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REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

APPENDIX II

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## CANADA

### VERIFICATION AND CONTROL REQUIREMENTS FOR A CHEMICAL ARMS CONTROL TREATY BASED ON AN ANALYSIS OF ACTIVITIES

#### INTRODUCTION

There seems little doubt that most nations would prefer to see the end of chemical weapons and of the threat of chemical warfare. Chemical weapons are not generally integrated components of conventional arsenals and are not required for normal defensive purposes by any nation. There is no excuse for a nation possessing them to avoid the timely negotiation of a protocol. Yet the Committee on Disarmament and its predecessor, the CCD, have actively negotiated for nearly 15 years without success.

The two Superpowers, the United States and the USSR, are the only nations thought to possess significant quantities of chemical weapons. Since neither needs them for defensive purposes, except for retaliation in kind against the other, a disposal formula which would preserve the relative security of each should be achievable. This would remove the bulk of world chemical arsenals and the remaining nations would most likely follow suit. However, even in direct bilateral negotiations, agreement has not been possible.

The major stumbling block appears to be verification mechanisms which would assure each Superpower that the promised weapon destructions in fact take place and that no new weapons are produced. There is a distinct difference of opinion on the extent of international involvement in verification activities and on the degree of intrusiveness which must be allowed. This situation may be further strained if the reported disparity in stocks continues or the United States decides to renew its capability with binary weapons. The problem of verification involves political judgements, but it is also a technical matter, and every effort should be made to ensure that technical difficulties do not stand in the way of an agreement.

In spite of the great variety of verification proposals that have been made over the years, no clear agreement has been reached as to which should be implemented. To assist in overcoming this block to agreement it should be feasible to systematically review the technical requirements for verification for each basic activity to be undertaken or banned. This should determine the minimum levels of verification

necessary and in particular the minimum levels of intrusiveness which would be unavoidable. It should then be possible to predict the type and levels of national and international control which must be provided under a treaty.

The following is an attempt to provide an initial analysis of these factors. It leads to suggested guidelines for national and international verification agencies. A general statement on control mechanisms to which this analysis is related was provided in a presentation to the Ad Hoc Working Group on 27 June 1980 (CD113).

#### ACTIVITIES

From a survey of past proposals including previous protocol drafts, there appears to be general agreement that a treaty should require elimination of existing chemical warfare agents, weapons (including all means of delivery) and their means of production, and it should ban the further development, production, acquisition, retention or stockpiling of chemical agents and weapons. The Geneva Protocol bans "use", however it is subject to conditions with respect to retaliation and its scope is not clear. To settle these matters and to deal with the problems of dual purpose agents and binary components, a further ban on "use" should also be included in a new treaty, and verification mechanisms for use are assessed in this analysis. This leads to a list of basic activities which will require some form of monitoring and verification. They fall into two groups, activities which must be undertaken, and those which must be banned.

##### A. Activities to be Undertaken and Monitored

1. Declaration of existing agent and chemical weapon production facilities including specific sites.
2. Declaration of existing agent and weapon stocks including storage sites and numbers.
3. Dismantling of existing production facilities.
4. Destruction of existing agent and weapon stocks.

##### B. Activities to be Banned and Verified

5. Development of new agent/weapon systems.
6. Construction or conversion of new agent or weapon (means of delivery) production facilities.
7. Production of chemical agents.
8. Retention, stockpiling or other acquisition of chemical agents and weapons.
9. Offensive military training or other activities in preparation for undertaking chemical warfare.
10. Use of chemical weapons for war purposes including dual purpose agents and binary components.

For the purpose of the following analysis, a comprehensive definition of chemical agents such as that given in CD117, which includes the use of any toxic effect on plants, animals or man in warfare, has been assumed.

#### ANALYSIS OF ACTIVITY REQUIREMENTS FOR VERIFICATION AND CONTROL

##### A. Activities to be Undertaken and Monitored

1. Declaration of existing agent and chemical weapon production facilities including specific sites. Should any nation declare production facilities for agents or weapons, their existence would not likely be doubted. Remote confirmation of the declaration may be possible by "National Technical Means" (satellite) which is available to the Superpowers but not to others. No other technical means of verification would be in place at that time. To provide a minimum confirmation to all nations, some on-site visits would be necessary. An inspection team including national and international personnel (non-technical) would be required to meet within the declaring nation, select one declared site at random, and visit it to confirm the accuracy of the declaration. Visits to all declared sites would be highly desirable, but not essential. Such on-site inspection should not put the host nation at risk, since it is unlikely that site or process information beyond that released in the original declaration would be observed. In fact, the visit should serve to demonstrate the good faith of that nation to the world.

2. Declaration of existing agent and weapon stocks including storage sites and numbers. Verification requirements would be identical to those for production facilities. A random visit by non-technical staff to confirm weapon quantities at one site would be an essential minimum requirement. This should include both national and international personnel. The deliberate non-declaration of some existing stocks (or production facilities) would be a violation of the agreement, but this could not be detected by any technical means including on-site visits, and means to do so should not be required of a treaty. Cover-ups might be exposed by "National Technical Means" which would then require a challenge mechanism. Hidden stocks would also be covered by bans on retention and stockpiling and eventually on use of chemical weapons in warfare and would be subject to verification mechanisms required to monitor those activities.

3. Dismantling of existing production facilities. All production facilities for agents and weapons should be dismantled. General agreement seems to have been reached that conversion to other uses would generally not be cost effective and in many instances would not be practical. Dismantling is also the only way to ensure that the facilities could not be rapidly reconverted to agent production and it eliminates the requirement for continued verification of the site. While dismantling toxic agent plants may be hazardous, it should not be technologically complex. It is suggested that any nation declaring such facilities should be able to dismantle them within five years. It may be possible to observe dismantling by satellite (national technical means) but by no other remote means. Satisfactory international verification

can only be achieved by visits. As a minimum, one site could again be randomly selected for inspection by a combined national and international team (non-technical) at the end of the five years. Alternatively all declared sites might be visited at the end of the five years. Inspection once a year would be more desirable but not essential. No sampling would be required. A declaration announcing completion of the task, confirmed by the inspectors, might be expected from each nation at a five year review conference. Failure to complete the task in five years should not constitute a violation of the treaty, if the nation could show that the process was well underway and proceeding on a definite schedule. However, a nation requiring such an extension of time might be required to admit international inspectors to its sites on a semi-annual basis thereafter.

4. Destruction of existing agent and weapon stocks. One approach to this problem might be to accept non-verification assuming that any nation admitting to the possession of CW agents and weapons in a declaration would be compelled to destroy them. Monitoring would be carried out by national agencies, however a few international visits to the site might perhaps be arranged by the nation in question for publicity purposes.

If such non-verification of stock destruction is considered inadequate for treaty purposes, then a much more intrusive and technical means would be required. Technically, the United States may represent the most difficult verification case due to the extreme containment required by its environmental protection laws. Fortunately suitable technology has been developed for the CAMDS \*/ system and has been released internationally. This or similar contained systems may also be used by other nations. Because of the containment, remote systems including national technical means or black box monitors will not verify the actual destruction of agents. Even periodic visits to storage and destruction sites, with sampling, will not ensure that stockpiles are being completely destroyed (rather than being moved to another hidden site). Monitoring of the process must be virtually continuous with periodic spot sampling and analysis. Inspection teams must be adequately trained, have access to laboratory space, and at least some members must be from the international community.

There has been general agreement that stock destruction would require ten years and this has been confirmed in reports of United States/USSR bilateral discussions (CD48). As a suggested schedule, the first five years might be allowed for building of destruction plants after which stocks could be destroyed at the rate of 20 per cent per year. This would allow retention of weapon ratios till destruction was completed.

B. Activities to be Banned and Verified

5. Development of new agent/weapon systems. Nations with current stocks will already have developed weapons and would require little further work. However development activities could be readily hidden and it would be very difficult to separate work of offensive intent from that for legitimate defensive purposes.

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\*/ CAMDS - chemical agent and munition disposal.

Atmospheric testing might be detected by remote means but the use of remote detection systems by international agencies against a specific nation would be tantamount to an accusation. It would also be very expensive. These activities may be routinely monitored and reported by national agencies, but the only international activities which seem feasible would be in response to challenge mechanisms.

6. Construction or conversion of new agent or weapon (means of delivery) production facilities. The construction of new chemical plants or the conversion of existing plants to new functions will occur continuously in most nations. Similar activities will occur with munitions plants. The intent to use new or converted plants for chemical warfare purposes cannot possibly be verified even with on-site inspections. These activities may be monitored nationally, but routine international verification for this activity does not appear to be feasible under a treaty. However, it would be necessary in response to challenge mechanisms.

7. Production of chemical agents. The banning of this activity is a key problem for chemical arms control verification and a technical solution is very complex due to the wide variety of chemicals which may be involved. Proposals over the past 15 years include analysis of economic and production data and a variety of remote, near-site and on-site observations involving sampling and analysis. A number of visits to industrial sites, carried out to determine if clandestine agent manufacture could be carried out in existing plants, have lead to the conclusion that the highly toxic single purpose agents would require special containment not normally available. Inspection, if it includes some sampling, would readily demonstrate the production or non-production of banned chemicals and would not result in compromise of commercial information. Water sampling downstream from a chemical facility should reveal nerve agent production, even from a high containment plant, but may not be suitable for all other agents. It is unlikely that remote air sampling downwind from a high containment plant would be successful. Routine monitoring of chemical plants in all nations including inspections might be feasible for national control agencies, but would be beyond the capabilities of an international agency without a large number of inspectors. In addition, it would be nearly impossible to verify intent for production of dual purpose materials even when it appears there were greater amounts being produced than needed for peaceful purposes.

It is concluded that it would be very difficult to provide verification of the non-production of banned materials on a routine basis by an international agency and that a satisfactory minimum international assurance might be provided by a structured information exchange and response to challenge mechanisms. On-site challenge inspections will require experts and the sampling and analysis of waste water and air effluents as well as process products. Routine inspections and reporting of accurate data on chemical manufacturing within a nation should be carried out by national agencies.

8. Retention, stockpiling or other acquisition of chemical agents and weapons. This activity is closely associated with agent production, although the treaty would also ban the transfer of chemical agents and weapons from one nation to another. Stockpiles once acquired could be readily hidden, especially if they involve binary munitions. Even with routine on-site inspections, verification would be very difficult. International measures, other than information exchange might therefore be limited to challenge mechanisms. Experts and sampling would be required for on-site inspections.

9. Offensive military training or other activities in preparation for undertaking chemical warfare. It has been generally agreed that defensive activities should not be banned and as a result an aggressive intent will be very difficult to verify. While offensive military activities should be included in the ban, international monitoring could be limited to informal exchanges and responses to challenge situations.

10. Use of chemical weapons for war purposes including dual purpose agents and binary components. In many instances the effects of chemical agents used in war will be apparent and verification will be provided by the antagonists. However in some instances involving isolated battles or limited wars and insurrections in remote areas few outside observers will be present and reports of clandestine use of chemicals must be carefully weighed by the international community. If reports are substantial, then the nations involved should be requested to allow samples to be taken at the site by international inspectors within 48 hours of an event if possible so that the use or non-use of chemical weapons could be verified.

#### SUMMARY OF VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.

Through this analysis of specific activities it is apparent that remote detection, as might be available through "national technical means" or at considerable expense to an international verification agency, may be sufficient to arouse suspicions which could lead to challenge situations, but is not likely to be sufficient to demonstrate non-compliance with a treaty. To provide assurance and security for all nations, some on-site inspections would be necessary although it would seem that these occasions should not be an unbearable intrusion. In most instances such on-site visits could be to the distinct advantage of the nation being inspected.

To verify initial declarations and the dismantling of production plants, on-site inspections would require the presence of some international personnel though not necessarily technical experts. For the activities to be banned including development, production, stockpiling and use, the provision of technical means of verification on a routine basis by an international agency would pose overwhelming logistic difficulties. Information and data on these activities should be routinely exchanged through an international verification agency but on-site inspection could be limited to unilateral invitations or challenge situations. For challenge inspections, appropriate experts must be involved and some sampling must be permitted. For the destruction of declared stockpiles intrusion will be greatest as guaranteed verification will require continuous on-site monitoring with periodic sampling and analysis by expert international inspectors.



## IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION AGENCIES

### A. NATIONAL AGENCIES

On the basis of this analysis each signatory would be required to maintain a national verification group. This need not be a separate permanent group established especially for this purpose, but could be an existing government agency with an environmental or health control function. It would need access to a selection of inspection personnel both technical and non-technical, but they need not be on permanent staff unless a variety of sites require routine periodic visits. The national agency would be responsible for all routine monitoring required by the treaty and for the provision of data and other pertinent information to the international control agency for exchange. If on-site visits and sampling were required either automatically for some activities or by challenge for others, all arrangements within the nation should be provided by the national agency. Whenever samples were to be taken this should be done in triplicate using standardized techniques so that they could be analysed nationally as well as independently in two designated laboratories elsewhere.

### B. INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES

For the international verification measures indicated in the preceding sections, technical or non-technical inspectors would be required for most activities; however the level of employment would not warrant placing these individuals on the permanent staff of an international agency. The most logical approach would be for each signatory to nominate one technical and one non-technical inspector who would then be available when needed. Similarly signatories could be encouraged though not required to designate a national laboratory where the analysis of samples could be carried out by standardized techniques on request.

On this basis an international verification agency need consist only of a supervisory (consultative) committee at the political level which would meet periodically or in response to a challenge, supported by a small secretariat. The committee would determine the verification measures to be carried out and arrangements would be made through the secretariat which would also provide for routine measures. From the foregoing analysis it is clear that much of the verification emphasis will be placed on challenge mechanisms and the treaty must specify them in some detail.

## CONCLUSIONS

An analysis of verification requirements based on specific activities to be undertaken or banned under a treaty has suggested that the minimum levels needed for adequate assurance to the international community are not extensive and should be achievable by available means. However, it is clear that remote technical means will not provide the necessary measures and for most activities some form of on-site inspection will provide the only realistic evidence of compliance. For only one activity, stockpile destruction, inspections have to involve a significant level of intrusiveness. In all cases, for publicity purposes, inspections should be to the advantage of the nation being inspected unless that nation has been guilty of non-compliance, or for some other unexplained reason denies an inspection.

An international verification agency will require only a controlling (consultative) committee at the political level supported by a small secretariat, with inspectors drawn from nominees provided by each signatory. National agencies will be required to provide most routine monitoring and would collect data within the nation for exchange.

It is hoped that this analysis of verification factors on the basis of activities has provided some insight into the minimum levels essential for international assurance of compliance with a chemical arms treaty and appears to have provided useful guidelines for the establishment of national and international verification agencies.

CHINA  
WORKING PAPER

Prohibition of Chemical Weapons:  
on the Definition of Chemical Warfare Agents

It is generally held that chemical weapons are composed of three elements:

1. The chemical warfare agent which produces a direct toxic effect on the target.
  2. The chemical munitions or devices which are filled with the chemical warfare agents and disperse them into a combat state.
  3. The launching system or means of delivery which sends such munitions or devices filled with the chemical warfare agent to the area of the target.
- The main element of the three is the chemical warfare agent, since the most essential difference between chemical weapons and conventional or other weapons lies in the former's reliance on the toxic effects of chemical warfare agents to produce lethal and injurious capabilities.

Chemical warfare agents should form the central contents for negotiations. In elaborating the Convention, it is imperative to first clearly ascertain the definition of chemical warfare agents. This definition will have a bearing on the scope and content of the prohibition, methods and means of verification, and will affect the solution of a whole series of problems including the destruction of chemical weapons and dismantling of production facilities. Therefore, it is necessary to carry out serious discussions on the question of the definition of chemical warfare agents, in order to reach a consensus at the earliest date.

Many delegations have already expressed their points of view in different forms on the question of definition of chemical warfare agents, and have advanced quite a number of useful proposals. In our view, it would not be difficult to draw up a scientific and generally acceptable definition of chemical warfare agents, on the basis of the reasonable portions of various viewpoints and proposals advanced in the CD.

In accordance with its basic position of the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons, the Chinese delegation is of the view that in determining a definition of chemical warfare agents, account should be taken of its comprehensiveness and accuracy. Its comprehensiveness is designed to ensure that all chemical warfare agents which ought to be prohibited are in fact prohibited, and not leave any loopholes which can be used for violations of the convention, its accuracy is designed to avoid the prohibition of chemical substances which ought not

to be prohibited, as if they were chemical warfare agents, as this would have an adverse effect on the development of industrial and agricultural production and on scientific and technological progress.

Basing ourselves on above considerations, and having drawn upon the reasonable portions of the proposals made by all sides, we wish to make a preliminary proposal on the definition of chemical warfare agents for the exploration of delegations.

We propose the following definition for chemical warfare agents:

All chemical substances which are developed, produced, stockpiled and used for hostile purposes, and whose toxic effects are used to interfere with or destroy the normal functions of man, animal and plant in such a way as to lead to death, temporary incapacitation or permanent injury, regardless of whether these poisonous effects occur immediately or in delayed fashion, and regardless of the origin and method of manufacture of these substances, should all be considered chemical warfare agents.

In accordance with above formulation of the definition, chemical warfare agents specifically include:

- (1) Single-purpose chemical warfare agents: including lethal agents, incapacitating agents and blister agents.
  - (2) Dual-purpose chemical warfare agents: i.e. dual-purpose chemical substances which have already been developed into weapons (such as those which have filled munitions and whose quantity stockpiled no longer indicates use for peaceful purposes.) Examples: phosgene, hydrogen cyanide, etc. irritant agents and anti-plant agents.
  - (3) Potential chemical warfare agents: these are chemical substances which have not yet been used as chemical warfare agents but which, because of their toxicity and physical and chemical characteristics can be or may be used as chemical warfare agents, e.g. dioxin, bicyclic phosphorous esters etc. This category of substances should be monitored, in order to prevent their development into chemical warfare agents.
- Here we are using the term "potential chemical warfare agents" to replace the term "chemical agents" used in some documents, since we consider the term "chemical agents" too broad in its meaning and does not accurately express the relationship between it and chemical warfare agents. The term "potential chemical warfare agents", however, does more accurately reflect the concept which we wish to express.
- (4) Precursors of chemical warfare agents: these themselves are not chemical warfare agents, but in the course of the use of two or more than two of this type of chemical substances, a reaction can be caused, thus producing a chemical warfare agent.
  - (5) Biochemical warfare agents: these refer to other natural poisons used as warfare agents not yet included in other relevant conventions, and other substances similar to natural poisons or their active pieces which have been artificially synthesized or semi-synthesized.

It is clear from the above definition and its specific content that:

(1) The definition proposed brings within its scope all chemical warfare agents.

(2) The definition proposed embodies the principle of using mainly the general-purpose criterion but combining it with the toxicity criterion. That is to say, that chemical warfare agents must possess some degree of toxicity, but toxic substances are not necessarily all chemical warfare agents. Therefore even though toxicity is an important criterion of chemical warfare agents, it is not the only criterion; whether or not a substance is a chemical warfare agent, should mainly depend on whether it is used for "hostile purposes". This is also the main indication for distinguishing dual-purpose chemical warfare agents.

(3) The definition proposed also reflects the scope of activities to be prohibited -- that is all the stages of the entire process from the development right up to the use of chemical warfare agents. Some chemical substances can be determined as being chemical warfare agents, only when they are connected with certain specific activities, e.g. substances such as phosgene, hydrogen cyanide can be clearly identified as chemical warfare agents only when they have filled munitions and developed into weapons, whereas irritants would be included as substances to be prohibited only when they are utilized on the battlefield. Proceeding from this characteristic of chemical warfare agents, it can also be clearly seen why in any convention prohibiting chemical weapons, the prohibition of use is an issue which cannot be evaded.



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CHINA

WORKING PAPER

Dismantling of Production Facilities/Means of  
Production for Chemical Weapons

One of the most important measures for the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons and the prevention of chemical warfare is the prohibition of producing chemical weapons and the dismantling of their existing production facilities/means of production. This is because the industrial production of chemical weapons accounts for the most crucial link among the various activities aimed at the attainment of chemical warfare capability and the use of chemical weapons, i.e. development, production, stockpiling, acquisition and transfer of chemical weapons. Only those countries which can produce chemical weapons on a certain industrial scale are able to stockpile and transfer these weapons as well as to engage in chemical warfare. This has been proven by the history of the two World Wars. Therefore, the Chinese Delegation is of the opinion that:

1. The convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons, besides prohibiting in clear terms the production of chemical weapons, should stipulate the total dismantling of all types of their production facilities/means of production, rather than the shutting down and the conversion of these facilities. The Chinese Delegation has already indicated in Working Paper CD/102 that "shutting down the facilities for the production of chemical weapons or converting them to peaceful production is not the best approach". The measures of converting the production facilities for chemical weapons to peaceful use is loaded with the potential risk of their reconversion, since the plants thus converted can easily be reconverted to the production of chemical weapons and this will increase the work load of verification and make it more difficult. If it is argued that the dismantling of production facilities for chemical weapons could take years, and that an interim measure is required, we can agree to consider the use of the method of shutting down the facilities as an auxiliary measure of supervision.

2. The convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons should also provide for limitations and dispositions regarding dual-purpose plants. There may be plants which have been designed and built originally for the purpose of producing chemical warfare agents, but during peace time are producing products for civilian use. In such cases, the entire dual-purpose plants or some of their units should be dismantled, if they or their units are identified as production facilities for chemical warfare agents, regardless whether they are engaged or not actually in producing chemical warfare agents; whether they are independent plants for the production of chemical warfare agents or just units producing chemical warfare agents in a large chemical complex. This is because the facilities and conditions of these plants exist to meet the requirement of producing chemical warfare agents, and they are ready to produce them at any time. If these plants produce products of civilian use, this might be a camouflage to cover up the production of chemical warfare agents or intended to make use of surplus production capacity of these plants. If such conversion is permitted, it will legalize these dual-purpose activities and thus offer an opportunity to the violators of the convention.

3. The convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons should pay special attention to the problem of dismantling the munition-filling facilities for the manufacture of chemical weapons. This is because of the fact that although the chemical warfare agents constitute the nucleus and the basis of the three components of chemical weapons, namely: chemical warfare agents munition and launching system, yet to make these agents weapons usable in warfare, it is necessary to fill them into munitions which are capable of dispersing them into combat state. This is a salient feature, the presence or the absence of which determines whether a dual-purpose substance is being used for military purpose. These munition filling facilities are very often specifically designed. It is difficult to convert them to peaceful uses. Therefore, all these facilities should be totally dismantled and strict verification should be applied to their dismantling.



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31 March 1981  
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LETTER DATED 26 MARCH 1981 ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF INDIA TRANSMITTING EXTRACTS FROM THE SECTION ENTITLED "REVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION" CONTAINED IN THE NEW DELHI DECLARATION ISSUED AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES HELD IN NEW DELHI FROM 9 TO 13 FEBRUARY 1981

I have the honour to request Your Excellency, in accordance with the rules of procedure of the Committee on Disarmament, to include as an official document of the Committee, the enclosed extracts from the section entitled "Review of the International Situation" contained in the New Delhi Declaration issued at the conclusion of the Ministerial Conference of Non-Aligned Countries held in New Delhi from 9 February to 13 February 1981, as a Consensus Document.

These extracts are of particular relevance to the work of the Committee on Disarmament since they reflect the joint hopes and aspirations of countries of the Non-Aligned Movement from the continents of Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) A.P. Venkateswaran  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative

Following are the extracts from the Section entitled "Review of the International Situation" from the New Delhi Declaration of the Ministerial Conference of Non-Aligned Countries held from 9 to 13 February 1981, in New Delhi, India.

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REVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

(paragraphs numbered as in the original Declaration)

31. Reviewing the international situation, the Ministers observed with grave concern that they were meeting at a critical moment of deterioration in international relations. Since the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government, held in Havana in September 1979, which had drawn attention to the complex and dangerous situation existing in the world, the international situation had so sharply deteriorated as to threaten the very survival of humanity. The crisis in the process of détente had once again posed a serious threat to world peace and stability. The rivalry among great Powers had intensified; the competition for spheres of influence continued for perpetuating and expanding relations of domination and exploitation. The arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, had escalated to new levels of irrationality and there had been a resurgence of the Cold War. Forces hostile to the emancipation of peoples continued to infringe the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of countries and the right of peoples under alien and colonial domination to self-determination and independence. There had been increasing recourse to the use, or threat of use, of force, military intervention, occupation and interference, in violation of the United Nations Charter and international law. Thus focal points of aggression and tension, particularly in the Middle East, Africa, particularly southern Africa, South-West Asia, South-East Asia, the Caribbean and Central America continued to exist, while new conflicts among States further aggravated the international situation. The continued intransigence of the developed countries has further aggravated the inequalities and injustices of international economic relations. Expressing their concern over these developments, especially at the acts of intimidation and aggression as well as the measures of political and economic coercion directed against the non-aligned countries, the Ministers reiterated the call for appropriate co-ordination and collective action to oppose such threats to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence and security of non-aligned countries, the right of all States to freely choose their political, economic and social systems without hindrance or pressure, the right of peoples under alien and colonial domination to self-determination and independence; and to support the struggle of national liberation movements. The developments had confirmed that the unfaltering struggle of countries and peoples for freedom and independence, which represents the main trend in the contemporary world, cannot be stopped by force. The Ministers considered that the achievement of international security for all peoples and nations could be realized only by efforts aimed at changing international relations as a whole. They reiterated their conviction that the easing of international tensions cannot be based on the policy of balance of force, spheres of influence, rivalry between power blocs, military alliances and the accumulation of armaments, particularly nuclear weapons, and the relaxation of tension cannot be fully ensured without the active participation of non-aligned countries in vital decisions affecting world peace and security on the basis of equality. The Ministers called for dissolution of military blocs or pacts, military alliances and their interlocking arrangements conceived within the context of conflicts between great Powers, and withdrawal of foreign military bases and military forces to achieve a global reduction of international tension, the benefits of which should be extended to all regions of the world.

32. The greatest peril facing the world today is the threat of destruction as a result of nuclear war. The actions of the nuclear-weapon States, which are engaged in a new and frenzied round of the nuclear arms race, have created a situation in which mankind seems to have been condemned to live in the shadow of nuclear annihilation. Attempts were being made by some nuclear-weapon States to promote the highly dangerous concept of limited nuclear war and to minimize the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons. At the same time, the so-called "balance of deterrence" among the great Powers had not prevented their involvement in regional conflicts. The competition in deterrence has not, in any way, afforded a dependable device for averting the impending catastrophe. It has only heightened the nightmare of uncertainty and fear which characterizes international relations today, because the arms race stems particularly from the persistent recourse to the use of force in order to maintain the status quo in international relations. There is only one real deterrent, namely mankind's desire to survive. As unrelenting protagonists of world peace, therefore, the non-aligned countries have to co-ordinate their actions so as to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race with a view eventually to bringing about the complete elimination of nuclear weapons from the arsenals of States.

33. The desire to survive is shared by people all over the world, including those of the nuclear nations. There appears to be no other force, save the force of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries capable of taking initiatives to deal with this alarming situation. The Ministers expressed their belief that the most effective way to eliminate the threat of a nuclear war, pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, was to prohibit the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons. The Ministers recognized the reluctance of nuclear-weapon States to agree to an international convention banning the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons. They were of the view, however, that a new international instrument, along the lines of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which prohibited the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons and which had now become an accepted norm in international law; covering nuclear weapons could provide a satisfactory answer.

34. The Ministers declared that the most effective assurance of security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was nuclear disarmament and prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States must refrain from any activity in the nuclear field which would jeopardize the security and well-being of the peoples of non-nuclear-weapon States. The nuclear-weapon States have the obligation to guarantee that the non-nuclear-weapon States will not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons. They noted with satisfaction that proposals on that subject had been submitted to the Committee on Disarmament, and that there had been no objection in principle in the Committee to an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States.

35. The Ministers affirmed that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constituted an important disarmament measure.

36. The establishment of such zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. In the process of establishing such zones, the characteristics of each region should be taken into account. The States participating in such zones should undertake to comply fully with all the objectives, purposes and principles of the agreements or arrangements establishing the zones, thus ensuring that they are genuinely free from nuclear weapons.

37. Even the limited agreement on strategic arms control between the two most heavily armed nuclear-weapon States remained unratified because of the policy of negotiating from positions of strength. The Ministers further deplored the fact that in dramatic contrast to the abject poverty in which two-thirds of the world's population lives, the international community, and particularly the nuclear-weapon States and their allies, squandered up to hundreds of billions of dollars annually on expenditure on armaments. The lack of progress in disarmament and the upward spiral in the arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, had further aggravated international tensions and impeded the realization of the purpose and principles of the United Nations Charter, and the objectives of the First Disarmament Decade.

38. The Ministers noted with regret that the decisions adopted at the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly have not yet been implemented, owing to the lack of political will of some major military Powers. They called upon all States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, urgently to implement these decisions so as to achieve more rapid progress in the field of real and genuine disarmament. They also emphasized the importance of the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament, to be held in 1982, and expressed their determination to work towards its success so that a process of genuine disarmament, particularly in the nuclear field, could be initiated.

41. The Ministers expressed grave concern over the growing build-up of great power military presence in the Indian Ocean area. The Ministers noted that despite the expressed wishes of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, military activity in all forms and manifestations of the great Powers in the Indian Ocean area had intensified and that there had been a marked deterioration in the climate of peace and security in the area. They further noted that the concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, as contained in the 1971 United Nations Declaration (United Nations General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971) and as considered at the meeting of the littoral and hinterland States of July 1979, as well as at the subsequent meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, was being systematically nullified by this escalation of military preparations by the great Powers. The Ministers, seriously concerned at the dangerous tension in the area caused by the expansion of existing foreign bases, military installations, logistical supply facilities, the disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, as well as the search for new base facilities, warned of the dangers of any actions that would provide pretexts for the intervention or the presence of the great Powers in the area. They also reaffirmed their determination to work for the success of the Conference on the Indian Ocean, scheduled to be held in Sri Lanka in 1981, to achieve the objectives of the concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, and to this end urged all great Powers and other major maritime users to participate in the Conference in a constructive spirit, and to start a process of reducing their military presence in the Indian Ocean area meanwhile.

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TABULATION OF PROPOSALS ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT SINCE  
THE FIRST SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

Prepared by the Secretariat

GE.81-61080

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I. Introduction

1. At the 116th meeting on 19 March 1981, the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament, in his statement concerning the further activities of the Committee on agenda items 1 and 2, requested the Secretariat to prepare a tabulation of all proposals on nuclear disarmament submitted since the General Assembly's first special session devoted to disarmament held in 1978, to be complemented subsequently by a similar tabulation of all proposals on nuclear disarmament submitted between the establishment of the United Nations in 1945 and the holding of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978.

2. In accordance with that request, the Secretariat has prepared the first tabulation. It presents proposals submitted to the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament; proposals submitted to the Committee on Disarmament since 1979; relevant recommendations contained in the resolutions of the thirty-third, thirty-fourth and thirty-fifth sessions of the General Assembly transmitted to the Committee on Disarmament by the Secretary-General; relevant documents submitted to those sessions of the General Assembly; and proposals submitted to the Disarmament Commission in 1979 and 1980.

3. The tabulation includes references to the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons because, although that question constitutes a separate item on the Committee's agenda, in many contexts it appears as an element of proposals concerning nuclear weapons.

II. Proposals submitted to the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament \*/

Proposals of the Soviet Union on practical measures for ending the arms race (A/S-10/AC.1/4).

4. The Soviet Union advocated a programme aimed at the cessation of any further quantitative and qualitative building of arms and armed forces of States with a large military potential, which, inter alia, included the following proposals:

(a) The cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of stockpiles until their complete elimination.

(b) The prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons.

(c) The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world.

(d) The non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there were no such weapons at present.

(e) After an agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms had been concluded, efforts in that direction should be continued without delay. They should lead to a substantial decrease in the levels of strategic offensive arms and to a further limitation of their qualitative improvement on the basis of the principle of equal security for both sides and with due account for all the related factors.

(f) The complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

(g) The limitation and subsequent reduction of military activities in the Indian Ocean. Immediately following the conclusion of an agreement on the "freezing" or "stabilization" of military activities in the Indian Ocean at the present levels, talks should be held on the drastic reduction of such activities, including the dismantling of foreign military bases. Thus, the idea that the Indian Ocean should be turned into a zone of peace would be largely implemented. In addition, the Soviet Union declared that it would never use nuclear weapons against those States which renounced the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and had no nuclear weapons on their territories. It was ready to conclude special agreements to that effect with any such non-nuclear State and called upon all other nuclear Powers to follow its example and assume similar obligations.

Working paper on disarmament submitted by China (A/S-10/AC.1/17).

5. The working paper stressed that to remove the threat of nuclear war, it was imperative to realize the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. When major progress had been made in the destruction of Soviet and United States nuclear arsenals and in the reduction of their conventional armaments, the other nuclear countries should join the Soviet Union and the United States in

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\*/ This section includes relevant proposals that are mentioned in paragraph 125 of the Final Document.



destroying all nuclear weapons. For the present, all the nuclear countries, particularly the Superpowers, which possessed nuclear weapons in large quantities, should immediately undertake not to resort to the threat or use of nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones. China was not only ready to undertake that commitment but reiterated that at no time and in no circumstances would it be the first to use nuclear weapons.

Working paper submitted by Romania concerning a synthesis of the proposals in the field of disarmament (A/S-10/AC.1/23).

6. Romania advocated, inter alia, the following measures: the conclusion of an agreement by which the nuclear-weapon States would undertake not to use such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States; the renunciation by nuclear-weapon States of the placing of new nuclear weapons in the territories of other countries; the cessation of the refinement and production of nuclear weapons; the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes; the gradual reduction of the stockpiles of nuclear weapons and delivery systems until their complete liquidation; the undertaking by the States participating in the special session of a solemn commitment to move on to the negotiation of an agreement on the total prohibition of nuclear weapons. In addition, Romania suggested that concrete measures should be agreed upon regarding the creation of zones of peace and international co-operation, free of nuclear armaments, with the consent of the States concerned and provided that their national sovereignty is respected and their security fully guaranteed. The States of the nuclear-free zones should be given real guarantees by the nuclear-weapon States that never, in any circumstances, would nuclear arms be used against States belonging to such zones, and that their free access to nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes would be secured. The States belonging to the region of the Balkans should be encouraged to convert it into an area of good neighbourliness, peace and broad-based co-operation, without nuclear weapons, foreign military bases or foreign troops. Such a measure would represent a major contribution to the achievement of security in Europe and throughout the world.

Proposals by Canada for the implementation of a strategy of suffocation of the nuclear arms race (A/S-10/AC.1/L.6).

7. Canada advanced the following proposals:

(a) Agreement by the two major nuclear powers to prohibit the flight-testing of new strategic delivery vehicles could serve as one means to curb the qualitative dimension of the strategic arms race to the extent that compliance with such prohibitions could be verified by national technical means.

(b) An agreement should be sought by the two major nuclear powers to cease production of additional fissionable material for nuclear weapons purposes. Such an agreement would require adequate verification arrangements including the acceptance of full-scope safeguards.

(c) If an adequately verified agreement could be reached between the two major powers to cease the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, a multilateral treaty prohibiting the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices should be negotiated as soon as possible. Such a treaty, to which nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States might adhere, would provide a common basis for the acceptance of full-scope safeguards.

(d) Limiting and then progressively reducing, on an agreed and verifiable basis, spending on new strategic nuclear weapons systems, including their research and development, by the major nuclear powers would be a further means of curbing the qualitative dimension of the nuclear arms race. Such agreements on restraint or reduction would require full openness in reporting and full effectiveness in authenticating military budgets.

Draft resolution by Cyprus, Ethiopia and India on the urgent need for cessation of further testing of nuclear weapons (A/S-10/AC.1/L.10).

8. In its operative paragraph, the draft resolution called upon all nuclear-weapon States; pending the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, to refrain from conducting any further testing of nuclear weapons.

Draft resolution submitted by Ethiopia and India on the non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war (A/S-10/AC.1/L.11).

9. Operative paragraph 1 declared that: (a) the use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity; and (b) the use of nuclear weapons should therefore be prohibited, pending nuclear disarmament; operative paragraph 2 requested all States, particularly nuclear-weapon States, to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session proposals concerning non-use of nuclear weapons, avoidance of nuclear war and related matters in order that an international convention on the subject might be formulated through further discussion and agreement.

Proposal by the non-aligned countries on the establishment of a zone of peace in the Mediterranean (A/S-10/AC.1/37, para. 72).

10. According to the proposal, the creation of a zone of peace in the Mediterranean should be encouraged.

III. Proposals submitted to the Committee on Disarmament

A. 1979 session

"Negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed", submitted on 1 February 1979 by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (CD/4). (Romania later joined the sponsors of this document.)

11. The proposal called for the holding of negotiations with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States as well as a number of non-nuclear-weapon States. The subject of negotiations was to be the ending of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of their stockpiles until they had been completely destroyed. At different stages of the negotiations consideration should be given, for example, to the cessation of the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, the gradual reduction of the accumulated stockpiles of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles as well as the destruction of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. The necessary verification measures would also have to be agreed upon. The elaboration and implementation of measures in the field of nuclear disarmament should be buttressed by the parallel strengthening of political and international legal guarantees of the security of States. It was proposed that the cessation of the production, the reduction and the destruction of nuclear weapons should be carried out by stages on a mutually acceptable and agreed basis. The content of the measures at each stage might be decided by agreement among the participants in the negotiations and the degree of participation of individual nuclear States in measures at each stage should be determined taking into account the quantitative and qualitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and of the other States concerned. At all stages of the constant reduction of the levels of nuclear strength, the existing balance in the field of nuclear strength should be undisturbed. For the purpose of preparing the negotiations, the proposal called for consultations within the framework of the CD. Although the CD was deemed to be the most suitable forum for the preparation and conduct of the negotiations, the consideration of alternative methods was envisaged.

"Conclusion of an International Convention to Assure Non-nuclear Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons", submitted by Pakistan on 27 March 1979 (CD/10).

12. The working paper proposed that the CD give early consideration during its 1979 session to the conclusion of an international convention to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and attached the text of a draft convention.

"Communiqué adopted at the meeting of the Committee of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty Member States held in Budapest on 14 and 15 May 1979", submitted on 20 June 1979 by Hungary (CD/20).

