

CD/PV.123
9 April 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-THIRD MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 9 April 1981, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. G. PFEIFFER (Federal Republic of Germany)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. M. MEDKOUR
Mr. M. MATI

Argentina: Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD

Australia: Mr. R.A. WALKER
Mr. R. STEELE
Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium: Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA

Bulgaria: Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. R. DEYANOV
Mr. K. PRANOV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U NGWE WIN
U THAN HTUN

Canada: Mr. G. SKINNER

China: Mr. JIANG Yufan
Mr. LIN Chen
Mr. PAN Jusheng

Cuba: Mrs. V. BOROWDOSKY JACKIEWICH

Czechoslovakia: Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. A. CIMA
Mr. L. STAVINOHA

Egypt: Mr. M.N. FAHMY

Ethiopia: Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. THIEBICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Mr. P. BUNFIG

Germany, Federal Republic of

Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. N. KLINGER
Mr. H. MULLER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOHIVES
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India:

Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. I. DAMANIK
Mr. F. QASIM
Mr. KARYONO

Iran:

Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA

Italy:

Mr. A. CIARRAPICO
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. D. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. R. ISHII
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya:

Mr. S. SHITETI
Mr. G. MUNIU

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
Mr. C. HELMER

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. L. BAYART
Mr. S.O. BOID

Morocco: Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. W.O. AKINSAITYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. T. AITAF

Peru:

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIAŁOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. G. JONANG
Mr. G. EKHOLM
Mr. J. LUNDIN
Mr. J. PRAWITZ
Mr. H. BESGIJUND

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. V.A. PERFILIEV
Mr. V.M. GANJA
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO
Mr. B.T. SOURIKOV
Mr. S.N. RIUKHINE

United Kingdom: Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES
Mr. N.H. MARSHALL
Mrs. J.I. LINK

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. FLOWERREE

Mr. F.P. DESINONE

Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER

Mr. J. MISKEL

Mr. C. PEARCY

Mr. S. FITZGERALD

Venezuela:

Mr. H. ARTEAGA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:

Secretary of the Committee
and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

Mr. CIARRAPICO (Italy) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, I should like, first of all, to say how happy I am to see as Chairman of the Committee for the month of April, the representative of a country -- the Federal Republic of Germany -- with which Italy maintains close relations of friendship and co-operation at both the European and international levels.

Furthermore we are convinced that, given your outstanding personal and professional qualities, the Committee will, under your leadership, make progress in carrying out its tasks.

My delegation promises you its wholehearted co-operation. I also take this opportunity to congratulate Ambassador Herder for his noteworthy and fruitful efforts to advance our deliberations during the month of March.

I should like to speak today on item 5 of our agenda, entitled, "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons".

With respect to the more general aspect of this item, we have noted the proposal submitted on 7 April last by the Hungarian delegation, concerning the convening of informal meetings of the Committee, with the participation of governmental experts. Although the proposal is structured in a more complete and detailed manner than other similar proposals put forward in past years, we believe that we must maintain, in respect of it, the reservations which, in common with other delegations, we have expressed repeatedly in the past. In our view, the most effective approach to the problems which may be raised by new systems of weapons of mass destruction is to negotiate separate agreements on specific types of such weapons as soon as they are identified. I should like to recall in this connection that, for many years, discussions were held in the United Nations in an unsuccessful attempt to arrive at an adequate definition of the terms "weapon of mass destruction", "weapons system" and "new weapons system".

We also fear that, given the limited time available for the Committee's deliberations as a whole, such a proposal could be adopted only at the expense of other topics of greater priority and urgency.

My delegation welcomed the presentation to the Committee, on 10 July 1979, of a joint proposal by the United States of America and the USSR on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.

We believe that the conclusion of such a treaty would constitute a modest, but useful, contribution to the disarmament process.

First, a treaty on radiological weapons should be considered as the implementation of the prohibition on radioactive material weapons referred to in the definition of weapons of mass destruction contained in the resolution of the Commission for Conventional Armaments, of 12 August 1948. Coming in the wake of the prohibition of bacteriological weapons, it would place outside the law a new system of weapons of mass destruction which, although for the time being neither operational nor deployed, has nevertheless been identified.

Secondly, a treaty on radiological weapons would have the advantage, not only of averting a potential danger, which is becoming increasingly real with the rapid build-up of radioactive materials, but also of alerting Governments and public opinion to the dangers of certain new forms of modern warfare.

(Mr. Ciarrapico, Italy)

Thirdly, the elaboration of a treaty would provide an impetus to the achievement of progress in other areas of disarmament. In the view of the Italian delegation, this consideration is of particular importance at a time like the present when the general situation is not itself propitious to the efforts made in the field of disarmament. It is not an insignificant fact that the basis for our discussions within the Committee should be a joint American-Soviet proposal. We all know that, to be successful, the disarmament process requires the combined will of the two Powers possessing the largest military arsenals. Within the narrow limits of its scope, the joint proposal is a demonstration of such a combination of will.

Fourthly, the elaboration of a treaty on radiological weapons could afford the Committee its first opportunity to fulfil the task for which it was set up, namely, the negotiation of the texts of agreements. We are aware that there is a sharp divergence of views in that respect. We nevertheless believe that, with less than a year to go before the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, it would be useful to have at our disposal a concrete example which would permit the international community to judge whether the Committee, in its present form, is in a position to discharge its mandate and to meet the technical conditions necessary for the conduct of negotiations. As for the Committee itself, the experience thus acquired cannot but prove useful as a precedent for other, more complex, deliberations in the future.

These are some of the reasons why my delegation has from the outset, co-operated towards the success of this undertaking.

It seemed to us that, in negotiating this treaty, the Committee should set itself two main goals: on the one hand, to arrive at a precise definition of radiological weapons and to prohibit them, and on the other to ensure that the provisions of the treaty do not entail any interference with other perfectly legitimate and important activities such as the peaceful use of nuclear energy and radioactive materials. In keeping with this approach, we have submitted a number of specific proposals and suggestions.

The patient and tireless efforts of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group, Ambassador Komives, to whom we should like today to express our sincere appreciation of the work accomplished, have shown that it is possible to amend and enrich the joint American-Soviet proposal in a constructive manner, by incorporating the ideas put forward by a number of delegations.

The Ad Hoc Working Group has advanced from the stage of identifying the main elements of the future treaty to that of negotiating on each of the elements identified. It would be desirable for the Group to be able to pass on to the final stage, that of the drafting of the text of the treaty. My delegation, for its part, is prepared to participate in that work, with the collaboration of its experts.

