

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.139
21 July 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-NINTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 21 July 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. A.P. Venkateswaran

(India)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. M. MATI
Mr. A. BENYAMINA

Argentina: Mr. J.C. CARASALES

Australia: Mr. R. STEELE

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. J.-M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. K. PRAMOV
Mr. R. DEYANOV
Mr. P. POPCHEV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U NGWE WIN
U THAN HTUN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL
Mr. G.R. SKINNER

China: Mr. YU Mengjia
Mr. LI Changhe
Mr. SA Benyang
Mr. PAN Jusheng

Cuba:

Czechoslovakia: Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. J. FRANEK

Egypt: Mr. EL S.A.R. EL REEDY
Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M.N. FAHMY
Mr. W. BASSIM

Ethiopia: Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. F. DE LA CORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. H. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. C. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Mrs. H. HOPPE

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. W. KLINGLER
Mr. H. MULLER

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. A. LAKATOS

India: Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. M. SIDIK
Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. FAUZY QASIM
Mr. ACHDIAK

Iran: Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA

Italy: Mr. A. CIARRAPICO
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. M. BARENGHI
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANAKA
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya:

Mexico : Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia : Mr. D. ERDLJIBILIG
Mr. S-O. BOLD

Morocco : Mr. M. CITRAIBI

Netherlands : Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria : Mr. M.B. DREMAH
Mr. W.O. AKINSAYIYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan : Mr. H. AHMAD
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru : Mr. F. VALDIVIAZO
Mr. A. DE SOTO
Mr. A. THORNBERRY

Poland : Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Romania : Mr. T. MELIȘCANU
Mr. H. BICHER

Sri Lanka :

Sweden : Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. J. LUNDIN
Mr. S. EKICIN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics : Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. V.H. GANJA
Mr. M.M. IPPOLITOV
Mr. V.F. PRYAKHIN
Mr. V.A. SEMIONOV
Mrs. L.V. GRACHIKOVA

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.H. SUMMERHAYES

Mrs. J.I. LINK

Mrs. C.A. BOOTS

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. FLOWERREE

Mr. F.P. DESIMONE

Mr. J.A. MISKEL

Mr. R.F. SCOTT

Mr. W. HECKROLLE

Mr. J.E. TRENTON

Ms K. CRITTENBERGER

Venezuela:

Mr. R. RODRIGUEZ NAVARRO

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC

Mr. D. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. B.A. NZENGEYA

Secretary of the Committee
and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee starts today its consideration of item 6 of its agenda, "Comprehensive programme of disarmament". As usual, members wishing to make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee are at liberty to do so in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure.

Mr. VOUTOV (Bulgaria): Mr. Chairman, before I proceed to the main subject about which I am going to make some remarks today as head of the Bulgarian delegation, I would like to make a short statement in my capacity as co-ordinator of the group of socialist countries for the month of July. I would like to raise the question which I raised at our last meeting in connection with document CD/194. This document contains a statement of the group of socialist countries on the question of the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, and highlights the particular importance that our group attributes to this problem, its attachment to the idea of the earliest possible elaboration of a treaty on a complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests aimed at the cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons by all States in all environments for all time. The socialist countries have actively and consistently spoken in favour of an active role of the Committee in efforts to solve the problem of a complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and in favour of the creation of an ad hoc working group on this item on the condition that all five nuclear-weapon States take an active part in it. The document also underlines the fact that the socialist countries have invariably attributed and continue to attribute special significance to the trilateral negotiations between the USSR, the United States of America and the United Kingdom, and appeal to the participants in these negotiations for their early resumption and successful conclusion. As noted in the statement, we are in favour of joint answers by the participants in the trilateral negotiations to the questions posed by the Group of 21 in their document CD/181.

At the same time, the socialist countries expect the two other nuclear-weapon States, which are not participating in the trilateral negotiations, to present in a more definite manner their attitude towards the creation of an ad hoc working group on this item and to state their readiness to participate in the negotiations on the future treaty and to undertake the relevant obligations under it.

The group of socialist countries expects answers to these questions and attaches great importance to them, and so we ask the representatives of the two nuclear-weapon States to provide concrete answers on their attitude and their intention as regards a nuclear test ban.

Allow me now, in the spirit of the business-like atmosphere which has been prevailing in the Committee in the month of July, to proceed to my statement on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, the subject of this week's discussion.

(Mr. Voutov, Bulgaria)

While preparing my statement, I perceived that at the present stage of the work of the Committee on Disarmament the issue of the comprehensive programme of disarmament poses before us a number of importunate requirements and also provides a ground for reflection along certain practical lines. First, this item is the only one on the agenda bound up with a fixed term. This fact increases the significance and the responsibility of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. Secondly, the fulfilment of the mandate of the Working Group, i.e. the elaboration of the CPD before the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, will be a test of the effectiveness of the Committee on Disarmament in general -- a problem whose actuality and validity have lately been underlined by a series of delegations, and above all by the delegation of the Soviet Union. Thirdly, it is becoming increasingly compelling to pay the necessary attention to the historic responsibility which falls upon the Committee as the basic collective drafter of the first whole and complete text of a CPD. Regardless of the fact that by its very nature the CPD will not have the same binding character as that inherent in the treaties now in preparation, to prohibit, for example, radiological or chemical weapons, the CPD in its political importance surpasses a number of other items in the work of this Committee.

The position of the People's Republic of Bulgaria on some of "the main parameters of the future CPD" has already been presented in the statement of the Bulgarian delegation of 12 March (CD/PV.114). Today, I would like to offer to the attention of my distinguished colleagues in the Committee some considerations of a more substantial character.

The preamble of a CPD, being an introduction to an international document with a long-term validity, should reflect the most important, ground-laying ideas which will guide States in the process of disarmament. It is necessary that the preamble should incorporate the thought that the continuation of the arms race, and particularly the nuclear arms race, is a growing danger not only to peace and security but also to the very survival of mankind. The stepping-up of the arms race has a negative effect on development programmes, the restructuring of international economic relations on a democratic and equitable basis and the solution of other world problems of paramount significance. It is important that we adopt in the preamble the idea of a correlation between disarmament and détente and of the objective necessity for these two processes to supplement each other.

On item 2 of the CPD -- "Objectives" -- quite a lot remains to be done in order to come to a generally acceptable text.

The Bulgarian delegation supports the document submitted on this subject by the delegation of Czechoslovakia. The document in question incorporates the addition proposed by the Bulgarian delegation (CD/CPD/WP.35) containing

(Mr. Voutov, Bulgaria)

the notion that all the negotiations in the field of disarmament which have been initiated in recent years in various forums and on a bilateral basis and which at the present time have been interrupted or deferred, should be resumed and continued, and initiatives should be taken to open new disarmament negotiations aimed at further promoting détente, strengthening world peace and security and achieving effective measures for disarmament. In the Working Group on a CPD no one has expressed a difference of principle in regard to document WP.35. Reservations have been made as far as its actual place in the CPD is concerned. The exact place of the Bulgarian proposal is, of course, subject to further discussion in the Working Group, but my delegation firmly believes that this text should find its place in one of the first four sections of the CPD, because the resumption of the suspended disarmament negotiations and the opening of new ones is a sine qua non for the implementation of a programme as comprehensive and long-term as the CPD.

The co-ordination of the texts in section 3, "Principles", is a highly important task. Finding the most accurate and purposeful formulations in this section to a large extent predetermines the practicability of the measures agreed to in the CPD.

As we have already pointed out, the Charter of the United Nations and the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament offer a broad methodological basis for determining the principles of the future CPD. At this stage the delegation of Bulgaria does not make it its aim to suggest a detailed picture of how section 3 should look, neither is it trying to arrange the principles according to their importance, but it is our opinion that three principles deserve special attention: (a) the principle of undiminished security for all parties to an agreement; (b) the principle that the participants in disarmament negotiations should not aim at obtaining military superiority; (c) all possible measures should be taken to secure the adoption and development of the principle of the non-use of force in international relations. We believe that the principle of the non-use of force in international relations should find more specific expression when we agree on the measures for disarmament, especially in regard to the paragraphs of section 5 concerning nuclear disarmament.

In regard to section 4 of the CPD -- "Priorities", my delegation supports the stand of a number of other delegations to the effect that the relevant part of the Final Document offers a satisfactory basis for coming to an agreement on the final version of this item.

Undoubtedly, the greatest efforts will be required for the drawing up of section 5 of the CPD -- "Measures". The distinguished Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a CPD, Ambassador García Robles, has done exactly the right thing by concentrating the activity of the Group on the section "Measures", which in fact is the heart of the CPD. In the discussions of this problem my delegation is endeavouring to contribute constructively

(Mr. Voutov, Bulgaria)

to the progress of our joint work, taking into consideration the positions of the delegations of the three main groups represented in the Committee.