13. The communiqué called for the conclusion among all States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe of a treaty on the non-first use of either nuclear or conventional weapons against each other. 1/ In addition, it called

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1/ A similar proposal is also contained in documents CD/58 of 12 February 1980; CD/98\* of 17 June 1980; and CD/160 of 3 March 1981.

for the speedy achievement of practical agreements regarding, inter alia: (a) the dates and procedures for holding talks on ending the production of nuclear weapons of all types and on gradual reduction of their stockpiles up to and including their complete elimination; (b) the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and simultaneous renunciation by all States of the use or threat of force in their mutual relations; (c) the conclusion of a treaty on complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests; and (d) the adoption of measures to strengthen the guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States, including the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons against the States that did not possess nuclear weapons and did not have them on their territories, and the undertaking not to deploy nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there were no such weapons at present. <sup>2/</sup>

"Draft international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States", submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR on 21 June 1979 (CD/23).

14. The working paper contained the text of a draft convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear States.

"Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons", submitted by Pakistan on 26 June 1979 (CD/25).

15. The working paper dealt with the nature, scope and content of the assurances or guarantees and with the form in which such assurances or guarantees should be extended.

"Proposal for a CD Recommendation to the United Nations General Assembly Concerning the Security of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against Nuclear Attack", submitted by the United States on 2 July 1979 (CD/27).

16. The working paper recommended that the CD should propose to the United Nations General Assembly that the individual unilateral pledges that had been made by the nuclear weapon States be incorporated in a General Assembly resolution. Such a resolution would (1) recognize the willingness of the nuclear-weapon States to be responsive to the desire of non-nuclear-weapon States to be assured that they will not be attacked by nuclear weapons and (2) give international status to the individual assurances by the nuclear-weapon States, thereby enhancing their character as solemn commitments. An illustrative General Assembly resolution was attached.

"Working Paper on Cessation of Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament", submitted by the Group of 21 on 12 July 1979 (CD/36/Rev.1).

17. The working paper expressed the view that the CD was the most suitable forum for the preparation and conduct of negotiations on nuclear disarmament; the question of the scope of those negotiations would have to be solved in preliminary negotiations concerning organizational matters. It was pointed out that, although other negotiations could and should go on in parallel with multilateral negotiations, negotiations conducted outside the CD should not in any way hinder negotiations within the Committee. It was noted that the need for undiminished security had been recognized by all States and that the agreements and measures included in paragraph 50

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<sup>2/</sup> Similar proposals are contained in documents CD/98\* of 17 June 1980 and CD/160 of 3 March 1981.

as part of the process of nuclear disarmament were closely linked. That relationship together with the inherent complexity of all relevant provisions would undoubtedly make their faithful implementation particularly difficult; paragraph 50 was, however, one of the key paragraphs of the Programme of Action approved by consensus by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and could not be ignored as unfortunately had been the case with all measures of nuclear disarmament in the proceedings of the CCD. It was therefore proposed that the CD should endeavour in informal meetings and consultations, to identify the prerequisites and elements for multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament and to delineate the course of action for the achievement of the objective pursued. On the basis of the progress which might thus be achieved in the Committee, the establishment of a working group for negotiation of agreements and concrete measures in the field of nuclear disarmament might then be envisaged.

"Statement of the Group of 21 on the Conclusion of the Annual Session of the Committee on Disarmament in 1979", 9 August 1979 (CD/50).

18. The statement said that there was no justification to delay any further the initiation of concrete negotiations in the CD on a CTBT and, therefore, affirmed that such negotiations should be initiated at the beginning of the 1980 session of the CD as the highest priority item. In addition, it was stated that the item on nuclear disarmament should be included on the agenda of the 1980 session of the CD and that negotiations should be conducted in accordance with paragraph 50 and other relevant provisions of the Final Document of the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament. The belief was expressed that the most effective assurance of security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was nuclear disarmament and prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States had an obligation to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It was noted that there was no objection, in principle, within the Committee on Disarmament to the idea of an international convention. The view was expressed that negotiations should be continued at the next session of the Committee in 1980, and that the mandate of the Ad hoc Working Group should be renewed so as to continue the search for a common approach which could be included in an effective international instrument to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

"Results of the 1979 Session of the Committee on Disarmament", working paper submitted by the Group of Socialist States on 10 August 1979 (CD/51).

19. It was considered that the discussion of document CD/4 had been useful and had contributed to preparations for negotiations in the CD on ending the production of nuclear weapons and on their destruction, which would be a step towards implementation of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It was noted that the idea of concluding an international convention on the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons had gained wide support and it was assumed that the negotiations on the conclusion of a convention on strengthening security guarantees for non-nuclear States would be continued at the beginning of the 1980 session of the CD. The belief was expressed that the problem of prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests was of paramount importance. The trilateral negotiations should be actively pursued; all participants in the negotiations should make efforts to bring about their speedy conclusion and submit their results to the Committee on Disarmament for consideration. At the same time, the view was expressed that, because of the specific nature of the subject, consideration of the question in the Committee on Disarmament could start only after completion of the trilateral negotiations. It was considered that the work done by the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events had been useful.

"Statement by Mr. Jamsheed Marker, Leader of the Pakistan Delegation to the CD",  
14 August 1979 (CD/54).

20. With regard to the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, it was stated that the premise of further negotiations in the CD should not be that, while the security of the major nuclear powers, and even their minor preoccupations, should receive full reflection, the security concerns of non-nuclear States, particularly the countries of the third world, were of marginal importance. The need for security against the nuclear threat arose from the possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear powers. Until these weapons were eliminated, the nuclear powers had an obligation to assure the non-nuclear States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Nor should this question be approached merely as another device for non-proliferation; rather, it should be conceived in the larger context of international peace and security and promotion of the goal of nuclear disarmament. In addition, with regard to agenda item 2, it was affirmed that nuclear disarmament would be a step by step process and that, in this process, the contribution of each nuclear Power will be determined by the level and sophistication of its nuclear arsenals. The view was also expressed that nuclear disarmament should be achieved in a balanced manner, without prejudicing the security of any State.

B. 1980 session

"Romania's position on disarmament, extracts from the report presented by Nicolae Ceausescu, Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Romania, at the Party's Twelfth Congress, Bucharest, 19 November 1979", 11 February 1980 (CD/57\*).

21. It was stated that, in the present circumstances, it would be of decisive importance to halt the production of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction, and to embark on effective nuclear disarmament under strict international control within the framework and under the auspices of the United Nations.

"Communiqué adopted at the meeting of the Committee of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty Member States, held in Berlin on 5 and 6 December 1979", submitted by the German Democratic Republic on 12 February 1980 (CD/58).

22. The communiqué called for businesslike negotiations on issues pertaining to medium-range nuclear weapons in keeping with the proposals put forward in the speech of L.I. Brezhnev in Berlin on 6 October 1980. At the same time it was considered important that no steps be taken capable of complicating the situation and obstructing the negotiations. In this connection, it was stated that the adoption of the decision on the production and stationing in Western Europe of new types of United States medium-range missile-nuclear weapons and implementation of such a decision would destroy the basis for negotiations. The hope was expressed that the NATO countries would give a positive response to the appeal of the socialist countries not to station more nuclear weapons in Europe, to their proposal to embark on negotiations. It was reaffirmed that the balance of forces in the European continent could and should be maintained not through building up armed forces and armaments, not through a further stepping up of the arms race, but rather through its cessation, reduction in the level of military confrontation, a resolute transition to concrete measures of disarmament, especially nuclear. 3/

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3/ Similar proposals are also contained in documents CD/60 of 13 February 1980; CD/63\* of 3 March 1980; and CD/98\* of 17 June 1980. For other relevant measures proposed in CD/58, see above document CD/20 of 20 June 1979.

"Statement of the Group of 21 on the Establishment of Working Groups on Items on the Annual Agenda of the CD in 1980", 27 February 1980 (CD/64).

23. The statement expressed the considered view that working groups were the best available machinery for the conduct of concrete negotiations within the CD and proposed the establishment of working groups, inter alia, on the following agenda items: "Nuclear test ban" and "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

"Statement of the Group of 21 on a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty", 4 March 1980 (CD/72).

24. The statement called for complete cessation of nuclear-weapon testing in all environments. It further said that there was adequate material to initiate immediate negotiations on the subject and recalled that, as far back as 29 February 1972, the Secretary-General of the United Nations had stated that only the political decision of States was necessary in order to achieve final agreement on the subject, all aspects of which, both technical and scientific, had been so fully explored. The statement recalled the view expressed in CD/64 concerning the establishment of working groups on items on the Committee's annual agenda (see above), and urged that a working group be established. Finally, it underlined the fundamental importance of progress on the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing, which as stated in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, "would make a significant contribution to the ... aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons and of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons".

"Working document containing the views of the Finnish Government concerning the item 'Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons'", submitted by Finland on 14 March 1980 (CD/75).

25. In the view of Finland, all approaches to achieving arrangements for non-use assurances should continue to be explored, all interested governments should be involved in the process and have the opportunity to reflect their particular security concerns.

"Comprehensive nuclear test ban, report of the Secretary-General", 16 April 1980 (CD/86\*).

26. The study provided a historical analysis of negotiations leading to the partial test ban Treaty, emphasizing the fact that in the Preamble of that Treaty the Parties expressed the determination to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions for all time and to continue negotiations to that end, a determination that was later reaffirmed in the Preamble of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The study summarized the deliberations and negotiations on the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, a matter that has been on the agenda of the General Assembly since 1957 -- longer than any other disarmament question; discussed the trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban, which began in 1977; and examined the major unresolved issues -- viz, verification, scope and duration of a comprehensive test ban. In their conclusions, the experts, among other things, stated that a comprehensive test ban is regarded as the first and most urgent step towards a cessation of the nuclear arms race, in particular as regards its qualitative aspects, reiterated the view of the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty that a comprehensive test ban would reinforce the Treaty by demonstrating the awareness of the major nuclear Powers of the legal obligation under the Treaty "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at any early date"; and noted that in order to achieve its purpose, the comprehensive test ban must be such as to endure.

"The prohibition of the Production of Fissionable Material for Weapons Purposes",  
submitted by Australia and Canada on 17 April 1960 (CD/90).

27. The working paper presented a review of the proposal to prohibit the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes as it had been considered and debated in the Committee and its predecessors. It expressed the view that an agreement prohibiting the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, taken together with other arms limitation measures, would be an important step towards halting and reversing the nuclear arms race and towards further inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons. Such a convention would in no way impede the further development of nuclear power for peaceful purposes; conversely, it might form the basis for further agreements whereby even greater amounts of fissionable material could be made available for use in commercial electric power reactors and research reactors producing isotopes for agricultural, industrial and medical applications. Indicating some of the principal characteristics of the proposal's historic development, the paper pointed out that there had been two fundamentally different approaches to the way in which the proposal should be implemented. Certain States had regarded the proposal as only one element in a process by which the final goal of general and complete disarmament would be reached by gradual stages while other States had envisaged the proposal in terms of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, the elements of which would be implemented more or less simultaneously. It was emphasized that these two approaches were not irreconcilable. It was suggested that, to be fully effective, a proposal to prohibit the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes should be a measure which would have the effect of expanding and introducing balance into the nuclear arms control régime of which the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was a principal element. It should also be in combination with a comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear explosive devices in all environments and an agreement to stop the flight-testing of strategic delivery vehicles. Other measures, such as an agreement to limit and then progressively reduce military spending on new strategic nuclear-weapons systems and even ones on the verified dismantling of nuclear weapons and the transfer of the released fissionable material to civilian cycles, would further improve the climate of confidence, but agreement to prohibit the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes need not be deferred until all those measures had been achieved. With respect to the verification régime, it was suggested that it could encompass both existing international measures aimed at detecting the diversion of fissionable material to weapons purposes and additional measures specifically developed to ensure that such a régime was fully effective. One advantage of the proposal would be that nuclear weapon States and non-nuclear weapon States could be placed on a generally comparable basis.

"Letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR addressed to the  
Secretary-General of the United Nations concerning the tasks of the Second  
Disarmament Decade", submitted by the USSR on 17 April 1960 (CD/92).

28. The contents of the letter were reproduced in the Secretary-General's report containing the views and suggestions of Member States concerning the possible elements of the Declaration of the 1930s as the Second Disarmament Decade (see below document A/CN.10/10 and Add.1-13).



"Prohibition of nuclear tests: proposal for an informal meeting of the CD with the participation of experts members of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events", submitted by Belgium on 13 April 1980 (CD/93).

29. It was considered that it would be useful if the CD could, already in 1980, ascertain specifically the nature and state of progress of the work of the Ad hoc Group, and the problems which remained to be solved within the framework of its terms of reference; be informed of the present possibilities of national participation in a system for the international exchange of seismic data; form an idea of the additional means which would have to be deployed in the various regions of the world in order that such a system might contribute effectively to the verification of an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests. To that end, it was suggested that the CD could hold one or two informal meetings with the participation of experts members of the Ad hoc Group. The proposed meeting would not prejudge the results of the work of the Ad hoc Group. It should revive the Committee's interest in that work and provide an opportunity for inviting the governments concerned to spare no effort in ensuring that the system envisaged was capable of operating effectively in due time. 4/

"An illustrative list of subjects which might be examined by the CD in considering Agenda Item 1 'Nuclear Test Ban'", submitted by Australia on 22 April 1980 (CD/95).

30. The list included various subjects relating to: legal basis for international seismic monitoring system; administrative and financial aspects; and access and information distribution.

"Declaration of States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, adopted at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty in Warsaw on 15 May 1980", submitted by Poland on 17 June 1980 (CD/98\*).

31. Among appropriate steps with regard to the Mediterranean area, the Declaration mentioned the withdrawal of nuclear-armed naval vessels from the Mediterranean Sea and renunciation of the deployment of nuclear weapons in the territory of non-nuclear European and non-European Mediterranean countries. The States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty were prepared to conduct serious and businesslike talks on those questions. In addition, parallel with ratification of the SALT II Treaty, the Declaration assigned highest priority to the conduct and completion of negotiations on, inter alia, the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States not having such weapons in their territory and non-emplacement of nuclear weapons in the territory of States in which none are now located. 5/ The Declaration also called for the creation of nuclear-free zones and zones of peace in various regions of the world including Europe.

"Compendium of Arms Control Verification Proposals", submitted by Canada on 12 June 1980 (CD/99).

32. Presented summaries of verification proposals relating to various disarmament measures, including nuclear disarmament.

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4/ On 18 July 1980, the Committee held an informal meeting with experts members of the Ad hoc Group at which consideration was given to the subjects referred to in document CD/93.

5/ For other measures proposed see above, document CD/20 of 20 June 1979.

"Proposal on behalf of a group of socialist countries concerning urgent steps for the practical implementation of 'Negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed' (CD/4)", submitted by the German Democratic Republic on 30 June 1980 (CD/109).

33. The working paper suggested that the Committee on Disarmament undertake immediately and without delay urgent measures for the practical implementation of the proposals contained in CD/4 and CD/36/Rev.1, as follows: (a) the carrying out of preparatory consultations in accordance with General Assembly resolution 34/83 J, whose aim should be to identify the prerequisites and main problems for negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and of nuclear disarmament in the framework of the Committee on Disarmament; (b) the establishment of an ad hoc working group on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament with a clearly defined mandate, taking into account the extraordinary responsibility of each of the members of the Committee on Disarmament and in particular of the five nuclear-weapon States for nuclear disarmament as a matter of high priority; (c) the compilation of documents by the Secretariat on the position of the members of the Committee on Disarmament concerning the question of nuclear disarmament, which should serve as basic material for preparatory consultations.

"Working Paper on the Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament", submitted by the Group of 21 on 9 July 1980 (CD/116).

34. The working paper suggested some of the substantive issues that needed to be addressed in negotiations within the Committee on Disarmament on the item entitled "cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament": (a) the elaboration and clarification of the stages of nuclear disarmament envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document including identification of the responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States and the role of the non-nuclear weapon States in the process of achieving nuclear disarmament; (b) clarification of the issues involved in prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, pending nuclear disarmament, and in the prevention of nuclear war; (c) clarification of the issues involved in eliminating reliance on doctrines of nuclear deterrence; (d) measures to ensure an effective discharge by the Committee on Disarmament of its role as the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament and in this context its relationship with negotiations relating to nuclear disarmament conducted in bilateral, regional and other restricted fora. The working paper proposed that the Committee on Disarmament should set up an ad hoc working group to begin negotiations during the 1980 session of the Committee, with a view to reaching agreement on the above-mentioned concrete issues which would contribute to progress towards achievement of the nuclear disarmament measures envisaged in the Final Document of the special session.

"Possible draft resolution for adoption by the United Nations Security Council as an interim measure on 'Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons'", submitted by Pakistan on 17 July 1980 (CD/120).

35. The working paper contained the text of a possible draft resolution for adoption by the Security Council as an interim measure on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

"A Quantitative Working Paper on the Compendium of Arms Control Verification Proposals", submitted by Canada on 29 July 1980 (CD/127\*).

36. The working paper was based on a quantitative analysis of the contents of the Compendium of Arms Control Verification Proposals (CD/99).

"Statement of the Group of 21 on the Conclusion of the Annual Session of the CD in 1980", submitted on 6 August 1980 (CD/134).

37. With respect to agenda item 3, the Group reiterated its view that the nuclear-weapon States have an obligation categorically to assure all non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pending the conclusion of a legally binding instrument for that purpose, consideration should be given in the relevant forums to measures based on the above principle and any other appropriate measures put forward in this context. With respect to agenda item 1, the statement reiterated the views set out in document CD/72 and expressed the hope that a working group on the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon testing in all environments would be set up without any further delay and undertake substantive negotiations at the beginning of the Committee's 1981 Spring Session. With regard to agenda item 2, the statement referred to the proposals advanced in documents CD/36/Rev.1 and CD/116.

"Results of the 1980 Session of the CD: Statement by the Group of Socialist States", submitted on 7 August 1980 (CD/135).

38. With respect to agenda item 2, the statement reiterated that the socialist States attached primary importance to the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and recalled the proposals they had submitted to the Committee. In connection with agenda item 1, the statement said that a long-term, effective solution to the question of the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests might be achieved, provided that all nuclear Powers without exception participate in the agreement. Support was given to the proposal of the Group of 21 for the creation of an ad hoc working group of the CD to discuss the question of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. With respect to agenda item 3, the statement recalled that the socialist States had made persistent efforts to reach an effective solution to the question of the strengthening of security assurances for non-nuclear States. They had proposed the conclusion of an international convention which would be equally binding on nuclear States not to use nuclear weapons or threaten to use such weapons in their relations with non-nuclear States Parties to the Convention, and on non-nuclear States not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons or to have such weapons on their territories. Unfortunately, the participants in the discussion of that problem had failed to reach an agreed formula during the session.

#### C. 1981 session

"Considerations on the Organization of Work of the Committee on Disarmament During its 1981 Session", document submitted by a Group of Socialist States on 5 February 1981 (CD/141).

39. The document stated that it was expedient to set up a working group in relation to agenda item 2. Its work should facilitate the earliest start of negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed. All nuclear-weapon States as well as non-nuclear countries should participate in this work. In addition, support was expressed for the proposal concerning the establishment of a working group on agenda item 1. Finally, bearing in mind the request made by the General Assembly in resolution 35/156 C, the document called for the establishment of a working group on the question of the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present.

"Working Paper on item 2 of the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament for 1981 entitled 'Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament'", submitted by Mexico on 11 February 1981 (CD/143).

40. Drew to the attention of the Committee on Disarmament, for its information, the declaration, entitled "The SALT Process: The Global Stakes", approved by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues at the conclusion of its third session, held recently in Vienna, from 6 to 8 February 1981.

"Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", submitted by Bulgaria on 13 February 1981 (CD/153).

41. The working paper suggested that, in pursuing its efforts to examine further all aspects of the problems related to the speedy elaboration of an international convention, the ad hoc Working Group could explore in parallel the possibility of reaching agreement on an interim measure, which would contribute to strengthening the security guarantees for the non-nuclear-weapon States and facilitate the search for a common approach to concluding such a convention. The working paper contained suggestions aimed at the implementation of General Assembly resolution 35/154. At the same time, it stressed that the adoption of any interim measure should not be construed as a substitute for an agreement on a common approach acceptable to all, which could be included in an international convention on strengthening the guarantees of the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

"Section of the report of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, entitled 'To strengthen peace, deepen détente and curb the arms race,'", submitted by the USSR on 3 March 1981 (CD/160).

42. It stated that the Soviet Union was prepared to continue the negotiations with the United States of America on the limitation and reduction of strategic armaments without delay, preserving all the positive elements that had so far been achieved in that area. It noted that the Soviet Union was also prepared to come to terms on limiting the deployment of the new submarines -- the Ohio type by the United States and similar ones by the USSR and that it could also agree to the banning of the modernization of existing and the development of new ballistic missiles for these submarines. It further proposed that there should be agreement that a moratorium should forthwith be set on the deployment in Europe of new medium-range nuclear-missile systems of the NATO countries and the Soviet Union, that is, a freeze quantitatively and qualitatively of the existing level of those weapons, including the United States forward-based nuclear systems in that region. The moratorium could enter into force at once, the moment negotiations began on that question, and it could operate until a permanent treaty was concluded on limiting or, still better, reducing such nuclear systems in Europe. In making this proposal, the USSR expected the two sides to stop all preparations for the deployment of corresponding additional weapons, including the United States Pershing-2 missiles and land-based strategic cruise missiles. It also suggested that a competent international committee should be set up which would demonstrate the vital necessity of preventing a nuclear catastrophe. The committee could be composed of the most eminent scientists from various countries and the whole world should be kept informed of the conclusions it drew. /

"Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", submitted by Pakistan on 4 March 1981 (CD/161).

43. The working paper suggested that during the 1981 session, the ad hoc working group should devote attention in the first instance to the possibilities of evolving a "common approach" or a "common formula" on the substance of the assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. Once agreement was reached on such a common approach it would become much easier to reach consensus on the form in which this should be embodied. The working paper further suggested five distinct alternatives which could be explored in the search for a "common approach" or "formula":

(a) A categorical assurance by the nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them.

(b) A categorical assurance by the nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them with accompanying interpretative statements by each nuclear-weapon State.

(c) A common formula for security assurances containing such conditions and limitations as might be raised in the negotiations in the CD and agreed upon by all concerned.

(d) A common formula which could reconcile the conditions and limitations contained in the existing unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon States.

(e) The investiture of more formal and legal status to the existing unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon States.

"Considerations of a group of socialist countries in the CD concerning negotiations in the CD on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and also on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests", 11 March 1981 (CD/162+).

44. In view of the fact that the CD was unable at present to agree on the establishment of working groups on agenda items 1 and 2, it was proposed that:

(a) Informal consultations with the participation of all the nuclear Powers should be started forthwith in the Committee on Disarmament, under the guidance of the Chairman of the Committee, with a view to preparing specific negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament;

(b) Informal consultations with the participation of all the nuclear Powers should be initiated without delay, under the guidance of the Chairman of the Committee, for the purpose of preparing negotiations to consider the problem of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests with a view to the conclusion of a treaty on this matter at the earliest possible date;

(c) Informal meetings of the Committee should be held at least once a week on the substantive issues of the cessation of the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament, and the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

"Memorandum entitled 'Peace, disarmament and international security guarantees' submitted by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Mr. A. Gromyko, to the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly", submitted by the USSR (CD/166).

45. This memorandum was originally issued as document A/35/482 (see below).

IV. Relevant recommendations contained in the resolutions of the General Assembly transmitted to the Committee on Disarmament by the Secretary-General.

A. Thirty-third session

Resolution 33/58

46. By operative paragraph 1, the General Assembly invited the United States of America to make every effort to ratify as soon as possible Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco); and by operative paragraph 2, it welcomed with satisfaction the declaration made by the President of the French Republic on 25 May 1978 regarding the adherence of his country to Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and invited the Government of that country to make every effort to adhere as soon as possible to that Protocol.

Resolution 33/60

47. By operative paragraph 5, the General Assembly urged the three negotiating nuclear-weapon States to expedite their negotiations with a view to bringing them to a positive conclusion as a matter of urgency and to use their utmost endeavours to transmit the results to the Committee on Disarmament before the beginning of its 1979 session for full consideration; and by operative paragraph 6, it requested the Committee on Disarmament to take up immediately the agreed text resulting from the trilateral negotiations, referred to in operative paragraph 5, with a view to the submission as soon as possible of a draft test-ban treaty, which would attract the widest possible adherence, to a resumed thirty-third session of the General Assembly.

Resolution 33/61

48. By operative paragraph 1, the General Assembly took note with satisfaction that Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) was signed in 1978 by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and that the Government of that country had officially announced that it intended to ratify that Protocol in the nearest future.

Resolution 33/63

49. By operative paragraph 1, the General Assembly strongly reiterated its call upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa, comprising the continental African States, Madagascar and other islands surrounding Africa, as a nuclear-weapon-free zone; by operative paragraph 2, it vigorously condemned any attempt by South Africa to introduce in any way whatsoever nuclear weapons into the African continent; by operative paragraph 3, it demanded that South Africa refrain forthwith from conducting any nuclear explosion in the continent of Africa or elsewhere; by operative paragraph 4, it requested the Security Council to exercise a close watch on South Africa and to take appropriate effective steps to prevent South Africa from developing and acquiring nuclear weapons, thereby endangering international peace and security; by operative paragraph 5, it condemned any nuclear collaboration by any State, corporation, institution or individual with the racist régime which could

frustrate the objective of the Organization of African Unity to keep Africa a nuclear-weapon-free zone; by operative paragraph 6, it demanded that South Africa submit all its nuclear facilities for inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency; and by operative paragraph 7, it appealed to all States to refrain from all co-operation with South Africa in the nuclear field so as not to enable the racist régime to acquire nuclear weapons, and to dissuade corporations, institutions and individuals within their jurisdiction from any co-operation with South Africa in this field.

#### Resolution 33/64

50. By operative paragraph 1, the General Assembly urged all parties directly concerned seriously to consider taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, and, as a means of promoting that objective, invited the countries concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; by operative paragraph 2, it invited those countries, pending the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East and during the process of its establishment, to declare solemnly that they will refrain on a reciprocal basis from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices; by operative paragraph 3, it called upon those countries to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party and to agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards; by operative paragraph 4, it further invited those countries, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and during the process of its establishment to declare, consistent with paragraph 63(d) of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, their support for the establishing of such a zone in the region and to deposit those declarations with the Security Council; and by operative paragraph 5, it reaffirmed again its recommendation to the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from any action contrary to the spirit and purpose of the present resolution and the objective of establishing in the region of the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone under an effective system of safeguards, and to extend their co-operation to the States of the region in their efforts to promote those objectives.

#### Resolution 33/65

51. By operative paragraph 1, the General Assembly reaffirmed its endorsement, in principle, of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia; by operative paragraph 2, it urged once again the States of South Asia and such other neighbouring non-nuclear-weapon States as might be interested to continue to make all possible efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to refrain, in the meantime, from any action contrary to that objective; and by operative paragraph 3, it called upon those nuclear-weapon States which had not done so to respond positively to that proposal and to extend the necessary co-operation in the efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia.

#### Resolution 33/68

52. By operative paragraph 1, the General Assembly urged that the talks between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America regarding their military presence in the Indian Ocean be resumed without delay; by operative paragraph 2, it renewed its invitation to the great Powers and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean that had not so far seen their way to co-operating effectively with the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean to enter with the least

possible delay into consultations with the Committee regarding the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace; by operative paragraph 4, it decided to convene a meeting of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean in New York from 2 to 13 July 1979, as the next step towards the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean for the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace as contained in General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI) and by operative paragraph 6, it requested the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to submit its report to the General Assembly at the thirty-fourth session.

Resolution 33/71 A

53. By operative paragraph 2, of the resolution, which concerned the question of military and nuclear collaboration with Israel, the General Assembly requested the Security Council, in particular, to call upon all States, under Chapter VII of the Charter and irrespective of any existing contracts: (a) to refrain from any supply of arms, ammunition, military equipment or vehicles, or spare parts therefor, to Israel without any exceptions; (b) to ensure that such supplies do not reach Israel through other parties; (c) to end all transfer of nuclear equipment or fissionable material or technology to Israel; and by operative paragraph 3, it further requested the Security Council to establish machinery for supervising the implementation of the measures referred to above.

Resolution 33/71 B

54. By operative paragraph 1, the General Assembly declared that the use of nuclear weapons will be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity and that the use of nuclear weapons should therefore be prohibited, pending nuclear disarmament; and by operative paragraph 2, it requested all States, particularly nuclear-weapon States, to submit to the Secretary-General, before the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly, proposals concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons, avoidance of nuclear war and related matters, in order that the question of an international convention or some other agreement on the subject may be discussed at that session.

Resolution 33/71 C

55. In the operative paragraph, the General Assembly called upon all States, in particular all the nuclear-weapon States, pending the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, to refrain from conducting any testing of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

Resolution 33/71 H

56. By operative paragraph 1 of Section I of the resolution, the General Assembly called upon the nuclear-weapon States involved in the negotiations on the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests to submit to the Committee on Disarmament a draft treaty at the beginning of its 1979 session; by operative paragraph 3, it urged all nuclear-weapon States to proceed, in accordance with paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, to consultations regarding an early initiation of urgent negotiations on the halting of the nuclear arms race and on a progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery within a comprehensive phased programme with agreed time-frame leading to their ultimate and complete elimination; and by operative paragraph 4, it



requested the nuclear-weapon States to inform the General Assembly, at its thirty-fourth session, of the results of their consultations and eventual negotiations. By operative paragraph 1 of Section IV, the General Assembly invited the Committee on Disarmament to take into account, when determining its priorities and programme of work, the priorities established in paragraph 45 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and the resolution adopted at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly; and by operative paragraph 2, the Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament to undertake, at its first session in January 1979, on a priority basis, negotiations on, inter alia, a treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

Resolution 33/71 L

57. By operative paragraph 2, the General Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session on the state of the consideration of all the proposals and suggestions listed in paragraph 125 of the Final Document of the tenth special session.

Resolution 33/72 A

58. By operative paragraph 2, the General Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament, with a view to taking effective measures for the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States through appropriate international arrangements, to consider, at the earliest possible date, the drafts of an international convention on the subject submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session, as well as all proposals and suggestions on effective political and legal measures at the international level to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Resolution 33/72 B

59. By operative paragraph 1, the General Assembly urged that urgent efforts should be made to conclude effective arrangements, as appropriate, to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, including consideration of an international convention and of alternative ways and means of achieving this objective; by operative paragraph 2, it took note of the proposals submitted and views expressed on this subject at its thirty-third session and recommended that the Committee on Disarmament should consider them and submit a progress report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session.

Resolution 33/91 C

60. By operative paragraph 1, the General Assembly deeply regretted that, in spite of all that has been declared, resolved or reiterated over the last decade, it has not yet been possible for the talks on the limitation of strategic weapons, known as SALT, to achieve even the immediate results envisaged in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first devoted to disarmament; by operative paragraph 2, it stressed once again with the greatest emphasis the necessity that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America strive to implement as soon as possible the declarations made in 1977 by their respective heads of State and reiterated its invitation to the Governments of both countries to adopt without delay all relevant measures to achieve that objective, which coincided

in essence with the one defined in that regard in paragraph 52 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly; and by operative paragraph 3, it trusted that the two Governments would fulfil the invitation which the General Assembly addressed to them in paragraph 52 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, in order that they might transmit to it in good time the text of the agreement which over the last four years had been pursued in the second series of the strategic arms limitation talks.

Resolution 33/91 D

61. By operative paragraph 1, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified experts, to carry out a comprehensive study providing factual information on present nuclear arsenals, trends in the technological development of nuclear-weapon systems, the effects of their use and the implications for international security as well as for negotiations on disarmament of: (a) the doctrines of deterrence and other theories concerning nuclear weapons; (b) the continued quantitative increase and qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems.

Resolution 33/91 F

62. By operative paragraph 1, the General Assembly called upon all nuclear-weapon States to refrain from stationing nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present; and by operative paragraph 2, it called upon all non-nuclear-weapon States which do not have nuclear weapons on their territory to refrain from any steps which would directly or indirectly result in the stationing of such weapons on their territories.

Resolution 33/91 H

63. In the operative paragraph, the General Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of its pursuit of proposals contained in the Programme of Action adopted by the tenth special session, to consider urgently the question of an adequately verified cessation and prohibition of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the General Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration.

B. Thirty-fourth session

Resolution 34/71

64. By operative paragraph 1, the General Assembly invited France and the United States of America to take all necessary steps in order to secure the ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) at the earliest possible date.

Resolution 34/73

65. By operative paragraph 4, the General Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament to initiate negotiations on a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear test explosions by all States for all time, as a matter of the highest priority; by operative paragraph 5, it called upon the three negotiating nuclear-weapon States to use their best endeavours to bring their negotiations to a positive conclusion in time for consideration during the next session of the Committee on Disarmament; and by operative paragraph 6, it invited Governments of Member States to contribute to the

further development of national and international co-operative measures to detect seismic events aimed at setting up a global verification system of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and to co-operate with the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events for the fulfilment of its mandate.

Resolution 34/74

66. By the operative paragraph, the General Assembly welcomed the fact that Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) had already been signed and ratified by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, France, the People's Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, thus fulfilling an aspiration of the General Assembly.

Resolution 34/76 A

67. By operative paragraph 1, the General Assembly strongly reiterated its call upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa, comprising the continental African States, Madagascar and other islands surrounding Africa, as a nuclear-weapon-free zone; by operative paragraph 2, it vigorously condemned the reported explosion of a nuclear device by South Africa; by operative paragraph 3, it reaffirmed that the nuclear programme of the racist régime of South Africa constituted a very grave danger to international peace and security and a particularly dangerous threat to the security of African States, and increased the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons; by operative paragraph 4, it condemned any nuclear collaboration by any State, corporation, institution or individual with the racist régime of South Africa since such collaboration frustrated, inter alia, the objective of the Organization of African Unity to keep Africa a nuclear-weapon-free zone; by operative paragraph 5, it called upon such States, corporations, institutions or individuals, therefore, to terminate forthwith such nuclear collaboration between them and the racist régime of South Africa; by operative paragraph 6, it requested the Security Council to prohibit all forms of co-operation and collaboration with the racist régime of South Africa in the nuclear field; by operative paragraph 7, it requested the Security Council to institute effective enforcement action, bearing in mind the recommendations of the United Nations Seminar on Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa, against the racist régime of South Africa, so as to prevent it from further endangering international peace and security through its acquisition of nuclear weapons; and by operative paragraph 8, it demanded that South Africa submit all its nuclear installations to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Resolution 34/76 B

68. By operative paragraph 2, the General Assembly appealed to all Member States in a position to do so to provide all relevant information at their disposal, concerning the report that South Africa might have detonated a nuclear explosive device in September 1979, to the Secretary-General.

Resolution 34/77

69. By operative paragraph 1, the General Assembly urged all parties directly concerned seriously to consider taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and, as a means of promoting that objective, invited the countries concerned to adhere to

the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; by operative paragraph 2, it invited those countries, pending the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East and during the process of its establishment, to declare solemnly that they will refrain on a reciprocal basis from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices; by operative paragraph 3, it called upon those countries to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party and to agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards; by operative paragraph 4, it further invited those countries, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and during the process of its establishment, to declare their support for establishing such a zone in the region consistent with paragraphs 60 to 63, in particular 63 (a), of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session and to deposit those declarations with the Security Council for consideration as appropriate; and by operative paragraph 5, it reaffirmed again its recommendation to the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from any action contrary to the spirit and purpose of the present resolution and the objective of establishing in the region of the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone under an effective system of safeguards and to extend their co-operation to the States of the region in their efforts to promote those objectives.

#### Resolution 34/78

70. By operative paragraph 1, the General Assembly reaffirmed its endorsement, in principle, of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia; by operative paragraph 2, it urged once again the States of South Asia and such other neighbouring non-nuclear-weapon States as might be interested to continue to make all possible efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to refrain, in the meantime, from any action contrary to that objective; by operative paragraph 3, it called upon those nuclear-weapon States which have not done so to respond positively to this proposal and to extend the necessary co-operation in the efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia.

#### Resolution 34/80 A

71. By operative paragraph 3, the General Assembly expressed its hope for the early implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace as contained in its resolution 2832 (XXVI); and by operative paragraph 4, it urged that the talks between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America regarding their military presence in the Indian Ocean should be resumed without delay and that the parties should refrain from any activity prejudicial to the implementation of resolution 2832 (XXVI).

#### Resolution 34/80 B

72. By operative paragraph 3, the General Assembly decided to convene a conference on the Indian Ocean during 1981 at Colombo for the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace as contained in its resolution 2832 (XXVI).

Resolution 34/83 B

73. By operative paragraph 1, the General Assembly urged the Committee on Disarmament to proceed, without any further delay, to substantive negotiations on the priority questions of disarmament on its agenda, in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and the other relevant resolutions of the Assembly on those subjects; and by operative paragraph 2, it invited the members of the Committee on Disarmament involved in separate negotiations on specific priority questions of disarmament to make every effort to achieve a positive conclusion of those negotiations without further delay for submission to the Committee and, failing that, to submit to the Committee a full report on the status of their separate negotiations and results achieved so far in order to contribute most directly to the negotiations in the Committee in accordance with operative paragraph 1.

Resolution 34/83 C

74. By operative paragraph 2, the General Assembly urgently called upon all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States and other major military Powers, immediately to undertake steps leading to effective halting and reversing of the arms race and to disarmament and, to that end: (a) to make every effort to bring to a successful end the negotiations which were currently going on in the Committee on Disarmament and in a limited or regional framework on effective international agreements according to the priorities of the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly; (b) to resume or undertake as soon as possible negotiations on a bilateral, regional or multilateral basis on measures which had been agreed upon by consensus at the tenth special session, taking into consideration all relevant proposals.

Resolution 34/83 G

75. By operative paragraph 1, the General Assembly decided to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament the views of States concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons, avoidance of nuclear war and related matters; and by operative paragraph 2, it requested the Committee to take those views into appropriate consideration and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

Resolution 34/83 J

76. By operative paragraph 1, the General Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament to continue at the beginning of its 1980 session consideration of the item "Nuclear weapons in all aspects" and to undertake preparatory consultations on the negotiations referred to in paragraph 2 of the same resolution; by operative paragraph 2, it requested the Committee on Disarmament to initiate, as a matter of high priority, negotiations, with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, on the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly; and by operative paragraph 3, it further requested the Committee on Disarmament to report on the results of those negotiations to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

Resolution 34/84

77. By operative paragraph 4, the General Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament to continue negotiations on a priority basis during its 1980 session with a view to their early conclusion with the elaboration of a convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Resolution 34/85

78. By operative paragraph 4, the General Assembly recommended that the Committee on Disarmament should conclude effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons during its 1980 session, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective.