It must be recognized, however, that the actual drafting work can be undertaken with a reasonable hope of success only if all delegations accept the idea of a convention of limited scope the urgency and importance of which would not be of the first order.

Another approach has been suggested, which would entail the radical widening of the field of application and the role of the convention. In this context, questions of major importance have been raised and discussed.

(Mr. Ciarrapico, Italy)

The question arises as to how far the present structure of the convention, as it emerges from the amended version prepared by the Chairman of the Working Group, is capable of absorbing these new elements without needing to be entirely recast and without this jeopardizing the possibility of agreement.

It is our feeling that certain concerns could be adequately accommodated either in the preamble or in the body of the convention, for example, those regarding the priorities which the Committee should observe, and the duty incumbent upon it to resolve, first and foremost, the problems presented by weapons systems which have already been developed and deployed, in particular in the nuclear field. Others raise problems calling for very detailed study.

The memorandum submitted by the Swedish delegation on 16 March 1981 and contained in working paper CD/RW/WP.19 is one example. We are grateful to the Swedish delegation for preparing a paper which has the merit of being thought-provoking, and to Ambassador Lidgard for providing us, in his statement of Tuesday last, with very interesting additional information, including information of a technical nature.

Those aspects are receiving careful study by the Italian authorities.

It would be premature to try to formulate any comments, even of a preliminary nature. I would simply note that the memorandum raises real problems and expresses legitimate concerns which Sweden is not alone in feeling.

At this stage, it is more important to reflect on these problems, rather than to know whether they can be solved within the framework of a convention on radiological weapons, or within the context of humanitarian law applicable to war situations. They will undoubtedly constitute an important subject for discussion at our summer session. My delegation's attention is directed towards a careful evaluation of the dimensions of these problems and in particular of the effects which could result from conventional military attacks on nuclear power stations and also on reprocessing facilities and waste deposits bearing in mind also the variety of types of existing installations.

In its discussions, the Ad Hoc Working Group has dealt also with another issue to which my delegation attaches special importance, that of the peaceful use of nuclear energy and radioactive materials. Last year, my delegation took the initiative of proposing amendments to the text of the joint proposal, with a view to safeguarding the right of parties to the treaty to institute international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses. Other delegations made proposals designed to give a positive tone to the text of the convention by reaffirming, on the one hand, the right of States parties to have access to technology, equipment, scientific information, etc. and, on the other hand, the obligation of States parties to promote international co-operation to that end.

In our view, such an approach could be adequately reflected in the treaty. Moreover, the examples of the Convention relating to biological weapons and the Convention relating to environmental modification techniques, which contain provisions of this type, lead us in this direction and can themselves serve as useful precedents guiding our efforts to reach a satisfactory compromise.

(Mr. Ciarrapico, Italy)

With regard to the concern that the convention might lead to possible discrimination against non-party States, I should like to point out that that is a problem inherent in any type of agreement or treaty and that it has been traditionally dealt with in accordance with the legal principle that "pacta tertiis neque jvant neque nocent".

Before concluding my statement, I wish to inform the delegations present that, tomorrow, Italy will sign, in New York, the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

In fact, 10 April is the day set for the opening of the Convention for signature. By thus signing it we wish to stress the importance we attach to that Convention and to international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts in general. In that area, Italy remains committed to co-operation for the achievement of further progress.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Italy for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the chair.

Mr. OKAWA (Japan): Mr. Chairman, it is a particular pleasure for me to welcome and congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship of our Committee for April. And I pledge to you the fullest co-operation of my delegation during your tenure of office. As to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Herder of the German Democratic Republic, my delegation wishes to express its gratitude to him for his valuable work in March; we shall remember him for his successful efforts in achieving a consensus on the launching of informal discussions on items 1 and 2 of our Agenda.

Today, with your permission, I wish to address myself to item 4 of our agenda, although I know I am one week late in taking the floor on this subject.

The question of a chemical weapons ban is one of the most urgent matters on the disarmament agenda. This is clearly stated in paragraph 75 of the Final Document of the General Assembly's first special session on disarmament as well as in countless General Assembly resolutions, the most recent of which is resolution 35/144 B.

Over the years during which this question has been on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament and its predecessor, member countries have made contributions in the form of countless studies and proposals. The Japanese delegation itself put forward a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, prohibition and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction as far back as in 1974, as well as a number of other working papers in succeeding years, in the hope of contributing to the early conclusion of a chemical weapons ban. A great many problems still remain to be solved. Some of the problems originate in political and military or security considerations of the States involved; others derive from the scientific and technological characteristics inherent in chemical warfare agents and chemical weapons themselves. We must, through our discussions in the Committee on Disarmament, try to achieve compromises in the form of realistic and effective solutions to the outstanding

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problems, taking into account and respecting as much as possible the various positions expressed by the delegations around this table. My delegation will also endeavour to work toward such compromises at the appropriate stage; today I shall limit myself to a few observations based on the basic position or way of thinking we have maintained over the years.

The use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases is prohibited by the Geneva Protocol of 1925 to which 96 States are Contracting Parties. Nevertheless, huge stockpiles of chemical weapons are maintained in certain countries, and production is continuing. This is the main reason why the banning of chemical weapons is considered by the international community to be of such great urgency. If the existing stocks of chemical weapons and chemical warfare agents could be destroyed, and the existing facilities for their production, assembly, storage, etc., could be destroyed, dismantled, or converted to peaceful purposes, it would be a great relief to the international community. At the same time my delegation is convinced that those countries not possessing chemical weapons, including my own, are hoping for a comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons, not only from humanitarian considerations but also from the point of view of their national security.

It was against this background that the Committee decided last year to establish an Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. This step was welcomed by my Government as the beginning of a promising new phase in the long history of international efforts towards the elaboration of a multilateral convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Although the initial mandate of the Working Group necessarily had to be of a somewhat limited nature, the discussions in the Working Group were characterized by a remarkable spirit of co-operation and goodwill among the delegates participating in the joint effort. The same spirit of co-operation is prevailing in the Working Group that has been re-established this year, and my delegation wishes to express its deep appreciation to Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden for the energetic but meticulous manner in which he is presiding over the proceedings of the Working Group. My delegation also welcomes the participation of the chemical weapons experts once again this year, as well as the presence of the delegates of non-member countries interested in this subject.

