

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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9 July 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SIXTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 9 July 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN (India)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. SALAH-BEY
Mr. H. HATI

Argentina: Mr. C. CARSALES
Mr. J.H. OTEGUI
Miss N. HASCIBEBE

Australia: Mr. R. STEELE

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. J.H. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. P. POPTCHEV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U NGWE WIN
U AUNG THAN

Canada: Mr. G. SKINNER

China: Mr. YU Mengjia
Mr. LIN Chen
Mr. PAN Jusheng

Cuba: Mr. P.N. MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. P. LUKES

Egypt: Mr. A. EL REEDY
Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. H. FAHMY
Miss W. BASSI

Ethiopia: Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THEBLICKE
Mrs. H. HOPPE

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. N. KLINGER
Mr. H. MULLER

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVLS
Mr. F. GAJDA
Mr. C. GYORFFY
Mr. E. SEBOK

India:

Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. S. DARUSMAN
Mr. F.M. SIDIK
Mr. E. SOEPRAPTO
Mr. HARYOMATARAN
Mr. ACHDIAT

Iran:

Mr. A. JALALI
Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA

Italy:

Mr. V. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO
Mr. A. CIARRAPICO
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. YOSHIO OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANAKA

Kenya:

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. CONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDENBILIG
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. M. CHRAÏBI
Mr. M. ARRASSEN

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FLIN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. OLU ADENIJI
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. M. AKRAM

Peru: Mr. A. THORNBERRY

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Romania: Mr. M. MALITA
Mr. T. MELESCANU
Mr. O. IONESCU

Sri Lanka: Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden: Mrs. I. THORSSON
Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. G. EKHOLM
Mr. J. LUNDIN
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. S. ERIKSSON
Mr. G. ANDERSSON
Mrs. I. SUNDBERG

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. V.M. GANJA
Mr. V.F. PRYAKHIN
Mr. M.M. IPPOLITOV
Mr. T.F. DMITRICHEV
Mrs. L.V. GRACHIKOVA
Mr. V.F. KULESHOV

United Kingdom:

Sir A. ACLAND
Mr. D. SUMMERHAYES
Mr. N. MARSHALL

United States of America:

Mr. C. FLOWERREE
Mr. F.P. DESIMONE
Miss K. CRITTENDERGER
Mr. R. SCOTT
Mr. J. MISKEL
Mr. K. MIKULAK
Mr. M. SANCHEZ
Mr. S. WARD
Mr. S. FITZGERALD

Venezuela:

Mr. RODRIGUEZ NAVARRO
Mr. O.A. AGUILAR
Mr. H. ARTEAGA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC

Zaire:

Mr. O. GNOK

Secretary of the Committee
and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy-Secretary of the
Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: Distinguished delegates, the Committee continues today its consideration of item 5 of its agenda, "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons", but of course, members wishing to do so are at liberty to make statements on any subject relevant to the work of the Committee, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure.

May I welcome today the presence amongst us of Sir Antony Acland, Deputy Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, who is responsible, inter alia, for British policy towards the Committee on Disarmament. Sir Antony Acland has a wide diplomatic experience, having served in the United Nations at New York and Geneva. He was Principal Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary between 1972 and 1975 and later served as Ambassador to Luxembourg and Spain.

Mr. ONKELINX (Belgium) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, every time I take the floor in this Committee I am tempted by the idea of omitting at the beginning of my speech the customary words of congratulation to the current Chairman and to the Chairman for the previous month. Such congratulations, often very eulogistic, frequently take up the first page of our speeches, both in the Committee itself and in its subsidiary bodies. Perhaps they are an important source of moral support for the Chairman; perhaps they help him to perform the hard tasks before him; I have nevertheless often thought that they take up too much of our Committee's time. When I spoke to you before the meeting, you told me of your concern at the length of the list of speeches, and I should have been further encouraged in my idea of leaving out words of congratulation. However, seeing you in the chair, I cannot resist. Once again, it is not today that I shall break with tradition and I should like very simply and above all very briefly to tell you how happy I am to see you presiding over our work this month. Ever since you joined us in this Committee you have impressed your colleagues by your drive, your competence and also your sense of humour, and I am sure that you will discharge your duties to perfection. Furthermore, you represent a country which, thanks to eminent leaders, has always played an important part in post-war international relations and more particularly in the field with which we are concerned, namely, security and disarmament. And since I have not wished to break with tradition, I shall follow tradition completely by addressing words of thanks also to our friend Ambassador Komives, who presided over our work last month in a noteworthy manner. Before beginning my speech, I should also like to welcome here Mrs. Thorsson, to whom we shall all listen very attentively after I myself have spoken, as well as Sir Antony Acland, the British Under-Secretary. Their presence here is proof of the interest which those two countries continue to take in the work of our Committee.

Since we resumed our work at this summer session, it has become clear from the discussions at plenary meetings and the activities of the Committee's subsidiary bodies how much importance very many countries attach to the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Obviously, this special session is not a goal in itself. It ought rather to be a particularly appropriate moment for the international community to reflect on the impact of the decisions -- especially those regarding structures -- taken by the General Assembly at its first special session, in 1978.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

Evaluation of the work of the Disarmament Committee will be one of the most important elements in this exercise of reflection, for what the international community will want to know is whether this multilateral negotiating body, set up more than three years ago, is capable of justifying the hopes that have been placed in it.

It will therefore be up to us to show that our Committee, in its present composition and with its present methods, can achieve concrete results by way of negotiations.

The ability of the Disarmament Committee to do so itself depends on a number of factors, of which I should like to mention those that seem to me the most important. First, there is the question of international security conditions, for the Disarmament Committee cannot negotiate in a vacuum, and it seems obvious to me that a tense international climate is -- alas -- not propitious for the attainment of any great progress in the sphere of disarmament. At the same time we ought not to underestimate the impact that efforts in this sphere could have on the restoration of confidence in international relations.

Secondly, the multilateral approach to disarmament cannot be divorced from developments in the separate negotiations going on in a number of priority spheres of disarmament. Belgium, which has always been in favour of these two approaches, naturally expects that the States responsible for the separate negotiations will take account of the overriding importance which the international community attaches to those negotiations.

Lastly and, I would say, particularly, the Disarmament Committee will be judged according to the combined will we have shown to make progress where that was possible.

Taking account of these factors, and bearing in mind the limited time available before the second special session, I should like to indicate three themes which would permit the Committee on Disarmament to demonstrate that this multilateral negotiating body merits the central role attributed to it in 1978.

In indicating these themes, I am not claiming that they are all of priority importance in relation to the problems posed by the gravity of the armaments race. I merely wish to point out that these are questions on which progress can be made and that it is important, in the present circumstances, not to neglect any possibilities for making progress, however limited they may be.

Thus, I consider that the time has come for the Disarmament Committee to conclude its negotiations regarding the prohibition of radiological weapons.

I also believe that between now and next spring the Disarmament Committee should complete the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

I would also like to see our Committee making substantial progress in the drafting of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons before the second special session.

Since, according to our programme of work, our discussions in plenary meeting this week should deal mainly with the question of radiological weapons, I should like to devote the remainder of my statement to that subject.

There are several reasons why Belgium attaches particular importance to the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons:

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

It would be one way of demonstrating that the negotiating machinery offered by the Disarmament Committee can function effectively;

It would also be the first time in the nuclear field that a treaty had been negotiated with the participation of the five nuclear-weapon Powers;

The very fact of the existence of an international agreement in the disarmament field would, in present circumstances, have a symbolic value which we cannot afford to disregard;

Furthermore, the procedure that has been followed with respect to these negotiations on radiological weapons coincides with our idea of the correct method to adopt in the matter of the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, namely, first to identify these weapons and then to negotiate, one by one, their prohibition or limitation.

The negotiation of a convention on radiological weapons has made good progress since the submission to the Committee by the United States and the Soviet Union of their joint proposal on major elements of a treaty. We are particularly grateful to Ambassador Komives, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, for the manner in which he is carrying out his important task.

Certainly, we would have wished these negotiations to be brought to a speedier conclusion, but we are aware of the importance of the points raised by many delegations, points which are themselves evidence of the importance we all attach to the question of radiological weapons.

We now have a consolidated text based on proposals submitted by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group. Belgium considers that this document, which is a combination of different proposals, should constitute the principal basis of our further work.

My delegation is particularly gratified to note that several of its own suggestions have been incorporated in the consolidated text.

We shall continue to make any contribution we can in the search for solutions to the various important problems which have not yet been resolved. Among these problems I would draw attention in particular to the following.

The problem of the definition of radiological weapons. The definition can obviously not include a reference to a nuclear explosive device. We understand the concern of those who fear that the fact of not mentioning nuclear weapons might be interpreted as justifying their use. Such justification was clearly not the intention of the bilateral negotiators, any more than it was their intention to settle the question of the legitimacy or otherwise of nuclear weapons. Would it not, then, be a good idea, as my delegation suggested last year, to include in the preamble to the convention a specific reminder of the goal of nuclear disarmament?

I would like to point out that in the negotiation of a number of disarmament instruments, use has often been made of the technique of incorporating in the convention an undertaking to negotiate subsequently either on matters on which it did not prove possible to reach immediate agreement, or on wider aspects of the general subject of disarmament. I might quote by way of example article V of the Sea-Bed Treaty, article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and article IX of the Convention on the prohibition of biological weapons. We should not overlook this as a possible means of resolving a number of the difficulties which we have encountered in the negotiation of a convention on radiological weapons.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

Another question to be decided is whether, in this convention, we ought explicitly to prohibit deliberate attacks on civilian nuclear installations in order to cause the release of radioactive substances. We are grateful to the Swedish delegation for drawing our attention to this important question, which is already partly covered by article 56 of the first Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention. The question raised by Sweden is important in itself. It also adds to the field of application of the first Additional Protocol. Furthermore, this question has become much more relevant since the attack on an Iraqi nuclear research centre, an attack which the Belgian Government has strongly condemned and which, although it was not the subject of the Swedish proposal, could have foreshadowed what Sweden specifically wished to prohibit in the convention on radiological weapons.

