

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-EIGHTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 11 June 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. I. KOMIVES

(Hungary)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Algeria:</u>	Mr. M. ILTI
<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. Julio C. CARSALES Miss N. NASCIMBENE
<u>Australia:</u>	Mr. R. STEELE Mr. T. FINDLAY
<u>Belgium:</u>	Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE.
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. I. SOTIROV Mr. K. PRAMOV
<u>Burma:</u>	U SAW HLAIING U NGWE WIN U THAN HTUN
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. D.S. McPHAIL Mr. G. SKINNER Mr. J. GAUDREAU
<u>China:</u>	Mr. YU Peiwen Mr. LIANG Yufan Mr. YU Mengjia Mr. LI Changhe Mr. SA Benwang
<u>Cuba:</u>	Mr. L. SOLA VILA Mr. PREDO NUNEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. RUZEK
Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. A. CIMA
Mr. J. FRANEK

Egypt:

Mr. EL S.A.R. EL REEDY
Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M.N. FAHY
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE
Miss K. SINEGIORGIS
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. de la GORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. H. KLINGER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. F. GAJDA
Mr. C. GYORFFY
Mr. A. LAKLATOS

India:

Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. S. DARUSMAN

Iran:

Mr. A. JALALI
Mr. D. AMERI

Italy:

Mr. A. CIARRAPICO
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI
Mr. M. BARENGHI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya:

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
Miss LUZ MARIA GARCIA

Mongolia:

Mr. S.O. DOLD

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI
Mr. H. CHRAËBI

Netherlands:

Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria:

Mr. W.O. AKINSOLA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. M. AKRAM
Mr. T. ALTAH

Peru:

Mr. A. DE SOTO
Mr. J. BENAVIDES
Mr. A. THORNBERRY

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. M. MALITA
Mr. O. IONESCU
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. A.T. JAYAKODDY
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. G. EKHOLM

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. V.P. PERFILIEV
Mr. V.M. GANJA
Mr. S.N. RIUKHINE

United Kingdom:

Mr. N.H. MARSHALL
Mrs. J.I. LINK

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. FLOWERREE
Mr. F.P. DESTIONE
Miss K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. J. MISKEL
Mr. S. FITZGERALD
Mr. R. SCOTT

Venezuela:

Mr. O.A. ACUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VREHNEC
Mr. B. BRAJKOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. B.A. NZENGLEYA
Mr. L.B. NDAGA
Mr. O. GNOK

Secretary of the Committee
and Personal Representative
of the Secretary General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Assistant Secretary-General
Centre for Disarmament:

Mr. J. MARTENSON

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I wish to extend a most cordial welcome to all members of the Committee, to non-members participating under the rules of procedure and also to others attending the meeting. In particular, I would like to welcome our new colleagues, Ambassador Julio Cesar Carasales of Argentina, Ambassador Ahmad Jalali of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Ambassador Tissa Jayakoddy of Sri Lanka. I extend to them my congratulations on their appointments and my good wishes for their success in the performance of their duties.

I wish also to extend my welcome to Mr. Jan Martenson, Assistant-Secretary-General of the Centre for Disarmament, who is present with us today. His continuing interest in our work is, I am sure, noted with satisfaction by all of us.

I should like, on behalf of all of us, to convey to the outgoing Chairman, Ambassador Pfeiffer of the Federal Republic of Germany, our warm congratulations for the courteous, efficient and dedicated manner in which he discharged his responsibilities during the month of April.

Distinguished delegates, it is a matter of honour and privilege for the Hungarian People's Republic and for me personally to assume the chairmanship for the month of June in the Committee on Disarmament. My Government attributes special significance to this Committee in promoting disarmament and thereby strengthening international peace and security. The Hungarian People's Republic, a member of the community of the socialist States, is of the strong conviction that everything should be done to consolidate and further strengthen the achievements of détente, to prevent a new wave of the arms race, to diminish the threat of a new world war and to make real progress towards genuine disarmament. Starting from this conviction, the Hungarian People's Republic, in concert with its allies, the Soviet Union and other member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, resolutely supports all proposals aimed at halting the arms race and at bringing about equal security at a lower level of armaments.

This being also the goal of our activities in the Committee on Disarmament, I will do my utmost from the Chair to promote this aim.

Distinguished members, I am looking forward to your co-operation and assistance in discharging my duties as Chairman for the month of June. In that capacity I shall try to ascertain the general consensus of the Committee on all matters, and to that end I shall be consulting you regularly, individually as well as collectively. For my part, I can assure you that I will always be at the disposal of the Committee, and will do my best to carry out my duties in accordance with our rules of procedure.

As you know, we have a great deal of unfinished business ahead of us and I am sure you will agree with me that we should all try to achieve as much as we can through mutual accommodation and understanding, despite the vagaries of the international climate. I say this because "disarmament" today has come to mean in the first instance the safeguarding of the survival of mankind, and without contradiction that is in the interests of all nations and peoples.

At its first special session devoted to disarmament the General Assembly declared that "removing the threat of nuclear war is the most acute and urgent task of the present day". We are also being reminded daily of this supreme task by various organizations as well as individuals, and particularly by women, who are known as the better half of mankind. Clearly, nuclear questions should receive the highest priority not only in this Committee but also in other negotiating forums.

(The Chairman)

Let us resolve therefore to take practical actions that will lead us step by step from one small measure to broader measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament. In this context the importance of an immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race cannot be over-emphasized. The development of new weapons of mass destruction is another area that demands our urgent attention and I hope we shall take meaningful steps to prevent the further misuse of scientific discoveries.

One often hears the argument that progress towards disarmament is impeded by international tensions, but we should certainly discuss and try to reach agreement on measures of disarmament. We are not expected to wait until the international atmosphere improves. Despite the unfavourable international climate and perhaps even because of it, members of the Committee have presented a number of far-reaching proposals relating to disarmament. As a negotiating body, it is surely our duty to give the most serious consideration to those proposals and prepare draft agreements, treaties, etc., in anticipation of the day when the nation States of the world will be ready to sign them.

