

AFGHANISTAN

THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIGENOUS MINE ACTION CAPACITIES

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


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PREPARED FOR
THE UNITED NATIONS
DEPARTMENT OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS

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(Cover Photo: Courtesy of UNOCHA)



LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACABQ	UN Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
AETF	Afghanistan Emergency Trust Fund
ARCS	Afghan Red Crescent Society
ATC	Afghan Technical Consultants
BAC	Battle Area Clearance
CAP	Consolidated Inter-agency Appeal Process
CMAC	Cambodian Mine Action Centre
DAFA	Demining Agency for Afghanistan
DHA	United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs
EU	European Union
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
GNP	Gross National Product
HI	Handicap International
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IRC	International Rescue Committee
MCPA	Mine Clearance Planning Agency
MDC	Mine Dog Centre
MDG	Mine Dog Group
MTT	Monitoring and Training Team
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OMA/OMAR	Organization for Mine Awareness and Rehabilitation
PRCS	Pakistan Red Crescent Society
SCF	Save the Children Fund
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SWAAD	South West Afghan Agency for Demining
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMACTP/MCP	United Nations Mine Awareness and Clearance Training Programme/Mine Clearance Programme
UNMCP	United Nations Mine Clearance Programme
UNOCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan (originally UNOCA)
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
VVAF	Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation

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INTRODUCTION

1. Afghanistan is where the UN first became involved in supporting the creation and development of a humanitarian mine action programme. The signing of the Geneva Accords in April 1988, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, led many to believe that warfare had come to an end, that peace would prevail, and that the rehabilitation of social services and infrastructure could begin. In 1988, landmines were seen primarily as a military problem which needed to be addressed on an urgent basis to reduce the risk of fatalities and injury to millions of civilians including, in particular, those about to return home in a massive repatriation programme then deemed imminent. This was the context within which the United Nations undertook initial planning for the development of mine action activities in Afghanistan.

2. Events did not unfold as anticipated. Sporadic warfare and instability continue to characterize the political landscape of Afghanistan and have a direct impact on population movements and on the coping capacity of affected communities. In periods of relative stability, significant numbers of people have returned to their native villages and begun the arduous task of rebuilding their homes, their farms, and crucial irrigation systems. But just as peace has gained a foothold in some parts of the country, armed conflict continues to uproot people and to destroy basic means of survival elsewhere. This is the context which has shaped the orientation and development of mine action activities since 1990 when the landmine problem was redefined and greater

emphasis was given to socio-economic concerns and the development of a systematic and strategic response.

3. The Afghanistan programme has been remarkably successful. It illustrates what can be accomplished under very trying conditions and with a small pool of trained personnel. Much of the success of the Afghanistan programme can be attributed to the people who worked with it, and supported it, and their determination to build a humanitarian, sustainable and indigenous mine action capability. In many respects the Afghan programme was and is a pioneer. It developed and grew within the context of continuing warfare and in the absence of a government which could exert authority throughout the whole country. It remains innovative and open to new ideas and approaches. It has shown that the problem of landmines must be addressed in a comprehensive manner in order to be effective and cost-efficient. The Afghan programme was among the first to call for a ban on the production, sale and use of landmines and to be an active member of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL).

4. This case study provides a short history of the Afghanistan mine action programme and highlights some of its more pertinent characteristics, experiences, and lessons which have been learned in the development and organization of different activities. This case study is one of four such reports which are part of a larger multi-country study concerned with

the initiation and organization of mine action activities supported by the United Nations in Angola, Cambodia and Mozambique as well as Afghanistan. The core objective of this study exercise is to identify lessons which have been learned in the development of an indigenous capacity to deal with the problem of landmines in war-torn settings. An abbreviated Terms of Reference is attached.

5. This study was commissioned by the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) in recognition of the need to learn from recent experience in an area of work that is still relatively new for the United Nations and to facilitate access to a growing pool of knowledge on the most effective means of addressing the problems inherent in the indiscriminate use of landmines in areas populated by, and crucial to the survival of, civilians.¹

6. Studies commissioned by, and for, DHA are designed to facilitate objective analysis; the three person study team is solely responsible for its findings and recommendations.² The multi-country study was undertaken with the financial support of Canada, Denmark, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom; their interest in, and financial support for this study are much appreciated. The study team could not have undertaken its work

without the support and collaboration of colleagues both in and outside the UN in the field as well as at headquarters. The collaboration of practitioners, including those who journeyed to the review workshops organized as part of the study, in Jalalabad, Afghanistan and Maputo, Mozambique is greatly appreciated. Similarly, the study team wishes to express its thanks to the many individuals who have taken time out from busy schedules to answer questions and to comment on the draft of this case study. Special thanks are due to past and present UNOCHA colleagues including in particular those who helped organize the Jalalabad workshop, Afghan provincial authorities and NGOs including ATC, DAFA, MCPA, OMAR and MDC, other NGOs involved in mine action activities including Handicap International and Save the Children USA, BBC personnel involved in mine awareness work, UN agencies and donor representatives. Interviewees provided both useful and insightful comments and were notably hospitable whatever the circumstances.

7. The study team traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan in November and December 1996. It completed its field research for all of the countries covered by the study in March 1997 and began drafting its reports shortly thereafter. Thus, the findings and recommendations of this study exercise were formulated prior to the decision of the UN Secretary General to transfer DHA mine action responsibilities to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. This new institutional home for focal point responsibilities for humanitarian mine action activities in the United Nations has some implications for the way in which the UN will review and use the study's findings and recommendations but does not, in the view of the study team, dimin-

1. DHA was established in 1992 and was designated UN focal point for landmines in December 1994. Thus, DHA did not have a team of specialists focused exclusively on the issue of landmines until the end of 1995.

2. The study team included Bob Eaton (Team Leader) who has wide experience in reconstruction and development activities in war-torn countries, including the development of programmes for the physical rehabilitation of landmine survivors. Chris Horwood has been directly involved in the initiation and management of mine action programmes and in a diverse range of activities geared to improving the performance of mine action entities. Norah Niland is involved in policy development and in the studies programme of DHA; she has previously worked on human rights, development and humanitarian activities in Third World countries.

ish the relevance and validity of the study's conclusions which are largely shared by colleagues directly involved in the development of indigenous mine action capabilities.

8. For ease of reference, the same format has been adopted for each of the case studies. Different timeframes, or phases, to delineate the evolution of the Afghanistan mines action programme have been identified. The institutional arrangements, philosophy and orientation, resource mobilization, accountability, and programme activities relevant to each phase are discussed as appropriate. The case study

commences with a short historical background to introduce readers unfamiliar with Afghanistan with the overall context within which programme activities were initiated. Each phase begins with a short overview of the political situation pertinent to that period of the programme's evolution and points to the key objectives and programme emphasis during that time period. Lessons considered relevant to other mine action programmes are highlighted throughout the text. The concluding section summarizes a few issues of particular relevance in the evolution of the Afghanistan mine action programme.

BACKGROUND

9. Afghanistan has not experienced peace or any semblance of political stability since the 1970s. When the monarchy was dethroned in 1973, Afghanistan became a republic and was subsequently declared a "democratic republic" in 1978 when a government with affiliations to Moscow assumed power. Political turmoil erupted into open warfare shortly after the Soviet intervention in December 1979.

10. As the conflict escalated and spread, a growing number of Afghans fled the fighting which had a devastating effect on lives and livelihoods. An untold number of people have been killed since the war began and hundreds of thousands have been disabled and maimed. Millions became refugees. Out of a total population of 14 million³ an estimated three million Afghans fled to Pakistan while another two million fled to Iran at the beginning of the 1980s. By mid-1983, Afghans made up the largest refugee population in the world.

11. The vast majority of refugees in the 1980s were from rural areas which suffered severely during the years of Soviet occupation. Warfare, including bombing raids, and the use of landmines by all military groups, severely disrupted agriculture. Agriculture and stock-raising were the main means of livelihood in the countryside where 85% of the population lived. Only 12% of Afghanistan's land area can be cultivated and some two-thirds of this is dependent on irrigation systems to produce 77% of the country's wheat, the primary food grain, and 85% of all food and industrial

crops.⁴ In 1988, experts estimated that agricultural production had declined to "less than half of the pre-war level."⁵

12. Even before the war, Afghanistan was one of the poorest nations in the world with an annual GNP per capita of US\$200. It is an impoverished landlocked country with a population made up of diverse ethnic groups which is an important feature of the political landscape and the way in which the society is organized. There are four major (Pashto, Dari/Persian, Uzbek and Turkic) and some thirty minor languages. Coupled with high rates of illiteracy, these features of Afghan society were important considerations in the development and organization of mine action activities. The State has not, traditionally, played a prominent role outside Kabul and the provisional capitals and its jurisdiction was often subordinate to powerful tribal leaders, the khans and land-owning maliks. Fifteen years of warfare changed and disrupted traditional relationships and the way in which different elements and segments of society interacted. Continuing warfare is partly a reflection of unresolved questions on the future of the Afghan State and the development philosophy which will be pursued. Generating and supporting rehabilitation and reconstruction activities within the Afghan context of the late

3. 1978 census figure

4. Christiansen, Asgar, *Aiding Afghanistan: The Background and Prospects for Reconstruction in a Fragmented Society*, SIDA, Stockholm, 1994, p.12

5. *Ibid.*, p.19

1980s required not only a profound knowledge of the changes wrought by war, and the implications of the struggle to achieve supremacy in Kabul, but an ability to assist

war-affected communities regain a measure of economic security while the peace process took hold.

PHASE ONE: PLANNING

TIMEFRAME

13. The planning phase covers the period from June 1988 shortly after the Geneva Accords were signed through November 1988 when UNOCHA established regional offices in Pakistan, Iran and the Soviet Union to begin cross-border operations into Afghanistan.

CONTEXT

14. The Geneva Accords, signed in April 1988, signaled the end of the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. It was widely assumed that the government led by President Najibullah would not survive the withdrawal of Soviet forces and that an administration reflecting the composition of the mujahedin resistance would soon take over. There was a general expectation that peace was imminent and that some five million refugees would flood home from neighboring countries. This highlighted the need for a massive humanitarian and economic rehabilitation programme to facilitate repatriation and the reconstruction of basic infrastructure and services in Afghanistan. The prevalence of landmines represented a serious threat to peace-building activities including repatriation and the regeneration of agricultural production; there was a widespread belief that prompt action was needed to avoid massive casualty rates.

15. Shortly after the Geneva Accords, the United Nations Secretary General appointed

Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, with the rank of Under-Secretary General, as Coordinator of UN system-wide activities geared to consolidating the peace in Afghanistan. Prince Sadruddin established UNOCHA (initially called UNOCA, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian and Economic Assistance Programmes relating to Afghanistan). Given the political difficulties of basing operations in Kabul before a new government was established, the Coordinator located his headquarters in Geneva. UNOCHA's early achievements included a negotiated agreement whereby all conflicting groups agreed to allow the UN to undertake humanitarian action in all parts of Afghanistan; this meant that UN and associated personnel could move freely from one commander's territory to another, and cross-border, from Pakistan, Iran and the then Soviet Union. UNOCHA organized inter-agency assessment missions in 1988 and subsequently initiated cross-border operations; the general understanding was that these initial activities would "jump start" rehabilitation that would begin in earnest once a new government was established in Kabul.

16. There was a great deal of optimism in Afghanistan in 1988. The general understanding was that the Geneva Accords represented a viable political settlement and that the country could begin to recover from the destruction of the war years. However, as events have shown, this period of optimism was short-lived and Afghanistan still seeks an elusive peace. Against all odds, the UN pro-

- The absence of an effective government structure need not, and should not, delay UN initiatives to support the creation of a strong mine action programme.

gramme of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan grew and provided important assistance to the affected population. The mine action story is illustrative of the problems and creativity needed to work effectively in a situation of sporadic warfare and continuing instability.

1.1

INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND ORIENTATION

LEADERSHIP AND DIRECTION

17. This was the first time a UN humanitarian programme had to tackle directly the problem of landmines so that larger, peace-consolidation objectives could be realized. Planning was driven by the need to help returnees reduce the risks they would encounter as they repatriated and re-established their home villages. The need to equip Afghans to deal with a problem that would take a long time to eradicate was a major factor in decision-making during the planning stage.

18. The peace consolidation initiative in Afghanistan did not involve the deployment of

a UN peace-keeping mission as happened in countries such as Angola, Cambodia and Mozambique where formal peace treaties have been concluded. None of UNOCHA's collaborating partners had either the expertise or the capability to deal with the issue of mines. Since UNOCHA's June 1988 mandate included "direction and organization of special tasks not within the mandate of any given United Nations agency" it had little option but to assume responsibility for the organization of UN support essential for the initiation of a mine action programme.

