

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIXTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 13 August 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. C.A. SANI (Indonesia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria Mr. A. SALAH-BEY

Argentina: Mr. J.C. CARASALES
Mr. J.F. GOMENSORO
Ms. N. NASCIMBENE

Australia: Mr. R.A. WALKER
Mr. R. STEELE

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINK
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U HGWE WIN
U THAN HTUN

Canada: Mr. C.R. SKINNER

China: Mr. YU Peiwen
Mr. YU Mengjia
Mrs. WANG Zhiyun
Mr. LIN Chen

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLA VILA
Mr. F.O. RODRIGUEZ

Czechoslovakia: Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. J. FRANEK

Egypt:

Mr. EL REEDY
Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. N. FAHMY
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia:

Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Mrs. H. HOPPE

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. F. RUTH
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. A. LAKATOS

India:

Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. A. SANI
Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. F. QASIM
Mr. W. ACHDIAK
Mr. SOEPRAPTO

Iran:

Mr. A. JALALI

Italy:

Mr. A. CIARRAPICO
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. M. BARENGHI
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANAKA
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya:Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. S. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. M. ARRASSEN
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. F.H. FEIN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria:

Mr. M.B. BRIMAH
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. M. AKRAM
Mr. T. ALIYAF

Peru:

Mr. A. THORNBERRY

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Romania:

Mr. M. MALITA
Mr. O. IONESCU
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. T. JAYAKODDY
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. U. ERICSSON
Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. N.F. CHERVOV
Mr. V.M. GANJA
Mr. V.F. PRYAKHIN

United Kingdom:

Mr. D. SUMMERHAYES
Mr. N.H. MARSHALL

United States of America:

Mr. C. FLOWERREE
Mr. F. DESIMONE
Miss K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. R.F. SCOTT
Miss L. SHEA
Mr. W. HECKROTTE

Venezuela:

Mr. R. RODRIQUEZ NAVARRO
Mr. O. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. G.O. GNOK

Secretary of the Committee and
Personal Representative of
the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: In conformity with its programme of work, the Committee continues today its consideration of the item dealing with the consideration of the reports of subsidiary bodies, as well as of the annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations. In accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, members wishing to do so may make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee.

You will recall that, at the time of the adoption of the programme of work for the second part of the annual session of the Committee, the Chairman stated, inter alia: "It is envisaged that the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events will be duly considered at a plenary meeting in August after its submission". The Ad Hoc Group completed its work on 12 August and I intend to invite its Chairman, Dr. Ulf Ericsson, to introduce it in the Committee today, after we complete our list of speakers. In accordance with the statement that I just quoted, I also intend to put before the Committee for approval the report of the Group, contained in document CD/210, at our next plenary meeting, on Tuesday, 18 August.

Mr. EL REEDY (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Mr. Chairman, we are happy to see you presiding over this Committee. Although you have joined us only recently, you have extensive and profound experience in our field of work. We have all been greatly impressed by the exemplary manner in which you have been conducting our work during the past few days. Please also allow me to refer to another aspect that your chairmanship embodies; you represent the sister State of Indonesia whose people are linked to our own by ties of brotherhood and love. While launching our vibrant appeal for disarmament, let us now remember that first appeal, made at Bandung over a quarter of a century ago, which expressed the wisdom of hundreds of millions of human beings in Asia and Africa.

Your chairmanship brings to mind the spirit and the words of Bandung. Here in this Committee we urgently need to apply that spirit and to seek inspiration from those concepts.

While we are putting the final touches to the report on the work of the Committee on Disarmament during the 1981 session, it might be useful to consider the impact that the report might have when it is submitted to the General Assembly at its last regular session before the special session devoted to disarmament to be held next spring. The question that will be asked will undoubtedly be: what is the end result of our work during the current year and what have we achieved with regard to the items on the agenda?

I am certain that we will be satisfied that, from the outset, we set about our tasks without wasting too much time on procedural matters and that the working groups that we set up straight away under distinguished and experienced chairmen benefited from the serious and effective participation of all delegations.

From the substantive point of view, the report will certainly reflect not only the serious and intensive discussions that took place on the subject of chemical weapons but also the detailed and careful manner in which the Ad Hoc Working Group

(Mr. El Reedy, Egypt)

dealt with the various aspects of that subject. We would like to pay tribute to that Ad Hoc Working Group and to its Chairman, Ambassador Lidgard, for the practical and scientific approach that he applied to its work. However, despite the progress achieved, we have not yet succeeded in removing the obstacles that are still impeding our efforts to attain the goal of concluding a convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons under effective verification measures. There are still differences of opinion regarding the most important elements of the draft convention, especially those relating to scope of application, verification measures and international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses.

As an essential step towards the achievement of this goal, it was only natural that the mandate of the Group should be amended so as to authorize it not only to study the relevant elements but also to conduct negotiations with a view to reaching agreement, but unfortunately this did not prove possible at the current session. Consequently, despite the efforts of the Ad Hoc Working Group and the meetings of experts that were held, the Committee was hampered in its efforts to make real progress towards its goal.

On the other hand, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, whose work was characterized by a joint political will on the part of the two Superpowers to conclude a treaty prohibiting the use of radiological weapons, continued its endeavours this year during which it benefited from the wide experience of its distinguished Chairman, Ambassador Komives. Various States, including the group of non-aligned States to which my country belongs, participated seriously in the work of this Ad Hoc Working Group, although some of them felt that the conclusion of a treaty on radiological weapons was not among the top priority items on the disarmament agenda.

In spite of all the efforts made to narrow the gap between divergent views regarding the elements of the draft treaty, we believe that further endeavours will still be required to overcome the remaining differences, especially in connection with three fundamental issues, namely: definition, the scope of the prohibition, and the peaceful uses of radioactive materials. Taking into account the flexibility shown by the Group of 21 with respect to these issues, and their readiness to enter into a dialogue regarding the specific proposals that they submitted in their working paper, we believe that there is still hope of reaching agreement if the other groups show similar flexibility and understanding of the positions adopted by the developing countries with regard to the Swedish proposal concerning the prohibition of attacks on peaceful nuclear installations. The importance of such a prohibition was highlighted by recent events since an attack on such installations could lead to the leakage and dissemination of radioactive materials, thereby causing damage the scale and effects of which would not be less than those resulting from the use of radiological and nuclear weapons.

