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FIRST COMMITTEE
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VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 3RD MEETING

Chairman: Mr. GOLOB (Yugoslavia)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.45 a.m.

STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN

The CHAIRMAN: In the coming weeks we shall be considering items on disarmament. I should like briefly to review the situation we are faced with, as I see it, and the tasks that lie ahead of us. I seek your indulgence in this regard, particularly the indulgence of the speakers inscribed on the list for this morning.

The Committee is starting its work under the shadow of a continuous deterioration of the international situation. Bloc rivalries have brought the process of détente to a dismal state and have spread crises and conflicts all over the globe. Recourse to violence and use of force is being generally condemned but it is, nevertheless, becoming the practice of the day. Increasingly large numbers of countries rightfully consider themselves to be threatened. Regardless of their size, whether possessing the most complicated systems of arms or being poorly armed, all of them are apprehensive about their own security and their future.

The arms race is at the same time the cause and the consequence of such a state of affairs. The grim realities of war and suffering gravely affect our present and seriously threaten our future. I wonder whether it is really impossible to act reasonably before nuclear weapons are used again? It is simply untrue that nuclear war can be won or that anybody can enhance his own security interests by waging war.

However, fortunately there is a widespread opinion that the negative trends should be reversed. Nations do differ in their problems and possibilities of resolving them. But there is a common denominator: it resides in their recognition of danger, the cost and consequences and the destructive potential of an unrestrained arms race.

The arms race is a form of terror that holds many in bondage and others hostage. It should be a thing of the past, but it is firmly

(The Chairman)

entrenched in the present. It promotes a system of relations that is totally in contradiction of that envisaged by the Charter of the United Nations.

The economic situation in the world is becoming more difficult and the arms race weighs heavily, almost unbearably, on the national economies of the developed countries. It presents the developing countries with the sad spectacle of the squandering of enormous resources - close to \$600 billion yearly - instead of using them for development. It has been rightly said that transfer of the resources now locked up in the machinery of destruction could mark the beginning of a new era. Most of us can only guess at the awesome social and economic consequences of investing in ever more advanced arms systems. None of us should underestimate the daily widening gap between what is being done in the armaments race and the little that is being done to halt and reverse it. There is an ever clearer perception of the arms race, particularly its nuclear aspect, as the maddest part of madness.

This, together with the futility and irrationality of the endless piling up of arms, is reflected in a growing impatience and mounting concern among the peoples we represent with regard to the impasse in the field of disarmament.

However, all this is not meant to be a call to subscribe to unrestrained pessimism. That would simply not help.

There remains for us hardly anything to do but to proceed from the meagre results of this year. The Disarmament Commission did work in difficult international circumstances, which is by itself no mean achievement.

The Committee on Disarmament, despite its intensive work, has not been able to achieve concrete results in considering the most important issues on its agenda.

Negotiations between the two blocs on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe have been bogged down for years and there remains little hope that they will contribute to an atmosphere conducive to disarmament in Europe. And the same holds true for the other parts of the world where there are hotbeds of crises.

(The Chairman)

Bilateral negotiations between the USSR and the United States on the prohibition of chemical weapons and trilateral negotiations among the USSR, the United States and Great Britain on the comprehensive nuclear test ban have been interrupted.

Last but not least, the United States and the USSR have indicated their agreement to talk about what they are going to negotiate at a later, unspecified stage in the area of nuclear armament.

The studies of different aspects of disarmament undertaken within the framework of the United Nations in the course of the year are a substantial contribution to better understanding of the inner workings of the armaments race and its consequences. They are particularly worthwhile in a year of impasse.

General and complete disarmament remains our goal.

We may be again in agreement on the nature and magnitude of the problem at hand. Furthermore, we all have an interest in survival, there is no doubt about it. If the world is being engulfed by the fire of crisis, we should remember it is our own world. We should not limit ourselves to the assessment that the situation is bad and watch it getting worse. We, at the United Nations General Assembly, should do everything possible to reopen the window of negotiations and thus contribute to the improvement of the situation. Progress in disarmament will increase trust among nations and conversely the restoration of the process of détente with the participation of all will make such progress possible.

But this will certainly not come about by itself. Only the political will of everybody, and particularly of those who shoulder the most responsibility for the present state of affairs and who are to the greatest extent responsible for future trends, can help to initiate a meaningful dialogue and results. We shall need all the political will we can muster. Disarmament is an exceedingly complex matter and differences are understandable. However, political will should keep the language of polarization out of our work. Confidence

(The Chairman)

and trust are also essential ingredients for successful negotiations and polarization tends to decrease them. We should remember that there is no mileage to be obtained from rejoinders and skirmishes in the Committee.

Problems among sovereign nations are best approached and dealt with through consensus. But this calls for consultations between the like-minded as well as those of different mind.

I hope that the members of the Committee will find it agreeable and useful to enter into consultations on different issues parallel to the ongoing debate. Let us keep in mind that consensus lasts longest. However, I shall be available to help these consultations and will always be at the disposal of delegations who may deem it useful to consult me.

It would be advisable to proceed from the fact that all nations are interested in ensuring their security and each has a right to participate in disarmament negotiations.

The United Nations provides the only framework in which the interests, consensus and needs of the Member States converge, where they can be examined and the solution sought.

There simply is no other organization or institution but the United Nations that can serve this end. The recent past abounds with proof that deliberating on important international problems outside the framework of the United Nations does not at all facilitate their solution.

Thus, let us make this Committee more effective; let us give a push to the Disarmament Commission as the deliberative body of the international community as a whole in the field of disarmament; let us stimulate the Committee on Disarmament as the multilateral negotiating body; let us support the world disarmament campaign to enhance the widest possible understanding of the problems, as well as the important activities of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament.

In the year which precedes the second special session, we should pronounce ourselves clearly in favour of negotiations on various issues of disarmament, on all levels. Our decisions should contribute to the creation of favourable political conditions which will enable

(The Chairman)

comprehensive preparations and successful outcome of this important international event.

The Preparatory Committee for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament completed its meetings last week. We are to address ourselves to further elaboration of the preparatory work. Our decision should make it possible for the Preparatory Committee to continue its work and substantially prepare for the second special session on disarmament.

In order to make the second special session an event of substantial importance, the momentum created by the first special session should be restored. It would be unwise to do otherwise. This is the responsibility of the current General Assembly session.

(The Chairman)

Finally, may I remind the Committee that the issues of disarmament will occupy our time until the very end of November. While the Committee will concentrate on disarmament, it may be advisable at the same time to do some groundwork on the review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security. We have inherited an Ad Hoc Working Group from the last session. Our colleague Ambassador Sinclair of Guyana is chairing the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference. I am pleased that he has professed his readiness to start a new attempt to bring the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group to successful fruition. I suggest, however, that that group meet when there are not enough speakers to convene a meeting of the First Committee.

I should like to thank representatives for their indulgence in listening to the points of view I have presented.

AGENDA ITEMS 39 TO 56, 128 AND 135

GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): Regardless of the provisions of our rules, I am certain that there is nothing in them that would prohibit my delegation from congratulating itself at seeing you, Sir, in the Chair of the First Committee. Personally, I believe I can say that with full knowledge of the circumstances. I have closely followed your performance, your work, not only in the area of multilateral diplomacy such as the body in which we find ourselves, but also in international forums of a consultative nature such as the board of which we are both members, and also in bilateral diplomacy. I have been witness to the brilliant and effective manner in which, for a number of years, you held the post of Ambassador of Yugoslavia

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

to my country. I am convinced that you have a clear and realistic vision of the discouraging situation confronting the world as regards disarmament. The very inspired words you have just spoken bear witness to that fact. Therefore, I am certain that with that competence for which you are known you will guide our deliberations towards the objective we all pursue and will lead those deliberations to a happy conclusion.

I have also noted with sincere satisfaction the designation of Mr. Yango of the Philippines to one of the posts of Vice-Chairman and Mr. Holonnen of Ethiopia to the post of Rapporteur.

Of the approximately 40 items which are included this year on the agenda of the First Committee - 26 specifically numbered and the rest included under two omnibus items - I have chosen six for consideration in the initial statement of the Mexican delegation: three that were dealt with by the Committee on Disarmament and that appear in its report under the headings "Comprehensive Programme for Disarmament", "Prohibitions of Nuclear Weapons Tests" and "The Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament", and three additional items which we received by virtue of resolutions of the last two sessions of the General Assembly: the one entitled "Strategic Arms Limitation Talks" and the two studies dealing respectively with "Institutional Arrangements Relating to the Process of Disarmament" and the "World Disarmament Campaign".

