

INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD
Vienna

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**PRECURSORS
AND CHEMICALS FREQUENTLY USED IN
THE ILLICIT MANUFACTURE OF NARCOTIC
DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPIC
SUBSTANCES**

**Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for
1996 on the Implementation of Article 12 of the United
Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988**



UNITED NATIONS

**REPORTS PUBLISHED BY THE INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
CONTROL BOARD IN 1996**

The *Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1996* (E/INCB/1996/1) is supplemented by the following technical reports:

Narcotic Drugs: Estimated World Requirements for 1997; Statistics for 1995 (E/INCB/1996/2)

Psychotropic Substances: Statistics for 1995; Assessments of Medical and Scientific Requirements for Substances in Schedules II, III and IV; Requirement of Import Authorizations for Substances in Schedules III and IV (E/INCB/1996/3)

Precursors and Chemicals Frequently Used in the Illicit Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances: Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1996 on the Implementation of Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 (E/INCB/1996/4)

The updated lists of substances under international control, comprising narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and substances frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, are contained in the latest editions of the annexes to the statistical forms ("Yellow List", "Green List" and "Red List"), which are also issued by the Board.

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Preface

The United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988,¹ article 12, paragraph 13, provides that the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) "shall report annually to the Commission on the implementation of this article and the Commission shall periodically review the adequacy and propriety of Tables I and II".

In addition to its annual report and other technical publications (*Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances*), the Board has decided to publish its report on the implementation of article 12 of the 1988 Convention, in accordance with the following provisions contained in article 23 of that Convention:

"1. The Board shall prepare an annual report on its work containing an analysis of the information at its disposal and, in appropriate cases, an account of the explanations, if any, given by or required of Parties, together with any observations and recommendations which the Board desires to make. The Board may make such additional reports as it considers necessary. The reports shall be submitted to the Council through the Commission which may make such comments as it sees fit.

2. The reports of the Board shall be communicated to the Parties and subsequently published by the Secretary-General. The Parties shall permit their unrestricted distribution."

¹Official Records of the United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Vienna, 25 November-20 December 1988, vol. I (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.94.XI.5).

Explanatory notes

The following abbreviations have been used in this report:

CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
ICPO/Interpol	International Criminal Police Organization
LSD	lysergic acid diethylamide
MDA	methylenedioxyamphetamine
MDMA	methylenedioxymethamphetamine
3,4-MDP-2-P	3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone
MIBK	methyl isobutyl ketone
UNDCP	United Nations International Drug Control Programme
WCO	World Customs Organization

The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

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INTRODUCTION

1. Many Governments are now taking specific steps to monitor closely the movement of precursors* through their territories. An increasing number of competent authorities are requesting the assistance of the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) in verifying the legitimacy of individual shipments, or otherwise advising it of intended exports or transactions authorized by them. The Board welcomes this development and continues to make every effort, within its treaty mandates, to assist Governments in identifying suspicious transactions in precursors to prevent their diversion from licit channels.

2. The Board finds that timely information exchange is the key to effective precursor control. It therefore focuses in the present report on rapid communication exchange to prevent diversion, with a view to drawing the attention of the international community to the need to further strengthen the requisite mechanisms and necessary procedures. Such mechanisms and procedures are already being established by an ever-increasing number of countries, but they need to be further expanded.

3. Very often it is a small step taken by competent authorities that has enabled them effectively to identify suspicious transactions. It is frequently the quick exchange of information between the authorities that allows them to confirm suspicions. The Board has closely monitored the attempts of competent national authorities to secure such information exchange. Some Governments have been successful in establishing communication links, while others have not. In chapter I of the present report, the Board reviews some of the major findings arising from actions taken by Governments and from investigations of the cases of attempted and actual diversions thus uncovered. In so doing, the report also summarizes the problems and issues identified. The Board then proposes further actions that Governments should take. In chapter II, an analysis of the reported seizures of, and illicit traffic in, precursors is given in the light of the most recent trends in illicit drug manufacture.

4. In examining the actions taken by Governments to implement the provisions of article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988,¹ the Board has found that some Governments are willing to do, and have actually done, more than others in similar situations. In this connection, the Board wishes to reiterate that the goal of the provisions of article 12 is adequate control of the substances included in the Tables of the 1988 Convention to prevent their diversion. It is not the intention of the 1988 Convention, as some Governments fear, to hinder legitimate trade or to give unfair advantage to certain sectors of industry or to certain States. In order for the controls to be meaningful, it is essential that Governments facing similar situations with regard to trafficking of precursors should take similar practical steps. Those steps should be based on actions already proven to have achieved results, and not on the very minimum requirements currently adopted by some Governments. Controls would otherwise not achieve their purposes, but would nonetheless leave extra burdens on national authorities and on legitimate industry.

*The term "precursor" is used to indicate any of the substances listed in Table I or II of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, except where the context requires a different expression. Such substances are often described as precursors or essential chemicals, depending on their principal chemical properties. The plenipotentiary conference that adopted the 1988 Convention did not use any one term to describe such substances. Instead, the expression "substances frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances" was introduced in the Convention. It has become common practice, however, to refer to all such substances simply as "precursors"; although that term is not technically correct, the Board has decided to use it in the present report for the sake of convenience.

5. While the Board has continued to assist Governments in preventing diversion, it has faced considerable difficulties in doing so, particularly because of the current budgetary and financial constraints faced by the United Nations, which have prevented the allocation of sufficient resources to the secretariat of the Board. The Board has therefore found it necessary to place priorities on its activities, and to defer some of them.

6. Article 12 of the 1988 Convention entrusts the Board with responsibilities relating to the control of various substances frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, including:

(a) Monitoring the implementation by Governments of the control measures provided for under article 12;

(b) Activities relating to possible modifications in the scope of control of substances listed in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention.

As was already communicated to all Governments in September 1996, the Board has decided that, until the necessary resources are in place, it will not carry out on its own any activities related to the assessment of substances for possible modifications in the scope of control of the 1988 Convention. It has also decided to defer implementation of the activities requested by the Economic and Social Council in its resolution 1996/29 of 24 July 1996, unless minimum resources become available. Instead, in fully utilizing its limited resources, the Board has decided to continue to give the highest priority to assisting Governments in fully implementing the provisions of article 12.

7. Specifically, the Board has instructed its secretariat to devote its efforts in matters relating to the control of precursors to assisting competent national authorities in verifying the legitimacy of individual transactions involving precursors, and in establishing the necessary working mechanisms and standard operating procedures for that purpose.

8. To that end, the Board proposes to open and maintain specific dialogues with any Government that wishes to do so, to determine how its recommendations in the present and in its previous reports can be implemented to prevent diversions of precursors.

I. FRAMEWORK FOR PRECURSOR CONTROL AND ACTION TAKEN BY GOVERNMENTS

9. Part A of the present chapter reviews the status of the 1988 Convention and of reporting by Governments in accordance with article 12 of that Convention.

10. Part B describes the major findings from the cases of diversion and attempted diversion uncovered as a result of actions taken by Governments and by the Board.

11. Part C outlines the proposals of the Board for further action that should be taken by Governments to prevent diversion and achieve more effective control of precursors.

A. Status of adherence to the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 and reporting by Governments under article 12

1. Status of the 1988 Convention

12. As of 1 November 1996, the Convention had been ratified, acceded to or approved by a total of 137 States, and formally confirmed by the European Union (extent of competence: article 12). That represented 72 per cent of all countries in the world. Since the report of the Board for 1995 on the implementation of article 12 was issued,² 18 States have become parties to the 1988 Convention. The Board expresses its appreciation for the fact that all countries in America are now parties to the Convention. It notes with concern, however, that several major manufacturing, exporting and importing countries elsewhere have not yet acceded to the Convention. The Board again requests all those countries to take, as a matter of priority, steps to establish the necessary mechanisms to implement fully the provisions of the 1988 Convention and to become parties as soon as possible.

13. In annex I, table 1, the parties and non-parties to the 1988 Convention are listed by region. The rates of accession have been as follows: Africa (68 per cent); America (100 per cent); Asia (67 per cent); Europe (74 per cent); and Oceania (21 per cent).

2. Reporting to the Board under article 12

14. Under article 12, paragraph 12, of the 1988 Convention, parties are required to submit annually to the Board data on, *inter alia*, seizures of substances in Tables I and II and information on methods and routes of their diversion and other information on illicit drug manufacture. For that purpose, the Board transmitted to all Governments, parties and non-parties alike, a questionnaire known as Form D. States that were not yet parties to the Convention were also invited to furnish the Board with the information required by resolution 5 (XXXIV) of 9 May 1991 of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (see annex IV).

15. As of 1 November 1996, a total of 118 Governments had submitted Form D for 1995. That represented 56 per cent of the 209 countries and territories requested to provide the information, which was similar to the rate of return in previous years. Fifty-seven per cent of all parties submitted data for 1995.

16. It is of serious concern to the Board that a large number of parties continue to fail to submit the requisite data. The Board has noted that some parties did not provide Form D for the last three years,

and urges those countries to submit, as soon as possible, the information requested under article 12 of the Convention. As the Board repeatedly stated in its previous reports, the timely provision of information in Form D is an indicator of: the existence of adequate mechanisms both to monitor scheduled substances and for data collection; appropriate coordination within Governments; and relevant legislation. Lack of reporting may therefore indicate that the framework and systems for adequate control are not in place.

17. The Board has noted that approximately the same number of Governments (38) have reported seizures of precursors in 1995, as compared with previous years. However, some countries in western Europe, which had previously reported seizures, did not do so in either 1994 or 1995. The reasons for that situation are not evident, since other countries in western Europe have provided detailed information on a number of seizures. The Board has raised this issue with the Governments concerned.

18. Form D for 1995 included a new part with a request for data on licit trade in, use of, and requirements for substances listed in Table I. That information was requested on a voluntary basis, in accordance with Economic and Social Council resolution 1995/20 (see annex IV). The Board is grateful to the 50 countries and territories that have provided such information; they included some major manufacturing, exporting and transit countries in America, Asia and Oceania. Others, notably the European Commission on behalf of the member States of the European Union, have indicated that such information would be provided as of 1997.*

19. Information on licit trade in, uses of and requirements for precursors is indispensable for preventing their diversion. Without such information, first of all, the Board finds it difficult to see how competent national authorities could possibly monitor the movement of substances in Tables I and II, as required under article 12. The Board has repeatedly stressed this point in its previous reports. Such information is also essential for the Board to assist Governments in identifying suspicious transactions. Without it, it would be difficult quickly to check the legitimacy of individual shipments. Without knowing the general trends, it would not be possible to identify unusual patterns of trade. Availability of such information further facilitates licit trade, as it would expedite, for instance, the issuance of export authorizations.

20. The Board is therefore concerned that over 75 per cent of all Governments are not yet able to provide data on the licit movement of substances in Table I. The Board will try to obtain some of that information from other sources (for example, the World Customs Organization (WCO) and international associations representing the chemical industry). However, the Board requests all countries and territories that have not already done so to put in place, as a matter of priority, mechanisms for collecting such data, and to provide it to the Board and to other Governments, if necessary on a confidential basis.

21. The submission of information to the Board as required under article 12, paragraph 12, of the 1988 Convention for the years from 1991 to 1995 is reflected in annex I, table 2. The countries and territories that have provided data on licit trade in, uses of and requirements for scheduled substances are listed in annex I, table 4.

*Denmark, Greece and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, however, have already individually provided such data to the Board.

B. Findings from cases of diversion and attempted diversion and actions taken to prevent diversion

1. Findings from the investigation of cases uncovered and actions taken by Governments and by the Board

22. The Board has repeatedly urged Governments to establish "working mechanisms and standard operating procedures" that would ensure the rapid exchange of communications, for instance, with other competent national authorities in order to verify the legitimacy of individual transactions and to identify suspicious shipments and prevent their diversion. To that end, in its previous reports the Board has made specific recommendations for action; a summary of those recommendations is reproduced in annex V to the present report.

23. The Board has noted with appreciation that an increasing number of Governments are utilizing such mechanisms and procedures, and are requesting assistance from the Board in verifying the legitimacy of individual shipments, or otherwise advising the Board of those transactions about which they have made inquiries, as well as those intended exports or transactions which they have authorized.

24. The Board was informed, for instance, that the Governments of the Czech Republic, Hong Kong, India and Singapore regularly send importing countries information on exports of some, or all, scheduled substances, and request importing countries to inform them of any objections to proposed exports. A number of other major exporting countries, including Belgium, China, Germany, Mexico and Switzerland, have been inquiring, directly or through the Board, about individual shipments to determine their legitimacy.

25. While still limited in number, an increasing number of Governments are trying to ensure rapid exchange of information on different types of individual shipments. The actions of those Governments are yielding dividends. Many cases of attempted diversion have been uncovered and shipments stopped. Actual diversions have also been identified, allowing the authorities concerned to take remedial measures.

26. The Board is aware, as a result, that as of 1 November 1996, at least 12 cases of attempted diversions involving ephedrine, a precursor for methamphetamine, a stimulant widely abused in various parts of the world, had been discovered, and a total of 12 tonnes had been prevented from entering into illicit channels. Additionally, seven ephedrine shipments, amounting to 4.5 tonnes, had been stopped because of evidence that aroused suspicions. Furthermore, diversion of a total of 512 tonnes of acetic anhydride and acetone (12 shipments in all), destined for use in illicit heroin manufacture, were also stopped in 1996. As regards chemicals used in the illicit processing of cocaine, particularly acids and solvents, 15 shipments totalling 1,755 tonnes were stopped because of suspicious circumstances or other irregularities.

27. The rapid exchange of communications between competent national authorities works. Major findings arising from the actions taken by Governments, often in cooperation with the Board, in identifying cases of diversion and attempted diversion, are described below. The discussion focuses on the sharing between Governments of information relating to international trade in precursors.

(a) Types of transaction

28. The following three types of transaction involving precursors require the collection and sharing of data:

(a) Transactions forming part of *established legitimate trade*, for which verification of the legitimacy of each and every shipment is not necessary;

(b) *Shipments of concern*, because the competent authorities are unable, for various reasons, immediately to establish whether or not the consignments in question are for legitimate purposes;

(c) *Suspicious transactions and stopped shipments*, where sufficient evidence is available to indicate that the consignments in question will be used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances.

29. For the first type of transaction, those forming part of established legitimate trade, it is necessary to collect general information in order to determine trends, for instance; without such data it would not be possible to identify unusual trends. The Board continues to collect such general data and, to the extent practicable, is trying to identify and fill missing areas (see also Part A above).

30. The second and third types of transaction, i.e. shipments of concern and suspicious transactions and stopped shipments, require immediate exchange of information between competent national authorities and with the Board. Different types of information are often needed. Suspicious transactions, once identified, and stopped shipments require immediate alerts to other countries.

(b) *Types of communication being exchanged between Governments*

Inquiries, no-objection certificates, pre-export notifications

31. Once the normal patterns of legitimate trade have been established, the number of transactions identified as shipments of concern will be limited. However, at the current stage of the development of international systems for precursor control and in the relevant communication networks, many transactions that are part of the established legitimate trade may require checking. This is because the facts about such trade that are necessary to verify the legitimacy of individual shipments are very often not readily or immediately available to competent authorities.

32. Consequently, on the one hand, there are shipments that appear to be legitimate; the authorities are, however, unable immediately to ascertain the legitimacy, or do not find any apparent suspicion, because certain information is simply not available. On the other hand, there are shipments about which suspicious circumstances seem to exist; the authorities are, nevertheless, not yet able to confirm their suspicions. In both cases, and also for other shipments that fall in between, Governments often find the need to make specific inquiries before allowing the shipments concerned to proceed. Such inquiries from exporting countries, for instance, are often made directly to the competent authorities of the importing countries; they are also addressed to the Board and/or to other competent international bodies.

33. In most cases, in the absence of suspicion, the authorities of the exporting countries or territories choose to authorize the shipments and provide the importing countries with pre-export notifications or a copy of the no-objection certificates that they have issued. Some authorities send such communications with a request to confirm, within a designated time-frame, the legitimacy of the consignments in question, indicating that otherwise the shipments would be allowed to proceed.

