

CD/PV.126
21 April 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SIXTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 21 April 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. G. PFEIFFER

(Federal Republic of Germany)

GE.81-61495

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. SALAH-BEY
Mr. M. HATI

Argentina: Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD

Australia: Mr. R.A. WALKER
Mr. R. STEELE
Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium: Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. R. DEYANOV
Mr. K. PRAMOV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U NGWE WIN
U THAN HPUH

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL
Mr. G. SKINNER

China: Mr. YU Peiwen
Mr. LIANG Yufan
Mr. YU Mengjia
Mr. SA Benwang

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLA VILA
Mrs. V. BOROWDOSKY JACKIEWICH
Mr. C. PAZOS

Czechoslovakia:
Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. A. CIMA
Mr. L. STAVINOLHA

Egypt:
Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M.N. FAHMY

Ethiopia:
Mr. T. TERRETE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:
Mr. P. DE LA GORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Mr. P. BUNTIG

Germany, Federal Republic of:
Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. H. MULLER
Mr. V. ROHR

Hungary:
Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. C. GYORUFY
Mr. A. LAKATOS

India:
Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:
Mr. A. SANI
Mr. F. QASIM
Mr. KARYONO
Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. J. HADI

Iran:
Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA
Mr. M. DABIRI

Italy: Mr. A. CIARRAPICO
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. I. TAKAHASHI
Mr. R. ISHII
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya: Mr. S. SHITEMI
Mr. G. MUNDU

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
Mr. C. HELLER

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILĒG
Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco: Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. H. VAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru: Mr. A. THORBERRY

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. G. EKHOLM
Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. V.A. PERFILIEV
Mr. V.V. LOSHCHININE
Mr. KUZENDO
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO
Mr. S.N. RIUKHINE
Mr. A.G. DOULYAN

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMTERIAYES
Mr. H.H. MARSHALL
Mrs. J.I. LINK

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. FLOWERREE
Mr. F.P. DESIMONE
Miss K. CRITTEMBERGER
Mr. J. MISKEL
Mr. C. PEARCY
Mr. S. FITZGERALD

Venezuela:

Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. N. VRHUNEC
Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:

Secretary of the Committee
and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: In accordance with its programme of work, the Committee should start today its consideration of interim reports of ad hoc working groups, if any. May I also note that, in conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, it is the right of any Member State of the Committee to raise any subject relevant to the work of the Committee at a plenary meeting and to have full opportunity of presenting its views on any subject which it may consider to merit attention.

Mr. SALAH-BEY (Algeria) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, during the months of March and April of this session, informal meetings of the Committee on Disarmament have been devoted to a thorough consideration of items 1 and 2 of the Committee's agenda, respectively on a nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

I would like to recall that these meetings were held at the request and on the initiative of the Group of 21. They have made it possible to focus attention on some of the concerns of the members of the Committee and especially those who are members of the Group of 21.

In view of the importance of these discussions and their obvious interest for the future work of the Committee, the Group of 21 has asked me to request the Secretariat, through you, to prepare a document containing a summary of the informal discussions held on agenda items 1 and 2 during the meetings devoted to those items.

The document need not do more than indicate the general trends that emerged during the exchanges of views which took place at the different meetings. The Group of 21 feels that there would be no need to mention the names of the delegations which took part in the debate in the summary document we are requesting.

I would add that the Secretariat could use the period between the two sessions of the Committee to prepare this document.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the Ambassador of Algeria, Ambassador Salah-Bey, for the statement on behalf of the Group of 21. In connection with the request to the Secretariat, I shall ask Ambassador Jaipal if this can be done.

