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Restrictive Business Practices

COMPETITION POLICY AND RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES

Issue No. 20

This information note by the UNCTAD secretariat aims to respond briefly to those basic questions which might be posed by government officials, business circles, academics and consumer organizations regarding competition policy, control of restrictive business practices at national and international levels, and UNCTAD's technical assistance programmes in this area.

I. INTRODUCTION

MARKET-ORIENTED REFORMS AND THE NEED FOR COMPETITION

1. Market-oriented reforms have been a matter of concern not only to developed market economies, where the phenomena of deregulation and privatization are commonplace, but also to most developing countries and countries in transition. Most of these countries have undertaken structural adjustment programmes involving far-reaching economic reforms, including price liberalization, which involves gradual (or rapid) scrapping of price-regulations and price-subsidies; demonopolization and privatization of large State-owned enterprises or parastatals; and liberalization of foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade. The latter includes drastic reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers which previously affected import competition of goods and services.

2. Domestic reforms, such as those listed above, have been strongly enhanced by trade-liberalization agreements at the multilateral level such as the Uruguay Round. As a result, border measures such as tariffs and quotas or non-tariff barriers are being gradually reduced or eliminated, and the traditional distinction between domestic and international markets is becoming

increasingly blurred. Governments, which in the past could shelter domestic producers from foreign competition (usually accused of engaging in "unfair" trade), have less and less scope for using such trade laws to deal with these effects.


Competition, efficient markets and competitiveness

3. As a result of widespread market-oriented economic reforms mentioned above, a convergence of views is emerging about the positive effects of competition on the efficiency of firms. Competition acts as a powerful incentive for enterprises to respond more rapidly to market signals; to improve the quality of goods and services they provide; to respond better to consumer needs through innovation and R & D, and by supplying quantities commensurate to demand. All this to the benefit of individual consumers, but also of intermediate users such as other providers of goods or services, and hence improves the competitiveness of the economy as a whole.

Competition in place of price regulations

4. Before introducing competition law, many countries used price controls and complex systems of price regulations. Administratively, regulated prices are usually unable to satisfy consumer needs and economic growth at the same time. One of the two objectives has to be sacrificed in favour of the other. For example, if prices are set by administrative regulation, there is little chance that they will correspond exactly to the point of equilibrium where supply and demand curves meet, as can be seen on the chart below.

Chart 1: PRICE EQUILIBRIUM UNDER 'PURE' COMPETITION



5. The upward slope of the demand curve corresponds to the ability and will of firms to supply more quantities when prices are higher. The contrary is true for demand, which will shrink as prices soar. Therefore there is a single point of equilibrium E where both supply and demand meet: this is the price which equates the quantity of goods supplied to that demanded by consumers. When administrative prices are set, the chances are that the Government will fix a price which is either lower or higher than E.

6. If the authorities want to favour specific groups of consumers, they will fix too low prices, which will result in shortages of supply and scarcity, giving rise to long queues in front of shops. Also, as a result of the low price, goods supplied will usually be of poor quality. On the other hand, if the Government wants to set higher than equilibrium (or competitive) prices, for example to protect specific producers (e.g. farmers in the EU), then supply will exceed demand, and the country will be faced with unsold surpluses (e.g. the "mountains" of butter of the European Community). Hence an effective allocation of resources throughout the economy will be achieved by liberalizing prices and letting the market itself set the competitive price.

Optimal allocation of resources, accelerated growth and development

7. As competitive prices are allowed to establish themselves in the economy overall, that economy will achieve optimal allocation of resources, satisfying consumer demand and resulting in the elimination of inefficient structures of production. The elimination of inefficiencies, improvement of quality and incentive for firms to innovate will eventually improve the efficiency of the overall economy, promote growth and, in the final analysis, accelerate development.

