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ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FIFTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 16 April 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. G. PFEIFFER (Federal Republic of Germany)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. SALAH-BEY
Mr. M. MATI

Argentina: Mr. F.J. DAVILA
Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD
Miss N. NASCIMBENE

Australia: Mr. R.A. WALKER
Mr. R. STEELE
Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. R. DEYANOV
Mr. K. PRAMOV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U NGWE VIN
U THAN HTUN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL
Mr. G. SKINNER
Mr. J. GAUDREAU

China: Mr. YU MENGJIA
Mr. SA BENWANG
Mr. LIN Chen

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLA VILA
Mrs. V. BOROWDOSKY JACKIEWICH
Mr. F. CUSPINERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. A. CHIA
Mr. L. STAVINCHA

Egypt:

Mr. EL SAYED ABDEL RAOUF EL REEDY
Mr. M.N. PAHNY

Ethiopia:France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. THEELICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. G. PFELETER
Mr. N. KLINGER
Mr. H. MULLER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India:

Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. CH. A. SANI
Mr. I. DAMANIK
Mr. S. HADI
Mr. F. QASIM
Mr. KARYONO

Iran:

Mr. M. DABIRI
Mr. D. ATERI
Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA

Italy: Mr. A. CIARRAPICO
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. R. ISHII
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya: Mr. S. SHITTEMI
Mr. G. MUNIU

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA-ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
Mr. C. HELLER

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. L. BAYART
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. Olu ADENIJI
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. M. AHMAD

Peru: Mr. A. THORNBERRY

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. T. MELESCANU

<u>Sri Lanka:</u>	Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA
<u>Sweden:</u>	Mr. C. LIDGARD Mr. G. EKHOLM Mr. J. LUNDIN
<u>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics :</u>	Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN Mr. V.A. PERFILIEV Mr. V.M. GANJA Mr. A.G. DOULYAN
<u>United Kingdom:</u>	Mr. D.M. SUTTERHAYES Mrs. J.I. LINK
<u>United States of America:</u>	Mr. C.C. FLOWERREE Mr. F.P. DESIIONE Miss K. CRITTENBERGER Mr. C. PEARCY
<u>Venezuela:</u>	Mr. H. ARTEAGA Mr. O.A. AGUILAR
<u>Yugoslavia:</u>	Mr. B. BRANKOVIC
<u>Zaire:</u>	Mr. O. GNOK
<u>Secretary of the Committee and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General:</u>	Mr. R. JAIPAL
<u>Deputy Secretary of the Committee:</u>	Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): In my intervention today, I am going to address item 3 on our agenda: "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". And I want to state that we have listened with the greatest interest to the preceding interventions on this subject. It is a matter of great satisfaction to my delegation that the CD's Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances has been re-established and that the group is now working effectively on substantive issues under the able guidance of its Chairman, Mr. Ciarrapico of Italy. We fervently hope that the ongoing efforts will yield some concrete results. Outwardly, the prerequisites necessary for progress seem to exist; all the five nuclear-weapon States are actively participating in the negotiations in the Working Group. They have furthermore recognized the legitimacy of the claims for effective and binding assurances not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. The discussion in the Working Group has so far made some progress in clarifying the issues involved. It is now time to commence a new phase of serious negotiations, which, given sufficient determination and political will, can result in a solution acceptable to all.

Before going into the details of the matter, I would like to make two points of a general nature, which I hope will shed some light on the approach of the Swedish delegation with respect to negative security assurances.

My first point relates to a specific aspect of Sweden's policy of neutrality. One basic feature of this policy is that it is not founded on any kind of international agreement. Consistent with this fundamental consideration we have rejected the idea of relying -- for our security -- on international guarantees, which in our view might place us in a state of dependence and interference from the outside. In view of this, it is natural that we act with caution in relation to the concept of security assurances. It is also understandable that we have some reservations as to the very terms "security assurances" and "security guarantees", which have connotations incompatible with the basic principles of our foreign policy.

The second general remark is that in our view an international security system cannot in the long-term perspective be built on the existence of nuclear weapons. As long as these weapons are in the arsenals of States no one is secure, neither the States which have these weapons nor those which do not have them. The only totally reliable assurance against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is their complete elimination. It is generally recognized that this is a final objective. However, until this has been achieved we are unfortunately compelled to take into account the role of nuclear weapons in our efforts to promote peace and to diminish the risk of a nuclear tragedy. This does not mean that we in any sense approve or legitimate the existence of nuclear weapons, but only that they represent a reality that cannot be disregarded. Consequently, whatever the arrangement that might eventually be agreed upon, it must be clarified that it represents an interim measure pending nuclear disarmament.

