

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.145
4 August 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-THIRD MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 4 August 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Ch.A. SANI

(Indonesia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. SALAH-BEY

Argentina: Mr. J.C. CARSALES
Mr. J.P. GOIENSO
Ms. H. NASCIBENE

Australia: Mr. R. STEELE

Belgium: Mr. J.H. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.L. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. K. PRAMOV
Mr. R. DEYANOV

Burma: U NGWE WIN
U THAN HITUN

Canada: Mr. McPHAIL

China: Mr. YU Peiven
Mr. YU Hongjie
Mr. LI Changhe
Mrs. WANG Zhiyun

Cuba: Mr. F.O. RODRIGUEZ

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. RUZEK
Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. J. FRANEK
Mr. A. CHIA

Egypt: Mr. EL S.A.R. EL REEDY
Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. N. FAHMY
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERJEFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Mrs. H. HOPPE
Mr. M. NOETZEL

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. N. KLINGER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES

India: Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. A. SANI
Mr. S. DARUSMAN
Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. F. QASIM
Mr. ACHDIAK
Mr. E. SOEPRAPTO

Iran:

Italy: Mr. A. CIARRAPICO
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. M. BARENGHI
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANAKA
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya:

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBIES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. S. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. M. ARRASSEN
Mr. M. CHRAÏBI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. H. WACENTAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. M.B. BRIMAH
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. M. AIMAD
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Romania: Mr. H. MALITA
Mr. T. NELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. T. JAYAKODDY
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALINAKKARA

Sweden: Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. U. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. CHERNOV
Mr. V.F. PRYAKHIN
Mr. V.M. GANJA
Mr. M.M. IPPOLITOV

United Kingdom: Mr. D. SUMERHAYES
Mr. H. MARSHALL
Mrs. J. LIHK

United States of America:

Mr. F.P. DESIMONE
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. R.F. SCOTT
Mr. W. HECROTTE
Mr. J.E. TRENTON
Mr. S. FITZGERALD
Ms. L. SIEA

Venezuela:

Mr. R. RODRIGUEZ NAVARRO
Mr. O. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. B. BRAJKOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. C.O. GHOK

Secretary of the Committee and
Personal Representative of
the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of
the Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee starts today its further consideration of agenda items and outstanding questions relating to the organization of work. As usual, in conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, members are at liberty to make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee. Distinguished colleagues, before proceeding, may I, on behalf of the Indonesian delegation, express our most sincere appreciation to the outgoing Chairman, Ambassador Venkateswaran of India, who has presided over the proceedings of the Committee during the month of July with great skill and efficiency. With a combination of firmness and flexibility he has succeeded in his inimitable way in creating an atmosphere which has helped the Committee to make further progress in its work. I hope that I can count upon his counsel in the days ahead.

Special tribute is also due to the Chairmen of the four ad hoc working groups. Ambassador García Robles with his vast experience and diplomatic skill has enabled the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme on Disarmament to make progress in elaborating the various stages of the programme. Ambassador Komives of Hungary, in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, is leading the Working Group with great efficiency in formulating the text of a draft convention. The Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons is manifestly making progress under the skilful leadership of Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden. It is to be hoped that in due time the Committee can agree on a new mandate for this Working Group which takes into account the progress it has made. The Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances is working hard under its dedicated Chairman, Minister Ciarrapico of Italy, to arrive at agreed formulations on the various alternatives of such security guarantees.

Distinguished colleagues, it is indeed a great honour to preside over the work of this important Committee, constituted to be the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum for arms control and disarmament agreements, which will enable the world to achieve the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. We are all aware that, in pursuing this objective, we have to pass through a long and difficult road. There are different national interests and different security concerns, sometimes conflicting, involved in dealing with disarmament matters. We should persevere in trying to narrow down those differences and reconcile the conflicting standpoints, so that convergent views may finally emerge as to how to ensure the survival of mankind.

August is the last month of this year's session in which the Committee will have to produce a report on its activities to be conveyed to the coming thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly. This time the report will be of special importance in view of the fact that the second special session of the General Assembly on Disarmament is to be convened in the spring of next year. The thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, and certainly the second special session, will evaluate the Committee's performance and effectiveness during the three years of its existence, since its restructuring in 1978. The General Assembly at its first special session established the Committee's terms of reference and priorities. It will be against those terms of reference and priorities, and against the provisions of the relevant resolutions of the thirty-fourth and thirty-fifth sessions of the General Assembly, and especially resolution 35/46 declaring the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, that our performance will be evaluated and judged. In order that the General Assembly, and the international community at large, can be correctly informed of the work of this Committee, the report should reflect as truly as possible the real situation, the progress we are making and the difficulties we are still facing in our negotiations.

(The Chairman)

During the past three years delegation after delegation has expressed its disappointment at the meagre results which have been achieved by the Committee. Three years are, relatively, not very long, but we must not forget that before us the ENDC and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) had been occupying themselves with disarmament already since 1962. It is therefore for nearly twenty years that the issue of disarmament has been discussed and negotiated without too much progress.

