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PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED  
NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION (UNAVEM III)

### I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1106 (1997) of 16 April 1997, by which the Council, *inter alia*, requested me to report by 6 June 1997 on my recommendations regarding the structure, specific goals and cost implications of an observer mission in Angola that would succeed UNAVEM III. It also covers major developments since my last report dated 14 April 1997 (S/1997/304).

### II. POLITICAL ASPECTS

2. Following my visit to Angola, from 22 to 25 March 1997, the peace process in the country showed significant progress. The establishment of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation on 11 April, the return of the deputies of the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) to the National Assembly and the enactment into law of the special status of the President of UNITA, were among the measures that contributed to the advancement of the peace process. The Council of Ministers of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation held its first meeting on 18 April to discuss its programme, while the National Assembly convened a plenary session on 22 April and elected several UNITA members and other deputies to posts in various commissions of Parliament.

3. After the adoption of Security Council resolution 1106 (1997), my Special Representative, Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, in close collaboration with the representatives of the Government and UNITA and the three observer States (Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States of America), prepared a list of priority tasks that remain to be completed in accordance with the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol. On the military side, these include the selection of UNITA members for incorporation into the Angolan National Police, the incorporation of selected UNITA military personnel into the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), provision of information on the strength of Mr. Jonas Savimbi's security detachment and the demobilization and disarmament of the civilian population. The political aspects include the normalization of State administration throughout the entire country, submission by UNITA of the list of



its members to be appointed to posts in the local administration, regularization of the status of the UNITA radio station, legalization of UNITA as a political party and the convening of a meeting in Angola between President José Eduardo dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi. On the basis of this list of priority tasks, the Joint Commission adopted an updated implementation timetable on 23 April 1997.

4. At its meeting on 24 April 1997, the Central Intersectoral Operation Group, chaired by the Minister for Territorial Administration, decided to begin the process of the extension of State administration with M'banza Congo (Zaire province), the only provincial capital that had remained under UNITA control. On 30 April, the Governor and other provincial authorities were inducted in a ceremony that was attended by a number of Government ministers and by representatives of UNAVEM III and the three observer States. The Provincial Intersectoral Operation Group was also established and has drawn up plans for the normalization process in all areas in the province controlled by UNITA. After a relatively smooth start, the exercise encountered delays, and it has become obvious that the extension process throughout the country will face serious logistical and psychological problems. I am hopeful that the implementation of various rehabilitation projects within the framework of the Community Development Programme presented to donors at the September 1995 Round Table Conference in Brussels will contribute to overcoming these difficulties. At the same time, the issue of national symbols - the flag and national anthem - is still a very sensitive one in many areas previously controlled by UNITA. On 30 May 1997, high-ranking government and UNITA officials who had arrived from Luanda to participate in a normalization ceremony in the central region were attacked by a local UNITA crowd in what appeared to be an organized protest. The initial steps towards the extension of State administration have also confirmed that the good offices and mediation of the United Nations will continue to be required, especially at the local level, to overcome the persisting political divisions and mistrust.

5. In the meantime, the Government and UNITA have recently agreed on a timetable to extend the State administration structures to municipalities in Benguela, Huambo and Kwanza Sul provinces. However, after a temporary suspension by UNITA, the process resumed in earnest only on 26 May, after strong protest by the Government at the delays.

6. Consultations are currently proceeding on the transformation of UNITA into a national political party. To complete that process, UNITA would be expected to comply with legislation governing the legalization of political parties. In accordance with the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol, UNITA must also complete its demilitarization and lift checkpoints and dismantle other military structures it continues to maintain in some parts of Angola.

7. The long-standing issue of the transformation of the UNITA radio station into a non-partisan broadcasting facility has not yet been fully resolved. Although agreement has been reached on the name and other particulars of the station, the question of the allocation of frequencies is still under discussion.

### III. MILITARY ASPECTS

8. The overall military situation in the country has remained calm, although recent developments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have contributed to a worrisome rise in tension in the northern provinces of Angola. The Government continued to reinforce its troops in Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul provinces, ostensibly to control the flow of armed elements infiltrating Angola from across the border and to prevent an influx of refugees. On 26 May, the Angolan Minister of the Interior stated that soldiers of the former Zairian regime, together with armed UNITA elements, were also entering Angolan territory in the provinces of Uige, Malange and Cabinda. UNITA, for its part, accused the Government of attempting to take over by force some of the areas previously controlled by UNITA.