Before I proceed into the substance of the question, I wish to express my Government's hope and expectation that the Soviet Union and the United States will be able to reopen their bilateral negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons in the very near future. While fully endorsing the important role of the Committee on Disarmament as the only multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, and consequently as the legitimate body for conducting multilateral negotiations on a chemical weapons ban, my delegation does recognize the importance of the bilateral negotiations and the fact that the two sets of negotiations must march forward hand in hand, so to speak. The USSR-United States joint report presented to us last July in document CD/112 is of great importance to the other members of the Committee as an indication of the progress so far made and of the problems that remain to be solved between the bilateral negotiators. My delegation hopes that we shall have the benefit of further such joint reports at regular intervals to help our work in the Committee. We also hope that our discussions in the Committee will act as a stimulant to the bilateral negotiators and will also be able to assist them in finding solutions to some of their problems.

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The basic concept of the Japanese draft convention of April 1974, which I mentioned a few minutes ago, was the comprehensive coverage of the prohibition to be envisaged as the long-term objective; this was, however, combined with the more realistic approach by stages, under which we would begin with the prohibition of those chemical agents known to be used for hostile military purposes and regarding which verification would present no problem or regarding which their verifiability could be agreed upon.

Paragraph 2 of the USSR-United States joint report (CCD/112) classifies chemical into three categories, namely, super-toxic lethal chemicals, other lethal chemicals and other harmful chemicals. Regardless of how toxicity criteria would come to be incorporated into the provisions of the convention, my delegation has been advocating the adoption of toxicity criteria to supplement the general purpose criterion and as a means of concretely identifying the chemicals for hostile military purposes that would be prohibited under the convention. We therefore consider that this classification of chemicals into three categories would be more or less appropriate for our purpose. We can also accept the idea that agreed ranges of toxicity levels should be used for distinguishing the three categories. However, the joint report recognizes that methods of measuring toxicity have to be agreed upon. My delegation mentioned last year the need to establish a standardized method of testing or measuring the toxicity of chemicals. A group of Japanese experts is now working on this question and we may eventually be able to present to the Committee some suggestions regarding the standardization of such testing methods.

My delegation has always considered it necessary to envisage some sort of listing of chemical agents which would be the object of prohibition or other control under the convention. Whether such a list should be annexed to the convention or not should be the object of careful study. Of course, it would be impossible to draw up a comprehensive list of such chemicals, but at least an illustrative list of chemicals that are known to be used or are likely to be used as CW agents would be both feasible and useful -- useful in making clear, in an illustrative manner, what chemicals would be prohibited and also in facilitating the process of verification.

I now turn to the question of verification, which is one of the keystones of a chemical weapons ban. The method or means of verifying whether obligations under the convention are being lived up to will vary according to what is to be verified. Different techniques will need to be employed for different situations. This is why our consideration of the multiple problems related to verification has a very close relationship to the scope of the prohibition under the convention. This point is recognized in paragraph 10 of the report of last year's Working Group on Chemical Weapons, where it is stated in section B: "It was held that verification measures should be commensurate with the scope of prohibition and other aspects of a convention". In the view of my delegation this is a point of practical importance that needs to be borne in mind.

It was also recognized last year that the verification system could be based on an appropriate combination of national and international measures. We think we could envisage national organs that would be responsible, inter alia, for observing and supervising national activities related to the subject matter of the convention, the collection of statistical and other information, and the preparation of periodic reports that would be presented to a consultative committee or other international verification organ to be established by the parties to the convention. The

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international organ would analyse and evaluate the periodic reports and statistical and other information submitted by the national organs of States parties, and be invited to send observers to be present when stocks are being destroyed or when production facilities are being dismantled. In connection with the obligation not to engage in the production of prohibited chemical agents, the international organ would request explanations from States parties and conduct inquiries as well as inspections, if necessary, upon invitation or with the agreement of the State party concerned.

What should the international verification system be expected to verify? The destruction of existing stocks of chemical weapons and of chemical warfare agents for hostile military purposes, and the destruction, dismantling or conversion to peaceful purposes of the facilities for the production of the above, as well as filling facilities and storage facilities are the principal items that immediately come to mind. One might also envisage the moth-balling of these facilities in the intermediate stage that could occur after the declaration of plans to destroy or dismantle facilities and before their actual destruction. The task of effectively verifying all this would already seem to be an enormous responsibility and the successful execution of the highly complicated and costly operations that this would entail would be a significant achievement, to say the least. Setting aside for the time being the question of how stringent the verification measures should be, my delegation feels that we should initially aim at the early establishment of a verification system that would cover the items or activities I have just mentioned to the extent that would be realistic and feasible -- both from the technical and from the financial points of view.

One of the most difficult problems in the field of verification will be the way in which a reasonable system could be applied to so-called dual purpose chemical agents. No mention is made of dual purpose chemicals in the USSR-United States joint report, and my delegation understands that the distinction between single purpose and dual purpose chemicals is only relative. A number of valuable technical suggestions have been made in this Committee and its predecessor regarding this problem, and we feel that, regardless of whether these terms will or will not appear in the text of our CW convention, the problem that so-called dual purpose chemicals would pose in the context of an effective chemical weapons ban cannot be avoided. We consider this important question to merit continued in-depth study in the Committee on Disarmament. At this stage I would simply say that it would be helpful if, with the help of experts, we could identify and list the principal chemical agents that could be used for both peaceful and hostile military purposes.

My Government considers that the verification measures to be provided for under the convention should be primarily directed against military or chemical-warfare-oriented activities, and that any intrusion into the normal operations of the chemical industries should be limited to the minimum necessary. My delegation fully shares the view expressed two weeks ago by the distinguished delegate of Brazil, Ambassador de Souza e Silva, that "the convention should be conceived according to the principle that civil industrial activities and the full use of technology for peaceful purposes should not only be allowed but actually encouraged; the production, development, stock-piling and transfer of chemical agents for warlike purposes is the exception that must be prohibited, rather than the other way around". Let me also quote a sentence from our own working paper CCD/430 of July 1974, in which we spoke of "the need to satisfy two conflicting requirements:

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to obtain verification results reliable enough to be able to deter non-compliance with the Convention and at the same time to minimize the burden of States parties to the Convention".

In the view of my delegation, the activities of chemical industries for peaceful purposes should not be submitted to on-site inspection, for instance, except in cases where the industry is suspected of producing prohibited chemical agents and no convincing explanations to the contrary have been put forward.

