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Thirty-sixth session  
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### GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

#### Study of the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament

#### Report of the Secretary-General

1. By resolution 34/87 E of 11 December 1979, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, to carry out a comprehensive study assessing current institutional requirements and future estimated needs in the United Nations management of disarmament affairs and outlining possible functions, structure and institutional framework that could meet those requirements and needs, including legal and financial implications, and formulating recommendations for possible later decisions on the matter.
2. Pursuant to that resolution, the Secretary-General appointed a Group of Governmental Experts to Study the Institutional Arrangements relating to the Process of Disarmament. By a letter dated 2 July 1981, the Chairman of the Group of Governmental Experts transmitted to the Secretary-General the report which is hereby submitted to the General Assembly.

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\* A/36/150.

ANNEX

Study of the institutional arrangement relating  
 to the process of disarmament

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Foreword by the Secretary-General

By its resolution 34/87 E of 11 December 1979, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, to carry out a comprehensive study assessing current institutional requirements and future estimated needs in the United Nations management of disarmament affairs and outlining possible functions, structure and institutional framework that could meet those requirements and needs, including legal and financial implications, and formulating recommendations for possible later decisions on the matter. The Assembly, furthermore, recommended that the Secretary-General, in carrying out the study, should seek the views of Member States, for the benefit of the experts, on some key issues such as desirable functions, structure and institutional framework of United Nations management of disarmament affairs and invited all Governments to co-operate with the Secretary-General so that the objectives of the study may be achieved.

In pursuance of the resolution, the Group of Governmental Experts to Study the Institutional Arrangements relating to the Process of Disarmament, was appointed by the Secretary-General in consultation with Member States. The Secretary-General, shortly thereafter, sought the views of Member States, for the benefit of the experts, on certain issues relating to the study.

In carrying out its work, the Group of Governmental Experts held four sessions between January 1980 and June/July 1981 during which time it undertook a comprehensive examination of the subject matter under study.

The Secretary-General wishes to thank the experts for the report which was endorsed by consensus and which he hereby submits to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session for consideration.

## LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

2 July 1981

Sir,

I have the honour to submit herewith the study prepared by the Group of Governmental Experts to Study the Institutional Arrangements relating to the Process of Disarmament which was appointed by you in pursuance of paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 34/87 E of 11 December 1979.

The Experts appointed by you were the following:

Argentina	Mr. Carlos Ortiz de Rozas Ambassador of Argentina to the United Kingdom London
China	Mr. Yang Hushan, Counsellor Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations, New York
Cuba	Mr. Carlos Lechuga-Hevia Director of International Organizations Ministry of External Relations Vedado-Havana
France	Mr. Benoit d'Aboville Head of Disarmament Department Ministry of Foreign Affairs Paris
German Democratic Republic	Mr. Ferdinand Thun Ministry for Foreign Affairs Berlin
India	Mr. Sushil Dubey, Director Ministry of External Affairs New Delhi
Japan	Mr. Tsutomu Ishiguri Disarmament Division of the United Nations Bureau Ministry of Foreign Affairs Tokyo
Kenya	Mr. Charles Gatere Maina Permanent Representative of the Republic of Kenya to the United Nations New York

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Mexico	Miss Alicia Cabrera-Silva, Minister Counsellor Deputy Permanent Delegate of Mexico to UNESCO Paris
Morocco	Mr. Sidi Mohamed Rahhali, Counsellor Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Morocco to the United Nations New York
Netherlands	Mr. P. H. Kooijmans Professor of International Law State University of Leyden, Leyden
Nigeria	Mr. B. A. Adeyemi, Minister Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the United Nations New York
Poland	Mr. Henryk Pac Adviser to the Minister for Foreign Affairs Ministry for Foreign Affairs Department of International Organizations Warsaw
Senegal	Mr. Ibrahim Sy, Counsellor Permanent Mission of the Republic of Senegal to the United Nations, Geneva
Sri Lanka	Mr. A. C. H. Mohamed Ministry for Foreign Affairs Colombo
Sweden	Mr. Rolf Björnerstedt Chairman of the Board for SIPRI Stockholm
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	Mr. Vladimir Shustov Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary Deputy Permanent Representative of the USSR to the United Nations, New York
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Roy Dean, Director Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit Foreign and Commonwealth Office London
United States of America	Mr. Robert B. Rosenstock, Adviser United States Mission to the United Nations New York

Yugoslavia

Mr. Darko Silovic  
Minister Counsellor  
Deputy Permanent Representative of the Socialist  
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the United Nations  
New York

From the first to the third session Mr. Fan Ta-chun, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations, New York, participated as an expert from China; at the first and second sessions, Mr. Tadayuki Nonoyama, Counsellor and Deputy Representative, Delegation of Japan to the Committee on Disarmament, Geneva, participated as an expert from Japan; at the first session Mr. Simon W. J. Fuller, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations, New York, participated as an expert from the United Kingdom, and, Mr. Miljenko Vukovic, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the United Nations, New York, participated as an expert from Yugoslavia at the first and second sessions.

The study was prepared between April 1980 and July 1981, during which period the Group held four sessions: from 8 to 11 April 1980; 30 June to 3 July 1980; 19 to 29 January 1981 and 22 June to 2 July 1981 at United Nations Headquarters in New York.

The members of the Group of Governmental Experts wish to express their appreciation for the assistance which they received from members of the Secretariat of the United Nations. They wish, in particular, to convey their thanks to Mr. Jan Martenson, Assistant Secretary-General, head of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament and to Mr. Pal Csillag, Director and Chief of the Committee and Conference Services Section of the Centre for Disarmament, who served as Secretary of the Group.

I have been requested by the Group of Governmental Experts, as its Chairman, to submit to you on its behalf this study, which was endorsed by consensus.

(Signed) Carlos Ortiz de Rozas  
Chairman of The  
Group of Governmental Experts  
to Study the Institutional Arrangements  
relating to the Process of Disarmament

## INTRODUCTION

1. The Group of Governmental Experts to Study the Institutional Arrangements relating to the Process of Disarmament was established in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 34/87 E adopted on 11 December 1979, during the Assembly's thirty-fourth session.
2. By the resolution, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, to carry out a comprehensive study assessing present institutional requirements and future estimated needs in the United Nations management of disarmament affairs and outlining possible functions, structure and institutional framework that could meet those requirements and needs, including legal and financial implications, and formulating recommendations for possible later decisions on the matter.
3. The Assembly, furthermore, recommended that the Secretary-General, in carrying out the study, should seek the views of Member States, for the benefit of the experts, on some key issues, such as desirable functions, structure and institutional framework of United Nations management of disarmament affairs.
4. By the same resolution, the General Assembly invited all Governments to co-operate with the Secretary-General so that the objective of the study might be achieved and requested the Secretary-General to submit a final report to the Assembly at its thirty-sixth regular session, beginning in September 1981.
5. At its first session the Group of Experts examined its mandate as contained in paragraph 1 of resolution 34/87 E, and considered that its study should be so conceived that its outcome would serve to promote the disarmament process. The Group, furthermore, felt that any evaluation of present institutional requirements and future estimated needs in the United Nations with regard to disarmament affairs should proceed in a co-ordinated manner, taking account of the work of all bodies and organs dealing with disarmament, both of the United Nations itself and of other members of the United Nations system of organizations.
6. In assessing the present institutional arrangements and future estimated needs in the United Nations in the field of disarmament, the Group bore in mind that a second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will take place in 1982. The first special session held in 1978 laid down the foundations of a comprehensive disarmament strategy. At that session, the General Assembly took decisions to revitalize the disarmament machinery and to strengthen the Secretariat. The Group considered that its own assessment should focus primarily on the operation of the United Nations Secretariat and other United Nations functions related to disarmament. The Group approached its work against the background of a growing disarmament agenda, increasing complexity of the issues involved, and more active participation by a large number of Member States, all of which create increasing demands on the United Nations in the field of disarmament.
7. In connexion with its work, the Group of Experts had before it the views and comments of Member States communicated to the Secretary-General for the benefit of the Group, in accordance with paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 34/87 E,

as mentioned above. Those views and comments are included in the present report as annex I. The Group also had before it a number of other documents prepared at its request by the Secretariat, including information received from the specialized agencies and other bodies within the United Nations system.

8. In carrying out its mandate, the Group of Experts, under the chairmanship of Mr. Carlos Ortiz de Rozas (Argentina), held four sessions between 1980 and 1981 at United Nations Headquarters in New York, the first from 8 to 11 April 1980, the second from 30 June to 3 July 1980, the third from 19 to 29 January 1981 and the final session from 22 June to 2 July 1981.

## I. PRESENT INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN THE UNITED NATIONS RELATING TO THE PROCESS OF DISARMAMENT

### A. Structure and functions of the Secretariat

9. The role of the Secretariat of the United Nations with respect to disarmament matters derives from the general functions of the Secretary-General as defined in the Charter and developed over the years. The present organizational and institutional arrangements of Secretariat management of disarmament affairs have evolved over a period of more than three decades, as a result of decisions by the General Assembly and other United Nations bodies.

10. The first Secretariat unit to deal with disarmament-related questions was established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 1 (I) of 24 January 1946, which created the Atomic Energy Commission and provided for "whatever staff it may deem necessary" in carrying out its functions. In the succeeding years, a small core of staff dealt with disarmament-related questions entrusted to the Secretariat with growing frequency and broadening scope. By 1966, the Disarmament Affairs Division had been established and its activities and responsibilities grew correspondingly with the expanding United Nations role in the field of disarmament.

11. At its thirtieth session in 1975, the General Assembly, by resolution 3484 (XXX), decided to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament. The Ad Hoc Committee submitted a report to the Assembly at its thirty-first session.

12. Among the agreed proposals included in that report was a recommendation by the Ad Hoc Committee that in view of the important new disarmament tasks comprising functions of committee and conference services, studies on disarmament matters, compilation and dissemination of information, and the follow-up of disarmament resolutions and agreements, which the Committee was also recommending to the General Assembly to entrust to the Secretariat, the Disarmament Affairs Division should be transformed into a United Nations Centre for Disarmament within the framework of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs. The Ad Hoc Committee recommended further that the Centre should be headed by an official with the rank of Assistant Secretary-General and that the Centre be staffed accordingly.



13. By resolution 31/90, the General Assembly, inter alia, endorsed the agreed proposals of the Ad Hoc Committee, among them, the proposal for the establishment of a United Nations Centre for Disarmament to replace the existing Disarmament Affairs Division. The Centre began operating officially on 1 January 1977, with an expanded mandate reflecting the tasks entrusted to the Secretariat. It is the principal Secretariat unit in the field of disarmament.

14. At its first special session devoted to disarmament, the General Assembly, in the Final Document (resolution S-10/2 of 30 June 1978), defined the objectives, priorities and principles that should guide all disarmament efforts, enumerated specific measures that should be adopted over the next few years, including the elaboration of a comprehensive disarmament programme, and revitalized the deliberative and negotiating bodies. In addition, there was recognition of the growing importance of certain supporting activities, in particular, research, study, information and training. It was decided that in order to enable the United Nations to continue to fulfil its central role and its primary responsibility in the field of disarmament and to carry out the additional tasks assigned to it by the special session, the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should be adequately strengthened and its research and information functions accordingly extended. The Centre should also take account fully of the possibilities offered by the specialized agencies and other institutions and programmes within the United Nations system with regard to studies and information on disarmament. An advisory board of eminent persons was established to advise the Secretary-General on various aspects of studies to be made under the auspices of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, including a programme of such studies. The special session also called for the adoption of a number of measures to increase the dissemination of information on the arms race and on efforts to halt and reverse it. Finally, in order to promote expertise on disarmament in more Member States, particularly in the developing countries, the special session decided to establish a programme of fellowships on disarmament.

15. About 30 resolutions, approved by the General Assembly at its thirty-third, thirty-fourth and thirty-fifth sessions, in effect, expanded the work programme of the Centre. They ranged from requests for convening of expert groups to assist the Secretary-General in preparing studies to a decision to convene a second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

16. The Centre's terms of reference needed to be updated in order to reflect, in addition to previously existing mandates, the relevant decisions of the General Assembly at its first special session and at its subsequent regular sessions. The Centre has been carrying out its rapidly expanding work programme through the utmost use of existing staff resources. In the present organizational manual of the Secretariat (ST/SGB/Organization, section I/Amend.4), the Centre is shown as structured into five administrative units: the Office of the Assistant Secretary-General, the Committee and Conference Services Section, the Treaties and Resolution Section, the Information and Research Section, and the Geneva Unit. As a result, however, of organizational and administrative streamlining, the Treaties and Resolution Section was abolished and the functions, as well as the staff previously assigned to it, are now included within the other sections. The tasks and resources of the Centre are, therefore, distributed among four administrative

units, instead of five. Within its present structure, the Centre continues to fulfil all its functions as it did hitherto. A proposal for approval of the updated terms of reference and of the accompanying structural adjustment has been addressed to the Secretary-General, in accordance with established Secretariat procedures.

17. Activities that are in their developmental stages, i.e., the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament, the non-governmental and information activities in connexion with the Second Disarmament Decade, and the computerized disarmament data system, are at present under the direct supervision of the Assistant Secretary-General. It is likely that a more permanent structural arrangement within the framework of the Centre for Disarmament will be found in the context of an appropriate review.

18. For the budget period 1980-1981, the total estimated direct and apportioned costs of carrying out the activities of the Centre are approximately \$6.6 and \$4.3 million respectively. In addition to inflation factors, the increase over that of the previous two-year budget period represented to a very large extent the costs of carrying out additional studies, an intensified publications programme and the servicing of a much greater number of meetings of disarmament bodies and other groups. For the programme budget period 1982-1983, the proposed outlay for direct costs for the Centre is \$6.7 million. Figures for total apportioned costs are not as yet available. No additional established posts were provided for the Centre in the 1980-1981 budget. Since 1979 the Centre has a staff of 25 at the Professional and higher levels, including the Assistant Secretary-General and 19 at the General Service level. Of this number, three Professional and three General Service staff are outposted to Geneva. Furthermore, the Centre has on its staff, on a temporary basis, three staff members at the Professional level and one at the General Service level to assist in the preparation of the study on the relationship between disarmament and development and two staff members at the Professional level and two at the General Service level to assist in preparations for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

19. The activities of the Secretariat in the field of disarmament are, at present, performed through various channels:

(a) The Secretary-General

Pursuant to Article 98 of the Charter, the Secretary-General submits to the General Assembly, at each regular session, a report on the work of the organization. It frequently contains a discussion of disarmament issues. On occasion, the Secretary-General has made recommendations or suggestions for consideration by the General Assembly and other bodies concerned with such matters. It can be mentioned that the establishment of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies by the General Assembly at its special session and the study on a world disarmament campaign, approved by the Assembly at its thirty-fifth session, derived from suggestions that the Secretary-General made in his opening statement to the special session.

(b) Department of Political and Security Council Affairs

The Political and Security Council Affairs is the major organizational unit of the Secretariat that deals with matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security.

(c) United Nations Centre for Disarmament

Within the framework of the Department, the Centre performs its functions as the principal Secretariat unit dealing with disarmament. Furthermore, the Centre ensures the co-ordination of disarmament-related activities carried out within the Secretariat.

- (i) The Centre provides secretariat and administrative services and substantive support to the Committee on Disarmament, the First Committee of the General Assembly, the preparatory committees of the special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Disarmament Commission and other subsidiary bodies of the General Assembly, for example, the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference and the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean; and other bodies dealing with disarmament, such as The United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and their preparatory committees.
- (ii) The Number of disarmament bodies has increased greatly. A list of these bodies is included as annex II of the present report. During the three-year period 1976-1978, there was a total of 15 disarmament bodies that met for 46 sessions; in the three-year period 1979-1981, about 40 committees, commissions, conferences, expert groups are expected to hold approximately 140 sessions. Thus, the volume of conference servicing and other related requirements almost tripled during that period.
- (iii) Pursuant to relevant General Assembly resolutions, the Centre provides substantive secretariat services to review conferences of multilateral disarmament agreements and their preparatory committees; assists the Secretary-General in the performance of his functions as depositary of multilateral disarmament conventions; and prepares specialized publications on the status of multilateral disarmament agreements.
- (iv) In performing its functions in the area of research and studies, the Centre renders secretariat and substantive support to the Advisory Board of the Secretary-General. Secretariat support is also extended to the study groups established by the General Assembly. In recent years, an average of 10 studies were prepared on specific aspects of disarmament, with the assistance of specialists appointed by the Secretary-General in their personal capacities or as governmental experts. During the three-year period 1976-1978, a total of five disarmament studies were carried out; between 1979 and 1981, 16 studies will have been completed

or will be in progress, with three of them extending up to the biennium 1982-1983. For use in these studies and in reports and publications, the Centre collects information on studies and research carried out by governmental and non-governmental bodies, as well as by individual experts and research institutions.