Mr. VENKATESWARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, as the 1981 spring session of our Committee draws to a close, my delegation, like several others around this table, looks back with a degree of satisfaction at the considerable amount of substantive work that has been accomplished. Bearing in mind that the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament is only a year away, it is necessary for us at this stage to take stock of the situation and order our future work in a manner that would produce credible and concrete disarmament measures in time for that session.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has undertaken an exhaustive and detailed analysis of several key issues involved in the negotiation of a prohibition on chemical weapons. There have been very useful and enlightening discussions with the active participation of experts. Issues have been identified, defined and

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examined with great care and differences of opinion have emerged on some vital issues. However, there is general agreement that the ban should be comprehensive in scope, that existing stockpiles should be destroyed, that production and storage facilities should be dismantled, and that verification should consist of a combination of national and international measures. It is our view that the time has now come to identify the areas of agreement and translate them into treaty language. At the same time, areas of disagreement need to be explored in greater depth to see whether and what compromises are possible from the point of view of translating them also into treaty language.

As regards the vexed question of verification, if we were to give overwhelming importance to the establishment of a foolproof verification system, we should never be able to agree on any measure of disarmament. It is also important to avoid any infringement upon the sovereignty of States, which is a fundamental requirement of the United Nations Charter. This dilemma underlines the primary importance of political decisions to be made on technical and scientific matters.

The verification question inevitably assumes magnified importance when there is mutual distrust among nations. Our aim should be to retain a proper perspective and secure reasonably adequate, practical and realistic measures of verification involving a balanced mix of national and international control. The Ad Hoc Working Group should continue to explore such measures.

In order to facilitate progress in the areas that I have indicated, it is essential that the mandate of the Working Group should be updated in the light of the work which remains to be accomplished, as also to permit the commencement of drafting of certain provisions of the treaty on which there is agreement. Further delay may well encourage a new and dangerous chemical weapons race among the major Powers which may prove difficult to halt and reverse.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons has further advanced its work during the 1981 session. In my plenary statement of 9 April 1981 I had occasion to comment upon some of the more important issues involved in the negotiation of a draft treaty prohibiting radiological weapons. We are optimistic that the pending differences over the scope of the future treaty and over the most appropriate definition to be adopted for radiological weapons will be satisfactorily resolved in the coming months. The question of the legitimacy of the possession and use of nuclear weapons is a key issue, and cannot be brushed aside as being extraneous. For is it not obvious that in a nuclear war the nuclear weapon itself would become a radiological weapon for the non-aligned and neutral nations, whose people would suffer death and injury from radioactive contamination and fall-out? The least that one may expect, therefore, is that a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons should not sanction the use of nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament has systematically reviewed the list of measures that would be included in the programme. A preliminary discussion of the basic principles that would underlie the programme has also taken place. However, the measures to be included must be further elaborated, and the actual formulations to be used need careful negotiations. This would be a difficult exercise, particularly since there would always be a tendency

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to reproduce the existing consensus formulations to be found in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We do not believe that a mere listing of the measures contained in the Final Document would suffice for a truly meaningful comprehensive programme of disarmament. To the extent possible, measures of disarmament have to be elaborated so that the actual process of their implementation is clearly delineated. And lastly, controversial questions concerning stages of implementation and time-frames need to be resolved. I must also add that the programme must first and foremost concern itself with measures to safeguard the survival of the human species and prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war. Without such immediate and urgent measures which concern the security and well-being of all States, the comprehensive programme would remain largely an academic exercise.

It is unfortunate that the Ad Hoc Working Group on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was unable to accomplish any substantive results during the spring session. This is not entirely surprising if we seek to analyse the deeper causes behind what may appear at first sight to be a failure to agree upon procedure. The original scenario in which the demand was made for assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons appears to have been forgotten. Once upon a time, on the presumption that negotiations on nuclear disarmament would begin and make steady progress, and pending nuclear disarmament, some non-nuclear-weapon States sought such assurances as one aspect of the general demand for a prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Their original presumption has proved to be unjustified, and furthermore, no nuclear-weapon State is prepared, at the present time, to give an unconditional commitment never to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances. We shall, therefore, have to look at this question from a more realistic angle.

