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LETTER DATED 31 AUGUST 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of the memorandum on the armed aggression by the Rwandan-Ugandan coalition against the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

I should be grateful if you would have this note distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) André MWAMBA KAPANGA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Memorandum dated 31 August 1998 on the armed aggression by the
Rwandan-Ugandan coalition against the Democratic Republic of
the Congo

I. STATUS OF THE ISSUE

1. Pursuant to Article 35 of the Charter, the Democratic Republic of the Congo wishes to draw to the attention of the United Nations Security Council the fact that, since 3 August 1998, it has been the object of an aggression by the regular armies of Rwanda and Uganda in its provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu and Lower Congo and in its Eastern province.

2. This aggression, perpetrated by two United Nations Member States against another Member State, poses a serious threat to peace and security in the Central African region in general and in the Great Lakes region in particular.

3. The violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the grave violations of the fundamental rights of the Congolese population and of the elementary rules of international humanitarian law by the aggressor countries in the conflict zones must elicit a response from the Security Council, whose primary mission under the Charter of the United Nations is the maintenance of international peace and security.

4. The Congolese Government draws the attention of the Security Council to the fact that the massive influx of Rwandan Hutu refugees into the eastern provinces of the Congo in 1994, after the Tutsi seized power in Kigali, further exacerbated the security problem on the Congolese-Rwandan border. The actions of the Ugandan rebels (Army of the Lord) in the area near the Congolese-Ugandan border also added to the instability in the Great Lakes region.

5. The liberation war which culminated on 17 May 1997 in the fall of President Mobutu's dictatorship was waged by the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (AFDL), with political and military backing from friendly countries, including Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Eritrea, Angola, Zambia and South Africa.

6. Before that war, Rwanda and Uganda had, in their liberation struggle, benefited from the political and military support of Congolese combatants trained and led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila, then Chairman of PRP, a party belonging to the opposition to President Mobutu's regime.

7. The two countries were to benefit from the assistance which they gave to the Congolese liberation war, for it removed from their borders tensions that were threatening their security. In particular, it neutralized the threat posed to them by elements of the former Rwandan Armed Forces (ex-FAR), rebel Hutu elements (Interahamwe armed militias) and Ugandan rebels.

8. Fifteen months after AFDL assumed power, Kabila, President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, judging that order and security had been

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restored within the Congo's borders, decided to put an end to the Rwandan military presence within the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC).

9. This sovereign decision by the Congolese Government, which the Rwandan Government moreover says it approved, was, for the Ugandan-Rwandan coalition, one of the triggers of the armed conflict against the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

10. The second trigger was fear of the presentation to the United Nations Secretary-General, between now and 15 October 1998, of an interim report on steps taken by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in response to the request by the Security Council that it investigate the massacres, other atrocities and violations of international humanitarian law committed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and that it bring the culprits to justice (S/PRST/1998/20). Testimony now gathered implicates those chiefly responsible for these reprehensible acts, identifying them as ringleaders and spokespersons of the Rwandan-Ugandan coalition.

II. ORIGIN OF THE CONFLICT

11. The present conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has its origins in the diversity and complexity of the African continent, which was formerly under colonial domination. Colonialism was to mark social relations among populations and States in this part of the world for a long time to come.

12. The underlying causes of the present conflict are to be found in Rwanda, a small, landlocked country with modest living conditions and a population composed essentially of three ethnic groups, namely, the Hutu majority and the Tutsi and Twa minorities.

13. Rwanda's considerable population density poses a problem of living space and its small dimensions create a host of problems, the main one being the ownership of arable and grazing land. This land problem is at the root of the many civil wars that have marked Rwanda's colonial and recent history.

14. As a means of easing its difficulties in the face of a hostile natural environment compounded by inter-ethnic strife, Rwanda took advantage of its Congolese neighbour's legendary hospitality by encouraging its own population to emigrate to the more hospitable lands of Kivu.

15. The Rwandan Tutsi who now call themselves "Banyamulenge" only settled sedentarily on the high plateaux of Itombwe between 1959 and 1962, following the inter-ethnic strife in Rwanda on the eve of that country's independence.

