

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.144
6 August 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-FOURTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 6 August 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Ch.A. Sani (Indonesia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Argentina:

Mr. J.C. CARASALES

Mr. J.F. GOMENSORO

Ms. N. NASCIMBENE

Australia:

Mr. R.A. WALKER

Mr. R. STEELE

Belgium:

Mr. A. ONKELINX

Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA

Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. P. VOUTOV

Mr. I. SOTIROV

Burma:

U SAW HLAING

U HGWE WIN

U THAN HTUN

Canada:

Mr. McPHAIL

Mr. C.R. SKINNER

China:

Mr. YU Peiwen

Mr. YU Mengjia

Mrs. WANG Zhiyun

Mr. PAN Jusheng

Cuba:

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. RUZEK

Mr. P. LUKES

Mr. J. FRANEK

Egypt:
Mr. M. EL REEDY
Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. N. FAHMY

Ethiopia:
Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:
Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:
Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Mrs. H. HOPPE

Germany, Federal Republic of:
Mr. F. RUTH
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:
Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. A. LAKATOS

India:
Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:
Mr. Ch.A. SANI
Mr. M. SIDIK
Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. F. QASIM
Mr. W. ACHDIAK
Mr. E. SOEPRAPPTO

Iran:
Mr. A. JALALI
Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA

Italy:
Mr. V.C. DI MONTEZEMOLO
Mr. A. CIARRAPICO
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. M. BARENGHI
Mr. L. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. H. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANAKA
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya:Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDENBILDG
Mr. S. DOLD

Morocco:

Mr. M. ARRASSEN
Mr. H. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. E. WAGENFLAKERS

Nigeria:

Mr. M.B. BRIMAH
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan:

Mr. H. AHMAD
Mr. T. ALTAUF

Peru:Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Romania:

Mr. O. IONESCU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. U. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. CHERNOV
Mr. V.A. SEMIONOV
Mr. V.F. PRYAKHIN
Mr. M.M. IPPOLITOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. D. SUMNERHAYES
Mrs. J. LINK

United States of America:

Mr. C. PELL
Mr. C.C. FLOWERREE
Mr. F. DESIMONE
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. R.F. SCOTT
Ms. L. SHEA

Venezuela:

Mr. R. RODRIGUEZ NAVARRO
Mr. O. AGULLAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. C.O. GNOK

Secretary of the Committee and
Personal Representative of
the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the Committee:

Mr. V. BERRASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee continues today its further consideration of agenda items and outstanding questions relating to the organization of work. Of course, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure members wishing to do so may make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee.

I would like to extend a warm welcome to His Excellency Ambassador Ruth, Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control of the Federal Republic of Germany. Ambassador Ruth is well known in the disarmament community and needs no introduction. I wish him a fruitful stay in Geneva and I hope that the first-hand contacts that he has made here will be useful in the performance of his important duties. Ambassador Ruth is listed to speak today and it will be my pleasure to give him the floor as first speaker, but before doing so I would like to give the floor to the distinguished Ambassador of Mongolia for a very short statement.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, allow me also, on behalf of the Mongolian delegation, to welcome the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Ruth, who is taking part in today's plenary meeting of the Committee.

On this date, all those to whom peace is dear and who are fervently opposed to atomic war are commemorating the anniversary of the tragic events of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As the representative of Mongolia, a peace-loving Asian country, I should like to suggest to the members of the Committee that we honour the memory of the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by a minute of silence.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Mongolia for his statement and would agree with him that we should observe a minute of silence in commemoration of those who died during the Hiroshima bombing. Let us stand and observe a moment of silence.

The Committee, standing, observed a minute of silence.

Mr. RUTH (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. Chairman, I am very happy to be here with this Committee and I am very grateful for your kind words of welcome. I would like to reciprocate by wishing you good luck for your month of chairmanship of this important Committee. I would also like to thank your predecessor, the distinguished representative of India, for the work he has been doing for the Committee in the previous month.

It is a great honour for me to outline today the position of the Federal Republic of Germany on the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament which is submitted today to the Committee by Australia, Belgium, Japan, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany. I am doing this to confirm my Government's support for the Committee on Disarmament and the negotiations on international disarmament and arms control.

I am deeply conscious of the historic dimension of 6 August, of Hiroshima as a symbol for man's hope for a world without war. The lesson of the sufferings of past and present wars as well as the dictates of reason must lead us to the conclusion that today, in the age of nuclear weapons, all policy must be directed towards peace. War and military conflicts can no longer be considered

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as permissible options for political decision. Instead, all policy must be determined by the objective of preventing military conflict with all available political means. This presupposes that all States observe the principle of the renunciation of the threat to use and the use of force embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and take seriously the obligation to exercise restraint in the application of military power.

Disarmament and arms control consequently serve as instruments of a rational policy aimed at translating the principle of the renunciation of force into disarmament agreements, thus contributing to the achievement of dependable peace.

The United Nations General Assembly, the Disarmament Commission and the Committee on Disarmament are the arenas of the world-wide debate on security policy which is constantly gaining in importance. As Chancellor Schmidt said at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in the interest of peace we need a comprehensive political partnership for security. The tasks facing us today are more pressing than ever before. The destructive potential of modern weapons and the financial resources now taken up by military expenditure throughout the world compel us, wherever opportunities exist, to work with greater effort for concrete and verifiable arms limitation and reduction measures.

At the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly, Foreign Minister Genscher described disarmament as "the great task of the eighties". In so doing he stressed the importance of this subject for my country's policy. To us, disarmament and arms control are essential components of a policy aimed at the safeguarding of peace and at co-operation based on partnership.

The Geneva Committee on Disarmament is at present the only multilateral negotiating forum with world-wide competence dealing specifically with disarmament issues. This is a great responsibility. I am sure that we would like to see the Committee make progress and achieve tangible success in its work. Success has, unfortunately, been lacking so far this year. There is, therefore, no reason to give way to euphoria. But resignation is not called for either. One need only imagine how much poorer international diplomacy would be if this Committee, the numerous activities within the United Nations and the diverse bilateral and multilateral efforts for arms control and disarmament did not exist. The disappointment at the lack of tangible results is therefore offset by the conviction that the available instruments provide a framework for negotiations which can and must be used.

This also holds true for the activities of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which has made substantial progress during the past two years under the direction of two highly experienced diplomats -- Ambassador Adeniji from Nigeria and Ambassador García Robles from Mexico.

Together with other States, we have already made a contribution to the discussions at this year's session of the Working Group: on 18 June, Ambassador Pfeiffer submitted a working paper which outlines the goals and principles that in our view should be embodied in a comprehensive programme of disarmament. In the paper we stated that we regard a CPD to be of particular value as it can provide a conceptual framework for disarmament negotiations, define criteria and principles of arms control and disarmament, and hence provide an important base for concrete negotiations.