What are the present circumstances? We find that nuclear-weapon States have their own different definitions of a "non-nuclear-weapon State" for purposes of assuring it against an attack using nuclear weapons. To earn their security assurances, States must either be signatories to the non-proliferation Treaty or be part of a nuclear-weapon-free zone and should not be militarily aligned to a nuclear-weapon State or be "associated" with it in an attack on a nuclear-weapon State. I would like to ask: are we now considering negative security assurances for nuclear-weapon States instead of non-nuclear-weapon States? What an extraordinary metamorphosis! A variety of conditions have been proposed as if non-nuclear-weapon States posed some kind of potential nuclear threat to nuclear-weapon States! All these conditions should, of course, be rejected as unworthy.

Even if unconditional assurances of the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States were forthcoming, what security would there be for them in the event of an all-out nuclear war among nuclear-weapon States? None at all. The use of nuclear weapons, because of their very nature, would affect countries not even remotely involved in an armed conflict among nuclear-weapon States and their allies.

The spring session also witnessed a strong upsurge of concern among member delegations of this Committee over the accelerating pace of the nuclear arms race and the failure to negotiate a general and complete cessation of all nuclear-weapon testing. It was this concern which led the Group of 21 to recommend the setting up

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of two additional ad hoc working groups on items 1 and 2 of the Committee's agenda. Unfortunately, no consensus could be evolved on these recommendations. In the absence of such a consensus, the Group of 21 took the lead in suggesting that informal meetings of the Committee be convened to carry out a substantive examination of concrete issues relating to items 1 and 2 of its agenda, with a view to facilitating a positive decision on the question of the setting up of ad hoc working groups to undertake multilateral negotiations on these items. The distinguished Ambassador of Algeria, in his statement of 16 April 1981, has presented to the Committee the assessment of the Group of 21 of the informal meetings of the Committee devoted to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. We earnestly believe that the time has come for this Committee to undertake, without further delay, multilateral negotiations on certain specific measures of nuclear disarmament as already identified in the Group of 21 assessment.

One delegation has enquired what the role of the Committee should be in negotiations concerning nuclear disarmament. It is clearly not intended to negotiate SALT III. The Committee should, in fact, move away from the SALT concept of arms limitation and control. That concept may have a validity for the two major nuclear-weapon States. Our business here has been clearly identified by the Group of 21, not only in its assessment presented at the last plenary meeting, but already last year in document CD/116.

We have heard that one nuclear-weapon State was able at one time "by virtue of its nuclear superiority to achieve stability and peace in the world". Is this proposition true of the present time also? If so, the prospects of halting the nuclear arms race are bleak indeed for one or the other major nuclear-weapon Power may seek nuclear superiority in order once again to "achieve stability and peace in the world". Similarly, the reliance on so-called strategic parity and nuclear deterrence have also proved totally ineffective in either containing the nuclear arms race or making measures of nuclear disarmament possible. And as we have repeatedly stated, without argument to the contrary being expressed here in this Committee, questions concerning nuclear weapons are not the concern merely of a handful of nuclear-weapon States and their allies. These are questions concerning the vital security concerns of all States. It is extremely dangerous to leave such vital matters to over-armed nuclear-weapon States that are in a state of heated ideological and political conflict. This, I submit, is the rationale for our seeking multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament. And lest this seem to be merely the expression of concern felt by non-nuclear-weapon States, I must add that it is in the interest of nuclear-weapon States themselves to involve non-nuclear-weapon States in a common endeavour and responsibility to survive in peace with honour, without becoming prisoners of the state of relations existing among them.

My delegation would also like to put forward, in some detail, its views concerning the proposal to negotiate a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. No one in this Committee would deny that a nuclear war, if it ever broke out, could not reasonably be expected to be confined to belligerents alone. We have heard the proposition that nuclear weapons are intended for self-defence. How can they be regarded as such when the consequences of their use will extend far beyond the areas of conflict? Nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction that do not and cannot discriminate between belligerents and non-belligerents, combatants and innocent civilians and military targets and civilian

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installations. Can Article 51 of the United Nations Charter be justifiably invoked to sanction the use of such weapons in exercise of the right of individual and collective self-defence? It would perhaps be interesting for the United Nations General Assembly to seek the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice under Article 96 of the Charter, on the legal interpretation of Article 51, and to clarify whether the use of nuclear weapons in exercise of the right of self-defence is permissible even if their use could endanger the survival of mankind.