Turning to the subject of negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States -- and I recently had occasion to commend the efforts of the Ad Hoc Working Group dealing with this topic, as well as its able Chairman, Minister Ciarrapico -- my delegation can only note with regret that we are still far from our original aim of establishing clear and specific binding legal commitments by which the nuclear-weapon States would undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

(Mr. El Reedy, Egypt)

With regard to the Ad Hoc Working Group entrusted with the task of formulating a comprehensive programme of general and complete disarmament, which was fortunate to have as its Chairman our dean, Ambassador García Robles, our report will no doubt reflect the way in which this Ad Hoc Working Group has dealt with the various elements of the proposed draft programme. However, this Group still has the task of crystallizing and drafting those elements in a generally acceptable and agreed manner. At a later stage, this Group will also have to deal with the other points of divergence relating to the legal nature of the programme and the time-frame needed for its implementation. The success of the Working Group in its task will ultimately depend on the extent of our combined efforts and our flexibility. It is to be hoped that by the time the special session is convened next year we shall have a full and comprehensive document ready for submission to the General Assembly.

In our view these are the principal features of our Committee's achievements during the current year that will be reflected in our report to the United Nations General Assembly at its coming session. However, in spite of our appreciation of the efforts made, these results do not truly constitute a real achievement in the sphere of disarmament, and especially nuclear disarmament and a nuclear test ban, which are the first two items on our agenda. We cannot even claim to have achieved any procedural progress on these two items. Although we have made every attempt to establish the framework within which negotiations can proceed on these two issues, we have constantly encountered obstacles created by nuclear-weapon States opposed to the establishment of working groups in this connection. Having received no alternative suggestions, we were finally forced to agree to the holding of informal meetings to discuss the questions of nuclear disarmament and a nuclear test ban. Our delegation had hoped that these informal discussions would lead to a substantive dialogue through which we could identify the obstacles impeding negotiations on the two most serious matters affecting the destiny of mankind, so that we could make every possible effort to help to overcome those obstacles. However, we were not given any clear answers in this respect and the Group of 21 therefore stated its position in working papers CD/180 and CD/181. Among other questions that we put to the nuclear-weapon States in those two documents, we enquired whether those States were intending to resume their trilateral negotiations on the cessation of nuclear tests and, if so, when. Unfortunately, even this question has so far remained unanswered.

Therefore, we can only note that the Committee on Disarmament was, in fact, prevented from accomplishing its task under those two items, largely because of the absence of political will on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to enter into negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament and a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests.

This is the picture that we will be presenting to the General Assembly just before it convenes its second special session devoted to disarmament. It is a picture that should give rise to concern and anxiety in all of us. Moreover, it should also give rise to questions regarding the consequences of the course of action of the nuclear-weapon States, consequences that will affect not only those States themselves but also mankind as a whole.

(Mr. El Reedy, Egypt)

While the Committee on Disarmament, the principal negotiating body in this field, has failed to achieve real progress, we are witnessing a constant increase in the rate of production and stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction, together with an escalation in the use of outer space for military purposes, with all the serious dangers which that implies, as pointed out by Mrs. Thorsson, the head of the Swedish delegation, in her statement to the Committee on 9 July.

Concurrently, the world has recently been witnessing events which constitute serious challenges to the non-proliferation régime, a régime that we are constantly endeavouring to promote. In our view, such events should be taken into consideration by the nuclear-weapon States that have assumed specific responsibilities under this régime. It is within the framework of this régime that a large number of non-nuclear-weapon States have entered into legal commitments to renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons and to place their peaceful nuclear installations under the international safeguards and inspection system.

We are not calling on any State to take unilateral disarmament measures or to disarm in the absence of an effective system of control and verification. However, we are urging States to enter into serious negotiations in order to control the appalling arms race that we are witnessing today, to put an end to this race through measures binding on the various parties and to proceed along the path towards disarmament, to which there is no alternative. In this context, let us recall paragraph 18 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in which all States expressed their conviction that "Mankind is confronted with a choice: we must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation".

Consequently, as our current session is about to conclude, my delegation expresses the earnest hope that our next session will be held in an atmosphere conducive to serious and real negotiations on nuclear disarmament and the cessation of the arms race. This will require political will on the part of the Superpowers, together with political initiatives to create an appropriate political climate in which the principles of peaceful co-existence based on respect for the sovereignty of States and non-interference in their internal affairs will be strictly observed.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Egypt for his statement and for the kind reference he made to my country and myself.

Mr. FLOWERREE (United States of America): Mr. Chairman I am pleased to be able to disengage myself from other responsibilities to be present today and to have the honour of welcoming you to the Chair on behalf of the United States delegation. You have come a long distance in order to take up the important duty of guiding the Committee through the final days of the 1981 session and we will do our best to ensure that when you return to Djakarta it will be with a feeling of accomplishment. To your predecessor, about whom much has been said, all of which was well deserved, I should like to say that the style, the deep sense of involvement and the sense of humour that he brought to the chairmanship gave us at least a Venkateswaran July if not an Indian summer.

It will not have escaped the notice of members of the Committee that the United States delegation has been relatively silent during our 1981 session. Apart from my April 7 intervention and a recent brief discussion of chemical weapons last month, my delegation has spoken only when spoken to -- that is, when it has been necessary to put our position on an issue on the record. We have thought this to be an appropriate posture, given the fact that the review of United States arms control policy is still continuing. On the other hand, in the working groups, whose efforts are directed at making progress toward goals that had already been agreed on, the United States has been an active and, we believe, a constructive participant. We do not, however, wish to let our relative silence in plenary meetings be taken as acceptance of some assertions that have been made in the Committee about United States attitudes and policies concerning defence programmes and arms control negotiations -- assertions that turn the facts on their heads or distort the real situation.

The over-all thrust of United States policy has been made clear by high-level United States Government officials who have addressed the interrelated problems of security and the control of armaments in a clear and straightforward manner. In an important speech delivered in New York on 14 July, Secretary of State Haig said:

"One of the President's first acts was to order an intense review of arms control policy, the better to learn the lessons of the past in the hope of achieving more lasting progress for the future. Two fundamental conclusions have emerged from this review:

First, the search for sound arms control agreements should be an essential element of our programme for achieving and maintaining peace.

Second, such agreements can be reached if negotiations among adversaries about their national security interests are not dominated by pious hopes and simplistic solutions."

The Secretary of State went on to say that the United States has a broad agenda of specific arms control efforts and negotiations already under way or about to be launched. The charge that the United States is not interested in arms control or that we have cut off communications with the Soviet Union is simply not true, he said. He concluded with these words,

(Mr. Flowerree, United States)

"It is one of the paradoxes of our time that the prospects for arms control depend upon the achievement of a balance of arms. We seek to negotiate a balance at less dangerous levels but meanwhile we must maintain our strength. Let us take to heart John F. Kennedy's reminder that negotiations are not a substitute for strength -- they are an instrument for the translation of strength into survival and peace."