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With the working paper introduced by Ambassador Pfeiffer, we and our co-sponsors wanted to assist this Committee in fulfilling the task it has been given in preparing for the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Today we want to go one step further by introducing a complete draft text, which is contained in the working paper before you, submitted by the countries I mentioned. This draft is based on the work carried out so far and is designed to develop further the results achieved. It is intended to demonstrate the form and substance which might, in our view, make a comprehensive programme of disarmament acceptable to all.

With this contribution to the discussion we are continuing the course we have pursued on this subject from the very outset. We know that the project of developing a CPD is a particular concern of our friends from the non-aligned countries, and we have consistently supported them in that endeavour. I should like to recall the contribution we made in 1979 (working paper A/CN.10/8 of 22 May 1979) when the aim was first to develop in the United Nations Disarmament Commission the "elements" of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. In our new contribution we are guided by the will to help promote effectively all serious efforts for disarmament and arms control. This means, in our view, that the programme must not lose sight of the long-term goals, but at the same time has to be geared to the goals that can be attained in the foreseeable future. We realize that a programme without a perspective would turn into routine and that a programme without a sense of reality would become a source of disappointment and resignation. Consequently, we aim at a programme which is both forward-looking and realistic.

We all realize that efforts for disarmament and arms control have become more difficult in the last few years. Much has been said about that here. This Committee knows that in performing its tasks it must not assume a position of privileged isolation. Military conflicts and hostilities in various parts of the world have been registered with concern. A political solution has still not been found for Afghanistan, as demanded by the majority of the Members of the United Nations. Unfortunately, the efforts of the non-aligned countries, especially the Islamic States, have been unsuccessful so far. It is to be hoped that the initiative taken by the ten member countries of the European Community will help bring about a solution. The Western States have underlined the destabilizing changes which have occurred in the East-West military balance. We are convinced that peace and stability between East and West serve world peace and that instability in this region will have adverse effects on other regions. Consequently, the members of the North Atlantic alliance regard a stable military balance as an important contribution to security and peace in general. The objective of arms control is to attain such a balance at the lowest possible level of armaments, especially nuclear armaments. This is the underlying objective of the decision taken by the members of the North Atlantic alliance on 12 December 1979. Taking into account the growing disequilibrium to the detriment of the West in the field of medium-range nuclear missiles, the members of the alliance took a decision which, we are convinced, can be described as both responsible and forward-looking. It contains the elements of restraint and moderation as potential instruments for preventing an arms race as it is characterized by the following facts:

The decision on modernization, necessary for reasons of defence and deterrence, was linked to an offer of negotiations aimed at limiting and reducing the number of weapons systems of both sides;

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Great importance was attached to transparency and calculability: the number of new systems, limited from the outset, was made known four years prior to their deployment;

The future deployment of new systems will not increase the total number of nuclear weapons in Europe. This number will in fact be decreased. In December 1979 the decision was taken in NATO to withdraw 1,000 nuclear warheads from Europe. This withdrawal has already been effected. In addition, the new weapons will replace old systems one for one. The reduced level will thus not be raised.

Our interest is now directed towards the opening of American-Soviet negotiations later this year. We are greatly gratified at the prospect of these negotiations being started. The Western allies are making intensive preparations for the talks.

Negotiations on arms limitation will be all the more fruitful the greater the transparency of existing potentials and military activities and the greater the confidence in predictable military conduct by the other side. Consequently, the confidence-building measures already agreed upon at the 1975 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe are important. For the same reason we attach great significance to the proposal for a conference on disarmament in Europe originally made by the Government of France. This conference is to be held within the CSCE framework and initially have the task of working out confidence-building measures to be applied to the whole of Europe. The Madrid follow-up Conference, charged with formulating a precise mandate for such a disarmament conference, went into recess at the end of July and will be reconvened in October. We regret that, in spite of a constructive and far-reaching Western proposal, the desired results have not yet been achieved and we hope that the Madrid conference can be brought to a substantive and balanced conclusion later this year.

The forthcoming negotiations on medium-range nuclear weapons and the endeavours to achieve consensus on the mandate for a conference on disarmament in Europe within the CSCE framework are of the utmost importance for East-West relations and the security of the States directly or indirectly involved. These negotiations and endeavours will supplement the Vienna MBFR talks and the SALT process and demonstrate that concrete negotiations are possible even under difficult international circumstances. They are designed, under the prevailing East-West security conditions, to help ensure confidence, through the greater transparency and calculability of military conduct and through restraint in the use of military force, and to create a stable balance at the lowest possible military level.

We are convinced that a successful outcome of these negotiations would be beneficial for world peace. We realize at the same time that negotiations and agreements between East and West can constitute only part of the universal endeavours for disarmament and arms control. They must be accompanied by negotiations and agreements on a global scale and in other regions. The work of this Committee, such important treaties as the non-proliferation Treaty, the Treaty of Tlatelolco establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America, the comprehensive dialogue in the United Nations and especially the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament are but a few of the stages along the road so far.

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Those responsible for conceiving the idea of a comprehensive programme of disarmament felt it was necessary to give new impulses to the disarmament efforts. We share their conviction and feel sure that the next special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament can in fact provide important impulses by adopting such a programme.

We asked ourselves how such a programme should be drafted so that it is convincing, effective and at the same time capable of gaining acceptance by consensus. The paper before you contains the ideas which we and other members of this Committee consider important and useful. In drafting the paper we have followed as closely as possible previous work, but have developed certain points. Permit me to single out a few elements of the paper:

1. In the paper we use the two terms "disarmament" and "arms control". Disarmament is intended to designate the long-term goal of complete and general disarmament under effective international control as well as a world-wide process aimed at the gradual elimination of armaments.

Arms control is intended to mean the totality of co-operative efforts designed to restrict, in this armed world, the use of military force in spite of continuing differences, to promote stability and transparency in the military sphere and thus improve the prospects for managing and preventing crises. Arms control includes in particular verifiable arms limitation and reduction oriented towards the objective of stable military balance.

2. It is natural that the efforts to limit and reduce nuclear weapons have special significance in disarmament and arms control. For that reason we attach great importance to the SALT process. However, in the endeavours to limit nuclear weapons in accordance with article 6 of the non-proliferation Treaty one cannot overlook that conventional weapons are still used in conflicts today and that nuclear disarmament without trust, reliable data on existing potentials and adequate verification can have only limited prospects of lasting success. In these fields of collateral endeavours a realistic comprehensive programme of disarmament can, in our view, be particularly useful with regard to both nuclear disarmament and disarmament in general.

3. We regard the CPD as an overview of the negotiations currently in progress in other bodies and as a conceptual framework for the various negotiations in the future. With its concepts and concrete suggestions the CPD should be designed to facilitate negotiations, no matter in which body they are conducted. It is obvious that the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament itself and the activities of the United Nations must occupy a special position in the CPD.

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4. We consider it necessary that the CPD to be adopted by the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should improve conditions for achieving concrete and verifiable disarmament measures: mere disarmament declarations or polemics and unrealistic disarmament demands will not be capable of improving the chances of peace in our time.

