FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FOURTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Ceneva, on Thursday, 2 July 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN (India)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. M. MATI Mr. M. MEDKOUR Argentina: Mr. C. CARASALES Mr. J.M. OTEGUI Miss N. NASCIMBENE Australia: Mr. R.A. WALKER Mr. R. STEELE Belgium: Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE Brazil: Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV Mr. I. SOTIROV Mr. R. DEYANOV Mr. P. POPTCHEV Burma: U NGWE WIN Canada: Mr. G. SKINNER China: Mr. YU Peiwen Mr. YU Mengjia Mr. SA Benwang Cuba: Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. RUZEK Mr. P. LUKES Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN Miss W. BASSIM

Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

Ethiopia:

Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE France: Mr. M. COUTHURES Miss L. GHAZERIAN German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER Mr. H. THIELICKE Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. N. KLINGER Mr. H. MULLER Mr. I. KOMIVES Hungary: Mr. F. GAJDA Mr. C. GYORFFY Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN India: Mr. S. SARAN Indonesia: Mr. DARUSMAN Mr. F. MOH. SIDAK Mr. HARYOMATARAM Mr. F. QASIM Mr. ENNY SUPRAPIO Mr. ACHDIAT Iran: Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA Italy: Mr. V. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI Mr. Y. OKAWA Japan: Mr. M. TAKAHASHI <u>Kenya:</u> Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG

Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. M. CHRAIBI Mr. M. ARRASSEN Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS Mr. O. ADENIJI Nigeria: Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA Mr. M. AHMAD Pakistan: Mr. M. AKRAM Mr. T. ALTAF Peru: Mr. A. THORNBERRY Mr. B. SUJKA Poland: Mr. J. CIALOWICZ Romania: Mr. M. MALITA Sri Lanka: Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD Mr. L. NORBERG Mr. G. EKHOLM Mr. J. LUNDIN Mr. H. BERGLUND Mr. S. ERIKSSON Union of Soviet Socialist Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN Republics: Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV Mr. V.M. GANJA Mr. V.F. PRYAKHIN Mrs. L.V. GRATCHIKOVA Mr. M.M. IPPOLITOV Mr. S.N. RYUKHINE United Kingdom: Mr. D. SUMMERHAYES

Mrs. J.I. LINK

United States of America: Mr. C. FLOWERREE

Mr. F.P. DESIMONE

laiss K. CRITTENBERGER

Mr. R. SCOTT

Venezuela: Mr. RODRIGUEZ NAVARRO

Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia: Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire: Mr. O. GNOK

Secretary of the Committee

and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General: Mr. R. JAIPAL

<u>Deputy-Secretary of the Committee:</u>

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAINGAN: Distinguished delegates, before beginning our proceedings today I would like to extend a warm welcome in the Committee to the representative of Venezuela, Ambassador Rodríguez Navarro, who has been appointed recently. In doing so, I wish him a successful mission in this Committee and at the same time assure him of the close co-operation of my own delegation.

The inexorable law of rotation which rules our solar system and also governs our Committee has ordained that the manifest symbol of the Committee's will, the gavel, shall be with the Indian delegation for the month of July. It is a great honour and privilege for me to preside over such an august assembly engaged in the pursuit of the most noble of causes — the pursuit of peace through the creation of a world free from the fear of war, a world free of suspicion and distrust among fellow human beings.

I assume this office in all humility, conscious of the skill and ability with which my very distinguished predecessors have charted the course of this Committee in the months that have passed. It will be my sincere endeavour to live up to the high standards set by them. I know that in this endeavour I can count upon full cooperation and assistance from all my colleagues. Needless to say, in the days to come, the Chair will rely heavily on the rich experience and advice of Ambassador Jaipal, Secretary of the Committee and personal representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, as well as his able and efficient team in the Secretariat.

Ambassador Imre Komives of Hungary has, in his usual thorough and meticulous manner, during his chairmanship tied up most of the loose ends concerning the work before the Committee, since it resumed its 1981 session in June. May I warmly congratulate him on his fruitful tenure, and convey to him my gratitude for handing over to me, as they say, a smoothly running outfit. I hope that the next Chairman will have as good a fortune as I have had in this regard.

Distinguished delegates, while we engage overselves in the serious business of negotiations on measures of disarmament, we must obviously remain conscious of the national and security interests of the countries we represent. In safeguarding those interests, we are no doubt guided by our own national perceptions. But we must not forget that the United Nations family is a much larger one. There is an ancient Sanskrit that says: "The whole world is our motherland; we are all children of the earth." We live in an increasingly interdependent world, where the pursuit of one country's national interests has to be consciously tempered and moderated by the awareness of the impact of our actions, or even lack of them, on the collective wellbeing and security of the international community as a whole. Our Committee serves two major and interlinked functions. Firstly, it gives each one of us the opportunity to articulate the security concerns and perceptions of the countries we represent. At the same time, it enables each of us to understand and appreciate the security concerns and perceptions of others. But this should not be the end of our exercise. Rather, this process of articulation and mutual understanding should lead to a serious and meaningful dialogue through which we can benefit from each other's point of view, identify the rationale behind the policies adopted by States and finally begin a process of reconciliation of our divergent views and interests. This is the essence of our negotiations. At present, our Committee is engaged in what is, in the main, a process of articulation and exposure. But the more fundamental aspect of conducting an earnest dialogue, with a view to accommodating and not merely rejecting, has yet

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to materialize in full measure. Without such a sincere dialogue, the difficult process of the reconciliation of the divergent security concerns with which we are entrusted would have little chance of getting off the ground.

The desire for security, after all, stems from fear, mistrust and a mood of pessimism. We crave for security mainly because we apprehend danger. And nothing serves to sharpen such apprehensions more than ignorance, lack of understanding, prejudice and preconceptions. We all profess peaceful intentions, but unfortunately too often we tend to mirror each other's fears and apprehensions. And this reflection, with its exaggerated and distorted image, can be overcome only through a process of dialogue, an attempt to understand what lies behind the fears and suspicions. Once a proper and undistorted perspective is established, collective security will no longer be the clusive goal that it has proved to be all these years.

Successful negotiations require a spirit of mutual accommodation, and mutual accommodation in turn requires a better understanding. This calls for individual delegations as well as members of groups or alliances, to resist the temptation to exaggerate their own narrow security perceptions while all too easily dismissing the similar concerns of others as inconsequential or as not worthy of serious attention. Let us, therefore, translate our commitment to the goal of collective security into practical day-to-day decisions in the conduct of negotiations within this Committee.

It is true that the international situation today is characterized by a spirit of confrontation and tension. I believe that it is all the more necessary, in this context, for us, as a collective body, to promote a dialogue amongst ourselves, and to lay the basis for better mutual understanding. If we fall victim to the mood of gloom and apprehension that besets the world today, we would be accepting failure before taking the first few steps on what is admittedly a long and arduous journey. Let us remind ourselves that the longest journey starts with the first step we take. Let us avoid a situation where the pursuit of our individual security concerns endangers our collective survival.

I have dwelt at some length upon issues which I believe must be addressed squarely and frankly if we are to fulfil our mandate as the single multilateral body which exists for negotiations in the field of disarmament. With the General Assembly's second special session on disarmament only months away, we need some concrete evidence to underline the continuing relevance, indeed the importance, of our Committee, for bringing about the realization of the cherished goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Before I conclude, I would like to wish the Chairmen of the four ad hoc working groups which have been set up by the Committee every success in their endeavours and trust that their efforts will enable us to present to the General Assembly at its second special session on disarmament next year proposals worthy of this Committee and each and every delegation represented here.

If, as I hope, during this month of July, the Committee and its working groups are able to get down to a serious and earnest dialogue through which we all become aware of what lies behind each other's individual security concerns and national perceptions, and begin the process of evolving mutual understanding, then I would be able to say with satisfaction, that this truly has been an Indian summer.

Mr. RODRIGUEZ NAVARRO (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, I should like first of all to congratulate you sincerely on behalf of the Venezuelan delegation on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of July. We are sure that under your wise and efficient guidance the Committee's work will be extremely useful and effective. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Venezuela is at present on an official visit to India, a fact which illustrates our two countries' desire to forge closer links of friendship and co-operation. I should also like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the warm words of welcome to the Committee on Disarmament you were kind enough to address to me. I intend to participate with the utmost interest and enthusiasm, together with my other distinguished colleagues, in the work of this important disarmament negotiating body, in which the international community places great hopes.

I should also like to extend my delegation's thanks and congratulations to Ambassador Komives, who discharged his duties as Chairman of the Committee in June with the skill and efficiency which have characterized his well-known activity in this multilateral body.

I wish now, on behalf of my delegation, to make some brief comments of a general character on certain items of the agenda.

It is becoming more difficult every day to make a statement about matters connected with armaments and disarmament without lapsing into inevitable repetitions. The basic solutions to the problems dealt with here have been constantly repeated in this and other international forums and stated in a great many resolutions of the General Assembly. However, the growing complexity and gravity of the international situation, as a result, principally, of the implacable nuclear arms race, make it more than ever necessary to reiterate with the utmost conviction the importance of disarmament, and to intensify efforts to achieve concrete measures in the sphere of nuclear disarmament.