Alerts

34. When suspicions have been established that consignments would be used in illicit manufacture, the authorities need to stop the shipments in question, unless they have decided to conduct controlled

deliveries. They must also alert other Governments about such diversion attempts. Immediate alerts are essential, as traffickers quickly turn to other countries, not only those in the same region, but also others elsewhere, as points of diversion.

(c) Advantages of rapid exchange of communications

35. Simple inquiries made about individual shipments of precursors, or the sending of some sort of notice (whether in the form of pre-export notifications as under article 12, paragraph 10, pre-approval notices, or no-objection certificates) to the authorities of importing countries, have resulted in the discovery of a number of cases of attempted and actual diversions of those substances, as noted above. Such communications have been helpful both to those countries and territories that still lack systematic mechanisms for precursor control and to those others that already have such mechanisms.

36. For those Governments that have not yet established systematic mechanisms to monitor the movement of precursors, communications about individual shipments have enabled them to know, first of all, what comes into their territories and, secondly, what information was needed to help determine the legitimacy of such consignments. In so doing, those Governments could also identify the procedures that might be lacking for the conduct of such verification.

37. For those other Governments that already have such monitoring mechanisms, information about individual shipments has enabled them, for instance, to detect falsified import certificates, to observe changes in patterns of trade, thus making it possible to identify unusual trends, and to find out any irregularities that may be indicative of suspicious circumstances.

38. It should also be noted that the rapid exchange of communications between competent authorities has been instrumental in detecting attempts to divert not only substances in Table I of the 1988 Convention, but also those in Table II.

Some examples

39. Noteworthy examples of the usefulness of the rapid exchange of communications are given below:

(a) When Hong Kong authorities informed the Board in May 1996 about an order for a large quantity (4 tonnes) of ephedrine (listed in Table I of the 1988 Convention) to be exported to a country in south-east Asia that did not yet have precursor monitoring mechanisms, immediate contacts with that Government established suspicions. The quantity appeared to exceed by far the licit requirements of the importing country. The consignment had repeatedly changed its ownership within Hong Kong, and the entire transaction had, moreover, been arranged by a person in a third country in the subregion. The Government of the country of destination subsequently informed Hong Kong, through the Board, that the importing company was not properly authorized, and confirmed that there was no licit requirement in the country for such a large quantity of ephedrine. The case continues to be under investigation by the Governments concerned;

(b) In early January 1996, acting immediately on a notification received from Hong Kong about a consignment of 2.5 tonnes of ephedrine, the authorities of Singapore, even without a systematic precursor monitoring mechanism, discovered that the consignment had not entered the country, but had been re-routed to Thailand. A company in the free-trade zone in Singapore had reshipped the consignment after mislabelling. The immediate investigation conducted by the Thai authorities showed that the importing company was fictitious. This discovery enabled the authorities concerned to stop further diversions through the same route;

(c) In view of the large-scale diversions and attempted diversions of ephedrine to North America, uncovered particularly in 1995,³ a number of Governments are especially vigilant regarding ephedrine shipments to that subregion. Acting on one pre-export notification sent by the Czech Republic in January 1996 for about 1 tonne of ephedrine, the Mexican authorities, which have established an import authorization system, conducted an investigation that revealed the fraudulent nature of the alleged Mexican import certificate; the Czech authorities did not authorize the shipment. Further investigations showed that two unlicensed intermediaries in Belgium had been involved in organizing the attempted diversion. In another case, in May 1996, the provision of a pre-export notification by Hong Kong to the United States of America, which has a systematic monitoring mechanism, prevented the diversion of 1 tonne of ephedrine. The routine, but timely, communication sent to the United States authorities allowed the latter to rapidly investigate the importing company in California, which proved to be fictitious;

(d) In February 1996, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia requested the assistance of the Board in investigating a proposed import and re-export of about 1 tonne of ephedrine, allegedly originating from Germany to be reshipped to India. The fact that India manufactures and exports ephedrine raised concern. As the investigation conducted by the Government of India showed that the alleged importer in India was not aware of the transaction, the authorities of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia did not issue an import authorization, which would have allowed the transaction to proceed. Investigations in Germany showed that the alleged exporting company was unknown. Trade documents further showed that an individual in Greece had arranged the transaction. It is, however, not yet clear where the actual origin and destination of the ephedrine in question were;

(e) In another case, relevant and timely information provided to the Board by both the exporting and the importing countries prevented diversion of a large quantity of acetic anhydride (listed in Table II). In November 1995, China requested the assistance of the Board in checking the legitimacy of an order of 38 tonnes to be shipped to Turkey. Turkey strictly controls the import of acetic anhydride into the country, and regularly provides the Board with lists of authorized imports of the substance. The Board noted that no import certificates had previously been issued to the company concerned and immediately contacted the Turkish authorities. As they confirmed that no import authorization to the company had been issued, China stopped the shipment. Investigations of the case in Turkey have led to the arrest of traffickers;

(f) More recently, in June 1996, China also stopped a shipment of 200 tonnes of acetone (listed in Table II) that was to be shipped to a textile factory in Myanmar, as a result of an inquiry made by China through the Board about the legitimacy of the order. A number of reasons for concern prompted the Chinese authorities to inquire, including the fact that the quantity was large and the export was destined to a textile factory. There was no information, in particular, about possible licit uses of such a quantity of acetone in the textile industry in Myanmar. The authorities of Myanmar subsequently advised that the importing company did not exist, and that the import certificate was false. They also clarified that only the Ministry of Industry, and not individual factories, could import chemicals and raw materials into the country;

(g) In April 1996, the Indian authorities requested the assistance of the Board in obtaining confirmation of the legitimacy of a proposed export to Kenya of anthranilic acid (listed in Table II) and ortho-toluidine (not under international control), both of which are key chemicals used in illicit manufacture of methaqualone. Attempts to establish clandestine methaqualone laboratories had been made in recent years in eastern and southern Africa (see paragraph 125). The combination of the two substances, as well as the destination, therefore raised concern among the Indian authorities. The Kenyan authorities subsequently confirmed to the Board the suspicious character of the shipment, which was stopped by the Indian authorities;

(h) In its last report,⁴ the Board gave an example of how alerts on stopped shipments could effectively prevent further diversions. Germany had rejected an order for 36 tonnes of acetic anhydride from Turkmenistan because of the suspicious circumstances. Follow-up investigations revealed that the import authorization had been falsified. Subsequently, having been alerted of the

case through the system of information exchange available within the European Union, the Belgian authorities stopped a shipment of 17 tonnes of acetic anhydride, under the same circumstances, to the same importing company in Turkmenistan;

(i) While not involving alerts as such, in a number of cases brought to the attention of the Board the quick exchange of communications about seizures resulted in the discovery of past diversions or the prevention of diversions by the same trafficking groups elsewhere. For instance, having seized nearly 3 tonnes of ephedrine in Mexico City in July 1996, the Mexican authorities provided initial findings of the investigation to the authorities of Hong Kong, from which the substance had been exported. It was then discovered that the cargo had been shipped from the territory without any export authorization. It was also found that two other shipments of ephedrine had been previously sent by the same company to Mexico using similar methods. Investigations further revealed that a trading company in California had been involved in arranging for the shipments. The rapid communication between the authorities concerned has led to the discovery of past diversions (the channel has functioned since 1994), and to the identification of a trafficking network and the methods of diversion;

(j) Similarly, in early 1996, the authorities of Germany became concerned when an individual tried to place orders, following unsuccessful attempts in the Netherlands, to German manufacturing companies to produce up to 100 million tablets of pseudoephedrine (containing a total of 6 tonnes of the substance) per month, allegedly for export to Costa Rica. Tablets containing ephedrine or pseudoephedrine have been seized in clandestine methamphetamine laboratories in the United States. Having been alerted by the authorities of the Netherlands and the United States, the Government of Germany did not authorize the transaction. In turn, Costa Rica, having been informed by the Board about such an attempt, subsequently invoked article 12, paragraph 10, of the 1988 Convention, and requested that it be prenotified of exports to it of all substances listed in Table I, in order to allow the effective monitoring of precursor shipments.

(d) Problems and issues noted in the exchange of communications

40. While the rapid exchange of communications has proven to be instrumental in effectively identifying suspicious transactions, or otherwise useful in prompting competent authorities to take further steps for control, Governments have been faced with a number of problems requiring the assistance of the Board, and have identified various other issues that need to be addressed. Particular attention has been focused on the following:

(a) Problems, including:

- (i) Lack of identified competent authorities.* The authorities of the exporting countries are frequently unable to immediately contact the competent authorities of the importing countries, since very often the identities and roles of the competent authorities responsible for article 12 have not yet been declared by those importing countries;
- (ii) Lack of immediate responses.* When inquiries are made before authorizing shipments to proceed, the exporting countries very often do not receive replies from the importing countries and, if at all, not immediately. In such a situation, a shipment would be allowed to proceed even though suspicion might later be established by the importing countries. On the other hand, if proper export authorizations are only granted after considerable delay, legitimate trade may suffer;
- (iii) Lack of uniform action by different Governments.* While some Governments exercise strict vigilance over their exports often as a result of full cooperation of the chemical industry, others do not. The legitimate interests of the industry in those countries with

tight controls might suffer if and when some other Governments do not apply the same level of vigilance, as the industry in those countries with lax controls might consequently take undue advantage of the situation, also allowing traffickers to benefit;

- (iv) *Lack of monitoring of certain types of transaction.* While some Governments have systems of control over exports, no mechanism exists to monitor their imports, thus making it difficult, if not impossible, to trace re-exports;
- (v) *Alerts not shared with Governments outside a region.* When alerts about suspicious or stopped shipments are sent, they are sometimes shared only with the countries in the region or subregion or, if shared with other Governments, only under special bilateral agreements;

(b) Various other issues, including:

- (i) *Lack of apparent suspicion.* In the absence of apparent suspicion, the authorities of the exporting countries may need to allow the shipments to proceed, even when they were unable at the time to ascertain fully the legitimacy of the transactions in question;
- (ii) *Limited waiting time permissible.* When Governments do make inquiries prior to authorizing exports, they may be unable to withhold the shipments for an unlimited period unless suspicion has been raised;
- (iii) *Availability of general information.* The above-mentioned issues are related to the lack of general information; for instance, the importing company may not be known, no means may be available to check the ultimate consignee,* and licit requirements and trends in use may not be known;
- (iv) *Availability of information on specific control requirements.* In some countries there is only one single importer of precursors, either a Government agency or a private company; that fact, and details of the importer, may not be known to the authorities of all exporting countries, especially when previous trade relations did not exist;
- (v) *Availability of authentic certificates.* While the import certificates in their possession may have been falsified, the authorities of the exporting countries may not have means to verify the authenticity of such documents.

41. The above-mentioned problems and issues need to be addressed through specific actions by Governments. In section C below, therefore, proposals are presented for further concerted action by Governments.

2. Other related international activities

42. The Board has recognized that, in giving priority to assisting Governments in verifying the legitimacy of transactions, special attention should be paid to maintaining and improving cooperation between Governments, and to facilitating the exchange of information between countries worldwide. The key role of the Board in working with Governments and its potential role as an information

*For instance, even when the importing companies are known established companies, other checks are indispensable. There have been cases where those that were denied authorization to import precursors then turned to the established companies to obtain the substances.

clearing house and data repository for information related to chemicals listed in the Tables of the 1988 Convention were highlighted at the Conference on International Chemical Control Communications sponsored by the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, and held at Bangkok from 10 to 12 July 1996. That meeting brought together competent authorities from a number of important manufacturing and exporting countries in an attempt to develop the basis for a global communications network for monitoring and preventing the diversion of controlled chemicals.

43. At the regional level, the Board has noted with satisfaction the successful outcome of the INCB/United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) Workshop on Precursor Control in South and south-west Asia and the Central Asian Republics, held at New Delhi from 19 to 23 August 1996. That Workshop, was designed, *inter alia*, to establish working systems for sharing information within and between regulatory and enforcement authorities at the national, subregional and regional levels.

44. Finally, through the assistance it has provided to Governments in verifying the legitimacy of transactions, the Board has determined that one of the many ways in which traffickers have tried to circumvent existing controls is by the use of mixtures. Because of both the lack of any clear definition of the term mixture and the ambiguities connected with the use of that term for the classification of a heterogeneous group of products (for example, pharmaceutical preparations and solutions), many Governments do not subject mixtures to control. Since traffickers have benefited, and continue to benefit, from that situation, the Board has started to examine the problem in detail. The Advisory Expert Group of the Board met from 24 to 28 June 1996 to review the control of mixtures containing substances listed in the Tables of the 1988 Convention. As a result of that meeting, the Board will carry out further studies to identify those mixtures that are commercially available and internationally traded and to determine the use of such mixtures in illicit manufacture, with a view to applying appropriate control measures.

C. Proposals for further action

1. Actions related to facilitating the exchange of information

45. Experience shows that the most effective means of preventing diversion is the rapid exchange of information between Governments of importing and exporting countries on individual shipments. As described in section B above, the Board has invested its largest efforts in facilitating such an exchange of information. The observations made in section B relating to international trade in precursors apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to the rapid exchange of communications between agencies within a country or territory regarding domestic movement of such substances. On the basis of those observations and of recommendations made by the Board in previous years (see annex V), proposals are presented below for further specific actions that Governments should now take. The Board recommends that those steps be followed for all transactions involving substances in both Table I and Table II of the 1988 Convention.

(a) First steps

46. As a first step, to examine transactions in substances listed in Tables I and II, Governments should use the "Guidelines for use by national authorities in preventing the diversion of precursors and essential chemicals", which were distributed to all Governments by UNDCP in 1993 pursuant to Economic and Social Council resolution 1993/40 of 27 July 1993:

The guidelines provide checklists and procedures to follow when authorizing transactions, and are general enough to be useful to countries with differing national control systems. In the same resolution, the Council urged Governments to consider the guidelines fully and to apply them. Competent national authorities should then establish their own checklists and procedures in their respective areas of competence. The Board requests feedback from Governments about the usefulness of the guidelines with a view to improving them.

(b) Information exchange

Inquiries

47. Governments of exporting countries should, prior to permitting shipments to proceed, make inquiries to the authorities of the importing countries about individual transactions whenever they could not immediately verify major elements that might raise suspicions. In all such cases, Governments should inform the Board of the action taken, or should otherwise request its assistance:

The Board has repeatedly urged Governments to make such inquiries, even when the mechanisms and procedures for verification have not yet been institutionalized between the Governments concerned (see annex V). For its part, in addition to facilitating direct intergovernmental communication, the Board may use its database to provide the requisite information. It also works closely with the International Criminal Police Organization (ICPO/Interpol) and WCO in handling such inquiries, and stands ready to serve as a gateway to the competent international bodies for regulatory authorities.

48. Governments should not release shipments that raise possible suspicions until the competent authorities of the importing countries have indicated that they have no objection to the transaction in question:

Inquiries may be made about shipments that do not necessarily raise any suspicion as such, but for which further checks are necessary. In such cases, if the authorities of exporting countries have any specific time-limits for delaying a shipment of concern unless a suspicion has been established, they should so specify to the Governments of the importing countries or territories and to the Board.

49. Upon receiving a request to verify the legitimacy of shipments of concern, the competent authorities of the importing country should provide immediate feedback, even pending completion of their investigation:

If the authorities of the importing country find an element of suspicion in the transaction in question, but are not able to complete the investigation in the time requested by the exporting country, they should immediately contact the Government of the exporting country and the Board, and request that the shipment be suspended pending further investigation.

50. Governments should immediately inform the Board if export orders have been cancelled while they are awaiting a reply from importing countries:

If the order was an attempted diversion, traffickers may have turned to other countries for points of diversion; immediate alerts might be necessary. If the order was for a legitimate purpose and was placed elsewhere, the Board will need to inquire about the

circumstances in order to identify possible weak links in control and to ensure that the legitimate interests of those industries cooperating in inquiries are properly protected.

51. Exporting countries that do not receive a reply to their inquiries about individual shipments should inform the Board of this fact:

The Board will continue to stand ready to use its good offices in facilitating verification.