We already, last year, raised the question whether this aspect should be included in the present convention or should appear in a different context. We do not wish the matter to be settled at this stage, because the arguments for and against are so complicated. My delegation is nevertheless ready, here too, to help find any solution that might be acceptable to all members of the Committee.

We ought, however, to be aware that, if we incorporate the Swedish proposal in the convention on radiological weapons, we shall substantially alter the scope of this convention and raise various problems, both of a legal nature and as regards the need to devise an adequate verification procedure. If, on the other hand, we consider that the Swedish proposal would be better placed in another context, either in an instrument complementing the Additional Protocols of the Geneva Conventions or in an entirely new instrument, we ought also to realize that it will take a great deal of time to work out the details of the Swedish proposal so that it can be implemented, and to resolve all the difficult questions that will arise. Could we not therefore make use of the technique I mentioned earlier and establish in the convention prohibiting radiological weapons the principle contained in the Swedish proposal, at the same time undertaking to negotiate on all its implications at a later date.

Another question to which my delegation attaches particular importance concerns the peaceful uses of radioactive materials. In this connection, we can accept the proposal made by the Chairman of the Working Group regarding article V of the proposed convention. In fact the provisions contained in that article in no way restrict the use of radioactive materials as authorized by article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. However, article IV of the non-proliferation Treaty balances two ideas. The first is the one I have just mentioned. The second concerns undertakings relating to the promotion of peaceful uses. Belgium believes that it would be appropriate to include this dual concept also in the part of the convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons dealing with the peaceful use of radioactive materials. My delegation therefore supports those delegations which would like to see included in the convention prohibiting radiological weapons a provision on the promotion of peaceful uses. The precedents for this that exist in disarmament treaties such as the non-proliferation treaty or the Convention prohibiting biological weapons, should enable us to find an appropriate form of language.

Those are the comments I wished to make at this stage of our work. I hope that my remarks will have been enough to show the constructive spirit in which my delegation approaches all the matters that are before our Committee.

Mrs. THORSSON (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, I would first like to thank you for your kind words of welcome to me two days ago.

Secondly, it is with the greatest pleasure that I see you chairing the Committee on Disarmament during the month of July. We are all aware of the outstanding qualities that you bring to this important and burdensome task, as well as the well-known ardour with which your great country pursues the course of disarmament, particularly in the field of nuclear weapons. The effect might well be that we shall look back on the month of July 1981 as the "Indian summer", to use your own words. Needless to say, you will get the consistent co-operation and support of the Swedish delegation.

The thanks of the Swedish delegation are also gladly given to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Komives of Hungary, for the excellent way in which he, during the month of June, set the summer part of the 1981 session going. I should also like to say a few words of welcome to our new colleagues, the distinguished representatives of Argentina, Iran, Sri Lanka and Venezuela, and I am sure that we shall find possibilities of excellent co-operation between their delegations and my own.

A few weeks ago we commenced the second part of the 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament, the last full session before the General Assembly's second special session devoted to disarmament. What shall we be able to produce this time, in terms of progress towards the achievement of the goals set in the Programme of Action contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly? Does any one of us, representing Governments which are charged with the responsibility to negotiate multilaterally the terms of achieving these goals, find any reason for optimism about the prospects ahead of us during a few summer weeks, considering what we have produced since January 1979? Do, in fact, the leading military Powers, on whose terms, unfortunately, we find ourselves around this table, have the sincere will to achieve, together with us, the goals which they supported three years ago?

In this assembly I have asked questions like these repeatedly. At no point in time have they been as legitimate as they are in the summer of 1981.

Since I last made a general statement in this Committee -- that was on 3 February -- nothing has changed for the better in the field of disarmament. On the contrary. In reply to what it deems to be a threatening build-up of Soviet military forces, nuclear and conventional, and in order to increase its strength world-wide, the United States has adopted its largest military budget in peace-time, with further steep increases to follow in the next few years. Furthermore, we have followed, with the utmost concern, the continued debate around the production of all components of the so-called neutron warheads, a weapon designed specifically for use on European soil. This combines with the tendency to move into new areas, such as binary chemical weapons, mobile ICBMs and anti-satellite and ABM warfare in outer space. All this so that this unique and only earth of ours will become, if possible, an even more threatened and insecure home for man. Added to that is the fact that owing to the advance of new technologies in search of a mission, which are being ruthlessly pursued toward the complete militarization of the human environment, physical and spatial boundaries are being pushed ever farther in a grotesque rivalry for universal military domination.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

For fear of seeing its empire crumble, one Superpower subjugates and threatens its neighbours and could end up leaving the détente it so much cherished in ruins.

Not unexpectedly, the other Superpower feels justified in downgrading what hopeful signs there were of a more compassionate, humane and humanitarian approach to world problems, and embarks again upon the simple but futile, and in our times dangerous and impossible road of military superiority.

And so here we sit; SALT II is considered dead; all bilateral arms negotiations between the Superpowers have been suspended and their commitment to multilateral negotiation is doubtful. It must, of course, be legitimate, and even to the outside world desirable, for a new Government to take time to define its policies. But it is difficult to believe that the year-long paralysis which has now been imposed on multilateral negotiations, including disarmament, as a result of the election campaign and the change in the United States administration, will in the final analysis benefit anybody.

With regard to European theatre nuclear forces, serious negotiations are still not in sight owing to the posturing and conditional approach of both sides. True, after the first initial sparring round of last year, the parties seem to be moving towards formal negotiations "by the end of the year", to quote the 4-5 May NATO communiqué. But how can one escape the conclusion that by that time -- two years after the momentous December 1979 NATO decision -- agreement to reduce theatre nuclear forces will be infinitely more difficult? The SS-20 programme will then, in all likelihood, have proceeded well beyond its present considerable number of some 200 missiles or more. In such circumstances, will the intention expressed in 1979 that NATO deployment of Pershing IIs and cruise missiles might be rendered inoperative through negotiations ever amount to anything more than just an intention?

The Swedish Government has never believed that the dual deployment of SS-20s and Pershing and cruise missiles has been or is necessary in order to maintain the existing rough equilibrium of forces in Europe. It appears instead increasingly likely that this deployment will risk becoming another series of tragic mistakes which, as in the past, could in the end leave both sides more vulnerable and insecure than before.

We have, therefore, the right to request that theatre nuclear forces negotiations start without further delay. The objective must be that the rapidly growing number of Soviet SS-20s is so drastically reduced that the deployment within NATO of new medium-range missiles can be avoided. Negotiations should also aim at limiting other nuclear-weapon systems intended for use in Europe.

Equally, the SALT process on strategic systems seems to face an uncertain future. Those who might have thought that SALT II could after all be wrapped up, with some minor amendments to take account of certain doubts expressed, were obviously wrong, and the results of some eight years of arduous negotiation will be laid aside and replaced by new approaches. Assuming that the SALT process will nevertheless resume again, such new approaches might in themselves offer new opportunities. It has been rumoured that the new United States administration is moving in the direction of proposing the aim of future strategic talks to be far-reaching reductions of nuclear weapons. The acronym SALT already appears frequently. This would seem to be an approach reminiscent of the unfortunately ill-fated Carter initiative of 1977, which was then flatly rejected by the other

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side. In so far as a serious attempt is made to elaborate a credible and balanced offer for reductions of strategic nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, it could prima facie appear to be an approach which should be investigated. In the meantime, I wish to repeat our demand to both Superpowers to respect the stipulations of the SALT II Treaty.

The prospects are that most negotiations -- multilateral as well as bilateral -- will remain suspended for most of the remainder of 1981. If this period of time is put to good use for a constructive -- I repeat, constructive -- reassessment of central issues, and without neglect of the interests of the international community, then too much need not be lost in the process. But if the only result will be one-sided reliance on increased military power in international relations, interruption of the vital multilateral and bilateral dialogue and the discarding of international agreements laboriously brought together, then we may all be in for troubled times. We consequently urge both the United States and the Soviet Union to exercise restraint in their international and bilateral relations in order that what we have all together built not be irretrievably lost.

Meanwhile, here we sit, trying to do our best, under painful circumstances, to have something to report to the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I shall have a few words to say on how we view our performance so far and the prospects ahead. This would imply reviewing the work so far of the ad hoc working groups and, added to that, another few words on the non-existent working groups.

First, let me comment on the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. I understand that under the able and effective chairmanship of the veteran disarmament negotiator, our colleague and friend, Ambassador Garcia Robles, the Group will advance consistently towards a draft programme to be submitted to the General Assembly at the second special session. The Group has indeed a particularly onerous task in trying to arrange in a logical and acceptable sequence most of the disarmament and arms control issues which have so long defied solution by the international community. We shall support every realistic effort in this field, although we fear that no ingenuity in the ordering and priority-setting of the relevant issues can ever replace the political will to negotiate multilaterally, which is so singularly lacking on the part of some delegations. We should make every effort to agree in this Committee on a comprehensive programme of disarmament, but may be well advised to leave the final say on certain central issues to the 1982 special session of the General Assembly on disarmament.

Secondly, a few words on the work to establish acceptable so-called negative security assurances, an issue which has taken on considerably increased importance and the accompanying public attention in many parts of the world. Not least is this a fact in the Nordic countries, where an intensely ongoing public debate on possibilities to establish these countries as a nuclear-weapon-free zone has involved Governments and parliaments. I shall return to this matter towards the end of this statement.

As far as the Working Group is concerned, we find it encouraging that, under the able chairmanship of our Italian colleague, Minister Ciarrapico, it is concentrating on efforts to evolve a common formula, which could serve as a basis for the conclusion of effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We are convinced that only co-ordinated and binding undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States can constitute satisfactory assurances in the true interest of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

As we have stated, both here in plenary and in the Working Group, we do not consider a common formula as an end in itself. To be acceptable, such a formula must bring about a considerable improvement as compared with the present situation. The existing undertakings by the five nuclear-weapon States are impaired by important deficiencies. There are basic dissimilarities between these undertakings; they are burdened with certain conditions and limitations, and they leave room for subjective interpretations by the nuclear-weapon States. The composite effect of all these factors is that there is considerable ambiguity and uncertainty as to the applicability of the assurances. As has been pointed out by several delegations -- including my own -- the discussion in the Working Group has demonstrated that the unilateral declarations are framed primarily to suit the nuclear-weapon States and their allies. Only in the second place are the security concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States outside the two military blocs taken into consideration. This is a priority-setting which is, of course, unacceptable.

