

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.132
24 June 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SECOND MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 24 June 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. I. Komives

(Hungary)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. M. MATI
Mr. M. MEDKOUR

Argentina:

Mr. C. CARASALES
Mr. J.F. GOMENSORO
Mr. J.M. OTEGUI
Miss N. NASCIMBENE

Australia:

Mr. R.A. WALKER
Mr. R. STEELE
Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium:

Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil:

Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. R. DEYANOV
Mr. P. POPTCHEV

Burma:

U NGWE WIN

Canada:

Mr. G. SKINNER

China:

Mr. YU Peiwen
Mr. YU Mengjia
Mr. LIN Chen
Mr. PAN Jusheng

Cuba:

Mr. PREDO NUNEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. RUZEK
Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. J. FRANEK

Egypt:

Mr. I.A. HASSAN

Mr. M.N. FAHMY

Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE

Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE

Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE

Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. B. NEUGEBAUER

Mr. G. HERDER

Mr. H. THIELICKE

Mr. M. NOTZEL

Mr. M. KAULFUSS

Miss H. HOPPE

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. G. PFEIFFER

Mr. N. KLINGER

Mr. H. MULLER

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES

Mr. F. GAJDA

Mr. C. GYORFFY

Mr. A. LAKATOS

India:

Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN

Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. S. DARUSMAN

Mr. E. SOEPRAPTO

Mr. ACHDIAT

Iran:

Mr. M.A. JALALI

Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA

Mr. H. SHARIFI

Italy: Mr. V. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO
Mr. M. BARENGHI
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANAKA
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya:

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG

Morocco: Mr. A. SKALLI
Mr. M. CHRAIBI
Mr. M. ARRASSEN

Netherlands: Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. M.B. BRIMAH
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. M. AKRAM
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru: Mr. A. THORNBERRY

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. A.T. JAYAKODDY
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. G. EKHOLM
Mr. J. LUNDIN
Mr. J. PRAWITZ
Mr. BERGLUND

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. V.A. SEMIONOV
Mr. L.A. NAUMOV
Mr. M.M. IPPOLITOV
Mr. S.N. RIUKHINE

United Kingdom:

Mr. N.H. MARSHALL
Mr. B. NOBLE

United States of America:

Mr. F.P. DESIMONE
Miss K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. J. MISKEL
Mr. S. FITZGERALD
Mr. R. SCOTT

Venezuela:

Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. O. GNOK

Secretary of the Committee
and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy-Secretary of the
Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee continues today its consideration of item 1 on its agenda, "Nuclear test ban". First of all, I would like to extend a warm welcome in the Committee to His Excellency the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Bernhard Neugebauer. He will speak today as first speaker and it will be my pleasure to invite him to address the Committee.

Mr. Neugebauer joined the diplomatic service in 1953. He holds his present position as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs since 1978. He served as representative of his country to the Economic Commission for Europe between 1963 and 1966, when he became Head of Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs until 1970. Between 1973 and 1977 he was Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations and he acted as Chairman of the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly at its thirty-second session.

Mr. NEUGEBAUER (German Democratic Republic): Comrade Chairman, first of all I would like to thank you for your kind words of welcome. It is a great pleasure and a privilege for me to have the opportunity to address the Committee on Disarmament at the beginning of its summer session.

At the same time, I should like to congratulate you, Comrade Chairman, on your assumption of the important and demanding office of Chairman for the month of June. May I express my best wishes to you and through you to all members of the Committee for a constructive and fruitful session. May I add that it gives me particular pleasure to see as representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Jaipal, with whom I had the pleasure of co-operating closely during his term of office in New York.

The German Democratic Republic has always devoted much attention to the work of the Committee on Disarmament. The responsibility of this body as the single multilateral negotiating forum on global issues of arms limitation and disarmament is all the greater today as the arms race is being stepped up enormously, threatening to get completely out of control. The risk of the outbreak of a global nuclear conflict would, as a result, rise dramatically. An alarmed world public has, therefore, come increasingly to judge the Committee by the extent to which it succeeds in stemming this trend and in working out agreements that are long overdue.

Whether in the west or the east, in the north or the south, the peoples want the course of peaceful coexistence, détente and disarmament to continue. It is the course of reason in the nuclear age.

The present situation is bound to remind us of a historical parallel. Almost half a century ago here in Geneva -- only a stone's throw away from this hall -- the disarmament efforts of the League of Nations failed, because they were boycotted by aggressive forces. They tried -- even if it was only scantily -- to

(Mr. Neugebauer, German Democratic Republic)

camouflage their war preparations and their striving for military superiority with the slogan "first rearm, then negotiate". The consequences for all nations were terrible, and it is hard to imagine today, in a world of thermonuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, what would happen if we did not succeed in preventing nuclear war.

However, it is extremely dangerous and adventurous that politicians in responsible positions have been making statements to the effect that armament is more important than negotiation, and that, in a questionable kind of logic, they see more significant tasks than that of preventing a war. Regrettably, the present situation in the Committee on Disarmament shows that these statements have not been verbal slips. Otherwise it would be hard to explain why some quarters are stubbornly trying to block negotiations for which there is a most pressing need. The interrelationship between this attitude and the armament decisions of NATO is only too obvious.

The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic, Erich Honecker, said on this subject at the Tenth Party Congress:

"The policy of peaceful coexistence is the only feasible way in which the danger of a new world war can be banished and a lasting peace can be assured. There is no acceptable alternative to this. In order that the peoples may be spared the catastrophe of a nuclear holocaust, the soundness of this policy must gain acceptance as the motive for practical action."

In the light of historical experience and of an analysis of the present situation, the German Democratic Republic has reached the following conclusion: the intensive continuation, the initiation or the resumption of negotiations is the decisive link. Acting in accordance with this awareness is in the best interest of all States without exception. Willingness to negotiate, therefore, is not a gift by one side to the other. Neither is it a suitable matter for bargaining. What is required is neither more nor less than what was unanimously agreed upon in the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, at the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly, and in resolution 35/152 E adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

He who does not seek military superiority and who declares himself in favour of the principles of equality and equal security has no reason to evade serious negotiations, especially when one takes into account that this particular principle is supported by the fact that, in the real world, an approximate military parity prevails between the USSR and the United States, between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO. The existence of such an approximate parity has also been recognized by many politicians and representatives of the

(Mr. Neugebauer, German Democratic Republic)

military as well as by scientific institutions in western countries. Thus, the London-based Institute for Strategic Studies, in its 1980 annual report, concludes: "We see no reason to alter our conclusion of earlier years that the over-all balance is still such as to make military aggression appear unattractive."

It is well known that the States members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization do not seek military superiority. Yet, similarly, they will not tolerate military superiority on the other side.

For us, military parity is not an end in itself but the starting-point for an agreed gradual reduction of the level of military forces under conditions of undiminished and stabilized security for all parties concerned. So, our position is clearly distinguished from all varieties of the deterrence doctrine, which thrive on the legend about a threat from the east. The fortieth anniversary of the fascist attack on the USSR recalls to memory the fact that this legend has always served to camouflage and justify armament, aggression and intervention.

