 Soviet missile delivery systems in Europe, which I believe is the case. In comparison with this he said NATO deployed a similar number. However, when he listed the components of the Western total he said that this Western total included the so-called United States forward-based systems, medium-range missile systems and aircraft of other NATO Western allies. For good measure he also included submarine-launched rockets.

However, he did not specify how the Soviet total was comprised. It is well known that there are nearly 1,000 Soviet missiles and bombers of medium range alone in the European theatre. If you also include Soviet aircraft and missiles comparable to the NATO systems which he referred to, the so-called balance is seen to be an advantage of approximately 2,600 Soviet systems compared with the supposed 1,000 NATO systems which I would add are mainly in the so-called United States forward-based systems, that is

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

aircraft, some of which are on aircraft carriers. And this, I might say, excludes any Soviet submarine-launched missiles, all of which are capable of being used against targets in the European theatre.

Alternatively, we could strike the balance sheet the other way. We could exclude from the NATO list all those systems for which equivalents do not appear in the total of 1,000 Soviet systems. There would then be seen to be less than 280 Western systems, depending on exactly which Western components are included. This indicates a Soviet preponderance of between 3 and 4 to 1. So, either way, the facts do not support Ambassador Issraelyan's proposition that there is what he called "rough equality in medium-range nuclear armaments" between East and West in Europe.

There is another matter on which I equally want to introduce a better sense of perspective. On 13 August my other distinguished neighbour, Ambassador Flowerree, referred to a decision taken by the United States Government to proceed with the production and stockpiling in the United States of what are properly called enhanced radiation warheads (ERWs), but for which the more emotive description "neutron bomb" was chosen in 1978, especially by those who wished to present an exaggerated picture of the character and potential of these weapons. A number of statements have been made in the Committee which have contained distortions, and since I believe it is important for us in this forum to maintain our objectivity, I venture to bring to your attention one or two basic facts about these ERWs.

The enhanced radiation warhead, of which we have heard so much, is a nuclear weapon which is designed to be employed either as an artillery shell or as the warhead on a short-range rocket. Its yield is thus clearly limited. And although it has acquired a doomsday reputation, it is actually designed to be less destructive than the many other nuclear weapons which are already deployed on either side of the line in Europe.

A different, and much more far-reaching, distortion which I think it necessary for my delegation to controvert most specifically is that which accuses the NATO alliance of preparing for "limited nuclear war". The allegation seems to be that the fact that enhanced radiation warheads are designed as short-range and tactical weapons is evidence of this intention. The argument runs, very briefly, that alliance thinking about nuclear war is in the course of making a dangerous shift, that with the introduction of weapons that are more accurate or have more limited effect NATO is somehow moving away from the concept of deterrence and beginning to plan for nuclear war. This is a fallacy resting on a complete misconception. The fact is that the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons is linked to their actual capability and that deterrence is designed to operate at every level. The only purpose for which the neutron weapon came into existence was to provide an effective counter to the threat of concentrated tank attacks, bearing in mind the almost three to one superiority that the Warsaw Pact has in armoured formations. Now in fact we know from the United States statement that no deployment is being considered at the present time. But the mere potential for deployment of the ERW will maintain balanced deterrence and will thus continue to prevent the risk of conflict. Deterrence, and the capacity to deal with any form of potential attack, are two sides of a single coin.

Turning to other matters, I should like to record that my Government was one of the co-authors and co-sponsors of the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament -- document CD/205 -- which was formally introduced in the Committee by the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany on 6 August. Our joint purpose in preparing a

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

draft for a complete programme in this way was to help the Ad Hoc Working Group to focus more fully on the likely end-product of its work, since it is difficult to decide on language for particular sections of the programme without seeing how these individual points will fit into an over-all whole. We hope that early in the next session the Working Group will be able to stand back from the detailed work it has been doing this year to discuss some of the crucial general issues, such as the question of the stages for implementation and the nature of the programme. As well as offering language on many aspects of a comprehensive programme of disarmament our draft is, I think, the first working paper to attempt to get to grips with these general and essential points. We hope it will be seen as a serious attempt to move the work of the Ad Hoc Group forward, and that the Group will discuss it fully at the beginning of next year.

Another agenda item in which we have taken particular interest is that dealing with negative security assurances. When I introduced the United Kingdom working paper (CD/177), I stressed that my delegation was willing to explore any approach in the search for effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. On 14 April the distinguished representative of the Netherlands made a statement in which he outlined a possible formula for a common guarantee. The text of the Netherlands proposal was subsequently presented to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances and I wish to place it on record that my delegation continues to support the formula which Ambassador Fein proposed. I do not therefore perhaps agree with the statement by the distinguished representative of Pakistan this morning that all the nuclear-weapon States except China had stuck rigidly to their own narrow approach.

In concluding, I should like to say that we believe that delegations should draw at least modest satisfaction from the work that has been done in the Committee during this session. I know that many are disappointed that more signs of progress have not emerged from the working groups. But we should not deny the steady pace of our work on all subjects. In my view all four working groups have played an essential role in clarifying the positions of all our Governments. Without such clarification there would be no understanding of each other's positions; without such understanding, there can be no eventual agreement.

I could not end without thanking the four Chairmen of the ad hoc working groups, Ambassadors Lidgard, Komives and García Robles, and Mr. Ciarrapico. They have worked exceptionally hard throughout the year, and -- perhaps just as important -- they have made sure that delegations all worked hard too. And finally, I would like to thank all the members of the Secretariat, upon whose assistance we now rely even more heavily.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom for his statement and for the kind reference he made to the Chair.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): I should like in this statement briefly to review some points relating to the vital interest of all peoples in a radical change being brought about in the international situation which has been created by the "existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race", a situation which called forth the justified alarm of the United Nations General Assembly because of the threat it implies to nothing less than "the very survival of mankind", to use the words of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

I shall begin by saying how much we regret that the statements made by the representatives of the two nuclear Superpowers last Thursday have brought into the Committee on Disarmament, in this final stage of its 1981 session, a new blast of the cold war. Repeated and very recent declarations by the President of Mexico and his Secretary for Foreign Affairs reveal once again my country's energetic rejection of any attempt to revive the deplorable international conditions of the 1950s and the 1960s.