The current United States approach to the control of nuclear armaments is strongly influenced by historical developments over the past decade or so which have caused the NATO alliance to take steps to respond to a Soviet military build-up that is continuing relentlessly. Some have suggested that the Western alliance has over-reacted -- that the Soviet build-up of nuclear weapons is merely for the sake of maintaining parity and that in any event the weapons targeted against Europe -- or the United States for that matter -- are defensive, and simply for deterrence, or that the threat posed by nuclear weapons is rhetorical rather than real. We wish that were so. The Soviet build-up, however, has exceeded the level of force needed simply for deterrence.

Let me dwell for a moment on the question of nuclear strategy. Several interventions in this Committee during the past months have alluded to United States doctrines that purportedly make nuclear war "more thinkable" or suggest that United States planning is based on an assumption that a limited nuclear war is winnable. That is not the case; the goal of United States strategic policy is to convince potential adversaries that they could not win or profit from any level of nuclear conflict and thus to deter them from starting one.

What about Soviet doctrine? While my delegation and others have noted on previous occasions that the closed nature of the Soviet society does not allow us the privilege of following closely the strategic debate within that country, we do have a few insights into Soviet military doctrine from authoritative sources, and what they reveal is not reassuring. Since the 1960s, Soviet doctrine has stressed the vital role of nuclear arms in any large-scale conflict. The publication, Soviet Military Strategy, by an authors' collective headed by Marshal V.D. Sokolovsky, first published in 1962, and revised in 1964 and 1968, assumes that any major war will be fought with nuclear weapons. A sample quotation:

"The basic means for armed combat in land theatres in a future world war will be the nuclear weapon used primarily with operational-tactical missiles, and also frontal aviation (bombers, fighter bombers, and fighters).

In addition, the strategic rocket troops and long-range aviation will deliver nuclear strikes against important objectives in the zone of the offensive fronts ... On the battle-fields the decisive role will be played by the firing of nuclear weapons. The other means of armed combat will utilize the results of nuclear attacks for the final defeat of the enemy."

(Mr. Flowerree, United States)

A 1971 publication, The Officers' Handbook, edited by Major-General S.N. Kozlov, sets out the role of nuclear weapons in unvarnished terms:

"Soviet military doctrine allocates the decisive role in contemporary war to nuclear missile weapons. At the same time it considers that along with the nuclear missile strikes of a strategic and operational-tactical character, the armed forces will employ conventional armament."

It is not often that we are able to get such insights into Soviet thinking about nuclear war, but what we see in the way of the proliferation of Soviet nuclear weapons is entirely consistent with what we have been able to read. And, just recently, in the May 1981 issue of Kommunist, the Soviet Communist party's principal periodical, Lieutenant-General P. Shilin denies that war changes its nature with the advent of mass destruction weapons. He rejects the argument that the Marxist-Leninist theory of "just" and "unjust" wars no longer applies because of the alleged immorality of any use of nuclear weapons.

Is there any wonder that after years of marking time the United States and its allies feel compelled to redress the nuclear balance? Moreover, the United States on behalf of the Western allies offered and has subsequently reconfirmed our willingness to negotiate reductions in European theatre nuclear forces.

It has been argued that a rough nuclear balance between East and West existed in 1964; others believe a balance was achieved some time later. But whether parity was achieved in 1964 or 1974, there is no evidence to support the Soviet claim that recent heavy increases in their military spending and deployment of weapons have been undertaken in response to Western provocations. How can the deployment of SS-20's which began in the mid-1970s possibly be construed as a response to a NATO decision that was taken in December 1979 about deployments projected for 1983 and beyond?

Let us quickly review the record. In the last decade or so, the United States took the following actions: (1) it introduced a moratorium on the production of chemical weapons beginning in 1969; (2) it stopped entirely the production of biological weapons and destroyed all stocks some five years before the BW Convention went into force in 1975; (3) it cancelled production of the B-1 bomber, (4) it reduced the Trident submarine programme. In that period the number of United States ICBM launchers remained constant. Defence spending in real dollar terms, after removing the effects of inflation, was on a downward slope and only regained the 1964 level this year, in 1981. In contrast, over the same period from 1960 until today, the Soviet Union increased defence spending (after removing the effects of inflation), each and every year by 4 or 5 per cent. Regardless of bilateral SALT negotiations, regardless of what went on in the United Nations or in this Committee, regardless of Moscow's high-sounding rhetoric about peace and disarmament, the USSR increased its military spending to the point where the resources it devotes to arms is double what it was in 1960 while the United States effort is at this moment very nearly what it was twenty years ago.

(Mr. Flowerree, United States)

One other unilateral action which the United States took in recent years also had no effect on the steady Soviet build-up. It was the 1978 decision not to proceed with the manufacture and deployment of the enhanced radiation reduced-blast weapon which the Soviet delegation and others have referred to as the "neutron bomb". Yes, there was a response to this action by the Soviet Union, but unfortunately that response lay entirely in the realm of propaganda. There was no slowdown in the output of the Soviet war machine, not in tanks, not in airplanes, not in missiles, large or small. Now that the United States has decided to manufacture and stockpile the enhanced radiation weapon we hear the same outcry, the same distortions of fact from Eastern spokesmen. They speak as though the enhanced radiation weapon is designed to annihilate population whereas in fact it is pre-eminently an anti-tank device. The enhanced radiation weapons, if they ever had to be used, which we pray will never happen, would be more effective and do less unintended damage to civilian populations than the weapons they replace.

Indeed, most of the nuclear weapons in the Soviet arsenal are far more massive and indiscriminate than the enhanced radiation weapon. We have heard the Soviet representative and some others speak of the inhumanity and barbarity of the "neutron bomb". But I fear that we would wait in vain to hear them speak of the inhumanity and barbarity of Soviet nuclear weapons, thousands of times more powerful, which are suitable for hitting cities, not tanks.

In some of the statements that have been made concerning the enhanced radiation weapon, the argument has been advanced that somehow its deployment would make it easier to cross the threshold into nuclear war. The United States rejects this argument categorically. The United States rejects this argument categorically.

The enhanced radiation warhead is still a nuclear weapon, and the decision to use it to defend United States forces of territory, or to defend the forces or territory of our allies, would be no easier to make than the decision to use any other nuclear weapon. That decision would remain the most agonizing one a political leader could face. The possibility of indiscriminately destructive responses from the other side would remain high, as would the potential for nuclear escalation. Here again, the enhanced radiation weapons are designed not to make nuclear war more thinkable, but to make aggression less so.

The declaration of the 26th Party Congress, which the Soviet delegation has been good enough to circulate for us and of which it frequently reminds us, gives one version of Soviet intentions in the area of defence and arms limitations. But far more persuasive are the facts of increasing Soviet capability in terms of strategic nuclear, theatre nuclear and conventional forces. The specifics of the recent increase in Soviet nuclear capabilities -- the SS-20, the SS-18 ICBM and increasing Soviet power projection forces are already familiar to you and were discussed in my 7 April statement. The reality of these armaments has forced the West to react.