I believe that the Committee is in a position to proceed towards negotiations on a number of priority items on our agenda. The four working groups that have been set up will no doubt want to resume their work as quickly as possible, perhaps according to the timetable already established, subject to minor adjustments where necessary.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): My delegation is pleased to see you assuming the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for this opening month of its so-called "summer session" for 1981. Having had the opportunity to follow closely your constructive work both in this multilateral negotiating body and as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, we are sure that you will guide our discussions wisely and efficiently, and we take pleasure in offering you the wholehearted co-operation of the delegation of Mexico in the discharge of your important functions.

At the same time, I should like to say once again how much we appreciated the exemplary manner in which the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Pfeiffer, guided the Committee's work in the month of April when the "spring session" for the present year was concluded.

As you all know, the Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament has just held its second session, from 4 to 15 May 1981, at United Nations Headquarters, New York.

On that occasion, the delegation of Mexico submitted to the Preparatory Committee a working paper containing an "annotated preliminary draft" of the provisional agenda for the special session of the General Assembly which I have just mentioned, which has been reproduced as document A/AC.206/13.

Since that working paper can easily be consulted by members of the Committee on Disarmament interested in this matter, I shall confine myself on this occasion to outlining our objective in preparing the document, namely, to turn to full account the lessons of the first special session devoted to disarmament.

We believe that the experience of the 1970 session underscored how useful it is in dealing with a wide-ranging item whose various elements are closely interrelated, to do everything possible to prevent a dissipation of effort and to seek instead

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a concentration of effort, with a view to maximum effectiveness and co-ordination. Such an approach is particularly advisable considering that the key item on the agenda of the 1982 special session will undoubtedly be the comprehensive programme of disarmament; the programme's structure and content are very similar in several respects to those of the Final Document. Even more than the latter, they will require a sustained unity and the necessary correlation between the various components.

It therefore seems to us imperative to avoid a proliferation of items on the agenda of the forthcoming second special session devoted to disarmament, which would rob it of its distinctiveness as a "special" session and make it rather like a regular session. That would be all the more regrettable considering the frequency of regular sessions: the thirty-sixth session will take place six months before the special session under consideration, and the thirty-seventh session barely three months or so after the end of the special session.

Thus the preliminary draft agenda which we have ventured to submit to the Preparatory Committee contains, apart from what we may call the ritual or customary items such as those concerning credentials, elections, general debate, adoption of the Final Act and so forth, only three substantive items: the item on "consideration and adoption of the comprehensive programme of disarmament"; the item entitled "consideration, adoption and opening for signature of draft treaties or conventions on disarmament submitted by the Committee on Disarmament"; and the item entitled "Solemn launching of the World Disarmament Campaign and holding of the first pledging conference for the Campaign".

With regard to the purpose of the third of the items which I have just mentioned, the annotation in our working document states the following:

"In line with the provisions of resolution 35/152 I of 12 December 1980, it appears very likely that the report prepared by the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of experts, on the organization and financing of a World Disarmament Campaign under the auspices of the United Nations will be submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session. It also appears very likely that, at that session, the General Assembly will take the necessary action for the solemn launching of the Campaign and the holding of the first pledging conference at the second special session, with a view to giving the Campaign the exposure and prominence it undoubtedly deserves."

With regard to the item I mentioned in second place, the Mexican working paper included the following commentary:

"The discussions in the Preparatory Committee showed that, on the basis of the relevant General Assembly resolutions, its members felt that the conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear-weapon tests -- an issue which the United Nations has been considering for more than a quarter of a century and to which the General Assembly has repeatedly accorded "the highest priority" -- and the conclusion of a convention on the elimination of chemical weapons -- an issue to which the Assembly has also repeatedly accorded "high priority" -- would provide the two instruments which could have most beneficial effects for the General Assembly".

While I would not wish to minimize the importance those two items may acquire, it nevertheless seems to me undeniable that the central item on the agenda of the General Assembly's special session in 1982 will be the one concerning the

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comprehensive programme of disarmament, the elaboration of which was expressly provided for in paragraph 109 of the Final Document of 1978, in which it was agreed that the programme should encompass "all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated". Taking into account the breadth of the final objective thus set out, as well as the significance and scope of the term "comprehensive" and the statement made by the relevant Working Group of the Committee on Disarmament and endorsed by the latter to the effect that the programme ought to be "self-contained", it is obvious not only that the programme should encompass all the elements included in the above-mentioned Final Document, but also that it will have to go further than the Final Document in some respects.

Moreover, the fact that the consideration and adoption of the programme will constitute the fundamental item on the agenda of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will in no way exclude the consideration of other related items of lower priority. We are convinced, on the contrary, that a detailed review and analysis of the content of the comprehensive programme by the special session of the General Assembly, which is essential if it is to be adopted by consensus, will necessitate the consideration of such items, even if this occurs — as happened with respect to similar items when the Final Document of 1978 was being considered — within the context of the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Among the various items of this kind which are specifically mentioned in the corresponding annotations of the working paper to which I have been referring, I shall mention, not as a complete list but merely as an illustration, the review of the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the previous special session devoted to disarmament, and a review of the status of disarmament negotiations envisaged in the Programme of Action, particularly those relating to nuclear disarmament; the recommendations made and the follow-up to studies initiated by the General Assembly during or after that session; the initiatives and proposals of Member States; the manner of implementation of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, and the strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.

If, as I venture to hope, there is consensus in the Committee as to the paramount importance that the comprehensive programme of disarmament will have, I hope that there will also be consensus in recognizing that it is extremely important that this multilateral negotiating body, with the help of the Ad Hoc Working Group set up by it, should be able to carry to a successful conclusion with all possible speed the noble task entrusted to it by the United Nations General Assembly, that of elaborating the draft comprehensive programme which is to be submitted to it for consideration next year and on whose fate will undoubtedly depend in the final analysis the success or failure of the second special session which the most representative organ of the international community will devote to disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair.