5. With this in mind, we regard the following points of the CPD as particularly important. They apply to nuclear and conventional arms alike:

The world-wide dialogue on security issues must be intensified. It will be all the more fruitful, the more positive international developments are.

The agreement of concrete confidence-building measures which have to be adapted to the specific conditions of individual regions and which bring about greater transparency and calculability of each side's activities, is a way of reducing world-wide distrust and fear, tension and hostility. With concrete confidence-building measures we are tackling the root causes of the arms build-up.

We regard the ongoing activities in the United Nations system for achieving transparency and comparability of military potentials and budgets as another basis for present and future disarmament efforts and as a contribution to confidence-building. We therefore advocate that the standardized reporting system for military expenditures be developed further. It is a realistic initial step towards the balanced reduction of military expenditures.

The reliability and comparability of data on military potentials can also be prompted by establishing registers within the framework of the United Nations.

Verification remains a key element of all arms control and disarmament efforts. Effective practical verification methods are needed so that States will have a justification for basing their security increasingly also on arms control and disarmament agreements. Adequate verification is necessary to ensure that agreements that have been concluded are in fact being observed. Through effective verification coupled with a departure from excessive secrecy the credibility of arms control and disarmament efforts can be achieved which is needed to gain the dependable support of the general public.

6. The credibility of the CPD itself will depend on how realistic its objectives are. We agree that the programme should not be confined to principles alone but should include concrete measures as well. The most important of these measures should be assigned to the first phase. Anything that can be achieved now or in the immediate future must be given priority. Every step counts.

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But let us not overlook the fact that we are dealing with a programme -- no less but no more. Such a programme cannot be expected to be able to determine when States must initiate particular negotiations and when they must produce results.

This does not mean that we regard the time factor as irrelevant. We take account of it in our draft by proposing periodic reviews as a central element of the CPD. This proposal is based on the final document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, of which paragraph 109 stresses the need for a continuing review.

The purpose of such reviews should be to analyse the progress achieved in the implementation of the programme, in other words to effect a kind of interim assessment. They would serve to show whether the current phase of the programme could be regarded as completed. It would then be possible to examine which steps need to be taken next, and the date would be set for the next review.

The rhythm of these periodic reviews should be such as to ensure their optimum effectiveness. We regard them as the centrepiece of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. They are to provide the impulses which we want the CPD to generate.

The growing interdependence of all parts of the world and the commitment to safeguarding peace apply world-wide. Consequently, we should do our utmost to contribute to the vitality and the effectiveness of the discussions within the United Nations and the negotiations in the Geneva Committee on Disarmament.

This is the great task facing the Committee on Disarmament. The work performed here should not be underrated. It should not be measured only by the number of agreements prepared for signature. The dedication of a large number of States with differing interests to the work of the Committee on Disarmament and to progress in arms control and disarmament -- here I have in mind in particular the working groups on chemical and on radiological weapons -- is indeed encouraging. In view of the preparations for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, this applies as well to the CPD Working Group. The work of the first special session devoted to disarmament, which was the result of an initiative launched by the non-aligned and neutral countries, must be followed up successfully at the second special session. An important contribution to achieving this objective could be made by assuring that the comprehensive programme of disarmament is prepared as carefully as possible and in a way which will increase the prospects of it being accepted by consensus. This is the objective motivating the draft which I have had the honour of submitting today.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement and for the kind reference he made to the Chair. Before giving the floor to the next speaker, I should like to recognize the presence among us of Senator Clayborne Pell of the United States Senate, where he is the ranking minority member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He is here to observe the work of the Committee and I hope that he will find time to meet with members and exchange views with them.

Mr. OKAWA: (Japan): Mr. Chairman, although it was I who suggested at an informal meeting of the Committee that we could perhaps simplify our protocol, I do wish to extend a warm welcome to you on your arrival in Geneva and to congratulate you on your assumption of the Chair for the final month of our 1981 session. I also wish to express my delegation's warm feelings of gratitude to Ambassador Venkateswaran for the witty Indian summer he provided for us all and for the smart and efficient manner in which he presided over us and our fates during the month of July. May I also take this opportunity to welcome Ambassador Ruth of the Federal Republic of Germany amongst us this morning and to thank him for having formally introduced document CD/205 to the Committee. My delegation is one of the co-sponsors of that document. May I also express my delegation's welcome to Senator Pell of the United States of America.

At the meeting of the Heads of State and Government of seven nations held in Ottawa on 20 and 21 July 1981, Mr. Zenko Suzuki, the Japanese Prime Minister, once again made a strong appeal to his six colleagues on the need for nuclear disarmament. Placing nuclear disarmament as the item of the highest priority on the list has long been the fundamental position of Japan in the field of arms control and disarmament.

In 1945, 36 years ago, when Japan became the victim of nuclear weapons, there was only one nuclear-weapon State in the world. That number has been increasing, and will continue to increase in the years ahead, unless there can be a concerted effort by both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States to muster human common sense to counter this suicidal trend. Our ultimate aim should be, of course, to reduce the present number of nuclear-weapon States to zero -- through the complete and total elimination of nuclear weapons from this planet. Since that eventuality is not and cannot be foreseen in the near future, we must, in the meanwhile, at least try to keep the present number from increasing. That is why the Government of Japan regards the existing non-proliferation regime as an important contribution to international peace and security in the present world. This regime, with all its shortcomings, must be maintained. It must be prevented from disintegrating. It must be further strengthened so that the objective of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons can continue to be achieved, while of course allowing for and promoting the peaceful application of nuclear energy for those in need in the decades ahead.

But we, the members of this Committee, and, especially the nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, must not forget what happened at last year's NPT Review Conference. They must remember that the failure of that Conference to adopt a final declaration was due to the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament under article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty. The question of halting vertical proliferation is, at least in the view of the non-nuclear-weapon States, of even greater urgency than that of preventing horizontal proliferation -- considering that the latter has so far been prevented by the NPT regime. The nuclear-weapon States,

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all five of them, must make much greater efforts towards nuclear disarmament. This is absolutely essential, not only for the maintenance of the existing non-proliferation system, but indeed for the very survival of mankind. It is not merely a question of establishing ad hoc working groups or of conducting structured informal consultations in this Committee. It is a matter of momentous importance, a matter on which real substantive progress must be made before it is too late.

Over the years, a great many concrete proposals for nuclear disarmament have been put forward by the non-nuclear-weapon States and by the nuclear-weapon States themselves. We have a whole list of such proposals before us in this Committee under the heading "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". Japan would not be against any of them provided that they were to be feasible under the present circumstances. However, we are forced to admit that none of these proposals is going to be easily achieved if the existing international order -- characterized by confrontation between East and West -- continues as a carry-over from the immediate post-war period.