Resolution 34/86

79. By operative paragraph 3, the General Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament to continue its efforts at its next session with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements further to strengthen the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States and report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

Resolution 34/87 C

80. By operative paragraph 1, the General Assembly believed it necessary to examine possibilities for an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present; and by operative paragraph 2, it requested the Secretary-General to that end to call upon all States to transmit to him their opinions and observations regarding the possibility of concluding the agreement mentioned in paragraph 1 and to submit a report on that question to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

Resolution 34/87 D

81. In the operative paragraph, the General Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of its work on the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects", to pursue its consideration of the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the General Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration.

Resolution 34/87 F

82. By operative paragraph 2, the General Assembly noted that it had not been possible for the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II) to go beyond certain limitations which, taken together, permitted considerable increments, both quantitatively and qualitatively, in relation to the levels of the nuclear arsenals existing at present; by operative paragraph 3, it welcomed the agreement reached by both parties with a view to: (a) continuing to pursue negotiations, in accordance with the principle of equality and equal security, on measures for the further limitation and reduction in the number of strategic arms, as well as for their further qualitative limitation; (b) endeavouring in such negotiations to achieve, inter alia,

the following objectives: (i) significant and substantial reductions in the numbers of strategic offensive arms, (ii) qualitative limitations on strategic offensive arms, including restrictions on the development, testing and deployment of new types of strategic offensive arms and on the modernization of existing strategic offensive arms; by operative paragraph 4, it trusted that: (a) the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II) would enter into force at an early date in accordance with the provisions of its article XIX, inasmuch as it constituted a vital element for the continuation and progress of the negotiations between the two States possessing the most important arsenals of nuclear weapons; (b) such negotiations, intended to achieve, as soon as possible, agreement on further measures for the limitation and reduction of strategic arms, would begin promptly after the entry into force of the Treaty, as provided for in its article XIV, with the objective of concluding well in advance of 1985 the new agreement, which would replace the Treaty and which is usually referred to as SALT III; by operative paragraph 5, it trusted also that the two contracting States would implement all the above-mentioned agreements and provisions and do their utmost in order that the SALT III agreement might constitute an important step towards the final goal described by their respective heads of State as that of achieving the complete and total destruction of existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and ensuring the establishment of a world free of such weapons; and by operative paragraph 6, it invited the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to keep the General Assembly appropriately informed of the results of their negotiations, in conformity with the provisions of paragraphs 27 and 114 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly.

Resolution 34/89

83. By operative paragraph 1, the General Assembly appealed to all States to put an end to any co-operation with Israel which might assist it in acquiring and developing nuclear weapons and also to dissuade corporations, institutions and individuals within their jurisdiction from any co-operation that might result in providing Israel with nuclear weapons; by operative paragraph 2, it called upon all States to take all necessary measures to prevent the transfer to Israel of fissionable material and nuclear technology which could be used for nuclear arms; by operative paragraph 3, it called upon Israel to submit all its nuclear facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency; by operative paragraph 4, it strongly condemned any attempt by Israel to manufacture, acquire, store or test nuclear weapons or introduce them into the Middle East; by operative paragraph 5, it requested the Security Council to adopt appropriate measures to ensure the implementation of the relevant resolutions concerning Israeli nuclear armament; and by operative paragraph 6, it requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified experts, to prepare a study on Israeli nuclear armament and to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.

C. Thirty-fifth session

Resolution 35/46

84. Paragraph 12 of the Annex stated that all efforts should be exerted by the Committee on Disarmament urgently to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement, and to submit agreed texts where possible before the second special session devoted to disarmament on, inter alia, a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or

threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into account all proposals and suggestions that had been made in that regard. Paragraph 13 stated that the same priority should be given, inter alia, to the following measures which were dealt with outside the Committee on Disarmament: (1) ratification of the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II) and commencement of negotiations for a SALT III agreement; and (2) ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco). Paragraph 14 stated that other priority measures that should be pursued as rapidly as possible during the Second Disarmament Decade included, inter alia, the following:

(1) significant progress towards the achievement of nuclear disarmament, which would require urgent negotiation of agreements at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned for (i) cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems; (ii) cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; and (iii) a comprehensive, phased programme with agreed time-frames, whenever feasible, for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time; (2) further strategic arms limitation negotiations between the two parties, leading to agreed significant reductions of, and qualitative limitations on, strategic arms. These should constitute an important step in the direction of nuclear disarmament and, ultimately, of the establishment of a world free of such weapons; (3) further steps to develop an international consensus to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 65 to 71 of the Final Document; (4) strengthening of the existing nuclear-weapon-free zone and the establishment of other nuclear-weapon-free zones in accordance with the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document; (5) establishment of zones of peace in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Final Document; and (6) measures to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, the prevention of nuclear war and related objectives, where possible through international agreement, bearing in mind various proposals designed to secure those objectives and in accordance with paragraphs 57 and 58 of the Final Document, and thereby to ensure that the survival of mankind was not endangered. Paragraph 17 stated that an essential condition for progress in the field of disarmament is the preservation and strengthening of international peace and security and the promotion of confidence among States. Nuclear weapons posed the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. It was essential to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal in this context was the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Significant progress in nuclear disarmament would be facilitated both by parallel political and international legal measures to strengthen the security of States and by progress in the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments of the nuclear-weapon States and other States in the regions concerned.

#### Resolution 35/143

85. By operative paragraph 1, the General Assembly regretted that the signature of Additional Protocol I by the United States of America and by France, which the General Assembly duly noted with satisfaction and which had taken place on 26 May 1977 and 2 March 1979, respectively, had not yet been followed by the corresponding ratifications, notwithstanding the time already elapsed and the invitations that the Assembly had addressed to them and which it reiterated with special urgency in the present resolution.



Resolution 35/145 A

86. By operative paragraph 3, the General Assembly urged all States that had not yet done so to adhere without further delay to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water and, meanwhile, to refrain from testing in the environments covered by that Treaty; by operative paragraph 4, it urged all States members of the Committee on Disarmament: (a) to support the creation by the Committee, upon initiation of its session to be held in 1981, of an ad hoc working group which should begin the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests; (b) to use their best endeavours in order that the Committee might transmit to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session the multilaterally negotiated text of such a treaty; by operative paragraph 5, it called upon the States depositaries of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, by virtue of their special responsibilities under those two treaties and as a provisional measure until the new comprehensive test-ban treaty entered into force, to bring to a halt without delay all nuclear test explosions, either through a trilaterally agreed moratorium or through three unilateral moratoria.

Resolution 35/145 B

87. By operative paragraph 3, the General Assembly called upon the three negotiating nuclear-weapon States to exert their best efforts to bring their negotiations to a successful conclusion in time for consideration during the next session of the Committee on Disarmament; by operative paragraph 5, it requested the Committee on Disarmament to take the necessary steps, including the establishment of a working group, to initiate substantive negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty as a matter of the highest priority at the beginning of its session to be held in 1981; by operative paragraph 6, it further requested the Committee on Disarmament to determine, in the context of its negotiations on such a treaty, the institutional and administrative steps necessary for establishing, testing and operating an international seismic monitoring network and effective verification system; by operative paragraph 7, it urged all members of the Committee on Disarmament to co-operate with the Committee in fulfilling its mandate and, to that end, to support the creation of a working group on a comprehensive nuclear test ban; and by operative paragraph 8, it called upon the Committee on Disarmament to exert all efforts in order that a draft comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty could be submitted to the General Assembly no later than at its second special session devoted to disarmament, to be held in 1982.

Resolution 35/146 A

88. By operative paragraph 2, the General Assembly expressed its deep alarm that the Secretary-General's report on South Africa's plan and capability in the nuclear field (A/35/402 and Corr.1) had established South Africa's capability to manufacture nuclear weapons; by operative paragraph 3, it also expressed its deep concern that South Africa's nuclear capability was being developed to preserve white supremacy by intimidating neighbouring countries and blackmailing the entire continent of Africa; by operative paragraph 4, it reaffirmed that the racist régime's nuclear plans and capability constituted a very grave danger to international peace and security and, in particular, jeopardized the security of African States and increased the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons; by operative paragraph 5, it requested the

Security Council to prohibit all forms of co-operation and collaboration with the racist régime of South Africa in the nuclear field; by operative paragraph 6, it called upon all States, corporations, institutions or individuals to terminate forthwith such nuclear collaboration between them and the racist régime of South Africa; by operative paragraph 7, it requested the Security Council to institute effective enforcement action against the racist régime of South Africa, so as to prevent it from endangering international peace and security through its acquisition of nuclear weapons; and by operative paragraph 8, it demanded that South Africa submit all its nuclear installations to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Resolution 35/146 B

89. By operative paragraph 1, the General Assembly strongly reiterated its call upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa, comprising the continental African States, Madagascar and other islands surrounding Africa, as a nuclear-weapon-free zone; by operative paragraph 2, it reaffirmed that the nuclear programme of the racist régime of South Africa constituted a very grave danger to international peace and security and, in particular, jeopardized the security of African States and increased the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons; by operative paragraph 3, it condemned any form of nuclear collaboration by any State, corporation, institution or individual with the racist régime of South Africa since such collaboration frustrated, inter alia, the objective of the Declaration of the Organization of African Unity to keep Africa a nuclear-weapon-free zone; by operative paragraph 4, it called upon such States, corporations, institutions or individuals, therefore, to terminate forthwith such nuclear collaboration between them and the racist régime of South Africa; by operative paragraph 5, it requested the Security Council, in keeping with the recommendation of its committee established by resolution 421 (1977) concerning the question of South Africa, to prohibit all forms of co-operation and collaboration with the racist régime of South Africa in the nuclear field; by operative paragraph 6, it demanded that South Africa submit all its nuclear installations to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Resolution 35/147

90. By operative paragraph 1, the General Assembly urged all parties directly concerned seriously to consider taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and, as a means of promoting that objective, invited the countries concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; by operative paragraph 2, it invited those countries, pending the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East and during the process of its establishment, to declare solemnly that they will refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices; by operative paragraph 3, it called upon those countries to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party and to agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards; by operative paragraph 4, it further invited those countries, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and during the process of its

establishment, to declare their support for establishing such a zone in the region consistent with paragraphs 60 to 63, in particular paragraph 63 (d) of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session and to deposit those declarations with the Security Council for consideration as appropriate; and by operative paragraph 5, it reaffirmed again its recommendation to the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from any action contrary to the spirit and purpose of the present resolution and the objective of establishing in the region of the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone under an effective system of safeguards and to extend their co-operation to the States of the region in their efforts to promote these objectives.

Resolution 35/148

91. By operative paragraph 1, the General Assembly reaffirmed its endorsement, in principle, of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia; by operative paragraph 2, it urged once again the States of South Asia and such other neighbouring non-nuclear-weapon States as might be interested to continue to make all possible efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to refrain, in the meantime, from any action contrary to that objective; and by operative paragraph 3, it called upon those nuclear-weapon States which have not done so to respond positively to this proposal and to extend the necessary co-operation in the efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia.

Resolution 35/150

92. By operative paragraph 2, the General Assembly requested the Ad Hoc Committee, in pursuance of the decision contained in resolution 34/80 B, to convene a Conference on the Indian Ocean during 1981 at Colombo, and taking into consideration the exchange of views thereon: (a) to continue its efforts for the necessary harmonization of views on the issues related to the convening of the Conference to achieve the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace; (b) to make every effort, in consideration of the political and security climate in the Indian Ocean area, particularly recent developments, as well as the progress made in the harmonization of views referred to in subparagraph (a) above, to finalize, in accordance with its normal methods of work, all preparations for the Conference, including the dates for its convening; (c) to continue the preparatory work for the convening of the Conference and to hold two preparatory sessions in 1981 totalling six weeks; and (d) to submit to the Conference a full report on its preparatory work.

Resolution 35/152 B

93. By operative paragraph 1, the General Assembly noted the decision of the Committee on Disarmament to resume intensive consideration, at its session to be held in 1981, of the item on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; by operative paragraph 2, it believed it necessary to intensify efforts with a view to initiating as a matter of high priority, negotiations, with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, on the question of the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly; by operative paragraph 3, it called upon the Committee on Disarmament, as a matter of priority and for the purpose of an early commencement of the negotiations on the substance of the problem, to undertake consultations in which to consider, inter alia, the establishment of an ad hoc working group on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and of nuclear disarmament with a clearly defined mandate; and by operative paragraph 4, it requested the Committee on Disarmament to report on the results of those negotiations to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.

Resolution 35/152 C

94. By operative paragraph 1, the General Assembly urged the Committee on Disarmament to establish, upon initiation of its session to be held in 1981, and ad hoc working group on the item which in its agenda for 1979 and 1980, was entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament"; and by operative paragraph 2, it considered that, in the light of the exchange of views held on that subject during the last two annual sessions of the Committee on Disarmament, it would be advisable that the working group begin its negotiations by addressing the question of the elaboration and clarification of the stages of nuclear disarmament envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, including identification of the responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States and the role of the non-nuclear-weapon States in the process of achieving nuclear disarmament.

Resolution 35/152 D

95. By operative paragraph 1, the General Assembly declared once again that (a) the use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity, and that (b) the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should therefore be prohibited, pending nuclear disarmament; and by operative paragraph 2, it requested all States that had so far not submitted their proposals concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons, avoidance of nuclear war and related matters, to do so, in order that the question of an international convention or some other agreement on the subject might be further considered at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly.

Resolution 35/152 E

96. By operative paragraph 4, the General Assembly recommended that the Committee on Disarmament should concentrate on the substantive and priority items on its agenda with a view to achieving tangible results.

Resolution 35/152 J

97. By operative paragraph 1, the General Assembly urged the Committee on Disarmament to continue or undertake, during its session to be held in 1981, substantive negotiations on the priority questions of disarmament on its agenda, in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and the other relevant resolutions of the Assembly on those questions; and by operative paragraph 2, it invited the members of the Committee on Disarmament involved in separate negotiations on specific priority questions of disarmament to intensify their efforts to achieve a positive conclusion of those negotiations without further delay for submission to the Committee and, at the same time, to submit to the Committee a full report on their separate negotiations and the results achieved in order to contribute most directly to the negotiations in the Committee in accordance with paragraph 1.

Resolution 35/154

98. By operative paragraph 3, the General Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament to continue on a priority basis, during its session in 1981, the negotiations on the question of strengthening of security guarantees of non-nuclear-weapon States; by operative paragraph 4, it called upon States participating in talks on the question of providing guarantees to non-nuclear States against the use or

threat of use of nuclear weapons to make efforts for the speedy elaboration and conclusion of an international convention on this matter; by operative paragraph 5, it called upon all nuclear-weapon States to make solemn declarations, identical in substance, concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States having no such weapons on their territories, as a first step towards the conclusion of such an international convention; and by operative paragraph 6, it recommended that the Security Council should examine declarations which may be made by nuclear States regarding the strengthening of security guarantees for non-nuclear States and, if all these declarations were found consistent with the above-mentioned objective, should adopt an appropriate resolution approving them.

#### Resolution 35/155

99. By operative paragraph 3, the General Assembly appealed to all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach agreement on a common approach to the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character; and by operative paragraph 4, it recommended that the Committee on Disarmament should actively continue negotiations with a view to reaching agreement and concluding effective international arrangements during its next session to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective.

#### Resolution 35/156 C

100. By operative paragraph 1, the General Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament to proceed without delay to talks with a view to elaborating an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present; and by operative paragraph 3, it requested the Committee on Disarmament to submit a report on the question to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.

#### Resolution 35/156 F

101. By operative paragraph 4, the General Assembly recommended that the Committee on Disarmament should take the report of the Group of Experts on a Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons (A/35/392) and its conclusions into account in its efforts towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control, in particular in the field of nuclear disarmament.

#### Resolution 35/156 H

102. By the operative paragraph, the General Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of its work on the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects", to pursue its consideration of the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the General Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration.

Resolution 35/156 K

103. By operative paragraph 1, the General Assembly deplored that the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II) had not yet been ratified, notwithstanding that it had been signed on 18 June 1979 and in spite of the many other reasons existing for such ratification as illustrated by those summarized in the preamble of the resolution; by operative paragraph 2, it urged the two signatory States not to delay any further the implementation of the procedure provided for in article XIX of the Treaty for its entry into force, taking particularly into account that not only their national interests but also the vital interests of all the peoples were at stake in that question; by operative paragraph 3, it trusted that, pending the entry into force of the Treaty, the signatory States, in conformity with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, would refrain from any act which would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty; by operative paragraph 4, it reiterated its satisfaction, already expressed in its resolution 34/87 F, at the agreement reached by both parties in the joint statement of principles and basic guidelines for subsequent negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms, signed the same day as the Treaty, to the effect of continuing to pursue negotiations in accordance with the principle of equality and equal security, on measures for the further limitation and reduction in the number of strategic arms, as well as for their further qualitative limitation which should culminate in the SALT III treaty, and to the effect also of endeavouring in such negotiations to achieve, inter alia, the following objectives: (a) significant and substantial reductions in the numbers of strategic arms; (b) qualitative limitations on strategic offensive arms, including restrictions on the development, testing and deployment of new types of strategic offensive arms and on the modernization of existing strategic offensive arms; and by operative paragraph 5, it invited the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to keep the General Assembly appropriately informed of the results of their negotiations, in conformity with the provisions of paragraphs 27 and 114 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly.

Resolution 35/157

104. By operative paragraph 1, the General Assembly took note of the progress report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Group of Experts to Prepare a Study on Israeli Nuclear Armament (A/35/458) submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session; and by operative paragraph 2, it requested the Secretary-General to pursue his efforts in that regard and to submit his report to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.

V. Relevant documents submitted to the General Assembly

A. Thirty-third session

Letter dated 8 September 1978 from the Acting Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/33/241\*).

105. The communication transmitted a letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. A.A. Gromyko, requesting the inclusion of an item entitled "Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States" in the agenda of the thirty-third session of the General Assembly as an important and urgent question. A draft international convention on the subject was attached. 7/

Declaration of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty adopted at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee held at Moscow on 23 November 1978 (A/33/392-S/12939).

106. The Declaration reiterated the proposals advanced by the Soviet Union at the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (see above document A/S-10, No. 1/4). It also reiterated the proposal that every State that participated in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe should commit itself never to be the first to use nuclear weapons against any other.

Draft resolution on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, submitted by Pakistan (A/C.1/33/L.15).

107. A draft international convention was annexed to the draft resolution. 8/

B. Thirty-fourth session

Communiqué adopted at the meeting of the Committee of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty Member States, held at Berlin on 5 and 6 December 1979 (A/34/825-S/13686).

108. The communiqué was also issued as CD/58 (see above).

Memorandum stating the views of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden on the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (A/C.1/34/4).

109. The memorandum was designed to express, in particular, the concern of the five Nordic countries over the development and achievement of nuclear explosive capability by any additional State or States.

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7/ The draft convention was subsequently annexed to draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.6. It was also circulated as document CD/23 (see above).

8/ The draft convention was subsequently circulated as document CD/10 (see above).

C. Thirty-fifth session

Statement and Declaration of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty adopted at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee, held in Warsaw on 14 and 15 May 1980 (A/35/237-S/13948).

110. The text of the Declaration was also issued as document CD/98\* (see above).

Memorandum of the Soviet Union entitled "Peace, disarmament and international security guarantees" (A/35/482).

111. The memorandum reiterated the proposals of the Soviet Union for the halting of the nuclear arms race and renunciation of the use of force in international relations, including halting the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they are completely destroyed; and the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. The memorandum reiterated the Soviet position that the formulation and implementation of measures for arms limitation and disarmament in the nuclear field should be inseparably linked with the strengthening of political and international legal guarantees of the security of States and of the preservation of peace, which required, in particular, the renunciation of the use of force in international relations concurrently with the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The memorandum further stated that the Soviet Union was ready to participate in the process of the limitation and reduction of strategic arms with strict observance of the principle of equality and equal security. The Soviet Union was prepared to ratify the SALT II Treaty and to comply with all its provisions provided that the United States acted likewise. It also confirmed that the Soviet Union was willing to participate -- after the SALT II Treaty had been ratified -- in negotiations on further limitations and reductions of strategic arms. The Soviet Union was also prepared to hold a serious discussion of the problem of preventing a surprise attack or the unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons, both on a multilateral and a bilateral basis, and was willing to co-operate in any steps aimed at preventing nuclear war. The memorandum called for the consolidation of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and, in this connection, reiterated the position of the Soviet Union concerning the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States; the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present and the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. With respect to regional measures in Europe, the memorandum recalled the proposal for the conclusion by all States participating in the European Conference of a treaty on the non-first use against each other of either nuclear weapons or conventional arms. Regarding the question of nuclear systems in Europe, the memorandum referred to a new proposal put forward by the Soviet Union, namely, to discuss concurrently and on the basis of their organic link the issues pertaining to both medium-range nuclear-missile systems in Europe and United States forward-based nuclear systems. The memorandum also recalled the programme of action for the relaxation of military tension in the area of the Mediterranean Sea, proposed by the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty in May 1980, which, inter alia, included the withdrawal from the Mediterranean Sea of warships carrying nuclear weapons and the renunciation of the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of European and non-European non-nuclear countries in the Mediterranean area. The Soviet Union also reiterated its support for the creation of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean and for the United Nations decision to hold an international conference on the Indian Ocean in 1981.



Communiqué of the Meeting of the Committee of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, held in Warsaw on 19 and 20 October 1980 (A/35/558-S/14231).

112. The communiqué, inter alia, expressed the support of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty for the proposal of the Soviet Union on negotiations regarding the medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe simultaneously and in an organic link with the United States forward-based nuclear means. The meeting participants noted with satisfaction that practical discussions of those questions had begun between the Soviet Union and the United States of America, and expressed the hope for their success which would constitute a step in the direction of eliminating the threat of a nuclear war in the European continent.

Letter dated 23 October 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/C.1/35/8).

113. The communication attached a draft resolution 2/ which called upon all States of the Middle East and non-nuclear-weapons States adjacent to the region, which were not signatories to any treaty providing for a nuclear-weapon-free zone, to convene at the earliest possible date a conference with a view to negotiating a multilateral treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East; and urged all States of the region to state by 1 May 1981 their willingness to participate in the conference.

Memorandum stating the views of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden on the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (A/C.1/35/10).

114. The memorandum stressed the need for further steps in order to promote international confidence that additional States were not seeking to achieve nuclear explosive capability. Such steps included:

(a) Early adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty by the largest possible number of additional States.

(b) Formal acceptance of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all nuclear activities, present and future (full scope safeguards), by all non-nuclear-weapon States with such activities that had not yet done so.

(c) Other national, bilateral or international measures aimed at preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons and promoting confidence in that respect.

Draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union on certain urgent measures for reducing the danger of war (A/C.1/35/L.1).

115. By section III of the draft resolution, the General Assembly would: call upon States participating in talks on the question of providing guarantees to non-nuclear States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to make efforts for the speedy elaboration and conclusion of an international convention on this matter;

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2/ The draft resolution was subsequently circulated as document A/C.1/35/L.8.

call upon all nuclear-weapon States to make solemn declarations, identical in substance, concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States having no such weapons on their territories, as a first step towards the conclusion of such an international convention; and recommend that the Security Council examine declarations which may be made by nuclear States regarding the strengthening of security guarantees for non-nuclear States and, should all these declarations be found consistent with the above-mentioned objective, to adopt an appropriate resolution approving them. By section IV, the Assembly would: **stress** the need for a speedy conclusion of an international treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests; and call upon all nuclear-weapon States -- as an indication of their goodwill and in order to create more favourable conditions for completing the elaboration of the above-mentioned treaty -- not to conduct any nuclear explosions within a period of one year beginning from a date to be agreed upon among them, having made in advance appropriate declarations to that effect.

VI. Proposals submitted to the Disarmament Commission

A. Views and suggestions of States on the comprehensive programme of disarmament (A/CN.10/1 and Add.1-6)

116. The Byelorussian SSR, inter alia, called for solutions to the following problems:

(a) Negotiations on the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed. The negotiations on this matter should be conducted with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, as well as a number of non-nuclear-weapon States. Parallel measures should be taken to strengthen the political and international legal guarantees for the security of States. In that connection, the proposal regarding the conclusion of world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations was becoming increasingly urgent.

(b) The maximum strengthening of the régime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Measures should be taken to enhance the effectiveness of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to strengthen in every way possible the IAEA system of safeguards. It was important to strive for the conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States. The implementation of the General Assembly resolution on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States, where there were no such weapons at present would be of great significance.

(c) The complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. The early completion of the drafting of a treaty on that matter and its signing would lead to the cessation of the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and would prevent the emergence of new types of such weapons.

(d) The speedy drafting of a new agreement on the complete demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor. The strict performance of their obligations by parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof would also be of great significance, as would increased participation in that Treaty.

(e) Regional measures for military détente and disarmament, including, inter alia, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace and the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the participants in the European Conference.

117. The Central African Republic considered it necessary, inter alia, to halt nuclear tests and strengthen the régime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

118. Chile suggested that as elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, consideration might be given, inter alia, to:

(a) Adoption of effective measures of nuclear disarmament, with a ban on nuclear testing for non-peaceful purposes as the first step.

(b) Elimination of nuclear arsenals.

119. China considered that when major progress had been made in the reduction of the armaments of the Superpowers, other nuclear countries should join them in reducing armaments in a reasonable ratio. It further considered that the fundamental way to the realization of nuclear disarmament and elimination of the threat of nuclear war lay in the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. That question should be given priority in the programme. However, nuclear disarmament alone could not totally eliminate the threat of war. Conventional disarmament had become more and more urgent. They should be given equal importance, and the two should proceed in conjunction. It was impermissible for the Superpowers to use nuclear disarmament to delay conventional disarmament, or pit one against the other.

120. Cuba, inter alia, considered that with regard to the régime of non-proliferation in disarmament negotiations, it was important to take into account the right and need of peoples to have access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes without hindrance or discrimination. It further considered that for the effective achievement of nuclear disarmament and the cessation of the arms race, it was necessary for all nuclear-weapon States to participate in the negotiation process and in disarmament agreements, in order to guarantee their universality and effectiveness. In this context, attention should be drawn to the adoption of measures designed to put an end to the danger of nuclear war and to bring about the conclusion, as a matter of priority, of a treaty which would provide for the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapons testing. With regard to regional disarmament agreements and détente, it mentioned the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones and pointed out that in the consideration of the establishment of zones of peace it was important to take into account the regions of the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean.

121. Finland suggested that a comprehensive programme of disarmament could encompass, inter alia, the following aspects of nuclear disarmament:

(a) A more effective limitation and a subsequent substantial reduction of strategic arsenals was a pressing task. Although talks on that subject were conducted bilaterally, the existence of stockpiles of strategic weapons were a global concern. As intermediary goals, a strategic stability should be pursued at as low a level of armaments as possible.

(b) A great variety of nuclear weapons that at present were not subject to negotiations should be brought within the reach of active efforts of arms control and disarmament.

(c) A goal that had long been sought as a key priority and one that should be immediately attainable was a comprehensive prohibition of nuclear testing. A comprehensive test-ban treaty would put constraints on the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and on their proliferation.

(d) Effective non-proliferation measures would be a contribution to the elimination of impediments to a wider international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. International consensus to that effect should be sought around the non-proliferation Treaty, inter alia, by adopting measures designed to further strengthen the Treaty.

(e) Another measure that could contribute towards the efforts to limit further production of nuclear weapons, facilitate nuclear disarmaments and promote non-proliferation would be the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.

(f) Nuclear-weapon-free zones were a contribution to the security of the zonal States and to international peace and security in general. They should be based on arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned and should involve commitments by the nuclear-weapon States not to use nuclear weapons against the States of the zone and to respect the status of the zone. The consideration of the establishment of such zones should continue to benefit from the "Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects", the United Nations study completed in 1975.

(g) The nuclear-weapon States should undertake arrangements to guarantee the security of the States that have foregone the nuclear-weapon option by giving commitments not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them.

(h) Bilateral agreements had been concluded for the prevention of nuclear war. In addition, a more generalized approach to that question should be taken into consideration.

122. The Federal Republic of Germany considered that it was necessary, inter alia, to maintain a balance between the measures to be taken in the different disarmament fields, in particular as between nuclear and conventional armaments. As regards measures in the field of nuclear weapons, it mentioned:

- (a) A comprehensive and complete ban on nuclear-weapon tests.
- (b) Strengthening of the non-proliferation régime.
- (c) Strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.
- (d) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones (on the basis of arrangements of the States in the region).
- (e) The limitation, balanced reduction and finally complete elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles.

123. Greece considered that priority should be given, inter alia, to the following elements:

- (a) Cessation of the nuclear and conventional arms race.
- (b) Cessation of nuclear-weapon testing.
- (c) Adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

124. India believed that the highest priority should be given to nuclear disarmament. Removing the threat of nuclear war was the most acute and urgent task of the present day. The ultimate goal in that context was the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Paragraph 50 of the Final Document provided the guidelines for urgent negotiations on nuclear disarmament. India considered that the first step in that direction should be the immediate cessation of the production of nuclear weapons systems to be followed by the reduction of the existing stockpiles and their elimination in the shortest period possible. It also believed that the negotiations on the comprehensive test-ban treaty should be concluded urgently and the results submitted to the Committee on Disarmament for full consideration. It noted that the General Assembly had also called on the nuclear-weapon States, pending the conclusion of the comprehensive test-ban treaty, to cease the further testing of nuclear weapons. India also believed that pending the elimination of all nuclear weapons, all States should work for international agreement to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons. It suggested that steps leading to nuclear disarmament should be completed in the next decade.

125. Israel believed that the various approaches to conventional and nuclear disarmament and arms limitations could include the idea of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones based on the precedent of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which represented an important contribution to the gradual reduction of tension; the strengthening of the national security of the States in the areas involved and of the States bordering those areas, and to universal disarmament.

126. Italy considered that a comprehensive programme of disarmament should embody, inter alia, a balance between the measures to be taken in the various fields of disarmament -- thus nuclear disarmament would parallel conventional disarmament -- in order to guarantee undiminished security to all States. In the area of nuclear weapons, it proposed the following measures:

(a) Conclusion, as a measure of the highest priority, of a comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTB).

(b) Limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

(c) Cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes.

(d) Strengthening of the non-proliferation régime.

(e) Nuclear-weapon-free zones.

127. Japan suggested the following measures of nuclear disarmament:

(a) The early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty.

(b) The early conclusion of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II (SALT II) and the initiation of SALT III.

(c) Universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

(d) The cessation of the production and the gradual elimination of fissionable material for weapons purposes, and the reallocation of such fissionable material to use for peaceful purposes.

(e) Strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

128. Qatar included, among the major measures, a comprehensive ban on all nuclear-weapon tests and a halt to the production of fissionable materials for the purpose of weapons production. Beyond that, it considered that the comprehensive programme of disarmament should include the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace, following the carrying out of a comprehensive study of the question from all aspects. Those zones should include the major zones of tension in the world, foremost among them the Middle East, Africa, the Indian Ocean and South-East Asia. That called also for the following:

(a) The observance of treaties on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(b) Encouragement of the establishment of organizations for a ban on nuclear weapons in those areas, on the lines of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.

(c) The provision of adequate international guarantees to ensure that peace was maintained in nuclear-weapon-free zones and that they would not be exposed to attacks from nuclear States.

(d) The guaranteeing of the effectiveness of nuclear-weapon control and inspection in nuclear-weapon-free zones.

(e) The promotion of bilateral, regional and multilateral measures in the field of arms limitation.

(f) Keeping the disputes and struggles of the major Powers away from nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace.

129. Romania suggested the following measures for the achievement of nuclear disarmament:

(a) An undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States not to use those weapons against non-nuclear States.

(b) A prohibition on the deployment of new nuclear weapons on the territory of other States and the removal of nuclear weapons already deployed there.

(c) The conclusion of an agreement to stop the production and development of nuclear arms, and an undertaking by all States not to produce such arms in the future.

(d) A halt to the production of fissionable materials for military purposes and the diversion of existing materials to peaceful uses in the countries which have produced them. At the same time, a proportion of such materials should be handed over for peaceful uses by any States which require them.

(e) The complete reduction and liquidation of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

(f) A total ban on nuclear weapons.

(g) The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones of peace and co-operation in the various parts of the world.

130. Spain believed that priority should be given to nuclear disarmament. To that end, it was essential for the nuclear Powers to put into effect as soon as possible the agreements now being negotiated on the prohibition of all test explosions and on strategic arms limitation, as a first step towards similar measures concerning all other types of weapons which had been placed within range of non-nuclear-weapon States. Measures designed to curb the production of fissionable material for military purposes and the production of vectors would be very constructive. However, in addition to the reduction of nuclear weapons, action should be taken with regard to conventional weapons.

131. Sweden suggested that one element that should be considered was categories of weapons hitherto not included in any negotiations and mentioned, as an example, nuclear weapons presently not included in any type of negotiations, e.g. the so-called grey-zone weapons.

132. The Ukrainian SSR proposed, inter alia, the following measures:

(a) The cessation of the nuclear arms race and the achievement of nuclear disarmament, and in particular the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed.

(b) The acceleration of the preparation of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations, which would help to consolidate the political and international legal guarantees of the security of States.

(c) The complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

(d) The strengthening by all available means of the régime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, including the conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States and the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present.

(e) The creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace.

(f) The complete demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor.

(g) Regional measures of military détente and disarmament, including agreement between the States participating in the European Conference not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons against each other.

(h) Measures to avert the threat of a nuclear war.

133. The USSR proposed the conclusion of agreements on the following questions concerning nuclear weapons:

(a) Ending the nuclear arms race and achieving nuclear disarmament.

(b) Averting the danger of nuclear war.

(c) Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States.

(d) Non-stationing of nuclear weapons in the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present.

(e) Complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

(f) General strengthening of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(g) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace.

(h) Complete demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor.

Among regional measures of military détente and disarmament, the USSR mentioned, inter alia, the following:

(a) Agreement on the limitation of rocket-borne nuclear weapons and other weapons in Europe on a basis of strict mutuality.



(b) The conclusion between the participants in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe of a treaty by which the parties would undertake not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional armaments against each other.

134. Norway suggested the following measures in the area of nuclear weapons:

(a) The early conclusion of a SALT II agreement between the United States and the USSR and continued efforts within the framework of SALT III to reach agreement on actual reductions of strategic armaments.

(b) Universal adherence to the non-proliferation régime through a strengthening of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, and the development of more proliferation-resistant technologies.

(c) The so-called grey-area nuclear weapons should be made the subject of arms control negotiations in a suitable forum.

(d) The early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty banning nuclear tests in all environments, including nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

(e) A treaty should be worked out on the cessation of production of fissionable material for military purposes (cut-off).

(f) Under certain specific conditions, nuclear-weapon-free zones might be an important supplement to the régime of the non-proliferation Treaty. When such conditions existed, States should initiate regional discussions with a view to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones.

(g) Nuclear-weapon States should extend their co-operation in the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones and should enter into binding undertakings never to use nuclear weapons or threaten to use such weapons against States that have entered into a binding agreement establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone encompassing their territory.

(h) In that respect the negative security guarantees given at the special session on disarmament could be further strengthened and formalized. Nations which were not protected by a nuclear security system and which met the same conditions of denuclearization had a legitimate claim to universally applicable security guarantees against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

135. Pakistan proposed various measures categorized in three phases. With respect to nuclear weapons, it proposed the following:

(a) Conclusion of internationally binding assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. (first phase)

(b) Immediate conclusion of a second strategic arms limitation agreement between the United States and the USSR and early conclusion of a third agreement envisaging significant reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals and a halt in their qualitative development. (first phase)

(c) The conclusion of an international treaty for the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests; the declaration of a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing by the most advanced nuclear-weapon States. (first phase)

(d) Action to prevent the main sources of nuclear proliferation -- including measures to bring all nuclear facilities under international safeguards. (first phase)

(e) Elaboration of an international consensus on nuclear non-proliferation (envisaged in paragraph 66 of the Final Document of the special session on disarmament). (first phase)

(f) Conclusion of an agreement among the nuclear Powers committing each of them not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against any State, nuclear and non-nuclear. (second phase)

(g) Conclusion of a further strategic arms limitation agreement among the two major nuclear Powers bringing their strategic forces in approximate parity with other nuclear Powers. (second phase)

(h) Conclusion of a general agreement among all the nuclear Powers to limit and reduce their nuclear weapons and delivery systems by stages. (second phase)

(i) Conclusion of an international agreement to eliminate "tactical" and "theatre" nuclear weapons from military arsenals of the nuclear Powers. (second phase)

(j) Adoption of concrete measures to implement the new consensus on nuclear non-proliferation, e.g. possible modification of the non-proliferation Treaty, application of universal safeguards, transfer of nuclear technology, etc. (second phase)

(k) Total prohibition of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in outer space, on the sea-bed and in other environments. (second phase)

(l) Agreement for dismantling and destruction of remaining deployments and stockpiles of nuclear weapons retained until this stage and of missiles, aircraft, ships and submarines, and artillery systems capable of delivering nuclear weapons (along with verification and control methods). (final phase)

With respect to regional measures, Pakistan proposed the following:

(a) Promotion of nuclear-weapon-free zones, including in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. (first phase)

(b) The limitation of nuclear and conventional armaments in Europe and other regions of arms concentration. (first phase)

(c) Conclusion of international agreements for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world, including Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. (second phase)

(d) Conclusion of international agreements to establish zones of peace in the Indian Ocean and other suitable parts of the world. (second phase)

136. Poland, inter alia, reiterated the proposal for the conclusion of an agreement by States which participated in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe that should commit them never to be first to use nuclear or conventional weapons against any other. It also reiterated the proposal contained in document CD/4. In its view, curbing the arms race in the field of nuclear armaments could be assisted by conclusion of agreement on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. It also considered that the requirements of security and disarmament made it imperative not to allow any further proliferation of nuclear weapons. It was thus necessary to guarantee that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons became universally binding and that the system of guarantees be further strengthened with respect to the Treaty's observance, on the basis of the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the international principles and guidelines on nuclear technology, equipment and material transfers, worked out in keeping with the non-proliferation Treaty. It was important at the same time that nuclear energy be used for peaceful purposes without obstacles nor discrimination, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty. Poland supported the proposal submitted by the USSR to conclude a convention on strengthening the guarantees of security of States which had renounced production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and had no such weapons on their territories. The régime of non-proliferation could also be strengthened by signing a convention not to introduce nuclear weapons in the territories of States which had no such weapons at present. Poland also favoured the establishment of zones of limited nuclear armaments or nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace. In the past, Poland had pursued efforts towards creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Europe. The idea of establishing such zones had later been developed, to be reflected in numerous proposals on the denuclearization of various regions of the world. Poland continued to support those efforts and was in favour of the continuation of work with a view to materializing those ideas. Poland fully supported the signing of and implementing further measures at limiting the strategic offensive nuclear arms within the framework of SALT.