On two items, considered of the highest priority by the General Assembly at its first special session on disarmament and in other relevant resolutions, namely, the comprehensive nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, the Committee has not been able to agree even to form ad hoc working groups to start multilateral negotiations. It is not my intention at this time to put the blame on anyone in particular. It will not be an easy task to give an acceptable explanation to justify the Committee's inability to start dealing effectively with these issues to which the international community attaches the greatest importance and the highest priority.

When we speak about disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, it is obvious that we do not address ourselves to countries like Indonesia. When we speak about disarmament, it is the nuclear-weapon Powers and the militarily significant States that we have in mind. Everybody, including the nuclear-weapon Powers, speaks of the need for disarmament, but apparently the cultural and moral motivations are not yet strong enough to overcome mutual distrust and produce the necessary political will, and above all the readiness to translate that will, if it is there, into concrete disarmament measures.

The few weeks which remain of this year's session will mainly be needed by the Committee to produce its report. I hope that the four ad hoc working groups will wind up their substantive work as soon as possible and start finalizing their reports so that the Committee can finish with its report in time for this session to be closed on 21 August as has been agreed.

Distinguished colleagues, since for all practical purposes I am a newcomer to the actual work of the Committee, I am bound to make mistakes with regard to procedure, as well as substance. I will rely very much upon the indulgence, the co-operation and the counsel of all my colleagues, and especially of the Committee's Secretary, my old friend Ambassador Jaipal, to keep me on the right track.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): Mr Chairman, let me first of all express the satisfaction of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic on seeing you preside over the Committee on Disarmament in the month of August. We all highly appreciate your well-known diplomatic experience and are confident that under your wise guidance the Committee will successfully accomplish its work during the last month of this year's session. May I wish you success in your difficult and responsible task. This is also an occasion to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Venkateswaran of India, for the excellent and eloquent way in which he steered the work of the Committee during the month of July.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

It is my intention to dwell today upon the question of effective international arrangements to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. As is well known, my country attaches great importance to efforts aimed at strengthening the security of States by means of special political and legally binding international instruments. The main aim in this regard is to exclude once and for all the possibility of a nuclear holocaust. Guided by this, my delegation as well as the overwhelming majority of CD member countries, have urgently demanded the beginning of negotiations with a view to ending the nuclear arms race and achieving nuclear disarmament.

Although it was not possible at this session of the Committee on Disarmament even to establish an ad hoc working group to initiate the relevant negotiations, my delegation intends to proceed with its efforts aimed at this goal. We hope that next year's session of the Committee and the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will give a new impetus towards starting such multilateral negotiations.

Pending nuclear disarmament, appropriate international measures should be taken to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. This is why my delegation highly appreciates the efforts of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances and of its able Chairman, Minister Ciarrapico of Italy, to elaborate an appropriate international instrument. The work of this Group deserves our special appreciation since it is closely connected with difficult and complex political, strategic and legal questions.

Having this in mind, we appreciate that within the Group the idea of elaborating an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is gaining more and more support. Such a step would also correspond to General Assembly resolutions 35/154 and 35/155.

In the course of the 1981 session the Working Group has done a great deal to explore ways and means of reaching agreement on a common formula acceptable to all which could be included in an appropriate international instrument. Many valuable proposals have been submitted in the Group. In this connection we highly estimate the efforts of the delegations of Bulgaria, the Netherlands and Pakistan.

As far as my delegation is concerned we would favour a common formula providing for the extension of security guarantees to all States which renounce the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and which have no nuclear weapons on their territories or under their jurisdiction or control, regardless of whether they are members of military alliances or not. Thus, our approach is based on two basic elements:

- (1) The nuclear-weapon-free status of countries which should receive the security assurances, and
- (2) The non-use commitment of nuclear-weapon States.

In this way, the overwhelming majority of States would receive security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons. We share the opinion expressed on 16 April 1981 by Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden that "without any exceptions all non-nuclear-weapon States which are legally committed to their nuclear-weapon-free status are entitled to unambiguous assurances that nuclear weapons will not be used against them" (CD/PV.125). I think the Swedish non-nuclear-weapon record is well-known to all of us.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

In our approach to the elaboration of a common formula we attach great importance to the non-stationing commitment. Here we proceed from the fact that the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of non-nuclear-weapon States would not only escalate the nuclear arms race but would also include the danger of a nuclear attack being launched from the territory of countries where nuclear weapons are stationed. Thus, the non-stationing formula could by no means be regarded as a condition, but rather as a basic element of a "common approach" to security assurances. It seems to be quite obvious that a State having foreign nuclear weapons on its territory could become the source of a nuclear threat. Could such a State really expect to receive security assurances?

We cannot agree to the argument that in the case of the stationing of foreign nuclear weapons on its territory, the country concerned was pressured to accept these weapons and has no control over them. On the contrary, it is the sovereign decision of the country concerned to accept nuclear weapons on its territory or not. Who else, if not its authorities, is in a position to decide on the use of its territory? Moreover, there are relevant examples, such as in the Western neighbourhood of my country, where a State not only accepted the stationing of thousands of nuclear weapons on its territory, but also takes part in decisions on their use.

Likewise we find it difficult to agree to the argument that a non-stationing commitment could not be verified. Such an approach would put into doubt all efforts to create nuclear-weapon-free zones, since a basic element of such zones is the obligation not to allow the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of the States concerned.