(Mr. Flowerrec, United States)

We wish that it had not been so -- that the Western nations could have continued to hold steady or cut back their defence expenditures in the interest of the economy and the welfare of their people, and that the Soviet Union would have exercised some restraint in the development of its military forces. We shared that wish with one political figure who was in an exceptional position to evaluate the increasing military thrust of Soviet policy, Nikita Khrushchev. In his memoirs, published in 1971, Mr. Khrushchev wrote,

"But from my position as pensioner, I can't help noticing that the economizing trend we started seems to have been reversed, that now money is being wasted on unnecessary items and categories, and that this new trend of military overspending is putting a pinch on some of the more important, but still underfinanced, areas of our country's life."

It is not only in the West that the build-up of Soviet military forces casts an ominous shadow. Writing in Kommunist in May 1972, General A.A. Yepishev said:

"In the present era, which is characterized by a strengthening of the positions of socialism and by sharp antagonism between the two social systems, a deepening of the external function of the Soviet armed forces has logically taken place."

We are seeing that "external function" of the Soviet armed forces in operation at this very moment as the brutal repression in Afghanistan continues. And, like it or not, this action has had a profound impact on the climate for arms control negotiations in the United States.

Earlier this year, we had in this Committee a wide-ranging debate on deterrence. Many countries expressed and continue to express the view that deterrence is an abhorrent doctrine. But many nations and groups of nations, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, practice it, including even neutral countries like our host country of Switzerland, where nearly 20 per cent of the federal budget is devoted to national defence. In the case of Switzerland, a combination of astute policy and rugged defence forces has spared the country from invasion for 500 years. Deterrence has its virtues, but it is naive to hope that it can continue to serve indefinitely into the future. We would all prefer to live in a world in which that doctrine and the military forces which support it were unnecessary. Nevertheless, with the best of will on all sides, arms and the impulses which cause nations to use them are not likely to be brought fully under control in the near future.

(Mr. Flowerree, United States)

The tendency in the Committee to adopt a high moral tone in preaching about the evils of deterrence, among other things, may be satisfying to the psyche, but it doesn't get us anywhere. Moral rectitude is not the exclusive property of any nation or group of nations. In fact, it cannot be truthfully claimed by any of us as nations. In citing the reasons why the Western alliance believes it must now gird up its loins, I am not attributing any particular virtue to that decision, just common sense. Nations first came into being out of a necessity for a group of people sharing the same territory, interests and beliefs to protect themselves against those with incompatible objectives. In the nation-State system that exists in the world today, the first duty of Governments towards their citizens is protection. Some non-aligned States, for what they consider good and sufficient reasons, devote a greater percentage of their national budgets to defence than does the United States. Progress toward disarmament can be helped if we accept the reality that each State is going to maintain that its own judgement of its security requirements is not subject to challenge, no matter what others may think or what the realities may be.

The United States does not believe that the Soviet Union's military build-up is justified, but we don't think for a minute that merely telling them so is going to stop that build-up. That famous quality, "political will", about which we hear so much in this forum is not going to be produced by waving a magic wand. Nations are induced to do things they normally do not want to do by various forms of leverage and demonstrations of mutual advantage. Some seem to assume that we in the United States enjoy putting so much of our resources into national defence instead of more productive domestic uses. To shapers of budgets, who in my country must be responsible to the will of the electorate, an increase in military spending is a painful business. For more than a decade the United States sought to trim the military budget. It took incontrovertible evidence that our security was in danger of slipping away to cause us to make the extra effort that is going into our current defence programmes.

Misconceptions abound even concerning the nature of those programmes. Speakers go on about the mad build-up in nuclear armaments as though every notion that had ever been mentioned in Aviation Week was about to spring to life as a full-blown military system. The fact is that our current increase in military programmes is far more heavily weighted on the side of conventional forces than on that of nuclear forces, which in any case are not projected for immediate deployment.

(Mr. Flowerree, United States)

I have pulled no punches in giving this assessment of how things look from the United States point of view. I hope it will be taken in the spirit in which it was offered -- as an attempt to present honestly the way we see things, not to stir up controversy, although I am aware that there are other delegations here who may be itching to take exception to what I have said. However, we should be able to be frank with each other in this Committee without stirring up enmities. We cannot afford to behave otherwise.

I have been dealing with the broad aspects of the factors that shape current United States arms control policies. The specific elements are in the process of being shaped now. The Presidential statement on non-proliferation policy that was distributed as Committee document CD/202 is the first of the specific elements of our over-all arms control policies to be fully elaborated. United States views on a timetable for the initiation of United States-Soviet negotiations on European theatre nuclear weapons were precisely spelled out in Secretary Haig's speech on 14 July to which I referred earlier. President Reagan, in an interview on 4 August, mentioned the many exchanges on this subject that have taken place between the United States and the Soviet Union and went on to say that the United States is willing to move on to the larger area of strategic arms reductions, not just limitations.

In closing, I must stress the necessity for a sense of realism in our work. People of noble intentions have tried before and failed in their efforts to create peace through international agreements on arms and armed forces. The Washington Naval Disarmament Conference of 1922 placed limitations on the tonnages of warships. The Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1929 was intended to outlaw war. But these and other high-minded efforts of the era were swept away by the winds of war.

The root causes of war and international tension were left untouched by the diplomatic efforts of our predecessors. If we are to be more successful than they, we must build our arms control efforts on a foundation that takes full account of the interaction between the causes of tension and the accretion of armaments. To do less would be to risk a bitter re-enactment of the past.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of the United States for his statement and for the kind reference he made to the Chair.

Mr. VOUTOV (Bulgaria): Mr. Chairman, I would like to make today a brief statement concerning the most burning questions of our time, that is, the continued nuclear arms race and the urgent necessity to take decisive and concrete steps in controlling and reversing it.

Before doing so however, Mr. Chairman, I would like to congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee during this important period of the annual session. My delegation is sure that under your able guidance we shall successfully conclude the 1981 session. At the same time, I should not fail to note the energy, ability and contribution to the successful work of the Committee of your predecessor, the distinguished Ambassador Venkateswaran of India, who presided over the Committee during one of the most difficult months of this session.

It is with growing concern that we perceive the beginning of yet another stage in the deadly upward spiral of the nuclear arms race. On behalf of my people, with deep pains in my heart, I would like to say that we deplore the fact that the United States Government started, "some two weeks ago", the production of nuclear neutron weapons. We cannot accept the idea that the world should be made hostage to the fierce competition between the American nuclear weapon laboratories pushing through their horrible inventions, the latest one being the "cost-effective", "clean" and so on neutron weapon. With the usual openness of our delegation we believe this to be a short-sighted and dangerous decision, a fallout from the greatest war hysteria after the second world war and the quest for unchallenged military supremacy over the world.