137. Turkey suggested that the nuclear Powers should work towards arrangements designed to end the nuclear arms race, to set limits on existing nuclear arsenals and to establish restrictions on the qualitative development of nuclear weapons. The early elaboration of the treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests and the accession of all nuclear States to that treaty were of particular importance. Among nuclear disarmament measures, priority should be given to the preparation of an international treaty prohibiting fissionable material which could be used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons and putting a stop to the production of such material. An important objective was to endow the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons with a truly universal character; in that regard, the nuclear States should discharge the obligations they had assumed under that Treaty. The conclusion of agreements establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, in which States would participate of their own free will, was an important step, provided that the initiative came from the States of the region and that due account was taken of certain special security conditions. In order to encourage such efforts and initiatives, real and convincing security guarantees should be offered to the non-nuclear States. Since the existence and development of nuclear weapons was, in some specific cases, intended only to offset an imbalance between conventional forces, nuclear disarmament measures should be conceived together with conventional disarmament measures and, in so far as practicable, disarmament efforts should include both categories of weapons.

138. The United Kingdom reiterated its disappointment at what it considered the lack of balance in the Final Document between nuclear and conventional measures in disarmament priorities, and reiterated its view that nuclear disarmament could not be accomplished in isolation without corresponding measures of control on conventional arms. The United Kingdom suggested, inter alia, the following measures for phase I of the comprehensive programme of disarmament:

(a) Bringing to a successful conclusion those negotiations in progress identified in the Programme of Action in the Final Document.

(b) Concluding an international agreement on the prevention of accidental nuclear war.

(c) Developing an international consensus on further measures to minimize the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation.

(d) Taking further measures to extend the application of the arms control régime in outer space.

(e) Encouraging the regional approach to disarmament, including the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in areas where security was not founded on nuclear deterrence.

The United Kingdom further suggested that, depending on the outcome of the studies by the United Nations Secretary-General and the results of phase I, measures which could be envisaged as forming phase II of a disarmament negotiating programme included, inter alia, acceptance by all States of voluntary inspection of their civil nuclear facilities.

139. Venezuela proposed the following measures of nuclear disarmament:

(a) Complete prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests.

(b) Significant qualitative limitations and considerable reductions in strategic nuclear-weapon systems until the final elimination of such weapons was achieved.

(c) Cessation of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons.

(d) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

(e) Universal accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

(f) Security guarantees for the non-nuclear-weapon States.

140. With regard to nuclear weapons, Czechoslovakia believed that the conclusion of a treaty on the general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests would be of great importance for the limitation of the qualitative development of nuclear weapons. It also considered that it was necessary to strengthen the non-proliferation régime of nuclear weapons. In its view, international co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy was of great importance for national economies; its misuse for the proliferation of nuclear weapons should, however, be prevented. Czechoslovakia considered that the conclusion of a universal

treaty on halting the production of all types of nuclear weapons and on the gradual reduction of their stockpiles until their complete liquidation would be of extraordinary significance in that respect. The initiation of talks on that question appeared to it to be one of the most pressing tasks in the field of disarmament. In addition, Czechoslovakia believed that an important task of the CD was to start negotiations on the conclusion of an international convention on strengthening the security safeguards for non-nuclear States. Of similar importance would be the conclusion of a treaty banning the deployment of nuclear weapons in the territories of States in which those weapons are not deployed at present. Closely connected with this question was the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace which could become an important obstacle to the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. Czechoslovakia also proposed that the existing Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof should, as soon as possible, be complemented by an agreement on the complete demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor. With respect to regional measures, Czechoslovakia reiterated the proposal for the conclusion of an agreement among the States participants of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe not to make the initial use of nuclear arms or conventional weapons against each other.

141. Denmark attached particular importance, inter alia, to the early conclusion of a SALT II agreement, a comprehensive test ban treaty and the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime.

142. Egypt called for the following:

- (a) Cessation of the production and development of nuclear weapons.
- (b) Emphasis on the principle of banning the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances whatsoever.
- (c) Destruction of nuclear stockpiles.
- (d) Strengthening of non-nuclear guarantees for the security of States.
- (e) The speedy conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty because it could be regarded as fundamental to the prohibition of nuclear proliferation.
- (f) Efforts to give reality to the principle of the universality of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in order to ensure the discontinuance of nuclear proliferation, as that was crucial for security in the various regions of the world, especially sensitive regions such as the Middle East. It was therefore essential that all major parties in the region should accede to the Treaty, as a guarantee of total commitment to the implementation of its objectives.
- (g) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions, particularly in the Middle East and Africa, which were threatened by the possibility that Israel and South Africa might possess nuclear weapons. Emphasis should be placed on the responsibilities of the nuclear Powers with regard to those regions and the necessity of respecting their non-nuclear status.

(h) Establishment of zones of peace and related measures to reduce military potentials, which should go hand in hand with nuclear disarmament in the European region, the regions of South-East Asia and the Indian Ocean.

143. The German Democratic Republic, proposed, inter alia, the following measures:

(a) Expeditious initiation of negotiations of all nuclear-weapon Powers with the participation of a number of non-nuclear-weapon States on the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and on the gradual reduction of existing stockpiles of such weapons leading to their complete elimination. Partial measures in that process could be: cessation of the qualitative improvement and further development of nuclear weapons; cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and of the production of fissionable material for military purposes; gradual reduction of existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery leading to their total complete elimination.

(b) Simultaneously and in inseparable connection with the steps above, measures should be taken to strengthen the political and international legal guarantees of the security of States, to lessen the danger of nuclear war and to strengthen trust among States. Such measures comprised: conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in all its forms and manifestations, including the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons; multilateral and bilateral measures to avert the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war; strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear weapon States, especially conclusion of an international convention on the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons against States which ~~did~~ not possess nuclear weapons and on whose territories no such weapons ~~were~~ deployed; renunciation by the nuclear-weapon Powers to the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there ~~were~~ no such weapons at present.

(c) The complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

(d) The consolidation of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should, as the centerpiece of that régime, be made more effective and truly universal. The IAEA safeguards system needed to be further strengthened.

(e) The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace in various parts of the world should contribute to strengthening the security of States belonging to such zones and international security in general. It would be of great importance to establish a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean.

(f) The complete demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and their exclusively peaceful use should be sought. The Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof should be complied with by all contracting parties. The number of parties to that Treaty should be increased.

With respect to regional measures in Europe, the German Democratic Republic called for further efforts with a view to reaching agreement on the limitation of nuclear missiles and other weapons which caused concern to the other side, on the basis of complete reciprocity, and to concluding a treaty among the participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe on the prohibition of the first use against each other of nuclear and conventional weapons.

144. Senegal, inter alia, called for the following measures:

(a) Non-use of force in international relations and prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons anywhere under any circumstances.

(b) Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems.

(c) Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.

(d) A comprehensive, phased programme with agreed time frames, whenever feasible, for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time.

(e) The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in accordance with paragraphs 60, 61, 62 and 63 of the Final Document in the following regions: Africa, Latin America, Middle East and South Asia. Furthermore, consideration should be given to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Europe, North America and North Asia.

(f) The establishment of zones of peace in the Atlantic Ocean, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean, Pacific Ocean and South-East Asia.

(g) The adherence of all States to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons with due regard for the provisions of paragraph 67 of the Final Document.

145. Austria considered that in accordance with the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the special session, the comprehensive programme of disarmament would have to call for appropriate and verifiable measures for the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems, including a comprehensive and complete ban on nuclear-weapon testing; for the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and the production of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery; and for a progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. It would be of particular importance to realize the urgency of actual reductions of stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, negotiations on nuclear disarmament would have to be extended to those categories of weapons which were not subject to any negotiations. The comprehensive programme should also contain measures designed to strengthen the non-proliferation régime based on the elaboration of generally acceptable and non-discriminatory safeguards under International Atomic Energy Agency auspices and an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to engage in nuclear disarmament.

146. Bulgaria believed that the main lines of the efforts to limit the arms race should, inter alia, be the following: halting the nuclear arms race and achieving nuclear disarmament; averting the danger of nuclear war; a complete and general ban on the testing of nuclear weapons; strengthening in all possible ways the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace; complete demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor; and regional measures for military détente and disarmament. In the context of the measures aimed at halting the nuclear arms race and achieving nuclear disarmament, it was particularly urgent that all States should reach agreement on banning the production of nuclear weapons of all types and progressively reducing stockpiles of such weapons until they were completely eliminated. The efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament also posed at the practical level the question of speedily elaborating a global treaty on the non-use of force in international relations, in order to strengthen the political and international law guarantees of the security of States. In addition, Bulgaria called for the implementation of General Assembly resolutions concerning the conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States and the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present. With respect to regional measures of military détente and disarmament in Europe, Bulgaria, inter alia, called for efforts, on a basis of full reciprocity between countries, to limit nuclear missiles and other weapons within the continent and reiterated the proposal for the conclusion among the States participating in the European Conference on Security and Co-operation of a treaty committing each one not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons against any other.

147. Nigeria called for utmost priority to the cessation of the nuclear arms race through the following measures:

- (a) Urgent conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty.
- (b) A ban on the further development and testing of means of delivery of nuclear weapons.
- (c) Measures to achieve significant qualitative limitations on and substantial reductions of strategic nuclear weapons systems and the ultimate elimination of such weapons.
- (d) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions and complete prohibition of the introduction of such weapons into areas where they did not exist.
- (e) Cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes and submission of all nuclear programmes of all countries to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.
- (f) Promotion of non-proliferation measures.
- (g) Promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in all countries.
- (h) Complete prohibition of nuclear weapons.



148. Hungary called for the realization, inter alia, of the following measures:

(a) In the next phase of negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms the parties were expected to strive for the quantitative reduction and qualitative limitation of offensive strategic weapons. It would be an important step ahead if the scope of negotiations were enlarged to include, on the one hand, further types of weapons and, on the other hand, other nuclear Powers.

(b) Without any further delay negotiations should be started on a comprehensive treaty, whereby all States agreed to stop the development of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, to end the production of nuclear weapon systems and fissionable materials for weapons purposes, and to start the gradual reduction of such stockpiles, leading to the complete elimination of the whole nuclear arsenals of all the nuclear Powers.

(c) The complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, covering all the environments and all the States, should be achieved through the speedy conclusion of a relevant treaty.

(d) The effectiveness of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the relevant system of guarantees should be further enhanced, and their force should be made genuinely universal. The international co-operation to promote the truly peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be also strengthened. At the same time greater attention should be paid to attempts by certain States to acquire nuclear weapon capacity.

(e) A treaty should be concluded without delay on the non-deployment of nuclear weapons in the territories of States where there were no such weapons at present.

(f) Negotiations should be started on the complete demilitarization of the sea-bed and the outer space, and all States should adhere to the treaties designed to keep those environments free from the nuclear arms race.

Efforts aimed at nuclear disarmament and arms limitation could be successful only if they were complemented with parallel political, international legal and security measures. In this field the following steps would be of particular value:

(a) Negotiations should be pursued on a treaty on the renunciation of the use or threat of force in international relations. The treaty should include the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

(b) An international convention should be concluded on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States. All the nuclear Powers should undertake not to use nuclear weapons against States which did not possess such weapons and do not have them in their territories.

(c) With the participation of all the nuclear Powers effective measures should be taken, bilaterally or multilaterally, to further reduce, and ultimately to avert, the danger of outbreak of nuclear war through accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, or failure of communication.

(d) In harmony with the principles of equal security and universal interest in disarmament further efforts should be made to have all States accede to existing international disarmament and arms limitation agreements. In that respect the nuclear Powers and other militarily important States bore particular responsibility.

With respect to regional disarmament and arms limitation measures, Hungary, inter alia, referred to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. In addition, it suggested that the security of the European region and international security as a whole would be greatly strengthened if an agreement, based on the principle of equal security, could be reached on the mutual reduction of the confronting armed forces. Such an agreement could then be followed by negotiations on the limitation and reduction of nuclear forces stationed in the region. Hungary also suggested that the strengthening of peace and security and the reduction of military confrontation in the European region would be promoted if the States signatories of the Helsinki Final Act undertook treaty obligations not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional arms against each other.

149. Zaire called for the following measures in the area of nuclear disarmament:

(a) Stopping all nuclear-weapons tests by means of an international treaty in conjunction with effective monitoring measures binding on all nuclear-weapon States.

(b) Reduction and then elimination of all strategic weapons.

(c) Reduction and, subsequently, destruction of stocks of nuclear weapons.

(d) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

150. Mongolia called for the adoption of bilateral and multilateral measures to avert the danger of nuclear war; referred to the proposals contained in document CD/4; advocated the conclusion of an agreement on a complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests; called for measures to increase the effectiveness of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and ensure that it was truly universal in nature, to strengthen the IAEA system of safeguards in every possible way and to develop international co-operation in the use of nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes; advocated the achievement of a legally binding international agreement on the non-deployment of nuclear weapons in the territory of States where such weapons were not stationed at present; called for the elaboration of an international agreement on the complete demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and considered that a major contribution would be made to the achievement of that goal if all the parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof complied strictly with the provisions of that Treaty, and if there were more accessions to the Treaty; supported the establishment of nuclear-free zones and zones of peace. Mongolia considered that the achievement of understandings and agreements on crucial disarmament questions would be substantially facilitated by the adoption of parallel measures to strengthen political and international legal guarantees of the security of States. The first step towards that goal should be the conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations unconditionally prohibiting the use of all types of weapons, and especially nuclear weapons. An international convention on strengthening the security guarantees for non-nuclear States, whereby the parties would undertake not to use nuclear weapons against States which had decided not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons and did not keep any such weapons in their territory, should also be worked out in the Committee on Disarmament.

151. Portugal considered that the comprehensive programme of disarmament should take into account the fact that the global military potential of States results from the conjunction of nuclear and conventional weapons. Consequently, the programme should establish a balance between the measures related to each of those two types of weapons so as to prevent one State or group of States from gaining superiority over another in any phase of the disarmament process.

B. Documents submitted by Member States concerning the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament

Working paper entitled "Chinese Delegation's proposal on the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament", submitted by China (A/CW.10/5).

152. It was proposed that the programme should include, inter alia, the following main principles:

(a) In order to safeguard the security of all States, the two States with the largest nuclear and conventional arsenals had the primary responsibility for disarmament and should be the first to reduce their armaments. When they had drastically reduced their nuclear and conventional armaments and closed the huge gap between them and the other nuclear States and militarily significant States, the other nuclear States and militarily significant States should join them in reducing armaments according to reasonable ratios.

(b) It was imperative to bring about the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons so as truly to eliminate the danger of nuclear war. While nuclear disarmament was being considered, equal importance should be given to the question of reducing the Superpowers' ever-growing arsenals of conventional armaments and disarmament in those two fields should be carried out in conjunction.

(c) No disarmament measure should prejudice the right of States to make use of modern scientific and technological achievements to promote their economic development.

(d) While formulating more comprehensive disarmament measures, importance should be attached to limited-scope measures, including regional measures. Zones of peace or nuclear-weapon-free zones should be established in the light of the specific conditions prevailing in different parts of the world and the desire of the States in the regions concerned. Those zones should be free from rivalry for hegemony between the Superpowers, foreign military presence in all its forms, all armed occupation of other countries' territory and direct or indirect armed intervention and the threat of force. All nuclear States should unconditionally undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against these zones. The proposed measures, inter alia, included the following:

(a) The ultimate aim of nuclear disarmament was the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery.

(b) Pending agreement by the nuclear States on the non-use of nuclear weapons, all nuclear States, the two States with the largest nuclear arsenals in particular, should unconditionally undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones.

(c) The two States with the largest nuclear arsenals should immediately stop their nuclear arms race, cease all activities aimed at improving the quality and increasing the quantity of their nuclear weapons and begin to reduce and destroy their nuclear weapons by stages. When substantial progress had been made in the destruction of their nuclear weapons, thus closing the huge gap between their nuclear arsenals and those of the other nuclear States to the satisfaction of the majority of States, the other nuclear States should then join them in negotiations for the total destruction of nuclear weapons.

(d) At the request of the States in the region, South-East Asia should be declared a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality.

(e) The position of declaring the Indian Ocean a zone of peace should be respected by all States, the two Superpowers in particular.

(f) In conformity with the desire of the countries in the region, the Mediterranean should be declared a zone of peace.

(g) All nuclear States should respect the status of the nuclear-weapon-free zones and unconditionally undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against these zones.

(h) The status of the nuclear-free zone in Latin America should be respected by all States.

(i) In conformity with the common desires of the States in the respective regions, nuclear-weapon-free zones should be established in the Middle East, Africa, South-Asia, etc.

Working paper entitled "Elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament", submitted by Sri Lanka on behalf of the non-aligned members (A/CN.10/6).

153. With regard to principles and priorities, the working paper stated that during the first stage of the implementation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, special attention should be given to immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race and the removal of the threat of a nuclear war.

The proposed measures, inter alia, included the following:

(a) A comprehensive test ban treaty, to be concluded before the adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

(b) Prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

(c) Cessation of nuclear arms race in all its aspects.

(d) Cessation of the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and means of their delivery.

(e) Cessation of the production of all the types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery; and cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapon purposes.

(f) Progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery within agreed time frames leading to their total elimination from the arsenals of States.

(g) Nuclear-weapon-free zones.

(h) Zones of peace.

Working paper entitled "Proposal concerning the elements of a comprehensive disarmament programme", submitted by Czechoslovakia on behalf of Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/CN.10/7 and Rev.1).

154. The measures proposed included, inter alia, the following:

(a) Discontinuance by all States of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradual reduction of their stockpiles until they had been completely destroyed. At one stage or another of the negotiations consideration could be given, for example, to discontinuance of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons; discontinuance of the manufacture of fissionable materials for military purposes; the gradual reduction of accumulated stocks of nuclear weapons and of means of delivering them; liquidation of nuclear weapons and of means of delivering them.

(b) The discontinuance of the production of, and the reduction and liquidation of, nuclear weapons should be carried out by stages on a mutually acceptable and agreed basis. The content of each stage could be the subject of an understanding between the participants in the negotiations.

(c) Development and implementation of nuclear disarmament measures should be backed up by the parallel consolidation of political and international legal guarantees of the security of States, including the conclusion of a world agreement on the non-use of force in international relations.

(d) Averting the danger of nuclear war.

(e) Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States.

(f) Non-stationing of nuclear weapons in the territories of States where there were no such weapons at present.

(g) Complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

(h) General strengthening of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(i) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace.

(j) Complete demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor.

(k) Implementation of regional measures of military détente and disarmament, particularly in those areas where military confrontation was especially intense.

Working paper entitled "Elements of a comprehensive disarmament programme", submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany on behalf of a number of countries (A/CN.10/8).

155. According to the working paper, a comprehensive programme of disarmament would have, inter alia, to ensure a balance between the measures to be taken in different disarmament fields, in particular between the nuclear and conventional armaments, in order to avoid destabilizing effects.

The measures proposed included, inter alia, the following:

(a) Cessation of the nuclear arms race.

(b) Nuclear disarmament as a result of negotiation of agreements at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned for: cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons systems; cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; a comprehensive, phased programme with agreed time-frames, whenever feasible, for progressive and balanced reductions of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time.

(c) A comprehensive test-ban treaty.

(d) Continuation of the strategic arms limitation negotiations between the two parties concerned, leading to agreed significant reductions of and qualitative limitations on nuclear arms.

(e) Promoting wider adherence to and support of the existing non-proliferation régime, including the strengthening of IAEA-safeguards.

(f) Strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

(g) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, where appropriate, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States in the region.

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C. Views and suggestions of Member States on possible elements in the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade (A/CN.10/10 and Add. 1-13)

156. Chile suggested that because of the risks they involved for all mankind, the limitation of nuclear weapons was one of the most important aspects of the Declaration, but it should be clearly understood that there should be no indiscriminate restrictions on the peaceful use of nuclear energy and that the right of all States to have that form of energy available for their development should be reaffirmed. In addition, the need to maintain the status of existing nuclear-weapon-free zones was a matter of unquestionable importance, and the obligation incumbent on the nuclear Powers to refrain from using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States was an essential element of the declaration.

157. Cuba called, inter alia, for the general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and the conclusion of a convention guaranteeing the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

158. The Federal Republic of Germany stressed the necessity of ensuring a balance between the measures to be taken in different disarmament fields, in particular, between nuclear and conventional armaments, in order to avoid destabilizing effects.

159. India assigned the highest priority to the elimination of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

160. Japan suggested, inter alia, the following principles and measures:

(a) The maintenance of balanced responsibilities and obligations between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon States.

(b) Comprehensive nuclear test ban.

(c) Strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation régime.

161. Zaire suggested, inter alia, that the IAEA inspection system should be applied on a mandatory basis and without exception, to all nuclear installations in the world, whether operated for military or peaceful purposes.

162. Bulgaria reiterated the proposals contained in document CD/4. In addition, it called for the reinforcement of the rules governing the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; the strengthening of guarantees for the security of non-nuclear-weapon States; the non-stationing of nuclear weapons in the territory of States where there were at present no such weapons; the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear tests and the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace. Bulgaria also reiterated the regional disarmament measures in Europe previously proposed by the Warsaw Treaty countries.

163. Kuwait called for a comprehensive test ban. In that respect, it suggested that the responsibility of States, such as Israel and South Africa, which prevented the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and Africa should be clearly defined.

164. Sudan called for the elaboration of an agreement acceptable to the General Assembly under the terms of which Africa would be declared a nuclear-weapon-free zone after the fashion of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

165. The USSR proposed, inter alia, the following measures:

(a) Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of stockpiles to the point of their complete elimination, together with the immediate initiation, for that purpose, of appropriate negotiations among all nuclear-weapon States and a certain number of non-nuclear-weapon States. At the same time, measures should be taken to strengthen political guarantees of the security of States and those provided by international law.

(b) The further limitation and reduction of stockpiles of strategic weapons, and the further qualitative limitation of such weapons, with due regard for all factors affecting the strategic situation throughout the world, including that in Europe.

(c) The conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

(d) The adoption of further measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, including the universal accession of States to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

(e) The conclusion of a convention on strengthening guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States.

(f) The conclusion of an agreement prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear weapons in the territory of States in which none were located at present.

(g) The creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world.

(h) The limitation and subsequent reduction of military activities in the Indian Ocean, and the creation of a zone of peace in that region.

(i) The conclusion, among all States parties to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, of a treaty outlawing the first use of both nuclear and conventional weapons.

166. Poland reiterated the measures of regional disarmament military détente in Europe proposed by the Warsaw Treaty countries. It also called for more decisive steps to effect -- under an appropriate international treaty -- a ban on the development, production and development of new systems of weapons of mass destruction, in particular the nuclear ones, including neutron weapons.

167. Austria stressed, inter alia, the close interrelationship of all armament systems and in particular of the interdependence between nuclear and conventional armaments, which should be taken into account in all phases of the disarmament process.

168. The Byelorussian SSR, called, inter alia, for the following measures:

(a) The immediate initiation of negotiations among all nuclear-weapon States and a certain number of non-nuclear-weapon States with a view to halting the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing stockpiles to the point of their complete elimination. At the same time, measures should be taken to strengthen political guarantees of the security of States and those provided by international law.

(b) The further limitation and reduction of stockpiles of strategic weapons, and the further qualitative limitation of such weapons, with due regard for all factors affecting the strategic situation throughout the world, including that in Europe.

(c) The adoption of further measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, including the universal accession of States to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

(d) The conclusion of treaties and agreements, inter alia, on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests; the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States; and the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons in the territory of States in which none were located at present.

(e) The creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world.

(f) The limitation and subsequent reduction of military activities in the Indian Ocean, and the creation of a zone of peace in that region.

(g) The conclusion, among all States parties to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, of a treaty outlawing the first use of both nuclear and conventional weapons.

169. Egypt called, inter alia, for the following measures:

(a) Agreement to halt the qualitative development of nuclear weapons systems and to halt the production of all nuclear weapons, weapon-launching systems and thermonuclear material for military purposes.

(b) A treaty forbidding the use of nuclear weapons on the basis of the acceptance of further verification measures.

(c) The provision of guarantees that non-nuclear States would not be a target of the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons.



(d) An undertaking by States which did not possess nuclear weapons that they would not, by producing or otherwise obtaining such weapons or through their possession or location on their territory, acquire nuclear capabilities to be used for other than peaceful purposes.

(e) The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

(f) The establishment of zones of peace.

170. Italy stressed that the process of the limitation and reduction of weapons would have to be carried out in a balanced manner, and concurrently in the nuclear and conventional sectors.

171. Morocco supported any proposal aimed at reducing as much as possible the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, at achieving the total destruction of such weapons and at keeping them out of the territory of non-nuclear-weapon States.

172. Canada suggested, inter alia, that nuclear-weapon States had a special responsibility to engage in negotiations in regard to these weapons, including both quantitative and qualitative controls.

173. Romania proposed, inter alia, the following transitional measures for immediate implementation:

(a) Ensuring that the nuclear-weapon States undertook never to use nuclear weapons in any circumstances and, in general, never to use force or the threat of force against non-nuclear-weapon States.

(b) Dismantling military bases in the territory of other States and withdrawing troops and weapons, including nuclear weapons, to territories within national frontiers.

In addition, it called, inter alia, for the following disarmament measures:

(a) Ending nuclear weapon production and gradually reducing nuclear weapons until they were totally eliminated.

(b) Halting the production of fissionable material for military purposes.

(c) Total prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and all technical developments in nuclear weaponry.

(d) Creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world.

(e) Total prohibition and outlawing of nuclear weapons.

The adoption of specific nuclear disarmament measures should both pave the way for the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and facilitate access by all States to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology and stimulate international co-operation in this area.

174. Nigeria, inter alia, proposed the following as priority measures to be achieved in the first half of the 1980s:

(a) A universal and comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.

(b) An international agreement assuring non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

(c) An agreement on the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapon systems.

(d) Cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes.

(e) Commencement of negotiations on the reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery.

(f) Commencement of negotiations by the parties concerned for the conclusion of the SALT III agreement, not later than 1985.

In addition, efforts aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons in the 1980s should seek to widen the base established in the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty would contribute significantly to the process. So also would the creation of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world and progress in negotiations for the cessation of qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons systems.

175. Indonesia, inter alia, proposed the following measures:

(a) Comprehensive test ban.

(b) The cessation of the production of fissionable material for military purposes.

(c) A commitment or a pledge by the nuclear-weapon States never to use those weapons or force against the non-nuclear-weapon States in a legally binding instrument.

(d) Nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions.

(e) Gradual reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.

(f) The negotiation of a treaty on the banning of nuclear weapons.

176. The Ukrainian SSR, inter alia, proposed the following measures:

(a) Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of stockpiles to the point of their complete elimination, together with the immediate initiation, for that purpose, of appropriate negotiations among all nuclear-weapon States and a certain number of non-nuclear-weapon States. At the same time, measures should be taken to strengthen political guarantees of the security of States and those provided by international law.

(b) The further limitation and reduction of stockpiles of strategic weapons, and the further qualitative limitation of such weapons, with due regard for all factors affecting the strategic situation throughout the world, including that in Europe.

(c) The conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

(d) The adoption of further measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, including the universal accession of States to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

(e) The conclusion of a convention on strengthening guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States.

(f) The conclusion of an agreement prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear weapons in the territory of States in which none were located at present.

(g) The creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world.

(h) The limitation and subsequent reduction of military activities in the Indian Ocean, and the creation of a zone of peace in that region.

(i) The conclusion, among all States parties to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, of a treaty outlawing the first use of both nuclear and conventional weapons.

177. Brazil stressed, inter alia, the following points:

(a) It should be recognized that the military nuclear Powers were effectively responsible for nuclear disarmament but that the fundamental and legitimate interest of the international community in disarmament matters could not fail to be considered on an equal footing and without discrimination.

(b) International commitments between nuclear and non-nuclear Powers in the disarmament sphere could not be allowed to take on a discriminatory character or tend to perpetuate already existing imbalances or structures of hegemonic power.

(c) There was a pressing need to ensure that measures of nuclear disarmament and control of armaments in no way hampered the absorption and development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

178. Norway assigned priority, inter alia, to the following measures:

(a) Prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(b) Conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

(c) Limitation and reduction of nuclear and conventional weapons.

179. Greece, inter alia, called for the following measures:

(a) Conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

(b) Limitation of strategic arms.

(c) Universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

D. Documents submitted by Member States concerning the elements of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade

Working paper entitled "Elements of a draft resolution entitled 'Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade'", submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany on behalf of a number of countries (A/CN.10/15).

180. The Working Paper stressed, inter alia, the need to adjust prospective disarmament measures in both the nuclear and conventional fields to ensure balance and thus avoid destabilizing effects.

Working paper entitled "Elements of a draft resolution entitled 'Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade'", submitted by Cuba on behalf of the non-aligned members (A/CN.10/16 and Corr.1).

181. The Working Paper called for agreement not later than the next special session on, inter alia, the following measures:

(a) A comprehensive nuclear ban treaty which would be valid for all time and in conformity with the aspirations of the international community by making a significant contribution to the aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons and of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(b) Conclusion of a binding international legal instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

In addition, the working paper called for ratification of the SALT II agreement and commencement of negotiations on a SALT III agreement within the same time-frame. Other priority measures that should be carried out within the first half of the decade included, inter alia, the following:

(a) Commencement of negotiations leading to:

(i) the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems.

(ii) the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.

(b) Commencement of negotiations on the progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate complete elimination.

(c) Conclusion of a SALT III agreement, leading to agreed significant reductions of, and qualitative limits on, strategic arms and thereby constituting an important step in the direction of nuclear disarmament and ultimately of the establishment of a world free of such weapons.

(d) Development of an international consensus of ways and means, on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, in accordance with the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document.

(e) Strengthening of the existing nuclear-weapon-free zone and the establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones in accordance with the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document.

(f) Establishment of zones of peace, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Final Document.

(g) Conclusion of an agreement prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Working paper entitled "Elements for inclusion in a draft resolution on the declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade", submitted by Poland on behalf of Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/CN.10/17).

182. In addition to the ratification of the SALT II Treaty, the working paper called for the speedy, successful completion of negotiations on:

- (a) The complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.
- (b) The non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States which do not have them in their territory.
- (c) The non-emplacement of nuclear weapons in the territory of States in which such weapons do not at present exist.

In addition, the working paper called for the initiation of negotiations and the activation of efforts regarding, inter alia, the following measures:

- (a) Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of stockpiles of such weapons, culminating in their complete elimination, and the immediate commencement, to that end, of appropriate negotiations with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States and also of some non-nuclear-weapon States; at the same time, measures should be taken to strengthen political guarantees of the security of States and those provided by international law.
- (b) A permanent ban on the use of nuclear weapons and renunciation by all States of the use of force in their relations with one another.
- (c) A further limitation of and reduction in the number of strategic-weapons, and also a further qualitative limitation of such weapons, taking account of all factors affecting the strategic situation in the world, including that in Europe.
- (d) Adoption of further measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and, for that purpose, the achievement of the universal accession by States to the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
- (e) The creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world.
- (f) The limitation and subsequent curtailment of military activities in the Indian Ocean, and the establishment of a zone of peace in that region.
- (g) The conclusion, among all States parties to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, of a treaty outlawing the first use of both nuclear and conventional weapons.

E. Documents submitted by Member States concerning items 4 (a) and 4 (b) of the agenda of the Disarmament Commission

Working paper on agenda item 4 (a) and (b) of the meeting of the Disarmament Commission, submitted by the German Democratic Republic on behalf of Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/CN.10/18).

183. The relevant measures proposed are similar to those included in document A/CN.10/17 (see above).

Working paper entitled "Conclusions of the second substantive session of the Disarmament Commission on item 4 (a) of its agenda", submitted by Cuba on behalf of the non-aligned members (A/CN.10/19).

184. The relevant measures proposed are similar to those included in document A/CN.10/16 (see above).

Working paper entitled "A general approach to nuclear and conventional disarmament; agenda item 4 (b)", submitted by Cuba on behalf of the non-aligned members (A/CN.10/20 and Corr.1).

185. The relevant measures proposed are similar to those included in document A/CN.10/16 (see above).

Note verbale dated 31 May 1980 from the Permanent Mission of Poland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting the statement and the declaration of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty adopted at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee held at Warsaw on 14 and 15 May 1980 (A/CN.10/21).

186. The text of the declaration was also issued as CD/98\* (see above).

ChinaWorking Paper on the Elements of a Comprehensive  
Programme of Disarmament

1. The Chinese Delegation attaches great importance to the elaboration of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. At the first session of United Nations Disarmament Commission, on 15 May 1979, the Chinese delegation submitted its Proposal on the Elements of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, in which we made a preliminary exposition of China's position on the objectives, principles and measures of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. Now, taking into account the development of the situation in the past two years and the present state of world armaments, and drawing upon the reasonable views advanced by other countries, the Chinese delegation would like to make a further elucidation of its views and proposals on the elaboration of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

2. The elaboration of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament as a guide to progress in disarmament is the urgent demand of many States. The deterioration of the international situation in the early 1980s, the escalation of the arms race and the growing danger of war, have added to the relevance of work on the elaboration of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

The first special session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament held in June 1978 affirmed the necessity of drawing up a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. The Disarmament Commission session of June 1980 and the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly of 1980 all adopted relevant resolutions, calling upon the Committee on Disarmament to speed up negotiations on the elaboration of the Programme in order that it could be submitted to the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to Disarmament in 1982 for deliberation and adoption. Therefore, this session of the CD should make positive efforts to get a draft Programme prepared as soon as possible.

3. The Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament is an important integral part of the International Disarmament Strategy. It should point to the right direction and objectives for future progress in disarmament and lay down the principles which should be followed in international disarmament negotiations and in adopting measures for disarmament. The formulation of the Programme should be closely related to the actual situation in respect of international events and world armaments. Only thus can it have a positive and promoting effect on progress in disarmament.

With regard to orientation and objectives, as the international tension has resulted in continued intensification of the arms race jeopardizing peace and security, it is imperative to oppose the aggression, expansion and military occupation which has poisoned the international atmosphere, and oppose hegemonism, in order to create favourable conditions for disarmament. In view of the present international situation and the state of the arms race, the objectives of the

Programme should be, by formulating reasonable principles and practical and effective measures for disarmament, to put an end to the arms race, promote real progress in disarmament, oppose all armed aggression and a new world war, relax international tension and safeguard international peace and security. As the existing old international economic relations hinder the normal development of the world economy and landed a large number of developing countries in a serious plight, the promotion of the economic and social development of the developing countries and the speeding up of the establishment of a New International Economic Order should be one of the objectives of disarmament.

As regards the principles to be followed in realizing disarmament, the Chinese Delegation had put forward 10 principles in its Proposal on the Elements of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. We would now like to make some explanations on the important ones.

(1) The most fundamental principle of disarmament is that the States with the largest arsenals shall be the first to reduce their armaments. The current situation with regard to armaments is that both the nuclear and the conventional armaments of the superpowers are substantially larger than those of other countries, they have, moreover, used their mighty armament as tools for carrying out aggression and expansion. In order to safeguard world peace and security, it is only right that they should take the lead in reducing their super-arsenals. This principle should be applied to all aspects of disarmament. After they have substantially reduced their armaments and narrowed the wide gap between their arsenals and those of the other nuclear weapon States and militarily significant States, the latter shall join them in reducing armaments according to reasonable ratios.

(2) The principle of universal security for all States. None of the various disarmament measures and stages should affect the security of States. No State shall be permitted to maintain and upgrade its military superiority and build its own "security" on the insecurity of other States. The principle of "equal security" shall not only be applied to the two superpowers, but shall also be universally applied to all States in the world.

(3) The principle of equal importance of nuclear and conventional disarmament. Since nuclear war poses an enormous threat to mankind, the problem of nuclear disarmament should be speedily and effectively resolved. However, conventional armaments account for four-fifths of the total world military expenditures and the utilization of conventional weapons for the conduct of war is the most real and direct threat to international peace and security. No State or military block shall be permitted either to use nuclear superiority or to use conventional arms superiority to threaten other countries. Therefore, full attention should also be given to conventional disarmament. Only if nuclear and conventional disarmament are carried out in conjunction, can progress be made toward the reduction of the danger of world war.

(4) The question of disarmament bears upon the security and interests of all States. All States in the world, regardless of their sizes, whether nuclear or non-nuclear, have the right to participate on fully equal footing in the deliberation, negotiation and solution of disarmament problems. The organization and procedures of disarmament machinery should be democratized. It should be free from manipulation and control by the superpowers and fully reflect the demands and wishes of all States. The role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament should be strengthened.

(5) Stringent and effective measures of international supervision and verification should be provided for in respect of disarmament measures of all spheres, in order to ensure their effective implementation.



All the above-mentioned principles were already reflected in the Final Document adopted by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament and the reports of the Disarmament Commission. The Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should clearly provide for these important principles.

4. The aim of adopting the disarmament measures is to realize the objectives of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. The priorities and stages of the various measures should be established in accordance with the spirit of the main principles of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. Each stage can have an indicative time-limit, in order to promote its implementation and periodic review. On this basis, we would like to make the following proposals on the principal measures:

(1) Effective measures and actions should be taken, on a priority basis, for nuclear disarmament, conventional disarmament and the prohibition of chemical weapons and biological weapons.

(a) Nuclear disarmament

The ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament is the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. The first stage of nuclear disarmament should be: the two States with the largest nuclear arsenals shall immediately cease all activities aimed at improving the quality and increasing the quantity of their nuclear weapons, stop the nuclear arms race and proceed to reduce their nuclear weapons. At certain stages of nuclear disarmament, other nuclear weapon States shall join them in reducing nuclear weapons according to reasonable ratios, and ultimately total destruction of nuclear weapons shall be realized. Before achieving nuclear disarmament, in order to reduce the nuclear threat against non-nuclear-weapon States, all nuclear weapon States shall unconditionally undertake the obligation not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

(b) Reduction of conventional weapons

The States with the largest conventional arsenals shall immediately stop their conventional arms race. As a first step, they shall undertake not to carry out armed aggression against and military occupation of other countries. They shall take the lead in substantially reducing their heavy and new-type conventional weapons and armaments, particularly their offensive weapons and armaments. At certain stages of conventional disarmament, other militarily significant States shall join them in reducing conventional arms according to reasonable ratios.

(c) Chemical and biological weapons

All chemical and biological weapons shall be completely prohibited and totally destroyed. Pending the attainment of this goal, all States shall unequivocally undertake not to use any chemical or biological weapons.