9. UNITA also claimed that in the western part of Lunda Norte, around Cafunfo, the FAA were massing troops, thus compelling UNITA to strengthen its positions by withdrawing approximately 100 soldiers from the Muchinda selection and demobilization centre. Although UNAVEM III conducted an investigation, a number of allegations could not be confirmed. The situation in the eastern part of the province was more grave. There were apparently serious clashes resulting in casualties near Andrada, where the FAA has reportedly taken over a number of UNITA-held localities. In both regions, the freedom of movement of UNAVEM III military and police observers was temporarily restricted. My Special Representative took up these issues with President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi, both of whom promised to cooperate with UNAVEM III in defusing the tensions. The President also promised to authorize staff of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to gain access to refugees and displaced persons from Angola who are currently stranded on the Democratic Republic of the Congo side of the border.

10. In the meantime, the unsettled security situation persisted in other parts of the country, in particular in Benguela and Huila provinces, where villages and individuals continued to be attacked by various armed elements, including members of the Government Civil Defence Corps. On 19 May, a corporal from the Brazilian battalion was killed and another injured in an apparent act of banditry while escorting a civilian convoy. Although the national police have apprehended one of the perpetrators, I call on both the Government and UNITA to cooperate fully with the investigation of this case. The prevailing insecurity in the countryside is also adversely affecting the activities of international humanitarian personnel.

11. The demobilization of ex-UNITA personnel (see paras. 23-25 below) and their selection for the FAA has been proceeding, albeit at a rather slow pace. In May, the Government delegation to the Joint Commission accused UNITA of continuing to maintain armed personnel in some parts of the country, as well as of deliberately delaying the incorporation of ex-combatants into the national army. During the reporting period, only a small number of UNITA police personnel were quartered, bringing the total number of UNITA armed and unarmed personnel registered in all selection and demobilization centres to 71,055 as at 1 June 1997. However, the number of deserters and absentees exceeded 35 per cent of all the personnel quartered. In the meantime, the number of UNITA troops incorporated into the FAA reached 10,700 personnel, which is far

short of the expected 26,300 troops, but the Government and UNITA, and subsequently the Joint Commission, agreed to conclude formally the selection process by 31 May since no more volunteers were coming forward.

12. In April, UNITA declared that all its command posts had been dismantled and provided UNAVEM III with lists of its communications equipment, but categorically declined to hand over that equipment to UNAVEM as required by the Lusaka Protocol. While UNAVEM is verifying the validity of these claims, it should be noted that, despite repeated assurances, UNITA has so far failed to provide information about the strength of and weapons in the possession of Mr. Savimbi's security guard. At the same time, the number of illegal checkpoints maintained by the Government and UNITA has slightly increased, still impeding the free circulation of people and goods.

13. UNAVEM military formed units and military observers have been actively involved in all aspects of the peace process mentioned above, verifying the status of the ceasefire, providing good offices and defusing tensions, enhancing confidence-building, escorting civilian convoys and performing engineering and other essential tasks.

14. As at 1 June 1997, the strength of the military component of UNAVEM III, including the military observers and staff officers, stood at 4,700 personnel, down from the peak level of over 7,000 military personnel in 1995 (see annex). While the withdrawal of the formed military units has generally proceeded as planned, the pace of the drawdown had to be adjusted several times to reflect the developments on the ground and, in particular, delays in the extension of State administration and actual closure of the selection and demobilization centres.

15. As members of the Security Council are aware, the timetable for the demobilization of ex-UNITA troops has again been reviewed by the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit, and it is now envisaged that the selection and demobilization centres in the eastern and south-eastern regions will be closed only by the end of August 1997. Since United Nations troops are expected to provide protection and support to the quartering areas until their formal closure, this would mean that these troops would be able to begin their repatriation movement only in early September. Since all UNAVEM III infantry companies that form the rapid reaction force will be withdrawn in August, I recommend that two reduced infantry battalions be retained in Angola until September in order to protect the last four selection and demobilization centres at Andulo, Lumeje, Chitembo and Licua. Accordingly, the newly revised drawdown plans provide for the repatriation of an additional 900 military personnel in June, 500 military personnel in July and 2,000 troops in August. The remaining 800 troops would leave before the end of September 1997.