Mr. VENKATESWARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, permit me first of all to offer you the warm felicitations of my delegation on your assumption of the office of Chairman of the Committee for the month of June. We are convinced that under your able and skilful guidance the Committee will be able to build further on the results achieved during the spring session. On behalf of the delegation of India, I offer you our full and sincere co-operation in the discharge of your heavy responsibilities.

May I also take this opportunity to welcome in our midst two new heads of delegation, Ambassador Jayakoddy of our close and friendly neighbour Sri Lanka and Ambassador Carasales of Argentina. We have no doubt that the Committee's work will benefit greatly from the rich experience and diplomatic skill for which our new colleagues already enjoy a well-deserved reputation.

Our summer session for 1981 takes place under the shadow of a blatant act of aggression and disregard for norms of international behaviour. The unprovoked Israeli attack on the Iraqi atomic reactor brings home to us once again how fragile is the **structure** of international peace and security in the present-day world. The Government of India has strongly condemned the attack and the official spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs has made the following statement:

"The Government of India have learnt with grave concern and a sense of deep indignation about the destruction of the Iraqi Osirak atomic reactor by Israeli war planes on 8 June. This Israeli action is stark adventurism and blatant intervention and aggression deserving condemnation.

Iraq has repeatedly stated that its programme in the nuclear field is confined to the utilization of nuclear energy and technology for peaceful purposes. There is, therefore, no basis for the Israeli contention that Iraq was on the verge of producing atomic weapons.

The aggressive, expansionist and anti-Arab policies of Israel have been a source of instability and tension in the region. This highly reprehensible, unprovoked and unjustified attack on the Iraqi atomic reactor has made a mockery of accepted norms of international conduct and behaviour and sets a most unfortunate precedent."

At the beginning of the second half of the 1981 session of the Committee, our thoughts turn quite inevitably to the issues left outstanding and unresolved at the end of the spring part of the session. While the four ad hoc working groups, re-established at the beginning of this year's session, have continued to carry out their negotiating tasks, with mixed results, under the terms of reference carried over from last year, the question of reviewing some of the mandates is clearly overdue. In particular, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has managed to reach a new stage in its negotiating tasks and further progress in our view could be clearly facilitated by the adoption of a fresh and more specific mandate. During the second half of the current year's session, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons should be enabled to begin the drafting of an actual treaty text taking into account the views expressed by States on the various issues involved. Alternative

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formulations, wherever necessary, could appear in square brackets in a first draft. At a later stage, negotiations could concentrate upon the removal of such brackets through a reconciliation of differing views. We would therefore request you, Mr. Chairman, to conduct informal consultations and perhaps convene informal meetings of the Committee to give serious consideration to this question.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament already has a mandate valid for the entire duration of its work, i.e. until it has elaborated the draft elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament to be submitted to the General Assembly's second special session on disarmament, scheduled to be held in mid-1982. The mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons is, in our view, adequate to the tasks that lie before it during the rest of the 1981 session. We would, therefore, not recommend any revision in its mandate at this stage.

During the early part of the current year's session, there were moves to seek a revision of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances. We would be willing to consider any proposals in this regard provided that the revised formulation would not preclude the consideration of all initiatives designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons. This Committee has been engaged in negotiating effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, pursuant to the provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Paragraph 32 of the Final Document states:

"All States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, should consider various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, and the prevention of nuclear war. In this context, while noting the declarations made by nuclear-weapon States, effective arrangements, as appropriate, to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons could strengthen the security of those States and international peace and security."

It is, therefore, quite unambiguously clear that all proposals "designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear war" should clearly be within the terms of reference of the Ad Hoc Working Group on negative security guarantees.

It is extremely unfortunate that the Committee was unable to take a positive decision on the proposals put forward by the Group of 21 for the creation of two additional ad hoc working groups on items 1 and 2 of its agenda. With respect to item 1, the Group of 21 put forward, towards the end of the spring session, the text of a possible mandate for an ad hoc working group on a nuclear-test ban. In his statement on 24 April on behalf of the Group of 21, the distinguished Ambassador of Algeria recommended the following mandate:

"The Committee on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of the second part of its 1981 session, an ad hoc working group of the Committee to negotiate on provisions relating to the scope, verification of compliance, and the final clauses of a draft treaty relating to item 1 of its agenda, entitled 'Nuclear test ban'. The ad hoc working group will report to the Committee on Disarmament on the progress of its work at an appropriate time and in any case before the conclusion of its 1981 session."

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"During the course of negotiations on this item, the ad hoc working group will take into account existing proposals and future initiatives, including the reports on the trilateral negotiations among the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States on this subject presented during the 1979 and 1980 sessions of the Committee on Disarmament, as well as any future reports on the trilateral negotiations that may be submitted to the Committee by the parties concerned during the remainder of its 1981 session."

Now that a concrete proposal for a mandate of a possible ad hoc working group on a nuclear test ban is before the Committee, it is the considered view of my delegation that informal consultations as well as informal meetings of the Committee should be convened to negotiate the terms to set up the ad hoc working group as early as possible.

I might add that the draft mandate put forward by the Group of 21 is designed to take into full account the results already achieved in the trilateral negotiations among the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. It is now up to the countries concerned to demonstrate their political commitment to the goal of a nuclear test ban by contributing fully to multilateral negotiations in the Committee.