May I also express my delegation's appreciation to the delegation of Canada for its recent paper on verification, contained in document CD/167, as well, of course, as for its many contributions to the Committee on this subject over the years

I would now like to touch upon the relationship between our CW convention and the Geneva Protocol of 1925. That document has played a most important role during the 50-odd years that it has been in force and my delegation has not the slightest intention of querying its usefulness. However, as has been pointed out by many delegations, there is room for reinforcing the Geneva Protocol. Several delegations have pointed out the possible duplication of legal obligations that would arise if the new convention were to embrace a prohibition of "use". On the other hand, we must also bear in mind that the scope of the prohibition under the new convention may not necessarily coincide exactly with the scope of the prohibition under the 1925 Protocol, that is to say: asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all other analogous liquids, materials or devices. Furthermore, no provisions for verification are included in the Protocol. We can therefore understand the argument in favour of the use of chemical weapons also being covered in some form in the new convention.

Incidentally, my delegation listened with interest to the statement made two weeks ago by you yourself, Mr. Chairman, in your capacity as representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, in which you suggested the inclusion in the chemical weapons convention of a verification procedure that would aim at ensuring observation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. We would like to give this suggestion careful consideration.

Much has been said about confidence-building measures that could be incorporated into the proposed convention, or could be implemented even before we have such a convention. My delegation agrees on their usefulness, but today I shall limit myself to saying that a workable and reliable verification system would be the greatest and most effective of all confidence-building measures.

In concluding my statement, may I express the hope of my delegation that, by the time of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament to be held next year, this Committee will be in a position to report some meaningful progress on a chemical weapons convention, the conclusion of which was said in paragraph 75 of the Final Document of 1973 to be "one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral negotiations".

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Japan for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the chair.

Mr. VENKATESWARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, it is a matter of great satisfaction to my delegation to see you, the representative of a country with which India has close and friendly links, as the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of April. We are convinced that under your able guidance the work of this Committee will be significantly advanced and the basis laid for achieving further concrete results during the rest of our 1981 session. We would also like to take this opportunity to express our appreciation to Ambassador Gerhard Herder of the German Democratic Republic, who guided the work of this Committee before you in a skilful and effective manner.

My delegation would today like to address itself to the problem of new weapons of mass destruction and radiological weapons. As far as new weapons of mass destruction are concerned, we have consistently taken the position that in the long run it would be necessary to evolve a mechanism whereby military applications of new advances in science and technology are put under general and effective control. What we are witnessing today is a phenomenon where the pace of progress in weapons technology is constantly outstripping the slow and halting pace of disarmament negotiations. It is a fact that the increasing complexity of new weapons systems which are introduced makes the task of adequate verification more difficult. The paradox is that the technological arms race has not resulted in greater security for any of its votaries. If nothing is done soon to ensure that the development of science and technology is used only for the advancement of human welfare and economic and social development, the arms race is bound to go out of control.

It has been argued by some in this Committee that it is unrealistic to evolve a mechanism to prevent the development of new weapons systems until such systems have already been identified. This point has once again been mentioned by the distinguished delegate of Italy this morning. However, in doing so, one should not neglect the historical experience of the last several decades. Time and again we have seen that once a new weapon system has been evolved or a new military application of some scientific or technological breakthrough has been identified, efforts to apply control or restraint to them have been largely discouraged. To those who have developed them, new and apparently more sophisticated weapons systems appear to provide the instrument for obtaining an edge over a potential adversary or in redressing a perceived military imbalance. Even if this is not the case, there have been occasions where new weapons systems have been used as bargaining counters in negotiations on arms control.

My delegation has noted with interest the proposal made by the Soviet Union for the setting up of an ad hoc group of experts under the aegis of this Committee to consider both a general prohibition on new weapons of mass destruction as well as specific measures in regard to the prohibition of specific potential weapons which have been identified. We regard this proposal as a constructive one meriting attention. As the only multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament, the Committee on Disarmament cannot shirk its responsibility in

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dealing with a problem which is at the very heart of the continuing and escalating arms race. Of course, an ad hoc group of experts is perhaps not the only way in which we can deal with this problem. We could, for example, hold periodic meetings at which scientists and technologists could acquaint the Committee with new military applications of recent advances in science and technology. At some stage we could even think in terms of setting up an ad hoc working group of this Committee itself to negotiate effective international arrangements to deal with the problem.

In this connection, I would like to quote from a thoughtful paper presented by Lord Zuckerman at the Colloquium on Science and Disarmament held in Paris in January 1981. Lord Zuckerman pointed out that "the technological arms race has no finishing post, and because of its increasing cost and of the increasing cost of the use of its products in terms of trained manpower, it erodes the military establishment itself". Lord Zuckerman formulated what he has called the "incororable law of Research and Development". Some aspects of the law read as follows:

"Since the cost of developing a weapon system of a given degree of sophistication is much the same in all advanced industrialized countries, considerations of the absolute size of the economy come into play when a country wishes its forces to live up to the standards set by the arms race between the super-Powers and when it has to re-equip at frequent intervals with weapons which are more sophisticated and correspondingly much more expensive than those they replace. If we suppose that the percentage of the Gross Domestic Product that can be devoted to defence remains roughly the same from year to year, and that the GDP is rising steadily, it inevitably follows that the greater amount of money that goes to defence each year would be unlikely to buy more defence".

"A more expensive offensive system is countered by an even more expensive defence. The net result is an increase in expenditure on defence equipment by both parties, and usually an increase in the security of neither".

These remarks, of course, apply to all the major Powers.

Lord Zuckerman accordingly concluded that "the long-term consequences are, therefore, inescapable. If we are to be efficient in defence, we cannot plan on allowing our equipment to become obsolete. Equally, we cannot assume that a rising share of the Gross Domestic Product will be allotted to defence. Therefore, the alternatives between which we are forced to choose are to alter our commitments so as to avoid the need to introduce some of the most expensive new weapon systems; or to make our forces smaller; or a combination of both these measures".

At the end of his interesting paper, Lord Zuckerman expressed the view that scientists and technologists have much to contribute by explaining to their respective political and military leaders the facts of life of the arms race.

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As he pointed out, what has happened over the past 20 years, far from adding to the security of nations, has made the world a much more dangerous place in which to live. One cannot but agree with his assessment that "the momentum of the technological arms race carries along not only the seeds of its own frustration, but of national bankruptcy -- or of worse, war itself."

It is therefore obvious that we in this Committee should be made aware of the so-called facts of life of the technological arms race. It is for this reason that we commend the Soviet proposal.

