

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-SECOND MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 30 July 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN (India)

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. M. MATI
Mr. A. HELLAL

Argentina: Mr. J.C. CARASALES
Mr. J.F. GOMENSORO
Ms. N. NASCIMBENE

Australia: Mr. R. STEELE

Belgium: Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VCUTOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. K. PRAMOV
Mr. R. DEYANOV

Burma: U NGWE WIN
U THAN HTUN

Canada: Mr. G.R. SKINNER

China: Mr. YU Peiwen
Mr. YU Mengjia
Mrs. WANG Zhiyum
Mr. LIN Chen

Cuba: Mr. F.O. RODRIGUEZ

Czechoslovakia: Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. J. FRANEK
Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt:

Mr. M. EL REEDY

Mr. I.A. HASSAN

Mr. N. FAHMY

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE

Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE

Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE

Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER

Mr. H. THIELICKE

Mr. M. KAULFUSS

Mrs. H. HOPPE

Mr. M. NOETZEL

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. G. PFEIFFER

Mr. N. KLINGLER

Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES

Mr. A. LAKATOS

India:

Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN

Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. A. SANI

Mr. M. SIDIK

Mr. HARYOMATARAM

Mr. F. QASIM

Mr. W. ACHDIAK

Iran:

Mr. T. AFSAR

Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA

Italy:

Mr. A. CIARRAPICO
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. M. BARENGHI
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANAKA
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya:Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG

Morocco:

Mr. M. ARRASSEN
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS
Mr. A. J.J. OOMS

Nigeria:

Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. M. AKRAM
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Romania:

Mr. M. MALITA
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. T. JAYAKODDY

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Yugoslavia:

Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. B.A. NZENGEYA

Secretary of the Committee and
Personal Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

Non-Member Representatives:

Austria
Norway

Mr. E. Nettel
Mr. K. Lie

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee continues today its consideration of item 3 of its agenda, "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". Of course, members wishing to make statements on any other subject are at liberty to do so, in accordance with rule 30 of our rules of procedure.

Mr. YU Peiwen (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, today, I wish to make a general statement on some of the important questions under discussion and negotiation during the summer session of the Committee on Disarmament.

At the outset, allow me to congratulate Your Excellency sincerely on your assumption of the chairmanship of our Committee for the month of July. The tasks before us are arduous and complicated. In the period of nearly one month, you have made a valuable contribution to the work of the Committee on Disarmament. I am especially pleased that the relations between the great country, India, that you represent and my country, the People's Republic of China, have undergone a new development. I am confident that the strengthening of friendly relations between our two countries will be of positive significance to the maintenance of world peace.

At the same time, I also wish to avail myself of this opportunity to express our thanks to your predecessor, Ambassador Komives, the representative of Hungary, for the achievements made under his chairmanship during the month of June. I would also like to extend our welcome to Mr. Jalali, the Ambassador of Iran, and Mr. Rodriguez Navarro, the Ambassador of Venezuela, on their participation in the work of the Committee on Disarmament.

During the current session of the Committee on Disarmament, the Chinese delegation has already stated its views on some of the items at the Committee's plenary meetings and, in particular, at the meetings of the working groups. Now I only wish to make some brief comments on some of the items under consideration and negotiation.

Disarmament is a matter of great importance to world peace and the security of all countries. The evolution of the world situation, both regional and global, will certainly influence the progress of disarmament negotiations. It is inconceivable that substantive progress could be made in the disarmament negotiations at a time when the world situation is marked by turmoil and tension and when the security of States and world peace are not adequately ensured. Any acts of foreign aggression, occupation or intervention occurring in any country or any region, such as those presently seen in Kampuchea, Afghanistan and the Middle East, inevitably bring consequences inimical to the disarmament negotiations. However, some people are reluctant to link the disarmament negotiations with the grave problems emerging in the international situation. They even accusingly term such a linkage as a deviation from the disarmament negotiations and a hindrance to the business-like practice in the Committee on Disarmament. We find this hard to understand.

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We are of the view that disarmament negotiations should not be conducted in an "ivory tower", far from realities. Such a practice is bound to lead them astray and will be criticized by the international community. Consequently, in discussing and negotiating disarmament issues, we must pay attention to their linkage with the realities of the international situation and with the present state of armaments. Only thus will the Committee on Disarmament be able to make substantive progress in its work. At the same time, we must also pay attention to the voice of the peoples of the world calling urgently for disarmament, as this is a positive factor promoting the cause of disarmament.

Both nuclear disarmament and the cessation of nuclear testing are priority items on the agenda of each session of the Committee on Disarmament. The numerous small and medium-sized countries urgently demand the consideration of these two issues because they find that the nuclear arms race between the Superpowers and their nuclear arms expansion have created a serious danger of nuclear war.

The Chinese Government is resolutely opposed to the nuclear arms race and nuclear war. It has consistently stood for the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons and demanded that the two Superpowers be the first to substantially reduce their nuclear armaments. As early as the beginning of the 1960s, the Chinese Government put forward specific proposals on nuclear disarmament, including the prohibition of nuclear testing and of the production and use of nuclear weapons, and the reduction and destruction of nuclear weapons. These are interrelated measures. To stress a certain measure alone, such as the banning of nuclear testing, can in no way halt the Superpowers in their nuclear arms expansion, and still less can it reduce their nuclear arsenals. So how can one talk about the cessation of the nuclear arms race or about lessening the danger of nuclear war?

The prohibition of nuclear tests and nuclear disarmament are connected with each other. The prohibition of nuclear tests by itself cannot bring about nuclear disarmament. It can be conducive to the lessening and elimination of the nuclear threat only when it is combined with various other measures of nuclear disarmament.

The numerous small and medium-sized countries demand that the two Superpowers take the lead in reducing armaments. For in terms of both nuclear and conventional armaments, they have far surpassed any other country in the world. They should not advocate universal disarmament while totally disregarding the present state of armaments. In fact, their armaments have far exceeded their defence needs and thus have become tools of aggression and expansion, and tools in their rivalry for hegemony. But the armaments of the numerous small and medium-sized countries are the necessary means for defending their independence and security against foreign aggression. In order to prevent a world war, it is necessary to call on the two Superpowers to be the first to reduce drastically their armaments in a balanced way. Only after progress has been made in this regard, will it then be possible for the other nuclear-weapon States and militarily significant States to join them in a further reduction of armaments according to rational procedures and ratios. As for the peace-loving small and medium-sized countries, their defence capabilities are usually inadequate and therefore they should not be the target countries of disarmament.

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It is the strong demand of the numerous non-nuclear-weapon States that security assurances be given to them by the nuclear-weapon States. This is fully legitimate and necessary. As for the question of negative security assurances now under discussion in the Committee and in the Working Group concerned, the nuclear-weapon States should undertake binding obligations to provide guarantees to the non-nuclear-weapon States, and they should in no way make unreasonable demands of any kind to the non-nuclear-weapon States. This should be a fundamental principle to be followed by the nuclear-weapon States on this question. To do otherwise would make it difficult to achieve substantive progress in our discussions and negotiations.

The Committee on Disarmament attaches great importance to the elaboration of the "comprehensive programme of disarmament", in preparation for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament to be held in 1982. To this end, the Committee and the Ad Hoc Working Group on a CPD have conducted discussions and negotiations over a fairly long period. Certain progress has so far been achieved in negotiations on some substantive questions, such as the principles and measures, the time-limits and stages of disarmament. However, as the contents to be included in the CPD are rather extensive and complicated, further efforts are needed before we can realize the aim we anticipated.

We are confronted with numerous problems in the field of disarmament. The representatives of various groups and countries have already submitted quite a number of documents of a partial or comprehensive nature relating to the CPD in the Committee and the Working Group. Such being the case, it is necessary to define the relations between various questions and to identify priorities. In addition, we feel that it might be desirable to concentrate our efforts first on working out disarmament measures to be included in the first stage of the CPD and then to proceed to the consideration of other stages. The former should be relatively specific while the latter only calls for an indicative outline.

Up to now, various groups and countries have put forward their respective working papers on the CPD. This is helpful in the drafting of the programme, and it can be expected that some more papers will be submitted. In order to facilitate the consideration of the elements of the programme being drafted, we think it may be necessary for the Secretariat to compile a paper incorporating the proposals of the various groups and countries and to distribute it to the delegations as a basis for discussions and negotiations. This will, we believe, facilitate our future discussions and negotiations and accelerate the progress of our work.

The task of disarmament must include the two aspects of conventional and nuclear disarmament. The Superpowers regard their conventional and nuclear armaments as inseparable parts of their military strength. Nuclear weapons are their major deterrents and means of blackmail, while conventional weapons are their tools frequently used for aggression. Therefore, while emphasizing nuclear disarmament, we cannot overlook conventional disarmament. Conventional and nuclear disarmament should be carried out in conjunction. This is necessary for world peace and the

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security of the numerous small and medium-sized countries. Attaching importance to conventional disarmament in no way means ignoring the importance of nuclear disarmament, nor does it imply underestimating the destructive power of nuclear war. Even less would it affect the priority status of nuclear disarmament. Whether or not the Superpowers agree to carry out nuclear and conventional disarmament is the real test of their good faith in promoting disarmament. The Committee on Disarmament has all along concerned itself with the discussion of the issue of nuclear disarmament, but has not discussed the issue of conventional disarmament. This year, at its session in May, the United Nations Disarmament Commission considered the question of conventional disarmament. The Chinese delegation hopes that the Committee on Disarmament will also in the future do likewise, for this will be beneficial to the cause of disarmament as a whole.

Lastly, I turn to the questions of the organization of the work and the efficiency of the Committee on Disarmament. On these questions, the representatives of various countries have engaged in fairly lengthy discussions at informal meetings — a fact which demonstrates the general concern for these matters. During the discussions, they submitted various proposals regarding future progress in the work of the Committee. Quite a few of these proposals are constructive and acceptable to us, and we will also consider the other proposals.

The Committee on Disarmament has failed to make marked progress in its work. We believe that the crux of the matter lies in the lack of sincere readiness for disarmament, and in the discrepancy between words and deeds. This has hindered progress in the negotiation of some of the disarmament items.

Some delegates treat the negotiating organs of the Committee and its working groups as forums for propaganda. They constantly quote from all kinds of speeches, declarations and documents, taking up a great deal of the Committee's time to no avail. If this situation can be changed, the efficiency of the Committee would be enhanced. It is clear that the failure to make the hoped-for progress in our disarmament negotiations is not primarily due to the lack of time. Of course, we can also go along with the idea that we allocate more time to our work if the developments of the negotiations so require.

It seems to us that the question of the composition of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament is either one of maintaining the status quo or of allowing an appropriate increase, and not one of reducing the number of members. We have no difficulty in this regard and are ready to accept a consensus.

With regard to the question of participation by non-member States in the Committee's activities, the Chinese delegation is of the view that all Members of the United Nations and its specialized agencies have the right to participate in some of the CD's activities, provided that such participation does not run counter to the United Nations Charter or the rules and regulations of the specialized agencies concerned. No State or group of States should, for political or other reasons, discriminate against any non-member State or deprive it of its legitimate rights, for this would be contrary to the purposes of the cause of disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Yu Peiwen for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. EL REEDY (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Mr. Chairman, in approaching today the question of negative security guarantees, I wish to begin by reiterating the obvious fact that neither the nuclear-weapon States nor the non-nuclear-weapon States can feel truly secure as long as the present ominous and escalating nuclear arms race continues unabated and as long as there is no agreement prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons -- weapons whose use would be an affront to the whole human civilization and a threat to human survival. Our subject today is clearly linked to this question.

When the international community decided to establish a régime to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the question arose of the need to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the possible use of nuclear weapons by the nuclear Powers. The crucial factor in this régime is the undertaking by the vast majority of non-nuclear-weapon States to forgo the nuclear option and to agree to place their facilities for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under an international system of safeguards and inspection. It was therefore only natural that these States would demand in turn that the nuclear-weapon States undertake not to use such weapons against them. This demand was recognized from the beginning as reasonable, just and legitimate.