Having said this, I wish again to emphasize that the Swedish delegation is strongly committed to the efforts in the CD to arrive at a solution on security assurances acceptable to all. We consider it an urgent task to exert every effort in order to meet the claims of the non-nuclear-weapon States in this question.

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Those claims derive from the fact that a few States -- in their own perceived security interest -- have acquired nuclear weapons which constitute a threat to all countries -- both the haves and the have-nots. There can, in our opinion, be no justification for this situation. I share the view expressed by Ambassador Adeniji a couple of weeks ago. He said: "After all, if nuclear-weapon States, in spite of all they know of the horror of nuclear weapons and the catastrophic effect of their use, still choose to flirt with self-destruction, then the least service they can render the rest of the world is an acceptance of the fact that their suicidal desire need not be forced on the rest of us".

It goes without saying that the responsibility to diminish and eventually eliminate this threat primarily rests with the nuclear-weapon States themselves. Sweden for its part is anxious to contribute to the efforts to achieve acceptable solutions. However, no progress is possible unless the nuclear-weapon States are willing to take some further action in the true interest of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

The task of the Ad Hoc Working Group is --- as stated in its mandate --- "to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". I would like to emphasize that the objective of these negotiations is to do something in the interest of the non-nuclear-weapon States. Although we recognize the security concerns of the nuclear-weapon States, we think that this aspect of the matter should not be permitted to overshadow the needs and aspirations of the non-nuclear-weapon States. It is therefore essential that the Working Group, in accordance with its mandate, should focus its attention on what can be done in the interest of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

As to the deliberations in the Working Group, it is inevitable that the existing five declarations form an integral part of the discussions. The in-depth analysis of these formulae which was carried out has helped us to clarify the various positions and to identify the similarities and differences in the unilateral declarations. As has been pointed out by other delegations, this examination shows that the unilateral declarations are shaped rather to suit the military doctrines of the nuclear-weapon States themselves than to meet the claims of the non-nuclear-weapon States. I agree with the representative of Finland, who said a few weeks ago -- with respect to the major nuclear Powers -- that the unilateral declarations essentially "are functions of the respective military doctrines".

Considerable efforts have been made by the Working Group in explaining ways and means of reaching agreement on a common formula which could be transformed into some kind of international arrangements. The Swedish delegation supports these efforts. This does not mean that a common formula is an end in itself, nor that we are prepared to agree to such a formula at any price. To be acceptable, a common formula must include certain basic requirements corresponding to the interest of the non-nuclear-weapon States. In the course of its deliberations the Working Group has been able to identify the similarities in the existing unilateral declarations and thereby to extract the common denominator in all the

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five formulae. It has been suggested that this common denominator could serve as the basis for the efforts to evolve one common formula on negative security assurances. However, this approach gives rise to serious reservations on the part of my delegation. Such a common formula would in fact be equal to the lowest common denominator and would be burdened with all the conditions and limitations included in the existing declarations. In addition it could be conclusive for further restrictions and conditions on certain commitments already made by some of the nuclear-weapon States. Such an approach would be in contradiction with the objective to reach agreement on international arrangements in the interest of the non-nuclear-weapon States. The efforts should therefore be directed towards an unambiguous formula which should be based on objective criteria and should not be burdened with restrictions and conditions.

With respect to the question of the nature and scope of negative security assurances, my delegation is of the view that there are basically three categories of issues that will have to be considered.

The most fundamental element of an effective security assurance is obviously legally binding undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. The obligations by the nuclear-weapon States should be as simple and clear as that.

The non-nuclear-weapon States should not be obliged to make any further commitments if, by adhering to the NPT, a treaty on a nuclear-weapon-free zone or another internationally binding instrument, they have undertaken not to develop or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. In this context I might add that in our view the non-proliferation aspect is an important feature of negative security assurances and we have noted with satisfaction that this view is generally shared by all members of the CD.

With respect to the legal framework for negative security assurances, I wish to reiterate that we have serious reservations as to the idea of an international convention which would impose obligations on non-nuclear-weapon States. For reasons that I referred to at the beginning of my intervention we would also find it difficult to enter into any kind of bilateral agreement.

The most crucial and most difficult issue involved is the claim by certain nuclear-weapon States, primarily the two major nuclear-weapon Powers, to certain exceptions from their obligations. The purpose of these exceptions, the so-called "self-defence clauses", is in certain circumstances to justify the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. The discussion has focused particularly on two kinds of exceptions, namely, with respect to non-nuclear-weapon States that either have nuclear weapons on their territories or are involved in a military operation in alliance or association with another nuclear-weapon State. It has time and again been pointed out that such exceptions create considerable ambiguity as to the exact applicability of the assurances, and give room for

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subjective interpretations by the nuclear-weapon States. Who can determine whether a non-nuclear-weapon State which is involved in a military operation against a nuclear-weapon State at a given moment is acting in "association" with another such State? And what are the exact implications of the provision "have not nuclear weapons on their territory" at a time when aircraft, naval vessels and armed vehicles capable of carrying nuclear warheads can easily move from one country into the territory of another State, especially if the nuclear-weapon State previously had other large military forces in that territory?