Thus, my delegation believes that the non-stationing question is by no means just a theoretical one. This becomes quite clear when we look at the international political environment. I believe that nobody here in this room can really deny the negative impact which the stationing of nuclear weapons on additional territories will have on the international situation, not to speak about disarmament negotiations. It is well known that there are plans to deploy new nuclear missiles in some West European countries and also in South Korea.

In this case, too, we observe an interesting phenomenon: while some people -- consciously or not -- tend to play down the dangers inherent in such steps, concerned citizens in such countries are realizing more and more the prospect of becoming "nuclear hostages". I think we should not neglect this.

Thus, let me once again stress that we see the non-stationing of nuclear weapons together with a non-acquisition commitment as part and parcel of a common approach to security assurances. The non-stationing formula would effectively complement the non-proliferation Treaty. In this regard we see much merit in the position put forward on 7 April 1981 by Ambassador Darusman of Indonesia when he stated that "with regard to the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present, this question should, in the opinion of the Indonesian delegation, be part of the obligation to be undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States. It is pertinent to note in this context that the obligation of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT, to which Indonesia belongs, is quite clear. The non-stationing of nuclear weapons in the territories of those States constitutes a further measure to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons". (CD/PV.122).

Having this in mind we favour very much the conclusion of an agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present. Such an international instrument would put a stop to the geographical spread of nuclear weapons and thereby reduce the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear conflict. It would also encourage efforts to create nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the world and create a useful basis for an agreement on security guarantees.

The Chairman: I thank the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Before beginning my statement, Mr. Chairman, I should like, on behalf of the Mongolian delegation, sincerely to congratulate you, the distinguished representative of the friendly country of Indonesia, on your accession to the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of August.

I should also like to express our gratitude to Ambassador Venkateswaran of India, who guided the work of the Committee last month with great skill.

At today's meeting the Mongolian delegation would like to speak on item 3 of the agenda, namely the question of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States against the use of nuclear weapons.

For the third year now, negotiations on this matter are going on in the Committee on Disarmament. For the past two years, the Ad Hoc Working Group has been doing all it can to consider this question thoroughly and it would seem that its task has been considerably lightened. For in fact all the nuclear-weapon Powers are sympathetic towards the demands of the non-nuclear-weapon States regarding the non-use of nuclear weapons against them, and the majority of non-nuclear-weapon States, for their part, declare that they are opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, it has not so far proved possible to reach an agreement on the question of assurances.

With the approach of the end of this year's summer session, the Ad Hoc Working Group will no doubt be considering what it has accomplished in its work. It will surely, then, not be superfluous to make some comments on the question under consideration in the Committee.

The Mongolian People's Republic has attached and continues to attach great importance to the provision of effective and reliable security assurances for States which do not possess nuclear weapons and which do not have them on their territories against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, considering this problem from the viewpoint of the whole complex of nuclear disarmament questions, and in particular that of the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons.

I would also recall our position to the effect that we are, as we have been, in favour of the speediest possible preparation of a draft international convention on this question, which would have binding force in equal measure both for nuclear-weapon and for non-nuclear-weapon States. Our position in this regard is based on the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament and well-known resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly.

Our proposals and observations on the question of the strengthening of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States are fully reflected in working paper CD/23, which was submitted by a group of socialist countries. Without going into details regarding the content of that document, I should like once again to stress that we are still, as before, convinced that in fact the preparation and conclusion of a convention on this question would be the most effective way of solving this important and urgent problem.

At the same time, the delegations of socialist countries, including the Mongolian delegation, have frequently stated that they are not opposed to the consideration, in addition, parallel to the preparation of a convention, of other ways of providing the non-nuclear-weapon States with assurances, in which all nuclear-weapon States would make declarations, either identical or similar in content, which would then be approved by the United Nations Security Council.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

While explaining the Mongolian delegation's position on the approach to a solution of the problem of strengthening security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, I should also like to touch on a number of topics under consideration in the Ad Hoc Working Group.

After completing the work of the first stage, including, in particular, identification of the various features of the assurances the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances embarked on the second stage of its consideration of this problem -- namely, discussion of the possible alternatives which might be explored in the search for a "common approach".

The Working Group is at present considering the texts of formulas put forward by the delegations of the Netherlands and Pakistan which have been commented on in some detail by the group of socialist countries, including my delegation. I should therefore like to make some observations of a general kind.

As regards the solution of the question of providing security assurances, the socialist countries have been and are in favour of a formula which would impose obligations to an equal degree both on the nuclear-weapon Powers -- not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States -- and on non-nuclear-weapon countries -- not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons and not to have them on their territory. Thus there are two basic principles for genuine non-nuclear status, namely the non-possession by the State of nuclear weapons and the non-stationing of such weapons on its territory. The question whether a non-nuclear-weapon State belongs to some military and political grouping or participates in some action of a nuclear-weapon Power is an entirely different matter.

I think there is no need for me to state the substance of the socialist countries proposals on this matter. I merely wish to say that a formula which requires the nuclear-weapon States to provide unilateral assurances does not solve the problem. Such an approach leaves open the possibility for the acquisition of nuclear weapons in the future in one form or another by non-nuclear-weapon countries.