The measures in a CPD should be stimulating and orienting the process of disarmament. The actual language which is to be applied in formulating the measures should, I believe, be balanced and concise; in regard to separate measures, the draft could allow more detailed elucidations or annotations but only in cases where these elucidations would have the nature of an integral part and the measure would otherwise lose its meaning. With some delegations there is a preference for giving in detail, or decoding, as it were, the substance of the separate measures. In the opinion of my delegation, such an approach would alter the nature of the CPD, which should be a co-ordinated, framework document "encompassing all measures thought to be advisable" and not a set of instructions. Moreover, while the CPD will be drafted as a uniform, comprehensive document on disarmament, its implementation will not be automatic but rather the result of bilateral, trilateral and multilateral negotiations, that is, in every single case (in implementing a measure embodied in the CPD) a certain period of time will be necessary as well as a co-ordination of areas and issues in which the political wills of two or more States should coincide.

In close connection with section 5, "Measures", is section 6, "Stages of implementation". On this issue the position of my delegation was made clear a long time ago. We are for the setting of tentative time-frames for the implementation of the relevant agreements, and for the specification of the terms to be accomplished according to the scope and nature of the measures we succeed in agreeing upon.

In reference to the last section of the CPD, "Machinery and procedure", my delegation considers that the States should use all channels for the respective negotiations and should discuss the implementation of disarmament measures both in the United Nations and in other forums. In this respect the socialist countries, and above all the Soviet Union, have given a good example with their initiatives and proposals, and they will continue to do so. Consultations among States should be held, in our view, at all levels, and particularly fruitful are the meetings and consultations at the highest level. My delegation shares the views as to the prime responsibility of the United Nations for the implementation of the CPD and the importance of the special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The convening of a world disarmament conference would of course, have a unique influence on the solution of the disarmament problem. Dwelling on the section "Machinery and procedure", allow me to express once again my appreciation and full support for the substantive and purposeful proposals on enhancing the effectiveness of the Committee made by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan. There is no doubt that making these proposals the basis for taking a decision on this matter would offer new perspectives before the Committee, particularly in the matter of creating the best machinery and procedure for implementing the CPD.

(Mr. Voutov, Bulgaria)

My delegation considers it appropriate to refer also to certain questions connected with the organization of the work of the Working Group on a CPD. My delegation is of the opinion that the activities of this Working Group are marked by efficiency and thoroughness stimulated by the competent chairmanship of Ambassador García Robles. We have no doubt that unless acts of obstructionism on the part of any delegation are manifested, the Working Group will manage to fulfil its mandate and to draft, at the latest by April 1982, the text of a CPD which, after adoption by the Committee, will be presented to the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. To this end, regardless of the energetic style of work applied by the Working Group on a CPD, my delegation proposes that even before the end of this month the Committee should take a decision that a reserve of a minimum of four additional weeks is to be foreseen -- a reserve to be used at the discretion of the Chairman of the Working Group in consultation with the co-ordinators of the three groups and during a period suitable to all. Taking such a decision will create conditions for the normal completion of the work of the Working Group, in case such a need arises.

In conclusion, I would like to express the opinion that apart from being a framework, a basis, for disarmament negotiations, the CPD will be in a way a mirror of contemporary international relations in their entire diversity and complexity. That is why my delegation believes that from us, the drafters of the CPD, a true statesmanship and realism are required so that our "mirror" can reflect above all the most important, the lasting and at the same time the long-term tendencies in international affairs. Such an approach would put the work of the Working Group on a still more realistic and more effective basis and would secure the successful implementation of its mandate.

In this regard the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria is ready to contribute in every appropriate way. For us the elaboration of the CPD is not just a task in the framework of our participation in the Committee on Disarmament, but an activity which falls entirely within the mainstream of the strategy of our foreign policy. This idea has been expressed in a most eloquent manner by the President of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Mr. Todor Zhivkov, who stated at the international meeting-dialogue on détente, held in Sofia in May of this year:

"The strategy of real socialism is aimed at preserving and promoting détente, at peaceful co-existence with the capitalist States, at halting the arms race and at disarmament -- in conditions of military parity and equal security of the East and the West and at an open and sincere dialogue on all controversial issues in international relations."

Mr. VALDIVIESO (Peru) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, since this is my first statement at a formal meeting of the Committee on Disarmament, I should like to express my appreciation of the productive work the Committee has been doing under your guidance during July. India's peaceful, non-aligned policy is constantly reaffirmed in the statements made by its delegation in the Committee, and this is a source of particular satisfaction to countries like mine which have adopted the same position. I should also like to thank your distinguished predecessor, Mr. Komives, the Ambassador of Hungary, for his unflagging efforts to advance the work of the Committee. Lastly, this being the first opportunity I have had to do so publicly, I should like to welcome the distinguished colleagues who have joined the Committee at its summer session. The Ambassadors of Argentina, Iran, Sri Lanka and Venezuela may be assured of all possible co-operation from my delegation.

I should like now to refer first to the exchange of opinions which took place in this Committee last week on documents CD/180 and CD/181, which were submitted by the Group of 21. In that discussion as in others on the subject of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, we heard frequent references to the doctrine of deterrence. My delegation wishes to dwell briefly on this matter since this doctrine not only forms the basis of the position of a number of delegations with respect to nuclear weapons but is also, indirectly or even directly, reflected in their approach to all the other items on our agenda.

We have been told that the policy of deterrence has been effective in recent decades in preventing the outbreak of a nuclear war. If that was the only way of doing so, we cannot but express our concern at the fact that the security of the international community should depend exclusively on the fear of reprisals. It seems to us that in that case the international system is suffering from chronic structural insecurity, and that all nations would do well to try to find a basis for a sounder system of security.

In the name of deterrence a nuclear arsenal has been built up that is capable of destroying the entire planet on which we live several times over. We must realize the absurdity of continuing to spend huge sums of money on war material which will never be used, for if the nuclear weapon Powers used only half their arsenals, they would do away with all forms of life on earth, including their own. In our view this fact constitutes a theoretical limit to the doctrine of deterrence and requires those Powers, once this point has been reached to establish a different system of political relations. As has already been said in this Committee, the policy of deterrence is subject to the law of diminishing returns that is referred to in economics, and thus the negotiation of measures of nuclear disarmament is a matter of pure political pragmatism.

The delegations which have argued that nuclear deterrence has prevented an atomic war have, however, failed to observe that, owing to the persistent antagonism among the great Powers, the policy of deterrence has replaced a possible total confrontation by a series of conflicts localized on the territory of third countries. The systems of alliances and the control of geographical points considered to be strategic are as important elements in the policy of deterrence as the accumulation of a war potential, and this has meant that the Powers which have been deterred use third countries to give rein to confrontations in favour of their own interests, bringing with them destruction and war and amounting, on occasions, to more or less open interference in the internal and external affairs of other countries. This situation, in turn, is a source of potential serious crises. The contemporary international scene abounds in examples of what I have just described, and the numerous explosive centres of tension thus created are in no way a guarantee of world peace.

(Mr. Valdivieso, Peru)

This is the obvious result of the policy of deterrence, and those who find it acceptable are only demonstrating once again how little respect they have for the life and welfare of others. Many States, including non-nuclear-weapon States and developing countries, will suffer serious harm whether deterrence succeeds or whether it fails and there is a nuclear holocaust. Consequently, these countries have a direct legitimate interest in promoting the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the discrediting of its ideological basis, the doctrine of deterrence. We shall continue to insist on this point, at the risk of seeming impertinent, because it is of vital importance in order to create a new international impetus that may lead to peace among all nations.

The presence in this Committee of a number of States which do not possess nuclear weapons and are not members of military alliances, in accordance with the specific intention of the United Nations General Assembly, is undeniable proof, we believe, of their right to participate in all matters which are within the competence of the Committee on Disarmament and especially in the negotiations towards "general and complete disarmament". This is basically why the delegation of Peru has, in the context of the Group of 21, encouraged the setting up of ad hoc working groups, on the terms set forth in documents CD/180 and CD/181. We cannot conceal our disappointment at the refusal of some States to agree to this proposal and make a start on concrete work in this area, particularly as the urgent need to reach agreement on these topics makes it unwise to continue a useless and ever preliminary exchange of ideas. What we ought rather to do, if we want to achieve tangible results within a reasonable period of time, is to embark on detailed negotiations in a sincere spirit of compromise.

Other delegations have already indicated very clearly the contradiction between the fact that the items on nuclear topics were included in the Committee's agenda by unanimous decision of the United Nations General Assembly, and the statements of the delegations which are now opposed to negotiations on these items. The reasons those delegations have given for opposing all forms of serious negotiation on nuclear weapons within this Committee appear to us inconsistent and although it may be unnecessary at this moment to make an exhaustive analysis of their arguments I should nevertheless like to point out that it is not the security of one or two nations alone that is at stake, that if these items appear on the agenda of the "single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum", that is obviously so that they can be negotiated, and that if they are on the Committee's agenda for the present session, that is because our delegations ought to concern themselves with them during that period. I do not know whether the wasting of time that is now being imposed on us with respect to the most important items on our work programme is a mere inconsistency on the part of certain Governments or an indication of their lack of will to negotiate, but my delegation is convinced that the work of this Committee will not be effective until substantive negotiation takes place on the nuclear topics which are rightly said to have priority a number of times over in the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

In these circumstances, we should like to express our hope that the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will be able at least in part to meet our concern about the nuclear arms race. Although this Ad Hoc Group is working at a different level, we shall feel relieved if the General Assembly can have before it at its second special session on disarmament a comprehensive programme of disarmament. This hope, which we feel is justified, is accompanied

(Mr. Valdivieso, Peru)

by our recognition and appreciation of the work that is being done by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group, the distinguished Ambassador García Robles of Mexico. The progress made so far in the work of the Group has been due to his skill, and this seems to augur a successful and timely conclusion, of the Group's work, in spite of the many obstacles that lie in its path.