The Indian delegation has already put before this Committee its views concerning the proposed treaty prohibiting radiological weapons. We are prepared to engage in serious negotiations in the elaboration of such a treaty. However, it is only natural that as individual delegations we should seek to ensure that the treaty text does not contradict or undermine the positions of principle that our countries have taken with respect to certain fundamental political issues. India has consistently held that the possession and use of nuclear weapons cannot be a legitimate instrument of ensuring the security of States. As early as 1961 the General Assembly declared that the use of nuclear weapons would be a crime against humanity. The same declaration was reiterated in subsequent resolutions of the General Assembly, most recently in resolution 35/152 D. It is this fundamental stand on principle which underlies our objection to a definition of radiological weapons which resorts to an exclusion clause with respect to nuclear weapons. This stand has the support of several delegations in this Committee. The distinguished Ambassador of Brazil, in his thought-provoking statement at our plenary meeting of 7 April 1981, quite rightly pointed out:

"My delegation favours the suggestions that have been made in the Committee and in the Working Group, according to which it would be advisable to define radiological weapons by their characteristics rather than by explicitly excluding nuclear weapons from the purview of the convention. There seems to be little point in adopting a definition that amounts to a legitimization of nuclear weapons, only to have the following article disclaim that fact by stating that nothing in the convention can be interpreted as legitimizing nuclear weapons. Such a disclaimer would, in fact, only underline the assumption that the very real nuclear weapons are, indeed, considered as a viable option, while the non-existent radiological weapons are prohibited. The exclusion clause, as it has been described, is, for those reasons, unacceptable to my delegation".

The constructive manner in which delegations have engaged in the negotiations on a ban on radiological weapons has been amply demonstrated in the several contributions that have been made to overcome the problem of definition which we have referred to. Yugoslavia, for example, has put forward before the Ad Hoc Working Group a possible alternative definition which does not resort to an exclusion clause with respect to nuclear weapons. The distinguished

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

Ambassador of Yugoslavia made a full and convincing case in support of his proposal at our last plenary meeting. My delegation would like to express its deep appreciation to Ambassador Vrhunec for the efforts his delegation has made to seek a reasonable solution to a problem that, in our view, is fundamental for ensuring the success of our negotiations.

My delegation has suggested some precise and specific formulations for inclusion in a future treaty on radiological weapons. We are grateful to the distinguished Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, Ambassador Komives of Hungary, who has, in the texts that he has so carefully and meticulously prepared for the consideration of the Working Group, taken account of these concerns. He should receive our full support in the difficult and sometimes frustrating task that he has so graciously undertaken.

The distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Lidgard, made a thought-provoking and convincing statement on radiological weapons at our last plenary meeting. We wish to express our gratitude to the Swedish delegation for the timely reminder that this Committee should not compromise its credibility in a hasty attempt to produce an agreement, which would not meet, even in a limited manner, the hopes and aspirations of the international community. Like the Swedish delegation, we too are not quite clear as to what we are trying to prohibit as the present text stands. The specific possibilities that have been suggested in the Committee appear to be exceedingly hypothetical when scrutinized closely. However, we are still prepared to negotiate a ban on such potential weapons, provided their specific technical attributes are made explicit and clear.

We have also taken careful note of the proposal made by Sweden that the proposed treaty on radiological weapons should also prohibit attacks on civilian nuclear facilities. Such a prohibition would certainly add to the validity of the convention which we are seeking to negotiate. The Swedish proposal will receive the most serious consideration by our Government.

In conclusion, my delegation is of the view that the Committee on Disarmament must first and foremost focus attention on priority items on its agenda. The cessation of the nuclear arms race and the achievement of nuclear disarmament are the most urgent and critical questions facing mankind. Our credibility, our relevance as a multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament, will be judged in the final analysis by our ability to negotiate concrete measures in the field of nuclear disarmament. A treaty banning radiological weapons could only have value if it is regarded as a step towards the eventual prohibition of all weapons causing death and destruction by radiation, including nuclear weapons themselves, which pose the greatest danger to human survival.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of India for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the chair.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, at the beginning of my statement I should like to express satisfaction at the fact that during this highly crucial month which concludes the spring part of the 1981 session of the Committee of Disarmament, the chairmanship of the Committee has devolved upon you. We hope that your experience and profound knowledge of the problems discussed in the Committee will make for the efficient organization of our work in the days that remain and will enable us to come closer to a solution of the issues entrusted to our Committee. I should also like to address some words of sincere gratitude to Ambassador Herder, Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament during the past month. To him fell the difficult task of harmonizing the approaches of various delegations on the question of how work should be continued within the Committee on questions relating to the limitation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and to the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

Today the Soviet delegation would like to touch upon a number of issues.

The Soviet Union's approach to the problem of the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons is well known to the members of the Committee on Disarmament. This approach was confirmed once again in the report by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the 26th Congress of the CPSU in which, as regards the problem under discussion the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, L.I. Brezhnev, noted the following important point:

"The pivotal line of the foreign policy of our Party and Government has been and continues to be the struggle to reduce the danger of war and to curb the arms race. At the present time, this objective has acquired particular significance and urgency. The fact is that rapid and profound changes are taking place in the development of military technology. Qualitatively new types of weapons, and first and foremost weapons of mass destruction, are being developed. These new types of weapons are such as to make control over them and, consequently also, an agreed limitation of these weapons an extremely difficult if not impossible undertaking. A new phase in the arms race will undermine international stability and greatly increase the danger of the outbreak of war."

As you know, we are in favour of a comprehensive agreement prohibiting the development and production of any new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. At the same time, we do not exclude the possibility of concluding particular agreements also.

We continue to believe that it would be more proper to act in such a way as to forestall, through an appropriate agreement, the threat of the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction well before they are developed or are converted into some material means of warfare. Time does not wait!

The problem we are discussing today has been on the agenda of the sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, the Committee on Disarmament and other international forums for about five years. The Committee on Disarmament periodically holds debates on the question of new types of weapons of mass destruction. Occasionally experts from certain countries participate in them. Up to now, things have not gone further than that. At the same time, unlike other disarmament problems, the question of the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction possesses distinctive and unique features peculiar only to it.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Among the first of these specific features is the fact that one of the crucial elements in the discussion of the question of new types of weapons of mass destruction is the elaboration of agreed scientific and technological concepts which must underlie the subject of the prohibition in a future agreement or agreements. This in turn means that, if this question is to be examined in the Committee, it should obviously be appropriately informed, bearing in mind the importance for the Committee to adopt political decisions on the basis of a strict scientific analysis of all the most complex facets of the problem.

In our view, what is needed in this case is a preliminary stage of discussion when, at the level of experts, an agreed opinion would be worked out on the scientific and technological aspects of the issue and this opinion would be presented to the Committee for its consideration.