Alerts

52. If the verification has established a suspicion about the transaction concerned, the competent authorities of the exporting country should, unless controlled deliveries have been arranged, immediately stop the shipment. Acting in concert, the Governments of the exporting and importing countries should then provide alerts about such a diversion attempt both to other Governments which in their view might be targeted as points of diversion, and to the Board. Such alerts should also be provided in cases where the exporting country has stopped the shipment without contacting the importing country:

If, for any reason, the shipment could not be stopped, the authorities of the exporting country should provide more details to the importing country to enable it to intercept the shipment in question upon arrival. The Board continues to stand ready to assist in alerting other Governments, as necessary, to diversion attempts. Wherever practicable, the exporting and importing countries should consider the possibility of controlled deliveries to identify trafficking groups or illicit manufacturing sites.

Notifications prior to exports

53. In those cases where, in the absence of any apparent suspicion, the authorities of the exporting country are unable, or do not find any specific reasons, to suspend the shipment until they have received a response from the Government of the importing country, they should still send to the governments of importing countries a notice prior to the shipments (pre-export notification, no-objection certificate, copy of export authorization etc.):

The authorities of exporting countries should send such notices prior to the actual shipment, even if exports appear, *prima facie*, to be legitimate. For exports of substances in Table I, the Board recommends that such notifications be sent even if the Government of the importing country or territory has not requested them under article 12, paragraph 10 (see annex V). Wherever feasible, such notifications should also be sent for all substances in Table II.

54. The Governments of importing countries should take immediate action upon receiving such notices to examine whether or not the transactions in question are legitimate, including visits to the companies, especially when a systematic monitoring mechanism has not yet been established:

While no individual reply may be required for each individual shipment for which the legitimacy was confirmed, some feedback should be given to the exporting country (for example, by providing a periodic summary of shipments properly received). When the shipment is not legitimate, immediate feedback is required.

55. In case the shipment in question is for re-export, the Government of the transit country or territory should use the above-mentioned guidelines, and, as necessary, send an inquiry concerning the legitimacy of the transaction, or a pre-export notification to the next importing country.

(c) Final remarks on information exchange

56. As the Board has repeatedly emphasized in its previous reports, the following are pre-requisites for the procedures mentioned above (see annex V):

- (a) Establishment of a legislative basis and regulatory controls;
- (b) Identification of competent authorities and their specific roles;
- (c) Informing the Board of details of the controls applied and of the names and addresses of competent authorities;
- (d) Systems for collecting information on the movement of precursors and for sharing such information with the Board.

57. Commercial or other types of confidentiality ought to be maintained during the exchange of information so as to facilitate, not impede, such an exchange for individual shipments. Concern over confidentiality of information should, therefore, not deter competent national authorities from sharing information.

58. Finally, in connection with maintaining and improving cooperation between Governments, and facilitating the exchange of information between countries worldwide, the Board has decided to convene in 1997 an international meeting to discuss further the type of information to be shared and the modalities for such information-sharing. Most importantly, the meeting aims at developing and establishing procedures to facilitate cooperation and the sharing of information between national authorities and with the Board.

2. Other issues

(a) Problematic target approaches

59. While monitoring the implementation of article 12, the Board is concerned about a certain imbalance in controls currently applied by Governments. For instance, some Governments employ a targeted approach, by which exporting countries apply, for certain substances, greater vigilance over shipments destined to areas where illicit manufacture of drugs takes place and to those which are known to have been targeted as points of diversion; those Governments still monitor all other transactions. Such an approach has been implemented, for example, by Hong Kong. The Board has noted, however, that certain Governments that use a targeted approach monitor only shipments to certain areas, and not transactions involving shipments to other areas. As the Board has repeatedly stated, traffickers quickly exploit weaknesses in controls applied by Governments, and are known to use complicated routes to hide the final destination. It is not adequate to neglect shipments to areas not included in such a targeted approach.

60. Furthermore, some countries focus on export controls. In order for export controls to be effective, however, it is also necessary to monitor imports, some of which may later be exported and subsequently diverted elsewhere (see also paragraph 40, subparagraph (a)(iv), above). There have been indications that such activities are occurring.

61. The Board therefore invites all exporting and transit countries to re-examine the scope of their current controls over international trade, and to make amendments where necessary.

(b) Use of pharmaceutical preparations in illicit manufacture

62. As was mentioned in paragraph 39, subparagraph (j), pharmaceutical preparations containing ephedrine or pseudoephedrine have been utilized by traffickers as raw material in the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine. The Board wishes therefore to remind all Governments that pharmaceutical preparations containing substances included in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention are not exempt from control measures, unless compounded in such a way that such substances cannot be easily used or recovered by readily applicable means. Pharmaceutical preparations, unless specifically excepted, should therefore be controlled accordingly.

(c) Special surveillance list

63. Some of the precursors required for illicit drug manufacture and listed in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention have become especially difficult to obtain as a result of the strict controls put in place by a growing number of countries and territories. As is shown in chapter II of the present report, traffickers have therefore sought to obtain alternate precursors that may be used as substitutes for those which are more closely monitored. In addition, they have identified and used new methods for drug processing or manufacture, requiring substances currently not listed in the Tables of the 1988 Convention. They have also manufactured so-called controlled drug analogues, many of which again require as starting material substances not listed in the Tables of the 1988 Convention. Those trends have been seen in all regions of the world, irrespective of whether the regions are affected by the illicit manufacture of cocaine, heroin or psychotropic substances such as the amphetamines (amphetamine, methamphetamine, 3, 4-methylenedioxyamphetamine (MDA), 3, 4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) etc.).

64. Growing concern over such developments has led to calls for the establishment, for use by Governments, of a special surveillance list of non-scheduled substances for which substantial information exists of their use in illicit drug manufacture, with a view to applying appropriate control measures to prevent use of those substances by traffickers. In its resolution 1996/29, the Economic and Social Council has called upon the Board and UNDCP to establish such a list, and has urged Governments to make arrangements for strengthening controls with regard to the substances included in that list.

65. While there is a clear need for a surveillance list such as that described above, the Board reminds Governments that it has deferred implementation of the activities requested by the Council in resolution 1996/29 until the necessary resources are in place.

II. ANALYSIS OF DATA ON SEIZURES OF, AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN, PRECURSORS AND TRENDS IN ILLICIT MANUFACTURE OF DRUGS

A. Overview

66. The following analysis provides an overview of major trends in seizures of, and illicit traffic in, precursors, as well as of trends in the illicit manufacture of drugs. It does not review in detail the actions taken by Governments in the light of those emerging trends. Where appropriate, such actions are discussed in the report of the Board for 1996.⁵

67. To assist in understanding the importance of individual precursors in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, a comprehensive list of the substances currently scheduled in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention and an outline of their typical uses in illicit manufacture are given in annex II. Information also provided in annex II may be used to calculate how much of a drug could be manufactured from a given quantity of seized substance.

68. The present report contains seizure data for the five-year period from 1991 to 1995, furnished by Governments under the provisions of article 12 of the 1988 Convention (see annex I, table 3). For the purposes of this review, the data have been supplemented by more recent information provided by Governments and other competent international bodies.

69. Seizures of all substances in Tables I and II, with the exception of *ergometrine* and *lysergic acid* used for the illicit manufacture of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), have been reported for 1995.

70. As in previous years, the seizure data emphasize the importance of *acetic anhydride*, used for the illicit conversion of morphine to heroin, and the widespread use of acids and solvents for the illicit manufacture of cocaine and heroin. They also highlight the use of substances in Table I in the illicit manufacture of psychotropic substances such as amphetamine, methamphetamine and amphetamine-type stimulants related to MDA and MDMA ("Ecstasy").

71. Information provided on seizures of substances not listed in the Tables of the 1988 Convention show the continued and growing use of substitute chemicals for many of the currently scheduled substances.

72. The Board has been informed, notably by Germany and the United States, of an increased number of shipments of precursors and chemicals that were stopped, suspended or voluntarily cancelled because of suspicious circumstances. The Board welcomes this development and the fact that the range of substances involved in such shipments has also increased. It regrets, however, that relatively few Governments are yet in a position to provide relevant information to the Board in a timely manner, or to alert other Governments to shipments that have been stopped.

73. On the basis of the available information on seizures, methods and routes of diversion, licit uses etc., the following major observations can be made:

(a) More information is required on seizures, stopped shipments and illicit laboratory activities. Available data are not comprehensive, and do not yet provide a satisfactory means for predicting future trends;

(b) More information is required also on licit trade in, use of and requirements for scheduled substances to enable new trends to be easily identified;

(c) Controls and seizures, including stopped shipments, have had an impact on illicit drug-manufacturing activities. Street market prices of some substances have risen significantly;

(d) Large quantities of substances listed in Tables I and II are still being diverted for use in illicit laboratories;

(e) Illicit manufacture of some drugs, notably methamphetamine in America and south-east Asia and hallucinogenic amphetamines in western Europe, is spreading;

(f) National seizure statistics do not always reflect the known illicit drug-manufacturing situation, because of either a lack of reporting or an inadequate capacity for control resulting in few seizures;

(g) Non-scheduled substitutes, including mixtures, have been used, particularly for cocaine-processing and for the manufacture of amphetamine-type stimulants;

(h) New methods of drug processing or manufacture have been used, in some cases with a requirement for new precursors.

74. Some of the above-mentioned points are discussed in more detail in the following review.

B. Trends in the illicit traffic in precursors and the illicit manufacture of drugs

1. Substances used in the illicit manufacture of cocaine

75. While most of the available cocaine hydrochloride is processed in Colombia, increased illicit manufacture has been reported in Bolivia, Brazil and Peru. Reports of seizures of all the necessary substances listed in Table II and used for such activity in those countries, as well as in Ecuador, provide some evidence for the increase.

76. All countries in South America should be vigilant in monitoring chemical movements, as indicated also in paragraph 85, since strengthened controls and increased enforcement activities in countries in the Andean subregion may lead to increased illicit manufacture of drugs in other neighbouring countries.

77. Seizure statistics related to scheduled substances used in the illicit manufacture of cocaine allow some general observations to be made on usage trends involving a number of substances in Table II, particularly the solvents and acids, which are used for the purification of crude cocaine base and for the preparation of cocaine hydrochloride. They are also used in a similar way in the illicit manufacture of psychotropic substances such as methamphetamine and MDMA, and of other narcotic drugs such as heroin. Despite that, most seizures of substances in Table II were reported by countries in South America. This probably reflects the particular focus on those substances in the strengthening of regulatory controls and enforcement capabilities in those countries where illicit manufacture of cocaine takes place.

(a) *Solvents*

78. With the exception of Colombia, the quantities of the solvents *acetone*, *ethyl ether* and *methyl ethyl ketone* reported seized in South America have continued to fall. There are indications that the smaller quantities of some solvents seized, for example ethyl ether, may be due to the fact that the substance can be easily recycled, and that traffickers have modified processing methods accordingly.

79. At the same time, while seizures related to scheduled solvents have fallen, the seizure of a large number (23) of other non-scheduled solvents has also been reported. These have included methylene chloride, chloroform and hexane, as well as mixtures such as thinners and aliphatic solvents. Further evidence that traffickers have explored the use of non-scheduled solvents for illicit cocaine processing is provided by the results of chemical analysis of samples of cocaine seized in the United States. While traces of *toluene* have been found in approximately 70 per cent of samples, frequently encountered non-scheduled solvents also include methyl isobutyl ketone (MIBK) (in 59 per cent of samples), aliphatic/miscellaneous hydrocarbons (56 per cent), isopropyl alcohol (55 per cent) and ethyl acetate (47 per cent).

80. In connection with the popularity of MIBK as a solvent in cocaine-processing, the Board notes with satisfaction that, *inter alia*, a major shipment of 120 tonnes of that substance destined to Venezuela from the United States was withdrawn voluntarily by the exporter after notification by the United States Drug Enforcement Administration of the possibility of diversion. A further shipment of 26.5 tonnes of a mixture of MIBK and *methyl ethyl ketone* from the United States to Colombia was also cancelled voluntarily by the exporter. Stopped shipments such as these provide further justification for the development of a system of alerts (see paragraph 34) to warn chemical manufacturers and exporters in other regions.

(b) *Acids*

81. In recent years the number of reported seizures of *hydrochloric acid* and *sulphuric acid* throughout South America has also fallen. As with solvents, Colombia has reported a major part of the acids seized in 1995. In particular, large seizures of hydrochloric acid, used to make cocaine hydrochloride, were reported by that country. Similarly, while Peru reported seizures of sulphuric acid, used in the early stages of cocaine processing, it also reported significant seizures of hydrochloric acid, a more than 40 per cent increase on the 1994 figures. This again provides some support to the view that the extent of cocaine hydrochloride manufacture in that country may be increasing.

(c) *Potassium permanganate*

82. Seizures of *potassium permanganate* were reported by Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia and Peru, the largest quantity (almost 38 tonnes) being seized in Colombia. A suspicious shipment of potassium permanganate to Guyana was voluntarily withdrawn in the United States after investigation of the shipment by the authorities of Guyana. As the legitimacy of more and more shipments of potassium permanganate to the Americas has been questioned, the use of possible non-scheduled substitutes (that is, hydrogen peroxide and sodium hypochlorite) has also been reported.

(d) *General remarks*

83. It is clear that cocaine traffickers attempt to obtain their chemicals from a variety of sources: information on seizures and stopped shipments indicate that diversions and attempted diversions from Europe and North America have taken place. Chemicals have also been diverted or smuggled from neighbouring countries into regions where cocaine is processed. In previous reports, the Board has

expressed concern that many countries in South America lack the necessary systems for effective control of the domestic distribution of chemicals.

84. Where strict legislation is in place, and is enforced, it can be effective. For example, the Government of Chile, recognizing that chemicals used in illicit manufacture of cocaine in Bolivia have been diverted from the licit market in Chile, and then smuggled through the border regions into Bolivia, is now taking steps to prevent such activity in the future by introducing controls over manufacture and domestic distribution. Already, as a result of new legislation that provides for the investigation of possible diversions, and establishes a basis for cooperation with law enforcement authorities outside the country, several joint operations in 1996 by the Bolivian and Chilean police have resulted in the seizure in the border regions of a total of 55 tonnes of chemicals destined for illicit cocaine manufacture in Bolivia. A number of traffickers have been arrested. The trafficking organization itself may have been in operation for at least five years, responsible for supplying as much as two thirds of the chemicals used in the illicit cocaine trade in Bolivia.

85. Other countries in Latin America face similar problems of diversion from normal commercial distribution channels. All Governments of the subregion are therefore requested again to maintain their vigilance in controlling the domestic movement of chemicals, and to remedy weaknesses in the system, once identified.

86. Finally, while cocaine base has been seized in various parts of the world, there is no evidence of any large-scale conversion of that substance to cocaine hydrochloride outside South America. A cocaine-processing laboratory was dismantled in Spain in 1996, but, as with similar operations reported by that country in previous years, it was not large-scale. Also, during the last five years cocaine base from Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela has been seized en route to Lebanon, where it is understood that trafficking organizations have gained the necessary knowledge to convert it into cocaine hydrochloride. There have, however, been no reports of the detection of any conversion laboratories in that country.

2. *Substances used in the illicit manufacture of heroin*

87. The total quantity of *acetic anhydride*—a key chemical used in the illicit manufacture of heroin—seized worldwide has shown a general increase since 1989, when comprehensive data on such seizures were first collected by the Board. In 1995, the Board also has been informed of a number of suspicious shipments of acetic anhydride that have been stopped. Further details of some of those are provided in paragraphs 94 and 96.

88. In previous reports, the Board has reported on attempted diversions, diversions and smuggling of heroin chemicals, particularly *acetic anhydride*, into and through South and south-west Asia. Chemicals have been smuggled from India into Pakistan or Afghanistan via Pakistan; through, or from, States of the Persian Gulf and the States members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in central Asia; and from Europe to, and through, Turkey. Seizure data for 1995 provide further support to those observations, although in some cases the methods of diversion have changed.

89. Previously unidentified routes and methods that have been used for the diversion of *acetic anhydride* have been uncovered since the Board issued its report for 1995. The following example highlights the increasingly sophisticated methods by which traffickers are being forced to transport the chemicals they require into the heroin-producing regions, as a direct consequence of increased controls and more concerted law enforcement activity in some countries of South and south-west Asia.