- (v) The Centre provides information in the field of disarmament for use by the official organs of the United Nations, Governments, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, academic and research institutions and the general public. For this purpose, an information system has been organized within the Centre for the collection, compilation and dissemination of relevant information. Activities in this field also include the preparation of The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, the periodical Disarmament, other specialized publications, a variety of pamphlets, fact sheets, wallcharts, posters and other visual material, as well as contributions to the United Nations Yearbook, in co-operation with the Department of Public Information. The Centre carries out programmes in connexion with the annual observance of Disarmament Week. Provisions for publications and the annual Disarmament Week observance in the programme budget for 1980-1981 amount to \$332,500 and \$20,000, respectively.
- (vi) The Centre organizes and administers the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament, the purpose of which is to contribute to the training and specialization of government officials, particularly those from developing countries, to enable them to participate more effectively in international disarmament deliberations and negotiations, as well as to provide expertise at the national levels. This programme is carried out in co-operation with UNITAR, IAEA and Member States and offers additional training opportunities. Provisions for the fellowship programme amount to \$250,000 per year.
- (vii) Bearing in mind relevant General Assembly resolutions, the Centre continues to increase contacts with non-governmental organizations and research institutions to encourage the role of such organizations and institutions in the field of disarmament. It maintains regular liaison with the non-governmental organizations committee on disarmament in New York and the special non-governmental organizations committee on disarmament in Geneva, as well as with an increasing number of individual non-governmental organizations such as labour unions, professional associations, parliamentary unions and religious organizations. The Centre makes the necessary arrangements for non-governmental organizations to submit contributions to disarmament bodies that have enabled them to do so. It continues to organize regional seminars for representatives of non-governmental organizations in connexion with the Second Disarmament Decade and assists those organizations in planning and carrying out Disarmament Week programmes.

(d) Other Secretariat units carrying out disarmament related activities

Within the Secretariat, the Department of Political Affairs, Trusteeship and Decolonization produces substantive papers on military activities which could impede decolonization, and the Department of International Economic and Social Affairs assists in promoting general and complete disarmament in its programmes aimed at encouraging the participation of women in international co-operation and peace. The Office of Legal Affairs provides legal support for meetings of organs or for conferences dealing with disarmament and performs legal functions in connexion with the role of the Secretary-General as the depositary of multilateral disarmament agreements. The apportioned costs mentioned in paragraph 17 represent the cost of programme support by other Secretariat units, such as the Department of Administration, Finance and Management, and the Department of Conference Services. Aside from the departments providing common services support to disarmament activities, the Centre maintains close co-operation with the Department of Public Information and the Electronic Data Processing and Information Systems Division in the exercise of its information functions. In the 1980-1981 programme budget, these apportioned costs amounted to approximately \$4.3 million. The Department of Public Information estimates that in 1979 it required \$395,000 to carry out disarmament-related activities and anticipates a somewhat higher figure for 1980 and 1981.

B. Co-ordination of disarmament-related activities within the United Nations system

20. In addition to political and security considerations, the disarmament-related activities of the United Nations and the specialized agencies and other bodies within the United Nations system reflect the complexity of disarmament issues and their manifold aspects - social, economic, ecological, military, educational and technological.

21. Co-ordination activities are reinforced by ad hoc interagency meetings on co-ordination of disarmament-related activities within the United Nations system, pursuant to a decision of the Organizational Committee of the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination. At the first meeting, held at Geneva in June 1980, it was agreed, among other things, that in order to avoid duplication of work and overlapping of activities and to promote the rational use of resources, the Centre for Disarmament should serve as the focal point for the exchange of information on ongoing and planned activities in the field of disarmament. At the second meeting, held also at Geneva in June 1981, the interagency group reviewed the disarmament-related activities of the specialized agencies and other bodies within the United Nations system during the intervening period and exchanged information on their planned projects. They also agreed that their activities in connexion with the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to be held in 1982, should be closely co-ordinated.

22. Among their other functions, the following specialized agencies and other organizations and programmes carry out disarmament-related activities:

(a) International Atomic Energy Agency

IAEA applies safeguards on nuclear materials in accordance with article III A.(5) of its Statute. In line with its general mandate, which also includes activities in the promotion of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, IAEA has been given specific functions by virtue of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) to conclude safeguards agreements with parties to those treaties and to verify compliance with those agreements. The Agency keeps the United Nations informed of its activities. Its annual report regularly appears on the agenda of the General Assembly and the Agency considers the resolutions referred to it by the Assembly or by any of the Councils of the United Nations. Senior representatives of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament regularly participate in meetings of the governing bodies of IAEA and in other meetings organized by the Agency that are relevant to the work of the Centre. IAEA expenditures on safeguards are estimated at \$21,740,000 for 1980 and \$25,003,000 for 1981.

(b) United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNESCO undertakes activities in the areas of disarmament information and education. It conducts conferences and symposia, issues publications and maintains contacts with non-governmental organizations to mobilize public opinion in favour of disarmament. In 1980, UNESCO held a World Congress on Disarmament Education, the convening of which had been welcomed in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The Centre for Disarmament participated in that Congress and submitted a substantive report. The Final Document also urged UNESCO to step up its programme on disarmament education through the preparation, inter alia, of teachers' guides, textbooks, readers and audio-visual materials. UNESCO also carries out study and research activities on the arms race. Resources available for 1979-1980 for the objective of peace research were \$911,600; of which amount the sum of \$135,600 was directly devoted to disarmament. In the 1981-1983 programme budget, the sum of \$374,000 has been earmarked for a theme dealing exclusively with disarmament. In addition, undetermined portions of allocations in other sections of the budget are also devoted to disarmament-related purposes, such as education and public information.

(c) World Health Organization

WHO conducts research and studies and issues publications on specific disarmament or military issues related to medical science and practice, such as chemical and bacteriological weapons. By resolution WHA34.38 of 22 May 1981, the World Health Assembly requested the Director-General of WHO: (i) to expedite and intensify the study of the contribution that WHO could and should make to economic and social development in order to facilitate the implementation of United Nations resolutions on strengthening of peace, détente and disarmament and prevention of thermonuclear conflict, and for this purpose invited him to create an international committee composed of prominent experts of medical science and public health; and (ii) to continue collaboration with the United Nations Secretary-General, governmental and non-governmental organizations, to the extent required, in

establishing a competent international committee of scientists and experts for comprehensive study and elucidation of the threat of thermonuclear war and its potentially fatal consequences for the life and health of the peoples of the world.

(d) World Meteorological Organization

A number of WMO activities in the areas of weather modification and ozone research and monitoring as well as the world climate programme are relevant to article III of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques and The Understandings of the then Conference of the Committee on Disarmament relating thereto. Also, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, under the aegis of the Committee on Disarmament, has proposed that WMO's Global Telecommunications System be used as part of the verification system for a future comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and WMO exchanges information with the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on this matter.

(e) International Labour Organisation

The current work programme of ILO envisages the possibility for ILO undertaking research projects and holding special consultations and seminars, in co-operation with the United Nations and other competent organs on: (i) ways and means of reconverting armaments production to peaceful production while maintaining and increasing the level of employment in the industries concerned; and (ii) socio-economic aspects of disarmament and the effective utilization of resources released by disarmament measures towards furthering productive employment and raising workers' living standards.

Furthermore, by a resolution adopted on 23 June 1981, the ILO General Conference invited the ILO Governing Body: (i) to instruct the Director-General to maintain close co-operation with the United Nations Centre for Disarmament and the United Nations bodies entrusted with work in this field, in order that ILO should continue to make an appropriate contribution, within its field of competence, to the work of the United Nations system as a whole on this subject; (ii) to urge Member States to lend their support to the studies and research which ILO will undertake to this end and to provide ILO with information at its request; and (iii) to determine, in the light of such research, what other steps would be appropriate for action by ILO in the area of the economic and social consequences of disarmament.

(f) United Nations Environment Programme

UNEP gathers information on methods of dealing with environmental problems caused by the material remnants of war, renders assistance to Governments in preparing their programmes for the elimination of mines in their territories and carries out and promotes studies on the environmental effects of the material remnants of war. UNEP is also engaged in the preparation of a comprehensive report entitled "The State of the Global Environment" to mark its tenth anniversary. The Centre for Disarmament has contributed a substantive chapter entitled "Peace,

security and the environment". In accordance with General Assembly resolution 35/8 of 30 October 1980, UNEP is preparing a report on the pernicious effects of the arms race on nature.

(g) United Nations Institute for Training and Research

UNITAR has, over the years, carried out disarmament-related activities involving seminars, lectures, training and studies in the maintenance of peace and security and co-operates with the Centre for Disarmament in the management of the United Nations Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament. The establishment of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research at Geneva within the framework of UNITAR provides another element of co-operation between UNITAR and the Centre for Disarmament. The estimated expenditures of UNITAR on disarmament-related activities in 1980 are \$283,000 and \$197,000 in 1981. It should be noted that pursuant to General Assembly resolution 34/83 M of 11 December 1979, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research was set up within the framework of UNITAR as an interim arrangement for the period until the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

(h) United Nations University

The United Nations University has included in its five-year research project on goals, processes and indicators of development (now in its fourth year) a study entitled "Militarization", which is related to the research on oppression and liberation underlying the national and international processes of development, as well as the research on human rights.

II. VIEWS ON PRESENT INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND FUTURE ESTIMATED NEEDS  
IN THE UNITED NATIONS RELATING TO THE PROCESS OF DISARMAMENT

23. In discharging its mandate the Group took into account the ideas and suggestions that Member States had communicated to the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 34/87 E. The communications identified, in various degrees of detail, certain functions to be performed in relation to the disarmament process, namely, deliberation, negotiation, implementation, verification, information and, in that connexion, they also referred to the infrastructure. The ideas and proposals available have, therefore, been subsumed under those headings, it being understood that the functions involved do not constitute distinct categories and that some have elements in common. The Group approached the consideration of these functions in connexion with the infrastructure of the United Nations for the management of disarmament affairs and concentrated its discussion on the tasks of the secretariat, particularly those of the Centre for Disarmament.

24. The Group considered the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament together with the elements of a comprehensive programme for disarmament as the basis and framework for assessing future institutional requirements in the United Nations relating to disarmament. In estimating the future needs, the Group also considered as a time frame, the 1980s, the Second Disarmament Decade. With regard to the machinery created at the first special session on disarmament for the



deliberation and negotiation of disarmament-related issues the view was expressed that any future needs could only be identified in exact terms when at a later stage there would be concrete indications justifying additional institutional measures to promote and successfully conclude disarmament negotiations. The view was also expressed to the effect that, as a general proposition, any assessment of institutional requirements and future estimated needs should be linked to actual disarmament measures and anticipated progress in that field.

#### A. Deliberation

25. In connexion with this function, it was generally observed that in recent years, particularly since the first special session on disarmament, the growing interest and more active involvement of a larger number of States, as well as the increasing number of problems under consideration, have intensified the activities of the deliberative bodies which, in turn, has imposed considerable additional demands on the Secretariat. With regard to the future needs concerning the deliberative function, the group confined itself to the context of the decisions taken at the first special session that committed resources of the Secretariat to the servicing of deliberative bodies.

#### B. Negotiation

26. The Group considered the Secretariat's servicing of the deliberative and negotiating bodies as one of its primary functions in the field of disarmament. In this connexion, a position was advanced that the main task of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament was to promote disarmament negotiations and deliberations by providing services. The suggestion was made also that the United Nations could be requested, as appropriate, to provide assistance to multilateral and regional disarmament negotiations and deliberations, especially the provision of factual information and services necessary for their efficient conduct. The view was expressed that, although the Centre for Disarmament seemed to be able to meet the requirements of the deliberative and negotiating bodies, it might be necessary to expand the staff to service the Committee on Disarmament.

#### C. Implementation

27. In considering this subject, support was expressed for the functions that the Secretariat discharges to assist in the implementation of disarmament agreements, specifically for the role of the Secretary-General as the depositary and the tasks performed by the Secretariat in connexion with the holding of review conferences. It was observed that such functions are likely to expand and, in this connexion, it was noted that the 1980 Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention gave additional duties to the Centre for Disarmament. It was recalled that by resolution 31/90, the General Assembly recommended that the United Nations provide assistance, on request, to States parties to multilateral disarmament agreements to enable them to meet their obligations. The same resolution also recommended that, in view of the existing and anticipated provisions for review conferences in

multilateral disarmament agreements, States parties should continue to request the United Nations to provide facilities, conference services and other assistance in connexion with the holding of such conferences and that the United Nations should have the capacity to perform such tasks.

28. Another view was expressed to the effect that the practice of holding review conferences may not be a sufficient measure of following up developments relating to disarmament agreements already reached and thus a proposal was made that consideration be given to the question whether the machinery for review conferences was an effective measure or if it should not be replaced or reinforced by a continuing review process performed by or at least based on a treaty secretariat. It was thought that this question could be discussed further at the General Assembly's second special session on disarmament.

29. Regarding the question of an institutional link between disarmament and development and, whenever possible, translating them into development progress, various views were expressed which are described below.

30. A view was stated pointing out that at its first special session on disarmament, the General Assembly had, among other things, emphasized the relationship between disarmament and development as an area which had institutional implications, i.e. the possibility of establishing machinery to supervise the transfer of resources that might be released to development uses as a result of disarmament. An opinion was expressed to the effect that this was an area where, under existing arrangements, the duties of the Assistant Secretary-General of the Centre for Disarmament overlapped with those of others. Thus, the proposal was advanced that the head of the Centre be given such discretionary powers and independence as to enable him to take action and/or otherwise deal directly with the Secretary-General on the development aspects of disarmament. It was considered that independence for the Centre in this field would constitute a first step towards the Centre's evolution as an independent body within the United Nations system.

31. A suggestion was made that on the basis of the recommendations of the Group of Experts on the relationship between disarmament and development, consideration should be given to the need for an expanded institutional framework for dealing with the issue of the link between disarmament and development and, furthermore, that the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should be prepared to undertake new activities in this field.

32. According to a related view, that study could lead to an increased United Nations involvement in this question in several ways, including continuing study, more deliberations and negotiations, co-ordination or supervision and, in the event of a release of resources from military to development assistance purposes, the use of special methods of transferring and utilizing such resources.

33. The opinion was also advanced that if there were agreements which could achieve savings by curbing the arms race, the savings could successfully be allocated for the purposes of development without the need for the creation of additional organs.

34. According to a different position, the subject of the relationship between disarmament and development was outside the scope of the discussion on institutional arrangements in the field of disarmament and in addition, the relationship as a whole was questionable. In this connexion, the view was expressed that even if there were a link between disarmament and other fields including development, this would not necessarily require a restructuring of existing disarmament institutions.

35. A view was expressed that, given the fact that its activities should embrace all questions relating to the process of disarmament, the Centre should deal with one of the measures set forth in the Final Document and in the elements of a comprehensive programme for disarmament, namely, the link between disarmament and development.

36. According to another view, the Secretariat and other bodies within the United Nations system were well aware of that relationship and took it into account through co-ordination among themselves.

37. Reference was made to the fact that under its terms of reference the group of experts studying the relationship between disarmament and development would pay particular attention to the question of transferring resources which might be released by disarmament measures. According to that position, the study on institutional arrangements should therefore not attempt to anticipate the conclusions of the ongoing disarmament and development study or assume that the Centre for Disarmament was the appropriate organ to deal with matters of economic and social development.

38. It was considered that the whole question of the link between disarmament and development merited further discussion, specifically at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

39. From a more general standpoint, the observation was made that there appeared to be a trend towards greater United Nations involvement in the field of implementation. If such a trend progressed this might warrant a reconsideration of the nature of the resources available for the carrying out of that function.

#### D. Verification

40. In the course of the discussion on this subject both the importance and sensitivity as well as the complexity of the related issues were recognized. Reference was made to several suggestions relating to the possible role of the United Nations in the field of verification, as envisioned in paragraph 31 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and mentioned in paragraph 125 of that Document. It was noted that at present the United Nations has limited functions in this field. In this connexion, a view was expressed that the only example of these activities is the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification

Techniques which provides for the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as the depositary for the Convention, to convene and serve as Chairman of a Consultative Committee of Experts for fact-finding purposes.

41. According to one view, verification - whether in the case of a comprehensive test ban or a chemical weapons ban - could not be improvised since, pending the conclusion of agreements, the parties concerned needed to know how a verification system would work and what its financial and legal implications would be. Therefore, it was not necessary to await the conclusion of agreements in order to identify future verification requirements. A differing position was advanced cautioning against making verification a priority concern within the context of considering future institutional requirements for the United Nations management of disarmament affairs. According to that position, consideration of future requirements would depend on actual rather than anticipated provisions of future disarmament agreements.

42. A related viewpoint was put forward emphasizing that it would be inappropriate for any individual Secretariat unit to be made responsible for monitoring disarmament agreements inasmuch as monitoring arrangements are determined by specific terms of each individual agreement; since such monitoring required various types of expert knowledge and such agreements differed in terms of goals and States parties to them.

43. While acknowledging that it was difficult to predict the outcome of negotiations, a different viewpoint was expressed to the effect that it would be too pessimistic to assume that no verification requirements would evolve from ongoing negotiations. Although such requirements could not be concretely forecast, it could be assumed, however, that when significant disarmament agreements were concluded in the future the need for verification machinery accessible to all States would grow. The details of such machinery would be decided and worked out by the negotiating parties, and those negotiations could be facilitated if there was already a nucleus to fulfil verification functions. Such machinery, in that view, appeared to be the prerequisite for the creation of a climate of confidence and trust without which a continuing fruitful disarmament process would be unthinkable.

44. Still another view was expressed to the effect that it was difficult at the present stage to envisage a body enjoying the confidence of all parties in the area of verification. According to this view, however, once the Centre for Disarmament had attained institutional independence in such fields as that dealing with the link between disarmament and development, in a continuing process of widening its areas of competence the inclusion of verification could be envisaged especially when a comprehensive test ban and chemical weapons convention had been concluded.