16. Their refugee status was recognized and confirmed by the United Nations, including the Administrator of the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), and by representatives of the Red Cross and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, who instructed all Rwandan refugees settled on the hills of Lemera, Mulenge and Katobo to remain strictly neutral and, above all, not to take part in any political movement in their capacity as refugees.

17. Mulenge, just referred to, is a village in the Bifulero community (territory of Uvira, province of South Kivu), inhabited entirely by members of the Bifulero tribe. It is therefore unacceptable that the name of this village should have now been transformed into the name of a tribe which never existed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

18. The inter-ethnic conflicts in the region basically involve the Tutsi and the Hutu.

19. According to the Kenyan Professor Mazrui, one effective way to put an end to the proliferation and cyclical resurgence of ethnic conflicts in Africa would be to set up mono-ethnic States. This would require the redrawing of the borders set by the 1885 Berlin Conference. Professor Mazrui, at the invitation of Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), had a chance to write a paper and expound his theory to African leaders, first in Cairo and then in September 1994 in Addis Ababa, on the occasion of the celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the OAU Convention on African Refugees and the twentieth anniversary of the OAU Office for African Refugees. By this time, the mass exodus of Hutu refugees to the Democratic Republic of the Congo had already taken place. This lent weight to the long-cherished idea of creating a Hima State. Establishing such an empire would pose the problem of where to put the Bantu, Hutu and Baganda of Rwanda and Uganda; thus the idea gained ground of creating a Hutuland on the eastern flank of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

20. In 1994, nearly 3 million Rwandan refugees, including 30,000 members of the former FAR and the "Interahamwe" militias, entered North Kivu (2 million) and South Kivu (1 million), fleeing the ravages of the civil war in Rwanda.

21. In September 1994, following the mass entry of Hutu refugees from Rwanda into the Democratic Republic of the Congo, President Museveni of Uganda, accompanied by Vice-President Kagame of Rwanda, arrived in the Rwandan town of Gisenyi, across the border from the Congolese town of Goma, and made a violent speech in which he proposed raising an army to drive the dictators out of Africa. He added that if by chance someone threatened the Front patriotique rwandais (FPR) regime in Kigali, he would be ready to organize an alliance to drive out the devil, in a barely veiled allusion to the much decried figure of President Mobutu.

22. On 10 October 1996, the President of Rwanda, Mr. Pasteur Bizimungu, made another violent speech in Cyangungu, a Rwandan town across the border from the town of Bukavu, inviting the "Banyamulenge", Rwandan refugees of Tutsi origin from 1959 and 1960, to take up arms against the Democratic Republic of the Congo, then Zaire, in order to recover their rights to nationality on what he called "the land of their ancestors". He further said that Rwanda was prepared to commit its army against the Democratic Republic of the Congo in order to help the "Banyamulenge", and proposed the holding of a second Berlin international conference to redefine the borders delineated in 1885. The Rwandan President stated on that occasion "if Zaire [now the Democratic Republic of the Congo] no longer wants the Banyamulenge, let it give them back to us with their land" - in other words, the land these refugees were occupying in the Democratic Republic of the Congo!

23. This is sufficient proof of the hegemonistic and irredentist designs harboured by Rwanda with respect to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, through which the Rwandan authorities see in a possible annexation of the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo a means of disencumbering Rwanda of part of its population, while at the same time enhancing the supremacy of the Tutsi community over the various other tribes in the region.

24. These threats were renewed in August 1998 by the Rwandan and Ugandan Ministers for Foreign Affairs, both of whom reiterated the expansionist ambitions of their respective countries. Their aim of splitting up Africa again with a view to establishing mono-ethnic micro-States for purposes of ethnic and economic domination and control of major sources of raw materials, over a buffer zone extending from the north of the mining province of Katanga to southern Sudan, passing through the forests of Maniema province, the Ruzizi valley in south Kivu province, north Kivu and Eastern Province, areas that contain major reserves of raw materials and strategic minerals such as gold, diamonds, oil, niobium, etc., no longer requires any demonstration.

III. THE FACTS

25. A few days after the departure of a number of Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers, the Congolese people witnessed the following facts:

(a) The refusal of certain Rwandan and Ugandan armed elements to leave Congolese territory;

(b) Simultaneous mutinies in a number of military garrisons;

(c) Leading Tutsi figures seeking refuge in certain embassies;

(d) The defection of political figures said to be Banyamulenge who immediately proceeded to Kigali to support the armed aggression against the Congo.