As we have already had occasion to state, both in the Preparatory Committee of the second special session devoted to disarmament and in the Committee in Geneva, we consider that the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will be the central theme of that Assembly's agenda and that its importance at that meeting will be such that in the last analysis the success or failure of that Assembly will depend on the Programme's fate.

While the work carried out by the Ad Hoc Working Group of the Committee on Disarmament dealing with that question would not justify unlimited optimism, neither does it give cause for inordinate alarm. As always happens in such cases, there are as many positive as negative elements.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

Among the former, we can undoubtedly state the following:

First, that the 1978 Assembly unequivocally defined the general lines of the content of the Comprehensive Programme when it decided by consensus that it should be such as:

to encompass all measures that may be deemed desirable in order that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control may become a reality in a world in which peace and international security prevail and where the New International Economic Order may be strengthened and consolidated.

Secondly, that the Ad Hoc Group decided in its report for 1980, which was adopted by consensus by the Committee on Disarmament, that the Comprehensive Programme in itself would have to be a complete whole, which obviously precludes any attempt to turn it into a reference list of the many documents which already exist on disarmament.

Thirdly, that at its third session also, the Group adopted a structure for the Comprehensive Programme which essentially is in keeping with the one laid down in the Final Document of 1978, since it contains the same sections as that Final Document: Introduction or Preamble, Objectives, Principles, Priorities, Measures, Mechanisms, and Procedure, with the sole addition of the heading "Execution Stages", which possibly would have to be merged with the "Measures".

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

The fourth and last of the elements to which I have been referring and which, in my view, give rise to optimism, is that it will considerably facilitate the work of the group by making possible the use of a sizeable part of the material contained in the 1978 Final Document, which, in addition to having been adopted by consensus, remains fully valid and relevant. This is fully demonstrated in the working paper submitted by the Group of 21 for the chapter in the Comprehensive Programme relating to principles, a document distributed not only as a paper of the Working Group as CD/CPD/WP.55, but also as Disarmament Committee document CD/208. A perusal of that document, which includes a lengthy explanatory note, clearly shows the desirability of making use of a similar procedure for the elaboration of the chapters relating to objectives, priorities and mechanisms.

As for the negative elements, those are to be found essentially in the Annex to the Working Group's report for this year, where approximately 80 per cent of the material reproduced, reflecting the results of the consideration of measures for the first stage of the Programme, has been left in brackets because it was not possible to reach agreement on those questions.

Such a situation, however, is in no way unusual, and those who participated in the preparatory work of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will doubtless recall that something similar occurred at that time and that, in the last analysis, this did not prevent the adoption by consensus of a document free of brackets.

On the other hand, even with regard to measures, consensus has already been achieved with respect to various procedural points, such as the following: the adoption of the classification approved by the Disarmament Commission in 1979; agreement that the programme should be carried out in stages; recognition of the need to include in each stage other measures - apart from disarmament measures and verification measures proper - such as measures aimed at confidence-building, reduction of international tension, prevention

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

of the use of force in international relations, mobilization of public opinion in favour of disarmament, ensuring that disarmament contributes towards the realization of the new international economic order and the strengthening of international security; recognition likewise of the desirability of examining, at the conclusion of each stage, the implementation of the Programme and, in the light of that examination, of adopting decisions that appear to be desirable, in which connexion the possibility is mentioned of entrusting that task to a series of special review Assemblies.

The basic questions on which a diversity of views still exists and to which a solution will have to be found are the following: first, whether or not to establish the number of stages to be encompassed by the Programme. In this connexion, it is worthwhile recalling that proposals for three and for five stages were put forward in the Working Group, and the Group agreed to proceed on the basis of a four-stage programme as a working hypothesis.

Secondly, the question of whether or not to determine the duration of all or some of those stages. On this point, mention must be made of the fact that the Working Group has been proceeding on the hypothesis of a five-year duration for each stage, in the same tentative way as in the case of the number of stages.

Thirdly, the question of what the content of the stages in the Programme should be and how we should proceed to decide on this point. The proposals submitted by the Group of 21 set forth in documents CD/CPD/WP.36, Addenda 1, 2 and 3, and CD/223, and those submitted by a group of five States in documents CD/CPD/WP.52 and CD/205, respectively, illustrate two of the positions taken on this question in the discussions in the Working Group.

The report of the Working Group, over which I have the honour to preside, is included in the report of the Committee on Disarmament which is doubtless already in the hands of the members of the First Committee. The appendices to that report include all the documents to which I have referred thus far in my statement today.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

I am sure that the members of the Group will be happy to hear any comments or suggestions that may be made here in connexion with our work in Geneva, especially if, in making such comments, account is taken of what I regard as the two fundamental requirements of the Comprehensive Programme, namely, that it faithfully adhere to the guidelines so clearly defined by the General Assembly in paragraph 109 of the 1978 Final Document, and, secondly, that it not include any provision which, either in letter or in spirit, might be construed as a backward step vis-à-vis that document.

I should now like to turn to the second of the questions I mentioned at the outset, the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

This is the item that quite rightly has been taking pride of place in the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament. Indeed, the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, which has been under consideration for over a quarter of a century and with regard to which the General Assembly has adopted more than 40 resolutions, constitutes a fundamental United Nations objective in the field of disarmament and one for whose attainment the Assembly has repeatedly requested that highest priority be given.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

It is also worthwhile recalling that the Assembly itself has condemned such tests on seven different occasions and has done so in the strongest terms; that since 1974 it has expressed its conviction that the continuation of nuclear-weapon testing intensified the arms race, thus increasing the danger of nuclear war and that it has repeatedly asserted in its resolutions that, whatever may be the differences on the question of verification, there is no valid reason for delaying the conclusion of an agreement on the complete prohibition of all nuclear-weapons tests.

The Secretary-General, for his part, declared close on 10 years ago, in fact in February 1972, and expressly reaffirmed last year, that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem had been so fully explored that only a political decision was now necessary in order to achieve final agreement; and he added that when one takes into account the existing means of verification, it was difficult to understand further delay in achieving agreement on an underground test ban.

It was on the basis of facts such as those I have described that the General Assembly adopted resolutions 35/145 A and 35/145 B at its last session on 12 December 1980. In operative paragraph 1 of the former, it began by reiterating once again "its grave concern that nuclear-weapon testing continues unabated against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Member States" and in operative paragraph 2, it reaffirmed its conviction that a treaty to obtain the prohibition of all nuclear tests

"... constitutes a vital element for the success of efforts to prevent both vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and a contribution to nuclear disarmament". (ibid., p. 7)

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

Further, the Assembly included in its resolution a number of appeals, of which I shall confine myself to recalling here the following two: first, in operative paragraph 5 the one addressed to the three States depositaries on the partial prohibition of tests and of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons urging them

"... by virtue of their special responsibilities under those two treaties and as a provisional measure until the new comprehensive test-ban treaty enters into force, to bring to a halt without delay all nuclear test explosions, either through a trilaterally agreed moratorium or through three unilateral moratoria".

The other appeal, in operative paragraph 4 (a), was addressed to "all States members of the Committee on Disarmament" and urged them

"To support the creation by the Committee, upon initiation of its 1981 session, of an ad hoc working group which should begin the multilateral negotiation of a treaty, for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests".

I need hardly comment on the appeal relating to an eventual moratorium. The news published in the press about test explosions carried out this year bears witness to the contempt with which it has been treated by those to whom it was addressed. But it does seem to me that the First Committee not only has the right, but that it would also have a very justified interest in receiving complete and trustworthy information concerning what may have happened in the Committee on Disarmament with respect to the second appeal, which was addressed, as I recalled a moment ago, to all the members of the multilateral negotiating body on disarmament and which appeared also, although in less peremptory terms, in the second resolution of that same date to which I referred earlier, resolution 35/145 B. I shall endeavour, therefore, to comply with that obligation concerning the provision of information.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

During the first part of its 1981 session the Committee on Disarmament, on the initiative of the Group of 21, held a series of informal meetings, as a result of which the Group itself formulated a recommendation similar to the one contained in the two Assembly resolutions to which I referred and which aimed at the immediate establishment of an ad hoc working group to undertake multilateral negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. In that same document, CD/181 of 24 April 1981, in which the declaration of the Group was published, the latter addressed 12 specific questions to the three nuclear-weapon States which had been taking part in the so-called trilateral negotiations and on this question stated the following:

The Group of 21 firmly believes that the Committee on Disarmament is entitled to know without further delay the specific reasons that have so far prevented the three nuclear weapon States, which have been carrying out among themselves separate negotiations for the past four years, to heed the often repeated and pressing appeals of the General Assembly to the effect of expediting such negotiations 'with a view to bringing them to a positive conclusion as a matter of urgency' and to transmit the results to the Committee on Disarmament."
(CD/181 p. 2)

In view of the fact that the recommendation of the Group of 21 concerning the setting up of an ad hoc working group, as had happened earlier with the General Assembly resolutions to which I have already referred, was totally fruitless the Group insisted again on this matter on 8 July 1981. In a further declaration, reproduced in document CD/192 of that same date, the following is stated:

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

"The Group of 21 deeply regrets that its proposal on the establishment of an ad hoc working group of the Committee on Disarmament on item 1 of the agenda, first formulated specifically in document CD/72, dated 4 March 1980, and reiterated most recently in document CD/181, dated 24 April 1981, has not yet been the subject of a decision, despite the urgency of the issue and the consistent interest and effort of the Group ...