(d) Prohibition of all new-type weapons of mass destruction

(2) Adopt regional measures conducive to safeguarding the independence, sovereignty and security of all States. Various types of nuclear-weapon-free zones, zone of peace and zone of peace, freedom and neutrality can be established according to the wishes of the States concerned. All nuclear weapon States shall unconditionally

undertake the obligation not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against these zones. All attempts by any State to seek any form of hegemony in these zones shall be prohibited, and all forms of foreign military presence shall be eliminated.

5. Through conscientious negotiation and elaboration of all States, the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament to be examined and adopted by the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament will guide and give an impetus to future progress in disarmament. Therefore, all States should undertake to make their best efforts for its implementation and realization.

CANADA

Disposal of Chemical Agents

It is the purpose of this paper to review common techniques for the disposal of chemical warfare agents and specifically to bring the Committee on Disarmament up to date on the Canadian experience in the disposal of World War II stocks of Mustard.

DISPOSAL METHODS

Historically a number of methods have been used to destroy toxic chemicals. They include:

- (a) venting to the atmosphere;
- (b) burning in the atmosphere;
- (c) burial in the ground; and
- (d) disposal at sea.

In each case it was left to nature to disperse or detoxify them. Unfortunately these processes have not always worked well as the chemicals have polluted the environment and in some cases remained a hazard for many years. Over the past two decades it has become increasingly apparent that hazardous materials must be destroyed under controlled conditions and only the most innocuous residues should be returned to the environment. Each toxic chemical must be considered individually as each may require a different process to destroy it especially if it must be done chemically. Laws governing disposal in the environment may vary from nation to nation, but the release of hazardous materials into the air or into water systems will affect all nations alike. As a result the above techniques are no longer considered to be acceptable for chemical agent disposals.

A great variety of toxic chemicals have been used or proposed as war agents and it may be useful to review suitable methods for their disposal. The following is a brief survey of some of the more common agent types.

Hydrogen Cyanide, Chlorine, Phosgene, Cyanogen Chloride

These were all used during World War I and are among the so-called "dual purpose agents" having common commercial uses. Because of their relatively low toxicity and the widespread availability of adequate respiratory protection, they are now of marginal utility as warfare agents. If any stocks of these materials should be declared under a new treaty, it would be necessary to consider their disposal. All are reactive chemically and could easily be destroyed by numerous reactions. They are also relatively volatile and could be readily vented to the atmosphere, although this would result in unnecessary pollution. It would be far better not to destroy such stocks, but to use them and all other dual purpose agents for legitimate industrial purposes, even when it involves drilling and draining of shells or other munitions.

### Arsenicals

Some arsenic based compounds such as Lewisite, Adamsite and other arsines were used during the first world war and still others were investigated during World War II. Some arsenicals have also been manufactured as insecticides, but have now been banned in many countries because of toxicity persistence in the environment. The toxicity of arsenic and its compounds is not readily destroyed even through chemical reactions or incineration. Eventually some toxic residue must be returned to the environment. This problem is also common to many mining and smelting operations and a great deal of research into means for disposal of arsenic residues has been carried out. Arsenicals are normally roasted to  $As_2O_3$  and stored, usually underground. A few arsenic compounds have found commercial uses, and conversion of some warfare stocks to useful materials might be possible. Recently some uses have also been found for elemental arsenic.

### Mustard

This compound is quite persistent in the environment. It is hydrophobic and does not tend to migrate within the soil. It is not readily attacked by soil micro-organisms. Examples are still being found of soils contaminated with mustard during World War II that yield potent vapour when freshly turned. Mustard is heavier than water and non-miscible and so forms a layer under it. Any hydrolysis which may occur at the interface is rapidly quenched by the acid formed. As a result mustard which has been disposed at sea will not be destroyed by the sea water should the container leak. It will tend to form a layer at the bottom. If released in deep water, it will presumably be incorporated eventually into the sea-bed as normal bottom deposits grow. However in shallow water, currents may move it towards shore or wave action could bring droplets to the surface. Munitions may be washed up on beaches or caught in fishing nets.

Mustard may be hydrolyzed above pH10 with heating and agitation but the disposal of the foul smelling products remains a problem. The Canadian experience with this technique will be described later in this paper. Mustard may be readily burned. In the atmosphere, this produces heavy black smoke filled with hydrogen chloride and sulphur acids. Perhaps the most reasonable disposal method is through contained incineration with good effluent scrubbing to remove the acids. Salts formed by neutralization are sufficiently harmless to be released to the environment. Useful incinerators are now commercially available and an incineration process is used in the United States Chemical Agent and Munitions Disposal System (CAMDS). A description of the CAMDS processes was provided during a visit to the Toole facility by the 6th Pugwash Workshop in CW disarmament May 1978 and copies of the Final Environmental Impact Statement, March 1977 containing technical details were distributed to its members. A further description of CAMDS was presented at the experts seminar held by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons in June 1980.

### Protein Toxins

This class of compound is derived from natural sources (puffer fish, shellfish, venoms, micro-organisms, castor bean, etc.) and contains the most toxic materials known, some of them orders of magnitude more toxic than the nerve agents. Most are untreatable. However they are normally solids which must be ingested for effect so have not been generally adopted for chemical warfare. Those of microbiological origin may be spread using the micro-organism as a vector in which case they are classed as biological agents and toxins in general are included under the biological warfare convention. Toxic proteins may be readily denatured and detoxified with heat usually above 100°C.

### G Agents (methylphosphonofluoridates)

Some containers of sarin are known to have been dumped at sea. G agents are hydrolyzed by sea water with a half life of a few hours so that leaks from shells or containers should not pose a prolonged hazard especially in deep water, however public concern now precludes the further dumping of G agents at sea. G agents may be incinerated in contained systems but extensive safety precautions would be required. They are easily destroyed by alkaline hydrolysis. Organic solvents such as alcohol or acetone will promote the reaction through solubilization. Hydrolysis with aqueous sodium hydroxide is the method utilized for sarin disposal in the United States CAMDS system.

### V Agents

These materials are also hydrolyzed by sea water, however some phosphonic acids produced are themselves toxic and are sufficiently resistant to further hydrolysis that this is not a practical disposal method. V agents may be detoxified by alkaline hydrolysis although an organic solvent to increase solubilization is usually required. V agents may also be oxidized with bleach or chlorine and this is the basis of decontamination techniques in the field. Acid chlorinolysis is the process used in the United States CAMDS system. As with the G agents, extreme safety precautions must be incorporated into any disposal plant in order to protect both the workers and the surrounding ecosystems.

### DDT

While this and related insecticides are not CW agents, they are now banned in many countries and their disposal is typical of the problems encountered with many toxic industrial chemicals and wastes. In the environment, DDT decomposes very slowly and may be accumulated within some plants, animals, birds or fish. The complete disposal of DDT requires contained incineration at very high temperatures (1700°F). Effluents must be scrubbed to remove acids.

In order to overcome environmental and safety concerns, extreme and highly expensive methods are often required to destroy stocks of chemical warfare agents. A preliminary description of the disposal of mustard at Suffield was presented in CCD 434 on 16 July 1974. The destruction was completed in 1976, and disposal of the hydrolysate products has been continuing at a slow rate since that time. The following is an updated version of the process.

### MUSTARD DISPOSAL IN CANADA

During World War II Canada, like many other nations, acquired supplies of chemical warfare agents in the event that gas warfare was used. Early in the war some mustard was obtained from the United States and the United Kingdom. Canadian mustard was produced by the thiodiglycol process in a special plant set up at Cornwall, Ontario in 1941. The plant ceased operation in 1945 and was dismantled in 1946. Mustard was not manufactured at Suffield, but because of its primary role as a Commonwealth CW Test Centre, a large storage capacity was created and Canadian stocks were stored there in bulk. Some of this material was used for wartime tests and experiments on the range. At the end of the war, the bulk mustard remaining at Suffield was stored in four large lead-lined concrete vats. As it would have been difficult to package this material for disposal elsewhere, it was left in situ to be used for experimentation. With the discovery of nerve agents, experimental interests shifted and little of the mustard was used.

By 1972 changes in Canadian Policy suggested that the mustard was no longer of use to the Canadian Forces. By measurement of fluid levels and simple density calculations, it was determined that about 700 tons of liquid remained in the vats, although some decomposition had occurred and layers of impurities had separated. However, analysis showed that the bulk of the liquid was still potent mustard.

The simplest means of disposal would have been by burning on the range or dumping at sea, however advances in environmental science by this time precluded either method. Burial in the ground was also out of the question. An ideal approach would have been to burn the mustard in a thermal destructor with stack scrubbing to remove the acids. In 1969 a large thermal destructor had been constructed at Suffield to destroy DDT stocks remaining after the banning of its use as an insecticide. The destructor was available but was located in the midst of tank maintenance facilities which had been constructed after the thermal destructor. It was not possible to move the mustard to the destructor safely either by truck or through a pipeline. Costs of moving the thermal destructor to a safer location or of building a new one were very high and the possibility of more economical chemical methods was examined.

Details of the study were reported in CCD 434. Eventually it was shown that mustard could be readily destroyed by alkaline hydrolysis. Some heating was required for initiation but the reaction was exothermic and rapidly rose to a maximum of about 95°C. Good agitation was required and lime was found to be a convenient and inexpensive base with which to maintain the pH above 10. The reaction product was a thick non-vesicant suspension of lime, salts and thiodiglycol in water. The DRES mustard was destroyed in eight ton batches over a three year period. Work could not proceed during the winter as all equipment was exposed to the elements and the mustard congealed in the vats. The disposal was also slowed by some equipment failures particularly in the steam generators and stirrers. Hydrolysis of the final batch of mustard was carried out on 18 October 1976.

The hydrolysate products were placed first into a spare vat and then into each of the others as they were emptied of mustard. This hydrolysate was stirred and kept above pH10 in order to act as a decontaminant for the traces of mustard which could not be removed from the vats with the pumps. When cool, without agitation the hydrolysate separated into two layers, the top one being mainly water with dissolved salts, and the lower one a thick syrupy gel of thiodiglycol and solid impurities.

Early experiments on the disposal of the mustard hydrolysate are described in CCD 434. Eventually many thousands of gallons were incinerated in the thermal destructor. In this process, the water evaporated, the thiodiglycol was consumed and the salts were dispersed as a finely divided aerosol. A high stack was added to the destructor so that all products including the aerosolized salt could be dispersed at such a height that all emission standards were met. Unfortunately the salt aerosolization was not completely efficient and the stack and destructor gradually became clogged.

In the meantime, experiments were attempted in which the hydrolysate was spread in strips onto the prairie grass to determine its effect. Studies by experts showed that the thiodiglycol was rapidly consumed by micro-organisms, however, the salts, primarily calcium chloride and lime, retarded some of the prairie grasses. These experiments were eventually terminated and the grass is now returning to normal.

Once hydrolysis had been completed, it was no longer possible to keep the hydrolysate stirred. The undisposed material was allowed to separate and over a period of time the aqueous layers were removed and evaporated in a pit.

At the present time the five vats remain intact with a shallow layer of thiodiglycol at the bottom of each. It is possible that traces of mustard were trapped under the lead liners, although none has been detected through sampling and analysis. Studies have been carried out to recommend suitable means of decontamination and destruction of the vats. Some consideration has been given to recovery of the lead, however for safety reasons it has been decided against this. Also, the remaining thiodiglycol will not be removed. Contracts are now being negotiated to cut the concrete tops and upper walls of the vats into sections and lower them into the cavity. As the vats are more than 50 per cent below the surface, the resulting materials will be covered with earth and planted to grass. It is anticipated that this work will be completed within 1981.





CD/174  
7 April 1981

Original: ENGLISH

HUNGARY

Working paper

Proposal for informal meetings of the Committee on  
Disarmament with the participation of qualified  
governmental experts on the prohibition of development  
and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass  
destruction and new systems of such weapons

1. The Committee on Disarmament has had for long on its agenda the question of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. But as yet there has been no serious negotiations on this important question in the Committee on Disarmament which reflects the different views as to how to approach this complicated matter.
2. The Hungarian delegation remains convinced that the most effective method of handling this question would be the setting up of an ad hoc group of qualified governmental experts.

Taking into account however the differing views, the various proposals and ideas put forward to this effect and the recognized need to continue the consideration of the issue of setting up a group of experts in an organized manner, the delegation of Hungary proposes as a first step the holding of informal meetings of the Committee on Disarmament with the participation of qualified governmental experts preferably during the second part of its 1981 session. The length of time put aside for the meetings and the exact time of holding them could be scheduled in accordance with the programme of work of the Committee to be elaborated for the second part of this session.

3. Experts participating in the informal meetings could address themselves to the major areas of this broad subject such as:
  - (a) review of questions related to the definition of new types of weapons of mass destruction as well as the criteria on the basis of which particular weapons fall under certain categories of NWMD on the basis of the formula of 1948 ~~taking~~ also into account the advance reached in the field of science and technology,
  - (b) review of the trends of the development of technology especially in the military field, identifying particular areas where the progress may contemplate emergence of NWMD,
  - (c) recommendations to the Committee on Disarmament as to the methods of further work and negotiations, including the setting up of an ad hoc group of experts,

(d) other relevant aspects, experts may deem necessary to bring to the consideration of the Committee.

4. Experts of non-member States are welcome to participate.

5. The Committee on the basis of the results of the discussion on the subjects above could consider the elaboration of recommendations as to the methods of further work and negotiations on agreements prohibiting the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and, in particular, concerning a possible mandate of an ad hoc group of governmental experts on this problem.

6. The delegation of Hungary is convinced that the informal meeting on this matter of the CD would be a step forward in discharging its responsibilities assigned to it in connection with the prohibition of the development and manufacture of the new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

CD/175  
7 April 1981

Original: SPANISH

LETTER DATED 1 APRIL 1981 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SPAIN  
ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT CONCERNING  
THE DECISION TAKEN BY THE COMMITTEE AT ITS 104th PLENARY MEETING  
ON 10 FEBRUARY 1981

With reference to the letter from Mr. de la Gorce, Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament in the month of February, addressed to Ambassador Piniés, Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations, I have the honour to inform you that the subjects which the Spanish delegation is interested in following in the Committee's respective working groups are:

Chemical weapons;

Negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

Since, by a decision of the Committee on Disarmament and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, Spain has been authorized to attend the public and informal meetings of the Committee, and the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Conference's Programme of Disarmament, I have pleasure in informing you that Mr. Ignacio Ferrer will attend, as an expert, the meetings of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, to be held in the month of April, as soon as a decision on this matter is taken by the plenary Committee.

The delegation of Spain also intends to participate, through a diplomat from this Mission, in meetings of the Working Group on negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

I should be most grateful if you could inform me, as soon as possible, of the decision taken on this matter.

(Signed) Enrique Domínguez Passier  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative



CD/176  
10 April 1981  
ENGLISH  
Original: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 7 APRIL 1981 ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS TRANSMITTING THE REPLY OF THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR, LEONID BREZHNEV, TO THE QUESTION PUT BY THE GREEK NEWSPAPER, TA NEA.

In connection with the discussion of the question of strengthening the security guarantees of the non-nuclear countries, I have the honour to forward to you the reply of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Leonid Brezhnev, to the question put by the Greek newspaper, Ta Nea.

I request that it be distributed as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament.

(Signed) V. Issraelyan

GE.81-61372

Reply by L.I. Brezhnev to a question put by  
the Greek newspaper Ta Nea

Question: Speaking at the Twenty-sixth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, you devoted particular attention, Mr. President, to the struggle to achieve international détente. You said in particular that the USSR would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries which did not allow such weapons to be stationed in their territory. Can your statement take the form of concrete guarantees for such countries as, for example, Greece?

Answer: The Soviet Union has already declared more than once that it will never use nuclear weapons against those countries which renounce the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and which do not have such weapons in their territory. This alone is a sufficiently firm guarantee. But we are prepared to go further and to conclude at any time a special agreement with any of the non-nuclear countries, including, of course, Greece, if that country in its turn undertakes not to have nuclear weapons in its territory.

I should like to take this opportunity, on behalf of the Soviet People to wish peace and prosperity to the Greek people.

Pravda, 4 April 1981.

UNITED KINGDOM WORKING-PAPER ON THE SUBJECT OF EFFECTIVE  
INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS TO ASSURE NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES  
AGAINST THE USE OR THREAT OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Introduction

The United Kingdom gave Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (NNWS) an assurance about their security from nuclear attack during the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in 1978. Other Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) also gave such assurances. Since that time, the subject of effective international arrangements to assure NNWS against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons has been extensively discussed at the United Nations, at the second Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference and especially in the Committee on Disarmament. The purpose of this paper is to provide a clear explanation of the position of the British Government.

United Kingdom Assurance to Non-Nuclear-Weapon States

On 2 June 1978 the then Prime Minister, Mr. James Callaghan, addressing the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, spoke about the question of undertakings to limit the use of nuclear weapons. He noted that: "It is my country's long-established policy that these weapons should never be used except in self-defence under the most extreme circumstances." He went on to add:

"I recognize, however, that States which have renounced nuclear weapons are entitled to look for some specific assurance that nuclear weapons will not be used against them. My country acknowledges these expectations and wants action to meet them. In February we proposed that the matter should be considered at this Special Session."

On 27 June 1978, in Parliament, the then Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, referring to the Prime Minister's statement, gave a formal assurance which was repeated the next day at the United Nations Special Session by the Leader of the United Kingdom Delegation. The text of the assurance was as follows:

"The United Kingdom is now ready formally to give such an assurance. I accordingly give the following assurance, on behalf of my Government, to non-nuclear-weapon States which are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or to other internationally binding commitments not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices: Britain undertakes not to use nuclear weapons against such States except in the case of an attack on the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its armed forces, or its allies by such a State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State."

On 12 August 1980 this assurance was reaffirmed at the second Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. It remains in effect, and unchanged.

Scope of the United Kingdom Assurance

The United Kingdom assurance is therefore fully in force and extends to Non-Nuclear-Weapon States which are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or to other internationally binding commitments not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices. Such States are required to accept safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency on all their peaceful nuclear activities. By thus accepting the Non-Proliferation Treaty and IAEA safeguards, three quarters of the world's States have made an effective demonstration that they are indeed Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. This is one reason why the United Kingdom assurance is extended only to States which have accepted these obligations.

The other reason is that the United Kingdom wishes to recognize the obligations undertaken by Non-Nuclear-Weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or other similar internationally binding commitments. In doing so, the United Kingdom believes it is supporting non-proliferation objectives to which the international community is committed.

The United Kingdom approach to the issue of scope differs from that proposed in the two draft Conventions placed before the Committee on Disarmament by Pakistan and the Soviet Union. The draft Convention proposed by Pakistan would require Nuclear-Weapon States to give assurances to "non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the nuclear security arrangements of some nuclear-weapon States". This formulation appears to present two main difficulties. First, because it does not extend the assurance only to NNWS which have clearly demonstrated their NNWS status by accepting safeguards, either by virtue of their adherence to the NPT or to a similar internationally binding commitment not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices. Secondly, because there is, in the United Kingdom's view, no reason why such NNWS which are party to the nuclear security arrangements of some NWS should not benefit from the United Kingdom security assurance providing only that they do not attack the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its armed forces or its allies in association or alliance with a NWS. Moreover, it would not be easy to determine which States are party to the nuclear security "arrangements" of "some" Nuclear-Weapon States. By contrast, the scope of the United Kingdom assurance is based on the readily understandable and discoverable criterion of adherence to the NPT or a similar commitment.

The draft Convention proposed by the Soviet Union and other countries would require Nuclear-Weapon States to give assurances to "non-nuclear States Parties to this Convention which renounce the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and which have no nuclear weapons in their territory or anywhere under their jurisdiction or control, on land, on the sea, in the air or outer space". This formulation gives rise to a number of difficulties.

First, there is again no clear definition of a Non-Nuclear-Weapon State comparable to that contained in the United Kingdom assurance. Second, the assurance proposed by the Soviet Union speaks of "nuclear weapons" rather than "nuclear explosive devices". The latter term is preferable, since it clearly covers both nuclear weapons and allegedly peaceful nuclear explosive devices. The necessity for covering both types of device was recognized in the drafting of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Third, and especially important, is the non-stationing requirement in the Soviet draft. To benefit from the proposed assurance, Non-Nuclear-Weapon States must not only renounce the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons but also have no nuclear weapons on their territory. There is no indication of how it would be



possible to verify that there were no nuclear weapons in the territory of a State or anywhere under its jurisdiction or control. Moreover, this requirement would mean that countries whose non-nuclear weapon status is now internationally recognized in the context of their adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty would no longer be recognized as such in the context of security assurances. For example, the Soviet Union and its allies accept that some countries in Western Europe which have] nuclear weapons controlled by a Nuclear-Weapon State on their territories are Non-Nuclear-Weapon States in the Non-Proliferation Treaty context. It is inconsistent that they should be denied non-nuclear status in the context of negative security assurances.

#### Substance of United Kingdom Assurance

The United Kingdom assurance contains only one qualification; it will cease to apply to a Non-Nuclear-Weapon State which would otherwise be covered "in the case of an attack on the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its armed forces or its allies by such a State in association or alliance with a Nuclear-Weapon State". Clearly this does not diminish the value of the assurance in any way for States whose intentions are peaceful. Indeed the assurance will still apply to States which actually enter into conflict with the United Kingdom, provided they are not allied to or associated with a Nuclear-Weapon State.

Questions have been raised concerning who would judge whether an "attack" by a Non-Nuclear-Weapon State was in progress and, if it was, whether that Non-Nuclear-Weapon State was "in association" or "alliance" with a Nuclear-Weapon State. The United Kingdom believes that in practice it will be obvious to all if an attack by a Non-Nuclear-Weapon State is in progress and whether that Non-Nuclear-Weapon State is acting in association or alliance with a Nuclear-Weapon State. But in the last analysis decisions like these would have to be made by the United Kingdom taking account of its own security interests.

It may be doubted whether any assurance is possible that would be free of the need for interpretation. As pointed out above, for example, there are a number of obscurities in the draft Conventions proposed by Pakistan and the Soviet Union. Moreover, the draft Convention proposed by the Soviet Union and its allies includes a general withdrawal clause on the grounds of supreme national interest. Such a clause increases uncertainty about the precise circumstances in which the assurance would fail to operate. The United Kingdom assurance clearly spells out the very limited conditions in which it would no longer apply.

#### Form of the United Kingdom Assurance

Much of the discussion about security assurances has been concerned with the possibility of making them "legally binding". The United Kingdom has always made it clear that its assurance was solemnly and formally given. It has also expressed willingness to explore ways in which its assurance could be included in an acceptable legally binding instrument. Although an international convention would in principle be acceptable, the practical difficulties involved in agreeing a uniform assurance have so far seemed insurmountable.

In these circumstances attention has focussed on the possibility of enhancing the political status of the various assurances given by Nuclear-Weapon States. The United Kingdom doubts the need for any such enhancement of its own assurance since it already regards it as a solemn undertaking. As has been constantly stressed, the assurance took effect immediately it was given. There is no requirement for Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, in order to benefit from the assurance, to conclude a bilateral agreement, to adhere to a yet-to-be-concluded convention, or for there to be some other form of joint action by the Nuclear-Weapon States.

Despite these considerations, the United Kingdom remains ready to consider whether an acceptable and practical method can be found of enhancing the legal or political status of its assurance if this is thought to be necessary.

### Conclusion

The United Kingdom continues to believe that there are compelling reasons for maintaining the scope and substance of its own assurance. The United Kingdom assurance is designed to support non-proliferation efforts and particularly the NPT, a treaty accepted by the large majority of the international community. The United Kingdom undertaking is clear in its terms, and it provides assurances which should meet the concerns of all States respecting the integrity of others according to the principles of the United Nations Charter. It was solemnly given and is regarded by the United Kingdom as being of the greatest political importance.

CD/178  
16 April 1981  
Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 15 APRIL 1981 ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT  
FROM THE MINISTER-COUNSELLOR OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF FINLAND ADDRESSING AN  
INVITATION OF THE FINNISH GOVERNMENT

As the Finnish Government has had the occasion to inform the Committee on Disarmament we have since 1972 worked on a project the purpose of which is to create a chemical weapons verification capacity to be used in connection with a CW convention. In several reports to the CD we have explained the nature and progress of the project. On the basis of informal consultations with all members of the Committee we have concluded that it would be opportune at this stage to organize, in Finland, a workshop on our project. That would give the CD an opportunity to get detailed information on the project and equipment used. The said workshop will be held on 2-4 July next.

The Finnish Government will provide the accommodation (Hotel Helsinki, Hallituskatu 12, Helsinki, tel. 630 701), transport during the visit and meals mentioned in the annexed draft programme.

This invitation is addressed to all members of the CD and to the representatives of the Secretariat as well as of Austria, Denmark, Norway, Spain and Switzerland. For reasons of practical nature we would need information on the number of the participants by 25 May and their names by 19 June.

I would be grateful if this communication could be circulated as an official CD document.

(Signed) Paavo Keisalo  
Minister-Counsellor

GE.81-61452

CW VERIFICATION WORKSHOP, HELSINKI 2-4 JULY, 1981

Proposed programme

Thursday, 2 July

Arrival

19.00 Welcome, introduction and dinner given by the  
Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Friday, 3 July

8.45 Proceed to the Department of Chemistry of the  
Helsinki University

Briefing and demonstration of the Finnish  
CW-verification project

Discussion

12.00 Proceed by bus to an industrial plant

13.00 Luncheon at the plant

14.15 Briefing and tour of the plant

17.00 Return by bus to the hotel

Saturday, 4 July

9.30 - 12.00 Sightseeing

The Chairman's Progress Report to the Committee on Disarmament  
on the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons

Introduction

1. The ad hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has authorized the Chairman to submit the following progress report to the Committee on Disarmament. It was, however, understood that the contents of this report, including its annex, will not bind or constrain delegations in the continuation of their work.
2. In the course of consideration of item 4 of its 1981 agenda, entitled "Chemical Weapons", the Committee at its one hundred and fifth plenary meeting on 12 February 1981 adopted the following decision contained in document CD/151:  
  
"The Committee further decided to re-establish, for the duration of its 1981 session, the ad hoc working groups on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and radiological weapons, which were established on 17 March for its 1981 session, so that they may continue their work on the basis of their former mandates.  
  
It is understood that the Committee will, as soon as possible, review the mandates of the three ad hoc working groups with a view to adapting, as appropriate, their mandates to advance the progress of the process of negotiations towards the objective of concrete disarmament measures.  
  
...  
  
The ad hoc working groups will report to the Committee on the progress of their work at any appropriate time and in any case before the conclusion of its 1981 session."
3. At its 107th meeting on 17 February 1981 the Committee elected Ambassador Lidgard, Sweden, as Chairman of the ad hoc Working Group. Mrs. L. Waldheim-Natural, Chief, Geneva Unit, United Nations Centre for Disarmament, was reappointed Secretary of the Working Group.
4. At their request and on the basis of decisions taken by the Committee on Disarmament at its one hundred and fourth and one hundred and twenty-second sessions, contained respectively in documents CD/PV.104 and CD/PV.122, representatives of Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Spain and Switzerland attended meetings of the Group in addition to members of the Committee on Disarmament.
5. The Group held 12 meetings between 18 February 1981 and 22 April 1981.

6. In carrying out its mandate the ad hoc Working Group took into account paragraph 75 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament, which stated that the conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons was one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral negotiations. The Working Group also took into consideration A/RES/35/144 B which in operative paragraph 3 "Urges the Committee on Disarmament to continue, as from the beginning of its session to be held in 1981, negotiations on such a multilateral convention [on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction] as a matter of high priority, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives."

7. During the period under consideration the following official documents dealing with Chemical Weapons were presented to the Committee on Disarmament:

(a) CD/142 submitted by Sweden entitled "Prohibition of retention or acquisition of a chemical warfare capability enabling use of chemical weapons (4 Annexes)"

(b) CD/164 submitted by Finland entitled "Creation of Chemical Weapons Control Capacity - Present Phase and Goals of the Finnish Project"

(c) CD/167 submitted by Canada entitled "Verification and Control Requirements for a Chemical Arms Control Treaty based on an Analysis of Activities"

(d) CD/168 submitted by China entitled "Prohibition of Chemical Weapons: on the Definition of Chemical Warfare Agents"

(e) CD/169 submitted by China entitled "Dismantling of Production Facilities/ Means of Production for Chemical Weapons"

(f) CD/173 submitted by Canada entitled "Disposal of Chemical Agents" ..

8. In the conduct of its work from February to April 1981, the following working papers were circulated to the Working Group:

(a) a working paper by the Chairman entitled "Outline suggested by the Chairman for the work of the group - Part 1" (CD/CW/WP.7 and Rev.1)

(b) a working paper by the Chairman entitled "Outline suggested by the Chairman for the work of the group - Part 2" (CD/CW/WP.8 and Corr.1)

(c) a working paper by Canada entitled "Verification and Chemical Weapons" (CD/CW/WP.9)

(d) a working paper by the Chairman entitled "Outline suggested by the Chairman for the work of the group - Part 3" (CD/CW/WP.10 and Corr.1)

(e) a working paper by Mongolia, Poland and the USSR entitled "Chemical Weapons: types of activity to be covered by a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons" (CD/CW/WP.11)

(f) a working paper by the Chairman entitled "Outline suggested by the Chairman for the work of the group - Part 4" (CD/CW/WP.12)

(g) a working paper by the Chairman entitled "Outline suggested by the Chairman for the work of the group - Part 5" (CD/CW/WP.13)

(h) a working paper by the Chairman entitled "Outline suggested by the Chairman for the work of the group - Part 6" (CD/CW/WP.14)

(i) a working paper by Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland entitled "Chemical weapons: definitions" (CD/CW/WP.15)

(j) a working paper by France entitled "Declarations and destruction of materials and facilities" (CD/CW/WP.16)

(k) a working paper by France entitled "Chemical weapons - definitions, criteria" (CD/CW/WP.17)

(l) a working paper by Australia entitled "Initial Comments on the Consolidated Outline suggested by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons (CD/CW/WP.18)

9. The following Conference Room Papers were submitted to the group during the first part of the Committee's 1981 session:

(a) a conference room paper by the Chairman entitled "Suggestions by the Chairman for particular technical issues to be addressed during CD's 1981 work on chemical weapons" (CD/CW/CRP.5 and Rev.1 and 2)

(b) a conference room paper by the Chairman entitled "List of topics to be discussed with regard to the definitions and criteria of importance for a chemical weapons convention" (CD/CW/CRP.6)

(c) a conference room paper by Belgium entitled "Proposed definitions (revision of document CD/94)" (CD/CW/CRP.7)

(d) a conference room paper by France entitled "Criteria for definition" (CD/CW/CRP.8)

(e) a conference room paper by the Chairman entitled "List of questions put to the delegations of the USSR and the USA at the meeting of 30 March 1981 with respect to the bilateral report, CD/112, and outlines by the Chairman for the work of the Working Group" (CD/CW/CRP.9)

(f) a conference room paper by the Chairman entitled "Draft Progress Report to the Committee on Disarmament" (CD/CW/CRP.10 and Add.1 and 2 and Corr.1 and Rev.1)

10. The Group agreed to structure its work on the basis of the outline annexed hereto, which was suggested by the Chairman as contained in documents CD/CW/WP.7, 8, 10, 12, 13 and 14 with the addition of some related suggestions for amendments, clarifications and corrections. The outline does not however reflect all the views and suggestions expressed during the Working Group's consideration and delegations attached importance to their proposals being further considered at the appropriate time as the Working Group continues its work.

11. In accomplishing its task, the Working Group, from February to April 1981, carried out another substantive and more detailed examination of the issues to be dealt with in the negotiation on a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Last year's report to the Committee of the Working Group (CD/131/Rev.1) and the USSR-US Joint Report on the Progress in the Bilateral Negotiations on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons of 7 July 1980 (CD/112) were of great assistance in this endeavour.

#### Scope of the convention, definitions, criteria

12. As regards the scope of the Convention three alternatives were presented in the outline (see Annex I). The first of these, which proposes the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, retention and transfer of chemical weapons, received the broadest support. The second, which suggested a more comprehensive prohibition, including also planning, organization and training for the use of chemical weapons, met with considerably less support, mainly because of the verification difficulties it would entail. Views were expressed that the subject should be discussed more in depth. The third alternative, according to which also the use of chemical weapons should be prohibited, was supported by several delegations, but criticized by others, who feared that it would diminish the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Still others thought that it would be possible to find a compromise formula in establishing a link between the Geneva Protocol and the Convention. In this connection it was also suggested that a link between the scope of the Biological Weapons Convention and that of a chemical weapons convention should be established wherever appropriate.

13. The issues of definitions and criteria were also extensively discussed. In that connection valuable clarification was given as to the intentions behind the suggestions contained in the Joint Report. This contributed to a greater degree of understanding of those suggestions, which should facilitate future negotiations on these specific issues.

14. There seemed to be convergence of views that the difficulties in defining chemical warfare agents, especially with reference to their single and dual purpose character, could be overcome by stipulating, with the help of a general purpose, quantity and toxicity criteria, that chemicals must not be produced for other than non-hostile purposes or military purposes not involving the use of chemical weapons. No chemical would then need to be labelled a chemical warfare agent. The toxicity criteria would serve to delimit those chemicals, the production of which will have to be more or less strictly regulated and verified. The group of the most toxic chemicals, the supertoxic lethal chemicals', had been defined so as to include mustard gas.

15. One difficulty regarding the toxicity criteria was found to derive from the lack of acceptable methods for determining toxicity limits for incapacitating and



irritating chemicals. In view of the assumed scientific development in this context, it was suggested that the Convention should stipulate possibilities to introduce new criteria for incapacitating effects.

16. Some delegations emphasized the necessity of elaborating standardized testing methods and procedures for establishing a toxicity spectrum.

17. The issue of other criteria was discussed, and different opinions were expressed about the necessity for any specific further criterion.

18. The need for and definition of different concepts like "chemical warfare agents", "chemical weapons", "chemical weapons system" etc. were discussed, but it was felt that only future negotiations could determine to what extent those concepts should be used in the Convention.

19. On the issue of possible exceptions from the prohibitions it was stated that peaceful chemical production and research as well as protective activities should not be described as exceptions, since they would together account for the overwhelming amount of chemical activities. Thus, they would not have to be referred to as exceptions in a convention.

20. It was held that certain types of chemicals, e.g. riot control agents and herbicides, are prohibited in war under the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Their widespread use in peacetime would, however, make it impossible to cover them by a prohibition of production, not least due to verification difficulties. On this issue views diverged.

21. The amount of production of supertoxic chemicals to be allowed for certain purposes were discussed. A number of delegations questioned the necessity of allowing an annual total production of one ton of such agents. With the obligation to make a detailed declaration of such production, including its purpose, and a clarification that the total would be an aggregate for all supertoxic chemicals for non-hostile military purposes, the issue seemed less controversial.

#### Declarations, Destruction.

22. On the issue of declaration of possession of specific materials, facilities and activities and of plans for disposals of materials and facilities there were differing views as to the timing and content of such declarations. The confidence building effects of such declarations, if undertaken already at the negotiation stage, were pointed out.

23. Some delegations emphasized that destruction and dismantling were to be regarded as the most important elements of the scope of the Convention and that this should be reflected already in its title.

24. Concerning the time required for destruction or conversion of declared stocks and destruction or dismantling of means of production, note was taken of the indication in the Joint Report that such activities may take up to 10 years. There were differing views whether the means of production instead of being destroyed or dismantled could also be temporarily converted for peaceful production. Some delegations felt that conversion of production facilities should be permitted only to make these facilities suitable to be used for the purpose of destroying stocks of chemical weapons.

### Compliance

25. On verification there was a convergence of views that an adequate verification system should be commensurate with the scope of the Convention and implemented through a combination of national and international verification measures.
26. Some delegations felt that the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons and production facilities as well as the prohibition of production of chemical weapons would have to be overseen and controlled routinely through on-site inspection. Other delegations held that the intrusive form of control over these activities should take place rather within the concept of verification by challenge. The discussion did, however, not clarify the full meaning of these concepts.
27. Even if the principle that control should not be more intrusive than necessary seemed to be generally adhered to, the views differed on what is necessary, i.a. concerning the need for occasional, periodic, or permanent on-site inspection in order to follow the process of destruction, dismantling or conversion or production facilities.
28. Some technical methods for verifying destruction of stocks and production facilities were discussed, as for instance chemical analyses, toxicity determinations and "black boxes".
29. Concerning the combination of national and international verification measures, it was stated that too little attention had been devoted to the national control possibilities. Only through such national means could sufficiently intrusive verification be carried out to ensure compliance within the chemical industry. Still, this was considered more difficult in the market economies than in the centrally planned economies. This view was not shared by all the delegations, since it was pointed out that also in the market economies a great variety of production regulations, i.a. for environmental protection purposes, were strictly enforced in the chemical industry. National verification measures could according to these delegations only be regarded as a form of national self-control and as a source of information and data for further stages in the verification process.
30. Technical methods for international verification activities were briefly discussed. Chemical off-, near- and on-site analyses of air, water and soil samples were mentioned among such methods, as well as remote sensing by satellites.
31. The establishment of a Consultative Committee as an international verification body seemed to enjoy general support, but views differed on its tasks, organization and procedures.
32. Also on the complaints procedure a number of different proposals were made. Some favoured, as a first step, bilateral consultation directly between the parties, whereas others thought that from the beginning all consultation should take place within the Consultative Committee and be brought to the knowledge of all the Parties of a convention.

33. Some delegations considered that complaints should be lodged with the Consultative Committee. Others suggested that the United Nations Security Council would be a suitable organ for taking up complaints regarding non-compliance with the convention. Strong objections were raised to this suggestion. Complaints should instead be lodged with the General Assembly according to some delegations.

#### Voluntary confidence building measures (CBMs)

34. On CBMs there were divergencies of views with respect to suitable times for their application. Four periods of time were mentioned in which various CBMs could be undertaken: the negotiating phase, after signing the convention and before a State had become party to it, the period until stocks of chemical weapons and production facilities had been destroyed, and the time thereafter.

35. It was stated that CBMs could be undertaken on a bilateral or multilateral basis, regionally or world-wide and with or without the condition of reciprocity. It was felt that also additional examples of CBMs other than those discussed so far could be explored.

#### International co-operation

36. There was convergence of views that the convention should promote co-operation between parties in fields related to the technical subjects dealt with in the convention, but not to what extent or in which organizational modes. However, there seemed to be large support for the view that provisions for co-operation and assistance with respect to protection against chemical weapons should be included in the convention.

#### Formal provisions

37. The issues in this context were only briefly examined. It was recognized that the formal provisions would best be discussed in the course of the actual negotiations at a later stage. Views were put forward that some of the more technical matters and some more detailed provisions might be put into annexes to the convention, and that the annexes should form an integral part of the convention.