#### IV. POLICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECTS

16. The civilian police component of UNAVEM III continued to verify the quartering and to monitor the activities of the rapid reaction police, whose total number was 5,450 as at 1 June. Civilian police officers also continued to monitor the neutrality of the Angolan National Police and matters related to

security arrangements for UNITA leaders. Since my last report, the civilian police have investigated a considerable number of individual cases involving allegations of abuse by the national police as well as allegations of human rights abuses. The civilian police component of UNAVEM III is also assuming an increasingly active role in support of the normalization of State administration.

17. While 212 bodyguards for UNITA leaders have completed their training, only 524 UNITA elements have been selected for incorporation into the Angolan National Police and the rapid reaction police, 442 of whom have actually joined the national police. Although the Government has downgraded the selection criteria for service in the Angolan National Police/rapid reaction police, the Joint Commission, with the agreement of the two parties, decided recently to conclude the selection of ex-UNITA combatants for service in the national police.

18. The Government programme for the disarmament of the civilian population has entered into the second phase of implementation, but shows little tangible progress. There is an urgent need to strengthen and enhance this aspect of the peace process, especially in light of the progress achieved in the extension of the State administration. It would be important for the Government to intensify the disarmament awareness campaign in order to encourage voluntary surrender of weapons by the civilian population and to introduce material and financial incentives. Moreover, measures must be taken to disarm members of the Civil Defence Corps, whose activities, in particular in Benguela and Huila provinces, often contribute to undermining stability.

19. A small unit of United Nations observers continues to monitor the human rights situation in Luanda and several key provinces, focusing primarily on training and civic education projects. In order to consolidate the rule of law and to ensure the protection of human rights throughout the country, a well-coordinated nationwide programme is required, together with necessary resources. Such a programme should target, among other things, the restructuring of the judicial and penal systems, and the updating of existing legislation, including criminal and civil codes. Such a long-term project would obviously require additional international assistance. In this connection, I would like once again to commend the European Union for the valuable assistance it has provided to human rights activities in Angola. In the meantime, the special ad hoc group set up by the Government and UNITA within the framework of the Joint Commission has held eight meetings, at which approximately 60 cases of alleged individual human rights abuses were considered. Specific recommendations were made in 37 of these cases, and investigation of the remainder is ongoing. While the Joint Commission intends to hold soon another extraordinary session devoted to the issue of human rights, it is also envisaged that, with the assistance of UNAVEM, the fifth regional seminar on a wide range of human rights issues will be convened in the near future.

## V. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS

### A. Relief and rehabilitation

20. During the reporting period, the United Nations and other humanitarian agencies and programmes have been closely monitoring the dramatic situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and preparing for an anticipated influx of refugees into Angola. While the Government of Angola has attempted to prevent this influx, several thousand refugees managed to cross the border in the area of Dundo (Lunda Norte province), but were turned back. In the meantime, UNITA representatives have confirmed to UNHCR representatives that approximately 1,000 refugees have entered Lunda Norte province in a different area; it appears that many refugees are heading to UNITA-controlled territory, and the Government alleges that there are many armed elements among them. A joint assessment team comprised of representatives of UNHCR, the United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Food Programme (WFP) has requested permission to cross the border to assess the refugee situation in areas adjacent to the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and the Government of Angola has confirmed to Mr. Beye its readiness to facilitate the provision of cross-border humanitarian assistance. The Government also indicated to the United Nations that it would prefer the organized repatriation of refugees from areas formerly controlled by UNITA after the extension of State administration to these areas. It is obvious that agreed, mutually acceptable procedures are needed to deal with this important problem, which could have long-term repercussions for the already tense situation in the northern provinces of Angola.

21. There have also been a limited number of organized resettlements of internally displaced persons, although some planned movements, in particular in Bengo and Huila provinces, are currently in progress. In the meantime, spontaneous movements of internally displaced persons have been registered in some parts of the country as a result of improvement in the security situation. The coordination group for internally displaced persons established in Luanda, which includes representatives of the Government, the United Nations and non-governmental organizations, has resumed its regular meetings to coordinate the activities of the provincial groups for internally displaced persons and to develop resettlement plans. With the planned completion of the demobilization process, an increase in spontaneous movement throughout Angola of an estimated 1 million internally displaced persons is anticipated.

22. A Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)/WFP crop assessment mission visited Angola from 28 April to 12 May to evaluate the 1996/97 planting season. Preliminary findings indicate that cereal production in 1997 will be lower than that of the previous year, necessitating a continuation of the present level of food assistance. By all indications, the projected number of people in Angola requiring substantial humanitarian assistance will essentially remain the same.