26. They include:

(a) Deogratias R. Bugere, Minister of State attached to the Office of the President of the Republic;

(b) Bizima Karaha (real name Bizimana Karahamuheto), Minister for Foreign Affairs;

(c) Michel Rudatenguha, Adviser in the Office of the President of the Republic, temporarily in charge of the Office for the Management of Misappropriated Goods (OBMA);

(d) Moïse Muhizi Nyarugabo, President and Director of OBMA;

(e) Samson Muzuri, ambassador;

(f) Azaria Ruberwa Manywa, Chef de Cabinet of the Minister for Foreign Affairs;

(g) Gervais Ng. Ruboneka, adviser to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

27. On 2 and 3 August 1998, with no advance notice, columns made up of a number of Rwandan army lorries carrying heavily armed soldiers violated the Congolese borders to invest the towns of Goma and Bukavu.

28. At the same time as these events were taking place in the east of the country, in Kinshasa a group of Rwandan soldiers which had evaded the repatriation operation assaulted the Tshatshi and Kokolo camps.

29. In Kisangani, still during the same night of Sunday, 2 August to Monday, 3 August 1998, another group of Rwandan soldiers awaiting repatriation opened fire on the Kisangani garrison.

30. On Tuesday, 4 August 1998, three Boeing aircraft from Congolese airlines, namely Congo Airlines, LAC and Blue Airlines, were diverted on leaving Goma by James Kabarehe, a Rwandan national, who until July 1998 had been serving as acting Chief of Staff of the Congolese armed forces. They landed at Kitona and disembarked some 800 Rwandan troops there with the purpose of:

(a) Trying to win over the Congolese troops being trained at that base;

(b) Cutting off Kinshasa by seizing, inter alia, the maritime ports of Banana, Boma and Matadi, river routes from the south-west which are vital for the capital's supply of essential commodities and oil products;

(c) Investing the hydroelectric dam at Inga which provides electricity for the province of lower Congo, the city of Kinshasa, the mining operations in Katanga and a number of other countries in central and southern Africa;

(d) Seizing Kinshasa, by way of Lower Congo, in order to overthrow the Congolese Government headed by President Laurent Désiré Kabila with a view to installing a Tutsi or Tutsi-controlled regime.

31. On Friday, 7 August 1998 some 30 officers of the Congolese armed forces, singled out after being taken hostage, were executed. Saturday, 8 August 1998 saw the beginning of deportation of members of the civilian population from Bukavu to the concentration camps in Rwanda to be massacred or summarily executed.

32. In order to perform their foul work without witnesses, the Rwandan troops drove out all the international humanitarian organizations, including UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO and Médecins sans frontières, compelling them to transit through Kigali for a systematic search by a military escort, thus preventing any compilation of information on the massacres and plunder conducted in the areas occupied by Rwanda.

33. On 8 August 1998 Ugandan troops invaded the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo via Aru with two columns of armoured vehicles, some 10 assault tanks and seven lorries carrying armed troops.

34. On Friday, 9 August 1998, at 11 a.m. (9 a.m. GMT), a heavy transport aircraft of the Ugandan army landed at Nebbi, a Ugandan district very close to Karobo, roughly 20 kilometres from Mahagi in Congolese territory. The aircraft unloaded a large consignment of weapons and munitions. These were distributed to the garrisons at Fahidi, Huruti, Mbo and Mee to enable them to provide support for the Ugandan-Rwandan coalition in the Congo.

35. In the course of their advance, despite the protests of the Congolese Government calling on Uganda to withdraw its troops immediately, on Thursday, 13 August 1998 the latter invested the town of Bunia in Eastern Province.

36. The same day, the Inga hydroelectric dam was occupied by the forces of the Rwandan-Ugandan coalition. They decided to cut off the supply of electricity and water to the capital, Kinshasa.

37. On 23 August 1998, Ugandan troops attacked the town of Kisangani.

38. These facts, which have been verified by independent observers, prove Kampala's involvement in the vast plot aimed at balkanizing the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in defiance of international law and the principle of inviolability of the borders inherited from the colonial period governed by the Charter of the Organization of African Unity.