#### Conclusion

38. After the extensive examination of the various issues, both last year and during the spring part of this year's session, the Working Group considers that while there was substantial convergence of views on a number of issues some considerable differences of views still exist and that it is necessary to proceed to further substantive work towards achieving a convention. Many delegations felt that the mandate of the Working Group should be revised, whereas others did not consider this necessary or were not in a position to agree to this.



Consolidated Outline Suggested by the Chairman  
for the work of the Group

Activities, facilities and materials to be prohibited, including criteria  
and definitions

1.1 Alternative views regarding the prohibitions

Three main alternative views have been expressed, which require further consideration:

Alt.1. There is a convergence of views that the convention should prohibit at least the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

Alt.2. It has also been suggested that the convention should be more comprehensive and prohibit all activities, facilities and materials intended to enable a Party to use chemical weapons or utilize the toxic properties of chemical substances for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.

Alt.3. Another suggestion is that the convention should prohibit also the use of chemical weapons in addition to the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

The alternatives are specified below.

1.2 The following activities, facilities and materials would be prohibited or otherwise regulated in the three alternative views:

1.2.1 Activities

Common for alternatives 1-3;

- development
- production
- stockpiling
- acquisition
- retention
- transfer (including trading) and assistance to other States

Additional for alt. 2:

- planning
- organization
- training

Additional for alt. 3:

- use

### 1.2.2 Facilities

Common for alternatives 1-3:

- development and testing facilities
- production facilities/means of production
- specific storing facilities

Additional for alt. 2:

- resources for planning and organization
- training facilities

### 1.2.3 Materials

1.2.3.1 Common for alternatives 1-3:

- chemical warfare agents which might include
  - (a) supertoxic chemical warfare agents
  - (b) toxic, single purpose chemical warfare agents
  - (c) toxic, dual purpose chemical warfare agents (insecticides, etc.)
  - (d) others, (herbicides etc.)
  - (e) precursors

1.2.3.2 Warheads, weapon systems and other materials, equipment and resources specifically intended for the use of chemical weapons

1.3 The following definitions could be considered:

1.3.1 Chemical agent: a chemical substance which may be used in a chemical weapon but is in fact not utilized or planned to be utilized in it.

1.3.2 Chemical warfare agent: a chemical substance, which alone or together with other chemical substances have direct toxic effects on man, animal or plant and with such physical and chemical characteristics that it can be utilized in a chemical weapon, i.e. a chemical substance which is actually used or intended to be used in chemical weapons. It may be a single purpose agent or a dual purpose agent, which groups may be differentiated according to their toxicities in super-toxic and toxic chemical warfare agents.

1.3.3 Single purpose chemical warfare agent: a chemical substance which is used or may be used for chemical warfare solely.

1.3.4 Dual purpose agent: a chemical substance which is used or may be used not only for chemical warfare but also for peaceful purposes.

1.3.5 Precursors to a chemical warfare agent: chemical substances which not necessarily themselves are suitable chemical warfare agents but which form particular chemical warfare agents when made to react chemically with each other whether for bulk production of chemical warfare agents or in a chemical weapons system. (The term precursor is a recognized general concept in chemistry).

1.3.6 Chemical Weapon: the combination of a charge of a chemical warfare agent and means of dispersing the agent in the target (chemical munitions).

1.3.7 Chemical weapons system: chemical weapons and means to make possible their use.

1.3.8 Chemical warfare capability: the capability to use chemical weapons.

1.4 The following criteria could be considered as the basis in determining the scope of the prohibition:

1.4.1 General purpose criterion: the intention

(a) with regard to chemical warfare

(b) non-hostile purposes - of activities, facilities and materials. The general purpose criterion might be supplemented by further criteria, like quantity and toxicity criteria.

1.4.2 Quantity criterion: allowance of activities, facilities and materials for peaceful and protective purposes to the extent justified by these purposes.

1.4.3 Toxicity criteria:

(a) Super-toxic lethal chemical might be any toxic chemical with a medium lethal dose which is less than or equal to 0.5 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration, LD<sub>50</sub>) or 2,000 mg min/m<sup>3</sup> (by inhalation, LCt<sub>50</sub>) when measured by an agreed method.

(b) Other lethal chemical might be any toxic chemical with a median lethal dose which is greater than 0.5 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration, LD<sub>50</sub>) or 2,000 mg min/m<sup>3</sup> (by inhalation LCt<sub>50</sub>) and which is less than or equal to 10 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration, LD<sub>50</sub>) or 20,000 mg min/m<sup>3</sup> (by inhalation, LCt<sub>50</sub>), when measured by an agreed method.

(c) Other harmful chemical might be any toxic chemical with a median lethal dose which is greater than 10 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration, LD<sub>50</sub>) when measured by an agreed method.

(d) In the case that chemicals exert incapacitating or irritating effects particular toxicity criteria might apply. These might then state dose limits for the effects of such chemicals, ED<sub>50</sub>. Since such toxicity criteria relating to man are not available today, a convention might provide for possible later inclusions of them.

1.4.3.1 Toxicological methods:

(a) Definitions

LD<sub>50</sub> (Lethal Dosis, 50 per cent) scientifically defined as the dosis of a substance, which is expected to kill 50 per cent of an exposed population. It is expressed as mg/kg body weight.

LCT<sub>50</sub> (Lethal Concentration and Time, 50 per cent) scientifically defined as the product of time for exposure and concentration of a substance in air, which is expected to kill 50 per cent of an exposed population. It is expressed as mg min/m<sup>3</sup>.

ED<sub>50</sub> (Effective /incapacitating, irritating/ Dosis, 50 per cent) scientifically defined as the dosis of a substance, which is expected to incapacitate 50 per cent of an exposed population. It is expressed as mg/kg body weight.

Ect<sub>50</sub> (Effective /incapacitating, irritating/ Concentration and Time, 50 per cent) scientifically defined as the product of time for exposure and concentration of a substance in air, which is expected to incapacitate 50 per cent of an exposed population. It is expressed as mg min/m<sup>3</sup>.

The expression "expected to incapacitate 50 per cent of an exposed population" could be understood as "expected to disable 50 per cent of the exposed soldiers to perform their usual duties in a war situation".

(b) Methods

General considerations. Toxicity tests could be in accordance with "Principles and Methods for Evaluating the Toxicity of Chemicals", Environmental Health Criteria 6, World Health Organization, Geneva 1978.

Toxicity tests may have to be preceded by chemical analysis, as described below. As far as possible, toxicity tests may have to be performed on pure substance. When determining lethal effects of a substance (LD<sub>50</sub> and LCT<sub>50</sub>) two species may have to be used - mice and rats of well-defined, easily available strains.

Lowest value may be decisive.

For LD<sub>50</sub>-determinations, subcutaneous injection could be the way of administration. Survival during 48 hours could be observed. Calculation of LD<sub>50</sub> may have to be done according to established procedure.

For LCT<sub>50</sub>-determinations, the time of exposure is maximized to ten minutes. When aerosols are used, particle size distribution may have to be determined and optimized in order to ascertain maximal uptake. Survival during 48 hours may have to be observed. Calculation of LCT<sub>50</sub> may have to be done according to established procedure.

For evaluating incapacitating effects of chemical substances (ED<sub>50</sub> and Ect<sub>50</sub>) animal tests may have to be devised that, as far as possible, are analogous to the situation for soldiers, which is suggested for the definition of incapacitating effects as mentioned above.



Primates could be used for such experiments. Experience from human use of incapacitating agents can be utilized to evaluate ED<sub>50</sub> and ECT<sub>50</sub>.

(c) Chemical identification

The chemical identity of all compounds must be ascertained, and expressed according to existing chemical nomenclature e.g. IUPAC.

In the case of mixtures, the active compound or compounds must first be isolated and purified by suitable methods to at least 99 per cent purity.

Whenever possible, the alleged chemical identity of a compound may have to be verified by mass spectrometry and nuclear magnetic resonance. If optical isomerism is possible, the presence or absence of optical activity of the compound should be verified. If mass spectrometry and/or nuclear magnetic resonance methods cannot be applied, e.g. in the case of macromolecules, other unequivocal physical, chemical, biochemical or biological methods might be used.

1.4.4 Other criteria:

- structural formulae for chemical substances
- shelf life
- volatility
- explosion stability

1.5 Exceptions (relating to exceptions from prohibitions in alternatives 1-3, as well as to possibly allowed activities):

1.5.1 for civilian purposes:

- protection against chemical weapons in civil defence
- medical
- scientific and research
- industrial
- agricultural
- riot control

1.5.2 for certain military purposes:

- protection against chemical weapons
- medical
- riot control

1.5.3 Parties may be allowed an annual production of super-toxic and toxic single-purpose warfare chemical agents together not exceeding one ton for peaceful and protective purposes.

Implementation of the convention, i.e. declarations and disposal of materials and facilities

2.1 Declarations

At the time States become parties to the convention concerning the possession or non-possession of specific materials, facilities and activities and of plans for disposal of materials and facilities.

2.1.1 Materials

2.1.1.1 Chemical warfare agents, stored in bulk or in munition.

Specific rules:

(a) Supertoxic and toxic single-purpose chemical warfare agents (i.e. sarin, soman, tabun, VX, mustard gas): declarations may have to be comprehensive, stating also the amount of the agents relating to bulk stockpiles and to munitions, and to be given each year;

(b) Toxic dual purpose chemical warfare agents (i.e. phosgene, hydrogen cyanide, chlorine): declarations may concern approximate amounts of each agent, estimation of yearly production and consumption. When stored in munitions, the declarations may have to be as comprehensive as for super-toxic and single purpose chemical warfare agents.

(c) Precursors: may have to be declared if they are stockpiled alone or together with the other reactant(s) of a binary set in munition or parts of munition, or in bulk for military purposes. The phosphorous containing precursors for binary nerve agents: may have to be declared as supertoxic and toxic single purpose warfare agents.

2.1.1.2 Chemical weapons (munition): may have to be declared comprehensively including special warheads intended for but not filled with chemical warfare agents.

2.1.1.3 Weapons systems, especially designed for the dissemination of chemical warfare agents and chemical munition: may have to be declared comprehensively.

2.1.1.4 Location of a State's stockpiles of chemical warfare agents and chemical munition, both within its territory and, if under its jurisdiction, outside: may have to be declared.

2.1.2 Facilities may have to be declared with respect to existence, location, capacity, function, etc.

2.1.2.1 Production facilities/means of production (including munition filling facilities and facilities related to dual-purpose production).

2.1.2.2 Testing facilities

If such facilities are also used for developing and testing protection against chemical weapons, this may have to be declared.

2.1.2.3 Facilities for training for use of chemical weapons may have to be declared. (Relates to alt. 2 in 1.1). If such facilities are also used for training for protection against chemical weapons, this may have to be declared.

2.1.2.4 Other facilities intended to enable the use of chemical weapons e.g. special transportation equipment (Relates to alt. 2 in 1.1).

### 2.1.3 Activities

2.1.3.1 Training and other activities to enable the use of chemical weapons. (Relates to alt. 2 in 1.1).

### 2.1.4 Other modalities of declarations

Plans for destruction, dismantling and converting of materials and facilities, including periodical exchange of statements and notifications concerning the implementation of the plans.

#### 2.1.4.1 Timing of declarations

2.1.4.2 Time frames (programmes) of plans for destruction, dismantling and converting of materials and facilities.

2.1.4.3 Other modalities, including for periodical exchange of notifications concerning the implementation of the plans.

## 2.2 Destruction, dismantling and conversion

The specific objects, timing issues and verification measures.

### 2.2.1 Chemical warfare agents

2.2.1.1 Supertoxic and toxic single purpose chemical warfare agents, stored in bulk or in munition: to be destroyed within a specific period of time.

2.2.1.2 Precursors, stored in munition, as well as the more specific compound in each set of precursors, if stored in bulk: may have to be destroyed within a specific period of time.

2.2.1.3 Specific issues concerning verification relating to destruction of chemical warfare agents:

To ascertain that chemical substances brought to a destruction plant really are chemical warfare agents and that the amount of substance brought to the plant corresponds to the given declaration an on-site verification procedure may be necessary.

Such verification procedure could comprise

- (1) measuring the amount of substance delivered and the amount of products obtained:
- (2) toxicity tests on materials delivered and products obtained.

Toxicity tests may have to be performed only in order to determine lethal dosis of the substances delivered to the destruction plant, i.e. to find out whether a substance is a super-toxic or toxic chemical warfare agent. Incapacitating agents and precursors could presumably not be monitored in this way. For such substances, chemical analysis could be used to ascertain the identity.

(organizational and procedural aspects on verification relating to the issues covered by Part 2 will be dealt with in Part 3).

2.2.2 Warheads and other means of disseminating chemical warfare agents in the target, including weapon systems, specifically intended for chemical warfare: to be dismantled and destroyed within a specific period of time.

The amount of chemical weapons etc. brought to a destruction plant may have to be verified.

2.2.3 Production facilities/means of production: to be dismantled or, if particular reasons are given, converted to production of other chemical substance within a specific period of time. Facilities might have to be "moth-balled" upon entering into force of a convention until they were disposed of.

2.2.3.1 Specific issues concerning verification relating to dismantling or conversion of production plants/means of production:

To ascertain that the plant etc. really has been or could be used for the production of chemical warfare agents an on-site inspection may be necessary before the pertinent action has begun. The destruction/dismantling procedure may have to be verified in the same way.

As probably some time will elapse between closing a plant and starting the dismantling, the plant may have to be sealed by mechanical means in the meantime. This procedure could be verified by on-site inspection and monitored by remote control.

For a production plant, which has been allowed to be converted to peaceful purposes instead of being destroyed, on-site inspection before and after the conversion may ascertain that the plant

- (a) has been used for chemical warfare agent production and
- (b) has been converted for production of other chemical compounds.

Such verification may consist of toxicity tests regarding the new product and inspection of the protection level at the converted plant. Furthermore, chemical analysis of waste water and the air around the building may be performed to confirm the permanence of the conversion.

For the perhaps permitted (exempted) production of certain amounts of chemical warfare agents, special facilities could be created, thus no existing production would be left for this purpose. The new plant may have to be under control through on-site inspection, ascertaining that the capacity of a new plant corresponds to the permitted production. (The issue will be further elaborated in Part 3).

2.2.4 Munition filling facilities: may have to be dismantled or converted to be used for filling munitions of a non-chemical warfare nature within a specific period of time.

2.2.4.1 Specific issues concerning verification relating to dismantling or conversion of munition filling facilities:

Verification may be made by the same means as specified for production plants.

2.2.5 Testing and training facilities, e.g. test fields: may have to be destroyed or dismantled unless preserved and used for protective or other purposes, in which case their use may have to be subject to verification measures. (The issue of training facilities relates to alt. 2 in 1.1).

### Implementation of the convention, i.e. verification measures and complaints procedures

## 3. Verification

The verification measures should be commensurate with the scope of the prohibition, obligations of destruction, dismantling and conversion and other aspects of the convention in order to provide assurance of compliance with the convention. Such measures may have to be both national and international.

### 3.1 National verification measures

3.1.1 Such measures may have to be decided in accordance with the provisions of the convention and the States parties' own constitutional procedures.

3.1.2 National means of verification including the use of national technical means of verification may have to be allowed in consistency with generally recognized principles of international law and without hindrance, e.g. through the use of deliberate concealment measures, from other parties.

3.1.3 Parties may have to undertake appropriate internal measures in accordance with their constitutional procedures to prohibit and prevent anywhere under their jurisdiction or control, any activity contrary to the provisions of the convention.

### 3.2 Scope of international verification measures

3.2.1 At the time States become parties to the convention:

Compliance with obligations concerning destruction, dismantling or conversion into peaceful use of

- stockpiles of chemical warfare agents and those weapons specifically intended for chemical warfare
- production facilities/means of production for chemical warfare agents and chemical weapons
- munition filling facilities
- testing and training facilities (The issue of training facilities relates to alt. 2 in 1.1).

3.2.2 Continuously as long as the convention remains in force:

(a) Status of production facilities/means of production which have been converted to peaceful use

(b) Compliance with the prohibitions and other regulations concerning certain activities, materials and facilities (see 1.2), i.a.:

- production of single purpose chemical warfare agents
- production of dual-purpose chemical warfare agents and some binary chemical weapons precursors
- some activities and facilities related to planning, organization and training. (This issue relates to alt. 2 in 1.1)

### 3.3 International measures and procedures for verification

3.3.1 Declarations and exchange of information.

Parties may have to undertake to declare possession (or non-possession) of specific materials, facilities and activities and of plans for disposal of materials and facilities according to 2.1, as well as exchange information on the progress of disposal of stocks and production facilities/means of production. Information may have to be exchanged on permitted production of chemical warfare agents for protective and peaceful purposes.

3.3.2 Consultations

3.3.2.1 Parties may have to undertake to consult each other and to co-operate in solving problems which may arise in relation to the convention.

3.3.2.2 Such consultations could be undertaken bilaterally between the parties concerned, or within the framework of a special procedure established by the convention (see 3.3.5) or within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.

3.3.3 Consultative committee

A consultative committee may have to be established to handle international verification measures at the entry into force of the convention.

3.3.3.1 The committee may be composed of one expert from each State party and with the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his representative as its chairman. It may for specific tasks set up sub-committees and verification teams.

3.3.3.2 The committee may meet for a regular meeting at least once a year and otherwise at the request of a party.

3.3.3.3 The committee may be competent:

(a) to follow the performance of destruction, dismantling and conversion to peaceful purposes of stockpiles of chemical warfare agents, chemical weapons, production facilities/means of production etc. (see 2.2)

- (b) to enquire into facts concerning alleged violations of the convention
- (c) to check periodically through on-site visits facilities for permitted production of chemical warfare agents, with respect to amounts produced and their use
- (d) facilitate compliance with the convention, e.g. by developing international standardization of methods and routines to be applied by national and international verification organs.

3.3.3.4 The committee may be empowered to request from States parties, international organizations, groups and individuals such information and assistance as may be appropriate and relevant to its work.

3.3.3.5 The parties to the convention may have to undertake to co-operate with the committee in carrying out its tasks.

3.3.3.6 The working rules and procedures of the committee may have to provide for effective, fair, impartial and unobtrusive proceedings.

3.3.3.7 If the committee is unable to provide for a unanimous report on its findings of fact, it will present the different views of the experts involved.

3.3.3.8 In order to carry out its tasks the committee may have to be provided with or have access to specific facilities, such as a secretariat, technical experts, chemical and toxicological laboratories and remote sensing equipment.

3.3.3.9 The committee may be allowed to undertake on-site inspections:

- (a) in order to confirm received information concerning planned, on-going or effected destruction, dismantling or conversion, after consultation with the State party concerned (see 3.3.3.3);

- (b) in order to inquire into facts concerning alleged ambiguities in or violations of the compliance with the convention, provided appropriate reasons have been given in support of the necessity of such an investigation.

If the requested party does not agree to on-site inspection, it may have to give appropriate explanations that an on-site inspection would at that time jeopardize its supreme interests.

Procedures are to be developed for on-site investigation, including provisions regarding the rights, obligations and functions of the inspection personnel, and those of the host side.

### 3.3.4 The Security Council

3.3.4.1 The convention may have to provide for the possibility for States parties to lodge a complaint with the Security Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations, if they have made unsuccessful efforts of consultation and co-operation pursuant to the relevant provisions of the convention and have reason to believe that any other State party is acting in breach of obligations under the convention.

3.3.4.2 Parties may then also have to undertake to co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate on the basis of the complaint received by the Council.

#### 4. Voluntary confidence building measures (CBMs)

##### 4.1 Object

Voluntary measures to build confidence with respect to the credibility of States' intentions.

(a) during the negotiating process and after the convention has been concluded but before it has entered into force;

(b) after the convention has entered into force.

CBMs might be undertaken on a bilateral, or multilateral basis, regionally or worldwide, with or without the condition of reciprocity.

##### 4.2 Examples of CBMs during the negotiating process and after the convention has been signed but before it has entered into force

4.2.1 Declarations of possession or non-possession of chemical weapons, production facilities, stockpiles and testing facilities and their location.

4.2.2 Invitations to visit stockpiles, testing facilities, production plants - with or without production of chemical warfare agents - and destruction plants.

4.2.3 Measures to facilitate co-operation between States regarding protection for civilian and military personnel.

4.2.4 Exchange of information on and invitations to attend military manoeuvres which could include elements related to the use of chemical weapons.

4.2.5 Exchange of information on methods for monitoring scientific and technical development relevant to chemical weapons.

##### 4.3 Examples of CBMs after the convention has entered into force

4.3.1 Exchange of information on protective measures, military and civilian, including industrial protective measures, relating also to the protection of workers in the chemical industry.

4.3.2 Invitations to co-operative efforts in areas related to the convention.

4.3.3 Exchange of information on results obtained by national technical means of verification.

#### 5. International co-operation

##### 5.1 Negative provision(s)

The convention should be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic and technological development of parties, for peaceful and protective purposes in fields related to the convention.



## 5.2 Positive provisions

5.2.1 Parties could undertake to exchange information, equipment and materials in order to facilitate the use of chemical agents for peaceful and protective purposes.

5.2.2 The convention could reflect the principle that a substantial portion of possible savings from disarmament measures should be devoted to promoting economic and social development, particularly in developing countries.

5.2.3 The convention could provide for assistance in accordance with the United Nations Charter to parties which so request, if the Security Council decides that they have been exposed to danger as a result of a violation of the convention. This assistance could include protective equipment and medical support in the treatment of chemical casualties.

As an alternative the consultative committee could fulfil this function.

## 6. Formal provisions

### 6.1 Entry into force

As in the ENMOD Convention it could be stipulated that the convention shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by ... Governments. For those States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of the convention, it could enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

### 6.2 Signature, ratification, accession

As in the ENMOD Convention it could be stipulated that the convention shall be open to all States for signature - to be subsequently ratified - and that any State which does not sign the convention before its entry into force may accede to it at any time.

### 6.3 Depositary

As in the ENMOD Convention instruments of ratification or accession could be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

### 6.4 Duration

As in the Biological Weapons and the ENMOD Conventions the convention could be of unlimited duration.

### 6.5 Withdrawals

As in the Biological Weapons Convention States parties could have the right to withdraw from the convention if they decide that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the convention, have jeopardized their supreme interests. It could be stipulated that notice of withdrawal should be given three months in advance and would include a statement of the extraordinary events which the notice-giving parties regard as having jeopardized their supreme interests.

#### 6.6 Review conferences

As in the Biological Weapons Convention it could be stipulated that a conference of the States parties should be held at Geneva ... years after the entry into force of the convention, or earlier if this is requested by a majority of the parties, possibly including the five permanent members of the Security Council, to review the operation of the convention. Provisions for further review conferences, to be held at intervals of five years thereafter and at other times, if requested by a majority of the parties, possibly including the five permanent members of the Security Council, could be included in accordance with established practice concerning the Biological Weapons Convention, though in that case such a provision was not specifically included. Review conferences could also have the function of revising the convention.

#### 6.7 Amendments

As in the Biological Weapons Convention it could be stipulated that amendments, proposed by States parties, shall enter into force for each State party accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States parties and thereafter for each remaining State party, when it accepts them.

#### 6.8 Preamble, annexes and other texts related to the convention

A preamble could be considered expressing the general considerations of the object and purpose of the convention. Furthermore, it could contain a reference to the relationship between the Convention, the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the Biological Weapons Convention.

The detailed technical questions involved in the convention, as well as the detailed organizational and procedural questions regarding the possible consultative committee could be dealt with in annexes, which would form integral parts of the convention.

Voluntary confidence-building measures could be dealt with in resolutions to be adopted by the United Nations General Assembly.

If detailed provisions are needed to deal with the relationship between the convention, the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the Biological Weapons Convention, it could be considered whether such provisions should be embodied in an annex or in a separate protocol.

A protocol could also be considered to deal with possible applications to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and the Biological Weapons Convention of provisions in a chemical weapons convention, e.g. those concerning the functions of a consultative committee.

CD/179/Add.1  
23 April 1981

Original: ENGLISH

The Chairman's Progress Report to the Committee on Disarmament  
on the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons

Page 2, paragraph 7, add after the last document in the list, the following:

"(g) CD/124/Rev.1 submitted by Indonesia entitled "Revision of  
CD/124 on the Definition of Chemical Agent and Chemical  
Warfare Agent""



STATEMENT BY THE GROUP OF 21 ON ITEM 2 OF THE AGENDA  
OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT ENTITLED:

"CESSATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT"

On the initiative of the Group of 21, the Committee on Disarmament engaged, at the latter part of its 1981 Spring session, in a substantive examination of concrete issues relating to item 2 of its agenda (cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament). In the course of this process, the Committee concentrated, on the "pre-conditions for negotiations on nuclear disarmament as well as on doctrines of deterrence and other theories concerning nuclear weapons".

In assessing the discussions that took place under that framework, the Group of 21 is convinced that the need for urgent multilateral action on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, through the adoption of concrete measures, has been once again amply demonstrated. In the opinion of the Group of 21, multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament have been long overdue and the fundamental prerequisite for their success is the political will of States, particularly the nuclear weapon States, to engage in such negotiations.

The discussions, for which Chapters V, VI and the Conclusions of the Secretary-General's "Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons" (A/392) provided useful background material, have confirmed the conviction of the Group of 21 that the nuclear arms race runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tensions; that progress in the field of nuclear disarmament would be beneficial to the strengthening of international peace and security and to the improvement of the international climate, which in turn would facilitate further progress; and that all nations, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, have a vital interest in measures of nuclear disarmament, because the existence of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of a handful of Powers directly and fundamentally jeopardizes the security of the whole world. The promotion of nuclear disarmament would be facilitated by the strict adherence by all States to the principles of the United Nations Charter, and in particular by measures that would bring about the relaxation of international tensions and the peaceful settlement of disputes among States.

The Group of 21 is further convinced, as a result of the discussions, that doctrines of nuclear deterrence, far from being responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, lie at the root of the continuing escalation of the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear armaments and lead to greater insecurity and instability in international relations. Moreover, such doctrines, which in the ultimate analysis are predicated upon the willingness to use nuclear weapons, cannot be the basis for preventing the outbreak of a nuclear war, a war which would affect belligerents and non-belligerents alike. The competitive accumulation of nuclear arms by the nuclear weapons States cannot be condoned on grounds that it is indispensable to their security. Such an argument is patently false considering that the increase in nuclear arsenals, far from contributing to the strengthening of the security of all States, on the contrary, weakens it, and increases the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war. Moreover, the Group of 21 rejects as politically and morally unjustifiable that the security of the whole world should be made to depend on the state of relations existing among nuclear-weapon States.

In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility. That responsibility entails the fulfilment of commitments entered into in international instruments in the field of disarmament, the respect for the security concerns of the non-nuclear nations, the refraining from any action conducive to the intensification of the nuclear arms race and to the increase of international tensions, and above all the duty to take positive and practical steps towards the adoption and implementation of concrete measures of nuclear disarmament.

In the light of this assessment, the Group of 21 firmly believes that the Committee on Disarmament, in which all nuclear weapon States as well as non-nuclear weapon States participate, must continue and intensify the search for a common approach that will enable it to discharge the mandate entrusted to it by the General Assembly of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. In particular, the Group of 21 expects that a growing awareness of the urgency of progress toward nuclear disarmament will facilitate the task of the Committee. Bilateral and regional negotiations, especially with regard to specific areas where the concentration of nuclear armaments increases the danger of confrontation, are useful and should be intensified, but multilateral negotiations on questions of vital interest to nuclear and non-nuclear weapon States alike should be initiated without delay in the Committee on Disarmament, the only multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament.

The Group of 21 believes, in accordance with its considered view already expressed in document CD/64, of 1980 that the immediate objective of the considerations of item 2 by the Committee, at the start of the second part of its 1981 session, should be the establishment of an ad hoc working group with the mandate to elaborate on paragraph 50 of the Final Document and to identify substantive issues for multilateral negotiations, as suggested in document CD/116, as follows:

- (i) the elaboration and clarification of the stages of nuclear disarmament envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document including identification of the responsibilities of the nuclear weapon States and the role of the non-nuclear weapon States in the process of achieving nuclear disarmament;
- (ii) clarification of the issues involved in prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, pending nuclear disarmament, and in the prevention of nuclear war;
- (iii) clarification of the issues involved in eliminating reliance on doctrines of nuclear deterrence;
- (iv) measures to ensure an effective discharge by the CD of its role as the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament and in this context its relationship with negotiations relating to nuclear disarmament conducted in bilateral, regional and other restricted fora.

CD/181  
24 April 1981

Original: ENGLISH

STATEMENT BY THE GROUP OF 21 ON ITEM 1 OF THE AGENDA OF THE  
COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT ENTITLED:

"NUCLEAR TEST BAN"

At the initiative of the Group of 21, the Committee on Disarmament held informal meetings during the first part of its 1981 session to undertake a substantive examination of concrete issues relating to item 1 of its Agenda, entitled Nuclear Test Ban.

The discussions which took place in these informal meetings have further reinforced the conviction held by the Group of 21 that the Committee on Disarmament should proceed without delay to undertake multilateral negotiations on the question of a Nuclear Test Ban. In its Working Paper CD/64 of 27 February, 1980, the Group of 21 had stated that in its considered view Working Groups are the best available machinery for the conduct of concrete negotiations within the Committee on Disarmament. Therefore, the Group of 21 in principle supported the establishment of Working Groups on all items of the Committee's Agenda.

In a subsequent working paper, CD/72 dated 4 March 1980, the Group of 21 urged the setting up of an ad hoc Working Group of the Committee on its Agenda item entitled Nuclear Test Ban, during the first part of the 1980 session. Unfortunately, no consensus could be reached on this proposal during the entire 1980 session of the Committee on Disarmament.

The Group of 21 would recommend that in the light of the discussions held in informal meetings of the Committee, the Committee on Disarmament should, at the beginning of the second part of its 1981 session, decide to set up an ad hoc Working Group on item 1 of its Agenda. In order to facilitate the adoption of this decision, the Group of 21 would suggest the following mandate for the ad hoc Working Group:

"The Committee on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of the second part of its 1981 session, an ad hoc Working Group of the Committee to negotiate on provisions relating to the Scope, Verification of Compliance, and the Final Clauses of a draft treaty relating to Item 1 of its Agenda, entitled 'Nuclear Test Ban'. The ad hoc Working Group will report to the Committee on Disarmament on the progress of its work at an appropriate time and in any case before the conclusion of its 1981 session.

During the course of negotiations on this item, the ad hoc Working Group will take into account existing proposals and future initiatives, including the reports on the trilateral negotiations among the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States of America on this subject presented during the 1979 and 1980 sessions of the Committee on Disarmament, as well as any future reports on the trilateral negotiations that may be submitted to the Committee by the parties concerned during the remainder of its 1981 session".

The Group of 21 firmly believes that the Committee on Disarmament is entitled to know without further delay the specific reasons that have so far prevented the three nuclear weapon States, which have been carrying out among themselves separate negotiations for the past four years, to heed the often repeated and pressing appeals of the General Assembly to the effect of expediting such negotiations "with a view to bringing them to a positive conclusion as a matter of urgency" and to transmit the results to the Committee on Disarmament.

As a further contribution to the work of the Committee on Disarmament on a Nuclear Test Ban, the Group of 21 would like to draw attention to specific questions which have been addressed jointly or separately to the parties engaged in the trilateral negotiations, in the course of both formal and informal meetings of the Committee during the first part of its 1981 session. The questions which are still awaiting suitable response from the negotiating States, are of relevance to the concerns of the international community, which has repeatedly deplored the continuance of the testing of nuclear weapons and has called for the early conclusion of a Nuclear Test Ban. Clarifications and further information have been requested from the States engaged in trilateral negotiations, on the following key issues:

#### I - Conduct of Multilateral Negotiations:

1. What is the role that the trilateral negotiators envisage for the Committee on Disarmament to play in the multilateral negotiation of a treaty on the Nuclear Test Ban, given the consensus reached in paragraph 51 of the Final Document that the trilateral negotiation should be concluded urgently and the result submitted to the Committee on Disarmament for full consideration by the multilateral negotiating body with a view to the submission of a draft treaty to the General Assembly at the earliest possible date?
2. What are, in the view of the trilateral negotiators, the main obstacles to the conclusion of the trilateral negotiations?
3. When do the trilateral negotiators believe that their negotiations will be resumed and by what time are they likely to be concluded?

#### II - Scope

4. Do the trilateral negotiators consider the scope of the treaty under negotiation broad enough to contribute effectively to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament?
5. Does the treaty under negotiation make provision for the promotion of the peaceful applications of nuclear technology, especially in the developing countries?
6. What specific arrangements, if any, are envisaged to provide for the conduct of PNE's under the treaty they are negotiating? Would the framework within which each State Party could conduct PNE's under the future treaty be the subject of multilateral negotiation?
7. Do the trilateral negotiators intend the treaty under negotiation among them to be an adequate basis for a truly comprehensive and universal ban on nuclear weapon testing by all States in all environments for all time to come, which is the goal of the international community as expressed in several Resolutions of the General Assembly?



### III - Verification of Compliance:

8. How would the trilateral negotiators reconcile the dual system of verification measures that they are negotiating with the principle that a multilateral treaty should create equal rights and obligations for all its Parties?
9. What are the "special concerns and circumstances" that make additional measures of verification necessary?
10. Would the trilateral negotiators clarify as to what specific measures are included under "national technical means of verification"? Would the information gathered by such means be available, without discrimination, to all States Parties to the treaty?

### IV - Other Clauses

11. The international community has repeatedly expressed its conviction that a treaty on a Nuclear Test Ban must be of unlimited duration. Will the trilateral negotiators conform with that conviction and, if that were not the case, clarify what is the duration they have in mind?
12. Since it is highly desirable that the future treaty should attract universal adherence, and should be based on the principle of equal rights for all its Parties, what special reasons do the trilateral negotiators have to accord the permanent members of the Security Council a virtual veto over the amendment procedure to be included in the treaty?



STATEMENT OF A GROUP OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ON THE RESULTS OF THE  
FIRST PART OF THE 1981 SESSION OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

This year the work of the Committee on Disarmament has been proceeding in a notable period. The 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has been an event of historic dimensions. The Congress has put forward a broad and multifaceted programme for the invigoration of the international situation comprising a wide range of constructive ideas and initiatives very important for the cause of peace. These new major ideas and initiatives are an organic continuation and elaboration of the Programme of Peace moved by the 24th and 25th Congresses of the CPSU with regard to the most topical problems of the contemporary international relations. The pride of place among them belongs to the proposals aimed at bridling the arms race and at disarmament, that is the proposals concerning the key problem of the present-day international life. These initiatives are concrete and realistic and they cover the main aspects and directions of the military detente.

The implementation of the programme advanced at the Congress would open up the way for the solution of the most acute and long-ripe international issues, the creation of a climate of mutual trust and peaceful co-operation among States for the sake of peace and the security of all peoples. All this would undoubtedly contribute to the productive work of the Committee on Disarmament and would have the most favourable impact on the settlement of the responsible and important tasks facing it.

Congresses of the Communist Parties which have a great international import have also taken place in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic. The decisions adopted by all these congresses just as the decisions of the previously held congresses of other fraternal socialist States convincingly demonstrate the unshakeable allegiance of the countries of the socialist community to the lofty ideals of peace, detente and disarmament. This foreign policy course of the socialist countries is of a long-term nature and is not susceptible to the momentary trends.

Many of the disarmament proposals put forward at the congresses have the most direct bearing on the activities of the Committee. In the course of the session the delegations of the socialist countries have been drawing the attention of the participants in the negotiations to the decisions of the congresses pertaining to the disarmament issues, have been explaining in detail their contents, and have been stressing the importance of these decisions for the fulfilment of the tasks facing the Committee. We note with satisfaction that many delegations in the Committee -- as a reflection of the most vivid response in the world produced by the work of the congresses -- have shown profound interest to their materials.

It is undoubtedly a positive fact that this year the session of the Committee has gotten under way and has been proceeding, on the whole, in a businesslike and constructive tonality. Attempts by certain delegations to poison the atmosphere of negotiations, to introduce in the work of the Committee questions of no relevance to its business have not yielded the desired results. It is essential to preserve in future as well the businesslike trend in the work of the Committee and the constructive tone of the discussions.

Practically on all agenda items of the Committee the socialist States have submitted concrete and realistic proposals dictated by their genuine concern for the advancement in the solution of the most important and long-ripe questions of disarmament. To this end, the delegations of the socialist countries have sought to assign the highest priority in the work of the Committee primarily to those questions which are of paramount importance for bridling the arms race, deepening the relaxation of tensions, and relieving mankind from the threat of a nuclear war.

Proceeding from the belief that the nuclear weapons constitute the gravest peril to the survival of humanity, the delegations of the socialist countries, just as at the previous sessions of the Committee, have consistently advocated the consideration of the questions related to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament as a matter of highest priority. As early as in February 1979 the socialist countries moved an initiative on that issue which has gained a wide recognition. With a view to preparing negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race the socialist countries have proposed to hold consultations within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament. They have also supported the proposal to establish an ad hoc working group. The socialist countries believe that it is necessary, first and foremost, to determine a set of questions to be examined and to resolve the questions connected with the organizational aspect of the negotiations. The subject matter of the negotiations must be, in the view of the socialist countries, the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed.

The socialist countries attach considerable importance to the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. They are in favour of the Committee playing an active part in the solution of this task and they express themselves in support of the proposal on setting up within the framework of the Committee an ad hoc working group on that issue on condition of the participation in it of all the nuclear Powers.

The socialist countries continue to attach great significance to the trilateral negotiations on this issue. They take the view that the consideration of the problem of the nuclear tests ban within the Committee must not complicate the course of the negotiations. The lack of political will on the part of the United States and Great Britain is the main reason why the treaty has not yet been concluded.

Taking into account the importance and urgency of the problem of the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present, the socialist countries have moved a proposal to establish an ad hoc group on this subject.

In the circumstances which have developed in the Committee when because of the lack of consensus ad hoc working groups have not been established on the first and second items of its agenda, the socialist countries, seeking to initiate as early as possible businesslike negotiations on the substance of the problems of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament as well as on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, have supported the proposal on holding informal meetings of the Committee on Disarmament. While not regarding the holding of such meetings as a substitute for the establishment of corresponding working groups, the co-authors of this Statement share the opinion on the usefulness of such form of work in the Committee on Disarmament.

The vivid exchange of views which has been held at the informal meetings has once again demonstrated in a very convincing manner the interest shown by the overwhelming majority of the delegations to ensuring that the Committee on Disarmament make its own concrete and weighty contribution to the attainment of nuclear disarmament and the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests.