90. From 1991 to 1994, the quantity of *acetic anhydride* reported seized by the Indian authorities has risen steadily (from 1 tonne in 1991 to almost 50 tonnes in 1994). However, statistics for 1995 (9.3 tonnes) and covering most of 1996 (3.1 tonnes) show much smaller seizures in India, particularly in the border regions with Pakistan. A similar trend has been observed in Pakistan. At the same time, while Pakistan has routinely reported seizures of smuggled acetic anhydride on the border with India, since 1994 it has also reported increasingly large seizures of the chemical arriving in the country from India by rail and air. Those observations indicate a move away from the classic method of using road transport to smuggle acetic anhydride into Pakistan.

91. India has reported a further development, involving the attempted smuggling of *acetic anhydride* directly into Afghanistan by air. Approximately 2 tonnes of the chemical, obtained through a broker from the licit market in India, have been seized. In this connection the Board commends the Government of India, not only for its enforcement efforts in countering the illicit trade in acetic anhydride and other scheduled substances, but also for the initiatives it has taken to strengthen existing chemical controls, including the development, in cooperation with industry, of a code of conduct for such control.

92. In Pakistan, successful law enforcement operations in 1995 have resulted in further seizures of chemicals and illicit heroin laboratories, including the seizure in North-West Frontier Province of 3.7 tonnes of *acetic anhydride*, 6.4 tonnes of heroin and 15 clandestine laboratories illicitly manufacturing the drug. In an unrelated case, an attempt to obtain acetic anhydride from sources in the United Kingdom has been identified. In cooperation with the authorities of the United Kingdom, a consignment of 1 tonne of the chemical was shipped under surveillance from that country. Its interdiction in Pakistan led to the arrest of traffickers in that country and in the United Kingdom. The diversion attempt was uncovered as a result of effective monitoring mechanisms over domestic trade and distribution in the United Kingdom, and of good cooperation with the chemical industry in that country.

93. Despite the above-mentioned successes, key chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of heroin continue to be readily available in South and south-west Asia. Traffickers have looked for, and sometimes found, new sources for the chemicals they require. Although no seizures have been reported, there have been continued reports of significant diversion and trafficking of those substances, *acetic anhydride* in particular, through and from the CIS member States in central Asia, and from the Russian Federation, into Afghanistan. Crude heroin has been manufactured in Kazakstan, and, because of the local availability of opium and of domestically manufactured acetic anhydride, large-scale illicit manufacture cannot be excluded. The Board again reminds the countries in central Asia that, because of inadequate controls, they may be targeted by traffickers as a source, or for the transit, of precursors. It is important that Governments should put in place, at the earliest opportunity, the controls necessary to prevent such exploitation.

94. In Turkey, an important country of transit and destination for illicitly produced morphine base and heroin originating in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 49.3 tonnes of *acetic anhydride* were seized in 1995 (sufficient to manufacture between 20 and 40 tonnes of heroin), more than doubling the quantity reported in 1994 (20.1 tonnes). Reports of seizures in 1996 also indicate that enforcement activities continue to be successful. In one case, 22.4 tonnes of acetic anhydride, originating from Belgium and transiting Italy, has been seized. Turkey was the only country in Asia reporting seizures of other chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of heroin, including *acetone*, *ethyl ether*, *hydrochloric acid* and *sulphuric acid*. Germany stopped five shipments of acetic anhydride, totalling 41 tonnes, to Turkey.

95. Some of the *acetic anhydride* seized in Turkey was destined for use in illicit heroin laboratories in that country, while the rest was to be transported on to producer countries to the east. Primitive clandestine heroin laboratories of relatively small capacity have been identified and dismantled in Turkey, mainly in the Istanbul area, but also in the east and south-east of the country. Six laboratories were uncovered in 1996, and morphine base, acetic anhydride and other chemicals were seized.

96. Much of the *acetic anhydride* seized in Turkey is believed to have been smuggled into the country from western and eastern Europe. This view appears to be supported by a number of seizures of the chemical in countries in south-eastern Europe, notably Bulgaria and Romania, while en route to Turkey. Germany also stopped seven shipments of acetic anhydride to Bulgaria (a total of 259 tonnes) and one to Romania (0.1 tonne).

97. It is reported also that *acetic anhydride* has been smuggled into Turkey from the Persian Gulf States and neighbouring countries, including Lebanon. A number of seizures have been made in the latter country. At the same time, some clandestine laboratories manufacturing heroin are believed to still exist in Lebanon, with morphine base being obtained from Afghanistan via the Islamic Republic of Iran and Turkey. Also in Lebanon, a combined seizure of acetic acid and sodium acetate, being shipped to Turkey, has been reported. The two chemicals together may be used for the manufacture of acetylating agents such as acetic anhydride and acetyl chloride.

98. A clear picture of the status of illicit production of opium and its conversion to heroin in illicit laboratories located in the border regions between China, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar and Thailand has been difficult to obtain. Despite the fact that some clandestine heroin laboratories, particularly in Myanmar, may have discontinued their activities, it is recognized that significant quantities of heroin are illicitly manufactured in the subregion. It is understood that chemicals are brought into the border areas of Myanmar from neighbouring countries.

99. The Board notes with concern, however, that among the countries within the subregion, only Myanmar has reported for 1995 seizures of any of the chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of heroin, and then only of *acetic anhydride*. Similar seizures were also made in 1996. For example, as a result of law enforcement activities in northern and eastern Shan State, more than 10,000 litres of acetic anhydride (sufficient for the manufacture of more than 5 tonnes of heroin), together with acids, solvents and laboratory equipment used in heroin-processing were seized, and 11 heroin refineries were destroyed. The Board has also assisted in uncovering an attempted diversion of 200 tonnes of acetone from China to Myanmar. That shipment was stopped (see also paragraph 39, subparagraph (f)).

100. China is understood to be one of the principal sources of precursors used illicitly in the subregion. In 1995, China reported the seizure of 89.9 tonnes of essential chemicals and precursors, including *acetic anhydride*, some of which was to have been smuggled for use in illicit heroin laboratories.

101. More reports have been received indicating that heroin traffickers in several countries of south-east Asia are now involved also in the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine. One large laboratory complex with a capacity for both heroin and methamphetamine manufacture has recently been uncovered in Lao People's Democratic Republic. Details of that seizure, and of the production capacity of the laboratory, are given in paragraph 116. No information is yet available to confirm how such activities will impact on the illicit manufacture of heroin, by replacing it with the manufacture of methamphetamine, and therefore on the requirement for the relevant precursors.

102. Finally, reports have suggested that illicit cultivation of opium poppy in the Andean subregion and the related illicit processing of opium, may be increasing. In 1995, for example, one estimate

indicated that illicit opium production in Colombia was approximately 65 tonnes. Despite those trends, in the past no reports of seizures of *acetic anhydride*, or of seizures of other acetylating agents that may be used for the conversion of morphine to heroin, have been made to the Board. Colombia has, however, now reported seizures of acetic anhydride in both 1994 and 1995 (4,701 litres and 45 litres, respectively). The quantities seized, together with seizures of opium, morphine and heroin, are relatively small compared with seizures related to illicit cocaine manufacture in that country. No information has been provided for 1995 on any seizures of clandestine laboratories set up to obtain morphine from opium.

3. *Substances used in the illicit manufacture of amphetamine-type stimulants*

(a) *Amphetamine*

103. Most of the known illicit manufacture of amphetamine worldwide has occurred in Europe, and to a lesser extent in Australia. Although seizure data reflect that fact, the number of seizures of the relevant precursors, *phenylacetic acid* and *1-phenyl-2-propanone*, the quantities reported seized and the number of clandestine laboratories identified are not commensurate with the extent of the problem. The Netherlands is recognized as a major source country for illicit amphetamine in Europe, yet in 1995, that country reported no seizures of amphetamine precursors. The Board notes with concern that seizures in the Netherlands have been relatively few compared with what may be expected from anecdotal reports of large-scale illicit drug manufacture.

104. No indication is given from reported data of any further spread of illicit amphetamine manufacture in central and eastern Europe. Poland reported some of the largest seizures of *1-phenyl-2-propanone*. Four clandestine laboratories were dismantled in that country in 1994, eight in 1995 and three in the first quarter of 1996. Illicit manufacture of amphetamine in Germany and the United Kingdom was indicated by seizures of relevant precursors. Where information was provided, most of the precursors seized were identified as being of domestic origin. In 1996, the United Kingdom authorities dismantled an illicit amphetamine laboratory, one of the largest ever discovered in that country, with a manufacturing capacity of up to 600 kilograms of amphetamine sulphate. Police were first alerted to the operation following voluntary disclosures related to the purchase of glassware and laboratory equipment, and not by monitoring the sale of precursors.

105. There have been reports in the past of illicit manufacture of *1-phenyl-2-propanone* in Europe, which may have accounted for a substantial part of illicit requirements. A recent case in Italy suggests that such manufacture, using *phenylacetic acid* as starting material, may have been occurring for several years. Illicit manufacture of amphetamine precursors, specifically phenylacetic acid, has also been reported from Australia.

106. At the same time, there is extensive evidence that traffickers have changed from conventional methods of synthesis to new methods requiring precursors that are not controlled, or are only controlled at the domestic level under voluntary measures. A wide range of such substances has been reported. One of those substitute chemicals, benzaldehyde, is frequently encountered, and may now be considered the starting material of choice in some countries for the illicit manufacture of amphetamine.

107. Other illicit laboratories, or reports of illicit manufacturing, have been indicated in a number of countries, particularly in Australia. That country reported the seizure in 1995 of both *phenylacetic acid* and *1-phenyl-2-propanone*. Most of the precursors used for such manufacture were either of domestic origin or were imported from Europe or the United States. However, in at least one case the traffickers had obtained precursors, including *1-phenyl-2-propanone*, from licit sources in China.

(b) *Methamphetamine*

108. Illicit manufacture of methamphetamine is a major problem in North America, East and south-east Asia, and Australia. The precursors used have, in the main, been *ephedrine* and *pseudoephedrine*. *Phenylacetic acid* and *1-phenyl-2-propanone* used as starting materials have also been reported in the United States.

109. Continued successes in identifying attempted diversions of, and seizing, both *ephedrine* and *pseudoephedrine* have had a major impact in further limiting the supply of those substances for illicit manufacture. In the recent past, large quantities of ephedrine have been smuggled, partly through Guatemala, into Mexico and the United States for the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine. In 1996, attempts were also made to tranship both ephedrine and pseudoephedrine through other Central American countries. Some trafficking organizations were using predominantly pseudoephedrine in 1995 for illicit manufacture of methamphetamine. Reports indicate, however, that even pseudoephedrine is now more difficult for traffickers to obtain. The rapidly changing situation is highlighted by seizure data from the United States, which reported the seizure in 1995 of 15.6 tonnes of ephedrine (compared with almost 9 tonnes in 1994) and 20.5 tonnes of pseudoephedrine (less than 0.5 tonnes in 1994).

110. As previously reported, tablets containing *ephedrine*, obtained as over-the-counter preparations or through the mail, have been used as a major source of starting material for the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine and methcathinone in Mexico and the United States. Legislation has been in place in the United States for the last two years imposing controls on the sale and distribution of such ephedrine products. As a result of those controls, and as already indicated, traffickers have sought to acquire *pseudoephedrine*, first as a powder and then in tablet form. New legislation limiting the bulk sale of pseudoephedrine preparations has recently been established. The Board welcomes this development, and trusts that full and timely implementation of those controls will effectively prevent further domestic diversion.

111. Perhaps the most important development in North America (Mexico and the United States), is the use of phenylpropanolamine as a starting material in illicit drug manufacture. Phenylpropanolamine is a substance chemically similar to *ephedrine* and *pseudoephedrine*. It is pharmacologically active, and is available in a number of over-the-counter products and prescription medicines used as decongestants and as cough and cold remedies. A small number of products have been promoted as diet aids.

112. In the clandestine laboratory, phenylpropanolamine can be used in illicit drug manufacture in the same way as *ephedrine* or *pseudoephedrine*. The final product is, however, amphetamine, not methamphetamine. Because of the possibility of such illicit use, phenylpropanolamine is already controlled in some countries. With the prospect of further controls on retail sales of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine tablets, traffickers have increasingly turned to the use of phenylpropanolamine in illicit manufacture, and amphetamine is already replacing methamphetamine on the street market in some parts of the United States. During 1996 there were reports of an increasing number of diversions and attempted diversions of phenylpropanolamine. Significant seizures were also made, particularly in Mexico, including cases involving 3.3 tonnes (from Germany), 2.3 tonnes (from Taiwan Province of China) and 2.0 tonnes (origin unknown). In a follow-up to the latter case it has been established that the trafficking organization had imported 12.5 tonnes of phenylpropanolamine into Mexico during the previous 12 months.

113. In Asia, a large number of countries are affected by increasing abuse of amphetamine-type stimulants, particularly methamphetamine. Despite continuing efforts in East and south-east Asia to

develop and strengthen control systems and to improve enforcement capacity for preventing the diversion of precursors, illicit manufacture appears to be spreading. *Ephedrine* obtained from within the subregion, is the most widely used precursor.

114. There is little evidence of the source of the precursors used in the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine in Asia. However, it is understood that despite increased enforcement activity in China and subsequent successes in seizing precursors, that country remains a principal source. The Republic of Korea reported seizures of ephedrine in 1995 totalling 200 kilograms, all originating from China. However, the small number of seizures of precursors reported from East and south-east Asia may support unconfirmed reports that, rather than smuggling the chemical, traffickers prefer to use clandestine laboratories in China for the illicit manufacture of the drug from precursors diverted from the licit domestic market.

115. Such reports are further supported by drug seizure data indicating that China continues to be a significant source of the illicitly manufactured methamphetamine available in the subregion. Clandestine laboratories were seized in Jiangxi Province during 1995, and large quantities of methamphetamine of Chinese origin are reported to have been smuggled into, *inter alia*, Hong Kong, Japan, Philippines, Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China. The Board notes with appreciation that the authorities in China have recognized that fact, and are making strenuous efforts to prevent such activities.

116. ICPO/Interpol has reported that illicit laboratories and processing centres for methamphetamine were detected and seized not only in China, but also, *inter alia*, in Lao People's Democratic Republic, Philippines, Thailand and, for the first time, Viet Nam. In 1996, at an illicit laboratory in Lao People's Democratic Republic, *ephedrine*, *pseudoephedrine* and *phenylacetic acid* were seized. The precursors had been smuggled into the country from China, and were sufficient to manufacture an estimated 400 kilograms of methamphetamine. It is understood that the laboratory also had the capacity for heroin-processing, further evidence of increasing diversification from the illicit manufacture of heroin into the more lucrative market of synthetic drugs. In 1996, a large illicit methamphetamine laboratory was detected in the Philippines, leading to the seizure of 1.6 tonnes of ephedrine hydrochloride and more than 600 kilograms of methamphetamine hydrochloride in liquid form. In Viet Nam in 1995, chemicals and equipment for the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine were seized. It is understood that the traffickers involved had used the same laboratory facilities to make methamphetamine on three previous occasions.

117. In Australia, newly adopted legislation introduced to make the possession of *ephedrine* above threshold amounts illegal has led to a serious shortage of that substance on the illicit market and to a threefold increase in its price. As a consequence, it has been reported that traffickers have committed armed robberies of chemical suppliers; at least one fatality has resulted. Tablets containing ephedrine and *pseudoephedrine* have been used as the source of precursors for the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine in the country.

118. In Europe, where methamphetamine abuse appears to have a strong foothold only in the Czech Republic, seizures of *ephedrine* have been reported from that country (17 kilograms), and from Finland, Italy and Slovenia.

119. Finally, seizures or stopped shipments of pharmaceutical preparations containing *ephedrine* and *pseudoephedrine* to countries in West Africa have continued to come to the attention of the Board. There is no evidence of the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine in the subregion, or of further re-exports to countries where such manufacture has been identified. It is likely, therefore, that part, if not all, of the seized materials were to have been consumed as stimulants.

(c) *Amphetamine-type stimulants related to MDA (Ecstasy)*

120. Large-scale abuse of the hallucinogenic amphetamines (MDA, MDMA and related drugs) appears to be largely a western European phenomenon, although small seizures of the drugs have been reported worldwide. Reports indicate that the illicit manufacture of MDA, MDMA and related drugs is still taking place mainly in the Netherlands, for distribution throughout Europe and elsewhere, particularly in Asia.