Since we have been speaking of nuclear topics and the CPD, we should also like to express our support for working paper CD/CPD/WP.36, which contains a proposal by the Group of 21 on this subject. If in this context too the nuclear-weapon Powers fail to give a palpable demonstration of their good faith as regards negotiations on nuclear disarmament, they will block what appears to be our only possibility of coming to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament with some pragmatic and concrete results. The failure of this Committee will be absolute and final unless the nuclear-weapon States adopt a more constructive attitude in this regard.

The importance of the comprehensive programme of disarmament lies above all in the fact that it will establish precise objectives for each stage. This will allow us to have a clear idea of the priorities and the extent to which real progress is being made towards the attainment of the goals set. Thus the comprehensive programme should give us a complete list of the measures that are to be taken, and an approximate indication of when. This said, it should be recalled that the greatest danger facing mankind is that of a nuclear war. Although this expression has become almost a cliché, its validity has constantly increased. This is why we think that in the comprehensive programme of disarmament the highest priority should be given to nuclear disarmament. Otherwise the Programme will be meaningless.

It should be added that a State cannot be required to adopt a measure of either nuclear or conventional disarmament if the prevailing logic suggests that more arms mean greater security. All States are concerned with their own security, their territorial integrity and their political independence. If this were egoism, it would at any rate be healthy egoism. This was fully taken into account by the General Assembly when it drew up a mandate for the Committee on Disarmament with a very specific purpose. Here, however, there is no contradiction, because the measures for disarmament and the security measures are not mutually exclusive. They merely mean the development of a new concept of security. The Charter of the United Nations several decades ago prohibited the use and the threat of use of force in international relations and established a forum for multilateral negotiations, thus supplementing bilateral dialogue. But it is difficult to believe that an extremely well-armed State that is in the process of increasing its arsenals really intends to adhere to the principles laid down in the Charter, and this naturally makes the solution of international problems more difficult. The system set up by the United Nations obviously requires a theoretical and practical complement, which is urgently needed at the present time so that the controversies between States may be settled in a peaceful and permanent manner.

In these circumstances, the effort required of the distinguished members of this Committee is immense, and must be based on imagination and good faith. The work of the Committee is regarded by many sectors of public opinion as in the realm of utopia, and yet indispensable. This is a heavy responsibility, and those States with the greatest war potential bear the largest share of it, for if only the small States were to carry out disarmament measures, the perilous situation in which we find ourselves would not have changed very much.

(Mr. Valdivieso, Peru)

In conclusion, allow me to remind you of the obvious truth which has been pointed out by all nations that the survival of mankind depends on the avoidance of war, especially nuclear war, and the achievement of general and complete disarmament. And in these difficult matters, the responsibility lies with this Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Valdivieso for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, today, the Soviet delegation would like to dwell on agenda items 4 and 6.

The elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament is, as is well known, an important task of the Committee on Disarmament. A draft programme should be submitted for consideration by the United Nations General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament which is scheduled to be held in 1982. There are good reasons to expect that this document will occupy a major place in the work of the special session.

The elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament is proceeding at a time when the world is facing a threat of being overwhelmed by a new gigantic wave in the arms race and the further growth of military expenditures. The adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament will, therefore, in our view, contribute to the restraining of the arms race and to disarmament, and will serve as a sharp denunciation of those forces and circles that rely on military force and hinder the process of disarmament. The programme as conceived should express the political will of those who are parties to it to do their utmost to bring about real progress in the sphere of disarmament and to achieve the programme's ultimate objective -- general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The Ad Hoc Working Group of the Committee which is responsible for the elaboration of a comprehensive programme under the energetic and able guidance of its Chairman, Ambassador García Robles, is working very strenuously to draw up a programme. A general outline of a comprehensive programme of disarmament is already taking shape, although, to be frank, rather obscurely. But it has to be said that there is still a long way to go to the finishing line. On many an issue raised by various delegations it has not so far, unfortunately, been possible to reach a consensus.

Nevertheless, a good and constructive foundation exists for working out a comprehensive programme of disarmament. This foundation consists of three principal documents drawn up and adopted by consensus by the States Members of the United Nations. I am referring, of course, to the following documents, which are well known to all delegations: the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the report of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, and the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade. These documents reflect a carefully established balance of the genuine interests of States, and any attempts to disrupt this balance are certainly counterproductive.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The delegation of the USSR, like the delegations of many other countries represented in the Committee, believes that measures aimed at the cessation of the nuclear arms race and at nuclear disarmament should occupy first place in the programme. Indeed, it is precisely nuclear weapons that pose the gravest threat to mankind. It is for this reason, therefore, that this issue should be given top priority. The Soviet Union, as you know, has spoken and continues to speak firmly in favour of the initiation without delay of negotiations on the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of stockpiles of such weapons until they are completely eliminated. It goes without saying that the implementation of nuclear disarmament measures should also be backed up by a parallel strengthening of political and international legal guarantees for the security of States.

Certainly, the programme should include other disarmament measures, too, such as, for instance, the prohibition of the development and production of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction, the reduction and elimination of conventional weapons and armed forces, the reduction of military budgets, measures for building confidence in the relations between States, a link between disarmament and development, etc. All these issues are not simple at all, but we must face up to them if we really want the disarmament programme to be comprehensive.

A comprehensive programme of disarmament will be viable with one indispensable condition, namely, that its implementation should at no stage prejudice the security of any party. In other words, the principle of equality and equal security -- a generally recognized and fundamental principle of international law -- should be strictly and absolutely observed.

In considering the nature of a comprehensive programme of disarmament the delegation of the USSR proceeds from the belief that the programme must not turn out to be merely another volume to be kept in the archives of the United Nations. The comprehensive programme should be a serious large-scale instrument which would pave the way for real advances in the sphere of disarmament and would serve as a means of bringing pressure to bear upon those forces in the contemporary world which worship the god of war.

We are coming nearer and nearer to the date of the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and there is still a great deal of work to be done on the comprehensive programme of disarmament. The Soviet delegation is ready to work on the preparation of the programme as much as is necessary.

We propose consideration of the question of extending the period of work of the relevant Working Group. This could be done in particular by arranging for it to resume its work at any time agreeable to the members of the Committee, but during the current year. It is essential that the Committee should complete the task assigned to it and that a draft comprehensive programme of disarmament should be ready by the time of the second United Nations General Assembly special session. This is the clear duty of the Committee, and one that should be fulfilled. For its part, the Soviet delegation will do everything in its power to facilitate the earliest possible elaboration of a programme.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Permit me now to make some comments on behalf of the Soviet delegation with respect to agenda item 4.

At the summer part of the current session of the Committee considerable attention has been given to the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons, which is one of the most urgent tasks in the sphere of the limitation of armaments and disarmament. In the first place we should like to note the intense and vigorous activity of the Ad Hoc Working Group under the able guidance of Ambassador Curt Lidgard of Sweden. The Group has held a considerable number of formal and informal meetings, and there have in addition been numerous bilateral and multilateral working meetings. The informal consultations of toxicologists, in which experts from 24 countries took part, were characterized by a business-like and constructive spirit. Many countries accepted the invitation of Finland to take part in a seminar held in Helsinki to discuss issues related to the problem of verification. The seminar was attended by Soviet experts as well.

All this attests to the great interest of States members of the Committee — and others, too — in the speediest possible prohibition of chemical weapons — an extremely dangerous type of weapon of mass destruction. The Soviet delegation has no intention at this stage of summing up the results of this multi-faceted and laborious work. We would like to underline only one point, a decisive one, in our view. The consultations, discussions and negotiations themselves with the participation of a wide range of States have accentuated once again the extreme complexity of the problem of prohibiting chemical weapons. They have confirmed that the solution of this problem is very different from similar tasks in other areas of the limitation of armaments and disarmament. This is due, first and foremost, to the particular nature of chemical weapons, that is to say that this type of weapon, unlike any other, is in many ways closely, inextricably linked with the peaceful branches of the economies of States. We have more than once spoken of how difficult it is to draw a dividing line between chemicals intended for peaceful uses and those intended for the manufacture of chemical weapons, between ordinary military production and military production of chemical weapons. Furthermore, present-day realities demonstrate that this interlinkage is tending to become more and more complex. Let us take, for instance, binary weapons. It is well known that in some countries special emphasis is being laid precisely on this most dangerous type of chemical weapons, and that these countries are planning to allocate tremendous resources to their production. However, the components of this weapon are chemical substances which are widely used in the economy and which very often are not themselves highly toxic. There is every justification for affirming that the adoption of this type of weapon will erect new and very great difficulties in the way of the prohibition of chemical weapons. Can we ignore these facts?