45. It was also held that the issue was not one of anticipating verification provisions of future agreements but rather a more fundamental question aimed at ensuring that the Secretariat was prepared to play a role in verification, as appropriate. In this view, substantive disarmament matters could not be approached unless the verification question had received serious study.

46. On a related point a suggestion was made that, if future agreements were made giving wider powers to the United Nations in this field, there might be a case for reconsidering the nature of the resources available to carry out this role. In this connexion, the hope was expressed that close attention might be given to such matters as costs, the training of personnel and in general the political feasibility of verification arrangements controlled by the United Nations.

47. Proposals were put forward to establish a separate organization within the United Nations system, for example, an international satellite monitoring agency, to carry out specific verification functions. In this connexion, a view was advanced that the question of a possible link between the Centre for Disarmament and the proposed agency should be examined.

48. The opinion was expressed that only in the course of the negotiations and in the framework of their concrete results could it be seen whether it would be necessary to create new institutional arrangements to verify compliance with the results of such agreements. In addition, the view was advanced that serious obstacles would be encountered with regard to the establishment of comprehensive agencies within the United Nations system for verification purposes, if as was the case with existing agreements, not all Member States became parties to future disarmament agreements.

49. Views were also expressed to the effect that in the light of envisaged demands for future United Nations involvement in the verification field the Centre for Disarmament, by accumulating information and knowledge on the question, could be in a better position to assist review conferences and facilitate negotiations by offering necessary information as appropriate.

50. The view was also advanced that the subject of the relationship between verification and institutional arrangements merited further study.

#### E. Information

##### Dissemination of information

51. It was generally recognized that there was increasing need for promoting wider understanding of disarmament issues and for creating broad public support for disarmament. Views were expressed on the possibilities for greater efficiency and effectiveness in the dissemination of information. According to some suggestions, in view of the critical importance of progress in disarmament and of growing public interest in the subject, increases in Secretariat resources devoted to promotional activities could be considered, but it must also be ensured that existing resources were efficiently used. An observation was made to the effect that influencing public opinion need not always involve additional costs or elaborate structure, and that ingenuity would be important, e.g., in harnessing resources, such as the talent and appeal of influential figures in the world of entertainment.

52. Many of the views expressed emphasized the usefulness of the Centre's publications, in particular The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook and the

periodical Disarmament. At the same time, suggestions for improving the contents of those publications and expanding their potential audience were offered. In this connexion, a desire was expressed for the Centre's documents to be translated into all the official languages without too much delay.

53. One opinion held that if all the functions concerned with the questions of disarmament information were assigned to the Centre for Disarmament, it might divert its attention from its main task of promoting the consideration of disarmament questions and negotiations on disarmament. In this regard, co-operation with the Department of Public Information, which already distributes publications and reports on various political questions, including disarmament, should be further strengthened. According to another suggestion, the United Nations Information Centres could improve their contacts with the news media and non-governmental organizations in order to ensure a wider flow of disarmament information. According to yet another suggestion, some distinction could be made to determine which activities should be carried out by the Centre and which could be carried out more effectively by the Department of Public Information, since it was well equipped for certain information activities.

54. Regarding the disarmament reference service of the Secretariat, the suggestion was made to create a disarmament information bank to collect, classify and index relevant documents and data of the United Nations system and of other sources.

55. A suggestion was made that the Centre should provide information outside the established pattern of official information aimed at the experts and negotiators - information that was understandable to the general public and was capable of stimulating the involvement of interested non-governmental organizations and individuals.

56. The problem of accreditation of non-governmental organizations in the field of disarmament could be solved with the establishment of a roster of international, regional, national and local organizations. According to this view, there should be a uniform rule for disarmament organs providing more access to non-governmental organizations, in order to keep them more closely informed, so that they could help strengthen public opinion for disarmament. It was suggested in this connexion that the non-governmental organizations liaison office of the Centre should intensify its distribution of information material to its organizations.

#### Studies

57. Various aspects of study activities were discussed in great detail, including the functions of the Centre for Disarmament, the planning and co-ordinating activities of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies and the financial implications of the present method of carrying out studies within the United Nations. In this respect, the role of the recently established United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research was also considered.

58. Views were expressed to the effect that the present method of carrying out studies by convening groups of governmental experts had led to very high costs. Various possible alternatives were discussed. According to one suggestion, a first

draft could be prepared by the Secretariat or by consultants hired for a limited time, then sent to Member States for comments and review, and a final report prepared on the basis of the comments received. Another alternative was advanced to the effect that consultants be used, possibly in conjunction with relatively brief sessions of expert groups to evaluate and adjust the consultants' report. In connexion with the selection of consultants, some views were expressed that account should be taken of the criteria of geographical distribution and of the schools of thought to which the consultants belonged, including that of the third world. A suggestion was also made that the Centre for Disarmament could prepare factual background studies, or those which would involve views of Governments, while the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research could be responsible for policy studies when suitably qualified academic staff had been recruited and consultants could be engaged to help with complex subjects.

59. Other views were expressed to the effect that it was both practical and politically expedient to entrust studies to groups of governmental experts because geographical and political balance was needed to carry out disarmament studies.

60. A similar view was expressed that for the elaboration of studies on specific matters, it would, to a certain extent, always be necessary to rely on groups of experts to provide geographical and political balance. Nevertheless, according to the same view, in order to reduce the number and cost of studies, Governments, before deciding to have the United Nations carry out such studies should ensure that they would actually help bring about progress in disarmament negotiations and Governments should also thoroughly examine the financial implications of the proposed studies. Views were expressed to the effect that the Centre for Disarmament could not independently conduct scientific research in the field of disarmament. Such research could be carried out competently only by experts appointed to conduct concrete research of this kind, i.e., people who deal with such research on a daily basis.

61. While emphasizing its advisory character, several views were expressed to the effect that the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies should have a primary role in co-ordination not only to help prevent duplication, but also to determine priorities among studies; it should consider how different types of studies should be carried out; it should continue to discuss studies and make recommendations on priorities in direct contact with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, but it should not assume executive functions. It was also pointed out that because of the experience and qualifications of its members, the Board could not only determine priorities, but could also recommend which of the proposed studies should be prepared and what approach could be taken to provide greater efficiency and cost savings.

62. According to one suggestion, the Board, in considering the programme of studies, should concentrate on research with practical relevance to disarmament negotiations.

63. A view was advanced that, as the subject matter of studies proposed by the General Assembly sometimes required further elaboration, the Board could be asked to meet during the meetings of the General Assembly in order to advise the First

Committee on the formulation of the subject matters of studies and on their feasibility. The Board could also become the co-ordinating body on disarmament studies carried out by international bodies within the United Nations system.

64. A number of comments were made on the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, welcoming its establishment. Regarding the nature of its envisaged activities, different views were expressed. While the original proposal for the Institute's establishment emphasized that it should concentrate on technical and future-oriented research, other views held that the Institute's activities should be action-oriented rather than theoretical. The need was stressed for academic and scientific independence and objectivity in the Institute's work.

65. A suggestion was made that the Institute could provide a less expensive and more effective way of carrying out studies, although a political forum, such as the Disarmament Commission, might be required for a discussion of more sensitive projects. In this case, the Institute would co-ordinate the involvement of the international academic community in United Nations disarmament studies, possibly with the assistance of a reconstituted Advisory Board.

66. An observation was made that in future it should be possible to have a division of work between the Centre for Disarmament and the Institute. The Centre could be responsible for studies where views of Governments were important or indispensable, while the Institute would carry out studies which would be less immediately policy-oriented or have more of a long-term character. In future more use could also be made of the Institute to give factual information and to draw up policy-oriented studies, if necessary with the help of consultants. According to the same view, the Institute should also have a liaison function with the scientific world. The Centre, it was felt, could reduce costs of studies by using work done by the Institute, and a certain coalescence of studies and research should be possible. Views were also expressed on the need to streamline the present Secretariat organization in the field of disarmament study if unnecessary duplication and excessive costs were to be avoided. The functions of the Board, the Institute and the Centre for Disarmament in the area of studies should be unified within the Secretariat.

67. According to another view, co-ordination efforts by the Centre with specialized agencies and other bodies of the United Nations system with respect to research and information on disarmament should continue.

68. Yet another view was advanced to the effect that the possibility of establishing an institutional framework of existing organizations, with the Centre for Disarmament at its core, for the purpose of co-ordinating research projects and maintaining the capability to assist such projects, should be examined.

#### Training

69. Mention was made of the usefulness of training activities. While recognizing, in this context, the value of the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament, a suggestion was made to the effect that the guidelines of the programme should be reviewed at the second special session of the General Assembly



devoted to disarmament and consideration given as to whether the programme should be confined to Fellows from developing countries.

70. According to another view, the Centre should not be turned into a research or training institute for professionals. The value of the United Nations fellowship programme should perhaps be assessed to see how the funds could be used more rationally and whether the Fellows made use of their acquired training.

71. According to still another view, the fellowship programme was one of the best initiatives of the Centre and it would be difficult to oblige Governments to make the Fellows pursue definite careers in international fields after their courses of study. It should be left to Governments to decide how best to use the Fellows' acquired expertise.

72. A view was also expressed that further training programmes in the United Nations context are needed in order to enable more States to have adequate expertise to participate more effectively in disarmament deliberations and negotiations, as well as to activate world public opinion. In the same view, it was suggested that particular attention should be given to the possible involvement of UNESCO and to the need for co-ordination to avoid duplication of efforts.

#### F. Infrastructure

73. In the discussion of infrastructural requirements, positions varied from maintaining present arrangements with the necessary adjustments to enable the Centre to cope with its continuously increasing work-load; to proposals for the establishment of a separate department headed by an Under-Secretary-General; to the creation of a separate international organization.

74. It was recalled that the United Nations machinery on disarmament was recently revitalized and that the functions of the Centre for Disarmament were expanded as a result of the first special session in 1978. There was recognition that the Centre for Disarmament needed strengthening in view of the continuously growing activities in the field of disarmament.

75. Some opinions were expressed that the necessary strengthening could be achieved within the framework of the existing structure, taking into account the identifiable needs as they relate to specific functions. In this connexion, several views stressed the need for economy and of making the most use of existing resources.

76. Views were expressed to the effect that disarmament was primarily political in nature and was related to the question of ensuring both the security of individual States and international security as a whole. It was stated that there was a close interrelationship between disarmament and international security and that this had been stressed in the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament and in other resolutions of the General Assembly. Thus, from this viewpoint, it seemed quite proper to concentrate United Nations disarmament activities within the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs. This

structure ensured the concerted work on problems relating to disarmament and international security, as well as the necessary assistance to be rendered to organs and bodies dealing with these questions. Accordingly, it was suggested that it would also be advisable to indicate in an appropriate manner that functions relating to disarmament questions represent one of the most important aspects of the work of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs. Therefore, this view proposed that the official title of the Department should be brought into line with the real state of affairs since that Department was the main unit of the Secretariat concerned with organizational arrangements for United Nations disarmament activities. It was therefore suggested that the title "Department of Political, Disarmament and Security Council Affairs" would reflect the tasks with which the Department is entrusted at the present time.

77. Some opinions considered the strengthening of the Centre an adequate measure to meet both present and immediate future requirements until needs in the longer perspective were clearly identified; at the same time, a number of other views held that such a strengthening was only an initial step towards a more comprehensive arrangement.

78. In another approach suggestions were made to the effect that the Centre for Disarmament should become either an office or a department for disarmament affairs, and that its head should be directly responsible to the Secretary-General. It was thought that such an arrangement would allow for a more independent and effective action by the head of the office or department in the area of disarmament and development, as a starting point; and that later on, in order to centralize all disarmament functions, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and the international satellite monitoring agency (if established) could be brought within the proposed office or department. According to a suggestion, in view of the present situation, especially the growing trends, the present staff and organizational structure of the Centre were not commensurate with the heavy task it had to undertake. The same suggestion was in favour of upgrading the Centre to an agency or an independent department headed by an Under-Secretary-General who would be reporting directly to the Secretary-General, and argued that the reduction in the chain of command would expedite work and increase efficiency. While also favouring the provision of additional staff to the proposed department, the same suggestion stressed the necessity to practise economy and minimize increases in expenditures in view of the financial difficulties of the United Nations.

79. According to another suggestion, the United Nations Secretariat should continue to strengthen and expand the structure and functions of the section concerned with disarmament in a gradual manner, and that in this connexion, the next step would be to change the existing "United Nations Centre for Disarmament" into a "Department for Disarmament Affairs". This Department would be headed by an Under-Secretary-General reporting directly to the Secretary-General, and would be at the same level as the other departments. According to this view, after a few years, in the light of the results achieved and of future requirements in the sphere of disarmament, the United Nations could consider whether it would be justified to establish a specialized agency devoted to disarmament, in accordance with proposals already submitted to the General Assembly.

80. According to another view, there would be undesirable results in creating a separate department for disarmament, i.e., it would serve to divorce questions relating to the promotion of disarmament negotiations from the Secretariat activities relating to the strengthening of international security; it would encourage attempts to assign to it functions which would be irrelevant to its purpose; it could lead to unnecessary financial expenditures and set a precedent for unnecessary breaking up of other Secretariat units; and it would create an illusion that progress was being achieved in the field of disarmament when there was none.
81. Without stating any preference, pending at least the preliminary results of the present study, another view was expressed that consideration might be given to whether the disarmament activities of the Secretariat justify the appointment of a separate Under-Secretary-General to supervise such activities especially if they are to increase both in scope and intensity.
82. It was recalled that the Centre for Disarmament is a distinct and semi-autonomous unit within the United Nations Secretariat, but forms part of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, headed by an Under-Secretary-General. Apart from the Centre, this view noted, the Secretary-General has a personal representative at the Committee on Disarmament who serves as Secretary of the Committee. In addition, the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies submits its recommendations directly to the Secretary-General. According to this view, while there was thus some diffusion of authority for disarmament matters under the Secretary-General, that situation did not seem to have caused any serious difficulties to date.
83. A suggestion was made that the conversion of the Centre for Disarmament into a department could be another step towards an independent global disarmament agency, such as a world disarmament authority with the broadest possible mandate. Among its first tasks would be the collection and collation of existing information relating to armaments, their production, distribution, transfer and application. Its other major role would be the implementation and monitoring of existing disarmament measures as well as those to be negotiated in the future. It was apparent from the wide ranging aspects of the work involved in disarmament that the need for co-ordination was paramount and that this was a strong point in favour of recognizing the need for the final establishment of a global authority or agency.
84. A specific proposal was put forward for the establishment of a United Nations Disarmament Agency. According to the proposal it was generally agreed that the need for progress in disarmament and arms control in the 1980s was more urgent than ever and that the United Nations must set high goals in the field of disarmament in the coming decade. The agency would be an organization for an effective disarmament machinery to correspond to those more ambitious goals. The agency should have a sufficiently independent position within the United Nations system, established in a manner similar to IAEA, with a governing council, funded in the same manner as other agencies, and reporting directly to the General Assembly. This major organization was envisaged to facilitate co-ordination of disarmament activities within the framework of the United Nations at the level of the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination, as well as to assist in the setting of

priorities and achievement of common aims. Its functions should include services for deliberation, negotiation, implementation, verification, information, research and study, disarmament and development and training. It was felt that the practical thinking needed to develop the proper organizational framework of such an agency should be an important part of the preparations for the second special session devoted to disarmament, and of that session itself.

85. Another view was advanced that a disarmament organization could provide the operational framework for the implementation of disarmament agreements, with functions mainly in the field of verification. The organization could also be given responsibilities in connexion with the preparation and organization of review conferences and could serve as a clearing-house for information on all implementation efforts in the field of disarmament.

86. According to yet another view the establishment of an international disarmament organization could be considered in the context of the search for new ways and means to foster and facilitate a genuine process of disarmament. It could be established either through the concentration of existing institutions or the creation of a new specialized agency of the United Nations.

#### G. Co-ordination

87. The discussions on infrastructural requirements were closely linked to the question of co-ordination. It was recognized that there was need for strengthening co-ordination, particularly in the area of disarmament studies. It was pointed out that there was need for strengthening the co-ordinating role of the Centre for Disarmament, vis-à-vis the other bodies performing disarmament-related activities.

88. A suggestion was made that the Centre should provide the General Assembly with better information on the disarmament activities of the other bodies and specialized agencies of the United Nations system.

89. A view was also expressed that the specialized agencies should not become involved with the political aspects of disarmament.

90. According to one view, the Advisory Board could play a significant role in assisting the Secretary-General to avoid duplication of efforts in the field of disarmament studies and avoid any potential inclination of some institutions to depart from their primary fields because of a tendency to regard disarmament as an important topic.

91. It was considered that the ad hoc interagency group on disarmament could provide a general direction to disarmament activities and also help prevent duplication and in this connexion it was suggested that the group meet regularly.

### III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE GROUP OF EXPERTS

92. In considering the mandate entrusted to it by General Assembly resolution 34/87 E of 11 December 1979, the Group of Experts took into account the recommendations of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (1978), and in particular paragraph 27 of the Final Document, which stated that the United Nations had a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. The Group also took into account, inter alia, the following factors:

(a) The Group recognized that whatever the adequacy of the means provided by the United Nations in the service of the task of disarmament, it was ultimately the will of States to make the best use of them and their political readiness to negotiate which would determine how much progress was made in that regard. The Group also recognized that institutional aspects constituted one of the factors which promote the development of the role of the United Nations in that sphere.

