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ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FOURTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 14 April 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. G. Pfeiffer

(Federal Republic of Germany)

GE.81-61423

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. SALAH-BEY
Mr. M. MATI

Argentina: Mr. F. JIMENEZ DAVILA
Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD

Australia: Mr. R.A. WALKER
Mr. R. STEELE
Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINK

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Dr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. R. DEYANOV

Burma: U SAW LAING
U NGWE WIN
U THAN HTUN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL
Mr. C. CACCIA, M.P.

China: Mr. YU Peiwen
Mr. LIN Chen
Mr. PAN Jusheng
Mr. YU Mengjia

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLA VILA
Mrs. V. BOROWDOSKY JACKLEWICH
Mr. F. CUSPINERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. A. CIMA
Mr. L. STAVINOHA

Egypt:

Mr. EL SAYED ABDEL RAOUF EL REEDY
Mr. I. ALI HASSAN
Mr. M.N. FAHMY

Ethiopia:

Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Mr. P. BUNTIG

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. F. RUTH
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. H. MULLER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India:

Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. CH. ANWAR SANI
Mr. M. SIDIK
Mr. I. DAMANIK

Iran:

Mr. M. DABIRI
Mr. D. AMERI
Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA

Italy: Mr. V. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. R. ISHII
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya: Mr. S. SHITEMI
Mr. G. MUNIU

Mexico: Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
Mr. C. HELLER

Mongolia: Mr. L. BAYART
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN

Nigeria: Mr. O. ADENIJI
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. M. MALITA
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. H.M.G.S. PALTHAKKARA

<u>Sweden:</u>	Mr. C. LIDGARD Mr. G. EKHOLM Mr. J. LUNDIN
<u>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:</u>	Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN Mr. V.A. PERFILIEV Mr. L.A. NAUMOV
<u>United Kingdom:</u>	Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES Mr. N.H. MARSHALL
<u>United States of America:</u>	Mr. C.C. FLOWERREE Mr. F.P. DESIMONE Miss K. CRITTENBERGER Mr. J. MISKEL Mr. C. PEARCY Mr. S. FITZGERALD
<u>Venezuela:</u>	Mr. H. ARTEAGA Mr. O.A. AGUILAR
<u>Yugoslavia:</u>	Mr. B. BRANKOVIC
<u>Zaire:</u>	Mr. O. GNOK
<u>Secretary of the Committee and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General:</u>	Mr. R. JAIPAL
<u>Deputy Secretary of the Committee:</u>	Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

Mr. SOLA VILA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, allow me first to congratulate you, on behalf of my delegation, on your accession to the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of April, the last month of our spring session, and to assure you that you can count on my delegation's full co-operation towards bringing this stage of our work to a successful conclusion.

Allow me also to express my delegation's sincere gratitude for the work carried out by your predecessor, Ambassador Herder of the German Democratic Republic, who so ably discharged the duties of Chairman of the Committee during the month of March.

Now that we are reaching the end of this first stage of the work of the Committee on Disarmament in 1981, I would like to make some comments in this connection on behalf of my delegation.

It is undoubtedly true that the world is at present passing through a difficult and doubtful period from all points of view, political, economic, social and military; various centres of tension, which are detrimental to the establishment and consolidation of international détente, unbridled acts of violence within some countries, the return to the so-called "cold war" phase, and more particularly the constant frenzied acceleration of the arms race are bringing our planet to the brink of an indescribable cataclysm. Never in the history of mankind has a comparable situation existed.

During this year, the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries, held in New Delhi, convincingly expressed its concern regarding the current situation in which the frenzied nuclear arms race is the greatest danger facing the world today and the only solution for survival in a world racked by disturbances and anxieties is to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race.

And even more recently, on the occasion of the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, our supreme leader and Commander-in-Chief, Fidel Castro, said that "the beginning of a new arms race and a return to the cold war would acutely worsen the serious crisis affecting the world economy today. The hopes that economic and social development will triumph over hunger, ignorance and disease, in a climate of peace and international co-operation, would be dashed for the vast majority of the inhabitants of the earth. Social conflicts, centres of tension and the danger of war would multiply. It would be a great crime against humanity".

Current developments in international politics have indeed shown that certain reactionary circles are pursuing a policy which is endangering the achievements of détente and plunging the world into a new "cold war" era.

The increase in the military budgets of the NATO countries, the deployment of 572 medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, the stagnation of the SALT II talks, all give cause for concern to those who merely wish to live in a peaceful world where the principles hallowed in the Charter of the United Nations are respected.

That is why the Committee on Disarmament must now play a very active role in carrying out its work as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament in order to bring about specific measures of disarmament, bearing in mind, furthermore, the fact that all the other types of disarmament negotiations are at present virtually paralysed, and that the Committee on Disarmament must therefore fill the gap left by the failure of other negotiating machinery to function.

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

Furthermore, this will be the last full session of the Committee before the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and we therefore have a major responsibility to achieve positive results by then.

The holding of this important session -- the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament -- should constitute a prelude to the convening of a world disarmament conference, which would provide an appropriate framework for moving towards genuine general and complete disarmament, not only because of the recommendations that would be made but also because of the decisions that would be adopted and would be binding upon States, and especially the States which possess the largest stocks of weapons of all kinds in their arsenals.

At its thirty-fifth session, the United Nations General Assembly adopted by consensus resolution 35/46 which declares the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade. It states:

"The decade of the 1980s should witness renewed intensification by all Governments and the United Nations of their efforts to reach agreement and to implement effective measures that will lead to discernible progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. In this connexion, special attention should be focused on certain identifiable elements in the Programme of Action as adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session which should, as a minimum, be accomplished during the Second Disarmament Decade both through negotiations in the multilateral negotiating forum, the Committee on Disarmament, and in other appropriate forums. Adequate methods and procedures of verification should be considered in the context of international disarmament negotiations."

That is why it is absolutely essential for the Committee on Disarmament to speed up its current disarmament negotiations.

Numerous resolutions on disarmament were adopted at the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly, many of them closely connected with the work of the Committee. Document CD/140, in which the Secretary-General of the United Nations transmitted those resolutions to the Committee on Disarmament, calls upon us to work with still greater intensity during the current year.

It is encouraging to note that this year a constructive atmosphere has prevailed within the Committee, and we are confident that we shall continue in this way, since this will benefit not only the Committee, by enabling us to dedicate ourselves to our appointed task, that of negotiating, so that we do not waste time on matters which should be raised and dealt with in other appropriate forums -- the constructive spirit, I repeat, which should prevail in this body will bring positive results not only for us, but, what is more important, for the international community, which is aware that the hundreds of thousands of millions of dollars that are being squandered on the arms race could be used to solve the most pressing needs of the world today such as hunger, poverty, disease and illiteracy, from which the developing countries suffer most. The reversal of the arms race would provide ample opportunities for the establishment of a new international economic order.