### B. Demobilization

23. There have been advances in the demobilization of ex-UNITA combatants during the reporting period. The rapid demobilization programme commenced on 14 April 1997 following approval by the Joint Commission of the special plan, which envisages the demobilization of all excess UNITA combatants currently being accommodated in 15 selection and demobilization centres and 7 centres for the war-disabled. The exercise commenced in the central and southern regions and will be extended to other areas of Angola in the next few weeks. Efforts have been made to ensure that the demobilization, which is envisaged to be completed by the end of August 1997 (with an additional one-month contingency period), is synchronized as closely as possible with the withdrawal of UNAVEM III troops (see para. 15 above). As at 1 June, a total of 10,321 former UNITA combatants of various categories had been formally demobilized throughout the country.

24. Notwithstanding the complexity of the project, the demobilization process has been proceeding relatively smoothly. However, disruptions in moving the ex-combatants from the selection and demobilization centres took place in April and May as a result of interference of local UNITA officials. This interference took the form of the obstruction of the movement of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) convoys, demands for last-minute route and schedule changes, and even the hijacking on 4 May of an IOM convoy in Kwanza Sul province. In the meantime, a separate timetable is now being formulated for the demobilization of excess FAA troops.

25. Effective demobilization is essential to the overall success of the peace process in Angola and to related United Nations activities in this regard. I am encouraged that as at 1 June 1997, over 23,000 demobilized soldiers and their dependants had been transported to their areas of origin or choice and provided with basic medical care and multi-purpose reintegration kits. However, the continued success of this important exercise has been jeopardized by a lack of sufficient funding for IOM activities, which are an essential element of the United Nations consolidated appeal for Angola. In a letter dated 16 May 1997, I appealed to donors urgently to provide the necessary funding in order to maintain the momentum of the demobilization process, at least over the next few months. In addition, funds are critically important for the provision of food to people in selection and demobilization centres and for other relevant humanitarian activities being administered by the United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit.

### C. Demining

26. Over the last two years, UNAVEM III military engineering units and a United Nations contracted company have cleared mines over 9,000 kilometres of roads, which greatly improved the ability of the Angolan population, UNAVEM III personnel and staff of humanitarian relief organizations to move freely throughout the country. UNAVEM also established a Mine Clearance Training Centre, where some 350 Angolan nationals received instruction and were subsequently formed into seven demining brigades. Administration of the Centre has now been transferred to the Angolan authorities, while responsibility for

logistical support is being transferred to the Department of Humanitarian Affairs of the Secretariat, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Office for Project Services. It is expected that the Department of Humanitarian Affairs will continue to provide funds and overall technical supervision for this programme. However, owing to delays in the establishment of the UNDP/United Nations Office for Project Services support structure, UNAVEM III has been requested to provide assistance to the project on a reimbursable basis for an additional period of up to four months. This support will also involve the continued use of UNAVEM III air evacuation and medical facilities for international staff.

27. I wish to acknowledge the excellent work several international non-governmental organizations in Angola are conducting in the field of demining, either unilaterally or under the auspices of the United Nations. Their activities have contributed significantly to alleviating the suffering of the Angolan people, and it is my sincere hope that they will carry on this noble endeavour.

#### VI. SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS

28. Following the adoption of the 1997 Economic and Social Programme, the Government made arrangements to pay wages and salaries which had been withheld for more than four months. This measure was aimed, among other things, at ending schoolteachers' strikes in Luanda and several provinces. After rising to a rather high monthly rate of 8 per cent in January 1997, inflation has begun to show a significant downward trend and, for the first time in several years, the rate was negative in March. However, this generally positive trend was partly due to non-payment of salaries.

29. During the past two months, foreign exchange rates have remained relatively stable, with some upward movement in mid-May of parallel rate. The normalization of State administration in the provinces may entail additional Government spending. This has already resulted in recent adjustments to the State budget, and may also involve extrabudgetary expenditures, particularly for military operations.

30. An International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission was in Luanda in early June to carry out annual consultations and continue efforts to get an IMF-assisted, long overdue structural adjustment programme under way. In the meantime, it is expected that a special programme to help strengthen the national capacity for economic management will be launched by July 1997.