The Committee on Disarmament has again in recent weeks, been considering the question of a nuclear test ban. We, too, wish to refer once more to this issue, in order to stress its importance and at the same time to emphasize the urgent need for it to be dealt with in an appropriate manner under the auspices of this Committee with a view to bringing about the adoption of a treaty on this subject.

Time and again, irrefutable arguments and reasons have been put forward in support of the early conclusion of an international agreement on this important and urgent issue. Unfortunately, these legitimate appeals have not, in practice, had the desired effect, owing to the positions adopted by certain delegations on the basis of their narrow, national perceptions, which are clearly incompatible with the overwhelming desire of the majority for the conclusion of a nuclear-test-ban treaty as an important step towards achieving the goal of general and complete disarmament. As a result, after a number of years of intensive consideration, no real progress can be said to have been made, for the fact is that nuclear tests are still being carried out, under various pretexts, thus fostering the nuclear arms race in both its quantitative and its qualitative aspects.

Nevertheless, far from resigning ourselves to such a discouraging situation, we wish today to reassert more vigorously than ever the basic affirmations made by our delegation, together with the other countries in the Group of 21, on item 1 of the Committee's agenda. Our insistence on this point stems from our conviction that,

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above all else, it is necessary to continue with perseverance and tenacity a thorough examination of the various alternatives which might lead to the adoption of a convention on an issue which has repeatedly been recognized by the General Assembly as being a matter of high priority.

I shall not repeat in detail Venezuela's position on this matter but would like simply to remind the Committee that my delegation is in favour of a complete prohibition of nuclear tests, including tests for peaceful purposes, since it is impossible to establish a clear distinction between tests for military purposes and tests for peaceful purposes. However, this does not imply the absolute exclusion of the possibility of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, but they should be carried out only in very special circumstances. Subject to very strict control by an international authority, a State could be authorized to explode a nuclear device, on condition that its purpose is demonstrably peaceful and that adequate measures are taken to prevent its being used for military purposes.

Document CD/181 submitted recently by the Group of 21 contains concrete proposals, stated clearly and concisely, which are designed to give a decisive impetus to the work on the prohibition of nuclear tests and thus to enable the Committee on Disarmament to carry out its role in dealing with this subject, through the establishment of the proposed working group. The document further contains some very specific questions addressed to the nuclear-weapon Powers engaged in the trilateral negotiations. These deserve a response in keeping with the urgency and importance of the subject, and in the precise form in which the Group of 21 has expressed its anxieties in the matter.

In document CD/180, the Group of 21 likewise reiterated its proposal for the establishment of an ad hoc working group on item 2 of the agenda entitled, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

The informal meetings held by the Committee on item 2 which, as we pointed out at the time, were rather a preliminary step towards a negotiation process, merely strengthened our belief that doctrines of nuclear deterrence must be relinquished in order to prepare the way for a better future for mankind, in which international peace and security may be based on firmer and more just foundations. A treaty prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, as proposed here, would be a significant step in the right direction.

Useful though they undoubtedly were, the informal meetings also pointed to the need to discuss the complex issues involved at the higher level of multilateral negotiations. The Group of 21 has suggested the main elements of the mandate that might be conferred on the new working group.

The importance of item 2 is quite obvious. And yet the action which the Committee on Disarmament ought to undertake on this question of the highest priority in conformity with paragraph 50 of the Final Document, has been constantly restricted and obstructed by certain States which, precisely because they are nuclear—weapon Powers, bear primary responsibility for the promotion of nuclear disarmament.

This paramount interest in the Committee's carrying out to the full the mandate entrusted to it by the international community through the United Nations General Assembly stems from the right of non-nuclear weapon States to demand nuclear disarmament and to demand that they themselves should participate in the negotiations on disarmament because, in the final analysis, it is a matter of ensuring their own survival amidst this senseless confrontation between a very few States, a

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confrontation which places the fate of all mankind at stake. Our countries cannot be content with, much less resigned to a passive or subordinate role in this critical world situation, the most alarming aspect of which is the nuclear arms race.

Since then, nuclear disarmament is the most urgent and important question, of vital concern to all the peoples of the world, it is only natural for the States members of the Group of 21 to insist that the Committee should, without further delay, undertake substantive negotiations with a view to the adoption of tangible measures in the field of nuclear disarmament.

Furthermore, these legitimate demands of the Group of 21, which are reaffirmed in the two documents I have referred to, closely concern the essential nature of this Committee, its very raison devre. It is the duty of all of us, members of the Committee, to preserve and where necessary strengthen, its character as a negotiating body. The Committee on Disarmament was set up to consider the important items on its agenda from the standpoint of negotiation and to conduct substantive negotiations for the purpose of proceeding towards the adoption of instruments embodying concrete measures of disarmament.

The negotiations taking place in other, restricted forums should not be an obstacle to this Committee's carrying on negotiations on the same issues, in keeping with its role as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. Consequently, those participating in the restricted negotiations should keep the Committee fully and constantly informed of the progress of these talks. Furthermore, the most practical and useful way in which the Committee on Disarmament can carry out its role as a negotiating body is, as has been pointed out, through working groups, the importance of which requires no further comment.

At this stage, the least we can do is to express the hope that the nuclear-weapon Powers which have so far stood in the way of a consensus on the establishment of the two working groups proposed will amend their attitude in the interests of disarmament and the very credibility of this Committee. The appeals of a large number of delegations, which reflect the aspiration, and expectations of many peoples of the world cannot and should not remain unheeded indefinitely.

My delegation would like to refer briefly to the question of so-called radiological weapons. Venezuela's position on this subject is already well known. At the outset of the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Working Group on this subject we proposed a different approach, for the sole purpose of contributing to the achievement of a genuine measure of disarmament in this connection.

We stated at that time that the convention to be adopted as a result of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group ought not to refer to radiological weapons, which do not exist, but to the prohibition of the use of radioactive materials for military purposes and the prohibition of radiological methods of warfare or methods of radiological warfare.

It was not, as we stressed, an inflexible position. Nevertheless, we merely followed with interest the deliberations of the Working Group, hoping that new elements would emerge which would result in additions or modifications more or less in line with the basic features of our delegation's original proposals.

Today we note with satisfaction that in recent weeks there has been a growing trend in favour of the inclusion of new elements designed to improve and broaden the draft convention. This trend became apparent with the proposals submitted by the Swedish delegation for the inclusion of provisions relating to the concept of

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radiological warfare and attacks on nuclear reactors. This last point has proved relevant with the attack by Israel on Iraq's nuclear reactor, which the Government of Venezuela has condemned both individually and in conjunction with the other countries of the Group of 21.

These proposals have met with support in most quarters. If they are finally approved they will give a new slant to the convention on so-called radiological weapons, the substance of which will be greatly improved.

The new proposals, particularly as regards the concept of radiological warrare, reflect some of those very concerns which prompted the delegation of Venezuela, some time ago now, to propose a different approach. This is why we broadly support them. True, the Swedish delegation's proposals call for certain clarifications from the political, legal and technical points of view, but the basic idea is undoubtedly very valuable and ought therefore to be incorporated in the draft treaty.

My delegation wishes also to stress that the use of the term radiological weapons in a convention should in no way signify or imply the consequent legitimation of the use of nuclear weapons. In the treaty now being negotiated there should be a suitable linkage with nuclear weapons since, when all is said and done, so-called radiological weapons would be intrinsically related to nuclear weapons. A convention on this subject which, as we all know, does not have the same priority as other items on the Committee's agenda, will be really valuable only if it contributes to the prohobition and elimination of nuclear weapons, whose existence and potentially devastating effects of course leave no one in doubt.

The Venezuelan delegation attaches special importance to the work of the  $\underline{\mathrm{Ad}\ \mathrm{Hoc}}$  Working Group responsible for drawing up a comprehensive programme of disarmament to be submitted in due course for examination and consideration by the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament.

The comprehensive programme will obviously be one of the main documents to emerge from the special session of the General Assembly since, as has been pointed out, it should provide the requisite framework for the substantive negotiations on disarmament. It is clear, therefore, that this Committee is required to draw up a comprehensive programme of disarmament in accordance with the priorities set forth in paragraph 45 of the Final Document, which states unequivocally that priority attention should be given to measures of nuclear disarmament.

These are difficult and critical times for the whole world. We are going through a crucial stage in international affairs, in which we all have the opportunity to help lay the foundations for States to live together in harmony and mutual respect, in an atmosphere of peace and justice. Nuclear disarmament is an essential prerequisite to the achievement of this goal. The second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament to be held in the near future will be one more demonstration of the international community's unswerving determination to promote disarmament. The Committee on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, is faced with the supreme challenge of making a significant contribution to improving the world situation and meeting the expectations of the international community.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Rodríguez Navarro of Venezuela for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, it is a satisfaction for my delegation to see you presiding over our deliberations during the current month of July. We are sure that under your guidance our work will be conducted with great competence, skill and total impartiality. May I also express my appreciation for the work performed by your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Komives, who deserves our gratitude and admiration for the outstanding contribution he made to this Committee during his chairmanship in the month of June.