The other proposal of the Group of 21 relates to the setting up of an ad hoc working group of the Committee on item 2 of its agenda, namely, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". In the absence of a consensus on this proposal, a series of informal meetings of the Committee were held, upon the initiative of the Group of 21, to undertake a substantive examination of the concrete issues relating to this agenda item. The object of this exercise was to pave the way for a positive decision on the proposal. In his statement of 16 April 1981 on behalf of the Group of 21, the distinguished Ambassador of Algeria made an assessment of the informal meeting devoted to nuclear disarmament and once again put forward some of the concrete issues that could be taken up in multilateral negotiations.

We are surprised that in the opinion of some delegations there were hardly any specific and concrete issues that could be considered appropriate or "ripe" for multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament. During the informal meetings on nuclear issues held in March this year, one delegation asked whether the Group of 21 was suggesting that the Committee should take up negotiation of a SALT-III. That certainly was not the intention of the Group of 21, which has already identified certain concrete issues which could be the subject of multilateral negotiations in an ad hoc working group on nuclear disarmament. These issues were clearly defined in document CD/116, and negotiations on these issues are certainly not designed to supplant the SALT process. The SALT concept is concerned with the limitation of certain categories of strategic nuclear weapons; we are concerned with the reduction and eventual elimination of all categories of nuclear weapons. The SALT concept is based on the management of nuclear arms competition between the United States and the USSR; we are concerned with the much broader objective of halting and reversing the nuclear arms race and finally achieving nuclear disarmament. We are, therefore, not demanding that the Committee on Disarmament should engage in SALT-type negotiations.

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What, then, is the basis for our proposal to undertake multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament in this Committee? Quite simply, the basis rests on the incontrovertible fact that the very existence of nuclear weapons and the espousal of strategic doctrines concerning their use, directly and fundamentally threaten the vital security interests of nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. The Final Document of the General Assembly's first special session on disarmament recognizes as a fundamental principle that all States have a right to participate in negotiations for measures of disarmament that affect their security interests. This is the principle on which our proposal is based.

Secondly, a multilateral negotiating body such as the Committee on Disarmament must concern itself with the urgent and most pressing task of preventing the outbreak of a nuclear war, which would affect belligerents and non-belligerents, nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. The proposal to negotiate an agreement on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is a step in that direction.

When we speak of elaborating the various stages of nuclear disarmament set forth in paragraph 50 of the Final Document, are we suggesting that the Committee on Disarmament should enter the arcane and complex world of multiple independently-targeted vehicles, ground-launched and air-launched cruise missiles, backfire bombers and "stealth" aircraft? Are we suggesting that the Committee on Disarmament also play the mystical and esoteric game of comparing the throw-weight of guided missiles, the circular error probability which distinguishes one generation of missiles from another or how many backfires are equal to how many cruise aircraft? This certainly is not what we have in mind. And how could we, when we have made it abundantly clear that we consider such games as having little relevance in an age of "nuclear overkill"? We, all of us here, are concerned with a simple and yet crucial question -- in a world where a handful of major Powers possess the means of global destruction, how can the rest of us ensure the survival of our people, the integrity and independence of our countries and progress towards a just and equitable régime of peace and international security? This is what we wish to negotiate here in this Committee. The SALT process may be designed to reconcile the security perceptions of the United States and the USSR. The negotiations on long-range theatre nuclear forces in Europe may attempt to harmonize the security interests of the European States. But these negotiations, important in themselves, do not deal with the vital security concerns of the majority of non-aligned and neutral non-nuclear-weapon States. Should not there be a mechanism whereby the security interests of the vast majority of countries of the world, already jeopardized by the continued existence and accumulation of nuclear weapons and the growing threat of a nuclear war, receive the serious consideration they deserve? Or are these countries beyond the pale, since they do not possess nuclear weapons or are not allied to a nuclear-weapon State and therefore do not count? The distinguished Ambassador of Canada, in his statement of 16 April 1981, explained that Canada belongs to a nuclear alliance because "we and our allies are subject to a nuclear threat". What choice is being given to the neutral and non-aligned countries which have no nuclear weapons, but whose security is all the same threatened by the danger of a nuclear war? Should they have to decide between joining a nuclear alliance or acquiring nuclear weapons

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themselves? If the answer to this question is in the negative, then is it not imperative that the security concerns of these countries should be given due weight? Before dismissing the proposal of the Group of 21 as unrealistic or impractical, the members of the Committee, especially those who still harbour reservations about the principle of multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament, should reflect carefully on these questions.

Some of the measures of nuclear disarmament are admittedly complex. But this complexity is not the result of actions taken by the non-nuclear-weapon States. Nor is it the result of some independent, blind force over which human beings have no control. Decisions regarding the development and refinement of nuclear-weapon systems have been taken by decision-makers in nuclear-weapon States themselves. Even as I speak, research laboratories in nuclear-weapon States are busy developing new and more sophisticated nuclear weapons and delivery systems, making the problem even more complex. To say that urgent measures of nuclear disarmament cannot be undertaken because the problem is complex, to say that issues of nuclear disarmament must be left to the nuclear-weapon States themselves because the issues involved would be technically incomprehensible except to the initiated few, **merely** begs the question. This is no argument. Who, after all, is responsible for taking decisions which are contributing to making the problem more and more complex day by day? Why has nothing been done to halt the trend towards the increasing complexity and sophistication of nuclear-weapon arsenals if the decision-makers involved were aware of the fact that such developments would make the achievement of nuclear disarmament more difficult in future? Paragraph 93(b) of the Final Document of the General Assembly's first special session on disarmament states that "States should assess the possible implications of their military research and development for existing agreements as well as for further efforts in the field of disarmament".

Could the representatives of the nuclear-weapon States, especially those with the largest nuclear arsenals, enlighten the Committee as to how seriously they have implemented this appeal of the General Assembly to which they themselves were a party?