31. At the same time, consultations have been initiated among the Government, UNDP, and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs/United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit on the transitional arrangements from provision of humanitarian assistance to rehabilitation and development programmes. This transition will focus on strengthening the national capacity for coordination of humanitarian operations and integration of humanitarian requirements into national development programmes. With the formation of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation, the Government has begun to focus its attention on non-oil sectors of the economy, in particular those related to exploration of



other natural resources. Discussions have been initiated with some international private companies to identify possible additional areas of collaboration. These welcome developments will no doubt result in the creation of jobs and generation of income which is particularly important in the present economic environment in Angola.

## VII. PROPOSED UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN ANGOLA

32. In my report of 7 February 1997 (S/1997/115), I presented to the Security Council comprehensive proposals regarding the mandate, goals and structure of a possible United Nations follow-on mission in Angola. These recommendations are still valid, although the delays observed in the fulfilment of certain aspects of the Lusaka Protocol will require the new mission to undertake additional responsibilities in order to facilitate the implementation of those tasks which have been only partially accomplished. In addition to these important responsibilities, the overall mandate of the follow-on mission would be to assist the Angolan parties in consolidating peace and national reconciliation, enhancing confidence-building and creating an environment conducive to long-term stability, democratic development and rehabilitation of the country.

33. In formulating the concept of operations of the follow-on mission, special consideration should be given to the need to bridge the deep political, psychological and even regional divisions in the country, and to foster mutual trust which has been severely undermined by one of the longest-running conflicts in Africa. Achieving these goals would obviously require patience, perseverance and readiness to lead the peace process to a successful conclusion, not only on the part of the Government and UNITA, but also of the international community, so as to establish a solid foundation for peace in Angola. As indicated in section VII.B below, I have once again reviewed the requirements for the new mission in order to make it as cost-effective as possible, while ensuring that it is endowed with the necessary human and material resources.

### A. Main objectives and mandate of the mission

#### 1. Political aspects

34. The experience of the United Nations involvement in Angola and the progress achieved so far in the peace process have clearly demonstrated the vital role played by the United Nations and the three Observer States in promoting the resolution of this deeply rooted conflict. With the participation of UNITA in various Government institutions and civil society in general, this leading role remains particularly important in overcoming difficulties facing national reconciliation. This aspect of the ongoing peace process was again clearly underscored during the recent incidents in the northern provinces of Angola (see para. 9 above), and by the tensions associated with the normalization of State administration. Having the above in mind, I recommend that my Special Representative continue to play a strong role in the peace process and to chair the Joint Commission, which has proved to be a vital conflict resolution and implementation mechanism. A continued United Nations public information

capacity would also be essential for the promotion of political tolerance and national reconciliation.

35. A strengthened Division of Political Affairs would assist the Special Representative in implementing the political mandate of the mission. Among other tasks, the Division would monitor the normalization of State administration throughout the country, provide good offices and mediation at the provincial and local levels and participate in the official organs established for that purpose. It would also monitor and verify the integration of UNITA elements into State structures, as provided for in the Lusaka Protocol and subsequent agreements between the Government and UNITA, and assist in the resolution and management of conflicts which may arise. In coordination with other components, the Political Division would also promote a climate of confidence and national accord by establishing a presence in major population areas and areas of tension.

## 2. Police matters

36. With the withdrawal of United Nations military personnel and the gradual normalization of State administration over the entire Angolan territory, the civilian police component would assume new and expanded responsibilities. It would continue to verify the neutrality of the Angolan National Police, the incorporation of UNITA personnel into the national police, the quartering and occasional deployment of the rapid reaction police, as well as the free circulation of people and goods. With the transformation of UNITA into a political party and the extension of activities of the Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola (MPLA) and other political parties throughout the country, special attention should be given to respect for civil and political rights and freedoms. With a view to generating confidence among the population, the civilian police would be called on to carry out joint patrols with the Angolan National Police, especially in areas formerly controlled by UNITA, to inspect prisons and, if need be, to establish its temporary presence at national police posts and stations.

37. The Mission's civilian police unit would continue to monitor and verify the collection of weapons recovered from the civilian population, supervise proper storage or destruction of these weapons and oversee security arrangements for UNITA leaders. With the extension of State administration, the Government police presence will eventually increase in areas formerly controlled by UNITA, which will necessitate the establishment of additional civilian police team sites and reinforcement of the present strength of the police observers.