Many delegations in this Committee have commented on the nature and the consequences of the deployment of nuclear neutron weapons. To my delegation it seems that the neutron weapons come to underline once again the fact that the proponents of the crazy idea of "limited nuclear war" are still having the upper hand in the leading Western power. They come to underline once again that in the United States strategy Europe is regarded as an "expendable item", to use this interesting American expression.

Permit me to quote a leading American military man, General Brown, who, explaining why the United States wishes to establish strategic superiority over the Soviet Union, stated while presenting the "Military Posture for 1979":

"This means that the territorial integrity must be assured and that an international environment must be maintained in which United States interests and United States freedom of action are ensured."

Does that not sound like a military policy with clearly imperial overtones?

Against this gloomy background, may I inform the Committee that during the recent meeting of the Presidents of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Comrades Todor Zhivkov and Leonid Brezhnev, the two leaders expressed the opinion that the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in certain regions of Europe, including the Balkans, could contribute to the reduction of tensions. The Politbureau of the Bulgarian Communist Party, the Bulgarian Government and the Bulgarian people welcomed this initiative. There is no doubt that the idea will evoke wide and positive reactions not only in the Balkans but throughout Europe as well.

(Mr. Voutov, Bulgaria)

This annual session of the Committee has demonstrated in a clear-cut way that we cannot circumvent the issues relating to nuclear weapons. We have spent another year without much tangible result, accepting willy-nilly the "absence of instruction" of the United States delegation. Let us hope that the views of the overwhelming majority of the States members of this Committee, which have appealed repeatedly for the commencement of meaningful multilateral negotiations on items 1 and 2 of the agenda, will not be lost on the United States leadership. In this connection, I would like to remind the Committee of the initiative of the socialist countries contained in document CD/200, namely, the urgent necessity of creating a sub-committee on nuclear weapons questions.

As to the neutron weapons, the developments around them require our close attention. We support the idea of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic for reintroduction in the Committee of the draft convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons. In this connection, the Bulgarian delegation would like to make the following proposal.

At the beginning of the next annual session, in 1982, the Committee should consider the establishment of an ad hoc working group on the elaboration of an international convention on the prohibition of neutron weapons, taking as a basis the draft convention proposed by the socialist countries and contained in document CCD/559.

In conclusion, I would like to quote from an important political statement of the President of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and General Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Todor Zhivkov, entitled, "The borderline between the two decades, between the seventies and the eighties, should not be a borderline between détente and confrontation". Copies of the speech have been distributed to all the delegations in the Committee. I quote: "Two social systems co-exist today in the world, competing with each other as to which of them will ensure better conditions for the development of society and man, of man's way of life. But the cardinal problem now, in the current troubled hour of the history of mankind, is to safeguard peace as a primary condition and a prerequisite for all peoples' social progress. This is the real problem; this is the highly ethical, complicated and difficult but feasible political goal. It is exactly this credo that meets the needs of all peoples, and of each and every person on Earth - to ensure social progress in conditions of lasting peace."

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Bulgaria for his statement and for the kind reference he made to the Chair.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, the Committee on Disarmament will be concluding its work in a few days, but there will still be time for an evaluation of the work done this year. What we should like to do today, in a brief statement, is to touch on issues raised by a number of delegations at recent meetings, including our meeting today. There has been discussion here, broadly speaking, on the effect of the international climate, the international situation, on negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament. Some delegations have said that certain developments in the international arena hinder the reaching of agreements in the field of disarmament, while others, as one speaker did on 6 August, have called upon the Committee not to assume a position, as he called it, of "privileged isolation".

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The Soviet delegation itself has more than once stated that the absence of political will on the part of certain States members of the Committee hampers the negotiations on various important disarmament issues such as, for instance, the limitation of the nuclear arms race. We have drawn attention to the fact that decisions aimed at the development of new types of weapons, both conventional and nuclear, cannot but complicate disarmament negotiations. The intensified military co-operation between certain nuclear-weapon Powers, particularly noticeable of late, and directed against the Soviet Union and its allies, also diminishes the prospects of reaching agreements in the sphere of the limitation of the arms race. The nuclear-weapon Powers in question should realize this. Aggressive actions such as the Israeli attack on the nuclear reactor near Baghdad, which was strongly condemned by many delegations in the Committee, undermine the international disarmament agreements now in force.

All these issues have been repeatedly raised in the Committee, and it would therefore be unjust to say that the Committee has assumed a position of "privileged isolation". Evidence of the lively reaction in the Committee to any steps which run counter to the lofty ideals of the strengthening of peace and disarmament may be found in the statements of the representatives of the German Democratic Republic, the Mongolian People's Republic and the People's Republic of Bulgaria, at the last meeting and the present one, in which they rightly observed that the decision taken by the Government of the United States concerning the production of neutron weapons represents a serious challenge to the cause of disarmament.

We all well remember how in 1978 the powerful campaign of protest launched by the anti-war forces made President Carter stop the implementation of plans for the deployment of neutron weapons in western Europe and to defer their production for an indefinite period of time. Today it is clear that the so-called "deferment" of the production of neutron weapons which was much publicized at that time in no way impeded the course of the preparations for the creation of this abominable weapon. We know that the Capitol provided generous appropriations to finance this work. As early as 17 December of last year, the Congress passed an appropriations bill in which it directed the Department of Energy to ensure the production of all the components for this weapon and to supply the necessary nuclear materials. Now the new nuclear bomb is on the assembly line, and the Pentagon has added it to its nuclear arsenal.

The shadow of the neutron bomb is again hanging over densely populated Europe. As was recognized by the United States Secretary of Defense, intensive consultations are now being held in NATO offices with a view to securing the consent of the West European members of NATO to the deployment of neutron weapons on their territories. It is difficult to find any justification for such actions. The only thing that can be said with complete certainty is that the practical steps taken by the United States Administration towards the production of neutron weapons are objectively increasing the threat of a new qualitative leap in the arms race, are increasing the danger of war and are gravely complicating the work of the international organizations in solving the disarmament problem.