Since the inception of this Committee, the delegation of Brazil, together with many other delegations, especially those in the Group of 21, has consistently spoken in favour of the commencement of substantive negotiations on the top-priority item on our agenda, namely, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The reasons for the urgency and importance of multilateral negotiations on that issue are well known and need not be repeated here; moreover, they have been explicitly recognized in many international documents adopted by consensus by all members of this Committee. It is only natural to believe that such a consensus should be enough to ensure that the Committee is able to tackle the matter substantively. By adopting the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, all members of the United Nations, and particularly the membership of the Committee on Disarmament, have agreed on taking the action it calls for, and have therefore entered into a formal commitment that should be fully respected. By placing the item on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament on the agenda and programme of work of the Committee, its members have also accepted that it should be the subject of negotiation in this body, which has been created with a clear negotiating mandate.

My delegation cannot understand, therefore, the reticence and hesitation of two members of the Committee in joining the consensus otherwise existing within this body on the establishment of an <u>ad hoc</u> working group to deal substantively with item 2. My delegation would have thought that the commitments undertaken by all of us should not be open to question, particularly when such commitments were the result of long and careful negotiation, expressed in a consensual document only four years ago.

Those two delegations have thus shown a very disturbing stand that reflects the current trend in some quarters towards the revision of some of the concepts that have been agreed to, in the field of disarmament, in the not too distant past. In the latter part of the 1960s, three nuclear-weapon Powers, including the two Superpowers, formally committed themselves in an international treaty to undertake, "at an early date", negotiations on nuclear disarmament. They continue to profess their strong attachment to that treaty; their devotion, however, seems to be confined only to some of the provisions of that instrument.

More recently, all nuclear-weapon Powers participated in the drafting of the Final Document and joined the consensus that permitted its adoption, thereby establishing the multilateral negotiating body which was supposed to take action on the issues embodied in its Programme of Action. During the three years of operation of the Committee on Disarmament, however, every attempt to bring to substantive examination and negotiation the two issues that were considered to

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be of first priority have been systematically thwarted. The argument that such issues were "too important", or "too sensitive", or "too complex" to warrant multilateral scrutiny was often advanced, together with the strange reasoning that nuclear disarmament involved the "vital interest" of the nuclear-weapon Powers alone, and as such should be better dealt with in ever smaller circles of great Powers.

Lately, however, the disturbing trend I mentioned above has become increasingly present in the reasoning and in the attitudes of some nuclear-weapon Powers. Such reasoning seeks to justify the existence and possession of nuclear weapons with the argument that such weapons are an essential instrument for the assurance of the security of those Powers, and hence they ensure the maintenance of a balance that in turn is responsible for the existing "peace, stability and order". Have we so downgraded the concept of "peace" as to equate it with a tolerable state of tension? Is the rest of the world expected to be satisfied with a concept of "stability and order" that condones the persistent spiralling upwards of the nuclear arms race? Can the "vital interests" of the non-nuclear nations continue to be ignored by those who have conceived such a grand design of world affairs?

Brazil is convinced that no equitable and lasting solutions to questions of disarmament can ever be achieved unless the legitimate concerns and aspirations of nuclear and non-nuclear nations alike are duly taken into account. There can be no justification for theories that assume that those who possess the power and the means to destroy civilization are thereby entitled to take decisions affecting the whole of mankind. If that were true, if power were the only recognized yardstick for international relations, indeed all nations would feel justified in seeking for themselves the acquisition of all the means with which to impose their will upon others. My delegation remains convinced that, through a careful and enlightened process of review of the current concepts in the field of disarmament, those delegations that so far have not found it possible to adhere to the premises upon which this Committee was established will finally realize that their individual security needs are best served if due account is taken of the wider picture of the security interests of the entire community of nations, and that the Committee on Disarmament is the adequate forum for the relevant negotiations. The opposite attitude would prove to be a tragic mistake that history would record sooner or later.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador de Souza e Silva for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. HEEDER (German Democratic Republic): Mr. Chairman, let me first of all express the satisfaction of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic on seeing you preside over this Committee. We are convinced that, guided by your well-known diplomatic skills and experience, you will ably lead us through the month of July in which we will undoubtedly face the bulk of the work of the summer session. At the same time I would like to thank your predecessor, Comrade Ambassador Kömives from Hungary, for his excellent and successful performance as Chairman for the month of June. Mainly through his perseverance, it was possible to secure a smooth start of our negotiations from the very beginning of our summer session. At the same time, I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to extend our sincere welcome to Ambassador Rodriguez Navarro of Venezuela, to whose statement we have listened with great interest. We wish him every success in his new assignment and are looking forward to constructive co-operation with him.

Allow me now to address the two central questions of the Committee's agenda — a nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

There can be no question as to the importance of these items. This is especially evident under present-day circumstances when the nuclear arms race is driven to new and dangerous dimensions by well-known circles beyond the Atlantic Ocean striving for military superiority. Ever more than before, concrete measures are needed to spare mankind a nuclear holocaust. Dialogue and negotiations on an equal basis are on the order of the day. These are the main ideas on which the recent appeal by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "To the parliaments and peoples of the world" is based and which, I noticed, was circulated just a few minutes ago as an official document. My country associates itself with this appeal. The People's Chamber of the German Democratic Republic solemnly declared in this regard:

"The peace appeal is launched by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR at a time when world peace is again seriously endangered. The transition of the aggressive military forces to a policy of confrontation and arms drive, to a policy of interference and whipping up conflicts, not only threatens to destroy the results of détente which the peoples have won in a hard struggle, but also brings mankind to the brink of a nuclear Armageddon."

Thus, the most authoritative bodies of nations have again raised their voices in favour of peace and disarmament. Naturally, the question arises: what will the Committee on Disarmament do to respond to these appeals, to fulfil its role as the single multilateral negotiating forum? Shall we continue to sit and wait for the outbreak of a nuclear catastrophe, or shall we settle down to the business entrusted to us by the peoples of the world and come to concrete solutions?

I think the latter is the right way. My delegation regards the establishment of subsidiary bodies of the Committee on a nuclear test ban and on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament as a first step in this direction.

In the absence of a consensus concerning this question at our spring session, we supported the holding of informal meetings on items 1 and 2. These meetings played a useful role in the clarification of some basic aspects connected with nuclear doctrines and the nuclear arms race. The urgent necessity of negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament was widely recognized. On the other hand, no concrete steps leading to the preparation of such negotiations could be agreed upon.

My delegation cannot but deplore that in this connection a tendency endangering the very basis of this Committee is emerging on the part of two nuclear-weapon States. Contrary to the provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the repeated appeals of the General Assembly and the expressed wish of world public opinion, these States seem to be not prepared to take an active part in negotiations on the crucial questions of our time. Sometimes one may have the impression that at best they are only ready to take part in not binding discussions. Owing to this attitude, even a procedural decision on the establishment of additional ad hoc working groups has been blocked up to now. To justify this position, the argument was advanced that "the time was not ripe" for negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. This argument holds no water. It is certainly not necessary to go into details. As in other cases, too, the Final Document of the

first special session speaks clearly in this regard. For the sake of clarity I would like to emphasize only one historical parallel. All here around this table are certainly familiar with the history of the disarmament negotiations in the framework of the League of Nations. Years were spent on sometimes very abstract deliberations. After all, they were doomed to failure by the ill-famed linkage concept used by the opponents of real disarmament. This concept was, inter alia, reflected in the report of the "Mixed Commission" of September 1921. I would like to quote from it:

"Of all the problems confronting the League of Nations, none is more difficult than that of disarmament, for armaments depend on policy, and policy depends on circumstances, while circumstances vary from year to year and from country to country."

The parallel to present-day arguments is obvious. My delegation cannot but repeat its appeal to the two nuclear-weapon States which up to now are not ready to join in our efforts to move ahead in nuclear disarmament to change their attitude and to accept at least a positive formal decision on the establishment of additional subsidiary bodies on items 1 and 2.

An <u>ad hoc</u> working group on a nuclear test ban could deal in a comprehensive manner with all aspects connected with the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. All nuclear-weapon States would have an appropriate opportunity to explain their position and to reach agreement on these vital problems. To our knowledge, no single nuclear-weapon State has until now officially questioned the need for a comprehensive test ban. Thus, favourable conditions for the establishment of a CTB working group seem to exist. A first step to be agreed on by all five nuclear-weapon States could be a one-year moratorium on all nuclear-weapon tests. This would, without any doubt, favourably influence future CTB negotiations. At the same time we believe that such a working group should not interfere with the resumption of the trilateral negotiations but should rather help to promote them. These talks were interrupted by the Vestern side in November 1980 and, despite the readiness of the USSR and repeated appeals in this Committee, have not been resumed since then. The reasons are well known.