## 3. Human rights issues

38. As members of the Security Council are aware, both the Government and UNITA would welcome an enhanced presence of human rights observers and related United Nations activities. Such a presence would contribute to the promotion of human rights and prevention of their abuse in the country. These activities would be aimed at developing the capacity of national institutions and other non-governmental organizations in the field of human rights to investigate

violations and to initiate appropriate action, including through mechanisms already established for this purpose. On several occasions in the past, the Government and UNITA, within the framework of the Joint Commission, recommended that the role of the small United Nations human rights unit be strengthened and expanded, in order to investigate adequately allegations of abuses. I believe that the Security Council would be justified in supporting the request of the two parties to the Lusaka Protocol, since respect for individual rights and freedoms will no doubt contribute to the establishment of a lasting peace in Angola.

#### 4. Military aspects

39. The withdrawal of the formed military units of UNAVEM III has been proceeding generally within the framework outlined in my previous reports to the Council. However, developments on the ground and, in particular, delays in the demobilization of UNITA ex-combatants and in actual closure of the selection and demobilization centres have necessitated the introduction of adjustments to the withdrawal plan, as described in paragraph 15 above.

40. With the withdrawal of main infantry and support units by August/September 1997, I recommend the retention thereafter in Angola of a reduced number of military observers whose presence would be necessary to verify compliance with various aspects of the ceasefire regime. They would, in particular, continue to investigate allegations of offensive troop movements, the presence of any UNITA armed elements and the existence of weapons caches, and monitor the dismantlement of checkpoints and UNITA command posts, as well as the integration of UNITA soldiers into the FAA. As other components of the mission, the military observers would have full freedom of movement throughout the country.

#### 5. Humanitarian aspects

41. In the next few months, the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit will begin to downsize its presence in Angola to reflect the changing circumstances on the ground. In accordance with the additional mandate entrusted to it in February 1995 in connection with the establishment of UNAVEM III, it would continue to support the demobilization of UNITA ex-combatants and their social reintegration. At the same time, the Unit would increasingly focus on the original coordination mandate entrusted to it in 1993, including monitoring the emergency situation and maintaining a capacity to respond to humanitarian needs as they emerge. It would thus serve as the focal point for information, donor liaison and coordination of humanitarian operations through an established network of field advisors in key provinces.

## 6. Administrative aspects

42. In paragraphs 45 to 47 of my report of 7 February 1997 (S/1997/115), I described in detail the challenges that would be faced by the administrative component of the follow-on mission, as logistical support would have to be provided to headquarters of the follow-on mission in Luanda, to the political, police, human rights and military components in six regional headquarters, and to almost all provincial capitals and over 30 other outstations. Initially, the administrative and logistical requirements of the mission would increase slightly, to compensate for the transport and communication capabilities that had been previously provided by the formed military units of UNAVEM III. Some administrative personnel would have to be redeployed to assume various operational tasks currently performed by military personnel, including staff officers. The great size of Angola and the lack of a viable infrastructure will continue to affect the complexity of various functions required to be carried out by the administrative component.

43. The existing resources allocated for UNAVEM III by the General Assembly will be used to ensure a smooth transition to an observer mission. UNAVEM III is already developing a transfer and liquidation plan leading towards the follow-on observer mission and has, within its 1997-1998 budget, made some very pressing requisitions. The average age of much of the UNAVEM III equipment far exceeds accepted write-off parameters. Most of the fleet of UNAVEM vehicles has been in use for five years, and the average per vehicle accumulation of 100,000 kilometres exceeds the possibility of maintaining them under reasonable safety standards.

44. Furthermore, obsolete communications and computer equipment already complicates the mission's ability to cope with anticipated requirements; replacements would be necessary to establish a reliable network of voice communication and data transmission, especially between Luanda and the regions, which at present is dependent to a great degree on the capabilities of the departing formed military units. A great deal of other equipment is either obsolete or has served out its usefulness, rendering it unfit for transfer to other peacekeeping operations or the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy. It is recommended that the present UNAVEM III fleet of fixed-wing aircraft be reconfigured once the military units have departed to adapt to the needs of the follow-on mission.