IV. TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE

Professor Joseph Mpangu, coordinator of the study group on the situation in the Great Lakes region

39. In exile in Nairobi, he confirmed in a statement on Radio France internationale the presence in Bukavu of 2,000 armed troops who had come from Rwanda through Ruzizi, Sinelac.

The French Minister of Cooperation, Charles Josselin

40. Following a visit to Africa, he acknowledged on Radio France internationale the participation of Rwandan troops in the armed aggression under way in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The pilot of the Nigerian aircraft belonging to the company Atlantic and chartered by the Congolese airline Lignes Aériennes Congolaises (LAC)

41. The Nigerian captain stated that he had transported from Goma to Kitona, via Kigali, military equipment and Nilotic armed personnel under the command of a certain James.

The South African Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Alfred Nzo

42. In a speech to the South African Parliament on the crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, he confirmed the direct involvement of Rwanda and Uganda in the armed aggression against the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The report of the four Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Zimbabwe, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Namibia, who had been requested by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to conduct a fact-finding mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Uganda

43. In their report to Mr. Mugabe, Chairman of the Victoria Falls mini-summit attended by Presidents Bizimungu (Rwanda), Museveni (Uganda), Mugabe (Zimbabwe) and Kabila (Democratic Republic of the Congo), the four Ministers for Foreign Affairs of SADC member countries provided clear evidence of the direct involvement of Rwanda and Uganda in the armed aggression against the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

V. SITUATION ON THE GROUND

44. The combat zones are:

East

- The town of Goma;
- The town of Bukavu;
- The town of Uvira;
- The town of Bunia.

West

- Base in Kitona;
- The town of Moanda;
- The town of Banana;
- The town of Boma;
- The site of the Inga hydroelectric dam;
- The port of Matadi.

45. The humanitarian situation is characterized by:

(a) Massacring of civilian populations, including children, women and elderly persons, and particularly the execution of 949 civilians in the Matadi

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region in the west, and of over one hundred people in Kasika, in the Mwenge territory, near the town of Uvira in the province of South Kivu;

(b) Mass deportation to Rwanda of populations in the Kivu, for the secret purpose of removing the region's indigenous population for the benefit of Tutsis from Rwanda and Uganda;

(c) Summary executions of prisoners of war;

(d) Capture, for purposes of extortion, of civilian targets such as the Inga hydroelectric dam, which has cut off the supply of electricity and water. This heinous act has had harmful consequences for the populations whose electric power is supplied by this dam, including:

(i) Difficulty in obtaining drinking water, which is essential for the populations' survival. This situation is likely to result in a number of epidemics (cholera, typhoid fever, etc.);

(ii) Power shortages, which interrupt the functioning of services provided in hospitals, many of which lack generators (paralysis of operating rooms, incubators and respirators, morgue refrigerators, etc.);

(iii) Difficulty, for many housewives, in preserving staple foods, etc.

VI. EXTERNAL REACTIONS

46. Despite the many diplomatic efforts made both at the African level and at the level of the United Nations system, particularly through the Permanent Mission of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the United Nations (see letters dated 19 and 20 August 1998, respectively, addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as well as those dated, respectively, 4, 10, 14, 18 and 19 August 1998), the reactions of the international community have not been commensurate with the tragedy.

47. United Nations. Though seized of the matter, the Organization has not deigned to fulfil its responsibility under the relevant provisions of the Charter, particularly Chapter VII, which recommends action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. The Security Council, in a statement that must, at the very least, be described as timid, merely called for a ceasefire, whereas, in similar cases such as those of Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kuwait, the Council had taken prompt action to determine the responsibilities of the parties and to restore peace.

48. Organization of African Unity. The Secretary-General of OAU reacted by belatedly dispatching a fact-finding mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Uganda.

49. In a statement to the press, the current Chairman of OAU, Blaise Compaoré, highlighted the complex nature of the problems in the Great Lakes region and of those underlying the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

50. Western Powers. Though their position is ambiguous, most Western countries seem to prefer the military option in favour of the Rwandan-Ugandan coalition. This has been manifested, inter alia, by:

(a) The request, made by one Western Power in December 1997, to the countries bordering on the Congo not to become involved in a Congolese conflict;

(b) The unfriendly and hostile statements made by some Western officials;

(c) The media campaign in favour of the Rwandan-Ugandan coalition;

(d) The presence of 250 French para-commandos in Brazzaville;

(e) The overflight of Congolese territory by foreign army helicopters;

(f) The positioning of spy satellites over the city of Kinshasa.