We were deeply disappointed that the statement with which one of those two representatives finally broke his long silence during this session which is now about to end contained so little that is encouraging as regards the implementation of the task entrusted to the Committee on Disarmament.

We are sure that certainly neither of the two Superpowers can aspire to a saint's halo where disarmament is concerned, particularly nuclear disarmament. We would, however, be prepared to pass over some imaginary descriptions we were given of the course of the nuclear arms race between 1960 and 1980, although the fact that such descriptions were given in this Committee would seem to imply a presumption that its members' knowledge of the subject is at the level of that of a primary school child. After all, anyone who wishes to obtain reliable information in this connection can easily find it in serious publications like those of the Stockholm institute known by the initials SIPRI or those of the Washington Center for Defense Information. The latter, for example, recently published the results -- extremely illustrative in this regard -- of a study made last year by an interdepartmental group consisting no less than of representatives of the Department of Defense, the Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the National Security Council.

However, in the statement I mentioned, there are other aspects which indeed seem to us rather disturbing. I shall refer briefly to two of them, both of which emerge from the following paragraphs:

"Earlier this year, we had in this Committee a wide-ranging debate on deterrence. Many countries expressed and continue to express the view that deterrence is an abhorrent doctrine. But many nations and groups of nations, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, practise it ...

"The tendency in the Committee to adopt a high moral tone in preaching about the evils of deterrence, among other things, may be satisfying to the psyche, but it doesn't get us anywhere ... In the nation-State system that exists in the world today, the first duty of Governments towards their citizens is protection ... Progress toward disarmament can be helped if we accept the reality that each State is going to maintain that its own judgement of its security requirements is not subject to challenge, no matter what others may think or what the realities may be."

The first point to which I should like to draw attention is the statement contained in the last part of that quotation. The view there expressed that the security requirements of each State depend on its own judgement of them and that this judgement "is not subject to challenge, no matter what others may think or what the realities may be" is in direct contradiction with numerous provisions of the Final Document, such as, for example, paragraph 47 which, as we know, says:

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

"... Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons."

The strict application of the approach in question seems to us so incompatible with the spirit and the letter of the Final Document that we believe that if any State were to begin seriously to put it into practice, it ought to start thinking about giving up its membership of the Committee on Disarmament.

The second point to which I should also like to draw particular attention is the reference to "deterrence".

I should like to point out for a start that, perhaps inadvertently, the statement to which I have been referring omits to say that the deterrence discussed in the Committee, both at formal and at informal meetings has been deterrence based on nuclear weapons. My delegation expressed its position in this regard more than 12 years ago when, on 18 March 1969, at the opening meeting of the session of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament for that year, we said:

"We refuse to believe that the so-called deterrent power -- a formula that has regrettably been much abused -- of such weapons can be regarded as a positive factor justifying their existence. The fact that in the past 20 years we have had a precarious peace based on a frightening balance of terror is for us far from being a convincing argument.

"In the millions of years of pre-history which are usually divided into the Stone Age, the Bronze Age, and the Iron Age it was enough for man to have the deterrent power of primitive weapons made from such materials; and during thousands of years of recorded history in which, we must not forget, for many periods over half a century long peace prevailed and the deterrent power never until quite recently went any further than the instruments of destruction, quite terrifying enough, that were based on TNT and dynamite. We cannot understand why today international peace and security should have to depend on weapons such as the nuclear weapons, the very existence of which entails the danger of universal suicide."

This is the kind of deterrence which we should like to disappear since, far from protecting international security, it carries with it an obvious danger for the survival of the human species. My delegation is in good company in this respect -- that of all the Members of the United Nations, including all the members of the Committee, unless there is anyone who would like to repudiate the solemn declarations embodied by consensus in the Final Document, for example:

"The attainment of the objective of security, which is an inseparable element of peace, has always been one of the most profound aspirations of humanity. States have for a long time sought to maintain their security through the possession of arms. Admittedly, their survival has, in certain cases, effectively depended on whether they could count on appropriate means of defence. Yet the accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, today constitutes much more a threat than a protection for the future of mankind."

The passage I have just quoted comes from the very first paragraph of the Final Document. A little further on, in paragraph 11, the General Assembly declared:

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

"The increase in weapons, especially nuclear weapons, far from helping to strengthen international security, on the contrary weakens it."

Two paragraphs later, in paragraph 13, the General Assembly made this emphatic statement which is particularly relevant to the subject we are dealing with here:

"Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority."

As is clear from what I have said, my delegation has not found anything very encouraging in the statement made here on Thursday, 13 August, by the distinguished representative of the United States.

Fortunately, that very day, in distant California, the President of the United States made an announcement which on the contrary seems to us to justify moderately optimistic inferences: he stated that he had sent a letter to the President of the Soviet Union inviting him seriously to discuss disarmament at what it is customary to call a "summit meeting". Since this invitation is similar to the one issued earlier by the Soviet Head of State, my delegation considers it reasonable to expect that this meeting may become fact in the not too distant future.

Since, as it would seem, the President of the United States has expressed his desire that at the proposed meeting the two parties should discuss "what the peoples really want", my delegation would like now to make its modest contribution to that discussion, by expressing its view that what the peoples of the world essentially want in the sphere of disarmament can be summed up in the words of paragraphs 18 and 109 of the Final Document:

In the first of those paragraphs the General Assembly said that "Removing the threat of a world war -- a nuclear war -- is the most acute and urgent task of the present day", and it concluded immediately thereafter that "Mankind is confronted with a choice: we must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation."

In the second of those two paragraphs, the body that is the most representative of the international community agreed on the elaboration "of a comprehensive programme of disarmament encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated".

Mr. OKAWA (Japan): On behalf of my delegation, I wish to thank Ambassador Lidgard and Dr. Ericsson for the report they presented to us last Thursday, the progress report on the twelfth session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make just a few comments in connection with the work of this Ad Hoc Group.