Competition and competitiveness in international trade

8. Competitiveness is a concept that should not be confused with competition policy. It is often argued by firms that wish to merge and create large conglomerates at home that, by so restraining competition at home, they will increase their competitiveness in overseas markets. While economies of scale and attainment of "critical mass" or size is an important consideration in achieving worldwide competitiveness, large organizations often also suffer from diseconomies of scale, as well as heavy and bureaucratic structures, and they are unable to adapt rapidly to changing demand and needs of foreign markets. Small and medium-sized firms have often demonstrated much faster adaptability to changing markets and have become highly competitive. Therefore special caution should be given to avoiding State subsidies and distortions to resource allocation in favour of "national champions" which are sometimes inefficient, failing firms. It is often a mistake to believe that shielding firms from competition at home will allow them to win battles abroad. Without the incentives of competition both on the domestic market and abroad, these firms may not achieve the necessary competitiveness. Gradual elimination of State distortions to trade in both domestic and international markets might also be replaced by private restraints to trade and competition, hence the need for competition policy at both national and international (multilateral) levels to ensure that competition is not stifled by restrictive business practices.

II. THE MAIN RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES AND THEIR ADVERSE EFFECTS ON COMPETITION

9. On any given market, enterprises have a natural tendency to compete with each other. The winner makes good profit. The loser makes losses and may be forced out of the market through bankruptcy. New firms may start up and enter the market, and the process continues. Free markets depend on consumer sanctions for firms to enter and - eventually - exit the market place. In the absence of free entry and free exit, competition may easily be stifled.

10. Under the incentive of competition, firms will be obliged to perform the best they can, in order to satisfy consumer needs. They will constantly try to guess those needs of the consumer through R & D and innovation. However, the preferred situation for any supplier on any market is to have a monopoly.

Monopolies and dominant firms

11. A monopoly can exist for a number of reasons. There are "natural" monopolies for reasons of economies of scale, for example when the size of the market does not allow the existence of more than one electric power plant, or when it does not make sense to have two parallel telephone lines or water distribution systems.


12. Monopolies are often attributed by State regulation. In other cases, for safety or many other reasons, the State may regulate the number of firms authorized to operate on a given market. Airlines may be tightly controlled for safety or banks may be chartered for prudential reasons, to ensure that those authorized will not fail. By so doing, however, the State reduces or eliminates competition, and at times it has done so in sectors such as hairdressers and tobacconists, where there was no evident justification on grounds of safety or otherwise.

13. Firms may also be tempted to reduce or eliminate competition without State interference because a monopolist can maximize profit. Actions by firms aimed at reducing or eliminating competition are called restrictive business practices (RBPs). 1/ If they eliminate all competition, they become a monopolist. If they reduce competition substantially, to a degree where existing competitors will not try to challenge their price decisions, they create for themselves a so-called "dominant position of market power" (DPMP). Like monopolists, dominant firms are able to set high prices without being affected by competitors, even though there are other firms in the market. To be able to do this, a dominant firm will usually be consistently larger or have "deeper pockets" than its competitors, the latter accepting to adapt their prices to those set by the dominant firm - i.e. to "follow the leader". 2/ An enterprise can gain a monopoly position by legal means: through innovation and/or diversification of its products, both of which are protected by intellectual property rules. But it can also do it by using restrictive business practices.

14. Two main types of RBPs exist. They are often referred to as horizontal or vertical practices.


15. The terminology of "horizontal" or "vertical" RBP refers to the production-distribution chain, which is usually described by a chart representing the vertical flow of goods, from suppliers of raw materials to the manufacturer, his distributors and finally, the consumer, as described below.

**Chart 2:
PRODUCTION-DISTRIBUTION CHAIN**



In the case of two (or more) firms competing to supply identical or similar goods, there are two (or more) similar vertical production- distribution chains, as follows:

**Chart 3:
PRODUCTION-DISTRIBUTION CHAIN OF TWO COMPETITORS:
FIRM A AND FIRM B**



In case of a cartel, there is a horizontal agreement between manufacturers A and B. But cartels can be at the level of suppliers, distributors (horizontal), or even among different members of the chain, in which case the agreement is both horizontal and vertical. In the case of a single firm (monopolist or a dominant firm), it will be able to use its market power to impose a series of restraints on his distributors (downstream) or its suppliers (upstream). This is why the RBPs used by the firm over its suppliers or distributors are called "vertical RBPs".

A. Horizontal RBPs or cartel agreements

16. In the first case, there are many firms supplying a given market (e.g. automobile firms selling similar types of vehicles). Instead of competing, auto manufacturers might decide to fix the prices which assure them the highest profits, in the same way as if they were in a monopoly. Such an agreement is called a cartel. The only difference from a monopoly is that members of the cartel will have to agree to share the market among themselves, so that each new "monopolist" has his guaranteed market share. They will also try to eliminate outsiders to the agreement, as new entrants to the market might be tempted to cut prices and thus ruin the advantages provided to its members by the cartel. To avoid this inconvenience, cartels usually establish so-called "combat funds" which enable them to force outsiders either to join the cartel, or to be eliminated by systematically underbidding their offers to customers. For example, firms were found to have preferred to "offer" their goods or services for a symbolic sum of one dollar, in order to ensure that their competitors were kept outside of their "preserved market".