Unfortunately, in addition to the objective difficulties in the matter of prohibiting chemical weapons, our negotiations have met with and are continuing to meet with contrived and artificial difficulties as well. When the negotiations started in this Committee, they were to pursue a clear-cut and explicit objective — the prohibition of the development, production and accumulation of chemical weapons and the destruction of stockpiles of them. In the course of the negotiations there has appeared an intention on the part of some delegations to go beyond the bounds

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

of these tasks -- quite far beyond them, moreover -- and attempt, for instance, to prohibit certain types of activity which cannot be separated from general questions relating to the organization of defence, such as military planning, the training of personnel, and so on. Furthermore, there are some who wish to review the already operative -- and perfectly effective -- 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. Needless to say, all this can only further complicate a problem that is difficult enough in itself.

The question then is how nevertheless to move forward in these circumstances? It seems to us that the answer to this question is unequivocal, namely: it is necessary first of all to reach a clear-cut and explicit agreement on the key, fundamental issues -- the subject and the scope of the prohibition. This is not to say that it is necessary to agree on all the full stops and commas in the specific formulations on these issues, but we firmly insist that a common understanding on them should be worked out, failing which, we believe, it is impossible to work seriously on other provisions of the convention, no matter how important they may be.

The Soviet delegation has already explained its views concerning the most useful methods of work on issues related to the convention within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament. These views are based on the conviction that it is necessary in the first place to reach a common understanding on the subject and the scope of the prohibition. It is for this reason and this reason only that we wish to focus attention on these cardinal issues. It is, therefore, this same approach that is reflected in the draft text of a new mandate which we have proposed for adoption at this session -- and we regret that this issue has not yet been resolved. We are convinced that our approach is the right one, and we are ready to continue to defend it.

In the statements of some delegations at our last meeting, particular emphasis was laid on questions of verification. In doing so some representatives tried, although in a veiled way, to distort the position of the Soviet Union on these questions. We have no intention of allowing ourselves to be drawn into a discussion on this matter at the present time. The viewpoint of the Soviet delegation was stated at the plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament on 31 March 1981. The only thing we would like to do is to reiterate that the Soviet Union attaches no less importance than any other country whatsoever to verification issues, and that at an appropriate time, when the participants in the negotiations know definitely what is to be prohibited under the convention, what types of activity, what categories of chemical substances, and to what extent, we will be ready to participate most actively in the detailed examination of other questions involved in the convention.

Although it is too early to take a final inventory, even now it is evident that at this part of the Committee's current session the Ad Hoc Working Group has accomplished useful work. We call upon delegations, in preparing for the next round of our negotiations, to give serious thought to the questions arising at the present stage of the negotiations and to answer first and foremost the principal, crucial question: what should constitute the subject of the prohibition?

Mr. MELESCANU (Romania) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, the concentration of the Committee's work in recent weeks on the subject of chemical weapons has shown how concrete and even, it must be said, specialized are our negotiations. The Working Group, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Curt Lidgard, whose work everyone appreciates, the meetings of experts on toxicity criteria, and also the seminar organized in Helsinki by the Finnish Government, all demonstrate this concrete approach.

Wishing to make a modest contribution to our discussions, the Romanian delegation has submitted working paper CD/197, on definitions and criteria for evaluating chemical warfare agents, which I have the honour to introduce today.

In the definition of chemical agents my delegation is guided by the aim of a complete prohibition of chemical weapons, both those that now exist in the military arsenals of States and those that are planned for the future, such as binary chemical munitions and the results of current attempts to synthesize natural poisons having special toxicity and efficacy against persons. We have also included the herbicides and defoliants which can be used for military purposes, with secondary effects on personnel and well-known effects on vegetation.

As regards the criteria for evaluating chemical warfare agents, the Romanian delegation believes that the first thing to be taken into account is the purpose of the production of chemical substances having toxic effects on human beings, animals and plants.

Special attention must be paid to chemical agents which can be used not only for military purposes but also for peaceful ones (dual-purpose agents).

In this context we are thinking of the large-scale use in industry, agriculture, medicine and scientific research of highly toxic chemical substances such as hydrocyanic acid and certain of its salts, the halogen cyanides, chlorine and other chemical substances with a high level of toxicity, which can also be used for military purposes as chemical warfare agents. Information on the quantities of these substances produced, what stocks of them exist and their intended purpose, would be an evaluation factor of great importance.

Another criterion, of similar importance, is that of the toxicity of chemical substances. The discussions which took place in the informal meetings with the participation of chemical experts brought out the importance of this criterion in the definition of chemical warfare agents (document CD/CW/WP.22). Likewise, the classification of chemical agents into super-toxic lethal chemical agents and lethal and non-lethal chemical warfare agents, as is done in the joint Soviet-American report (document CD/112), represents, in our view, an excellent basis for our current negotiations.

As is stated in our working paper, the definition of chemical warfare agents should take into consideration other criteria such as those relating to chemical structure, volatility, effectiveness and so on.

These, in outline, are the main ideas contained in the working paper presented by my delegation. I should like to take this opportunity of assuring you of our desire to continue to contribute to the conclusion, as soon as possible, of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons.

Mr. McPHAIL (Canada): Mr. Chairman, I would like, as several others have done this morning, to offer some brief reflections of my delegation on the discussion that we have had over the past week or two when the agenda of the Committee focused on chemical weapons and the eventual elaboration of a chemical weapons treaty. First of all, I wish to join others in expressing appreciation for the valuable role played by the consultations held in the presence of chemical weapons experts in the furtherance of our common goal. The achievement of just such a treaty, the results of these consultations as contained in the report of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons on toxicity determinations has moved us ahead. In our view it is this kind of technical activity which is invaluable in the eventual elaboration of the treaty, and we look forward to further consultations on the basis of what has already been achieved.

At the same time, I would like to compliment the Government of Finland for the successful chemical weapons workshop which was held at Helsinki on 4-6 July. The Government of Finland has our thanks.

It is not my intention today to raise the question of the mandate of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, or to discuss in any detail the precise nature of the documents which the Working Group is now addressing. It is demonstrable that valuable work can be done -- and is being done -- on the basis of the existing mandate, and we are anxious that this work should continue. We also note that the texts before the Working Group (particularly documents CD/CW/WP.20 and WP.21) are clearly designated as elements to be considered in an eventual chemical weapons treaty, and not the text of a treaty itself. We therefore agree with those speakers who have argued that in identifying these elements we should not fall into the trap of seeking to develop exact treaty language, a drafting exercise which can be taken up later.

With this in mind, I wish to draw attention to the interconnected problems of scope and verification. If we are successfully to conclude our consideration of "elements", these elements must be balanced and in correct proportion to each other. Some have suggested that it is not possible to deal with verification in any substantive way until the scope of a treaty has been adequately defined. Others have suggested that questions of scope and definition, interrelated as they are, need to be examined simultaneously with the problem of verification so that in this fashion a balanced text will emerge as a natural outcome of the process of discussion. We share this latter view.

In the meantime, however, it is clear that the discussions on verification within the Chemical Weapons Working Group have been superficial and inadequate. This same inadequacy is inevitably reflected in element VII in working paper 21. This, of course, is no fault of the Chairman, but simply represents the highest common denominator the Working Group has been able to achieve so far. We therefore intend to develop wording on this matter which we hope would be acceptable to all in terms of the verification régime required and the methods necessary to achieve it. In this regard, we are encouraged by the number of statements which have remarked favourably upon the Canadian working paper, document CD/167, on "verification and control requirements for a chemical arms control treaty based on an analysis of activities". Bearing in mind the comments of a number of delegations, we propose to develop wording which would deal with problems of concept, responsibility, organization and national/international arrangements in a chemical weapons verification régime. This wording, of course, would be suitable for consideration under element VII of the text now before the Working Group.

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, I should like, today, to speak about the agenda item on chemical weapons. I intend to do so in some detail as my delegation did not have the opportunity of stating its position in this connection during the spring part of the Committee's session.

In the first place, I should like to mention my country's satisfaction at the progress being achieved in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, under the energetic chairmanship of Ambassador Lidgard. The stage reached by the Working Group makes it desirable -- as we said in our general statement in plenary meeting -- that its mandate should be widened, and we regret that this has not been possible, and also that so many difficulties are arising in connection with the preparation of an "agreement" which would meet with general acceptance and could provide new impetus to the work being done in the Working Group.

I shall go on to discuss a number of basic principles that my Government considers should be taken into account in an international agreement designed to bring about the elimination of chemical weapons. Although the majority of these principles have already been enunciated earlier, and especially since the setting up of the Ad Hoc Working Group in 1980, we believe it is not superfluous to reiterate and develop them, for we believe that the adoption of clear and definite positions on the various aspects of disarmament constitutes the best way of gradually achieving a convergence of views which would make it possible to attain the objectives for which this Committee was set up.