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

The Committee on Disarmament was able to get down to its substantive work speedily this year and three working groups were re-established on (1) chemical weapons, (2) radiological weapons and (3) effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament has also continued its work. It has thus been demonstrated that working groups are the appropriate forum for dealing with the items on our Committee's agenda. This has been stated by many delegations, and in particular by the Group of 21, both in statements and in documents submitted to the Committee, for example document CD/64, which states in one of its paragraphs:

"In the view of the Group of 21, the adoption of the annual agenda is general recognition by the Committee that all the items included therein should be the subject of concrete negotiation. It also represents a commitment by all members to pursue in good faith negotiations to reach agreement on concrete binding and effective disarmament measures on these items."

The Working Group on Chemical Weapons has worked hard and effectively under the leadership of Mr. Lidgard, the distinguished Ambassador of Sweden. Many delegations, particularly those of the Soviet Union, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Egypt and others, have made valuable contributions from the technical point of view. This has enabled the experts from my delegation to reach a comprehensive judgement on the subject of chemical weapons.

My delegation considers that a future convention on chemical weapons should provide at least for the following: (a) the destruction of existing stockpiles of such weapons; (b) the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling for hostile purposes; and (c) the encouragement of co-operation between States parties to the convention for peaceful and non-hostile military purposes.

My delegation is of the view that such a convention should not be discriminatory but should give equal opportunities to all States parties.

We believe that sufficient bases exist for the Committee to initiate discussions on the possible content and scope of such a convention and we hope that this will be possible during the summer part of our session.

The Committee can count on my delegation's co-operation with the participation of experts on the subject.

Allow me now to make some comments on the proposals submitted here by various delegations, and particularly on the work suggested by yourself.

My delegation greatly appreciates the efforts made by all delegations to offer proposals that are generally acceptable and we also value the content of the documents presented by yourself as Chairman of the Working Group. We consider the joint United States-USSR proposals in document CD/112 extremely valuable, and we believe that this document should serve as the basis for all the other proposals.

In my delegation's view, the definition of chemical weapons should be based on the general purpose criterion combined with the toxicity criterion, as indicated in document CD/112.

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

Cuba, which is an independent and non-aligned country, whose defence is designed to protect its sovereignty and the progress achieved in the building of socialism, cannot but be concerned lest a future convention on chemical weapons should contain loopholes that might enable a State party to find ways of violating it.

That is why my delegation considers that a future convention such as the one we are considering should contain references to the use of certain herbicides and defoliants which, in given circumstances and quantities, could constitute chemical warfare agents. Experiences during the recent war in Viet Nam justify this concern on the part of my delegation.

The development of the chemical industry for peaceful purposes is very closely linked to its development for purposes of chemical warfare. The interrelationship is so close that in many cases it is difficult to draw a line which will not affect the development of the first category of chemicals. History has shown that discoveries in the field of chemical weapons have sometimes been made indirectly and accidentally. It is for this reason that my delegation attaches great importance to the statements and proposals made in the Working Group which you have presided over so capably with respect to what are called the binary chemical weapons.

My delegation understands that the development, production and stockpiling of this kind of chemical warfare agent complicates the treaty we are contemplating because of the difficulty of defining the relationship between the so-called chemical warfare agent precursor and the chemical warfare agent itself -- the final product.

We believe that this aspect should be the subject of more thorough study by the experts, but our preliminary view is that chemical warfare agent precursors should be considered to be those substances, toxic or non-toxic, which in their final phase lead to the formation of a chemical warfare agent.

Some delegations have expressed their concern about certain of the definitions given, especially as regards the concepts of single-purpose and dual-purpose agents.

At a certain stage in scientific and technological development, a chemical agent may have only one purpose, either peaceful or connected with warfare. But the great speed of advance in making discoveries nowadays in the chemical industry in general can mean that a substance which at one time had only a hostile use may now be economically essential to a State for peaceful purposes. Consequently the prohibitions and obligations contained in a future treaty should in no way hamper the development of those countries which have large-scale plans in that branch of industry.

I should like now to make some comments on the matter of the control and verification of compliance with undertakings and obligations under the future convention, and in so doing to indicate my delegation's position.

We realize that there are considerable difficulties in reaching agreement on the methods and systems for verification, which is only natural in view of the complexity and diversity of chemical industry technology and the great number of chemical industry installations in many countries.

As a matter of principle, no verification measure should affect the right of every country to provide for its own defence nor endanger its sovereignty.

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

We believe that national verification measures should form the basis of the verification system as a whole, but that they should be organized at the level of the State, State bodies being responsible for carrying them out. Nevertheless, we have no doubt that a wise and fitting combination of national measures with effective and appropriate international measures could provide a solution to this complex problem.

Furthermore, we consider it essential that the adoption of a convention on the prohibition of the production, development and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, should in no way undermine the importance of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 with regard specifically to the use of chemical weapons.

We also consider that the declarations by States parties to build or increase confidence, under paragraph 4.2.1 of part IV of the Chairman's outline, should be made after the convention has entered into force and not before.

We support the principle that verification should not be discriminatory, and that its results should be communicated to all States parties and should constitute a solid manifestation of confidence.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons has worked extremely hard under the able guidance of the Ambassador of Hungary, Comrade Konives.

The matter of radiological weapons is as important as it is complex for the following reasons:

(a) The continued acceleration and diversification of scientific and technological progress show that it is possible for such a weapons system to be developed, the more so as it has not been possible to find a peaceful use for the radioactive waste from the nuclear industry, which has been stockpiled by the nuclear nations for many years.

(b) Radiological weapons are not yet defined as such; they have never yet been used, and there are many conflicting views among military experts as regards their effectiveness from the military point of view. Some of these aspects were explained by the Swedish delegation in the statement made by the Swedish Ambassador on 7 April.

However, my delegation believes that the possibility that radiological weapons will be developed cannot be totally excluded and it therefore urges the need for a treaty to prohibit such weapons, although such a treaty should not be prejudicial to the development by any State party of its nuclear industry for peaceful purposes.

I should like to make some general comments based on my delegation's study of the various documents which the Ad Hoc Working Group had before it, to give the Committee an idea of my delegation's position.