121. As in previous years, even in Europe the seizure of relatively small quantities of the precursors required in illicit manufacture (that is, *isosafrrole*, *3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone* (3,4-MDP-2-P), *piperonal* and *safrole*, all substances in Table I) does not reflect the widespread availability of the drugs on the illicit market. Seizures of the necessary precursors have been reported in the Netherlands, as well as in Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Ireland and Norway in Europe, and in Australia, Brazil and the United States.

122. An illicit laboratory was dismantled in the Czech Republic in 1995, as reported previously, and 845 litres of 3,4-MDP-2-P were seized. In Canada in 1996, a clandestine laboratory, reported to have been producing substantial quantities of MDMA and LSD, was also dismantled. That laboratory was reported to be one of the largest and most sophisticated ever to be discovered in North America. Other smaller-scale laboratories were uncovered in Australia and the United Kingdom.

123. Seizure data have provided little indication as to which of the relevant substances listed in Table I of the 1988 Convention is that of choice for illicit manufacture; unconfirmed reports have suggested that *safrole* in the form of sassafras oil has been used on a number of occasions. As with amphetamine precursors, there have been unconfirmed reports from both western and eastern Europe of the illicit manufacture of precursors for MDA and related drugs.

4. Substances used in the illicit manufacture of methaqualone

124. Despite the efforts of regulatory and law enforcement authorities in India, the hypnotic and sedative drug methaqualone continues to be illicitly manufactured in large quantities in that country. Four clandestine laboratories were seized in 1995, along with chemicals, final products (approximately 20 tonnes) and laboratory equipment. Of the main precursors required for manufacture, no *anthranilic acid* (Table II) was encountered, but the seizure of *N-acetylanthranilic acid* (Table I) in both solid and liquid form was reported. The quantity of methaqualone reported seized in India has fallen in recent years, as more stringent controls and successful law enforcement actions have forced traffickers to move their operations to other locations both within the country and outside.

125. While India is still understood to be a major source of illicit methaqualone available in eastern and southern Africa, reports have indicated that the drug is, or has been, manufactured illicitly in those subregions. In recent years, illicit laboratories manufacturing or tableting methaqualone have been shut down in Kenya, South Africa, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia. In 1995, a methaqualone laboratory was dismantled in Mozambique, and seizures of *N-acetylanthranilic acid* and *anthranilic acid* have been reported for the first time at an illicit laboratory in South Africa. In 1995 and 1996, controlled deliveries of precursors have been made to South Africa from Germany and the United Kingdom.

126. In 1995, the Indian and Kenyan authorities successfully cooperated in investigating a suspicious shipment of *anthranilic acid* and ortho-toluidine (a key chemical for methaqualone manufacture not scheduled in the 1988 Convention) from India to Kenya (see also paragraph 39, subparagraph (g)). On two occasions involving shipments destined for South Africa, attempts have been made to obtain,

in addition to ortho-toluidine, another non-scheduled substance, isatoic anhydride, as a substitute for anthranilic acid. Those efforts to obtain precursors, together with reports of seizures of the necessary starting materials, clearly indicate attempts to establish clandestine methaqualone laboratories to support the continued and growing abuse of the drug. As the Board has stated in its previous reports, such attempts give clear warning of the need to monitor closely the licit trade in acetic anhydride, N-acetylanthranilic acid and anthranilic acid in Africa.

127. In that connection, the Board is pleased to note also the close cooperation between the Indian and South African law enforcement authorities in stopping methaqualone trafficking from India to Africa. In 1995, acting on information from South Africa, the Indian authorities closed down an illicit methaqualone manufacturing unit and confiscated 1.82 tonnes of finished product (more than 3 million tablets) destined for the South African drug market.

5. Substances used in the illicit manufacture of LSD

128. During 1996 there was no significant change in the reported availability of LSD worldwide. However, in view of the continuing popularity of the drug, it is still of concern to the Board that little background information is available on the sources of the precursors necessary for its illicit manufacture.

129. Of the three LSD precursors scheduled under the 1988 Convention (*ergometrine, ergotamine and lysergic acid*), only *ergotamine* was reported seized in 1995. Customs authorities in the Russian Federation seized approximately 30 kilograms of that substance (sufficient for the manufacture of approximately 100 million doses of LSD), and the authorities in Canada seized 15 kilograms that had been exported from India to a fictitious pharmaceutical company. Australia reported the seizure of a small quantity of the substance, sufficient to manufacture about 200 doses. Germany stopped delivery of suspicious shipments of ergotamine and lysergic acid (one each) within the country. Finally, on two occasions, in 1994 and 1996, the Board has been alerted to suspicious shipments of methylegometrine maleate to Nepal. Methylegometrine may be used as a substitute for ergometrine or ergotamine in the illicit manufacture of LSD.

6. Substances used in the illicit manufacture of phencyclidine

130. Illicit manufacture of phencyclidine continues to be a problem in the United States. Six laboratories illicitly manufacturing the drug were reported seized by the United States authorities in 1995, together with 172 kilograms of *piperidine* (Table II), as well as cyclohexanone, a non-scheduled substance. Piperidine and cyclohexanone are the major precursors for phencyclidine. The seizure of a small quantity of piperidine was also reported in Australia.

III. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

131. On the basis of findings from current cases of diversion and attempted diversion, the present report has focused on requirements and mechanisms for the exchange of information. In its review of those cases, the Board has identified three main areas for the exchange of information, including information on: legitimate trade; shipments of concern, where the authenticity of a shipment has not been verified; and special alerts on identified diversion attempts, stopped or suspended shipments and specific seizures. For each category, the Board has identified both the essential information that needs to be exchanged and how that information should be exchanged.

132. To facilitate the collation of relevant information and the cooperation required between Governments for sharing such information, the Board has outlined in chapter I, section C, a series of recommendations for further action by Governments to establish, or to strengthen, systems for the exchange of information. It urges all Governments to consider those recommendations, to examine their current systems for sharing information, and to take immediate steps to strengthen those systems should weaknesses be identified.

133. This is not the first time that the Board has called upon Governments to review, and where necessary strengthen, existing precursor controls, or has made recommendations in this respect. It has therefore re-examined and, as appropriate, revised and summarized, in annex V to the present report, all recommendations relating to the issue and contained in its reports for 1994 and 1995 on the implementation of article 12.

134. All the recommendations are based on the findings from cases of diversion and attempted diversion uncovered by a limited number of States. The Board is confident that those achievements will multiply as more Governments from exporting, importing and transit countries and territories worldwide establish effective systems for precursor control on the basis of the practical guidance given in this and previous reports.

135. Nevertheless, the Board has noted with concern that a large number of Governments have not yet developed adequate systems for control, in full knowledge that traffickers have responded to strengthened controls in one State by attempting to obtain the chemicals they require in another where controls may be inadequate. Some of those Governments have already experienced such problems, with precursors being diverted in, or through, their territories.

136. The Board finds that sufficient time has now passed since the entry into force of the 1988 Convention to enable Governments to consider and devise systems of control to implement fully the provisions of article 12 of the Convention by translating the general obligations of that article into specific measures, and by taking concrete actions. In that connection, the Board is now considering how, and under exactly what circumstances, it should exercise its specific powers under article 22 of the 1988 Convention.

137. While the focus of the present report has been on the exchange of information, the report also refers to a number of other issues related to precursor control, some new and some which have already been referred to in previous reports. New issues include, for example, the need to develop a special surveillance list of non-scheduled substances that have been found to be used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, and to carefully consider the implications of any targeted approach to implementing controls. Other issues, including the need to respond rapidly and positively to inadequacies identified in current systems of control, especially by strengthening controls in free ports and free-trade zones, and to be vigilant to the role of brokers in precursor transactions, are highlighted in the summary of past recommendations of the Board given in the present report.

138. The Board encourages all Governments to review those past recommendations, as well as new ones contained in the present report, and to take the necessary steps to strengthen controls should any weaknesses be identified. Again, it reminds all Governments of the importance of enforcing in a concerted way all the provisions of the 1988 Convention, if traffickers are to be thwarted.

Notes

¹*Official Records of the United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Vienna, 25 November-20 December 1988*, vol. I (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.94.XI.5).

²*Precursors and Chemicals Frequently Used in the Illicit Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances: Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1995 on the Implementation of Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.96.XI.4).

³*Ibid.*, paras. 47-51 and 61-63.

⁴*Ibid.*, paras. 57-58.

⁵See *Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1996* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.97.XI.3).

Annex I

TABLES

TABLE 1. PARTIES AND NON-PARTIES TO THE 1988 CONVENTION*

<i>Region</i>	<i>Party to the 1988 Convention</i>		<i>Non-party to the 1988 Convention</i>	
Africa	Algeria (09.05.1995)	Mali (31.10.1995)	Angola	Gabon
	Botswana (13.08.1996)	Mauritania (01.07.1993)	Benin	Liberia
	Burkina Faso (02.06.1992)	Morocco (28.10.1992)	Central African Republic	Mauritius
	Burundi (18.02.1993)	Niger (10.11.1992)	Comoros	Mozambique
	Cameroon (18.10.1991)	Nigeria (01.11.1989)	Congo	Namibia
	Cape Verde (08.05.1995)	Sao Tome and Principe (20.06.1996)	Djibouti	Rwanda
	Chad (09.06.1995)	Senegal (27.11.1989)	Equatorial Guinea	Somalia
	Côte d'Ivoire (25.11.1991)	Seychelles (27.02.1992)	Eritrea	South Africa
	Egypt (15.03.1991)	Sierra Leone (06.06.1994)		Zaire
	Ethiopia (11.10.1994)	Sudan (19.11.1993)		
	Gambia (23.04.1996)	Swaziland (08.10.1995)		
	Ghana (10.04.1990)	Togo (01.08.1990)		
	Guinea (27.12.1990)	Tunisia (20.09.1990)		
	Guinea-Bissau (27.10.1995)	Uganda (20.08.1990)		
	Kenya (19.10.1992)	United Republic of Tanzania (17.04.1996)		
	Lesotho (28.03.1995)	Zambia (28.05.1993)		
	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (22.07.1996)	Zimbabwe (30.07.1993)		
	Madagascar (12.03.1991)			
	Malawi (12.10.1995)			
<i>Regional total</i> 53	36		17	
<i>Region</i>	<i>Party to the 1988 Convention</i>		<i>Non-party to the 1988 Convention</i>	
America	Antigua and Barbuda (05.04.1993)	Brazil (17.07.1991)		
	Argentina (10.06.1993)	Canada (05.07.1990)		
	Bahamas (30.01.1989)	Chile (13.03.1990)		
	Barbados (15.10.1992)	Colombia (10.06.1994)		
	Belize (24.07.1996)	Costa Rica (08.02.1991)		
	Bolivia (20.08.1990)	Cuba (12.06.1996)		
		Dominica (30.06.1993)		

TABLE 1. PARTIES AND NON-PARTIES TO THE 1988 CONVENTION^a (continued)

<i>Region</i>	<i>Party to the 1988 Convention</i>		<i>Non-party to the 1988 Convention</i>	
America <i>(continued)</i>	Dominican Republic (21.09.1993)	Panama (13.01.1994)		
	Ecuador (23.03.1990)	Paraguay (23.08.1990)		
	El Salvador (21.05.1993)	Peru (16.01.1992)		
	Grenada (10.12.1990)	Saint Kitts and Nevis (19.04.1995)		
	Guatemala (28.02.1991)	Saint Lucia (21.08.1995)		
	Guyana (19.03.1993)	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (17.05.1994)		
	Haiti (18.09.1995)	Suriname (28.10.1992)		
	Honduras (11.12.1991)	Trinidad and Tobago (17.02.95)		
	Jamaica (29.12.1995)	United States of America) (20.02.1990)		
	Mexico (11.04.1990)	Uruguay (10.03.1995)		
	Nicaragua (04.05.1990)	Venezuela (16.07.1991)		
<i>Regional total</i> 35	35		0	
<i>Region</i>	<i>Party to the 1988 Convention</i>		<i>Non-party to the 1988 Convention</i>	
Asia	Afghanistan (14.02.1992)	Myanmar (11.06.1991)	Cambodia	Lao People's Democratic Republic
	Armenia (13.09.1993)	Nepal (24.07.1991)	Democratic People's Republic of Korea	Maldives
	Azerbaijan (22.09.1993)	Oman (15.03.1991)	Georgia	Mongolia
	Bahrain (07.02.1990)	Pakistan (25.10.1991)	Indonesia	Republic of Korea
	Bangladesh (11.10.1990)	Philippines (07.06.1996)	Iraq	Singapore
	Bhutan (27.08.1990)	Qatar (04.05.1990)	Israel	Thailand
	Brunei Darussalam (12.11.1993)	Saudi Arabia (09.01.1992)	Kazakstan	Viet Nam
	China (25.10.1989)	Sri Lanka (06.06.1991)	Kuwait	
	Cyprus (25.05.1990)	Syrian Arab Republic (03.09.1991)		
	India (27.03.1990)	Tajikistan (06.05.1996)		
	Iran (Islamic Republic of) (07.12.1992)	Turkey (02.04.1996)		
	Japan (12.06.1992)	Turkmenistan (21.02.1996)		
	Jordan (16.04.1990)	United Arab Emirates (12.04.1990)		
	Kyrgyzstan (07.10.1994)	Uzbekistan (24.08.1995)		
	Lebanon (11.03.1996)	Yemen (25.03.1996)		
	Malaysia (11.05.1993)			
<i>Regional total</i> 46	31		15	

TABLE 1. PARTIES AND NON-PARTIES TO THE 1988 CONVENTION^a (continued)

<i>Region</i>	<i>Party to the 1988 Convention</i>		<i>Non-party to the 1988 Convention</i>	
Europe	Belarus (15.10.1990)	Monaco (23.04.1991)	Albania	Iceland
	Belgium (25.10.1995)	Netherlands (08.09.1993)	Andorra	Liechtenstein
	Bosnia and Herzegovina (01.09.1993)	Norway (14.11.1994)	Austria	Lithuania
	Bulgaria (24.09.1992)	Poland (26.05.1994)	Estonia	San Marino
	Croatia (26.07.1993)	Portugal (03.12.1991)	Holy See	Switzerland
	Czech Republic (30.12.1993)	Republic of Moldova (15.02.1995)	Hungary	
	Denmark (19.12.1991)	Romania (21.01.1993)		
	European Union ^b (31.12.1990)	Russian Federation (17.12.1990)		
	Finland (15.02.1994)	Slovakia (28.05.1993)		
	France (31.12.1990)	Slovenia (06.07.1992)		
	Germany (30.11.1993)	Spain (13.08.1990)		
	Greece (28.01.1992)	Sweden (22.07.1991)		
	Ireland (03.09.1996)	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (13.10.1993)		
	Italy (31.12.1990)	Ukraine (28.08.1991)		
	Latvia (25.02.1994)	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (28.06.1991)		
	Luxembourg (29.04.1992)	Yugoslavia (03.01.1991)		
	Malta (28.02.1996)			
<i>Regional total</i> 44	33		11	
<i>Region</i>	<i>Party to the 1988 Convention</i>		<i>Non-party to the 1988 Convention</i>	
Oceania	Australia (10.11.1992)		Kiribati	Papua New Guinea
	Fiji (25.03.1993)		Marshall Islands	Samoa
	Tonga (29.04.1996)		Micronesia (Federated States of)	Solomon Islands
			Nauru	Tuvalu
			New Zealand	Vanuatu
			Palau	
<i>Regional total</i> 14	3		11	
<i>World total</i> 192	137		55	

^aThe date on which the instrument of ratification or accession was deposited is indicated in parentheses.

^bExtent of competence: article 12.

TABLE 2. SUBMISSION OF INFORMATION BY GOVERNMENTS PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 12 OF THE 1988 CONVENTION (FORM D) FOR THE YEARS 1991-1995

Notes: Territories are in italics.
 A blank signifies that Form D was not received.
 X signifies that a completed Form D (or equivalent report) was submitted, including nil returns.
 n.a. signifies not applicable.
 Parties to the 1988 Convention (and the years since they became parties) are shadowed.