(b) The Group of Experts noted that the important measures undertaken following the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament to revitalize and appropriately constitute machinery for disarmament deliberations and negotiations with a more representative character (Disarmament Commission, Committee on Disarmament) have offered the Members of the United Nations wider opportunities for deliberations and negotiations of disarmament matters within the framework of the Organization. The Group believed in the meantime that it would undoubtedly be premature at that stage to reach final conclusions in this respect.

(c) The Group did not wish to express an opinion on the deliberative and negotiating bodies in the light of the political nature of such an assessment, having in mind, inter alia, the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

(d) In estimating future needs, the Group considered as a time-frame, the 1980s, the Second Disarmament Decade.

93. The Group decided that it would be useful to consider the way in which several recommendations concerning the role and responsibility of the United Nations made by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament had been implemented and to what extent they had implications for the over-all effectiveness of the services rendered by the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament. In that spirit, the Group of Experts felt it necessary to stress particularly the following developments at the institutional level:

#### (a) Deliberation and negotiation

The increasing length of sessions of deliberative and negotiating organs dealing with disarmament both in New York and Geneva has placed a greater burden on the Centre for Disarmament as regards the servicing of meetings and assistance to delegations. It is to be expected that this trend may well continue in the 1980s. The Group recognized that, despite its limited resources, the Centre had made great efforts to cope with those additional responsibilities and had performed its

functions to complete satisfaction. Staff increases (doubling of Professional staff between 1976 and 1981) and the internal restructuring have enabled the Centre to meet the increased demands and to provide necessary services.

(b) Implementation and verification

The Group of Experts devoted considerable attention to the way in which the United Nations could make a greater contribution as regards the implementation of disarmament agreements. It was noted that the United Nations is already involved in the task of implementation of various disarmament agreements, and through IAEA, in verification procedures relating to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The aspects concerning the role as depositary of treaties and conventions and the assistance which the United Nations could provide at review conferences scheduled by depositaries of such treaties did not appear, at that stage, to require any particular innovations. There was no general agreement in the Group that the United Nations and/or related bodies could play a more important role as regards international verification of disarmament agreements. The Group noted that various proposals along those lines, on which there had been no agreement, had been submitted and that several of them appeared in paragraph 125 of the Final Document of the first session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It was recognized that if at some future time there were agreements according verification functions to the United Nations there would, in all likelihood, be substantial institutional implications for the United Nations system.

(c) Information

With regard to information on disarmament, the Group of Experts noted the efforts made by the Centre for Disarmament to make available both to experts and to the public detailed and up-to-date information, as well as the contribution which could be made in that regard by the use of data-processing techniques. It found, however, that a clearer co-ordination of functions between the Centre for Disarmament and the Department of Public Information was desirable.

(d) Studies

The Group of Experts observed that since 1978 there had been an increasing trend in the amount of studies and research concerning disarmament conducted by the United Nations and related bodies, or under their auspices. The Group noted the interest taken in those studies, but was at the same time aware that the costs of carrying them out have increased markedly. The Group noted with satisfaction the extent to which the Centre was taking advantage of the possibilities offered by the specialized agencies and other institutions and programmes within the United Nations system with regard to studies on disarmament. However, it also felt that improvements were possible: better interagency co-ordination in order to avoid duplication; more precise definition of the role of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies; decision on the future status of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research; arrangements for more complete utilization of studies made.

(e) Training

The Group considered that the programme of training and fellowships administered by the Centre for Disarmament was functioning satisfactorily.

Infrastructure

94. The Group recognized that at present the Centre for Disarmament was performing its functions in a highly satisfactory way. Some experts were of the opinion that, consequently, there was no need for structural changes, especially in the absence of actual disarmament measures or prospect for progress in that field. Other experts, however, felt that in view of the greater importance which presumably will be given to disarmament issues in the nineteen-eighties, the ensuing increased institutional needs should be met, either by changing the Centre into a department for disarmament affairs headed by an Under Secretary-General or by establishing a World Disarmament Agency within the United Nations system. These various viewpoints and proposals were discussed but the Group did not take a position of its own on them.

95. The Group submitted the following recommendations:

(a) Because of the Organization's "central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament", the Group of Experts considered it necessary that there should be a clear reaffirmation of the co-ordinating responsibility vested in the Secretary-General for the activities undertaken in that sphere by the various bodies in the United Nations system. In the opinion of the group, the Assistant Secretary-General in charge of the Centre for Disarmament is, in the present circumstances, the most appropriate person for implementing such a co-ordinating role. The aim would be not only to ensure that better use was made of necessarily limited human and material resources but also to avoid duplication and overlapping, thus improving the effectiveness of efforts made in a sphere which was multidisciplinary in nature.

(b) The Group considered it desirable that, in the same spirit, Member States should be kept informed of the progress made in the matter of co-ordination as well as of the difficulties encountered. In the opinion of the group, in his annual report to the General Assembly, the Secretary-General should bear this concern in mind.

(c) The Group of Experts recommended that the Secretary-General should consider possibilities to strengthen the Centre for Disarmament with an appropriate number of additional staff, within the existing over-all resources of the United Nations, to meet anticipated growing needs. In this connexion, the Group recalled the unique and crucial role of the Committee on Disarmament.

(d) The Group of Experts considered that the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies could be encouraged to develop a role in the co-ordination of studies produced by the United Nations and related bodies or at least to suggest ways of achieving such co-ordination.

(e) The Group of Experts considered it desirable, in the light of General Assembly resolution 35/152 H, of 12 December 1980, that the future status of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research should be discussed and decided at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

(f) The Group of Experts recommended that when any proposal for a particular United Nations disarmament study was being discussed, it would be desirable to bear the following factors in mind:

- the extent to which the proposed study would help the conclusion of disarmament agreements;
- the opinion of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies;
- the studies already available in that area;
- the assistance which might be given by the various competent organs and institutes existing within the United Nations family (in particular the Centre for Disarmament and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research);
- the estimated total cost of the study requested.

(g) The Group of Experts recommended that the role of the United Nations in the important area of implementation and verification of international disarmament agreements should be examined if at some future time there were agreements according verification functions to the United Nations.

(h) The Group recalled that the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament affirmed that a close relationship existed between disarmament and development. In this connexion, the Group recommended that the Secretary-General put forward at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament any proposals which may be appropriate on the possible institutional implications for the United Nations in this field, taking into account the study to be presented by the Group of Experts on Disarmament and Development.

(i) The Group recommended that training programmes and the United Nations Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament should continue to give preference to candidates from the developing countries.



APPENDIX I

Replies received from Member States

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AUSTRIA

(Original: English)

(8 April 1980)

1. Austria has followed with deep concern the disappointing results of genuine disarmament efforts carried out on different levels over the last years and has furthermore been forced to conclude from recent developments that even in cases where the negotiating process has led to concrete results, these results could not be finalized or that the assumption of negotiations has been refused altogether.
2. It is unfortunate that since the tenth special session of the General Assembly, whose important symbolic effect cannot be disputed, no perceivable progress of a practical nature in the field of disarmament could materialize and that States, in particular the most heavily armed ones, continue to proceed with an unabated arms race. In view of the enormous social and economic injustices in the world and in view of the numerous other problems with which mankind in its totality is faced, this situation is, in Austria's view, unbearable and cannot be analysed in terms of logical criteria.
3. Apart from these considerations the continuous arms race leads to a situation in which - paradoxically - not only the security of those countries that participate in the arms race decreases but in which also the defense potential of smaller states declines on a relative scale thereby creating the danger of a new, and this time military, process of colonization of small States by big Powers.
4. Austria has therefore again and again referred to the disastrous consequences of a continuation of such a world armament policy. These statements have, however, found only passing attention inasmuch as they were deemed to be useful for the political goals of one or the other side. It is for these reasons that Austria is greatly interested in the search for new ways and means to foster and facilitate a genuine process of disarmament.
5. The pre-condition for genuine disarmament, however, has to be seen in the political will to achieve concrete results. This political will must manifest itself in a conscious search for contacts and negotiations, in order to enhance the military transparency and overcome mutual distrust. Given the accumulated enormous mutual potential for annihilation, in particular in the nuclear field, there can be no doubt that the major nuclear weapon powers could undertake far more courageous disarmament steps without jeopardizing their security. Thus it could be proven in practice that meaningful disarmament measures are indeed feasible. Such a good example would furthermore demonstrate the existence of genuine interest in disarmament and would, hopefully, be emulated by others.
6. In searching for new ways and means to combat the arms race the idea of establishing an international disarmament organization can assume major importance. Austria therefore supports in principle considerations of that kind.

7. In this connexion, however, the existence of a number of already established international institutions and organizations - especially within the framework of the United Nations system or in relationship with the United Nations - dealing with disarmament questions will have to be taken into consideration. Therefore the primary task of the Group of Government Experts which will be convened in accordance with General Assembly resolution 38/87 E will be to proceed with a thorough stocktaking of the already existing institutions and organizations.

8. On this basis proposals for an efficient concentration or co-ordination of these institutions within the framework of a single disarmament organization should be elaborated. The establishment of an additional organization without co-ordination with existing institutions would be in contradiction to principles of economy and efficiency of work and would not contribute to progress in the disarmament process.

9. On a general level the question of institutional and organizational aspects in relation to the arms control and disarmament process has in the course of past years evoked a considerable amount of interest on the part of a growing number of United Nations Member States. Recent developments, such as a growing disarmament agenda, the increase in the complexity of the issues involved and a more active involvement by a larger number of States have accentuated the need for an assessment of present and future institutional and organizational requirements in the multilateral disarmament field, apart from aspects relating to the deliberative and negotiating machinery, which has been already reformed by the tenth special session of the General Assembly. Various ideas and proposals that have been advanced in the past on this subject have helped to identify the following functions which should be carried out within an appropriate multilateral framework:

Promotion of the disarmament process (e.g., collection and dissemination of information on the arms race and disarmament);

Preparatory work for disarmament deliberations and negotiations (writing of background papers and preparation of factual studies);

Implementation of disarmament agreements (organization of review conferences, secretariat services in connexion with implementation procedures in disarmament agreements);

Verification of disarmament agreements (providing for the framework of international verification measures).

10. At the current stage of the international disarmament efforts the first three of the four above-mentioned categories of activities constitute by far the major components of the institutional requirements for the United Nations management of disarmament affairs. To a large extent these functions are being carried out in a generally satisfactory way by the United Nations Secretariat. However, already now it would appear that these functions in view of their increasing importance could best be entrusted to an autonomous international organization, constituted as a specialized agency of the United Nations. This applies for instance to secretariat services in connexion with the preparatory work for disarmament

deliberations and negotiations. In this field an international disarmament organization if established, could assume valuable functions in carrying out various disarmament studies either in response to a mandate emanating from the United Nations General Assembly or on its own initiative.

11. An international disarmament organization could also assume important responsibilities in the field of dissemination of information on the arms race and disarmament, going beyond the current activities of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament and the Department of Public Information. Thus a genuine fact-finding competence entrusted to an international disarmament organization could in Austria's view yield important and beneficial results. In pursuance of such a mandate, an international disarmament organization could collect material concerning the military potentials, the military budgets and military doctrines, etc., of States Members of the United Nations in an objective and impartial manner. For this purpose, Member States would have to assume the obligation to agree to the collection and investigation of relevant data or to provide the data themselves under adequate means of control on the part of the organization. As far as the collection and examination of economic data is concerned, the OECD framework and the periodic country reports elaborated by OECD could provide an appropriate structural example. Furthermore, the system of IAEA inspectors could offer relevant indications of existing possibilities in the field of control.

12. The collected material could then be published by the organization and be disseminated directly, that is without hindrance through national Governments, in all Member States, thus providing objective information for world public opinion on the magnitude of armament efforts and the volume of military potentials.

13. Such an independent information of world public opinion could have a positive influence on governmental positions with regard to the arms race and could contribute to a reduction in military secrecy and thus increase mutual confidence. A dissemination of the collected data solely to Governments would not meet this goal. Furthermore, this information material could constitute an additional basis for estimates concerning the military potential of possible adversaries and would make it possible for Governments to gain a more objective assessment in their subjective estimations on possible military threats directed against their respective countries.

14. Austria has always maintained the view that arms control and disarmament agreements can only have a positive and effective result if they are adequately verifiable and thus strengthen the confidence of all contracting parties in the mutual correct compliance with all contractual obligations. It would therefore appear both possible and desirable for an international disarmament organization to assume also responsibilities in the field of verification of existing or future disarmament agreements. This idea forms the basis of General Assembly resolution 33/71 concerning the establishment of an International Satellite Monitoring Agency. Verification by means of an international organization might facilitate agreement of States to open their territory for on-site control.

15. The United Nations General Assembly has in numerous resolutions expressed its conviction concerning the urgent need of a speedy conclusion of a comprehensive

test ban treaty as well as a chemical weapons treaty. Intensive negotiations on these issues have been carried out during the past years and it is to be hoped that these negotiations will be successfully concluded in the near future. In both cases measures of international verification will play an important role in ensuring compliance by all parties with the terms of the agreements. These measures of verification will have to be structured in such a way as to provide for participation in the verification process by all parties to the agreements as has been stipulated in paragraph 31 of the Final Document of the special session. Involvement of the United Nations system in the verification process seems to be the best method to provide for such participation. However, such responsibilities would clearly go beyond the current capacities of the Secretariat. Thus an international disarmament organization, in addition to the other responsibilities mentioned above, could in due time also assume important functions in the field of international verification in relation to the above-mentioned disagreements. In this connexion, the example of IAEA, which is carrying out important verification measures in relation to the relevant provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, shows that such an organization, in spite of the manifold political complexities involved in its work, can indeed function in an efficient and effective manner.

16. For the purpose of utmost reliability and impartiality in the work of an international disarmament organization, either as a new body or established through concentration of existing institutions, its staff should be recruited on the basis of personal competence and enjoy a completely independent status. This would also guarantee the necessary continuity in the activities of the organization. Furthermore, other meaningful possibilities to assure an objective method of work for the organization will have to be considered.

17. It is obvious that these and other similar ideas will have to be analysed closely before any concrete proposals can be put forward. Austria therefore welcomed the conclusion of a section entitled "Review and verification of agreed measure" in the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, prepared by the Disarmament Commission. It may be recalled that this section calls for an "examination of the requirements of an institutional and procedural nature to facilitate the disarmament process and to ensure implementation of disarmament agreements". Austria furthermore welcomed the adoption of General Assembly resolution 34/87 E which requested the Secretary-General to carry out a comprehensive study of this subject.

18. Austria is aware of the fact that in the course of an examination of the proposal for the establishment of an international disarmament organization numerous technical, political and other difficulties will have to be overcome. At the same time Austria is confident that the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts will be in a position to put forward realistic proposals in this regard.

BAHAMAS

[Original: English]

[5 June 1980]

The Bahamas Government does not have any comments to make regarding paragraph 2 of resolution 34/87 E.

BANGLADESH

[Original: English]

[3 July 1980]

1. As enjoined by the Constitutions, Bangladesh is wedded to general and complete disarmament. It is this dedication to the cause of disarmament that undergirds not only the principles we espouse in this field but the concrete and tangible action we are prepared to take in this context. As but one example of such a motivation Bangladesh has acceded to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. Under the present circumstances, in our view, this is the main international instrument available for the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons. Bangladesh has always been pursuing the goal of improving the organizational structure of the negotiating instrument in the field of disarmament. In this respect, the tenth special session on disarmament held in 1978 has again reaffirmed the central role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and laid special emphasis on the establishment of a mechanism which will be more democratic for arriving at negotiated arrangement on disarmament.

2. Bangladesh believes that the role of the United Nations should be central in the field of disarmament negotiations. The mechanism of the negotiations may be oriented on the following lines:

(a) A study on armament and its effects on the economic, political and social fields;

(b) Mobilization of the political will of all the States-Members of the United Nations for the effective measures to be undertaken for the achievement of disarmament;

(c) Verification of the disarmament accords by the countries and the improvement of the methods of verification. The Disarmament Commission which has been revitalized after the tenth special session on disarmament should play a pivotal role in co-ordinating the negotiating efforts in the field of disarmament leading to the realization of the programme of universal disarmament. In this regard Bangladesh believes that the Disarmament Commission should concentrate on the following specific items:

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- (i) A thorough analysis of the elements of CPD which have been identified in the last session of the Disarmament Commission;
- (ii) Starting from this, the negotiations should be launched in order to achieve universal and global disarmament;
- (iii) The expert group should analyse all the reports and information received directly or through the General Assembly, before making recommendations;
- (iv) The expert group may also initiate the study and research with the specific objectives of reaching a universal disarmament;
- (v) The Disarmament Committee in Geneva and other negotiating forums, regional and bilateral, should define their specific characters in the negotiating process on disarmament in conformity with the recommendations of the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission;
- (vi) The Advisory Board on disarmament studies should become an active instrument of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for studying problems of armament and the actions and initiatives in the field of disarmament. To be more effective this Advisory Board should be, above all, oriented towards action programme and the identification of the practical modalities for achieving universal disarmament;
- (vii) The United Nations Centre for Disarmament should be re-organized and revamped. This Centre should become more autonomous in order to be able to help the process of negotiations and at the same time transmitting the necessary information to the Member States of the United Nations for their information in the process of their efforts of achieving disarmament.
- (viii) The new institute of the United Nations for research in the field of disarmament should occupy itself in elaborating effectively the studies which have already been undertaken by the United Nations. It should also identify the effects and implications of armament and disarmament in other fields of human activities, including those of the economic and social fields, of the Member States.
- (ix) The United Nations, in the view of the Government of Bangladesh, should have a central role in the verification of the accords of disarmament. In this regard, Bangladesh has supported the creation, under the aegis of the United Nations, of an International Satellite Agency for controlling disarmament accords.