We believe that in principle an agreement can be reached on a treaty for the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

We consider that the contributions made by various delegations are positive and we greatly appreciate document CD/31 of 9 July 1979, presented by the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

We support the view that the relationship between so-called radiological weapons and existing weapons of mass destruction must be defined. My delegation has reached the preliminary conclusion that the only destructive factor in so-called radiological weapons is the action of ionizing radiation on living organisms, which creates a certain confusion when a comparison is made with the destructive factors of a nuclear explosion produced in the field. We listened very attentively to the statement of the Ambassador of Sweden in this connection and we shall study it carefully.

On the other hand, the definitions of so-called radiological weapons which have been proposed, and particularly that in document CD/31 of 1979 submitted by the USSR and the United States, are, my delegation believes, based on the idea of the dispersion or dissemination over an objective -- which may be the land -- of radioactive material which then exposes the human beings residing in the region or passing through it to external radiation.

We wonder what difference there is from the point of view of the term "dissemination" between the deliberate dispersion of radioactive materials over a country for military purposes and the "dissemination" of radioactive materials within that same country as a result of the bombing of nuclear power plants in the course of conventional hostilities.

Our small country is making great efforts towards and hopes to develop a programme for the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. My delegation is therefore anxious that a future treaty on radiological weapons should include a provision on the protection of nuclear power plants for peaceful means, whether on land or at sea.

My delegation believes that the basic elements of a future convention on so-called radiological weapons are the definitions and the scope of that convention.

My delegation is against the idea that the problem of radiological weapons can be solved through nuclear disarmament. We understand and support the proposals on general and complete nuclear disarmament, but we feel that the one topic does not include the other, for technically demonstrable reasons.

In my delegation's view, what is important on this subject is to secure a treaty on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.

We are in favour of a future convention on radiological weapons which would make it compulsory for States parties to provide all the necessary information to prove that they are fulfilling the obligations they have assumed under the convention.

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

My delegation is perfectly willing to co-operate in this Committee in finding a solution to the differences which are still an obstacle to an agreement. We are in favour of consultations with experts during the summer part of the session so as to obtain all the necessary scientific information for the complete clarification of this issue.

We agree that this is not one of the highest priority matters within the context of general and complete disarmament, but we cannot ignore the importance that would attach to the Committee's achievement of some concrete measure in this connection.

With regard to the consideration of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, Cuba considers the question important and believes that agreement on a treaty on the subject would be a positive achievement, although undoubtedly this question is closely linked with such matters as the total prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the non-utilization of force -- and consequently of nuclear force -- in international relations, and is thus something implicit in the negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

While awaiting the outcome of this process of negotiations on nuclear disarmament, as the only effective and sure way for all non-nuclear-weapon States and for the nuclear-weapon States themselves, since a nuclear conflagration would lead to a crisis which would extend beyond the boundaries of the countries involved in the conflict and would constitute a serious danger for the very survival of mankind, my country believes that agreement on an international instrument would be an intermediate step towards the ultimate solution and that, more importantly, if a common formula could be found which would guarantee the security of the nuclear-weapon States, this could provide a temporary solution at the present time.

Cuba considers that an extremely important part of the Committee's work is the preparation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. The Final Document is undoubtedly a valuable source for the preparation of such a programme, but there should be no going back on the achievements of that document, which was approved by consensus.

The various phases in the implementation of the programme should be realistic and objective, and each phase should include a process of review and evaluation.

As regards the nature of the programme, it should include an undertaking by States with respect to its implementation. Very interesting and constructive proposals have been made in that connection which would undoubtedly make this feasible. We are certain that the Ad Hoc Working Group under the chairmanship of Ambassador García Robles will complete its work successfully.

My country, as a member of the Group of 21, has expressed its concern that, on the eve of the celebration of the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, the Committee on Disarmament has not yet been able to form two working groups: the one on nuclear disarmament and the other on a general nuclear-weapons test ban.

Many proposals have been submitted to the Committee on Disarmament by the countries of the Group of 21 and the socialist countries, and there have also been positive reactions from some of the western countries, on the setting up of working groups on nuclear disarmament issues. The Committee on Disarmament is at present holding periodical informal meetings on these issues, and we hope that they will achieve concrete results and will not become mere academic exercises.

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

It would be extremely regrettable if our next report to the United Nations General Assembly shows that no progress has been achieved on the problem of nuclear disarmament, for the doctrine of nuclear deterrence does not convince those who are steadfastly fighting for a genuine and lasting peace.

The Committee on Disarmament must fulfil its mandate. The Final Document, in paragraph 50, clearly sets out the priorities established in the field of disarmament. In my delegation's view, the informal meetings which have been taking place, first under the competent guidance of Ambassador Herder and now under your guidance, should be of help to us in meeting the international community's expectations concerning our work. The Committee on Disarmament already possesses a large body of substantive material as the basis for its work; all that is lacking is the political will of certain members of the Committee which would enable it to carry out its inescapable duty.

At the last session of the General Assembly, Cuba co-sponsored draft resolution 35/152 G entitled "Paragraph 125 of the Final Document", paragraph 2 of which reads:

"Invites the appropriate international bodies in the field of disarmament to continue, in accordance with the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, efforts aimed at achieving positive results in curbing the arms race in accordance with the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document and the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade."

The Committee on Disarmament is primarily responsible for carrying out the disarmament negotiations referred to in the Programme of Action. That same resolution expresses concern over the fact that the current negotiations on arms limitation and on disarmament are being protracted and that some of them have been suspended or terminated.

At the Second Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba, held recently, our Commander-in-Chief, Comrade Fidel Castro, said the following:

"The arms race must be stopped. Existing stocks of nuclear weapons are already sufficient to destroy the world many-times over At the present time, for each one of us, for each inhabitant of the planet, some \$90 are spent each year on armaments, that is, more than the per capita annual income of hundreds of millions of persons in the under-developed world.

"Those expenditures benefit no one; they are totally unproductive and their results, which have periodically to be discarded, can only be used as scrap. This situation is shocking when contrasted with the financial requirements for the solution of some of the most acute problems of the world's population.

"The senseless arms race, which could at any moment erupt into the most destructive and universal holocaust, cannot continue. We must put an end to this suicidal policy if we want to guarantee a future with peace and well-being for all mankind."

The Committee on Disarmament is required to play a very important part in this context as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament and it is therefore our inescapable duty to fulfil the mandate entrusted to us by the international community.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Cuba for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the chair.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): Mr. Chairman, taking the floor for the first time in plenary in the month of April, I wish to congratulate you warmly on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament and to wish you every success in guiding its work at, perhaps, crucial moments of this part of its 1981 session. Let me also express our admiration for Ambassador Herder of the German Democratic Republic for his excellent performance, particularly for his skilful and efficient leadership of the Committee in March.