My delegation is aware that a second limited test of exchanges of seismic data over the WMO global telecommunications system network is to take place in October and November this year. Ambassador Walker of Australia referred to this test earlier this morning. It will be recalled that, when the previous progress report of the Ad Hoc Group was before us, on 13 February this year, I expressed the hope that all

(Mr. Okawa, Japan)

countries represented on the Group would find it possible to take part in the next trial exchange. That hope was expressed because only 14 countries had taken part in the trial exchange held in October and November last year. I am therefore glad to hear that 15 countries have already formally expressed their willingness to participate in this year's trial exchange and that a few more countries may be expected to do likewise. I am pleased to note that the name of a socialist country appears on the list of the 15, and I hope that many more socialist countries from eastern Europe will also find it possible to participate in this year's test.

I need hardly repeat that my Government has been continuously calling for an experimental exercise on a global scale and my delegation regards last year's and this year's trial exchanges as limited steps towards such a global experiment, although, frankly, the global experiment itself seems to me to be continuing to recede further into the future.

Reference is made in the progress report to "the use of seismographs and hydroacoustic instruments on the ocean bottom to improve the detection and identification capability for seismic events in the southern hemisphere" (paragraph 9 (a)). Japan has been making some progress in research and development in the field of ocean bottom seismographs. Indeed, Japanese seismographs placed on the ocean bottom off the south coast of Honshu have been in operation since the summer of 1979 and have been transmitting seismic data to land-based monitoring stations in Japan ever since, without interruption and without mishap. Japan has thus been making an important contribution to real-time observation of seismic activity for the past two years. Japan hopes to be able to continue its activities in this field in the years ahead.

My delegation has learnt from paragraph 10 of the progress report that the submission of a full formal report -- the long-awaited third report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts -- is now envisaged for the second part of next year's session of the Committee on Disarmament, or even later. We would have hoped that the third report could have been produced at least in time for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. My delegation understands, however, that the delay is due partly to the need to await the results of the trial exchange to be held in October and November, and has noted that an extended progress report is to be delivered to the Committee early in 1982.

Finally, I wish to thank Dr. Ericsson and the members of his Ad Hoc Group for the role they are continuing to play in working out international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events in anticipation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

The CHAIRMAN: I now intend, with your permission, to suspend this meeting until 3 o'clock this afternoon. If there is no objection the meeting is suspended and we convene again at 3 o'clock this afternoon.

The meeting was suspended at 12.55 p.m. and resumed at 3 p.m.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): The delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic, as the co-ordinator of the group of socialist countries in the Committee on Disarmament, has the honour to make the following statement on its behalf.

The socialist countries which were co-sponsors of the draft international convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons (document CCD/559) express their profound conviction that it is urgently necessary, without any further delay, to take practical steps within the Committee in order to remove a grave new danger threatening mankind, the danger entailed by nuclear neutron weapons. Recent events connected with the adoption by the United States Government of a decision to proceed with the production of this barbarous means of mass destruction of persons make this task particularly urgent.

The decision to embark on the development of the production of neutron weapons will lead to a further lowering of the so-called nuclear threshold, that is, to an increase in the risk of the outbreak of a nuclear war, and the entire responsibility for this will rest with the United States of America.

Assertions to the effect that the neutron warhead is somehow a "clean", a "humane" weapon are dangerous illusions. It is well-known to all that the neutron bomb is specially designed to destroy people and the consequences of its use persist for an extremely long period and adversely affect future generations.

It is therefore the task of all those who are concerned about the fate of the world and of the future of civilization to take practical steps to safeguard the foremost human right -- the right to life. The stockpiling of ever newer means of warfare must be resolutely opposed in favour of the alternative of limiting, reducing and ultimately eliminating armaments, including nuclear armaments. It is precisely this that the socialist countries have been consistently advocating, in the Committee on Disarmament as elsewhere.

As long ago as in 1973, the socialist States submitted for consideration by the Committee on Disarmament a draft international convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons (document CCD/559). Unfortunately, as a result of opposition on the part of a number of States, that document has not yet received proper consideration by the Committee on Disarmament.

In view of the recent dangerous development in matters concerning the neutron weapon, the socialist States in the Committee on Disarmament wish to submit a formal proposal on the need for the urgent establishment within the Committee of an ad hoc working group for the preparation of an international convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons. The ad hoc working group might take as the basis for its work the above-mentioned draft convention submitted by the socialist countries.

Naturally, the socialist countries would be prepared to consider any other constructive proposals aimed at the speediest possible prohibition of this particularly barbaric type of weapon of mass destruction.



(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

In view of the urgency of the matter, the socialist countries request that the proposal they have put forward should be considered and a decision taken on it at the next meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): A document has been circulated at the request of the Soviet delegation containing a statement by TASS on the decision of the United States Administration to embark on the scaled up production of neutron weapons. In addition to what was said in this connection by the Soviet delegation in its intervention of 13 August, I have been instructed to state the following.

With its decision to start the full-scale production of neutron weapons the United States Administration has taken a further step which will lead to the escalation of the arms race. In taking this decision, the United States seeks to acquire a weapon which would help it to put into practice its doctrine of a limited nuclear war. Neutron weapons are regarded as particularly suitable for confining a nuclear conflict to a given region, for example, Europe or the Middle East. Neutron weapons can also be installed on delivery systems which are not tied to specific regions, for example, those at the disposal of the "rapid deployment" forces or aboard United States naval vessels sailing around the entire globe. The introduction of neutron weapons essentially leads to the lowering of the nuclear threshold and increases the probability of the escalation of an armed conflict to the level of an all-out nuclear war.

The attempts by the United States Administration to minimize the dangers inherent in its decision by declaring that what is involved is only the production of neutron weapons and not their deployment in specific regions are futile. There can hardly be any doubt that the production of neutron weapons is merely an initial stage, which will be followed by pressure on the allies to secure their agreement to the deployment of neutron weapons on their territories.

The United States Administration's decision in many respects creates a new situation in the approach to the problem of the limitation of the arms race and disarmament. The production of neutron weapons will considerably hamper the ongoing disarmament negotiations. It can in no way serve as an appropriate overture to the negotiations on nuclear armaments in Europe. For the United States to believe that it will thus be able to strengthen its position at the proposed Soviet-American negotiations is a profound fallacy. The production of neutron weapons in conditions where Europe is already over-saturated with various types of weapons of mass destruction in fact diminishes European security.