The available experience of the discussion of the issue of new types of weapons of mass destruction shows that an expert speaking at a meeting of the Committee is compelled by the very nature of his audience to try to make his statement as easily understood as possible, sometimes prejudicing its scientific accuracy. This may lead either to a not altogether correct understanding of a given problem, as is shown, in particular, for instance, by the proposals of some delegations to include in the scope of the prohibition of radiological weapons the so-called particle beam weapons also, or to the distortion of the substance of the matter.

These considerations warrant the assertion that the effectiveness of the discussion of such a scientifically complex problem as that of new types of weapons of mass destruction would be much higher if the members of the Committee had at their disposal the views not merely of one expert, even if highly qualified, but of a group of experts from various countries which would be worked out on the basis of a procedure recognized by the scientific world. This is precisely the purpose of the proposal of the USSR delegation for the setting up of an ad hoc group of experts. We have heard with interest the statement of the Hungarian delegation of 7 April and we support its proposal to hold informal meetings, which would also serve the same goal.

The group we are proposing could present authoritative opinions on those developments in science and technology which pose a potential danger from the point of view of the devising of new types of weapons of mass destruction and also provide the Committee with surveys of the current situation in this matter from the scientific and technological standpoint. The mandate of such a group could be agreed on in greater detail at the informal meetings of the Committee with the participation of experts proposed by the delegation of Hungary.

Thus, the existence of such a group would ensure that the Committee receives objective scientific and technological information on the subject of weapons of mass destruction, and would provide it with an important practical means for a regular monitoring of the status of this problem.

I should now like to dwell briefly on the question of the prohibition of radiological weapons. First of all, I wish to express our appreciation to Ambassador Kórnives for his skilful and efficient stewardship of the Working Group on Radiological Weapons.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

At the Committee's plenary meeting on 7 April we listened attentively to the statements of a number of delegations on this subject. In some of them -- and not for the first time -- the question was raised as to whether there is any need at all to deal with the problem of the banning of radiological weapons (meaning, precisely, weapons as such) in view of the fact that there are other unresolved issues in the sphere of the limitation of armaments and generally in the field of the lessening of the danger of war. The Soviet delegation believes that, since the introduction of the joint Soviet-United States document on the basic elements of a treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons, the authors of this document and representatives of other delegations have devoted much attention to explaining and substantiating the idea, purposes, subject and scope of the prohibition in the proposed treaty. In particular, the danger of the development of radiological weapons has been demonstrated on the basis of the existence of a possibility in principle of using radiation produced by the decay of radioactive materials. Mention has been made of a possibility in principle of producing such weapons in the form of bombs, shells, fougassés, etc., intended for the dissemination of radioactive materials by means of an explosion. The possibility has also been indicated of developing special devices or equipment for the purpose of disseminating radioactive materials in a non-explosive manner, for instance, through their dispersion in the form of liquid or solid particles. Other possibilities, also, have been noted for the use for hostile purposes of radioactive materials which may be at the disposal of a State.

Many delegations have made references, among other things, to the United Nations definition of 1948 in which, even at that time, radiological weapons were identified as weapons of mass destruction. We wish also to recall the decisions adopted quite recently -- at the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held in 1978, and at the last regular session of the General Assembly, in 1980. Thus, paragraph 76 of the Final Document of the special session says the following: "A convention should be concluded prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons". This provision is echoed in General Assembly resolution 35/156 G of 12 December 1980. Both texts, as you know, were adopted by consensus.

Certain other comments have been made replies to which, it seems to us, have already been given by the Soviet delegation both at the plenary meetings of the Committee on Disarmament and in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons and in the course of the bilateral consultations.

The Soviet delegation, like many of the other delegations which are in favour of the earliest completion of the work on the text of a convention banning radiological weapons, has never, of course, contended that this is a priority question or that it should be considered and resolved before all the other issues. However, while we show our interest and actively participate in the examination of such crucial disarmament questions as the curtailment of the nuclear arms race, the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests, the prohibition of chemical weapons and a number of other issues, we at the same time believe that blocking any direction for the arms race, even a modest one, would be a step forward. And if there is the possibility of reaching such a decision now, we ought not artificially to slow down this work by introducing questions which, although important ones, bear no direct relation to the subject under discussion. We are prompted by the belief that the entire world community is interested in equal degree in achieving the prohibition of radiological weapons since every country will benefit in equal measure from the realization of this measure.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

At our last meeting, on Tuesday, we already gave our assessment of the statement by the United States delegation of 7 April as an unconstructive one that was not in the interests of the tasks confronting this Committee. The American delegation galloped headlong, as it were, through various complex international problems and in the process trampled on subjects having nothing to do with foreign policy. We, too, of course, could cite many examples -- and real examples, not invented ones -- touching on various facets of the social, economic and political life of the United States which, in our view, call for serious criticism. However, we are not in favour of wasting the Committee's work time, which is already extremely limited. In short, we will not follow the American delegation's example but will speak about certain questions of substance.

First of all, hard as the American representative tried, he did not succeed in refuting the obvious fact that it is the United States which has been the initiator of every round in the arms race during the entire post-war period. After all, who was the first to develop nuclear weapons? The United States! Who was the initiator in the development of nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles aboard, the equipping of intercontinental missiles with multiple warheads and the creation of a whole series of the most destructive types of weapons of mass destruction? Again, the United States! Who is taking the lead now in the development of neutron weapons, new types of supertoxic lethal chemical weapons and other dangerous means of warfare? Once more, the United States!

The current military preparations in the United States, which the United States Secretary of Defense, C. Weinberger, calls "the start of America's rearmament" are nothing but an unprecedented super-armament of the United States the aim of which is to achieve preponderance in every category of strategic and conventional armaments.

For instance, the Pentagon has long been boasting about the superiority of its naval forces. What, then, is the purpose, it may be asked, of the decision to increase the total number of warships from 456 to 600, with an increase to 15 in the number of aircraft-carrier groups? And in view of all these facts, how can it be contended that it is the Soviet Union that is responsible for the arms race?

As has been authoritatively stated more than once by the leaders of the Soviet Union, our country is not striving to achieve military supremacy. The military potential of the USSR does not exceed what is required for necessary defence purposes, this being fully in line with the defensive character of Soviet military doctrine. Is our good will not shown by such facts as the unilateral withdrawal from the German Democratic Republic of 20,000 Soviet servicemen, 1,000 tanks and other military equipment which was completed last year?