Although the item concerning new types of weapons of mass destruction and radiological weapons is not on our agenda for this week, allow me to deal shortly with it and more precisely with radiological weapons. I do not want to enter into the details of a wide and constructive discussion which has been taking place recently in the Working Group on the principal elements of the future radiological convention. Thanking Ambassador Komives for his unremitting efforts in working out the draft text of the convention by the Working Group and pledging the full support of the delegation of Poland for his endeavours, I would like to refer now to the discussion on the subject matter that has been under way in the last plenary meetings. In fact, I feel somewhat alarmed by a certain tendency towards diminishing, if not totally negating, the importance of any document to be worked out on the prohibition of radiological weapons, which was noticed in the interventions of several delegations on 7 and 9 April.

Speaking about radiological weapons, I have in mind -- like many other speakers -- especially the radioactive waste materials. Let me put this straight question: what is the problem with radioactive waste materials in the world today? While reading some generally accessible sources, one may easily come to the conclusion, and I do not say that it is a particularly comforting one, that the quantity of these wastes is steadily growing. Thus, for example, the quantity of high-level wastes in the form of solutions of radioactive chemicals left over from the reprocessing of nuclear reactor fuels to retrieve plutonium, coming from military activities, only totals today tens of thousands of cubic metres. These radioactive high-level wastes emit gamma rays and atomic particles that can injure or kill living creatures. Radiation, as all of us here probably know, kills cells or damages the genetic material for reproduction. It is equally clear to anybody dealing with the problems of nuclear energy that the quantity of high-level wastes will still be increasing. Some reasons: the radioactive wastes come from nuclear power plants producing plutonium which, in turn, is needed for the production of different types of nuclear weapons. Besides, there is no doubt that the rapid development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes will result in a growing quantity of high-level wastes in many countries coming from civilian activities.

Taking duly into account the dangerous aspects of the above-mentioned facts, the USSR and the United States of America presented in 1979 an agreed joint proposal on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, published in documents CD/31 and CD/32.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

The scientific researchers in some countries are considering the question of what form the radioactive waste should be converted to for further disposal. They are studying a variety of ways of putting nuclear wastes into solid forms that will resist dissemination into the environment. One of the methods, for example, would be calcination, heating the waste until it turns to ash. Other methods include embedding the waste in glass or ceramics or in some kind of synthetic materials. What is most important in these considerations is the fact that the research is directed towards the substantial reduction of the size of waste and the condensation of the radioactive material. Bringing up the above, I simply wish to recall that at the time of conducting such experiments there might at the same time be considered or there might come out autonomously some ideas on the utilization and/or processing of the high-level wastes also for military purposes. The interventions pronounced by several delegations last Friday in the Working Group on Radiological Weapons, calling for review conferences of the future radiological convention every five years and justifying it by the development of science and technology in this respect seems precisely to confirm the assumption that one day may, indeed, bring unexpected qualitative changes in the development of radiological weapons. How can we reconcile this with statements considering radiological weapons as purely hypothetical ones.

To what I have already said I want to add only that radioactive wastes can be produced -- with the present development of knowledge in this respect -- either in liquid or in solid form. May I also add that today's medicine does not offer us any efficient medicaments against either acute or chronic radiotoxemia.

Taking all the above into account it would seem rather short-sighted to neglect or deny the possibility of conducting further research on radiological weapons. Such research may simply result one day in an improved form of this weapon. In other words, considering the entirety of anti-human aspects of the probability of use of radiological weapons, we should manifest a maximum of goodwill to reach preventive agreement prohibiting its production and use. Besides its importance in the preventive military domain, the convention would provide an advantageous climate in all actions leading to effective isolation of radioactive materials from the environment -- an equally important aspect of the convention's role in the situation of growing utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

We have been listening with great attention to the discussion and the arguments which were put forward in the Committee on the purposefulness and the significance of signing a convention prohibiting radiological weapons. I would like to say that my delegation is not convinced about the validity of the arguments minimalizing the aim and the importance of signing such a convention. Of course, we realize and we have often pointed out that the prohibition of radiological weapons has only relative importance in comparison with the evidence and the primordial problem of e.g. the prohibition of nuclear and chemical weapons. Therefore, it is not a matter to be settled at the cost of or in exchange for other problems. We are of the opinion, though, that we cannot neglect any chance to make however modest a step towards eliminating what is still a concrete danger. Such a step would have significance for paving the way for further measures, surely of more importance. This opportunity exists and in our opinion should not be wasted only because there are more important goals. It will be the disregarding of such an opportunity that will put us in a bad light, and not the taking of this initiative. In brief, we still strongly believe that it would be better to achieve something, however modest, than to achieve nothing.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

Let me now say a few words on other systems of weapons of mass destruction. The Soviet Union put forward last year a proposal supported by socialist countries, as well as by many non-aligned countries, to establish under the auspices of the Committee on Disarmament a special group of experts to work out the draft of a comprehensive agreement or partial agreements prohibiting the research on and the development of new systems of weapons of mass destruction. The basic task of such a group would be to follow developments in the field of potentially dangerous directions in scientific research, in order to take as early as possible appropriate preventive steps against emerging new weapons. We still hold the view that this Committee should pay due attention to the said proposal and examine the possibility of the establishing of such a group during the summer part of this session.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Poland for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the chair.

Mr. FEIN (Netherlands): Two years ago, on 26 June 1979, the Netherlands delegation in the Committee on Disarmament attempted an analysis of the problems posed by the question of negative security assurances. Our interest in this question has remained undiminished.

We are still convinced -- as, I believe, are all of us here -- that effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would have a valuable confidence-building effect, as well as a positive bearing on the concept of non-proliferation, thus strengthening peace and security.

We welcomed the unilateral declarations on negative security assurances at the time they were given by the Governments of the five nuclear-weapon States. The effectiveness of those commitments would, however, be significantly augmented if the five separate declarations could be developed into a single, meaningful common guarantee. You may recall that in my statement two years ago I submitted to you the proposition that such a common formula was feasible. Today we remain convinced of this possibility. But we are no less convinced that the road to the magic formula is a difficult one.

We are therefore grateful for the work done in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances, both last year under Mr. El-Baradei and this year under the guidance of Mr. Ciarrapico. The experience in the Working Group has shown that we can only achieve progress if we apply realism and restraint. Thus, an important lesson in realism that we learned was that it is unlikely that we can achieve a consensus on a convention as the legal framework in which the common formula might be incorporated. We would therefore do better to concentrate our efforts on the elaboration of the terms of a common formula.