It should be borne in mind that negotiating a convention on chemical weapons is, in view of the ease of technological access to such weapons, one of the most complex and difficult problems of disarmament. For this reason we must try to ensure that the convention that emerges from our work is the best one possible, so that the security of the States parties is strengthened and that new vulnerabilities are not indirectly created as a result of the different degrees of development of the countries concerned.

Definition of chemical weapons

The Argentine Government considers that the definition of chemical weapons should include prohibited chemical substances, binary weapons and all vectors, devices or equipment in any way connected with their delivery or storage.

Precursors ought in general to be prohibited, with the exception of those capable of being used for peaceful purposes, in which case conditions of production and transfer must be established in such a way as to permit a clear indication of their purpose.

Scope of the convention

With regard to the scope of the Convention, the prohibition should be complete, covering in their totality the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, use and transfer of chemical weapons.

I should like to emphasize once again the need to include explicitly the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons, although it is referred to in the 1925 Geneva Protocol, both in order to allow for verification, which was not provided for in that agreement, and to extend its scope to hostile situations not considered as casus belli or provided for in the 1925 text.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

Criteria to be employed in the convention

The Argentine Government considers that the principal criterion on which the convention should be based is that of "general purpose". But at the same time, consideration should be given to a number of additional criteria which would facilitate the classification of substances as well as the implementation of a system of verification, including toxicity and perhaps "chemical structure" and "quantity".

We recently received a very interesting report on the consultations held by a group of experts during the week from 6 to 10 July. I should like to take this opportunity of expressing my delegation's satisfaction at the work done by the group, in which an Argentinian expert participated. No small part in the usefulness of the work done by the group was played by the skilful chairmanship of Dr. Lundin, of the Swedish delegation, whom we should especially like to congratulate.

We believe that the work of such experts, which should certainly continue, would be facilitated and made more valuable if their meetings were planned further in advance, if the specific subjects of their work were clearly fixed beforehand, and if continuity were maintained through the participation of the same experts.

The following may be mentioned by way of example. The last meeting of experts led to a proposal to define and specify the conditions for selecting and systematizing testing methods which could be used internationally to determine levels of toxicity. In this connection we believe that in view of the particular nature of the work the experts co-operating with the Ad Hoc Working Group should begin the selection of those methods as soon as possible.

If the experts have a clearly defined framework and period within which to find solutions to the problems put before them, they can make contact with other scientists or national and international research institutes in order to complete the collection and consideration of information. In this way the experts will be able to carry out, in their respective countries, useful preparatory work for the tasks to be accomplished at their next meeting.

Annually, or more frequently if necessary, a meeting could be held for an evaluation of the progress made and it would also permit the co-ordination and guidance of the experts' efforts. At the same time, the Disarmament Committee, through the relevant Ad Hoc Working Group, would be able to appraise the results achieved in relation to the targets fixed. In this way I believe that the experts would become a valuable source of scientific assistance during the period of the drafting of the convention.

Among the supplementary criteria, we would point out that the "quantity" criterion will help to facilitate decisions in doubtful situations. The criterion of "basic chemical structure" would make it possible to classify substances in the case of groups or components whose toxic action on man is not clearly known. We are, of course, aware of the disadvantages of the fact that the same basic chemical structure can correspond to toxic substances and, at the same time, with certain minor differences, to substances intended for peaceful uses. The criterion can, however, be particularly useful in the first instance for the examination of the new substances which are constantly being developed or discovered.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

Moreover, this scientific and technological development makes it essential for the clauses of the convention to be drafted in such a way as to permit the speedy incorporation of all specific new elements that are relevant to its purpose.

Prohibitions and exceptions

In this connection, we are in general in favour of the criterion used as the basis of the classification of toxic substances proposed in paragraph 2 of document CD/112, a document of great value for the progress of discussion on chemical weapons.

At the same time we support the right of each State party to retain substances which are classified as prohibited toxic agents if it intends to use them for non-hostile purposes, but in reasonable quantities, specified and declared in order to facilitate international control where necessary.

By non-hostile purposes we mean purposes directly connected with industrial, agricultural, scientific or research activities, or purposes specifically related to measures of protection and defence against chemical weapons. We also consider that, with reference to the classification of substances proposed by the World Health Organization (based on the effect produced by certain chemical agents), Governments should be allowed to use the agents termed "irritants" or "short-term incapacitants" for the maintenance of order and the enforcement of the internal law of States.

Verification

It has been repeated often enough in this forum that a convention on chemical weapons must include a complaints procedure and a verification system adequate to ensure the implementation of the terms of the convention.

However, we are convinced that the primary element on which the agreement should be built is a genuine commitment by States parties never in any circumstances to use or possess chemical weapons. On this basis, verification would represent only a mutual reassurance for States and not a complex and all-embracing system which, because of its breadth and detail, would be resisted by a large number of countries and would therefore fail to win the necessary consensus.

To this end the verification system ought to have certain characteristics that would render it adequate to meet the interests of the international community. In our view, these are as follows.

(a) The system should be both national and international in character. The national bodies which are organized or selected for the application of the system in each State party, in accordance with its own legislation and internal structure, will be the key components of the system, co-ordinating with similar bodies in other States and with the relevant international bodies.

The international character of the system will be assured by the presence within the system of an independent element, made up of experts in the fields involved in chemical weapons. The organic and functional characteristics of this

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

element, which we could agree to call a consultative committee, should be discussed in the Ad Hoc Working Group, but we should like to emphasize that it would be advisable for the committee to consist of a fairly small group of experts on the subject. It would then be able to act quickly and effectively in its own field, without becoming involved in aspects having nothing to do with the technical and scientific content of the matters it should deal with.

(b) The system should employ simple methods, accepted and recognized by the States parties, of a kind to ensure a thorough study of any problems that may arise and the securing of rapid and conclusive results.

(c) It should use verification procedures appropriate to the circumstances of the case in question. In this context, random, non-routine visits to the installations or premises of the different States parties, following co-ordination with them, will help to build mutual confidence and reinforce the fulfilment of the convention.

(d) The system should permit the prompt and thorough investigation of any complaints that may be made of non-compliance with the convention.

(e) It should permit the settlement of disputes at the level of bilateral agreements.

Confidence-building measures

These include measures which will have to be taken in implementation of the terms of the agreement and which it may be appropriate to carry out before the agreement comes into force in order to confirm the commitment never to use chemical weapons, a commitment to which I referred earlier.

Basically, the "confidence-building measures" should be designed to ensure internationally the freezing and limitation of the development, stockpiling and production of chemical weapons. Among possible measures of this kind, we should like to mention:

(a) The declaration of stocks and production facilities;

(b) The programmed destruction of stocks, in the presence of invited international commissions;

(c) The dismantling of production facilities or possibly their conversion to other purposes, also in the presence of invited international commissions;

(d) The exchange of information between States in the sphere of chemical weapons and related matters.

Preamble and other matters

We believe that the preamble to the convention should refer solely to the content of its constituent articles, avoiding additions which go beyond its normative framework or are not relevant to the purpose of the prohibition.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

Among the other matters which should be included in the convention on chemical weapons, we consider that the provisions relating to scope of application, signature, ratification, entry into force, amendments, etc., could be drafted along the same lines as the comparable provisions in the "Convention on prohibitions or restrictions of use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects".

The recent conclusion of the above-mentioned Convention in the field of disarmament makes it appropriate that it should be taken into consideration in the present case, with certain adaptations as required by the difference in the type of weapons to be controlled.

These are the comments my delegation wished to make at this stage of the work in progress in the field of chemical weapons. The time is ripe for the Committee on Disarmament to intensify its efforts towards the drawing up of a draft convention. The sooner this is done, the greater will be its success in a field which is of major concern to the international community.

Mr. SARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, my delegation listened with considerable interest to the intervention made by Ambassador McPhail of Canada in the Committee on 16 July 1981. With your permission, I would like to comment on some of the observations made by the distinguished Ambassador.

The halt of the arms race, in the Canadian perspective, "begins with the mutual perception of security balances which can lead to agreements to limit arms and to control their development and deployment. Contrary to what is sometimes advocated, only then, once arms competition is contained, can efforts be focused on reductions, always reflecting that same appropriate security balance". At another point the Ambassador argued that "it is clear that a selective freezing of the present and growing disequilibrium offers no solution at all".

Let me recall that in 1964, the United States presented a proposal to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee for a freeze on strategic delivery vehicles, based on what was then called "a common general philosophy" of arms control and disarmament. Expounding this "common philosophy", the then United States representative, Mr. Foster, stated: "This philosophy is that a logical first step is to freeze things where they are and thereby remove future obstacles to disarmament."

The representative of Canada, in a statement to the ENDC on the subject of the freeze, said: "Between the phase of building up armaments and the hoped-for phase of reducing armaments, there has to be a point of time at which you stop -- like changing the movement of a motor-car from forward to backward." On the same question, the Italian representative stated on 28 January 1964: "In order to achieve disarmament, the first step must be to put a stop to the armaments race. That is self-evident." All this was being heard at a time when, in the words of the United States representative himself, "There have been claims by both sides to superiority in strategic nuclear forces". The United States representative went on to say: "Regardless of which side is ahead, these are the weapons which appear most threatening to all countries."