19. In the absence of a recognized government, UNOCHA took responsibility for planning, resource mobilization, and developing a dialogue with donors and other concerned parties including UN agencies and NGOs involved in relief and rehabilitation activities. A demining consultant was appointed to the UNOCHA staff in Geneva in the summer of 1988. Field assessment missions were organized with agency representatives to travel inside Afghanistan. The overall strategy was formulated at UNOCHA headquarters in Geneva while the UNOCHA team in Islamabad, Pakistan was responsible for planning. Regular meetings of agency representatives in Islamabad were the formalized mechanism for coordination. UNOCHA was, in effect, the overall "governing authority" for mine action activities while simultaneously being responsible for the coordination and organization of operational activities.

20. Planning was based on the assumption that a new government would quickly emerge in the wake of the Geneva Accords. UNOCHA, in consultation with donors and others, defined the institutional arrangements which would be utilized for the initiation of

mine action activities. From a public relations point of view, the high profile of Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan and his status as Under-Secretary General lent credibility to the initial planning and helped open fund-raising doors and mobilization of support for the programme.

ASSESSMENT AND PRELIMINARY PLAN

21. Little reliable data was available in 1988 to determine realistically the nature of the threat posed by mines in Afghanistan.⁶ All warring groups had used mines but maps recording the location of minefields were not generally available. Soviet and government forces had placed mines to make protective rings around military posts and vital assets, such as airports, government installations and power stations, as well as on secondary roads and paths to limit access. For their part, the mujahedin forces dug up and replanted Soviet mines and were provided with mines by countries supporting their activities.

22. Given the absence of a standing UN capability to deal with mines, the Coordinator invited the governments of France, Turkey, and the United Kingdom to provide expertise to assess the problem. The United States government also fielded an assessment team. The assessments were based on second-hand and largely anecdotal information because military personnel seconded to UNOCHA were not allowed by their governments to visit Afghanistan and were largely based in Pakistan. Security was so poor in the latter part of 1988 that even civilian UN missions into the Afghan countryside were limited in scope and duration.

23. The initial findings of the assessment exercise were that some 20-30 million landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) represented a major hazard and a significant obstacle to safe repatriation.⁷ The assessment team reported that, in addition to the placement of mines for militarily-strategic purposes, landmines had also been used to depopulate villages by restricting their social and economic activities.

24. A number of considerations shaped initial planning perspectives on the most appropriate way to address the landmine problem quickly. In addition to the urgency of the task, given the anticipated rate of repatriation, the general assumption was that peace would prevail, that UNOCHA was a temporary mechanism, and that Afghan authorities would assume responsibility for the programme as soon as a government with authority over the whole country was established in Kabul. The operational focus of the planned UN humanitarian response to the problem of mines was defined initially in terms of refugees and repatriation. Only later was its scope expanded to include Afghanistan as a whole.

25. From the beginning, there was consensus on the need to develop an Afghan capability to address the landmine problem.

6. According to a study undertaken by the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAFA) in 1995, approximately 90% of the minefields identified in Afghanistan "have been found in agricultural and grazing land and, to a lesser extent, in or near irrigation systems." The same study indicates that the "mining of water systems has had a profound effect on daily agricultural life in the country... [and] has had a particularly significant impact because three-quarters of all wheat production in the country and 88% of the food and agricultural crops are grown in irrigated land." Roberts, Shawn & Williams, Jody, *After the Guns Fall Silent: The Enduring Legacy of Landmines*, Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, Washington, 1995, p12

7. Current estimates indicate that 5-7 million mines were planted in Afghanistan.

- In all situations where humanitarian mine action is required, the collection and compilation of minefield survey data should be a top priority.

UNOCHA decided to train some 15,000 Afghans in manual mine clearance. The plan was to equip three-man teams with metal detectors on the understanding that they would return to their homelands and undertake spontaneous clearance. This effectively meant that the teams would operate without supervision and direction and their clearance activities would not be documented. With the benefit of hindsight, few would support this approach today, but in 1988 humanitarian mine clearance was a new concept and military and civilian planners considered this to be a legitimate approach. It must be kept in mind that it was widely assumed that any attempt at organized clearance in advance of an anticipated, massive, and unregulated return of refugees would do little to reduce the risk of death and injury.

26. Mine awareness activities were seen as an important factor in reducing the level of risk facing returnees. The initial plan thus included activities to generate awareness among refugee families of the danger posed by mines upon their return. UNOCHA funded the

International Rescue Committee (IRC) to provide mine awareness training to refugees.

27. UNOCHA planners made no provision for the systematic survey, documentation and marking of mines and UXO in Afghanistan. Given that the planned level of intervention was village-based mine clearance and mine awareness education among refugees in Pakistan, this is not surprising. With hindsight, it is easy to conclude that any mine action programme, whatever its planned profile, should systematically collect and compile survey data for use by planners.

RESOURCE MOBILIZATION

28. UNOCHA was instrumental in mobilizing donor support for a coordinated programme; it was largely successful in ensuring that external funding was provided in a manner that supported a cohesive approach. The Afghanistan Emergency Trust Fund (AETF), which was established in June 1988, supported all UNOCHA activities and was used to manage these funds. Germany provided an initial seed grant of \$500,000. A successful pledging conference was convened in New York in October 1988 and resulted in a record-making US\$900 million for rehabilitation activities in Afghanistan. Pledges included a Soviet in-kind contribution of US\$600 million (400 million roubles) and other contributions specifically for mine action activities.

PHASE TWO: INITIATION

TIMEFRAME

29. The initiation phase covers the period from the winter of 1988 when UNOCHA established offices in the region through mid-1990. By mid-1990, the Afghan mine action NGOs were established. During this phase, energies were focused on training and the organization of initial clearance and mine awareness activities.

CONTEXT

30. The initiation of Afghan mine action activities occurred against a background of political uncertainty and sporadic fighting in many parts of the country as the mujahedin sought to unseat the Soviet-supported Najibullah government. Continued warfare had dramatic implications for both repatriation and rehabilitation. Contrary to what was anticipated during the planning phase in 1988, refugees did not return in vast numbers; in addition to security concerns, the mujahedin parties opposed repatriation on the grounds that a massive return home might strengthen the position of the Kabul administration.

31. Continuing insecurity left some areas inaccessible and the fractious political scene limited what rehabilitation work could be undertaken. UNOCHA was able to organize inter-agency assessment missions and successfully established small field offices in the region and in Afghanistan. The bulk of rehabilitation activities were focused on "providing

material assistance for the repair of roads and irrigation systems as well as the repair and construction of shelter and essential public buildings."⁸ Assistance was also provided for the resuscitation of agricultural activities through improved seed and limited amounts of fertilizer.

2.1

INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND ORIENTATION

LEADERSHIP AND DIRECTION

32. Continuing political instability, and the limited authority of the Kabul administration, obliged UNOCHA to take responsibility for decisions and institutional arrangements that in other settings would normally be the prerogative of the government. As peace remained elusive in Afghanistan, the institutional mechanisms identified and established during the planning and initiation phases have, for the most part, prevailed to the present day.

33. During the initiation phase, UNOCHA assumed the role of a "national mine action authority" and defined overall pol-

8. United Nations, Plan of Action, Humanitarian and Economic Assistance Programme relating to Afghanistan, 1990.

icy and direction. This task would normally have been the responsibility of the central government. UNOCHA was responsible for programme planning, resource mobilization, provision of technical assistance and some support services, including procurement, monitoring, and coordination of operational activities.

34. The inability of Afghan factions to coalesce and form a central government was a major constraint for strategic planning and mapping out the steps needed to realize long-term objectives. Consequently, the governance mechanisms for mine action activities had a temporary and ad hoc aspect since it was understood that UNOCHA would transfer responsibility for mine action to the appropriate authority once a recognized government emerged. Although there was no formal governance structure in the sense of an established steering committee for mine action, UNOCHA developed mechanisms to ensure an ongoing dialogue with donors on overall programme objectives and achievements. Periodic field visits by donors, monitoring feedback by UNOCHA mine action staff, and presentation of annual plans in association with appeals for funding, helped ensure that donors and other UN agencies were familiar with ongoing and planned activities.

35. From the early days of programme development UNOCHA played a central role in planning, coordinating and monitoring on-the-ground activities. HALO Trust, a British mine clearance NGO which operated as an independent entity primarily in government-held areas, received some funding from UNOCHA but had little substantive interac-

tion with it. The USAID-funded RONCO project for mine-dog training, however, did collaborate with UNOCHA and viewed its mine-dog activities as part of the mine action programme for Afghanistan.

36. Mine action activities, during the initiation phase, were geared to facilitating the repatriation and reintegration of returnees as well as supporting rehabilitation projects in UN-assisted areas. The approach to mine clearance in 1988 and 1989 was to train large numbers of Afghans from the refugee camps in Pakistan in basic mine clearance techniques. The UNOCHA Plan of Action 1990 document states that by the end of 1989, 5,873 Afghans had taken the basic training course. Twenty-five of these had further qualified as team leaders and 87 as instructors. In addition, it asserted that in 1990 the training programme would "continue in Pakistan until 15,000 volunteers have been through the basic course."⁹

37. In terms of mine clearance, this same report indicates that "many graduates of the Mine Clearance Training Programme undertook mine clearance in their areas of origin inside Afghanistan during 1989."¹⁰ However, there is little reliable information on the actual use of skills acquired during the initial training programme. Very few of the 1,500 Tandy metal detectors, part of the original equipment package to be given to graduates, were ever distributed. The bags of tools were soon withdrawn when the graduates were found to be selling these locally and not returning to Afghanistan. Cleared areas were neither documented, verified nor quantified, nor is there any record of the number of individuals injured or killed doing unsupervised clearance. Of the 13,500 volunteers ultimately trained

9. UNOCHA, *Plan of Action, 1990, Geneva, p49*

10. *Ibid*

under this programme "hardly more than 500" were employed in demining activities according to an evaluation undertaken in July 1991 by Col. B. Florence for UNOCHA.

38. Mid-way through the initiation period the concept of spontaneous clearance was judged by all concerned to be a failure. UNOCHA recognized the need for a more organized, systematic and accountable response to the Afghan mine problem and was no longer willing to put off organizational questions until the establishment of a new government. This in effect meant that the commitment to massive training and largely unsupported demining was abandoned.

39. UNOCHA was wary of being both the coordination entity and implementing mechanism.¹¹ It spearheaded the idea of establishing Afghan mine action NGOs on the premise that such a capacity would be absorbed or utilized by any future government. A major feature of UNOCHA's revised vision of the nascent mine action programme was its strong commitment to support Afghan NGOs through a grant-giving system.¹² Providing Afghan NGOs with grants for specified tasks effectively insulated the mine action programme in the field from the constraints of UN rules and regulations on procurement and recruitment. UNOCHA's leaders resisted the temptation to overload the newly formed Afghan NGOs with technical advisers and other foreign experts.

40. In the "UN Plan of Action for 1990" UNOCHA had four stated objectives for action on landmines:

- a. to give priority to mine clearance in UN-assisted areas including, in particular, voluntary repatriation and reintegration of refugees;

- b. to support and coordinate demining operations undertaken by other humanitarian agencies within the context of the rehabilitation programme;
- c. to promote the collection of information for minefield mapping; and
- d. to procure mine detectors and mechanical clearance vehicles (Aardvark Flails) for the intended programme.

41. These stated objectives were an important departure from the initial approach and marked the start of a more systematic development of an indigenous capacity and structured coordination of humanitarian mine action activities.

42. In line with its coordination role, UNOCHA tasked the newly created Afghan NGOs to undertake various mine action activities. By virtue of UNOCHA's central role, and the availability of a common training programme and support facilities, standard practices and procedures evolved. As UNOCHA bore primary responsibility for ensuring collaboration with the donor community, its coordination activities within the larger humanitar-

11. Since UNOCHA's basic raison d'être was to secure a coordinated UN response it was wary of becoming directly involved in operational activities notwithstanding its mandate to assume direct responsibility for tasks other parts of the system were not equipped or unwilling to address. Thus, from the outset, UNOCHA actively sought implementing partners; when training, for example, was first being organized for mine action activities the Pakistan Red Crescent Society was funded to organize the facilities and attendant logistical arrangements. When the programme changed course and it became necessary to find implementing partners which could operate in Afghanistan, UNOCHA defined and stuck with the concept of supporting the development of Afghan mine action NGOs. At the time, there was a great deal of skepticism that the creation of Afghan NGOs was a viable proposition given both the nature of Afghan politics and the conflicting interests of various parties in the struggle for political supremacy then being waged in Afghanistan.