And as to restraint, we have learned that we should not try to achieve more than this agenda item asks from us, i.e. safeguarding a State which has given up the nuclear option against nuclear attack. No more.

(Mr. Palm, Netherlands)

In other words, we see it as our collective duty to conceive the effective international arrangements under negotiation here as concrete and specific measures, limited to one goal, i.e. providing adequate assurance to a State which has renounced the acquisition or possession of nuclear weapons. Allowing the present negotiations to be side-tracked into a debate on questions such as whether or not nuclear warfare is legitimate cannot but interfere with the essence of the problem we have to solve and therefore the effectiveness of our work. That other question -- whether or not nuclear warfare is legitimate -- is not at stake under this agenda item and it confuses the issue.

The fact that we decline to be drawn into an argument concerning the validity of nuclear deterrence, in certain circumstances and places, is not because of any reluctance on our side to discuss that issue, but because it falls beyond the scope of the negotiations on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Let us now look at the heart of the matter, i.e. the terms of the existing unilateral assurances, starting with the negative security assurances of the United Kingdom and of the United States and the Soviet Union, and in this connection the declaration made by the Soviet Union when ratifying Protocol II of the Tlatelolco Treaty and furthermore a certain statement made by the President of the Soviet Union. Later on I shall have some remarks to make about the French and Chinese positions in this respect.

There are -- we are pleased to note -- quite a few similarities between the positions of the first three nuclear-weapon States. Simply said, security assurances would be given to non-nuclear-weapon States who have, in one way or the other, formally accepted the non-nuclear-weapon status. The guarantee would, however, not apply in certain circumstances, viz. when a non-nuclear-weapon State engaged in an act of aggression against -- that is an attack on -- a nuclear-weapon State while at the same time being supported by another nuclear-weapon State. On these two points all three negative security assurances are similar.

But the main difficulty in our analysis of these three negative security assurances is the view put forward by the Soviet Union that a negative security guarantee cannot be given to a non-nuclear-weapon State that has nuclear weapons stationed on its territory. Since this non-stationing clause is the main stumbling block, we should take a closer look at it.

Negative security assurances should be designed for those circumstances prevailing when hostilities are taking place. It is in those circumstances -- and specifically in those circumstances -- that non-nuclear-weapon States must be assured that they will not be attacked with nuclear weapons. On the other hand, non-nuclear-weapon States which are supported by a nuclear-weapon State in military activities against another nuclear-weapon State cannot, of course, expect to be a safe haven.

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

A clear perception of circumstances of this kind is the basis for the British and American guarantee formulas, as well as -- so it appears -- for certain Soviet statements and declarations. I have already mentioned the Soviet declarations at the time of the ratification of Protocol II of the Tlatelolco Treaty. I can also quote the statement made by the President of the Soviet Union in which he stated: "The Soviet Union for its part, wishes to state as emphatically as it can that we are against the use of nuclear weapons, that only extraordinary circumstances, only aggression against our country or its allies by another nuclear Power, could compel us to have recourse to that extreme means of self defence."

Taking these two Soviet statements into account, I would say that agreement on a sound and realistic guarantee formula could be reached, provided no additional, extraneous objectives are sought. One may wonder if precisely such a "bonus" objective is not envisaged when the Soviet Union puts forward the non-stationing clause.

As I understand it, the Soviet Union seeks to justify the non-stationing requirement with the argument that a nuclear attack could be launched from the territory of a non-nuclear-weapon State where nuclear weapons are stationed. For argument's sake I shall recognize this as a valid consideration. But we should distinguish between a static definition of a non-nuclear-weapon State as such, enjoying a negative security guarantee, and a dynamic conception of the circumstances in which assurances should become operational..

Speaking in operational terms -- and taking into account that security guarantees should be drafted on the basis of strategic analysis -- I cannot but conclude that all possible contingencies would be covered by the reservation concerning aggression -- an attack -- supported by a nuclear-weapon State.

After all, the situation that the Soviet non-stationing requirement seeks to cover is none other than a conflict between nuclear-weapon States. This non-stationing requirement is therefore a distortion of the subject-matter of our discussions: assurances by nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States. It seeks to interfere with internal alliance affairs and that, of course, is unacceptable. Furthermore, it makes no sense in strategic terms because it introduces an artificial distinction between allies of a nuclear-weapon State: if and when there should be a nuclear war -- which God forbid -- there are only friends and foes.

Let us now look at the non-stationing requirement from another angle. As a consideration of a different nature, but of no less importance, I submit that the stationing or non-stationing of nuclear weapons -- nuclear warheads -- can hardly be verified adequately. Given the existence of, for example, dual purpose delivery systems, how is one to know that the other side

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

has not hidden, somewhere in the territory of a non-nuclear ally, a stock of nuclear weapons that could be launched by those dual purpose delivery systems? And even if nuclear warheads were not stored in peacetime on the territory of an ally, what is to prevent one of the parties on the eve of war or at the time of an armed conflict, flying in such warheads overnight? What, then, is the practical value -- in the circumstances we are talking about -- of assurances that a certain non-nuclear-weapon ally does not -- in peacetime, mind you -- have nuclear weapons stationed on its territory? We come therefore unavoidably to the conclusion that the non-stationing clause is not only difficult -- to say the least -- to verify in peacetime, but impossible to verify in wartime, precisely when it counts. The non-stationing requirement is just not a viable construction.

I wonder whether the Soviet Union itself is really convinced of the validity of the non-stationing clause. The Tlatelolco Treaty prohibits the stationing of nuclear weapons in the territories of the Latin-American countries for which the Treaty entered into force. There you have a real non-stationing situation. That non-stationing situation par excellence should have been sufficient for the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union, when ratifying Protocol II of the said Treaty, deemed it necessary to make a reservation which, inter alia, implies that the non-use obligation (concerning nuclear weapons) could be reconsidered in case of "the commission by one or several States Party to the treaty of an act of aggression with the backing of a State possessing nuclear weapons or jointly with such a State". There you have the non-attack requirement plain and simple! One wonders, therefore, whether in the view of the Soviet Union, non-stationing is really the crux of the matter in a situation in which the security assurance must be relevant, that is, on the eve of or during an armed conflict.

I have stated my case: the non-stationing requirement is superfluous, because all theoretically dangerous situations for the Soviet Union and its allies are covered by the kind of formula adopted by the United Kingdom and the United States, and by the Soviet Union itself when it had to define its position in relation to the Latin-American nuclear-weapon-free zone. The non-stationing requirement is uncalled for because it implicitly legalizes the threat and the use of nuclear weapons against certain non-nuclear-weapon States, even when not engaged in an armed conflict. The non-stationing requirement is non-verifiable, in particular on the eve of and during such conflicts, when it really matters. And finally, the Soviet Union itself apparently does not believe in the formula.