In his statement today the representative of the United States tried to convince us that the neutron weapon is comparatively harmless and that its use would significantly reduce losses among the civilian population. This weapon, he claimed,

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

would increase the capacity of NATO to withstand the alleged "Soviet military threat", and is a reliable means of combating Russian tanks. Nothing of this corresponds to the reality. It was evidently intended for those who are not very well informed about the substance of the matter. The neutron weapon is first and foremost a nuclear weapon. Its lethality from the blast wave is approximately the same as in the case of other nuclear weapons, but in addition it has a powerful penetrating radiation capacity for which there is no comparison. The civilian population will not be protected from this penetrating radiation even in deep concrete shelters. Consequently the neutron weapon can in fact only be called "humane" as regards buildings. It has also been said here that the neutron weapon would help to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war. I do not have to hand all the various sources that would refute this argument, but even in today's edition of the International Herald Tribune there is a short quotation from the English newspaper, the Guardian, which affirms the contrary. It says the following:

"It is a fiction to say that the neutron bomb will not be deployed in Europe: it is useless anywhere else. This is a battlefield weapon par excellence. Whatever its value in deterrence theory it virtually promises nuclear response to a conventional attack, but on a scale small enough to ensure that continental United States and continental Russia could, if they so agree, stay out of it.

The contingency of a Soviet attack, or the threat of one, is still sufficiently remote, in many a European view, not to need an emotionally charged new weapon to guard against it. The introduction of such a weapon makes the U.S. assessment of the contingency appear more immediate than the European. And if that is the U.S. assessment, then Europeans may believe that what is intended to forestall might in the event provoke.

NATO has 6,000 nuclear warheads already in Europe. To say that they are not enough, as Mr. Weinberger now says, is to fear the worst. And to fear the worst is to expect that it will happen."

Of course we do not agree with everything that is said in this short article; I simply wanted to draw your attention to the fact that to claim that the neutron weapon will prevent the possibility of the outbreak of nuclear war is completely false.

I should now like to turn to another question. We would not wish to leave without comment the attempts that have been made to distort the meaning of certain decisions that have a great impact on the disarmament negotiations. I shall also try to some extent to answer the statement made by the representative of the United States.

In his statement of 6 August, Ambassador Ruth of the Federal Republic of Germany said that the decision taken by the NATO Council, at its December 1979 meeting, on the additional deployment in a number of west European countries of nearly 600 new American nuclear missiles was aimed at the stabilization of the military balance between East and West, and would not increase the total number of nuclear weapons in Europe. The actual position in this matter is quite different. I shall, as usual, quote facts and figures. What are these facts?

In Europe there has already for some years been an approximate equality in the number of medium-range nuclear weapons of NATO and the Soviet Union. There are about 1,000 delivery vehicles on each side. What do these 1,000 items consist of on the NATO side? They include United States forward-based nuclear systems, that is, nuclear-weapon-carrying aircraft stationed at air bases in a number of west European countries; FB-111 medium-range bombers, and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons (A-6 and

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

A-7) aboard United States aircraft-carriers -- a total of over 700 units. There are also the land-based medium-range ballistic missiles, missile-carrying submarines and the bombers of the United States' allies, amounting in all to about 300 delivery vehicles.

When Ambassador Ruth spoke about the disequilibrium to the detriment of the West in the field of medium-range missiles, he for some reason did not say a word about the United States forward-based nuclear systems and the medium-range systems of its allies. But can one really ignore all these systems? Of course not. In fact, they have a range of from 1,000 to 4,500 kilometres, and they present a very real threat to the security of the USSR and its allies.

The NATO armaments mentioned above have undergone several modernizations and the process of their improvement is continuing at the present time. What evidence is there of this? I will give it to you. The United Kingdom, for example, is equipping its submarines with the sophisticated "Polaris A-3 TK" missiles, and "Trident" missiles are in prospect. In France the land-based and sea-based single warhead missiles will be replaced by missiles with seven warheads. The United States forward-based systems are also being replaced by new ones.

In these circumstances it could hardly be expected that the USSR would stop improving its armaments. We are doing the same thing. This is only natural because weapons and technology become obsolete. However -- and I should like to stress this -- in the process of renewing its weaponry the Soviet Union, for the sake of maintaining parity, does not increase by a single item the total level of Soviet medium-range delivery systems in Europe. The number of missile launchers is even decreasing since for every new missile that appears in the USSR one and sometimes even two older missiles are immediately removed; they are dismantled and are not deployed in other areas.

However, with the deployment in Europe of about 600 new United States medium-range nuclear missiles, NATO will have a more than 1.5 times superiority in nuclear delivery vehicles. As for nuclear warheads, even now the NATO medium-range vehicles can carry in one launch (sortie) one and a half times as many as the corresponding systems of the USSR. After Europe's "additional armament", the NATO superiority in nuclear warheads in one launch (sortie) will further increase. As a result, the present rough equality in the nuclear weaponry of the two sides in Europe will be substantially tilted in NATO's favour.

The representative of the Federal Republic of Germany said in his statement that the United States had withdrawn 1,000 nuclear warheads from Europe and therefore, he argued, the deployment of new United States missiles would not result in an increase in nuclear weapons in Europe. Such arguments used to justify the December decision of NATO do not stand up to criticism. The fact is that the relationship between the nuclear forces of the two sides should be determined not by the number of warheads stored in depots but in the first instance by the number of delivery vehicles and the quantity of nuclear charges lifted by these delivery vehicles in one launch (sortie). Consequently, the withdrawal from Europe of obsolete nuclear mines and fougasses kept in stores can in no way be used as a cover to conceal NATO's attempt to disrupt the nuclear balance in its favour.

To the question whether the NATO decision of December 1979 on the "additional armament" of Europe can be viewed as a factor stabilizing the East-West military balance, even a layman in military matters will give a negative answer. The Soviet evaluation of the NATO December decision on the "additional armament" of Europe is unequivocal: it will result in an arms race, the disruption of the military balance in Europe and between the USSR and the United States, and the destabilization of the situation in the world.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The leader of our State, L.I. Brezhnev, has repeatedly stated that the USSR and other socialist countries will not allow any military supremacy to be established over them. In the long run, the equilibrium will be maintained, but at a higher level, as a result of which international security will not increase but decrease.

The only reliable way to resolve this problem lies not in the NATO "missile solution" but in the maintenance of the existing military and strategic balance between the USSR and the United States, between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO, which objectively serves to safeguard peace on our planet.

I should now like to say a few words about the statement made at today's meeting by the United States representative, Ambassador Flowerree. We have already replied to some of the points he raised. I should like to make a more general comment. Ambassador Flowerree rightly mentioned that the United States delegation has rarely taken the floor this year -- only two or three times in all. That is why many of us awaited with interest a statement by the United States delegation, having heard it say more than once that it had difficulty in taking part in the discussion because it had no instructions on specific items on our Committee's agenda. Of course many of us expected that today the United States delegation would at last tell us that it was ready to conduct negotiations on item 1 of the agenda, the question of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. It was expected that it would also say "yes" on the second item of the agenda and say it was ready to conduct negotiations on the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. It was expected, too, that it would adopt a positive attitude on item 5 of the agenda, that is, that it would not stand in the way of the Committee's engaging in negotiations on the prohibition of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction. Finally many, of course, expected the United States delegation to say that it was willing to proceed to a revision of the mandate under agenda item 4 -- the prohibition of chemical weapons -- and that it would adopt a more active attitude on item 3 -- the strengthening of security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States.