That is why my delegation has repeatedly emphasized the urgency of achieving a comprehensive nuclear test ban as the one measure that would appear to be feasible under the circumstances, and consequently the most important measure at the present moment. It is the one measure on which three nuclear-weapon States have been conducting serious negotiations since 1977; those States have even presented us with occasional progress reports on their negotiations. A comprehensive test ban treaty would act as a restraint on the further qualitative development of nuclear weapons, and in that sense would be the first meaningful step towards nuclear disarmament.

My delegation has expressed itself in favour of the establishment of a CTB working group in this Committee as one way of making progress on this matter. It will continue to call for the establishment of such a working group. Let me underline, however, that the setting up of the working group is not in itself the objective; it is the commencement of substantive discussions and negotiations in this multilateral forum that is important. The beginning of such multilateral negotiations, long overdue, is all the more important in view of the approaching second special session of the General Assembly. The mere setting up of a CTB working group would be a very meagre achievement indeed, but if the Committee on Disarmament were able to report even that achievement to the special session next year, it would be of some significance. At next year's special session, we must be able to report on some movement in the right direction.

In this connection, I am once again to urge the three nuclear-weapon States concerned to reopen their tripartite CTB negotiations without further delay. At the same time, I again remind the distinguished delegates of those three States that I addressed certain questions to them in this Committee on 7 August 1980, in connection with the tripartite report that they submitted to us last year.

Incidentally, my Government has noted that Mr. Eugene V. Rostow, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, referred to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, signed by the Soviet Union and the United States, in his statement before the Committee on Armed Services of the

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United States Senate on 24 July 1981. Mr. Rostow said that he believed there was merit in these treaties, and that the United States Government should move forward on them. My Government considers this statement as worthy of attention from the point of view of the promotion of nuclear disarmament.

It is to be deplored that nuclear explosion tests continue to be conducted by the nuclear-weapon States. I am instructed to reiterate Japan's opposition to any nuclear test by any State whatsoever.

I shall now turn to the question of negative security assurances.

It is only natural that a State which has renounced the possession of nuclear weapons should wish to be assured that the nuclear-weapon States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against it. Such a State has every right to expect that its non-nuclear-weapon status will be respected, that its security will not be jeopardized because it has renounced its nuclear option; it feels entitled to an assurance that it will never be attacked with nuclear weapons -- unless it itself initiates an attack on a nuclear-weapon State or its allies with the support of or in association with another nuclear-weapon State.

As a means of seeking to satisfy the legitimate claims of the non-nuclear-weapon States in this regard, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances has been endeavouring since 1979 to achieve progress in this field. The Japanese delegation would like to express its deep appreciation to Mr. El Baradei of Egypt and Minister Ciarrapico of Italy for their painstaking and methodical efforts to advance our work on negative security assurances as the successive Chairmen of the Working Group. At this year's session of the Committee, we have particularly appreciated the various working papers which Mr. Ciarrapico has presented to us on the substance of eventual negative security assurances and on the identification of the various features of the assurances that could be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States. I wish to congratulate Mr. Ciarrapico on the masterly way in which he wound up the substantive part of the discussions in his Working Group last week, on 28 July.

Of course, it would be ideal if the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States could be guaranteed through a single global international convention. However, this possibility is totally unrealistic and no consensus can be achieved on this approach. We must be pragmatic, and we must avoid being perfectionists from the outset. That is why we have adopted the more realistic approach -- which is to take as a starting point the individual declarations already made by the five nuclear-weapon States, to try to extract the elements common to those five declarations and to use those elements to try to arrive at a common formula for security assurances.

In this connection, very special mention should be made of the substantial contribution made by Ambassador Fein of the Netherlands in his statements of 26 June 1979, 14 April 1981 and 30 July 1981. Ambassador Fein's statements provide an extremely interesting analysis and the Government of Japan is of the view that the Dutch proposal constitutes a realistic and promising basis for our deliberations in this Committee.

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The non-nuclear-weapon States are naturally interested in obtaining the maximum degree of assurances regarding their security, but at the same time we must not forget that it is the nuclear-weapon States which are to extend the assurances. This delegation would therefore be interested in hearing more from the nuclear-weapon States regarding the Dutch proposal.

Before concluding on this subject, I wish to state the view of my delegation that effective international arrangements for negative security assurances would help to reinforce the existing non-proliferation regime and could constitute a preliminary step towards nuclear disarmament. However, my delegation agrees with Ambassador Yu Peiwen of China that a negative security assurance is only a transitional measure pending nuclear disarmament. My Government continues to maintain that optimum negative security assurances can be achieved only through nuclear disarmament -- that is to say, the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

The existence of mutual trust and confidence among the nuclear-weapon States is essential to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to the advancement of nuclear disarmament. And such trust and confidence among nations can be generated only through self-restraint in the behaviour of nations, based on the strict and faithful observance of the principles of the United Nations Charter. The general international security situation has to be improved. The settlement of disputes between nations must be sought through the United Nations; and if international disputes can be prevented from turning into armed conflicts, this will help to create and increase confidence among nations and the task of disarmament, and particularly of nuclear disarmament, will become a trifle easier.

My Government and my country have been reminding the world for the past 36 years, as if such reminding were needed, that Japan is the only country to have suffered from nuclear weapons. I myself feel inclined these days, and particularly on this the thirty-sixth anniversary of the Hiroshima bomb, to change that wording slightly and instead of saying that Japan is the only country, to say that Japan was the first country to know the horrors of these weapons and that, if the world continues behaving as it does, many other countries may have the chance to follow in our wake. I shall not fail to report to my Government and to the people of Japan the most cordial gesture shown by the Committee at the beginning of its session this morning. My delegation wishes to interpret this gesture also as a reaffirmation of our determination to make further efforts in disarmament and in particular in nuclear disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank our distinguished colleague from Japan for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. ONKELINX (Belgium) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, since the suggestion just referred to by Ambassador Okawa regarding our protocol has not yet been put into practice, I too will conform with tradition, and I would like, therefore, with your permission -- following the chronological order -- to address myself to your predecessor. I should like to express my delegation's appreciation of the very skilful, intelligent and dynamic way in which our colleague from India directed the Committee's work last month, and I think we should all be grateful to him for that.

This month, we are very happy to work under your direction, Mr. Chairman. Since you came from Jakarta to join us here in Geneva, we have come to know you; we all have very warm feelings for you personally, and I think you can be sure of our fullest co-operation during this month. Your country is an important member of ASEAN, a political grouping towards which we are very sympathetic and whose regional and international co-operation efforts we appreciate, and it is a pleasure to note that you assumed the chairmanship of our Committee just a few days before the celebration of "ASEAN Day" -- for, if my information is correct, it is to be held tomorrow, and I should like to offer you my congratulations on that occasion.

I would also like to welcome among us Senator Pell whose interest in the international discussions which take place in these venerable buildings in Geneva is well known to us all.