Why, then, does the Soviet Union put forward such a requirement? A look at the map is sufficient for even those who are not schooled in nuclear strategy to understand the situation and I can therefore deal with it very briefly. While the Warsaw Pact countries are geographically a solid block, a contiguous land-mass, the members of the NATO alliance are divided, separated by an ocean. The strategic interests of both sides are therefore

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

obviously different. The Soviet non-stationing requirement would leave Western Europe at a serious disadvantage, unable to match the Soviet Union's massive capability to inflict destruction on Western Europe. The integrity of NATO's defence forces as a deterrent lies in the alliance's ability to defend its collective territory by all the means at its disposal at whatever point it is threatened. This posture must include the ability to deploy weapons wherever they would be most effective against the threat.

Our conclusion is, therefore, as far as this part of the argument is concerned, that the Soviet Union, by introducing the non-stationing requirement into the -- supposedly global -- negative security assurances, is trying, in the Committee on Disarmament (and in the General Assembly for that matter) to obtain a strategic advantage over NATO. While we would not deny the Soviet Union the right to negotiate on these matters -- in fact we would encourage them to do so -- I would suggest that neither this Committee, nor the subject of negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States is the proper place to do so. Such aims might be pursued in the context of East-West negotiations and should then be matched by equivalent counter-offers. In fact, we welcome and encourage serious negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the subject of nuclear weapons in Europe, and elsewhere for that matter.

We can therefore eliminate the concept of non-stationing and focus on the degree of congruence between the positions of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union and compare -- as I did in my statement of 26 June 1979 -- the negative security assurances of the first two States with the declaration given by the Soviet Union when signing Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco as well as President Brezhnev's declaration which I quoted. All truly relevant elements from these three declarations can then be brought together into one common formula and we have solved our problem. I shall return to this in a moment.

If I have so far dealt mainly with the negative security assurances of the three major nuclear-weapon Powers, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union, it is not only because these are the three principal nuclear-weapon States but also because their negative security assurances are closest to each other. However, it would of course also be desirable to harmonize the French and Chinese positions with the other three. I shall say only a few words about that in this statement. As to the French position, we note that it is also the French desire to arrive at a common formula, as stated by President Giscard d'Estaing on 25 May 1978. And as to the Chinese position, the present negative security assurance of the People's Republic of China as it now stands appears to be generous enough -- although perhaps not altogether precise -- to allow acceptance of the common formula containing

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

the two basic elements which I have discussed (the non-nuclear-weapon status and the non-attack requirement) and should therefore cause no problems to China.

Before going on to the common formula, I must also say a few words about the format in which the common formula could be presented. Although several members of this Committee still believe that a convention would be the most desirable format, we must all realize that it is not likely that a convention could be concluded in the near future. We therefore must turn our minds to the Security Council resolution option.

Now, what would be the procedure in the Security Council? It would seem to us that one might follow the usual procedure as in all or nearly all cases where the Security Council has to deal with matters on which there are views more or less common in substance but different in detail.

First, the interested parties will state their positions, which would mean, in this case, that the five nuclear-weapon States would each place on record their own views on negative security assurances. These views need not necessarily be identical. It happens seldom that all the major Powers hold identical views on international questions. The essential requirement is, however, that each of the statements should contain certain common elements, which can be put in a resolution, representing that which they have in common. From all possible precedents I would like to cite the Security Council resolution of 19 June 1968 on positive security guarantees.

In the particular case we are discussing now, such common ground would be the two elements we have referred to before, viz. the non-nuclear-weapon status and the non-attack provision. If the Soviet Union wishes in its own national statement also to include remarks on the non-stationing issue, that would have to make no difference to the validity of the common formula, for as long as a non-nuclear-weapon State does not attack the Soviet Union, it would fall under the negative security assurance whether there are nuclear weapons stationed on its territory or not. Provided the national statements do not undermine the common formula, such a solution seems possible.

In the resolution, the Security Council would then, after a suitable preamble, welcome, or accept, or approve the solemn undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States, e.g. not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State that has committed itself not to manufacture or receive such weapons, or other nuclear explosive devices, or to acquire control over them, provided that State does not undertake or partake in an attack upon a nuclear-weapon State or its allies with the support of another nuclear-weapon State.

Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, my statement today will be devoted to item 5 of our agenda: new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.

It is a matter of satisfaction to my delegation that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons has got off to a good start this session under the able guidance of Ambassador Komives of Hungary. The identification of the basic elements of a future treaty, and the elaboration of their alternative texts will enable the Working Group to harmonize views that would lead to an agreed text. My delegation believes that this is a subject on which the CD should be able to report positive results in the form of a convention to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session as demanded in resolution 35/149. The Committee can thereafter concentrate its work during its spring session next year on achieving agreement on more significant measures for submission to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Various views have been expressed within this Committee and in the Working Group on the non-existence of radiological weapons, and the narrow chances of their being used in warfare. My delegation has no reason to doubt this view of the experts; however, I believe that agreement on the prohibition of such weapons of mass destruction as radiological weapons can be a step in the right direction. Prevention, they say, is better than cure. In any case we all subscribed to paragraph 76 of the Final Document of the General Assembly's first special session on disarmament which states: "A convention should be concluded prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons."

The argument therefore in the Committee should not be why we should exert effort on this non-existent weapon; we did not set up a Working Group for such procedural arguments. Rather, our concentration should be two-fold: first, how to make our agreement on radiological weapons relevant to the whole process of our efforts in the wide field of disarmament, especially in the related field of arms that rely for their effect on radioactive materials -- the most lethal mass destruction weapons, and secondly, how to ensure that we complement agreement on non-existent weapons with agreement on existing weapons so as to avoid exposing the CD to universal ridicule for being incapable of reaching agreement on positive disarmament measures.

It is a well-known fact that the rate of scientific and technological research leading to breakthrough in and development of armaments far outpaces disarmament negotiations. The rapid quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear weapons and new systems of such weapons by the nuclear-weapon States continues to throw into sharp relief the very slow pace of negotiations both in this Committee and in other forums, be they bilateral or trilateral. The hope of the non-nuclear-weapon States is to see man's ingenuity which results in these scientific and technological progress converted to peaceful purposes.