The American representative tried to confuse the issue as regards the correlation of forces on the European continent, to put it mildly, freely interpreting various facts and juggling with some data. The best response to these attempts is to be found in the statement made by the head of our State, L.I. Brezhnev, at the Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on 7 April of this year. The Soviet delegation would like to read out the relevant passage from that statement. We are doing this also because, in spite of the claims made here about the so-called "free" Western press, many of its organs have not considered it necessary even to mention this most important part of L.I. Brezhnev's speech. I quote:

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

[speaking in English]

"The unbridled nuclear arms race in Europe is becoming lethally dangerous for all European peoples. In order to start in some way the practical solution of this problem, we propose that, for the time being at least, a line be drawn under what exists, that is, to put an end to the further deployment of new, and replacement of both Soviet and NATO medium-range nuclear missiles stationed in Europe. This includes, naturally, the American nuclear forward-based systems in that region. The moratorium could be valid until a permanent treaty is concluded on the limitation and, still better, on the reduction of the above-mentioned nuclear means of both sides in Europe.

"Naturally, our proposal for the moratorium is not an end in itself. It has been made with the intention of creating a more favourable atmosphere for talks. We regard as the objective in this question -- I have stated this before and repeat it now -- precisely the reduction by both sides of the amount of nuclear means accumulated in Europe. This it is quite possible to do without worsening the conditions of security of either East or West.

"Our proposal has, as is known, met with a very positive response in broad political circles and among the public in Western Europe. However, the reaction of those who apparently did not like it was not slow either.

"It is alleged that the new Soviet proposal has the aim of consolidating a supposed advantage of the forces of the Warsaw Treaty member countries. This is certainly not so. I spoke about this in detail at the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. If one casts a glance at the nuclear potentials which both sides now have in the area of Europe, what is obvious is the approximate balance of the forces of both sides. That has, by the way, repeatedly been admitted in the West. For example, Chancellor Schmidt of the Federal Republic of Germany, in one of his public speeches in February of this year, denied that the East-West balance of forces in Europe had been violated. The Chancellor, however, expressed the apprehension that the 'Russians might be on the point of violating it'. The United States Secretary of State Haig also recently spoke about 'the relative balance and parity'. He expressed anxiety, however, that this balance might change in favour of the USSR allegedly by the middle of this decade.

"With such an appraisal of the present-day situation and the prospects of its development, leaders of Western countries should logically have jumped at our proposal. Instead, some of them are trying to minimize its significance, and this is certainly not because the correlation of forces in Europe has changed in the course of a few days. They are doing so because they would like to change that correlation in favour of the West and are unwilling to bind themselves by a moratorium.

"But such attempts -- and this should be clearly understood -- will only impel the other side to take retaliatory steps. A vicious circle will be witnessed again and the situation in Europe will become more precarious for all. Is it so difficult for the Governments of western Powers to understand that?

"As a whole, our proposals mean the settlement of the most urgent international problems which are of paramount significance for the consolidation of peace. We propose that the parties concerned should have business-like, constructive negotiations on these issues -- at any level, without any preliminary strings attached. If anybody has other reasonable proposals, we are ready to consider them also.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

"But, frankly speaking, so far we do not see a particular readiness for negotiations on the part of the Governments of the western Powers.

"Sometimes we are told that all this is very interesting but calls for a long study and there is supposedly no reason to be in a hurry. At the same time it is implied that the definition of the attitude taken does not depend on the Government in question but on others. Meanwhile the arms race continues to escalate and the international situation continues to worsen.

"In other cases, there are attempts to make claims on us, to impose preliminary conditions. There are claims to some 'right' to rule the roost in nearly all parts of the planet, together with demands that as 'payment' for the Western consent to negotiations we should stop considering the interests of our own security and give no assistance to our friends when they are subjected to aggression or a threat of attack.

"A strange stand, to say the least.

"Let us suppose for a minute that the Soviet Union should declare: 'Before opening negotiations on the settlement of some overdue international problems, let the Western Powers change their policy in the sphere which we, and many others, definitely do not like. Let the United States, say, first withdraw its troops from such and such a country, from such and such military bases abroad. And let it terminate support to and the arming of certain dictatorial terroristic régimes.'

"Would anybody seriously accept such an approach to the question of negotiations? That is hardly possible. We would be called simpletons, people who are insufficiently versed in politics or who deliberately raise obstacles and cause procrastinations, who avoid negotiations because they have different but by no means peaceful intentions.

"The experience of history, including that of recent decades, convincingly shows us that success in talks between States comes only when attempts to dictate terms to each other are discarded, when there is a real will for peace and mutual respect for the parties' interests. It is precisely on this basis that major international agreements which have helped to consolidate peace and the security of peoples have been achieved."

[resuming in Russian]

This is our response to the statement made by the distinguished representative of the United States.

Allow me now to respond to the questions of the British delegation. The distinguished representative of the United Kingdom has repeatedly asked us about the character of the statement by the Soviet Union that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon countries which do not permit the stationing of such weapons on their territories. A similar question was put to L.I. Brezhnev a few days ago by the Greek newspaper Ta Nea. I will now quote L.I. Brezhnev's answer: "The Soviet Union has already declared more than once that it will never use nuclear weapons against those countries which renounce the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and which do not have such weapons in their territory. This alone is a sufficiently firm guarantee. But we are prepared to go further and to conclude at any time a special agreement with any of the non-nuclear countries, including, of course, Greece, if that country in its turn undertakes not to have nuclear weapons in its territory".

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of the USSR for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the chair.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, first of all permit me to welcome you warmly upon your accession to the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of April. The Mongolian delegation hopes that you may follow the splendid example of your predecessor, Ambassador G. Herder, and so bring the work of the first part of the Committee's session to a successful conclusion.

I should like to take this opportunity again to express my delegation's gratitude to Ambassador G. Herder, the representative of the German Democratic Republic, for his constructive contribution to the Committee's work.

Much time has elapsed since the Soviet Union first came forward with the proposal to prohibit the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and submitted a draft international agreement to that effect to the United Nations General Assembly.

The Soviet proposal received wide support in the international community. As you know, the General Assembly resolution on that subject, resolution 3479 (XXX), was adopted by an overwhelming majority.

Since that date, the question of the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction has been constantly on the agenda both of the General Assembly and of the Committee on Disarmament as a priority task.

However, it has so far been impossible to reach agreement on this problem -- an agreement which would spare mankind from the threat of the emergence of new and terrible weapons of mass destruction -- even though all the necessary prerequisites to that end appear to exist.

The Mongolian People's Republic, which from the very outset has resolutely supported this proposal, together with others, has consistently spoken in favour of reaching a generally acceptable agreement in this field as soon as possible.

Its reason for doing so is that until such time as an agreement strictly prohibiting the development and production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction has been reached, the possibility of using the achievements of modern scientific and technical progress for military purposes will remain.