I was planning to talk about two subjects in my statement today: the comprehensive programme of disarmament and the prohibition of radiological weapons. With respect to the latter topic, the Belgian delegation was contemplating making a suggestion as regards our work. However, consultations are still in progress and my authorities have asked me to defer this suggestion for a while. Thus, the statement I shall make today will deal only with the subject of the comprehensive programme of disarmament; it will therefore be shorter than planned -- a fact for which my colleagues will, I hope, be grateful to me.

I referred in my last statement, at the plenary meeting of the Committee on 9 July, to my country's great interest in the timely preparation, i.e. before the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, of a comprehensive programme of disarmament which should constitute one of the essential elements of that session.

The Ad Hoc Working Group set up by our Committee on this question has undoubtedly already done important preliminary work. I should like to thank the two successive chairmen, Mr. Adeniji of Nigeria and Mr. García-Robles of Mexico. However, we must not conceal from ourselves the fact that the essential work still remains to be done. I am glad to note, in this connection, that the Committee is on the point of taking procedural decisions which will enable us to intensify our work in this regard.

Together with the Federal Republic of Germany, Australia, Japan and the United Kingdom, Belgium is a co-sponsor of document CD/205, which sets forth in detail the main views of these delegations on the comprehensive programme of disarmament. This document has been presented by the Federal Republic of Germany as a complete draft text. In fact, it seems to me essential that at this stage of our work we should have a clearer idea of the general structure of the programme.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

In preparing this draft, our aim was to present a clear, concise and logical document. The comprehensive programme might thus, I believe, be what the international community expects, namely, a credible instrument which will facilitate negotiations in the sphere of disarmament, and not an academic collection of our various wishes.

The framework of this instrument comprises a permanent element and a dynamic element.

The permanent element consists of the major principles on which the disarmament negotiation efforts should be based. Without in any way forgetting the principles -- albeit sparse -- contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, we think that the comprehensive programme of disarmament should clearly and rigorously identify the fundamental principles which should guide the negotiators in determining the successive stages of disarmament. These principles derive from the need on the one hand to ensure the security of States at all stages of the disarmament process, and on the other to see to it that the Charter of the United Nations is scrupulously respected so that no actions contrary to it will hinder efforts in the sphere of disarmament.

Apart from the principles I have just mentioned, the permanent element of the framework for the disarmament process also includes what I would call "methods".

These are **first** of all the priorities defined in the Final Document, it being understood that these priorities constitute a coherent whole and that, as regards the prospects for negotiations, nothing must be allowed to prevent efforts to reach agreements on questions the outcome of which seems the most promising.

We cannot neglect any possibility of progress, however small. It is, in fact, with this in mind that Belgium has always defended the regional approach to disarmament. Indeed, we believe that partial solutions and regional measures must be sought wherever there is a possibility of reconciling the views expressed by the international community.

We also think that the comprehensive programme of disarmament should reflect in an appropriate manner something which constitutes another permanent element of the disarmament process, namely, the need for disarmament measures to be accompanied by adequate means of verification. Such means will not only contribute to the creation of confidence between States, but they will also help to ensure their security. A State will not undertake disarmament measures if it is not absolutely convinced that its security will not be endangered by such measures. Lastly, we should not overlook the probable impact on the actual negotiation of a disarmament measure of the prospect of there being created an adequate system for the verification of the agreement reached.

In addition to these permanent elements which I have just described, the comprehensive programme of disarmament also has a dynamic aspect.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

This is a result of the changing nature of circumstances -- particularly the contemporary political and security situation and the actual course of the disarmament process -- circumstances which determine the pace of negotiation of disarmament measures. States cannot be required to disregard these circumstances. This is why we do not believe that it is possible for States to undertake to carry out a particular disarmament measure at a particular period of the implementation of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. On the other hand, it can reasonably be expected that the programme should be implemented within the framework of a series of interdependent phases, each of these phases determining the negotiations to be conducted on disarmament measures, themselves interrelated in a coherent manner.

Parallel to the disarmament measures proper and during each of the phases, it will also be necessary to provide for the negotiation of what are known as collateral measures, and also the carrying out of studies which will help to improve the prospects for negotiations.

The first of the phases to which I have just referred should have as its aim the conclusion of the negotiations that are at present under way. This completion of negotiations should be taken in its broadest sense and cover all measures for which advanced preparatory work has been done and approved. The document of which Belgium is a co-sponsor gives a detailed list of such measures.

The list of other measures which should form part of subsequent phases of the comprehensive programme of disarmament is in fact a catalogue of the steps the international community should take to reach the goal of general and complete disarmament.

All these measures should be formulated in as general a manner as possible in the comprehensive programme. We must avoid two dangers, on the one hand that of excessive specificity, which would inevitably lead to incompleteness, and on the other that of giving the negotiators such precise instructions that they would, at this stage, prove to be paralysing.

The review meetings will play an important part in the implementation of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. They should on the one hand determine how far the measures allocated to a phase have been carried out. Where appropriate, they could declare the phase to have been completed. They could also, if necessary, redefine a phase and those which are to succeed it. So, taking account of the circumstances prevailing at that time, they can specify the content of the next phase. My delegation considers that these meetings should be periodic. This does not mean that they ought necessarily to be regular. Here again it is the circumstances of the moment which ought to determine when these meetings should be held. In view of the similarity of the measures envisaged for the comprehensive programme of disarmament and the measures contained in the programme for the Second Disarmament Decade, it would be useful if the review of these two undertakings could be combined.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

My delegation, for its part, is not in favour of the setting up of a new body for the purpose of such reviews. We consider that the present disarmament structures within the United Nations could undertake this task. The United Nations Disarmament Commission could perhaps be requested, when the General Assembly deemed it appropriate to carry out reviews of the implementation of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. This would then confirm the role which has already been conferred upon the United Nations Disarmament Commission within the framework of the Second Disarmament Decade.

I have explained why I thought that the comprehensive programme of disarmament could not be a legally binding instrument. It should, however, be understood that in view of its importance the comprehensive programme of disarmament should form the subject of an undertaking by States to respect its objectives, principles and priorities, and should contain an expression of the firm determination of the international community to implement the programme through the negotiation of specific and verifiable measures of disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Belgium for his statement, the kind words he addressed to me and the reference he made to the Association of South East Asian Nations.

Mr. VENKATESWARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, while relinquishing the Chair last week, I had already offered to you the warm greetings of my delegation and best wishes for a successful tenure as Chairman for this month. Since I am now speaking for the first time under your distinguished chairmanship, I would like to thank you, as well as other distinguished delegates, for their kind and friendly words concerning my own tenure as Chairman of the Committee last month. I would also like to welcome in our midst Ambassador Ruth of the Federal Republic of Germany whose statement we were privileged to listen to this morning. The presence of Senator Clayborne Pell of the United States of America in our midst will, we trust, enable him to carry back to the Senate the views of the Committee on Disarmament which I believe constitute a major plank in the efforts of the international community towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament.