In order to justify the conditions and limitations in the existing unilateral declarations, reference has been made to the security preoccupations of the nuclear-weapon States. Even if it can be argued that certain exceptions may be justifiable in view of the implications of certain nuclear security arrangements, there is no reason why these exceptions should have a general application.

On the other hand, the vast majority of the non-nuclear-weapon States are, in legally binding form, committed to their nuclear-weapon-free status. They do not -- either directly or indirectly -- threaten anybody with nuclear weapons and they are therefore by definition entitled to firm assurances without any exceptions that they will not be subjected to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Their security preoccupations are at least as valid as those of the nuclear-weapon States, not to speak of the fact that they are not charged with the heavy political and moral burden of possessing and threatening to use nuclear weapons.

Despite the deficiencies and ambiguities of the existing assurances, the Swedish Government has interpreted the intention behind the declarations by the five nuclear-weapon States to be that States outside the alliances and committed to a permanent nuclear-weapon-free status are exempted from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. As the Committee may recall, Ambassador Lidgard said, in a statement on 16 April 1981, that we take it for granted that a country with a non-alliance status and a non-nuclear-weapon record is covered without any exceptions by the unilateral assurances of the nuclear-weapon States. On the same occasion, he asked the representatives of the nuclear-weapon States to confirm that our understanding of their respective assurances is correct. We have not as yet received any answer. Therefore, I repeat our question and request the nuclear-weapon States shortly to give us the confirmation that we have asked for.

I now turn to the proposed convention banning radiological weapons, which is being negotiated in the third Working Group, chaired by my old friend and colleague, Ambassador Komives. This issue is an obvious example of the limited importance which the Superpowers seem to attribute to the Committee on Disarmament. While they have steadfastly refused for a number of years now to enter into multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty and are prepared to accept only limited negotiation activities in the chemical weapons area -- both areas being of the highest concern to most peoples and nations of the world -- they

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have not hesitated to put before the Committee a draft treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons, which has, during our negotiations, been convincingly shown to be completely lacking in substance. It is my belief that the Committee made a mistake in agreeing to take up this item on its agenda to the detriment of more urgent questions.

In order to give some meaningful content to the draft convention on radiological weapons, the Swedish Government has proposed the inclusion of a prohibition of attacks against nuclear installations, releasing the radioactivity contained in such installations to the detriment of the people living in the area and their environment. Such attacks would, actually, apart from nuclear explosions, which are expressly exempted from the draft treaty, seem to be the only credible ways of waging radiological warfare. We firmly believe that such a prohibition should be added to the draft and are much encouraged by the support given to our proposal. Needless to say, the alarming event just about a month ago, which showed a horrifying distrust of the non-proliferation efforts of the international community, and which has been so sharply condemned in this Committee, should convince any rational mind that the original drafters of the proposed convention would do well to listen more carefully to the arguments that support our proposal. As matters now stand, we entertain grave doubts about the usefulness of going forward with the deficient text originally provided to us by the United States and the Soviet Union, as we do not think that it would add to the already suffering credibility of the Committee on Disarmament.

Finally, in this part of my statement, I should like to make some comments on the eternal issue of banning the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, which is under negotiation in the fourth Ad Hoc Working Group under Swedish chairmanship. The deliberations in the Committee have, in our view, confirmed the existence of a political consensus on the need for an effective convention to that end. Since last summer the Working Group has striven with great intensity and the active and constructive contributions of delegations have generated a strong momentum towards a chemical weapons convention. It is now essential to maintain and to strengthen this momentum.

On this occasion I should like to touch briefly upon one aspect of the question which is of particular importance to the Swedish delegation, i.e. our proposal concerning "chemical warfare capability" -- the capability to use chemical weapons. This proposal has gained valuable support in the Committee and, although some objections have been voiced, no one is really denying that it would be advantageous to enlarge the scope of a chemical weapons convention as we have suggested. We for our part fully recognize the concerns of those who have voiced reservations concerning our proposal, in particular as regards the verification aspects of the matter. On the whole, we have no quarrel with those who at present favour the more restricted "classical" approach. In fact, we agree with them that a comprehensive and verifiable prohibition of production and stockpiling of all kinds of chemical weapons would constitute a major achievement in itself. This does not, however, detract from the fact that it would be an obvious advantage to enlarge the scope in order to close the loopholes which would allow the maintenance of a "chemical warfare capability". Such an enlargement of the scope would increase confidence among the parties to a convention, which is burdened with the problem of the effective verification of stipulations in a convention restricted to the "classical" scope approach.

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I wish to take this opportunity to draw the attention of the Committee to the further clarification that the Swedish delegation has given in the Working Group regarding our proposal on chemical warfare capability. We have pointed out that the prohibition of planning, organization and training for the use of chemical weapons need not enter into force immediately. The destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons will, for instance, take a long time, perhaps up to 10 years. As long as the stockpiles exist, parties to the convention can be expected to claim that they will need a capability to retaliate against an attack with chemical weapons. But once all stockpiles are destroyed, there can be no justification for maintaining such a capability. To meet this concern, the Swedish delegation has proposed to the Working Group that the prohibition of certain activities like planning, organization and training should become effective at a later stage but not later than 10 years after the entry into force of the convention itself.

I would now like to say a few words about the unfortunately still non-existent ad hoc working groups, particularly that on a comprehensive nuclear-weapon test ban.

In spite of our misgivings in regard to negotiating the deficient United States-USSR draft convention on the banning of radiological weapons, we did, generously, accommodating ourselves to the wishes of these two Powers, enter such negotiations. I have, a few minutes ago, given voice to our serious disappointment in facing firm resistance on the part of the original drafters towards sound and well-founded proposals to improve and make more meaningful the original draft text.

If we had hoped to gain some corresponding concession from the Superpowers, particularly on the convening of a working group on a CTBT, we were obviously mistaken. The attitude of "give and take" is indeed not theirs. In glaring contrast to our willingness to accommodate and compromise, some delegations of nuclear-weapon States still refuse to enter into multilateral negotiations on the highest priority item on our agenda, disregarding their own votes in favour of such a step in the United Nations General Assembly, disregarding repeated appeals, and requests in this Committee, shielding themselves behind their unsuccessful trilateral negotiations. We simply do not understand the reasons for their refusal. Do they dislike, do they fear, do they distrust the multilateral negotiation procedure that they themselves have endorsed by their vote in the General Assembly? Anyhow, I think that we are not going to forget the lesson that this experience has given us. And we shall come back, again and again, to this issue. For the time being I associate the Swedish delegation firmly and fully with the position of the Group of 21 on which I understand that we shall hear more from the spokesman of the Group, the distinguished Ambassador of Brazil, later this morning. The unsuccessful trilateral negotiators had better prepare themselves for severe and adamant criticism of their failure at the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. As regards the other non-existent working group, on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, I also associate the Swedish delegation firmly with the position taken by the Group of 21.

Before I enter upon the concluding part of my statement today, I have to say a few words on an increasingly threatening aspect of our daily existence, and our efforts to end the increasing militarization of this existence. The possibility of a continued militarization of outer space, which opens up horrifying prospects of a disastrously continuing upward spiral of the arms race and of which we have been given ample proof recently, was one of the issues of my short statement to this Committee on 24 April last.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

The keen concern of the Swedish delegation, as of other delegations, has not diminished since then. Although the issue of the military use of outer space is not on the current agenda of the Committee on Disarmament, it seems to us necessary for the disarmament community to find ways and means to place it firmly on its agenda, in the immediate future. The hope of the Swedish delegation is to make this possible through the General Assembly's second special session on disarmament, where the issue is bound to appear.

While I deeply regret to say that official disarmament negotiations, the success of which is so desperately needed, have continuously shown a dismal record -- and we know where to place the blame for this -- another phenomenon is emerging to which we, as representatives of Governments in all parts of the world, should give careful attention.

The ongoing and intensified arms race has created a popular resistance movement, which obviously is gaining ground in western Europe, including the Nordic countries, in fact wherever a free debate on matters of life and death is possible. A growing number of people refuse to be drawn into what they conceive to be a Superpower conflict. For them the arms race has turned from being an issue of deterrence, of military balance, of inferiority or superiority, into being an issue of survival.

I should like here to quote from a column in the International Herald Tribune some weeks ago, written by the well-known British thinker and writer Wayland Young and called "On the New Wave of Disarmament". He there recalls the times of the late 1950s and early 1960s, the times of popular protest against nuclear weapons. In one of the many marches in England and among the many bearers of official-looking banners, there was a girl who held up a small placard saying: "Caroline says No". His immediate reaction was: "The general staffs and the cabinets of the world must bear Caroline in mind". The general staffs and the cabinets have not been that sensible: they have forgotten her. It might well be that the new wave of disarmament is the result. If things are going to be put right, concludes Wayland Young, there is a need for harder thought, within and among Governments, than is probably yet realized, including a new look at matters which were hotly debated 20 years ago, but which have since then been forgotten.

But it isn't only Caroline; it is not only individual human beings at grassroot level; it is not only the concerned general public who refuse to say yes any longer and who have, in fact, started to say no. Among the many people who ask for a way out of our present dilemma, the dilemma which the arms race has created and worsened, and who are looking for the means to give it political force, are distinguished scientists and diplomats. The well-known American diplomatic historian George F. Kennan, who cannot be said to be unfamiliar with the way in which the Soviet mind is working, made a strong case in a statement a few weeks ago for a new approach to the nuclear arms race dilemma. Against the background of the grotesque redundancy and overkill capacity of present nuclear-weapon systems -- he states that anything beyond 20 per cent of existing arsenals is overkill of dimensions defying rational understanding -- he would like to see President Reagan propose to the Soviet Government, as a first step, an immediate and across-the-board reduction by 50 per cent of these arsenals by the two Superpowers -- affecting in equal measure all forms of nuclear weapons -- all this to be subject to the national means of verification now at the disposal of the two Powers.

