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Agenda item 22

THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA

NOV 2 1981

UN/SA COLLECTION

Letter dated 28 October 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Democratic Kampuchea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, for your information, the résumé of the communiqué issued by the High Command of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea on 2 October 1981 regarding the military results of the 1981 rainy season.

I should be obliged if you would have this text circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 22, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) THIOUNN Prasith
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
Democratic Kampuchea to the
United Nations

ANNEX

កម្ពុជាប្រជាធិបតេយ្យ



MILITARY RESULTS OF THE 1981 RAINY SEASON

RESUME OF THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY THE HIGH COMMAND
OF THE NATIONAL ARMY OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

- 2 October 1981 -

MILITARY RESULTS OF THE 1981 RAINY SEASON

RESUME OF THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY THE HIGH COMMAND OF THE NATIONAL ARMY OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

- 2 October 1981 -

I- MILITARY RESULTS

1. Enemy forces wiped out : 36,300
including 21,400 killed or definitively put out of action.
2. Enemy positions destroyed or captured by the National Army and guerrillas of Democratic Kampuchea : 170
including - 93 positions defended by platoons;
- 46 positions defended by companies;
- 25 positions defended by battalions;
- 6 positions defended by regiments;
3. Enemy intervention, transport and supply units put into rout : 199 times
including - units at platoon level : 112 times
- units at company level : 63 times
- units at battalion level : 18 times
- units at regiment level : 6 times
4. Villages and communes liberated :
- 275 villages
- 38 communes

At the end of April 1981, the number of people living in the areas controlled by the Government of Democratic Kampuchea numbered 1,500,000. During the 1981 rainy season, we have liberated more than 200,000 inhabitants.

Thus, by the end of September 1981, the population living in the areas controlled by the Government of Democratic Kampuchea numbered 1,700,000. The majority of the remaining population live in guerrilla areas.

5. Enemy transport and communication lines cut off during the 1981 rainy season :

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The National Army and guerrillas of Democratic Kampuchea have cut off enemy transport and communication strategic lines of vital importance such as highways 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10 and 12 and the railway lines Phnom Penh-Battambang and Phnom Penh-Kompong Som as well as strategic lines linking the enemy positions in the Western part of Kampuchea.

The results achieved are as follows :

- roads cut off in 115 places totalizing more than 27.5 km long;
 - railway lines cut off in 120 places totalizing more than 5.6 km;
 - 56 bridges of all dimensions.
6. Vietnamese soldiers deserting their ranks : 1,829
 7. Vietnamese soldiers killed or wounded in mutinies : 131
 8. Vietnamese soldiers killed or wounded in revolts by Kampuchean soldiers and self-defence guards forcibly enlisted : 337
 9. Vietnamese soldiers killed or wounded by the Kampuchean population : 92
 10. Kampuchean soldiers forcibly enlisted by the Vietnamese enemy deserting so as to return home : 1,023
 11. Kampuchean soldiers forcibly enlisted by the Vietnamese enemy deserting so as to join the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea : 205
 12. Combatants from independent groups deserting so as to join the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea : 137

II- OBSERVATIONS BY THE MILITARY HIGH COMMAND

The Military High Command has noted on the battlefields of Kampuchea the following facts :

1. The situation of the Vietnamese enemy has been further deteriorating as compared to the 1980-1981 dry season.
2. The Vietnamese enemy is more and more running short of effectives. Thus, in the region of North-East, East and South-East, its troops are only composed of forces coming from dispersed units which have been seriously decimated by our attacks, and of scattered forces which have been assigned to guard some places.

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Those units have been able to occupy only 1/3 of the territory of these regions. The remaining 2/3 are under the control of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea.

3. The enemy has to withdraw a large number of its forces from the Eastern part so as to cover the battlefields of the West of Kampuchea, that is in the West of the line linking Stung Treng to Kompong Som. Those forces have been divided into two important parts, the first one deployed in the West of Tonle Sap, the second one in the East. They have been mainly engaged in defending strategic lines and roads.

Therefore, during the 1981 rainy season, the Vietnamese enemy has no more strategic intervention forces to operate anywhere at its will.

4. That is why the enemy has lost the combat initiative for the 1981 rainy season. From May to late September 1981, it has not been in a position to conduct mopping up operations at regiment level, and yet those regiments were composed of units with reduced effectives. Such operations have been conducted 6 times only, and at every time, the troops engaged were quickly routed by our forces.

In general, the operations conducted by the enemy were small guerrilla operations carried out by battalions and companies to attack our transport and supply lines.

This situation shows the final failure of the "lightning attack, lightning victory" strategy of the enemy which is now trapped in the "protracted war strategy" waged by the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea, and compelled to disperse its forces and to carry out in its turn guerrilla tactics against the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea.

5. The deterioration of the situation of the enemy also results from the speedy decline of its morale, the increase of desertions and rebellions within its ranks, the growing revolts of Kampuchean soldiers forcibly enlisted. In addition to this, there are the shortage of food, the worsening of the soldiers' health, inextricable difficulties in all fields in Vietnam itself and the complete isolation on the international arena. The Vietnamese Le Duan clique is in a complete stalemate in its war of aggression in Kampuchea.

In the meantime, the National Army and guerrillas of Democratic Kampuchea have been continuously developing and strengthening their forces. By the end of September 1981, the situation of the war for national survival has nearly reached the end of the strategic phase of "balance of forces".