12. To assist in the creation and development of the Afghan NGOs, UNOCHA ensured that these new entities were allotted grants under standard agreements based on UNHCR procedures developed to fund NGO work in refugee return areas.

LESSONS

- An up-front commitment, during the initiation stage, to the concept of indigenization facilitated the organization of support essential for the creation and development of Afghan NGOs.
- UN personnel rules are an obstacle to the rapid development of a field presence in emergency situations.

ian arena helped ensure synergies between the mine action programme and relief and rehabilitation activities.

43. Sensitive to the differing political perspectives and ethnic diversity of Afghanistan, UNOCHA was a strong proponent of creating a capacity that could function wherever humanitarian mine action was needed in the country. To succeed, the effort had to be multi-ethnic and non-partisan.¹³

44. The first Afghan mine action NGO, Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC), founded in October 1989, commenced work on clearing a major road in Kunar province in January 1990. By the end of the initiation period in mid-1990, four Afghan NGOs had been established with grants from UNOCHA and were operational inside Afghanistan. These NGOs were established as autonomous entities. However, while formally independent of the UN, the Afghan NGOs had a strong identity with it. They were closely supervised by UNOCHA and depended on it for technical and financial support to such a degree that,

13. Initially, the Afghan NGOs were seen to be affiliated with a particular political party or ethnic group which did limit access to particular areas and population groups. However, on the basis of repeated negotiation, and trial and error, mine action NGOs learned to operate with minimal political conditionality imposed by specific partisan entities.

institutionally, they were an intrinsic part of the UN-led Afghan mine action programme. They benefitted from the agreement on humanitarian access negotiated by UNOCHA with all Afghan parties in 1988.

MANAGEMENT

45. Prior to the expected fall of the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul, UNOCHA established offices on the Afghan border in Pakistan, Iran and the Soviet Union. The UNOCHA office in Islamabad, Pakistan was seen as the headquarters for mine action activities.

46. The system of contracting out work to the NGOs meant that it was the responsibility of the NGO and its director to establish an internal management structure that was able to deliver the result for which it was contracted. Because of the special conditions surrounding the creation of these NGOs, international staff did play a part in the development of internal NGO management structures, while remaining independent from the line management of the individual NGO with which they were associated. The technical advisers (TAs) associated with the NGOs did not exceed five although large numbers of TAs (over 100 at one stage) worked in the training facilities in Pakistan in the early days of the programme.

FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION

47. There was considerable confusion during the initiation phase on most aspects of administration. Simple questions of staff recruitment, insurance, and working conditions

had to be developed on an ad hoc basis. United Nations personnel regulations on recruitment, compensation and benefits proved too cumbersome for the needs of rapid programme development. For example, the question of whether deminers on a United Nations programme could or should be covered by the UN insurance plan delayed field deployment for over half a year. The issue was resolved by UNOCHA finding indirect means of employment to secure the deployment of key personnel. Local administration of the training programmes in Risalpur and Quetta were contracted out to the Pakistan Red Crescent Society (PRCS) which was far more flexible in its operating rules than the UN.

2.2

MINE ACTION ACTIVITIES

PROGRAMME PROFILE

48. By the close of the initiation phase in mid-1990, programme activities included mine clearance, mine awareness, survey, training, monitoring, mapping and collation of data. UNOCHA provided coordination, resource mobilization, and management of the overall endeavour.

49. The various NGOs that operated within the Mine Awareness and Clearance Training Programme (MACTP) that later became the UN Mine Clearance Programme (UNMCP) worked in an environment that was particular to the Afghan situation and differed significantly from other mine action programmes around the world. Most of the oper-

ational entities were Afghan NGOs which did not exist prior to UNOCHA and were developed, encouraged, supported, financed and advised by UNOCHA and expatriate technical advisers. An exception to this was the British NGO, HALO Trust, operating out of Kabul and highly resistant to coordination by UNOCHA. Initially, it was not part of the UNMCP programme but received contracts from UNOCHA in August 1990 and March 1991. Another exception was the development of the Mine Dog Centre that was set up by RONCO with USAID funding. This capacity was later transferred to UNOCHA oversight in 1994. In addition, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) was contracted to perform mine awareness activities from 1988-90, after which OMA (Organization for Mine Awareness), a UNOCHA-established Afghan NGO, took responsibility for such activities.

50. Afghan NGOs were developed and contracted to perform defined activities. The Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA), established in 1989, was tasked to undertake the marking of minefields, to develop a database for all mapping, marking and clearance data, and to monitor and provide refresher training for staff who did manual demining. OMA was tasked to perform all mine awareness activities. ATC (Afghan Technical Consultants) and SWAAD (South West Afghan Agency for Demining) were given regionally-based clearance taskings. MDC (Mine Dog Centre) was contracted to support the marking teams of MCPA and to develop its own clearance capacity.

51. By mid-1990 UNMACTP/MCP was able to establish mine action operations in different areas of Afghanistan: 30 teams

(approximately 900 deminers) were employed within Afghanistan through the organizations of ATC and SWAAD which later became the DAFA (Demining Agency for Afghanistan). By the end of 1990, OMA (later OMAR, Organization for Mine Awareness and Rehabilitation) reported it had reached over 402,000 persons in the refugee camps.

52. There are different opinions on the extent to which different types of activities were performed competently a year after the fielding of organized teams. An evaluation conducted in June 1991 by a team led by Col. B. Florence concluded that, despite the speed of implementation and the many activities conducted under the auspices of UNOCHA, there were a number of institutional and operational issues which needed to be resolved.¹⁴

TRAINING

53. During the initiation phase Pakistani military and intelligence units assisted the UN with the organization of training facilities and in the identification of trainees. Nine other countries contributed military personnel to assist in the training of Afghans in basic demining skills, first aid, and mine awareness. These military trainers were under the responsibility of a designated senior military officer who reported to the UNOCHA Coordinator.

¹⁴ The evaluation team recommended that the programme be administered by UNDP, as UNOCHA was seen to be a temporary mechanism, and that the programme required a radical centralization of command and control. It also recommended a drastic improvement "in the way in which information is gathered, analyzed, used, stored and disseminated." The evaluation team also stressed the importance of the programme being maintained as a neutral mechanism and "have the freedom to operate independently of the Afghan government." Evaluation of the Mine Clearance Programme in Afghanistan, by Col. Brian Florence and Professor James Freedman, UNOCHA, July 1991, p.4

Contributing nations prohibited their soldiers from actually entering Afghanistan given the continuing warfare. Therefore, the training took place in two prominent border areas in Pakistan, in Risalpur in the Northwest Frontier Province and in Quetta in Balochistan.

54. Training consisted of a two-week basic course in what was, essentially, counter-mine information that focused on mine awareness and mine identification issues. Training since then has become far more rigorous and focuses on skills needed for specific tasks which are undertaken within the context of highly organized teams involved in minefield-related activities.

INFORMATION: DATABASE AND MINEFIELD SURVEYS

55. In 1989, as the transition was made from a training-based UN programme to a full-scale mine action operation, the need to establish a database to document minefields and clearance became apparent. As mentioned, the Mines Clearance and Planning Cell (later changed to MCPA, Mine Clearance Planning Agency), was created to survey, mark, and map minefields. MCPA was also tasked to monitor, and later train, deminers, and to collect clearance and activity reports from the mine action NGOs to document progress. The Coordinator of UNOCHA was keen to create an indigenous surveying and monitoring capacity among the Afghan NGOs; consequently, the responsibility for developing and maintaining a central database was contracted to MCPA even though this function is considered critical to central coordination which was the responsi-

bility of UNOCHA's Mine Clearance Programme. During the initiation period the use of the database was limited and the vision of how it would support and inform the work of the Mine Clearance Programme was, as yet, unformed.

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

56. Clearly, training could not begin without a curriculum. The first contingents of military personnel assigned to training compiled a curriculum using their own military training and making adaptations considered appropriate to the Afghan environment. Initial Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) were based on training manuals and a diverse range of military procedures practised in different countries. The presence of large numbers of military personnel meant that there was a good staff capacity to develop and document the use of these initial SOPs. As in many programmes, the SOPs developed in an ad hoc manner. It appears that all the NGOs followed similar SOPs in the initiation period although a central authority did not issue them at any particular time. During the initiation period, SOPs did not cover "non-technical" aspects of mine-action activities such as administration and financial issues.

SAFETY

57. It is not known how many casualties there were among the approximately 13,500 graduates of the initial training programme, or indeed, how many returned to their homelands to clear mines on their own. According

LESSONS

- Rational planning and selection of priority areas for mine clearance were constrained by the slow development of surveys and a national database on minefield information.
- The collection, analysis, management and dissemination of minefield and related information are crucial to effective coordination, the organization of a coherent programme, and strategic use of resources.

to interviewees met by the Study Team some graduates cleared areas under the command of various mujahedin forces while others were absorbed by the newly created Afghan NGOs. It is assumed that many of the trainees did not use their acquired skills at all and had no intention of doing so but were, instead, enrolling in the UN courses to receive the cash payments provided to support attendance. Given the level of injuries sustained in highly-organized, supervised, and body-protected teams of deminers, it may be assumed that unsupervised, unprotected and unsupported deminers operating in unmarked minefields face far higher risks and that the accident ratio was probably high. It may also be assumed that without medical support or vehicles, most of those seriously injured would have died from infection or loss of blood.

58. As soon as NGOs began fielding organized mine clearance teams in Afghanistan in late 1989, minefield accidents began to occur. Generally, the accident rate in the Afghan programme has been high when compared to Cambodian CMAC statistics. During the initiation phase when SWAAD

LESSONS

- Mine awareness must be given high priority from the very beginning of a mine action programme. Leadership of the programme must resist the temptation to become solely focused on mine clearance to the exclusion of public information and community action necessary to educate the general population about the danger of mines.
-

and ATC became active, procedures and minefield discipline were being established. Between 1989 and 1991 there were 48 accidents including 14 fatalities which is high particularly in view of the fact that they occurred in relatively low-risk minefields (as compared to high-risk minefields such as canals and collapsed buildings).

PRODUCTIVITY AND COST-EFFICIENCY

59. A major problem facing manual mine clearance globally is the widespread perception that the costs of this labour-intensive work are high particularly in terms of what is regarded as a frustratingly slow pace of progress. Any cursory analysis of the statistics and projections made by planners and donors indicates that clearance will be needed for decades after high priority minefields have been cleared and costs will continue to be substantial. During the initiation phase, there was considerable experimentation which was time-consuming but resulted in consensus on the need for a more systematic approach.

PHASE THREE: CONSOLIDATION

TIMEFRAME

60. The consolidation phase commenced in mid-1990, when mine action organizations were being established, and extends up to the current period, the winter of 1996-1997. Normally, the consolidation period would have been much shorter but the continuing inability of the Afghan factions to form a government with authority over the whole country has blocked the programme's maturation to a devolution phase.

CONTEXT

61. As the Cold War came to an end so too did the support which had maintained a number of super-power allies. The demise of bi-polarity had implications for all sides in the Afghan war. Resistance parties were pressured by their patrons to form an alliance in 1989 but it never coalesced into a united front. It was partly due to the divided nature of the resistance that Najibullah was able to maintain power after the departure of Soviet forces in February 1989. However, as aid from the former Soviet Union could no longer be relied on, Najibullah's position was increasingly precarious and early in 1992 he announced his intention to step down. By April 1992 the mujahedin were in control of Kabul but the fall of the Najibullah regime intensified differences among the former jihad parties; the ensuing struggle for supremacy and control of the capital, has in the years since then destroyed much of the city.

62. Elsewhere in Afghanistan, the situation was relatively calm during the early part of 1992 and an estimated 1.2 million refugees from Pakistan as well as some 300,000 from Iran returned home. As fighting flared in late 1992, however, other Afghans fled the country including some who left for the first time as highly destructive warfare engulfed Kabul. Population movements in both directions have been sporadic ever since. According to VVAF, the dramatic increase in population movements in 1992 saw casualty rates from mine accidents jump to "two to three times the rate recorded during the same period in the previous year."¹⁵ With fighting concentrated in and around urban areas, returning populations were often confronted with destroyed housing and the reality of landmines buried in the rubble. Accidents were frequent and often fatal when families tried to salvage their possessions or used debris to make bricks to rebuild their homes.