The reports submitted to the Committee on Disarmament by the trilateral negotiators show that considerable progress has been made on the road to a treaty on a complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. Key provisions of such a treaty were agreed upon. The understanding reached on verification is of particular importance. The use of seismic monitoring methods which, according to some reports, can detect 1 to 2 kt-yield nuclear explosions, on-site inspections on a voluntary basis in special cases, as well as a committee of experts, would ensure reliable verification of compliance with a CTBT. In this regard my delegation wishes to express its satisfaction at the work of the Committee's Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on seismic events, which has already done much of the groundwork for the establishment of an international seismic data exchange system within the framework of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

In view of all these achievements, we firmly reject all attempts to use a so-called verification question to justify a reluctant attitude to CTB negotiations. It is all too obvious that alleged verification difficulties are simply a cover for a lack of political will to agree on a CTB.

Not long ago, the United Nations General Assembly solemnly declared the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade. We hope that that Declaration does not remain a dead letter. There are more and more signs that we are entering a period which poses a greater danger of nuclear war than ever before. This is caused by the renewed advocacy in one major nuclear-weapon State of limited nuclear war as a realistic political option, by conceptions that nuclear weapons must be used as active instruments of foreign policy. At the very heart of this policy lies a fundamental unwillingness of this nuclear-weapon Power to acknowledge the need to stabilize the nuclear strategic balance and to bring it down to agreed limits.

It seems to us that instead of thinking about a constructive attitude to agreements and negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament, this nuclear-weapon Power is giving more and more thought to enhancing the "credibility of nuclear deterrence". Efforts are being made to move quickly towards a first strike counter-force doctrine and capability. Whereas the start of new SALT negotiations is continuously postponed, new destabilizing military programmes are coming smoothly into existence. Today nobody knows how long the "pause" in SALT and other negotiations imposed and foreseen by such a policy will endure, and what results dangerous for the security of all peoples it will still bring about.

The policy of military strength, confrontation and containment puts existing agreements into question. Already at the beginning of the spring session of this year my delegation drew the attention of the Committee to attempts by certain circles in the United States to abrogate the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. Only some days ago the Moscow meeting of the Palme Commission with all seriousness underlined its importance and urged the countries concerned to maintain the treaty (CD/188).

The German Democratic Republic favours the earliest possible resumption of the SALT negotiations and the entry into force of the SALT II agreement. This would not only enhance international security; it would also have a favourable impact on the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament. The Committee itself, with due regard to the stipulations of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament, should concentrate on the basic aspects of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

Already at the very beginning of the work of this Committee in its new form, a group of socialist countries tabled in document CD/4 clear proposals on how to prepare and initiate appropriate negotiations. Concrete ideas about the subject and stages of such negotiations were put forward. All these proposals are still valid today. We cannot but express our concern that up to now it has not been possible to reach any agreement in this Committee concerning the questions raised in document CD/4 and in documents presented by the Group of 21. There can be no justification for a position blocking the start of business-like negotiations on the most crucial question of our time. Perhaps the two nuclear-weapon States concerned have concepts and ideas on nuclear disarmament different from those of the majority of the Committee's

members. But this should not prevent them from joining a consensus on the creation of an ad hoc working group in which they may explain their concepts and concerns. Negotiations are the only reliable way to cope with the vital problems of our day. An ad hoc working group could determine the set of questions to be dealt with in the relevant negotiations and solve matters connected with the organizational preparation of the negotiations.

As far as the mandates of the two additional working groups are concerned, useful ideas were expressed by the group of socialist States as well as by the Group of 21. Now the time is ripe for a serious debate and a formal decision on them. It is our understanding, Mr. Chairman, that it fits into the role entrusted to you by the Committee for you to initiate this process by holding appropriate consultations, in particular with the delegations of the nuclear-weapon States, or to set up a special contact group.

Closely connected with the cessation of the nuclear arms race is the prevention of the geographical spread of nuclear weapons. Therefore, let me remind this Committee that under resolution 35/156 C of the United Nations General Assembly, it was called upon to proceed without delay to talks with a view to elaborating an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present. We hope that the Committee on Disarmament will respond with all seriousness to this resolution. Appropriate proposals were made by the socialist countries at the beginning of this session.

At the conclusion of my statement, permit me to say a few words about a recent event. Some days ago the German Democratic Republic, together with other socialist countries, strongly condemned the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear research centre near Baghdad. We cannot but state our concern that following this attack, in Western mass media, and not only there, attempts were made to put into question the safeguards system of the IAEA and to justify the Israeli attack. At the same time the fact that the aggressor, according to some reports, already years ago clandestinely acquired nuclear weapons is widely neglected. As a party to the NPT we strongly oppose such attempts. In our view, this act of State-directed terrorism should make those countries which closely collaborate with Israel in the nuclear field review their policy in that respect and take appropriate sanctions against the aggressor. Thereby legitimate non-proliferation concerns can be met. Otherwise, we fear, such an aggressive régime as the apartheid clique in Pretoria will be encouraged tomorrow to attack nuclear facilities in African countries under the pretext of "securing its survival".

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Herder of the German Democratic Republic for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. DARUSMAN (Indonesia): Mr. Chairman, to begin with, allow me to offer you the warm congratulations of the Indonesian delegation on your accession to the chair of the Committee. You represent a country which is well-known for its untiring efforts for the cause of international peace. It is therefore a great pleasure to my delegation to see you chairing this important Committee and may I offer you the full co-operation of my delegation in the discharge of your difficult task and heavy responsibility. With your vast experience and deep knowledge of the problems we have to deal with, my delegation is convinced that, under your competent guidance, our Committee will make further progress.

Allow me also to take this opportunity to express the appreciation of my delegation to your predecessor, Ambassador Komives of Hungary, for the competent and efficient manner in which he presided over our Committee during the month of June.

Allow me also to welcome the distinguished representative of Venezuela, H.E. Ambassador Rodríguez Navarro.

When the first United Nations Disarmament Decade was proclaimed by the General Assembly on 16 December 1969, the objectives of which were the cessation of the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament, the elimination of other weapons of mass destruction, the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control and the possible channelling of the resources freed by the disarmament measures to promote development in developing countries, there was a high hope that the 1970s would be marked by substantive progress and concrete achievements in the field of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Two years before the end of the decade, the General Assembly, at its tenth special session, which was devoted to disarmament, emphasized in paragraph 47 of its Final Document that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and civilization and that the nuclear arms race, in the context of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, should be halted and reversed. It is with regret and concern that we note that the first United Nations Disarmament Decade has ended without the accomplishment of its objectives. On the contrary, we have witnessed the continued increase in the number and destructive capability of nuclear weapons in the world's arsenals, as well as the continued improvement of the accuracy of their delivery systems. Concerned with such a situation, the Foreign Ministers of the Non-Aligned Movement,

#### (Mr. Darusman, Indonesia)

in the Declaration issued at the conclusion of their meeting held in New Delhi last February, stated, <u>inter alia</u>, as follows:

"The actions of the nuclear-weapon States, which are engaged in a new and frenzied round of the nuclear arms race, have created a situation in which mankind seems to have been condemned to live in the shadow of nuclear annihilation."

The Group of 21, in its statement at the conclusion of our spring session, emphasized the special responsibility of all the nuclear-weapon States, particularly those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, in the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament. This special responsibility was recognized not only in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1973 (paragraph 48) but had also been previously affirmed in another international instrument, namely, the non-proliferation Treaty (article VI) which was concluded ten years earlier. While believing that bilateral and regional negotiations are useful and should be intensified, it is also the view of my delegation that this Committee, the only multilateral negotiating organ in the field of disarmament and in which all nuclear-weapon States as well as non-nuclear-weapon States participate, should start without further delay multilateral negotiations in the discharge of the mandate entrusted to it by the General Assembly and, more particularly, in order that the Committee shall be in a position to submit its report on the results of those negotiations to the General Assembly at its second special session on disarmament, to be held next year. The cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament are of concern to the international community as a whole, nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike, because the continued quantitative and qualitative increase in nuclear armaments has not resulted in the strengthening of international peace and security; on the contrary, these armaments continue to pose a threat to international peace and have only created a deeper sense of insecurity on the part of the majority of the nations of the world. The concepts of nuclear superiority or of a balance of nuclear deterrence can only lead to an endless nuclear arms race, thus making nuclear disarmament more remote. A slight sense of nuclear inferiority on the part of one nuclear-weapon State would push this State to make up for it by increasing its own military expenditures in order that the nuclear balance be restored or even to tilt it in its favour. Such a process may go on ad nauseam, running counter to the common man's profound need for peace and security. A spiralling arms race will also jeopardize the endeavours by the world community to cope with the present international economic problems and to achieve a new international economic order. The competition in deterrence, as stated by the Foreign Ministers of the Hon-Aligned countries in their February meeting in New Delhi, "has only heightened the nightmare of uncertainty and fear

#### (Mr. Darusman, Indonesia)

which characterizes international relations today because the arms race stems particularly from the persistent recourse to the use of force in order to maintain the status quo in international relations. There is only one real deterrent, namely, mankind's desire to survive".