17. There are four main types of cartels:

(a) Domestic cartels. An example of such a cartel would be one regulating the production, distribution and after-sales network of bicycles. If such a cartel covers a large enough share of the market (say 90 per cent of manufacturers and distributors), then it becomes very difficult for outsider manufacturers of bicycles to sell into that market (since no dealer member of the cartel will agree to sell their product unless they also join the cartel). Strong domestic cartels can therefore seriously hamper imports. In fact, they are often supplemented by an import cartel as well;

(b) Import cartels. These cartels often act as centralized buying organizations for the supply of raw material inputs to an industry, for example chemicals. They can be established to countervail the market power of export cartels in other countries;

(c) Export cartels. In almost all countries having RBP legislation, the law either specifically exempts such cartels provided they are notified, or it simply does not cover such cartels as a result of the "effects principle", i.e. where the effects are not felt in the domestic market the law does not cover such arrangements;

(d) International cartels. When enterprises in different countries join to fix prices, allocate markets (share markets), or take turns in projects being awarded to them, one speaks of an international cartel.

Characteristics of cartels

Restrictive practice	Type of action
Price fixing	Uniform sales conditions
	Collusive tendering (bid-rigging)
Market allocation	Geographical allocation
	Customer allocation
	Taking turns in projects
Elimination of outsiders	"Combat funds" and predatory pricing to under-bid non members

18. In all these forms of cartels, there is the possibility of collusive tendering, i.e. where the members of the cartel take part in tenders and submit what is called "cover bids" in order to ensure that the cartel member whose turn it is to be awarded the contract effectively submits the most attractive bid and is thus selected. Of course, even the winner will have offered an exaggerated cartel price for the project in question.

B. Vertical restrictive business practices

19. A monopoly or a dominant firm can make use of RBPs to take unfair advantage of its strong market power over its suppliers or distributors. There are numerous vertical RBPs, among which:

(a) Resale price maintenance, whereby the manufacturer fixes the price at which he obliges the distributor to sell; the latter is impeded from fixing his own margin. If he discounts the goods in question, the manufacturer will refuse to continue to supply him;

(b) Refusal to deal, in which case the distributor will be in trouble, since he has lost his source of supply and will have difficulty to find a replacement, as the supplier is a dominant firm. (In the case of a monopolist, the distributor has no chance of finding a replacement.) By threatening to stop supplying his distributors, a monopolist or a dominant manufacturer can force them to accept a whole range of vertical RBPs, including resale price maintenance and the practices listed below;

(c) Exclusive dealing, which involves an undertaking by the manufacturer that he will give exclusive supply to the dealer in a given market (for example, a city, a region, or a country), thus guaranteeing him a monopoly in that market. It is important to note that exclusive dealing is a customary business arrangement which is usually pro-competitive. It allows the manufacturer to ensure that his distributor will maintain necessary quality and after-sales service. However, in the case of exclusivity granted by a monopolist or a dominant firm, anti-competitive effects can occur. In

particular, to maintain the monopoly position of his exclusive dealer (or agent) in a given market, the manufacturer may attempt to block parallel imports (e.g. imports by independent dealers who import the same goods from cheaper sources abroad);

(d) Reciprocal exclusivity, which implies that the distributor undertakes to sell exclusively the goods of his exclusive supplier and no-one else's;

(e) Differential pricing, which involves the maintenance of different prices in different markets in order to extract the maximum prices which different types of consumers can afford. This practice can occur when a manufacturer wants to fix different prices in different countries, and tries therefore to block parallel imports;

(f) Tied selling, whereby the manufacturer forces the resaler or wholesaler to hold more goods than he wishes or needs. In other cases, the purchaser is forced to take more products than he wants (e.g. if he needs a computer, he is forced to buy the software as well; if he wants spare parts, he has to buy large quantities of them). The distributor may be forced to hold the whole range of the manufacturer's products: this RBP is called full-line forcing. A dominant firm may abuse its power to force the sale of other, non-needed goods with those for which it has a monopoly or a dominant position.