The five nuclear weapon States responded to this demand in the declarations they made during and after the tenth special session of the General Assembly. These declarations which were made individually by the nuclear-weapon States were not the subject of prior negotiations undertaken with the non-nuclear-weapon States with regard to their contents. We welcomed these declarations as a positive step along the road of assuring the non-nuclear weapon States. However, along with other non-nuclear-weapon States, we have been aware of the fact that these declarations fail to provide a full assurance. The non-nuclear-weapon States, having given a complete and internationally verifiable undertaking to forgo the nuclear option, are certainly entitled to a full assurance that these weapons will not be used against them. On the other hand, these declarations, with the exception of the Chinese declaration which more closely meets the requirements, contain provisions which allow an escape from the assurance either through reserving to the nuclear-weapon States the power to interpret the conditions in which the assurance would not be applicable, or by merely declaring the intention to negotiate to give assurance to groups of States establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, a matter which is beyond the power of an

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individual non-nuclear-weapon State. In general, it became clear that these declarations which vary in their nature and in their scope and differ on the conditions of their coming into operation, do not in their totality provide a sufficient assurance to the non-nuclear-weapon States, aside from the ambiguity of their binding legal nature.

Consequently, it became obvious that more effective assurances are needed, that is to say, assurances which would be of a legally binding character, and whose operation would be based clearly on objective criteria. It was with this in mind that the General Assembly requested our Committee to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Ad Hoc Working Group on this question was established, and I take this opportunity to express to its current Chairman, Minister Antonio Ciarrapico of the Italian delegation our appreciation of his persistent and excellent efforts, and we also wish to thank the Chairman and all delegations who have contributed to the Group's work through the submission of working drafts and papers.

But we cannot fail to notice that the debate on this question has taken a turn away from its original objective, that is, to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States. Instead of maintaining this as the goal of our endeavours, a great deal of effort has been spent on matters such as those related to the military and strategic doctrines espoused by the big Powers.

The underlying cause for this, in our view, is the reluctance of most of the nuclear-weapon States to engage themselves in a commitment on the non-use of nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States. A readiness to undertake such a commitment is obviously required if we are to have real progress on the road to the provision of assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. The fundamental question is not in what legal form or instrument the assurance should be given, but rather the existence of the political will on the part of the nuclear Powers to commit themselves, individually or collectively, to giving the unambiguous and clear-cut assurance to which I have just referred. We would not attempt to simplify the question. We know that it is complex. But we believe that an approach involving military doctrines, power politics and big-Power strategies would not help in reaching a solution either. On the contrary, such an approach may further complicate the problem.

We proceed from the belief that there is a supreme interest recognized by all with regard to the absolute necessity of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In our view, the non-nuclear-weapon States, the majority of which have engaged themselves in legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons, and have agreed to place their peaceful nuclear facilities under the international

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system of safeguards and verification, and the majority of which also belong to the non-aligned movement, have already done their share in the cause of non-proliferation. The onus is now on the nuclear-weapon States, which have chosen to pursue horizontal non-proliferation while maintaining and even increasing their arsenals of nuclear weapons. It is only reasonable and logical to demand from them an undertaking not to use such weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States.

We therefore appeal once again to the nuclear-weapon States to respond positively to this just demand, and to demonstrate their readiness to provide the non-nuclear-weapon States with the required guarantees, which should be effective. This would undoubtedly contribute to the creation of an atmosphere of confidence and stability in the relations between the nuclear-weapon States on the one hand and the non-nuclear-weapon States on the other. It would also be a great contribution to the efforts exerted to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador El Reedy for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. FEIN (Netherlands): My delegation has already paid its compliments to you, Mr. Chairman, but this being the last day of your chairmanship I do not wish to miss the opportunity of thanking you for the manner in which you have presided over us during the current month.

Today I wish to make a statement of a somewhat technical nature, as a follow-up to my statement of 14 April 1981, concerning negative security assurances. I intend to comment on and -- I hope -- clarify certain aspects of the common formula which we suggested at the end of that statement and which since then has been circulated as document CD/SA/CRP.6. In my comments, today, I shall also take into account some, if not all, of the remarks that have been made since then by various delegations in our discussions on negative security assurances. For the sake of convenience allow me first to read out once again the suggested formula, which, we hope, might serve as a basis for negotiations between the nuclear-weapon Powers, and which eventually might be incorporated in a Security Council resolution as an operative paragraph. This would read:

"The Security Council (and then there would of course be a suitable preamble)

Welcomes the solemn undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State that has committed itself not to manufacture or receive nuclear weapons (or other nuclear explosive devices) or to acquire control over them, provided that that State does not undertake, or partake in, an attack upon (the territory or the armed forces of) a nuclear-weapon State or its allies with the support of another nuclear-weapon State."

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

Before commenting in detail on the several component parts of this formula I wish to make a few preliminary and general observations, which might be helpful in clarifying the nature of our proposal, thus facilitating the understanding of the meaning of these component parts.

First of all the question has been raised -- and with justification, I should say -- whether and, if so, to what extent, this Committee, the Committee on Disarmament should involve itself in the designing of a Security Council resolution. The answer is, of course, that our competence in this is limited. There are limits to how far we can go.

But neither should the Committee on Disarmament miss an opportunity -- if not an obligation -- that is clearly presented to us. It is true -- we all realize this -- that in the end it is the five nuclear-weapon States, Permanent Members of the Security Council, which are all represented here, that must agree amongst themselves on a "common formula", because the formula is "common" between them. But it is also true that the common formula is obviously of no less interest to non-nuclear-weapon States, and if they wish to have a say in the matter, then it is also evident that the Committee on Disarmament is a proper setting for the discussions and negotiations on the common formula.

A second remark of a general nature that I wish to make is that the common formula that we have suggested as an example, or perhaps even as a basis for discussion does not pretend in any way to represent legally precise treaty language. This should be understood because otherwise we shall be talking at cross-purposes. A Security Council common formula is nothing more but also nothing less than an expression of political intentions enhanced by its setting in a Security Council resolution which in itself is an authoritative international instrument.

If, on the other hand, it were possible to agree on actual treaty language, then we, too, the Netherlands, would argue in favour of the convention format as our immediate goal, instead of the Security Council format which we regard -- that is, the Security Council resolution format -- as an important stepping-stone leading possibly later on to a convention and ultimately, hopefully, to a total dismantling of the nuclear option.

So we do not think it is possible, at this stage of the affair, to design an assurance formula in precise, legal treaty language that would be objectively applicable under all imaginable circumstances. That is in our opinion not realistic, and it is not practical for us to attempt to pursue that road at this time in the process of our negotiations.

I should also like to remark in this connection that the common formula, as an operative paragraph of a Security Council resolution, should not be lifted out of its context; it should be read and interpreted within the over-all context of the resolution and of the scenario of that particular Security Council session as a whole, and that would include as an important element the national statements delivered on that occasion by all concerned, particularly, of course, the nuclear-weapon States which are the ones giving the assurance.

It is therefore no doubt true, as it has been said, that the approach suggested by us does allow, to a certain extent, and given the particular circumstances and events, subjective judgements; as I said, it is not legally precise treaty language that we seek.

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

One more final remark of a general nature, before I comment on the component parts of the language we propose. A common formula in a Security Council resolution can by definition only cover the common ground contained in the national statements of the nuclear-weapon States. The formula suggested by us does just that: we have included in our formula that which we found to be common in the national statements; nothing less but nothing more either. And I wish to stress that nothing that is not common can be included in a common formula. In putting together the results of this extraction we have of course formulated it as flexibly as possible. After all, as I have said more than once in this statement, we have attempted to provide the basis for negotiations and not a final, legal text.

Allow me now to refer you to the text of the formula we suggested and to clarify the reasons why -- after due consideration -- we chose to use certain formulations rather than others that have been mentioned, and I am revealing no secret if I tell you that my authorities spent quite a lot of time -- as a matter of fact more than a year -- in trying to develop the suggested formula. It is not something that was "cooked up" on the delegation level overnight and we attach a certain value to the choice of the wording that we are presenting to you.

The first two lines of the formula would not seem to cause any difficulties:

"The Security Council,

Welcomes (alternatives are, of course, possible, such as takes note, or acknowledges; we think welcomes is an appropriate word) the solemn undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State..... "

So far, there appear to be no problems. Then follow the conditions upon which the assurances depend, which fall into two categories, which I mentioned at length in my statement of 14 April, and those are the non-nuclear-weapon status, and the non-attack clause. Let us now look at the wording of those two conditions.

The first term that has drawn some comment is the word "committed"; what do we mean by that? What is committed? We intend the word "committed" to mean that there exists with regard to a particular State or group of States a clearly recognizable arrangement of the non-nuclear-weapon status, preferably in a treaty arrangement such as the NPT, the Tlatelolco Treaty or other such, and with the acceptance of full IAEA safeguards or in any other convincing manner, recognized as such by others. That is the word committed.

Then we come to the peaceful nuclear explosions text between brackets: "(or other nuclear explosive devices)". This part we put between brackets because we believe this matter will have to be dealt with in the national statements, to which I referred earlier, on the occasion of the Security Council session. I might add that as far as the Netherlands is concerned, there is no difference between nuclear weapons and peaceful nuclear explosions: a State that develops and uses peaceful nuclear explosions is, as far as we are concerned, a nuclear-weapon State de facto. We would thus, for example, consider a CTB that permits non-nuclear-weapon States to carry out peaceful nuclear explosions undesirable.

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

We next come to the word "provided" which has elicited some comments. I must confess that we have some difficulty in understanding what is the supposed rationale of perceiving a difference between "provided something is not done" and "except something is done". We have difficulty in understanding that.

The next component of the formula that might require some comment are the words "undertake, or partake in, an attack". The difference here is that in the first case we are referring to attack (I shall deal with that word separately in a moment) on a country's own initiative, while in the second case it would be an attack at the initiative of a third party. Both possibilities are valid and distinct and should therefore be mentioned explicitly.

In this connection the use of the term "attack" rather than, e.g., "aggression" is relevant. We have preferred the term "attack" because in the context of the subject matter, negative security assurances, it conveys more clearly the real sense of the undertaking of the military operation. An attack could also include a military operation "by means of conventional warfare". But the disengaging clause, freeing the nuclear-weapon Powers from the negative assurance, can only become valid if the attack is supported by a nuclear-weapon State. But I should add that the question whether even in those circumstances the disengaging clause can be invoked will depend on circumstances; it would not be automatic.

In choosing this language we were inspired by the "common ground" which we attempted to identify in our statement of 14 April and particularly the existing assurances given so far by certain nuclear-weapon States. I need not now repeat once again that analysis.

As to the term "aggression" as defined in General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX), we are not inclined to advise the use of that term in this context because it is much vaguer than "attack", which in itself is of course the most evident form of aggression. We therefore prefer simply: "attack", and we see no need to embroider on it. In any case, in the Security Council scenario which we have suggested, such matters as an interpretation of the meaning of the terms "attack" and "support" could be dealt with in the national statements accompanying the adoption of the resolution.

A question could be raised concerning the meaning of the words "or its allies". Our answer is that in view of the undeniable existence of alliances, this addition is no more than logical, particularly since the formula deals with attacks "with the support of nuclear-weapon States".

I have now dealt with all those elements of the common formula proposed by us as a basis for negotiation that, as far as I can see, might at this stage require some detailed explanations. If I have not commented on certain other elements that have been mentioned in the course of our discussions, it is because they do not and cannot form part of the proposed common formula; and the reason for that is that they simply are not common to all the existing formulas.