Mr. Kennan does not deny the possibility of risks involved. But, he states, "is it possible to conceive of any dangers greater than those that lie at the end of the collision course on which we are now embarked?"

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

Thanks to the free access of the rest of the world to the public debate in the United States, we know that Mr. Kennan's is not an isolated voice in that country. It would be possible to quote from hundreds of persuasive statements, articles and debates, all aiming at the same goal: to enable us to break out of the present vicious circle. The same is the case in western Europe. What about the other side? From there we listen to the many disarmament proposals by President Brezhnev. It is an obvious fact that the public passivity, since January 1981, of the present United States administration in matters of arms control and disarmament has, in the eyes of a concerned world public opinion, given Soviet proposals a particularly sharp relief. The meeting of these proposals with indifference has not, again in the eyes of this concerned public opinion, diminished the sharpness of their relief.

But why not test their seriousness? After all, as another columnist in the International Herald Tribune stated a month ago, "no people are more acutely aware of the pains war brings than those who live in the European parts of the Soviet Union".

The fact is that there is a new wave of disarmament in Europe, growing stronger every week. It is in my view a serious psychological and political mistake to dismiss this movement, as several prominent statesmen and military leaders have done, as a new wave of "neutralism", however unrealistic and irrational their arguments and slogans may sometimes be. This way of reacting is, of course, a sign of the concern at these developments felt by these commentators, but it is also an indication that they have not understood well enough what the movement is all about. One example: a top NATO military leader declared in an interview a few weeks ago that "we again see anti-nuclear demonstrations, which we had hoped were a thing of the past". And he added that "the peoples of those nations must ... be prepared to make sacrifices for their security".

In fact, what the peoples of those nations, and many others as well, are preparing is a call to their leaders to remember the first paragraph of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament, adopted by the world community three years ago, from which the following sentences should be quoted.

"States have for a long time sought to maintain their security through the possession of arms."

"Yet the accumulation of weapons ... today constitutes much more a threat than a protection for the future of mankind."

"The time has therefore come ... to seek security in disarmament ..."

The new wave of disarmament means that the peoples have taken for granted what the leaders of the world agreed on three years ago. This growing wave -- is it an indication that the time has come for the idea of disarmament? Let us hope so. In any case it is a memento to be taken very seriously by all of us, but particularly by some of us.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Mrs. Inga Thorsson for her statement and for the kind words she has addressed to the Chair. Before I give the floor to the next speaker, I would like to rectify a lapse on my part by sincerely thanking Ambassador Onkelinx for the very kind sentiments he expressed to the Chair, both past and present.

Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): Mr. Chairman, at the outset let me congratulate you on your assumption of the important office of Chairman for the month of July. In expressing to you my best wishes I offer you the fullest co-operation of the Hungarian delegation. I also take this opportunity to welcome our new colleague, Ambassador Rodriguez Navarro, the distinguished representative of Venezuela, and wish him the best in our common and responsible activity. My words of welcome go also to Mrs. Thorsson, the distinguished Under-Secretary of State for Disarmament of Sweden, and to Sir Antony Acland, the distinguished Deputy Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom.

Although the Committee starts today the consideration of item 5, entitled: New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons, let me be permitted to deal first in a brief manner with some questions related to items 1 and 2 of our agenda.

Many delegations have underlined the responsibility of our Committee, as the single multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament, in connection with the present alarming situation which is characterized by the growing danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war. The reasons for this situation are well known: the decision of NATO to seek military superiority, the so-called doctrine of limited nuclear war, the decision to deploy medium-range nuclear missiles in western Europe and, let me add, the constant danger of a nuclear holocaust which could be caused by a technical failure or by human error.

Last week we all heard a moving statement by the head of the Soviet delegation on the terrifying consequences of a nuclear war, including its so-called limited version. As to the pretext advanced by the United States and its allies to justify their drive for military superiority, it has been time and again proved, both here in the Committee and elsewhere, as completely false. In the International Herald Tribune of 4-5 July, Mr. Stephen Cohen, Professor of Politics at Princeton University and a member of the American Committee on East-West Accord, joined his voice to that of many others criticizing the present policy course of the United States Administration and pinpointing the real cause of tensions in the world today and the factual motives of Washington in its rush for another headstart in the arms race. "The crisis", writes S. Cohen, "existed well before 1979, and the United States contributed significantly to it by violations of earlier détente promises to Moscow -- for example, promises of most-favoured-nation status in trade and credits, of ratification of SALT-II, and of an evenhanded policy toward China .." "That underlying cause", continues the author, "intuitively understood but almost never stated -- is the issue of political, not military, parity, or what may be called the parity principle." And he goes on to say: "Enthralled by 64 years of anti-Sovietism and by a long history of being the only superpower, many U.S. leaders and substantial segments of public opinion persist in seeing the Soviet Union mainly as 'godless', 'terroristic' and an 'evil force' without any legitimate political status or entitlement in the world... But it is this unwillingness to concede political parity that repeatedly causes U.S. diplomacy to succumb to militaristic policies, as acceptance of the necessity of military parity succumbs to the chimera of superiority, and episodes of détente succumb to cold war."

This is where the American shoe pinches.

Under the present dangerous circumstances the most important task is to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war, to curb the arms race in general and the nuclear arms race in particular. These lofty aims call for negotiations. In the nuclear age, in the shadow of a nuclear holocaust which could lead to the elimination of mankind and human civilization, there is no other method of solving the problems, however acute and complex they are.

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

In this connection the Hungarian people, Government and parliament attach special importance to the appeal of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union to the parliaments and peoples of the world. During the meeting of the Hungarian National Assembly on 25 June the speaker of this high body stated the following: "The Hungarian National Assembly declares its agreement with and support to the Soviet peace initiatives. It is convinced that by common efforts of the peoples and by effective actions of all peaceloving and reasonable forces it is possible to avert the dangers threatening the peace and security of mankind. As it has done so far, the Hungarian People's Republic will take part in the future in these initiatives and is ready to contribute to their realization".

The threefold maxims aimed at the prevention of a nuclear war and curbing the nuclear arms race could be characterized the following way: no more development of nuclear weapons; no more nuclear weapons tests, and no more deployment of nuclear weapons. My delegation shares the view expressed by many delegations that the Committee on Disarmament should start substantive negotiations on these vital issues if the Committee, or more precisely each member of the Committee, really adheres to the consensus reached during the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, as contained in the key paragraph 50 of its Final Document.

In connection with the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, I see no need to go into the details of how important this achievement would be for curbing the nuclear arms race, for strengthening the NPT régime and for the improvement of the international political climate. The Hungarian delegation supports the establishment of an ad hoc working group with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States aimed at the elaboration and adoption of a CTBT also with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States.

The comprehensive test-ban negotiations would be greatly and very favourably influenced by a one-year moratorium by all nuclear-weapon States. The Hungarian delegation, like many others, considers as very important the resumption of the trilateral negotiations, which were interrupted by the Western side in November 1980.

In connection with a CTB, my delegation attaches great importance to the work of the Ad Hoc Group of seismic experts in the work of which a Hungarian expert has actively participated. The results of the experts' work have already provided considerable ground for the establishment of an international seismic data exchange system within the framework of a treaty on a general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

Turning to agenda item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", the Hungarian delegation shares the view expressed by many delegations that negotiations on these issues are the best way to curb the nuclear arms race and to eliminate the danger of a nuclear war. It was with this lofty aim in mind that the delegations of a group of socialist countries already in 1979 submitted the well-known document CD/4 which contains proposals aimed at facilitating the earliest possible starting of negotiations on nuclear disarmament. To be quite frank, the Committee has lost more than two years: because of the opposition of some western countries, the Committee has not been able to start substantive negotiations on this vitally important issue.

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

Now we are confronting the same refusal of some western countries in connection with the establishment of an ad hoc working group on item 2 on our agenda. The Hungarian delegation supports the establishment of an ad hoc working group on nuclear disarmament, but, at the same time, is ready to consider any other constructive ideas for multilateral negotiations on this item. In this connection, my delegation looks forward with great interest to the proposals which will be submitted today by Ambassador Herder, the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic and expresses the hope that these proposals may facilitate the further work of our Committee on this vitally important issue. The participation of all nuclear-weapon States in the process aimed at the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament continues to be a prerequisite of meaningful negotiations.

In the field of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, special responsibilities are borne by the USSR and the United States. The Hungarian Government welcomed the signature of the SALT-II agreement, the ratification of which has been postponed indefinitely by the United States.

Hungary favours the resumption of the SALT negotiations, the sooner the better, and attaches great importance to the entry into force of the SALT-II agreement.

As is well known, the Soviet Union called for an early resumption of the SALT negotiations and for the continuation or the start of other talks on nuclear disarmament questions with the United States. But it looks as if some highly placed Administration officials are still not in a negotiating mood. Apart from the long delays which have been caused by them regarding such talks, they have adopted and steadfastly pursue linkage tactics. This dangerous approach actually boils down to a capricious condition: either the Soviet Union behaves like Washington wants it to or there will be no talks. Such tactics, which have been the subject of extensive and most unfavourable commentaries in the world press, are rightly causing great concern in the international community, particularly now that the global situation has been deteriorating. It is precisely because of growing tensions that talks on nuclear arms limitations should be resumed as soon as possible and not delayed under artificial pretexts. The socialist States, including the Soviet Union as well as non-aligned-countries, as is clear from the statement by their Foreign Ministers in New Delhi earlier this year, firmly believe that increased tensions in the world today demand more urgently than ever before a resumption of a constructive dialogue between the USSR and the United States on matters in question.

My delegation has already expressed its support for the establishment of two working groups on items 1 and 2 of our agenda. In connection with the possible mandates of these working groups, useful ideas have been put forward by the Group of socialist countries and by the Group of 21. These proposals require serious consideration and appropriate decision.

The Hungarian delegation attaches great importance to the prevention of the geographical spread of nuclear weapons. It was the Hungarian delegation which, on behalf of 16 delegations, submitted a draft resolution on this issue to the United Nations General Assembly at its last session. The draft resolution was adopted

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by an overwhelming majority. Resolution 35/156 C calls for our Committee to proceed without delay to talks with a view to elaborating an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of States where there are no such weapons at present. Unfortunately the Committee has not yet responded to this resolution in an appropriate manner, despite the growing importance and urgency of the matter.