(g) Predatory pricing, where the supplier sells at a very low price (often below cost) in order to drive his competitors out of business, or he supplies intermediate inputs to competitors at excessive prices, with the same goal in mind. (It should be noted that this will be possible only if the supplier is a dominant firm, since otherwise, the competitor will have no difficulty to find a replacement at a market price.);

(h) Transfer pricing, which involves over-invoicing or under-invoicing intermediate inputs between a parent and a subsidiary enterprise. In the case of over-invoicing, the subsidiary (in another country) can declare less profits and thus evade taxes or circumvent profit-remittance restrictions. Strictly speaking, this is not an RBP. However, under-invoicing can be used as a method of predatory (lower) pricing in order to drive competitors out of business with the aim of creating a monopoly.

C. Mergers and acquisitions

20. Concentration of market power through mergers, takeovers or joint ventures constitutes yet another type of restrictive business practice when they are used to create a monopoly or a dominant position of market power in a given market. A merger or takeover of two competing firms may create similar results to those of a cartel agreement.

III. ACTION AT NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVELS:
THE SET OF PRINCIPLES AND RULES

A. Action at national level

21. While all Governments are aware that certain business practices have adverse effects on their country's interests, officials are not always sensitized to the existence of specific RBPs, and the official bodies tackling issues where RBPs could be discovered are often dispersed in different Ministries and administrations (e.g. the Central Bank, the Customs Administration, the Ministries of Foreign Trade or of Industry, etc.), each one dealing with diverse issues such as direct foreign investment, transfer of technology, programming and planning of domestic industry, government procurement, import licensing and export promotion. In such circumstances, effective action in detecting and tackling specific cases of RBPs may not be taken because of the absence of a conscious competition policy and procedures aimed at controlling and eliminating RBPs. The elaboration of precise criteria for the detection of RBPs in the sectors where they occur is therefore essential if effective action to tackle RBPs is to be taken.

22. The only way to control effectively RBPs that have adverse effects is to enforce national competition legislation strictly. To date, all developed countries as well as economies in transition have adopted, or are in the process of adopting, competition legislation. 3/ With increased liberalization and globalization of international markets, however, national competition laws are sometimes unable to control effectively anti-competitive practices which affect the domestic market, but originate from abroad. In other cases, fact-finding might have to be undertaken abroad, encroaching over the sovereignty of other nations. Differences in degrees of application of national competition laws may result in trade disputes among trading partners. For many such reasons, international consensus on the main principles of competition, leading to increased "common ground" on rules and cooperation in the control of restrictive business practices, is a necessity.

B. Action at international level: the Set of Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices

23. Proposals to control RBPs by private enterprises were already included in Chapter V of The Havana Charter in 1946, and in GATT negotiations in the 1960s. All those attempts were inconclusive. In 1980, however, after almost 10 years of negotiations between developed, developing and centrally-planned economies, agreement was reached in UNCTAD on a voluntary code of conduct on competition: the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices. 4/

The Set of Principles and Rules for the Control of RBPs

Objectives

24. The Set's first objective is to ensure that RBPs do not impede or negate the realization of benefits that should arise from the liberalization of tariff and non-tariff barriers affecting world trade, particularly those affecting the trade and development of developing countries. It also seeks to

attain greater efficiency in international trade and development through, inter alia, promoting competition, control of concentration of economic power and encouragement of innovation. Moreover, it aims at protecting and promoting social welfare in general and, in particular, the interests of consumers.

Voluntary nature of the Set

25. The Set, as adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 35/63 of 5 December 1980, is in the form of a recommendation. In other words, its application and implementation depends upon the willingness of States which have accepted the Set to meet their commitment to it. Moreover, it is stipulated in the Set that, in the performance of its functions, neither the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices, established in UNCTAD to provide the institutional machinery for the Set, nor its subsidiary organs "shall act like a tribunal or otherwise pass judgement on the activities or conduct of individual Governments or of individual enterprises in connection with a specific business transaction". It is also stipulated in section B (ii) of the Set, "Scope of application", that the Set "shall not apply to intergovernmental agreements, nor to RBPs directly caused by such agreements".