Nevertheless, let me say one more word about a matter which I already discussed at some length in my statement of 14 April. If a nuclear attack were launched from the territory of a non-nuclear-weapon State, then that State would deprive itself of the assurances given by the other nuclear-weapon States. For it is evident that such a non-nuclear weapon State would be "partaking in an attack".

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Fein for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. VOUTOV (Bulgaria): Mr. Chairman, today I wish to speak on item 3 of our agenda, which is "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", being the subject of our discussion in plenary this week.

I hardly need reiterate that my country, which is a party to the non-proliferation Treaty, attaches particular importance to this question. As a non-nuclear-weapon State situated at one of the crossroads of Europe -- a continent unfortunately over-loaded with nuclear weapons -- the People's Republic of Bulgaria naturally is deeply interested in safeguarding its national security, as well as that of other non-nuclear-weapon States, against the possible use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Together with the other socialist countries my Government is anxious to contribute to bringing about the conditions when all nuclear-weapon States would provide effective and hopefully uniform security guarantees that would meet the legitimate expectations of the non-nuclear-weapon States which are not in a position to become sources of nuclear threat.

We believe that in the current state of tense international relations the urgent need to arrive at a widely acceptable solution of that problem without further delay has become even more acute. The distinguished head of the delegation of Nigeria, Ambassador Adeniji, in his statement on 19 March, rightly drew our attention to resolution 35/46 entitled, "Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade", in which the General Assembly agreed by consensus that:

"All efforts should be exerted, therefore, by the Committee on Disarmament urgently to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement, and to submit agreed texts where possible before the second special session devoted to disarmament on:

.....

(d) Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons ...".

It is our hope that by the time of the second special session next year the Committee on Disarmament will be able to report some meaningful progress in its negotiations aimed at further strengthening the security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States in the most effective and credible forms.

In my previous statements in plenary on 17 March and 24 April I had the opportunity to set out the general approach of the delegation of Bulgaria to the subject of security guarantees, so today I need not go into too much detail again. Instead, I wish to comment on some aspects of the question as a whole in its relation to the proceedings of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances, which already for the third consecutive year is trying to make its way ahead towards a final solution of the intricate problems arising in the context of negative security guarantees.

My delegation appreciates the work done in the Ad Hoc Working Group under the able and enthusiastic chairmanship of Minister Ciarrapico from Italy. The Working Group embarked this year in a more detailed and precise manner on examining primarily

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the substance of the negative security guarantees. To this end it has exhaustively explored various alternatives of evolving a common approach designed to meet the security preoccupations of all States concerned. The extensive discussion held has revealed that almost all of the alternatives suggested under stage two of the Chairman's programme of work has some merits which ought to be borne in mind in our future joint search for a solution acceptable to all.

The proceedings of the Working Group have reinforced the belief that the most effective and credible assurance that nuclear weapons will never be used against non-nuclear-weapon States, and indeed against all nations, is nuclear disarmament up to the complete elimination of all types of nuclear weapons. To set into motion the process that would ultimately lead to this end, the socialist countries, like those from the Group of 21, vigorously advocate an early commencement in the Committee on Disarmament of negotiations on the complex of issues relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. Pending the achievement of this goal, a radical solution of the problem of strengthening the security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States would undoubtedly be a complete prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons concurrently with the renunciation of the use of force in international relations. Until this comes about, however, categorical guarantees against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons should be given to all States whose territories cannot become a source of nuclear threat. In that context, the discussion held has once again raised the hope that a promising way to achieve progress may be searched for in the direction of evolving a common basis on the substance of the subject which would be acceptable to all. Depending on its merits, such a basis could serve the purposes of an international instrument of a legally binding character or of an appropriate interim arrangement which would constitute a step forward to such an agreement. The debate in the Working Group has also indicated that commitments by means of conventions or bilateral agreements, concluded between nuclear-weapon States and participants in nuclear-weapon-free zones or individual States with nuclear-weapon-free status, could be extremely useful measures in strengthening security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States.

In this context, my Government welcomes the recent statement made by President Brezhnev on that aspect of the question. In his interview before the Finnish newspaper "Suomen Sosialidemokraati" on 26 June this year, the Soviet President expressed the readiness of the Soviet Union to assume the legally binding obligation of providing security guarantees to the States of Northern Europe parties to a nuclear-weapon-free zone in this region, or in other words, to those States that renounce the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and the stationing of them on their territories. President Brezhnev went on to say that such a guarantee on the part of the Soviet Union could be extended either in the form of a multilateral agreement, to which his country would be a party, or through bilateral agreements with each of the States participating in such a zone. My Government considers this statement made at the highest political level as an extremely important contribution to our joint efforts to find effective ways to strengthen the guarantees for the security of non-nuclear-weapon States by all possible means, including the form of newly created nuclear-weapon-free zones. We have been glad to learn that this

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commendable move by the Soviet Union has also been widely welcomed in the States directly concerned. It is to be hoped, therefore, that a similar course of action will soon be followed by all other nuclear-weapon States, which should entail the necessary steps for the implementation of the initiative put forward some time ago by Finland.

Now, turning to the most recent work done in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances, I would like to note the constructive spirit prevailing in its proceedings. Several suggestions have been submitted in the Working Group. The delegation of Bulgaria has also presented a paper (CD/SA/CRP.8) offering comments and raising some queries with regard to the formulations put forward and to the direction in which we believe the Working Group should hopefully find a wider basis for an agreement. The debate held has clearly indicated that, if it is to be acceptable to all, such an agreement ought to take into due account the legitimate security interests of all States concerned in a way which would not negate the value of the basic undertaking of the nuclear-weapon States. In this respect, we should like to reiterate several points which we consider as being fundamental to the question of security guarantees.

First, it is essential that the undertaking of the nuclear-weapon States should be formulated in a manner that would not condition the guarantees on events that could be too susceptible to subjective interpretations. This is a point that we believe should guide us in analysing the suggestions made on the substance of the guarantees, some of which, unfortunately, are once again burdened with conditions providing for cases of actual withdrawal from the basic non-use undertaking.

One of these suggestions contains a "withdrawal provision" applicable in cases of an attack by a non-nuclear-weapon State upon a nuclear-weapon State or its allies with the support of another nuclear-weapon State. With regard to this formulation, we share the apprehensions expressed by many delegations to the effect that it is precisely such conditions that may seriously undermine the real value of the negative security guarantees, especially in times of armed conflicts when their unequivocal character would be extremely important. Formulations of that type may, unfortunately, give rise to interpretations seeking an easy recourse to nuclear weapons. The formulation I have specifically referred to provides for withdrawal moves on the part of the nuclear-weapon States in cases of ordinary armed conflicts that by virtue of their scope, means of warfare employed and implications may not be serious enough to justify at all such a drastic action, which would inevitably be considered as preceding use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

I should like to point out that by possibly including such a type of withdrawal provision in a security guarantee formula, we would be running the risk of legitimizing doctrines that do not particularly seek to value the establishment of a kind of a threshold between conventional threats, being the only ones within the reach of non-nuclear-weapon States, and those that could originate from a nuclear-weapon State. We share the view held by many other delegations that the lack of such

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a threshold would be conducive to increasing the risks of easily extending armed conflicts of a classical type into a devastating nuclear war. My delegation believes, therefore, that an approach acceptable to all should not leave room for diminishing the real value of the security guarantees by including provisions of the kind I have referred to.

It is clear to us that suggestions aimed at creating an illusion of a development by only slightly changing in terms of cosmetics some old formulations could not be regarded as serious attempts to widen the common ground on the substance of security guarantees.

I do not want now to comment in detail on another suggestion which has sought to remedy the shortcomings of other formulations by employing the idea of possibly suspending the guarantee undertaking only in cases of an aggression by a nuclear-weapon State. It seems that there is some reason in looking for acceptable ways of not including in the non-use undertaking those extraordinary circumstances when recourse to nuclear weapons could be thinkable as an extreme means of self-defence against an aggression by another nuclear-weapon State. We remain unconvinced, however, that this should be done by providing for a withdrawal possibility in the guarantee formulation which is expected to offer clear-cut assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It would to put it mildly, be extremely difficult to reconcile such concepts of the possible use of nuclear weapons, as the two I have just referred to, which are almost opposite to each other.

And here I come to our second fundamental point. My delegation believes that it would be much more useful if the efforts to evolve an acceptable approach concentrate primarily on the possibilities of elaborating a formulation of a non-conditional character which would have a substantially lower degree of subjectivity. Such a formulation could clearly stipulate in objective terms the characteristics of the States which, owing to their actual nuclear-weapon-free status in all its aspects, would receive security guarantees against the possible use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

An example for such a kind of guarantee is the formula suggested by the socialist countries in document CD/23, or the one contained in a clearer form in the guarantee undertaking assumed in 1978 by the Soviet Union. This is a formulation that confines itself to describing the minimal requisites of the States which obviously cannot offer the slightest possible nuclear threat to other States and do, therefore, fully deserve to be guaranteed in the most effective and credible way. It provides for a variety of forms of renouncing the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons, which substantially widens the scope of its application in comparison with the kind of guarantees offered by the United States and the United Kingdom. The formulation put forward by the socialist countries also makes sure that the nuclear-weapon States would not be increasing the nuclear threat

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against non-nuclear-weapon States by using the territory of a State which is guaranteed in preparing a possible aggression. In this respect we do not make any difference between States which may or may not be in alliance with a nuclear-weapon State; not interfering in this way in the choice of a non-nuclear-weapon State to seek an increased security and co-operation within the framework of an alliance. Last but not least, our formula does not provide for whatever conditions which, if present, may seriously question the merits of enjoying a security guarantee.

My third point relates to one of the basic characteristics of the States to be assured which, as we firmly believe, is indispensable if the guarantees are to be of real value. I refer here to the need to secure the absence of all nuclear weapons whatsoever from the territory of these States. By introducing foreign nuclear weapons on its territory a non-nuclear-weapon State is obviously rendering a decisive assistance to a nuclear-weapon State in preparing for a possible aggression. Such an aggression, or even the threat of it, could well be affecting the security of other non-nuclear-weapon States, which would contradict the idea of strengthening the security guarantees for the non-nuclear-weapon States that are not in a position to be sources of a nuclear threat. A system of guarantees failing to take into account this fundamental point would actually be conducive to further increasing the risks arising from the territorial proliferation of nuclear weapons in the possession of nuclear-weapon States and would serve in practice as a way of circumventing the valuable concept of curbing the nuclear weapons proliferation. Such guarantees could encourage nuclear-weapon States to station on and possibly use nuclear weapons primarily from the territories of States which enjoy security guarantees, thus avoiding the risks of being countered in kind. It is a well-known fact that States having nuclear weapons on their territory would, in times of major armed conflicts, have their crucial share in a decision to use these weapons. In doing so such a State would actually become an accomplice in a thinkable aggression on the part of a nuclear-weapon State, which might directly affect the security of a number of non-nuclear-weapon States.

My delegation believes, therefore, that the notion of territorial absence of nuclear weapons should be included among the characteristics of the States to be assured in a solution acceptable to all. Since the problem of arriving at such an agreement has mainly to do with the need for further increasing the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, we definitely think that the search for a common approach should take into due account the fact that the presence of nuclear weapons on the territory of only a few non-nuclear-weapon States, which do not seem to be particularly anxious to be assured against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, affects the vital and legitimate security interests of a number of other non-nuclear-weapon States which are entitled to guarantees.

In this respect, my delegation has been impressed by a calculation illustrating the fact that formulas like the one suggested in document CD/23 which is also a

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security guarantee in force for the Soviet Union, cover more than 140-145 non-nuclear-weapon States, while other formulations providing for possible "withdrawals like that offered by the United States, restrict their application to not more than 120 non-nuclear-weapon States, and even this quite modest scope is subject to suspension conditions. I should also like to mention the importance that many countries attach to receiving security assurances irrespective of whether or not they belong to one or another political system or alliance. The powerful voices of quite a number of Governments, as well as of the massive peace movements now in action all over Europe, against the further territorial spread of nuclear weapons only confirm and amplify this important aspect of the problem of negative security guarantees. We believe that it would be a clear expression of political goodwill if all nuclear-weapon States find appropriate ways to widen the scope of their respective security assurances by explicitly employing the concept of not introducing nuclear weapons into the territories of the States to be guaranteed.