"Accordingly, the Group of 21 requests that the proposal contained in document CD/181, which includes the establishment of an ad hoc working group on item 1 of the agenda and the formulation of its mandate, be taken up by the Committee at its next official meeting for a decision.

"If, contrary to what could reasonably be expected, it were not possible to reach a positive decision, the Group believes that it would be necessary to examine what further steps should be taken by the Committee to ensure that its rules of procedure are not used in such a way as to prevent the Committee from taking procedural decisions enabling it to conduct negotiations on the items included on its annual agenda." (CD/192, p.1)

In accordance with the request thus formulated by the Group of 21, its proposal for the establishment of an ad hoc working group on item 1 of the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament was submitted to the Committee by the then acting Chairman for decision. This took place at the 137th plenary meeting held on 14 July, and what happened on that occasion is summarized in paragraph 44 of the report of the Committee, in the following terms:

"Two Western States spoke on this proposal. One nuclear-weapon State explained that the review of its policy concerning nuclear testing including the question of negotiations on the test ban, had not yet been completed and in the circumstances it was not in a position to agree to the establishment of a working group. Another nuclear-weapon State reaffirmed its position that the most effective pursuit of a comprehensive test ban treaty was through the continuation of the trilateral negotiations....In the light of these two statements, the Chairman noted that there was for the present no consensus on the proposal." (A/36/27 para.44)

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

The negative voices of the United States and the United Kingdom -- the "two Western States" to which the report I have just quoted from refer, were the only ones out of the 40 members of the Committee to oppose the establishment of the ad hoc working group, which both the General Assembly and the Group of 21 had proposed with special emphasis. Two weeks earlier, the delegation of Mexico had already pointed out prophetically that it would appear that some members of the negotiating body had the tendency to confuse it with the Security Council. That comment was made in the intervention of 2 July at the 134th meeting of the Committee, and a reading of it would amply demonstrate the flagrant incompatibility between the vetoes cast by the two nuclear Powers on 14 July 1981 and the votes they cast in three successive years in favour of resolutions 32/78 of 12 December 1977, 33/60 of 14 December 1978 and 34/73 of 11 December 1979.

Since it was not possible to reach a positive decision in the Committee, the delegations of Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden, Yugoslavia and Mexico, in keeping with what the Group of 21 had anticipated for such a contingency in document CD/192, submitted on 30 July the working paper contained in document CD/204. The possibility is contemplated therein that if, when the 1982 session begins, a situation similar to the one that prevailed in July of 1981 arises, the Committee should formally consider the desirability of inserting an addition to rule 25 of its rules, whereby it will be clearly stated that the consensus rule shall not be used in such a manner as to prevent the establishment of subsidiary bodies for the effective discharge of the functions of the Committee.

The last of the three items inherited from the Committee on Disarmament with which I shall deal now is the "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament," which has been appearing on the agenda of the negotiating body immediately after the prohibition of nuclear tests.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

Those arguments which militate in favour of the establishment of another ad hoc group to deal with the subject are as obvious and convincing as those that were adduced in the earlier case. Suffice it to recall in this connexion that the first of all the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, that which bears the number 1 (I), adopted unanimously on 24 January 1946 by the then 51 Members of the United Nations, was aimed at the creation of a Commission one of the chief functions of which was to be to make specific proposals "for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons" and that, 32 years later, at its first special session devoted to disarmament, the Assembly itself, after solemnly declaring that:

"...effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority"... (S-10/2, para.20)
it formulated this unequivocal pronouncement:

"Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons". (Ibid., para.47)

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

If we confine ourselves to the more recent past we find even greater similarity between the situations pertaining to the two items. As happened with the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, the General Assembly, at its thirty-fifth session, adopted on the recommendation of the First Committee not one, but two resolutions, both on 12 December 1980.

The first, resolution 35/152 B, which was based on a draft resolution submitted by a group of socialist and non-aligned States, calls upon the Committee on Disarmament

"as a matter of priority and for the purpose of an early commencement of the negotiations on the substance of the problem, to undertake consultations in which to consider, inter alia, the establishment of an ad hoc working group on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and of nuclear disarmament with a clearly defined mandate". (resolution 35/152 B, para. 3)

The second resolution, which bears the number 35/152 C and the draft resolution for which had been sponsored by 19 States, including Mexico, almost all of them members of the Group of 21 of the Committee on Disarmament, was more categorical in its terms, since it urged the Committee on Disarmament

"to establish, upon initiation of its session to be held in 1981, an ad hoc working group on the item which in its agenda for 1979 and 1980 was entitled 'Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament'". (resolution 35/152 C, para. 1)

In 1979, its first year of work since having been constituted with its present membership, the Committee on Disarmament dealt with the question of multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament both in several statements and in two working papers, documents CD/4, sponsored by seven socialist States, and CD/36, submitted by the Group of 21. In 1980 there were two other working papers of the same origin as the first two. They were, respectively, documents CD/109 and CD/116. At the same time there was a considerable increase in the number of statements on the subject. But it was not until 1981 that the Committee, no doubt prompted by the alarming international situation, seems to have placed nuclear disarmament on the same priority level as the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. By way of illustration, I should like to cite the fact that if we look at the Committee's last report we see that, out of the 120 paragraphs devoted to an account of the work of the Committee during its 1981 session,

no less than 41, or more than a third of the total, relate to the item "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

Unfortunately, the Committee's lengthy debates, held both in formal and informal meetings, have been as sterile in concrete measures with regard to this item as they were with regard to the other. This was the case despite the fact that, if the number of States that spoke out in favour of the establishment of an ad hoc working group was not 38 as in the case of the item on nuclear-weapon tests, it was still obvious that out of the 40 members of the Committee at least 30 - the Group of 21 and all the socialist States including China - were in favour of the creation of such a group.

Therefore, the Group of 21, in its statement which was issued as a document, made the following judgement, which is perhaps the main contribution of the deliberations to which we are referring:

"The discussions, for which chapters V, VI and the conclusions of the Secretary-General's 'Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons' (A/35/392) provided useful background material, have confirmed the conviction of the Group of 21 that the nuclear arms race runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tensions; that progress in the field of nuclear disarmament would be beneficial to the strengthening of international peace and security and to the improvement of the international climate, which in turn would facilitate further progress; and that all nations, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, have a vital interest in measures of nuclear disarmament, because the existence of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of a handful of Powers directly and fundamentally jeopardizes the security of the whole world....

"The Group of 21 is further convinced, as a result of the discussions, that doctrines of nuclear deterrence, far from being responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, lie at the root of the continuing escalation of the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear armaments and lead to greater insecurity and instability in international relations. Moreover, such doctrines, which in the ultimate analysis are predicated upon the willingness to use nuclear weapons, cannot be the basis for preventing the outbreak of a nuclear war, a war which would

affect belligerents and non-belligerents alike. The competitive accumulation of nuclear arms by the nuclear-weapon States cannot be condoned on grounds that it is indispensable to their security. Such an argument is patently false considering that the increase in nuclear arsenals, far from contributing to the strengthening of the security of all States, on the contrary, weakens it, and increases the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war. Moreover, the Group of 21 rejects as politically and morally unjustifiable that the security of the whole world should be made to depend on the state of relations existing among nuclear-weapon States."
(CD/228, appendix II, vol. II)

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

If we now turn from the multilateral negotiations on nuclear weapons, which have not yet even begun, to the bilateral negotiations known as the SALT talks, the picture is not much more encouraging in spite of the fact that these talks began 12 years ago and during that period the General Assembly has adopted no less than 11 resolutions on the subject.

The most recent of those resolutions, resolution 35/156 K of 12 December 1980, in its preamble, highlighted, inter alia, the following two elements, which the Assembly clearly defined as far back as 1978 in the Final Document adopted by consensus at its first special session devoted to disarmament.

Firstly, "all the peoples of the world had a vital interest in the sphere of disarmament" fully justified by a series of facts, also spelled out in the Final Document, such as "existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone were more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth, that the increase in weapons, especially nuclear weapons, far from helping to strengthen international security, on the contrary weakened it, and that the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race posed a threat to the very survival of mankind ...".