Although fully aware of the complexity of these matters, we are of the view that without any exceptions all non-nuclear-weapon States which are legally committed to their nuclear-weapon-free status are entitled to unambiguous assurances that nuclear weapons will not be used against them. We have in this regard noted that representatives of both the major alliances have made statements recognizing that the utmost restraint is imperative. President Brezhnev stated on 25 April 1978 that "only extraordinary circumstances ... could compel us to have recourse to" nuclear weapons. The Ambassador of the United Kingdom made a similar statement here in the CD on 19 March. He said that the British assurance is valid in all circumstances "except self-defence in extreme circumstances".

Even if it can be argued that certain exceptions may be justifiable in the context of military alliances and similar binding agreements, there is no reason why such exceptions should also apply to non-nuclear-weapon States, which are outside all nuclear security arrangements. As long as such States are legally committed to their nuclear-weapon-free status there is no reason why they should be subjected to any limitations and additional conditions in their inherent right to the freedom from being the object of use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Nor can it be accepted that with respect to such States the validity of the assurances are subject to any interpretations by the nuclear-weapon States.

As I have already stated, our discussion has demonstrated that the unilateral assurances are primarily framed to serve the security interests of the nuclear-weapon States themselves and their allies. Only in the second place have the legitimate concerns of States non-parties to nuclear security arrangements been taken into consideration. We have for our part understood the intentions behind the existing unilateral declarations to be that such States -- provided they are committed to a nuclear-weapon-free status -- should permanently enjoy freedom from being the subject of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We take it for granted, therefore, that a country like Sweden, with its non-alliance status and its non-nuclear-weapon record, as embodied inter alia in its adherence to the NPT, is covered, without any exception, by the unilateral assurances made by the nuclear-weapon States, in so far as they relate to individual non-nuclear-weapon States. I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to ask the representatives of the nuclear-weapon States to confirm that our understanding of the applicability of their respective assurances with respect to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is correct.

Mr. McPHAIL (Canada): Mr. Chairman, let me congratulate you on your chairmanship of the Committee this month. It is, of course, customary to make a comment of that kind, but as you well know, the comment is not a perfunctory one. The orderly dispatch of the business of the Committee is essential to its functioning. This orderly dispatch is frequently a difficult task and you ought to be congratulated, Sir, on your performance, and naturally I take the occasion to acknowledge as well the success of Ambassador Herder in conducting our affairs during the previous month.

The item of business for this week is a composite one, the further consideration of agenda items, and it is my intention this morning to make brief references to various items on our agenda on which my delegation has not intervened in plenary during this session.

The first half of the 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament approaches its conclusion. It is a good time to take stock. While our conclusions must still be tentative, the pattern which is emerging is not cause for unbridled satisfaction. It would be wise for the Committee to make an objective assessment of the direction in which we are moving and why, since, while it is true that the Committee on Disarmament is the sole multilateral negotiating body of this kind and it therefore possesses unique authority, in the long run its authority -- and indeed its existence -- will depend upon the results it produces.

At the beginning of this year's session, we were bold enough to set out what we thought the Committee's objectives should be this year as we move towards the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, and thus in commenting on several agenda items today I wish also to attempt an assessment, the kind that I suggest we now need, or to make a kind of trial balance-sheet of where we stand as we approach the mid-point of the 1981 session.

Today I wish to attempt such an assessment or trial balance-sheet.

Nature of the balance-sheet

Before I deal with certain of the substantive issues before the Committee, I should like to make some general comments:

(a) There have been a number of welcome developments lately in the Committee. The most significant, early in the session, was the rapidity with which procedural items were dealt with. The general willingness to get down to business, we hope, will become a practice which in most instances eluded those institutions of which this is the successor.

(b) The concentrated session on chemical weapons was a success in that it laid the groundwork, by means of the application of technical expertise, for progress on a number of problems standing in the way of the conclusion of a treaty. The two Canadian working papers, we hope, made a practical contribution along these lines. We hope also that the enhanced understanding of the issues involved enabled a common conclusion to be reached that verification need not be an insurmountable problem, assuming, of course, that agreement can be reached on sufficient measures to reassure all States. We agree with those who have noted that adequate measures of verification are indispensable for confidence in a treaty: inadequate verification measures will surely create or add to mistrust, and undermine the value of any accord.