51. It is important to highlight the statements made by the French Minister for Cooperation, Charles Josselin, and the former United States Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman Cohen.

Statement by Mr. Josselin

52. Mr. Josselin said that, as France was not aware of the situation on the ground, the balance of power or the intentions of the parties to the conflict, it could not side with either party. He also said that President Kabila was undoubtedly a military leader, but not the man to lead a country the size of a continent.

Statement by Herman Cohen

53. In his statement, Mr. Cohen said that the situation was not the same as in 1997, when it had involved getting rid of Mobutu, and that the country could not change presidents every six months. He said that the Congolese people supported Kabila because he had taken the popular step of expelling the Rwandans, and that the war therefore would not last long. After the war, he said, Mr. Kabila should draw a lesson from it by surrounding himself with experienced men, of whom there were many in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

54. The European Union reacted by refusing to side with either party.

VII. CONCLUSION

55. In the light of the foregoing, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo calls upon the international community to put a stop to the barbarous aggression being perpetrated against it.

56. More than once, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has appealed to its neighbours to join it in building regional peace based on reciprocal interests. However, to its great regret, it finds that its desire to export a culture of peace, friendship and development to the peoples of the Great Lakes region is

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being thwarted by belligerent, irredentist and expansionist aims designed to destabilize and destroy the Congolese State so as to splinter it into a number of micro-States.

57. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo believes that the time has come for the United Nations to fulfil the responsibilities assigned to it by the Charter in the event of aggression against a Member State. This action is all the more important in that it will prevent discriminatory treatment of the current situation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo from seriously undermining the credibility of the United Nations and the confidence of its Member States in the system of collective security instituted by this universal Organization.

58. In any event, the Democratic Republic of the Congo will never accept hegemony of any kind, regardless of its origin. The Republic is unshakeably resolved to remain united, within the current boundaries of its territory.

59. In view of the laxity displayed by the international community, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has made it a point of honour to organize its own defence, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, in order to recover its territory occupied by enemy forces.

60. The Democratic Republic of the Congo declares that it has no wish to make war on any State. It is merely defending its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Therefore, unless the aggressors see fit to withdraw their troops, the Democratic Republic of the Congo vows to use all means at its disposal to put an end to this aggression.

61. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo merely intends to reestablish its authority over its entire territory in accordance with the principles of territorial integrity and inviolability of internationally recognized State borders.

62. The Democratic Republic of the Congo remains convinced that a military victory cannot guarantee or create conditions conducive to peace in the region.

63. The Democratic Republic of the Congo wishes to reaffirm that in carrying out its constitutional duty to defend the country, it has no hegemonic intentions or designs on the territory of neighbouring countries.

64. On several occasions, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has expressed its determination to complete the ongoing process of democratization in a firm and resolute manner. It is its hope that the current crisis will be brought to a rapid conclusion in order not to disrupt the normal course of this process, the success of which is an essential condition for peace and lasting stability in the country, and hence in the entire Great Lakes region.

65. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo wishes to alert the international community to the risks posed by destabilization of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The unfortunate effects of this instability would result in lasting damage to peace in the Central African region.

66. The Democratic Republic of the Congo considers that dialogue and cooperation are useful and necessary means for the resolution of armed conflicts. It therefore supports without reservation the initiatives of the Organization of African Unity, the summit held at Victoria Falls and SADC, and firmly rejects any systematic recourse to force such as that advocated by the Rwandan-Ugandan coalition.

67. Following the withdrawal of all foreign occupying troops from its national territory, the Democratic Republic of the Congo will be fully open to any dialogue.

68. The Democratic Republic of the Congo reiterates its willingness to meet fully its responsibility towards all Rwandans, Ugandans and other foreigners who have chosen to live on Congolese soil. The search operations currently being carried out in some of the country's cities are intended only to neutralize the web of complicity woven by the aggressors within the country.

69. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo intends to reverse the negative perception of the Tutsi in the Congolese community, which does not understand how fellow citizens who call themselves "Banyamulenge" of Congolese nationality can so easily cast their lot with the Rwandan Tutsi, who are clearly foreigners. This is not at all true of other, far more numerous, refugee populations.

70. The Congolese people also fail to understand why individuals who claim to share their nationality invoke the 1994 Rwandan genocide, for which they have taken, and continue to take, vengeance, in order to perpetuate a certain illusion of persecution and point to alleged additional massacres of Tutsi as a means of attracting the sympathy of the international community.

71. The Democratic Republic of the Congo considers that the use of force is not a solution to the integration of Tutsi populations of Rwandan origin into the Congo. This issue must be resolved within an appropriate legal framework and, in particular, one defined by the new Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

72. The Democratic Republic of the Congo notes certain States' indifference, lethargy, complicity and even support for the armed aggression which Rwanda and Uganda (both led by the minority Tutsi power) have unleashed against the Democratic Republic of the Congo since 2 August 1998.

73. It is clear that the aggression of which the Democratic Republic of the Congo is a victim is the work of the Ugandan-Rwandan coalition. What some have sought to portray as a "Banyamulenge insurrection" is neither more nor less than crude window-dressing intended to mask the destabilizing efforts of Mr. Museveni and Mr. Kagame, whose expansionist designs on Congolese territory no longer require any demonstration. The Tutsi refugees of Rwandan origin, of whom there are no more than 50,000, have neither the human resources nor the financial means to raise an army capable of igniting conflict throughout much of Congolese territory.

74. The violations committed by the aggressor countries are clear from the point of view of international law: acts of aggression, violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a State Member of the United Nations, violation of the basic rules and principles of international humanitarian law, massive human rights violations, etc.

75. The entry of Rwandan and Ugandan troops into Congolese territory constitutes an act of aggression under United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, entitled "Definition of Aggression".

76. This act of aggression is contrary to the policy of good-neighbourliness advocated by the Charter of the United Nations. The Congolese Government wishes to draw the attention of the Security Council to the fact that the policy of good-neighbourliness is one of the guiding principles of its foreign policy.

77. By their military attack on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda and Rwanda have violated the fundamental principles which should govern relations between States Members of the United Nations, particularly the injunction to refrain from the use of force and the need to develop friendly relations.

78. The violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo by Uganda and Rwanda contravenes the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter.

79. Ugandan and Rwandan troops are also engaging in massive human rights violations in the areas of conflict, including violations of the freedom and security of the Congolese people, torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, failure to respect the right of peoples to self-determination and to full control of their assets and national resources and violation of the right to health and the right to freedom from hunger.

80. Since 17 May 1997, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has experienced peace and tranquillity both within and outside its borders. The Congolese Government reaffirms its commitment to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and that of the Organization of African Unity.

81. The Democratic Republic of the Congo does not practice a policy of warmongering, nor does it wish to make war on any State. It is merely exercising its natural right of individual or collective self-defence, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter, in order to regain its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The sole purpose of the military operations currently being carried out, with the help of some members of SADC, in certain cities and regions of the country is to repel the Ugandan-Rwandan aggression and to neutralize the web of complicity woven by the aggressors within the country.

82. The aggression of which the Democratic Republic of the Congo is a victim constitutes a threat to peace and security in Central Africa and the Great Lakes region.

83. For the foregoing reasons, the Democratic Republic of the Congo calls on the Security Council to condemn the Ugandan and Rwandan aggression and to take measures with a view to achieving:

(a) The withdrawal of the foreign occupying troops;

(b) Respect for the territorial integrity, unity and inviolability of the Congo's borders;

(c) An end to the violations of human rights and of the fundamental rules of international humanitarian law;

(d) Compensation of Congolese victims of murder and looting.

84. The Congolese Government, which, in cooperation with the United Nations Development Programme, organized a summit of Heads of State and Government on peace, stability and development of the Great Lakes subregion in May 1998, would support the organization of an international conference on peace, security and development in the Great Lakes region on the condition that certain prerequisites, including withdrawal of the foreign occupying troops and respect for inherited colonial borders and for Congolese institutions, were met.