Like the other socialist States, the German Democratic Republic will reliably and perseveringly pursue its foreign-policy course aimed at arms limitation and disarmament. We shall make every effort to help ensure that the possibilities of improving the international climate be used and the Committee's tasks be met. This purpose is served by our programme for a safer peace and for disarmament, which is forward-oriented and, at the same time, realistic. The proposals of the Twenty-sixth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union provide fresh stimulants for the continuation of détente and the prevention of a nuclear war. In this connection, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic, Erich Honecker, stated at the Tenth Party Congress: "These proposals, taken singly and together, are proof of a consistent quest for peace and a constructive approach to the most urgent international problems. Their aim is no mere temporary improvement in the world situation, but a sweeping, long-term one, so that peace can be stabilized on a permanent basis."

The initiatives of the socialist States are aimed at measures of political as well as military détente. They relate to nuclear as well as conventional weapons, to global, bilateral and regional aspects. Their primary purpose is to revive the détente dialogue and to bring about fruitful negotiations. We agree with the non-aligned countries that priority must be given to nuclear disarmament, that is, to a ban on the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of existing stockpiles until they are completely done away with.

That is the central task before the Committee on Disarmament. A working group, with the participation of the nuclear-weapon States, would make it possible to discuss and determine the basic elements of relevant agreements. The security interests of all those concerned could be duly taken into account.

(Mr. Neugebauer, German Democratic Republic)

A factor of extraordinary significance for the over-all problem of nuclear disarmament consists in continuing the SALT process while preserving all the positive elements that have so far been achieved in this area. We should like to recall that the United Nations General Assembly, at last year's session, adopted by consensus a resolution on this subject. The constructive attitude of the USSR with regard to the SALT process was also manifest at the Twenty-sixth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Closely related to the global aspects of the reduction of strategic nuclear arms is the issue of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. This matter has acquired particular urgency as a result of NATO's decision to deploy a qualitatively new generation of nuclear weapon systems -- Pershing II and cruise missiles. The idea behind this decision is to put into practice the doctrine of a wageable, limited nuclear war and to create a potential for blackmail and threats. It has been declared that the point is the closing of an alleged arms gap. But, in reality, there exists an equilibrium, covering all relevant means of delivery. In the case of nuclear warheads, NATO even has a preponderance of as much as 50 per cent. Growing opposition to NATO's missile deployment decision and categorical calls for negotiations in many West European countries testify to an increasing awareness that the people of these countries have been chosen as hostages of a policy of nuclear threat and called to become the first victims of a so-called limited nuclear war.

No effort should be spared in order to start Soviet-American talks on medium-range nuclear weapons, including the forward-based systems of the United States. Such talks would be facilitated by adopting the moratorium proposed by the USSR, taking into account, by the way, ideas stated by Western statesmen. A freezing of the medium-range nuclear missile weapons deployed in Europe will prevent a further build-up of nuclear capabilities and their modernization. There would be no unilateral advantage because of the prevailing approximate parity. And the negotiations on reductions could proceed free from strains which would otherwise be caused by a continued arms race in this field.

It is easy to understand that the German Democratic Republic, which is situated along the dividing line between NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries, attaches special importance to questions of military détente in Europe. Their solution is all the more significant for our people's security interests as the German Democratic Republic's neighbour to the west has the highest density of nuclear-weapon deployment on its territory.

We also firmly support the convening of an all-European conference on military détente and disarmament. For a continent with the largest concentration of the most dangerous weapons it is of vital importance to continue along the road of détente and to lessen military confrontation. This would be beneficial for all European States and peoples. It is, therefore, completely absurd to

(Mr. Neugebauer, German Democratic Republic)

demand that the socialist countries pay a price for the convening of this conference. The socialist States have submitted clear-cut proposals for the preparation and holding of such a conference and have responded constructively to Western ideas expressed in this respect. This applies, for instance, to the declared readiness of the USSR to extend the application of confidence-building measures to the entire European part of its territory, provided the Western side, too, extends the area covered accordingly. Thus far, unfortunately, the United States and other Western States have not been prepared to respond to these proposals.

We, for our part, would underline that we attach great importance to reaching agreement on confidence-building measures, especially since the policy of military confrontation is increasingly causing concern and distrust.

Generally it is true of confidence-building measures that they are not an end in themselves but designed to foster and speed up disarmament. They cannot be a substitute for disarmament, nor can they gloss over a policy of military confrontation; rather, they are intended to help overcome such a policy. And here again it applies that bringing about confidence-building measures depends on the observance of the security interests of all parties concerned.

This year's summer session of the Committee is already marked by the preparations for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The purpose of that special session should be to consolidate what has been achieved and, furthermore, to obtain new results. The German Democratic Republic deems it to be important to mobilize the public still more against the acute dangers involved in the arms race. For the rest, we hold the view that the special session should be dominated by:

The consideration of new draft agreements in the field of disarmament;

The adoption of the comprehensive disarmament programme; and

New proposals and initiatives by member States.

The contribution which, we believe, the Committee on Disarmament should make in this respect consists, above all, in making progress and, if possible, completing work on projects which are still pending. In particular, this concerns the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests. The prompt resumption of the trilateral negotiations would be a decisive step to resolve the remaining problems. This is all the more urgent as intense efforts are being made to introduce and test new terrible types of arms, such as the neutron bomb. The German Democratic Republic supports the demand that a working group be set up on this subject, with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, so that the Committee on Disarmament can live up to its responsibility in this field.

(Mr. Neugebauer, German Democratic Republic)

Progress towards a ban on chemical weapons would be of major significance. A stimulating effect in this respect would, no doubt, result from the resumption of the relevant bilateral talks between the USSR and the United States. We share the concern which has been voiced that current measures for the manufacture of binary weapons amount to escalating the arms race in the field of weapons of mass destruction and, at the same time, lead to a severe setback in efforts to solve the problem as a whole. Here again, there is a distinct risk that the arms race which certain States are stepping up, will wreck partial successes gained in the course of negotiations.

A comparatively advanced stage has been reached in drafting a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons. We see chances for the negotiations to be brought to a successful completion by the time the special session is to convene.

The German Democratic Republic will continue to participate actively in the work of the Committee on the strengthening of security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States. We wish to recall that this matter was given great attention by the General Assembly at its first special session on disarmament. It is our conviction that concrete progress on this issue would serve the security interests of all States and be conducive to measures to bring about nuclear disarmament and to strengthen the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The remarkable efforts being undertaken in the Working Group to draft a comprehensive disarmament programme merit high appreciation. In accordance with the Final Document of the first special session, the emphasis of its work should be on concrete and effective measures.

The Committee on Disarmament bears a great measure of responsibility for the entire disarmament process. I am convinced that the experience embodied in this multilateral negotiating organ and the great efforts made by the representatives of its member States are an essential basis on which disarmament agreements, which are so vital for all of us, can be worked out. In the final analysis, what counts in fighting the arms race is not studies or declarations, statistics or analyses, but binding agreements whereby the means of material war preparation are curbed and ultimately eliminated.

Comrade Chairman, let me assure you that it is the firm intention of the German Democratic Republic to continue to do everything it can to contribute with the utmost resolve and perseverance to meeting the greatest challenge -- to ensure the survival of mankind; for there must be no recurrence of what happened here in Geneva almost fifty years ago. The conscience of the world must stay awake, and politicians must spare no pains in order to put an end to the irrational arms drive.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic, Deputy Minister Neugebauer, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. WALKER (Australia): Mr. Chairman, my first words in my first statement in the month of June must be to express the pleasure of my delegation at serving once more under your chairmanship. This is a frequent pleasure, because if my calculations are right, you preside over two plenaries each week, two sets of informal meetings of the plenary and at least one meeting of the Working Group on Radiological Weapons, which you also chair. That is not to mention the various other consultations and informal meetings which you direct. My delegation believes that the Committee should be grateful to you for this service and devotion. I have had occasion earlier to compliment your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Pfeiffer, for the way in which he discharged the duties of Chairman of this Committee.