I would now like to turn to item 5 of the Committee's agenda, "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons."

As members of the Committee will recall, it was the delegation of the Soviet Union which in 1975 submitted a proposal and a draft international agreement to the United Nations General Assembly aimed at effectively prohibiting new types of weapons of mass destruction. The importance and urgency of this question is clearly reflected in paragraph 77 of the Final Document of the General Assembly's first special session on disarmament which states: "In order to help prevent a qualitative arms race and so that scientific and technological achievements may ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes, effective measures should be taken to avoid the danger and prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements. Efforts should be appropriately pursued aiming at the prohibition of such new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction."

The Hungarian delegation continues to be convinced that the best organizational way to deal with these questions would be the establishment of an ad hoc group of qualified governmental experts, as proposed by the delegation of the Soviet Union early in 1978, and a comprehensive approach would be the best method for preventing the emergence of new weapons of mass destruction, in the form of a comprehensive agreement supplemented by individual agreements on particular types of new weapons of mass destruction.

At its last session the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution 35/149, which requests our Committee, "... in the light of its existing priorities, to continue negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, with a view to preparing a draft comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and to draft possible agreements on particular types of such weapons."

Unfortunately the CD has been prevented from dealing in an appropriate manner with these questions because of the reluctance of some countries. These delegations consider the problem of new weapons of mass destruction either as non-existent or as not urgent, despite the press reports on the development of new weapons of mass destruction. In this connection I would like to mention only the question of neutron weapons. The revival of the plans aimed at the production and deployment of neutron weapons in western Europe gives special importance and urgency to this question. The draft treaty

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in connection with the prohibition of neutron weapons submitted by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries already in 1978 under these circumstances must have more importance and actuality.

Led by the desire to promote the in-depth consideration of issues related to the question of the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction, and taking into account the differing approaches to the organizational aspects as well as to the basic approach to the substance of the question, the Hungarian delegation proposed, in document CD/174, the holding of informal meetings of the Committee on the prohibition of new weapons of mass destruction, with the participation of experts.

The Committee on Disarmament at its 133rd meeting, on 30 June, adopted a decision which says: "The Committee decides to hold informal meetings under item 5, New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons ... The number of these informal meetings and their dates will be announced by the Chairman after consultations with members". Since then, the Chairman of the Committee has announced that the two informal meetings on this subject will be held on 27 and 31 July.

On behalf of the Hungarian delegation I would like to express our thanks to delegations for supporting this modest Hungarian initiative and also to express the hope that many delegations will be assisted by experts when the Committee deals with this important question in the framework of informal consultations. These informal meetings offer a special opportunity for every delegation to address itself in connection with questions related to the prohibition of new weapons of mass destruction.

The Hungarian delegation is convinced that the Committee's informal meetings on this matter will be a step forward in the discharge of the responsibilities assigned to it in connection with the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Hungary for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): Mr. Chairman, our plenary meetings this week are devoted to a highly topical question -- the prohibition of the development and production of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. Since 1975 when the USSR advanced this proposal, it has been supported by my country. In doing so we have recognized the importance of such a step for halting the arms race. It would, especially, curb the qualitative arms race which not only is likely to destabilize the international military balance but also threatens to undermine negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament.

It stands to reason that the prohibition of existing weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, should be given highest priority in negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament. This direction of our efforts should be effectively complemented by a preventive prohibition of weapons of mass destruction which may be developed in the future, either on the basis of scientific and technological principles that are known today but have not yet been applied individually or jointly to develop weapons of mass destruction, or on the basis of scientific and technological principles that may be discovered in the future, and which will have properties similar to or more powerful than those of existing mass destruction weapons.

This what I would call double or parallel approach was reflected in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and in the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament. Why is it then, we may ask, that a comprehensive preventive agreement in this field has up to now not been achieved? Everybody here around this table knows the answer. It is too obvious that those who are not yet ready to prohibit and eliminate existing weapons of mass destruction are also not prepared to bar future developments in military research and development from the exploitation of which they expect to obtain unilateral military advantages.

Instead of playing an active and constructive part in elaborating appropriate instruments to close the road to the development of new weapons of mass destruction, some delegations here have chosen the opposite course. It has been argued that the subject of the Soviet proposal was unclear, and that a prohibition on this subject would hamper the freedom of science and could not be adequately verified.

As to the scope of the prohibition, since 1976 a whole range of interesting ideas and proposals have been advanced in the course of the deliberations held in this Committee. This concerns a general definition of new weapons of mass destruction, on the one hand, and concrete examples of such weapons, on the other. At the same time it is obvious that one cannot expect to have already today a 100 per cent foolproof definition and an exhaustive list of weapons which should be the subject of preventive action. Demanding this would mean postponing such a step endlessly and letting the qualitative arms race go on. Nobody today is in a position to foresee concrete future developments which may lead to the creation of new weapons. Very often even great scientists have misinterpreted the pace and directions of the use of science and technology for military purposes. The opinion of Ernest Rutherford concerning nuclear energy was already mentioned here some days ago. Let me quote some other examples. Thus, Dr. Vannevar Bush,

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one of America's most well-known scientists during the Second World War, maintained that the ICBM was a technical impossibility. During the 1950s some scientists believed that manned spaceflight should be abandoned because "the human system could not survive its rigours".

Thus the experience of mankind fully speaks in favour of a comprehensive agreement. Already today such dangerous weapon concepts as particle beam weapons, infrasonic weapons, electromagnetic radiation weapons, ethnic weapons, etc., are entering the stage of feasibility. I do not intend to elaborate on them. This should be done by appropriate experts. Let me only briefly touch upon the so-called particle beam weapons. Particle beams are streams of highly energetic atomic or subatomic sized particles like electrons, protons, hydrogen atoms or ions, which can burn, melt or fracture the target and generate secondary radiation. According to some American sources such weapons could be ready for military use in the early to mid 1990s. They are expected to revolutionize warfare. It is no secret that corresponding long-range military programmes are under way in the United States of America. Generally it is emphasized that particle beam weapons should be used for defensive purposes against such targets as satellites and missiles. Very often it is forgotten that they could have a mass destruction capability against biological targets as well. Such a weapon could be space-based and operate like a large-scale neutron bomb. In this context a United States official was quoted as saying, "This would destroy a population without breaking a single brick."

It has sometimes been argued that an international agreement on the prohibition of new weapons of mass destruction would hamper the freedom of scientific research. We do not share this perception. It is not the aim of the proposal to block the peaceful uses of new scientific findings. It is their military use that should be prohibited; i.e. States parties to an agreement on this subject would establish and implement appropriate rules to forestall certain military misuses of scientific findings. I think nobody today complains that the Convention relating to biological weapons hampers the peaceful uses of biological findings.

In past debates the question of verification has also been brought up. It is surely too early to dwell upon verification at this stage. Detailed verification arrangements could be agreed upon after the scope of the prohibition is established. But there will be a broad range of possibilities for coping with this question. A verification system could use such means as internal constitutional procedures, analysis of scientific literature, national technical means of verification, international exchange of information and other international procedures. It is widely recognized that an adequate combination of these means would make the detection of new weapon developments very likely, especially when they enter the test stage or the stage of production.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

After all, the question of a practical approach to the prohibition of new weapons of mass destruction should be given an answer. Here we see great merit in setting up an ad hoc group of experts. Such a group could consider possible areas of development of new weapons of mass destruction and elaborate a general definition of such weapons to be included in an international instrument. Thus, an adequate scientific approach to this highly complex problem would be assured. Its study by appropriate scientific experts would allow the CD to concentrate on its main task, i.e. the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

Having said this, I would like to express the disappointment of my delegation that some delegations from the Western group are not yet prepared to join a consensus on the establishment of such an expert group which, for the time being, would only have the modest aim of exploring the areas mentioned. This is especially regrettable because only one or two years ago even some Western delegations favoured an expert examination of the question of new weapons of mass destruction. We do not know what has changed their position so fast. But how else than by means of constructive negotiations can the question of new weapons of mass destruction be explored and solved?

As for the format of a possible international instrument in this field, we prefer a comprehensive agreement prohibiting once and for all the development and production of new weapons and systems of mass destruction. Such an agreement could contain a list of individual types of new mass destruction weapons, which could subsequently be amended following scientific development. At the same time we are prepared to conclude special agreements on individual types of new weapons of mass destruction, as is the case with radiological weapons. Thus, there could be a general framework treaty and more detailed agreements concluded subsequently. As a useful precedent we regard the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons and its protocols.

Let me once again appeal especially to those delegations coming from highly industrialized countries to send their experts to the forthcoming informal meetings and to play a constructive role in solving the problems connected with the prohibition of new weapons of mass destruction. At the same time we should not lose sight of the fact that this question should also be addressed in an appropriate manner within the framework of the comprehensive programme of disarmament since it is an indispensable part of a comprehensive approach to arms limitation and disarmament.

The German Democratic Republic regards an international agreement on the prohibition of radiological weapons as a useful means to stop the development of one new weapon of mass destruction. Furthermore, such an agreement would be a valuable contribution to the forthcoming second special session of the

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General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Therefore the Ad Hoc Working Group should expedite its work in order to finish the draft treaty and thereby allow the Committee to concentrate on its main items. During the first part of this session the Ad Hoc Working Group made some headway under the efficient leadership of its chairman, Ambassador Komives of Hungary. We highly appreciate the consolidated text submitted by him in April. In our opinion it constitutes the basis for elaborating the final draft treaty.

With regard to items 1 and 2 of the Committee's agenda I would like to say the following. My delegation has followed very attentively the consideration by the Committee of these main items during the spring session and the first part of the summer session. In the same way, I am sure, as many other delegations here, we came to the conclusion that the Committee must not allow itself to be paralysed in its proceeding to the crucial questions of its mandate. It should exhaust all its possibilities to make at least some headway before the second special session.