The position of the USSR with regard to neutron weapons has been repeatedly set forth in statements by the leader of the Soviet State, L.I. Brezhnev, and other Soviet leaders. It is also reflected in formal statements and proposals by the USSR, and in particular in the draft convention on the prohibition of neutron weapons which was submitted to the Committee on Disarmament jointly with other socialist countries in March 1978. The reason why the United States and its NATO allies blocked the elaboration of such a convention in Geneva is now very obvious.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Every State is responsible for the way in which the situation in the matter of the production of neutron weapons will evolve. Not a single Government can stand aloof if it really cares for the interests of peace and the security of its own country. It is precisely for this reason that the Soviet Union advocates the immediate establishment of a working group within the Committee on Disarmament for working out an international convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons. As you know, a basis for negotiations in the working group exists. This is the draft of an appropriate international convention which was tabled by a group of socialist countries in 1978. The Committee cannot disregard this issue.

In taking its decision to produce neutron weapons, the United States Administration has assumed a heavy responsibility for the consequences this step will have for future developments in the international situation.

The Soviet Union of course cannot remain a passive onlooker in the situation which is taking shape now. It will draw conclusions from what is happening at present and, taking into account future developments, it will take appropriate measures to ensure the security of the Soviet people and its allies and friends. However, the Soviet Union firmly opposes any new upswing in the nuclear arms race.

Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): In my statement today I would like to dwell briefly on a specific aspect of the unfolding latest round of the nuclear arms race, that is, on the recent decision of the United States Administration to start the production and deployment of nuclear neutron weapons, or, as it is called by that country's delegation, the enhanced radiation, reduced blast warhead. First of all I would like to put on record once again that the people and Government of the Hungarian People's Republic strongly condemn this decision of the United States Administration and consider it as a dangerous decision forming a part of its general quest to attain military superiority.

The Hungarian representative in the CCD in 1978 in one of his statements pointed out that "by its political influence the neutron bomb has already proved to be an effective instrument in the hands of those who strive to hinder détente and continue the escalation of the arms race". This happened in 1978 when, in view of the extremely condemnatory and hostile reaction of world public opinion, particularly in Europe, the United States Administration put off the execution of this inhumane plan turning the neutron weapon into some sort of "bargaining chip". Now the statement referred to is more valid than ever.

The recent decision of the United States Administration, however, turned this so-called "bargaining chip" into a horrifying reality of our days. Studying the records of the debates of the CCD in 1978 one cannot help but conclude that the highmarish fears of world public opinion are coming true. The proponents of neutron weapons try to gain acceptance for the idea that a large-scale nuclear war could be avoided by the use of this new weaponry. In this connection the danger was emphasized that the relatively small yield and collateral damage will reduce the military and political restraint to use this weapon, thereby lowering the nuclear threshold. At the same time, the possible proliferation of this weapon was mentioned, with the consequence that if the weapon were to be deployed outside of Europe, in different parts of the world, the danger of a nuclear war would be greatly increased.

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

Since the neutron weapon is meant by its proponents as a tactical "anti-tank" weapon, it was supposed that the command over it might be given to military commanders, including those of allied States. In this respect it was emphasized that the deployment of the neutron weapon would dangerously alter the over-all balance of power in Europe and would have unpredictable repercussions in relation to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by inducing some non-nuclear-weapon States to acquire this "easy-to-use" weapon. These are only some of the conclusions arrived at during the CCD's 1978 session.

In 1978, delegations of the socialist community in the CCD introduced a draft convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons.

The Hungarian delegation shares the idea expressed by the representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Voutov, in his intervention of 13 August 1981, that the Committee on Disarmament should consider the establishment of an ad hoc working group for the elaboration of an international convention on the prohibition of nuclear neutron weapons.

A group of socialist countries has presented an official proposal to the Committee in the form of a working paper urging the Committee to consider and take an appropriate decision in the nearest future to establish a working group with the task of elaborating an international convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear neutron weapons. The Hungarian delegation, as a co-sponsor of the draft convention of 1978, and of this latest proposal, urges the Committee to take prompt and effective measures.

In conclusion, I would like to reiterate the concern of my Government over the grave situation created by the decision of the United States to produce and deploy nuclear neutron weapons, which is a step strongly condemned by world public opinion including those who, it is planned, are to be defended by these weapons.

Mr. RUZEK (Czechoslovakia): Mr. Chairman, may I first of all ask the indulgence of the Committee in taking the floor now when we all are looking forward to finishing our session, but I am doing so upon the instructions of my Government regarding a very serious matter.

But before I begin my remarks let me -- even if it is almost at the end of the session -- extend a warm welcome to you in Geneva knowing very well that you came exclusively for the purpose of chairing our Committee. Your performance as Chairman has undoubtedly been most helpful to the Committee during this final and difficult period. At the same time I would like to express our thanks to Ambassador Venkateswaran of India for the efficient and pleasant way he guided the work of the Committee during the month of July.

I asked for the floor first of all to support the proposal of a group of socialist countries, introduced a short while ago by the distinguished Ambassador of Mongolia, Comrade Erdembileg, for the setting up of a working group to deal with the problem of neutron weapons.

(Mr. Ruzek, Czechoslovakia)

In this connection I should like to make three remarks:

First, the most dangerous aspect of the decision to start the production of nuclear neutron weapons by the United States Government is that it will have as a consequence the lowering of the threshold at which nuclear weapons might be used. The fact that we are being told that one of the probable geographical areas for these weapons to be used is Europe must lead every responsible person to consider the serious consequences which would be contained in a scenario of an armed conflagration begun in the European theatre with the use of nuclear neutron weapons. Moreover, it is clear that the decision to start the production of nuclear neutron weapons by the United States Government cannot but complicate the situation as far as the ban on nuclear testing is concerned as well as the ban on nuclear weapons in general.