It is also a pleasure to welcome the three new representatives amongst us, the distinguished Ambassadors of Iran, Sri Lanka and Argentina. My delegation welcomes their personal contribution to the work of this Committee. I would like also, Mr. Chairman, to welcome, and to echo your welcome to our distinguished visitor from the German Democratic Republic.

The Committee on Disarmament is currently addressing its agenda item 1: Nuclear test ban. I propose to speak on this subject but also to take the opportunity of touching on other nuclear issues on which the Committee is currently working. In this statement I shall give particular prominence to the question of nuclear non-proliferation in its narrow sense of measures to resist the spread of nuclear weapons to countries other than the five present nuclear-weapon States. Nuclear non-proliferation is by no means the only aspect of arms control and disarmament to which the Australian Government attaches importance, but it is one facet of that complex of issues which we believe must be kept at the forefront of our collective attention.

Why do we attach such great importance to nuclear non-proliferation?

We in Australia believe that an effective non-proliferation régime -- that is to say an effective network of national and international agreements and other arrangements designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons -- that such a régime contributes directly to the security of all countries. We believe that an effective non-proliferation régime can also make an important indirect contribution to the security of States, by removing a potential source of fear and conflict. This is of particular relevance in areas where there is a high level of international tension, as recent events have demonstrated. We also see an effective nuclear non-proliferation régime as necessary for the civil nuclear trade and international co-operation in the civil uses of nuclear energy. We do not believe that it would be a responsible attitude to envisage such trade and co-operation outside a rigorous non-proliferation régime.

For Australia a central element of the non-proliferation régime is the non-proliferation Treaty and its attendant system of safeguards. But we believe that many other elements -- including, for example, other bilateral and multilateral agreements -- contribute to that régime, which has widespread ramifications.

(Mr. Walker, Australia)

One of these other elements - one which is explicitly recognized in the NPT -- is the logical and political connection between vertical and horizontal proliferation, that is to say, the connection between measures of nuclear restraint and disarmament on the part of nuclear-weapon States and measures to restrain and block the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries.

Negative security assurances have a place in this Australian perspective. They relate to the security concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States which deny themselves the possibility of acquiring their own nuclear weapons. Moreover an undertaking, through effective non-proliferation arrangements, that they will not develop or acquire nuclear weapons is in our view important in establishing the non-nuclear status of countries which are to benefit from such assurances. The Working Group, which has already held two meetings this session, is fortunate in having the able Italian Minister Ciarrapico as Chairman because it faces the difficult task of reconciling and accommodating widely diverging approaches.

Australia's concern for nuclear non-proliferation is also important to the approach which we bring to the attempt to draft a comprehensive programme of disarmament. I elaborated on this point in the statement I made at the conclusion of our spring session. My delegation continues to be impressed by the difficulty of the task facing the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and its Chairman, the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico. We wish the Working Group to succeed in drafting in good time a programme that will, by its realism and constructive nature, attract the enthusiastic adherence and support of all countries.

Turning now to our current agenda item, let me recall that the Australian delegation, like many others, has drawn attention to the important role which a comprehensive test-ban treaty is called upon to play in reinforcing the non-proliferation régime of which I have been speaking. Indeed, of itself, a comprehensive test-ban treaty would serve the important purposes which I identified at the beginning of my statement as being served by the non-proliferation régime. In addition, a comprehensive test-ban treaty should contribute directly to a cessation of the nuclear arms race. Moreover, it should free people in many countries of their concerns and fears as to the direct physical effects of continued nuclear testing.

This is the perspective which led the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Street, on 30 May to welcome the announced decision of the new French Government to suspend testing in the South Pacific -- testing which, like the nuclear testing of the other nuclear-weapon States, has drawn expressions of concern from Australia and many other countries. In that statement the Minister expressed the hope that the suspension of French testing might lead to its permanent end.

(Mr. Walker, Australia)

Unfortunately, a few days later, the Minister had to express regret at reports that an authoritative spokesman of the French Government had said that these hopes were not to be fulfilled. On both occasions Mr. Street reiterated Australia's determination to work actively for a comprehensive test-ban treaty in multilateral forums.

This Committee on Disarmament is less deeply involved in the preparation of such a treaty than many delegations would wish. Delegations should not, however, lose sight of the fact that the Committee is not entirely inactive on this important question. Nothing should deter delegations from the work now open to them. In the spring we held a number of informal meetings at which important statements were made on this issue. I explained at the end of the spring session why my delegation thought these exchanges had been useful. I would today add to those comments an expression of appreciation to the sponsors of document CD/181 -- the delegations known as the Group of 21 -- for contributing that document to the body of papers before the Committee. Important and useful work has also continued in the seismic experts Group. My delegation renews its call on all delegations to contribute actively to the work of that Group and to co-operate fully in its activities. I would wish furthermore to take this occasion to refer once more to the Australian proposal that the administrative and institutional arrangements for an international seismic network constitute a subject which the Committee should waste no time in addressing.

In conclusion, since I have broadened the subject matter of this statement to include other nuclear issues, I wish to say a very few words about the proposed radiological weapons convention. My delegation warmly welcomes the positive and constructive attitude which many delegations, hitherto reserved about this convention, have now brought to the Working Group. We believe that it is important for the Committee as a whole to respond positively to this development and to make a determined effort to seek to find answers to all questions and concerns which are raised in a constructive spirit in connection with the proposed convention on radiological weapons. We see here the possibility of real progress, provided all concerned can find the requisite good-will, imagination and above all open-mindedness. No country represented here can be expected to concede vital interests but all can be expected to make a major effort to accommodate each other's concerns.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Walker of Australia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. DARUSMAN (Indonesia): Mr. Chairman, my delegation wishes first of all to offer you its warm congratulations on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee for the month of June. We have seen you for two consecutive years chairing the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons in a very efficient manner, with full flexibility and competence. My delegation has therefore every reason to be confident that, under your chairmanship, the Committee will make further substantive progress during this second part of its 1981 session. I pledge you the full co-operation of my delegation in the discharge of your difficult and heavy responsibilities.

I should also like to take this opportunity to extend the appreciation and gratitude of my delegation to your predecessor, Ambassador Pfeiffer of the Federal Republic of Germany, who presided over the Committee during the month of April, and to welcome the new representatives in this Committee, Ambassador Carasales of Argentina, Ambassador Ahmad Jalali of Iran and Ambassador Tissa Jayakoddy of Sri Lanka. Allow me also to greet the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic, H.E. Mr. B. Neugebauer.

Looking back at the spring session of our Committee, we note that while substantive results have been achieved in various fields, some issues remained unresolved. In the view of my delegation, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has, during our spring session, completed its task under its existing mandate. We have expected, therefore, that as from the beginning of this summer session of the Committee, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons would move further by transforming the elements identified and the relevant proposals submitted into a draft convention. It is, regrettably, not the case, at the moment at least, because the Ad Hoc Working Group was not provided with a new mandate for the performance of its new task. We still hope that, perhaps at a later stage during this summer session, the Committee will be in a position to agree on an adjusted mandate for the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons to enable it actually to draft the text of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling as well as the use of chemical weapons.