BELGIUM

[Original: French]

[13 June 1980]

On instructions from the national authorities concerned, the Permanent Representative of Belgium presents below a number of points for the consideration of the Group of Governmental Experts established pursuant to resolution 34/87.

1. The number and level of the staff members making up the United Nations services responsible for disarmament questions appear adequate for the tasks currently entrusted to them.
2. The position of these services in the structure of the Secretariat must, however, evolve according to the increasing importance and specificity of disarmament issues and the efforts by Member States to find solutions to them. For the same reasons, the tasks can be expected to expand and become more varied.
3. In the longer term, the proliferation and the increasing specificity of the tasks which the United Nations is required to perform in the field of disarmament - such as handling arrangements for reciprocal information, mutual observation or international verification - can be expected to engender a need to set up some independent bodies at the world level, and possibly at the regional level as well.

BRAZIL

[Original: English]

[16 June 1980]

1. In the 12 paragraphs numbered 113 to 124, the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly established what Member States consider to be adequate machinery for negotiating and taking decisions on questions relating to disarmament. To support these processes and assist in the implementation of the decisions arrived at, the Final Document called for the strengthening of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament.
2. There were other proposals made by several countries, but none of these met with consensus by the Member States.
3. The new mechanism clearly represents progress in relation to the previous channels for the discussion of disarmament matters. Nevertheless, as only a little over a year has elapsed since the new set-up was put into operation, it is not yet possible to evaluate what else is needed to improve the system. The establishment by the Committee on Disarmament of working groups to negotiate specific texts should yield results during the course of this year and next. Under the circumstances, once the preparations for the second special session on disarmament, scheduled for 1982, are under way, States will perforce undertake an evaluation of the effectiveness of the existing institutional framework.



4. Up to the present time, the obstacles impeding negotiating attempts on priority disarmament issues do not seem to have stemmed from deficiencies in the machinery adopted. To the contrary, what has been observed is a continuation of the lack of political will, mainly on the part of the nuclear military powers, to agree on measures leading to the end of the arms race.

5. It still seems premature, therefore, to formulate new proposals concerning the future needs of the United Nations for dealing with disarmament issues.

#### BULGARIA

[Original: Russian]

[8 May 1980]

1. In recent years, taking into account the growing significance of the problem of disarmament in the work of the United Nations, the General Assembly has adopted a number of decisions on the further improvement of the existing institutional arrangements in this field. The machinery for conducting disarmament negotiations has been enlarged and expanded. Certain organizational changes have been made in the United Nations Secretariat. The Disarmament Affairs Division has been changed to the Centre for Disarmament within the framework of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs. The functions of the Secretariat have also been appropriately expanded. All these steps are aimed at ensuring the successful conduct of the work of the United Nations in the field of disarmament over the long term.

2. The People's Republic of Bulgaria believes that at the present time the work of the United Nations in the field of disarmament is developing on the basis of a stable institutional structure which comprises both effective machinery for deliberations and negotiations and appropriate apparatus for the technical servicing of that machinery. This assessment fully applies to the United Nations Centre for Disarmament, which, with its present composition and organization, is fully able and qualified to perform its functions of servicing the disarmament bodies and also of collecting and disseminating necessary information. Moreover, the fact that the Centre operates within the framework of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, thus ensuring direct co-ordination of the work of the Secretariat on the inseparably linked questions of international security and disarmament, unquestionably contributes in a significant manner to the success of its work.

3. In the light of the foregoing, the People's Republic of Bulgaria feels that the existing apparatus for the technical servicing of United Nations activities on disarmament questions meets the requirements at the present stage and that there is no need for any reorganization. It would be unjustified to make new structural changes in this apparatus without allowing sufficient time for it to reveal its full potential. At the present time, it is not institutional changes in the apparatus for the technical servicing of disarmament work which are needed, but rather the concentration of the efforts of all States on accelerating ongoing

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negotiations and resuming suspended negotiations in order to ensure the early adoption of specific practical measures to halt the arms race and move forward to genuine disarmament.

4. Quite apart from these considerations and taking into account the interest shown at the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly in the institutional arrangements of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, the People's Republic of Bulgaria feels that the expert group on this question could carry out useful work if it directed its efforts towards the identification, rational utilization and practical realization of the considerable potential of the existing apparatus.

**BYELORUSSIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC**

[Original: Russia]

[23 May 1980]

1. The Byelorussian SSR, together with the other States of the socialist community, has consistently called for a speedy solution to the problems involved in halting the growing arms race, with its attendant threat to peace, and proceeding to the reduction of weapons stockpiles and to genuine disarmament on the basis of the principle of equal security.
2. The Byelorussian SSR feels that the United Nations and the existing structure and functions of the Secretariat as regards disarmament matters have great potential for servicing, from an organizational and other stand points, the efforts made in this connexion by Member States in multilateral and bilateral negotiations.
3. The principal task under the present circumstances is to make full use of the available possibilities for continuing or renewing earlier negotiations aimed at curbing the arms race, bringing about disarmament and achieving concrete, tangible results in this field.
4. The main obstacle to practical action to give effect to the many important initiatives on various aspects of disarmament which are now on the agenda of negotiations at various levels is, of course, the absence of political will and of willingness on the part of some States to move forward not merely in words but decisively and consistently in deeds, to halt the arms race instead of stepping it up further.
5. Various kinds of initiatives calling for all sorts of reorganization schemes, functional and procedural changes and abstract theoretical studies have also, despite the stated intentions of their sponsors, had the objective effect of complicating the conduct of disarmament negotiations.
6. The introduction and discussion of such matters, without regard to realities and needs, diverts the attention of Member States from the substance of disarmament problems and serves as a pretext for the opponents of disarmament to block

effective negotiations and measures to limit armaments, achieve disarmament and implement the relevant United Nations decisions. In addition, frequent reorganizations - not called for by any urgent need - of various units of the United Nations Secretariat have a negative impact on the effectiveness of their practical activities.

7. The Byelorussian SSR continues to believe that organizational improvements in the structure and functions of United Nations machinery, in particular the transformation of the Disarmament Affairs Division of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs into the United Nations Centre for Disarmament together with a corresponding expansion of its functions - a transformation which was carried out on the basis of recent well-known decisions of the General Assembly - fully meet for the present all possible needs of the United Nations with regard to conference servicing, the servicing of sessions of disarmament bodies, the preparation of the necessary studies and the gathering, processing and distribution of relevant information.

8. The work of the United Nations Centre, as one of the principal units of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, reflects to the fullest extent the organic link between the problems of disarmament and of international legal guarantees of the security of States - a link whose existence has been repeatedly affirmed in many decisions of the General Assembly and in the practice of the latter's main political organs.

9. As regards the expert group set up under a decision taken at the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly for the purpose of studying United Nations institutional arrangements relating to disarmament, the Byelorussian SSR feels that this group should focus its main efforts on studying ways and means of more effectively utilizing the possibilities and capacities of the existing, recently established organizational structure of the United Nations Secretariat for servicing disarmament negotiations. Only if that is done can the expenditure of time and resources be justified.

10. In view of the growing role of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs in the institutional arrangements for all United Nations disarmament activities, the Byelorussian SSR believes that the logical way to complete the reorganization of the work of this unit would be to change its name formally to "Department of Political, Disarmament and Security Council Affairs", which would more accurately reflect the tasks entrusted to the Department by numerous General Assembly decisions.

CANADA

[Original: English]

[2 May 1980]

#### 1. Introduction

1. In resolution 34/87 E, the General Assembly, inter alia, requested the Secretary-General to carry out a study which will assess present institutional

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requirements and future estimated needs in the United Nations management of disarmament affairs. It also recommended that views of Member States be sought on some key issues, such as desirable functions and structure, as well as the institutional framework of United Nations management of disarmament.

## 2. Functions

2. Four distinct functions for the management of United Nations Disarmament Affairs have been identified: promotion, preparation, implementation and control.

### Promotion and preparation

The United Nations Centre for Disarmament carries out these functions now in a generally satisfactory way, given the limits on its resources imposed by budgetary factors. Canada believes, however, that some increase in the resources devoted to promotion might become necessary, given the growing public interest in the subject. The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook in particular is an invaluable source of information for the interested public and could well be expanded to include additional material to that now provided on disarmament debates, negotiations and treaties. The Disarmament Quarterly, published by the Centre, could also be made more useful, for example by presenting accounts of the studies by expert groups now in the course of preparation. There is a danger that the impact of these studies will be lost if significant efforts are not made to distribute and popularize their main conclusions and recommendations.

In regard to preparation, Canada is satisfied that the Centre is able to do the necessary work, again possibly with some increase in resources if the number of meetings begins to increase from current levels.

### Implementation and control

These two functions are different in nature from the first two in the sense that the work of the United Nations Secretariat in these respects depends on the number and complexity of agreements negotiated on disarmament questions. The Secretary-General already participates, as the depository, in the implementation of at least one arms control/disarmament agreement (the EnMod Convention) in matters such as convening review conferences and ratification and accession. Previous disarmament agreements name governments as depositories which are responsible for the above measures. Although there does not appear to be any need at the present time to change the existing organization or structure to enable this function to be better performed, this situation might well change. For example, it is noted that the draft RW Convention gives the Secretary-General responsibilities similar to those of the EnMod Convention, and that the recent BW Convention Review Conference gave additional duties to the Centre for Disarmament.

The Secretary-General plays some role in the control function where the EnMod Convention's verification provisions call upon him, as depository, to convene a committee of experts for fact-finding. A similar role is envisaged in the draft RW Convention. Moreover, there appears to be a trend towards greater involvement by the United Nations in the control of agreements; if this trend gathers strength and if future agreements are made which give larger powers to the United Nations, there may be a case for reconsidering the nature of the resources available to carry out this role. Canada would hope that the study requested by Resolution 34/87 E might give close attention to possible future activities of this kind including such matters as costs, the training of personnel and in general the political feasibility of verification arrangements controlled by the United Nations.

3. Institutional framework of United Nations management of disarmament affairs

3. Given these preliminary conclusions, Canada does not believe that any basic changes in the current structure or institutional framework of the United Nations are required. While attention might be paid to incremental changes in the resources of the Centre in response to specific requirements, it might also be considered on the other hand whether the disarmament and arms control activities of the Secretariat justify the appointment of a separate Under-Secretary-General to supervise such activities, especially if these are to increase in both scope and intensity. The fact that new bodies, such as the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and the Advisory Board for Disarmament Studies have recently been created suggests that some supervisory or co-ordinating function at a senior level may be desirable. The Canadian Government does not wish to state any preference in this regard until at least the preliminary results of the United Nations study are available. Canada attaches importance to the effective and efficient management of the resources of the United Nations in this field as in others.

4. In the longer term, Canada would wish to see the United Nations gradually develop the capacities to implement and control the verification of disarmament agreements, much as the United Nations has gradually developed its peace-keeping capacities. However, the verification of disarmament agreements is a technically complex and increasingly costly function and there is little doubt that some time will have to pass before the principal States concerned are ready to give preference to international arrangements. In the shorter term, therefore, it would appear to be premature to consider establishing a new body or agency, separate from the United Nations proper, to carry out functions which are not yet ready to be organized in this way.

CUBA

[Original: Spanish]

[11 March 1980]

1. The Republic of Cuba fully endorses the view set forth in the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament that the role

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and responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament should be strengthened.

2. Similarly, the Republic of Cuba shares the view that the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should intensify its activities in this field in order to provide information on the arms race and disarmament at more frequent intervals.

3. In that connexion, the Government of the Republic of Cuba is of the view that the United Nations Centre for Disarmament, as presently constituted, is capable of performing these functions without having to establish additional machinery.

4. The recognition of the role and responsibility of the United Nations in the disarmament field is an incentive for the Centre for Disarmament to redouble its efforts with the resources at its disposal in performing the tasks set for it by the General Assembly.

5. Furthermore, the establishment of an advisory board to advise the Secretary-General on disarmament matters has strengthened the existing institutional arrangements in this area and is conducive to progress in disarmament research and negotiations.

6. The Republic of Cuba is of the view that the revitalization of the negotiating and deliberative forums which was undertaken as a result of the special session devoted to disarmament has made them representative, and this has already begun to yield its first fruits.

7. In the light of the foregoing, the Government of the Republic of Cuba believes that a second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1982, would be the most appropriate forum for appraising the performance of the existing disarmament bodies, since it would allow sufficient time for the adoption of the most realistic criteria.

#### CZECHOSLOVAKIA

[Original: English]

[7 August 1980]

1. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic regards the halting of the arms race and the achievement of real disarmament measures as a key issue of the current times. It takes therefore an active part in disarmament talks both within the United Nations and in other important multilateral fora such as the Geneva Disarmament Committee and the Vienna talks on the reductions of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. At the same time, it devotes considerable attention to the questions of disarmament also in bilateral negotiations with other States.

2. Together with other socialist countries, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic

has been submitting a number of new initiatives and proposals aimed, on the one hand, at bringing on-going talks to a successful conclusion and also at initiating new negotiations on questions which as yet have not been considered. The last practical example of this action-oriented approach is the Joint Declaration adopted at the Warsaw session of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty last May. Czechoslovakia's striving for the achievement of tangible progress in disarmament is also attested by the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament adopted on the initiative of Czechoslovak Socialist Republic by the thirty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1979.

3. The efforts by the socialist and other peace-loving States to resolve the problem of disarmament resulted in the establishment of an extensive machinery of disarmament talks both on bilateral and multilateral levels. In that respect due attention must be paid to the organizational requirements and technical services related to such talks. Czechoslovakia welcomed therefore the well-known decisions of the United Nations General Assembly aimed at improving the organizational structure and the operation of United Nations bodies in the field of disarmament. Of particular significance in that respect was the establishment of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament within the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs. In comparison with the original Disarmament Affairs Division, the Centre for Disarmament has broader powers. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is of the view that the Centre for Disarmament performs a fully satisfactory work both in organizing the sessions of committees and conferences, groups of experts preparing United Nations disarmament studies as well as in gathering and disseminating relevant information.

4. The fact that the United Nations Centre for Disarmament operates within the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs gives, at the same time, due emphasis to the close inter-relation between disarmament and international security. It also underlines the generally recognized fact that the question of disarmament is, above all, a political question.

5. On the basis of the above-said the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic believes that the structure of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament and its incorporation in the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs have fully proved themselves and do not require any changes. It is of the view that a certain stability in the composition of United Nations bodies benefits their activities. On the other hand, frequent and unfounded changes may have a negative impact on their work. In view of the growing importance of disarmament negotiations, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is ready to give its support also to possible proposals to the effect that the question of disarmament be duly reflected in the official name of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs.

6. In this context, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic wishes to point out that in its view the reason for the insufficient progress in disarmament is not the organizational activities of the relevant United Nations machinery but in the lack of political will and readiness on the part of some nuclear powers to assume specific commitments aimed at halting the arms race and achieving real

disarmament. The main potentialities in the work of the group of experts established on the basis of resolution 34/87 E are, in our view, in the continued rationalization of the activities of the existing United Nations machinery dealing with problems of disarmament.

DENMARK

[Original: English]

[24 July 1980]

1. In the opinion of the Government of Denmark the adoption of the Final Act at the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament constitutes an improvement as regards the institutional framework for disarmament questions.
2. Although the experience gained so far from the work of the reorganized negotiating and deliberative disarmament machinery is generally positive it is too early to make a thorough evaluation of the system.
3. However, when conclusions are to be drawn in respect of institutional changes in the disarmament machinery all earlier proposals put forward by several nations in the United Nations General Assembly, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and during the tenth special session should be analysed.
4. The United Nations management of disarmament affairs - notably the United Nations Centre for Disarmament - should be reviewed in the context of the considerable widening of the tasks and responsibilities attached to it as a result of the tenth special session of the General Assembly.
5. In order to secure the effective and impartial fulfilment of the Centre's duties, it should be emphasized that in connexion with future changes in the institutional structure an appropriate independence should be embodied in the United Nations Centre for Disarmament.
6. In this respect, it is essential that the director holds a position within the United Nations administration in accordance with the still increasing importance of the Centre for Disarmament.
7. It is furthermore of vital importance that any proposal concerning future institutional arrangements are accompanied by reasonable accurate estimates of the staff requirements and a clear definition of functions and responsibilities for new divisions or organs.
8. Finally it is the opinion of the Government of Denmark that the financial implications of institutional proposals should be adequately dealt with.



EGYPT

[Original: Arabic]

[14 July 1980]

1. The Group of Experts should study the possibility of dividing disarmament topics into major topics and subsidiary topics in order to avoid confusion and repetition among those topics. This would help to avoid confusion and vagueness among the items included in the agenda of the General Assembly. The following are examples of items where there is vagueness of content and which were included in the agenda of the thirty-fourth session:

(a) Strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapons States (item 44);

(b) Strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States (item 43);

and again:

(a) Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security (item 46);

(b) Settlement by peaceful means of disputes between States (item 122);

In addition these two items resemble two other items on the agenda of the Sixth Committee, namely:

(a) Report of the Special Committee on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Non-Use of Force in International Relations (item 116);

(b) Report of the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization (item 114).