I now turn to the theme of my statement today, namely, the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

In the early 1960s, several non-aligned countries as well as the two major Powers, the United States and the USSR, put forward fairly detailed programmes for the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. These programmes envisaged sweeping and drastic reductions in existing arsenals of all types of weapons, to be achieved within a limited time-span, extending, at the most, over just a decade or so. During the past several years, however, progress in the field of disarmament has been marked by an emphasis on partial measures. By the end of the 1960s, this partial approach to disarmament had relegated the comprehensive approach to the background. At the same time, bilateral and restricted negotiations amongst a few States had eroded and gradually attained an ascendancy over the multilateral approach. The reasons for this change in emphasis are fairly obvious. The pursuit of limited measures of disarmament permitted a greater flexibility and the opportunity to harmonize conflicting security concerns in a relatively predictable framework for the handful of countries concerned.

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

Negotiations in bilateral and restricted forums also enabled the more heavily armed States to pursue a reconciliation of their national interests in an environment insulated, to a large extent, from the pressures of world public opinion and the need to satisfy the concerns and security requirements of a larger number of States.

This change of emphasis did achieve some limited results in the decade of the 1970s. However, as the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament itself recognized,

"The fact remains that these agreements relate only to measures of limited restraint while the arms race continues. These partial measures have done little to bring the world closer to the goal of general and complete disarmament. For more than a decade there have been no negotiations leading to a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The pressing need now is to translate into practical terms the provisions of this Final Document and to proceed along the road of binding and effective international agreements in the field of disarmament."

Given this consensus assessment of the impact of limited and partial measures of disarmament, we find it rather strange that some delegations still continue to insist on pursuing this discredited strategy of the 1970s without any essential change. General and complete disarmament under effective international control will become a credible goal only if limited and partial measures of disarmament are pursued within a universally accepted programme embodying well-recognized principles, objectives and priorities in the field of disarmament negotiations. These principles, objectives and priorities are clearly enunciated in the Final Document of the first special session and this is what makes that Document a touchstone for the disarmament process.

What is the nature of the comprehensive programme of disarmament which the Committee on Disarmament is expected to formulate and to elaborate? For one thing, the quotation I have just used from the Final Document would naturally lead us to the conclusion that the programme is conceived in terms of a treaty. The very fact that the elaboration of the programme has been entrusted to the sole multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament would seem to support this view. If the programme were to be only a mere indicative framework, with no legal and binding political commitments, why was it necessary to entrust the task to the Committee on Disarmament instead of to a deliberative body like the United Nations Disarmament Commission? Paragraph 38 of the Final Document makes it abundantly clear what the nature of the CPD is expected to be:

"Negotiations on partial measures of disarmament should be conducted concurrently with negotiations on more comprehensive measures and should be followed by negotiations leading to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control."

If it is in fact a treaty which we are engaged in negotiating, then it is obvious that we must agree upon explicit provisions for its entry into force and for its implementation, the mechanism for its periodic review and the procedure

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

for future amendments of its provisions. The CPD would not conform to what is expected of it if its entry into force and the implementation of its provisions were to be left vague or open-ended, as some States want it to be. I may point out that not one treaty negotiated so far in the field of arms limitation or disarmament has been conceived without very specific provisions relating to its entry into force and the periodic review of its implementation.

I might mention that the 1962 draft treaties on general and complete disarmament submitted by the United States and the USSR were conceived as a package of interrelated measures of disarmament that the parties were committed to implement within a period of less than a decade. The provisions of the Soviet draft were intended to be implemented within a period of five years, while the first two stages of the three-stage United States draft treaty were to have been implemented within a period of six years. Both these draft treaties contained provisions for their entry into force and for a review of their implementation. Although certain specific provisions in the two drafts may have been overtaken by both political and technological developments in the intervening years, surely one cannot claim that their aims and objectives were any different from what the Committee on Disarmament is trying to achieve at the present time. The nature of the document we are engaged in negotiating is basically the same as that of the draft treaties presented by the major Powers in 1962. If this is not the case and some delegations would prefer to ignore paragraph 38 of the Final Document, then it is best that we should be made abundantly aware of this fact now at once, so that we do not waste valuable time in trying to reconcile the irreconcilable. My delegation, for one, cannot countenance a retreat from the provisions of the Final Document which the international community adopted by consensus.

What are the principles on which the CPD ought to be based? Here again I would base myself primarily on the provisions contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Since the process of disarmament affects the vital security interests of all States, they must all be necessarily and actively concerned with and contribute to measures of disarmament and arms limitation. All States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations. They have a right to participate on an equal footing in those multilateral disarmament negotiations which have a bearing on their national security. While disarmament is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear-weapon States have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and, together with other militarily significant States, for halting and reversing the arms race. Most important of all, the adoption of disarmament measures should appropriately take place in an equitable and balanced manner so as to ensure the right of each State to security and so that no individual State or group of States may obtain unilateral advantages over others. At each stage, our objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces. These are some of the fundamental principles that I have selected from the Final Document. With respect to each category of disarmament measures, e.g., those relating to nuclear disarmament or the setting up of nuclear-weapon-free zones, there would naturally be more specific principles governing the negotiation and implementation of those measures. These specific principles can also be garnered from the Final Document.

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

I would now like to turn to priorities in the field of disarmament negotiations. Paragraph 45 of the Final Document states categorically that "priorities in disarmament negotiations shall be: nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons; conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and reduction of armed forces". While States are not precluded from conducting negotiations on all priority items concurrently, this certainly does not imply that the order of priorities may be reversed or ignored in the Committee on Disarmament, which is, after all, the sole multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament. The spectacle of some of the major nuclear-weapon States refusing to allow the CD to undertake negotiations on nuclear issues and restricting the terms of reference with respect to negotiations on chemical weapons, even while recording little or no progress in their own restricted bilateral or regional negotiations on these issues, is a regrettable state of affairs. Throughout the Final Document, the emphasis is on the urgent negotiation of measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of a nuclear war. It is universally recognized that "the immediate goal is that of the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war and the implementation of measures to halt and reverse the arms race and clear the path towards lasting peace". Yet in the negotiations on the draft CPD, there is a curious reluctance to accord measures of nuclear disarmament, and particularly measures for the prevention of nuclear war, the priority they amply deserve and which has in fact already been spelt out by consensus in the Final Document. One has sometimes heard the argument that measures to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons should be implemented not merely in the first stage of the CPD but as a continuous objective during subsequent stages since they could probably not be implemented until nuclear disarmament had been substantially achieved. The Final Document, in paragraph 58, has referred to these measures in the context of the overriding and urgent aim of ensuring "that the survival of mankind is not endangered". One would have expected that these measures, which we have all agreed are essential to the survival of mankind, would figure unequivocally in the very first and earliest stage of the CPD. It is a measure of the air of unreality which afflicts our work in this Committee that attempts are made to put such simple logic aside under the cover of national or alliance security interests.