If complexity is a key problem in progress towards achieving nuclear disarmament, then the rational thing to do, first and foremost, is to cease the qualitative development and refinement of nuclear weapons forthwith. And this is what the first stage of nuclear disarmament is designed to achieve, as set forth in paragraph 50 of the Final Document which reads: "Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems". Under this heading one may consider several concrete measures, e.g. (i) a complete and immediate freeze on the deployment of new types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, (ii) a complete and immediate halt to the replacement of existing missiles, aircraft and other nuclear delivery vehicles by new and modernized versions, (iii) a ban on the increase of the megatonnage of existing nuclear warheads, irrespective of the delivery vehicle on which they are mounted. Other measures could also be considered under this heading. Since the votaries of the nuclear arms race have been so quick and alert in detecting improvements and refinements

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in the weapons systems of their potential adversaries, using existing and available means of verification, to justify their own plans for modernization, my delegation is convinced that verification of compliance should not be a problem. However, such specific details would have to be worked out in the course of negotiations. Right now the question is whether an essentially political decision on the part of all the countries concerned to agree to an immediate halt to the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapon systems is possible. If the answer is "Yes", then an ad hoc working group on nuclear disarmament can begin to look into this aspect forthwith.

I have gone into this matter at some length in order to dispel the notion that there are no specific and concrete measures of nuclear disarmament upon which this Committee could usefully negotiate. Counting the number and types of nuclear missiles is not the only exercise relevant to nuclear disarmament. And lest it be forgotten, I would like to recall to the Committee that in its predecessor body, the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, the two major nuclear-weapon States themselves put forward several concrete and detailed proposals on measures of nuclear disarmament for multilateral negotiations. In 1962, the United States and the USSR submitted draft treaties on general and complete disarmament which contained specific provisions for the reduction and total elimination of nuclear weapons. In 1964, both the United States and the USSR came forward with proposals concerning the reduction and elimination of bomber aircraft, while the United States proposed a verified freeze on the number and characteristics of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. In those days, it was not considered unusual by the nuclear-weapon States to submit proposals concerning nuclear weapons to a multilateral negotiating body. Today, the worsening state of confrontation among the major Powers makes it even more necessary for the non-aligned and neutral countries to play an active role in the prevention of a nuclear war and the negotiation of urgent measures of nuclear disarmament. This would be in the obvious interest of the major Powers and their allies themselves just as it would be in the interest of the non-aligned and neutral countries. Instead of arguing against multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament, would it not be more reassuring to the international community if the nuclear-weapon States and their allies put forward their own specific and concrete proposals to the Committee for consideration, just as the Group of non-aligned and neutral countries have done? I recall that in the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament submitted in 1962, the United States recommended the setting up of an international commission on the reduction of the risk of war through accident, miscalculation or failure of communication, whose structure and mandate was to be negotiated multilaterally. Agreements have been concluded among some but not all of the nuclear-weapon States which partially deal with the problem of an outbreak of nuclear war through accident, miscalculation or failure of communications. The technology of war has today heightened these dangers considerably. Does not the United States or for that matter any other nuclear-weapon State have any fresh

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ideas to offer concerning this vital issue? Do not non-nuclear non-aligned States and neutral States have a role to play in this regard, especially in periods of heightened tensions among the nuclear-weapon Powers? These are questions which multilateral negotiations can attempt to ~~answer~~ with the help of ideas from nuclear-weapon States. Instead of always demanding that the non-nuclear-weapon States demonstrate the practicability of multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament, instead of challenging the non-aligned neutral States to come forward with concrete and specific measures for such an exercise, it would be better if the nuclear-weapon States themselves came forward with their own initiatives and ideas in this regard. As countries possessing nuclear weapons, they are in a position to offer constructive proposals for consideration in this Committee. We urge them to assume their responsibilities, mindful of the fact that the non-aligned and neutral countries are always ready to shoulder their part of the burden and to engage in a constructive and fruitful dialogue on ensuring what, after all, is a common aim of all the countries of the world -- the survival of the human species.

My delegation and many others have consistently put forward serious and practical proposals which, in our view, would make the goal of nuclear disarmament less distant than it has become today. It would indeed be tragic if the international community has to acknowledge that the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons is no longer a credible one. The consequences of such an abandonment of faith would be disastrous. Coming back to Geneva from New York after attending the United Nations Disarmament Commission session there which ended on the fifth of this month, my delegation, like many others which participated in it, cannot but express its deep concern at certain negative trends which have manifested themselves. We must strive to correct these trends before we are overtaken by pessimism or cynicism which it is too easy to fall prey to in the vital area of disarmament. If we are to show the vision expected of us by the international community, we have to work dedicatedly not merely to overcome the pain of today nor to safeguard against the pain of tomorrow which we may be able to envisage, but to work to avoid the pain that is yet to come and that threatens the future of our children and our children's children. The nuclear arms race has not resulted in greater security for the nuclear-weapon States and their allies. It has certainly brought about greater insecurity for them as well as for the non-aligned and neutral countries. It is time, therefore, to give a chance to a different conception of international security, one which is based on a world free of nuclear weapons. For it is only if nuclear disarmament is achieved that efforts to evolve a new, just and equitable régime of international peace and security and development, based on general and complete disarmament, would have a chance of success.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Venkateswaran for his statement and kind words addressed to the Chair.

Mr. McPHAIL (Canada): Mr. Chairman, at the beginning of the 1981 session, I indicated my intention to speak on the subject of verification and its significance to the arms control process, particularly as it relates to this Committee.

It is appropriate to do so today because it is almost one year since the Compendium of arms control verification proposals (CD/99) was tabled. The Compendium was followed by a second paper (CD/127) which served to quantify some of the research upon which the Compendium was based. Today, I have the honour to submit to this Committee the third and final working paper which deals with the subject in a generic fashion. It is entitled "A conceptual working paper on arms control verification".

More importantly, however, it is appropriate to consider verification as this Committee resumes its work because if priorities are oriented properly, 1981 could prove to be one of the most productive sessions in many years. Leading up to the United Nations General Assembly's second special session on disarmament, this Committee's negotiations could prove influential by achieving progress in areas where the verification aspects of the problem have taken on a particular significance. There are two areas where positive action could be taken.