It is a recognized principle of international law that in any armed conflict the right of the parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited. It is also a recognized principle of international law that in any armed conflict the parties concerned cannot employ means of warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment. These principles have most recently been enshrined in the preamble of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, which was opened for signature by States in New York only a short while ago. Now I would like to ask the representatives of those nuclear-weapon States which reserve unto themselves the right to use nuclear weapons in the defence of their security, does not this right contravene both the letter and the spirit of these well-recognized principles of international law? Is not the choice of nuclear weapons to wage war truly a recourse to unlimited means of warfare? And could anyone here argue that the use of nuclear weapons would not cause "widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment", not to speak of the millions of innocent civilians who would be massacred? Is it not somewhat ironical, and perhaps cynical, that we ban land-mines and booby traps on the grounds that their use contravenes humanitarian law, and yet continue to suffer the threat of the use of nuclear weapons? If the nuclear-weapon States are truly sincere in their commitment to these principles of international law, then we see no reason why they cannot agree to a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. Such a convention would certainly be more relevant than a prohibition on the use of booby traps. It is not my intention here to belittle the importance of the inhumane weapons Convention. I am merely trying to show that the same principles of international and humanitarian law which made it possible to negotiate the inhumane weapons Convention apply with far greater force and relevance to nuclear weapons.

It has been argued in this Committee that, whether we like it or not, nuclear weapons are a component of a delicate military balance between the two major alliance systems in the world today. Further, that the doctrine of nuclear deterrence is an essential element preserving international peace, and especially peace in Europe. A convention on the non-use of nuclear weapons, it is said, would upset the existing military balance, therefore, and make war more likely.

My delegation has, in contrast, argued that the concepts of strategic parity, military balance and nuclear deterrence are at the very heart of the escalating nuclear arms race. And this accelerating escalation, unless arrested, will one day result in a nuclear catastrophe. If parity could keep the peace, why is there today a scene of growing confrontation and mutual distrust between the two major military alliances? Has the achievement of parity or balance in the military sense created the conditions for greater mutual understanding and trust among the countries concerned? For if mutual mistrust and suspicion fuel the arms race, then the achievement or maintenance of strategic parity or military balance has clearly failed to create conditions of enduring peace and stability. Many delegations here argue fervently for confidence-building measures, transparency of intentions and verification. Efforts are made to subject military manoeuvres involving armed forces

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and conventional armaments to mutual observation and surveillance. But what about nuclear weapons? Can trust and confidence be generated at all if the parties concerned rely on the threat of use of nuclear weapons as an insurance for their security? Can mutual trust coexist with a policy of keeping the other side guessing as to when and at what so-called "threshold" nuclear weapons would be used in an armed conflict? To put it bluntly, the so-called doctrine of nuclear deterrence and confidence-building are contradictory aims. The pursuit of one effectively precludes the other.

Leaders of all the nuclear-weapon States have affirmed time and again that they are conscious of the catastrophic consequences of a nuclear war and that a decision to use nuclear weapons would not be taken lightly. It has also been affirmed by them that only in extreme circumstances, in situations involving extraordinary dangers to national survival would an option to use nuclear weapons be considered. We believe that these statements have been made in all sincerity. If, for all the nuclear-weapon States, nuclear weapons truly represent a weapon of the last resort, how can there be opposition to a mutual agreement among them to forswear their use?