(Mr. Saran, India)

I might add that in 1964 it was the United States which wanted a working group of the ENDC to be set up to undertake multilateral negotiations on this proposal, and several delegations, including Canada, supported this proposal.

If the "security balance" which the distinguished Ambassador of Canada spoke of was a relatively stable one, then his proposition would be perhaps arguable. In fact, historical experience indicates that the notion of balance is inherently unstable, subject to changes in subjective perceptions, technological developments, miscalculations or even an adventurous decision. As we see it, the search for disarmament consists not only in searching for means to reduce and finally eliminate existing arsenals; we must also ensure that our task does not grow while we are busily engaged in looking for a solution. Would the distinguished representative of Canada deny that in the 30 or more years that we have been looking for solutions to the problem of nuclear disarmament, the problem itself has grown into what he has chosen to call "one of the most complex security relationships in history, in terms of nuclear and conventional forces"?

And what, after all, is the balance we seem so fond of referring to? Is it the balance between the two major Powers, the United States and the USSR, which is crucial to international security? Or is it the maintenance of balance among the five nuclear-weapon States? What about the balance between the nuclear-weapon States on the one hand and the non-nuclear-weapon States on the other? Too often the peace and security of the world are identified narrowly in terms of the equation between the United States and the USSR or between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. In the perception of some countries this may perhaps seem valid. To us, who deliberately choose to remain aloof from the rivalry and confrontation between the great Powers and their respective allies, the impact of these equations on international peace and security seems less than benign. The extension of great Power rivalry into our own region of South Asia and the Indian Ocean, which has serious and adverse consequences on our security, makes us feel less than enthusiastic about the so-called "balance" argument.

We do not, of course, question the right of any other country to pursue its security interests in a manner that it deems appropriate. All that we wish to say is that the pursuit of one's security interests should not be done in a manner that disregards, or even worse, jeopardizes the security interests of others. And, as we have had occasion to point out earlier, the very existence of nuclear weapons threatens our survival. The espousal of doctrines of nuclear deterrence, which are predicated on the use of nuclear weapons, directly and fundamentally jeopardizes our security interests. These are our clear perceptions which, we are convinced, reflect the reality of today.

The second point made by the distinguished Ambassador of Canada was that "it is not possible to attempt to differentiate between nuclear and conventional weapons disarmament". We do not accept this proposition. Nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction. Enough has been said in this Committee to underline the fact that atomic weapons have introduced a totally new and unprecedentedly destructive dimension to the concept of warfare. How can we speak of nuclear and conventional weapons in the same breath? It is another matter that some States have chosen to rely on nuclear weapons, or so-called nuclear deterrence, in order to avoid the

(Mr. Saran, India)

political and social consequences of maintaining or augmenting their conventional armed forces. For them, nuclear weapons appear to be a cheaper alternative. It is no coincidence that four-fifths of the world's armaments expenditures are spent on conventional armed forces and weapons and only one-fifth on nuclear. And yet that one-fifth is more than enough to destroy all life on earth several times over.

Much has also been said about the "regrettable" situation existing in Europe, which we are asked to accept as an unfortunate reality. Let us not forget that this regrettable situation was the result of conscious political decisions on the part of the leaders of the countries concerned. Nuclear weapons did not just fall into their laps and then, without anyone realizing it, became part and parcel of a "balance". Nuclear weapons were made part of the so-called balance through a series of conscious decisions -- decisions to forego expenditure on building up conventional forces in favour of a cheaper, more destructive, alternative. Those who did not acquire their own independent nuclear weapons felt strengthened, if that is the word to use, from collective nuclear security arrangements under military pacts headed by the rival major Powers.

I must confess that it is rather strange for us to hear from those who warn us against the proliferation of nuclear weapons that nuclear and conventional arms have to be considered together in one package. The whole logic of the horizontal non-proliferation of nuclear weapons resides in their unique and destructive character, their ability to spread death and destruction beyond national boundaries, in short, their nature as global means of destruction. And yet with respect to certain environments, certain special theatres, this judgement is suspended. Worse, this argument is stood on its head. The possession of nuclear weapons and the option to use such weapons are deemed essential to keep the peace and prevent a war.

We do not wish to minimize the importance of conventional disarmament. But let us not forget that even in respect of conventional arms, it is the very same nuclear-weapon States which possess the most important arsenals. But those who are so zealous about the maintenance of "balance" and the careful weighing of relative military power with their perceived adversaries should perhaps pay a little more attention to the grave imbalance which already exists between them, either as nuclear-weapon States or allies of such States, and the non-nuclear rest of the world, made up mostly of developing countries whose security interests are continually sacrificed in the "interests" of East-West or bipolar equilibrium. Those who say that a "selective freezing of the present and growing disequilibrium" offers no solution at all to the problem of international stability do not think twice in preaching the same "selective freezing" with respect to the yawning gap between nuclear-weapon States on the one hand and non-nuclear-weapon States on the other. Quite to the contrary, an impression is created that the non-nuclear-weapon States could somehow assist the process of nuclear disarmament by agreeing to reduce their conventional forces, as if these forces were a threat to nuclear-weapon States and their allies.

(Mr. Saran, India)

This brings us to another observation made by the distinguished Ambassador of Canada. He said that "a number of the crisis spots in other parts of the world are not yet cast entirely in ideological terms as is the case between East and West. The vast majority of disputes, particularly in the third world, are regional in scope and often reflect deep-seated and historical quarrels in relation to local issues." We are not quite sure what is meant by this assertion. Is the conflict between East and West cast entirely in ideological terms? Are there no deep-seated and historical quarrels in relation to local issues which are manifest in Europe too? And is an ideological confrontation somehow of a higher and more noble order than disputes of the kind which the distinguished Canadian representative witnesses in the third world? True disarmament must involve all nations, all regions of the world. But there is no escape from the fact that the two major Powers deploy the overwhelming proportion of the world's armaments, both nuclear and conventional. There is no escape from the fact that Europe has the heaviest concentration of armaments, both nuclear and conventional. Whether in a qualitative or in a quantitative sense, how can all other regions of the world be put on the same footing? And even if we wish to focus attention on disputes in the developing world, "which are regional in scope" and "which reflect deep-seated and historical quarrels in relation to local issues", let us not forget that many such disputes are often encouraged and exacerbated by outside powers, also in the interest of the so-called "balance of power".

We were indeed glad to see that the distinguished Canadian representative recognized the reciprocal relationship between horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. In fact, the "strategy of suffocation" that he outlined in his statement is one which we would certainly be ready to explore with some changes in the elements of the package. However, there are some assertions which were made in this respect which we find difficult to accept.

Firstly, we question the seeming equation he sought to establish between the possession of nuclear weapons and the possession of a nuclear weapons potential. There are several nations today which have the technology and materials necessary to become nuclear-weapon States, if they so decided. And as time goes by, more and more nations will join the ranks of those who have the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons. This is bound to happen since nuclear technology will spread to more and more countries, despite attempts to erect barriers against the flow of technology from the rich industrialized countries to the developing world. Nuclear technology, like any other technology, is neutral. It can be put to peaceful uses or to military uses. In the case of another field, chemicals, there is a similar problem. A large number of toxic chemicals have peaceful uses but can also be used for making chemical warfare agents. Nobody seriously suggests that, therefore, developing countries should not develop their chemical industries or be permitted access to toxic chemicals. The effort should be to evolve a

(Mr. Saran, India)

universally acceptable and verifiable political commitment from all countries of the world to ensure that whether it is chemistry or atomic science, they are used solely for peaceful purposes.

India has had the necessary capacity to move into the nuclear-weapons field for several years now. But it has deliberately and, we believe, wisely chosen to decide to exploit nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only. There are several other countries in the same category. We cannot accept that just because these countries, like India, possess the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons, this detracts from international security.

Capability is not the crucial issue here, but intention. We would agree that the demonstration of intention on the part of a non-nuclear-weapon State to become a nuclear-weapon Power would have a damaging impact on the perceptions of its neighbours and on international security as such. But if we are asked to believe that the only way a country can demonstrate that it does not retain what we call the "option" to develop nuclear weapons is by accepting discriminatory obligations and safeguards that are applied inequitably, then, of course, our paths diverge. India is committed to the goal of non-proliferation, both vertical and horizontal. It was India which, in 1964, inscribed this item on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly and brought international attention to focus on it. But we cannot accept a so-called non-proliferation régime which endorses and indeed perpetuates the unequal division between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. Adherence to this point of principle cannot be equated to a country wishing to retain its "option" to develop nuclear weapons.

And if we wish to speak of keeping options open, what about countries which are members of nuclear alliances? They might have signed the non-proliferation Treaty, yet participate quite enthusiastically in security arrangements that call for the collective deployment and use of nuclear weapons. Some of the same NPT members have nuclear weapons deployed on their territories and, we are told, would share in any decision to use them. What kind of option might this be? Allies of nuclear-weapon States may have given up the option to produce and acquire their own nuclear weapons. They certainly have not given up the option to have nuclear weapons used for their defence.