(c) Deliberations on nuclear issues have shed necessary light on some matters: while the positions advanced cannot be reconciled through negotiation within the Committee on Disarmament nevertheless, the debate provided an opportunity for national

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security concerns to be presented: and these concerns must be understood if positions on specific arms control measures are to be fully appreciated. Without such an appreciation, negotiation is surely bound to be hollow.

However, other methods of work of the Committee on Disarmament should be considered carefully to determine whether they contribute to the goals we collectively seek:

(a) Undue emphasis on procedure threatens to immobilize the substantive work of the Committee. (At one point, one sitting was devoted to the question of written records.) This is symptomatic of a larger problem which it is in our common interest to resist: i.e. the growing tendency for the Committee on Disarmament to become the forum for the presentation of national positions in a static way rather than the translation of those positions into real negotiating terms. It is right and proper that national positions be put forward, especially in plenary and perhaps even in what are styled as our informal sessions: but it is not right and proper that such positions simply be restated in working groups where negotiation is supposed to take place.

(b) Secondly, the proliferation of meetings has placed a strain on all delegations with little appreciable impact on our rate of progress. We need to examine ways in which this situation can be rectified: the success of the concentrated meetings of chemical weapons experts may provide a clue to enhancing our effectiveness and efficiency. Let us acknowledge that increasing the quantity of meetings is no substitute for improving the quality of substantive negotiations.

(c) Thirdly, and I will touch on this only briefly, the continuing debate -- and indeed concern -- about the relationship of this Committee to other, more restricted negotiations is worrying. This problem has been most evident in our discussion about a CTB treaty. But rather than adopting a theological approach to this question -- which will not advance matters in any practical way -- we believe that it would be in our common interest to focus on areas where the Committee on Disarmament might reasonably be expected to play a constructive role. I emphasize the word constructive: the yardstick should be the degree to which we can make a positive contribution to the matter at hand, i.e. in this illustrative case, how we can assist, support and go beyond the trilateral negotiations. I will return to this point later.

We are not here to debate resolutions, but rather to negotiate arms control agreements. This is the standard against which the Committee on Disarmament will be judged. I do not underestimate the value of debate -- I mentioned the debate on nuclear disarmament: if such a debate puts into sharper focus concerns about the strategic nuclear equation, then so much the better. The debate reflected accurately the nature of the international climate, and this climate must be taken into account. It is in this sense that we use the word realism. But in our more precise endeavours, we must work within the realm of the possible. The record of the Committee on Disarmament so far suggests that this is perhaps the most urgent and abiding over-all requirement if progress is to be made in the Committee.

Matters before the Committee on Disarmament

I now wish to turn to a number of matters on our agenda.

Agenda items 1 and 2: nuclear disarmament and CTB

Nuclear issues should indeed rank first on our agenda, for they are of paramount concern.

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(a) At the outset I wish to reiterate the Canadian position that the CTB trilateral talks should be resumed at the earliest possible moment. We share the overwhelming desire of the international community in this regard. I need not repeat what is at stake. Others have expressed it well. We believe that the Committee on Disarmament can play a useful role in the process leading to a CTB treaty: valuable suggestions have been advanced, particularly in the area of seismic data exchange, about what the Committee might now examine, thereby contributing to the realization of a multilateral treaty.

(b) At the same time, we doubt that much purpose can be served by repeatedly presenting the Committee with verbatim quotes from successive General Assembly resolutions. Similarly, while it may be an effective means to proceed in a debate, we doubt that matters are much advanced by putting repeatedly to the partners in those negotiations questions which they are not yet in a position to answer. We think the best role for the Committee on Disarmament is to focus on areas where it can make a positive contribution to or act in support of negotiations for a CTB.

(c) Questions have been raised about a moratorium on peaceful nuclear explosions, as envisaged in last year's trilateral report, as part of an over-all CTB package. We consider that a moratorium on so-called peaceful nuclear explosions -- leading to a complete ban -- is indispensable. We are against peaceful nuclear explosions and remain unconvinced by those who defend them, arguing unsuccessfully, in our view, that "peaceful explosions" can somehow be separated from those which are not. Unless and until some effective means can be devised to make absolutely sure that there would be no weapons-related benefits from a peaceful nuclear explosion, no such explosions should be contemplated under a CTB treaty.

(d) The relationship of the non-proliferation Treaty to the conclusion of a CTB has been raised. The results of the second non-proliferation treaty review conference highlighted the concerns of many States in this regard. While in a number of respects we share those concerns, we do not believe that they should be used as an excuse to prevent the further strengthening of the Treaty or adherence to the Treaty by other States.