63. Early in 1994, major hostilities occurred in and around Kabul causing the flight, of approximately, a half million people who sought safety in Jalalabad and elsewhere. The end of 1994 also saw the emergence of the Taliban as a movement to be reckoned with as it gained control of Kandahar in October. By September 1995, the Taliban had taken Herat and by the winter had laid siege to Kabul. A year later, in a major offensive, the Taliban routed the Rabbani coalition of for-

15. *Roberts & Williams, After the Guns Fall Silent, op.cit., p15*

mer mujahedin groups who abandoned Kabul and retreated to the north of the country.

64. Consolidation of the mine action programme is ongoing and, to-date, has occurred within a context of shifting alliances as different entities vied to control Kabul and warfare continued to rearrange the political landscape. The one constant during this programme period has been the fragmented nature of the Afghan state.

3.1

INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND ORIENTATION

LEADERSHIP AND DIRECTION

65. The United Nations Mines Clearance Programme (UNMCP) has evolved and consolidated its activities in an environment of continuing instability, sporadic warfare, and uncertainty about the future. UNOCHA has retained its central role in defining the programme's strategic objectives and overall direction in the absence of a central government. UNOCHA serves as the governing body of the UNMCP identifying overall strategy, setting policy, making key personnel decisions, and monitoring activities.

66. The programme has achieved a remarkable level of indigenization. There are now five major Afghan NGOs employing some 3,500 people in mine action activities throughout the country. These NGOs are represented at international fora on mine action issues.

67. Capacity-building is still a central concern as more attention is focused on developing the skills necessary for a future Afghanistan Mine Action Centre. Nowadays, the level of interaction and consultation between UNOCHA and its mine action partners is much more pronounced and structured than in earlier phases of the programme. As a result, planning and strategizing about the future are much more influenced by field perspectives than in the past and mine action NGOs are more involved in the preparation of annual programme plans.

68. The core objectives of the programme are unchanged in that the overall endeavour is designed to assist Afghans to address the problem of mines and unexploded ordnance through education on mine avoidance and clearance of mines in high priority areas. However, significant changes have occurred in the way in which programme resources are used to meet these objectives. The nature of the landmine problem has been redefined. The emphasis has shifted from the earlier primary concern about the way mines threatened repatriation to the urgent need to identify and clear minefields which pose a major threat to lives and livelihoods. The shift in emphasis has meant greater attention to casualty rates and to the end-use of cleared areas (including, for example, residential use, roads, canals, and agricultural land). This, in turn, has meant that greater flexibility is required to respond to new or crisis situations. Thus in 1995, in what became known as the "Kabul Emergency", some 25% of the country's mine action capacity was redeployed to respond to the increased threat in the city.

69. The shift in emphasis to demand-driven clearance priorities has necessitated

change in the way in which direction is provided at all levels of programme management. This is manifested in the preparation of annual plans, including decision-making on which elements of the programme need to be strengthened, such as increasing the mine-dog and monitoring capacity, greater use of mechanical clearance, and strengthening of data collection, analysis and flow of information. The national survey undertaken by MCPA in 1993 provided more accurate and relevant information than was previously available and underlined the importance of current data for cost-effective use of available resources.

70. A stronger understanding at the centre of on-going and evolving field operations and their impact has also facilitated the introduction of innovative ideas and increased attention to improving cost-effectiveness. Better data on the cost of various mine action activities in different terrains and environmental conditions has been a significant factor in determining overall orientation of activities. UNOCHA has promoted a "tool-box" approach so that the most effective mechanisms are available for mine clearance in different settings. In addition, the overall approach to mine awareness has recently been revamped dramatically. Better information has also contributed to improved management and accountability, including the way in which contractual arrangements identify the respective roles of UNOCHA and the mine action NGOs.

71. Greater attention to improved monitoring and transparency has, in turn, strengthened the programme's profile and credibility. This has increased donor confidence, leading to greater assurance of continued funding and

support for a coordinated approach. Donors, including those who provide bilateral funding, point to their reliance on a central authority to provide information and insights on the programme's overall direction so that they can make appropriate funding decisions. Increased confidence and greater certainty of continued funding have facilitated long-term planning and the initiation of activities that were difficult to promote and develop within the previous six-month planning cycle.

72. While the programme has strengthened authority and oversight at the centre, it has simultaneously pursued decentralized management of operational activities. Decision-making mechanisms at the regional level (in Herat, Kandahar, Kabul, Mazar and Jalalabad) help ensure that field perspectives influence overall policy and direction which helps ensure that decisions on priorities are demand-driven and support socio-economic rehabilitation and development activities.

73. At the international level, the Afghan programme has been an important voice in pushing for greater interaction among different country programmes. As the most mature UN-supported humanitarian mine action programme in the world, it has participated actively in conferences and other mechanisms designed to facilitate an exchange of views and perspectives. New mine clearance programmes in other parts of the world have used protocols, curricula and management tools pioneered in Afghanistan. The UNMCP also took steps in 1995 to link up with, and participate in, activities aimed at bringing into force a global ban on the production, sale and use of anti-personnel landmines.

LESSONS

- Even in situations of continuing uncertainty and sporadic conflict, and in the absence of a central authority, the UN can support the development of a highly credible mine action programme.
- Decentralized management and decision-making, coupled with strong leadership and authority at the centre, facilitate both demand-driven tasking and priority-setting while simultaneously retaining the flexibility and capacity to re-allocate and deploy resources to meet urgent or new crisis situations.

CONSOLIDATION

RESOURCE MOBILIZATION

74. The Afghanistan Emergency Trust Fund (AETF) was established in 1988 with management assigned to UNOCHA. By 1994, a consolidated appeal was being issued annually by DHA for the period from October through the following September. Each year UNMCP has raised a higher proportion of its proposed budget through this appeal process than any other programme requesting funds in the Afghan appeal. Over the past five years, the overall donor response to the CAP was averaging less than 50% of



the funds requested while meeting around 90% of the amount requested for mine action activities coordinated by UNMCP. The ability of the mine action programme to attract funds speaks to its credibility and its ability to expand and operate effectively notwithstanding continuing political instability and sporadic warfare.

75. The increasing credibility of the mine action programme with donors over this time period has stabilized the income flow at a reasonably high level of the proposed budget as the following graphs illustrate.

76. The bulk of Afghan mine action NGO activity is financed with funding channelled through UNOCHA. Annual UNOCHA-NGO project agreements stipulate specific activities to be undertaken by each NGO, resources required for different activities, timeframe and anticipated outcomes. Project agreements, however, are not rigid and allow for a redefinition of activities and responsibilities as appropriate to changing needs.

77. European Union funding for mine action activities has been significant. The EU does not contribute to the AETF but provides

Response to Annual Funding Requests for Mine Action and other Programmes included in the CAP



funding directly to NGOs. Tripartite Memoranda of Understanding between the EU, the concerned NGOs and UNMCP help ensure that direct EU funding is closely coordinated with UNMCP and overall programme coherence is not undermined. EU financed projects are closely coordinated with UNMCP with respect to technical and financial procedures, levels of pay, and conditions of service. During this consolidation period, total funding for UNMCP, including Consolidated Appeals and EC funds, has averaged about \$20 million per year.

78. Tripartite agreements are, unquestionably, an important tool in securing a coherent and coordinated programme. However, it should not be assumed that the NGOs are automatically committed to their relationship with UNOCHA/UNMCP. As long as UNOCHA is the conduit for funds and has the donor-supported role of coordination, the current system will be adhered to by the NGOs. If funding conditions change, it cannot be assumed that current coordination structures would automatically continue. Uncoordinated and unilateral action is a potential weakness of the Afghan model despite the high level of operational efficiency and synergies achieved from the combined endeavour of different mine action entities to-date.

79. Some donors have expressed concern about the 13% overhead associated with the AETF. Others are pleased to have the planning, coordination, and reporting functions sustained through this overhead. A formalized monitoring and reporting system for donors might lessen resistance to overhead costs.

LESSONS


- The tripartite contractual arrangements between donors, NGOs and UNMCP have successfully allowed for broad-based funding outside the Trust Fund without weakening a coordinated approach.
- Transparency, accountability, coordination and effective use of resources are fundamental to maintaining credibility and continued donor support

MANAGEMENT

80. As the day-to-day management of operational activities improves, concerted attention needs to be given to identifying and developing skills essential for the future management and sustainability of a national Mine Action Centre irrespective of the current political environment. Such skills should include overall strategic analysis and planning, resource mobilization, and database management.

81. It is perhaps ironic that Afghanistan has the most developed indigenous mine action programme and has achieved this distinction in the absence of a national government. Programme management continues to improve including that of the individual NGOs. In terms of UNMCP's presence inside Afghanistan, it was only in early 1996 that it was able to create and fill Regional Manager and Field Officer positions in the Western, Northern, Southern, Eastern and Central regions. The delay in implementing this structure (which was identified by UNMCP staff in late 1994 as the only effective means of ensuring effective coordination in Afghanistan) was due in part to the UN's ACABQ (Advisory Committee on

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CONSOLIDATION

Administrative and Budgetary Questions) which did not approve the creation of additional positions until 1996. Also, it was not recognized within UNOCHA that the Afghan NGOs working in the field had difficulty relating to UNMCP managers based in Quetta and Peshawar, Pakistan. Now that UNMCP has personnel stationed in the field, it is in a much stronger position than before to coordinate and support the work of NGO implementing partners. Special efforts have been made to devolve tasking authority to the regional level. The organigramme below indicates the structure that has emerged:

82. This in effect means that UNMCP has developed a management structure that requires only five expatriates for a programme involving some 3,500 staff. Such a relatively small number of expatriate personnel can in part be attributed to UNMCP not being directly involved in implementation activities. This, of course, also means that significant management functions occur within the individual NGOs.

83. The implementing NGOs operate as contractors within the current institutional structure and their management systems or organization relationships are considered internal issues and therefore not illustrated in the organigramme. Nevertheless, UNMCP does expect the NGOs to operate within certain guidelines. It issues Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) which act as operational directives for recommended procedures for different activities (e.g., finance, logistics, reporting). The NGOs also operate within strict guidelines set by UNMCP pertaining to clearance in terms of programme objectives, selection and training, conduct and operations, and emergency clearance tasks.

84. Given the limited number of staff working within UNMCP, the division of labour between UNOCHA and the NGOs relieves the former of a considerable burden of administration associated with some 3,500 employees. To date, it appears to be an efficient division of labour and allows

UNOCHA to employ relatively few staff to coordinate what is currently the largest humanitarian mine action programme in the world. The internal management structure of UNMCP headquarters in Islamabad is fairly straightforward. A staff of three expatriates and seven nationals carry out technical, planning, and administrative functions. In 1997, UNMCP plans to add two expatriates to the headquarters staff. One of the new expatriates will be assigned to provide assistance to technical teams and an international specialist in mine awareness will be hired to advise the mine awareness NGOs.

FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION

85. The UNOCHA finance section handles all bookkeeping and accounting for UNMCP. Administrative matters have been codified into Standard Operating Procedures. Terms of reference for all key staff have been developed and an articulated staffing table established to indicate staff posts and the supervision chain. UNMCP plans to strengthen the skills of Afghan staff in bookkeeping and accounting functions. In 1996, counterparts were identified in MCP's staffing chart. These counterparts are expected to assume management positions when the UN Mine Clearance Programme is turned over to national authorities. As the entity with overall responsibility for the Afghan programme, UNOCHA maintains full financial control over the implementing agencies. The institutional function of UNOCHA has been established from the outset but the consolidation of this function in terms of a dedicated structure, personnel and activities continues.

STRATEGIC AND FORWARD PLANNING

86. Strategic planning at this point in the programme's development would normally focus on making the transition from a consolidation to a devolution phase. However, since the continuing conflict in Afghanistan has stymied the emergence of a broad-based government the development of a devolution strategy has largely been delayed. Even so, staff is developing procedures and structures to pave the way toward an eventual hand-over to a government body whenever it may emerge.¹⁶

87. Forward planning involves the development of work plans and resulting yearly contracts with NGOs to carry out the tasks identified. A clearly articulated planning mechanism has been developed by UNMCP to maximize regional input and national control over allocation of resources between various regions. The regional boundaries used by UNMCP conform to those used by the rest of the UN system for the purpose of planning and organizing support for development initiatives.

88. UNMCP Headquarters staff participate in the Inter-Agency Humanitarian Coordination Committee on a weekly basis in Islamabad. This is a useful forum in which agencies may exchange and review information on future plans. UNMCP staff in the field participate in Regional Coordination meetings which are chaired either by UNDP or UNOCHA staff.