What the Soviet Union and the socialist countries have proposed, in the matter of the granting of assurances, is the inclusion of a provision concerning the non-stationing of nuclear weapons. In fact, without a ban on the stationing of nuclear weapons, any assurances would undoubtedly be fraught with the danger of the territorial extension, that is, the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Such assurances could encourage nuclear-weapon States to station and perhaps to use nuclear weapons in the first instance from the territories of those States which have been granted assurances. The presence of foreign nuclear weapons on the territory of a non-nuclear-weapon State will automatically raise another problem: how to determine whose nuclear weapon was used, if such use were to take place. Those are the few comments my delegation wished to make at the present stage of the Committee's work on this subject.

Aware of the fact that the Ad Hoc Working Group is still confronted with many difficulties in its negotiations on the question of negative assurances, the Mongolian delegation is ready to continue to make efforts, in co-operation with other delegations, to find a positive solution to this important question.

In conclusion, I should like to draw the attention of the members of the Committee to document CD/201 of 30 July 1981, containing "The Appeal of the Great People's Khural of the Mongolian People's Republic to Parliaments of All Asian and Pacific Countries", which has been circulated as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Mongolia for his statement and the kind reference he made to the Chair.

Mr. FEIN (Netherlands): Mr. Chairman, yesterday at our informal plenary meeting I already had an opportunity to express the satisfaction of my delegation at seeing you as our Chairman for the month of August. Today, in this first formal plenary meeting, I wish to place on record the satisfaction of my Government, my delegation and of myself personally at welcoming you, the representative of Indonesia, with which my country has had such long-standing and strong ties, as our Chairman. We are looking forward to working with you in order to bring to a successful conclusion this year's session of the Committee on Disarmament, in so far as the international circumstances of today permit us.

Today I wish to introduce document CD/203, submitted by my delegation, concerning consultation and co-operation, verification measures and complaints procedure in the framework of a convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction.

Before doing so, however, may I acknowledge once again the crucial importance for our work in the Committee on Disarmament of a successful outcome of the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In an intervention on 2 April 1981 I said that it was a courageous political decision at the highest level that ten years ago provided a breakthrough with regard to the Biological Weapons Convention. I then expressed the hope that the same political courage and the same political wisdom would soon again prevail and lead to our common goal, a convention on chemical weapons. This hope we still hold, today.

We all know that virtually no substantial progress has been made of late in any field of arms control and disarmament. We are all aware of the expectations with regard to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament next year. We are also aware of the renewed hopes invested in the Committee on Disarmament since its transformation in 1978. That is why I wish to appeal once again to the Governments of the United States and of the Soviet Union, to resume their bilateral negotiations with respect to chemical weapons in the near future. A courageous political decision at the highest level allowing a breakthrough in the bilateral negotiations would surely further enhance the momentum noticeable lately in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons.

As for the mandate of Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons we have taken note of the statement of the Chairman of that Group, Ambassador Lidgard, at the 141st meeting of the Committee that no consensus could be reached on a revision of the present mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group. We regret that no such consensus emerged. We support the appeal contained in the final part of Ambassador Lidgard's statement. We hope very much that at the beginning of the 1982 session of the Committee on Disarmament a new mandate can be agreed upon enabling the Ad Hoc Working Group to elaborate, as a matter of high priority, a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

It is a well-known position of my delegation that verification is no means in itself but should rather serve as a component in a system that together with a meaningful scope and a reasonable amount of protective measures will give a State more national security than the maintenance of the chemical weapon option would do. Since such a system is as strong as its weakest link, it is of great importance to obtain the best possible verification procedures. Without adequate verification, States will not be confident that the provisions of a convention will be observed.

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

Like many other delegations here, we believe that within the framework of a chemical weapons convention, national and international measures of verification are complementary. After all, we are dealing with a proven weapon system, ready and available in large amounts. Therefore, verification items cannot be left to the fine print, but have to be stated clearly in the treaty itself.

I shall not tax the endurance of the Committee with a full exposé of all aspects of chemical weapons verification. Enough has been said about it in recent weeks. Moreover, the Canadian document, CD/167, and the Finnish document, CD/196, form, between them, a unique and substantial inventory of the ingredients for chemical weapons verification. On that score, the document which I have the honour to introduce today is self-explanatory. It stems from what we believe to be a down-to-earth approach reflecting plain realities and designed to take care of practical needs. Thereby it gives a complete outline of a reasonable, but effective, verification system, a cornerstone of an adequate and consistent convention on chemical weapons.

Given the close interrelationship between the scope and the means of verification, we hope that our document may contribute to a move forwards. Let me summarize the main characteristics of our proposals:

Consultation, co-operation, verification and complaints -- and this is an innovation -- are not treated individually but form elements of one integrated, consistent system;

National and international verification are therefore interlinked;

The establishment of national implementation agencies will be called for;

The national implementation agency will, inter alia, work closely together with a consultative committee to be established;

The consultative committee should permanently oversee the destruction or diversion for permitted purposes of declared stocks of chemical weapons;

The consultative committee must carry out the supervision of the destruction and diversion through on-site inspections on a permanent basis;

Through random on-site inspections the consultative committee will check periodically that the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals does not exceed agreed quantities;

With a view to enhancing confidence the consultative committee should undertake inspections on a random basis at facilities on the territory of States parties that will on a regular basis be assigned by lot;

The consultative committee shall be competent to enquire into facts concerning alleged ambiguities in, or violations of, the compliance with the convention;

In the context of such an enquiry the consultative committee would be competent to undertake on-site inspections after consultation with the State party concerned. If the latter State party, however, does not agree to such an on-site inspection, it must provide appropriate explanations;

Each State party to the convention may use national technical means of verification;

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

Complaints can be lodged with the Security Council. Each State party undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate.