(e) Discussions on the nature of the nuclear strategic relationship have been enlightening, but also incomplete. Canada is a member of a nuclear alliance but has deliberately chosen not to produce its own nuclear weapons. We belong to a nuclear alliance because we and our allies are subject to a nuclear threat. Our concern is just that. Thus, we cannot dismiss what we consider to be the asymmetrical disposition of nuclear forces in Europe; and we are therefore party to the NATO decision of 1979 on redressing this balance. This balance is fundamental to the maintenance of the peace. While we recognize the expressed Soviet interest in arms control, we note that the Soviet proposal for a moratorium would only perpetuate an unacceptable imbalance, contrary to the principle of equality. The NATO offer for talks on European theatre nuclear forces aimed at balanced, equitable and verifiable arms control agreements limiting such forces is of fundamental importance, and the holding of such talks is in the mutual interest of all parties concerned, be they nuclear Powers, non-nuclear Powers allied with nuclear Powers or non-nuclear Powers which are non-aligned.

Agenda item 3: negative security assurances

Assurances to non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons through effective international arrangements are important. Arguments have been advanced pointing to the relationship of such assurances to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. But with the history of the treatment of this

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question at last year's session and in the light of the fact that we have not registered much progress this year, we remain sceptical about the outlook. Each assurance has its own purpose, and has been issued under certain specific conditions. There is not much evidence that those purposes can be reconciled by drafting. This said, we will with others seek to find means for a suitable outcome.

Agenda item 5: radiological weapons

Reservations have been expressed by a number of delegations concerning the utility of negotiations to ban a type of weapon which does not exist at present, and for which there appears to be little practical application in the foreseeable future. Concern to bring into the text under discussion the practical consideration of the bombing of nuclear power stations has also been registered. This latter point will have to be seriously considered to see whether it can readily be incorporated into the text of the draft treaty under discussion. Inclusion of suitable wording on peaceful uses of radiological substances will also have to be considered. In the meantime the draft treaty as it stands does have the great advantage of closing off a weapons option and prospects for its development.

Agenda item 6: comprehensive programme of disarmament

The underlying requirement in arms control and disarmament agreements is, we believe, verifiability of compliance with the terms of the agreement in question. In other words, our view is that we should look at measures in relation to each other, capable of realization. A step-by-step approach means exactly that: building on what has already been accomplished. We can, of course, set priorities and goals and establish principles, as has been done in the final document of the first Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament, a text which we continue to endorse and uphold. While there are indeed stages in the process of arms control and disarmament, they are not related to time *per se* but to confidence, or the lack of it, in existing security arrangements. The selection of arms control measures because they are important, without recognizing why arms are in place, is not realistic. The imposition of unattainable deadlines is also unrealistic, and the continuing credibility of this Committee depends on realism. In its turn, realism is a vital component in building confidence; and the uninterrupted cultivation of confidence is essential before progress in the pursuit of an arms control and disarmament programme can be realistic in both political and military terms.

In conclusion, I wish to comment on the notion of political will. This term has been used increasingly in this Committee of late: Indeed, it appears in the Final Document of the General Assembly's first special session on disarmament. It has perhaps been insufficiently examined by the Committee. Political will must be developed by an understanding of positions and confidence-building along the lines I have just noted, and then must be nurtured through the process of negotiations. If negotiations falter, simple exhortations to political will will be insufficient to revive them. Political will is fragile, and depends for its existence on factors outside the confines of these chambers: its real meaning is the desire to understand, and to agree. It implies balance, reciprocity, and confidence. It is not a unilateral phenomenon. Appealing to political will in the abstract does not produce results.

In our view, particularly in the period leading up to the General Assembly's second special session on disarmament, the Committee must look to those measures which show prospects of realization, where real progress can be made. Our objectives should be modest but realizable, for it is better for us to devote ourselves to measures whose prospects for success are greatest, rather than to measures whose prospects are doubtful.

(Mr. McPhail, Canada)

My assessment today of the work thus far of this session of the Committee on Disarmament is not much cause for comfort. But there are areas where progress can be made, provided we work together.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Canada for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the chair.

Mr. JIMENEZ DAVILA (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, the congratulations offered to those who preside over the work of the Committee on Disarmament are of great significance, given the importance of this forum, the trust which the international community places in it and, essentially, the obligations inherent in its task.

These three elements constitute a heavy burden and at the same time an incentive in carrying out the duties of Chairman.

This is why my delegation, mindful of the excellent record of your distinguished predecessors in this office -- Ambassador de la Gorce, the representative of France, and Ambassador Herder, the representative of the German Democratic Republic -- associates itself with the remarks made during these last two weeks recognizing your wise leadership, your untiring dedication and your determination to advance our work.