<i>Country or territory</i>	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Afghanistan					
Albania					
Algeria				X	
Andorra		X	X	X	
Angola					
Anguilla			X		
Antigua and Barbuda	X	X	X		X
Argentina	X	X	X	X	
Armenia	X ^{a)}	X ^{a)}		X	X
Aruba	X	X			
Ascension Island	X	X	X	X	X
Australia	X	X	X	X	X
Austria	X			X	X
Azerbaijan		X		X	
Bahamas	X	X	X	X	
Bahrain	X		X	X	X
Bangladesh	X	X	X	X	
Barbados	X	X	X	X	X
Belarus	X ^{a)}	X ^{a)}		X ^{a)}	X
Belgium	X	X	X	X	X
Belize					
Benin			X	X	
Bermuda	X	X	X	X	X
Bhutan	X			X	
Bolivia	X	X	X	X	X
Bosnia and Herzegovina	n.a.				
Botswana		X	X		X
Brazil	X	X	X	X	X
British Virgin Islands		X			
Brunei Darussalam	X	X	X	X	X
Bulgaria		X	X	X	
Burkina Faso	X	X	X	X	X
Burundi					
Cambodia					
Cameroon	X	X		X	
Canada		X	X		
Cape Verde	X		X	X	X
Cayman Islands	X		X		X
Central African Republic			X	X	X
Chad	X	X		X	
Chile	X		X		X
China					
Christmas Island					
Cocos (Keeling) Islands					
Colombia	X	X	X	X	X
Comoros					
Congo	X	X	X	X	X
Cook Islands	X	X	X	X	X

TABLE 2. SUBMISSION OF INFORMATION BY GOVERNMENTS PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 12 OF THE 1988 CONVENTION (FORM D) FOR THE YEARS 1991-1995 (continued)

Country or territory	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Costa Rica	X	X	X	X	X
Côte d'Ivoire		X		X	X
Croatia	n.a.				
Cuba			X	X	X
Cyprus	X	X	X	X	X
Czech Republic	X ^{a)}	X ^{a)}	X		X
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	X				
Denmark	X	X	X	X	X
Djibouti					X
Dominica	X			X	X
Dominican Republic		X	X	X	
Ecuador		X	X	X	X
Egypt	X	X	X	X	X
El Salvador					
Equatorial Guinea	X	X	X	X	X
Eritrea	n.a.	n.a.		X	X
Estonia					
Ethiopia	X	X	X	X	X
Falkland Islands	X	X	X	X	X
Fiji	X	X	X	X	X
Finland	X			X	X
France	X	X	X	X	X
French Polynesia					
Gabon					
Gambia					
Georgia	X ^{a)}	X ^{a)}		X ^{a)}	X ^{a)}
Germany	X	X	X	X	X
Ghana	X	X	X	X	X
Gibraltar			X		X
Greece	X	X	X	X	X
Grenada	X	X	X	X	X
Guatemala		X			
Guinea	X		X		X
Guinea-Bissau					
Guyana	X	X	X	X	
Haiti		X	X		
Honduras		X		X	X
Hong Kong	X	X	X	X	X
Hungary	X	X			X
Iceland	X	X	X	X	
India	X	X	X	X	X
Indonesia					
Iran (Islamic Republic of)		X	X	X	X
Iraq	X		X	X	X
Ireland	X	X	X	X	X
Israel		X	X	X	X
Italy	X	X	X	X	X
Jamaica		X	X	X	X
Japan	X	X	X	X	X
Jordan	X		X		
Kazakhstan	X ^{a)}	X ^{a)}		X ^{a)}	X ^{a)}
Kenya				X	

TABLE 2. SUBMISSION OF INFORMATION BY GOVERNMENTS PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 12 OF THE 1988 CONVENTION (FORM D) FOR THE YEARS 1991-1995 (continued)

Country or territory	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Kiribati		X	X	X	
Kuwait	X	X			
Kyrgyzstan	X ^{a)}	X ^{a)}		X	X
Lao People's Democratic Republic	X	X	X	X	X
Latvia				X	X
Lebanon	X				X
Lesotho			X		
Liberia				X	
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya					X
Lithuania			X		X
Luxembourg	X	X	X	X	X
Macao	X	X	X	X	X
Madagascar	X		X	X	
Malawi					
Malaysia			X	X	
Maldives		X	X	X	X
Mali	X	X	X	X	X
Malta	X	X	X	X	X
Marshall Islands					
Mauritania					
Mauritius	X	X	X	X	X
Mexico	X	X	X	X	
Micronesia (Federated States of)		X			X
Mongolia		X	X	X	
Montserrat	X	X	X	X	X
Morocco	X	X	X	X	
Mozambique					
Myanmar	X	X	X	X	X
Namibia					
Nauru	X	X	X	X	X
Nepal	X	X	X		X
Netherlands	X	X	X	X	X
Netherlands Antilles	X	X	X	X	X
New Caledonia					
New Zealand					
Nicaragua		X	X	X	X
Niger			X	X	
Nigeria		X		X	X
Norfolk Islands					
Norway		X	X		X
Oman		X		X	
Pakistan	X	X	X	X	X
Palau	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.		
Panama			X		X
Papua New Guinea	X				
Paraguay		X	X	X	
Peru	X	X	X	X	X
Philippines	X	X	X	X	X
Poland			X	X	X
Portugal	X	X	X	X	X
Qatar	X	X	X	X	X
Republic of Korea	X	X	X	X	X

TABLE 2. SUBMISSION OF INFORMATION BY GOVERNMENTS PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 12 OF THE 1988 CONVENTION (FORM D) FOR THE YEARS 1991-1995 (continued)

Country or territory	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Republic of Moldova	X ^{a)}	X ^{a)}		X ^{a)}	
Romania	X	X	X	X	X
Russian Federation	X	X		X	X
Rwanda	X	X			
Saint Helena		X		X	X
Saint Kitts and Nevis	X	X	X	X	
Saint Lucia				X	
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines		X	X		X
Samoa	X	X	X	X	X
Sao Tome and Principe	X	X	X	X	X
Saudi Arabia	X	X	X	X	X
Senegal		X		X	
Seychelles		X	X	X	X
Sierra Leone		X	X	X	
Singapore	X	X	X	X	X
Slovakia	X ^{b)}	X ^{b)}	X	X	
Slovenia	n.a.	X	X	X	X
Solomon Islands				X	
Somalia					
South Africa	X			X	X
Spain	X	X	X	X	X
Sri Lanka	X	X	X	X	X
Sudan	X				
Suriname					
Swaziland	X	X	X	X	
Sweden	X	X	X	X	X
Switzerland					
Syrian Arab Republic	X			X	
Tajikistan	X ^{a)}	X ^{a)}		X ^{a)}	X ^{a)}
Thailand	X		X	X	
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	n.a.				
Togo	X	X	X	X	
Tonga	X				
Trinidad and Tobago	X	X	X	X	
Tristan da Cunha		X	X	X	X
Tunisia	X	X	X	X	
Turkey	X	X	X	X	X
Turkmenistan	X ^{a)}	X ^{a)}		X ^{a)}	X ^{a)}
Turks and Caicos Islands		X			
Tuvalu	X	X			
Uganda	X	X	X	X	
Ukraine	X ^{a)}	X ^{a)}	X	X	X
United Arab Emirates	X	X	X	X	X
United Kingdom	X	X	X	X	X
United Republic of Tanzania					
United States of America	X	X	X	X	X
Uruguay	X	X	X	X	
Uzbekistan	X ^{a)}	X ^{a)}		X ^{a)}	X
Vanuatu	X	X	X		
Venezuela		X			X
Viet Nam					
Wallis and Futuna Islands					X

TABLE 2. SUBMISSION OF INFORMATION BY GOVERNMENTS PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 12 OF THE 1988 CONVENTION (FORM D) FOR THE YEARS 1991-1995 (continued)

<i>Country or territory</i>	<i>1991</i>	<i>1992</i>	<i>1993</i>	<i>1994</i>	<i>1995</i>
Yemen					
Yugoslavia					
Zaire		X	X	X	X
Zambia		X			
Zimbabwe		X	X	X	X
Total Forms D ^e	105 ^d	121	122	129	118
Total Governments ^e	189	205	209	209	209

^aInformation was provided by the Russian Federation.

^bForm D from Czechoslovakia.

^cIn addition, the Commission of the European Communities has submitted Form D for the years 1991-1995.

^dIncluding Form D from the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

^eNumber of Governments requested to provide information.

TABLE 3. SEIZURES OF SUBSTANCES IN TABLES I AND II OF THE 1988 CONVENTION AS REPORTED TO THE BOARD

Tables 3a and 3b show information on seizures of the substances included in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention, furnished to the Board by Governments in accordance with article 12, paragraph 12.

The tables include data on domestic seizures and on seizures effected at the point of entry or exit. They do not include reported seizures of substances where it is known that they were not intended for the illicit manufacture of drugs (for example, seizures effected because of administrative shortcomings, or seizures of ephedrine/pseudoephedrine preparations to be used as stimulants). Stopped shipments are also not included.

Units of measure and conversion factors

Units of measure are indicated for every substance. Fractions of full units are not listed in the table; the figures are, however, rounded.

For several reasons, quantities of individual substances seized are reported to the Board using different units; one country may report seizures of acetic anhydride in litres, another in kilograms.

To enable a proper comparison of collected information, it is important that all data are collated in a standard format. To simplify the necessary standardization process, figures are given in grams or kilograms where the substance is a solid, and in litres where the substance (or its most common form) is a liquid.

Seizures of solids reported to the Board in litres have not been converted into kilograms, and are not included in the table, since the actual quantity of substance in solution is not known.

For seizures of liquids, quantities reported in kilograms have been converted into litres using the following factors:

<i>Substance</i>	<i>Conversion factor (kilograms to litres)*</i>
Acetic anhydride	0.926
Acetone	1.269
Ethyl ether	1.408
Hydrochloric acid (39.1% solution)	0.833
Isosafrole	0.892
3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone	0.833
Methyl ethyl ketone	1.242
1-phenyl-2-propanone	0.985
Safrole	0.912
Sulphuric acid (concentrated solution)	0.543
Toluene	1.155

*Derived from density, quoted in *The Merck Index* (Rahway, New Jersey, Merck and Co., Inc., 1989).

As an example, to convert 1,000 kilograms of methyl ethyl ketone into litres, multiply by 1.242, i.e. 1000 x 1.242 = 1,242 litres.

For the conversion of gallons to litres it has been assumed that in Colombia, the United States gallon is used, with 3.785 litres to the gallon, and in Myanmar the imperial gallon, with 4.546 litres to the gallon.

Ephedrine tablets have been assumed to contain 25 milligrams of ephedrine each.

In those cases where reported quantities have been converted, the converted figures are listed in the table in italics.

Notes: Territories are in italics.

- signifies nil (the report did not include data on seizures of the particular substance in the reporting year).
- ? signifies that a statistical report was not furnished.
- ° signifies less than the smallest unit of measurement shown for that substance (for example, less than 1 kilogram).
- n.a. signifies not applicable.

Discrepancies may occur with the regional total seizure figures and the world total figures because of rounding to whole numbers of the actual quantities seized.

TABLE 3a. SEIZURES OF SUBSTANCES IN TABLE I OF THE 1988 CONVENTION AS REPORTED TO THE BOARD

Country or territory, by region		N-acetylanthranilic acid ^a	Ephedrine	Ergometrine	Ergotamine	Isosafrole ^b	Lysergic acid	3,4-MDP-2-P ^{a, **}	1-phenyl-2-propranolone	Piperonal ^c	Pseudoephedrine	Safrole ^d
		kilo-grams	kilo-grams	grams	grams	litres	grams	litres	litres	grams	kilo-grams	litres
AFRICA												
South Africa	1995	30	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Uganda	1994	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	50	—
AMERICA												
Central America and the Caribbean												
Bahamas	1991	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	114	—	—	—
North America												
Canada	1992	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Mexico	1991	—	85	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	500	—
	1992	—	2 755	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	50	—
	1993	—	4 817	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1994	—	6 668	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
United States of America	1991	—	1 156	—	—	9	—	1	748	2 400	21	—
	1992	^b	2 091	—	—	°	—	—	231	—	°	6
	1993	—	4 026	—	—	°	—	—	178	4 270	26	5
	1994	6	8 997	—	—	°	—	—	796	1	478	21
	1995	—	15 618	—	—	°	—	29	81	25 000	20 528	477
Total subregion	1991	0	1 241	0	0	9	0	1	748	2 400	521	0
	1992	^b	4 848	0	0	°	0	0	231	0	50	6
	1993	0	8 843	0	0	°	0	0	178	4 270	26	5
	1994	6	15 664	0	0	°	0	0	796	1	478	21
	1995	0	15 618	0	0	°	0	29	81	25 000	20 528	477
South America												
Brazil	1995	—	—	—	—	45	—	—	—	—	—	—
ASIA												
East and South-East Asia												
Hong Kong	1992	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Japan	1994	—	202	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Republic of Korea	1991	—	235	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1992	—	267	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1993	—	358	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1994	—	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1995	—	164	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Thailand	1991	—	102	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1994	—	1 519	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total subregion	1991	0	337	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1992	0	269	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1993	0	358	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1994	0	1 821	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1995	0	164	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
West Asia												
Azerbaijan	1992	—	^c	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
	1994	—	°	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

TABLE 3a. SEIZURES OF SUBSTANCES IN TABLE I OF THE 1988 CONVENTION AS REPORTED TO THE BOARD (continued)

Country or territory, by region		N-acetylanthranilic acid*	Ephedrine	Ergometrine	Ergotamine	Isosafrole*	Lysergic acid	3,4-MDP-2-P**	1-phenyl-2-propanone	Piperonal*	Pseudoephedrine	Safrole*
		kilo-grams	kilo-grams	grams	grams	litres	grams	litres	litres	grams	kilo-grams	litres
EUROPE												
Bulgaria	1993	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	154	—	—	—
Czech Republic ^d	1991	—	°	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1993	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1995	—	17	—	—	—	—	846	—	—	—	—
Latvia	1994	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1995	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Lithuania	1995	—	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Norway	1995	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	45	—	—
Poland	1993	—	°	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1994	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 135	—	—	—
	1995	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	710	—	—	—
Slovenia	1995	—	2 750	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Ukraine	1994	—	°	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1995	—	10	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
European Union^e												
Austria ^f	1994	—	—	—	—	°	—	—	1	—	—	1
Belgium	1992	—	—	—	—	—	—	200	—	—	—	—
	1993	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1994	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1995	—	—	—	—	—	—	500	—	—	—	—
Denmark	1991	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—
Finland ^f	1995	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
France	1991	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	75
	1992	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	6	—	—	—
Germany	1991	—	1	—	—	°	—	—	30	—	—	°
	1992	—	1	—	—	°	—	—	7	3 680	—	°
	1993	—	°	—	—	°	—	—	2 425	250	—	2
	1994	—	°	—	—	°	—	—	602	2	—	12
	1995	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1
Ireland	1992	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	54	—	—	—
	1995	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	22 960	—	—
Italy	1993	—	—	—	—	—	—	16	—	36	—	—
	1995	—	20	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Netherlands	1991	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 600	—	—	—
	1992	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	492	—	—	—
	1993	—	—	—	—	5 450	3	°	30	—	—	60
	1994	—	5 500	—	—	—	—	—	1 035	—	—	—
	1995	—	—	—	—	3	—	121	—	—	100	2 400
Spain	1993	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—
Sweden ^f	1991	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	10	—	—	—
	1992	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1991	—	250	—	—	3	—	—	22	10 000	—	—
	1992	°	—	—	—	—	—	—	14	500	—	°
	1993	—	3	—	300	24	—	—	°	—	—	—
	1994	—	—	—	—	1	—	40	—	—	—	—
Total region	1991	0	251	0	0	3	0	0	1 663	10 000	0	75
1992	°	3	0	0	0	0	200	574	4 180	0	0	
1993	0	4	0	300	5 474	3	17	2 609	286	0	62	
1994	0	5 501	0	0	1	0	40	2 773	2	0	13	
1995	0	2 805	0	0	3	0	1 467	712	23 005	100	2 401	

TABLE 3a. SEIZURES OF SUBSTANCES IN TABLE I OF THE 1988 CONVENTION AS REPORTED TO THE BOARD (continued)

Country or territory, by region		N-acetylanthranilic acid ^a	Ephedrine	Ergometrine	Ergotamine	Isosafrole ^b	Lysergic acid	3,4-MDP-2-P ^c	1-phenyl-2-propanone	Piperonal	Pseudoephedrine	Safrole ^d
		kilo-grams	kilo-grams	grams	grams	litres	grams	litres	litres	grams	kilo-grams	litres
OCEANIA												
Australia	1992	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	300	—
	1993	—	^e	—	—	—	2	—	1	—	25	10
	1994	—	4	—	—	2	5	—	5	1 200	9	1
	1995	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	212	—	^e	2
WORLD TOTAL												
	1991	0	1 829	0	0	12	0	1	2 525	12 400	521	75
	1992	^e	5 122	0	0	^e	0	200	806	4 180	351	6
	1993	0	8 847	0	300	5 474	5	17	2 788	4 556	51	77
	1994	6	22 990	0	0	3	5	40	3 574	1 203	537	35
	1995	30	18 588	0	0	48	0	1 498	1 005	48 005	20 628	2 880

Notes: ^aIncluded in Table I in 1992.