The question of assuring the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is of paramount importance to non-nuclear-weapon States, considering the continuing arms race and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons and the possible use or threat of use of such weapons. In this connection, the Twelfth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held early this month in Baghdad, in the second preambular paragraph of resolution 28/12-P, stated the following:

"Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarters".

In the second operative paragraph of the said resolution the Conference stated further:

"Requests the members of the Committee on Disarmament to reach an urgent agreement on an international convention to assure non-nuclear States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

(Mr. Darusman, Indonesia)

We note that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances has started the second stage of its work, namely, the exploration of various alternatives in searching for a common approach to the problem. While continuing to hold the view that the most effective assurances for the security of non-nuclear-weapon States would be the banning of nuclear-weapon tests in all environments and nuclear disarmament and, pending these, a complete prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons, my delegation is willing to consider other feasible alternatives set out in document CD/SA/WP.5, without, naturally, implying our preference or acceptance of any of those other alternatives.

We also note that the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament has resumed its substantive work. The time available to this Ad Hoc Working Group is indeed very short to enable it to complete the formulation of a draft programme for submission to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament next year, considering the wide range and the complexities of the issues involved. We have no doubt, however, that also during this summer session of the Committee, the Ad Hoc Working Group will succeed in making significant progress as was the case during our spring session.

With regard to the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, my delegation is pleased to note that, thanks to your competent chairmanship, it was able to make substantive progress. With your continued wise guidance and the co-operation of all the members of the Committee in the Ad Hoc Working Group, I am convinced that further progress will be made during this summer session and that a draft treaty text, reflecting all the working papers and proposals submitted, could be produced. In the opinion of my delegation, the questions relating to the definition of the weapons to be prohibited, the scope of the prohibition and the uses of radioactive materials for peaceful purposes are some of the questions of major importance to be dealt with by the Ad Hoc Working Group during this summer session of the Committee. With a view to assuring the sovereign and inalienable rights of every State to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, my delegation would be in favour of including a provision in the proposed convention prohibiting attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities. My delegation disagrees with the arguments that the inclusion of such a provision would not be necessary because this is already stipulated in the 1977 Protocol I of the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, more specifically in its article 56. As was pointed out by my delegation during the spring session in its statements on chemical weapons, the inclusion of identical provisions in various international instruments is not unusual, and it would only reinforce the provisions concerned. My delegation referred to three Conventions and one draft convention which contain identical provisions. In addition, there are also practical considerations for having the provision I referred to earlier in the proposed radiological convention: if a State is not a party to the 1977 Protocol and if the radiological weapons convention to which that State is a party does not contain a provision prohibiting attacks on nuclear installations for peaceful purposes, this would mean that that State would not be legally bound by such a prohibition. The recent Israeli attack on the peaceful nuclear facilities near Baghdad, which was entirely without justification and has posed a serious threat to international peace and security and was condemned by the international community and most recently by the Security Council, renders the inclusion of a provision prohibiting attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities in the proposed radiological weapons convention all the more relevant. As was rightly stated in the statement made by the Group of 21 on 18 June, the blatant aggression committed by Israel poses a challenge to the sovereign and inalienable right of every State to acquire and develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. It is totally unjustifiable that peaceful nuclear facilities, situated in a country party to the NPT and put under IAEA safeguards, were subject to an attack. The irresponsible Israeli act was

(Mr. Darusman, Indonesia)

strongly condemned by my Government immediately after it took place. In a statement made on 10 June, the Indonesian Minister for Foreign Affairs stated as follows:

"The Government of the Republic of Indonesia condemns the Israeli air raids against the nuclear installations outside Baghdad on 7 June 1981. The attack, which was entirely without justification, once again demonstrated the complete disregard of Israel for the norms of international conduct and purposefully increased the tension in the Middle East".

The Israeli attack was also jointly condemned by the ASEAN member countries. In a statement issued in Manila on 17 June 1981, on the occasion of the annual meeting of Foreign Ministers of the ASEAN member countries, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers stated as follows:

"The Foreign Ministers condemn the recent unwarranted Israeli air attack on Iraqi nuclear installations near Baghdad and regard it as a serious violation of the United Nations Charter and international law. They express grave concern that this dangerous and irresponsible act would escalate the existing tension in the area and pose a serious threat to international peace and security".

If I may now turn to item 1 of our agenda, namely, "Nuclear test ban", I wish to express the full support of my delegation for the recommendation contained in document CD/181 submitted by the Group of 21 that in the light of the discussions held in informal meetings of the Committee, an ad hoc working group on a nuclear test ban be set up at the beginning of this summer session of the Committee. Much has already been said in the past on the necessity of establishing such a working group. The Group of 21 has even gone further by also proposing in the document I have just referred to, a specific mandate for the ad hoc working group. Considering that working groups constitute the most appropriate forums for the conduct of negotiations, it is the hope of my delegation that those delegations which during the spring session of the Committee manifested their reservations on the creation of the said working group are now in a position to go along with the proposal made by the Group of 21 in order that actual negotiations can be conducted soon and that the Committee will be able to report to the second special session next year accordingly.

As regards item 2 of the agenda, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", in document CD/180 the Group of 21 has proposed that the establishment of an ad hoc working group on this item and its mandate should be the immediate objective of the considerations at the start of this summer session of the Committee.

We hope that this pending issue, i.e. the creation of ad hoc working groups on items 1 and 2, can be resolved without delay. Without the establishment of appropriate working groups, I am afraid, Mr. Chairman, that actual negotiations could never be conducted and that, consequently, this Committee would cease to be a negotiating body and would become a deliberative organ, at least as far as a nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament are concerned.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Darusman of Indonesia for his statement, and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. JAYAKODDY (Sri Lanka): Mr. Chairman, the delegation of Sri Lanka wishes at the outset to express its best wishes and congratulations to you on your assumption of the chairmanship of this Committee for the month of June. We are confident that your long experience, skill and enduring patience will help to guide the Committee to constructive and successful endeavour. My delegation pledges its fullest support and co-operation with you. We also wish to express our appreciation of the excellent work that was done by Ambassador Pfeiffer during his tenure of the chairmanship of the Committee in the month of April. Permit me also to extend our own welcome to the distinguished Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic, H.E. Mr. Neugebauer.

It is a pleasure for me, Mr. Chairman, to thank you and the distinguished Ambassadors here, who have welcomed me so warmly to this Committee. Your words of cordial welcome are a source of great encouragement as I start work in this Committee.

Last week in our deliberations the distinguished Ambassador of Argentina presented on behalf of the Group of 21 a statement regarding the Israeli attack on a nuclear facility on 7 June. The delegation of Sri Lanka fully supports this statement which expressed the just indignation and concern of all peace-loving people in the world. In connection with this attack, the Government of Sri Lanka issued a statement condemning the action. May I be permitted to quote the text of this statement.

"Sri Lanka is greatly perturbed over the Israeli bombing of a nuclear reactor in Iraq.

"This is a violation of the sovereignty of nations. This disregard for international law can have the most serious consequences. Sri Lanka condemns this action and calls on the international community to deal suitably with this violation of international law.