Secondly, there is the obvious fact that "in the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility", a responsibility which acquires incalculable dimensions in the context of averting the danger of a universal holocaust.

Starting from these two premises and the various provisions of resolutions adopted in the two years preceding - resolution 33/91 C of 16 December 1978 and resolution 34/87 F of 11 December 1979 - the Assembly included in the operative part of its resolution last year an explicit appeal, and another which was euphemistically cloaked in an expression of confidence.

The former, reflecting the conviction expressed in the last preambular paragraph of resolution 35/156 K "that the signature in good faith of a treaty, especially if it is the culmination of prolonged and conscientious negotiations" - negotiations which, as we know, lasted more than six years - "carries with it the presumption that its ratification will not be unduly

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

delayed" in operative paragraph 2,

"Urges the two signatory States not to delay any further the implementation of the procedure provided for in article XIX of the Treaty for its entry into force, taking particularly into account that not only their national interests but also the vital interests of all the peoples are at stake in this question".

In the second provision to which I have referred, operative paragraph 2, the Assembly noted that it:

"Trusts that, pending the entry into force of the Treaty, the signatory States, in conformity with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, will refrain from any act which would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty".

It would appear that the two super-Powers have tried to live up to the confidence of the General Assembly since there is no information that either of them has carried out any act which may be interpreted as a violation of the commitments accepted in the SALT II Treaty. However, it is extremely deplorable that the clear and urgent appeal made by the Assembly in that same resolution 35/156 K for ratification of the Treaty has so far been ignored in spite of the fact that the resolution was adopted by consensus.

The reasons adduced in some influential circles of one of the two super-Powers when endeavouring to explain its failure to proceed to the ratification requested by the General Assembly do not appear to us to be valid. Of course, we, too, would have preferred the Treaty to contain, apart from the modest limitations it contains, significant reductions and important qualitative limitations. Our position on the subject has always been that the SALT II Treaty is to be regarded simply as a modest instrument contributing to progress towards nuclear disarmament and not as an end in itself.

In the statement I had the honour to make in this same hall on 21 November 1980 on behalf of my delegation and the other sponsors - Argentina, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden, and Yugoslavia - in introducing draft resolution L.45, which was to become resolution 35/156, I took the liberty of explaining it at length in the following terms:

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

"There is another matter in draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.45 which also deserves to be stressed. Great care has been taken in the drafting of the document to ensure that the provisions will contribute soon to Assembly resolutions on the matter in fulfilment of resolutions 33/91 C and 34/87 F.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

"Briefly, it could be stated that the Assembly has never actually considered the SALT II treaty as an end in itself. As mentioned in the second preambular paragraph of the draft resolution, the Final Document stresses that:

'SALT II ... should be followed promptly by further strategic arms limitations negotiations between the two parties, leading to agreed significant reductions of and qualitative limitations on strategic arms.'

"Similarly, in the resolution adopted last year, the instrument in question is described, as the fifth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution says, as:

'a vital element for the continuation and progress of the negotiations between the two States possessing the most important arsenals of nuclear weapons'.

"As the draft resolution itself says, the final goal of those negotiations should be that defined by the highest representatives of the two contracting States, namely, to

'move towards the complete, total destruction of nuclear weapons, with a view to a world truly free of nuclear weapons'." (A/C.1/35/PV.38, p. 21)

That is the end of the quotation from what I said in this Committee last year, when I introduced draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.45, to explain the meaning the authors gave to it.

The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues which, for the sake of brevity, is generally called the Palme Commission, after the former Prime Minister of Sweden, who is its Chairman, has a position similar to ours, as can be seen from the declaration adopted at its third session, in Vienna, from 6 to 8 February of this year. The entire text of this was reproduced in Disarmament Committee document CD/143 of 11 February and I shall now quote from it, by way of epilogue to the part of my statement relating to this subject, the following conclusions:

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

"The over-riding purpose of the SALT process is to help prevent nuclear war. Nuclear weapons have confronted mankind with unprecedented dangers; civilization as we know it can literally be destroyed in moments. There are grounds for criticizing the SALT process. It is cumbersome and slow. Its accomplishments have been limited. But it is the only existing means to deal with the most pressing threat to man's survival. If the process comes to an end, what little progress had been made in containing the risk of nuclear war would be set back immeasurably. It would mean a return to the futile propaganda wars of the 1950s in place of serious discussions of practical limitations on weaponry. And it would mean removal of one of the most important initiatives to ease the risk of nuclear war.

"...

"For these reasons, the Commission believes it is essential for the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union to follow through on their pledges to resume the SALT negotiations."

(CD/228, appendix II, vol. I)

It follows with absolute certainty from what I have said that since we met here a year ago not a single nuclear disarmament measure has as yet become a reality although, as is customary, we give to these words the broadest possible meaning, in other words, one which encompasses not only the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, but also the prevention or limitation of such weapons.

I am convinced that the Assembly will endeavour to remedy this situation through the adoption of whatever specific resolutions it deems relevant, whether with respect to the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament or the SALT negotiations. But I believe, further, that among the items allocated to the First Committee there are two which offer real possibilities for exerting a beneficial influence and which may be translated into the promotion and strengthening of all tasks and activities relating to disarmament, including, of course, first and foremost, nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

I am referring to items 55 (b) and 51 (i) of the Assembly's agenda, which in the remainder of this statement I shall attempt to examine, as I said at the outset I intended to do, if only in a cursory manner.

The origin of item 55 (b), entitled "Study on the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament" goes back, as may be remembered, to resolution 34/87 E of 11 December 1979. In that resolution the Assembly reaffirmed its Declaration contained in the 1978 Final Document concerning the fact that:

"the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the field of disarmament"

and it stressed the fact that:

"the growing disarmament agenda and the complexity of the issues involved, as well as the more active participation of a large number of Member States, create increasing demands on United Nations management of disarmament affairs for purposes such as the promotion, substantive preparation, implementation and control of the process of disarmament".
(resolution 34/87 E)

On the basis of that premise, the Assembly then expressed its conviction that:

"a comprehensive study of the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament would be desirable in providing for carefully considered decisions regarding the organization, functions and structure required to meet current and future needs in the disarmament process"

and to that end requested

"the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, to carry out a comprehensive study ... and to submit a final report to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session" (ibid.)

The study in question has been completed and was submitted to the Secretary-General by the Chairman of the Group of Experts, Ambassador Carlos Ortiz de Rozas, a man of the highest prestige in the field of disarmament. Since it has already been distributed in document A/36/392, and therefore the text can be easily consulted, I shall confine myself to stressing the desirability of the second special session devoted

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A/C.1/36/PV.3

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(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

to disarmament next year taking a decision relating to what is designated in the study as the infrastructure of the United Nations body dealing with disarmament.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

In that connexion, the experts were unable to reach agreement and the study merely mentions the three possible alternatives which were considered: first, the status quo, secondly, the transformation of the present Centre for Disarmament into a United Nations specialized agency devoted to disarmament: or, thirdly, the transformation of the Centre into a disarmament affairs department.

That third alternative, which reflects an intermediate position, is in keeping with the one that appears in the Mexican Government's reply which, together with the replies of 29 other States, is reproduced in Appendix I of the study. That reply was dated 25 April 1980 and, in our view, it is today perhaps even more valid than it was when it was originally formulated. The terms used in that reply are the following:

"Probably the main observation that can be put forward for the time being with regard to the best way of coping with these demands that is to say, the demands mentioned in General Assembly resolution 34/87 E, to which I referred a moment ago, is a recommendation that the United Nations Secretariat should continue, as it has done up to now, to strengthen and expand the structure and functions of the section concerned with disarmament in a gradual manner; thus the next step would be to change the existing 'United Nations Centre for Disarmament' into a 'Department for Disarmament Affairs' which would be headed by an Under-Secretary-General, who would report directly to the Secretary-General and would be at the same level as the other departments, such as the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs and the Department of International Economic and Social Affairs. After a few years, in the light of the results achieved and of further requirements in the sphere of disarmament, the United Nations could consider whether it would be justified to establish a specialized agency devoted to disarmament, in accordance with proposals already submitted to the General Assembly." (A/36/392, p. 58, para. 4)

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

The second of the items to which I referred a moment ago, item 51 (i) entitled "World Disarmament Campaign", originated with General Assembly resolution 35/152 I of 12 December 1980; among its main antecedents was a recommendation of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, to which I referred at the beginning of this statement and of which our Chairman and I are both members. In compliance with the provisions of that resolution, the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a small number of experts, prepared a study on the subject which was distributed in document A/36/458.