When this Committee was created, three years ago, it was the expectation of the community of nations that this single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament would be more successful than the ENDC or the CCD. credibility of this organ would be at stake and the confidence that the international community has in this organ may be shaken if we fail even to engage in negotiations on nuclear weapons which were given first priority among the items listed in paragraph 45 of the Final Document of the first special session. Up to the conclusion of our spring session, negotiations on this priority item, including the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, had not even been started. Informal meetings did take place, but although the discussions in those meetings were not totally futile, no significant results have actually come out of those informal deliberations. It is a matter of regret and concern to us to note that today, at the beginning of the third week of our work this summer, there seem to be no indications that the proposals of the Group of 21 contained in document CD/180 on the establishment of an ad hoc working group on item 2 of our agenda and its mandate will receive a positive response. In response to arguments that only bilateral, trilateral or regional forums are suitable for effective negotiations, the Group of 21 has stated in its document CD/180 that such forums for negotiations continue to be useful, and negotiations taking place therein should be intensified, while multilateral negotiations of vital interest to nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike should be initiated without delay in this Committee as the only multilateral organ in the field of disarmament in which both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States are participating. This view is in conformity with the provision in paragraph 121 of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament. Disarmament negotiations in the nuclear field are not an area of activities reserved solely for nuclear-weapon States. Paragraph 113 of the Final Document of the first special session states, inter alia, that nuclear disarmament is essential for the survival of mankind. Mankind does not consist of nuclear-weapon nations only; it consists of all the nations in the world which have now been affected by the continued escalation of the nuclear arms race and which would suffer from a nuclear war, regardless of whether they are nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon nations. This Committee therefore constitutes the most appropriate forum for the conduct of negotiations on disarmament in the nuclear field, which are of vital interest to mankind as a whole.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Darusman of Indonesia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): In the history of every people there have been times when its very existence as a nation was jeopardized. To survive in such circumstances required the mobilization of all the forces and internal resources of one country or another. The first world armed conflict put at stake the fate of several States and caused not only the loss of many millions of human lives and tremendous devastation but also radical changes in the political map of Europe — and not Europe alone, either. The Second World War involved the greater part of the countries of the world, and for many of them the preservation of their national independence, their statehood and sometimes even their mere physical survival entailed unheard-of destruction and sufferings and losses amounting to millions upon millions of human lives. At the present time, in the era of thermonuclear weapons, it is not only the fate of many nations but also the preservation of human civilization and the very life of man on earth that are imperilled.

Can there be a people that in the face of this universal threat would seek its own destruction? Can there be a Government, if it really represents the interests of its people, that would not do its utmost to help put an end to this bridled nuclear Bacchanalia? Can any sober-minded person stand aside from the struggle to save peace, to avert the threat of thermonuclear holocaust?

It was precisely these thoughts, this anxiety for the future of all mankind that imbued the speech delivered by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR L.I. Brezhnev on 23 June 1931 at the session of the highest State body of the Soviet Union, as also the appeal by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the parliaments and peoples of the world which has been circulated as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament.

In the face of the unprecedented aggravation of the international situation in recent times, the head of the Soviet State declared: "Only one conclusion can be drawn: now, today, everything possible must be done to bar the way to those who love unrestricted rearmament and military gambles. Everything possible must be done to safeguard the right of people to life. No one can be an indifferent onlooker in this matter: it affects all and everyone. It affects Governments and political parties, public organizations and, of course, parliaments elected by the peoples and acting on their behalf". 1/

This task also directly concerns our Committee. We representatives in the Committee of Disarmament know perhaps better than anyone not only about the great objective difficulties that are connected with this multifaceted complex of problems relating to the limitation of armaments but also about those subjective factors that are possibly even more important at the present stage and which may be brought together under one heading — "the political will of States". Yes, it is indeed the political will or, more precisely, the lack of it in the leading Western Powers that has up to now been the principal obstacle to practical headway being made in the negotiations on the limitation of the nuclear arms race and to really tangible measures being adopted in the sphere of nuclear disarmament.

<sup>1/</sup> Pravda, 24 June 1981.

Who will deny that in present-day conditions the gravest peril to peace and the security of peoples lies in the continuing arms race, and first and foremost the nuclear arms race?

The main feature of the current stage in the nuclear arms race is that its focus has shifted from the quantitative to the qualitative aspect. In the era of scientific and technological revolution, qualitative innovations in nuclear weapons systems can entail far-reaching consequences both of a military and strategic and of a political nature.

The monstrous consequences of the arms race in general and the nuclear arms race in particular cause legitimate anxiety on the part of the world community.

In this connection permit me to refer to the unbiased opinion of competent scientists in various countries, both nuclear and non-nuclear, who are entirely justified in thinking that any war in which weapons of mass destruction were used would inevitably become nuclear omnicide — the total self-destruction of civilization on earth. Thus, for instance, the participants in the authoritative Pugwash Conference recently stated that, unless effective measures are taken to alleviate and remove dangerous trends in the qualitative and quantitative arms race, a nuclear military catastrophe will break out even before the end of the present century. Such a war will sow death and devastation which human society will no longer be able to cope with. The very survival of a human being as a biological species will be endangered.

I would like to stress once again that this opinion is not merely that of some representatives of the general public but of renowned scientists who know the value of their words. One of them, Professor Rotblat, an eminent British authority in the sphere of radiation biology, stated in no uncertain terms at the 30th Pugwash Conference that military experts are either unable or unwilling to take into account the consequences of the policies of the arms race and seek to secure public acceptance of the doctrine of a "limited" nuclear war.

A similar viewpoint is held by an eminent American scientist, John Somerville, an honorary Professor of New York University, who, in particular, said: "Now each and every person, all people on earth are participating in a sort of a world referendum on the subject of whether the ever-growing stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction should continue to exist or whether life should continue. Those who take no action against these types of weapons are in fact voting for omnicide".  $\underline{2}/$ 

In late March of this year a conference of "international physicians for the prevention of nuclear war" took place in the vicinity of Washington with the participation of prominent scientists and physicians from 11 countries. The conference studied the consequences of various types of nuclear strikes. It was established, for example, that the explosion of a one-megaton bomb in the air over a

Morld of Science, vol. XXIV, 1980, p. 29.

<sup>2/</sup> Problems of Peace and Socialism, No. 6, p. 70.

city with one million residents would cause the death of 300,000 people as a result of the blast, burns and radiation, while 400,000 more would suffer from the after-effects of the nuclear explosion. The explosion of a 20-megaton thermonuclear device would wipe out all buildings within a 24-km radius and the luminous radiation would be so intense as to burn everything alive to a distance of 140 km from the epicentre of the explosion.

The explosion of 10,000 megatons -- and this is precisely the yield of nuclear devices which, according to the estimates made by American experts, will be exploded in the event of a thermonuclear war -- will reduce the ozone layer of the atmosphere by 30 to 40 per cent. The so-called hard ultraviolet radiation will sharply increase, the result being the destruction of agricultural crops and animals. 1/

Scientists and military experts in various countries have described the tremendous human losses and destruction that would result from a nuclear war, including a so-called limited nuclear war.

With the present-day level of the development of strategic arms, guidance systems and missile early-warning systems it is impossible to launch a preventive nuclear strike, which the architects of the new nuclear strategy count on, without inevitably suffering a no less powerful retaliatory attack. Illusory, therefore, are the hopes of those who wish to find some foolproof "recipe" for a nuclear war that would enable them at an auspicious moment to disarm the enemy with, so to speak one knock-out blow, without themselves risking destruction in such a war.

One cannot make prior judgements as to the nature and methods of nuclear warfare. The architects of the concept of a limited use of strategic nuclear arms are actually proposing to wage a nuclear war in accordance with some predesigned "rules" whereby nuclear missiles should explode in "gentlementy" fashion, that is, not over cities but over targets which they would consider it advantageous to call military objects. It is clear to any sane-minded person that this is impracticable. Military facilities are at present deployed in such a way that in any case selective nuclear strikes against them will at the same time cause massive annihilation of the civilian population. Any attempt to portray a nuclear war as "an exchange of selective strikes solely against military targets", without the possibility of its escalating into an all-out war, seems altogether naive.

From the military standpoint, as the advocates of the new nuclear strategy are perfectly well aware, a nuclear "mini-war" is an absurdity, since it is clear to everyone that any limited nuclear war will inevitably and immediately escalate into an all-out global war.

It is difficult to imagine the consequences of even a limited number of nuclear strikes against the territory of an industrialized State. Experts of the United States Department of Defense prepared a report on the effects of a "limited nuclear war" which was presented in 1975 to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It contains the following data on possible losses in the United States in the event of the launching of selective nuclear strikes against various targets within the territory of the country. A strike against the Whiteman (Missouri) airbase alone could kill 10.3 million people, and attacks on other ICBM bases 21.7 million people.

<sup>1/</sup> Komsomolskaya Pravda, 10 April 1981

One cannot help wondering whether the apologists of the new nuclear strategy comprehend the magnitude of these figures and of the possible consequences? In truth, a glance at the figures is enough to convince anyone of the danger to the world that is being created by the nuclear maniacs.