16. *Of course, if the conflict continues indefinitely, and all priority minefields have been cleared by the time an Afghan government is able to assume responsibility for the landmine problem then the focus and nature of the programme will be substantially different to that now managed by UNMCP.*

**QUALITY CONTROL, MONITORING
AND EVALUATION**

89. Quality control is used here to describe the continuing assessment of staff performance at all levels. Where there are Standard Operating Procedures, performance can be judged against these standards. Quality control is, essentially, a task performed by staff in the field. It is focused on relatively small work units and individual performance. UNMCP and MCPA have developed an excellent quality control mechanism in the Monitoring and Training Teams (MTT). An MTT consists of two trainers who visit clearance teams and other minefield personnel that they themselves have trained. After several days of reviewing work procedures, the MTT meets with the section leaders in charge of specific minefield activities to discuss specific points on the use of SOPs. When deemed appropriate, the MTT develops a refresher training course of one to two weeks for the units that have been observed.

90. Clearance teams receive targeted refresher training in the field based on observations of their performance. The MTTs are made up of trainers; over time, these personnel, are able to draw conclusions about the overall effectiveness of the training programme and to correct those segments found to be weak. This provides valuable feedback to colleagues responsible for modifying and using the curriculum used in the training of new recruits. In practice, the results depend on the quality of the field staff and the commitment of MCPA management to this important process. There are currently seven MTTs operating in Afghanistan and the expectation is that each clearance operation will receive a visit from an MTT at least twice a year. The

MTTs also monitor the dog groups, survey, and mine awareness teams, and in this case serve more as independent monitors. Senior staff of the NGOs are encouraged to personally visit each of their work groups in the field twice a year.

91. Monitoring, for the purposes of this case study, is the term used to describe an internal management function carried out by a specially dedicated unit accountable to top management. Monitoring is less concerned with individual staff action and more concerned with team performance and productivity. It is largely an educational function but even though far more time and money is lost to inefficiency than to corruption, good monitoring will also have a policing function. Good monitoring focuses on helping work and programme units perform their tasks more efficiently.

92. A February 1994 evaluation mission of Brown and Taylor, funded by the Commission of the European Union, recommended that the UNMCP headquarters take day-to-day responsibility for "technical, operational, financial and management monitoring of mine clearing NGOs." Up to this point, monitoring was carried out informally by international and senior Afghan staff. There was no dedicated unit to perform such functions.

93. Evaluation is an activity undertaken by an entity or individuals with no line management responsibilities. Evaluation teams are normally chosen with the involvement of the donors and the main executing agency; in this case, UNOCHA/UNMCP. There have been four external evaluations of the Afghan programme during the consolidation phase. These included:

- a) Evaluation of the Mine Clearance Programme in Afghanistan, by Brian Florence and James Freedman, July 1991. The team stressed that changes in focus, so that the programme expanded its scope beyond repatriation concerns and organization, were urgently needed. It noted that there would be a noticeable improvement in productivity if proposed changes were implemented.
- b) Mine Clearance Operations: Afghanistan Monitoring Report to the Commission of the European Union, by Steve Brown, February 1994. The study concluded that the EU was making a valuable contribution to the Afghanistan programme and to the rehabilitation process within the country. The study report noted that during the four years of operations hard lessons has been learned. The concept of Afghan-run and organized NGOs "supplemented by expatriate technical and project management expertise has been proven" the report concluded.
- c) Monitoring Visit of ODA-Funded Mine Clearance Work Undertaken by the HALO Trust in Afghanistan; Overseas Development Administration, by J.A. Craib, 27 April 1995. This evaluation concluded that the work of HALO Trust was well conducted and was providing valuable benefits to local communities. The study report noted that misunderstandings between the HALO Trust and UNOCHA should be resolved and indicated that "UNOCHA wants the HALO Trust to operate under their full control with funding being passed through UN channels. The monitor disagrees, and believes that the HALO Trust must maintain its independence albeit within a clearly defined framework of cooperation."

LESSONS

- The training programme has developed an innovative quality control and training feedback mechanism to maximize individual performance in the field.
- Periodic evaluation undertaken by external and objective personnel can provide useful insights and help ensure that the programme is on track and organized to meet appropriate objectives.

- d) Mine Clearance Operations: UNOCHA Afghanistan; Monitoring Report to the Overseas Development Administration, by Philip Bean, 26 May 1995. The evaluation report noted that the UNOCHA mine clearance programme was the most mature of all UN demining programmes. It further noted that it "has produced a model for operations elsewhere in the world, and in terms of indigenous capacity building has been hugely successful. The scale of the mine problem in Afghanistan, although quantifiable, remains immense. Comprehensive mine casualty figures for the country overall are not known but based on ICRC figures, and those of UNOCHA, they remain well in excess of 100 per month."

94. The 1991 evaluation was critical of both UNOCHA and the Afghan NGOs, indicating that the authority, coordination and centralization of information in UNOCHA should be considerably increased. The 1994 and 1995 evaluations, however, give very positive reports on the functions and work of UNOCHA and the Afghan NGOs. UNOCHA's role in overall management and coordination of the mine action programme

LESSONS

- Training focused almost exclusively on the technical aspects of mine clearance and related skills and short-changed attention to the need to train top and middle level management needed for a future national Mine Action Centre.

was seen to be well established and effective. It further noted that hard lessons had been learned and that the "capacity of UNOCHA, as well as the indigenous agencies, has undeniably improved."

3.2 MINE ACTION ACTIVITIES

PROGRAMME PROFILE

95. During the consolidation phase, the programme shifted its focus to the appalling problem of mines in heavily-populated urban areas while continuing to address high-priority rural minefields. During the years of the Soviet military presence, major provincial capitals, most notably Herat in the north-west, were surrounded and under virtual siege by hostile forces. The encirclement was so close that defenders and attackers would establish firing zones in the suburbs. Roof-tops became firing positions and were mined to prevent attack.

17. Retaining the original demarcation of houses and their surrounding compound was deemed important as this helped avoid property disputes.

Shelling often collapsed entire blocks of houses where mines were sometimes stored. The resulting debris of rubble and live ordnance required demining cubic metre by cubic metre down to the original foundation to ensure that the house site was safe and could be used again.¹⁷ In addition, battlefields needed to be cleaned and unexploded ordnance destroyed; this required skills that were different to those needed for traditional mine clearance.

TRAINING

96. Technical assistance to the UN Mine Clearance Programme has been provided by a relatively small number of expatriate specialists. During the early part of the consolidation period, the majority of TAs worked in the Pakistan-based training programme. A far smaller number were involved in providing technical advice directly to the Afghan NGOs. The last training TAs left the programme in December 1992 while those assigned to work with NGOs left in July 1993. A sign of the success of the training programme is that there were only five international TAs working with UNMCP at the end of 1996.

97. If Afghan NGOs do continue to use TAs, it is by private arrangement or special request and they are considered responsible to the NGO director, not UNOCHA. This is an important step as the Afghan NGOs mature and now "own" the process of recruiting and supervising international technical assistance. TAs may also be positioned within an NGO by special arrangement between the NGO and UNMCP so as to bypass the UN's rigidity concerning expanding staff posts in the field.

98. Observers have noted an interesting phenomenon regarding the source of many of the technical experts who have helped build this programme. Most of the expatriate Technical Advisers now with the programme originally came as part of military contingents during the initiation period and have since resigned their commissions to remain as civilian management and technical experts.

MINE AWARENESS

99. From the initial efforts of the International Rescue Committee (IRC) in 1989 to alert returnees to the threat of landmines in anticipation of a mass repatriation, the profile of mine awareness under the auspices of the UNMCP has evolved significantly during the consolidation period. Since the creation of OMAR as UNMCP's implementing partner to disseminate mine awareness training inside Afghanistan, the agencies involved in mine awareness have increased in number and function. The current agencies participating in UNMCP mine awareness activities include:

a) The Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR) which has 12 mine awareness teams working inside Afghanistan in various accessible provinces and in Kabul. Operational since 1990, OMAR reports it has exposed over 2,000,000 people to mine awareness using a direct training approach of presentations with hand-out materials.

b) The Refugees Relief Group of Ansar (RRGA) operates inside Iran giving mine awareness to Afghan refugees through direct teaching techniques.

c) Save the Children, USA (SCF/USA) began operations in 1996 in Kabul with its Landmine Education Programme which stresses a participatory approach. It intends to expand operations into northern Afghanistan and to work with nomadic groups and street children.

d) Handicap International (HI) has developed a community-based Mines Awareness Project in Kandahar. Started in late 1995, it is experimenting with a different approach to mine awareness by developing local sustainable structures for disseminating mine awareness.

e) The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Pashto and Dari services have, since 1995, broadcast messages and information through plays, stories and announcements about the dangers of mines.

f) The Afghan Red Crescent Society (ARCS) operates mainly within Kabul using direct teaching methods. ARCS has been active from 1990 through 1996 with funding from UNOCHA; since 1996 ARCS has received funding from the International Committee of the Red Cross.

100. Since 1991, there has been an expansion from one NGO with a single operating team to six agencies operating with numerous teams and increasing the scope of their operations every year. The casualty rates from mines and UXO (particularly in 1996 in Kabul) remain unacceptably high.¹⁸ Mine

18. It is difficult to locate precise figures on casualties as a result of mine accidents in affected countries. Reporting mechanisms tend to be weak and in poor countries devastated by war it is assumed that many mine victims do not reach a health care facility. In Afghanistan in 1996, casualty rates of 150 mine and UXO victims per week were partly a result of the battle for Kabul. Afghan weekly figures almost doubled reported casualty rates in Mozambique for a month in 1996.

awareness is an important preventive educational approach and the continued growth and consolidation of mine awareness NGOs should be encouraged. Indeed, the expansion of agencies participating in this activity should be seen as evidence of consolidation and maturation. Differing approaches are used and a range of target populations are identified: community-based, participatory approaches, the use of broadcast media, institutional, informal, nomads and street children, returnees, women and children.

101. The UNMCP is actively encouraging mine awareness NGOs to explore different approaches, particularly those that may be more sustainable at the village level. The inclusion of new international NGOs in this sector and a departure from a single agency exclusively handling mine awareness appears to have stimulated the whole sector to become more innovative and effective.

**INFORMATION:
DATABASE AND MINEFIELD SURVEYS**

102. Information is needed for strategic and forward planning. It consists of two elements: technical and socio-economic data.

103. A major event of the consolidation phase was the nation-wide General Survey initiated in late 1993. Under the auspices of UNOCHA, and with funds from the European Union, this survey was completed in 1994 and continues to serve as the main basis for planning operations. It is hard to over-emphasize the importance of this survey. For the first time, data was available to permit strategic planning. The information generated by the nation-wide survey indicated that

roughly 120 square kilometres needed high-priority clearance. As of the survey date, roughly 55 square kilometres had been cleared, and the clearing rate was about 20 square kilometres per year in 1994. Subsequently, the annual rate has decreased slightly for the understandable reason that mine clearance in urban areas takes considerably more time than elsewhere. Nonetheless, UNMCP now estimates that it will take approximately three more years to clear all high priority areas if the current level of known minefields does not increase. This projected timeframe has significant funding and planning implications and illustrates the importance of undertaking nationwide surveys as quickly as it is possible to do so.

104. The technical data obtained during this period has been incorporated into a database developed by the Mines Clearance and Planning Agency under contract to UNMCP. All NGOs involved in mine clearance submit progress reports to MCPA for entry into the database. MCPA and UNMCP can now analyze and chart weekly, monthly and annual progress by minefield, by NGO, and by team.

105. In the short history of humanitarian mine clearance, socio-economic aspects have only recently been raised. The issue of socio-economic data is closely related to priority-setting and coordination between all relevant actors. Priority-setting addresses the way in which minefields are selected for clearance so that the outcome offers the highest socio-economic use to communities and benefits the largest number of people. Coordination addresses appropriate interaction with NGOs, international organizations, UN agencies and local indigenous authorities concerned with

development and rehabilitation activities in order to ensure that demining priorities mesh with the priorities of these agencies.

106. Socio-economic data relevant to mine action prioritization is not systematically collected at this time in Afghanistan. The casualty reports of mine injuries kept at the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) hospitals are reviewed but the coverage is limited. The UNOPS Rural Rehabilitation Programme and UNHCR jointly collected socio-economic data in selected districts but follow-up funding from UNDP was not provided and this hopeful beginning ended. United Nations Drug Control Programme data is monitored to support work associated with the reduction of agricultural crops used in the production of narcotics. UNHCR statistics on refugee inflow and outflow are collected monthly.

107. Despite the collection of some socio-economic data in the survey and clearance work reported to MCPA, there has been little or no analysis of the data. UNMCP notes that it has never explored this area adequately and has no mechanism to do so but would like to develop a capacity capable of such analysis in the future. The reality is that this is a time-consuming and specialized area of analysis if prioritization decisions are going to be made on the basis of socio-economic considerations including end-use of land declared free of mines.