It has been argued that a declaration on the non-use of nuclear weapons could prove to be positively dangerous since it might breed the false impression that aggression could be undertaken without the risk of nuclear war. The opposite could also be true. The risk of a nuclear war may lead to aggression in the belief that limited conventional conflicts and particularly local regional conflicts would have to be tolerated precisely because no one would like to risk a nuclear war. Not to mention the fact that, despite the existence of so-called strategic parity and nuclear deterrence, the major Powers have not at all been inhibited from intervening militarily in and extending their influence over regions of the world not covered by their alliance systems. And if it is argued that the use of nuclear weapons would be threatened even if a limited conventional conflict were to break out, then nuclear war becomes far more likely. Then it would not be possible to say that the use of nuclear weapons is contemplated only in extreme and exceptional circumstances.

A convention on the non-use of nuclear weapons would not by itself eliminate the threat posed by the very existence of nuclear weapons. However, such an agreement would be an important confidence-building measure and would make the task of eventually eliminating nuclear weapons much easier to achieve. If the nuclear-weapon States, without exception, recognize the utility of an interim measure such as extending guarantees of non-use of nuclear weapons to a selected category of non-nuclear-weapon States, surely they cannot argue that a total prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, pending the elimination of existing nuclear arsenals, is of lesser utility.

There is a further argument in favour of a prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Once the illegitimacy of the use of nuclear weapons is recognized, there will be greater credibility to international efforts to stop the horizontal proliferation of such weapons. At present, the continued insistence by some States that they have a right to use nuclear weapons in the pursuit of their security interests makes it more difficult to convince other States that it is in their interest to forswear the acquisition of such weapons.

I hope my intervention today will enable members of the Committee, particularly the representatives of the nuclear-weapon States, to gain a better understanding of our proposal for an agreement on a prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. We recognize that it is only the achievement of nuclear disarmament that would effectively remove the threat of a nuclear war. In the interim, however, a prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons could be a measure of some political significance. It would not only increase confidence and trust among States but would also make the task of negotiating measures of nuclear disarmament easier. The ICBMs of war should be replaced by the ICBMs of peace, by which I mean that the threat posed by nuclear

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missiles and by the nuclear arms race can only be alleviated by international confidence-building measures which would create the necessary atmosphere of trust within which nuclear disarmament can be pursued as a credible goal. A convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons will be one such ICBM of peace. We earnestly hope that multilateral negotiations on such a convention will begin in this Committee at an early date.

The CHAIRMAN: You will remember that a request was made by the distinguished representative of Algeria, Ambassador Salah-Bey, for summary records of the informal meetings which we had on items 1 and 2 of the agenda. I find that for this, a decision of the Committee is required as to whether we will allow the Secretariat to produce these summaries. I will come back to this question at the end of our meeting.

Mr. JAIPAL (Secretary of the Committee and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General): At our 117th plenary meeting on 24 March, the distinguished representative of France made a statement in connection with the distribution of documentation in the official languages of the Committee.

First of all, may I assure the distinguished representative of France that the Secretariat continues to attach particular importance to the timely circulation of documentation in French and other languages. As the distinguished representative of France said in his statement, the distribution of documentation in the official languages should, as far as possible, be simultaneous, and it is on that understanding that the Secretariat has been working. There are, however, exceptional cases when delays in distribution in one or another language do occur, for reasons beyond our control.

In the case of the documents mentioned by the distinguished representative of France, may I note that document CD/164 presented by Finland was in fact circulated also in French at the plenary meeting on 24 March. I regret that the French translation did not reach the desk of the distinguished representative of France; this was probably the result of a mistake during the actual circulation at the meeting; we have, however, established beyond doubt that the French text was in fact distributed during that meeting.

With regard to document CD/166 presented by the USSR, I would like to state that this document was received by the Secretariat on Monday, 23 March, in the afternoon, with a request from the sponsor that it be circulated at the plenary meeting the following morning, that of 24 March. This was a long document of 13 pages and it was circulated as and when the various translations were ready. The French text of that document was available only early in the afternoon of 24 March, together with the other official languages. Although the document in question had already been translated in New York, it had to be reissued as an official document of this Committee.