As regards the question of the form of negative security guarantees, we consider it indispensable that the final aim of our joint efforts should be an international instrument of a legally binding character, like the draft convention submitted in document CD/23 by the socialist countries. We regard the present work done in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances as practical work on article 1 of such a convention, to the idea of which, we are glad to note, there is still no objection in principle in the Committee on Disarmament. The socialist countries have also expressed their readiness to consider other parallel ways of strengthening the security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States, including through appropriate interim measures which would give new impetus to the pursuit of the final objective, such as the measure suggested by the General Assembly in its resolution 35/154.

In concluding, I wish to underline once again the urgent need for the international community and, therefore, for the Committee on Disarmament, to find ways and means to arrive at an effective solution of the problem of security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States. It seems that there should not be any insurmountable difficulties to achieve this goal in the near future -- no reduction of arms is called for; no difficult problems such as the balance of forces or verification arise; everybody agrees in principle on the need for security guarantees; there is a widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention on the subject. All that is obviously needed is the political will of all nuclear-weapon States to take the necessary steps. We believe that it is high time that this crucial prerequisite of success in all negotiations should ultimately be demonstrated by all States concerned, so that the General Assembly this year, as well as next year at its special session devoted to disarmament, will be able to note with satisfaction the result achieved by the Committee on Disarmament on the subject of our discussion today.

Mr. RODRIGUEZ NAVARRO (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): The Venezuelan delegation wishes to make a few brief comments on the subject of the "comprehensive programme of disarmament". We have already on previous occasions explained in detail our views about the elaboration of the comprehensive programme and the basic elements which should be included in it, as the instrument designed effectively to promote the goals of general and complete disarmament in the coming years.

The reason why we have decided to make some additional comments is precisely because we wish once more to emphasize the importance we attach to this subject and to the imperative need for us to endeavour to achieve a comprehensive programme that will meet the aspirations of the international community in the matter of disarmament that were basically embodied, by consensus, in the Final Document.

The difficult circumstances that are today creating a highly disturbing world situation, only confirm the urgency of the need to give a decisive impetus to the efforts to bring about disarmament, which is essential if we are to help shape more promising prospects for the future of mankind. The adverse international situation ought rather to prompt us to intensify our efforts in this Committee to achieve concrete disarmament agreements. To do anything else would be to fail to respond to the gravity of the hour in which we live, which is the main cause and also the consequence of the nuclear arms race.

Because there is a general determination not to give way to the every-expanding armaments race, the General Assembly held its first special session devoted to disarmament, and it will shortly hold its second. In 1978, the foundation was laid for the initiation of efforts to achieve disarmament by the most effective and promising methods. The Final Document meant, for all States, a commitment to act in accordance with the letter and the spirit of its provisions, in one of which the General Assembly entrusted to this Committee the task of elaborating a comprehensive programme designed to promote and channel negotiations on disarmament.

The Committee on Disarmament thus has a clear responsibility to carry out to the full the task laid upon it by the General Assembly. And we should never forget this, for we are faced with a basic challenge, to put it in the simplest terms. Our task is obviously not just a matter of agreeing on a significant instrument. As important as elaborating that instrument is the solemn undertaking to respect the principles and provisions agreed on, with the aim of our approaching the goals of general and complete disarmament.

The Group of 21 has made some very constructive proposals with respect to the first phase of the instrument now being negotiated, designed to achieve a comprehensive programme, both practical and substantial, which should constitute an adequate response to the instructions given by the General Assembly at its special session. The working papers presented by the Group of 21 simply put together the essence and the priorities of the Final Document, in clear and transparent language corresponding to the importance of the instrument to be agreed upon. The Final Document stated categorically that since nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization it is essential, as a matter of first priority, to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects, and it pointed out in this connection the special responsibility of all the nuclear-weapon States, and in particular those which possess the most important nuclear arsenals.

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Consequently, as has been stated in the course of the discussions, the comprehensive programme cannot imply a going back on anything already embodied in the Final Document, or in the relevant report of the Disarmament Commission and the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade.

We are aware that the negotiations on the comprehensive programme have not been and will not be easy. But there is no reason for thinking that the obstacles and difficulties that will certainly arise will necessarily be insuperable, provided that there is, particularly on the part of the great Powers, sufficient political will or, if you like, what amounts essentially to a sincere desire to negotiate with the definite intention of securing tangible results. Moreover, the Ad Hoc Working Group on this subject is fortunate in being under the guidance of Ambassador García Robles, to whom we would like once more to pay a tribute for his sure and tireless efforts in conducting the negotiations.

In view of the fact that the comprehensive programme ought to be ready for consideration by the General Assembly at its next special session, it is logical and reasonable that the Working Group should hold as many meetings as possible from now on so that it may conclude its most important task in time, and that therefore it should start its work at the very beginning of 1982.

The Venezuelan delegation shares the view that the comprehensive programme will be almost the principal document to emerge from the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We say this in the reply which Venezuela will be sending to the Secretary-General concerning the work of the Preparatory Committee, emphasizing in addition the importance of nuclear disarmament measures and of other aspects such as the link between disarmament and development and the strengthening of the role of world public opinion in the promotion of disarmament.

This last point reminds us that the activities of the Committee on Disarmament are followed with the utmost interest by various international circles, which are naturally concerned at the senseless nuclear arms race and earnestly hope that, as a result principally of the work of this negotiating body, the second special session of the General Assembly will in fact prove to be an occasion on which irreversible advances are made in the cause of disarmament.

The Committee on Disarmament cannot and must not disappoint world public opinion. In any event, public opinion is fully aware of what must be done and which countries undoubtedly bear the primary responsibility for acting in a manner consonant with these difficult times and for clearing the way towards genuine progress in the sphere of disarmament.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): Mr. Chairman, today, I would like to dwell upon two items of our agenda: the effective international guarantees to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, which is inscribed on our agenda for this week, and the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

First of all, let me offer some thoughts of my delegation on the most important and urgent task of our Committee, namely, the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. We fully share the general opinion that the Ad Hoc Working Group, under the able and skilful chairmanship of the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, is making considerable progress

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in drafting this programme. But as the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament is approaching very fast, we must do our utmost to finish the drafting work in the shortest possible time. My delegation fully shares and supports the opinions and proposals put forward in this Committee by the delegations of the USSR and Bulgaria, and also by a number of other delegations, that we should provide for additional meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the CPD to be devoted to the elaboration of this programme. There seem to be emerging a convergence of views in our approach to many aspects of the CPD. I welcome warmly this development.

The Ad Hoc Working Group has reached consensus on a number of important issues to be included in the CPD. I would make only one complaint as far as consensus in the Working Group is concerned: it is, perhaps, too eager to reach consensus on putting in square brackets perfectly good formulations on disarmament measures.

But, coming back to the main purpose of my intervention, I would like to express the opinion of my delegation that the CPD should become one of the main means of achieving the final objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. We share the view that the programme has to be concrete yet realistic. To meet these requirements it should take due account of the basic development trends in the world today. The first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament has significantly contributed to laying the basis for an international disarmament strategy in which elaboration of the CPD is an important element.

The CPD should centre on the basic goals and requirements of consolidation of international peace and security. In our view, the success of the CPD largely depends on the realization of partial measures leading to general and complete disarmament. Their implementation could proceed by carefully defined stages.

The Polish delegation believes that the central question of the CPD which should focus the main efforts of all Governments and nations is eliminating the threat of war, particularly nuclear war. This immediate objective could be achieved by the effective limitation, gradual reduction and complete liquidation of all types and systems of nuclear weapons. A preliminary agreement banning the production of such weapons should include the following measures: halting the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, and the gradual reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. The effectiveness of such agreements calls for all nuclear-weapon States and other States with significant non-nuclear military potential to participate in the negotiations. Checking and reversing the nuclear arms race could be facilitated by the conclusion of agreements on a complete and general nuclear test ban, the prohibition of the development, manufacture and use of neutron weapons, and the prohibition of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. Poland would welcome the acceleration of efforts to reach agreement on arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and strongly supports the idea of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the world.

In the future disarmament programme, further steps should be envisaged to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty. The non-proliferation régime could be strengthened by elaborating a convention on the non-introduction of nuclear weapons on the territories of States which have no such weapons at present.

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Equally urgent is the need to speed up the ongoing negotiations concerning other weapons of mass destruction, and first of all chemical weapons, an issue of traditional and keen interest to Poland, and to finalize the convention prohibiting the development, production and use of radiological weapons.

At the same time, measures should be undertaken in the field of conventional disarmament. Serious efforts must be made towards the cessation of the conventional arms race, and the reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces must be considered.

In the opinion of my delegation, the CPD should also include such measures as the renunciation of the use of force in international relations and confidence-building measures. We also attach great importance to the interrelationship between disarmament and international security and between disarmament and development.

It is our firm conviction that the CPD should embody certain rules and principles which should be observed in the disarmament negotiations. These include, inter alia, the principles of the undiminished security of all parties at every stage of the disarmament process, the sovereign equality of States and a balance of rights and obligations.

Above all, the CPD must clearly and distinctly convey the idea that in the nuclear age there is no rational alternative to disarmament and the peaceful coexistence of States. This programme should also provide for an effective psychological infrastructure for preparing societies and individuals for life in peace.

I am not going to dwell today upon the subject of the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace. I have referred to it on a number of occasions and my delegation put forward as recently as 9 July 1981 a working paper, CD/CPD/WP.42, fully devoted to this idea. I only wish to reiterate that the CPD would not be fully comprehensive if it lacked such important measure as the elaboration of a broad programme of action aimed at making international public opinion aware of the problems created by the arms race, including the specific activities of Governments and international organizations within the United Nations system and non-governmental organizations, in accordance with the principles and spirit of the United Nations Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace.

There is another point I would like to make before I change the subject of my intervention. It concerns the problem of verification in the process of disarmament. Sometimes there might appear an impression that there are two schools of thought or two different approaches to this problem. After spending nearly three years in this Committee, I am coming to the conclusion that there is no basic difference of approach to this problem and that there is not a single person in this hall who would not support the idea of verification. What we may differ about are perhaps the methods and means of verification but not the principle itself.

We are of the opinion that the disarmament agreements, like any other agreements, must be implemented, first of all, in good faith. But the disarmament agreements are of a special nature; their implementation involves the vital security interests of States and this implementation must be accompanied by adequate measures of verification. These measures of verification must be acceptable to all

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participating States in order to create the necessary confidence and to ensure their observance by all parties. The forms and conditions of verification provided in any concrete agreement depend on the objectives, scope and nature of that agreement.

Thus, the various disarmament agreements already concluded differ considerably in their verification provisions and procedures, from on-site inspections in the Treaty on Antarctica to inspections by "national technical means" in the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water.

In confirmation of what I have said about the similarity of approach to the problems of verification, I would like, with your permission, to quote from the working paper introduced by a group of Western countries (document CD/CPD/WP.33 of 17 June 1981) which in its part V, under the heading "Verification", states, among other things, that "the form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in specific agreements depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement". This is exactly what the socialist countries have been preaching in this Committee for years.

I also wish to say a few words on the subject of effective international arrangements to assure the non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, an item which de facto is inscribed on our agenda for this week.