108. Col. B. Florence's 1991 evaluation report strongly advised UNOCHA to disengage data collection and management of planning information from MCPA. He advocated that all central information on minefield mapping and clearance progress should be maintained in the offices of the UNMCP. At that time the evaluation team felt that MCPA was

LESSONS

- The Afghan experience illustrates the importance of undertaking a nationwide survey as quickly as it is feasible to do so. Planning improves immeasurably when up-to-date and reliable survey data is available. Accurate information on the prevalence of minefields which directly threaten lives and livelihoods enables programme managers to calculate the amount of time and resources needed to render these areas safe and available for human and economic activity.

not operating to acceptable standards. Even more crucially, the evaluators felt that it was inappropriate for a contracted NGO to have control over data central to the coordination of the overall programme. By 1996, however, MCPA had greatly improved its capacity to survey, mark, map and collate mine-related information. Subsequent evaluations and current working standards illustrate the agency's professionalism in this regard. The capacity for the MCPA database to collate, analyze, and illustrate the entered information is of a high order. Information concerning land use, beneficiaries, and some rudimentary socio-economic information is collected at both the marking and mapping phase and upon the completion of clearance tasks.

109. The functional problem of whether it is appropriate for a coordination agency to contract out the maintenance and control of centralized information to an NGO remains to be answered, however. Staff in UNMCP and participating NGOs continue to struggle with this question and it will certainly become an issue when a national Mine Action Centre takes over the coordination and regulatory functions now handled by UNMCP.

PUBLIC INFORMATION

110. Public information is the important function of providing the public, donors, and government with timely information on the Mine Action Programme and the nature and scope of the landmine problem. The purpose is to gain informed support for the programme.

111. The BBC Pashto and Dari service provides some information to the public but it primarily concerns mine avoidance education. The UNMCP and contracting NGOs have a well-developed capacity to take donor representatives and foreign correspondents into the field to observe the programme in action. This has proved to be very successful in generating support for the programme among donor countries.

112. The current impasse in establishing a broad-based government in Afghanistan has limited activities in the area of public information aimed at educating government ministries about the Mine Action Programme. However, UNMCP staff has remained in contact with the Department of Demining of the Disaster Preparedness Ministry in Kabul. Public information is recognized by UNMCP management to be an important function, but limitations in time, personnel and funds have restricted developments in this area.

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

113. SOPs, which provide comprehensive guidance, facilitate UNMCP's coordination role. (This is discussed and commended in the 1995 ODA evaluation.) UNMCP's SOPs set standards for all tasks relating to mine clearance including programme objectives, recruitment and training, terms of reference, criteria for

selection of emergency clearance tasks, etc. A senior technical adviser was officially responsible for the development and issuing of SOPs during the early stages of the programme. With the departure of some TAs in 1993, UNMCP lost valuable staff who could develop and document new SOPs. Many of the SOPs developed over the years have needed updating and collation; thus, in the second half of 1996 a consultant began working with existing SOPs and UNMCP staff to develop two comprehensive volumes of all SOPs required. One volume will be a technical reference manual covering all aspects of mine clearance, survey, EOD, and other minefield related tasks. The other volume will collate all administrative SOPs. This task is scheduled for completion in early 1997 when the documents will be approved and distributed.

SAFETY

114. Manual mine clearance can maximize safety by enforcement of careful clearance procedures, use of protective clothing, and high levels of supervision. The Afghan mine action programme is one of the most comprehensively organized programme in the world in terms of strictly enforced SOPs, numbers of supervising staff, protective clothing (helmets and visors were introduced in mid-1993), careful minefield-marking, and access to medical personnel and ambulances. Nonetheless, the Afghan programme has the highest number of demining accidents relative to programme size of all such efforts.

115. Table 1 overleaf summarizes total number of accidents between 1989 and 1996.

116. An exponential rise in accidents occurred as teams were expanded. During the

Total Accidents by Agency 1989 - 96 ¹⁹

Table 1

AGENCY		1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
ATC	Death	N/A	2	6	6	3	1	1	2
	Injury	N/A	17	4	47	29	36	31	31
DAFA/ SWAAD²⁰	Death	N/A	0	1	1	1	1	1	0
	Injury	N/A	0	5	16	11	25	15	16
MCPA	Death	N/A	0	2	1	0	1	0	2
	Injury	N/A	1	5	6	10	13	3	7
OMAR	Death	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	3	4	0	0
	Injury	N/A	N/A	N/A	3	10	10	8	7
MDC²¹	Death	3 (2)	0	0	0	0	2 (2)	0	4 (1)
	Injury	2 (1)	0	0	0	1	0	6	5
Totals	Death	3 (2)	2	9	8	7	9 (2)	2	8 (1)
	Injury	2 (1)	18	14	72	60	84	63	66

consolidation phase (1991-1996) there was an alarming average of 60 accidents (death and injury) per year. Although the number of fatal accidents during the consolidation phase were significant, the accident rate compared to the amount of land cleared has fallen continually in recent years.

117. There is no doubt that the mined urban environment in Afghanistan poses special problems. Collapsed buildings with mines and UXO buried in two to three metres of earth create a three dimensional problem for deminers, a far more difficult problem than the two-dimensional search for mines on or near the surface of open fields. Clearance of canals is particularly dangerous because the mines buried in watery mud shift around making it far more likely that a deminer will hit the top when probing for it. The presence of minimum metal and non-metallic mines combine to create challenges

that differ from those in other countries.

118. It would be naive to assume that cultural differences do not affect working practices of different groups of deminers around the world. Whether this could be a factor in the Afghan programme needs to be considered. Some observers argue that the cultural approach to danger and risk in Afghanistan, when combined with a less than stringent enforcement of procedures, contribute to the high level of Afghan accidents.

119. The rise in accidents, with 65 recorded in 1995 and 74 in 1996, occurred as larg-

19. Horwood, Chris, Dog Study Report for Handicap International, 1997

20. The NGO agency named SWAAD is now called DAFA; for the purposes of this report the statistics recorded by MCPA for both names are grouped together under DAFA.

21. These figures are expressed as totals of handlers and dogs with the number of dog casualties in parenthesis.

Accident Rates

Table 2

	Number of staff sustaining accidents as a percentage of total operating staff per agency ²³		Number of hectares (one hectare = 10,000 SqM) of mined land cleared per accident sustained		Number of mines (not UXOs) located and destroyed per accident sustained ²⁴	
	1995	1996	1995	1996	1995	1996
ATC	3.9%	4.0%	36.6 ha	20.0 ha	262	345
OMAR	5.7%	2.5%	51.2 ha	37.2 ha	733	902
DAFA	3.8%	3.8%	10.0 ha	16.2 ha	66	149
MDC	3.0%	4.5%	100.0 ha	105.0 ha	90	369

er amounts of land were successfully cleared in more complex contaminated environments. UNOCHA and the mine action NGOs face an urgent challenge: to diagnose and remedy the causes for what is an unacceptably high level of deminer injuries.

120. Tables 2 above illustrates the relationship between accident rates in 1995 and 1996 in relation to agency operator staff number, amount of ground cleared, and number of mines located/destroyed. All of these statistics are based on UNMCP documentation.²²

121. This table is made available from a study undertaken by Chris Horwood for Handicap International. The study report indicates the following:

"It must be recognized that the above figures

22. UNMCP 1995 and 1996 Annual Reports verified by discussion with senior UNMCP and agency staff.

23. Operational staff refers to those individuals directly associated with minefield activities and at risk through daily operations. The agency figures here are: ATC=820, OMAR=280, DAFA=420, MDC 200, (MDG staff not MDS). These levels were the same for both years.

24. Mines have been selected for this calculation as almost all accidents sustained by operators are due to mines. (This is not the case with civilian accident statistics).

are based on averages and care should be exercised in the interpretation or conclusions drawn from these figures. Some could argue that the above statistics, as presented, do not do justice to prevailing conditions and details. For example:

In the case of the number of hectares cleared a deeper analysis could be made of the kind of land type and category where higher levels of accidents are sustained and whether certain agencies were tasked to clear such areas more than others.

In the case of numbers of mines located and destroyed no analysis is made of how the mines are located. Locating 500 anti-personnel mines individually, in most instances, is considerably more dangerous than findings a single cache of 500 mines which are then demolished altogether. Hopefully, by taking annual averages, these calculations account for differences such as these.

This study notes that column A reveals little information about the interpretation of accident statistics that column B indicates information about the different processes used (dog-assisted or manual-only) and their relative safety to operator staff. Column C reveals more about procedures used by the agencies once mines are located. All agencies listed here are (according to UNMCP) working to the same SOPs for exposing and demolishing mines once located/indicated by dog or detector.

It could be argued that the most important indi-

cator is that concerning area cleared per accident sustained (assuming consideration is also given to the proportion of mine density in the cleared land). Returning safe land to the community is the overall objective of UNMCP's work. In this category it is clear that the MDC teams (in 1996) were able to clear 2.8 times more land before sustaining an accident than the closest manual demining team (OMAR).

In 1996, MDC had the highest percentage of staff and dogs injured (and killed), during operations, at 4.5%. However, this study considers the important calculation to be that of land cleared. Obviously, a large or small team of staff that do little work will in general face fewer risks. Those teams performing more clearance face higher risks.

While maintaining a relatively high percentage of accidents (relative to staff size) in 1995 and 1996, the Mine Dog Centre increased its already high clearance ratio in relation to accidents (105 hectares per single accident) and increased by 4 times the numbers of mines located in relation to accidents sustained.

Amongst the manual demining NGOs, OMAR is noteworthy in 1996 for its low percentage of staff casualties while maintaining relatively high area clearance and mine location rates in relations to accidents.²⁵

CLEARANCE

122. The Afghan programme has proven to be very open to new approaches and technologies. UNMCP expatriate staff have continually promoted research and experimentation with different technologies appropriate to Afghanistan believing that it will be in the field and not the laboratory that new, useful technologies will develop. UNMCP has wide experience in developing systems to address the needs of communities in different geographical locations and under different climatic conditions. Bare rocky landscapes, sandy riverbeds, silt-filled irrigation canals, areas of field and bushes, destroyed housing, battle-

LESSONS

- Early and systematic attention, including independent investigation of accidents, and the introduction of remedial measures including targeted re-training, are important factors in lowering on-the-job casualties.

fields strewn with metal remnants of war, and steep mountain sides are some of the different terrains faced by the Afghan teams. They also work in diverse climatic conditions including in temperatures over 40 degrees centigrade and below freezing plus the sand storms and windy conditions which often prevail in Western Afghanistan. The Afghanistan programme has been the first to operate in such varied conditions while maintaining a systematic approach and achieving highly efficient results.

123. The Afghan teams have significant experience using different metal detectors. The teams have used various models, including the basic Philips, the Schiebel, the Vallon, the Whites model, and the Ebinger; recently, they have field-tested four new models. Burning of vegetation and the controlled use of defoliants increase the speed of clearance teams. At different times tank-roller systems and flails have been used and tested in various situations. UNMCP has found these mechanical devices to be cumbersome, less cost-efficient than manual or dog teams, and extremely demanding in terms of technical knowledge required for operations, maintenance costs, and down-time. Current

25. Horwood, HI Dog Study *op.cit.*

UNMCP management and NGOs prefer not use these devices and they are rarely deployed.

124. Necessity breeds invention. In terms of the challenge facing clearance in Afghanistan, UNOCHA was obliged to consider alternative techniques to deal with the presence of non-metallic mines, the challenge of more accurate survey work, and the colossal task of clearing collapsed and contaminated residential areas. In this respect two more recent developments deserve mention. To assist the highly dangerous task facing mine clearance teams in residential areas, the UNOCHA Regional Manager in Kandahar, in collaboration with DAFA, has developed the use of a modified Backhoe. Following successful tests, UNOCHA is planning to increase its use in 1997 to seven machines. UNMCP reports that an armored and customized backhoe excavator can accelerate mine clearance in residential areas by 300%.

125. Mine dogs have been used to assist survey work conducted by MCPA. They increase the speed of this work and reduce the perimeters of suspected minefields. They are also crucial when operating in known low-metallic or non-metallic minefields. Since 1995 UNOCHA has worked with the MDC to develop new teams of dogs specifically tasked with clearance work. The clearance rate of Mine Dog Groups (MDGs) is remarkable. They are not suited to all clearance tasks but in appropriate conditions their clearance efficiency can be between five and ten times faster than manual clearance teams. In terms of the current global search for clearance technology there are few systems being developed that would attempt to improve on manual clearance by such a margin as produced by dogs. Apart from the importance of dogs in

non-metallic minefields, the ratio of accidents is significantly lower than in manual teams. Currently, there are ten teams. Each team uses four dogs, four handlers and eight deminers. UNOCHA plans to increase this number to 15 teams in 1997.