### B. Organizational structure

45. The organizational structure of the new mission would be as follows:

(a) The mission, with headquarters in Luanda, would be headed by the Special Representative, who would continue to be assisted by a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, as well as by the necessary professional and support staff, albeit at a reduced level. The public information and interpretation sections would remain at the present level at the initial stages of the new operation, but would begin to be downsized by the end of 1997. Since the Special Representative would continue to chair the Joint Commission, a small secretariat would be provided by the United Nations;

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(b) The Political Division, headed by a Director, would have offices in most of the 18 provinces of Angola, in addition to a headquarters cell in Luanda, bringing the overall strength of the Division to 28 Professional staff assisted by necessary support staff. Senior political officers stationed in six operational regions would serve as coordinators responsible for all activities of the observer mission, replacing the military commanders who are currently performing these functions;

(c) The civilian police component would be headed by a Police Commissioner with the rank of Chief Superintendent. This component would maintain headquarters and a special task force in Luanda. The police observers, whose total number would increase by 85 (i.e. from 260 to 345), would be deployed to each of the 6 regional headquarters and 36 outlying teamsites each with 6 to 7 police observers;

(d) The human rights component would be headed by a Director and would have two monitors in almost all provinces, with a total of 29 Professional staff supported by 26 United Nations volunteers;

(e) After the withdrawal of the main body of military units, the military component of the follow-on mission would be headed, as of October 1997, by a Chief Military Observer with the rank of Brigadier-General. It would have a reduced number of military observers: 86 compared to the current authorized strength of 350. In addition, the military component would retain a reduced military helicopter company to provide the mission with the necessary investigative and medical evacuation capabilities and two small military medical dressing stations. In light of the Organization's experience in other peacekeeping operations, I also recommend the postponement, until the end of November 1997, of the repatriation of one United Nations infantry company to ensure proper protection of United Nations property, which is an important aspect in any withdrawal exercise; this company would be stationed at the mission's logistical bases in Luanda and Lobito;

(f) The administrative component would be headed by a Chief Administrative Officer and would comprise Professional and General Service staff adequate for the downsizing and liquidation of UNAVEM III and the implementation of the mandate of the follow-on mission.

46. Upon completion of the demobilization process, the United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit would be gradually reduced in size. Under the follow-on mission, it would continue to support the demobilization exercise, including the provision of material and human resources for the selection and demobilization centres, as well as the Demobilization and Reintegration Office. According to current plans, the gradual downsizing of the Demobilization and Reintegration Office would entail a reduction from the current 17 Professional posts to 14 in August and 3 by December 1997, so as to take into account the delays in the demobilization exercise. The United Nations Volunteers posts would be reduced from 30 to 21 in August, with only 2 posts remaining by December. By the end of 1997, the United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit would have 14 international Professional and 22 national posts, all of which would be funded through voluntary contributions; it

would continue to report directly to the Special Representative on all humanitarian matters related to the peace process.

47. All components of the follow-on mission would function under the overall authority of the Special Representative, who would coordinate all United Nations activities in support of the peace process. The mission would rely on integrated logistical, communications and transport systems to ensure maximum flexibility, operability and cost-effectiveness. Having the above in mind, all components of the new mission, to the greatest extent possible, would be deployed together. In the meantime, pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 1106 (1997) of 16 April 1997, I have initiated the transition of UNAVEM III to an observer mission (as described in section VII of my report dated 7 February 1997 (S/1997/115)) by making arrangements for the deployment to Angola of a small number of additional political, police and human rights staff.

#### VIII. OBSERVATIONS

48. Despite persistent difficulties and delays, events in Angola since my visit in late March 1997 have generally been moving in a positive direction. The formation of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation, the return of UNITA deputies to the National Assembly, the beginning of the normalization of State administration and the demobilization of ex-combatants represent important steps towards the implementation of the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol and provide a strong basis for the process of national reconciliation.

49. However, despite the progress achieved recently, the road towards lasting peace in Angola remains a difficult one. The recent tensions in the northern part of the country have underscored the unsettled situation prevailing in some areas of the country. The process of extension of State administration to the areas formerly under UNITA control is proceeding at a slow pace and, in some instances, gives rise to incidents such as those which took place in the central region on 30 May 1997 (see para. 4 above). Moreover, the psychological and political barriers between the parties are still wide. In this connection, the holding of the long-overdue meeting between President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi as early as possible inside Angola could facilitate the normalization of State administration and accelerate the process of national reconciliation and the peace process in general. Such a meeting could also help to resolve the precarious situation which persists in the border area between Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

50. It is currently possible - and indeed imperative - for the parties to accelerate the normalization of State administration and to encourage the process by conducting an intensive public awareness campaign. Equally, I call on the Government and UNITA to cooperate with the United Nations towards the completion of demobilization of UNITA ex-combatants, closure of the selection and demobilization centres, as well as the earliest conclusion of the formation of the united Angolan armed forces. At the same time, I would like to commend the spirit of cooperation and tolerance which characterized the initial steps of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation and hope that all parties involved will continue to work harmoniously within the new Government and the National Assembly in order to rehabilitate and rebuild their war-torn country.