With regard to a comprehensive test-ban, there are two main problems involved. Firstly, we favour the earliest possible resumption of the trilateral talks with the aim of completing the task the three negotiators set before themselves four years ago. Secondly, we would like to see a more active involvement of the CD in the solution of problems connected with a complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

The views of the German Democratic Republic as well as of other socialist countries on this issue have been repeatedly stated. As we understand it, the Group of 21 maintains the same approach. I would like to draw your attention to document CPD/WP.36 which in particular says: "The Committee on Disarmament should undertake without further delay multilateral negotiations on a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Such a treaty should aim at the general and complete cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons by all States in all environments for all time to come". The tripartite negotiators have determined their attitudes to this proposal. Out of them, only the Soviet Union has expressed its readiness to participate in the consideration of the issue concerning a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests by all States in all environments for all time to come. We would like to put a question to the two nuclear-weapon States outside the trilateral negotiations. As we understand it, they seem to be ready to join a consensus on the establishment of an ad hoc working group. It is not clear to us, however, if they are ready to take part in elaborating a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and to assume appropriate obligations. We ask for a response to our questions. Their reply will largely determine the destiny of further efforts made by the Committee as regards the issue of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. My delegation sees especially two advantages in a multilateral approach to a CTB in the framework of an ad hoc working group. Firstly, all nuclear-weapon States could explain their concrete approach to such a step which they subscribed to at the

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first special session on disarmament. And what is more, they could contribute in a practical way to its achievement. Secondly, through the involvement of non-nuclear-weapon States a truly multilateral CTBT could be considered. The proposals tabled by the Group of 21 in document CD/181 we regard as a useful basis for the elaboration of a mandate for an ad hoc working group on a CTB.

At our last informal meeting on Tuesday, 2 July, I proposed to submit today a proposal of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic on further actions concerning item 2 of the Committee's agenda. In line with this I would ask you, Mr. Chairman, to distribute as a formal CD document the paper my delegation has just tabled. In this working paper we have tried to give an assessment of the consideration of item 2 during the first part of our 1981 session. We deem the informal meetings held in March and April to have played a useful role. But no practical conclusion leading to the commencement of actual negotiations was reached. Just at this point the CD should proceed with further actions the aim of which should be the preparation of substantive negotiations. Therefore my delegation proposes that you, Mr. Chairman, initiate consultations, in particular with the delegations of the five nuclear-weapon States, individually or together, to clarify their approach to the practical preparation of substantive negotiations. In particular those nuclear-weapon States which have until now opposed the creation of an ad hoc working group could come out with their alternatives. It is our hope that the informal character of such consultations would be very much conducive to building up further momentum concerning the commencement of negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. After these consultations you, Mr. Chairman, could report your conclusions to the Committee to allow a formal decision on its further proceeding. If you come to the conclusion that there is sufficient common ground to go ahead, we could find the appropriate forum in which to solve questions connected with the start of concrete negotiations. Such questions have been raised by delegations in different documents.

In the view of my delegation the following substantive and organizational questions should, inter alia, be addressed in a structural manner and within the framework of the preparation of negotiations on item 2:

What could be the concrete approach to the implementation of the stages of nuclear disarmament envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament?

What parallel steps are necessary to strengthen the international political and legal guarantees of States?

What could be the role of the Committee on Disarmament?

What should be the relationship to other negotiations dealing with questions of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament?

As to the form of such deliberations -- ad hoc working group, contact group, structured informal meetings, etc. -- my delegation is very flexible.

If, on the other hand, you, Mr. Chairman, come to the conclusion that there is no possibility of proceeding in this way we should confess our inability to cope with our main item and state this as well as the reasons for it in our report to the General Assembly at its second special session on disarmament.

Mr. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, in my capacity as co-ordinator of the Group of 21 I have the honour to read out a statement, but before doing so I should like to offer a word of praise to the Secretariat and particularly to its documentation service for the expediency with which this document (CD/192) was processed.

"STATEMENT OF THE GROUP OF 21

(Item 1: Nuclear test ban)

"The Group of 21 deeply regrets that its proposal on the establishment of an ad hoc working group of the Committee on Disarmament on item 1 of the agenda, first formulated specifically in document CD/72, dated 4 March 1980, and reiterated most recently in document CD/181, dated 24 April 1981, has not yet been the subject of a decision, despite the urgency of the issue and the consistent interest and effort of the Group.

"The Group of 21 firmly believes that the general aspects of the question of the Nuclear Test Ban, as well as technical issues related thereto, have been exhaustively and thoroughly discussed and studied. The results of such discussions and studies, together with the many General Assembly resolutions dealing with the matter, clearly indicate that the commencement of multilateral negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on this priority item are long overdue. The Committee on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on questions of disarmament, is the appropriate forum for such negotiations.

"Accordingly, the Group of 21 requests that the proposal contained in document CD/181, which includes the establishment of an ad hoc working group on item 1 of the agenda and the formulation of its mandate, be taken up by the Committee at its next official meeting for a decision.

"If, contrary to what could reasonably be expected, it were not possible to reach a positive decision, the Group believes that it would be necessary to examine what further steps should be taken by the Committee to ensure that its Rules of Procedure are not used in such a way as to prevent the Committee from taking procedural decisions enabling it to conduct negotiations on the items included on its annual agenda.

"The Group of 21 expects further that the parties to the trilateral negotiations should give careful consideration and provide, jointly or individually, an adequate response to the questions submitted in document CD/181 which raise some issues of deep concern and legitimate interest to the world community."

Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, it is a matter of satisfaction to see you presiding over the work of the Committee in this month of July when a substantial part of our work for the 1981 session will be done. Your well-known competence and diplomatic skill, coupled with the untiring efforts of your delegation and your country in the cause of peace and disarmament, will no doubt assist the Committee and advance its work. My delegation pledges its fullest co-operation with you in the discharge of your onerous task. Your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Komives of Hungary, deserves our gratitude and appreciation for the very able manner in which he steered the work of the Committee to a successful take-off in the month of June. May I also welcome to the Committee the distinguished Ambassadors, Ambassador Carasales of Argentina, Ambassador Jalali of Iran, Ambassador Jayakoddy of Sri Lanka and Ambassador Rodríguez Navarro of Venezuela.

Before I speak on the subject of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons and in particular radiological weapons allow me to address a few words to the two most central and priority questions before this Committee, namely, a nuclear test ban, and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The intensity of the consideration of these two items underscores the importance of these questions not only as indicated in the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, but also as a direct response to the legitimate concerns of the international community over the increasing nuclear arms race and the daily threat of a nuclear war. No one in this Committee can deny the importance and the urgency attached to these questions, and the need to initiate substantive multilateral negotiations as indicated in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament.

Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind, and to international peace and security. However, despite the concern of the international community against the irrationality of the race for the development and deployment of sophisticated nuclear weapons, despite the statements made in this Committee, the arms race continues unabated. My country, a non-aligned and developing country, firmly believes that the arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspects, runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tension, to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding on the basis of the new international economic order.

It is a matter of regret and dissatisfaction therefore that the Committee on Disarmament, the single multilateral negotiating body, has not been able to initiate substantive negotiations on these two very important items. The reasons, of course, are well-known. Two of the five nuclear-weapon States sitting in this Committee have not been able to join the consensus which almost exists within the Committee for the establishment of the relevant working groups. It is very frustrating that those nuclear-weapon States should continue to hold back the work of the Committee owing to what I believe are their narrow security perceptions. This development is certainly not a good omen for negotiations within the Committee, yet it is expected that the Committee on Disarmament should make a positive contribution to the achievement of general and complete disarmament through the early conclusion of agreements on the urgent disarmament measures listed in

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

paragraph 50 of the Final Document, as well as the conclusion of a treaty on the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States. The responsibility of the CD for making progress on the accomplishment of these tasks becomes more pressing as we enter the Second Disarmament Decade and approach the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament scheduled for 1982.

My delegation remains convinced that working groups provide the most effective mechanism for negotiations in this Committee. This is why we would like to recall and fully endorse the proposals of the Group of 21 contained in documents CD/180 and 181, and support the call that this Committee should examine those proposals in detail and take concrete decisions on them. We have for some time held informal meetings on these two subjects. If further informal meetings are to be productive, then the discussions should be arranged to address specific issues relating to the general subjects under agenda items 1 and 2. In view of the time factor and the fundamental importance of item 1, in particular, it is my belief that some priority consideration should be given to that item. Ambassador de Souza e Silva this morning read a statement on that item on behalf of the Group of 21; needless to say, my delegation fully associates itself with that statement. The three nuclear-weapon States which were engaged in separate negotiations -- we no longer presume that those negotiations are in progress -- should respond, either collectively or individually, to the pertinent questions that were raised in document CD/181 so that we may know why the call for an early conclusion of their negotiations and the submission of the treaty to the CD has not been heeded up to date. It is pertinent also in this connection to recall the proposal made by the distinguished representative of Pakistan that a structured discussion on the issues of scope, verification and the final clauses of a nuclear test ban treaty should be undertaken. This is a constructive proposal and we hope that it will be considered with all the seriousness it deserves by the Committee.

As regards the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, my delegation continues to find unacceptable the delay in the work caused by the reasoning that nuclear weapons act as a deterrent to war and that we should therefore learn to live with a continuous increase in these weapons. The reverse, we believe, is the case, as the accumulation of such weapons, and indeed the competitiveness of the arms build-up, is by itself a source of insecurity to the major military Powers and to the world at large. The doctrines of deterrence, strategic balance and parity are all based on the narrow security interests of the nuclear-weapon States which fail to take into consideration the vital security interests of all States. It is a fact that the more nuclear-weapon Powers there are, the greater is the probability of a nuclear war the consequences of which will affect belligerents and non-belligerents alike. And by the same token the greater the quality and quantity of nuclear weapons, the greater the risk of nuclear war, either by deliberate calculation or by accident.