That study, despite its brevity and extremely modest appearance, could become an instrument of incalculable value for the promotion of disarmament at the global level. The World Disarmament Campaign, the organization and operation of which are expressed in an articulate and concise manner in that study, offers serious possibilities of making much more effective the scant persuasive power enjoyed thus far by United Nations resolutions. The Campaign, as stated in the Final Document, would tend to mobilize world public opinion in favour of disarmament "to avoid dissemination of false and tendentious information concerning armaments" and to create a greater awareness of the increasing dangers which the arms race entails for international peace and security and its economic and social consequences, and to explain to the public at large the benefits that would derive from the adoption of effective disarmament measures aimed at eliminating the danger of war and thus ensuring the survival of mankind. In short, the Campaign would help to create a well-informed body of public opinion which would exert an ever-increasing influence in favour of disarmament.

As provided for in the study, the Campaign would be conceived and carried out under the auspices of the United Nations and the Secretary-General, who would submit yearly reports to the General Assembly and would be in charge of its orientation and general co-ordination. The various elements of the Campaign should be such as to make it possible to implement them at the world, regional and national level. The United Nations and

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

its specialized agencies, Governments, non-governmental organizations and research for peace institutes would have a clearly defined role and responsibilities throughout the Campaign, which without prejudice to its universal and comprehensive character should pay special and continued attention to particular groups which are of special importance, such as parliamentarians and other government officials, the so-called mass media and the educational communities, which include among others both students and university professors and secondary school pupils and teachers.

My delegation believes that in the 18 pages which are the sum total of that document there are keen assessments and practical suggestions which could be very constructive. Of the latter, I believe it would be very appropriate, as suggested in paragraph 57 of the report, that a pledging conference of Member States could be held at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and from time to time thereafter.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

We believe that it would be desirable for that conference to be held during the first few days of the Assembly's session, opening as it were a parenthesis in the general debate, in order that it may take place when there are present in New York the Heads of State or Government and Foreign Ministers who, it is to be hoped, will attend such a conference in large numbers as they did the first special session of the Assembly.

I am reaching the conclusion of my statement, which has, perhaps, been unduly lengthy. I should simply like to add a few words setting forth the philosophy that underlies our position on disarmament. On the first of September of each year, the President of Mexico goes before our country's Congress to report on the action of the Executive on both the domestic and international levels. In a report covering the fifth year of his six-year administration which he delivered barely a month and a half ago, President José Lopez Portillo spoke the following words which illustrate the basic element of that philosophy and with which I shall end my statement:

"During the period covered by this report, the process of détente has been obstructed and peace threatened principally as the result of pressures to establish a new and unacceptable policy of bipolarity based on the force of ever-more destructive weapons and involving the squandering of the natural and human resources so urgently demanded by the more needy.

"Mexico will spare no effort to make its voice heard in favour of disarmament and the establishment of a peace that will be not merely the absence of war, but an active process of international co-operation for the benefit of all."

Mr. CHOUDHURY (Bangladesh): May I first of all express to you, Sir, the sincerest felicitations of my delegation on your well-deserved election as Chairman of this Committee. Your election is but a testimony to the confidence and trust reposed in you and your great country by the

(Mr. Choudhury, Bangladesh)

international community in the field of disarmament. I am sure that your knowledge and experience in this field will be of great help to all of us in enabling us to arrive at a successful conclusion of this session of the Committee.

An unprecedented arms race involving most destructive means of war is gravely threatening the peace, security and, indeed, the very existence of mankind. The huge resources, material and human, which are directed at further increasing the destructive capacities of our heavily over-armed planet, severely strain the potential of all countries to ensure and foster their economic and social progress - and all this is occurring at a time when existing relationships between nations are such that the hopes of the larger part of mankind gradually to overcome its state of underdevelopment grow alarmingly dimmer.

The spirit of détente that pervaded the better part of the 1970s has given way to an air of distrust and disbelief and to an erosion of trust and confidence. This breakdown of the process of confidence building has been a great setback for the efforts to reach even a minimum goal of disarmament and international security which would at least diminish, if not eliminate, the grave risk of complete destruction which mankind is now facing.

Bangladesh's policy on disarmament is based on its constitutional commitment according to which we are wedded to the concept of general and complete disarmament. It is this dedication to the cause of disarmament that undergirds not only the principles we espouse in this field, but the concrete and tangible action that we are prepared to take in the appropriate context. It was our commitment to the concept of general and complete disarmament that prompted President Ziaur Rahman of Bangladesh, in addressing the eleventh special session of the United Nations General Assembly, on international economic co-operation and development, to state:

(Mr. Choudhury, Bangladesh)

"The current global military expenditure is nearly \$500 billion a year and is increasing at the rate of \$40 billion annually. By contrast, official development assistance is on the decline and is today less than 5 per cent of the amount spent on armaments. The economic picture for the developing countries as a whole fills us with foreboding and gloom. The combined foreign debt of the developing countries is now in excess of \$300 billion. Forty billion dollars a year is spent on servicing the foreign debt, which accounts for more than 20 per cent of the total exports of the developing countries. Partly owing to this and partly owing to the trade policies of the developed countries and the increase in the price of their products, the developing countries suffered a balance-of-payments deficit of \$45 billion in 1979. In 1980, this figure is likely to increase to \$60 billion." (A/S-11/PV.3, p. 11)

The existing arrangements on the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons beyond countries that already possess them are considered by my delegation to be only an interim measure. The ultimate goal should be the destruction of all nuclear weapons. The arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspects, runs counter to the efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tension. The present arms race goes against the establishment of international relations based on peace, coexistence and trust between all States. It militates against the spirit of the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States. For that reason the elimination of nuclear weapons as part of a comprehensive programme of disarmament is essential if a nuclear holocaust is to be avoided.

(Mr. Choudhury, Bangladesh)

This debate is taking place at a moment that is ushering in the Second Disarmament Decade at the end of the First Disarmament Decade. We attach great importance to this new disarmament decade, largely because the first one was in fact characterized by more armament than disarmament which, unfortunately, was almost totally absent. One of the primary objectives of the decade - reduction of the huge expenditures on armaments and use of the resources thus freed for purposes of development, particularly of the developing countries - is far from being attained. We are encouraged by the growing awareness that world peace and security cannot be maintained or guaranteed in the existing conditions of economic disparities.

As a member of the Group of 77 and, in particular, as a member of the Group of Least Developed Countries, Bangladesh attaches the utmost importance to the implementation of measures of disarmament that would result in the saving of important financial resources and human potential in both the developed and the developing countries and their reallocation for development needs. That is why Bangladesh attaches particular importance to the proposals put forward by Romania and Sweden regarding the freezing and reduction of military budgets. In the same spirit, my delegation has noted with satisfaction that the Second Disarmament Decade was proclaimed almost simultaneously with the declaration of the 1980s as a third United Nations development decade.

My delegation is pleased to be associated with the Preparatory Committee for the second special session on disarmament in which it serves as a Vice-Chairman. We firmly believe that the second special session on disarmament, to be held next year, should review the implementation of the decisions taken at the first special session. The second special session should also be planned in such a way as to help achieve the increase of the awareness, both public and governmental, of the need to halt and reverse the arms race and the urgency of progress towards disarmament.

(Mr. Choudhury, Bangladesh)

This session should point out the direct benefit that nations and peoples will derive in the attainment of their economic and development goals. We should also build support for specific arms control and reduction measures and for implementing the commitments already made in the Final Document of the first special session. It is also our belief that the disarmament process will be much enhanced if the constituency for disarmament were enlarged by committing more government leaders, prominent world citizens and non-governmental organizations in the process of disarmament. The bilateral and multilateral negotiations should be intensified for reaching agreements for arms control, both nuclear and conventional. We should also encourage and stimulate the settlement of international disputes taking into account the national security needs, the principles of the United Nations Charter and resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly.

My delegation believes that the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should be the centre-piece of this second special session which will provide a long-term time-schedule for future disarmament efforts. The Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament may also envisage parallel progress in the peaceful settlement of disputes and in building the United Nations inter-regional security and peace-keeping capability. We believe that the comprehensive approach will encourage Member States in arresting armaments in view of the firm basis of security requirements which will be guaranteed by international instruments and agreements. The Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should lay the utmost emphasis, inter alia, on strategic nuclear arms control. Serious consideration may also be given to the proposals made by George Kennan for a 50 per cent across-the-board reduction in nuclear weapons, a freeze on the introduction of new or improved nuclear weapons or other measures. It is, of course, essential that before the commencement of the second special session, both the bilateral Strategic Arms Limitation Talks as well as negotiations for an agreement limiting long-range theatre nuclear forces in Europe should commence.

(Mr. Choudhury, Bangladesh)

We also believe that before the commencement of the session the comprehensive test-ban treaty as part of the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation régime should be completed. Simultaneously with the comprehensive test-ban treaty, agreement on negative security guarantees by nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States should be concluded. Besides, a treaty on radiological weapons and a treaty on chemical weapons, together with regional agreements to control and reduce conventional weapons, forces and expenditures may also be concluded.