"Sri Lanka expresses her support and solidarity with Iraq on this issue."

The implications of this violation of international law have been extensively analysed by the distinguished Ambassadors who have spoken earlier. Therefore, it is not necessary for me to cover the same ground. I would like to emphasize, however, that in our view this disregard for international law threatens the security not only of one country or one region of the world, but threatens international peace and security as a whole. It undermines confidence in the NPT and raises doubts about the Treaty's usefulness. The action was designed, we feel, to intimidate developing countries that are constructing, or planning the construction of their own nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes in the course of their economic development. It is a totally unacceptable form of international behaviour which must not be allowed to repeat itself.

This session of the Committee is invested with important significance for two compelling reasons. On the one hand, the negotiations that will be conducted in the next 10 weeks will bring to a close the last full round of the Committee's work before the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament. What the Committee achieves will necessarily serve next year, together with the work of the spring session of this Committee in 1982, as a basis for discussions at that special session. What is accomplished in this Committee will naturally lie on the table for consideration by States Members of the United Nations. My delegation is convinced that what the Committee will transmit to the General Assembly at its special session will not fall completely short of the expectations of all Member States and the millions of concerned people around the world who justifiably expect that something concrete in the form of negotiated agreements will come out of our work.

(Mr. Jayakoddy, Sri Lanka)

This session also draws special significance from the currently deteriorating international political environment. We are witnessing a steady drift away from a period of relaxed relations when the voices of international dialogue were less strident and more co-operative than they are now. We seem to be losing some of the ground that was gained in avoiding crises and lessening tensions around the world. Anxiety and fear are not diminishing. On the contrary they grow stronger and the causes that generate them are increasing.

Against this background it is claimed by some that the present time is inopportune for genuine negotiations on disarmament and a variety of reasons are adduced to sustain this point of view. However, for my delegation the time of tension and growing crises calls for renewed and vigorous efforts at working towards multilateral disarmament negotiations. The work of this Committee, my delegation would wish to urge, cannot and should not be subject to the blowing of hot and cold in the relations between individual States or groups of States. Multilateral disarmament negotiations are an integral part of the struggle to avoid catastrophic annihilation of the people of this planet, and the destruction of the planet itself. We, therefore, hope that this session of the Committee will turn out to be a productive and constructive one despite the cold winds that might blow elsewhere.

The two priority items of the Committee's work have been and remain a nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The Group of 21 has submitted proposals to this Committee on both these items, calling for the setting up of working groups on them. My delegation is of the view that the reasons that were adduced by the Group of 21 and many other delegations in favour of an urgent beginning of negotiations on these two items are convincing. The case for the setting up of these working groups in the view of my delegation is clear and rational and should be beyond controversy. However, this Committee has not been able to arrive at a consensus on the setting up of these working groups. It is said by those who do not support the setting up of the working groups that the two priority items are too complicated in their nature, and are not ripe enough for negotiations in this forum.

No one could quarrel with the assertion that the issues are complicated, but that is reason enough in itself for making a start at resolving them through working groups of this Committee which is, after all, the only multilateral forum for disarmament negotiations. The very dangers that nuclear weapons pose and the utter futility of using them must surely make items one and two of our agenda ripe enough for negotiation in this Committee. These two priority items have earned their place at the top of the agenda of this Committee out of their very importance for the survival of all mankind. It is only rational, therefore, that they should be so treated by the Committee.

There is today repeated assertion that national and international security can be defended and maintained only by resort to, and reliance on, theories of deterrence and military superiority which, it is said, can provide the only certain and effective shield for survival. The question that my delegation would wish to pose is whether there is no other course for survival. Cannot the collective wisdom of mankind plot a new course to ensure that the world lives in lasting peace, security and harmony?

(Mr. Jayakoddy, Sri Lanka)

The Sri Lanka delegation is convinced that negotiations in two new working groups of this Committee on the two high-priority agenda items, combined with the work on the other agenda items, could lead the way towards this other course. My delegation, therefore, earnestly urges that this Committee agrees by consensus to set up immediately working groups on the two priority items of the agenda. A consensus agreement on this issue will be the Committee's positive response to the universal cry for nuclear disarmament.

As regards the item on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, my delegation is pleased to see the Working Group on that subject, under its able Chairman, has proceeded beyond the existing unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon States and got down to the business of examining substantive issues in the form of alternative proposals for a common formula for security assurances. My delegation shares the realistic view that the examination of alternatives should lead the working group to concentrate on the most promising alternative in terms of its acceptability to all concerned. This realism should, however, be a two-way street. While I do not wish to engage in a polemical discussion as to why and how the need for security assurances arose, I should like simply to say that the nuclear-weapon States ought also to take account of the reality of the very nature and the mobility of existing nuclear weapons, and of the fact that the primary consideration in giving security assurances should be to meet the security concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States rather than the perceived security concerns of the nuclear-weapon States themselves. It would be unrealistic and unjust to expect the States who have renounced the nuclear option in unambiguous terms to accept an assurance against the threat or use of nuclear weapons which will eventually be invalidated through a series of qualifications.

The Working Group on Chemical Weapons, under its very efficient Chairman, has presented a programme of work for its next phase of negotiation with which my delegation is in general agreement. My delegation is of the view that the Committee should give urgent consideration to the question of expanding the mandate of this Working Group to enable it to proceed towards actual elaboration of a convention on the basis of the large measure of convergence of views that was evident during the first part of the session and also to make further progress in narrowing down the differences that exist on several issues. My delegation feels that in respect of certain issues, consideration of texts would be the next logical step to facilitate the latter exercise.

As to the question whether the Working Group should concentrate on making further progress on areas of agreement or whether efforts should be intensified to narrow the differences, my delegation keeps an open mind as flexibility on the part of all delegations would facilitate a decision on this question depending upon the progress of negotiations.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, through the untiring efforts of its Chairman, has already been able to achieve considerable progress in examining the measures to be included in the programme. The work that lies ahead of us during the second part of the 1981 session will be crucial, not only because it involves substantive discussion of the measures and the important question of a time-frame for the programme, but also because definitive progress in finalization of the comprehensive programme of disarmament will make a concrete contribution to the deliberations of the General Assembly at its second special session on disarmament.

(Mr. Jayakoddy, Sri Lanka)

Despite the low priority attached to it in our agenda, my delegation believes that the negotiation of a treaty banning radiological weapons will be a contribution to the disarmament effort in that it will hopefully eliminate at least one option for the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and, more importantly, indirect methods of waging radiological warfare. The recent Israeli attack on an Iraqi nuclear plant has brought into sharp focus the validity of the argument that a treaty banning radiological weapons should encompass the possibility of waging radiological warfare by attacks on peaceful nuclear power installations. My delegation wishes to stress strongly that a future treaty on radiological weapons should include positive provisions to facilitate access, for all States, to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and international co-operation for the peaceful application of nuclear technology and radioactive materials.

My delegation is prepared to co-operate fully in your dedicated efforts as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons to facilitate the speedy finalization of negotiations on this item.

My delegation will continue to make its contribution, modest though it be, towards the success of this Committee's work.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Jayakoddy of Sri Lanka for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. SKALLI (Morocco) (translated from French): My delegation would first like to express its satisfaction at the speedy resumption of substantive work in our Committee. It is a pleasure to note, in this connection, that at the very outset of its session this year the Committee embarked on the active phase of its work, thus breaking with the distressing trend seen in previous years, when our negotiating body appeared to be condemned to spend the bulk of its time on procedural matters and the organization of work.