The scope of the Set

26. The Set applies to all enterprises, including transnational corporations, whether private or State-owned, and it is universally applicable to all countries and to all transactions in goods and services. It also applies to regional groupings of States (such as the European Union and the European Economic Area), to the extent that they have competence in the area of competition law and policy.

Preferential or differential treatment for developing countries

27. Under section C of the Set, which lists multilaterally agreed principles for the control of RBPs, the specific needs of developing countries, and in particular the least developed, are taken into account, as it was agreed that "in order to ensure the equitable application of the Set of Principles and Rules, States, particularly developed countries, should take into account in their control of restrictive business practices the development, financial and trade needs of developing countries, in particular of the least developed countries, for the purposes especially of developing countries in:

"(a) Promoting the establishment or development of domestic industries and the economic development of other sectors in the economy, and

"(b) Encouraging their economic development through regional or global arrangements among developing countries."

The Set and enterprise behaviour, including transnational or multinational corporations: prohibited horizontal and vertical practices

28. Section D of the Set states that "enterprises should conform to the restrictive business practices laws and the provisions concerning restrictive

business practices in the laws of the countries in which they operate and, in the event of proceedings under these laws, should be subject to the competence of the courts and relevant administrative bodies therein". Paragraphs 3 and 4 of section D deal with the main types of RBPs that enterprises should refrain from. Concerning intra-firm transactions between different entities of a transnational corporation, while paragraph 3 excludes enterprises "when dealing with each other in the context of an economic entity wherein they are under common control, including through ownership, or otherwise not able to act independently of each other", paragraph 4 covers all enterprises which "limit access to markets or otherwise unduly restrain competition ... through an abuse or acquisition and abuse of a dominant position of market power". This same paragraph goes on to list practices in this respect, which include predatory behaviour towards competitors and "discriminatory (i.e. unjustifiably differentiated) pricing or terms or conditions in the supply or purchase of goods or services, including by means of the use of pricing policies in transactions between affiliated enterprises which overcharge or undercharge for goods or services purchased or supplied as compared with prices for similar or comparable transactions outside the affiliated enterprises".

Action by States at national, regional and subregional levels: competition legislation and cooperation between national competition authorities

29. In order for States to be able to take effective action against RBPs, the Set calls for the adoption, improvement and effective enforcement of appropriate legislation and the implementation of judicial and administrative procedures. In this respect, continued work is also prescribed within UNCTAD on the elaboration of a model law or laws on RBPs in order to assist developing countries in devising appropriate legislation. UNCTAD and other relevant organizations of the United Nations system working in conjunction with UNCTAD are also to provide technical assistance, and advisory and training programmes for this purpose.

30. In order to facilitate the control of RBPs by States, the Set calls for the institution of improved procedures for obtaining information from enterprises, including transnational corporations, and the establishment of appropriate mechanisms at the regional and subregional levels to promote exchange of information on RBPs and to assist each other in this area.

Action at the international level

31. This includes in particular the establishment of consultation procedures whereby a State may request a consultation with other States in regard to issues concerning the control of RBPs. In this connection, the States involved may request the Secretary-General of UNCTAD to provide mutually agreed conference facilities for such consultations. Action at the international level at UNCTAD also includes work by the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices and the United Nations Conferences to Review All Aspects of the Set (the Review Conferences).

C. The Intergovernmental Group of Experts and Review Conferences

32. The Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices, established in 1981, provides a forum for multilateral consultations, discussions and exchange of views between States on matters related to the Set and undertakes and disseminates periodically studies and research on RBPs. It also monitors UNCTAD's technical cooperation activities in the area of competition law and policy.

33. The First Review Conference, which was convened by the General Assembly five years after adoption of the Set, in 1985, was followed by the Second and Third Review Conferences, respectively in 1990 and November 1995.

34. The Third Review Conference (13-21 November 1995) adopted a resolution 5/, in which it established a comprehensive work programme for UNCTAD in the field of competition law and policy, affirmed the fundamental role of competition law and policy for sound economic development and recommended the continuation of the "important and useful work programme within UNCTAD's intergovernmental machinery that addresses competition law and policy issues, and proceeds with the active support and participation of competition law and policy authorities of member countries" (para. 13 of the resolution). It further recommended to the General Assembly to change the name of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices to that of Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy and to convene a Fourth Review Conference in the year 2000.