The socialist countries deem it imperative and advisable to go on, at the summer session of the Committee, with the consideration of questions related to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament, including the question of the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present as well as the issue of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests. A basis for such discussions could be found in the considerations of a group of socialist countries (document CD/162) as well as in the proposals by the Group of 21.

The socialist countries attach great importance to the problem of strengthening the security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States.

The socialist countries believe that one of the most effective means of strengthening the security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States would be the conclusion of a relevant international convention. In view of the negative position taken by certain States in this respect, however, and remaining at the same time staunch advocates of the idea of an international convention, the socialist countries have also expressed their willingness to consider another possible alternative of solving the problem, provided that a similar approach would be followed by all nuclear-weapon States. In particular, they have suggested that all nuclear-weapon States make identical or similar in substance solemn declarations concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which have no such weapons on their territories. Such declarations, if they meet the abovementioned objective, could be backed up by an authoritative decision of the United Nations Security Council.

The socialist countries have proposed that the work of the ad hoc working group on security assurances be organized on a constructive and realistic basis and the possibility of working out a common approach of the negotiating parties, including all nuclear-weapon States, be considered in practical terms. The debate held in the ad hoc working group has contributed to clarifying further the positions of States and has given rise to some interesting observations on the substance of the security guarantees.

The delegations of the socialist countries continue to believe that the problem of strengthening the security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States retains its importance in the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament and they are determined to spare no efforts in order to resolve effectively this high priority task.

An important direction in the work of the Committee, in the view of the delegations of the socialist countries, has been and continues to be the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. This issue, like all other items on the agenda of the Committee should be discussed using the appropriate organizational structures. We welcome the fact that the advantages of a competent examination of this issue in a group of experts are becoming ever more obvious for many of the delegations in the Committee. The mandate of such a group could be agreed upon at informal meetings of the Committee on Disarmament with the participation of experts during the summer part of the current session as proposed by the delegation of Hungary in its working paper CD/174.

In the opinion of the delegations of the socialist countries, at the spring part of the session of the Committee on Disarmament real opportunities have existed for reaching agreement on the text of a treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons. Regrettably, one has to state that, although the ad hoc working group on this issue has, indeed, succeeded in bringing somewhat closer the positions of the negotiating parties, nevertheless agreement has not yet been reached on the fundamental articles of a treaty. The delegations of the socialist countries intend to continue to work perseveringly for the earliest achievement of a final agreement on the text of a treaty, the importance of the conclusion of which is underlined both in the Final Document of the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament and in numerous resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly.

The socialist countries resolutely condemn the revival of the plans for the production and deployment of neutron weapons in Western Europe. The realization of these plans would seriously exacerbate the danger of a nuclear war, and it is not by accident that the broadest possible masses of the world's public are opposing the neutron weapons.

It is demonstrative that the voices of protest against the plans for the production and deployment of neutron weapons in West European countries have been raised within the walls of the Committee on Disarmament as well. All the above stresses once again the urgency of the appeal to ban the neutron weapons at the international scale on a contractual basis as it was made by the socialist countries in March 1978.

During the consideration of questions related to the prohibition of chemical weapons the socialist countries have directed their efforts to identifying such approaches to the solution of this problem which would lead to a success. In particular, they have expressed their view on the question of the prohibition under the future convention in working papers tabled in the corresponding ad hoc working group.

The socialist countries note with satisfaction the businesslike character of the examination of many aspects of the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons and of the identification of the more similar approaches to some of them. We share the opinion of those delegations which hold the view that the resumption of the Soviet-American talks on this subject would facilitate the earliest elaboration of a convention banning chemical weapons.

The socialist countries are fully determined to continue to act in the spirit of the resolution 35/144 B adopted by the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly which urged States to exert all efforts for the earliest successful conclusion of the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

The delegations of the socialist countries have actively participated in the consideration of the question of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. They consider that this programme can play an important part in stimulating disarmament negotiations. It is essential that in elaborating a comprehensive programme of disarmament all States should strictly adhere to the provisions of the Final Document of the first Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, the report of the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade.

The programme will be viable if it has as its basis the principle of undiminished security of all parties. The group of the socialist countries states its intention to continue its constructive co-operation with all members of the Committee on Disarmament in the elaboration of this document.

At the summer part of the Committee's session negotiations will have to be continued on the items on its agenda. It will be an especially responsible period due to the fact that the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament is scheduled to be held in 1982. It is quite obvious that on the political will of the participants in the negotiations and on their readiness to reach concrete agreements in the disarmament sphere will depend the judgement passed on the Committee's activities at the special session.

As for the socialist States, they, being guided by the decisions of the congresses of the Communist Parties and relevant decisions of the Political Consultative Committee of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, will continue to exert all efforts to contribute to the productive work of the Committee, to the solution of the issues related to the curbing of the arms race and to disarmament, to the consolidation of peace and international security.





**COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT**

CD/183

12 June 1981

Original: ENGLISH

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CANADA

A Conceptual Working Paper on Arms Control Verification  
Produced by the Arms Control and Disarmament Division,  
Department of External Affairs and the Operational  
Research and Analysis Establishment, Department of  
National Defence, Ottawa 1/

The above-mentioned conceptual working paper was introduced in the Committee on Disarmament at its 128th plenary meeting on 11 June 1981.

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1/ A limited distribution of this document in English has been made to the members of the Committee on Disarmament. Additional copies are available from the Secretariat of the Committee.



**COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT**

CD/184  
15 June 1981  
Original: ENGLISH

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LETTER DATED 12 JUNE 1981 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF PAKISTAN  
ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING  
RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE TWELFTH ISLAMIC CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS  
HELD IN BAGHDAD FROM 1 TO 6 JUNE 1981

I have the honour to enclose copies of resolutions adopted by the  
Twelfth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Baghdad on  
1-6 June 1981 on "Strengthening the Security of Non-Nuclear States against the  
use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" and "the Establishment of Nuclear  
Weapon Free Zones in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia".

It is requested that the texts of the resolutions may kindly be circulated  
as official documents of the Committee.

(Signed) Mansur Ahmad  
Ambassador and  
Permanent Representative

GE.81-61966



Texts of the resolutions

on

1. Strengthening the security of non-nuclear States  
against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

and

2. The Establishment of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones  
in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia

adopted by

The Twelfth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers,  
Baghdad, 1-6 June 1981

Resolution No. 28/12-P

Strengthening the security of non-nuclear States against  
the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

Begins. The Twelfth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, held in Baghdad, Republic of Iraq, during the period 29 Rajab - 4 Sha, ban 1401 H, (corresponding to 1-6 June 1981),

Deeply concerned at the continuing escalation of the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, and the possibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarters,

Recognizing that effective measures to assure the non-nuclear States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can constitute a positive contribution to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons,

Recalling the resolutions of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers regarding assurances from the nuclear powers to non-nuclear States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Further recalling that the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly had called for the nuclear weapons States to conclude urgently effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Welcoming the in-depth negotiations initiated in the Committee on Disarmament and its working group on the question of effective international arrangements to assure the non-nuclear States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Noting that the Thirty-fifth Session of the United Nations General Assembly has recommended that the Committee on Disarmament should actively continue negotiations with a view to reaching agreement and concluding effective international arrangements during its next session to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective,

1. Notes with satisfaction that in the Committee on Disarmament there is no objection in principle, to the idea of an international convention to assure non-nuclear States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, although there has been lack of progress in the Committee towards evolving a common approach acceptable to all,

2. Requests the members of the Committee on Disarmament to reach an urgent agreement on an international convention to assure non-nuclear States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

3. Recommends that the Islamic countries should continue to co-operate in the Committee on Disarmament, the United Nations General Assembly and other relevant international forums with a view to promoting the above-mentioned objective aimed at strengthening the security of non-nuclear States against the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons,

4. Requests the Secretary-General of the Islamic Conference, pursuant to the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 35/36 to closely follow up new developments in this respect and to report thereon to the 13th Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers.

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Ends.

Resolution No. 29/12-P

The Establishment of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones in  
Africa, the Middle East and South Asia

The Twelfth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, held in Baghdad, Republic of Iraq, during the period 29 Rajab to 4 Sha,ban 1401 H, (corresponding to 1-6 June 1981).

Recognizing that the establishment of nuclear weapon free zones in various regions of the world is one of the objectives of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and general and complete disarmament,

Convinced that the establishment of such nuclear weapon free zones in various regions will strengthen the security of States of the regions against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Recalling that the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly recommended the creation of such nuclear weapon free zones in various parts of the world, including Africa, the Middle East and South Asia,

Further recalling the resolutions of the previous sessions of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers regarding the establishment of nuclear weapon free zones in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia,

Taking account of Resolutions Nos. 35/146-B, 35/147 and 35/148 adopted at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly on the establishment of nuclear weapon free zones in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia,

Further taking into account Thirty-fifth United Nations General Assembly Resolutions Nos. 35/157 and 35/146-A dealing respectively with Israeli nuclear armament and the nuclear capability of South Africa,

Noting the declarations issued at the highest level by Government of South Asian States reaffirming their undertaking not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons and to devote their nuclear programmes exclusively to the economic and social advancement of their peoples,

Bearing in mind the declaration of the denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first ordinary session, held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964,

Deeply concerned at the attempts and designs of South Africa and Israel to acquire nuclear weapons,

Noting the opposition of these two racist entities to the creation of nuclear weapon free zones in their regions,

1. Calls upon all States to respond positively to the proposals for the establishment of nuclear weapon free zones in the regions of Africa, the Middle East and South Asia,

2. Vigorously condemns the development of nuclear weapon capability on the part of Israel and South Africa,



3. Condemns any collaboration with the régimes of South Africa and Israel which enables them to develop nuclear weapons and frustrates the objectives of creating nuclear weapon free zones,
4. Reaffirms the determination of the Islamic States to take measures to prevent nuclear proliferation on a non-discriminatory and universal basis,
5. Requests all Islamic States to continue to co-operate at the United Nations and in other relevant international forums to jointly promote the goals of the establishment of nuclear weapon free zones in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia,
6. Requests the Secretary-General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, in pursuance of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution No. 35/36 to closely follow the developments in this regard and report thereon to the thirteenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers.



CD/195  
16 June 1981  
ENGLISH  
Original: SPANISH

LETTER DATED 9 JUNE 1981 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE  
OF SPAIN ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON  
DISARMAMENT CONCERNING THE DECISION TAKEN BY THE COMMITTEE  
AT ITS 104th PLENARY MEETING ON 10 FEBRUARY 1981

With reference to my letter dated 1 April 1981 (CD/175), I am pleased to inform you that Mr. Ignacio Ferrer will attend, as an expert, the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, to be held in the summer, as soon as a decision on this matter is taken by the Plenary Committee.

With regard to the Working Group on negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, to which Spain has been invited by the Committee on Disarmament (letter dated 3 April), I am pleased to inform you that Mrs. María Rosa Boceta, Counsellor at this Permanent Mission, will attend its meetings.

[Signed] Enrique Domínguez Passier  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative



Programme of Work of the Committee on Disarmament  
for the second part of its 1981 session  
(Adopted at the 129th plenary meeting on 16 June 1981)

In compliance with rule 28 of its Rules of Procedure, the Committee on Disarmament adopts the following programme of work for the second part of its 1981 session:

- 11-19 June: Statements in the plenary meetings. Consideration of the programme of work for the second part of the 1981 session, as well as of the establishment of additional subsidiary bodies and questions relating to the organization of work. 1/
- 22-26 June: Nuclear test ban.
- 29 June-3 July: Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.
- 6-10 July: New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.
- 13-17 July: Chemical weapons.
- 20-24 July: Comprehensive programme of disarmament.
- 27-31 July: Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
- 3-7 August: Further consideration of agenda items and outstanding questions relating to the organization of work. 1/
- 10... August: Consideration of the reports of subsidiary bodies.
- Consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report as appropriate to the General Assembly of the United Nations. 2/

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\*/ Reissued for technical reasons.

1/ These questions are spelt out in the statement of the Chairman.

2/ The annual report of the Committee will, inter alia, deal with the question of the consideration of the modalities of the review of the membership of the Committee.

The ad hoc working groups already established by the Committee shall continue to hold at least one meeting per week, starting on 16 June, as follows:

- Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons on Tuesday afternoons;
- Chemical weapons on Wednesday afternoons;
- Comprehensive programme of disarmament on Thursday afternoons;
- Radiological Weapons on Friday mornings.

Additional meetings of the ad hoc working groups may be convened weekly after consultations between the Chairman of the Committee and the Chairmen of the ad hoc working groups according to the circumstances and needs of the various groups.

The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events shall meet from 3 to 14 August.

In adopting its programme of work, the Committee has kept in mind the provisions of rules 30 and 31 of its Rules of Procedure.

Statement by the Group of 21 on the Israeli air attack  
against a nuclear facility on 7 June 1981

1. The members of the Group of 21 have consistently upheld the principles of the United Nations Charter regarding strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of States and non-use of force or threat of force in international relations. The members of the group have always opposed and continue to oppose all acts of aggression and violation of these principles.
2. Therefore, the Group of 21 condemns the blatant aggression committed by Israel against the peaceful nuclear facilities in the vicinity of Baghdad on 7 June 1981. It considers that this unprecedented attack, and the untenable reasoning used to justify it, are matters of special concern to the Committee on Disarmament. This action by Israel furthermore contravenes the provisions of paragraphs 65 to 71 of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament relating to nuclear non-proliferation and the development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. It also poses a challenge to the sovereign and inalienable right of every State to acquire and develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.
3. This attack is all the more unwarranted as the developing, non-aligned and neutral countries are strongly opposed to nuclear weapons and have been in the vanguard of efforts for nuclear disarmament. The Group of 21 rejects the assertions that have sought to portray the development of peaceful nuclear energy programmes in developing countries as an inevitable threat of horizontal nuclear weapons proliferation.
4. The Group of 21 is convinced that the international community should condemn this aggression and take all the necessary measures to ensure against the repetition of such an aggression by Israel or any other State. It urges the Committee on Disarmament to reaffirm the international principle prohibiting an attack against the peaceful nuclear facilities of a State under any circumstances. The Group recommends that the Committee take appropriate steps which would contribute to reversing the adverse implications of this action.





MEXICO

Working paper on item 2 of the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament for 1981  
entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament"

In February 1981, at the request of the Mexican delegation, the secretariat of the Committee on Disarmament circulated working paper CD/145, dated 11 February 1981, which reproduced the declaration approved by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues presided over by Mr. Olof Palme, former Prime Minister of Sweden, at the conclusion of its third session held in Vienna from 6 to 8 February 1981. Details of the membership of the Commission were given in an annex to the working paper.

In the introduction to the working paper, the Mexican delegation explained the reasons which had led it to make that request and which amounted, in sum, to its conviction that it is extremely desirable that the Committee on Disarmament should at all times be kept duly informed of any events of any significance which may occur at the international level in matters relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament in view of the fact that that item occupies no less than second place on the agenda of this "single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum".

It is for these same reasons that the delegation of Mexico has requested the circulation of the present working paper which reproduces the two declarations approved by the above-mentioned Commission at its fourth and fifth sessions concerning, respectively, the urgent need for the resumption of negotiations on so-called "theatre nuclear weapons" or medium-range nuclear weapons, and the Treaty concluded between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 26 May 1972, during the first stage of the SALT talks, bearing the title "Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems".

1. DECLARATION APPROVED BY THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON  
DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY ISSUES AT THE CONCLUSION OF  
ITS FOURTH SESSION HELD IN GENEVA  
FROM 24 TO 26 APRIL 1981

Members of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, meeting in Geneva from 24-26 April, express serious concern about the present state of affairs in the field of arms control and disarmament.

The Commission considers that along with resumption of the SALT process, the most important step to arrest the present adverse trend, would be negotiations on the limitation of theatre nuclear forces and calls on the United States and the Soviet Union to start such negotiations without any loss of time.

At the meeting, the Commission concluded that failure to begin talks and make progress soon towards the control and reduction of these weapons would result in aggravating the present dangerous situation in Europe, with repercussions for the rest of the world.

The Commission carefully assessed the inherent complexities and difficulties relating to the talks. The Commission, however, believe that both sides should show flexibility during the talks in relation to preparation for deployment of the missiles, actual deployment of the missiles and possible reductions in missiles. It urges that each side should give serious consideration to proposals of the other that have been or will be put forward.

The Commission believes that the talks could promise success if based on the following principles:

- (i) The talks should be resumed without pre-conditions on either side.
- (ii) Although the strategic arms limitation talks and negotiations on theatre nuclear weapons are closely interconnected, the sides should be prepared to start negotiations on theatre nuclear forces now.
- (iii) Both sides should strive to create a positive atmosphere in this field to help the conduct of the negotiations.
- (iv) The sides should strive for agreements that would limit, reduce, or end present and prospective deployment of theatre nuclear systems.
- (v) The sides along with their respective allies should proceed with a sense of urgency consistent with the standard of equality and equal security.

2. DECLARATION APPROVED BY THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON  
DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY ISSUES AT THE CONCLUSION OF  
ITS FIFTH SESSION HELD IN MOSCOW  
FROM 12 TO 14 JUNE 1981

The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, meeting in Moscow on 12-14 June, reaffirming its serious concern about the present state of affairs in the field of arms control and disarmament, urges that the Soviet Union and the United States should maintain the Soviet-American Treaty of 1972 on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.

The Commission felt that the ABM Treaty is not only a vital part of the SALT process, but a prerequisite for its continuation and for stabilizing nuclear arms relationships. The ABM Treaty provides the foundation of strategic stability necessary for the continuation of SALT in such a manner that substantial reductions and important qualitative limitations of nuclear weapons may be achieved.

The Commission noted that there is increasing interest in ballistic missile defenses. The main reason for this is that confidence in the survivability of land-based missiles has decreased because of greater numbers of accurate missile warheads. As a result, steps are underway to modernize or provide greater security for the land-based missiles of both parties.

The Commission concluded that attempts to ensure the survivability of ICBM's by building systems for ballistic missile defense would require abrogation or major modification of the ABM Treaty, while likely to offer only marginal benefit in protecting land-based missiles. If deployed by one party, it would be matched by the other party, and would be both costly and destabilizing. The Commission therefore believes that a negotiated settlement reducing substantially the levels of strategic forces would be a much more effective way of promoting peace and stability.

The Commission also noted that with the increasing numbers and sophistication of offensive arms, there is still no technology in sight capable of providing an effective ABM system for the defense of cities and populations against a massive attack.

The Commission believes, therefore, that the United States and the Soviet Union should continue to preserve the letter and spirit of this most important document.

The Commission also reviewed technological developments in the field of verification which could make it possible to negotiate far-reaching limitations on the number and characteristics of weapon systems. Particular attention was paid to how compliance with limitations on strategic arms would be verified, and to the main reasons which have been more frequently advanced as an explanation of the delay in concluding a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB), which has been under consideration in the United Nations for a quarter of a century. Satellite-based photo-reconnaissance systems, radar devices, and seismic stations were among the technologies which were discussed.

The Commission concluded that although no verification system is totally foolproof or immune to charges of cheating, the treaties and agreements relating to strategic arms are adequately verifiable. Co-operative measures and mechanisms for consultation such as are provided in the ABII Treaty and other treaties will further enhance confidence that agreements are being observed.

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/189  
25 June 1981

Original: ENGLISH/RUSSIAN

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LETTER DATED 22 JUNE 1981 ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF MONGOLIA TRANSMITTING AN EXTRACT FROM THE REPORT OF THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY, PRESIDENT OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE GREAT PEOPLE'S KHURAL, MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC COMRADE YU.TSEDENBAL TO THE XVIII CONGRESS OF THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY

I have the honour to send you herewith the enclosed extract from the report of the General Secretary of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, President of the Presidium of the Great People's Khural, Mongolian People's Republic comrade Yu.Tsedenbal to the XVIII Congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party.

I would request you kindly to circulate it, in accordance with the rules of procedure of the Committee on Disarmament, as an official document to the members of the Committee.

(Signed) DUGERSURENGIIN ERDEMBILEG

Ambassador, Permanent Representative

EXTRACT FROM REPORT OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF MPRP  
DELIVERED BY YU.TSEDENBAL, GENERAL SECRETARY OF  
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S  
REVOLUTIONARY PARTY

THE ACTIVITY OF THE MPRP IN THE FIELD OF FOREIGN POLICY AND THE FURTHER TASKS

In close co-operation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the Mongolian People's Republic will:

- actively and consistently pursue the policy of consolidating detente and improving the international situation;
- promote in every way the implementation of the peace initiatives advanced by the XXVI Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as a follow-up to the Peace Programme;
- support the efforts of peace-loving States to curb the arms race and adopt effective measures in the field of military detente and disarmament;
- contribute within the framework of the United Nations and other international organizations to efforts aimed at finding constructive solutions to the pressing problems of today;
- contribute in every way to strengthening peace and security in Asia through joint efforts of Asian States;
- work for a further expansion of the political dialogue and the equal co-operation in various fields with the countries of Asia.

The Mongolian People's Republic is coming forward with the proposal to draft and sign a convention on mutual non-aggression and non-use of force in relations among the countries of Asia and the Pacific Ocean. For this purpose, a conference of countries of the region could be called, and all permanent members of the UN Security Council could be invited to it.

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/190  
26 June 1981

Original: ENGLISH

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LETTER DATED 22 JUNE 1981 ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE  
COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT FROM THE DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE,  
CHARGE D'AFFAIRES a.i. OF AUSTRIA CONCERNING THE DECISION TAKEN  
BY THE COMMITTEE AT ITS 113TH PLENARY MEETING ON 10 MARCH 1981

With reference to the decision of the Committee on Disarmament adopted at its 113th plenary meeting and concerning the participation of the representative of Austria in the meetings of certain ad hoc working groups, I have the honour to submit the following request:

The Austrian Government would be grateful if its representative were also invited to participate in the work of the ad hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons.

(signed)

Winfried LANG  
Deputy Permanent Representative  
Chargé d'affaires a.i.





COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/191  
30 June 1981  
ENGLISH  
Original: RUSSIAN

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LETTER DATED 30 JUNE 1981 ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN  
OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE  
OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS TRANSMITTING  
THE APPEAL OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE UNION OF  
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS TO THE PARLIAMENTS AND  
PEOPLES OF THE WORLD

I have the honour to forward to you the appeal of the Supreme Soviet of the  
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the parliaments and peoples of the world.

I request that it be distributed as an official document of the  
Committee on Disarmament.

(Signed) V. ISSRAELYAN

APPEAL  
OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS  
TO THE PARLIAMENTS AND PEOPLES OF THE WORLD

The Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, disturbed by the increasing military danger and the unprecedented scope of the arms race, appeals to the parliaments and peoples of the world.

The Supreme Soviet of the USSR issues this appeal on the 40th anniversary of the attack by Nazi fascism on our homeland. The Soviet people bow their heads to the glorious memory of 20 million of their fellow countrymen who fell during the war. The Second World War inflicted incalculable disasters and sufferings on all mankind. We deeply revere the memory of all those who sacrificed their lives in the struggle against aggression for the sake of peace on earth.

History has taught a stern lesson. The peoples have paid far too high a price for the failure to prevent war, to avert in time the threat hanging over the world. A repetition of the tragedy must not be allowed. Everything must and can be done to prevent another world war.

The planet is already more than saturated with weapons of mass annihilation. But still these weapons are being accumulated, and new weapons are being developed that are ever more sophisticated and destructive. Launching pads are being prepared for hundreds more nuclear missiles in western Europe. People are being conditioned to the criminal idea of the permissibility of the use of nuclear weapons.

Political tension is being aggravated. Once again the stakes are being placed on the attainment of military superiority; the language of threats is being resorted to. Pretexts for interference in the affairs of other countries and peoples are being openly advanced. And all this is being done under cover of a gross fabrication about a "Soviet military threat".

The Supreme Soviet of the USSR solemnly declares that the Soviet Union is not threatening anyone, is not seeking confrontation with any State in the West or in the East. The Soviet Union has not striven and is not striving to secure military superiority. It has not been and will not be the initiator of new spirals in the armaments race. There is no type of weapon it would not agree to limit, to ban, on a reciprocal basis, by agreement with other States.

The safeguarding of peace has been, is and will remain the supreme aim of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. This is the goal of the peace programme for the 1980s adopted by the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It includes measures for the reduction both of nuclear and of conventional weapons; it contains proposals for the settlement of existing conflicts and crisis situations and the prevention of new ones; it is permeated with the desire to deepen détente and develop peaceful co-operation between countries on all continents. It expresses the readiness of the Soviet Union to engage in negotiations on all urgent issues affecting peace and security, its readiness to give careful consideration to any constructive ideas put forward by other States.

In our nuclear age, dialogue and negotiations are needed equally by all, just as all need peace, security and confidence in the future. There is now no other sane method of solving disputed problems, no matter how acute and complex they are, than by negotiations. Not a single opportunity must be missed. Time will not wait.

With each day lost for negotiations, the risk of nuclear conflict grows greater. The solution of urgent problems confronting each people and all peoples is being shelved. Time will not wait!

At the present time, all those who through their actions encourage the arms race and the further stockpiling in the world of the means for the mass annihilation of people, who advocate the use of force in the solution of disputed issues between States, or who merely close their eyes to the dangers threatening the world today, are in fact pushing mankind towards the abyss.

The Supreme Soviet of the USSR addresses itself to the legislative bodies of all countries with an appeal to speak out vigorously in favour of negotiations which would make a new round in the nuclear arms race impossible - honest and equal negotiations without any preliminary conditions or attempts at diktat.

The Supreme Soviet of the USSR earnestly hopes that its appeal will be considered with all the attention merited by this most important, most pressing issue of our time. It is convinced that parliaments have the necessary prerogatives and authority to be able to press effectively for a curbing of the arms race and for disarmament through negotiations. For its part, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR will continue to make its contribution to the creation of an atmosphere conducive to the achievement of positive results through negotiations.

Peace is the common possession of mankind, and in our time also the paramount condition for man's existence. It is only through joint efforts that it can and must be maintained and reliably safeguarded.

SUPREME SOVIET  
OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

The Kremlin,  
Moscow,  
23 June 1981.



STATEMENT OF THE GROUP OF 21(Item 1: Nuclear Test Ban)

The Group of 21 deeply regrets that its proposal on the establishment of an ad hoc working group of the Committee on Disarmament on item 1 of the agenda, first formulated specifically in document CD/72, dated 4 March 1980, and reiterated most recently in document CD/181, dated 24 April 1981, has not yet been the subject of a decision, despite the urgency of the issue and the consistent interest and effort of the Group.

The Group of 21 firmly believes that the general aspects of the question of the Nuclear Test Ban, as well as technical issues related thereto, have been exhaustively and thoroughly discussed and studied. The results of such discussions and studies, together with the many General Assembly resolutions dealing with the matter, clearly indicate that the commencement of multilateral negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on this priority item are long overdue. The Committee on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on questions of disarmament, is the appropriate forum for such negotiations.

Accordingly, the Group of 21 requests that the proposal contained in document CD/181, which includes the establishment of an ad hoc working group on item 1 of the agenda and the formulation of its mandate, be taken up by the Committee at its next official meeting for a decision.

If, contrary to what could reasonably be expected, it were not possible to reach a positive decision, the Group believes that it would be necessary to examine what further steps should be taken by the Committee to ensure that its Rules of Procedure are not used in such a way as to prevent the Committee from taking procedural decisions enabling it to conduct negotiations on the items included on its annual agenda.

The Group of 21 expects further that the parties to the trilateral negotiations should give careful consideration and provide, jointly or individually, an adequate response to the questions submitted in document CD/181 which raise some issues of deep concern and legitimate interest to the world community.



## GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Considerations on the further proceeding of the Committee on Disarmament  
concerning item 2 of its agenda

1. The German Democratic Republic and the other socialist countries have consistently advocated the consideration of the questions related to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament as a matter of highest priority for the Committee on Disarmament. As early as in February 1979 they proposed in document CD/4 to start negotiations on ending the production of nuclear weapons and destroying them. To orderly prepare those negotiations they favoured the holding of consultations within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament. They also supported the proposal to set up an ad hoc working group on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. When during the first part of this session, due to the position of some nuclear-weapon States, it was not possible to reach consensus on the establishment of such an ad hoc working group, the socialist countries favoured the holding of informal meetings on prerequisites for negotiations on nuclear disarmament as well as on doctrines of deterrence and other theories concerning nuclear weapons. The exchange of views at these meetings contributed to the clarification of some basic questions concerning the nuclear arms race and negotiations on nuclear disarmament. The close relationship between the doctrine of deterrence and other theories justifying any use of nuclear weapons on the one hand, and the intensification of the nuclear arms race on the other, was revealed. It was stressed that international peace and security would be decisively enhanced by the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Many a delegation deemed the time ripe for starting corresponding negotiations.

On the other hand, it was not possible to achieve a consensus on the commencement of substantive negotiations. No common position on the prerequisites of such negotiations could be agreed upon.

In order not to lose the momentum created by the useful exchange of views in the informal meetings mentioned above all possibilities of the CD should be appropriately used.

Having this in mind the delegation of the German Democratic Republic on 2 July 1981 proposed that the Chairman of the CD hold consultations on the further proceeding of this Committee concerning item 2. Those consultations should in particular be held with the delegations of the nuclear-weapon States, individually or together. In this connection those nuclear-weapon States rejecting the creation of an ad hoc working group on item 2 could come out with proposals they deem essential to further the work of the CD in the field of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. After these consultations the Chairman could report its conclusions to the Committee to allow a formal decision on its further proceeding.

2. As far as the form of this follow-up proceeding is concerned the German Democratic Republic holds a flexible approach. It is of decisive importance that the Committee can live up to its task and prepare genuine negotiations on item 2 of its agenda. This could be done in the framework of an ad hoc working group, a contact group, structured informal meetings or in other forms.

In a corresponding forum the following questions could be taken to:

(a) Determination of a set of questions to be considered at the negotiations

- How could the problems connected with the cessation of the nuclear arms race be solved?
- What could be the concrete approach to the implementation of the stages of nuclear disarmament envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first Special Session on Disarmament?
- Which would be the responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States?
- How should the principle of undiminished security find its application?
- Which parallel steps are necessary to strengthen the international political and legal guarantees of States?

(b) Organizational aspect of the negotiations

- Which States should take part in the negotiations?
- Which could be the role of the Committee on Disarmament?
- What should be the relationship to other negotiations dealing with questions of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament?

The delegation of the German Democratic Republic is aware that this by no means presents an exhaustive list of problems to be considered within the framework of the preparation of negotiations on item 2. What is most urgent now is to start the substantive work in this regard. First steps in this direction would be a valuable contribution to the preparation of the Second Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.



Statement  
of a Group of socialist countries concerning a nuclear test ban

The Group of socialist countries in the Committee on Disarmament attaches extraordinary importance to the topical problem of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

Advocating an early and positive solution of this problem, the socialist countries are convinced that the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests would have great importance for improving the international climate, creating favourable conditions for curbing the arms race, especially in the nuclear field, and would promote the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime. Such a treaty should aim at the general and complete cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons by all States in all environments for all time to come.

Therefore the socialist countries request that the Committee on Disarmament play an active role in the solution of the task of a complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. They favour the establishment of an ad hoc working group in the framework of the Committee on this question under the condition that all nuclear-weapon States will take part in it. Such a group should consider the problem of nuclear-weapon tests in all its aspects with a view to rapidly concluding a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States which should assume corresponding obligations under such a treaty.

Now as before the socialist countries attach great significance to the trilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the United Kingdom on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. Being interested in the achievement of a constructive agreement in this regard, the socialist countries appeal to the participants in these negotiations to immediately resume them and to bring them to a soon and successful conclusion.

The socialist States recommend that the tripartite negotiators jointly elaborate answers to the questions raised by the Group of 21 in document CD/181. Furthermore, they expect that those two nuclear-weapon States which do not take part in the above negotiations determine more clearly their attitudes to the creation of an ad hoc working group on a nuclear test ban and express their readiness to take part in the preparation of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and to take over corresponding obligations under that treaty.

The group of socialist countries expresses its readiness to exert all efforts to achieve an early and successful solution of the problem of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.



## YUGOSLAVIA

Working Paper

## INCAPACITATING AGENTS

(Some aspects of definition, classification and toxicological characteristics)

According to the general purpose criterion, incapacitating agents, owing to their physical, chemical and other characteristics, can be used for both military and non-military purposes (better known as a part of dual-purpose agents). According to the degree of toxicity, these compounds should be classified as non-lethal or other harmful chemicals (USSR-USA Joint Report, CD/112, 7 July 1980).

The need to establish the toxicity (not only the lethality) criteria as part of the definition of scope for a chemical weapons convention has been generally agreed in the Committee on Disarmament. For these reasons, the classification of incapacitating agents can be made on the basis of the toxicological manifestations (symptoms) or on the basis of the time of their onset and the duration and disappearance of symptoms after exposure to these substances (Table 1). For the purpose of the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, it seems more acceptable to us to classify incapacitating agents according to the duration of toxic effects into two main categories:

- Short-term incapacitants
- Long-term incapacitants

In the military sense, both categories could be defined as chemical agents which impair the subjects' ability to carry out duties, but the use of which does not incur serious risk or death or permanent injury. Therefore, incapacitating agents produce in normal (healthy) people a temporary, reversible disability with few, if any, permanent effects. However, in young children, old people and those with impaired health, the effect may sometimes be aggravated. They are called incapacitating agents because the ratio between the lethal and incapacitating doses is very high.

## SHORT-TERM INCAPACITANTS

Short-term incapacitants may be defined as chemical compounds that are capable of rapidly causing a temporary disablement that lasts a little longer than the period of exposure. They have also been called "harassing agents", "riot agents", etc. They are unlikely to kill or produce long lasting injury, except when used in doses (concentrations) much higher than those necessary to produce disablement. Short-term incapacitants have been extensively employed in wars and by police forces (about 15 sensory irritants have been used at various times in different

parts of the world). They are peripheral sensory irritant materials which interact, at the site of action (contamination), with sensory receptors in the skin and mucosae, causing local uncomfortable sensation with related reflex effects (Table 2). The uncomfortable sensation and reflex effects hinder the performance of co-ordinated activities and this forms the basis for the short-term incapacitating or harassing properties of these chemical substances. We would like to underline that what is characteristic of these substances is the prompt onset of effect upon exposure and the rapid disappearance of signs and symptoms after the period of exposure.

On the basis of exposure to aerosols or smokes, sensory irritants have been broadly classified into those for which the principal site of action is the upper respiratory tract ("sternutators"), and those having their main effect on the eye ("lachrymators" or, euphemistically, "tear gases").

The most important members of this group are:

- O-chlorobenzylidenemalonitrile (CS) ("Irritant agent")
- Dibenzoxazepine (CR) ("Irritant agent")
- Chloracetophenone (CN) ("Tear gas")
- Diphenylaminochlorarsine (DM) ("Sickening agent", "Vomiting agent").

On the basis of the onset of symptoms (several minutes after exposure) and recovery time (several hours), DM is unsuitable as a short-term incapacitating agent.

#### LONG-TERM INCAPACITANTS

Long-term incapacitants may be defined as chemical compounds whose application causes temporary illness or induces temporary mental or physical disability, the effect of which may be delayed in onset and whose duration greatly exceeds the exposure period. These incapacitating agents could be classified as physical incapacitants or mental incapacitants, according to whether they act predominantly on the physical or mental activities of the subject.

#### Physical incapacitants

The effects of physical incapacitants - that is to say, agents which do not depend for their incapacitating effects solely upon action on the central nervous system, or on military performance - are more predictable than those with dominant action on the central nervous system ("psychochemicals", "mental incapacitating agents"). On the other hand, physical incapacitants, i.e. agents which disrupt the basic life-sustaining system of the body and thus prevent the execution of physical activity (lower blood pressure, paralysis of skeletal muscles, respiratory depression, etc.) almost invariably have a low margin of safety between the effective (incapacitating) and possible lethal doses and thus do not fulfil the basic purpose of an incapacitating agent which is to reduce military effectiveness without endangering life.

Possible mechanisms of physical incapacitation are many, but the mentioned criterion of low margin of safety means that no practical physical incapacitant is known at present, although the vomiting agent DM is described as a physical incapacitant.

Mental incapacitants

There are many chemical substances which act upon the central nervous system to produce incapacitation. Few of these are sufficiently potent and "safe", or possess the necessary chemical and physical properties to make them potential chemical agents. An example of this type of agent is the BZ-compound whose application produces severe mental disturbances. In minute doses it will merely give changes in mood, varying from an apparent drunken happiness to deepest despair. In larger doses, it produces severe hallucinations and one no longer knows who they are or what they are doing. The military effect, therefore, varies from disturbance of morale to a complete breakdown of military discipline, resulting in the inability to appreciate and carry out orders. The onset of symptoms may be delayed from one to several hours while the duration of effects from a few hours to several days. During this phase, the subject may inflict injury on himself or on others. Memory during the period of intoxication may be lost or fragmentary.

\* \* \*

On the basis of all that has been mentioned, the problem of quantitative evaluation of incapacitants, especially psychochemicals, regarding experimental animals in relation to lethal chemical warfare agents seems to be more complicated. As we have pointed out, different incapacitating agents produce different effects and each type requires a separate method for the determination of the effective (incapacitating) dose and the possible extrapolation with regard to humans.

If the toxicity criterion is to be one of the foundations for the prohibition of highly toxic or lethal chemical warfare agents, then incapacitating agents and among them riot control agents only, should be the subject of further consideration and agreement. The other incapacitating agents should be encompassed by the Convention in order to be banned. In our opinion, a quantitative limitation of production and a limitation of the types of incapacitating agents and types of devices for their use should be set in order to distinguish them as much as possible from those agents which can be used as chemical weapons. If new short-term incapacitating compounds are discovered in the future, the criterion for their possible use should be based on the safety threshold for humans and should in any case be of a similar or lesser toxicity than the existing ones.

Table 1

CLASSIFICATION OF INCAPACITATING AGENTS  
ACCORDING TO DIFFERENT SOURCES

Medical (Toxicological)  
Classification

Equivalent Military (Service)  
Classification

SHORT-TERM INCAPACITANTS

Sensory irritant agents  
(Lachrymators - tear gases,  
Sternutators, Vomiting or  
Sickening agents, etc.)