Secondly, the world is being told that nuclear neutron weapons are "defensive" weapons destined for defence against tanks, particularly on the European battlefield. Let us leave aside for the moment the question whether that is the true intention or not. One might also suppose that this contention is regarded as the only feasible way of securing the deployment of neutron warheads on the territory of west European countries. At the moment of course, the American officials speak only about the warheads of the Lance missile and the eight-inch howitzer shell. May I ask who would guarantee that once the production of nuclear neutron weapons begins it will only be these two warheads which will be produced? Who can guarantee that -- once a system like this exists -- it will not be used for offensive purposes? Who can guarantee that apart from the two warheads mentioned, a real bomb which can be dropped from an aircraft or put on a longer-range missile than the Lance will not be produced? I am convinced that for a military planner under certain circumstances the concentration of tanks does not differ so much from a concentration of economic units or population centres.

Thirdly, for many years it was believed that the Hiroshima and Nagasaki blasts were unique in that they produced a large field of fast neutrons, and that this led to a high frequency of cancer among the victims. According to new research being done especially at the Lawrence Livermore weapons laboratory in California as well as at a number of other research institutions, there is no reason for an assumption of the decisive role of neutrons in Hiroshima. The research completely changes the scheme of radiation doses that people are supposed to have received particularly in Hiroshima, and has serious implications on the concept of the radiation effects of nuclear weapons. One of the important implications is that the neutron weapon is really a new weapon in its principle, with far more dangerous neutron radiation effects having no relevant precedent.

As one of the well-known experts in this field, Professor Jorma Miettinen of Finland, pointed out already four years ago:

"Introduction of the enhanced radiation warhead with its new weapons effects would force all countries to start a lot of new research ... on nuclear weapons effects and new approaches to radiation protection ...

(Mr. Ruzek, Czechoslovakia)

The enhanced radiation weapons are advertised as "small" and "clean" weapons. In fact, they are "clean" only for buildings, not for any living beings. Neutron weapons would kill soldiers in hours or days when the dose was huge, 800 to 1,800 rads ... i.e. within 1 km or so from the explosion. But many more soldiers, as well as civilians in cities at a greater distance, would get doses between 200-600 rads, doses which would kill a part of the victims slowly and painfully within weeks or months, leaving those who did not die invalid, living "dummies" like many of the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, for the rest of their lives. The survivors and all who received doses smaller than 200 rads would have an increased risk of deleterious genetic effects ..."

As is well known, the socialist countries introduced in the CCD on 10 March 1978 a draft convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons (CCD/559). At that time nuclear neutron weapons were regarded only as a potential system of weapons of mass destruction. In the meantime the production of components and now the assembly of the whole weapon has become a reality. Under such circumstances the establishment of a working group which would start negotiations on a treaty prohibiting nuclear neutron weapons has become a matter of the utmost urgency.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. CIARRAPICO (Italy) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, as this is the first time this month that I am taking the floor on behalf of my delegation, I should like first of all to offer you my sincere congratulations and those of my delegation on your accession to the chairmanship of the Committee. During this period of intense activity preceding the closure of our annual session you have shown great skill and I have no doubt that we can count fully on your eminent qualities in guiding us during the rest of our work and in concluding that work in the most satisfactory manner possible.

I should like at the same time to take this opportunity to express my appreciation and gratitude and those of my delegation for the very active contribution made to our efforts by your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Venkateswaran of India. I have asked for the floor in order to thank Dr. Ericsson who, last Thursday, submitted to the Committee the report on the twelfth session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. My delegation would like to congratulate him, and the members of his Group, for the serious way in which they have done their work over the years, and for the results they have obtained. My country is very much interested in the further pursuance of this work.

There are some encouraging aspects, mentioned in the progress report, which we should like to stress. Dr. Ericsson himself drew our attention to these aspects when he presented the report last Thursday. There is, for instance,

(Mr. Ciarrapico, Italy)

the prospect of greater participation in future experimental data exchanges by countries situated in the southern hemisphere; this will be important in helping to make possible an evaluation of the world telecommunications system of the World Meteorological Organization on a truly global scale. Then, in paragraph 9 of the report, there are some interesting indications concerning the advantages that may be derived from more recent developments in seismology and associated techniques.

There is, finally, a list of subjects on which further studies are desirable.

While noting the above facts with satisfaction, we should like to go beyond the confines of the report and offer some comments, here and now, on the question of the possible renewal of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. This is a question which will in all probability arise towards the middle of next year. It is one to which we should give some thought during the interval before the resumption of the Committee's work. While aware of the difficulties which exist in this connection, my delegation for its part is convinced that once the present work has been successfully completed, the Group of Scientific Experts should go a step further and tackle the problem of the discrimination of seismic events. If we do not want the world system for the exchange of seismological data which we are in the process of testing to become a source of contradictory declarations, we must study and identify discrimination methods which could be generally and uniformly adopted. For this purpose, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts should be given a broader mandate which would enable it to discuss and compare the different methods of discrimination with a view to identifying scientifically valid methods likely to meet with general approval.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Italy for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to myself.

Mr. VENKATESWARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, in a few days' time, the Committee on Disarmament will wind up its 1981 annual session. It has been a year of hectic negotiating activity at least with respect to some items on our agenda. Although we are naturally disappointed that actual agreements have not yet emerged on these items, we believe that the work accomplished during these last several months has laid the basis hopefully for concrete progress to be made during the next session. This is especially true of negotiations on chemical weapons. However, it is a matter of deep regret to my delegation that the Committee was unable to initiate multilateral negotiations on two of the most urgent items on its agenda -- namely, a nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. It is our conviction that unless the Committee makes sufficient progress in finding solutions to the most urgent problems which have a bearing on the very survival of mankind and which affect the security and well-being of all nations, its credibility as the sole multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament is bound to be seriously undermined. The prospects for a successful outcome to the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament would also, as a consequence, be adversely affected.