In only a few days' time, you will be called upon to close this first part of the 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament. My delegation may perhaps not be the only one to refer during the time that remains to the results of these three months of meetings, especially as these meetings and those to be held in the summer months together make up the last full session of this body before the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament to be held in 1982.

The first part of my statement will be of a general character, and it is my delegation's intention that it should be so and to recall certain facts and ideas which from the beginning have been essential to the process of negotiation.

Each new session of the Committee brings a new hope and the desire to achieve some measure of progress, not only within the negotiating body itself but also within the various internal forums which in one way or another have the same objective -- that the negotiations should produce concrete results.

Unfortunately, the world political situation over the past 35 years has accustomed us to a political "TIME" perspective (with capital letters and inverted commas) which is frighteningly unchanging in the matter of disarmament. I am referring to that vast slow-moving mass of arguments, prevarications and suspicions that have taken the place of negotiation, and made progress virtually impossible.

I am not referring to those well-known historic moments when there has been a positive development in the disarmament negotiations, moments which, by their very rarity, have confirmed the principle of the legitimacy of the negotiations as the appropriate means for removing the grave threat of nuclear war.

I have to say that the thought of that slow-moving mass, to which I referred a moment ago, conjures up anew in my delegation's mind those old philosophical notions of the earthly existence of living beings, material and mortal, as being merely a

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reflection of "IDEAS" (again in capital letters and between inverted commas) -- celestial, pre-existent, immutable and eternal.

This digression, which is not really one, in fact makes me think that general and complete disarmament is rather like one of those abstract and elusive ideal states, and that it will become real only on the day when the negotiators, by their efforts, find that angle of reflection which gives life to what in fact exists, and is within our grasp but which, for countless reasons, we are unable to attain.

The subject of disarmament, as a political topic, is perhaps the one which has taken up most discussion time both in the Security Council and in the General Assembly as well as in its First Committee and in many committees and commissions and bodies of all kinds whose composition has ranged from the small number of two members to the fullness of membership of the Disarmament Commission.

I wonder whether our predecessors in negotiation foresaw, in the 1940s, when the Atomic Energy Commission was set up, the extreme technical and political complexity of the problems inherent in atomic weapons, in their prohibition and their destruction, in everything which is still being considered by our Committee today in the 1980s.

Despite the fact that the very first resolution of the General Assembly, adopted by consensus in 1946, called for the elimination of nuclear weapons from the arsenals of States, we see today that no progress has been made in nuclear disarmament. On the contrary, what we have today is the idea of security based on nuclear weapons -- a hopeless contradiction of principle -- a resort to the absurd to demonstrate the reasonable.

The men of 1946, still very much aware of the miseries of war, based their reasoning on a few simple and wise principles, self-evident and indisputable. They believed in the exchange of scientific information in the interests of the peaceful utilization of atomic energy; it seemed natural to them to establish adequate controls over atomic energy in order to ensure that it was used for peaceful purposes; they were ready to look for effective safeguards.

But the scientific revolution born of the discovery and application of atomic energy moved at a quicker pace than the application of the principles. The political problems of security swamped the good intentions of the negotiators.

Time was creating, by dint of failed encounters or contrived non-encounters, a veritable labyrinth of roads leading inevitably to what are known as "priorities", which are the basic constants of any discussion on disarmament. Some of the questions have today to a certain extent been answered: questions were asked about the priority

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between arms control and disarmament, about partial measures as a means of achieving general and complete disarmament, about the possibility of aiming directly at general disarmament. And always, with respect to alternative priorities, there was the question whether ensuring conditions of international trust was a prerequisite to the implementation of disarmament measures, or vice versa.

In the light of these general reflections, and in a desire to co-operate in your efforts, Mr. Chairman, my delegation ventures to submit, in a preliminary way, some comments on the course of our work at this first part of the present session.

We believe, in the first place, that the Committee should be congratulated on the speed with which it managed to adopt its agenda, organize its work and appoint its working groups. In 1980 this took the Committee almost all of the first part of the session.

We believe that the value of working groups as the most appropriate machinery for the initiation of negotiations in this forum has been demonstrated. As for the question of negative guarantees, we note that the efforts to analyse the substance of the matter have not succeeded in narrowing the differences between the various positions. In our view, negative guarantees are merely a temporary palliative, for the only real guarantee is the elimination of nuclear arsenals. But we nevertheless support the conclusion of a legally binding international instrument whereby the nuclear-weapon States would provide States which do not possess such weapons with a guarantee against the use or the threat of use of such weapons.