Riot control agents  
Harassing agents

LONG-TERM INCAPACITANTS

1. Peripherally-acting  
physiochemicals  
Non-irritant agents  
Non-irritant physiochemicals
2. Centrally-acting  
physiochemicals  
Psychotomimetic agents

Physical incapacitants  
Immobilizing agents  
Physically incapacitating agents  
Mental incapacitants  
Psychochemicals  
Mentally incapacitating agents

Table 2

LOCAL EFFECTS OF SENSORY IRRITANTS AT VARIOUS BODY AREAS<sup>\*/</sup>

| Affected area | Symptoms   |
|---------------|--|
| Eyes          | Burning sensation or pain, heavy flow of tears. Involuntary closing of eyes.   |
| Mouth         | Stinging or burning sensation of palate and tongue.  |
| Nose          | Irritation, burning sensation. Nasal discharge.  |
| Chest         | Irritation, burning sensation. Coughing, feeling of suffocation. Tightness in chest, often accompanied by a feeling of panic.          |
| Skin          | Stinging or burning sensation on moist skin areas, usually accompanied by redness (erythema). Blisters from very heavy concentrations. |

<sup>\*/</sup> Mentioned effects on the recipient create a sense of panic, make him cease performing acts of violence and force him to abandon the immediate area.





# COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/196  
16 July 1981

Original: ENGLISH

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LETTER DATED 15 JULY 1981 ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT FROM THE MINISTER COUNSELLOR OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF FINLAND TRANSMITTING A DOCUMENT ENTITLED "TRACE ANALYSIS OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS" 1/

I have the honour to transmit to you a document entitled "Trace Analysis of Chemical Warfare Agents". This study was presented at a Chemical Weapons Workshop held in Helsinki on 2-4 July 1981.

The workshop was arranged in order to demonstrate the Finnish project for CW verification.

Thirty diplomats and experts from 16 countries and United Nations Secretariat participated in the workshop which gave a possibility for exchange of views on various aspects of the role and requirements of laboratory analysis in verification of chemical disarmament. Discussions with experts indicated wide agreement on the suitability and efficiency of the presented analytical methodology and instrumentation for CW verification analysis. Adaptation of analytical systems for practical use and extension of the methodology and data base also for non-phosphorus warfare agents was considered as important future work in many comments. Capability to analyse biological samples for verification of alleged exposure to CW agents was also considered necessary.

Demonstration of the developed analytical systems, laboratories and selected instrumental facilities were performed in two stages in relation to the proposed approach to the potential verification tasks: as a research or central laboratory verification procedure and as a mobile laboratory verification procedure. The former procedure is capable of detecting and identifying any toxic chemical agent and its degradation product, and the latter is used for on-site monitoring of known chemical agents. Because of simplicity and clarity, all research teams demonstrated Sarin and Soman monitoring as model experiments. These agents are also the model compounds of the fourth Blue Book published just before the workshop. The research laboratory procedure proposed as a basis for standardization consists of sampling and sample concentration, enzymatic toxicity test for nerve agents, phosphorus and fluorine compound analysis, and finally ultrasensitive trace organic analysis. If no nerve agents or related compounds are found in the sample standard organic chemical structure, analysis will be carried out for the suspected toxic compound. Despite the fact that the procedure demonstrated was designed for organophosphorous warfare agents it is after certain modifications also applicable for any important chemical warfare agents. This work is part of the next phase of our project.

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1/ A limited distribution of this document in English has been made to the members of the CD. Additional copies are available from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Helsinki.

GE.81-63324

The complete verification procedure requires rather heavy and sophisticated instrumentation which presupposes a well equipped analytical laboratory. The equipments and instrumentation demonstrated consist of sampling and sample preparation equipments, enzymatic analysers, high resolution gas and liquid chromatographs, high resolution mass spectrometer and Fourier transform nuclear magnetic resonance spectrometer. Different instrumental techniques are needed to produce unambiguous verification data from control samples to be able to cope with any type of sample matrices and agent categories. While enzymatic measurements serve as characterizing nerve agent type toxicity chromatographic, mass spectrometric and nuclear magnetic resonance spectrometric data serve as mutually independent data for chemical characterization and identification of agents.

Excluding mass and nuclear magnetic resonance spectrometry from the complete procedure a simplified monitoring procedure is obtained. Sampling, sample concentration, enzymatic and high resolution gas chromatographic analysis can be carried out in a light and easily transferable mobile laboratory. Principle and operation of such a mobile laboratory developed in connection of the Finnish project was also demonstrated to the participants of the CW verification workshop. The presented laboratory is a prototype and its construction and instrumentation as well as application for openair verification tests will be described in a later report.

(Signed) Paavo Keisalo

Minister Counsellor

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R O M A N I A  
WORKING PAPER  
SUGGESTIONS FOR ELEMENTS OF A CHEMICAL  
WEAPONS CONVENTION  
DEFINITIONS AND CRITERIA

A. DEFINITIONS

1. Chemical agents are: chemical warfare agents including irritating chemical agents used for riots control, as well as herbicides and defoliants used for military purposes.

2. Chemical warfare agents are: all chemical substances or their combinations, which used in accordance with their toxic properties cause intoxications of human body and animals or bring about the destruction of plants and vegetation and whose physical and chemical characteristics make them appropriate for use as chemical weapons. Chemical warfare agents are: super-toxic lethal chemical agents; other lethal chemical or biochemical agents; harmful agents including incapacitating agents as well as their precursors, including compounds used in binary chemical munitions.

- Super-toxic lethal chemical warfare agents are all agents whose medium lethal dose is equal or less than 0.5 mg/Kg (Kilo-body) (LD - 50) or less than 2,000 mg.min/mc. (LC<sub>t</sub> - 50), measured by a method to be agreed upon by all States Parties to the future Convention.

- Other lethal chemical warfare agents are all agents whose medium lethal dose is between 0.5 - 10 mg/Kg (LD - 50) or between 2,000 - 20,000 mg.min/mc (LC<sub>t</sub> - 50) measured by a method to be agreed upon by all States Parties to the future Convention.

- Harmful chemical agents<sup>x/</sup> including incapacitating agents are all agents whose lethal dose is greater than 10 mg/Kg (LD - 50) or 20,000 mg.min/mc (LC<sub>t</sub> - 50) measured by a method to be agreed upon by all States Parties to the future Convention.

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<sup>x/</sup> Non-lethal chemical agents.

3. Chemical warfare agents may be produced for single or dual purpose:
- Single purpose chemical warfare agents are all agents which may be used only for military purposes;
  - Dual purposes chemical warfare agents are all agents which may be used for military as well as peaceful purposes;

4. Chemical munitions are any means whose warfare charge is a chemical warfare agent or precursors which during their delivery through a synthetical reaction do produce an agent and which can be dispersed on the target.

5. Chemical weapons are combinations of chemical munitions or chemical warfare agents and devices or equipment which permit dispersing the agent on the target.

6. Chemical weapons systems include chemical munitions or chemical warfare agents in bulk and specifically means to make possible their use.

#### B. CRITERIA FOR DEFINITION

The definition of chemical warfare agents should be based on two important criteria: purpose and toxicity, but which may be complemented by other secondary criteria, such as: effectiveness, chemical structure, volatility and others.

The main criterion and the most important is the purpose criterion. It defines the destination and the quantities in which chemical warfare agents are produced. From this point of view chemical warfare agents can be classified as follows:

- Single purpose chemical warfare agents which can be used only for **military** purposes.
- Dual purpose chemical warfare agents which can be used in military and peaceful purposes alike. The use of chemical substances considered as chemical warfare agents for peaceful purposes covers their use in:
  - industrial output;
  - protection against chemical weapons in civil defence;
  - medical field;
  - science and research.
  - agriculture;

The second criterion is the toxicity criterion, which defines the efficiency of the chemical warfare agents against men, animals and plants.

Toxicity criteria are in fact necessary to determine the following:

- inhalation toxicity;
- subcutaneous toxicity;
- percutaneous-route toxicity;
- intraperitoneal injection toxicity.

From the toxicity point of view, chemical warfare agents can be classified as follows: super-toxic chemical warfare agents, other lethal chemical warfare agents and harmful chemical warfare agents, with non-lethal effects.

Effectiveness criterion can be very important for incapacitating agents.

Chemical structure criterion may be used as a basic element in verification system. The chemical structure criterion can be very useful for binary weapons control.

Volatility criterion is an important criterion from a military point of view. Thus, chemical warfare agents can be classified as: persistent and non-persistent chemical warfare agents.



AUSTRALIA, BELGIUM, FRANCE, GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF,  
JAPAN AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

Working Paper

Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

I.

Introduction

The Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which is to provide the necessary framework for substantive negotiations in the field of arms control and disarmament, should be a carefully worked out package of interrelated measures. Its task is to provide the international community with a framework for the measures needed to achieve progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Progress towards this aim can help to enhance international security and to preserve peace and international stability.

The Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should be based principally on documents which the international community has adopted by consensus, namely the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament, the Elements of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, elaborated by the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

II.

Objectives and principles

The ultimate objective of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament is the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control without diminishing the security of any State. It should contribute to the strengthening of international peace and security in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. While the achievement of general and complete disarmament under the Programme is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear-weapon States have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and, together with other militarily significant States, for halting and reversing the world-wide arms build-up.

Agreements to be negotiated within the framework of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should primarily aim at achieving gradually lower levels of armaments and armed forces. It is important that measures be envisaged which are designed to increase the confidence between States and to create a climate favourable to disarmament and arms control negotiations. It should be ensured that the implementation of the Programme makes an effective contribution to the economic and social development of States, in particular developing States.

The following fundamental principles must be respected:

- The security of all States must be assured and safeguarded at all stages of the disarmament process.
  - The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage. At each stage the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces.
  - Security and stability should be assured in all regions, taking into account the specific needs and requirements of their respective situation.
  - A balance should be ensured between the measures to be taken in different disarmament fields, taking into account the situation of nuclear and conventional armaments, in order to avoid destabilizing effects.
  - All arms control and disarmament agreements must provide for effective international verification, in order to create the necessary confidence between States and ensure that the agreements are being observed by all parties.
- The Charter of the United Nations must be scrupulously respected to ensure that disarmament efforts will not be countered by actions contrary to the principle of non-use of force in international relations.

### III.

#### Framework

Negotiations on disarmament and arms control agreements should be conducted on a bilateral or regional, multilateral or global level, depending on how in each case effective disarmament agreements can most readily be achieved. Reciprocal benefits can be derived from conducting negotiations concurrently on different issues. At the initiative of the States of the regions, appropriate measures of regional disarmament should be adopted, taking into account the specific needs of the situation of the region. Such regional measures can i.a. be a valuable contribution to the facilitating of negotiations on multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament.



The international disarmament machinery should ensure that all disarmament issues are being dealt with in an appropriate context. The Committee on Disarmament should fully discharge its responsibility as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body.

In this context, the United Nations has an important task. It should help to establish a climate in which successful negotiations in the field of arms control and disarmament can be conducted, encourage States to participate constructively in such negotiations and promote the inclusion of adequate measures of verification in arms control and disarmament treaties. Where appropriate, the United Nations should also play an active role in promoting the implementation of verification régimes. The United Nations can furthermore support efforts undertaken at different levels and thus facilitate the conclusion and implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements.

#### IV.

##### Implementation and review

The Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should follow a phased approach. The objective of the first phase would be the successful conclusion of the negotiations currently in progress. On the basis of an evaluation of the implementation of the measures agreed upon and of the degree of confidence which consequently has developed among the States concerned, further measures could be considered in later phases.

In each phase there must be a close link between disarmament measures and measures to build confidence. Confidence-building measures are a necessary prerequisite for the successful outcome of disarmament negotiations. Such measures could, in particular, be the notification of manoeuvres, the exchange of information and of observers and further measures that may be agreed upon in their appropriate regional context.

Provision should be made for a review of progress by the international community at the end of each phase in whatever form seems appropriate, so that plans for the next phase can be made taking into account the implementation of the measures which have been agreed upon in preceding stages, the internal progression of negotiations and external events. These regular reviews will form the basis for continued progress in the implementation of the Programme through entering into negotiations on further measures.

Each new phase will thus be preceded by a thorough and realistic evaluation, based on the results of international verification, of whether the measures agreed upon in earlier phases have been put into effect and whether their implementation has contributed to assuring and maintaining international stability and helped to preserve peace.

The Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament must be implemented by all States in good faith: States should express their firm will to implement the Programme through the negotiation of specific agreements. These agreements should form a series of specific interrelated measures in the context of an overall Programme. The measures must respect the principles which have been enunciated above.

The achievement of the goals of the Comprehensive Programme will require the negotiation of specific agreements and should lead to their conclusion and implementation.

The negotiations should be based on a flexible and realistic step-by-step approach. As arms control and disarmament negotiations cannot successfully be discussed in isolation from security interests, the international political and security situation should be taken into account in these negotiations. They should be aimed at the achievement of realistic, balanced and verifiable agreements, including on partial measures, which increase confidence and security among States.

The conditions for the parallel and successive negotiation of interdependent agreements within an overall structure as well as the close interrelationship between such negotiations and the international political and security situation require flexibility in the implementation of the Programme. The elaboration of a fixed timetable for the achievement of concrete results is therefore not feasible.

#### V.

#### Verification

Verification is one cornerstone for progress in disarmament and arms control. Because arms control and disarmament measures concern the vital security interest of the States involved, such measures must be verifiable. They should also make the remaining armaments situation more transparent and contribute to the strengthening of confidence between the States concerned. Without strict international and national verification means, as appropriate, a sufficient degree of confidence of States into the observance of agreements can hardly develop. Negotiations on specific disarmament measures should therefore aim at the inclusion of appropriate verification arrangements in the respective agreements, and States should accept appropriate provisions for adequate verification.

Effective verification is of paramount importance for the maintenance of the undiminished security of States during the disarmament process. States should therefore take a positive approach to the development of the necessary and appropriate measures of verification, including on-site inspections, for each arms control and disarmament agreement and show a willingness to accept such measures without exaggerating the difficulties involved in their implementation. The valuable contribution which verification can make to the promotion of international co-operation should be recognized.

The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in specific agreements depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement.

## VI.

### Collateral and other measures

The international community should consider various measures which may facilitate the pursuit of policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build up confidence among States. Collateral and other measures **therefore** should, at each stage, form an integral part of the Comprehensive Programme. Such measures can increase confidence between States, thus preparing the way for negotiations on arms control and disarmament. They are not only a necessary prerequisite for the successful outcome of such negotiations but can also eliminate sources of tension and enhance the effectiveness of the international machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Their implementation, and the strengthening of international security and confidence which they entail can, in any case, create a climate favourable to the early implementation of disarmament and arms control measures contained in the Programme.

Such measures could, apart from others mentioned above, comprise the following:

- Achievement of greater transparency of military postures, i.a. the establishment of a standardized and verifiable reporting system for military expenditures, enabling their comparison as a step towards their balanced reduction.
- Strengthening of international procedures and institutions for peace-keeping and peaceful settlement of disputes, for conflict containment and effective crisis management.
- Along with the disarmament process, strengthening of the security system of the Charter of the United Nations.
- The preparation of disarmament measures by thorough studies and reviews as appropriate of all the factors involved.



## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

## WORKING PAPER

## DEFINITION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TOXINS

In three classical instances (diphtheria, tetanus and botulism), typical bacterial exoproducts were discovered early in the history of bacteriology, soon after the identification of bacteria (Corynebacterium diphtheria 1884, Clostridium tetani 1890, Clostridium botulinum 1897). While in most instances it is still difficult to establish which of the multitude of bacterial properties determine the microb's ability to cause disease, in these three cases it was fairly easy to establish the role of bacterial "toxins"; it was found that the bacteria produce exoproducts, which when applied to experimental animals mimic the natural disease.

The introduction of the term toxin is rather obscure. It originated soon after the three above-mentioned infectious diseases were identified as "intoxications" (that is, not the proliferation of bacteria in the organs, but the production of toxic exoproducts causes the disease).

A poison may be defined as any chemical substance which when introduced into a suitable host -- either parenterally (by injection), orally, by inhalation or by any other route results in overt damage to tissues or interruption of normal physiological functions, and if the dosage is sufficient, in death of the individual.

The distinction between poison and toxin was made by early investigators although no hard rules were even established, nor are they established today. A tacit agreement was arrived at, namely that toxins are antigenic poisons of microbial origin (the term antigenic means that they are able to induce the antibody response in the body; to be able to do this, their molecules must have rather high molecular weight and a complex structure -- in most instances they are proteins).

This definition does not cover, however, the whole problem. An infectious disease is a result of complicated interrelationships between the host and the micro-organism. The micro-organisms display metabolic activity and produce many soluble substances which can be found in the tissues of the infected host, as well as in laboratory cultivating

media. The majority of these substances have been found to have a "toxic activity", demonstrated by damaging cells or tissues in some laboratory artificial system (experimental animals, their isolated tissues and cells etc.); their concrete role in causing the disease in man remains, however, uncertain. This is specifically true for some bacterial species, which -- before the BW treaty was concluded -- had belonged to the most important candidates as biological warfare agents (such as the agents of anthrax or plague). Hence it is very difficult (at present time largely impossible) to make a clear borderline between infection and intoxication.

There is also an increasing evidence indicating that only a few toxins are "simple toxins" -- as are for instance tetanus or botulinum toxins, both being homogeneous proteins, synthesized by bacterial cells as a fully active molecule. More often, the toxins are actually mixtures of substances of different chemical nature, and with different functions. The final "toxic activity" is thus often a sum of different discrete metabolic and other changes, and no one specific substance can be identified as the main one responsible for the "toxicity".

It should be also understood that toxins are not produced by a micro-organism just to be toxic. For the microb they serve as tools necessary mainly for active accommodation of the microenvironment, to create conditions needed for metabolism, growth and proliferation of microbial cells. They have been developed during the long evolutionary process of adaptation of the micro-organisms to their hosts. Accordingly, the "toxic mechanism" might be rather complex and subtle.

A lethal infectious disease such as cholera may be used as an example. Cholera is a typical intoxication localized in the small intestine. The toxin (cholera enterotoxin) is able to cause damage to some isolated tissues of experimental animals, so it was believed that some kind of injury of the small intestine mucous membrane is the reason for the disease in man. In the last years the "intoxication process" has been analysed in more detail. It appeared that in man, there is no injury to the mucous membrane cells at all. The toxin has only learnt the mechanism regulation secretion of fluid into the small intestine (something that the science itself has not yet sufficiently understood), is able to recognize and to react with the necessary receptors in the cell membrane and to give them false signal for secreting the fluid. Nothing more is needed for the cholera bacterium for which alkaline fluid, pumped into the intestine in an amount of 20-30 litres, is the most satisfactory living medium.

To find such very specific toxic activities, equally specific testing methods are needed for objective evaluation of the effects on man. These methods are not based on accepted toxicological techniques; the discrete regulatory mechanisms and cell-interactions ought to be studied. For research as well as for routine purposes they are performed by microbiological, not by toxicological laboratories.

Another important fact is that in spite of much effort spent on these problems, the chemical structure of majority of toxic substances has not yet been deciphered. In the protein toxins some typical aminoacid components were identified (e.g. in botulinum and tetanotoxin), but the molecular groups determining the specific biological activities are not known.

In addition to all these factors emerging from deeper understanding of micro-organisms and of infectious disease, it should be stressed that the current understanding of the term "toxins" has also become substantially broader. It actually shifted to a vast variety of metabolic products of many species of micro-organisms as well as of higher living organisms (plants, mushrooms, snakes, etc.), with a great diversity of damaging biological activities.

Many of these products are not of protein nature; their molecule has a more simple structure, and there is an increasing list of toxins whose chemical formula has been already recognized (e.g. saxitoxin, tarichatoxin, tetrodotoxin, bufotoxin, curare, strychnin, muscarin...). Substances of such simple chemical structure are not able to stimulate the antibody production. With respect to chemical structure (and hence also to their antigenicity), these toxic substances clearly differ from bacterial toxins. Clear enough, also, that having their molecule more simple, and better understood, they might become candidates for production by modern methods of chemical synthesis.

For all these reasons, the definition of toxins as a class of chemical substances, based on their chemical structure, is not available (and with present scientific knowledge it is not possible); hence it is not possible to include the toxins into a certain category of chemicals. The only fundamentally important characteristic valid for all toxins is their organic origin plus a kind of prominent biological activity

Conclusion:

The toxins whatever their origin or method of production have been covered by the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. The consequence of any other arrangement could be predicted with certainty: undermining the reputation of the BW treaty, and creating a really important "grey area" of ill-defined situations in CW treaty, leading to many misunderstandings, misinterpretations and endless queries.





Increasing the effectiveness and improving the organization  
of work of the Committee on Disarmament

Document by a group of socialist countries

In the current gravely deteriorating international situation, decisive measures are urgently required to reduce the risk of war and make progress on a number of vitally important issues related to limitation of the arms race and to disarmament. A cause for great concern is the failure, during the past few years, to achieve any noticeable results in disarmament negotiations owing to the resistance of the opponents of détente. The Committee on Disarmament -- the sole multilateral forum for negotiations on disarmament questions -- has thus been unable, during the past three years, to draw up a single agreement on limiting the arms race.

The main reason for the stagnation in disarmament negotiations is the lack of political will on the part of certain States which have embarked on a course of armaments build-up and have attempted to achieve military superiority, to the detriment of the security interests of other countries.

Progress in the preparation of disarmament agreements is also being hampered by certain organizational shortcomings in the work of the Committee on Disarmament. In the opinion of the delegations of the socialist countries, measures are needed to improve the Committee's machinery with a view to making it an effective negotiating body.

The delegations of the socialist countries consider that work to enhance the Committee's effectiveness in this regard should proceed along the following lines:

1. The contents of negotiations in the Committee. It must be regarded as abnormal that no negotiations have taken place in the Committee on a number of the most important disarmament issues -- the banning of nuclear-weapon tests, the limitation of the nuclear arms race and the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction -- because of the position of certain States. In the view of the delegations of the socialist countries, all matters placed on the Committee's agenda should, as well as being considered in the general debate, be the subject of discussions in various subsidiary bodies, as provided for in rule 23 of the Committee's rules of procedure. In particular, the possibility could be considered of setting up a single subsidiary body on questions related to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament -- for instance, a sub-committee on nuclear-weapon questions. Its participants could comprise either all the Member States of the Committee or a limited number of participants -- for example, all the five nuclear-weapon States and a certain number of non-nuclear-weapon States.
2. Increasing the effectiveness of the work of subsidiary bodies. The centre of gravity of the Committee's activities should be shifted to the work of the subsidiary bodies. The effectiveness of the Committee's work would be enhanced by making use of all possibilities for the establishment of subsidiary bodies in accordance with rule 23 of the rules of procedure, without detracting in any way from the right of Member States of the Committee to participate in the final decision on any issue within its competence.

The establishment of working groups signifies the readiness of all Member States of the Committee to work out specific agreements, and their activities should be considered to have been successfully accomplished when the text of an appropriate agreement has been drawn up. Working groups should submit reports either on the completion of their entire work or when their mandate has been fulfilled, and in any case as part of the preparation of the Committee's annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. The minimum amount of time should be taken up in decisions on the various organizational matters related to the activities of ad hoc working groups. Such decisions should be taken at the beginning of each session for the whole year.

3. Organizational matters. Procedural and organizational questions should not distract the Committee's attention from negotiations on substantive matters and should be dealt with mainly through consultations between the Chairman and the delegations or groups of delegations chiefly involved, or in any other form deemed most effective. Formal meetings should in the main adopt decisions prepared in the course of consultations.

The delegations of the socialist countries, recognizing the importance of the preparation of the Committee's report, consider that the Committee's conclusions and decisions included in the report should be aimed primarily at achieving progress in disarmament negotiations.

4. Duration of the Committee's work. The problem of disarmament, one of the most important and pressing problems of all world politics, calls for constant negotiations. Provision should therefore be made, together with the Committee's annual regular sessions, for the possibility of subsidiary bodies working for longer periods. The delegations of the socialist countries consider that the Committee's schedule of work should be independent and should, as a rule, not depend on the dates of other conferences or the work schedules of other international organizations.

5. The beginning of the Committee's work in 1982. Taking into account the particular nature of the Committee's tasks related to the forthcoming second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the delegations of the socialist countries express their support for the proposal that the Committee's 1982 session should begin in the second half of January and that the Working Groups on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and on radiological weapons should resume early in January.

6. Improving the character of States' representation in the Committee. The Member States of the Committee could consider the question of strengthening their delegations in order to bring about an over-all intensification of the Committee's work, and in particular the holding of parallel meetings of its subsidiary bodies.

7. The question of reviewing the Committee's membership. All major groups of States -- socialist, non-aligned and neutral, and Western -- are represented in the Committee on Disarmament. Forty States participate in its work, including all the nuclear-weapon States as well as other countries having the largest military potential. In its present form, the Committee has been working for only two to three years. The delegations of the socialist countries consider that there is no need at present to increase the Committee's membership. The interest shown by a number of States in making their contribution to disarmament negotiations could be satisfied in other ways -- in particular, in accordance with section IX of the rules of procedure. At this stage, the main task is to enhance the Committee's effectiveness and improve its organizational structure.

8. Rules of procedure. The delegations of the socialist States believe that the Committee's rules of procedure, adopted with due regard to the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the General Assembly's first special session devoted to disarmament, have proved their suitability for governing negotiations in the Committee and provide reserves for decisions on questions arising in the course of its work.

The basis of the entire work of the Committee on Disarmament is the principle of consensus, set forth in section VI of the Committee's rules of procedure.

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The delegations of the socialist countries consider that, in present-day conditions, it is essential to make all efforts, including those to improve the Committee's machinery, in order to take steps towards the limitation of the arms race. For their part, they declare their determination to multiply their efforts and to strive even more vigorously for military détente, the normalization of international relations and progress in disarmament negotiations.



**COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT**

CD/201  
30 July 1981  
Original: ENGLISH

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LETTER DATED 28 JULY 1981 ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE  
COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE  
OF MONGOLIA ENCLOSING THE TEXT OF "THE APPEAL OF THE GREAT  
PEOPLE'S KHURAL OF THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC TO  
PARLIAMENTS OF ALL ASIAN AND PACIFIC COUNTRIES"

I have the honour to forward herewith the enclosed text of "The Appeal of the Great People's Khural of the Mongolian People's Republic to Parliaments of All Asian and Pacific Countries".

I would request you kindly to circulate it as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament to its members.

(Signed) D. ERDUMBILEG  
AMBASSADOR  
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE

GE.81-64157

APPEAL OF THE GREAT PEOPLE'S KHURAL OF MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC  
TO PARLIAMENTS OF ALL ASIAN AND PACIFIC COUNTRIES

We, deputies to the Great People's Khural of the Mongolian People's Republic, being deeply concerned over the serious situation, emerging of late in the world, particularly in Asia, have decided to address the Parliaments of all countries of Asia and the Pacific on problems of peace and security on our continent.

The problem of maintaining peace and strengthening security in Asia, where more than one half of the entire humanity lives, acquires today a particular urgency. The international situation here has become dangerously complex. There is a growing threat to the cause of peace, national independence and social progress of the peoples. Hotbeds of tension and armed conflicts have increased in number in the Middle and Near East, in the regions of the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, South-East Asia and the Far East.

There is an intensification in the policy of direct interference in the internal affairs of states of our continent, of setting them against each other and sowing among them distrust and hostility. The network of foreign military bases is being expanded, and plans are being hatched to revive the old and form new aggressive military blocs, and interventionist forces are being set up. The situation is aggravated by the fact that the contours are becoming increasingly evident of an alliance based on the military and political rapprochement of the major powers in Asia and the Pacific region on the basis of expansionist and hegemonistic strivings.

We call on the Parliaments and parliamentarians of Asia and the Pacific countries to combine the efforts in the struggle to stave off the threat of war, establish a lasting peace in the region and develop mutually advantageous co-operation among the states of the continent. The Asian states have experience in the joint struggle for establishing peace, security and good-neighbourly relations. The Bandung Conference, convened over a quarter of a century ago at the initiative of a number of Asian countries showed the possibility of uniting all the forces concerned for a joint solution of urgent international problems.

We note with satisfaction that forces of peace, national independence and social progress are growing on the continent and now many Asian states, including the socialist countries of the continent have proposed constructive ways to improve the political climate in the vast region.

The Mongolian People's Republic supports the initiatives and proposals aimed at consolidating peace and security in various areas of Asia, in particular proposals on turning such regions as South-East Asia and the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace and co-operation, creating a nuclear free zone in the Pacific and working out confidence-building measures in the Far East.

For its part, the Mongolian People's Republic has recently taken an initiative to formally propose to the states of Asia and the Pacific to conclude a convention on mutual non-aggression and non-use of force in their relations and to convene to this end a conference of the countries in these regions to which all states permanent members of the United Nations Security Council could be invited.

We consider it important for the solution of urgent problems of peace and security in Asia that an atmosphere of confidence and mutual understanding be created through a wide-range political dialogue between all the states of the continent. As there is no other reasonable alternative to peaceful co-existence of states with differing social systems, there is no alternative for political talks and agreements.

It is from this conviction that the Mongolian People's Republic proceeds in proposing the signing of a convention on mutual non-aggression and non-use of force in the relations between the states of Asia and the Pacific. We are confident that such a convention duly worked out and signed will remove one of the main reasons of tension and conflicts.

We hope that the proposal of the Mongolian People's Republic will meet understanding and support on the part of all the states of Asia and the Pacific, including the support of all parliamentarians of these countries.

We, deputies to the Great People's Khural of the Mongolian People's Republic, appeal to the Parliaments and parliamentarians of the countries of Asia and the Pacific to actively support the struggle of the nations for peaceful life and well-being of the present and future generations. We are convinced that our call is in line with the mandate of those who entrusted the parliamentarians to speak and act on their behalf in their interests.

Representatives to the supreme state power organs bear great responsibility for defending the intrinsic right of peoples to life, creative endeavour and peace.

Together with the entire people of our country we believe that good will and joint efforts of all who cherish peace and security in Asia and the world over can ensure peaceful conditions for life and co-operation. At the same time we stress that urgent action is required so as these forces work with greater cohesion.

Ulan Bator, 29 June 1981





COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/202

30 July 1981

Original: ENGLISH

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LETTER DATED 29 JULY 1981 ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE  
COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT FROM THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE  
TO THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE  
ANNOUNCEMENT MADE ON 16 JULY 1981, BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONCERNING THE NON-PROLIFERATION AND  
PEACEFUL NUCLEAR CO-OPERATION POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES  
OF AMERICA

I have the honour to transmit to you the enclosed copy of the text of the  
announcement made on 16 July 1981, by the President of the United States of America,  
concerning the non-proliferation and peaceful nuclear co-operation policy of the  
United States of America.

I request that the text of that announcement be circulated to the Committee on  
Disarmament as an official Committee document.

Charles C. Flowerree  
Ambassador  
United States Representative  
to the Committee on Disarmament

GE.81-64205

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT REAGAN ON NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION  
16 JULY 1981  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Our nation faces major challenges in international affairs. One of the most critical is the need to prevent the spread of nuclear explosives to additional countries. Further proliferation would pose a severe threat to international peace, regional and global stability, and the security interests of the United States and other countries. Our nation has been committed on a bipartisan basis to preventing the spread of nuclear explosives from the birth of the Atomic Age over 35 years ago. This commitment is shared by the vast majority of other countries. The urgency of this task has been highlighted by the ominous events in the Middle East.

The problem of reducing the risks of nuclear proliferation has many aspects and we need an integrated approach to deal with it effectively. In the final analysis, the success of our efforts depends on our ability to improve regional and global stability and reduce those motivations that can drive countries towards nuclear explosives. This calls for a strong and dependable United States, vibrant alliances and improved relations with others, and a dedication to those tasks that are vital for a stable world order.

I am announcing today a policy framework that reinforces the longstanding objectives of our nation in non-proliferation and includes a number of basic guidelines.

The United States will:

- Seek to prevent the spread of nuclear explosives to additional countries as a fundamental national security and foreign policy objective.
- Strive to reduce the motivation for acquiring nuclear explosives by working to improve regional and global stability and to promote understanding of the legitimate security concerns of other States.
- Continue to support adherence to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) by countries that have not accepted those treaties.
- View a material violation of these treaties or an international safeguards agreement as having profound consequences for international order and United States bilateral relations, and also view any nuclear explosion by a non-nuclear-weapon State with grave concern.
- Strongly support and continue to work with other nations to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency to provide for an improved international safeguards régime.
- Seek to work more effectively with other countries to forge agreement on measures for combating the risks of proliferation.

- Continue to inhibit the transfer of sensitive nuclear material, equipment and technology, particularly where the danger of proliferation demands, and to seek agreement on requiring IAEA safeguards on all nuclear activities in a non-nuclear-weapon State as a condition for any significant new nuclear supply commitment.

I am also announcing that I will promptly seek the Senate's advice and consent to ratification of Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

The United States will co-operate with other nations in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including civil nuclear programmes to meet our energy security needs, under a régime of adequate safeguards and controls. Many friends and allies of the United States have a strong interest in nuclear power and have, during recent years, lost confidence in the ability of our nation to recognize their needs.

We must re-establish this nation as a predictable and reliable partner for peaceful nuclear co-operation under adequate safeguards. This is essential to our non-proliferation goals. If we are not such a partner, other countries will tend to go their own ways and our influence will diminish. This would reduce our effectiveness in gaining the support we need to deal with proliferation problems.

To attain this objective, I am:

- Instructing the executive-branch agencies to undertake immediate efforts to ensure expeditious action on export requests and approval requests under agreements for peaceful nuclear co-operation where the necessary statutory requirements are met.

- Requesting that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission act expeditiously on these matters.

The administration will also not inhibit or set back civil reprocessing and breeder reactor development abroad in nations with advanced nuclear power programmes where it does not constitute a proliferation risk.

The United States will support IAEA programmes and other international co-operative efforts in the areas of nuclear safety and environmentally sound nuclear waste management.

To carry out these policies, I am instructing the secretary of state, working with the other responsible agencies, to give priority attention to efforts to reduce proliferation risks, to enhance the international non-proliferation régime and, consistent with United States security interests, to re-establish a leadership role for the United States in international nuclear affairs.



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THE NETHERLANDS

Consultation and Co-operation, Verification Measures and Complaints Procedure  
in the framework of the Convention on the complete and effective  
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of all  
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.

1. Consultation and Co-operation

1. The States Parties to this Convention undertake to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objectives of, or in the application of the provisions of the Convention.
2. Consultation and co-operation pursuant to this article may be undertaken directly between two or more States Parties to this Convention and through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with the Charter. These international procedures include the services of appropriate international organizations, as well as of a Consultative Committee of experts as provided for in paragraph 3 of this article.
3. For the purpose of providing a permanent body for consultation and co-operation pursuant to paragraph 1 of this article and to ensure the availability of international data and expert advice for assessing and verifying compliance with the provisions of this Convention in accordance with the provisions of this Convention a Consultative Committee of experts shall be established at the entry into force of this Convention for the duration of the Convention. Each State Party to the Convention may appoint .. representative. to this Committee.
4. The depositary or his personal representative shall serve as president of the Committee and convene it at least once a year, or otherwise immediately upon receipt of a request from any depositary to this Convention.
5. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to co-operate with the Committee in carrying out its tasks, including through its National Implementation Agency specified in article ... paragraph ..
6. The functions, organization and procedures of the Committee are set forth in annex ..

2. Verification

(a) General

1. Verification will consist of national and international measures that shall be considered as complementary to each other.

2. Each State Party to this Convention will designate a National Implementation Agency that will oversee the implementation of the Convention and that will be responsible for the collection of all data relevant to the activities required by the provisions of this Convention.

3. The National Implementation Agency of each State Party to this Convention will provide the Consultative Committee of experts with all data necessary to the execution of the task of the Committee with respect to verification of compliance with the Convention. In case of inspections or other on-site visits by experts, organized by and under responsibility of the Consultative Committee according to the provisions of this Convention, the National Implementation Agency will extend all assistance requested including technical assistance and the provision of data.

(b) Verification tasks of the Consultative Committee of experts  
Destruction and Diversion of Stocks

4. The Consultative Committee of experts shall permanently oversee the destruction and diversion for permitted purposes of declared stocks of chemical weapons as stipulated in article .. of this Convention.

5. The Consultative Committee shall undertake on-site inspections, if it so deems necessary on a permanent basis, in order to confirm, in conformity with its task specified in paragraph 4 above, received information that the destruction and diversion for permitted purposes of declared stocks of chemical weapons as stipulated in article .. of this Convention is effectuated in accordance with this Convention.

Destruction, Dismantling and Conversion of Means of Production

6. The Consultative Committee of experts shall oversee the destruction, dismantling and temporary conversion of declared means of production of chemical weapons as stipulated in article .. of this Convention.

7. The Consultative Committee shall undertake on-site inspections at the beginning as well as upon completion of the destruction, dismantling and temporary conversion of declared means of production of chemical weapons as stipulated in article .. of this Convention, in order to confirm, in conformity with its task specified in paragraph 6 above, received information that these activities are effectuated in accordance with this Convention.

Production of Supertoxic Lethal Chemicals

8. The Consultative Committee shall check periodically whether the declared production of supertoxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes does not exceed the quantity specified in .....

9. The Consultative Committee shall randomly inspect on-site in order to confirm, in conformity with its task specified in paragraph 8 above, that the declared production of supertoxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes does not exceed the quantity specified in ....

Confidence with respect to compliance

10. The Consultative Committee shall in any possible way endeavour to create confidence that the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes does not exceed the quantity specified in ..... and that production of chemicals for non-permitted purposes does not take place.

11. The Consultative Committee shall undertake on-site inspection on a random basis at facilities and on the territory of States Parties that will at regular intervals be assigned by lot, with a view to enhance confidence, in conformity with paragraph 10 above, that the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes does not exceed the quantity specified in ..... and that production of chemicals for non-permitted purposes does not take place.

Alleged ambiguities and violations

12. The Consultative Committee shall be competent to enquire into facts concerning alleged ambiguities in or violations of the compliance with the Convention, including reports or indications the confirmation of which would corroborate the conclusion that a State Party would have violated any obligation under this Convention. This competence includes enquiry into facts concerning reports or indications of use of chemical weapons by or with the assistance of a State Party to this Convention.

13. The Consultative Committee shall be competent to undertake on-site inspections in order to enquire into facts concerning alleged ambiguities or violations according to paragraph 12 of this article. Such on-site inspection shall take place only after consultation with the State Party concerned. If that State Party does not agree to on-site inspection, it must give appropriate explanations to the effect that an on-site inspection would at that time jeopardize its supreme interests. In such case the Consultative Committee shall examine the validity of these explanations.

(c) National technical means of verification

14. Each State Party to this Convention may use national technical means of verification, at its disposal for the purpose of monitoring compliance with the provisions of this Convention in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

15. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to impede, including through the use of deliberate concealment measures, the national technical means of verification of other States Parties operation in accordance with paragraph .. above.

3. Complaints Procedure

1. Any State Party to this Convention which has reason to believe that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the

Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all relevant information as well as all possible evidence supporting its validity.

2. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties of the results of the investigation.

3. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to any State Party which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been harmed or is likely to be harmed as a result of violation of the Convention.



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