The delegation of Poland is one of many sharing the legitimate concern of non-nuclear-weapon States facing the alarming course and dimensions of the nuclear arms race. As I have more than once emphasized in this Committee, my delegation is not alone in believing that this concern stems from the most profound dissatisfaction with the concept of international security, based, in the first place, on the precarious balance of fear. Therefore, the desire of the non-nuclear-weapon States to obtain effective assurances in this respect is well founded and should focus the attention of all nuclear-weapon Powers. In our view, already many times pronounced both in the Committee on Disarmament and in the United Nations General Assembly, the most suitable formula for effective security assurances is one that would provide for an international convention-type agreement of a juridically binding nature, under which the nuclear-weapon Powers would commit themselves not to use nuclear weapons or threaten to use them against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to such a convention. The latter, on their part, would assume a corresponding obligation not to produce, acquire or otherwise have such weapons on their territories.

As the Committee knows only too well, we are for the time being very far from such an arrangement. Therefore, the relevant Ad Hoc Working Group, under the able chairmanship of the distinguished representative of Italy, embarked on the consideration of possible alternatives which have been explored in the search for a so-called "common approach" or a "common formula", possibly to be incorporated in a Security Council resolution. Alternative texts of the "common formula" have generated an active exchange of views in the Working Group. However, what is rather unfortunate is the fact that the discussion in the Working Group is usually conducted among the delegations of the non-nuclear-weapon States, with the notable participation in them of the Soviet Union delegation. The delegations of the other nuclear-weapon States remain passive during the substantial discussion and no doubt with this state of affairs there is little prospect of our achieving tangible results. Having said this, I would like none the less, to express the

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gratitude of my delegation to many delegations, among others to the delegations of Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, Pakistan and the Netherlands, as well as to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group, for their unremitting efforts in trying to find a common formula for the said assurances and for their constantly enriching the discussion with new arguments and proposals.

At the same time, I would like to recapitulate the position of my delegation in this important phase of the negotiations conducted in the Working Group: the difficulties on the road to the negotiated convention-type agreement are manifold and diverse. The solution, satisfactory and acceptable to all interested parties, regardless whether we concentrate on alternative "D" or any other formulas proposed by different delegations, will call for flexibility, a spirit of accommodation and a sustained effort by all the members of the Committee and in the first instance by all the nuclear-weapon States. While the convention is not within our immediate reach, we need to devote our energy and goodwill to the elaboration, as an interim arrangement, of a Security Council resolution which would thus give a special status to identical declarations by its five permanent members.

Mr. MIRCEA MALITA (Romania) (translated from French): The security of the non-nuclear-weapon States in a world living under the shadow of a real danger of self-destruction as the result of a thermonuclear conflict is one of the highest priority items on the Committee's agenda.

This priority is due to the fact that, despite the efforts made, the positive guarantees granted to certain non-nuclear-weapon States (Security Council resolution 255 of 1968) function after a nuclear attack, which is rather like an umbrella opening after the rain.

For nearly three years, all participants in the Ad Hoc Working Group set up to negotiate effective international arrangements to guarantee the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, whether they possess nuclear weapons or not, have been able to present their positions and put forward specific proposals in this sphere. Throughout our discussions, however, we have seen the constant erosion of our common objectives.

The negotiations which were intended to lead to the adoption of effective international arrangements guaranteeing the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States have practically abandoned this objective. They are now being directed, especially very recently, towards the adoption of measures of an intermediate kind, such as a Security Council resolution. In the negotiation of such measures the role of the Committee is not very clear and it could be regarded as being merely that of giving an advisory opinion the conclusions of which may or may not be taken into consideration by another body which will take the final decision on the actual substance of the intermediate measures.

These negotiations, which were originally aimed at the preservation of the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States, have, in the course of our debates, turned into a discussion centring on the security of the nuclear-weapon States and on their preoccupations and security perceptions, which, as one might imagine, nuclear weapons occupy a very important place.

(Mr. Mircea Malita, Romania)

Our discussion, which was to have been concerned principally with the adoption of measures aimed at the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons as part of a single deliberate process directed towards the goal of the outlawing of nuclear weapons, has veered towards the idea of there being certain cases which are exceptional, it is true, but nevertheless cases in which nuclear weapons could be used.

All these developments, with which we are all familiar, make it necessary, my delegation believes, for us to consider where exactly these negotiations stand, so that we can define our objectives, both immediate and future.

Until we have done so, the interesting and undoubtedly useful discussions taking place in the Working Group, which is presided over with such selflessness and devotion by the distinguished representative of Italy, Minister Antonio Ciarrapico, will be merely a rhetorical exercise.

That, we believe, is not what is expected from our Committee as its contribution to the success of the special session of the General Assembly to be held in 1982. I should, however, like to stress here that our comments on this situation in no way mean that the Romanian delegation is unaware of the objective reasons which have marked and determined the course of our discussions. On the contrary, fully aware as we are of the situation characterizing the world today, we believe that this is the moment for us to attempt to define together what, in these circumstances, the Committee could do, in concrete and practical terms, for the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

The aim of our negotiations, in my delegation's view, is and should continue to be to draw up a formula in which the nuclear-weapon States undertake never under any circumstances to use nuclear weapons or to threaten to use nuclear weapons or force in general against non-nuclear-weapon States.

My country's position in this matter was clearly expressed by the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu, when he said: "Mankind is justifiably concerned at the danger represented by the existence of nuclear weapons. This is why sustained efforts must be made to terminate the nuclear-arms race and liquidate existing stocks; this is the only real way of safeguarding mankind from the threat of a thermonuclear war. The non-proliferation of atomic weapons, the importance of which cannot be denied, should be brought about in such a way that all nations renouncing these weapons are assured that they will never be the victims of an atomic attack or the object of a threat to use nuclear weapons against them. It is the legitimate right of every State which renounces atomic weapons to be sure that it will not be the object of an attack threatening its national independence and sovereignty".

On the basis of this position of principle, my delegation wishes to state that if there is a consensus on the idea of making intermediate arrangements, the adoption of this approach necessitates the following things also:

(a) A decision that the ultimate objective of the Committee's activity remains the negotiation of an effective legal guarantee, in the form of a mandatory international agreement of a formal nature whereby the nuclear-weapon States undertake never under any circumstances to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against States not possessing such weapons, pending the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the adoption of a set of measures designed to lead to the outlawing of such weapons.

(Mr. Mircea Malita, Romania)

(b) The defining of the form of the intermediate arrangement and, if the idea of a Security Council or General Assembly resolution is widely accepted, the defining of the way in which the results of the Committee's negotiations on this subject will be transmitted to those bodies. We, for our part, consider that the transmission of the text of a draft resolution through a recommendation adopted at next year's special session might be the most appropriate course to follow.

(c) The negotiation of the actual substance of the intermediate arrangement, more specifically of the common formula which should form the basis of any resolution adopted by the Security Council. My delegation considers that the attempts to solve this problem by finding the lowest common denominator of the unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon States are doomed to failure. It is therefore necessary to find a formula based on the substance of the unilateral declarations and not on their wording.

At the same time, in the drafting of this common formula, account should also be taken of other pertinent international documents and especially of the Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, adopted in General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961 and the positive security guarantees given in Security Council resolution 255 of 19 June 1968. Such a formula ought also to provide, for the purposes of its practical application, for the international machinery -- that of the United Nations -- that will establish the necessary link between the positive and negative guarantees in place of a subjective interpretation by the nuclear-weapon States.

I should like to stress once again the urgent need for us to achieve concrete results in this sphere before the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. All the objective factors argue in favour of such results. The non-nuclear weapon States which have given numerous undertakings to maintain their status and to contribute to non-proliferation find themselves in the situation of not benefiting from the security guarantees which they regarded as an integral part of their status.

In fact, these States see that their position is becoming more and more dangerous for the following reasons.

First, they are still targets in the strategic planning of the nuclear-weapon Powers. Contrary to all requirements of the principles of security and equality, the majority of countries in the world are under the perpetual threat of becoming involved in a nuclear scenario as the victims of a conflict which has nothing to do with them.

Secondly, the territory of these countries is becoming more and more the possible theatre of nuclear conflicts in certain strategic variants. This is particularly so in Europe where the development of nuclear weapons and of doctrines on their use clearly indicate how great is this risk.

Thirdly, the non-nuclear-weapon countries watch helplessly the widening of the areas of risk of a nuclear conflict by error, accident or miscalculation, for they do not possess and are not parties to any multilateral system to ward off the dangers of such a conflict.

It is for these reasons that the demand of the non-nuclear weapon countries to be freed from the threat of nuclear weapons and the danger of their use is more than legitimate. We believe that the Committee should heed and in its activities respond to the urgent appeals from these countries and their peoples, and in this way discharge the responsibilities which Governments themselves have laid upon it.

Mr. SARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, in accordance with rule 30 of our rules of procedure, my delegation would like to address itself today to the agenda items relating to chemical weapons and negative security guarantees.

During the past several weeks, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, under the energetic and skilful leadership of Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden, has given intensive consideration to the draft elements to be included in a future chemical weapons ban. However, there are certain key questions which remain to be resolved, e.g. concerning the scope of the future ban and measures relating to verification. The prospects for the early conclusion of our work will depend greatly on the approach we adopt with respect to these crucial issues.

In the view of our delegation, the Committee must constantly bear in mind the aim of a chemical weapons ban. What we have set out to accomplish is to prohibit the use of chemicals for hostile and military purposes. The aim is not to prohibit toxic or lethal chemicals; rather it is to prevent their use as agents of warfare. Of course, there may be some supertoxic lethal chemicals which may at present have only limited use in peaceful applications. In such cases, by mutual agreement, one could consider setting a ceiling for both production and stockpiling. This, however, is an exception. In general, the prohibition applies to purpose or use, not to the chemicals themselves.

It is important to keep this perspective in focus during the process of negotiation. Technical discussions may be necessary to establish criteria for distinguishing between various categories of toxic and lethal chemicals. However, precision in this area is not as important as evolving mutually agreed criteria that all are familiar with. Toxicity criteria would serve only a limited purpose in the context of the proposed convention.

The aim of the convention is not to ban toxic or lethal chemicals. It is to prohibit the use of such chemicals for military purposes. The identification of criteria for determining toxicity would have been a critical area of concern if our purpose was to prescribe absolute and verifiable limits on the production of certain types of chemicals. During our negotiations so far, it is only with respect to super-toxic lethal chemicals that a quantitative limit has been recommended. If accepted, such a recommendation may involve defining with a fair degree of precision what is meant by super-toxic chemicals. But with respect to other types of chemicals, covering the entire range of toxic, lethal and incapacitating chemical agents, the determination of toxicity criteria will have little relevance since no one has seriously suggested that any quantitative limits be placed on their output. Again, precise toxicity criteria would be required only if we proposed that production facilities for each variety of chemicals throughout the chemical industry in each State party to the future convention should be subject to different procedures of verification. That is, if a different set of verification measures were proposed for toxic lethal chemicals as against other lethal chemicals, then it would perhaps be important to have precise criteria for determining toxicity. Our negotiations so far do not seem to suggest that this is in fact what delegations have in mind with respect to verification procedures. My delegation would therefore submit that our technical discussions be closely related to the actual requirements of the future convention. Otherwise such technical discussions may well become a substitute for engaging in serious political negotiations on a future convention.