^b3,4-MDP-2-P = 3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone.

Côte d'Ivoire (1992) and Mali (1991-1995) have reported seizures of preparations containing ephedrine believed not for use in illicit manufacture.

^cThe exact quantity of the seizures was not specified.

^dA solution containing an unknown amount of N-acetylanthranilic acid was seized.

^eA solution of 1.5 litres containing an unknown amount of ephedrine was seized.

^fData for 1991 to 1992 relate to seizures reported by the former Czechoslovakia.

^gData for Spain for 1991 were provided by that country. All other figures were provided through the European Commission.

^hMember State of the European Union as of 1 January 1995.

TABLE 3b. SEIZURES OF SUBSTANCES IN TABLE II OF THE 1988 CONVENTION AS REPORTED TO THE BOARD

Country or territory, by region		Acetic anhydride	Acetone	Anthrannilic acid	Ethyl ether	Hydrochloric acid*	Methyl ethyl ketone*	Phenylacetic acid	Piperidine	Potassium permanganate*	Sulphuric acid*	Toluene*
		litres	litres	kilo-grams	litres	litres	litres	kilo-grams	kilo-grams	kilo-grams	litres	litres
AFRICA												
South Africa	1995	—	50	25	—	5	—	—	—	—	—	225
Uganda	1994	—	—	—	—	55	—	—	—	—	2	—
Total subregion	1994	0	0	0	0	55	0	0	0	0	2	0
	1995	0	50	25	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	225
AMERICA												
North America												
Mexico	1992	4 350	4 350	—	—	1 900	—	—	—	—	—	—
United States of America	1991	1 653	3 769	389	5 173	—	26 088	1 346	2	—	—	1 224
	1992	1 415	2 453	0	3 320	2 313	17 784	993	16	40	1 081	792
	1993	772	1 489	885	1 038	2 401	6	692	69	3	273	951
	1994	195	817	2	793	1 160	40	204	28	6	91	313
	1995	351	5 886	1	2 058	3 031	—	847	172	0	242	441
Total subregion	1991	1 653	3 769	389	5 173	—	26 088	1 346	2	—	—	1 224
	1992	5 765	6 803	0	3 320	4 213	17 784	993	16	40	1 081	792
	1993	772	1 489	885	1 038	2 401	6	692	69	3	273	951
	1994	195	817	2	793	1 160	40	204	28	6	91	313
	1995	351	5 886	1	2 058	3 031	0	847	172	0	242	441
South America												
Argentina	1991	—	771	—	884	39	—	—	—	—	51	—
	1992	—	349	—	347	60	—	—	—	—	12	—
	1993	—	105	—	101	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1994	—	60	—	58	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Bolivia	1991	—	11 444	—	3 431	26 438	—	—	—	1 883	44 863	—
	1992	—	14 468	—	4 481	1 144	—	—	—	531	16 057	—
	1993	—	13 817	—	6 415	983	—	—	—	745	17 574	—
	1994	—	39 469	—	24 376	1 572	—	—	—	609	29 476	—
	1995	—	6 769	—	—	527	—	—	—	387	7 258	—
Brazil	1991	—	20 536	—	5 871	360	—	—	—	—	160	—
	1992	—	1 175	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1993	—	8 634	—	2 287	—	—	—	—	50	200	—
	1994	—	1 849	—	4 346	48	—	—	—	—	2	—
	1995	—	1 979	—	1 879	136	—	—	—	—	—	—
Chile	1995	—	25 200	—	—	208	—	—	—	—	—	—
Colombia	1991	—	853 108	—	1 047 302	284 351	264 899	—	—	—	—	—
	1992	—	785 235	—	514 643	127 790	191 646	—	—	43 505	483 296	—
	1993	—	512 961	—	226 766	112 981	215 194	—	—	29 049	419 975	—
	1994	4 701	880 910	—	170 931	397 452	1 537 758	—	—	26 916	538 908	212 842
	1995	45	694 475	—	280 336	37 313	—	—	—	37 940	239 957	204 840
Ecuador	1992	—	3 217	—	60	12	2 200	—	—	91	—	—
	1993	—	—	—	220	40	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1994	—	3 711	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2 655	—
	1995	—	4 644	—	891	2 260	1 300	—	—	—	1 527	—

TABLE 3b. SEIZURES OF SUBSTANCES IN TABLE II OF THE 1988 CONVENTION AS REPORTED TO THE BOARD (continued)

Country or territory, by region		Acetic anhydride	Acetone	Anthranilic acid	Ethyl ether	Hydrochloric acid*	Methyl ethyl ketone*	Phenylacetic acid	Piperidine	Potassium permanganate*	Sulphuric acid*	Toluene*
		litres	litres	kilo-grams	litres	litres	litres	kilo-grams	kilo-grams	kilo-grams	litres	litres
Paraguay	1992	—	—	—	—	525	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1993	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3 750	—
	1994	—	—	—	—	5 375	—	—	—	—	3 206	—
Peru	1991	—	4 646	—	43 366	189	27 171	—	—	991	19 095	—
	1992	—	13 579	—	—	1 911	—	—	—	2 751	53 005	—
	1993	—	25 697	—	—	363	—	—	—	1 811	18 128	—
	1994	—	1 711	—	—	16 053	—	—	—	240	41 379	—
	1995	—	681	—	7	23 021	—	—	—	224	26 509	—
Venezuela	1992	—	24	—	113	—	84 609	—	—	—	380	2 900
Total subregion	1991	0	890 505	0	1 100 854	311 377	292 070	0	0	2 874	64 189	0
	1992	0	818 047	0	519 644	131 442	278 455	0	0	46 878	552 750	2 900
	1993	0	561 214	0	235 789	114 367	215 194	0	0	31 655	459 627	0
	1994	4 701	927 710	0	199 711	420 500	1 537 758	0	0	27 765	615 626	212 842
	1995	45	733 748	0	283 113	63 465	1 300	0	0	38 561	275 251	204 840
ASIA												
East and South-East Asia												
Hong Kong	1992	15 167	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Japan	1995	—	—	—	—	—	—	9	—	—	—	—
Macao	1992	—	4 169	—	—	—	4 251	—	—	—	—	—
	1993	—	5 475	—	—	4 000	—	—	—	—	—	—
Myanmar	1991	1 191	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1992	5 164	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1993	4 546	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1994	5 413	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1995	5 271	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Thailand	1991	—	254	—	684	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1993	—	—	—	986	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1994	1 150	362	—	224	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total subregion	1991	1 191	254	0	684	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1992	20 331	4 169	0	0	0	4 251	0	0	0	0	0
	1993	4 546	5 475	0	986	4 000	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1994	6 563	362	0	224	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1995	5 271	0	0	0	0	0	9	0	0	0	0
South Asia												
India	1991	1 080	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1992	11 530	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1993	19 758	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1994	47 740	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1995	9 282	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
West Asia												
Armenia	1995	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Azerbaijan	1992	12	600	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1994	12	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Kyrgyzstan	1995	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Lebanon	1995	99	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Pakistan	1991	1 785	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1992	3 206	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1993	3 880	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1994	2 822	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1995	5 495	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

TABLE 3b. SEIZURES OF SUBSTANCES IN TABLE II OF THE 1988 CONVENTION AS REPORTED TO THE BOARD (continued)

Country or territory, by region		Acetic anhydride	Acetone	Anthranilic acid	Ethyl ether	Hydrochloric acid*	Methyl ethyl ketone*	Phenylacetic acid	Piperidine	Potassium permanganate*	Sulphuric acid*	Toluene*
		litres	litres	kilo-grams	litres	litres	litres	kilo-grams	kilo-grams	kilo-grams	litres	litres
Turkey	1991	25 344	216	—	218	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1992	—	10	—	65	16	—	—	—	—	10	—
	1993	179	13	—	153	29	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1994	20 087	130	—	243	163	—	—	—	—	164	—
	1995	49 344	184	—	70	338	—	—	—	—	176	—
United Arab Emirates	1995	38 050	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total subregion	1991	27 129	216	0	218	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1992	3 218	610	0	65	16	0	0	0	0	10	0
	1993	4 059	13	0	153	29	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1994	22 821	130	0	243	163	0	0	0	0	164	0
	1995	102 277	184	0	70	338	0	0	0	0	176	0
EUROPE												
Bulgaria	1992	180	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Czech Republic ^a	1993	—	21	—	—	22	40	—	—	—	—	—
	1995	—	—	—	—	149	—	—	—	—	—	—
Lithuania	1993	"	"	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Norway	1995	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Romania	1995	292	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Slovenia	1993	—	—	—	—	20	—	—	—	—	—	—
Ukraine	1995	—	1 510	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
European Union^f												
Austria ^a	1994	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Belgium	1994	—	32 486	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1995	—	400	—	145	325	3 000	—	—	—	38	"
Denmark	1991	—	—	—	20	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1992	13	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	11	—
Finland ^a	1994	—	1	—	—	—	600	—	—	—	—	—
	1995	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	—	—	—	—
France	1991	19	200	—	10	70	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1992	—	—	—	—	150	—	—	—	—	60	150
Germany	1991	2	28	—	25	55	—	—	—	—	11	1
	1992	1	77	—	117	—	—	—	2	—	18	45
	1993	1	9	—	16	14	—	—	5	—	8	1
	1994	121	29	100	4	10	—	—	3	—	3	1
	1995	55	3	—	13	9	—	—	—	—	11	1
Ireland	1995	—	—	—	280	30	—	—	—	—	25	—
Italy	1991	—	2	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1992	—	1	—	2	9	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1993	—	11	—	25	6	—	—	—	1	2	—
	1994	—	582	—	111	40	—	—	—	—	3	—
	1995	—	1 269	—	5 632	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Netherlands	1993	—	—	—	"	805	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1994	—	1 385	—	1 360	825	—	—	—	—	1 035	—
	1995	—	1 310	—	88	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Portugal	1993	—	—	—	—	—	40	—	—	—	—	—

TABLE 3b. SEIZURES OF SUBSTANCES IN TABLE II OF THE 1988 CONVENTION AS REPORTED TO THE BOARD (continued)

Country or territory, by region		Acetic anhydride	Acetone	Anthranilic acid	Ethyl ether	Hydrochloric acid ^a	Methyl ethyl ketone ^b	Phenylacetic acid	Piperidine	Potassium permanganate ^c	Sulphuric acid ^d	Toluene ^e
		litres	litres	kilo-grams	litres	litres	litres	kilo-grams	kilo-grams	kilo-grams	litres	litres
Spain	1991	—	103	—	157	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1992	9	20	—	32	10	—	—	—	3	11	—
	1993	—	17	—	57	6	—	—	—	—	16	—
	1995	—	288	—	173	13	200	—	—	—	—	10
Sweden ^f	1992	122	28	—	75	35	—	53	—	2	24	6
	1993	53	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1991	1	^a	—	^a	—	—	^a	—	—	—	—
	1992	30	—	—	5	28	16	67	—	—	57	—
	1993	406	74	—	26	45	—	1 000	—	—	62	13
Ireland	1994	5	3	—	30	30	—	2	—	—	33	1
	1995	40	23	20	27	65	—	1	—	—	35	20
Total region	1991	22	333	0	212	125	0	0	—	0	11	1
	1992	355	126	0	230	231	16	120	2	5	181	201
	1993	460	115	0	87	912	80	1 000	5	1	72	14
	1994	126	34 487	100	1 506	905	600	2	3	0	1 074	2
	1995	387	4 805	20	6 358	591	3 200	7	0	0	108	31
OCEANIA												
Australia	1992	60	70	—	—	115	—	20	—	—	419	—
	1993	66	92	—	11	119	—	—	—	—	80	27
	1994	815	25	—	1 459	96	—	316	—	—	811	4
	1995	146	275	—	63	164	—	72	3	—	283	59
WORLD TOTAL	1991	31 075	895 077	389	1 107 141	311 502	318 158	1 346	2	2 874	64 180	1 225
	1992	41 259	829 755	—	523 259	136 017	300 506	1 133	18	48 923	554 441	3 893
	1993	29 661	568 398	885	238 044	121 828	215 280	1 692	74	31 659	460 052	992
	1994	83 061	983 530	102	203 936	422 879	1 538 398	522	30	27 772	617 768	213 161
	1995	117 759	744 947	46	291 662	67 593	4 500	934	175	38 551	276 060	205 596

Notes: ^aIncluded in Table II in 1992.

^aThe exact quantity of the seizures was not specified.

^bIn addition, another seizure of 674 litres of acetone was reported by a different authority.

^cA seizure of 59 litres of hydrochloric acid was reported by a different authority.

^dA seizure of 76 litres of toluene was reported by a different authority.

^eData for 1991 to 1992 relate to seizures reported by the former Czechoslovakia.

^fData for Spain for 1991 were provided by that country. All other figures were provided through the European Commission.

^gMember State of the European Union as of 1 January 1995.

**TABLE 4. LIST OF COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES REPORTING TO THE BOARD
ON LICIT TRADE IN, USES OF, AND REQUIREMENTS FOR, SUBSTANCES
IN TABLES I AND II OF THE 1988 CONVENTION**

Governments of the 50 countries and territories listed have provided information on licit trade in, uses of, and requirements for, substances listed in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention on Form D for 1995. That information was requested in accordance with Economic and Social Council resolution 1995/20 of 24 July 1995. Details may be made available on a case-by-case basis, subject to confidentiality of data.

<i>Country or territory</i>	<i>Country or territory</i>
Armenia	Malta
<i>Ascension Island</i>	Micronesia (Federated States of)
Australia	<i>Netherlands Antilles</i>
Belarus	Nigeria
Bolivia	Panama
Botswana	Philippines
Brazil	Poland
Chile	Republic of Korea
Colombia	Romania
<i>Cook Islands</i>	Samoa
Costa Rica	Seychelles
Cyprus	Singapore
Czech Republic	Sri Lanka
Denmark	<i>Tristan da Cunha</i>
Ecuador	Turkey
Ethiopia	Ukraine
<i>Falkland Islands</i>	United Arab Emirates
Fiji	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Greece	United States of America
<i>Hong Kong</i>	Uzbekistan
Hungary	Venezuela
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	<i>Wallis and Futuna Islands</i>
Jamaica	Zaire
Japan	Zimbabwe
Latvia	
Lithuania	

Note: Territories are in italics.

TABLE 5. GOVERNMENTS THAT HAVE REQUESTED PRE-EXPORT NOTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 12, PARAGRAPH 10 (a), OF THE 1988 CONVENTION

All Governments of exporting countries and territories are reminded that it is an obligation to provide pre-export notifications to Governments that have requested them pursuant to article 12, paragraph 10 (a), of the 1988 Convention, which provides that:

“ . . . upon request to the Secretary-General by the interested Party, each Party from whose territory a substance in Table I is to be exported shall ensure that, prior to such export, the following information is supplied by its competent authorities to the competent authorities of the importing country:

- (i) Name and address of the exporter and importer and, when available, the consignee;
- (ii) Name of the substance in Table I;
- (iii) Quantity of the substance to be exported;
- (iv) Expected point of entry and expected date of dispatch;
- (v) Any other information which is mutually agreed upon by the Parties.”

Governments that have requested pre-export notifications under the above provisions are listed alphabetically, followed by the substance(s) to which the provisions should apply and the date of notification of the request transmitted by the Secretary-General to Governments.

Governments may wish to note the possibility of requesting, as was done by the Governments of Ecuador, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, that a pre-export notification for all substances listed in Table II of the 1988 Convention be also sent.