There is another concept which the distinguished Ambassador of Canada used, with which also we cannot agree. He stated that "the emergence of States with nuclear weapons potential, or presumed nuclear weapons potential, vastly complicates and destabilizes regional military balances, far exceeding the impact of modernized nuclear weapons systems in areas where they already exist". It is not quite clear in which sense Ambassador McPhail is using the term "nuclear weapons potential". As I have pointed out earlier, the acquisition and development of nuclear technology and know-how can be turned to peaceful as well as military uses. The mere acquisition of nuclear know-how cannot be equated

(Mr. Saran, India)

to an intent to make nuclear weapons. But leaving this question aside, the Canadian Ambassador appears to argue that the emergence of an additional nuclear-weapon State or potential nuclear-weapon State (whatever that might mean) would have far more dangerous consequences than the continued accumulation and refinement of nuclear weapons by the existing nuclear-weapon States. Thus, despite his acceptance of the principle of a reciprocal link between vertical and horizontal proliferation, the distinguished Ambassador of Canada has in fact asserted what has become a fashionable apology for the continuing nuclear arms race among the nuclear-weapon States. If we are to accept his logic, horizontal proliferation is fraught with greater danger than vertical proliferation. It is only a small step from this to the theory that existing arsenals of nuclear weapons may continue to grow in quantity and quality without much impact on global security, and that all attention needs to be focused on the prevention of the emergence of an additional nuclear-weapon Power or potential nuclear-weapon Power. And it is also a small step to the theory that the present division of the world between a handful of nuclear-weapon States possessing the means of global destructive power and the rest of the world, consisting of nuclear have-nots, can be permitted to continue indefinitely, provided the nuclear club remains as exclusive as it is today. We could hardly be expected to accept such a reasoning. The main threat to peace and security today is the continuing arms race, especially in its nuclear aspect. The danger of a nuclear war, which may wipe out human civilization, emanates from those who possess nuclear weapons and not those who may be perceived to possess the potential of acquiring such weapons.

Lastly, our arguments against nuclear weapons are not merely applicable only to those States which possess them. We would like to negotiate measures which would apply equally and in a non-discriminatory manner to all States. Thus we suggest a multilateral agreement prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons by all States. We recommend and support a test-ban treaty which would commit all States to the prohibition of the testing of nuclear weapons in all environments for all time to come. We recommend measures for the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and the prohibition of the production of fissionable materials, with appropriate measures of verification and compliance that would be applied to all States in an equitable manner and on a non-discriminatory basis. It is not our intention to ask the nuclear-weapon States to stop nuclear-weapon testing while we retain the "option" to continue such tests. We do not ask the nuclear-weapon States to accept safeguards on all their nuclear facilities while we refuse to accept such safeguards on our own facilities. Certainly not. Just as the distinguished Ambassador said, in respect of verification, "We are not asking others to do anything more than we ourselves are prepared to do".

U SAW HLAING (Burma): Mr. Chairman, as a representative whose country has the privilege of maintaining long-standing relations of friendship and good neighbourliness with India, I am most happy to see you presiding over the work of the Committee on Disarmament during this crucial part of its annual session. I have witnessed the success of your leadership in the past two weeks and I am sure your diplomatic skill and wealth of experience will undoubtedly bring concrete results to this Committee.

May I also associate myself with the speakers before me in expressing the deep gratitude of my delegation to Ambassador Komives of Hungary whose contribution to the work of the Committee in June was invaluable.

I would also like to extend a warm welcome to the leaders of delegations, Ambassador Carasales of Argentina, Ambassador Ahmad Jalali of Iran, Ambassador Tissa Jayakoddy of Sri Lanka and Ambassador Navarro of Venezuela, who have joined this Committee recently. I am confident that their experience will be a great asset in the work of this Committee.

On 12 March 1981, at the 114th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament, I made a statement in which I put forward the considered views of my delegation on the subject of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. I do not have much to add to what I said then. However, I would like to reiterate here that we have a set time-frame on this subject, which the international community has entrusted to us, namely, to submit a report to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which is to be held during the first half of 1982. As far as the progress of work in the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament is concerned, my delegation is satisfied that, under the leadership of Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, it has established a working method aimed at accomplishing maximum results within the remaining weeks of July and August. My delegation together with other members of the Group of 21 have submitted concrete proposals in working papers CD/CPD/WP.36 and 36/Add.1 setting out the maximum common basis of approach for consideration by the Ad Hoc Working Group. It is the earnest hope of my delegation that the specific proposals of the Group of 21 will generate an added impetus to the work of the Committee on this subject, and that it will be possible to move forward towards a consensual conclusion before the second special session. My delegation, both individually and jointly with the rest of the members of the Group of 21, will contribute to achieving this objective.

At the risk of repetition, may I be allowed to say a few words on the principles on which a comprehensive programme of disarmament should be based. In the considered view of my delegation, a CPD must in all aspects transcend the limits of mere formal expressions of political intent to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Rather it must embrace genuine political commitments of the highest degree by all States, especially by those with the largest military arsenals, to implement in good faith all the disarmament measures within a reasonable and realistic time-frame.

A comprehensive programme of disarmament without adequate provisions on questions of nuclear disarmament will suffer a serious lack of content that can finally negate its value as a composite disarmament measure. It is our belief and commitment that the questions of a nuclear test ban, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament are entitled to the highest priority place and the most urgent consideration in the CPD we are trying to evolve. My delegation feels sure that with patients, mutual understanding and a large measure of conciliation on all sides the Committee will be able to proceed with a mutually acceptable text of a CPD that would truly reflect the consensus and hopes of the international community.

(U Saw Hlaing, Burma)

Exercising the right contained in article VIII, paragraph 30, of the rules of procedure of the Committee, I would like to put forward brief comments as to the current state of negotiations on two of the agenda items to which my delegation attaches the highest priority and importance -- that is a complete ban on nuclear testing in all environments on the one hand, and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament on the other. Since I set out the principles of my delegation on the two crucial disarmament questions in my statement on 24 February 1981, I need hardly add any new thoughts. Many other delegations have also put forward concrete proposals on this matter. Despite all these the continuing lack of political will on the part of certain major Powers has rendered this Committee powerless. My delegation is unhappy about this failure to fulfil the basic and fundamental responsibilities of the Committee.

My delegation's commitment is firmly embedded in the belief that the only realistic and productive machinery available for effective and efficacious negotiations under the present circumstances are the modalities we have adopted in the form of ad hoc working groups. This modus operandi is the result of our careful negotiations. Frankly speaking, it is becoming hard to believe that any modality other than those in current use by the Committee on Disarmament would lead us to any fruitful conclusion of our basic and fundamental tasks. Rather we may be led into a diffused and directionless series of debates of the kind which have burdened this Committee for so long. In the opinion of my delegation, we have exhausted all possible theoretical and academic dissertations with regard to nuclear disarmament. What remains to be done is to establish a firm step forward.

Time and again my delegation, either with the members of the Group of 21 or individually, has appealed to the good sense of the members of this Committee so that a decisive step can be taken for the commencement of meaningful negotiations on nuclear disarmament. We in the Group of 21 deeply regret that our urgent and sometimes pathetic calls, appeals and supplications so often meet with a negative response from certain major negotiating Powers whose reticence and hesitation have prevented us from accomplishing effective work on these items. My delegation has joined the other members of the Group of 21 in an attempt to break this icy attitude by presenting concrete and positive proposals. Documents CD/180 and CD/181 are two of the long list of such constructive suggestions. These two proposals spelt out in no ambiguous terms specific measures to break the impasse and commence an effective dialogue in a structured formal setting.

To our dismay and profound regret, the proposals of the Group of 21 tabled before the Committee on 14 July 1981 were confronted once again with the same obstinate opposition. My delegation shares the views aired in this chamber casting doubts upon the viability of the political authority of this single multilateral negotiating body if even such a fundamental question as the formation of procedural machinery could not be resolved in the three years of its existence. Perseverance, mutual understanding and accommodation and a determination to reconcile differences with sincerity will be needed if we are to prevent the erosion of the Committee's negotiating authority. My delegation will continue to endeavour in a most insistent manner to work for the achievement of the lofty objectives set before the Committee.

Let me state the views of my delegation on the current state of negotiations in the ad hoc working groups on what are informally referred to as chemical weapons, security assurances and radiological weapons.

(U Saw Hlaing, Burma)

I shall speak first of all on the question of chemical weapons — item 4 of our agenda. Before doing so, allow me to express our deep gratitude to Ambassador Okawa of Japan, whose diligent, dynamic and skilful handling of this complex matter in 1980 paved the way for the present structure of negotiations under the energetic leadership of Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden. His resourcefulness and deep commitment to this question have inspired us and made us more determined to achieve positive conclusions.