(Mr. Saran, India)

The question of verification is, of course, an important issue. However, let us acknowledge frankly that with respect to a chemical weapons ban, there will be large areas where effective verification will not be possible. The chemical industry, involving peaceful applications of a wide range of toxic and lethal chemicals, is already a significant sector in the economies of most advanced countries. In several developing countries, it is one of the most rapidly growing sectors of the national economy. There will be large quantities of toxic and lethal chemicals produced and stockpiled for legitimate and peaceful purposes. To evolve a verification system which would keep a complete account of the production of the entire chemical industry all over the world would, of course, not be feasible. Reference has been made to new methods of verification, involving remote control techniques to detect the presence of so-called chemical warfare agents. However, the problem is that the mere presence of highly toxic or lethal chemicals is no evidence of the presence of chemical weapons. Therefore, let us not waste time in exploring measures of verification that will not, in the final analysis, add to confidence in the implementation of the convention. We must search for methods of verification which verify, not the presence or absence of toxic or lethal chemicals, but rather the diversion of such chemicals for purposes of developing and producing chemical weapons. This is the point of application of verification procedures. For example, let us find out from experts in chemical weapons whether production facilities for chemical weapons differ significantly in their observable characteristics from facilities using toxic and lethal chemicals for peaceful purposes. If the answer is yes, then perhaps we could devise means of verification that take such differences into account. Let us not pursue verification procedures which may be "intrusive" but not necessarily effective in ensuring compliance. There is a tendency in the Working Group to assume that on-site inspection or other intrusive methods of verification necessarily ensure compliance. When we are dealing with as complex a field as chemicals, we cannot be so sure. Our debate should not concentrate merely on whether or not to have on-site inspection. Rather we should try to determine what methods of verification are (i) feasible and (ii) optimal in ensuring compliance.

We agree that with respect to verification of declarations of existing stockpiles, the destruction of such stockpiles, and also the dismantling or conversion of existing facilities for producing chemical weapons on-site inspection may provide a high degree of confidence in compliance. However, with respect to the prohibition of the development and production of chemical weapons, on-site inspection may be only marginally useful, given the size and complexity of the chemical industry all over the world.

Reference has been made in the Working Group to including in the future treaty a provision for national technical means of verification. However, we are all aware that the concept of national technical means of verification evolved in the context of a bilateral arms regulation agreement. We must, therefore, examine carefully how such a concept could be incorporated in a multilateral context. We need to know, first of all, whether information gathered through national technical means will be made available to all States parties to the future convention. What would be the machinery for disseminating such information? Only when such questions have been satisfactorily answered could our delegation consider the inclusion of such a provision in the future treaty.

(Mr. Saran, India)

There are, of course, several other provisions on which my delegation would have liked to express its views, but for the moment we will confine ourselves to these more general observations. We hope that during the next annual session of the Committee, preferably before the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, a draft convention will be ready for submission to the international community.

I would now like to turn to the negotiations taking place on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Our delegation has made no secret of the fact that in its view, the only credible guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons lies in the urgent achievement of nuclear disarmament. Pending nuclear disarmament, all States should agree not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances.

In the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances, we have asked representatives of the nuclear-weapon States the following questions:

(i) Given the nature of nuclear weapons as weapons of mass destruction, and given the fact that any use of nuclear weapons would necessarily affect the security and well-being of non-nuclear-weapon States, even if they were not involved in an armed conflict involving the nuclear-weapon States or their allies, what practical benefit would flow to the non-nuclear-weapon States from the selective and partial pledges of the non-use of nuclear weapons contained in the various unilateral undertakings?

(ii) There are well-established principles of international and humanitarian law which prohibit the use of weapons and methods of warfare that would cause indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians, destruction of civilian facilities and severe and long-term damage to the natural environment. How do the nuclear-weapon States reconcile their option to use nuclear weapons with these principles?

We have not received any answers to our questions.

Even if it is argued that selective and conditional pledges of the non-use of nuclear weapons have some political value, a closer examination of some of the unilateral undertakings would yield some interesting results. Most of the pledges of non-use are conditional. To be eligible, a non-nuclear-weapon State should have undertaken international commitments never to acquire or produce nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. During the course of negotiations, several States have clarified that such "international commitments" can be equated to (i) participation in the NPT and/or (ii) acceptance of full-scope safeguards on all nuclear facilities. Countries which do not accept such "international commitments" are consigned to a "grey area" or a no-man's land, because such countries, it is argued, could well acquire nuclear weapons, and should, therefore, be ineligible for guarantees against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It is not enough, therefore, for a State not to possess nuclear weapons. The State must in addition demonstrate that it has no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons. And such disavowal of intention to acquire nuclear weapons can only be credible, to some States at least, if there is ready acceptance of inequitable and discriminatory obligations. The refusal, as a matter of principle, on the part of some States to accept discriminatory obligations is equated with retaining a "nuclear weapons option".

(Mr. Saran, India)

As against this, the second condition which qualifies most of the pledges of non-use is based on a different assumption. A non-nuclear-weapon State is eligible for negative guarantees provided it does not actually participate in an attack on a nuclear-weapon State or its allies in association or alliance with another nuclear-weapon State. Non-nuclear-weapon States which are part of multilateral military pacts are committed through solemn treaty obligations to participate in collective military action involving nuclear-weapon States. Therefore, their intention to participate in such collective military operations is already more than apparent. In fact, it is only in breach of its treaty obligations that a non-nuclear-weapon State allied to a nuclear-weapon State would qualify for negative guarantees, in the event of an armed conflict.

In this particular case, intent is not important. The trip-wire for the withdrawal of a non-use pledge is an actual act of commission, not intention. The intention to participate in collective military action against a nuclear-weapon State or its allies, in association or alliance with another nuclear-weapon State is ignored, so long as the intent is not translated into action. This is in sharp contrast to the condition relating to non-nuclear-weapon status. The first condition is based on demonstration of intention, the second, on commitment of action. It is easy to see that most of the unilateral undertakings are weighted heavily in favour of those non-nuclear-weapon States which are allies of one or another nuclear-weapon State. For the vast majority of non-nuclear-weapon countries, the second condition relating to "alliance" or "association" with a nuclear-weapon State is so vague and subjective as to offer no guarantee at all.

Any common formula based on such assumptions could hardly provide even a modicum of psychological assurance to non-nuclear-weapon States, especially those which are non-aligned or neutral.

We would once again urge the Committee to give serious consideration to the proposal for a total prohibition on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It is our considered view that partial pledges of non-use would only serve to legitimize the pernicious doctrine of nuclear deterrence. And who can doubt that it is this doctrine which lies at the heart of the nuclear arms race and the growing threat of a nuclear war?

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, my delegation has requested the floor this morning to make some comments regarding the item on "effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

The Pakistan delegation is most gratified that during the 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament the question of negative security guarantees has been intensively examined in the Ad Hoc Working Group under the able and wise chairmanship of Minister Ciarrapico of Italy.

The Ad Hoc Working Group has quite rightly focussed on the substance of the assurances to be provided to the non-nuclear-weapon States rather than on the question of the form in which they are to be extended. The central part of this exercise has been to develop a common formula which could be included as a uniform obligation to be undertaken by all the nuclear States in a binding international

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instrument. The approach of my delegation to the development of a common formula has been affirmed on several occasions in the past. Pakistan believes that the nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against all non-nuclear-weapon States, without conditions, qualifications, or exceptions. Such an assurance has been provided by only one nuclear-weapon State -- the People's Republic of China.

The other four nuclear-weapon States appear to encounter difficulties in extending such an unconditional and universal assurance. As we see it, their difficulties stem from the existence of military alliances and arrangements to which these nuclear-weapon States and a number of non-nuclear-weapon States are parties and, in the context of which the use of nuclear weapons is kept open as a prime option for defence. The unilateral declarations of these nuclear-weapon States reflect the different nuclear and strategic doctrines of the two opposing military alliances. It is precisely for this reason that it has been found difficult to reconcile these unilateral declarations.

During the current session, a sincere effort was made in the Ad Hoc Working Group by several delegations, including Pakistan, to explore the various possible avenues to overcome these difficulties in the way of a common formula. In this context, the examination in the Working Group of suggestions for the development of a completely new basis for a common formula was an interesting and potentially promising exercise.

In the opinion of the Pakistan delegation there are two possible ways in which the difficulties posed by the prevailing nuclear alliances and doctrines can be overcome. One way of doing so is to clearly identify, on the basis of objective criteria, those non-nuclear-weapon States which are to be included in or excluded from the purview of the security assurances. The unilateral declaration of the Soviet Union, as reflected in document CD/23, adopts this approach. This formulation includes in the scope of assurances those non-nuclear-weapon States which have renounced the acquisition and development of nuclear weapons and "do not have them on their territory". As has been explained by its proponent, the *raison d'être* of this qualification is that a State which has nuclear weapons on its territory can be a source of nuclear threat to a nuclear-weapon State and, therefore, cannot be provided security assurances against nuclear attack. The reasoning is quite valid in so far as it goes. But it does not take into account the other side of the nuclear coin.

There are other non-nuclear-weapon States in alliance with a nuclear-weapon State which, it is claimed, do not have nuclear weapons stationed on their territories. Nevertheless, these States have not given up the right to have the nuclear weapons of their allies used in their defence. Thus, being covered by the "nuclear umbrella", these States are also a part of that region of the world in which the possibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is considered as a real military option. Another deficiency of the formula in document CD/23 is that it does not take into account the fact that in today's world of mobile missiles and tactical nuclear weapons the situation of those non-nuclear allies of

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

nuclear-weapon States which may not have nuclear weapons on their territory at present could change in a matter of hours in the event of a crisis.

In my delegation's opinion, any objective formula for security assurances should take account of the totality of the nuclear equation. This is precisely what is proposed in the compromise formula submitted by Pakistan in document CD/10. Under this formula, assurances would be provided to the non-nuclear-weapon States which are not parties to the "nuclear security arrangements" of some nuclear-weapon States. Although this formula may not be perfect, it is the result of years of patient consultations with nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear weapon States. It has been developed on the basis of objective criteria taking into account the current realities. This proposal was endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution 31/189C and again at the Assembly's thirty-second regular session. The discussions in the Ad Hoc Working Group this year have confirmed our belief that this proposal continues to provide the most promising basis for the development of a "common formula" to be included in an international instrument.

At the same time, the Pakistan delegation has demonstrated its willingness to explore alternative approaches to devising a common formula. One such alternative approach could be through the inclusion of a so-called "withdrawal clause" in the common formula. The unilateral declarations of the United Kingdom and the United States contain such a withdrawal clause. However, these formulations contemplate the revocation of the security assurance even in circumstances which would not justify a nuclear threat being held out against an offending non-nuclear-weapon State. To say that nuclear weapons may be used in case of any "attack" by a non-nuclear-weapon State with conventional weapons, merely because that non-nuclear-weapon State has an "alliance" or is in "association" with a nuclear-weapon Power, would seem to provide too wide a scope for the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations says that States "shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force..." -- except, that is, under article 51, in exercise of "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations". A security assurance which becomes null and void in case of any attack is in fact no more -- and perhaps even less -- than a reiteration of the obligation already assumed by the nuclear-weapon States under the Charter of the United Nations.

A "withdrawal clause" in a common formula for security assurances should become operative only in the most grave and explicit circumstances of a nuclear threat against a nuclear-weapon State. Under present international circumstances, this can happen only when an aggression is launched against a nuclear-weapon State, and/or its allies, by another nuclear-weapon State with the participation of one or more of its non-nuclear-weapon allies. It is only in these circumstances, and against such non-nuclear-weapon States, that the withdrawal clause should be applied. The Pakistan delegation has made an effort, admittedly an imperfect one, to describe such circumstances in one of the formulations which we have presented in the Working Group. This formulation has drawn substantially on the statement

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made in 1978 by the President of the USSR, to the effect that the Soviet Union would have recourse to nuclear weapons only in the case of an aggression against it or its allies by a nuclear-weapon Power. As we said previously, this qualification is sufficient to take into account the preoccupations of the other nuclear-weapon States. The formulation which we have suggested could, of course, be improved and refined if there is a desire to develop a common formula through the inclusion of the so-called withdrawal clause. I must reiterate, however, that for my delegation this approach is less preferable than the one of developing a common formula that is susceptible to objective rather than subjective interpretation.