Bangladesh acceded to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1979 as a demonstration of its commitment to the attainment of general and complete disarmament. All efforts should be made for universal adherence to and strengthening of the non-proliferation régime. We strongly believe that the Latin American countries, by signing the Treaty of Tlatelolco, have set an example for other regions. We therefore strongly support the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones in areas such as the Indian Ocean, South-East Asia, the Middle East, Africa and northern Europe. We also support the efforts to prevent the militarization of outer space. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 prohibits nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction from being placed in a fixed orbit; and yet, new space weapons are being developed. It is our firm conviction that as a point of departure an anti-satellite weapons treaty should be concluded. We, of course, attach high importance to the verification measures which may include the United Nations verification capability in arms control measures. Various other confidence-building measures such as sharing of information, intelligence, reports, research, information and standardized reporting on arms and forces levels, manoeuvres, military budgets, both declared and undeclared, troop movements logistic deployments and so forth should also form an important part of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

(Mr. Choudhury, Bangladesh)

The arms race, underdevelopment and the unlawful use of force against other nations: these are the three major challenges to mankind's continued progress and even survival. Therefore, today, we are faced with a fateful and critical choice. We can continue to watch as powerless spectators the menacing trends that have been unfolding of late. The outcome could be disastrous. Each one of these developments or, even more so, the combination of any two of them, or all three, can push mankind on to the verge of a precipice.

(Mr. Choudhury, Bangladesh)

To ensure peace and security and preserve our planet for succeeding generations an answer must be found that will stop the continuing escalation of the arms race. The needs of self-defence can in no way justify the unrestricted armament that has taken the better part of the efforts of all of us. The concept of détente of the 1970s is unfortunately giving way to a concept of distrust and diminished confidence in each other. The inevitable result is uncertainty and suspicion. The hopes generated by the first special session devoted to disarmament have been belied. Instead of armament control and disarmament, we have witnessed an unprecedented degree of escalation in the field of armament, both nuclear and conventional. This must stop.

I warmly welcome the press briefing given by Mrs. Inga Thorsson, Swedish Under-Secretary of State for Disarmament and Chairman of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts, to study the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. I fully agree with her that any steps towards disarmament would be to the mutual advantage of all nations and peoples. The concepts of disarmament, development and security have a triangular relationship, and there was an urgent need to approach the concept of security in a broader framework. The arms race is a threat to the security of nations and their security needs cannot be met by military means, but rather through international co-operation and development. It is in this perspective that I take this opportunity of launching an appeal to all States, particularly the most powerful and militarily significant States, to display self-restraint and moderation and enter into serious negotiations on disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of Indonesia, who will introduce the report of the Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. ANWAR SANI (Indonesia): Mr. Chairman, permit me in the first instance to express my delegation's and my own personal happiness and satisfaction at seeing you preside over the deliberations of the First Committee. Your long diplomatic experience and your considerable skill are matters of general knowledge to delegations and make us confident that you will guide us successfully through the difficult days ahead.

(Mr. Anwar Sani, Indonesia)

I say "difficult days", because this Committee is charged with the responsibility for disarming the over-armed nations of the world and for ensuring the survival of the human species in an international order that guarantees equality, justice, freedom and peace. It seems that there is nothing more difficult than the fulfilment of this foremost responsibility because, while the risks and dangers involved in the galloping arms race are unacceptable, we have so far been unable to halt that race.

It is in this sombre context that, as current Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament, I have the honour to introduce the report of that Committee for the year 1981. The report has already been circulated and its appendices are also being issued this week in the various languages; some were, in fact, circulated last Friday. I commend those documents particularly to the attention of those delegations that are not represented on the Committee on Disarmament. Appendix II contains the official documents of the Committee, many of which are in the nature of formal proposals made by members and groups, and some of which are in the nature of assessments by them.

The Committee met for 22 weeks in all during 1981. It held 49 plenary meetings and 45 informal meetings. In addition, the four working groups had 91 meetings. Consultations of an informal character, which are so necessary for reaching decisions, accounted for 73 meetings. Thus, there were a total of 258 meetings during 1981, as compared with 185 in the previous year. Official documents, working papers and so on amounted to 242, which represents a considerable increase in the workload.

Some 15 non-member States followed the work of the Committee; six of them attended the meetings of working groups and presented their views and papers.

The reports of the four Working Groups on security assurances, chemical weapons, radiological weapons and a comprehensive programme of disarmament have been integrated into the annual report and appear on pages 25 through 105. The portions of the Committee's report on nuclear questions are on pages 14 to 25; these questions were examined at informal and plenary meetings.

(Mr. Anwar Sani, Indonesia)

A very large number of communications were received mainly from women in Western Europe, drawing attention to the danger of nuclear war and the need to avert it. Communications from non-governmental organizations were also received and circulated to the members.

The recommendations of the General Assembly were taken into account by the Committee on Disarmament. If I may sound a note of caution, the work of the Committee on Disarmament should not be judged only on the basis of concrete results. It should rather be assessed on the basis of the proposals considered and the ongoing discussions, which could give a clearer picture of the complex nature of the problems and of the obstacles in the paths of progress.

Those are the few remarks with which I should like to introduce the report of the Committee on Disarmament in my capacity as its current Chairman. Of course, at the appropriate time my delegation will express Indonesia's views on the question of disarmament and our evaluation of the work of the Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia) (interpretation from Russian): I should like first of all, Sir, to offer my warm congratulations to you, as the representative of a country which is friendly to us, on your election to the important post of Chairman of the First Committee and to assure you of our whole-hearted support and co-operation. We should also like to convey our sincere congratulations to the other officers of the Committee.

Turning directly to a discussion of the long list of agenda items devoted to the problem of disarmament, our Committee is facing a difficult but at the same time extremely important and urgent task, that of making progress in an area directly connected with the most vital interests of mankind - the preservation and strengthening of peace for our own and for future generations. It will have to adopt recommendations and decisions of great political importance in producing a number of international treaties and agreements on the limitation of the arms race,

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

to discuss the status of and means of stepping up negotiations which are at present under way and to conclude work on a further stage of preparation for the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, to be held next year.

I should like to point out that this is a task that will have to be tackled in circumstances for which reactionary forces are to blame, as a result of a perceptible intensification of the activities of those in militarist circles of international imperialism and hegemonism in a direction which is by no means encouraging. This is demonstrated by the alarming fact that, in spite of the earnest efforts of the socialist countries, the non-aligned countries and other peace-loving States, the international community still has to face such factors as the unprecedented growth of arms expenditures, which exceed the already astronomic sum of \$500 billion a year. This is by no means a matter of individual, isolated steps, but rather a whole interlocking system of decisions with the sole aim of undermining the policy of international détente, bringing about a further escalation of the arms race, achieving military supremacy over the socialist countries and pursuing a policy from a position of strength.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Worth recalling, by way of illustration, are just the most recent steps taken along those lines. They include the plans adopted in NATO under pressure from the United States for the deployment of more than 500 new American medium-range nuclear missiles on the territory of a number of Western European countries, the manufacture of the most inhuman weapon ever known to mankind so far, the neutron weapon, and the introduction of new strategic weapons systems: the MX missiles and the B-1 bomber.

The answer to this is the programme of peaceful initiatives and proposals put forward this year at the twenty-sixth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which were fully supported by Czechoslovakia and the other socialist countries parties to the Warsaw Treaty, and which have met with broad response from peace-loving forces, as well as the valuable proposals of the developing countries urgently calling upon world public opinion to put an end to the unbridled arms race.

Czechoslovakia is convinced that in spite of the odd voices raised here and there against the demands of the overwhelming majority of members of the international community, there is not and cannot be today any task more important than the preservation of peace and averting the threat of nuclear conflict that hangs over mankind. The desire to eliminate that threat is the very basis of socialist Czechoslovakia's entire foreign policy and stems from our alliance with other socialist countries parties to the Warsaw Treaty.

There is no doubt that the most solid guarantee of peace and the most reliable barrier to the threat of war would be the achievement of real progress towards disarmament, primarily nuclear disarmament. At the same time, Czechoslovakia has always attached fundamental importance to political and legal measures to be undertaken in parallel with disarmament efforts and designed to strengthen peace, to create reliable security guarantees for States, to strengthen the process of international détente, to put into effect the principle of non-use of force in international relations and to bring about the elimination of the threat of war from the life of the international community.