IV. TECHNICAL COOPERATION ON COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY

35. In line with provisions 6 and 7 of section F of the Set, and the resolutions adopted by the Second and Third Review Conferences, UNCTAD provides technical assistance and advisory and training programmes on competition law and policy to developing countries and countries in transition. Given the considerable interest in developing and other countries for the adoption of competition legislation, UNCTAD receives a constant flow of requests for technical assistance in this field, which can only be attended to when financial resources are made available.

A. The main types of technical cooperation by UNCTAD

36. The main types of requests so far are as follows:

(a) States without any competition legislation may request information about restrictive business practices, their existence and possible adverse effects on their economy. This may involve a study of the restrictive business practices in their economy;

(b) States without legislation in this field may request introductory seminars directed at an audience which would include government officials and academics, as well as business and consumer-oriented circles;

(c) States which are in the process of drafting competition legislation may request information on such legislation in other countries, and seek advice as to drafting their competition legislation;

(d) States which have just adopted competition legislation may seek appropriate advice for the setting-up of the competition authority; this usually includes training of officials responsible for the actual control of RBPs, and may involve training workshops and/or on-the-job training with competition authorities in countries having experience in the field of competition;

(e) States which have already adopted such legislation and have experience in the control of RBPs may wish to consult each other on specific cases and exchange information; seminars may be organized for such exchanges between competition authorities;

(f) States which wish to revise their competition legislation might seek expert advice from competition authorities in other States, so as to amend their laws in the most effective manner possible;

(g) In addition, a number of countries, such as Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom, have accepted UNCTAD requests to train foreign competition officials at the premises of their competition authorities. Such exchanges of personnel, although time-consuming and difficult to organize - sometimes for language or confidentiality reasons - might be one of the most effective ways of on-the-job training for officials of recently established competition authorities.

B. How to request and obtain assistance from UNCTAD

37. A formal request should be addressed to the Secretary-General of UNCTAD, indicating the types of RBP assistance and/or advisory mission which is envisaged.

38. For national assistance services, the possibilities of UNDP/IPF assistance should be explored with local UNDP services before addressing UNCTAD's RBP Trust Fund (INT/86/A01).

Notes

1/ It should be noted that terminology in this area is very rich (and confusing), as some countries refer to restrictive trade practices to mean the same thing.

2/ For more detailed tests to determine the existence of DPMP, see chapter II of TD/B/RBP/INF.37 on Competition Policy and Competition Legislation.

3/ For a detailed examination of recent trends and characteristics of competition legislation, see UNCTAD, "Competition Policy and Competition Legislation: Information Issue No. 21 (TD/B/RBP/INF.37).

4/ The Set is contained in doc. TD/RBP/CONF.10/Rev.1.

5/ See document TD/RBP/CONF.4/14, or annex I to the Report of the Third Review Conference (TD/RBP/CONF.4/15).

ANNEX

Main technical assistance activities of UNCTAD in the area
of competition (1986-1995)

Year	Type of activity	Country(ies) of participants	Foreign experts from:	Location
1986	Regional seminar for Africa	Botswana Egypt Ethiopia Gambia Ghana Kenya Lesotho Liberia Somalia Swaziland United Republic of Tanzania Zambia Zimbabwe	Federal Republic of Germany Norway Sweden	Nairobi (Kenya)
1987	Regional seminar for Asia	Bangladesh Brunei Darussalam Myanmar China Democratic People's Republic of Korea Fiji India Islamic Republic of Iran Nepal Papua New Guinea Philippines Republic of Korea Sri Lanka Thailand Viet Nam	Federal Republic of Germany Japan Norway Sweden	Bangkok (Thailand)
1988	None			

Year	Type of activity	Country(ies) of participants	Foreign experts from:	Location
1989	Regional seminar for Africa	Angola Benin Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon Cape Verde Central African Republic Chad Comoros Congo Côte d'Ivoire Djibouti Equatorial Guinea Guinea Madagascar Mali Morocco Mozambique Niger Rwanda Sao Tome and Principe Senegal Togo Tunisia Zaire	France Spain EEC	Douala (Cameroon)
1990 September	Regional seminar for Latin America	Bolivia Brazil Chile Cuba Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Paraguay Peru Trinidad and Tobago Uruguay Venezuela	Federal Republic of Germany Norway Sweden United States of America	Caracas (Venezuela)
	National seminar	Cuba	Sweden	Havana (Cuba)
1991 February	National seminar	Ghana	Germany	Accra (Ghana)
March	National seminar	Zambia	Netherlands	Lusaka (Zambia)
June	National seminar	Indonesia	Netherlands Sweden	Djakarta (Indonesia)
1991 (cont'd) September	Subregional symposium on competition	Bangladesh China Fiji Islamic Republic of Iran Myanmar Philippines Republic of Korea Sri Lanka Viet Nam	United States of America Philippines	Seoul (Republic of Korea)
	Subregional seminar/exchange of experience	India Sri Lanka Thailand	Germany	Bangkok (Thailand)