As delegations will notice, we have refrained in our document from relating the organizational framework outlined therein to the Netherlands proposal, also supported by many others, concerning the establishment of an international disarmament organization. This is no omission. It is rather a reflection of our wish to provide the Committee on Disarmament with a practical manual rather than with the outline of more far-reaching, maybe less immediate objectives.

Nonetheless, for us these objectives do exist and it might be useful to recall them briefly in this context. One should, of course, not elaborate a chemical weapons convention in order to fall in line with one's wish to have an international disarmament organization. It should of course, rather be the other way round: if the organizational framework for the implementation of a chemical weapons convention and other arms control agreements, between them, would call for a streamlined universal, rational "servicing" agency, well, then an international disarmament organization might be helpful. It stands to reason that while establishing a verification system as well as a consultations and complaints procedure for a chemical weapons convention, one might usefully draw on the experience gained elsewhere. In this context, as my distinguished colleague from Morocco pointed out on 23 July, the example of IAEA springs to mind. In fact, IAEA has more than amply demonstrated its usefulness in the framework of IPT and the Tlatelolco Treaty. Multilateral consultative organs are provided for not only by the non-proliferation and Tlatelolco Treaties, but also by the Environmental Modification Convention. Future treaties such as the chemical weapons convention and the comprehensive test-ban treaty are hardly conceivable without similar tools and machinery to make them work. Other types of agreements which would require an operational framework for servicing verification and implementation are:

Agreements establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones;

Agreements on the prohibition or restriction of certain conventional weapons;

Agreements on the reduction of military budgets;

Regional arms control and confidence-building measures.

Bringing together the implementation and verification systems of such treaties -- including possible information from international satellite monitoring arrangements -- into one dependable and specialized world-wide servicing organization under United Nations auspices would cut operational costs considerably and warrant a rational over-all performance.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of the Netherlands for his statement and for the kind words of welcome he addressed to me.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, as I have had the privilege of witnessing your brilliant performance as the permanent representative of Indonesia to the United Nations, it is a matter of particular satisfaction to me to see you now guiding the deliberations of this the only multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament. We are convinced that the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament could not be in better hands during the period that is beginning today, the period that is always the longest in each session, in the present

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

case extending up to the beginning of 1982. My delegation would also like once more to congratulate your predecessor, Ambassador Venkateswaran, the distinguished representative of India, for the efficiency with which he guided our work during the month of July.

As members of the Committee know, rule 25 of the rules of procedure of the Committee on Disarmament reads as follows:

"The approval by consensus of reports shall not be interpreted as affecting in any manner the essential requirement that such reports must reflect faithfully the positions of all the members of the respective organs."

The purpose of that provision was to ensure that one of the abuses of the consensus rule which occurred in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on more than one occasion should not be repeated in the Committee on Disarmament.

Working paper CD/204 which has just been circulated, and which I have the honour to introduce today on behalf of its sponsors, the delegations of Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden, Yugoslavia and Mexico, has a similar purpose with respect to the abuse of the consensus rule that has been taking place in order to prevent the establishment of working groups. This is explained in the "Commentary" included in the document, which also summarizes the main facts relevant to this matter and which reads as follows:

"Since February 1980, the Group of 21, in its statement issued the 27 of that month as document CD/64, declared that it was 'the considered view of the Group of 21 that working groups are the best available machinery for conduct of concrete negotiations within the Committee on Disarmament'. It added therefore that 'the Group of 21 in principle supports the establishment of working groups on the items on its annual agenda'.

"This position of the Group of 21 has been subsequently reiterated in the statements CD/72 of 4 March 1980, CD/116 of 9 July 1980, CD/134 of 6 August 1980, CD/180 of 24 April 1981, CD/181 of the same date and CD/192 of 8 July 1981. In all these statements special emphasis has been placed on the necessity and urgency of establishing working groups on the first two items of the Committee's agenda, particularly on the first of such items entitled 'Nuclear test ban'.

"For reasons well known to all members of the Committee it has been so far impossible to implement the repeated and well substantiated proposals of the Group of 21 to which reference has just been made. The delegations sponsoring the present working paper believe that the paralysis of an important section of the negotiating function of the Committee which has thus occurred is contrary to the spirit of the rule of consensus included in rule 13 of the rules of procedure of the Committee. Consequently the delegations have decided to submit this document with the intention that it may be studied by the members of the Committee during its recess. Thus, if, upon initiation of the Committee's session corresponding to 1982, it were not yet possible to give effect to the repeated requests of the Group of 21, the proposal may be formally considered in plenary session by the negotiating organ."