The need for redoubled efforts in the field of disarmament has recently been underscored by the decision by one nuclear-weapon State to manufacture and deploy neutron weapons. The Indian delegation deplores this latest development which will no doubt herald a new round in the qualitative nuclear arms race. Speaking at a press conference in Nairobi on 12 August, the Prime Minister of India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, expressed great concern over the confrontation between the big

(Mr. Venkateswavan, India)

Powers and the danger arising from the continuing arms race, including the manufacture of neutron bombs. This morning, the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico made a very important statement and my delegation endorses several of the pertinent observations made by him. We share his concern at some of the ideas expressed in this august body, particularly by the distinguished representative of the United States in his statement last week.

We have heard two interesting statements at our last plenary meeting, on 13 August -- one from the delegation of the United States of America and the other from that of the USSR. I would like to express my delegation's views on some of the issues raised by these two delegations.

The representative of the United States seemed somewhat perturbed by what he called "the tendency in the Committee to adopt a high moral tone in preaching about the evils of deterrence". My delegation is not aware that anyone here had "preached" sermons about any "evil" or had adopted "a high moral tone". In any event, we are not really concerned about such subjective reactions. But we would like to place on record our position on the question of deterrence. It is certainly true that nations practise deterrence against their perceived adversaries. In a certain sense, the Charter of the United Nations itself can be seen as a declaration of deterrence against war, against want, against the violation of human rights and rights of nation-States, etc. What we have drawn attention to are the dangers and risks inherent in the practice of the doctrine of deterrence with nuclear weapons, whose use could pose a threat to the survival of mankind. The nuclear-weapon States have themselves recognized that a nuclear war would affect belligerents and non-belligerents alike. Those who feel this threat, especially we the non-aligned and neutral non-nuclear-weapon States, and therefore speak about it and strive to avert a nuclear war, cannot be said to be adopting a high moral tone or preaching about the evils of deterrence. This is tantamount to accusing a potential victim of "wrongfully" objecting to his undeserved slaughter!

It is not to justify our psyche or to score any debating points that we speak of the danger of nations basing their security on doctrines of nuclear deterrence. We speak of such issues for a simple yet compelling reason -- the desire to survive. Survival is hardly a moral question. For most of us, I would imagine, it is a matter of considerable practical consequence.

The distinguished representative of the United States has also stated that we must accept the reality that each State is going to maintain that its own judgement of its security requirements is not subject to challenge, no matter what others may think or what the realities may be. We are not here to challenge the security perceptions of one or another State. But we do consider it necessary that in the process of evolving an enduring system of international peace and security, we must also take account of the security perceptions of all States. Implicit in the process of negotiations is the willingness to consider the security concerns of others and to the extent possible, to modify one's own policies and positions. If we regard our current security perceptions as immutable, then I am afraid we would have already closed the door to any possible harmonization of divergent views and dashed any hope of evolving a just and equitable regime of world peace and security.

There is another, more fundamental problem which we have with the position stated by Ambassador Flowerree. Agreed that each State has the right to protect its own security in the manner it deems most appropriate. However, are there no limits to this right? As we have asked repeatedly before, is it permissible for a handful of nuclear-weapon States to endanger the survival of other States, of mankind as a whole,

(Mr. Venkateswavan, India)

in the pursuit of their perceived security interests? Is it permissible for a State to adopt security policies and strategies which, while deterring a perceived adversary, also, at the same time, jeopardize the vital security interests of third States, who are neither involved nor regarded as a threat? The doctrine of nuclear deterrence appears to be based on the assumption that in fact some States do have unlimited rights to pursue what they regard as their legitimate security concerns and that others may be sacrificed to their sacred concepts. My delegation categorically rejects such a doctrine.

While the representative of the United States devoted the greater part of his statement to informing this Committee of what, in fact, lies behind the security concerns of the United States, the representative of the Soviet Union also gave us an insight into what underlies the anxieties felt by the USSR.

The group of non-aligned and neutral non-nuclear-weapon States have for their part clearly and consistently stated what their primary security concerns are, especially on nuclear issues. We are, therefore, in this multilateral negotiating body, in a position to look at the problem of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, from an objective angle. We are perhaps in a better position to understand the mutual anxieties of the two major Powers as well as the apprehension of the vast majority of States belonging to the developing world. For example, we have been given a picture of theatre nuclear weapons deployed in Europe as it appears to the Soviet Union and to the United States. Could not some of the mutual apprehensions felt by these two major Powers in this regard be removed? Should we not make an effort in this Committee to do so?

Again, it is clear from the Soviet statement that it considers what it regards as parity or balance to be upset each time there is a move to "modernize" weapons and their systems. It is also clear from that statement that the Soviet Union will not permit the other side to upset what it regards as the existing parity. Given these perceptions (which we ourselves do not subscribe to), should not both sides reflect upon the consequences of decisions to introduce new and modernized weapons? For, if each side continues "mirror-imaging" the fears, anxieties and perceived intentions of the other, the arms race would of course become magnified and have no finishing post at all. Does this also not point to the need for our Committee to examine these aspects with a view to breaking this vicious circle of action and reaction?

We sincerely believe that there is room for the two major Powers to reconcile their main differences. Secretary Haig stated recently that the United States and the USSR have to "search for co-operation to protect mankind". We trust that this is a practical imperative and not a moral issue. However, as far as the Committee on Disarmament is concerned, I would say that not only must the major Powers, including the United States and the USSR, co-operate to protect mankind but that all the delegations represented here have an equally significant role to play in pursuing that objective. We trust, therefore, that we can raise this question in the Committee on Disarmament without being charged with moral pretensions. For this appears to us to be plain common sense to protect mankind and ensure its survival.

I would like to conclude this statement by expressing the hope that we in this Committee will deal with the causes underlying the arms race, because this is fundamental to disarmament negotiations. As Ambassador Flowerree has said, the root causes of war and international tension have been ignored by our predecessors. We are ready to join him and all others in this Committee in ensuring that the Committee on Disarmament is not found guilty of dereliction of its responsibilities to the international community.