2. The Group of Experts should consider ways of strengthening the specialized role of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament in the dissemination of awareness of and information about the hazards of the arms race and the benefits of disarmament both by the dissemination of publications or pamphlets and audio-visual materials and by co-operation with non-governmental organizations, the development of relations with information media and the organization of regional seminars in co-operation with the Department of Public Information (note by the Secretary-General, document A/CN.10/11, 29 April 1980). The role of the Centre should also be strengthened in co-ordinating the work of the negotiating body, the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva, and the negotiating body at New York, the United Nations Disarmament Commission. There should be an expansion of the training programme given to nationals of third-world States for the creation of a new generation acquainted with the goals and aims of general and complete disarmament.

3. There should be an effort to direct the efforts being made in the field of

disarmament studies both by United Nations bodies and specialized agencies and by non-governmental research institutions, in order to alleviate the increasing burden placed on the United Nations Centre for Disarmament and to make use of available capacities and potentials outside the range of United Nations bodies for the purpose of carrying out studies and providing desired information in the field of disarmament. It would be useful to establish a liaison desk, under the authority of the Secretary-General or within the Centre for Disarmament, with the task of conducting liaison with such institutes, for example, SIPRI, and finding out their capacity for studying or following-up one of the subjects on which a study is to be submitted to the United Nations General Assembly, and in order to encourage such institutions to co-ordinate their efforts with the Centre for Disarmament. The following are some examples of duplication of efforts. The Secretary-General prepared a report on incendiary weapons and the SIPRI Institute prepared a study on the same subject. The same thing happens with regard to the specialized agencies. The Secretary-General prepared a study on chemical weapons, and the World Health Organization prepared a study on the same subject. There should be concentration on the specific, in implementation of paragraph 123 of the provisions of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

FINLAND

[Original: English]

[11 June 1980]

1. Arms limitation and disarmament are prerequisites for, and an integral part of, the efforts of the international community to maintain international peace and security. The role of the United Nations in disarmament is therefore central and self-evident, as affirmed, i.e., by the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament held in 1978.
2. In the Final Document of the special session, the General Assembly underlined the role and responsibility of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament and called for the strengthening of this role.
3. In 1976 the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament was the subject of a review by the Ad Hoc Committee set for this purpose.
4. As the result of the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee and the decisions by the General Assembly concerning the organization and functions of the United Nations in matters related to disarmament, the preparedness of the organization to exercise its full role in multilateral disarmament efforts has been markedly enhanced. These improvements include structural changes in the international disarmament machinery, the strengthening of the United Nations Secretariat, in particular for the extension of its research and information functions, and the preparation of a programme of studies related to arms limitation and disarmament.
5. While the number of nations actively participating in international

deliberations and negotiations has increased, several proposals have been made concerning further organizational requirements of the international disarmament machinery and, in particular, the establishment of specific organs to deal with disarmament questions.

6. Finland was among the sponsors of General Assembly resolution 34/87 E, by which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to carry out a comprehensive study of the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament. In the resolution, the General Assembly recalled the proposals referred to in paragraph 125 of the Final Document of the special session, and those made elsewhere, relating to institutional and procedural requirements of the disarmament process.

7. In the following, the Government of Finland wishes to put forth some further considerations which it regards as pertinent to the mandate of the Secretary-General and the Group of Experts is carrying out the study:

(a) The lack of satisfactory progress in disarmament is, in the first place, not due to institutional inadequacies, but rather reflects the inherent political and technical intricacies of disarmament negotiations;

(b) It is important that the international disarmament machinery be adapted to changing needs. The present structure and procedures have, however, shown considerable flexibility. This machinery should continue to be geared to existing concrete needs for negotiations, and, to an extent, to foreshadowing future needs;

(c) While the study to be undertaken should be responsive to the substantive needs of the disarmament machinery its work should mainly be directed to structures, methods and procedures;

(d) In view of increasing needs for information collection and dissemination by the United Nations, its projected role in future arms limitation and disarmament agreements as well as in the process leading to them, the study should assess all aspects of the future resource requirements of the machinery.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

[Original: English]

[14 April 1980]

1. The German Democratic Republic reaffirms its position that the United Nations, in accordance with its Charter, is to play a very prominent role in bringing about steps leading to real disarmament. The measures ensuing from resolution 31/90, helped increase the effectiveness of the United Nations Secretariat's work in dealing with disarmament questions. Further decisions aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the work of the Centre for Disarmament were adopted at the tenth

special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Since then, a relatively short time has elapsed.

2. Judging by its over-all performance, the United Nations Centre for Disarmament proved that it is, indeed, capable of solving the tasks entrusted to it.
3. There is growing general awareness of the fact that the problems relating to the cessation of the arms race, to disarmament and the strengthening of international security have multiplied, and became more complex and intertwined to a greater extent.
4. Mindful of this realization, the United Nations General Assembly - both in the Final Document of the tenth special session and in resolution 34/83 A - emphasized the close interrelation between questions of international security and of disarmament.
5. The present structure of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs with its Centre for Disarmament reflects this close interrelation. This structure ensures the concerted work on problems relating to disarmament and international security, as well as the necessary assistance to be rendered to organs and bodies dealing with these questions. The recommendations, adopted at the tenth special session of the General Assembly, on the mechanism in deliberative and negotiating organs seized with disarmament questions, were also translated into practice.
6. Now, it is imperative that all participating States, strictly observing the principle of equal security, comprehensively and efficiently utilize these organs and bodies with a view to bringing about concrete and effective steps towards disarmament.
7. The German Democratic Republic re-emphasizes its view, which has been repeatedly outlined, that real results in the field of disarmament can only be achieved if all States, particularly all nuclear-weapon States and other States of major importance in the military field, display their political will to take steps leading to disarmament, and refrain from any action that may initiate a new round of the arms race.
8. The reasons for the unsatisfactory results achieved so far in implementing the Programme of Action adopted at the tenth special session of the General Assembly, cannot be sought in the deliberative or negotiating mechanisms, or in the work of the Secretariat. These results are rather to be ascribed to several States of major military importance showing insufficient readiness to take effective disarmament measures, and to their adhering to a course of intensified arms race.
9. The German Democratic Republic does, by no means, underestimate the significance of the required forms of organization and structures of the apparatus which has to support the deliberative and negotiating organs dealing with disarmament questions. However, deliberations on organizational matters should not divert attention from endeavours to conduct serious negotiations on substantial questions relating to disarmament.

10. In accordance with its principled position to support any action that could promote the successful holding of disarmament negotiations, the German Democratic Republic is ready to participate in the discussion of institutional arrangements concerning the process of disarmament.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

[Original: English]

[20 June 1980]

1. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany welcomed the adoption of the Final Document at the first special session on disarmament, particularly the decisions to strengthen the institutional framework for disarmament affairs. The reorganization of the international disarmament machinery decided upon by the Final Document is one of the outstanding achievements of the tenth special session of the General Assembly. In the view of the German Federal Government, the experiences made so far within the different forums of the reorganized disarmament machinery have been generally positive. The objectives of the General Assembly's decisions to revitalize, strengthen and improve the international machinery with a view to enable implementation of the programme of action have been largely realized.

2. Due to the short time of operation of the referred disarmament machinery it would, however, be premature to draw any final conclusions, instead, it will be advisable to keep the operations of the various bodies under constant review in order to gather further experience before decisions on any additional, more fundamental steps aiming at the further improvement of the present structure and mode of operation should be considered.

3. As to the United Nations management of disarmament affairs in a more narrow sense, it cannot be overlooked that - due to the comprehensive programme of action and the general activation and stimulation of the international disarmament debate resulting from the tenth special session - its tasks and responsibilities have widened considerably. Correspondingly, its political importance for facilitating, co-ordinating and fostering the efforts of States for arms control and disarmament has grown. In the opinion of the Federal German Government, the assessment of the functions, structure and institutional framework of the United Nations management of disarmament affairs ought to proceed from the role and importance accorded to the United Nations by the consensus of its Member States as embodied in the Final Document of the special session on disarmament. Documentations for new or modified structures have to take into consideration the present requirements and future needs of the United Nations. The question will have to be answered whether the institutional framework will be able to carry out the various tasks assigned to it under the Final Document, in particular under the programme of action. These tasks comprise the following:

- (a) Preparation, co-ordination and increased use of reports and expert

studies in accordance with the programme of action and further decisions of the General Assembly;

- (b) Assistance on request to multilateral and regional disarmament negotiations and deliberations, especially the provision of factual information and services necessary for their efficient conduct;
- (c) Collection, compilation and dissemination of information on disarmament issues, in order to keep Governments as well as world public opinion properly informed on progress achieved in the field of disarmament;
- (d) Increase of contacts with the member countries, specialized agencies, non-governmental organizations and research institutions;
- (e) Assistance, on request, to States parties to multilateral disarmament agreements in their duty to ensure the effective functioning of such agreements, including verification and appropriate reviews.

4. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany believes that the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should be given the amount of independence necessary for the effective and impartial fulfilment of its duties.

- (a) Its director should hold a position within the United Nations administration reflecting the increased and still increasing political importance of the role of the Centre for Disarmament;
- (b) The size of the staff should be in adequate relation to its enhanced responsibilities and the added tasks;
- (c) The staff should be recruited on an appropriately balanced basis;
- (d) The Centre's functions and responsibilities should be defined as clearly as possible in order to prevent an unnecessary increase of United Nations bodies and personnel.

5. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany continues to support the establishment of a United Nations institute for disarmament research. Such an institute should be able to work with a high degree of scientific independence in order to be able to stimulate initiatives and provide the member nations with insights into the problems of disarmament affairs based on impartial scientific research.

6. It is further suggested that the group of governmental experts consider carefully the legal and financial implications of their recommendations.

ITALY

[Original: French]

[19 June 1980]

1. The study which the General Assembly, in resolution 34/87 E, asked the Secretary-General of the United Nations to carry out provides a good opportunity to consider in depth the real status at present of the United Nations institutions associated with the disarmament process: in particular, to ascertain how the existing structures meet present needs; to evaluate whether they can cope with constantly increasing responsibilities; and to identify the sectors in which it would be desirable to step up the United Nations presence and level of activity.
2. The deliberative bodies - the First Committee of the General Assembly, and the Disarmament Commission - are, however, outside the scope of the study owing to the specific nature of their functions and the balance achieved in their composition and the division of their responsibilities.
3. The emphasis should rather be on the United Nations Secretariat proper, which in this context means the Centre for Disarmament. At present the Centre's principal job is to provide the deliberative bodies, the various ad hoc or special committees and, for specific needs only, the 11 study groups currently working on 11 aspects of disarmament problems, as well as the negotiating body in Geneva, the Committee on Disarmament, which is independent of the United Nations, with all possible assistance as regards information and research.
4. Taking into account certain new responsibilities that have been transmitted to the United Nations in recent years (for instance, the Secretary-General acts as depositary for disarmament agreements), the Organization should in future play a larger technical role in the area of the implementation of disarmament agreements. Italy has always maintained that, in the field of disarmament, the United Nations should be capable of performing all activities of common concern to the States Members of the Organization, as such activities cannot, except in a very few cases, be carried out on an individual basis. Amongst these, the verification of multilateral disarmament agreements is of special importance. In this connexion, it should be recalled that Italy has proposed the establishment of a specialized United Nations agency which could be asked to monitor the agreements on disarmament or arms limitation and reduction concluded within the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.
5. The idea of this agency, which could be set up by stages, fits in well with other proposals relating to the monitoring sector which have often been supported and encouraged by Italy, such as that relating to the establishment of a "satellite monitoring agency".
6. The multiplicity of proposals is evidence that a trend towards greater United Nations participation in activities of this type is starting to develop in the international community; in view of the degree of maturity they have attained, it is now necessary to subject them to a comprehensive examination.

7. Whilst no structure, however sophisticated, can by itself advance the disarmament negotiations, it is none the less true that the existence of machinery in which all can take part and which is capable of applying and monitoring future agreements could certainly facilitate progress in the negotiations.
8. On 5 February 1980, Italy submitted to the Committee on Disarmament a proposal for controlling and limiting international transfers of conventional arms (document CD/56). Paragraph 3 of the proposal calls for "the setting up, within the United Nations, of an ad hoc body for the purpose of monitoring, controlling and limiting, through agreed procedures, international arms trade". In this case, too, the United Nations would play a central co-ordinating and monitoring role in a disarmament sector of increasing importance, although so far largely unexplored.
9. Putting the above proposals into effect would require adapting the Organization's structures and modus operandi, particularly where the tasks of the Secretariat services are concerned. It would be advisable, incidentally, in an initial stage, to ensure that the new spheres of action are defined and developed separately, without the creation of direct links with the existing structures, since this would allow the structures and functions to develop optimally and would avert the possibility of conditioning by external factors.
10. An initial approach based on the establishment of decentralized institutions would make it possible to avoid radical changes in the structure of the Centre for Disarmament.
11. From the functional point of view, the Centre should, even so, be independent of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, so as to be able to carry out its ever-increasing responsibilities with the requisite efficiency. It might in future also be called upon to play a central role, at the Secretariat level, as the co-ordinator of all the activities carried out by the various bodies to be developed. In this case, a structural reform might be contemplated, in which the Centre would be divided into departments or sections responsible for specific functions in the different sectors of disarmament.
12. In such an organization, especially given the prospect of an appreciable expansion, the question of staff would obviously become important. If need be, the staff should be recruited on the basis of a genuine application of the criterion of equitable geographical distribution, bearing in mind particularly the technical abilities essential to the proper execution of the tasks to be performed.
13. The study being as yet only at a preliminary stage, Italy considers it appropriate to give no more than the broad outlines of a possible scheme for the balanced development of United Nations institutions in the field of disarmament. But, given the potential importance of the solutions proposed by the Group, Italy reserves the right to set out its point of view at a later stage.



JAPAN

[Original: English]

[31 March 1980]

The Government of Japan is of the view that it would be useful to adjust the functions and structure of the United Nations in order to facilitate the progress of disarmament deliberations and negotiations as well as to assure the effective implementation of various disarmament measures already adopted. In a study of this question, the following points should be considered:

1. First of all, the functions and problems of present institutions and organs related to disarmament should be thoroughly examined. The study should seek to strengthen and readjust existing organs so that they may be fully utilized and made more effective. It should not simply arrange for the expansion of those organs, and it should avoid placing additional burdens on the regular budget of the United Nations.

2. The reference service of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should be improved by creating a kind of disarmament information bank which would collect, classify and index according to various fields not only the publications and reports of the United Nations and its related organizations, but documents and data on disarmament from other sources as well.

3. In order to effectively and efficiently promote United Nations research on disarmament, an institutional framework, based on existing organizations and with the Centre for Disarmament as its core, should be examined for the following purposes:

(a) Regulating various research projects and consolidating them if necessary;

(b) Maintaining the capability to provide research projects with expert advice (e.g. by making lists of outside institutions and consultants).

4. In order to facilitate the settlement of questions regarding the non-observance of disarmament conventions, United Nations functions to investigate technical and specialized facts, as well as to use the good offices in arranging consultations among States concerned, should be examined.

MALAWI

[Original: English]

[5 September 1980]

The Government of Malawi has no comments at present.

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## MALTA

[Original: English]

[3 June 1980]

1. The basis of any study does not necessarily depend on the volume of information received. In fact, the lesser the volume - which in any case tends to be repetitious the better the chance for an objective appraisal of what is required.
2. The positions of delegations reflect the policies of their Governments. As such, the delegation of Malta has already stated its views, and sees no need to repeat them, since they are on record.

The emphasis of the Government of Malta, very briefly stated, is that proposals should be sincere, practical and should concentrate on the disease, not on its symptoms.

The Committee should be in a position to analyse objectively statements made, with the assistance of the Centre, and to make practical recommendations based on that appraisal.

The delegation of Malta expresses its willingness to co-operate to the fullest extent of its abilities. The Government's practical contribution to national non-armament, and to regional and universal co-operation, speaks for itself.

## MEXICO

[Original: Spanish]

[25 April 1980]

1. In recent years, United Nations activities in the disarmament field have been developing continuously.
2. At its tenth special session devoted to disarmament, the General Assembly reaffirmed with full justification that "the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament".
3. This situation, together with the numerous tasks envisaged in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and with the more active participation of a greater number of Member States, creates "increasing demands on United Nations management of disarmament affairs for purposes such as the promotion, substantive preparation, implementation and control of the process of disarmament", as was rightly noted in General Assembly resolution 34/87 E of 11 December 1979, the most recent General Assembly resolution on the subject.
4. Probably the main observation that can be put forward for the time being with regard to the best way of coping with these demands is a recommendation that the United Nations Secretariat should continue, as it has done up to now, to strengthen

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and expand the structure and functions of the section concerned with disarmament in a gradual manner; thus the next step would be to change the existing "United Nations Centre for Disarmament" into a "Department for Disarmament Affairs" which would be headed by an Under-Secretary-General, who would report directly to the Secretary-General and would be at the same level as the other departments, such as the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs and the Department of International Economic and Social Affairs. After a few years, in the light of the results achieved and of future requirements in the sphere of disarmament, the United Nations could consider whether it would be justified to establish a specialized agency devoted to disarmament, in accordance with proposals already submitted to the General Assembly.