With regard to chemical weapons, the Working Group's concentrated effort was complemented by the valuable participation of experts and it has without any doubt fully discharged the mandate conferred upon it, which means that it will be necessary at the second part of this session to broaden this mandate so that it can begin negotiations on the text of a convention, bearing in mind that identification of its elements has been the subject of extensive consideration.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons has managed to initiate negotiations on the text of a convention in a satisfactory manner although certain basic difficulties remain as regards the definition of such weapons and the scope of the convention. Argentina believes that in any event the definition of radiological weapons should in no way legitimize nuclear weapons and it also believes that the text of the convention should include the obligation to proceed to nuclear disarmament, as well as recognition of the right of States to the peaceful use of radioactive materials and an undertaking by States parties to strengthen international co-operation in this field.

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The magnitude of the task of the Working Group responsible for formulating the comprehensive programme of disarmament bears a direct relationship to the expectations created by the need for the Committee to be in a position to submit the said programme to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, in 1982.

The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, with his customary tenacity and application, has succeeded in laying the bases for the programme, with some very valuable preparatory and preliminary work. This work will, we hope, facilitate the analysis and definition, during the second part of this session of the Committee, of the measures to be included in the programme and its organization.

As regards priorities, the Argentine position, which has been clearly stated on many occasions, is that absolute priority should be given to nuclear disarmament.

If it is felt that we should draw up a timetable, with a view to ~~hastening~~ the implementation of what was agreed upon in the Final Document of the first special session, my delegation would be inclined to favour tentative periods or some other flexible machinery, if there is no agreement on setting successive dates for the attainment of the objectives by stages, with consideration of the results at the end of each stage.

Before concluding my statement, I should like to refer to the proposals, which the Group of 21 has strongly supported since the start of the Committee's work, that two working groups should be set up to initiate negotiations on the two items of highest priority on our agenda, namely, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and a nuclear-weapon test ban.

It is indeed regrettable that even today we have gone no further towards meeting this very legitimate and urgent request than to offer the palliative of informal Monday afternoon meetings.

It is with the deepest concern that I have conveyed to you my delegation's views, in the hope that the earlier negative attitudes of certain countries are likewise replaced, but by a greater sense of international realism and co-operation.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Davila for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the chair.

Mr. SALAH-BEY (Algeria): At the outset Mr. Chairman, I would like to congratulate you on your assumption of the chair of our Committee for this month. I would also wish to express our gratitude to Ambassador Herder, the outgoing Chairman, for his important service to the Committee during the previous month. I would also wish to welcome our colleague, the new representative of Indonesia.

I have the honour, as Co-ordinator of the non-aligned and neutral countries of the Group of 21, to make the following statement on item 2 of the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament.

On the initiative of the Group of 21, the Committee on Disarmament engaged, during the latter part of its 1981 spring session, in a substantive examination of concrete issues relating to item 2 of its agenda (cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament). In the course of this process, the Committee concentrated on the "pre-conditions for negotiations on nuclear disarmament as well as on doctrines of deterrence and other theories concerning nuclear weapons".

In assessing the discussions that took place within that framework, the Group of 21 is convinced that the need for urgent multilateral action on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, through the adoption of concrete measures, has been once again amply demonstrated. In the opinion of the Group of 21, multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament have long been overdue, and the fundamental prerequisite for their success is the political will of States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to engage in such negotiations.

The discussions, for which chapters V and VI and the conclusions of the Secretary-General's "Comprehensive study on nuclear weapons" (A/35/392) provided useful background material, have confirmed the conviction of the Group of 21 that the nuclear arms race runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tensions; that progress in the field of nuclear disarmament would be beneficial to the strengthening of international peace and security and to the improvement of the international climate, which in turn would facilitate further progress; and that all nations, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, have a vital interest in measures of nuclear disarmament, because the existence of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of a handful of Powers directly and fundamentally jeopardizes the security of the whole world. The promotion of nuclear disarmament would be facilitated by strict adherence by all States to the principles of the United Nations Charter, and in particular by measures that would bring about the relaxation of international tensions and the peaceful settlement of disputes among States.

The Group of 21 is further convinced, as a result of the discussions, that doctrines of nuclear deterrence, far from being responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, lie at the root of the continuing escalation of the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear armaments and lead to greater insecurity and instability in international relations. Moreover, such

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doctrines, which in the ultimate analysis are predicated upon the willingness to use nuclear weapons, cannot be the basis for preventing the outbreak of a nuclear war, a war which would affect belligerents and non-belligerents alike. The competitive accumulation of nuclear arms by the nuclear-weapon States cannot be condoned on grounds that it is indispensable to their security. Such an argument is patently false considering that the increase in nuclear arsenals, far from contributing to the strengthening of the security of all States on the contrary weakens it, and increases the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war. Moreover, the Group of 21 rejects as politically and morally unjustifiable that the security of the whole world should be made to depend on the state of relations existing among nuclear-weapon States.