That policy has been unswervingly supported by Czechoslovakia at all international meetings from the very first days of the United Nations and its forums. It has been reflected in dozens of constructive initiatives and proposals and has been enshrined in a whole series of international documents adopted on

the initiative of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, including Czechoslovakia. Among the proposals and documents, which have played such an important part in establishing the political climate and in developing international relations, I should like to single out the following examples of documents of profound political importance: the resolution on the non-use of force in international relations and permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons of 1972; the draft world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations, submitted by the Soviet Union in 1976; the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, adopted on the initiative of Czechoslovakia as long ago as 1970; the Declaration on the Deepening and Consolidation of International Détente of 1976; the resolution on the Inadmissibility of the policy of hegemonism of 1979, adopted on the basis of proposals by the Soviet Union; the Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace and the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament, adopted by the General Assembly on the basis of proposals by the Polish People's Republic and Czechoslovakia in 1978 and 1979 respectively. There are, of course, a number of other equally important proposals which could well be added to that list, in addition to documents and decisions adopted by the General Assembly after having been proposed by socialist, non-aligned and other peace-loving States, all of them along the same lines.

In this regard I should like also to recall the principles for relations among European States agreed upon in the course of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and laid down in the 1975 Final Act. Subsequently, States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, on the basis of those principles, have, as members will recall, repeatedly proposed to their NATO partners that an agreement be concluded that would bind the parties not to be the first to use nuclear or conventional weapons. They have proposed the convening of a conference to be devoted exclusively to questions of disarmament and military détente in Europe, and that agreement be reached on a substantial expansion of confidence-building measures. But all these constructive proposals - which would radically improve the international climate and make it possible substantially to limit the danger of military conflict, including conflicts involving the use of nuclear weapons - have either been rejected or simply boycotted by the Western countries. Instead,

attempts have been made to exacerbate the international situation, to create a situation of imbalance, and to provide further momentum for the arms race. As a result of all this the danger of nuclear conflict continues to grow.

Bearing in mind the situation that has arisen, we wholeheartedly support the proposal made by the Soviet Union at this General Assembly session for the adoption of a solemn declaration on the prevention of nuclear catastrophe because we see in it a real and necessary step that should be taken by the United Nations in accordance with its Charter. After all, the lofty idea of eliminating the scourge of war from the life of mankind is the very cornerstone of the United Nations and its work.

It is proposed in the draft declaration contained in document A/36/2^{b1} that the General Assembly solemnly proclaim that: States and statesmen that resort first to the use of nuclear weapons will be committing the gravest crime against humanity; the decision to be the first to use nuclear weapons is unjustifiable and unpardonable; it is the direct obligation of the leaders of nuclear-weapon States to prevent nuclear conflict; and that nuclear energy should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. By doing this, the General Assembly and our Committee would be taking a very important step towards the maintenance of international peace and security and would be doing their duty towards the peoples of all the countries of the world. Such a declaration, in our view, would be an important political instrument which would promote the preservation of peace and the salvation of mankind from the destruction of nuclear war. The Czechoslovak delegation, on the basis of the position of principle that we have set forth, and bearing in mind the urgent need for focusing all the efforts of the United Nations and the whole international community on the task of preventing the nuclear catastrophe that hangs over the heads of the peoples of the world, intends actively to work for the adoption of the draft declaration proposed by the Soviet Union at this session of the General Assembly.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

A question of vital importance and principle on the agenda of this Committee is the second proposal of the Soviet Union on the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space. Czechoslovakia, which takes an active part in space research for peaceful purposes, believes it to be of the utmost urgency that outer space be used exclusively as a theatre of peaceful co-operation among States and not a new theatre for military rivalry in any respect whatsoever.

We note with satisfaction that in this area it has been possible in the past to achieve a number of important measures which have already done a great deal to reduce the danger of the arms race spreading to outer space. Thanks to the partial Test-Ban Treaty of 1963 and the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, it has been possible to free outer space from the threat of the spread of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction. Also, as a result of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, proposed by the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries and concluded in 1977, another dangerous channel for the arms race was blocked.

We now have a number of international agreements which are operating successfully and doing a great deal to limit the possibility of the abuse of outer space for military purposes. To use the language of lawyers, we have established a régime for the partial demilitarization of outer space. However, as the Soviet Union's proposal quite rightly points out, the existing limitations are still not complete and the international community still does not possess a reliable barrier which fully seals off all avenues for the military use of outer space.

In our view the draft treaty we are considering, which would prohibit the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space, is very timely and very successfully fills the gap in the system of norms and principles governing the conduct of States with regard to the conquest and use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes. The reasons why this draft treaty, in our view, deserves universal approval and support by all Member States of the United Nations, however, do not lie in its international legal significance. After all,

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it is no secret that, in disregard of all existing agreements, in certain countries intensive work is still going on to develop dangerous programmes of armaments aimed at converting outer space into a kind of offensive springboard. Space devices are being developed at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars that could be used for military purposes. At the same time, for more than two years - and the American side is to blame for this - talks between the Soviet Union and the United States on the question of anti-satellite systems have been suspended. This reveals, even more clearly, how useful, timely and justified are the Soviet Union's proposals.

It is entirely understandable that plans for converting outer space into a kind of new theatre of military activity insulated from earth in actual fact poses a real threat not only to countries which have also entered outer space, but to the whole of mankind and the peoples of all countries.

On the basis of those considerations, the delegation of Czechoslovakia believes that the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space to be a realistic basis for the effective solving of this important problem. We believe that it should be constructively considered and approved, and that we should conclude such a treaty in this Committee and in the General Assembly.

Lastly, Mr. Chairman, permit me once again to assure you and all Member States of this Committee of our readiness to co-operate constructively in the further discussion of the disarmament questions on our agenda with a view to finding effective solutions to these problems. We intend to express our views on other items of the Committee's agenda in the general debate at a later stage.

Mr. TROYANOVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Firstly, I should like to express the satisfaction of the delegation of the Soviet Union on your election, Sir, the representative of friendly Czechoslovakia, as Chairman of the First Committee for this session of the General Assembly. We are sure that, with your great experience and authority, you will successfully conduct the proceedings of this Committee. Permit me to assure you of the readiness of the Soviet delegation to co-operate fruitfully with you.

(Mr. Troyanovsky, USSR)

The thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly is taking place at a time when there are serious difficulties in the international community. There continues to be a dangerous growth of tension and the arms race is assuming unprecedented proportions. All of this is accompanied by the whipping up of an atmosphere of military psychosis and war hysteria. Mankind is edging ever closer to the brink of the abyss from which there is no return.

It is no surprise that in these circumstances people are ever more alarmed by the threat of a nuclear war, which has no analogy in history. People are being exercised by the problem of how to preserve the tremendous achievements of mankind and the very lives of this and future generations.

The task of preventing a nuclear catastrophe and removing the sword of Damocles hanging over the head of mankind is a task which should be given the highest priority in international relations. Guided precisely by those considerations, the Soviet Union has proposed inclusion on the agenda of this session of the General Assembly an item entitled "Prevention of a nuclear catastrophe: declaration of the General Assembly". There are people who say that the problem of eliminating the threat of nuclear war is an old question which the Soviet Union began to raise regularly long ago in the General Assembly. This is certainly a fact. Even at the time when the atomic weapon had hardly made its appearance, the Soviet Union was the first to declare publicly that nuclear war was a deadly threat which should not be allowed. It was in the urgent raising and the subsequent concrete treatment of the question of the danger of nuclear war and the need to prevent and eliminate it from the life of society that the humanitarian nature of the foreign policy of our State was manifested.

(Mr. Troyanovsky, USSR)

In our nuclear age, peace, security and belief in the future are equally necessary to all. Just as nuclear war would be a catastrophe for everyone, so peace can only be reliably preserved and ensured by concerted efforts. Many of our colleagues here in the United Nations often stress that the times no longer exist when the fate of the world could be settled in a few world capitals. But if this is the case - and it certainly is - then responsibility for preventing a new world war is borne, not by two, three or even five Powers but by all States, whatever their social, economic or political systems, whatever their potential and whatever their geographical location. To shirk this responsibility or even simply to close one's eyes to the dangers which threaten the world, is tantamount to helping mankind towards the abyss.

As has already been stated, the problem of preventing nuclear war has now become particularly relevant. Nuclear clouds are visibly gathering now over the heads of mankind, borne by winds blowing from the west, or rather, from the United States. It is precisely there that they are banking on force as an instrument for achieving certain political goals, and it is precisely there that we find the intention proclaimed of creating a position of absolute military supremacy. It is precisely from that quarter that the wind is fanning the flames of the arms race in its most dangerous respect, that is, the nuclear missile respect.