Some nuclear-weapon States and their allies continue to insist that a common formula must contain a reciprocal commitment from the non-nuclear-weapon States regarding their "non-nuclear status". We have already stated our position of principle on this issue. Pakistan supports the objective of nuclear non-proliferation. We have declared that we will not develop or acquire nuclear weapons. We have taken various initiatives, especially in the context of our own region, to promote the objective of non-proliferation. However, my delegation does not consider that the quest of non-nuclear-weapon States for credible security assurances is used to promote non-proliferation. On the contrary, the conclusion of an international instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States should be viewed as an indispensable inducement against horizontal nuclear proliferation. In our view, to question, in the context of security assurances, the status of certain non-nuclear-weapon States, whatever their capabilities, will accelerate rather than arrest the enlargement of the "nuclear club".

Whatever approach is adopted to devising a common formula, it is essential that the search for security assurances is conducted within the proper political perspective. The vast majority of the non-aligned and neutral countries conceive of negative security assurances only as a first step towards the complete prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and as a part of the efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament. This first step will be acceptable to those States only if the nuclear-weapon States simultaneously commit themselves to the broader objectives of achieving nuclear disarmament and the complete prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

Despite the extraordinary efforts deployed in the Ad Hoc Working Group, especially by the non-nuclear-weapon States, the prospects for an agreement on the subject of negative security assurances are questionable. The inordinate flexibility and patience demonstrated by the non-nuclear-weapon States has not been reciprocated by most of the nuclear-weapon States. They remain preoccupied with their narrow security perceptions and strategic doctrines. Indeed, at certain stages of the discussions in the Working Group, one could well have wondered whether the exercise we are engaged in it to provide security assurances to the nuclear-weapon States rather than to the non-nuclear-weapon States.

The CHAIRMAN: In accordance with the decision taken by the Committee at its 104th plenary meeting, I have pleasure now in giving the floor to the distinguished representative of Austria, Ambassador Nettel.

Mr. NETTEL (Austria): Mr. Chairman, may I first express my delegation's sincere satisfaction in seeing you presiding over the work of this Committee for the month of July. Your well-known diplomatic skills will be helpful in guiding this body through the crucial stages of its 1981 session. May I also address my best wishes to Ambassador Komoves who chaired the Committee during the month of June and whose performance has been highly appreciated by all sides.

Taking the floor for the first time in the course of the 1981 session, I wish to express our gratitude that the Austrian delegation was given the possibility to participate more closely in the meetings of the Committee on Disarmament. By observing directly the activities of the different working groups, my delegation obtained a better insight into and a better understanding of the problems and difficulties the members of this Committee are usually confronted with.

In participating in your deliberations, the Austrian delegation hopes that it will constructively contribute to the work of your Committee.

I should like to turn to an issue which is of fundamental importance to us -- and not only to us but to a number of members of the Committee as well. I am referring to the matter on which my delegation spoke on 3 July 1980, indicating Austria's preliminary position; that is, the issue of the so-called "negative security guarantees" or "security assurances". In fact, a variety of "labels" is being used -- and has been used in the past -- to define the issue. Common to all those labels, such as "arrangements", "assurances", "guarantees", "declarations", is their vagueness. Obviously we are faced here with a problem of terminology, on top of all other problems, and I would accordingly make some comments on this terminology.

On the one hand, the notion of "arrangement" is particularly weak and non-committal, whether or not one qualifies it by using the word "effective"; some stronger expression is certainly warranted. On the other hand, the term "assurance" admittedly represents a certain progress, but in our view this expression still falls short of what the original idea was supposed to convey, namely, a legally binding commitment of the nuclear-weapon Powers, a commitment embodying the obligation of those States towards those members of the international community that were willing to forgo the acquisition and/or production of nuclear arms, thus at the same time refraining from entering the nuclear arms race. Even less satisfaction can be drawn from the concept of "guarantee", which apparently is not consistent with the sovereign equality of States. Guarantees may be misused (and have in fact been misused) because the guarantor may arrogate to himself the right to intervene in the affairs of the other State, whenever the terms of reference of the guarantee so permit. My delegation, therefore, is opposed to the notion of "guarantee" and would accordingly not like to see the concept of guarantee introduced in the domain under discussion here, or, by the way, anywhere else.

I should note in this context that it has been gratifying for my delegation when listening to my distinguished colleagues, Ambassador Lidgard and Ambassador Pictet, to find that there are similar lines of thought in Sweden, Switzerland and Austria in respect of what I may call the question of security commitments towards non-nuclear-weapon States. Irrespective of the historical background and the legal nature of their particular situation, all three Governments have declared the concept of positive security guarantees as being incompatible with political self-determination and sovereignty. We have also expressed reservations with regard to the idea of a convention. We believe that a mechanism of compulsory consultations is unacceptable and that the quid pro quo concept of a convention would in the end imply that we will have to enter into new obligations, in addition to already existing legal commitments, in order to obtain in exchange from the nuclear-weapon Powers the commitment not to use atomic weapons.

(Mr. Nettel, Austria)

When examining the non-use-commitment hitherto issued by the nuclear-weapon Powers, we deem it necessary to underline that such declarations do not constitute measures of nuclear disarmament and therefore cannot be substitutes for such measures. We want to recall that for nuclear-weapon Powers, parties to the NPT, the obligations to promote nuclear disarmament result from article VI of the non-proliferation-Treaty. We certainly do not overlook -- and we welcome -- the effect of confidence-building which stems from the nuclear non-use-commitment in the present period of growing tensions. Neither, however, should we overlook the limited character of the commitments issued up to now, and the exceptions they contain, which considerably reduce their practical value.

It is these restrictions which are of some concern to us. The aim of the commitments must be the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States regardless of the strategic doctrines guiding the actions of nuclear-weapon States.

Owing to the restrictions contained in the unilateral declarations, the deliberations in the Ad Hoc Working Group were centred, in our opinion, too much around the respective strategic doctrines of the nuclear-weapon Powers and their allies and did not take sufficiently into account the purpose of the nuclear non-use commitments, which is the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. It should therefore be made clear that these commitments have to be firm, unequivocal and free of loopholes in order to produce the confidence-building effect that could contribute to an improvement of the over-all political climate. Confidence will be obtained and trust will be created only when reliable commitments are entered into, when credibility becomes evident.

My delegation was quite surprised to learn that in the Ad Hoc Working Group the question was raised whether or not these commitments were operational and legally binding. If they were not, especially from the point of view of the nuclear-weapon Powers, the entire exercise would only be of cosmetic value. It is this uncertainty which has led us to think about ways and means to ascertain the legal value of the existing commitments.

There are different possibilities to dissipate our doubts. One would be the adoption of an instrument which -- while incorporating the five unilateral declarations -- confirms formally their legally binding character, a solution which has been proposed by Switzerland. Another way to identify the legal character of these declarations would be an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. Although such an opinion could not be requested by the Committee on Disarmament itself, such a demand could emanate from the General Assembly in accordance with a decision of the Committee to that end. This suggestion results from our belief that the Court has an important role to play in our world and that the observance of international law is one of the pillars of an international society which strives for the limitation of the use of force in the conduct of international affairs. An advisory opinion of the court would be an important element of future discussions on this matter in the Committee.

The Austrian Government considers the question of nuclear non-use commitments as one of the matters to be considered by the Committee on Disarmament on a priority basis; we hope that this consideration will be concluded within the foreseeable future and that it will not impede the examination of genuine disarmament measures.

The Austrian Government highly values the work of the Committee on Disarmament. We hope that the work of the Committee will clarify the positions and concepts with regard to the question of the "nuclear-non-use commitments", so very important to us. My delegation expresses its sincere hope that the result of your work will contribute to achieving genuine disarmament, particularly in the nuclear field.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Nettel for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. Now, in accordance with the decision taken by the Committee at its 104th plenary meeting, I have pleasure in giving the floor to the distinguished representative of Norway, Mr. Kai Lie.

Mr. LIE (Norway): Mr. Chairman, allow me first of all to express our gratitude for again being allowed to address this important negotiating forum in our role as observer nation. And permit me also to pay a tribute to you, the distinguished representative of India, in the responsible post of Chairman of the Committee for this month.

The comprehensive programme of disarmament will occupy an important place in an international disarmament strategy in the years to come. The programme must not only highlight the important elements in such a strategy; it must also provide a firmer foundation for our thinking about arms control and disarmament as an integral part of every nation's security policy. The importance of such a recognition is clearly underlined by the fact that the arms race has changed significantly over the last few years -- both qualitatively and quantitatively -- and both in the nuclear as well as in the conventional field.

As the ramifications of the arms race become increasingly complex, it is all the more important that we do not forget that arms control and disarmament are not concessions to be made as gestures of goodwill, but potential and real security gains to be sought. In our times arms control and disarmament clearly ought to be pursued as part of every nation's enlightened self-interest.

In a world marked by poverty and unfulfilled basic human needs, efforts to halt and reverse the arms race become even more imperative considering the fact that world armaments absorbed in 1980 well above \$500 billion.

The United Nations General Assembly has given the highest priority to the comprehensive programme of disarmament, the consideration and approval of which will be an important task of the next special session devoted to disarmament. We therefore view progress in the negotiating process here in the Committee on Disarmament to be of paramount importance and a most urgent concern.

I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate and elaborate on the Norwegian views on some of the matters concerning the comprehensive programme of disarmament to which we attach particular importance, concentrating on the problems connected with the removal of the threat of nuclear weapons.

Norway is greatly concerned about the vertical as well as horizontal aspects of nuclear weapons proliferation.

Norway welcomed the conclusions of the SALT II agreement as a most important achievement during 1979 in the field of nuclear arms control.

For its part the Norwegian Government will urge continuation of the SALT process as a matter of the highest priority.

A priority objective of the next SALT round should be an agreement for substantial and comprehensive reductions in strategic arms.

(Mr. Lie, Norway)

In this connection, Norway attaches particular importance to the initiation of preliminary talks and subsequent negotiations with the aim of preventing a new and ominous arms race on the continent of Europe with the competitive deployment of theatre nuclear forces.

The nuclear-weapon States carry not only the responsibility but a true obligation to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their strategies and arsenals. Increasing reliance on nuclear weapons is incompatible with a strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. Furthermore, experience suggests that the convertibility of nuclear-weapon power into politically useful currency is very limited. Any advantage which may be attained in the nuclear weapons competition is at best of incremental utility and always short-lived.

It was disappointing that neither during the special session in 1978 nor during the NPT Review Conference last year did it prove possible to make greater advances towards solving the nuclear problems. In our view, halting the further proliferation of nuclear weapons is a most urgent task facing the world community. Norway therefore finds it especially regrettable that the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the non-proliferation Treaty ended without their coming to agreement on a final declaration by consensus, especially since in fact general agreement was attained in many significant areas of concern.

The central problems during the Review Conference related to the ability and determination of the nuclear-weapon States to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in international relations by negotiating real reductions of their arsenals. It became evident that a large number of countries felt that the nuclear-weapon States had not fulfilled their obligations under the non-proliferation Treaty to pursue such negotiations effectively. This applies particularly to the question of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Such a treaty would constitute a non-discriminatory instrument of essential relevance to the promotion of non-proliferation and represent a significant step in the direction of meeting the obligations of the nuclear powers under article VI of the NPT.

Progress towards a CTB has been all too slow, but the tripartite report to the Committee on Disarmament of 30 July last year shows that some degree of progress has been made towards the important target of concluding such a treaty.

Several technical issues connected with the verification of a comprehensive test-ban remain. However, the benefits of an agreement and the risk involved in violating such an agreement should, in our view, now outweigh the technical obstacles to an agreement.

In our opinion, an adequate verification system is a necessary component in a total test-ban regime, in order both to ensure compliance and to build confidence. I would like to underline the special interest of Norway in the work being undertaken in this field within the framework of the CD. In its Ad Hoc Group of seismic experts, Norwegian experts are among those who actively contribute to the efforts being made in this connection.