In the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, there is an opportunity to explore verification at the top end of the spectrum. By that I mean that chemical weapons, which exist in great numbers and therefore constitute a real and present threat, must of consequence be subject to a high level of verification in such areas as non-production, facility dismantling and weapons destruction. The Canadian working paper on verification and control requirements tabled on 26 March 1981 (CD/167) provides an overview of the problem. While we are aware that there have been fears expressed concerning intrusiveness and the possibility of compromising civilian industrial secrets, our appreciation is that such inspections are possible without detriment to legitimate commercial sensitivities. This is the conclusion pointed to by the 1979 workshop conducted by the Federal Republic of Germany (in terms of non-production) and of the subsequent British workshop (from the standpoint of dismantling and destruction of facilities). Results were presented in documents CD/37 and CD/15 respectively. Working papers documenting the Canadian experience in destruction of existing agents support this line of reasoning as well.

This Committee has not really come to grips with the verification issue vis-à-vis chemical weapons. I suggest, therefore, that during the second period of concentration of the chemical weapons Working Group, this aspect be explored. Such work would constitute a positive and realistic contribution in support of the bilateral negotiations.

While this Committee has not been involved in direct negotiations concerning a possible comprehensive test ban, many members, myself included, have registered our interest and concern. Progress toward a CTB agreement has been considered by all to be painfully slow, but we have recognized at the same time the complexity of the technical issues involved, particularly those relating to verification. The Norwegian representative underscored this fact for all of us, I think, when he pointed out on 10 March 1981 (CD/PV.113) that "an adequate verification system is a necessary component in a total test-ban régime, both in order to ensure

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compliance and to build confidence". In highlighting his own country's contribution through "NORSAR" in the area of seismic verification, he acknowledged the important progress achieved by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events.

Canada considers the work accomplished by the Ad Hoc Group to be of singular significance in practical terms toward the realization of a comprehensive test ban. A ban is one of the four elements in the "Strategy of suffocation" which Prime Minister Trudeau outlined at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1978. Beyond that, however, it is an area of interest to Canada precisely because it is one in which advanced technology, unfettered by other considerations, could provide adequate verification with practical and almost immediate results. I need hardly point out that as far back as in 1962, it was the Soviet Union which declared that, in the interests of seismic verification, it was "prepared to agree to two to three inspections a year being carried out in the territory of each of the nuclear powers" and that the proposal it had put forward for "automatic seismic stations" included "elements of international control" (ENDC/73).

Eighteen years later the negotiating States, in their tripartite report to this Committee (CD/130), acknowledged the contribution which co-operative seismic monitoring measures could make in verifying compliance with a treaty. The report accepted conditional "on-site" inspection as a co-operative measure. We strongly believe that this Committee and the seismic experts Group could supplement in a very practical manner the efforts of the negotiating States.

These two areas of negotiations -- CTB and CW -- are representative of those in which verification plays a pivotal role. Very often it appeared that difficulties in verification issues were based on preconceived differences regarding purpose, methodology and definition. It was in part the frustration of being so close to and yet so far from a number of agreements which prompted the initiation of the basic research programme of which this conceptual paper is a result.

We accept the argument put forth very often that specific terms of verification cannot be negotiated before the arms control problem itself is defined. It has been our view, however, that there are similarities in the concept of verification which extend across the spectrum of the arms control problem. Hence we can and should learn from our experience. It is in this spirit that we developed the "Compendium", to see what had actually been proposed and why, with the objective of developing a common perspective and verification typology. There has been a virtual revolution in terms of verification technology. Yet, argumentation has remained largely unchanged. On the one hand, information which might have been kept from hand-held cameras in 1960 is now made available, often by mutual agreement through national technical means today. On the other hand, while intrusion has indeed changed, in any practical sense we tend here to be rather historical, and updating is needed.

Prior to the Second World War -- the 1922 naval accords and the 1925 Geneva Protocol were examples -- arms control and disarmament agreements negotiated under comparatively normal peace-time conditions did not normally make provision for systematic and effective verification of compliance with obligations. In post-World War II negotiations, however, provision has generally been made for some type

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of verification. In fact, verification in some form is now normally a part of almost any significant agreement, whether public or private. As members of this Committee, we must recognize therefore, that to insist upon verification in an arms control agreement is not necessarily to question the good faith of any one of the negotiators entering into an agreement, but rather through the reciprocal nature of the provision, to build confidence and ultimately strengthen mutual trust.

I believe that it will be apparent to you upon reading the conceptual paper that the rationale which has been developed is without bias -- that has certainly been our intention. The definition of verification, for example, was selected not from any political document, but rather from the Oxford Concise Dictionary. It is a particularly apt definition in that it included "demonstration" as an equal, and in my view preferable, method of verification to "inspection".

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko warned last autumn that the arms race "is approaching a point beyond which it may become impossible to curb it effectively by means of agreements based on mutual verification". If mutual verification encompasses the principle of reciprocity in its broadest sense, then of course all of us can support his reasoning and his concern. That being said, members of the Committee have the right to believe that it should apply not only to verification means now in use internationally (such as national technical means), but also to all methods of verification, existing and potential. It means that preconceptions of "mutual verification" of the last 20 years must be reassessed, in the light of the necessities today. Should not the requirement for secrecy within national borders and the claim of intrusiveness as an argument against adequate verification be reviewed? Indeed it could be argued that national technical means, a verification method accepted by treaty in the SALT process, is the most intrusive method in terms of national security assets. I commend to you the discussion on intrusion contained in Canada's conceptual paper being tabled today.

In submitting this latest working paper on verification, Canada continues on a course set 20 years ago, in the then multilateral negotiating body here in Geneva. Canada then took a special interest in the verification provisions of the Sea-Bed Treaty; and today, we apply the same concept of verification to other subjects, recognizing the special requirements of each area.