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Mexico for his statement and for the very kind words he addressed to me.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Allow me first of all, Mr. Chairman, to congratulate you on your accession to the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament. I have already -- yesterday -- had the opportunity of reminding you of our co-operation with you in New York, when you were the permanent representative of Indonesia to the United Nations. We wish you success in the difficult task of being Chairman of the Committee for the month of August, the concluding month of our work in 1981. We offer our greetings and respect to the representative of India and would ask him to convey them to Ambassador Venkateswaran, who is apparently now resting from the heavy burden he bore during the month of July, with our best wishes for his speedy recovery and return to our family.

Today I should like to refer to a number of topics, and in the first place to the very important question of the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. This is a major political issue and interest in it is great. There are good reasons for this, for it involves the security interests of all States, both nuclear-weapon States and, more particularly, States which do not possess nuclear weapons. On the solution of this question depends the strengthening of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the averting of the threat of nuclear war.

The Soviet Union views with understanding the non-nuclear-weapon States' justified desire to receive, from the nuclear-weapon Powers, reliable guarantees that nuclear weapons will not be used against them. The basis of our view is that States which renounce the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and do not permit them to be stationed on their territory are making a substantial contribution to the lessening, and ultimately to the removal, of the threat of the outbreak of a nuclear war. These States have the right to receive the requisite assurances that nuclear weapons will not be used against them. Such assurances have in fact been given by the Soviet Union.

Our formula, which we have spoken about many times, both at plenary meetings and in the Ad Hoc Working Group, is clear and simple. It excludes from the sphere of application of the assurances only those non-nuclear-weapon States which permit -- I repeat, which permit -- nuclear weapons to be stationed on their territory. The Soviet formula makes no distinction between non-nuclear-weapon States which participate in military alliances and those which do not. It extends its formula to non-nuclear-weapon States in both categories. The Soviet formula makes no distinction between participants and non-participants in nuclear-weapon-free-zones: it grants assurances both to participants and to non-participants in such zones.

Whatever attempts may be made to distort the Soviet Union's position or to interpret it tendentiously, the undeniable fact is that the Soviet formula guarantees the security of the overwhelming majority of non-nuclear-weapon States. In this connection I should like to refer to the statement made by Comrade Voutov, Ambassador of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, in which he entirely correctly proved, with the help of figures, that only a very few non-nuclear-weapon States are outside the scope of our guarantees whereas the formula of the assurances of the other nuclear-weapon Powers covers a much smaller number of States.

The Soviet Union's genuine readiness and desire to meet the legitimate and justified demands of the States that do not possess nuclear weapons have recently been demonstrated in statements by the head of the Soviet State, Leonid Ilich Brezhnev, to which we have referred on a number of occasions. We should, however, like to draw particular attention to President Brezhnev's recent

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replies to questions by a correspondent of the Finnish newspaper, Suomen Sosiali Demokraatti. In these replies he stressed that, in the interests of strengthening the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States of northern Europe, the Soviet Union is ready to proceed to a possible consideration of questions concerning several other measures relating to the Soviet Union's own territory in the region adjoining a nuclear-free-zone in northern Europe. This is in essence a new development. No other nuclear-weapon State has expressed readiness to consider measures relating to its own territory. This is, too, further clear evidence of our sincere desire to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States and a manifestation of our readiness to seek other possible mutually acceptable ways of achieving these lofty aims.

We consider that the work of the Committee's Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances has been positive, on the whole. Useful and thorough discussions have been held in the Group on this subject, in the course of which the viewpoints of the various countries have been compared and clarified and the points on which the positions coincided, approximated or diverged brought out more clearly. In addition, the substance of the various countries' positions was made clear on the main aspects of this problem. The idea of concluding a convention again received wide support in principle. In connection with the Working Group, it is impossible not to note the energetic efforts and positive contribution of its Chairman, Mr. Ciarrapico.

The Soviet delegation, together with the delegations of other socialist countries, has participated actively in the negotiations on the question of security assurances. Unfortunately, such an active role was not forthcoming on the part of a number of other nuclear-weapon Powers. As a result, it was not possible to make real progress in the strengthening of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. At the same time, we are satisfied to note that the majority of delegations participated constructively in the negotiations and certain of them made proposals that are worthy of attention. The results of the negotiations can and should be utilized in the course of further deliberations on the problem of strengthening security assurances for States not possessing nuclear weapons.

I should like now to refer briefly to the subject of the prohibition of radiological weapons. In the light of the meetings held, during the current session of the Committee on Disarmament, by the Committee itself and by its Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, and also of the informal consultations on various aspects of a treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons, I should like today to dwell briefly on the results of our work on this question and at the same time to glance ahead, as it were, and offer certain comments on a possible way of moving forward.

As the members of the Committee are aware, we are approaching the end of our 1981 session, the end, that is, of the third year of our consideration of this matter, without having managed to reach agreement on the key problems of the instrument being drafted -- definition, scope of the prohibition and peaceful co-operation.

We have devoted a large part of our work on this agenda item, at least during the summer part of the session, to discussing how to deal with the proposal -- a very important and, I would say, pertinent proposal -- for the inclusion in a radiological weapons treaty of provisions concerning the protection of civilian nuclear facilities from attack.