Mr. SKINNER (Canada): Mr. Chairman, we note that the initiative concerning neutron weapons comes from a group of countries which poses a nuclear threat to Europe and indeed to ourselves. We hope that the scruples they have expressed on enhanced radiation warheads also apply to their own devastating nuclear capacity. If not, we should accordingly draw our own conclusions. I shall comment briefly today on one aspect of the Committee's recent discussion on nuclear questions, particularly in their horizontal dimension. On 21 July, the distinguished deputy representative of India made a lengthy intervention largely concerning a Canadian statement the previous week. Although I will not comment on the parts of the intervention in which he describes the Indian view on nuclear disarmament, I am compelled to address those parts where the deputy permanent representative may have misunderstood the intent of Canadian views as Ambassador McPhail expressed them. The first is that in which the Canadian statement is described as asserting an apologia for the continuing nuclear arms race among the nuclear-weapon States. The Canadian Government has been working for many years to promote concrete and verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements. I need not review and describe these efforts. Let me simply say that the continuation of the SALT process and the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty are Canada's top priorities in arms control and disarmament, and we look forward to the forthcoming bilateral talks aimed at controlling long-range theatre nuclear forces in Europe. While the Canadian statement also insisted on the importance of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons to States not now possessing them, we do not consider it constructive to be told that it is only a small step from there to espousing two positions which my Government most emphatically does not espouse.

Canada fully shares the sense of frustration and impatience reflected in the Indian representative's words at the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament. But I deeply regret that Canada's concern about the risks of horizontal nuclear proliferation was linked to the suggestion that we support any further growth of nuclear arsenals, or that Canada advocates the acceptance of an indefinite continuation of the nuclear have and have-not division. The nuclear arms area is one where Canada wishes that all States were equal as have-nots.

This Committee is supposed to be a place for negotiation. Perhaps some of those who have spoken today should bear this in mind. However, it might be useful to reply to the question posed by our distinguished Indian colleague about what was meant by the concept of balance in nuclear disarmament as described in the Canadian intervention. Ambassador Summerhayes has just spoken clearly on the matter. It may indeed have been situated primarily in an East-West context, but the concept itself was meant to be that which we believe is behind paragraph 49 of the Programme of Action adopted at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament which states that "the process of nuclear disarmament should be carried out in such a way ... that the security of all States is guaranteed at progressively lower levels of nuclear armaments".

Mr. FLOWERREE (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, if attention to my delegation and mention of its name in this forum was any measure of popularity, I am sure that the United States would be at the top of the list by now. At any rate, I do feel that there are a few things that have been said that require me to make a response, and in view of the late hour I will not respond on all aspects of the points which have been made with which I disagree. This morning we heard the Vice-Minister of Cuba noting that his delegation had circulated a statement on biological warfare, document CD/211, "which might be useful to the Committee in its work" -- those were

(Mr. Flowerree, United States)

his words. The United States has examined this document and has found it to be tendentious and completely without foundation in fact. The Cuban Government should be aware of the fact that the United States destroyed all its biological weapons stocks and ceased all production some five years before the entry into force of the Biological Weapons Convention to which the United States is a party. On 27 July of this year the United States rejected the suggestion that the outbreak of dengue fever in Cuba was caused by any action of the United States. Our spokesman said that this latest charge, like earlier ones about sugar rust, tobacco mould and swine fever, was totally without foundation. Now, what was not mentioned in the statement by Mr. Castro which was circulated to the Committee is that the United States Government, in line with its general policy of humanitarian concern, has co-operated with the Pan-American Health Organization in helping to stem this latest outbreak of dengue fever in Cuba. On 17 July the Department of Commerce of the United States received a licence application from the Pan-American Health Organization to export to Cuba 300 metric tons of abate, a United States-made granular pesticide which is used to kill the mosquitoes that spread dengue fever. The application was approved expeditiously, on the same day. There are substitute products made in other countries for dealing with dengue fever, but Cuba and the Pan-American Health Organization preferred the United States-made product as being the most effective and efficient.

There is another point which I wish to take up. It has to do with the discussion that we have had on neutron weapons. There are several points that have been made by different speakers, some that were made by the representative of the Soviet Union last Thursday; I will not address all of them, but there are two, at the moment, to which I would like to call attention. One point was addressed in part by our British colleague this morning. It had to do with what is called the United States forward-based systems. The capabilities in these systems reside largely in submarines and aircraft-carriers. The proper response to those forward-based systems is certainly not a land-based missile with multiple warheads. The number of warheads which the Soviet Union has accumulated in the SS-20 system is now well over 700 and is growing weekly. But you do not sink submarines or aircraft-carriers, or shoot down airplanes with SS-20 land-based surface-to-surface missiles, and those more than 700 warheads are far beyond the needs for fixed targets in Europe. One then must ask oneself what they are for.

There is another point about neutron weapons which I think needs to be cleared up, and that is what is the nature of the weapon. I am not at this point speaking about whether it is a good or a bad weapon; I just want to explain what the weapon is. All nuclear weapons create blast, heat and what is called prompt radiation and fallout, which is delayed radiation. Each of these characteristics can be enhanced or suppressed in building the weapons, depending on their military purposes. The enhanced radiation weapon, the radiation warhead, is a fission-fusion device, a small hydrogen fusion bomb with an atomic fission trigger that enhances the prompt radiation characteristics while reducing blast, heat and fallout. The enhanced radiation weapon is designed primarily for anti-tank warfare; a small enhanced radiation weapon can penetrate a tank's armour and immobilize the tank with its prompt radiation effects without causing significant blast or thermal damage to surrounding areas. Now, we have never advertised this as being anything but a weapon, and weapons kill. But our Soviet colleague somehow or other thinks that death from an SS-20 half-megaton warhead might be more pleasant than death from a neutron weapon. Well, I heard him say that this neutron weapon can penetrate concrete bunkers -- I am pretty sure that he would not like to be in that concrete bunker when the warhead of a Soviet medium-range missile exploded overhead.