In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility. That responsibility entails the fulfilment of commitments entered into in international instruments in the field of disarmament, respect for the security concerns of the non-nuclear nations, refraining from any action conducive to the intensification of the nuclear arms race and to the increase of international tensions, and above all the duty to take positive and practical steps towards the adoption and implementation of concrete measures of nuclear disarmament.

In the light of this assessment, the Group of 21 firmly believes that the Committee on Disarmament, in which all nuclear-weapon States as well as non-nuclear-weapon States participate, must continue and intensify the search for a common approach that will enable it to discharge the mandate entrusted to it by the General Assembly of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. In particular, the Group of 21 expects that a growing awareness of the urgency of progress toward nuclear disarmament will facilitate the task of the Committee. Bilateral and regional negotiations, especially with regard to specific areas where the concentration of nuclear armaments increases the danger of confrontation, are useful and should be intensified, but multilateral negotiations on questions of vital interest to nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States alike should be initiated without delay in the Committee on Disarmament, the only multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament.

The Group of 21 believes, in accordance with its considered view already expressed in document CD/64, of 1980, that the immediate objective of the consideration of item 2 by the Committee, at the start of the second part of its 1981 session, should be the establishment of an ad hoc working group with the mandate to elaborate on paragraph 50 of the Final Document and to identify substantive issues for multilateral negotiations, as suggested in document CD/116, as follows:

- (i) The elaboration and clarification of the stages of nuclear disarmament envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document, including identification of the responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States and the role of the non-nuclear-weapon States in the process of achieving nuclear disarmament;
- (ii) Clarification of the issues involved in prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, pending nuclear disarmament and in the prevention of nuclear war;

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- (iii) Clarification of the issues involved in eliminating reliance on doctrines of nuclear deterrence;
- (iv) Measures to ensure an effective discharge by the CD of its role as the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament and in this context its relationship with negotiations relating to nuclear disarmament conducted in bilateral, regional and other restricted forums.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Algeria for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the chair.

Mr. SOLA VILA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): We have now reached the last week but one of the spring part of this session, and my delegation would like to make just a brief statement, for we have already referred in our statement of 14 April to a number of items on the Committee's agenda. That same day, document CD/174, submitted by the delegation of Hungary, was circulated officially. Although the Ambassador of Hungary had already presented that document at a formal meeting of the Committee, my delegation did not have an opportunity to comment on the proposal contained in it. That is why I would like to make these comments. Cuba, as a developing country whose foreign policy is based, inter alia, on the struggle for peace, international security, and cessation of the arms race, considers that the senseless expenditures of scientific, technical, material and other resources that are squandered on the arms race in daily increasing quantities should be invested in the economic development of all peoples of the world and especially those in the so-called third world. That is why we welcome and strongly support the Hungarian proposal in document CD/174, since, as there is no consensus on the proposal to set up a working group of governmental experts, a proposal we have always endorsed, we believe that informal meetings will make it possible to give support to an idea that is consistently approved in so many international forums, and especially in the United Nations, namely, that the new scientific and technological discoveries, which are being made at a more rapid rate every day, should be devoted to just and noble causes.

Furthermore, the holding of informal meetings at this spring session on agenda items 1 and 2 has proved useful and, more importantly, has demonstrated the responsible attitude which the Committee on Disarmament should adopt with regard to such important agenda items. We cannot therefore evade consideration of such an important question in the field of disarmament, which is clearly set forth in paragraph 77 of the Final Document.

In conclusion, I should like to say that my delegation appreciated, as something very pertinent and positive, the reading out by our distinguished colleague, Ambassador Jaipal, the Secretary of our Committee and Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, of letters from men, women and children who want to live in a world of peace, progress and co-operation among States.

The CHAIRMAN: I would like to take up the question of the closing date for the first part of the 1981 session of the Committee, as well as the opening date for the second part.

In accordance with rule 7 of the rules of procedure, the Committee shall decide on those dates as soon as practically possible, taking into account the requirements of its work. I have conducted consultations on this question and there seems to be a consensus in favour of closing this part of the session on Friday, 24 April, with a plenary meeting that morning. The Thursday plenary meeting of 23 April would not then take place and instead there would be a meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons.

As regards the opening date for the second part of the 1981 session, it seems to me that Thursday, 11 June, is generally acceptable.

If there are no objections, I will take it that the Committee agrees with the suggestions I have just made.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: In accordance with the decision just taken by the Committee, the Secretariat has circulated today an informal paper containing the timetable for meetings of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. May I take it that you have taken note of that paper?

If there are no objections, I will consider that the Committee adopts the timetable as circulated.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 21 April, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.