During the last meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and again during the negotiations on the elaboration of the CPD, we have witnessed a disturbing trend which makes progress in disarmament negotiations conditional upon an improvement in the international situation, an increase in confidence among States and in prior agreement being reached on measures of verification and control. For example, document CD/198 submitted on behalf of a group of Western States asserts that confidence-building measures are "a necessary prerequisite for the successful outcome" of disarmament negotiations. The same document also seeks to equate measures for verification and control with the development of trust and confidence among nations. This is a one-sided view. I would draw attention specifically to paragraph 34 of the Final Document which states:

"Disarmament, relaxation of international tension, respect for the right to self-determination and national independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the strengthening of international peace and security are directly related to each other. Progress in any of these spheres has a beneficial effect on all of them; in turn, failure in one sphere has negative effects on others".

In fact, the first few paragraphs of the Final Document would appear to emphasize that it is the accumulation of armaments and the lack of progress in disarmament which constitute the real threat to international peace and security and which undermine trust and confidence among nations. Thus, paragraph 11 states in part:

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

"The increase in weapons, especially nuclear weapons, far from helping to strengthen international security, on the contrary weakens it. The vast stockpiles and tremendous build-up of arms and armed forces and the competition for qualitative refinement of weapons of all kinds, to which scientific resources and technological advances are diverted, pose incalculable threats to peace. This situation both reflects and aggravates international tensions, sharpens conflicts in various regions of the world, hinders the process of détente, exacerbates the differences between opposing military alliances, jeopardizes the security of all States, heightens the sense of insecurity among all States, including the non-nuclear-weapon States, and increases the threat of nuclear war."

The aggravation of international tensions cannot be held out as a pretext or justification for lack of progress in disarmament negotiations. These tensions are themselves a symptom of the relentless accumulation of arms which is taking place, especially among the major Powers. To make disarmament conditional upon the improvement of the international environment is largely a case of putting the cart before the horse.

Similarly, while it is true that adequate measures for verification may contribute to confidence among States, verification can never be a substitute for relations of mutual trust among States. Even with the very effective and intrusive means of verification available to them, the major Powers are vigorously engaged in an unprecedented build-up of nuclear and conventional armaments. This build-up has nothing to do with lack of means of verification. Furthermore, those who lay so much emphasis on verification could not have failed to notice that more stringent and so-called intrusive means of control have historically been far more acceptable in an era of relatively good relations among the major Powers and their allies than would be the case otherwise. The recent demands for more stringent verification are a reflection of the deterioration in the relations among the major Powers and the opposing military alliances, the causes for which have little or nothing to do with a genuine verification process.

While recognizing the importance of verification, we would urge, therefore, that the proper perspective should be maintained. My delegation will soon submit a working paper to the secretariat concerning the question of verification which will be circulated to members of the Committee and which we trust will be useful to all concerned.

In conclusion, I would like to offer some views on the measures to be included in the comprehensive programme of disarmament. The Final Document envisaged the CPD as one that would encompass "all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated".

The elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament drawn up by the United Nations Disarmament Commission in 1979 conceived the programme as a framework within which negotiations on a multilateral, bilateral and regional level could be conducted on specific measures of disarmament. The Disarmament Commission itself provided only an outline of the programme. It was left to the Committee on Disarmament to elaborate and give shape to the above outline. If the purpose of the exercise we are undertaking here is only to stick closely to the formulations contained in the Disarmament Commission's draft "Elements" or even to reproduce formulations from the Programme of Action contained in the Final Document, as some delegations appear to be suggesting by the positions they have taken in the Working Group on a CPD, then we wonder if we are not wasting valuable time, which could be used for negotiations on more urgent and priority issues, e.g., nuclear disarmament. For our part we look upon

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

the CPD as going further than the Programme of Action contained in the Final Document. The draft treaty that should emerge from our negotiations must accordingly contain detailed and specific measures of disarmament to be implemented in a feasible manner consistent with our objectives, principles and priorities in the field of disarmament as already endorsed by the international community. However, constructive recommendations made by the Group of 21 regarding such specific measures, whether under nuclear disarmament or conventional disarmament, have drawn the rather strange and negative response from the major Powers and some of their allies that these recommendations are "too specific" in character. The entirely untenable position has been advanced from certain quarters that the specific measures to be negotiated under each category of disarmament items must be left to those involved in the negotiations and those who are most directly concerned. If this is the case then either the draft elements drawn up by the Disarmament Commission for the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament ought to be sufficient as a framework for pursuing the goal of general and complete disarmament. Should the Committee on Disarmament then report to the General Assembly at its second special session on disarmament that it is unable to advance any further than the Final Document adopted at the first special session? If we are not going to deliver the goods, is it legitimate for us to pretend that we are engaged in elaborating a CPD containing specific measures of disarmament, when a number of States, including the major Powers, appear to have little intention of accepting any concrete commitments with respect to either nuclear or conventional disarmament? If the identification of concrete measures is to be just left to the States involved in the negotiations, then why have a CPD at all? The answer is that the objectives, principles and priorities in the field of disarmament are already well-known. The major categories of disarmament measures have already been outlined in the declarations prepared by the United Nations Disarmament Commission based on the Final Document of the first special session. As we see it, it is the elaboration of the various measures of disarmament which requires intensive negotiations, so that this outline is transformed into a series of well-defined and interrelated commitments by States incorporated into a multilateral treaty for universal adherence. If this is not what we are really engaged in, then we may as well confess that we are unable to fulfil the serious mandate given to us by the General Assembly at its first special session.

In concluding this statement, my delegation would like to pay a sincere tribute to the meticulous and painstaking way in which the distinguished Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the CPD, Ambassador García Robles, has been directing the course of negotiations on this important document, from the very beginning, hopefully towards a successful completion. However, while a preliminary consideration of measures to be included in the CPD, in a hypothetical first stage, has been completed, the more fundamental issues such as those which I addressed myself to today need to be debated and thrashed out with the minimum of delay. Our negotiations on the concrete formulations of the various measures would obviously be influenced by our agreement, or lack of it, concerning the nature of the CPD and its relationship to the Final Document of the first special session. Negotiations within the Working Group so far indicate that it might well be difficult to go beyond the terms of the Final Document. Perhaps this is due to certain delegations not being quite clear in their own minds regarding the nature of the CPD we are all engaged in negotiating. In such a situation, it is only natural that we seek to stand still on familiar ground. But our mandate is to build further on this ground and the sooner we manage to clarify our ideas concerning the nature and contents of the CPD the better would be the chances of our being able to go to the second special session on disarmament with a document worthy of ourselves and the confidence reposed in the Committee on Disarmament by the entire international community.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of India for his statement and for the kind reference he made to the Chair. With the last speaker on my list, we have concluded that list for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage?