(Mr. Flowerree, United States)

One final point. Since the subject has been brought up by two of our colleagues today -- and I am glad to see that people do read my speeches -- I would like to make a brief comment about this business of deterrence. In regard to the statement made by the distinguished representative of Mexico this morning, I am sorry that he chose to quote only selectively from my statement of 13 August regarding deterrence. I am sure that a full reading would make clear the valid point I was making, so with your indulgence, I will read a part of the statement that was left out. I described the fact that deterrence had been used for many purposes by Governments, or had been in long use by Governments, over many years, and then said: "Deterrence has its virtues, but it is naive to hope that it can continue to serve indefinitely into the future. We would all prefer to live in a world in which that doctrine and the military forces which support it were unnecessary. Nevertheless, with the best of will on all sides, arms and the impulses which cause nations to use them are not likely to be brought fully under control in the near future." I wish that were not our judgement, but it happens to be our judgement and I think that very many people here would share it. Now, in the statement by the distinguished representative of India this afternoon, he talked about the terrible consequences of a nuclear war, which we share fully and understand. Our point of difference is that we think that deterrence makes nuclear war less likely, and that is the premise on which we have been proceeding for a long time. We know it is not the best system; in fact I said that in this very Chamber in my statement on 7 April, I went into great detail about the possible dangers to the world -- dangers to the world as a whole -- of dismantling deterrence on a unilateral basis. So, I hope that my statement will be read in its entirety and not be mistaken as an advocacy of deterrence as a long-term solution to our problems. Finally, in closing, I am glad to see that the representative of India and the representative of Mexico cited Secretary of State Haig and President Reagan in statements that indicated their understanding of the concerns which preoccupy this Committee and the fact that they are interested in doing something about it.

Mr. ISSRAELIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, I too should like to comment briefly on some of the statements which have been made today and at recent meetings. First of all I should like to draw the attention of the members of the Committee to the fact that the question of medium-range missiles does not form the subject of negotiations in the Committee. This is a very complex question and affects the interests of a large group of States and preliminary consultations are at present under way, or rather, I should say, could be under way with a view to such negotiations. The Soviet delegation has not brought these questions before the Committee for its consideration. We do not quite understand why the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany considered it necessary to make this question the subject of negotiations or discussions in the Committee, quoting various figures which were not in accordance with the facts, and obliging us on 13 August to give an explanation in this connection. Apparently that was not sufficient. Today the representative of the United Kingdom decided to continue the discussion on a question which, I repeat, does not form the subject of negotiations in the Committee.

As regards neutron weapons, this is a question which is certainly within the competence of the Committee, for the simple reason that questions concerning the limitation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament constitute the second item on the agenda and naturally the Committee is entitled to discuss those questions. A draft agreement on this subject was put before the Committee as long ago as in 1978. The views of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in this connection have

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

already been expressed here. I found it very unpleasant to hear the neutron bomb being lauded; I do not think that such advertising redounds to the credit of those responsible for it. We should like once again to emphasize the essential fact about the neutron bomb. The essential fact is a political one. The essential political fact about it is very simple; there is no need to go into details about its technical characteristics. The essential political fact about the neutron bomb is that it brings nuclear war nearer to us. Whereas nuclear war was at a certain distance away from us, now it has come much closer to the realities of the day. In what exactly does the essential political fact about the neutron bomb consist? It consists in the terrible danger that this weapon represents and in the basic difference between it and other types of advanced medium-range missiles, including those referred to in his statement by Ambassador Flowerree. And a last point. But I am referring to this only because of the rather recent date of the participation of the representative of Canada in the work of the Committee. Otherwise I cannot explain how he could have asked why countries which put forward a proposal for the prohibition of neutron weapons do not advocate the prohibition of the nuclear capacity which they themselves possess. I would draw the attention of the representative of Canada to document CD/4 which is in the archives of the Committee on Disarmament. I would recommend him to read it. He would see that the Soviet Union and a large group of other socialist countries put forward a proposal for the starting of negotiations on nuclear disarmament. It is not the fault of the Soviet Union or of the socialist countries but undoubtedly that of Canada's allies that these negotiations have not yet begun. We were ready for these negotiations and we are still ready for them today. With the appearance of the neutron bomb we consider that it has become all the more urgent to undertake these negotiations.

Mr. SOLA VILA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): We are in the habit of hearing the United States delegation deny various accusations that have been made by Cuba only to see, a short time later, in official documents of the United States Senate itself or in statements issued by that country's leaders, a recognition of the truth of the charges made by Cuba at a time when they were denied. We might recall in this connection the 'mercenaries' invasion of the Girón beach, or the Bay of Pigs as it is known in United States literature, when, although the United States Ambassador to the United Nations denied the participation of the United States in the preparation and financing of and the provision of air support for that invasion, a few days later the President of the United States himself acknowledged the full responsibility of the United States Government.

During the decades of the 1960s and 1970s the Cuban Government made repeated charges, after capturing the actual agents, of plans for the assassination of our leaders, all of which were at that time also denied by the United States Government. In the recent investigations by the United States Senate into the activities of the CIA, the authenticity and veracity of all that we said about such plans were fully recognized.

We are grateful to Ambassador Flowerree for referring to this matter, although we are still awaiting a response to the fundamental question put by the Cuban Government to the United States Government as to whether its plans for aggression and blockade against our country are being maintained. We do not deny that on 17 July the United States Government gave the authorization to which Ambassador Flowerree referred. However, we can state with assurance that by 27 July not one gramme of the disinfectants needed to deal with that pest had arrived.

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

The suspicions of our people are based on the experienced facts of 20 years of aggression, blockades and attempted assassinations. We would not wish it to happen that a short time from now, in one of the memoranda of one of the generals or departmental Secretaries or some other such person, there should appear an acknowledgement of the truth of Cuba's charge and suspicion in this connection and a refutation of what Ambassador Flowerree has claimed.

The CHAIRMAN: As I announced at the beginning of this plenary meeting, I intend to put before the Committee for approval the recommendation contained in the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events contained in document CD/210. In particular, the Ad Hoc Group suggested that the next session should be convened from 1-12 March 1982, in Geneva.

If there is no objection, I will take it that the Committee approves the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Group. I see no objection.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: In accordance with our time-table for the present week, I will convene now, in five minutes' time, an informal meeting of the Committee to continue our consideration of Working Paper No. 44 containing the draft report to the United Nations General Assembly, as well as Working Paper No. 45, entitled "Draft decision containing proposals for the functioning of the Committee on Disarmament."

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 20 August, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 4.40 p.m.