(Mr. Lie, Norway)

My Government would like to see the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes halted altogether and therefore supports the idea of a ban on such production. This would constitute a useful contribution to the search for more effective non-proliferation instruments. Such a ban would place nuclear-weapon States on a more equal basis with non-nuclear-weapon States than has been the case till now. The nuclear-weapon States would then have to accept much the same IAEA safeguards that are required of non-nuclear-weapon States, thereby eliminating one important element of discrimination between the two categories of States.

Another condition for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is the solution to the question of assuring the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States against nuclear attack. This problem has so far not received a satisfactory solution.

Norway accepts the argument of those States which hold that Security Council resolution 255 of 19 June 1968 does not provide sufficient guarantees to non-aligned States. Those States that are not parties to alliance security systems involving nuclear security guarantees and which have been asked to renounce their option to acquire nuclear weapons, have a legitimate claim to guarantees against being attacked or threatened by attack with nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States bear a special responsibility for finding a solution to this problem.

Norway supports the establishment of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones as an important component in a non-proliferation regime, provided such arrangements are based on voluntary agreements of the States concerned and reflect the special circumstances prevalent in the region in question. In this connection we welcome the significant fact that all five nuclear-weapon States have ratified Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

It is of great concern that several threshold States from regions of tension and conflict have not yet abandoned the option to acquire nuclear weapons. Further proliferation could increase the risk of regional conflicts developing into nuclear confrontation. The further spread of nuclear weapons could stimulate the perception that nuclear war is somehow inevitable, and such perceptions carry the dangerous seed of self-fulfilment.

Before concluding, I should like to express the hope of the Norwegian Government that this Committee will be able to present a draft comprehensive programme of disarmament, which would enhance the possibilities of a successful conclusion of the next special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The fulfilment of such a goal is important not only for future arms control and disarmament endeavours in this Committee and in the United Nations system; it is also important in terms of restoring the confidence of world public opinion that our combined efforts in this field can produce meaningful and lasting results which are in everybody's interest.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Mr. Kai Lie for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

(The Chairman)

Distinguished delegates, in view of the extreme lateness of the hour I propose that this plenary meeting be suspended, and resumed at 3 p.m. tomorrow, Friday, 31 July, so that we may complete unfinished business before our scheduled informal meeting. I trust that there is no objection to this. I see none.

It was so decided.

The meeting was suspended at 1.40 p.m. and resumed on Friday, 31 July 1981, at 3 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: Distinguished delegates, the 142nd plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament is resumed. You will recall that yesterday we completed our list of speakers for this plenary meeting and, as I noted, there were some pending questions to consider which were not taken up because of the lack of time.

Mr. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, I wish to comment today on some aspects of the question of negative security assurances, a subject that has been under discussion in a Working Group of this Committee since the start of our 1980 session. Several delegations made interesting statements on this issue yesterday and it would be a difficult task indeed to try to extract all their highlights. My delegation was particularly impressed by the last three paragraphs of the statement delivered by the distinguished representative of Pakistan. In the concluding part of his presentation, Ambassador Ahmad made the point that a common formula on negative security assurances does not need to contain a reciprocal commitment from the non-nuclear-weapon States regarding their non-nuclear status. My delegation agrees with this view, and with its corollary assertion that the quest of some non-nuclear-weapon States for credible security assurances should not be used to promote non-proliferation. I would add that the whole point of the idea of negative security assurances is not to perpetuate the present status of the nuclear-weapon States, or in other words, the question should not be approached from the perspective that a handful of nations will forever retain their nuclear military might while all other nations must accept commitments that the former are not prepared to accept. As the distinguished representative of Canada, Ambassador McPhail, said, speaking in a different context, also with respect to the nuclear option, States should not ask others to do what they are not prepared to do themselves. Renunciation of nuclear weapons is not a quid-pro-quo for bestowing upon some countries a right to maintain their deadly arsenals or, what is even worse, for condoning their continuing nuclear build-up. Contrary to what some recent statements in this chamber have sought to convey, the real danger lies not in the possibility that some additional countries may reach the technological plateau which would enable them to manufacture a nuclear explosive device. Rather, the real danger lies in the insensitivity of the few existing nuclear-weapon Powers that continue to increase the numbers and the destructive might of their weapons. Why is it that the prospect of technological progress in the nuclear field in the developing countries is apt to raise such an outcry from the nuclear-weapon Powers, and some of their allies, while their own capacity to destroy one another and the rest of mankind does not seem to evoke any emotion? Why should they be so keen on promoting the concept of international "arms control" while not accepting any multilateral approach to the real problems of nuclear disarmament? Have they invented a new scale on which to gauge national security, and according to which their own security interests are more important or more worthy of protection than the national security interests of other nations, or for that matter, the interest of mankind as a whole?

(Mr. de Souza E Silva, Brazil)

Ambassador Ahmad concluded his statement yesterday with a remark that my delegation fully endorses. He said that "at certain stages of the discussions in the Working Group, one could well have wondered whether the exercise we are engaged in is to provide security assurances to the nuclear-weapon States rather than to the non-nuclear-weapon States".

With one exception, the unilateral declarations issued by the five nuclear-weapon States contain several qualifications designed to take into account the particular security concerns of the nuclear-weapon Powers issuing the declaration. All those qualifications impose obligations on the part of the non-nuclear-weapon States, obligations that must be fulfilled and the observance of which is to be determined by the nuclear-weapon State concerned. As long as the nuclear-weapon Power is satisfied, according to its own judgement, that the obligation is being kept, the guarantee stands. It is, of course, perfectly legitimate for a State to issue a unilateral declaration worded as it sees fit; it is another matter, however, to expect other States to subscribe to such conditions and to accept the obligations they prescribe without asking for a suitable reciprocal commitment. What would then be the suitable commitment in exchange for the nuclear non-military option, if not a similar commitment on the part of every other State that enters into whatever arrangement is envisaged?

The five declarations from the nuclear-weapon Powers, without any exception this time, have one feature in common: they envisage one single obligation for the nuclear-weapon Powers, that is, to provide a unilateral guarantee. All five declarations seem to assume that non-nuclear-weapon States will forever maintain their own non-nuclear-weapon status, which would be a commendable development; but all five declarations also seem to assume that the existing nuclear-weapon Powers will forever retain their own status as such. Why would nuclear-weapon Powers be so reluctant to contemplate for themselves obligations they so adamantly advocate for the rest of the world?

The vast majority of the nations in the world have accepted the commitment never to acquire nuclear weapons. Many did so by adhering to an international instrument that Brazil and many other countries consider imperfect and discriminatory, because it imposes different degrees of obligations on its parties, according to their nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon status. The commitment entered into by the non-nuclear parties to the NPT is clear and unambiguous, and has been carried out so far; on the contrary, the weak provision that calls for negotiations on nuclear disarmament has met with the indifference of the nuclear-weapon parties, which seem determined to achieve exactly the opposite. How can they reconcile their professed dedication to the cause of disarmament, or even to the equivocal cause of "arms control", with their adherence to doctrines of nuclear deterrence and their ceaseless engaging in vertical proliferation?

It is obvious that it is not the renunciation of nuclear weapons that creates a reciprocal obligation to provide adequate guarantees against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. If it were so, the nuclear-weapon States would have no hesitation to extend such assurances to those that have so far remained true to their sovereign decision not to exercise a nuclear military option. Brazil, for its part, by signing and ratifying the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, has conferred international status on its commitment to the cause of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. By virtue of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, Brazil had unequivocally renounced the nuclear military option, while keeping open all its options for the full development and utilization of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

May I conclude my statement by reaffirming one fundamental concept of my delegation. Negative security assurances can only be conceived in their proper political perspective, as an interim measure in a chain of events conducive to nuclear disarmament. The goal of nuclear disarmament is, and must remain, the main consideration in the grim realities of today's world.

The CHAIRMAN: I now intend to take up the question of the closing date of the 1981 session of the Committee. After intensive consultations I am now in a position to inform the Committee that Friday, 21 August seems to have general acceptance. Can I take it that the Committee agrees to conclude the session on that date?

If there is no objection, I intend to establish that a consensus exists to end the 1981 session on Friday, 21 August.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: In connection with the decision just taken by the Committee, I would appeal to the Chairmen of the ad hoc working groups to ensure that reports of subsidiary bodies are adopted not later than 17 August for the ad hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, and 12 August for the other groups, so that those reports do not collide with the processing of the report of the Committee to the General Assembly. Members of the Committee are aware that the technical services of the Secretariat also cover other important meetings being held in Geneva and that there is a limit to what can possibly be done by them at short notice.

Distinguished delegates, the Secretariat circulated yesterday, at my request, an informal paper prepared in consultation with the next Chairman of the Committee, which contains a timetable of meetings to be held by the Committee on Disarmament and its subsidiary bodies during the week 3-7 August 1981. The informal paper contains basically the same allocation of time as provided for during the previous week, the only difference being that the time allotted in July for informal meetings has now been left open. You will notice that no meetings are scheduled for Monday or Friday afternoons. As the session is coming to an end, I feel that we need to retain a certain flexibility in the scheduling of our meetings. If the need arises, the Chair will inform the Committee on the best way to utilize the time that may be available but, for the time being, it seems to be advisable not to take a decision. As usual, the timetable is indicative and may be adjusted as we proceed. If there is no objection I will consider that the Committee accepts the timetable. I see no objection.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: Distinguished delegates, this is the last plenary meeting at which I shall be serving as your Chairman. And by tradition, custom and usage, some words from the Chair are expected. I had planned to make this statement yesterday but due to the long list of speakers I decided not to compete unduly for your attention against your more compelling gastronomic needs. An army is said to march on its stomach; the peaceful forces of disarmament do no less!

(The Chairman)

As I look back upon my term as Chairman, I take satisfaction in the fact that July has been an eventful, active and interesting month in the current calendar of the Committee. Certainly it would have given me greater satisfaction if we had been able to achieve more concrete progress on items of the highest priority on the Committee's agenda, namely, a nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The world community certainly expects more than that from us. However, I believe that the frank and open exchanges of views which have taken place during the past few weeks have led to a much better understanding of each other's position.

We have had a very constructive debate on ways and means to improve the functioning of the Committee and enhance its effectiveness as a negotiating body. I feel honoured that the Committee has entrusted to me the task of co-ordinating the work of arriving at an agreed set of recommendations in this regard. I have every hope that with the help of all colleagues I shall be able to discharge this work entrusted to me.

What impression shall I carry with me of my term as Chairman? I can say without hesitation that what has made my task both worthwhile and satisfying is the genuine goodwill and earnestness displayed in the Committee while working to find solutions for the serious ailment which affects the entire world. I am conscious of the fact that not all my actions may have been satisfactory to every delegation. But this is the occupational hazard which faces any Chairman. I consider myself fortunate that I have received support in ample measure for carrying out my task. I would accordingly like to express my sincere gratitude to each and every one of you for your readiness to help with advice and for the spirit of accommodation, even indulgence, which you have shown.

I would also like to express my appreciation to Ambassador Jaipal, Personal Representative of the Secretary-General and Secretary of the Committee, to Mr. Berasategui, his deputy, and all the members of the disarmament secretariat as well as to our gallant band of interpreters.

Last but not least, I take this opportunity to welcome Ambassador Anwar Sani of Indonesia who will take over soon as Chairman for the month of August. To him falls the crucial task of guiding the Committee during the most difficult phase of its annual session, that is the consideration and adoption of the annual report of the Committee to the General Assembly. I offer him my warm congratulations and good wishes and pledge to him the fullest support of my delegation in the discharge of his duties as Chairman. I have no doubt that with his long and varied experience as one of the leading diplomats from Indonesia he will successfully accomplish this task.

I would like to conclude with the oldest written prayer, from the Vedas, which I believe has relevance to the efforts we are all making in the Committee:

"Asathyo na sāt ganaya
Thamaso ma jyothirgamaya
Mithyorma amrithangamaya."

(From Illusion lead us to Reality!
From Darkness lead us to Light!
And from death lead us to immortality!)

I thank you all.