It is gratifying that at the current session, the Ad Hoc Working Group has addressed itself to issues of substance in drafting a future convention. I would like to touch on some of these questions. Although the draft United States-USSR joint proposal submitted to the CD in 1979 provides a basis for negotiations, it needs to be broadened to meet the realities of the present day, as well as to reflect the

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

pertinent suggestions that have been made within this multilateral body. Progress in the completion of negotiations on radiological weapons depends, therefore, to a large extent on the willingness of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to accept constructive suggestions made by other members of the Committee on Disarmament. I hope the break before our summer session will give us all a time for serious reflection. To make a preventive convention such as the radiological convention relevant, it should be conceived in the over-all context of nuclear disarmament. Thus an explicit provision to this end should be an indispensable part. Its placing should not be beyond our imagination to reach consensus on.

In the same vein, the Swedish proposal that a future radiological weapons convention should cover prohibition from attacks on nuclear reactor plants and electrical installations is important. Ambassador Lidgard's statement on 7 April, a week ago today, was a major contribution to our work, for it showed the in-depth study undertaken on this question, thus enabling this Committee to understand the issues more clearly. The possibility of attack on nuclear reactor plants with consequent risk of dispersal of radioactive substances and the considerable destruction of lives farther and wider than the immediate theatre of conflict makes the proposal worthy of serious consideration. Even if Additional Protocols I and II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions contain certain provisions, these are conceived in a very different context -- the humanitarian. The CD cannot abandon its responsibility for disarmament measures in a comprehensive way, on the argument that a Red Cross instrument has made some references to a particular question.

As regards the peaceful uses of radioactive materials or sources of radiation, it is the view of my delegation that the convention should, in a positive manner, reflect the important link between disarmament and development. The provisions of article V as contained in working paper CD/RW/WP.18/Add.1 appears to my delegation too generalized to make the desired impact. My delegation prefers the inclusion of peaceful-use clauses, stating in clear and positive terms the right of all States to peaceful uses of nuclear energy for development. Nigeria, as a developing country, places a high premium on scientific and technological co-operation among States. This principle guided my delegation in introducing on behalf of the co-sponsors resolution 32/50, which recognizes the need for international co-operation in the field of nuclear energy, and also the desire to promote the transfer and utilization of nuclear technology for economic and social development, especially among the developing countries.

In a world situation characterized by growing tension and uncertainties, by feverish research and development in the military field, the emergence of an agreed text on even "non-existent" but not totally inconceivable weapons of mass destruction can be a useful contribution by this single multilateral negotiating body, if only to prevent activities in this regard and to save part of resources, human and material, from a further unproductive pursuit of the arms race. However, such a "negative" disarmament measure has to be supplemented quickly by positive measures

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

of disarmament if the CD is to justify its existence. On 10 April, only a few days ago, the Convention on the prohibition or restriction of use of particularly inhumane weapons was opened for signature in New York. To the Convention, there are annexed three Protocols. One of those Protocols covers weapons that are not known ever to have been used. This did not prevent its being the subject of a Protocol as a preventive measure. However, no one would have thought of opening for signature a Convention with only that particular Protocol. The value of the success of the United Nations Conference on inhumane weapons lies in its reaching agreement on two other Protocols concerning existing weapons which have actually been used in wars. The agreement on these two other Protocols placed the Protocol on the non-existent weapon on a different footing which intrinsically it does not on its own possess.

Let us bear this in mind in the CD. In fact, I should say to the CD, "Go and do thou likewise", i.e. like the United Nations Conference on inhumane weapons. Balance one, non-existent weapon with agreement on at least two existing weapons.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I should like to touch upon some of the issues raised at today's meeting.

First, I refer to the statement made by the distinguished representative of the Netherlands on the question of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. Let me recall the position of the Soviet Union. It is a clear-cut and coherent one: we have advocated and still advocate the earliest elaboration of a draft international convention on this issue, a convention which would have binding force. Such a convention would, of course, contain a formula acceptable to all parties, which would not infringe the interests of any of the parties to the convention. We have submitted a draft of such a convention and are ready for it to be examined article by article. In the course of such article-by-article examination there would be an opportunity to settle, among others, the issues raised by the representative of the Netherlands, in particular how to detect whether or not nuclear weapons belonging to some nuclear-weapon State are stationed on the territory of a non-nuclear-weapon State. We are deeply convinced that it is precisely the elaboration and conclusion of a convention which would represent the most effective means of solving this important and urgent problem. In this we have also been guided by the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and of related General Assembly resolutions.

We have no objection, either, to examining, parallel with the elaboration of the convention, other alternative means of providing security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States, whereby all nuclear-weapon States would make declarations either identical or similar in content, which would then be approved by a decision of the United Nations Security Council.

We regard such an action as entirely realistic, even under conditions of aggravation of the international situation. We have said that we are willing to

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

show flexibility in the elaboration of such a formula provided the other nuclear-weapon Powers adopt the same approach. We have not heard comparable statements from the other nuclear-weapon States. We await their reply: are they willing to show flexibility in the search for an acceptable formula?

As you see, there is no lack of constructive ideas and proposals of various kinds on the part of the Soviet Union in the search for a solution to this urgent problem. As for the formula proposed by the Soviet Union and those proposed by the United States and the United Kingdom, we have already spoken on that subject more than once. I do not want to take up the Committee's time; I can only confirm that the Soviet Union is prepared to provide guarantees to all non-nuclear-weapon States which have no nuclear weapons on their territories, irrespective of whether or not they are members of a military alliance. Thus the Soviet Union is willing to give guarantees of the non-use of nuclear weapons to, among others, those non-nuclear-weapon NATO countries on whose territories no nuclear weapons are stationed. As for the formulas of the United Kingdom and the United States, the main difference between those formulas and the Soviet Union's formula consists, as we see, in the fact that the United States and the United Kingdom are not prepared to give security guarantees to those non-nuclear-weapon States which are in a military alliance with another nuclear-weapon Power.

Here the situation is perfectly clear: the range of States to which we are prepared to provide guarantees is wider than that to which the United States and the United Kingdom are willing to provide such guarantees. Can an acceptable solution be found even under such conditions? Surely it can, and, I repeat, we are ready to seek such a solution in a constructive spirit, a spirit of co-operation, and not in a spirit of suspicion and a misrepresentation of situations. For that was the tone of the Netherlands representative's remarks when he said that the Soviet Union's formula is aimed at disturbing the existing parity and that the USSR is trying to obtain some kind of advantage. One cannot help thinking here of the Russian saying that a frightened cow is scared of every bush.

I repeat: we are prepared to continue to co-operate in the search for a solution acceptable to all, but only on condition that flexibility and an interest in solving the problem are shown not by the Soviet side alone, but also by the other parties participating in such a search.