This, however, did not happen. The "no" which we had heard throughout the whole year rang out clearly again today. Nothing positive! Instead, we have heard a whole set of misstatements about and distortions of the Soviet Union's position of a kind of which, to be frank, we are thoroughly tired by now, with references to some very dubious sources and various obscure publications printed in the United States of America which, of course, hardly deserve to be invoked in a serious discussion. But I should not like to be drawn into an argument at this stage. I do not think that this was the purpose for which the Committee on Disarmament was established. What I should like is that the slight signs of a more positive attitude that were in evidence at the end of the American delegation's statement should receive specific confirmation, that the systematic "no" should be replaced by positive replies that would open up possibilities of conducting business-like negotiations, and, lastly, that a positive reply should be given to the numerous proposals and appeals addressed by the leadership of the Soviet Union to the United States of America concerning the resumption of the dialogue on a wide range of questions relating to the limitation of the arms race on the basis of principles of honesty and equality, with respect for the interests of the security of both parties and with non-impairment of their interests.

All the various attempts to lay the blame for the deadlock which has occurred in the different disarmament negotiations on the Soviet Union are doomed to failure. The Soviet Union has shown in fact that it is interested in progress being achieved in the negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament.

U SAW HLAING (Burma): Mr. Chairman, I have asked for the floor today in order to present formally to the Committee in my capacity as the Co-ordinator of the Group of 21 a working paper on the chapter entitled "Principles" of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. Before doing so, may I take this opportunity to express, on behalf of my delegation, my deep gratification and satisfaction to see you presiding over the Committee on Disarmament at this final and crucial stage of its session.

I am sure that your wisdom and rich diplomatic experience and skill will bring a fruitful and speedy conclusion to the third annual session of the Committee. I would also like to add my voice of thanks and appreciation for the invaluable contribution made by Ambassador Venkateswaran of India to the work of the Committee last month.

Allow me now to speak in my capacity as the Co-ordinator of the Group of 21, on whose behalf I would like to present to the Committee on Disarmament a working paper which is already circulated as document CD/208, on the chapter entitled "principles" of the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

As is stated in paragraph 10 of the 1980 report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which was incorporated in paragraph 68 of the report submitted by the Committee on Disarmament to the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session (CD/139), it has been expressly agreed that "since the comprehensive programme will have to be self-contained, it should encompass in extenso all the principles that are thought to be relevant, including even those that are not to be found in the Final Document but which may be found appropriate".

Bearing in mind this decision, the Ad Hoc Working Group, during its 1981 session, has provisionally approved on the basis of a first reading the "principles" compiled by the Secretariat in working paper 29 of 16 April 1981, following the two objective criteria defined in the introduction to the document. In addition to those "principles" which have all been reproduced from the Final Document, the Working Group has also approved two which originated in proposals submitted by delegations.

It seems appropriate to note that the term "principles" as used both in the Secretariat compilation and in the present working paper, should be understood -- as it also was in the Final Document -- in a broad sense. If a more strictly accurate definition were desired, the term "principles and guidelines" would be preferable.

In view of what has just been stated, as well as of the tentative nature of the approval given by the Ad Hoc Working Group to these texts, it is obvious that both the Working Group and the Committee are entitled to reformulate the "principles" where they deem it necessary or to incorporate additional formulations which may be proposed and agreed upon.

The Group of 21 feels, nevertheless, that the material already approved on first reading by the Working Group, in spite of its provisional character and of the fact that it remains subject to whatever modifications may be found advisable, is already sufficiently illustrative of what should essentially be the contents of the chapter which under the title of "Principles" or "Principles and Guidelines" would form an integral part of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. It is for this reason that the Group has concluded that it would be useful to submit to the Working Group and to the Committee the present working paper before the 1981 session comes to an end.

(U Saw Hlaing, Burma)

Finally, it should be pointed out that, although in all the texts incorporated in this working paper their substance has been scrupulously respected, on some very few occasions minor modifications of form have been made. It should likewise be mentioned that the order followed in the enunciation of the "principles" is that which has been considered the most logical and appropriate and does not correspond to the order followed in working paper 29. As a last observation, it would be wise to bear in mind that in several instances there exist repetitions which can no doubt be eliminated without difficulty at a later stage.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Burma for his statement and for the reference he made to the Chair.

Mr. de la GORCE (France) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, the French delegation would like first of all to offer you its congratulations and best wishes. You have the onerous task of bringing the work of this session to a close. We should like to compliment you on the skill and competence with which you are doing so.

I should also like once again to express to your predecessor, Ambassador Venkateswaran, our appreciation of the exceptional qualities he showed in that office. We were all impressed by his talent, his courtesy and his humour.

The French delegation has listened very carefully to what has been said at this meeting and the preceding one on the subject of the enhanced radiation weapon. The French Government has reserved its options as regards this weapon. It seems to me therefore that it would be useful for me to restate the reasoning behind its attitude in this matter.

In the first place, France is concerned to maintain the conditions of its security and the independence of its defence. It is from this angle that it has considered and will continue to consider the scientific, technical and military means which may seem to it to be necessary to achieve this end. In the circumstances at present prevailing in Europe, a deterrence resting on the maintenance or restoration of a global balance determines security and hence peace on our continent.

With reference to the statements we have heard and some of the proposals that have been made, I should like to stress that the enhanced radiation weapon is a nuclear weapon based on the same physical principles as all other nuclear weapons. The only difference lies in the way the effects common to all nuclear explosions are distributed. While the radiation effect is greater, the blast effect is smaller; hence the difference in ideas about the use of this weapon which, as everyone knows, is essentially defensive.

In view of its nature, this weapon falls within the general category of problems connected with the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. There is no reason for giving it special treatment or, therefore, for making specific provision with respect to it in treaty form.

Lastly, I should like to reply to our distinguished colleague from the Soviet Union on a point in his statement which casts doubt upon a fundamental position of the French Government. In the comparison he made between the forces of the NATO countries and those of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, Ambassador Issraelyan mentioned the systems of the United States' allies and he referred in this connection to the process of modernization of France's forces that is at present under way. My delegation cannot pass over in silence this inclusion of French forces. France's forces are independent, and they constitute a strategic system. We cannot therefore accept a reference to them as NATO medium-range forces.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of France for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to myself.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, it is my intention formally to introduce working document CD/210 which has been distributed, but I think that I would be remiss, since this is the first time I am taking the floor this month, if I did not also congratulate you on your assumption of that office, wish you well in the performance of your task here and assure you of the co-operation of my delegation. We are entirely aware of the difficulties of leading this body during the final month of its session, but I am confident that you will do it in a successful way. At the same time, I should like to pay tribute to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Venkateswaran of India, for the excellence he showed in his chairmanship of the Committee in the month of July, which became a good and truly productive month for this Committee, not least thanks to his leadership.