The Secretariat has circulated today, at my request, a timetable for meetings to be held by the Committee on Disarmament and its subsidiary bodies during the week of 10-14 August. In that connection, I wish to inform the Committee that, in accordance with rule 44 of the rules of procedure, the first instalment of the draft report of the Committee to the General Assembly has been prepared by me with the assistance of the Secretary of the Committee and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General and will be made available to all members in the delegations' boxes tomorrow, early in the afternoon for the English text and after 5 p.m. in the other languages. Since the first instalment of the report deals mainly with technical aspects, I hope that it will be possible to start a first reading at an informal meeting on Monday afternoon. In that connection, provision has been made in the timetable for consideration at that meeting of a draft statement by the Chairman proposed by the delegation of Pakistan regarding the implications of the Israeli military attack against Tammuz, if members are ready to do so.

As regards the substantive paragraphs of the report on items 1, 2 and 5 of the agenda, I have consulted with the Co-ordinators of the various groups and other delegations in order to devise flexible and practical ways to deal with them. I have requested the Secretariat to provide us with texts which could be used as a basis for consideration. During my consultations I found that members agreed to this approach.

As we approach the closing date of the Committee's work, the activities in the working groups are particularly intense, and you will notice that we have attempted to meet the concerns of their Chairmen in the context of the timetable. Its provisions might not be ideal, but at this stage we need to fully utilize our time and I am sure that members will understand that we should depart from normal practices in order to meet the closing date decided by the Committee.

Also in connection with the timetable, may I note that the work of the drafting group dealing with proposals on the improved and effective functioning of the Committee has been making substantive progress under the able leadership of Ambassador Venkateswaran and, accordingly, I intend to put the recommendations before the Committee at an appropriate stage, possibly during the coming week. I will be in touch with the Chairman of the drafting group in order to ensure appropriate consideration of those recommendations.

If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Committee is prepared to accept the timetable, which as usual is merely indicative and can be adjusted as we proceed. I recognize the distinguished representative of Yugoslavia.

Mr. BRANKOVIC (Yugoslavia): Mr. Chairman, I share entirely the views just expressed by you, that we are approaching the end of the Committee and we should use all the available time in the manner which we find appropriate. However, I see that in the programme you have suggested, Monday morning, the 10th, is free and I feel that we should try our best to utilize this time for the work of the working groups.

(Mr. Brankovic, Yugoslavia)

At the same time I see that on Friday 14 August two different working group meetings have been scheduled. There is no need for me to go into a detailed explanation why the CPD Working Group needs all available time to finish its work, but having this in mind I would suggest that we allocate the whole of Friday, both morning and afternoon to the CPD Working Group because we know that this is the only working group with a heavy load which to finish its work has been allowed only until Friday evening. At the same time we feel that the meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons should be allocated time on Monday morning. Tomorrow there is a meeting of the Radiological Weapons Working Group to start discussion of the report and I feel that we should continue on Monday morning hopefully to finish it on Wednesday, as is scheduled, between 9 a.m. and 11 a.m.

The CHAIRMAN: I have been informed that the Chairman of the Working Group on Radiological Weapons is not yet ready to hold a meeting on Monday morning and that is why it has been scheduled as it appears on the draft programme. I hope that you will take this into account as regards your proposal.

Mr. BRANKOVIC (Yugoslavia): I do not know if the Chairman of the Radiological Weapons Working Group is ready but I was thinking much more on the lines of whether the report is ready, and whether the Working Group is ready to consider it. If we are going to start discussion of the report tomorrow, Friday morning, and I see that working paper No. 24 is before us now, I see no reason why we should not utilize Monday morning for this Working Group also.

The CHAIRMAN: The best thing is to ask the view of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons to explain why it is not possible for the group to meet on Monday.

Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): In my capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons I would like to say the following in connection with the proposal made by our distinguished colleague from Yugoslavia. The Working Group on Radiological Weapons will tomorrow have the first reading on the draft report on its work. I am sure that many proposals and comments will be made which will have to be taken into account in the further elaboration and improvement of the draft report. It is quite clear that for this purpose, in order to submit a new version of the draft, the time between Friday morning and Monday is very short. That is why I have already asked for an additional meeting for the Working Group on Wednesday which, in my opinion, will bring us very close to the finalization of the report which can then be adopted on Friday, the 14th. I would therefore like to ask the understanding of my Yugoslav colleague for this consideration, and that of my colleagues.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank our distinguished colleague from Hungary for his explanation and I hope that this is acceptable to the Committee.

Mr. CIARRAPICO (Italy): Mr. Chairman, in the timetable contained in the informal paper that was just distributed, only one meeting for the negative security assurances Working Group is scheduled. That will take place on Tuesday in the afternoon as usual. I hope, and am even confident that on that occasion it will be possible to approve the report of the Group. However, as I cannot be sure of

(Mr. Ciarrapico, Italy)

that, I have to draw your attention to the possible need for a further meeting of this Group on the following day, that is Wednesday, or even Thursday. I think it will therefore be necessary to leave open the possibility of holding another meeting of this Group. I repeat that it is my firm hope that that will not be necessary, but I cannot rule out this possibility.

The CHAIRMAN: I think we will have to wait and see, but I will take note of the statement made by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances.

Mr. SARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a request that in the timetable both for next week and for the subsequent week at least one full afternoon be left free to give delegations an opportunity to go through the massive amount of documents they have to consider, both of the working groups and of the Committee. I think it will be extremely difficult for small delegations like mine to function if each and every day of the week we have to work from 9 in the morning until about 8 in the evening. I would therefore request, Mr. Chairman, and through you the various Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Working Groups, that they should take into account the difficulties of small delegations, and at least some time during the week should be set aside so that delegations can reflect on and digest the amount of documentation that is made available to us.

The CHAIRMAN: We will take note of this request by our distinguished colleague from India.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, I would like to make only two comments. The first is that my delegation is glad to see that no meeting either of the Committee or of its working groups has been planned for Monday morning. We are glad of this because at the weekly meeting of the Group of 21 held yesterday, it was agreed that another meeting could usefully be held next Monday morning. The only reason why a final decision was not taken on the matter was that it was possible then that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons might meet and naturally we did not wish to compete with it. Now that there is to be no meeting of the Radiological Weapons Group, I am certain that the distinguished representative of Yugoslavia will agree with me that a meeting of the Group of 21 will make good use of Monday morning. My second point concerns the meetings planned here for the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. The secretariat has said that the draft report of that Group will be distributed next Monday. I do not think that its contents will be very controversial: it is an objective, narrative account of what happened and I dare to hope that we could complete consideration and approval of this report in the two meetings currently scheduled in the work programme, i.e. one on Thursday afternoon and the other on Friday afternoon. However, if my forecast proves to be wrong, we could hold a night meeting on Friday, 14 August.

The CHAIRMAN: I would hope, with the distinguished representative, that it would be possible to finish the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group under his leadership after the two meetings on Thursday and Friday and also that he will be able to avoid night work on Friday the 14th. Are there any other speakers who wish to take the floor? If not, I wish to announce, before adjourning, that a drafting group on Radiological Weapons will meet in Room C-108 this afternoon at 3 p.m. The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 11 August 1981. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.