<i>Requesting Government</i>	<i>Substances to which pre-export notification requirement applies</i>	<i>Date of communication to Governments by the Secretary-General</i>
Costa Rica	All substances included in Table I	3 September 1996
Ecuador ^a	All substances included in Table I All substances included in Table II	1 August 1996
Latvia	Ephedrine	27 May 1994
Turkey ^a	All substances included in Table I All substances included in Table II	2 November 1995
United Arab Emirates ^a	All substances included in Table I All substances included in Table II	26 September 1995
United States of America	Ephedrine, Pseudoephedrine	2 June 1995

^aThe Secretary-General has informed all Governments that a pre-export notification for all substances listed in Table II of the 1988 Convention is also required for the requesting Government.

Annex II

**SUBSTANCES IN TABLES I AND II OF THE 1988 CONVENTION AND THEIR
TYPICAL USE IN THE ILLICIT MANUFACTURE OF NARCOTIC DRUGS
AND PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES**

A. List of scheduled substances

Table I

N-acetylthranilic acid
Ephedrine
Ergometrine
Ergotamine
Isosafrole
Lysergic acid
3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone
1-phenyl-2-propanone
Piperonal
Pseudoephedrine
Safrole

The salts of the substances in this Table
whenever the existence of such salts is
possible.

Table II

Acetic anhydride
Acetone
Anthranilic acid
Ethyl ether
Hydrochloric acid*
Methyl ethyl ketone
Phenylacetic acid
Piperidine
Potassium permanganate
Sulphuric acid*
Toluene


The salts of the substances in this Table
whenever the existence of such salts is
possible.

*The salts of hydrochloric acid and sulphuric acid are specifically excluded from Table II.

B. Use of scheduled substances in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances


The scheduled substances and their use in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances depicted in the Figure I and II below represent classic production and manufacturing methods. The extraction of cocaine from the coca leaf and the purification of coca paste and the crude base products of cocaine and heroin require solvents, acids and bases. A wide range of such chemicals has been used at all stages of drug production.

Figure I. Manufacture of cocaine and heroin



Note: The figures shown in parentheses are the approximate quantities of chemicals required for the illicit manufacture of 100 kilograms of cocaine or heroin hydrochloride.

Figure II. Manufacture of psychotropic substances



^a3,4-MDP-2-P=3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone. Figures given are the respective quantities of safrole, isosafrole and piperonal required for the manufacture of 100 litres of 3,4-MDP-2-P. Approximately 250 litres of 3,4-MDP-2-P are required to manufacture 100 kilograms of MDA hydrochloride; 125 litres of 3,4-MDP-2-P are required to manufacture 100 kilograms of MDMA or MDEA.

^bMDA=3,4-methylenedioxyamphetamine; MDMA=3,4-methylenedioxymethylamphetamine.

^cAnthranilic acid is converted to *N*-acetyl-anthranilic acid using acetic anhydride. 100 kilograms of anthranilic acid reacted with 100 litres of acetic anhydride will produce sufficient *N*-acetyl-anthranilic acid to manufacture 100 kilograms of methaqualone.

^dApproximately 3 kilograms of ergometrine, 5 kilograms of ergotamine, or 1.5 kilograms of lysergic acid, are required for the illicit manufacture of 1 kilogram of LSD. 2.5 kilograms of ergometrine or ergotamine are required to manufacture 1 kilogram of lysergic acid.

^e100 kilograms of piperidine are required to manufacture 100 kilograms of phencyclidine.

^fBetween 200 litres and 400 litres of P-2-P are required for the manufacture of 100 kilograms of amphetamine sulphate. 100 litres of P-2-P can be manufactured from 200 kilograms of phenylacetic acid.

^g150 kilograms of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine are required for the manufacture of 100 kilograms of methamphetamine.

^hThe manufacture of drug salts requires solvents such as acetone or ethyl ether and acids such as hydrochloric acid or sulphuric acid.

Note: Unless otherwise stated, the figures given are the approximate quantities of precursors required for the illicit manufacture of 100 kilograms of drug salt.

C. Comparative significance of seizures of precursors

The figures above outline the typical use of precursors in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. The numbers shown in parentheses in the figures are the approximate quantities of precursors required for illicit drug manufacture. These data may be used to calculate how much drug could be manufactured from a known quantity of seized precursor.

To assess the significance of such manufacture in terms of drug doses on the illicit market, the table below gives details of typical street doses of some narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, together with the approximate number of such doses that may be manufactured illicitly from one kilogram (or one litre) of the relevant precursor.

Street doses of drugs manufactured illicitly using precursors

Narcotic drug or psychotropic substance	Street dose ^a	Precursor	Approximate number of street doses of drugs manufactured using one kilogram (or litre) of precursor
Amphetamine	10 mg to 250 mg	Phenylacetic acid (kilograms)	1 000 to 25 000
		1-phenyl-2-propanone (litres)	2 000 to 50 000
Cocaine	100 mg to 200 mg	Potassium permanganate (kilograms)	25 000 to 50 000
		Acetone, ethyl ether, methyl ethyl ketone or toluene (litres)	250 to 500
Heroin	100 mg to 500 mg	Acetic anhydride (litres)	800 to 4 000
		Acetone, ethyl ether, methyl ethyl ketone or toluene (litres)	100 to 500
LSD	50 µg to 80 µg	Ergometrine/ergotamine (kilograms)	2 500 000 to 4 000 000
		Lysergic acid (kilograms)	8 500 000 to 13 000 000
Methamphetamine	10 mg to 250 mg	Ephedrine/pseudoephedrine (kilograms)	2 500 to 70 000
Methaqualone	250 mg	Anthranilic acid (kilograms)	4 000
		N-Acetylanthranilic acid (kilograms)	3 200
MDA and analogues	100 mg	Safrole (kilograms)	1 000 ^b
		Isosafrole (kilograms)	2 000 ^b
		Piperonal (kilograms)	2 000 ^b
		3,4-MDP-2-P (litres)	4 000 ^b
Phencyclidine	1mg to 10mg	Piperidine (kilograms)	100 000 to 1 000 000

^aDoses may vary depending, *inter alia*, on the route of administration (by mouth, injection, inhalation, etc.) and on the frequency of drug use.

^bFor illicit manufacture of MDA. The numbers of street doses of MDMA or MDEA that could be manufactured are approximately twice the figures given.

Using the data given in the figures, and in the above table, it can be seen that, for example, 1 kilogram of ephedrine may be used for the manufacture of approximately 0.7 kilogram of methamphetamine. This quantity of drug is equivalent to a maximum of about 70,000 street doses.

Similarly, 1 kilogram of lysergic acid may be used to manufacture approximately 0.7 kilogram of LSD. This quantity of drug, however, is equivalent to about 10 million dosage units.

Therefore, in terms of the availability of the two drugs on the illicit market, the seizure of 1 kilogram of lysergic acid may be considered to have an impact approximately 150 times greater than the seizure of the same quantity of ephedrine (10 million divided by 70,000).

Annex III

**TREATY PROVISIONS FOR THE CONTROL OF SUBSTANCES FREQUENTLY
USED IN THE ILLICIT MANUFACTURE OF NARCOTIC DRUGS AND
PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES**

1. Article 2, paragraph 8, of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961^a provides as follows:

"The Parties shall use their best endeavours to apply to substances which do not fall under this Convention, but which may be used in the illicit manufacture of drugs, such measures of supervision as may be practicable."

2. Article 2, paragraph 9, of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971,^b provides as follows:

"The Parties shall use their best endeavours to apply to substances which do not fall under this Convention, but which may be used in the illicit manufacture of psychotropic substances, such measures of supervision as may be practicable."

3. Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 contains provisions for the following:

(a) General obligation for parties to take measures to prevent diversion of the substances listed in Table I and Table II and to cooperate with each other to that end (paragraph 1);

(b) Mechanism for amending the scope of control (paragraphs 2-7);

(c) Requirement to take appropriate measures to monitor manufacture and distribution, to which end parties may: control persons and enterprises; control establishments and premises under licence; require permits for such operations; and prevent accumulation of substances listed in Tables I and II (paragraph 8);

(d) Obligation to monitor international trade to identify suspicious transactions; to provide for seizures; to notify the authorities of the parties concerned in case of suspicious transactions; to require proper labelling and documentation; and to ensure maintenance of such documents for at least two years (paragraph 9);

(e) Mechanism for advance notice of exports of substances listed in Table I, upon special request (paragraph 10);

(f) Confidentiality of information (paragraph 11);

(g) Reporting by parties to the Board (paragraph 12);

(h) Report of the Board to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (paragraph 13);

(i) Non-applicability of the provisions of article 12 to certain preparations (paragraph 14).

Notes

^aUnited Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 520, No. 7515.

^b*Ibid.*, vol. 1019, No. 14956.

Annex IV

**RESOLUTIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS AND THE
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL RELEVANT TO IMPLEMENTATION
BY GOVERNMENTS OF ARTICLE 12 OF THE 1988 CONVENTION**

1. The Commission on Narcotic Drugs, in its resolution 5 (XXXIV) of 9 May 1991:

"Urges source, transit and receiving States to act together but also independently, particularly with regard to specific activities originating in their territories, by establishing measures whereby the legitimacy of chemical shipments may be determined and those found to be suspicious may be investigated, communicating with each other concerning such shipments and taking the action necessary to prohibit such shipments where there is sufficient evidence that they may be diverted into the illicit traffic" (paragraph 5);

"Urges all States involved in the international commerce of chemicals commonly used in the illicit production of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, particularly those listed in Tables I and II of the Convention, to support the development of secure and effective means of communication whereby States may promptly transmit and receive relevant information on the legitimacy of specific transactions" (paragraph 6).

2. The Economic and Social Council, in its resolution 1992/29 of 30 July 1992:

"Underlines the importance of applying suitable regulatory measures, in accordance with the provisions of article 18 of the 1988 Convention, to every stage of the receipt, storage, handling, processing and delivery of precursor and essential chemicals in free ports and free-trade zones and in other sensitive areas such as bonded warehouses" (paragraph 2);

"Invites all chemical-manufacturing States to monitor routinely the export trade in precursor and essential chemicals in a way that will enable them to identify changes in export patterns that suggest the diversion of such chemicals into illicit channels" (paragraph 4);

"Invites States in which precursor and essential chemicals are manufactured and States in regions in which narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances are illicitly manufactured to establish close cooperation in order to prevent the diversion of precursor and essential chemicals into illicit channels and, if necessary, on a regional basis, to consider the establishment of bilateral agreements or arrangements where appropriate" (paragraph 5);

"Urges States that export chemicals essential to the illicit production of heroin and cocaine, namely acetic anhydride, acetone, ethyl ether, hydrochloric acid, MEK, potassium permanganate, sulphuric acid and toluene, to establish suitable mechanisms to detect and prevent their diversion and illicit trafficking and, where there is a risk of diversion of or illicit trafficking in those substances, to ensure that:

"(a) Exporters of those essential chemicals are identified;

"(b) Exporters of those essential chemicals are required to keep detailed records of all export transactions, including details of ultimate consignees, and to make these available for inspection by the competent authorities;

"(c) An export authorization is required in respect of any consignments of commercial quantities of those essential chemicals to any State that has been identified as being concerned by the illicit manufacture of heroin or cocaine on its territory or as sensitive as regards the possible diversion of essential chemicals, taking into account the relevant reports of the International Narcotics Control Board, the Customs Cooperation Council and the International Criminal Police Organization;

"(d) Applicants for export authorizations are required to provide full details of ultimate consignees and transport arrangements;

"(e) The competent authorities, in considering applications for export authorizations, take reasonable steps to verify the legitimacy of transactions, in consultation, where appropriate, with their counterparts in importing countries" (paragraph 6);

"*Recommends* that, if permitted by the basic principles of their legal systems, States should strengthen law enforcement cooperation by applying the technique of controlled delivery at the international level in appropriate circumstances to suspect consignments of precursor and essential chemicals" (paragraph 7);

"*Invites* Governments to establish close cooperation with the chemical industry with a view to identifying suspicious transactions of precursor and essential chemicals and, where appropriate, to encourage the industry to establish codes of conduct to complement and enhance compliance with regulatory requirements" (paragraph 16).

3. The Council, in its resolution 1993/40 of 27 July 1993:

"*Calls upon* all Governments, which were invited by the Economic and Social Council, in its resolution 1992/29, to establish effective measures to implement article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, to take fully into consideration the recommendations contained in the final report of the Chemical Action Task Force" (paragraph 1);

"*Urges* Governments to consider fully and, where appropriate, to apply the guidelines disseminated by the Programme, which have been prepared for use by national authorities in preventing the diversion of precursor and essential chemicals" (paragraph 9).

4. The Council, in its resolution 1995/20 of 24 July 1995:

"1. *Urges* that Governments, where appropriate, invoke article 12, paragraph 10(a), of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, in order to give importing countries advance notice of any shipment of substances listed in Table I of the Convention;

"2. *Requests* the Government of an exporting country, subject to its legal provisions, to provide the following information to the competent authorities of the importing country prior to any export, even when the importing countries have not yet formally requested such notification under article 12, paragraph 10(a), of the 1988 Convention:

"(a) Name and address of the exporter and importer and, when available, of the consignee;

"(b) Name of the substance listed in Table I of the 1988 Convention;

31. Governments that receive notifications on stopped or suspended shipments should investigate all cases brought to their attention, and reply to the authorities of the exporting country, informing them whether the suspicion was indeed justified, or whether the investigations have cleared the company. Where suspicions are confirmed, the importing country should also take appropriate steps against the company in question, in accordance with current national legislation.

32. All Governments should alert their counterparts of suspicious attempts to obtain substances used in the illicit manufacture of drugs, wherever necessary through the Board, so that traffickers who have failed to obtain chemicals in one country do not succeed in another.

33. All Governments with a mechanism in place to alert neighbouring countries as soon as diversion attempts are identified should extend that mechanism, as appropriate through the Board, to other Governments, since, once identified, traffickers are likely to turn to other countries or regions to obtain the substances used in the illicit manufacture of drugs.

6. Informing exporting countries of issued import authorizations

34. Governments of importing countries that have an authorization system in place should provide the names of companies authorized to import substances used in the illicit manufacture of drugs to the competent authorities of the exporting countries.

35. In cases where individual import certificates are required, Governments of importing countries should provide copies of the import certificates to the competent authorities of the exporting countries. That should be done as early as possible, preferably when the order is placed with the exporting company.

7. Role of the Board

36. The Board stands ready to assist, where necessary and to the extent practicable, in accessing additional information that may be available in databases maintained by Governments or other international and regional organizations. In so doing, the Board will fully exploit its expected role as a gateway for the exchange of information, within the international network of databases and between individual Governments, through direct electronic communication links where these have been established.

8. Confidentiality

37. Commercial secrecy should be protected, but should not be allowed to benefit traffickers by becoming an obstacle to preventing diversions.

The International Narcotics Control Board consists of 13 members who serve in their personal capacities and not as government representatives. Its main responsibilities under the international drug control treaties are to endeavour, in cooperation with Governments: (a) to limit the cultivation, production, manufacture and utilization of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances to the amounts necessary for medical and scientific purposes; (b) to ensure that the quantities of those substances necessary for legitimate purposes are available; and (c) to prevent the illicit cultivation, production, manufacture of, trafficking in and use of those substances. Moreover, with the entry into force of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, the Board has specific responsibilities related to the control of substances frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

In the discharge of its responsibilities, the Board:

(a) Administers an estimates system for narcotic drugs and a voluntary assessment system for psychotropic substances, and monitors international trade in drugs through the statistical returns system, with a view to assisting Governments in achieving, *inter alia*, a balance between supply and demand;

(b) Monitors and promotes measures taken by Governments to prevent diversion of substances frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, and assesses such substances for possible change in the scope of control of Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention;

(c) Analyses information provided by Governments, United Nations bodies, specialized agencies or other competent international organizations, with a view to ensuring that the provisions of the international drug control treaties are adequately carried out by Governments, and recommends necessary remedial measures;

(d) Maintains a permanent dialogue with Governments to assist them in complying with their obligations under the international drug control treaties, and recommends, where appropriate, technical or financial assistance be provided to that end.

INCB meets at least twice a year. Each year, it issues a report on its work, supplemented by technical reports on narcotic drugs, on psychotropic substances, and on precursors and chemicals frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

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