51. The demobilization of tens of thousands of troops and their reintegration into civil society remains one of the most crucial challenges under the Lusaka Protocol. I once again urge the donor community to provide the urgently needed assistance to IOM for the demobilization programmes, as well as the necessary resources to assist former combatants in the quartering areas and the large number of refugees. The link between the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Angola and the consolidation of peace in the country is evident, and I call on the international community to fulfil the pledges made in this regard at the 1995 Brussels Round Table Conference.

52. I am encouraged by the readiness of the Security Council to consider the establishment of a follow-on mission of the United Nations in Angola, bearing in mind my previous recommendations in this regard. I am convinced that the Angolans will continue to need a sustained level of international assistance and encouragement in order to conclude the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol and to consolidate the gains made thus far in the peace process. Accordingly, a continued, but scaled-down presence of the United Nations in Angola will be required after the expiration of the mandate of UNAVEM III on 30 June 1997. Against this background, I recommend the establishment, as of 1 July 1997, of a new operation to be known as the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola/Missão de Observação das Nações Unidas em Angola (MONUA). The mandate and organizational structure of this mission are described in section VII above, and the cost implications are being issued separately as an addendum to the present report.

53. The performance of the new mission and its components will be measured against specific indicators, such as the completion of the demobilization process and the closure of the selection and demobilization centres, the incorporation of ex-UNITA combatants into the FAA and the Angolan National Police, the integration of UNITA personnel in all levels of State administration, which has to be effectively implemented throughout the whole country, elimination of all the impediments to free circulation of people and goods, disarmament of the civilian population and other essential tasks. In view of the magnitude of the tasks which still need to be accomplished, I recommend that the new mission be established for a period of seven months, until 1 February 1998, after which, depending on developments on the ground, it would be gradually drawn down in accordance with plans which I intend to submit to the Security Council by the end of 1997.

54. In closing, I should like to pay tribute to my Special Representative, Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, and all civilian, military and police staff of UNAVEM III as well as to the personnel of United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations for their dedicated efforts in support of the consolidation of peace and national reconciliation in Angola. I also wish to express my appreciation to the three Observer States and to other Member States that have consistently provided assistance to the United Nations in promoting the peace process.

Annex

United Nations Angola Verification Mission III: Contributions  
 as at 1 June 1997

Country	Military observers	Civilian police officers	Staff officers	Troops <sup>a</sup>	Total
Bangladesh	10	21	11	203	245
Brazil	20	9	29	715	773
Bulgaria	10	14	-	-	24
Congo, Republic of the	4	-	-	-	4
Egypt	10	15	1 <sup>b</sup>	-	26
France	8	-	11 <sup>b</sup>	-	19
Guinea-Bissau	14	4	-	-	18
Hungary	10	7	-	-	17
India	20	11	44	686	761
Jordan	17	21	2 <sup>b</sup>	-	40
Kenya	10	-	-	-	10
Malaysia	19	20	-	-	39
Mali	9	15	-	-	24
Namibia	-	-	3	200	203
Netherlands	15	10	2 <sup>b</sup>	-	27
New Zealand	4	-	7 <sup>b</sup>	-	11
Nigeria	19	21	-	-	40
Norway	4	-	-	-	4
Pakistan	4	-	14 <sup>b</sup>	-	18
Poland	7	-	-	-	7
Portugal	7	28	5	310	350
Romania	-	-	22	760	782
Russian Federation	7	-	2	149	158
Senegal	10	-	-	-	10
Slovakia	5	-	-	-	5
Sweden	19	10	1	-	30

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Country	Military observers	Civilian police officers	Staff officers	Troops <sup>a</sup>	Total
Ukraine	5	-	3	1	9
United Republic of Tanzania	-	3	-	-	3
Uruguay	4	13	27 <sup>b</sup>	10	54
Zambia	10	15	8	503	536
Zimbabwe	<u>21</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>676</u>	<u>747</u>
Total	<u>302</u>	<u>259</u>	<u>220<sup>c</sup></u>	<u>4 213</u>	<u>4 994</u>

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<sup>a</sup> Including military police.

<sup>b</sup> Including military specialists in the UNAVEM III demining school and in Quartering Area Administration.

<sup>c</sup> The total figure does not include the four demining experts seconded by Germany.