We hope that this conceptual working paper will lead to greater consideration of verification in this body. We are not looking to the Committee to conduct a study of verification, which would be inappropriate for the Committee. We are looking to others to contribute to greater consideration of this subject: we hope others will choose to table papers on aspects of verification in which they may have special expertise and which can contribute to common understanding.

Finally, in the spirit of the commencement of the Second Disarmament Decade, and in the approach to the United Nations General Assembly's second special session on disarmament, I hope this Committee will allocate to itself a period within which to discuss briefly the unique and vital significance of verification to arms control agreements. This would serve to highlight the importance which has been accorded to this subject by the Committee in including it in item IX of its permanent agenda. In this connection I am pleased to offer, on behalf of my Government, to provide a briefing on the conceptual paper and on the research behind it by experts from Ottawa who are ready to share their experiences with you.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador McPhail of Canada for his statement and kind words addressed to the Chair.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, the Pakistan delegation wishes to congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of June. We are confident that under your able guidance the Committee will be able to achieve substantive progress in its work during this summer part of its 1981 session.

Since we adjourned in the spring, international political circumstances have not improved substantively. Indeed, new sources of tension continue to emerge as a result of the even more frequent resort to the use or threat of force by a number of countries, in flagrant violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter. We are all the more convinced of the need for a political dialogue, especially between the major Powers, to reverse the precipitous decline towards a disastrous conflagration and to restore confidence in a world order based on principles rather than on a balance of terror.

The Committee on Disarmament can make a positive contribution to these objectives. The potential inherent in the CD has so far remained to be fully exploited because of the reticence of some of its members to engage in a concrete dialogue on specific matters. We hope such positions will be reviewed, since participation in negotiations does not and cannot prejudice or prejudice the position of any State or group of States. Even if such negotiations are unsuccessful, the exposition of various points of view cannot but add to mutual comprehension and understanding. At this moment in time, this in itself may be a contribution to peace.

As we open this summer session, we are confronted with a number of important proposals and issues on which early decisions are necessary. My delegation hopes that as a first order of business, this session of the CD will take up consideration of the proposals of the Group of 21, contained in documents CD/180 and CD/181, for the establishment of ad hoc working groups on the two highest-priority items, viz., the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and the nuclear test ban. A positive response to these proposals would be an important indication of the political will of the major nuclear-weapon Powers to promote the agreed goals of disarmament.

Another decision which seems essential is to adjust the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. In our view, further progress on this item will be possible only if the Working Group is able to commence the actual process of considering and negotiating concrete and substantive provisions for inclusion in a chemical weapons convention.

The Pakistan delegation would like to reiterate its desire to see the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States turn immediately to exploring the "alternative approaches" that have been identified by it in the search for a common formula which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. My delegation will submit specific views at a subsequent stage about those alternatives which may provide a feasible basis for agreement on such a common formula.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

Considerable work remains to be done on the comprehensive programme of disarmament if it is to be adopted at the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. In particular, we hope that the Ad Hoc Working Group on that subject will find it possible to reach agreement regarding the nature and scope of the programme and to rationalize and elaborate the measures for inclusion in it, only some of which have been tentatively identified so far.

The "elements" relating to a convention to ban radiological weapons proposed by the Soviet Union and the United States, have been substantively analysed earlier this year. A number of important issues remain to be resolved in relation to this convention. When speaking on this item in the Committee on 24 April this year I stated that we shared the view of the Swedish delegation "that the most feasible way in which radiation could be used for hostile purposes, without recourse to nuclear weapons, is through an attack on nuclear power facilities". I added: "Such facilities, which are in a nascent stage in most developing countries, would provide an attractive and vulnerable target in any armed conflict ... Therefore, the convention on radiological weapons must include a provision prohibiting an attack on civilian nuclear facilities. Indeed, my delegation is of the view that the proposal deserves adoption as a legal norm in its own right".

These words assume special poignancy in the wake of the wanton air attack by Israel on the Iraqi atomic reactor last Sunday. In a statement issued on 9 June, the Government of Pakistan has condemned this unprovoked Israeli aggression against Iraq in the strongest terms. We expect that this unprecedented action which has violated all norms of international conduct and threatened peace and security in the volatile region of the Middle East will be unanimously condemned by the international community, including the Security Council.

This Israeli aggression is of special concern to the Committee on Disarmament for more than one reason. Apart from flouting the principles of the United Nations Charter, it violates humanitarian norms, specifically article 56 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention regarding the "protection of works and installations containing dangerous forces" including "nuclear electrical generating stations". Secondly, it demonstrates most vividly the inherent weakness of the proposed "elements" of the convention on radiological weapons and brings into sharp focus the relevance and indispensability of the Swedish proposal to prohibit attacks against civilian nuclear installations under any circumstances.

Most importantly, it calls into question the very foundations of the understanding on which it is sought to promote nuclear non-proliferation as a universal objective. The majority of non-nuclear-weapon States have made a sovereign choice not to develop nuclear weapons. Many have adhered to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, and most have accepted IAEA safeguards on the transfer of nuclear technology and materials as a manifestation of this sovereign option. But every State has the inherent right -- and this is confirmed by the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament -- to acquire and develop nuclear technology for economic and social development. What the Israeli air attack against Iraq has done is to challenge this basic and fundamental right of every country to acquire and develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. And this challenge has been defiantly repeated in the form of threats of similar aggression against any of Israel's neighbours which seeks to develop a nuclear energy programme.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

There are, of course, other aspects in the unprecedented action which must give pause. There is the spectacle of a country which has itself, clandestinely, and through fair means and foul, developed a nuclear capability outside any international control, asserting the right to prevent another State from developing even a modest nuclear energy programme and portraying this as a threat to its national security and survival.