The Secretariat is sometimes requested, at short notice, to circulate documents at a particular meeting, while the technical services are at the same time required to meet the urgent requests of other bodies. In those circumstances it is difficult to ensure simultaneous distribution, since the Committee does not have exclusive control over the services for the typing, production and distribution of documentation. In the case of documents requiring translation, which are the majority issued by the Committee, there is bound to be some delay.

In spite of these technical problems, I wish to assure the distinguished representative of France and the other members of the Committee that the Secretariat is conscious of the need to ensure, as far as possible, the simultaneous distribution of documentation in all the official languages of the Committee. If the Secretariat were to be given adequate notice, simultaneous distribution of documentation in all official languages should always be possible.

Mr. de la GORCE (France) (translated from French): I should like to thank Ambassador Jaipal, the distinguished Secretary of the Committee, for his statement. We are fully persuaded of the serious attention given to these problems by the Secretariat. When, on 24 March, we drew attention to two cases in which it seemed to us that the normal procedure could have been followed more rigorously, it was, of course, precisely because we were concerned for the punctilious observance of the rules we have adopted, especially as regards document CD/166, to which Ambassador Jaipal has just referred. We were astonished that a document already distributed in October in New York, in all the languages, should need to be re-translated or retyped, when in fact the text was already available. However, I do not wish to dwell further on this matter. I would simply like to state and to confirm my delegation's satisfaction on hearing the Secretary of the Committee give us assurances which appear to us entirely satisfactory and for which we thank him and also the Secretariat as a whole.

The CHAIRMAN: May I be allowed to come back to the request that we heard from the distinguished representative of Algeria, Ambassador Salah-Bey, as spokesman of the Group of 21. For clarity I would like to re-read the French original of his request:

"Le groupe des 21 m'a chargé de demander, par votre entremise, au Secrétariat de préparer un document qui présenterait la synthèse des discussions officieuses qui se sont tenues sur les points 1 et 2 au cours des réunions consacrées à ces questions.

"Ce document pourrait se limiter à indiquer les tendances générales qui sont apparues lors des échanges de vues qui se sont instaurées lors de ces différentes occasions. Dans l'esprit du Groupe des 21, il ne serait pas utile que les délégations qui ont pris part au débat soient citées dans le document de synthèse dont nous demandons l'établissement."

This was the request read out this morning to the Secretariat, and I think that we need a decision of the Committee to ask the Secretariat to take up this matter. May I ask the Committee if there is a consensus that the Secretariat be asked to produce these summaries, as requested in the text I have just read out, so that they may be ready at the beginning of our summer session.

Mr. FLOWERREE (United States of America): I take the floor simply to ask for clarification concerning the summaries. Would the summaries as prepared by the Secretariat have the same status as, for example, the transcripts that were asked for, earlier in our sessions? That is, would they be documents circulated for the private use of delegations or would the summaries become documents of the Committee?

Mr. JAIPAL (Secretary of the Committee and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General): I would like to draw the attention of members to rule 22 of our rules of procedure. I presume it is in terms of this rule that this request has been made. Rule 22 reads as follows: "The Committee may hold informal meetings, with or without experts, to consider as appropriate substantive matters as well as questions concerning its organization of work. When requested by the Committee, the Secretariat shall provide unofficial summaries of those meetings in the working languages." I presume that it would be right to interpret these unofficial summaries as being intended strictly for circulation among the members of this Committee for their use.

The CHAIRMAN: I hope Ambassador Jaipal's statement answered the question raised by Ambassador Flowerree. I draw the conclusion that we all agree that, on the basis of the request made this morning by Ambassador Salah-Bey of Algeria on behalf of the Group of 21, the Secretariat is asked to proceed in accordance with that request.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: You will recall that at our 125th plenary meeting the Committee agreed to hold the next plenary meeting on Friday, 24 April, at 10.30 a.m. It was also decided that the Thursday plenary meeting would not take place this week and that instead there would be a meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons. Therefore, we will meet in plenary meeting on Friday at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.35 a.m.