Despite convincing data about the catastrophic consequences of a war in which nuclear weapons are used, here and there in the West the advocates of such a war raise their voices ever more loudly in its defence. The apologists of the doctrine of deterrence even try to theorize on the subject of the advisability for the United States to employ nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union. A nuclear war is possible say Colin S. Grey and Keith Pane in the magazine, Foreign Policy. But unlike Armageddon, they say — an apocalyptic war which is prophesized to mark the end of history — a nuclear war can have the most varied outcomes. 1/

However, to the authors of this article, judging by its title, "Victory is Possible", the outcome of a war is clear. It will be waged to "force the Soviet Union" to give up those foreign policy actions whose character is misinterpreted by Washington.

More frequent attempts have been made lately to provide a "theoretical basis" for the need to continue resorting to the doctrine of deterrence which has more than once been refuted by life itself. Furthermore, it is characteristic that whereas in the past the advocates of this doctrine used it mainly with respect to the continent of Europe, nowadays they are trying to extend its sphere of application to include the entire globe. Illustrative in this regard is the article by a former director of the CIA, Admiral Stanfield Turner, entitled "Towards a New Defence Strategy" which was published in the New York Times Magazine in May of 1981.

We agree with those representatives who have declared that a nuclear war would not be confined to those countries which possess nuclear weapons or have military alliances with nuclear-weapon Powers. In the present-day geopolitical situation it is hard to think of a region which would be spared by a nuclear conflict.

The peace initiatives of the Soviet Union spring from its understanding of this objective reality and not from some other considerations. The readiness of the Soviet side to start a dialogue on the whole spectrum of disarmament issues has been repeatedly reaffirmed in recent statements by the head of our State, L.I. Brezhnev, at the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Moscow, in Prague, Kiev and Tbilisi, at the recent Soviet-Algerian, Soviet-Jordanian and Soviet-Libyan negotiations and during meetings with prominent political figures such as 0. Palme, W. Brandt, etc. A concentrated expression of Soviet willingness to conduct negotiations is provided by the appeal to the parliaments and peoples of the world referred to earlier. It is symbolic that the appeal, whose urgency in the present world situation is indisputable, was adopted on the eve of the 40th anniversary of the outbreak of the bloodiest war in the history of mankind. Does anyone need weightier evidence of the sincerity of our initiatives in the sphere of disarmament than the unparalleled human and material losses suffered by the Soviet Union in that war?

Nevertheless, there are persons, persons holding responsible posts furthermore, who are trying to brush the Soviet proposals aside without, for their part, offering any constructive initiatives.

<sup>1/</sup> Foreign Policy, No. 39, summer 1980, p. 14.

There is no more important or more urgent task today than preventing the world from sliding into war, warding off a nuclear conflict. The best way of doing this is by negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament. That is the view held by the broad masses of the world's population; it is also the position of many States members of the Committee on Disarmament. This is clear from the statements of their representatives in this body. A vivid manifestation of the strong desire to proceed to practicel negotiations is to be found in the proposals tabled by socialist States for specific measures, in particular within the framework of our Committee, towards the major goal of disarmament.

The Soviet Union has been and is in favour of the consideration in the Committee on Disarmament, as a matter of priority, of the problem of nuclear disarmament.

The proposals of the Soviet Union and of other socialist countries on this subject should be very well known. We therefore find frankly incomprehensible the requests addressed by some delegations either to "the two most powerful States" or to all nuclear powers in general to set forth their positions on nuclear disarmament issues. In this connection we once again draw the attention of those delegations, and of all other delegations also to documents CD/4, CD/109 and CD/141, to numerous statements on these issues by leaders of the Soviet Union some of which have been issued as official documents of the Committee this year (CD/160, CD/166, CD/176 and CD/191.

Document CD/4 contains specific proposals aimed at the earliest possible starting of negotiations on nuclear disarmament. It defines our attitude to the subject of the negotiations, to negotiating stages, to arrangements in preparation for the negotiations, to their time-periods as well as to other issues connected with the conduct of the negotiations. The document also emphasizes the need to reach agreement on appropriate verification measures.

I would also recall that the delegation of the Soviet Union along with the other co-authors of document CD/4 have repeatedly provided explanations regarding the proposals put forward by them.

The socialist countries consider that the cessation of the production, the reduction and the elimination of nuclear weapons should be carried out on a stage-by-stage, nutually acceptable and agreed basis. The degree of participation of individual nuclear-weapon States in measures within each stage should be determined with due regard for the quantitative and qualitative significance of the existing arsenals of nuclear-weapon States and of other States concerned. At all stages, the existing balance in the matter of nuclear arms should be maintained, with a gradual lowering of their levels.

Arguments have often been heard of late to the effect that nuclear disarmament issues are inseparably linked with the highest national security interests of States and that negotiations on the limitation of nuclear aramaments should not be held without account being taken of those interests. We fully subscribe to such a statement, provided, of course, it is not used as an excuse for refusing to negotiate on nuclear disarmament. We have repeatedly stressed, both in document CD/4 and in our statements, that we are in favour of the elaboration and implementation of measures for the limitation of the nuclear arms race and for nuclear disarmament being inseparably linked with the strengthening of the political and international legal guarantees of the security of States.

As a measure aimed at the limitation of the nuclear arms race, the Soviet Union has proposed that on the territories of States where there are no nuclear weapons at present, such weapons should not be deployed. No one can deny that such a measure would contribute to restraining the spread of nuclear weapons and would thus curb the nuclear arms race. We are ready to reach an agreement whereby all nuclear-weapon States undertake not to station nuclear weapons on the territories of countries where there are no such weapons at present, irrespective of whether or not such a country has alliance relations with this or that State. We have put forward quite a number of other, very specific proposals aimed at the curbing of the nuclear arms race and we have stated that we should be interested to hear the reactions to those proposals of other States and especially of nuclear-weapon States.

As a preparation for negotiations, socialist countries have proposed the holding of consultations within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament in order to draw up a set of questions for consideration and to resolve organizational issues.

Naturally, the initiation of such negotiations and a dialogue with other nuclear-weapon Powers are possible only if they for their part show a readiness to engage in negotiations, if they display a constructive approach. Unfortunately, we have not yet received from them a positive response to our proposals.

As for the Soviet delegation, we are ready to embark on informal consultations with the other nuclear-weapon Powers, with any delegation or delegations on this subject.

Thus, on the one hand, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have submitted to the Committee proposals which offer a good basis for advancing in this direction. There are also quite a number of useful proposals put forward by the non-aligned and neutral countries. Furthermore, active discussions have taken place in the Committee which have shown that there is wide support for the idea of the conduct in the Committee of specific negotiations on this urgent and important problem and the setting up of an ad hoc working group to this end.

On the other hand, the other nuclear-weapon Powers and some of their allies persist in refusing to undertake negotiations on the limitation of nuclear aramaments and on nuclear disarmament in the Committee. Their ideas run in exactly the opposite direction.

In these circumstances we believe that it is time, indeed it is high time to move from general debates to practical negotiations.

"In our nuclear age", says the appeal by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the parliaments and peoples of the world, "dialogue and negotiations are needed equally by all, just as all need peace, security and confidence in the future. There is now no other sane method of solving disputed problems, no matter how acute and complex they are, than by negotiations. Not a single opportunity must be missed. Time does not wait.

With each day lost for negotiations, the risk of nuclear conflict grows greater. The solution of urgent problems confronting each people and all peoples is being shelved. Time does not wait". 1/

Yes, indeed, Mr. Chairman, time does not wait. And our Committee should at last set to work.

<sup>1/</sup> Pravda, 24 June 1981.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Issraelyan of the USSR for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Little more than a year has passed since you became head of the Indian delegation to the Committee on Disarmament. In that relatively short time, however, you have won the high regard of all your colleagues, among whom you have today rightly come to occupy a prominent place.

That is unquestionably due both to the sincerity and ardour of the concern for the cause of disarmament that is always shown in your statements, and to your wide knowledge of the subject and the implacable logic that always prevails in those statements, a logic which you use with such skill to demolish the many artificial obstacles that we so often encounter here in our work.

We are confident that your outstanding qualities will enable you to carry out an equally productive task in the performance of the important duties you are taking up today as Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of July. My delegation is pleased to see you in that office and offers you its fullest co-operation.

We should also like to reiterate to your predecessor, Ambassador Komives, the distinguished representative of Hungary, the congratulations which we had occasion to offer him at the start of his period of chairmanship, on 11 June. What we said then on the basis of mere expectation we can repeat today in the light of his constructive and in every way exemplary performance which began with the speedy organization of work for what is known as the summer session and ended successfully last Thursday with the decision to hold informal meetings on item 5 of the agenda, New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

Lastly, my delegation would like to add its warm welcome to the greeting which you extended at the beginning of this meeting to the new representative of Venezuela, the distinguished Ambassador Rodriguez Navarro, from whom we have already this very day heard an eloquent statement.