Here again my delegation fully endorses the proposals which have been made by the Group of 21 regarding the mandate of the proposed working group on item 2 of our agenda. The elaboration and identification of substantive issues in paragraph 50 of the Final Document would provide an appropriate basis for multilateral negotiations. The basic factors which have been accepted by all as prerequisites for effective nuclear disarmament negotiation include the undiminished security of all States at progressively lower levels of existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States; adequate measures of verification; negotiations in stages, and the special responsibility devolving on the two nuclear-weapon States with the largest arsenals.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

These basic factors have been accepted and reflected in the consensus document that emanated from the first special session on disarmament and therefore should not raise any difficulty. While we agree with the multilateral negotiation of nuclear disarmament measures in stages, emphasis would no doubt have to be placed on the cessation of the qualitative and quantitative improvement in the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States. Otherwise, scientific and technological advances could render disarmament negotiations ineffective, if not irrelevant, as we have seen in the past.

In an address to the inaugural meeting of the third United Nations Fellowship Programme on Disarmament, I observed that certain Governments perpetuate the myth that the more heavily armed a country is the greater is its security. I use the word myth because the proposition in my view ignores the competitiveness which increased armaments in the possession of one super-Power provoke in the other super-Power. It ignores the competitiveness which increased armaments in the possession of one alliance provoke in the other alliance. It ignores the competitiveness which increased armaments in the possession of one regional Power or even one country in a region provokes in another regional Power or in another country within the same region. Such competition gathers its own momentum; it becomes, as we now see, a way of life, and yet we know that this competition, whatever else it may do, certainly does not assure the security of any of the States concerned although the question of security is the ostensible reason which is used to justify this mad race.

Anyone who listened to the facts about the effects of a nuclear war so eloquently given by Ambassador Issraelyan of the USSR at the 134th plenary meeting, on Thursday, 2 July 1981, would not only insist that the Committee get down to concrete negotiations on nuclear disarmament but would also, in the words of another very distinguished international civil servant, the Commonwealth Secretary-General, Mr. Ramphal, wonder at "the false rationality which has overtaken reason", in which "theories of institutionalized deterrence, of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, of global war and theatre war, all underpinned by the doctrine of mutual assured destruction -- very appropriately termed 'MAD' -- are aired and promoted with cool detachment to enlarge the overkill capacity which already exists".

Indeed, if the present trend in research and development continues, it may become impossible to control and verify any agreement which may subsequently be reached.

The present situation in the Committee on Disarmament, which is nothing short of a stalemate, has to be broken very soon as it is affecting the morale even of those of us who sit in the Committee, not to talk of the great disappointment of those who come to observe our work. How long can we continue to invoke the complexity of disarmament issues when even the marginal observer of our work knows that we just do not seem to be trying.

Allow me now to offer some brief comments on the item on our agenda for this week. In the statement I made to the plenary on 14 April 1981, I indicated that the early conclusion of a radiological weapons convention would give further impetus to other disarmament negotiations, and would be a positive contribution by the CD to an appropriate atmosphere for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. I also indicated my delegation's preference for a broad and comprehensive text that would contain explicit provisions on nuclear disarmament

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

and the peaceful uses of radioactive materials for the economic and social development of all countries but particularly the developing countries. My delegation is happy to note that the Ad Hoc Working Group, under the leadership of Ambassador Komives, continues to try to reconcile views and proposals made by various delegations on the substantive issues of scope and definition.

Mention should be made of the Swedish proposal that the scope of a future convention should include the prohibition of radiological warfare and the protection of nuclear facilities from attacks. The proposal seems to my delegation the more relevant in the light of the recent unprecedented Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear facility. This act of aggression has received world-wide condemnation, including that of my own Government. The joint statement of the Group of 21 contained in document CD/187 also fully conveys the views of my delegation. I should also indicate that I fully agree with the concluding part of the statement made on 2 July 1981 by Ambassador Herder of the German Democratic Republic, as follows:

"... this act of State-directed terrorism should make those countries which closely collaborate with Israel in the nuclear field review their policy in that respect and take appropriate sanctions against the aggressor. Thereby, legitimate non-proliferation concerns can be met. Otherwise, we fear, such an aggressive régime as the apartheid clique in Pretoria will be encouraged tomorrow to attack nuclear facilities in African countries under the pretext of 'securing its survival'."

Let me quickly add that in urging the Committee on Disarmament to conclude work on the radiological weapons convention, I do not wish to be misunderstood as overrating the importance of such a convention. It should be disposed of, however, partly -- and this is quite significant -- partly to make available the time now used by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons for what we believe to be more important subjects. I believe that if the Committee on Disarmament is to contribute as much as it is potentially capable of doing to the second special session on disarmament, then it will have to conclude agreements not only of a preventive nature, on non-existent weapons, but also of a positive disarmament nature on existing weapons. Given the political will of member States, especially those that have so far held back, I believe that the Committee on Disarmament may yet be able to avoid the inevitable criticism of its performance at the second special session on disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Nigeria for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. Before I give the floor to the next speaker, I would like to consult delegations on the question of time for including all the five remaining speakers on our list for this morning. In view of the fact that this afternoon the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament has already been scheduled, I would like to put before the Committee the following alternatives: we could either continue tomorrow afternoon at a plenary meeting and schedule the informal meeting for the remaining time, or we could suggest that the remaining speakers, at the end of this morning's session defer their statements until next Tuesday, when the regular plenary meeting is scheduled.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I understand your well-founded concern, Mr. Chairman, as five speakers have yet to take the floor. I should like to propose the following -- that the representative of Mongolia, and, if there is still time, the following speaker, the representative of Czechoslovakia, should be allowed to make their statements. The Soviet delegation, for its part, in accordance with the policy of unilateral steps and mutual example which the Soviet Union, as you know, follows in disarmament questions also, requests that its name should be moved to the list of speakers for Tuesday morning, and it calls on other delegations in a similar position to follow our example.

Mr. FEIN (Netherlands): Mr. Chairman, in line with the Netherlands' policy of reciprocating any unilateral step, we will agree with the proposal of the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union.

The CHAIRMAN: If there is time for the representatives of Mongolia and Czechoslovakia to make their statements, there would still be one other delegation which is on the list of speakers for today. May I take it that the distinguished representative of Romania has no objection to the procedure agreed to by his two colleagues, namely, to speak on Tuesday? Thank you very much, Ambassador Malita. It is therefore decided.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, we are glad to welcome you, the distinguished representative of India -- a country with which the Mongolian People's Republic is linked by bonds of long-standing friendship and close co-operation -- as the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of July. The Mongolian delegation expresses the hope that under your guidance the work of the Committee on Disarmament will move forward towards the achievement of the desired results.

I should like to note with particular satisfaction the important contribution made towards the Committee's activities by your predecessor, the esteemed Ambassador of Hungary, Comrade I. Kómives. His energetic and active efforts were largely responsible for the successful solution of a number of organizational problems in the month of June.

Allow me to extend a sincere welcome to our new colleagues in the Committee, the representatives of Sri Lanka, Iran, Argentina and Venezuela, and to wish them every success in their important mission.

The Mongolian delegation, like many others, attaches paramount importance to the starting of real negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on the question of ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed. That does not mean that we underestimate the importance of negotiations on questions relating to new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and especially radiological weapons, on the discussion of which the Committee has embarked this week.

In this statement I should therefore like to concentrate once more on the question of nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

Committee members are well aware that a group of socialist countries took the initiative of proposing that negotiations should be started on ending the production of nuclear weapons and destroying them. That proposal was presented formally in document CD/4 of 1 February 1979, which contains concrete suggestions by the sponsors regarding the subject of negotiations, the stages and timing of negotiations and preparations for them. With respect to timing, the sponsors proposed that the preparatory consultations should be started at once, with a view to beginning the negotiations on the substance of the problem that very year -- in 1979.

In the same proposal, the socialist countries once more reaffirmed and emphasized their steadfast view that agreement on this important problem can be reached only provided there is strict observance of the principle of the inviolability of the parties' security. The sponsors of the proposal also stressed that the elaboration and implementation of measures in the field of nuclear disarmament should be buttressed by the parallel strengthening of political and international legal guarantees of the security of States. They especially emphasized that appropriate negotiations should be conducted with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States without exception, as well as of a certain number of non-nuclear weapon States, and that the Committee on Disarmament therefore offered a suitable forum for preparing and conducting negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

We are regretfully obliged to note that the Committee on Disarmament is now engaged in its third session since the well-known proposal by the group of socialist countries was placed before it, but still no progress has been made on this matter.

To be fair, it should also be noted that during this period, first at the informal consultations and later at both informal and formal meetings of the Committee, there has been a useful exchange of views in the course of which the sponsors of document CD/4 have given detailed explanations of their position of principle on the matter and have replied to questions of interest to individual members of the Committee.

More recently, the Group of 21 has submitted proposals for the establishment of ad hoc working groups for the consideration of items 1 and 2 of the agenda -- proposals which have been supported by the delegations of socialist countries. As you know, these proposals have met with objections on the part of certain nuclear-weapon States.

As you know, too, the delegations of socialist countries have also made a number of other concrete proposals, including a proposal for the establishment of a working group to consider the important and urgent problem of the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of States where there are none at present, and a proposal for the establishment of a group of experts to consider the question of the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. These are only two of the various suggestions and proposals put forward by the group of socialist countries in the Committee on Disarmament.

However, for reasons we all know, negotiations on the substance of the question of ending the production of nuclear weapons and destroying them have not yet begun in this forum. We have never denied the positive developments in the activities of the Committee on Disarmament. On the contrary, we have always noted and we again emphasize the importance of maintaining in the future the business-like trend that has appeared in the Committee's work.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

Unfortunately, the constructive spirit shown in the Committee has come up against opposition from certain delegations which have attempted to poison the business-like atmosphere of the negotiations and to intrude into the Committee's work questions which bear no relation to its activities, as happened, for example, during the spring part of its 1980 session. In saying this we do not wish in any way to dramatize the occurrence of undesirable situations of this kind in the Committee. Now as before, we are for a business-like and constructive approach to the substance of the problems before us and for the manifestation of political will and determination in seeking ways of achieving genuine results in the difficult task of solving urgent problems in the sphere of the limitation of the arms race and disarmament.