At the last meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, the Soviet delegation stated its views on this question in detail. We indicated the way which, we believe, could lead the Committee out of the impasse both as regards

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further work on a radiological weapons treaty and as regards solving the problem of the protection of civilian nuclear facilities from attack. In other words it would be possible, in our view, to find a mutually acceptable solution to the problem of the protection of civilian nuclear facilities from attack if other delegations, too, would display the requisite flexibility and a spirit of compromise. Otherwise, we shall be unable to complete the work on a treaty on radiological weapons, and the question of protecting civilian nuclear facilities will likewise remain unresolved -- not to mention the fact that the Committee will be demonstrating its inability to solve the problems even in this relatively uncomplicated matter.

Solutions can also, we think, be found for other basic questions. The Group has not so far, for example, discussed the Chairman's revised texts relating to the key problems of definition and peaceful uses, which he submitted to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons last Friday. It seems to us, after a preliminary study of these new versions of the articles in the Chairman's texts, that they could form a good basis for the achievement of agreement, with due regard for the mutually acceptable settlement of other related questions.

All this shows that towards the end of this session we have seen a certain advance which permits us to hope that we may manage to find a way out of the present situation. In other words, we have some thing to consider as possible compromise solutions, but of course it will probably still be difficult for us to do this in what is left of the present session.

For these reasons we could, as other delegations have already done, support the proposal of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, -- Comrade Komives, Ambassador of the Hungarian People's Republic -- a proposal which he made during the informal consultations and then repeated at the Group's meeting on 31 July, that this Group should continue or resume its work in January 1982, i.e. somewhat earlier than the beginning of the next session of the Committee on Disarmament. We think that the additional time in January 1982 will give us an opportunity to work carefully and with due deliberation on the unresolved questions and, we hope, to complete the drafting of a treaty on radiological weapons before the beginning of the General Assembly's second special session devoted to disarmament.

A number of organizational questions related to the holding of meetings of the Group in January can be settled if we agree in principle on the approach proposed by the Chairman.

The Soviet delegation expresses the hope that all the other members of the Committee will be guided by the same constructive approach so as to create a sound basis for progress in the completion of the work on the prohibition of radiological weapons at our next meeting.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me.

Mr. BRIMAH (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, permit me to join other delegations which have congratulated you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of August. My delegation is confident that under your chairmanship the Committee will effectively conclude its work for the 1981 session; and I pledge my delegation's fullest co-operation. Taking the floor for the first time, having been held up elsewhere this morning -- I had to rush back in order to take the floor -- I must also vouch my full and unalloyed support and co-operation to you and to all members of this Committee for the successful fulfilment of its most important assignments. In the same vein, my delegation would like to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Venkateswaran of India, for the valuable contribution he made to the work of the Committee during the tedious month of July.

My intervention today is merely to associate myself with the views just expressed by the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico on the issue of the establishment of subsidiary organs. As a co-sponsor of the working paper, CD/204, dated 30 July 1981, my delegation fully shares the views and proposal contained in the working paper.

We have had the opportunity to stress our delegation's regret that it has not been possible to establish ad hoc working groups on items 1 and 2 of the agenda. The present stalemate which has arisen, through no fault of the overwhelming majority of members of this Committee, puts into serious question the negotiating status of this Committee. In fact, the impressions gathered from within and outside this Committee often point to the failure of this Committee to live up to its negotiating role. Certain nuclear-weapon States have continued to demonstrate lack of concern for the vital security interests of the non-nuclear-weapon States that desire progress in disarmament negotiations.

The "raison d'être" of this Committee is to negotiate, and we believe that items inscribed on the agenda are meant to be negotiated upon. We recognize the strained international climate which has "cast a dark cloud" on the work of this Committee, but we believe that substantive negotiations on such priority items as a comprehensive test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament will in themselves greatly help to improve the present climate. This is the urgent and legitimate concern of the international community as we approach the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We firmly believe that progress in negotiations in this Committee, especially in the field of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, will considerably strengthen international peace and security. We therefore fully endorse the proposals already tabled in this Committee by the Group of 21 in document CD/64 and reiterated most recently in documents CD/180 and 181 that ad hoc working groups provide the best machinery for the conduct of concrete negotiations within the Committee.

Finally, my delegation is well aware of the fact that the outlook for the present four working groups accomplishing their task within the next 12 months remains bleak. The political will needed to make progress continues to be withheld for no other reason than that of political expediency for the States concerned. As Ambassador Adeniji has stated on several occasions in this Committee, there is still time for a change of heart. During our recess, Mr. Chairman let those States who have caused the present paralysis on the Committee harken to the "cry of mankind all over the world for détente, not defence, for development not rearmament".

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Nigeria for his intervention and for his kind reference to the Chair.

Mr. YU Peiwen (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, my statement today will be on the question of the providing of security assurances by nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States.

Allow me first, in the name of the Chinese delegation, warmly to congratulate you, Your Excellency, Ambassador Anwar Sani of Indonesia, on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of August. In the course of performing your duties as Chairman, you may rest assured of the full co-operation of my delegation. We are convinced that, thanks to your guidance, the Committee will smoothly fulfil its tasks in the last month of its summer session.

I would like to express our thanks to your predecessor, His Excellency, Ambassador Venkateswaran of India, for the efforts and contributions he made in conducting the proceedings of the Committee on Disarmament during the month of July.