At a time when the United Nations has proclaimed the 1980s as the Disarmament Decade, the Secretary of Defence of the United States, Caspar Weinberger, discerns its meaning elsewhere. He has called the 1980s the decade of confrontation with the Soviet Union. In inflating the myth of the Soviet military threat, which is nothing but an ideological underlay for the build-up of defence potential, the United States Administration is sharply increasing military appropriations, accelerating plans for deploying American nuclear medium-range missiles in Europe, is developing the manufacture of the neutron weapon, investing billions of dollars in developing new types of weapons of mass destruction and is planning to spend for

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military purposes in the next five years a total of one and a half trillion dollars.

The situation is made worse by the fact that at the present time, swift and profound changes in the development of military technology have led to the development of qualitatively new types of weapons, primarily nuclear weapons, and the task of controlling them, and hence coming to an agreement on limiting them, could become an exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, task. We should not forget, either, the sharp increase in the speed of action of contemporary strategic weapons, and as new generations of such weapons come into the possession of the leaders of the countries in question, less and less time will be left for reflection, for the taking of decisions on retaliatory action, and hence there is a corresponding increase in the risk of accidents connected, for example, with technical irretrievability or other factors which are hard to control. Only recently there have been repeated references in the press to dangerous situations arising in the United States when there have been failures of devices designed to control weapons of mass destruction.

In the circumstances, a new stage in the arms race might irreparably undermine international stability and thus multiply the dangers of the outbreak of war. And this is precisely the direction in which the United States is nudging the world, a country which, as so often before, has assumed the initiative of creating and developing new, ever more destructive offensive nuclear missile systems, such as the system of intercontinental MX mobile-based missiles, cruise missiles, new missile-carrying submarines, supersonic strategic bombers, atomic super aircraft-carriers, and so on. Furthermore, work is going on actively on developing space weapons and plans are being considered for new destructive systems and types of weapon and putting them into the boundless expanses of outer space.

The objective danger of a new round in the arms race is growing beyond measure as a result of the fact that the vast accumulation of means of mass destruction is accompanied by the development of doctrines founded on the use of these means for the first strike. In putting forward the

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doctrine of the admissibility and acceptability of nuclear war, an attempt is being made - which is nothing short of monstrous - to, as it were, legalize the use of nuclear weapons and to condition people to the possibility and even the admissibility of nuclear war. People are being fed the idea that nuclear war could be limited and that there could be a winner of it. However, the very idea is itself suicidal and adventuristic. Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev stated at the twenty-sixth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that to count on victory in nuclear is a dangerous folly.

There can be no doubt that a similar statement by the leaders of the United States of America would be welcomed throughout the world. but, unfortunately, what we hear from the west are statements of quite a different kind. There is talk about the possibility of victory on the basis of a count of warheads which would be left over after the destruction of factories, electric power stations and other vital targets, and after tens of millions of people had perished in all countries, including their own. Surely this is nothing but a mockery of common sense. But this is precisely the way the authors of the various concepts of limited nuclear war are thinking. This - as has been stressed in the report of Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev to the twenty-sixth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union -

"is a sheer deception of the peoples, because so-called limited nuclear war, for example, in Europe, would from the very beginning mean the actual destruction of European civilization and the United States itself, of course, could not remain on the sidelines, out of range of the flames of war."

The General Assembly of the United Nations at its last session, in resolution 35/152, pointed out with legitimate alarm the emergence of the doctrine of the limited use of nuclear weapons. The goal of such a doctrine would be to create a psychological climate of "acceptability" of the use of nuclear weapons, to condition the people to the possibility and even the inevitability of thermonuclear war, to force the peoples of the world to resign themselves to the development of a nuclear arms race of unprecedented scale and to refrain from struggling against the nuclear threat. Along with

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this, the SALT II treaty which has already been signed, has been set aside, and even the fate of SALT I is being called into question. Unilaterally many other talks are either being interrupted or halted, talks on very important areas of limiting the arms race.

(Mr. Troyanovsky, USSR)

In the circumstances, the minimum which in the view of the Soviet Union could be done without delay by the United Nations to exert a restraining effect on the dangerous development of the course of international events would be a firm and unequivocal stand against the use of nuclear weapons first. There is not and there cannot be any grounds or motives, there is not and cannot be any circumstance or situation which would give any State the right to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

The United Nations will therefore be taking timely and correct action if it issues a warning that there could never be any justification or pardon for any politician or statesman who would take a decision to be the first to use nuclear weapons. To say that in such a way as to make sure the warning is heeded and heard in all capitals and corners of the world would be to remind statesmen and politicians who, because of their positions, are connected with resolving the problem of the use of nuclear weapons that each of them bears personal responsibility for the fate of mankind. In fact, it would be no exaggeration to suppose that the preservation of peace or the actual increase in tension and the threat of war is to a considerable extent determined by the actions of the leaders of States which possess nuclear weapons.

The point is that despite a clash of interests and despite disagreements, no matter how sharp and acute they might be, their actions should show a prevailing tendency to a pondered and sensible approach to resolving acute international problems. It is precisely for that reason that the new Soviet initiative provides for an appeal to the leaders of nuclear Powers to act in such a way as to do away with the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear conflict.

At the same time, the Soviet Union proposes to condemn as contrary to the laws of human morality and the high ideals of the United Nations any doctrines which would permit of the first use of nuclear weapons and any action which would nudge the world towards such a catastrophe.

(Mr. Troyanovsky, USSR)

The Soviet Union also attached great importance to having the United Nations state that the arms race should be halted and reversed by the concerted efforts of us all by means of honest and equal negotiations so that atomic energy could be used for peaceful purposes and only for the good of mankind, rather than for the manufacture of means of destruction.

All those ideas are contained in the draft declaration which the Soviet Union has submitted for consideration at the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

The adoption by the General Assembly of a decision on this subject would lead to a strengthening of the legal and political bases of international security and at the same time would constitute an important step towards the total elimination of the threat of nuclear conflict. What we are talking about is, in the broadest sense, large-scale measures for creating trust among States. Without any fear of a first strike, people could feel tranquil in the realization that there would be no second, third or any other strikes. In other words, there would be no danger of a world catastrophe. I should like to express the hope that other States, too, which possess nuclear weapons will find it possible to take the same approach to a renunciation of first use of that weapon.

In this declaration, the delegation of the Soviet Union has found it necessary to focus attention on the new proposals submitted by the Soviet Union to this session of the General Assembly. That of course does not mean that there has been any slackening in our interest in other important areas of limiting the arms race and ultimately the nuclear threat. Such areas have already been indicated, and there are quite a number of them here in the United Nations. There is the holding of talks on the halting of the manufacture of nuclear weapons in all forms and the gradual reduction of stockpiles of those weapons up to and including their total elimination. There is the conclusion of the international convention on security guarantees for States which do not possess nuclear weapons and which have none on their

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territories, and the translation into practical terms of the question of the non-deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are none such at present. There is also the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world and the adoption of measures to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons on our planet. In that regard, we attach great importance to the prevention of the proliferation of the arms race and the new area of human conquest, which is outer space. In coming with all those proposals to the United Nations, the Soviet Union proceeds from the belief that in the work of preventing war, it is not only militarily powerful States but the whole world community at large that can and must play an important part.

The head of the Soviet delegation and Foreign Minister of the USSR, Mr. Gromyko, stated from the rostrum of the General Assembly:

"We are convinced that to prevent war is not only necessary but also possible if this is actively fought for.

"Hand in hand with all States, our country is prepared to wage the struggle for curbing the arms race, removing the threat of war, settling outstanding problems. In this respect we are not politically allergic to any partner, irrespective of differences in social systems or ideologies." (A/36/PV.7, pp.43-45)

The Soviet Union calls upon all who cherish the fate of the world to pronounce themselves firmly in favour of reducing the arms race, to condemn the unbridled build-up of the arsenal of nuclear means, and any doctrines which justify the use of such means, and actively to involve themselves in the struggle for the prevention of a thermonuclear catastrophe. In that regard, no possibility of any kind should be ignored, since every day that we lose in trying to solve this problem increases the risk of a nuclear catastrophe. The alternative in that situation is quite clear: if we do not act today, we may all become radioactive tomorrow.

(Mr. Troyanovsky, USSR)

The Soviet delegation is convinced that a constructive and businesslike discussion of the proposal made by the Soviet Union and the adoption of the declaration we have proposed could be a step towards the elimination of such gloomy prospects. And, as has been pointed out, we are convinced that this is the very minimum that should be undertaken immediately by the United Nations to prevent the nuclear threat. In the present circumstances, the authority and prestige of the United Nations in the eyes of the world will depend in large measure on the contribution that it is able to make to carrying out that task.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to urge all delegations to inscribe themselves on the list of speakers so that we can make full use of the resources allocated to the First Committee. I should like to remind representatives that the list of speakers for the general debate is going to be closed two days from now, on Wednesday, 21 October, at 6 p.m.

The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.