So, then, I would like now formally to introduce the twelfth progress report to the Committee on Disarmament of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. I have been informed that the experts have continued their excellent co-operation and that they have been exploring the matter in depth. We suggest that their next meeting should take place from 1 to 12 March 1982. The report does not say when a formal report will be forthcoming but we should note the plan to provide this Committee with an extended progress report in early 1982, as a contribution to the Committee's own report to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Mr. Chairman, you have already announced that you will ask the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts Dr. Ulf Ericsson, to answer questions and maybe in some detail explain the report.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Sweden for his statement and for the kind reference he made to the Chair. May I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, Dr. Ulf Ericsson, to speak on the report contained in document CD/210 which has been introduced by our colleague from Sweden.

Mr. ERICSSON (Sweden): Document CD/210, before you, has the same format as a number of progress reports which have been presented to the Committee. The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events operates now under a mandate given to it on 7 August 1979 and its developing results were reported upon earlier in the reports in documents CCD/558 of 1978 and CD/43 of 1979. As the Ambassador of Sweden has already mentioned, the experts enjoyed excellent co-operation among themselves. The recent session lasted two weeks and engaged experts and representatives from 20 countries, and during the present mandate more than 100 working documents were submitted for consideration. The work has been organized in five directions. The first one is to consider all seismological stations and station networks in greater detail, to assist in the monitoring of underground nuclear testing. Secondly, there

(Mr. Ericsson, Sweden)

is a group looking at exactly how these measurements should be taken out of the earth and transmitted on. Thirdly, there is a group looking at the transmission of data around the globe, and here we enjoy the co-operation of the World Meteorological Organization, because it has been proposed, and they have also in principle accepted the idea, that their network of telecommunications lines would be used. Fourthly, we have the transmission of more extensive measurements, large bunches of data; and the fifth item is exactly how the envisaged computerized data centres should operate and how they should be designed and structured. The Group has been busy doing a number of national, unilateral studies on these matters which are presented to the whole Group and then discussed. They are also providing drafts towards a formal report to this body. It might also be of interest to you to know that the recent development of readily available computers and associated equipment for telecommunication facilities with low prices and high performance is of very great relevance to what the experts are doing when reviewing the organization proposed a number of years ago. In their development of the scientific and technical details of this system they are, I think, making great efforts to take into account how these modern developments might be exploited. The development there is so fast that the cake changes flavour while you are eating it.

Another development of some interest is a series of experimental tests of this global transmission of data, which is very much a question of co-operation with WMO, which is very good, as well as of co-operation between States. We have repeatedly stated, in this context, that it would be advantageous to extend our co-operation into the southern hemisphere, and here I am happy to say that we were very glad to receive information that scientists in Peru will join us in making such tests of the global system. I should also mention that several national research units are developing the subject of international data centres, where great advances have been made but where quite a lot of work still remains. This therefore means that the experts do not see clearly when they will be able to deliver a formal report under the present mandate. The report before you says during the second part of the 1982 session of the Committee on Disarmament or later. Under the circumstances, however, the Group intends to place before you an extended progress report which might assist the Committee in reporting to the United Nations General Assembly and its Secretary-General, in view of the special session of the Assembly on disarmament.

The Group this time also explicitly considered what might be done in the future, beyond the immediate present concerns, and on page 3 of the report you have a few of these items. One of them, which is very fascinating, is the use of seismographs and other instruments on the ocean bottom to improve coverage of the southern hemisphere, which as you know, is covered mostly by the ocean. There are recent developments and experiences which make this option appear more and more realistic. Then there are the items widespread digital recording, automation of the extraction of parameters from instruments and automated processing; these are reflections of the developments in computers. Finally, there is a purely seismological item -- methods to accommodate the reporting of large earthquake sequences. This is another view of what is going on, and I wish to end by repeating that the Group suggests that its next session should be convened between 1 and 12 March next year here in Geneva.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts for his statement. As I said at the beginning of this meeting, we will consider the report at our plenary meeting next Tuesday. However, if there are any delegations wishing to comment at this stage they can do so.

Mr. WALKER (Australia): I do want to thank the Expert Group and its Chairman, and to comment on the report but would be quite happy to do so at our next plenary meeting.

Mr. OKAWA (Japan): I would also be very glad to follow the example of Ambassador Walker of Australia.

The CHAIRMAN: Distinguished colleagues, the Secretariat has circulated today, at my request, an informal paper containing the time-table for meetings to be held by the Committee on Disarmament and its subsidiary bodies during the week of 17 to 21 August. Provision is made for meetings of subsidiary bodies on Monday and I hope that no activities of Working Groups will go beyond that day; otherwise we would have to have night meetings and Saturday meetings. We would start discussing the last additions to the report of the Committee on Tuesday afternoon and I hope that the consideration of the draft report will be concluded by Wednesday afternoon, since the Secretariat will need some time to produce a consolidated text of the draft report for adoption on Friday morning. If we are not able to conclude on Wednesday afternoon, we can still use Thursday morning, on the understanding that the last plenary meeting for adoption of the report will then be held on Friday afternoon.

In connection with the time-table, may I also note that Working Paper No. 44/Add.1 has been circulated today. That working paper contains the draft concluding paragraphs under items 1, 2 and 5 of the agenda of the Committee, as well as on the question of the modalities of the review of the membership of the Committee and on the Israeli attack against the Tammuz nuclear research centre. I intend to convene the drafting group for the consideration of Working Paper No. 44/Add.1 tomorrow, Friday, at 10.30 a.m., in Room C-108. The drafting group will continue on Friday afternoon as well as on Monday, if necessary. May I again recall that, in addition to the nucleus which I announced at our informal meeting on Monday for the drafting group, the group is open to other members to attend whenever they see fit to do so and to make contributions on matters of interest or concern to them.

Of course, since we may need to adjust our activities to changing circumstances, the time-table is merely indicative. Its only purpose is to provide us with an outline of what we may have to do next week. If there is no objection, I will consider that the Committee accepts the time-table.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: In accordance with our time-table for the present week I had intended to convene in five minutes, after the closing of this plenary meeting, an informal meeting of the Committee to continue our consideration of Working Paper No. 44 containing the draft report to the United Nations General Assembly, as well as Working Paper No. 45, entitled, "Draft decision containing proposals for the functioning of the Committee on Disarmament". That working paper was circulated on Tuesday afternoon in all the languages used by the Committee, but since there is no time left we shall have an informal meeting immediately after our plenary meeting next Tuesday morning, 18 August. The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 18 August, at 10.30 a.m. The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.