The Chinese delegation has listened attentively to the statements made by other delegates on the question of the providing of security assurances by nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States. We think that the views put forward by a number of delegates merit our attention and will be helpful towards a positive settlement of the question.

I would like now to present briefly some views and suggestions on this matter.

China's position on the question of the provision of security assurances by nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States has been explained time and again at various meetings of the United Nations, the Committee on Disarmament and the ad hoc Working Group. Allow me here briefly to recall our consistent position on this question.

As early as 1963, the Chinese Government issued a statement proposing the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons.

In order to break the nuclear monopoly, China tested its first atomic bomb in 1964. On the day the test succeeded, the Chinese Government reiterated the above position and declared that China would never at any time and under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons, nor would it use them against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones.

In his statement on 29 May 1978, at the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, Mr. Huang Hua, Foreign Minister of China, stated that, in order to reduce the threat of nuclear war to small and medium-sized countries, a measure of urgency is for all nuclear-weapon States to undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones.

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At the plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament on 5 February 1980, Mr. Zhang Wenjing, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of China, pointed out that the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons are essential for the elimination of nuclear war and the nuclear threat. We are aware that its realization is no easy matter. This being the case, the nuclear-weapon States should at least undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones.

From this recapitulation it can be clearly seen that, on its own initiative and unilaterally, the Chinese Government declared long ago that it would unconditionally undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones.

In August 1973, China signed Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, thereby undertaking not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the nuclear-weapon-free zone and the non-nuclear-weapon States of Latin America.

In accordance with the above position, the Chinese delegation holds that it is legitimate and reasonable for the numerous non-nuclear-weapon States to oppose nuclear threats and to require that security assurances be provided by nuclear-weapon States and that all the nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them.

It has been our consistent view that the fundamental security guarantees to be provided by the nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States should be the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons. However, as the nuclear-weapon States have hitherto failed to provide such guarantees, they should at least give the non-nuclear-weapon States negative security assurances, that is, the unconditional commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them.

Should the nuclear-weapon States, in providing such negative assurances, impose various requirements and conditions on the non-nuclear-weapon States, would this not be tantamount to demanding security assurances from the non-nuclear-weapon States?

In fact, it is the two Superpowers with their enormous nuclear arsenals that pose a serious threat to the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. The non-nuclear-weapon States lack adequate defence capabilities; therefore, the nuclear-weapon States have the obligation to give the non-nuclear-weapon States negative security assurances. This obligation cannot be shirked under any pretext whatsoever. Pending the realization of nuclear disarmament, this is the least the nuclear-weapon States should undertake to do towards the non-nuclear-weapon States.

Except for a few States, the overwhelming majority of States have, in one way or another, assumed the obligation not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons. Although some States have reached the necessary scientific and technological levels to manufacture nuclear weapons, they still abide by such obligations. Some nuclear-weapon States, while totally disregarding their own vertical nuclear proliferation and continuously expanding their own nuclear arsenals, clamour about the prevention of

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horizontal nuclear proliferation among the non-nuclear-weapon States, and even attempt to deprive those States of the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy or seek to restrict such a right. This is obviously unfair and is an infringement of the sovereign rights of States. As the Superpowers are constantly expanding their nuclear arsenals and carrying out nuclear threats, it is only by halting vertical nuclear proliferation that horizontal nuclear proliferation can be prevented. This is self-evident.

China is opposed to major power nuclear monopoly. Like many other peace-loving countries, China does not advocate or encourage nuclear proliferation. And we are emphatically opposed to any production of nuclear weapons by racists and expansionists such as South Africa and Israel.

To sum up, negative security assurances given by the nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States are only a transitional measure to be adopted pending nuclear disarmament. The nuclear-weapon States should recognize the fact that the non-nuclear-weapon States find themselves menaced by the danger of nuclear war and nuclear threats, and that it is the strong demand of the peoples of the world that the Superpowers halt the arms race and carry out nuclear disarmament. The nuclear-weapon States should unconditionally guarantee not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States without further delay and, at the same time, they should take effective measures to carry out nuclear disarmament until the ultimate goal of complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons is achieved.

Finally, the Chinese delegation reiterates that China has unilaterally undertaken the unconditional commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and suggests that, when an international convention on security assurances is elaborated, the inclusion of such commitments should be taken into consideration. We are also prepared to work together with other delegates in the Committee on Disarmament in a continued effort to search for a common formula for security assurances which will conform to the requirements of the non-nuclear-weapon States and will be acceptable to all the nuclear-weapon States.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the Ambassador of China for his statement and for the kind reference he made to the Chair.

Distinguished colleagues, you will recall that the Committee adopted, at its 142nd plenary meeting, a timetable of meetings to be held by the Committee and its subsidiary bodies during the present week. On that occasion, my predecessor noted that no meeting was scheduled for Friday afternoon. He also noted that the Chair

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would inform the Committee on how best to utilize the time made available. I have consulted with the Chairman of the ad hoc Working Groups and, at the request of the Chairman of the ad hoc Working Group on Security Assurances, we agreed to recommend to the Committee that the afternoon meeting of Friday, 7 August, be allocated for a meeting of that Working Group, which would start at 3 p.m. If there is no objection, I take it that the Committee agrees to this recommendation.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 6 August at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.