Particularly clear evidence of this is the constantly accelerating pace of technological improvement of types of weapons of mass destruction and the marked increase in recent years in the appropriations for military research and development in the military budgets of the NATO States and their allies.

Attention should also be drawn to the figures showing that an average of 15-20 new inventions, many of which are used for military purposes, appear in the world every hour.

Thus the acceleration of the arms race is accompanied by continuing improvement in existing types of weapons, resulting in the unchecked development of new and even more destructive means of mass destruction.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

The conclusion to be drawn from this is obvious: if a solid barrier to the appearance of new types of weapons of mass destruction is not erected in time, a serious situation may arise in which the arms race reaches a point of no return, as a result of which the measures achieved so far in the sphere of the limitation of the arms race and disarmament will be brought to nought, and the negotiations currently being conducted in this field will be useless.

That is why the conclusion of an international agreement on the prohibition of the development and production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction will contribute, inter alia, to the supremely important task of putting a stop to the dangerous escalation in the qualitative improvement of weapons of mass destruction, which would undoubtedly constitute a major step towards the halting and reversing of the arms race. It is precisely in this that we see the importance and urgency of achieving an agreement on the prohibition of the development and production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.

Extremely important in this connection would be the conclusion of an international convention on the complete prohibition of the production of neutron weapons.

As you know, three years ago, eight socialist countries, including Mongolia, submitted to the Committee on Disarmament a joint draft international convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons.

This initiative, like other specific proposals made by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries aimed at halting the dangerous arms race and achieving disarmament, is in keeping with the vital interests of all peoples and with the aim of preserving and strengthening peace and international security and warding off the threat of a nuclear catastrophe.

Deep concern and anxiety has been aroused by the recent talk in the United States of renewing plans for manufacturing nuclear neutron weapons and stationing them in western Europe.

It is almost impossible to grasp to the full how harmful the consequences of such plans might be.

The reason and conscience of the peoples demand that the authors of this criminal plan renounce its implementation for ever. Otherwise, such an action on the part of those who like to play with fire could provoke a counteraction. There is an eastern proverb which says: "He who throws a stone into the air risks getting a bump on the head".

The whole course of the discussion being pursued here on the question of prohibiting new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction shows that there is emerging in the Committee to a sufficient degree the outline of a general understanding that it is much easier to achieve an agreement on the preventive prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction than it will be to prohibit them after they have already been developed, tested and included in the arsenals of States.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

Given this approach to the problem of the prohibition of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction and, most important, given sufficient political will on the part first and foremost of the nuclear-weapon States and other countries with a developed military and industrial potential, it will be possible to solve this problem by working out a comprehensive agreement and also, if necessary, agree on individual new types of weapons of mass destruction. The draft treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons under preparation in the Ad Hoc Working Group could serve as a model for such an agreement.

It would be very useful, both as regards a comprehensive agreement and as regards individual agreements on the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction to adopt the proposal of a group of socialist countries for the establishment, under the aegis of the Committee on Disarmament, of an ad hoc group of qualified experts which could undertake an examination of this problem. We believe that the Committee could consider this suggestion and adopt an appropriate decision on it before the end of the first part of the present session so that the group of experts may begin its work during the summer part of the Committee's session.

Now permit me to turn briefly to the question of the prohibition of radiological weapons.

We note with satisfaction that the Ad Hoc Working Group was able to renew negotiations at the very outset of the current session and has already begun to agree on certain provisions for a future treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. The Mongolian delegation fully supports the active and pioneering efforts of the distinguished Chairman of the Working Group, Ambassador I. Komives.

As the progress made in this auxiliary body at the present stage shows, the conditions are favourable for the successful completion of the negotiations towards the elaboration of a draft convention. Unfortunately, however, there are also certain difficulties, mainly in connection with the scope and object of the prohibition.

There is still no general agreement on the formulation and definition of the term radiological weapon, especially the "exclusionary provision" which defines it as any radioactive material "other than that produced by a nuclear explosive device". Many arguments were adduced in the Working Group in favour of the inclusion of the provision contained in the joint USSR-United States proposal in documents CD/31 and CD/32. The Mongolian delegation is inclined to the view that the future convention should have a clear aim: the prohibition of radiological weapons. The inclusion in the future convention of various elements connected with nuclear weapons might, in our view, create additional obstacles to reaching a general agreement on this question.

In connection also to some extent with the question of the scope and object of the prohibition, there is the proposal for the prohibition of what has been called the waging of radiological war, in other words, an attack on nuclear power facilities. The Mongolian delegation's position regarding that proposal is based on its understanding that the convention is to prohibit radiological weapons and not the manner of waging war, whether radiological or other. As you know, the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 prohibited attacks on nuclear power facilities.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

We should like to make several observations on the use of sources of radiation for peaceful purposes. The Mongolian delegation regards the main purpose of the future treaty to be the prohibition of radiological weapons. Of course we do not in the least disagree that the provisions of the treaty should not prevent the peaceful use of nuclear energy for the benefit of mankind. However, we consider that it would be pointless for the States parties to the future treaty to commit themselves again to obligations already undertaken by them under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as is proposed by certain delegations.

At the last plenary meeting, during consideration of the question of weapons of mass destruction, doubt was expressed as to the desirability of and even the need for the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons, on the grounds that the development of such weapons was a matter of the unforeseeable future. It is hardly possible to agree with this view of things. We believe that the threat of radiological war will sooner or later become real and that today's fears regarding the possible development of this type of weapon are therefore fully justified. We consider that the adoption of anticipatory measures to prohibit radiological weapons and other new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction will without doubt constitute important steps towards the curbing of the arms race, the prevention of the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction, and consequently, towards the achievement of the final goal, that of complete and general disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Mongolia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the chair.

Mr. FLOWERREE (United States of America): If I can address myself just for a moment to the statement made by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, I would like to say that, while there are individual points in the Soviet statement of today and that of 26 March that I could rebut, I am satisfied that my statement of 7 April adequately put the position of my Government on record. The United States delegation will therefore show its readiness to put an end to a possible action-reaction circle in this Committee by resisting that temptation and resting its case.

The CHAIRMAN: The Secretariat has circulated today, at my request, the timetable for meetings to be held by the Committee and its subsidiary organs during the coming week. As agreed by the Committee at its 118th plenary meeting, the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will meet on Monday, 13 April, at 10.30 a.m. instead of Thursday afternoon. If there are no objections, I will consider that the Committee adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 14 April, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.