During the first part of this year's session of the Committee on Disarmament I spoke only very briefly on the item which comes first on the agenda of this multilateral negotiating body, namely, "Muclear test ban". Furthermore, in that address, delivered on 19 February, I confined myself to listing the ten statements my delegation has made in the Committee on earlier occasions on the item under consideration, and to recalling the appeal addressed by the General Assembly, in its resolution 35/145 A of 12 December 1980, to "all States members of the Committee" to "support the creation by the Committee, upon initiation of its session to be held in 1981, of an ad hoc working group which should begin the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests".

This brevity was due in part to the belief that it is difficult to say anything new about a question which has been considered by the United Nations for more than a quarter of a century, and in part to our hope that at the informal meetings which were shortly to begin it would prove possible to overcome the stubborn resistance of two of the three nuclear-weapon Powers which have been conducting negotiations outside the Committee for more than four years, to the Committee's adoption, with respect to the item that has the highest priority on its agenda, of the modest procedure which has been used since last year in connection with four other items, namely, the establishment of an ad hoc working group.

Unfortunately, we were mistaken, as were all the other members of the Group of 21. The failure of our combined efforts and the untenable pretexts used to frustrate them provoked in the Group the justified impatience — it could almost be called indignation — which is reflected in the statement read out on 24 April at the final meeting of the Committee's so called "spring session" and reproduced in working paper CD/181 of the same date, which says, inter alia, the following:

"The Group of 21 firmly believes that the Committee on Disarmament is entitled to know without further delay the specific reasons that have so far prevented the three nuclear-weapon States, which have been carrying out among themselves separate negotiations for the past four years, to heed the often repeated and pressing appeals of the General Assembly to the effect of expediting such negotiations 'with a view to bringing them to a positive conclusion as a matter of urgency' and to transmit the results to the Committee on Disarmament."

The state of mind shown in this paragraph, as well as in the 12 well-considered and pertinent questions put thereafter in document CD/181 to the nuclear-weapon States engaged in the trilateral negotiations, is all the easier to understand if we remember, on the one hand, that it is only two of the 40 members of the Committee that seem to tend to confuse it with the Sccurity Council, and, on the other hand, that the "repeated and pressing appeals" of the General Assembly referred to in the statement of the Group of 21 not only formed the subject of consensus in the Final Document, but were actually voted for by those two members in three other General Assembly resolutions adopted between 1977 and 1979. In resolution 32/78, adopted on 12 December 1977 and voted for by the United States and the United Kingdom, some six months after the trilateral negotiations had begun, the General Assembly:

- 1. Reiterated its "grave concern" that "in spite of the repeated resolutions of the General Assembly related to nuclear-weapon testing in all environments, adopted by very large majorities, such testing has continued unabated during the past year";
- 2. Noted with satisfaction that "negotiations have begun among three nuclear-weapon States with a view to the drafting of an agreement on the subject of the present resolution";
- 3. Declared that "the conclusion of such an agreement and its opening for signature would be the best possible augury for the success of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to be held in May and June 1978";
  - 4. Urged the "three nuclear-weapon States to expedite their negotiations with a view to bringing them to a positive conclusion as soon as possible and to use their best endeavours to transmit the results for full consideration by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by the beginning of its spring session in 1978";
  - 5. Requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to "take up the agreed text resulting from the negotiations referred to in paragraph 4 above with the utmost urgency, with a view to the submission of a draft treaty to the General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament".

The second of the three resolutions to which I referred earlier is resolution 33/60 of 14 December 1978, adopted, like the previous one, with votes in favour by the United States and the United Kingdom. In that resolution the Assembly began by reaffirming "its conviction that the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States in all environments would be in the interest of all mankind, ... as a major step towards ending the qualitative improvement, development and proliferation of nuclear weapons" and by recalling both its previous resolutions on the subject and "the determination of the parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons expressed in those Treaties to continue negotiations to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions for all time".

In the operative part of the resolution the General Assembly then:

- 1. Reiterated "its grave concern over the fact that nuclear-weapon testing has continued unabated against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Member States";
- 2. Reaffirmed "its conviction that a treaty on the subject of the present resolution is a matter of the highest priority";
  - 3. Regretted "that a treaty has not been concluded during the past year";
- 4. Noted that "the three negotiating nuclear-weapon States acknowledge the need to bring their negotiations to a speedy and successful conclusion";
- 5. Urged them to "expedite their negotiations with a view to bringing them to a positive conclusion as a matter of urgency and to use their utmost endeavours to transmit the results to the Committee on Disarmament before the beginning of its 1979 session for full consideration"; and .
- 6. Requested the Committee on Disarmament to "take up immediately the agreed text resulting from the negotiations referred to in paragraph 5 above with a view to the submission as soon as possible of a draft treaty, which will attract the widest possible adherence, to a resumed thirty-third session of the General Assembly".

It should be noted that in that resolution the General Assembly, no doubt in order to stress the urgency of the request it was making, provided that the draft treaty to be submitted to it by the Committee on Disarmament would be examined not at the next session, the thirty-fourth, but at "a resumed thirty-third session", i.e. at the same session at which the resolution was adopted.

The third of the resolutions that are particularly relevant in this matter and, like the other two, also adopted with the favourable votes of the two nuclear-weapon Powers which today appear to have wholly forgotten its contents, is resolution 34/73 of 11 December 1979. In that resolution, the General Assembly, among other things:

- 1. Reiterated "its grave concern at the fact that nuclear-weapon testing continues unabated against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Member States";
- 2. Expressed "its conviction that positive progress in the negotiations by the Committee on Disarmament on such a treaty is a vital element for the success of efforts to prevent both vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and will contribute towards an end to the arms race and the achievement of nuclear disarmament";
- 3. Requested "the Committee on Disarmament to initiate negotiations on such a treaty as a matter of the highest priority"; and
- 4. Called upon "the three negotiating nuclear-weapon States to use their best endeavours to bring their negotiations to a positive conclusion in time for consideration during the next session of the Committee on Disarmament".

Indeed, the attitude of the two nuclear-weapon Powers whose vetoes, as I said last week, have been hampering the work of the Committee for the past year, really seems utterly irreconcilable with the attitude they adopted at the thirty-second, thirty-third and thirty-fourth regular sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, as manifested by the resolutions I have just quoted show. It should be borne in mind that those two Powers agreed, not through participation in a consensus. which can sometimes mean passive acceptance, but through the positive and unequivocal action of a vote in favour, that, in three separate resolutions adopted in three successive years, the General Assembly should urgo the three negotiating States -- in other words, themselves -- first, to bring those negotiations to "a speedy and successful conclusion", and secondly, to transmit immediately thereafter the results thus obtained to the Committee on Disarmament. At the same time, the General Assembly requested the Committee to undertake negotiations on the treaty in question either "with the utmost urgency", or "as a matter of the highest priority" or "immediately", whichever expression one prefers to choose from any of the three resolutions in which they are respectively used.

To have adopted thrice in a row this position which appears so positive and then, after completely disregarding in practice the three resolutions for which they were partly responsible, to refuse openly, as they have been doing, let us not say to

transmit to the Committee on Disarmament the results of their negotiations that have been going on for four years now, or to reply to the concrete questions of the Group of 21, but even to allow the Committee on Disarmament to carry out its duty as the "single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum", and that with respect to no less a matter than the item which has the highest priority on its agenda, constitutes not merely disrespect for but mockery of the body that is the most representative of the international community, namely, the General Assembly of the United Nations.

My delegation has, from the outset -- that is, from the time when in 1978 it participated in drawing up what was to become the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament -- interpreted the "consensus" requirement expressly provided for in paragraph 120 of the Final Document, as something designed to prevent the adoption either of hasty decisions or of decisions which might harm the vital interests of the members of the Committee, but certainly not as something which for incomprehensible and sometimes even capricious or arbitrary reasons should allow consensus to become an insurmountable obstacle to the Committee's fulfilment of the basic functions entrusted to it by the General Assembly.

My delegation therefore believes that the time has some to clarify some fundamental points relating to this matter. To this end, we believe that first of all it would be desirable for the Committee next week, at one of its formal meetings — plenary meetings, as it is customary to call them — to take a public decision on the proposal first made by the Group of 21 on 4 March 1980 (CD/72) and reiterated very forcefully on 6 August 1980 (CD/134) and 24 April 1981 (CD/181) for the setting up of an ad hoc working group on the item entitled "Nuclear test ban".

If, contrary to what we venture to hope, there is continued opposition to the establishment of this working group by the nuclear-weapon States which have up to now been an obstacle to its creation, my delegation considers it necessary for the Committee to undertake a searching examination of the significance and scope of the term "consensus" as used in article 18 of its rules of procedure. We believe in fact that this would be indispensable, for we find it inconceivable that the constituent body — that is, the General Assembly, at its special session of 1978 — should have wished to leave open the door for the flagrant abuse of the application of that term, which in practice would come to mean the paralysation of the Committee on Disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the Ambassador of Mexico, His Excellency, Mr. García Robles, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, may I first of all express the admiration of my delegation to Ambassador Komives of Hungary for the skill, efficiency and good humour with which he steered the Committee during the difficult stage of its work in June. Under his chairmanship the Committee reached expeditious decisions on various organizational and substantive issues in the resumed summer session.

The assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee by you for this month is a matter of great satisfaction for the Pakistan delegation and for me personally. We have no doubt that with your great experience and wisdom and the dedication of your country to the cause of disarmament, you will guide the Committee towards important achievements. To this end, the Pakistan delegation pledges to you its full and unreserved co-operation.

Mr. Chairman, your country is a great neighbour of Pakistan with which we desire close and improved relations. The recent visit by the Foreign Minister of India, His Excellency Mr. Narasimha Rao, to Pakistan has made an important contribution to the process of promoting greater understanding between our two countries. It may not be out of place to mention in this Committee that in the joint press statement issued in Islamabad on 10 June after talks between the Foreign Ministers of Pakistan and India, "both sides reiterated their policy of using nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes", and "they called upon all nuclear-weapon States to engage in serious discussion on nuclear disarmament".

The Committee is currently considering the item on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Everyone agrees that this is the most urgent task before the international community. Pakistan's views on nuclear disarmament and the ways and means to promote this objective have been stated in the Committee on previous occasions and I do not intend to repeat these today. Yet, it is necessary to underline that the complete absence of any efforts to address this priority goal is an important impediment in the pursuit of other disarmament measures and a contributory factor to the current international climate of confrontation.

The Pakistan delegation has consistently favoured the consideration of questions relating to nuclear disarmament in this Committee since it was established. Although useful informal discussions were held earlier this year under this item, the Committee has not as yet initiated the process of negotiations on nuclear disarmament outlined in paragraph 50 of the Final Document.

The Pakistan delegation considers that the Group of 21 has made an objective analysis of the situation in document CD/180 and submitted timely and realistic proposals for the commencement of the process of multilateral negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. We hope that the Committee will reach early and positive decisions on these proposals.

I consider it relevant to underline that the proposals submitted by the Group of 21 in document CD/180 contain two distinct elements. First, it has been proposed that the CD should examine certain specific issues relating to the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Secondly, the Group of 21 has suggested the creation of an ad hoc working group of the Committee to undertake this task of examination and clarification.

### (Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

It may be helpful to acknowledge that the issues presented for examination by this Committee in document CD/180 would not amount to the conduct of negotiations on specific measures of nuclear disarmament. What has been proposed in this document is, in the opinion of my delegation, a process of clarifying concepts and positions in order to lay the ground for concrete negotiations on nuclear disarmament. The consideration of these issues would not prejudice the policies of any State or group of States. But we believe that such a process of clarification could make a most useful contribution to bridging the gulf in understanding and comprehension which characterizes current dispositions regarding the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

It is the assessment of my delegation that no member of the Committee on Disarmament is opposed to the consideration of these issues and if possible to reaching agreed conclusions on them. Such conclusions could constitute important guidelines for negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

As regards the second element of the proposal of the Group of 21, i.e. the establishment of a working group, my delegation shares the view that this constitutes the most effective modality for the process of clarifying the issues which have been suggested. Those members of the Committee who do not find the creation of such a working group to be acceptable have an obligation to suggest an alternative modality for the examination of these issues. May I say that, for its part, the Pakistan delegation is flexible as regards the mechanism to be used for the consideration of the issues identified in document CD/180. What is important, in our view, is that these issues should be addressed in depth by the Committee on Disarmament during the present session, with a view to reaching appropriate conclusions that can enhance the prospects for negotiating concrete agreements to bring about the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

It should be noted that the Committee on Disarmament will have to reach a consensus within the next ten months on the specific measures of nuclear disarmament to be included in the comprehensive programme of disarmament. My delegation believes that the examination of the issues called for by the Group of 21 in CD/180 would be indispensable to permit the elaboration of a meaningful consensus on nuclear disarmament measures within the comprehensive programme. It should be self-evident that the comprehensive programme will fail to achieve general acceptance unless it contains specific and concrete measures relating to nuclear disarmament.

Therefore, it is the hope of my delegation that the Committee on Disarmament will be enabled to make a meaningful contribution to initiating the process of nuclear disarmament before the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Unless this Committee makes such a contribution, its credibility as an organ for multilateral disarmament negotiations will be completely eroded. The serious consequences this would have for the goals of disarmament and for peace and security require no elaboration.

There is one further question which my delegation would like to mention today. This concerns the grave implications of the Israeli military attack against Iraqi civilian nuclear facilities. The Security Council and the Governing Body of the IAEA have both pronounced themselves on the Israeli military attack against Iraq within

the context of their respective mandates. Many members of the Committee have addressed this issue and unanimously condemned the Israeli attack. Every group has made a statement in the Committee and expressed its collective condemnation. The Group of 21, in its statement circulated in document CD/187, has asked that in addition to condemning this attack, the Committee on Disarmament should take the necessary measures to ensure against the repetition of such an aggression by Israel or any other State. The Group of 21 has urged the Committee "to reaffirm the international principle prohibiting an attack against the peaceful nuclear facilities of a State under any circumstances" and recommended "that the Committee take appropriate steps which would contribute to reversing the adverse implications of this action".

The Pakistan delegation therefore proposes that the Committee on Disarmament should adopt an appropriate decision on the Israeli military aggression and its implications. We submit the following text for the Committee's consideration:

"The Committee on Disarmament strongly condemns the Israeli military attack against the Tammuz Nuclear Research Centre near Baghdad on 7 June 1981 as a clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct. This act of aggression has given rise to grave implications for the maintenance of international peace and security and for the prospects of disarmament.

"The Committee on Disarmament reaffirms that the goal of disarmament can be achieved only on the basis of strict adherence by all States to the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter regarding respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of States and the non-use of force or the threat of force in international relations. Furthermore, the Committee considers that this aggression constitutes a violation of the sovereign and inalienable right of every State to acquire and develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. It also contradicts the basic principles outlined in paragraphs 65-71 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament which provide the only agreed basis on which the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States can develop an international consensus on ways and means to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

"The Committee considers it entirely unacceptable that Israel should have arrogated to itself the right to carry out this military attack on the basis of its own arbitrary and untenable assertions regarding the intentions of another State which are refuted by all objective evidence. It is Israel's nuclear programme, capability and intentions which are the primary cause for concern in the Middle East and the greatest threat of nuclear proliferation in that region.

"The Committee considers that any repetition of such aggression by Israel or any other State, besides its grave consequences for international peace and security, would seriously jeopardize the efforts of the international community to promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The Committee strongly affirms that civilian nuclear facilities should under no circumstances be the object of military attack or sabotage for any reason whatsoever."

# (Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

Mr. Chairman, my delegation would request you to convene informal consultations among members of the Committee as soon as possible to consider this text and to reach an appropriate decision on the subject.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Mansur Ahmad for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. SKINNER (Canada): Mr. Chairman, I hope the Committee will forgive me for asking for the floor at this hour. It had been the intention of my delegation to speak today on the very important question of nuclear disarmament, but in view of the large number of delegations that have spoken, we will do that at a later date. I understand also that there are other speakers who are in the same position.

There is, however, one matter I would like to raise briefly before we conclude today. You will recall that the Canadian delegation submitted, as an annex to document CD/183, a Conceptual Working Paper on Arms Control Verification. On that occasion, we announced our intention to arrange for an exchange of views on that subject with other delegations in this Committee. In accordance with the established Committee practice of responding favourably to requests for the provision of facilities for informal consultations with other interested delegations, I have requested the Secretariat to provide us with Conference Room I tomorrow, Friday, 3 July at 9.30 a.m. I would therefore like to take this opportunity to invite those members of the Committee and others who might have an interest or wish to participate in a discussion on verification, to join us in Conference Room I tomorrow, as I believe Ambassador McPhail has already indicated to Ambassadors in this room.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Canada for his statement and trust that all delegates have taken due note of it. Distinguished delegates, I have requested the Secretariat to circulate today a timetable for meetings to be held by the Committee and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. It is not the practice for the timetable to include informal consultations that may be held between members within the framework of the various organizational arrangements agreed upon by the Committee. As usual, the timetable is only indicative and may be changed or adjusted as the Committee proceeds.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, after listening to your introduction of the timetable, and in conformity with what you have said, I should like to take this opportunity to remind delegations of what I have already announced in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, namely, that the consultations on toxicity determinations will take place next week, starting on Monday, 6 July, at 10 a.m. in Room VII.

The CHAIRMAN: At the moment, we have only one speaker for the plenary meeting on Tuesday next. I would urge those delegations wishing to speak on Tuesday to inscribe their names before Monday morning at 10.30 a.m.

### (The Chairman)

Distinguished delegates, if there is no objection, I will consider that the Committee agrees to follow the timetable as a guideline for the coming week.

#### It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will meet this afternoon from 3.50 p.m. to 6.30 p.m. This announcement is being made at the request of the Chairman of the Working Group, Ambassador García Robles.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 7 July, at 10.30 a.m. The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 1.50 p.m.