NETHERLANDS

[Original: English]

[25 March 1980]

1. The Netherlands Government prefers to give its views on this subject at a later stage. It may be recalled that the Netherlands has made proposals for a study on the establishment of an international disarmament organization on several occasions, e.g. during the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament in 1978, to which reference is made in paragraph 125 (gg) of the final document of that session.
2. Furthermore, a Netherlands expert has been appointed as member of the group of experts which will be established under resolution 34/87 E. During the meetings of the group of experts the Netherlands expert will elaborate on the Netherlands proposals.

NORWAY

[Original: English]

[2 July 1980]

1. Norway welcomes the initiation of the United Nations study of the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament. The report stemming from this study could provide a useful and highly needed basis for deliberations on this question during the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.
2. Norway has the following comments in regard to the work on disarmament undertaken by the General Assembly, the Disarmament Commission, the Institute for Disarmament Research and the Centre for Disarmament.

### General Assembly

3. The decision taken by the first special session devoted to disarmament, that the First Committee in the future only shall deal with questions of disarmament and related international security questions, holds the promise of promoting the work of the General Assembly in the field of disarmament. However, ways and means should be looked into with a view to reducing the number of disarmament resolutions introduced at each session of the General Assembly, thus permitting more time and effort to be spent in deliberating on the substance of the most important aspects of arms control and disarmament.

### Disarmament Commission

4. The role of the Disarmament Commission, as a deliberative body and a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, should be reviewed at the second special session. The Commission may play a more useful role in carrying out preparatory work on disarmament questions to be brought up during the following session of the General Assembly.

### Institute for Disarmament Research

5. In view of the necessity to strengthen and broaden the research activities to be undertaken by the United Nations in the field of disarmament, Norway welcomed the decision to establish - as an interim arrangement and for the period until the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament - the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. The organization of this Institute and its relations with UNITAR should be reviewed at the second special session. The question of providing the Institute with sufficient resources to carry out relevant research on disarmament issues under negotiation, as well as on long-term disarmament policy issues, should be considered.

### Centre for Disarmament

6. Serious consideration should be given to the question of strengthening the Centre for Disarmament, i.e. by providing the Centre with more resources, thus enabling it to employ additional, highly qualified consultants. This applies in particular to areas where the United Nations is undertaking expert studies and where these studies require a follow-up by the Secretariat.

POLAND

[Original: English]

[10 April 1980]

Desiring to facilitate the work of the group of governmental experts who, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 34/87 E, are to assist the Secretary-General in carrying out a comprehensive study on present institutional requirements and future estimated needs in the United Nations management of

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disarmament affairs, the Government of the Polish People's Republic has the honour to offer the following observations in the hope that they will be found relevant to and useful in the preparation of the said study:

1. The Polish People's Republic, whose foreign policy has been traditionally committed to the cause of strengthening international security through effective curbs on the arms race as well as through tangible disarmament, has always sought to deploy its efforts at the United Nations and elsewhere in support of such realistic initiatives and measures as were deemed most likely to contribute to the early attainment of such a goal. In her active advocacy of constructive endeavours in the field of disarmament, Poland has always placed full confidence in and extended firm support to the Secretary-General in his management of disarmament affairs within the context of the United Nations. The effective and competent coverage of disarmament agenda by the appropriate organizational units of the Secretariat's department of Political and Security Council Affairs has given and continues to give complete satisfaction to the Polish Government. In its view, one of the reasons of the satisfactory performance of the United Nations Secretariat with regard to the management of disarmament affairs, both conceptual and organizational, has been the fact that the existing institutional framework at no time exceeded the actual requirements and needs dictated by the ongoing disarmament efforts, whether deliberative or negotiating. Indeed, Poland well understands the views of those Members of the United Nations, who think it advisable and wise to recommend avoiding situations in which the international community could be led inadvertently and unfairly to believe that, however desirable, institutional and formal arrangements pertaining to matters of disarmament are tantamount to real, not perceived, progress in substantive disarmament negotiations or, at least, objective possibilities existing in that regard.

2. The Government of the Polish People's Republic holds the view that the developments which led to the convocation of the special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament fully justified the adoption at that session of important and far-sighted decisions pertaining to disarmament machinery. These decisions, naturally enough, had major implications also for institutional arrangements in the United Nations Secretariat management of disarmament affairs.

3. The need to reassess and enhance the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament became particularly apparent against the backdrop of the sustained and unquestioned process of political detente and the pleas for its extension on to the military sphere both in Europe and in other geographical regions. For one thing, that process carried at the time an important promise of genuine determination of all States to seek early and effective measures of tangible disarmament, hence a justified anticipation of a weighty disarmament agenda for the United Nations Secretariat to handle.

4. At the same time, an ever greater number of Members of the United Nations grew increasingly concerned over the course of disarmament efforts and

aware of their vital stake in the positive outcome of negotiations in that respect. Understandably, they were becoming more vocal than ever in declaring not only their interest in but also desire to make their own contribution to the disarmament efforts. The specific views of the Members of the United Nations in that regard could not but lead to an in-depth re-examination of the United Nations role in disarmament with the strict delimitation of the desirable deliberative and negotiating machinery in the realm of disarmament. While the deliberative functions have been invested in the reactivated - on the basis of a specific mandate - United Nations Disarmament Commission, the negotiating machinery has been provided for in the reorganized Committee on Disarmament whose enlarged membership would, to a large degree, meet the legitimate demands for a more equitable geographical representation and create better possibilities for contributing to the progress of disarmament negotiations.

5. As a consequence, to provide for the expanded requirements in the field of management of disarmament affairs, important decisions have been incorporated in the Final Document of the special session with regard to the institutional framework, structure, functions and responsibilities of the United Nations Secretariat in matters related to disarmament affairs. Accordingly, the Disarmament Affairs Division of the Secretariat's Department of Political and Security Council Affairs has been transformed into a largely self-contained unit of that Department - the United Nations Centre for Disarmament. In a separate but supplementary decision, the Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to Disarmament resolved in its wisdom that apart from the Centre for Disarmament and independently of it, the Secretary-General should set up an Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies to advise him on various aspects of studies to be made under the auspices of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and arms limitation.

6. In the considered opinion of the Polish Government, the above-mentioned institutional framework which the Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to Disarmament has established, after careful analysis and considerations of the existing requirements, with a view to assuring effective management of disarmament affairs by the Secretariat of the United Nations, has proved entirely satisfactory. At the same time, its present total adequacy could be re-examined if and when increased requirements are identified in the light of realistic prospects for substantive progress in the field of disarmament negotiations. It has been Poland's consistent view however that the adoption of practical measures in the field of disarmament and arms limitation should at all times have the highest priority and that, consequently, unnecessary diversion of attention, efforts and resources from that goal should be avoided as far as possible.

ROMANIA

[Original: French]

[7 April 1980]

1. In its foreign policy, Romania attaches particular importance to the achievement of disarmament, first and foremost nuclear disarmament, as a prerequisite for the maintenance of international peace and security.
2. At the United Nations and in other international forums, the Romanian Government has strongly urged a radical change in disarmament negotiations so as to move on from general discussion on disarmament to the achievement of concrete progress towards stopping the arms race and reducing armaments.
3. In order to achieve this objective, Romania has consistently striven to improve the organizational structures for the consideration and negotiation of disarmament problems and to adapt them to the vast changes that have occurred in international life.
4. The decisions of the tenth special session of the General Assembly in 1978 were certainly an important step in that direction in that they reaffirmed the central role of the United Nations in disarmament problems and established more democratic machinery for disarmament deliberations and negotiations.
5. In the opinion of Romania, the results of the special session, in that respect, represent only a promising start, a stage in the broader process of improving the institutional structure in the field of disarmament, on the basis of a single concept, so as to make it an integral part of the United Nations effort for the maintenance of international peace and security.
6. It was for this very reason that Romania welcomed the Swedish proposal at the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly for a review of the practical modalities of adapting the machinery to the present requirements of the process of deliberation and negotiation on disarmament problems.
7. As is well known, Romania supported resolution 34/87 of the General Assembly on this question and is keen to participate actively in future debates on and the adoption of practical measures to improve the effectiveness of institutional structures in the field of disarmament.
8. To this end, the Romanian Government makes the following suggestions and comments in reply to the letter of 8 February 1980 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

I. Functions of disarmament machinery

9. Taking as a starting point the central role of the United Nations in disarmament, we consider that the functions of the deliberative and negotiation

machinery should embrace all stages of the disarmament process. The functions of this machinery should therefore be oriented towards:

(a) Study of the arms race and its economic, political, and social effects, and the generation of ideas and initiatives on topics which are the subject of disarmament negotiations;

(b) Mobilization of the political will of all States in favour of the institution of specific disarmament measures, and the establishment of priorities in the approach to disarmament problems;

(c) Effective negotiation of multilateral disarmament agreements and co-ordination of the efforts being made in various forums to this end;

(d) Monitoring the observance of disarmament agreements by effective means and methods acceptable to all parties.

## II. Institutional structure and framework

10. In the process of establishing the institutional framework for disarmament, the improvement of existing organizational structures will be imperative in the years to come. To this end, the following could be envisaged:

(a) The General Assembly of the United Nations and the First Committee should remain the deliberative forum for the purpose of mobilizing the political will of States and establishing negotiating priorities. Special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will make it possible to review, every four or five years, results achieved in the disarmament process and to discuss the general lines of action to implement the comprehensive programme for disarmament.

(b) The United Nations Disarmament Commission should have a more precise mandate enabling it, between the special sessions, to co-ordinate all negotiating efforts in the field of disarmament and to guide the implementation of the comprehensive programme for disarmament in the various forums. For this purpose, the specific functions of the Commission might be:

To consider in detail certain specific disarmament topics identified by the United Nations General Assembly as areas for priority action;

On this basis, to direct the work of all negotiating bodies towards implementing the comprehensive programme for disarmament;

To analyse reports and information received directly or through the General Assembly from negotiating bodies and to formulate recommendations;



To analyse, at the request of the United Nations General Assembly, draft multilateral agreements drawn up by the Committee on Disarmament and to formulate recommendations on them;

To initiate studies and research relating to the implementation of the comprehensive programme for disarmament.

(c) The United Nations Committee on Disarmament at Geneva and regional or bilateral negotiating bodies should consolidate their specific role as bodies for concrete negotiation of certain disarmament agreements, in accordance with the recommendations of the General Assembly and of the Disarmament Commission. The idea underlying their activities should be that they will represent the interests of the international community, by the achievement, in specific forms and by specific means, of the comprehensive programme for disarmament.

(d) The Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies should become an active agent of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in studying the problems of the arms race and the direction which actions and initiatives in the disarmament field should take. In order to be effective, its work must be action-oriented and directed towards the identification of practical modalities for starting negotiations on the measures provided for in the comprehensive programme for disarmament.

(e) The Centre for Disarmament of the United Nations Secretariat should make a substantially greater contribution. It should become a support for concrete negotiations, able to provide States Members of the United Nations the necessary information throughout the disarmament process.

(f) The new United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research should probably be responsible for the effective preparation of United Nations studies in the field of disarmament. It should also pay more attention to studying the implications of the arms race and disarmament for other spheres of the economic and social life of States.

(g) The United Nations should also play a central role in disarmament problems with respect to monitoring the implementation of disarmament agreements. Romania therefore supports the establishment of the International Satellite Monitoring Agency within the United Nations.

### III. International community

11. The intensity and magnitude of the entire international community's concern with regard to disarmament and the need for continuity in action to end the arms race and reduce armaments will probably necessitate the establishment of an international disarmament organization. This entity could absorb all existing structures dealing with disarmament matters and perform the functions of the unified effective disarmament machinery outlined in section I above.

12. At the special session of the United Nations General Assembly, Romania joined other States in supporting the proposal to set up such an organization.

**SURINAME**

[Original: English]

[25 June 1980]

1. Suriname has no specific viewpoints to offer at this stage with regard to the United Nations management of disarmament affairs.
2. The Permanent Representative, however, would like to suggest, that the decisions of the United Nations Committee on Disarmament be transmitted promptly so as to enable delegates participating in the work of the First Committee of the General Assembly to examine them thoroughly to take them into account during discussions of disarmament matters in the Committee.

**SWEDEN**

[Original: English]

[31 March 1980]

1. For some years many States have shown an interest in the institutional and organizational aspects of the handling of disarmament matters within the United Nations system. Several proposals have been made for the establishment of an organization to deal exclusively with questions of disarmament. The matter was discussed in the 18-nation Disarmament Committee already in the early 1960s, then in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament 10 years later, in the preparations of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and also in the United Nations Disarmament Commission last year. Moreover, the question of strengthening the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament was discussed in the First Committee of the General Assembly in 1975 and 1976.
2. In the light of developments in the field of disarmament in recent years the institutional requirements have become more obvious. The growing disarmament agenda and the complexity of the issues involved, as well as the more active participation by a large number of member States constitute salient features of these developments. Not least important in this respect is the impact of the outcome of the special session and the requirements emanating from there. Sweden therefore notes with great satisfaction that the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session adopted resolution 34/87 E, requesting the Secretary-General to carry out a comprehensive study of the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament. In the view of the Swedish Government such a study should consider the possibilities and modalities of establishing a United Nations disarmament organization.
3. The main functions of United Nations management of disarmament affairs today are the promotion of the process of disarmament and the substantive preparation for negotiations in the field. Promotion of the process of disarmament is performed

through, among other things, collecting, processing and dissemination of information about the arms race and disarmament. Substantive preparation is carried out through providing the factual basis for and servicing multilateral disarmament deliberations and negotiations, such as the First Committee of the General Assembly, the Disarmament Commission and the Committee on Disarmament. In addition the Secretary-General has in recent years been charged with some functions concerning the implementation and control of disarmament agreements such as acting as depositary.

4. Considering the limited number of disarmament agreements achieved so far and the urgent need to revitalize the improve the present disarmament situation, the promotion aspect of disarmament has become a question of prime importance. The situation calls for greater resources to collect, process and disseminate information in the field of disarmament. This would include studies and research, the creation of an "information bank" and intensified contacts with non-governmental organizations and mass media.

5. The substantive preparation of deliberations and negotiations will have to be expanded as a result of the comprehensive approach to disarmament adopted by the Committee on Disarmament and the United Nations Disarmament Commission, the growing disarmament agenda, the increasing complexity of the issues involved as well as of the more active participation by a large number of States in the disarmament efforts.

6. Implementation and control of disarmament agreements is an area where in the present situation the United Nations has limited functions. However, an increasing number of agreements as well as the tendency to use the United Nations more often than before for purposes such as registering agreements and acting as depositary, administering their implementation and contributing to their verification, will require a growing United Nations involvement. Already today the United Nations provides the means for the settlement of disputes arising from the implementation or non-implementation of several agreements. There is a growing opinion for giving the United Nations a more active role in the verification process. Not least important in this respect is the proposal for an International Satellite Monitoring Agency.

7. The effective fulfilment of the above-mentioned functions requires not only sufficient resources and a correspondingly efficient organization of these resources. Such an organization should also have a sufficiently independent position within the United Nations system, in order to ensure that the above functions will be fulfilled. The organization should have a governing body elected by all members of the United Nations, and adequate regular funding to be able to undertake the work requested by Member States. It should report directly to the General Assembly.

UKRAINIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

[Original: Russian]

[20 May 1980]

1. The Ukrainian SSR unswervingly adheres to the policy laid down in its Constitution of ending the arms race and achieving genuine disarmament measures. In United Nations bodies it consistently calls for intensifying negotiations on both a multilateral and a bilateral basis in this field which is of such extraordinary importance for ensuring the security of all peoples. In this connexion, it believes that those disarmament negotiations which have been suspended or postponed for one reason or another should be resumed and continued. While attaching due importance to institutional arrangements relating to disarmament, the Ukrainian SSR considers that the decisive factor for achieving real success in the matter of disarmament is the presence of political will among the States participating in the negotiating process. The lack of progress in halting the arms race and achieving disarmament has essentially been caused by the continuing build-up of armaments by certain militarily and politically important States and not by any lack of efficiency in the organization of the work of the existing United Nations apparatus servicing the activities of the Organization in this field.
2. Of late, the United Nations General Assembly has adopted a number of decisions aimed at improving the structure and functions of the relevant United Nations apparatus. Within the framework of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, the Disarmament Affairs Division has become the United Nations Centre for Disarmament, and, as its activities demonstrate, the Centre is fully coping with the tasks entrusted to it in servicing the work of the various bodies concerned with individual aspects of disarmament and in collecting and disseminating relevant information. In the opinion of the Ukrainian SSR, there is therefore no need for any change in the existing structure of the Centre.
3. There is also no justification for the artificial separation between the organizational servicing of the activities of States in the field of disarmament and that of their efforts to strengthen peace and international security. The questions of limiting the arms race and achieving disarmament have always been and continue to be political questions. They have a very direct influence on the security interest of States and of the entire international community. The close and inseparable link between disarmament and international security has been noted in many United Nations decisions, including the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It is therefore perfectly natural that the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should operate within the framework of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs.
4. At the same time, since the organizational servicing of United Nations activities in the field of disarmament is one of the most important areas of work of this department, its official title might well be changed to "Department of Political, Disarmament and Security Council Affairs". Such a change would fully accord with the functions and tasks currently being carried out by this unit of the United Nations Secretariat.