126. Table 3 overleaf illustrates the clearance capability of dog and manual clearance teams in different types of terrain and minefield conditions:

127. As noted in the HI study, some interesting points in relation to Table 3 include:

- a. *"The MDG teams are made up of 24 staff (including drivers, medics, field admin) whereas the manual demining teams have, on average, 35 staff (with drivers, medics and field admin.)"*
- b. *The table illustrates the difference of speed per NGO and land type as well as the relative advantages of using dogs in particular situations.*
- c. *It is outside the scope of this report to comment on the manual demining teams' different clearance speed in particular types of situations. There appears to be considerable differences between agencies which, considering that the SOPs and techniques are similar, does require some explanation. UNMCP suggests that different management styles between agencies and possible failure to fully submit clearance reports by some agencies may offer some explanation.*

128. *It may be of interest to amalgamate the speeds of NGOs using manual clearance to make a simpler comparison between the use of dogs and the absence of dogs across different mined areas. It must be recognized that the table 4 on page 38 represents averages only for 1996:*

Comparison of Clearance rates for 1996²⁶

(Rate of SqM/hr/per)

Table 2

Land Type	Category ²⁷	ATC	DAFA	OMAR	MDG
Agriculture	A	296	74	894	603
	B	337	220	114	505
	C	309	298	217	935
Grazing	A	372	311	595	870
	B	383	258	357	669
	C	416	559	914	1188
Road	A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1051
	B	138	25	N/A	771
	C	240	6	N/A	906
Residential	A	192	47	49	499
	B	190	48	174	299
	C	139	10	138	593
Irrigation/ Canals	A	109	264	N/A	N/A
	B	220	83	67	N/A
	C	637	203	185	535

129. Points of interest in relation to Table 4 include:

- a. The factor of increase in speed between MDC's 1996 performance and the average of manual demining NGOs is, at lowest 1.4 (Agriculture Category A) and at highest 9.4 (Road Category B). Another way of expressing this is to state that when using the least impressive comparison with manual deminers, the dogs work 140% faster than manual teams in Agricultural land in Category A. The most impressive comparison with manual deminers indicates that they work 940% faster than manual teams on Category B of Road clearance.
- b. Dogs perform at faster rates in all categories where they are used. A cost-analysis will

illustrate what levels, if any, of cost-benefit are made by using dogs as opposed to manual teams in particular categories.

- c. It is interesting to note that even in areas where manual teams are conventionally preferred to dog teams (Residential and Irrigation), the dogs perform their tasks at relatively high speeds.¹²⁸

130. Since September 1995, UNMCP staff have developed the framework and

26. Horwood, HI Dog Study op.cit.

27. Categorization is defined as follows: A) Mines which are visible in minefields; B) Survey team located mines, which were sub-surface, with detectors; C) Mines are not visible and were not detected by survey teams but suspected minefield.

28. Horwood, op. cit.

**Comparison between demining agencies
(using one 'non-dog' average) and MDC for clearance rates - 1996**

Table 4

Land Type	Category	Averages for non-dog demining NGOs ²⁹ (SqM/hr/team)	MDG (SqM/hr/team)	Speed Increase Factor of MDC
Agriculture	A	421	603	1.4
	B	234	505	2.2
	C	275	935	3.4
Grazing	A	426	870	2.0
	B	333	669	2.0
	C	430	1188	2.8
Road	A	N/A	1051	N/A
	B	82	771	9.4
	C	123	906	7.4
Residential	A	96	499	5.2
	B	137	299	2.2
	C	96	593	6.2
Irrigation/ Canals	A	187	N/A	N/A
	B	123	N/A	N/A
	C	342	535	1.6

methodology for the introduction of two specialized teams to address the specific tasks inherent in dealing with unexploded ordnance (UXO) in residential areas and visual clearance requirements in post-conflict battle zones. In most mine-affected countries designated 'demining' teams actually locate and destroy far greater numbers of UXO than landmines. Despite this reality, demining NGOs and national authorities have been slow to recognize the need for Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) training and expertise within their programmes. This has also been the case in the Afghanistan programme where

demining teams have been destroying UXO with limited knowledge of correct methodology and techniques. If demining teams had attempted to destroy UXOs by conventional methods in a crowded urban area, such as Kabul, this would have resulted in unacceptable dangers and collateral damage. Therefore, UNMCP was obliged to develop an alternative strategy.

131. UNMCP developed EOD teams in collaboration with ATC. The success of these teams has been clear and they will be increased and used more widely in the future. ATC has also pioneered the UNMCP-led development of Battle Area Clearance (BAC) teams. These teams use visual search

29. Averages taken from Table 3 from ATC, OMAR, DAFA.

methods to survey large areas contaminated by UXOs lying on the surface. BAC teams will destroy items up to a certain calibration (82mm), beyond which they will contact the EOD teams. These BAC teams are able to clear large areas of suspect land swiftly and their development has increased UNMCP's operational capacity and diversity.

132. In terms of programme consolidation the changes, innovations and development commented on above represent a commendable deepening and maturation of the programme's operations.

PRODUCTIVITY AND COST-EFFICIENCY

133. It was not until the consolidation phase that UNMCP was able to illustrate that teams were operating in relatively high cost-effective ratios. For example, in 1995-96 UNMCP reported that the average clearance cost using manual teams was \$1.0 per square metre. This cost is the lowest reported from any country. UNMCP also advised that the use of dogs is significantly reducing this average in certain terrain.

134. Since 1990 the costs of mine awareness, manual clearance, and survey work have been declining in relation to productivity. For planning purposes, UNOCHA calculates clearance speeds in different environments according to findings based on MCPA's accumulated data. Worthy of note are the increased amounts of land the clearance teams are covering. During the consolidation phase the work rate stabilized at about 20 square kilometres per year compared to half that rate during the period from 1989 through 1992. However, in 1997, with a relatively small

increase in funds and a reorganization of teams, the plan was to clear 27 square kilometres of high priority land. This is a significant increase in productivity and cost-efficiency.

135. Manual clearance speeds are now considered to have reached their maximum levels without the addition of assistance from trained dogs or mechanical devices and using the SOPs for humanitarian mine clearance. The focus for increasing productivity and cost-efficiency has occurred at two levels.

136. First, the coordination and management of operations were organized to ensure that teams were always working on high-priority tasks that were selected in line with criteria designed to maximize the benefit of clearance to Afghan communities. Prioritization was identified as an important management function which includes careful monitoring of marking and mapping so that clearance teams spend as little time as possible working in non-mined areas. In recent years, these issues have been of central concern to UNMCP.

137. The second important element of improved productivity is the use of alternative technologies. Numerous engineers, inventors together with research and the development departments are currently concentrating their efforts to assist humanitarian mine clearance in terms of efficiency and cost. To-date there are developments regarding various crushing, sorting, flailing and earth-moving vehicles, bio-sensors, ground penetrative radar, multi-spectral cameras, and vapor-condensing mechanisms. The use of the flail mechanical clearance vehicle (where practicable) in Afghanistan proved to be more costly than manual clearance, once all associated costs of the device had been assessed. It may still have a useful role to play in future clearance but

LESSONS

- **It is important to give early attention to the issue of productivity and cost-effectiveness, both from an organizational and technical perspective. Afghanistan illustrates the importance of developing well-identified socio-economic based criteria for site selection and careful monitoring and analysis of minefield marking activities so that clearance teams only operate in areas which are actually mined.**
- **The use of different technologies and approaches in different environments and minefield conditions will help ensure effective use of available resources.**

CONSOLIDATION

only in specialized areas of operation. Further tests are planned in 1997. So far, none of the technologies currently being explored have been found suitable to the environment of Afghanistan except on an experimental basis. UNMCP is open to new technologies and actively encourages researchers to visit minefields.

138. Another technology, developed within the UNMCP, is the customized and armored backhoe. This has been built and successfully tried in Afghanistan for increasing the speed of clearance in residential areas where mines and ordnance are sometimes buried under two or three metres of earth. The number of these machines will be increased in 1997. They are low-cost innovations that promise to increase productivity in residential clearance in Kandahar, Herat, and Kabul.

CONCLUSIONS

139. The Afghanistan mine action programme was and is a pioneering enterprise both because it had to map its own way forward without the benefit of hindsight from other programmes and because it has always been prepared to break new ground and test innovative ideas.

140. The Afghanistan programme experience has helped in the development of mine action activities in other settings particularly in terms of curricula and the content and use of Standard Operating Procedures. A number of key lessons, and insights gained from the development of mine action activities in Afghanistan, have been enumerated in the case study and will not be summarized here. The study team found many features of the Afghanistan programme of major interest and note three of them here:

- a. the commitment of UNOCHA to the development of an indigenous capability,
- b. the innovative use of available technology and data management including a tool-box approach and the effective and efficient use of sniffer dogs to increase productivity, and
- c. the separation of survey, clearance, training and monitoring activities coupled with the active involvement of field staff in planning and tasking contribute significantly to quality control and cost-effectiveness.

AFGHANIZATION OF THE MINE ACTION PROGRAMME

141. Even before it became apparent that peace was not an automatic proposition in

Afghanistan, UNOCHA negotiated and secured access in a country split into rival fiefdoms and ever-changing alliances. UNOCHA's early and continuing ability to negotiate access for humanitarian purposes was crucial to the success of the mine action programme.

142. Confronted with continuing warfare and the absence of an authority which could claim legitimacy throughout Afghanistan, UNOCHA did not delay the initiation and development of an Afghan capability to deal with the problem of landmines. With the wisdom of hindsight, the decision to move ahead in 1988 may seem obvious but at the time there was a great deal of skepticism of the viability and appropriateness of the mine action initiative.

143. UNOCHA and those NGOs and donors which support the programme must be commended for their foresight and commitment to the creation and development of Afghan NGOs and what is, essentially, a unique institutional model in the brief history of indigenizing mine action capabilities. The Afghan institutional architecture, involving a strong central coordination and oversight mechanism and autonomous but affiliated mine action NGOs, helps secure the viability, sustainability and accountability of the programme while maximizing flexibility, plurality of methodologies, and a keen sense of competitiveness and productivity.

144. The Afghanistan programme has been in the forefront of analyzing and testing

the use of different methodologies to survey, mark, and clear minefields in diverse environmental and mine-contaminated conditions. Afghanistan has spearheaded the use of dogs and has developed an impressive reservoir of knowledge and expertise on the management and use of dogs including the circumstances in which they are best able to perform. The Afghanistan programme has been able to demonstrate that in some situations dogs and their handlers are 140% faster than manual detection and clearance teams. The use of what has been referred to as a "tool-box" approach in Afghanistan helps ensure that optimum use is made of available resources and that there is constant attention to the issue of productivity. Sophisticated data management and analysis help managers to closely monitor trends and to modify plans in line with changing requirements.

SELF-CHECKING QUALITY CONTROL

145. In Afghanistan, survey and clearance activities are undertaken by different mine action agencies which is an effective quality control and self-checking system that simplifies management of the programme.

UNOCHA/MCP and its collaborating partner, MCPA have also developed a significant management tool in the form of Monitoring and Training Teams who make unannounced visits to minefield sites and observe the way in which activities are managed and how SOPs are used in the performance of specific tasks. This type of review and feedback mechanism contributes to improved management, training and productivity and facilitates an exchange of experiences between different mine action entities. Field staff are also actively involved in planning and the identification of local priorities which helps ensure that tasking is demand-driven and the outcome is of direct benefit to intended end-users.

146. In conclusion it is worth noting that mine action activities in Afghanistan appear to be universally appreciated and supported; minefield personnel are seen to be involved in a jihad against landmines. The strong support the programme enjoys both within Afghanistan and within the donor community point to its credibility and its ability to sustain and expand activities in an environment of sporadic warfare and continuing political uncertainty.