There is, indeed, no denying that this year there has been evidence of a general will to initiate without delay, and in a constructive spirit, negotiations on the majority of the items on our agenda. These negotiations have been of a breadth and an intensity which we are happy to recognize. The ad hoc working groups have been able to make some progress, thanks to the genuine efforts made by all delegations and the impetus given to them by their respective chairmen, to whom we wish to pay a well-deserved tribute.

The experience we now have confirms that working groups do indeed constitute the best machinery for the conduct of concrete negotiations within the Committee. It cannot but be regretted, therefore, that it should not yet have been possible -- for reasons with which everyone is familiar -- to reach a consensus on the establishment of two working groups on items 1 and 2 of our agenda, namely, a "nuclear test ban" and the "cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

(Mr. Skalli, Morocco)

It is, to say the least, paradoxical that we should find ourselves unable to negotiate on these two questions which, I need hardly remind you, have been given absolute priority and which everyone agrees are of the utmost importance. My delegation certainly can neither understand nor agree with attempts to gain acceptance for the idea that the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and nuclear disarmament are not appropriate topics for negotiation within the Committee. On the contrary, we believe that these two fundamental questions fall within the jurisdiction and the terms of reference of this multilateral negotiating body. It is, moreover, no accident that they appear high on our agenda.

With regard to the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, the fact that this question has been under study for a quarter of a century clearly indicates the lack of political will on the part of the major nuclear-weapon Powers to achieve a positive and satisfactory outcome.

Yet the urgent need to conclude a treaty completely banning nuclear-weapon tests has been constantly proclaimed and affirmed both by the United Nations General Assembly and by the various bodies responsible for disarmament negotiations. No one can be unaware of the impact that such a treaty would have on the chances of success of the efforts to put an end to the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and to prevent the proliferation of such weapons.

It is inconceivable that the nuclear-weapon Powers should feel no obligation to respond to the deep-rooted concerns and the long-standing expectations of the international community other than with such reluctance to conclude a nuclear test-ban treaty. We believe that this situation cannot last indefinitely without risk of grave damage to the non-proliferation regime itself. That is why we must pay heed to the urgent appeals contained in the many resolutions of the General Assembly which call on us to take the steps necessary to initiate negotiations and conclude such a treaty.

In this Committee, the neutral and non-aligned countries, supported by many other delegations, have again and again emphasized the urgent need to set up an ad hoc working group to conduct negotiations to this end. In a recent proposal, contained in document CD/181 which, my delegation wishes to repeat, it fully supports, the Group of 21 reiterated its position yet again, calling for the establishment, for the duration of this summer part of the Committee's session, of a working group with a mandate "to negotiate on provisions relating to the scope, verification of compliance and the final clauses of a draft treaty relating to item 1 of its agenda".

The Group of 21 also sought to make a further contribution to the Committee's work by drawing the attention of the nuclear-weapon Powers engaged in the trilateral negotiations to a number of specific questions to which it would be very wise and extremely desirable for them to provide appropriate answers.

We should like to express the hope that common sense and wisdom will eventually prevail and that we shall then be able to get down without further delay to the task that has been entrusted to us.

The question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament is one to which the international community has also attached the highest priority. For no one can be unaware of the grave threats that loom over the world as a result of the pursuit of the nuclear arms race or of the disastrous consequences that the outbreak of a nuclear war would have for the whole of mankind.

(Mr. Skalli, Morocco)

My country is firmly convinced that nuclear disarmament is an essential measure capable of instituting a climate of trust between States and peoples and of strengthening peace and security in the world.

Consequently, we cannot subscribe to the view expressed by certain delegations that peace and stability have been maintained in the world because of nuclear deterrence.

My delegation would like to refer in this connection to the statement that was submitted by our Group of 21 during the first part of this session and that, in particular, refuted the doctrine of deterrence in these terms:

"The Group of 21 is ... convinced, as a result of the discussions, that doctrines of nuclear deterrence, far from being responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, lie at the root of the continuing escalation of the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear armaments and lead to greater insecurity and instability in international relations. Moreover, such doctrines, which in the ultimate analysis are predicated upon the willingness to use nuclear weapons, cannot be the basis for preventing the outbreak of a nuclear war, a war which would affect belligerents and non-belligerents alike."

It has often been said in the Committee that the political will of States, and especially of the nuclear-weapon States, is the prerequisite for the success of any negotiations on nuclear disarmament. We fully share this opinion and hope that the nuclear-weapon Powers will manifest that political will by initiating appropriate negotiations in the working group whose establishment has been requested by the Group of 21, with the reasonable and realistic mandate proposed.

Until nuclear disarmament has become a reality, the non-nuclear-weapon States are entitled to seek and obtain guarantees against the use or threat of use of such weapons.

The question of negative security guarantees is one of those that are the subject of negotiations in the Committee's ad hoc working groups.

I should like very briefly to state my delegation's views on a number of important aspects of those questions.

With regard to the item entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", my delegation favours the adoption of an international instrument of a legally binding nature, which might take the form of an international convention. Meanwhile, we hope that the Working Group will be able to agree on interim arrangements, perhaps through a Security Council resolution.

From the discussions that have been held so far in the Working Group, my delegation has the impression that certain nuclear-weapon Powers are more concerned with their own security than with that of the non-nuclear-weapon countries for whose benefit the Working Group has been charged with negotiating these international undertakings. We should like to hope that our misgivings and doubts will be rapidly dispelled, for the States which have voluntarily renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons legitimately expect the Powers possessing such weapons to give them, without any ambiguity whatsoever, guarantees against the use or threat of use of those weapons.

(Mr. Skalli, Morocco)

With respect to radiological weapons, the Working Group has as its task the negotiation of a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.

Although the conclusion of such a convention would not constitute a disarmament measure in the strict sense, we are, none the less, favourably disposed towards any initiative or measure aimed at preventing the emergence, and prohibiting the use, of new types of weapons of mass destruction.

When this question was examined by the Working Group, a major objection was raised with respect to the definition of radiological weapons as proposed in the draft text of a treaty submitted jointly by the United States and the Soviet Union. In this connection, the Moroccan delegation is of the opinion that whatever the definition we adopt, it must not in any way justify or legitimize the possession or use of nuclear weapons.

In addition, I should like to take this opportunity to reiterate my delegation's support for the Swedish proposal for the inclusion in the future convention of provisions prohibiting deliberate attacks on civilian nuclear installations.

The Moroccan delegation attaches very great importance to the negotiation and conclusion of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons. The elaboration of a convention on this question, which is, moreover, an urgent one and one which has been given high priority, would unquestionably constitute an effective and genuine disarmament measure.

In the view of my delegation, it would be desirable for this convention to be general in scope and to include also a prohibition on the use of chemical weapons. We do not share the view expressed by certain delegations that the inclusion in the convention of a provision banning the use of chemical weapons would have the effect of weakening the Geneva Protocol. Such a provision could in no way prejudice the earlier instrument, which we consider to be very valuable.

We are convinced that, in view of the progress made in its work by the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, the Committee will shortly take a decision for the broadening of its mandate so as to enable it to apply itself to the elaboration of the text of a convention.