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UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

[Original: Russian]

[25 March 1980]

1. The Soviet Union consistently advocates prompt termination of the arms race and achievement of disarmament. It is prepared to hold negotiations on these matters on the basis of respect for the principle of equal security. It favours the reopening and continuation of all the negotiations on curbing the arms race and on disarmament which have been initiated in recent years in various forums or bilaterally but have now been suspended or postponed for one reason or another. This position is backed up by practical steps taken by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. As a result of efforts by the Soviet Union and other peace-loving States in recent years, there has developed a system of disarmament negotiations on both a bilateral and a multilateral basis. Needless to say, such negotiations require that appropriate technical servicing facilities be available.
2. Because of the growing importance and significance of the problem of disarmament and the corresponding expansion of the network of organs which deal with the matter and conduct negotiations, the General Assembly has taken certain decisions leading to organizational improvements in the structure and functions of the United Nations disarmament machinery. In particular, the Disarmament Affairs Division has been transformed into the United Nations Centre for Disarmament within the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs. Its functions have been widened correspondingly.
3. The work of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament demonstrates that the Centre is competently performing its tasks on servicing committees, conferences and groups of experts by preparing United Nations studies on disarmament questions as well as assembling and disseminating relevant information. This indicates that the structure of the Centre has proved itself and there is no reason whatever to change it. Experience shows, furthermore, that frequent and unnecessary changes in the structure of any organ can have an adverse effect on its performance. This, of course, does not preclude the need to identify and utilize reserve capacity so as to improve further the performance of this important part of the United Nations Secretariat.
4. The satisfactory operation of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament as a subdivision of the Secretariat Department of Political and Security Council Affairs provides practical confirmation of the close interrelationship between disarmament and international security which has been repeatedly referred to in numerous General Assembly resolutions. It is universally recognized that the problems of disarmament are primarily political in nature, going to the core of the question of ensuring both the security of individual States and international security as a whole. One cannot, without harming the cause, separate the organizational work in support of disarmament efforts by States from the United Nations Secretariat's servicing of their efforts to strengthen international security. It therefore seems quite proper to concentrate United Nations disarmament activities within the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs.

5. It would also be advisable to indicate in an appropriate manner that functions relating to disarmament questions represent one of the most important aspects of the work of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs. It would obviously make sense, therefore to bring the official title of the Department into line with the real state of affairs, since the latter is the main unit of the United Nations Secretariat concerned with organizational arrangements for United Nations disarmament activities. The title "Department of Political, Disarmament and Security Council Affairs" would reflect the tasks with which it is entrusted at the present time.

6. Despite the importance of organizational questions relating to disarmament, one should not lose sight of the fact that the real reasons for the inadequate progress in the field of disarmament do not lie in the way the work of the relevant United Nations machinery is organized but rather in the unwillingness of certain major States to halt the arms race and their determination to press forward with an arms build-up. However, in view of the interest shown at the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly in the question of the organization of work of United Nations disarmament machinery, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics expressed willingness to take part in an expert group on the problem. It took that position with a view to helping to ensure that additional means of making more rational use of the existing United Nations machinery for the discussion of disarmament questions were studied in the course of the group's work.

UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

[Original: English]

[19 January 1981]

1. The Government of the United Kingdom note that this subject was thoroughly discussed in the course of the review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, as a result of which certain organizational improvements were made. The related question of international machinery for disarmament was tackled at the United Nations special session on disarmament in 1978, and essential changes were introduced. The present study of the institutional framework for disarmament affairs should therefore be seen in the light of previous reforms, and in particular in relation to paragraph 114 of the Final Document of the special session. Furthermore, the group of experts should pay particular attention to any major budgetary consequences of the recommendations which they may make in their report.

2. It should also be recognised that the present machinery should be given a fair chance to prove its effectiveness. The Government of the United Kingdom believe that an important aspect of the work of the Second Special Session in 1982 will be to review the working of the institutional arrangements for disarmament. However, it remains the view of the United Kingdom that progress towards real measures of arms control and disarmament is more often determined by the quality of the international climate than by the structure of disarmament institutions.

Deliberation and negotiation

3. Deliberation on the political and security aspects of disarmament should be carried out in the established United Nations institutions: the First Committee of the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission. In the view of the United Kingdom, discussions in the First Committee would be assisted by the introduction of a properly structured agenda; every effort could then be made to concentrate on achieving resolutions which would be directly helpful to the disarmament negotiations, and not merely declaratory statements. In the First Committee and the Disarmament Commission there should be a better balance between nuclear and conventional disarmament, and less overlapping of subjects. The performance of the deliberative and negotiating machinery will need to be reviewed at the second special session.

4. The Government of the United Kingdom would like to express their great appreciation of the technical and administrative services provided by the Secretariat in support of the disarmament negotiating and deliberative bodies. A good example of this was the Conference on Certain Conventional (Inhumane) Weapons which was successfully held in Geneva in September 1980.

Implementation

5. There are several ways in which organs of the United Nations could help in the implementation of arms control agreements. Since 1977 the Secretary-General has

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been the depositary for the Environmental Modification Convention, and it is expected that he will also be nominated as depositary for the Radiological Weapons Convention currently being negotiated in Geneva. This is clearly a useful function. The personal authority of the Secretary-General should encourage Member States to adhere not only to these but also to other arms control treaties which already exist. The purpose of these agreements will not be fully realised until all member states are a party to them.

6. The Centre for Disarmament is already playing a valuable role in the organization of Review Conferences for existing treaties. As a depositary power for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Seabed Treaty and the Biological Weapons Convention, the Government of the United Kingdom wish to pay tribute to the work of the Centre for Disarmament in organising the review conferences for these treaties in 1975, 1977 and 1980.

7. The question of implementation will become more important as progress on specific arms control measures is made under a Comprehensive Programme for Disarmament, as foreseen in paragraph 109 of the Final Document of the Special Session. Consideration may then have to be given to the possible role of the Centre for Disarmament for some other international body in monitoring compliance with arms control agreements. At the final stage of disarmament there could be consideration of the nature and functions of an international control organization, within the framework of the United Nations, to preserve the peace in a disarmed world. The Government of the United Kingdom note that several proposals concerning such agencies have been made in recent years, taking up ideas put forward in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission in 1954. They see these as possible components in a system of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, which remains the ultimate goal.

8. It may also be appropriate for the Centre for Disarmament to oversee and implement the work done by the Secretary-General's group of experts on a standardised system for the reporting of military budgets. If the information could be verified, such a system could contribute to the building of confidence among States, as well as possibly providing a data base for any future negotiations on a balanced and universal reduction of military budgets.

9. The United Kingdom would like to pay tribute to the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementing safeguards agreements on source or special fissionable materials, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. The Government of the United Kingdom are convinced that the system of international safeguards and verification procedures operated by IAEA, as laid down in article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, provides an important element in the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy within an acceptable non-proliferation régime.

#### Verification

10. It has been apparent for some years that many of the disarmament negotiations have been frustrated over the question of verification procedures. Paragraph 31 of



the Final Document of the Special Session emphasizes the importance of verification in the disarmament process. It states that agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations in the verification process.

11. The Government of the United Kingdom believe that verification measures must be designed for individual arms control agreements; that no single verification arrangement or technique can be seen as a blueprint for others; and that the onus of responsibility for slow progress in the negotiations lies at the door of those countries which have traditionally opposed international control. They note that the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies has recommended that the subject of verification merits further study.

#### Information

The Government of the United Kingdom value the publications of the Centre for Disarmament. They welcome the introduction of an authoritative Disarmament Yearbook, which contains information of great utility to arms control practitioners, university teachers and research institutes. Consideration should now be given to making key elements of this information more widely available to the public in popular form, using quick and inexpensive production methods. The role of the quarterly disarmament review and its potential audience might be examined at the second special session. United Nations Information Centres throughout the world should be encouraged to improve their contacts with the news media and non-governmental organizations.

13. Research into possible measures for the limitation and reduction of armaments can play an important part in preparing the way for negotiations on complex subjects. The Centre for Disarmament has produced a number of useful background studies, and has provided assistance to the various experts groups which are preparing reports for the Secretary-General. In addition, the Government of the United Kingdom welcome the launching of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research in Geneva. They look forward to the Institute taking over some of the research projects recommended by the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies. This may become feasible as the Institute establishes itself. Initially the Institute should be run with a small staff of non-governmental experts, thereby ensuring academic objectivity. All its research should be action-oriented rather than theoretical. It should be possible to build on earlier United Nations studies.

14. Similarly the programme of studies being considered by the Secretary-General's Advisory Board should concentrate on research which will be of practical relevance to arms control negotiations.

15. The special role of UNESCO in promoting education and information about disarmament was recognized in the Final Document of the special session. The Government of the United Kingdom have studied with interest the wide range of expert views expressed at the World Congress on Disarmament Education held at UNESCO headquarters in June 1980. They were particularly pleased to see the emphasis on freedom of expression and information, without which disarmament

education could be reduced to yet another medium for sterile propaganda. In the view of the United Kingdom, it would be preferable for UNESCO to concentrate on the principles of education and avoid the political aspects of disarmament, which are the proper concern of the First Committee and the Disarmament Commission.

16. Training in arms control techniques is also a useful adjunct to disarmament education. In this connexion, the Government of the United Kingdom have welcomed the introduction of the Disarmament Fellowships Scheme under the auspices of the Centre for Disarmament. They believe this scheme is of particular value to the developing countries who are building up their diplomatic services, and will enable them to make a stronger contribution to United Nations work in the field of arms control and international security. To make the best use of resources, it is suggested that the guidelines of the programme should be reviewed at the Second Special Session and consideration given to whether the programme should be confined to Fellows from the developing countries.

#### Infrastructure

17. There is a clear need for more effective co-ordination of United Nations disarmament activities to avoid duplication of effort. In the view of the United Kingdom, the Centre for Disarmament is the appropriate co-ordinating body. Insofar as other United Nations agencies are involved, they should consult the Centre for Disarmament before planning any action. It is particularly important to avoid politicization of the specialized agencies.

18. The Centre for Disarmament now appears to be adequately staffed for its present range of activities, and to have dealt admirably with the extra responsibilities placed upon it since the special session.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

[Original: English]

[31 March 1980]

1. Resolution 34/87 E requests the views of United Nations Member States on "desirable functions and structure as well as the institutional framework of United Nations management of disarmament affairs" for the benefit of national experts, who are to prepare a study for the thirty-sixth United Nations General Assembly on this subject. In the study itself, the experts are asked to cover present requirements and future needs as well as legal and financial implications, and to make recommendations.

2. In proposing such a study on 29 October 1979, Swedish Foreign Minister Ola Ullsten made clear that his Government was not suggesting any change in intergovernmental negotiating or deliberative bodies. However, he noted that a number of different United Nations Members had in recent years proposed the creation of a new international institution for disarmament, and suggested further study of this idea. Foreign Minister Ullsten took note of the current functions being performed by the United Nations Centre for Disarmament, but proposed that with increasing international disarmament activity and involvement, the possibility should be examined of creating a United Nations disarmament organization for the functions of "promotion, implementation and control of disarmament." In introducing resolution 34/87 E in the First Committee on 23 November 1979, Ambassador Curt Lidgard added the criterion of "substantive preparation" for the process of disarmament to the list of functions that a two-year study, as foreseen in the resolution would lay the basis for consideration in depth of institutional matters at the General Assembly's second Special Session on disarmament in 1982. In our initial, general comments below, we address the current functions of the Disarmament Centre; the current and projected structure and institutional framework for United Nations management of disarmament affairs; and the question of creating an organization in the United Nations family to "control" disarmament - a function that is not currently being performed by an international institution, except perhaps IAEA with regard to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

1. Current Functions

3. As a general matter, the United States believes that the United Nations Centre for Disarmament is effectively organized and staffed to meet the responsibilities that have been or are likely to be assigned to the Secretary-General by the United Nations General Assembly. The Centre's activities span the promotion of disarmament (e.g., disarmament publications, the fellowship program, organization of symposia and briefings for the press and public); substantive preparation (e.g., reports and background papers for the General Assembly and subordinate United Nations Committees; staffing for the General Assembly and its committees, the United Nations Disarmament Commission, the expert groups, and the Committee on Disarmament); and to a limited degree the implementation of disarmament agreements (e.g., background papers and staffing for review conferences under agreements such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the agreements on bacteriological (biological)

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weapons and sea-bed denuclearization). The United States is aware that these extensive responsibilities have from time to time placed strains on the personnel resources of the Disarmament Centre. These strains have been alleviated by the approval of the Fifth Committee and the General Assembly for the hiring of contract personnel in connexion with United Nations expert studies. We do not believe there is any responsibility the Centre has or is likely to have in the immediate future which cannot be met by existing resources. Furthermore, taking into account the severe budgetary limitations which the United Nations like most national institutions must face in a period of world-wide inflation, the United States would not support any significant growth in the functions of financial needs of the Disarmament Centre in the near future. Should compelling needs be identified, reallocation of funds from other areas of the United Nations budget would be called for in order to meet them. Despite the above-stated reservations regarding the creation of additional disarmament institutions within the United Nations system, the United States will participate in the study actively with a view to examining impartially any considerations which may argue for establishing a new body.

## 2. Structure and institutional framework

4. The Centre for Disarmament is a distinct and semi-autonomous unit within the United Nations Secretariat, but forms part of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, headed by an Under-Secretary-General. Apart from the Centre, the Secretary-General has a personal representative at the Committee on Disarmament, who serves as Secretary of the Committee. In addition, the Board of Advisers on disarmament studies set up by the tenth special session of the General Assembly now submits its recommendations directly to the Secretary-General. While there is thus some diffusion of authority for disarmament matters under the Secretary-General, this does not seem to have caused any serious difficulties to date.

5. The projected creation of a Disarmament Institute in Geneva for research into disarmament matters under the joint direction of UNITAR and the Advisory Board will further expand and diffuse United Nations activities in the disarmament field. It has been suggested that the new disarmament institute and the Centre for Disarmament could eventually be brought together under a new, more autonomous United Nations authority. At the present time, the United States does not see any pressing need for such a major structural change. Moreover, we would be inclined to oppose any structural change which would establish a separate budget for the United Nations disarmament functions, or reduce the Secretary-General's management authority, which allows for maximizing the efficient use of Secretariat resources.

6. We would foresee extensive political, organizational, technical and financial problems involved in the establishment of any new international organization designed to control or monitor arms control agreements. Certain of these potential difficulties are described in more detail in the United States national views on the proposal to establish an International Satellite Monitoring Agency, submitted on 12 April 1979 and circulated in General Assembly document A/34/374.

APPENDIX II

List of deliberating and negotiating bodies  
dealing with disarmament matters

1. The General Assembly, which consists of all Members of the United Nations, is the main deliberative organ of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. In accordance with Article 11 of the United Nations Charter, it considers the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles of governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments and adopts relevant resolutions. In accordance with the decisions of the first special session devoted to disarmament the Assembly's First Committee deals exclusively with disarmament and related international security questions. It considers and prepares draft resolutions on various disarmament subjects for approval by the General Assembly.
2. The Disarmament Commission, established by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, is a deliberative body, a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly. Composed of all members of the United Nations, it considers and makes recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament. It functions under the rules of procedure relating to the committees of the General Assembly with such modifications as the Commission may deem necessary and makes every effort to ensure that, in so far as possible, decisions on substantive issues are adopted by consensus. The Disarmament Commission reports annually to the General Assembly.
3. The Committee on Disarmament is the single multilateral negotiating forum of limited size in the field of disarmament. In paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the tenth special session devoted to disarmament, the General Assembly welcomed the agreement reached among the Member States on the establishment of the Committee on Disarmament which takes its decisions by consensus, functions according to its own rules of procedure and adopts its own agenda taking into account the recommendations of the General Assembly and the proposals presented by the members of the Committee. The Secretary of the Committee, appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, acts as his personal representative and assists the Committee and its Chairman in organizing the business and time-tables of the Committee. The Committee on Disarmament consists of the nuclear-weapon-States and 35 other States. The other Member States of the United Nations have possibilities of taking part in the work of the Committee, in accordance with its rules of procedure. The Committee reports annually to the General Assembly, or more frequently as appropriate, and provides its formal and other relevant documents to the Member States of the United Nations on a regular basis.
4. The Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference was established in pursuance of resolution 3183 (XXVIII) in 1974. In accordance with its latest mandate, which is contained in resolution 35/151, it considers various questions in connexion with convening a World Disarmament Conference at the earliest appropriate time with universal participation and with adequate preparation. The Ad Hoc Committee consists of 40 non-nuclear-weapon States of the United Nations; the nuclear-weapon-States are invited to co-operate or maintain contact with the Ad Hoc

Committee enjoying the same rights as the appointed members of the Committee. The Ad Hoc Committee reports annually to the General Assembly.

5. The Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean was established in pursuance of resolution 2992 (XXVII) in 1972. It, inter alia, considers various questions in connexion with the convening of the Conference on the Indian Ocean during 1981 at Colombo, to achieve the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace which is contained in General Assembly resolution 2832 (XVI). The Ad Hoc Committee consists of 46 Member States of the United Nations and reports annually to the General Assembly.

6. A number of Study Groups have been established over the years by the General Assembly composed of governmental and/or consultant experts to assist the Secretary-General in carrying out studies on various disarmament aspects. Ten Study groups have been active in the course of 1981, and seven of them have to submit their reports to the General Assembly at its 36th Session in 1981.

7. The Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies was established by the Secretary-General in pursuance of paragraph 124 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament to advise him on various aspects of studies to be made under the auspices of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and arms limitation, including a programme of such studies.

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