The action has exposed the hollow rhetoric of the claim that adherence by a State to the NPT would be regarded as proof of a country's commitment not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. Its impact on the IAEA safeguards also cannot be disregarded. As the Director-General of the IAEA stated at a meeting of the Board of Governors the day before yesterday: "From a point of principle, one can only conclude that it is the Agency's safeguards régime which has also been attacked".

In the context of nuclear non-proliferation and the development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, one cannot but share the views of the Director-General of the IAEA when he stated: "During my long time here, I do not think we have been faced with a more serious question than the implications of this development". Yet, if the adverse implications of this development are to be reversed, it is necessary to go beyond the crude logic of terror and intimidation which appears to impel the Israeli leadership. There can be no question that the *raison d'être* built by Israel is drawn from the popular and misconceived images that have been painted by certain circles in some of the advanced nations regarding the imminent danger in the development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes by the developing countries. While shrugging off the calamitous consequences of the escalating accumulation of nuclear armaments by the Superpowers, while pushing under the rug the frenzied nuclear preparations by South Africa and by Israel itself, the so-called international news media have spread rumours and deliberate concoctions regarding the alleged danger of nuclear arms development by States in the Arab Middle East, in South Asia and in Latin America. The effect, if not the design, of such a campaign of propaganda has been to numb international public opinion to the kind of blatant aggression which was launched last Sunday by Israel against Iraq.

It is the responsibility of the Committee on Disarmament to comprehend this development in all its gravity. The Committee, after due deliberation, should adopt a decision which would help to reverse the adverse consequences of this development for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and to ensure that such actions are not repeated in the future.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement and kind words addressed to the Chair.

Mr. OKAWA (Japan): Mr. Chairman, it is with great pleasure that I congratulate you on behalf of the Japanese delegation on your assumption of the chairmanship of our Committee for this month. My delegation has full confidence in your ability to guide us in our work and you may count on our fullest co-operation.

I also wish to express my delegation's deep appreciation to Ambassador Pfeiffer of the Federal Republic of Germany for presiding so effectively over our Committee in the month of April.

My delegation also warmly welcomes in our midst the newly arrived distinguished representatives of Argentina and Sri Lanka.

My delegation, on the eve of the opening of the second part of the current session of the CD, was shocked by the extremely disturbing news that nuclear facilities in the territory of Iraq were attacked by the Israeli Air Force. Iraq is a party to the NPT, and a country which accepts IAEA safeguards.

Japan is deeply concerned about the possible repercussions of this attack on international relations in general, and negotiations on disarmament in particular.

I regret that my first intervention at this second part of this year's session of CD has to be a statement deploring the Israeli attack. I am to read out the provisional translation of the statement issued by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan on 9 June 1981.

The statement is as follows:

"1. Concerning the attack of the Israeli air force on the nuclear reactor in the vicinity of Baghdad on 7 June, the Government of Japan considers it extremely regrettable that Israel should have resorted to such an outrageous action. This action of Israel violating the territorial air of Iraq and destroying its facilities, can never be justified for whatever cause.

"2. The Government of Japan is deeply concerned that tensions between the Arab States and Israel may be further heightened by this incident and hopes that all the nations concerned will exert utmost restraint in order not to further deteriorate the situation.

"3. On this occasion, the Government of Japan reconfirms its position that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a threat to world peace and that countries which are not party to the non-proliferation Treaty should accede to it as soon as possible."

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Japan for his statement and kind words addressed to the Chair.

Mr. YU Peiwen (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, first of all let me extend you my congratulations on your assuming the Chair at the summer session of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of June. I believe that under your able and experienced chairmanship the Committee will carry on its work successfully. You can count on the full co-operation of the Chinese delegation. At the same time, I wish to express my respects to Ambassador Pfeiffer of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman of the Committee in April, who presided excellently over the meetings of the Committee in that month and made positive contributions. I wish also to express my warm welcome to His Excellency Ambassador Carasales of Argentina and His Excellency Ambassador Jayakoddy of Sri Lanka who have newly joined in the work of the Committee. I believe that they will make useful contributions to the work of the Committee.

(Mr. Yu Peiwen, China)

We have listened to the statements made by the distinguished Ambassadors of India, Pakistan and Japan regarding Israel's air raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor on 7 June. The Chinese delegation holds similar views on this serious event. We consider that this act of flagrant invasion of a sovereign State committed by Israel seriously trampled on the norms of international law and aggravated tensions in the Middle East. Mr. Huang Hua, Vice-Premier of the State Council and Foreign Minister of China, in a statement on 9 June said that the Chinese Government and people strongly condemn this new act of aggression committed by Israel and give their firm support to the just struggle of Iraq and other Arab countries in safeguarding State sovereignty, recovering lost territories, restoring the national rights of the Palestinian people and opposing Israeli aggression and expansion.

We consider that Israel's bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor constitutes another serious provocation further aggravating the tension in the Middle East following its bombing of Lebanon. This session of the Committee should follow closely the development of this event.

At the beginning of the summer part of the session, we shall discuss organizational questions, i.e. the programme of work of the session, and questions concerning the mandates and activities of the ad hoc working groups, etc. We shall consider suggestions made by various sides and make relevant decisions. The Chinese delegation will take a positive and practical attitude towards all questions that the session will be faced with and work together with other delegations for their solution.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of China for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair.

I have prepared, with the assistance of the Secretary, a working paper numbered 37 containing a draft programme of work, which has been circulated this morning. Since we shall have some time left after this plenary meeting, I suggest that we hold an informal meeting of the Committee so that I may have the opportunity to introduce and explain the draft programme of work I have circulated to you. The Committee might also wish to continue discussions on the programme of work at an informal meeting tomorrow, Friday, 12 June, at 10.30 a.m.

If there are no objections, I will convene an informal meeting five minutes after the closing of this plenary meeting, on the understanding that our discussion will continue at another informal meeting tomorrow at 10.30 a.m.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 16 June, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.