I will conclude my statement with a few words on the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

As everyone knows, the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament is the only Group whose mandate is subject to a time-limit, since it is required to submit the programme to the United Nations General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, which will be held in June 1982. Little time remains, therefore, before that important date. We feel, nevertheless, that the Group has made good progress in its work and that, under the impetus of its Chairman, the distinguished representative of Mexico, it has acquired such momentum that we are justified in hoping that we shall by then have a document containing a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Mr. VENKATESWARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, let me first of all extend the warm welcome of my delegation to H.E. the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Bernard Neugebauer. We have listened with keen interest to his thought-provoking and constructive intervention in our Committee this morning.

Today is the last plenary meeting of the current session at which the Committee will be considering the question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, which is the first item on our agenda, not without good and sufficient reason. Of course, we may revert to this important subject later in the session, perhaps in the first week of August, because we have yet to take a decision on certain formal proposals made by the Group of 21. I am referring to document CD/181 of 24 April 1981, in which the Group of 21 has put forward for approval a draft mandate seeking the establishment of an ad hoc working group of the CD to negotiate on the provisions of a treaty banning all nuclear weapons tests.

We would expect the Committee to take a formal decision on this proposal of the Group of 21, as, indeed, we would expect the same treatment for the other proposal of the Group of 21 in document CD/180 proposing the setting up of a further working group on the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. In both cases the Group of 21 has proposed precisely defined mandates indicating how best the Committee on Disarmament may fulfil its responsibilities at the present time in regard to two questions which have been accorded the highest priority by the General Assembly at its first special session devoted to disarmament.

At our last plenary meeting, on 23 June, the distinguished Ambassadors of Brazil and Mexico raised these very same points. The Ambassador of Brazil referred to the series of questions addressed by the Group of 21 to the trilateral negotiators on the test ban. He said: "The nuclear-weapon States concerned should not shirk their special responsibilities and they should respond to the unanimous concern of the non-nuclear-weapon States". We agree with him, and we certainly expect replies to our questions, if not from the trilateral negotiators as a group, then from the individual States concerned. Refusal on their part to answer those questions would inevitably diminish the role of the Committee as a multilateral negotiating forum -- a role which has been conferred on this Committee by the consensus of its members and of the General Assembly. In that event we shall have to review the fundamental attitudes of the members towards the Committee in relation to the functions entrusted to us.

These questions are particularly relevant, since despite the sustained consideration of a nuclear test ban over the last quarter of a century or more, we are still no nearer to a treaty. Verification has been said to be a major stumbling-block. But is that really the case? In 1958, a group of experts from both Western countries as well as socialist countries, studied the possibility of detecting violations of a possible agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests. The experts had detailed a viable verification and control system and then came to the unanimous conclusion:

"The Conference of Experts, having considered a control system for detecting violations of a possible agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests, has come to the conclusion that the methods for detecting nuclear explosions available at the present time, viz., the method of collecting samples of

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

radioactive debris, the methods of recording seismic, acoustic, and hydroacoustic waves, and the radio-signal method, along with the use of on-site inspection of unidentified events which could be suspected of being nuclear explosions, make it possible to detect and identify nuclear explosions, including low yield explosions (1-5 kt). The Conference has therefore come to the conclusion that it is technically feasible to establish, with the capabilities and limitations indicated below, a workable and effective control system, to detect violations of an agreement on the world-wide suspension of nuclear weapons tests."

That was in 1958. Technology has made rapid strides in the intervening years. And yet, some countries still continue to argue that adequate verification of a nuclear test ban remains an obstacle. The experts of the same countries had, more than 20 years ago, accepted that verification was not a problem, given the technology then available. Does not this demonstrate the validity of our assertion that the real difficulty lies in a lack of political will, not verification? Our Committee cannot evade this issue and still retain its credibility.

This is a matter of vital importance to the future of the Committee on Disarmament. In that connection, we shall also have to bear in mind the decisions we eventually take in the CD on the proposals of the Group of 21 for the establishment of two working groups, one on the nuclear test ban and the other on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. So far we have only discussed these matters at several informal meetings, and while those meetings have contributed to our general education, they have not moved us one inch closer to the undertaking of multilateral negotiations on any aspect of the nuclear questions, which understandably deserve the highest priority. The time has come now for the Committee to take formal decisions on the formal proposals before it. It is not enough to have them discussed at informal meetings whose proceedings are not even recorded.

The members of the Group of 21 have in all seriousness and earnestness of purpose assumed their responsibilities and put forward concrete proposals concerning the most important question facing all of us -- the question of human survival. They have demonstrated good faith and good intentions, and they cannot be held responsible for lack of progress. As the Ambassador of Poland said on 23 June, at the plenary meeting of the Committee, questions are being asked as to what the CD has achieved since the first special session, and if it has achieved nothing, who is responsible for that. My delegation would certainly not blame the CD as a whole, or the Group of 21, for failure to deliver the goods collectively expected of us.

One thing is very clear. It is not for lack of initiatives or absence of proposals that we have made no progress on nuclear issues. There is no shortage of proposals within the CD or outside it. The other day the Ambassador of Mexico referred to the proposals of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues. One has only to read journals, newspapers and other publications to become acutely aware of the intensity of public concern for the immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race. Former diplomats, political leaders and negotiators of arms control measures, not to speak of scientists and retired generals -- people who have

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

had intimate inside knowledge of the arms race and its dangers -- have warned about the risks inherent in the present situation and have put forward various suggestions as to what ought to be done. Concerned non-governmental organizations have also done the same. Why is it, then, that we, in the Committee on Disarmament, have not given adequate attention to these mounting expressions of public concern? Why is it that we have not even made a compilation of the various proposals made, in all sincerity, by eminent persons? We have received literally thousands of communications from citizens of many countries, voicing their simple desire for survival in a world freed from the danger of a nuclear holocaust. What is to be our response to their cries of anguish?

Evidently, the expectations from the Committee are great indeed. Are these expectations misplaced? No, I do not think so, because the General Assembly, at its first special session on disarmament, gave us a clear enough mandate to concern ourselves with the prevention of nuclear war, with the cessation of the nuclear arms race and with the achievement of nuclear disarmament. The Committee on Disarmament is, in a sense, accountable not only to the General Assembly but also to the public at large for its non-performance in regard to these nuclear questions. At our informal meetings we have discussed the prerequisites for negotiations, but we have not yet reached any consensus on the actual commencement of negotiations on an agreed basis. Doctrines of nuclear deterrence have been subjected to strong criticism by us on the ground that they have in fact fuelled the arms race and increased the risks of nuclear war. We have also questioned the legitimacy of the use of nuclear weapons, as they have the potential for endangering the very survival of the human species.

There is now very little more left for us to do as a body except to begin negotiations on a variety of urgent nuclear disarmament issues. If the Committee on Disarmament, constituted as it is, cannot tackle questions of direct relevance to the survival of mankind, we might as well confess our impotence. Or else we should try to identify the obstacles in the path of our undertaking negotiations. What could be these obstacles? What really are the causes underlying this senseless nuclear arms race? We do not believe that man is powerless before the so-called technological momentum of the arms race. Every decision concerning the arms race is man-made and is directly related to State policies. What, then, are State policies made of? -- fear, suspicion, envy? No longer is the security of one State unrelated to the security of other States, for in a nuclear war we shall all be victims. We have demonstrably not really addressed ourselves so far to the root causes; unless we do so, we shall not be able to create the proper climate for success in disarmament negotiations.