Year	Type of activity	Country(ies) of participants	Foreign experts from:	Location
November	Subregional workshop for ASEAN countries	Brunei Darussalam Indonesia Philippines Thailand	Netherlands Norway	Manila (Philippines)
1992 March	Advisory mission	Colombia		Bogotá (Colombia)
	Advisory mission	Trinidad and Tobago		Bogotá (Colombia)
	Advisory services on drafting legislation	Ghana	Germany United Kingdom	Accra (Ghana)
September	National seminar	China	France Norway United Kingdom	Beijing (China)
	National seminar	Viet Nam	France EEC	Hanoi (Viet Nam)
October	National seminar	Argentina	Germany	Buenos Aires (Argentina)
1993 February	National seminar (exchange of experience)	India	Germany	New Delhi (India)
March	Subregional seminar	El Salvador Guatemala Honduras	Norway Sweden	Guatemala City (Guatemala)
	Subregional seminar	Costa Rica Nicaragua Panama	Norway Sweden	Panama City (Panama)
1993 March (cont'd)	Regional seminar for CARICOM	Antigua and Barbuda Bahamas Barbados Dominica Grenada Guyana Jamaica Montserrat	Canada Norway Sweden	Bridgetown (Barbados)
June	National seminar	Egypt	Germany	Cairo (Egypt)
1994 January	National seminar	Malaysia	Australia Norway Pakistan	Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia)
February	Regional seminar for FORUM countries	Cook Islands Fiji Kiribati Papua New Guinea Solomon Islands Tonga Samoa	Australia Norway New Zealand	Suva (Fiji)
March	National seminar	China	Germany United Kingdom	Shanghai Shenzhen (China)
June	World Bank/UNCTAD Conference on Competition Policy and International Trade	Chile Colombia Peru Venezuela Mexico	United States of America EU	Bogotá (Colombia)

Year	Type of activity	Country(ies) of participants	Foreign experts from:	Location
	Subregional seminar	Bahamas Belize Jamaica	Norway	Kingston (Jamaica)
	National seminar	Trinidad and Tobago	Jamaica Norway	Port of Spain (Trinidad and Tobago)
August	National seminar	Philippines	Germany	Manila (Philippines)
December	National seminar	Dominican Republic	Norway Venezuela	Santo Domingo (Dominican Republic)
	National seminar	Costa Rica	Norway Venezuela	San José (Costa Rica)
	National seminar	Nicaragua	Norway	Managua (Nicaragua)
	National seminar	El Salvador	Norway	San Salvador (El Salvador)
1994 December (cont'd)	National seminar	Peru	Germany	Lima (Peru)
1995 January	International/ CUTS Conference	India	Germany Pakistan Philippines Republic of Korea	New Delhi (India)
February	National seminar	Guatemala		Guatemala City (Guatemala)
	Advisory mission	El Salvador		San Salvador (El Salvador)
October	Regional African seminar	Tunisia Morocco Egypt South Africa Gabon Mauritania Kenya Zambia Zimbabwe	France World Bank	Tunis (Tunisia)
	Regional seminar for Latin America and the Caribbean	Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Peru Colombia Venezuela Jamaica Dominican Republic Trinidad and Tobago Mexico Guatemala El Salvador Panama Costa Rica Nicaragua	World Bank	Caracas (Venezuela)
	National seminar	Bolivia	Germany	La Paz (Bolivia)

Year	Type of activity	Country(ies) of participants	Foreign experts from:	Location
December	National seminar	Zambia	Kenya Norway Pakistan South Africa United Kingdom	Lusaka (Zambia)
	Advisory mission	South Africa	Norway United Kingdom	Pretoria (South Africa)
	National seminar	Pakistan	Germany	Islamabad (Pakistan)