In this connection, I should like to draw attention to document CD/182 containing a statement of a group of socialist countries, including Mongolia, on the results of the first part of the 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament. I do not think that it is necessary for me to dwell in detail on the contents of that document. It states clearly and unequivocally its sponsors' positions on all the main items on the Committee's agenda, as well as on other urgent problems.

I should like to supplement the above by saying that Mongolia's supreme legislative body, the Great People's Khural, addressed a message some days ago to the parliaments and peoples of all countries of Asia and the Pacific Ocean. The message contains an appeal for united efforts in the struggle to avert the threat of war, to establish a durable peace and to develop mutually advantageous co-operation among States. It reaffirms Mongolia's firm support for the proposal to convert the region of south-east Asia and the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace and co-operation and for the proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Pacific and the elaboration of confidence-building measures in the Far East.

The message emphasizes that Mongolia, for its part, has proposed the conclusion of a convention on mutual non-aggression and the non-use of force in relations among States of Asia and the Pacific Ocean and the convening for that purpose of a conference of the countries of those regions, to which all permanent members of the Security Council could be invited.

As you know, this proposal by Mongolia was formulated in the foreign policy programme enunciated in the decisions of the eighteenth congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party which was held recently.

Reaffirming the Mongolian People's devotion to the lofty ideals of peace, détente and disarmament, our Party Congress proclaimed in its decisions that the Mongolian People's Republic, in close co-operation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, would:

"Actively and consistently pursue the policy of consolidating détente and improving the international situation;

Promote in every way the implementation of the peace initiatives advanced by the XXVI Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as a follow-up to the Peace Programme;

(Mr. Erdenbileg, Mongolia)

Support the efforts of peace-loving States to curb the arms race and adopt effective measures in the field of military détente and disarmament;

Contribute within the framework of the United Nations and other international organizations to efforts aimed at finding constructive solutions to the pressing problems of today;

Contribute in every way to strengthening peace and security in Asia through joint efforts of Asian States;

Work for a further expansion of the political dialogue and equal co-operation in various fields with the countries of Asia."

(Document CD/189)

In giving a detailed description of the foreign policy line adopted by the Mongolian People's Republic I am prompted by the fact that many of the proposals and initiatives in the field of disarmament put forward by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have a direct connection with the work of the Committee on Disarmament.

In his report to the eighteenth congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the MPRP, President of the Presidium of the Great People's Khural of the Mongolian People's Republic, Comrade Yu Tsedenbal said: "An important part in the implementation of the foreign policy of the Mongolian People's Republic is played by our activities in the United Nations, the Committee on Disarmament and other international organizations. In those organizations, our country, together with the Soviet Union and other States of the socialist community, is actively working for a positive solution to the key problems of our time, including problems connected with the deepening of détente, the strengthening of universal peace and security, the halting of the arms race and the adoption of effective measures in the sphere of disarmament".

As an Asian State, the Mongolian People's Republic, together with other peace-loving countries, is deeply concerned at the serious aggravation of the situation in the vast Asian continent, the growth of centres of tension and conflict as a result of the stepping-up of attempts by imperialist and hegemonist forces to revive militarism and knock together a new military and political alliance, and to expand "strategic partnership" through deliveries of United States offensive weapons.

During the period since the Second World War there have been more wars and conflicts in Asia than in any other region of the world.

The tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are still fresh in the memories of the peoples of that great continent. The horrors of the Korean war, when bacteriological means of destruction were used, have not been forgotten. The wounds are not yet fully healed that were inflicted upon heroic Viet Nam by repeated foreign aggression, in the course of which extensive use was made of chemical weapons, napalm and other pernicious means of destroying the peaceful population and the environment.

The crisis in the Near East is being exacerbated every day. An attempt has been made to test the reliability of "rapid deployment forces" in the area of the Persian Gulf, with results that are known to all.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

In that connection I should like to mention the recent savage bombing raid carried out by the Israeli air force against a nuclear research centre in Iraq, which has been widely condemned in many countries throughout the world, including Mongolia. This act of international terrorism and tyranny, elevated by Israel to the status of State policy, has been resolutely condemned in the Committee on Disarmament and other forums as a flagrant violation of the norms of international law.

As for the policies and actions of those who inject tensions into the international atmosphere and nurture military ideas of various kinds concerning the possibility of waging "limited nuclear warfare", they represent a direct challenge to the vital interests of the peoples of Asia and the whole world.

Tens of hundreds of millions of people today, and not in the countries of Asia alone, are in acute need of better food and housing and of a solution to the pressing problems of development.

That is why it is essential to find a speedy solution to the most burning problem of our time, that of nuclear disarmament.

In the Mongolian People's Republic, whose working people are at present solemnly commemorating the glorious sixtieth anniversary of the establishment of people's power, exceptional importance is attached to the cause of the relaxation of international tensions, the achievement of practical measures towards the halting of the arms race and disarmament, and the preservation of peace and security in Asia and throughout the world.

It is precisely for this reason that the Mongolian Parliament unanimously supported the recent appeal of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the Parliaments and peoples of the world, saying that the appeal represents a passionate call for energetic and immediate action to curb the nuclear weapons race and to solve outstanding international problems by the only sensible method, that of negotiations.

In conclusion, I should like to make some observations on the question of the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

The Mongolian People's Republic has from the first advocated the comprehensive solution of this urgent problem, and is still doing so, convinced that only such an approach can help to limit the possibility of the further qualitative refinement of nuclear weapons.

It was, after all, the failure to deal with this problem comprehensively that made possible the emergence of a new generation of weapons of mass destruction, namely, nuclear weapons. A serious danger lies in the existence of forces which, taking advantage of the absence of a comprehensive solution of this problem, are seeking to achieve the further improvement of this weapon of mass destruction in order to secure a unilateral superiority.

Hence the urgent need for the earliest possible elaboration and implementation, with the participation of all nuclear-weapon Powers without exception, of an international agreement prohibiting all nuclear-weapon tests. Such an agreement would make it possible to take practical measures to prevent the further improvement of these weapons of mass destruction.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

The Mongolian delegation is of the view that a situation must not be allowed to recur in which one or two nuclear-weapon Powers or a number of so-called near-nuclear States will again stand aside from an international agreement on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. That is why, together with other delegations of socialist countries, we firmly advocate that all nuclear-weapon States without exception should become parties to any future agreement. This means that a comprehensive prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is possible only with the participation of all States possessing nuclear weapons.

At the Committee's meeting this morning, Ambassador G. Herder, the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic, has submitted a working document containing a business-like proposal for breaking the deadlock in the consideration of the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

The Mongolian delegation, whose position is very close to that of the Group of 21 and which supports the ideas advanced in documents CD/180 and CD/181, considers that in the present situation of a lack of consensus on the question of the establishment of an ad hoc working group, the Committee should use all available possibilities in order to ensure the preparation of negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

The Mongolian delegation, together with other socialist countries, fully supports the proposal of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic that the Chairman should hold consultations involving the representatives of the five nuclear-weapon States to determine the future forms and methods of the start of negotiations and to work out what specific questions shall form the subject of discussion at such negotiations.

We should now like to hear something from the other participants in the future negotiations, and in particular the representatives of the other four nuclear-weapon States, including the two nuclear-weapon States not participating in the tripartite negotiations. We wonder whether this time they will show any willingness. If it again proves impossible to achieve a consensus, the majority of the Committee will once more be perfectly aware of the essential reasons which are preventing this multilateral negotiating body from embarking on a concrete examination of the most urgent priority issue of halting the nuclear weapons race and nuclear disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Mongolia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I am glad to announce that, in view of the lateness of the hour, the distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia has also kindly agreed to defer his statement to next Tuesday's plenary meeting. We deeply appreciate his gesture.

May I now know if any other delegations would like to take the floor? If there are none, I would like to draw the Committee's attention to the informal paper circulated by the secretariat containing a timetable for meetings to be held by the Committee on Disarmament and its subsidiary bodies during the week of 13 to 17 July 1981. Distinguished delegates will recall that, at our informal meeting on 3 July, I suggested a timetable for informal meetings during the month of July, which was accepted by the Committee. In accordance with that recommendation, informal meetings to be held on 13 and 17 July will be devoted to the consideration of questions relating to the organization of work which are mentioned in the statement of the Chairman at the 129th plenary meeting, at the time of the adoption of the Programme of Work for the second part of the session. If there is no objection, I will consider that the Committee accepts this timetable on the understanding that it is indicative and that we can make adjustments as we proceed.

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, I have, of course, no objection to the programme of work which you have outlined for the meetings of the Committee and the working groups for next week. However, I do have a question which I would like to pose at this point. This concerns, firstly, the manner in which you propose to proceed with regard to the further consideration of items 1 and 2. I believe that the Group of 21 has just made a proposal with regard to the formal consideration of document CD/181 and we have also received a proposal from the German Democratic Republic regarding item 2. I think we would all be happy to know how you would like to proceed on that matter. Secondly, I would be grateful to be informed of your intentions regarding the further consideration of the proposal made by my delegation regarding the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear facilities.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, the Soviet delegation, the delegation of the Netherlands, the delegation of Romania and the delegation of Czechoslovakia have obligingly renounced delivering their addresses. We proceeded on the assumption that you were closing the meeting, and therefore if you intend to continue the discussion I request the floor in order to read out my statement; it is true that it is 15 pages long, but I shall be obliged to do this. I request that you immediately close the meeting, and that all organizational matters, including those raised by the representative of Pakistan, should be discussed tomorrow at the informal meeting. I ask you to decide to close the meeting immediately or to give the floor to the next speaker for our work to continue.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of the USSR and would like to assure him that the intention is not to continue our deliberations but to decide upon some of the procedural aspects which I have raised. I would like also to tell the distinguished representative of Pakistan that the points he has raised are fully engaging the attention of the Chair and that decisions on this will be announced shortly.

If there are no further comments, I would now like to take it that the programme of work, as I have outlined it, is accepted. I have seven speakers for our next plenary meeting, on Tuesday, 14 July 1981, including those delegations which agreed to defer their statements to that meeting. I would like to invite any other delegations wishing to speak on that occasion to inscribe their names as soon as possible. I may add that Switzerland has also indicated its intention to speak next Tuesday on chemical weapons.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 14 July, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.