Some would have us believe that we cannot have disarmament unless we first agree to verification and control measures. Others tell us that we must first agree on the disarmament package before verification and control can be accepted. It is futile to argue about which comes first -- control or disarmament. My delegation stated in 1962, on 20 March of that year, in the ENDC at its fifth meeting, presided over by Mr. Krishna Menon, that "My Government has at all times regarded control and disarmament as being inseparable. We do not think one should follow the other or should obstruct the other".

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

It is in the light of this position that we have examined in a preliminary manner the Canadian conceptual working paper on arms control verification. It is a useful and interesting compilation of various verification and control measures and it outlines the merits and demerits of specific systems. One thing is abundantly clear to us, and that is that there is no such thing as a universally applicable verification process, and that each system has to be geared to the special requirements of particular measures of disarmament. The Canadian paper has correctly assessed the missing ingredient as "political will".

I have the distinct feeling, Mr. Chairman, that so far we have been looking only at the symptoms of the disease without really trying to go into or remove them. It seems to us, therefore, that we should really be addressing ourselves primarily to the reasons for the absence of this political will, and to related questions such as, "Why is there mutual fear and suspicion?"; "What is it that States are deterring one another from?"; "What are their legitimate fears?" and "How should we establish mutual confidence and trust?". These are basic questions facing us and the answers will decide the future of mankind. As long as there is mutual fear and suspicion, there will be need for verification. But once the climate of mistrust is dispelled, verification will be less of an obsession. Unfortunately, today the more powerful a nation is, the more afraid it seems to be. The search for security does not lie in acquiring more arms but rather in establishing an equilibrium of peace with one's earlier perceived adversary.

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, first of all I would like to add the voice of my delegation in extending a warm welcome to the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic to our Committee. I would also like to express my delegation's satisfaction at the efficient and effective way in which you have been conducting the work of our Committee during the current month. I have asked for the floor this morning in order briefly to express the views of the Pakistan delegation on the item listed on our programme of work for this week: a nuclear test ban.

For nearly two decades, Pakistan has actively advocated the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty as an important instrument to arrest the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Developments during this time, including the hundreds of nuclear tests conducted by the major nuclear-weapon Powers to perfect their nuclear weapons, and the techniques developed for this purpose, have no doubt eroded the ultimate impact of a nuclear test-ban treaty on disarmament and increased the difficulties in negotiating a treaty which could gain universal adherence.

Nevertheless, Pakistan considers that the achievement of an effective test-ban treaty would constitute an important and indispensable step in the broader process of halting and reversing the nuclear arms race, especially between the two Super-Powers. It is quite evident, however, that a nuclear test-ban treaty will not be effective or gain universal adherence unless it is equitable and non-discriminatory. An unequal and discriminatory treaty, such as the NPT, can no longer be imposed on the non-nuclear-weapon States.

(Mr. Akram, Pakistan)

It remains the firm conviction of my delegation that such an equitable treaty, which responds to the national security concerns of all States, can be evolved only within this multilateral body set up for the purpose of conducting disarmament negotiations. This conviction is shared by all the members of the Group of 21. The Group has proposed, in document CD/181, that the Committee establish an ad hoc working group with a precise mandate "to negotiate on provisions relating to the scope, verification of compliance and the final clauses of a draft treaty" relating to item 1 of the Committee's agenda entitled, "Nuclear test ban".

Besides the point of principle to which I have referred, the opening of concrete negotiations in the Committee on the nuclear test ban have become indispensable for two additional reasons.

First, it was agreed in paragraph 51 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament that the three nuclear-weapon States which have chosen to conduct separate and restricted negotiations on this subject should urgently conclude these negotiations and submit the results for full consideration by this Committee. Almost three years have elapsed since this agreement was unanimously adopted. The trilateral negotiations have not been concluded. Indeed, these talks have been suspended for almost a year. There is no assurance that they will be resumed and if they are resumed, whether they can be concluded successfully. In the circumstances, the Committee on Disarmament is the natural and only available forum for negotiations on the subject.

Moreover, such information as has been made available about the substance of the trilateral negotiations makes it seem rather unlikely that the kind of arrangements being negotiated by the three nuclear-weapon Powers will provide the basis for a treaty that can, in the words of the Final Document, "gain universal adherence". The doubts and questions which arise with regard to the effectiveness and equity of the treaty being evolved in the trilateral negotiations were expressed during the informal meetings of the Committee on the subject earlier this year. These doubts and misgivings are reflected in the questions posed to the trilateral negotiators by members of the Group of 21 and which are outlined in document CD/181.

It should be self-evident, therefore, why my delegation and other members of the Group of 21 do not agree with the conclusion of the three negotiating parties contained in their report submitted last August that the trilateral negotiations "offer the best way forward". It has often been argued that negotiations on a nuclear test ban within the CD may have a negative influence on the trilateral talks. It is time to say that surely the shoe is on the other foot. It is the restricted talks, which cater to the national interests of three States, which must be conducted, if at all, in a way that does not impede the conduct of multilateral negotiations on a measure that affects the vital security interests of all States.

It is apparent that the vast majority of the members of the Committee strongly favour the establishment of a working group on a nuclear test ban and the commencement of concrete negotiations under the aegis of the Committee. Indeed, one could say that a consensus, as normally understood, exists on the proposal of the Group of 21. But of course we have chosen to interpret consensus in the Committee

(Mr. Akram, Pakistan)

as meaning unanimity. Therefore the CD may well find itself unable to approve the proposal for the establishment of an ad hoc working group. Nevertheless; we hope that the Committee will make a formal determination on the subject and at least record the overwhelming support for the proposal of the Group of 21.

At the same time, we hope that the three negotiating parties will demonstrate their good faith by responding, jointly or individually, to the number of pertinent questions which have been addressed to them by the members of the Group of 21 and which are listed in document CD/181. It is our understanding that not all of the three negotiating parties are engaged in a review of their policies. Some of them should surely find it possible to provide this Committee with clarifications regarding their position on the issues raised by members of the Group of 21. My delegation would, therefore, like to address the following question to each of the trilateral negotiators: are they prepared to provide -- and if so, when -- the information and clarifications requested by the Group of 21 in document CD/181?

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Mr. Akram of Pakistan for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Before adjourning the plenary meeting, I would like to suggest that we hold, in five minutes' time, a brief informal meeting to consider a communication addressed to me by a non-member State, as well as the relevant draft decision. Both documents were placed in the delegations' boxes yesterday morning and have also been circulated in the Committee today. I would also like to suggest a timetable for meetings of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. If there is no objection, we will suspend the plenary meeting and convene the informal meeting.

The meeting was suspended at 12.35 p.m. and resumed at 12.40 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: The 132nd plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament is resumed.

Working Paper No. 41, containing the draft decision concerning the participation during 1981 of the representative of Austria in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, is before the Committee. If there is no objection, I will consider that the Committee adopts the draft decision. I see no objection.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: A timetable for meetings of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies has also been circulated today. As I explained at the informal meeting, the time timetable is merely indicative and subject to change if necessary. If there are no objections, I will consider that the Committee decides to be guided by it.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 30 June, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.