The question of banning chemical weapons, a priority item on the international disarmament agenda, has a long and difficult past. Despite the well-meaning efforts and endeavours of the international community to bring this matter to the focal attention of various disarmament negotiating forums, it continues to elude a negotiated comprehensive solution. The Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in paragraph 75, emphatically points out the urgent need for a chemical weapons convention. Unlike nuclear weapons, which need a very high degree of technology and sophistication in production and delivery systems, chemical weapons are low-cost weapons of mass destruction which are fairly easy to acquire and to utilize with devastating effects. Moreover, the rapid development of science and technology has substantially made it possible to increase many times the lethality and injurious capabilities of chemical weapons. Binary chemical weapons technology, as it has emerged, would enable practically all innocent-looking general and industrial production facilities to fabricate, in greater secrecy and ease, chemical warfare agents of mass destruction. Taking into consideration the real danger and overwhelming potential threat of the possibility of causing untold death, injury or harm to human beings, animals and plant life, my delegation feels the urgency of concluding an international convention to completely ban chemical weapons.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has, since February 1981, made perceptible progress in its deliberations to resolve numerous issues that are involved in the elaboration of an international chemical weapons convention. My delegation is heartened to note that a convergence of views on a fairly large range of conceptual approaches has emerged and that efforts are being made to narrow the area of divergence. It is my delegation's sincere belief that this positive trend in the Working Group will continue to gain momentum and accelerate towards the final achievement of concluding a convention on chemical weapons. However, such an objective will remain illusory if we cannot resolve certain fundamental principles and if we fail to set a well-defined and purposeful direction. Indeed, it will be of paramount importance to reach political decisions on major issues such as the scope of the convention, the declaration and destruction of stocks and facilities, the system of verification and compliance, measures for protection and confidence-building, etc. But my delegation wonders whether such political decisions, important and fundamental as they are, can be effectively and realistically taken in the absence of a clear-cut and specific mandate that will allow the Working Group to proceed with the task of actually negotiating a chemical weapons convention. My delegation accordingly considers it necessary to revise the present mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group in order faithfully to reflect and correspond to the goals it has been entrusted with. However, my delegation is satisfied with the progress being achieved under the present method of work and intends actively to participate to produce more concrete results. My delegation hopes that Ambassador Lidgard's consultations will yield positive results and provide us with a timely opportunity to inject vigour and vitality into the work of the Working Group under a fresh mandate.

(U Saw Hlaing, Burma)

One issue on which considerably divergent views persist is that of the scope of the convention and another is verification and compliance. These two issues will be pivotal in the elaboration for consideration of a draft chemical weapons convention and consequently a serious and in-depth examination of all proposals relating to these central issues should be made with a view to finding a mutually acceptable formula. As for my delegation, we would like to see the scope of the convention as comprehensive as possible, encompassing a complete ban on the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, retention, assistance and transfer of all chemical weapons and on their destruction.

The question of verification will play a decisive role for a successful chemical weapons convention. As we are all aware, a system of measures designed to ensure faithful compliance with the provisions of the chemical weapons convention is a complex and sensitive issue that would need to be addressed with the utmost care. It would be an ideal achievement if we could all agree on a 100 per cent foolproof verification procedure, but in this imperfect world of ours we must all be realistic and practical in our approach. My delegation would be happy to see a balanced combination of national and international control systems which would involve the minimum element of intrusion.

My delegation highly appreciates the contribution of the Government of Finland in providing this Committee with an opportunity to acquaint itself with the Finnish project on the role of instrumental analysis of chemical warfare agents and their verification. I am sure that the workshop held in Helsinki in June was a practical approach to this complex problem. I also wish to take this opportunity to express our satisfaction with the results of the meeting of chemical experts on toxicity determination concluded under the chairmanship of Dr. Lundin of Sweden. My delegation feels sure that such expertise on the technical aspects of certain problems could help clarify a number of complicated problems. My delegation earnestly looks forward to the increased participation and contribution of technical experts in the future.

We have all agreed that only nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons can offer truly effective guarantees against the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons. Paragraph 56 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament clearly confirmed this fact. Pending the accomplishment of this long-term disarmament objective, all non-nuclear-weapon States are entitled to a categorical and unconditional guarantee that they will not be the object either of attacks or of threats of attacks with such weapons. In all the statements of principle I have heard so far, the reaffirmation of this fact is almost universal. In this regard, the international community has called on the nuclear-weapon States to take effective steps to transform their commitment into reality. The General Assembly, in paragraph 59 of the Final Document of its first special session, pointed out:

"... the nuclear-weapon States are called upon to take steps to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The General Assembly notes the declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States and urges them to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons."

(U Saw Hlaing, Burma)

Since the adoption of this consensus document in 1978, a number of proposals have been tabled in this Committee and other international forums. Different approaches have been submitted for consideration, and divergent views continue to persist with regard to basic principles and perceptions.

My delegation accepts the views expressed in this Committee that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances should concentrate on reaching agreement on a common approach which should be included in a future international instrument. In an effort to find such a common formula or approach, the Ad Hoc Working Group, under the chairmanship of Minister Ciarrapico of Italy, has mobilized all its negotiating power to reconcile different formulations into a cohesive one that would be acceptable to all. A number of alternatives lay before the Ad Hoc Working Group -- eight of them, I believe. Some contained categorical and unconditional guarantees which my delegation could accept without hesitation, while others contradict the objective of our exercise. However, my delegation is of the opinion that the adoption of a common formula for security assurances containing such elements as may be reached in the negotiation in the Committee, and agreed to by all concerned, leaves ample negotiating room for our future work. My delegation considers that whatever common formula we may be able to devise should not be an end in itself. Rather it must be a dynamic vehicle to bring about improvement in the present state of negotiations in the Working Group. The discussions in the Working Group have demonstrated that there is a tendency towards priority-setting with regard to the security of nuclear-weapon States and their allies. The security interests of non-nuclear-weapon States outside the two military alliance systems do not seem to enjoy the same level of importance and seriousness. This tendency contradicts the very objective we are trying to realize and is therefore hardly acceptable to all non-nuclear-weapon States, including my own.

My delegation's position on prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons is derived from the basic tenet enshrined in the Final Document of the first special session which stipulates, inter alia, that qualitative and quantitative disarmament measures are both important for halting the arms race and that efforts to that end must include negotiations on the limitation and cessation of the qualitative improvement of armaments, especially weapons of mass destruction and the development of new means of warfare. Paragraph 77 of the Final Document elaborates further as to the need for specific agreements to prohibit particular types of new weapons of mass destruction which may be identified. Paragraph 76 of the Final Document and subsequent General Assembly resolutions instruct this Committee to conduct negotiations for the conclusion of a convention that would prohibit the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.

In response to these specific calls of the international community my delegation has all along unswervingly supported proposals to foreclose the application of new scientific and technological discoveries for military purposes, including the prohibition of radiological weapons.

My delegation is quite satisfied with the business-like atmosphere of the negotiations now in progress in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons chaired by our veteran negotiator, Ambassador Komives of Hungary. I am confident that his dynamic leadership will bring added impetus to the work of the Working Group.

(U Saw Hlaing, Burma)

Discussions in the Committee and in the Ad Hoc Working Group have demonstrated the existence of fundamental differences of approach to the questions of the definition of radiological weapons and the scope of a future convention. The Group of 21 has submitted concrete proposals to the Working Group. My delegation hopes that the Group's substantive proposals will contribute positively to the successful conclusion of a radiological weapons convention. Controversial questions relating to an exclusion clause which may either implicitly or explicitly legitimize nuclear weapons, the concept of radiological warfare, complaint and verification procedures, attacks against nuclear facilities and the relationship of the proposed convention to other disarmament measures and agreements are a few of the complex problems that should be addressed with a high degree of flexibility and mutual accommodation. The question of the peaceful use of radio-active materials and sources of radiation will also be another area of high sensitivity. Circumspection, patience and mutual accommodation will no doubt be required as additional elements to the normal diplomatic skills for negotiation.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador U Saw Hlaing for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. Owing to the lateness of the hour, the distinguished representative of Finland has kindly agreed to defer his statement to the next plenary meeting.

Mr. McPHAIL (Canada): I would like simply to thank Mr. Saran for having examined our text so carefully: a 12-page response on only the points on which we diverged is not bad. Although he found some convergences, he was of course treating the divergences which our Governments have experienced on these questions before. I want only to make one very brief point, and will not attempt to make any response in detail at the present time. I would, however, not want to leave with the Committee any idea that we make an apology or construct a so-called fashionable "apologia" for the continuing nuclear arms race. The reason I point to that is simply because at that point in his text the representative of India began to extrapolate, and to talk about things which are not our policy. It is, of course, his right to extrapolate, but it would be wrong to leave the Committee with any impression that certain of the points he thereafter discussed were representative of the policy of my Government. I will study his text with the care which he obviously has given in studying ours and then come back to the question, if that appears appropriate, at a later time.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador McPhail for his statement and I am sure we all look forward to his response subsequently. If there are no other speakers, the next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 23 July 1981, at 10.30 a.m. This meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.