CHRONOLOGY

- April 1988 Geneva Accords; Soviet withdrawal agreed
- May 1988 UN Secretary-General appoints Sadruddin Aga Khan Coordinator of UNOCHA
- June 1988 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan (UNOCHA) opens Geneva office
- October 1988 US\$ 900 million pledged at donor conference;
Afghanistan Emergency Trust Fund established
- November 1988 UNOCHA opens office in Islamabad, Pakistan
- February 1989 Soviet withdrawal completed;
UNOCHA establishes Training Camps at Risalpur and Quetta, Pakistan
- April 1989 RONCO, funded by USAID, begin using mine dogs
- September 1989 International Rescue Committee (IRC) initiates mine awareness activities, funded by UNOCHA
- October 1989 Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC) established with UNOCHA funding
- November 1989 Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA) established with UNOCHA funding
- January 1990 ATC pilot project launched in Kunar Province, Afghanistan
- March 1990 Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA) established for planning and quality control
- May 1990 ATC Mine Mine Clearance flail unit commences activities;
South West Afghan Agency for Demining (SWAAD) established
- August 1990 Organization for Mine Awareness and Rehabilitation (OMAR) established, taking over IRC Mine Awareness contract
- September 1990 Flail machines operational in Urgun, Paktica Province
- July 1991 External evaluation of mine action activities carried out by Florence and Freedman
- March 1992 Mine Awareness activities carried out by Kabul Afghan Red Crescent Society
- August 1992 OMAR carries out mine clearance, funded by European Union, in Herat
- December 1992 MCPA takes over training for all mine clearance activities in Afghanistan
- March 1993 MCPA begins nationwide survey with funding from European Union
- April 1993 ATC establishes Explosive Ordnance Disposal unit
- June 1993 Last Australian military TAs leave the region
- November 1993 European Community review carried out by Steve Brown
- January 1994 SWAAD changes name to Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA);
ATC undertakes Battle Area Clearance (BAC) in Jalalabad

CHRONOLOGY

- February 1994 Mine Dog Centre established and absorbs dogs previously used by RONCO/USAID
- March 1994 Refugee Relief Group of Ansar Mines Awareness begins programme in Iran
- June 1994 First Mine Dog Group formed in Herat
- Mid 1995 Backhoe and one-man demining trials take place in Kandahar
- April 1995 Overseas Development Administration (UK) carry out review;
Kabul emergency - 18 teams relocated to Kabul
- August 1995 Review of effectiveness of flail machines undertaken
- January 1996 Peshawar, Pakistan training camp relocated to Jalalabad, Afghanistan

ANNEX II

MINE ACTION PROGRAMME AFGHANISTAN RESOURCES SINCE 1991*

COUNTRY	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Australia	0	658,868	138,279	274,800	306,000	293,600	748,000
Austria	0	180,000	0	315,725	159,982	203,030	16,667
Canada	0	0	562,559	716,874	355,540	737,419	726,190
EC	0	0	0	0	2,785,321	5,077,730	2,261,364
Cyprus	0	0	0	0	10,000	0	0
Denmark	0	400,000	0	202,823	900,000	900,000	600,000
Finland	235,294	227,635	175,991	756,559	242,825	423,191	0
Germany	0	0	0	0	374,232	2,388,041	2,000,000
Greece	0	16,365	0	0	0	0	0
Japan	5,000,000	2,000,000	2,000,000	0	2,000,000	0	1,000,000
Korea	0	0	75,000	0	0	0	0
Netherlands	0	586,281	780,457	341,591	789,345	1,363,527	2,530,993
Norway	765,004	1,126,877	1,819,103	630,606	562,375	886,163	1,508,106
Sweden	894,458	872,600	1,148,494	1,894,524	2,218,743	2,535,812	2,500,000
Switzerland	0	0	709,220	0	344,828	344,828	0
United Kingdom	904,350	954,350	1,494,000	1,085,840	1,970,728	1,183,088	1,209,677
USA	123,000	1,105,023	1,500,000	3,227,405	2,564,089	1,308,507	2,000,000
Direct/In-kind	0	2,955,000	6,972,428	7,251,244	0	115,328	1,111,100
Total	7,922,106	11,082,999	17,375,531	16,697,991	15,584,008	17,760,264	18,212,097

* Details of both financial and in-kind resources provided prior to 1991 are not available. Financial data provided by UNOCHA/UNMCP.

In-kind donations from 1991-1995 include EC funding as well as in-kind donations from USA and the former USSR. The 1996 and 1997 in-kind donations were provided only by the USA.

**TERMS OF REFERENCE
FOR A MULTI-COUNTRY STUDY ON THE
DEVELOPMENT OF INDIGENOUS MINE-ACTION CAPACITIES**

I. BACKGROUND

Land mines are defined by their grim arithmetic. Relevant statistics include their cheap and plentiful availability, their indiscriminate proliferation, an incalculable toll in human lives, suffering and disability, and costly obstructions to peace-building and the regeneration of social and economic development. Added to this, is the dangerous, expensive and labourious task of individually removing each and every piece of metal and weapon fragment before declaring mine infested areas cleared and safe for habitation.

Costing as little as \$3, land mines have become the "weapon of choice" in many late 20th century war zones. An estimated 110 million land mines are scattered in 64 countries creating new victims each month and destroying the livelihood of millions of people confronted with the lethal reality of mines long after wars have formally ceased.

With each mine costing, on average, \$1,000 to identify, remove and destroy, an estimated \$33 billion is required to deal with existing mine fields. Costs will inevitably increase as new mine fields, which outstrip the pace of clearance, put additional people in danger. A ban putting an end to the production and use of mines is the only answer to what is, in essence, a man-made disaster.

Accelerating the eradication of mines through improved research and technology, and maximizing the use of limited resources,

are equally critical in addressing the problem of land mines. It is within this context that the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) is committed to learning from experience and ensuring that improved knowledge and practices are available and used to benefit future activities geared to the organization and development of indigenous mine-action programmes.

II. RATIONALE

The human cost of land mines in terms of lives and disability, and the destructive social and economic implications of such weapons, dictate the need for prompt and effective action both to remove and destroy mines, and to develop a national capacity to do so. Generating mine-action programmes in post cease-fire settings, or in situations of sporadic warfare where central and institutional capacity is often weak or non-existent in key sectors, poses particular challenges. Quick action on mine-clearance is often crucial to maintaining the momentum and consolidation of peace-building and related humanitarian activities. Simultaneously, all mine-action activity must contribute to the development of an indigenous capacity that is sustainable, cost-effective and meets basic standards of safety and quality control. Studying different country experiences will help highlight practices and procedures that are most cost-effective in supporting the formulation of a national mine-action capacity. The Study will also identify poten-

tial constraints and means of addressing or pre-empting these.

III. JUSTIFICATION

The growing need for mine-action programmes and the difficulty of developing effective institutional and technical capacities illustrates the importance of benefitting from, and building on, recent experiences and ensuring that relevant lessons are fed into future planning and programme management. The Study Report will be used for the ongoing development of guidelines relevant for the initiation and formation of national indigenous mine-action capacities.

IV. OVERALL OBJECTIVE

The overall objective is to enhance the capacity of all actors involved in the planning, development and implementation of mine-action programmes to determine the most appropriate and cost-effective means for the initiation and development of indigenous capabilities essential for the management and sustainability of mine-action programmes.

V. IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES

The immediate objectives are:

- to identify factors which affect the development of indigenous mine-action capacities in war-torn settings while simultaneously addressing the need for humanitarian demining essential for peace-consolidation activities;
- to study the initiation, development, management and implementation of mine-action programmes in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia and Mozambique. Specifically,

this includes analyzing pertinent issues generic to different settings with the end view of formulating recommendations for future programmes on goals, strategies, institutional structure, programme management, resourcing, implementation, cost effectiveness and sustainability;

- to study the role of DHA in supporting the initiation and evolution of mine-action activities through various stages of programme development; and
- to prepare a report which reflects the context within which specific initiatives were launched, highlights the insights and lessons which can be distilled from different experiences, and make recommendations which will assist the development and management of future mine-action programmes.

VI. METHODOLOGY

A multi-disciplinary three-person team, under the guidance of a team leader and with the backstopping and support by DHA and field colleagues, will undertake a review of available documentation to determine, in advance of field visits, issues which can be clarified prior to in-country research. Consultations will be held at Headquarters (with NGO, donor and affected country representatives, UN and other colleagues) to develop an overview of pertinent issues and perspectives.

The study team will visit each country programme for an in-depth review of issues, opportunities and constraints which shaped the development of individual programmes. Three to four days will be devoted at the end of field research to preparing summary find-

ings, which will be reviewed with relevant personnel prior to departure from each country setting.

Upon the completion of the Cambodia and Afghanistan case studies, tentative findings and recommendations will be reviewed at a small two-day workshop geared to bringing together a larger cross-section of expertise from affected countries, the donor community, NGOs, the UN as well as individuals with specialist mine-related experience. A second workshop will be held following completion of the Angola and Mozambique case-studies.

Utilizing, as considered appropriate, insights gained throughout the review process, the study team will prepare a comprehensive report reflecting their findings, recommendations and individual reports of the three country programmes.

VII. MAJOR ISSUES AND FOCUS OF STUDY

1. Programme Goals and Philosophy

The Study Team will review goals and perspectives which led to the initiation of the programme taking into account political and other factors which shaped overall objectives and orientation. The Study Team will review the way in which the realization of an indigenous capacity was originally conceptualized. The Study will also examine the role of DHA and others in assisting local authorities to define programme goals and philosophy. In this connection, the Study will review what impact if any the mine-clearance activities of troops deployed on peace-keeping operations have had in the identification of programme goals and philosophy.

2. Overall Policy and Approach

The Study Team will review what considerations and constraints need to be analyzed when determining overall policy and approach of national mine-action programmes. It will examine what role DHA and others tasked with assisting the development of a mine-action programme should play in the formulation of policy as well as determining immediate and longer term strategies. The Study Team will investigate the role of DHA and others in facilitating the participation and support of key stakeholders in the identification and development of programme policy and overall orientation of mine-action activities. It will, for example, examine different experiences to determine what lessons have been learned in terms of utilizing different implementation modalities including the identification of expatriate expertise, commercial or NGO mine-clearance groups, and procurement of equipment and supplies. The Study Team will also examine the policy implications of initiating mine-action activities under the aegis of peace-keeping operations.

3. Institutional Architecture

The Study Team will investigate which institutional and coordination mechanisms are most appropriate at different stages of programme evolution taking into account the overall context within which programmes are initiated. It will study the role of DHA and others in assisting the creation of umbrella frameworks particularly in the early stages of programme development. It will examine the implications of utilizing different institutional mechanisms and uncoordinated activities for long-term sustainability, coherence, and cost-effectiveness. It will also review factors which impede the devel-

opment of an institutional framework essential for timely and appropriate policy-setting, effective programme management, resourcing, implementation and accountability. In this connection, it will examine how the different components of the UN system can be most effectively utilized in supporting the development of indigenous institutional structures.

4. *Funding and Resource Mobilization*

The Team will study the ways in which different programmes and key activities have been funded with particular reference to the initiation stage. It will examine the implications of using a combination of resources including in-kind contributions (personnel, equipment and supplies), use of the UN assessed budget as well as voluntary contributions including the UN Demining Trust Fund. It will examine the perspective of donors on overall funding policy as well as the perspective of those dependent on external resources for programme delivery. The Study Team will also examine the experience of different actors, including technical assistance entities, in accessing pledged funds and means of ensuring resources are available in a timely manner. The Study Team will explore what role, if any, DHA should play in resource mobilization.

5. *Programme Management and Implementation*

The Study Team will review the many factors which affect the development of an indigenous capacity to effectively manage and implement a national mine-action programme. The team will examine different modalities for providing technical assistance geared to the twin objectives of rapid action on mine clearance and related activities and the development of a national structure and capacity essential for the long-term organi-

zation of a national mine-action programme. The team will pay particular attention to the nature, composition and duration of technical assistance and the role of DHA and other entities in facilitating and providing this type of support. The Study Team will review a range of issues (see attached Annex) which affect programme performance and cost-effectiveness including, for example, the management and utilization of information technology available for different tasks. It will examine, for example, the role of DHA and others in the development of Standard Operating Procedures, as well as the application of SOPs and the extent to which these impact on the overall effectiveness of mine-action activities. The team will study different modalities used for the provision of training in different skill provision areas and at different levels of responsibility. Issues of quality control, safety and support infrastructure for field activities will be examined as well as internal review mechanisms and accountability procedures.

VIII. TIME FRAME

1. The study programme will commence with:
 - 10 days preparation in New York
 - 3 weeks in Cambodia
 - 3 weeks in Afghanistan
2. It will be immediately followed by a two day workshop, expected to be held in Jalalabad (Afghanistan).
3. The team will then proceed with:
 - 2 weeks in Angola
 - 2-3 weeks in Mozambique
4. This will be immediately followed by the second two day workshop, expected to be held in Maputo or Luanda.

5. The study team will have an additional 3 weeks over the course of the study programme to prepare, finalize and submit for publication, the complete Study Report.