Secondly, I should like to address a request through you, Mr. Chairman, to all my colleagues to make their statements a little more slowly. Otherwise, as happened today, the interpreters cannot keep up with them. All of us, including my delegation, are sometimes guilty in this respect. In the interests of more efficient work, we should bear in mind the difficulties of simultaneous interpretation.

My third and last point is this. We would ask the Secretariat to be more careful in the matter of documentation. Document CD/176, distributed today at the Soviet delegation's request, has an inadmissible defect in the Russian version. We hope that this error will immediately be rectified and that such mistakes will not recur in the future.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan, for his statement and I may tell him that I have been able to understand the translations of his statements very well. He spoke slowly enough for me to follow what he was saying to us. At the same time, I think the Ambassador has been notified by the Secretariat about the missing second page of the document referred to. As you rightly said, Ambassador Issraelyan, on my English version the second page fortunately is not missing.

Mr. SARAN (India): Several comments have been made today concerning the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. My delegation would like to express its views concerning this issue.

The question of negotiating effective international assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is presumably designed to protect the security of those States which have renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons, should a nuclear conflict break out involving some or all nuclear-weapon States and their allies. What, after all, would be the nature of such a conflict? Can the nuclear-weapon States and their allies guarantee that the effects of such a nuclear war can be contained within their national boundaries? Can the non-nuclear-weapon States rest content with the assurance that they would not be the object of a direct hit by nuclear warheads, when extensive fall-out and radioactive contamination would have serious and adverse effects on the well-being of their populations? And even if such an assurance would give some limited comfort to non-nuclear-weapon States, the subjective conditions and qualifications attached to the assurances make them virtually meaningless. How does one judge, for example, whether a non-nuclear-weapon State is "associated" with a nuclear-weapon State in an attack on another nuclear-weapon State or its ally? The delegation of the United Kingdom I think, stated at one of our earlier meetings that, in practice, this would always be quite obvious. But how? Could this argument perhaps be used to justify a pre-emptive attack on a non-nuclear-weapon State which may have friendly relations with one or another nuclear-weapon State? Can one who is subject to a law be allowed to be a judge as well?

And what about a situation in which the territory of a non-nuclear-weapon State is, in case of a war, used, against its will, by a nuclear-weapon State for military activity? Experience of the last World War shows that this is quite possible. Should that State be punished for its inability to withstand the superior military might of a major military Power and be subject to a nuclear attack? After all, these assurances are relevant in scenarios of conflict, not in peacetime and, therefore, must take such possibilities into account.

These considerations have led our delegation to conclude that the only effective assurance to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons lies in the achievement of nuclear disarmament, and pending nuclear disarmament in the conclusion of an agreement on the total prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. In no way can this position taken by our delegation be considered outside the scope of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances.

In this connection, I would like to draw the attention of the Committee to paragraph 32 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, which reads:

"All States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, should consider various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, and the prevention of nuclear war. In this context, while noting the declarations made by nuclear-weapon States, effective arrangements, as appropriate, to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons could strengthen the security of those States and international peace and security."

(Mr. Saran, India)

The context in which, therefore, we are negotiating so-called negative security guarantees involves the consideration of all proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear war.

The CHAIRMAN: I now call on the Secretary of the Committee and personal representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Jaipal, who will make a short statement to inform the Committee on communications received by the Secretariat.

Mr. JAIPAL (Secretary of the Committee and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General): First of all, in reply to the comments made by the distinguished Ambassador of the Soviet Union, on behalf of the Secretariat, I would like to convey our apologies for failing to publish the enclosure in the Russian version of document CD/176. This was clearly an omission. There is really no excuse for it and I shall bring it to the notice of the appropriate authority. I would like to inform the Ambassador of the Soviet Union that this document in Russian will be reissued.

As I said on an earlier occasion, from time to time I intend to keep the Committee informed of communications received by the Secretariat. Four communications were received from non-governmental organizations during the current session and they contain views, statements and declarations relating to the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. They are from the Labour Action for Peace, the Women's International Democratic Federation, the Quakers Organization and Co-operation for Disarmament. They are all intended for the information of the members of the Committee and we shall be circulating them informally to the members.

We have also received so far nearly 1,000 communications from mainly women and children in Denmark, Sweden, Norway, the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Mexico, Turkey and the United States of America. They are all brief and contain the inscription, "EARTH FOR LIFE". The average daily intake in the last few days has been about 100 letters. They are all addressed to the CD, Geneva. To give the members an idea of their contents, it is enough for me to read out two letters, one from Denmark and the other from the United States.

The letter from Denmark is from a lady and it reads as follows:

"TO UNITED NATIONS - Committee on Disarmament - 3.4.81 Denmark

"I write to you because I get scared and desperate when I learn about how much money is spent on war material, and how many times we are able to kill each other, and still some people say that we must have even more war-material.

"I used to keep my desperation to myself, but I cannot anymore, and a lot of people are beginning to make some sort of protest against the growing armament, because this is not a trend that we/she, man/woman in the street want, it is a threat against our lives and all what we live for.

(Mr. Jaipal, Secretary of the Committee and
Personal Representative of the Secretary-General)

"How can you expect us to be able to bring up the coming generation, when we are scared ourselves? I am the mother of three children. The oldest is only 5 years old, and he already knows about the A-bomb and he has to grow with the fear of it.

"What can I say to him when he asks me questions?

"Can I tell him not to worry, that we have got wise men who govern the world, and that we can trust that they will see to it, that the armaments do not end up in a disaster?

"Don't you think that he can sense that I am not sure myself?

"The UNITED NATIONS must do more than they do at the present time to suggest new ways to solve the problems concerning international disagreements."

The second letter is from a lady from the United States of America and it reads as follows:

"In the middle of the day, at work or at home, I am suddenly aware of the growing fear that some day there will no longer be a home or a place to work.

"No individual, no organization, no country can alone stop the insanity of the arms race. But if many people work together in organizations and in the countries, and they are being encouraged and supported by all of us, then there might be a hope: We do not want nuclear war! We will not accept the production of still more numerous and more horrible weapons!

"We want to protect the earth so that people, animals and plants can live!

EARTH FOR LIFE

"We have to tell each other, so that it is not misunderstood, and so that the politicians and generals will understand that we do not dare let them have the power to destroy the earth. This power must be demolished. The weapons of doomsday must be destroyed."

The CHAIRMAN: As announced at our informal meeting yesterday, I intend to hold informal open-ended consultations on the questions I referred to in our meeting yesterday.

These informal open-ended consultations will take place tomorrow, 15 April, at 3 p.m., in Conference Room No. 1.

The next plenary meeting of the CD will be held on Thursday, 16 April, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.