

CD/PV.118
26 March 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTEENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 26 March 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. G. Herder (German Democratic Republic)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Algeria:</u>	Mr. A. SALAH-BEY Mr. M. MEDKOUR Mr. A. ABBA Mr. M. MATI
<u>Argentina:</u>	Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD
<u>Australia:</u>	Mr. R. STEELE
<u>Belgium:</u>	Mr. A. ONKELINX Miss G. van den BERGH Mr. de BISSCHOP
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. P. VOUTOV Mr. I. SOTIROV Mr. R. DEYANOV Mr. V. SOTIZOV
<u>Burma:</u>	U SAW HLAING U NGWE WIN U THAN HTUN
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. D.S. McPHAIL Mr. G. SKINNER Mr. M.C. HAMBLIN
<u>China:</u>	Mr. YU Peiwen Mr. LIANG Yufan Mr. LIN Chen Mr. LI Weimin
<u>Cuba:</u>	Mrs. V. BOROWDOSKY JACKIEWICH Mr. C. PAZOS

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. L. STAVIMOHA
Mr. J. FRANIK
Mr. J. MORAVIC

Egypt:

Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M.N. FAHMY

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. GESBERT
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. K.H. LOLIS
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Mr. P. BUNTIG

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. H. MULLER
Mr. W. ROHR
Mr. J. PFIRSCHKE

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. C. GYORFFY
Mr. A. LAKATOS

India:

Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. M. SIDIK
Mr. I. DAMANIK
Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. F. QASIM
Mr. KARYONO

Iran: Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA

Italy: Mr. V. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI
Mr. L. SALAZAR

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. R. ISHII
Mr. K. SHIMADA
Mr. K. ODA

Kenya: Mr. S. SHITEMI
Mr. G. MUNIU

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
Mr. M.A. CACERES

Mongolia: Mr. S.H. LKHASHID
Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco: Mr. A. SKALLI
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS
Mr. A. OOMS

Nigeria: Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. M. AKRAM

Peru: Mr. P. PAREDES PORTELLA

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. A. SASU

Sri Lanka: Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. L. NORBERG
Mrs. I. SUNDBERG
Mr. J. LUNDIN
Ms. G. PUU

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. L.S. MOSHKOV
Mr. V.V. LOSHCHININE
Mr. A.G. DOULYAN
Mr. S.N. RIUKHINE

United Kingdom: Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES
Mrs. J.I. LINK

United States of America: Mr. C.C. FLOWERREE
Mr. F. DESIMONE
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. J.A. MISKEL
Mr. C. PIERCY
Mr. M. SANCHEZ
Mr. MIKULAK

Venezuela: Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT
Mr. H. ARTEAGA

Yugoslavia: Mr. V. VOIVODIC
Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire: Mr. LONGO B. NDAGA

Secretary of the Committee and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General: Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the Committee: Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

Mr. PFEIFFER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. Chairman, today I want to offer a few remarks on item 4 of our agenda, namely on chemical weapons. Before turning to questions of substance, however, I want to express my Government's satisfaction that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has taken up its work at an early date and that, under the guidance of the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Lidgard, the definition of issues to be dealt with in the negotiation on a convention on chemical weapons is proceeding in a business-like manner. My delegation is of the opinion that the discussion in the Group has not yet exhausted the present mandate and that further useful work can be done within its scope.

One need hardly stress the importance of a convention on a comprehensive, effective and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. All delegations around this table have spoken out in favour of it. I have on several occasions had the opportunity to point out the priority which my Government accords to such a ban on an already existing and particularly insidious weapon of mass destruction.

Among others, the agreement on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction showed that multilateral negotiations can lead to substantive results, if they are focused on a specific disarmament measure. It is true that the Convention which I just mentioned cannot serve as a model for a ban on chemical weapons. This applies to various fields, but in particular to that of verification. Nevertheless, this important achievement should encourage us to solve the problem--much more difficult but, at the same time, much more important -- of a chemical weapons convention.

As early as 1954, the Federal Republic of Germany unilaterally renounced the production and possession of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Together with the majority of States, it is a party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use in war of bacteriological and chemical weapons to which it adhered without reservations. That is why, after there had been several reports on the use of chemical weapons in various regions of the world, it co-sponsored resolution 35/144 C which was adopted by the General Assembly at its last session. My Government hopes that the impartial investigation which the General Assembly in this resolution decided to carry out will get under way at an early date.

I should like to focus my observations on some aspects of a chemical weapons ban which have been the object of a particularly detailed discussion in the chemical weapons Working Group.

One of these aspects is the question of the activities to be prohibited. For those familiar with the jargon of the Working Group, I can summarize my Government's position as being in favour of "Alternative 1". Let me briefly outline the reasons for this position.

A chemical weapons convention must, in our opinion, be comprehensive. Parties to it should undertake never to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain munitions or devices specifically designed to cause death or other harm to man through the toxic properties of chemical agents which have been released as a result of the employment of these munitions or devices.

(Mr. Pfeiffer, Federal Republic of Germany)

Furthermore, the convention should provide for the destruction of existing stockpiles within a reasonable period. In this connection, and with reference to certain reports in the press alleging a very high cost of the destruction of chemical weapons, I should like to mention that in the Federal Republic of Germany an installation has been developed and constructed to destroy toxic agents remaining from the first and second world wars, which have inadvertently not been destroyed and are occasionally still being discovered today. This installation allows a destruction at a reasonable cost and without danger to the environment.

A repetition as such of the prohibition contained in the 1925 Geneva Protocol, namely, not to use chemical weapons, would in our opinion not enhance a future convention. We feel that a duplication of this prohibition might lead to doubts concerning the obligation of States which have adhered to the Geneva Protocol but not yet to the Convention. Both agreements should complement rather than be in concurrence to each other. Moreover, the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons is universally accepted as international customary law.

This position is, furthermore, in agreement with the general view of the Federal Government that purely declaratory measures such as, e.g. the mere duplication of legal obligations should be avoided. We therefore welcome that our opinion is shared by many delegations, and we hope that this policy will also be pursued in other areas.

We feel, however, that there could be one connecting link between the two instruments; but that is a question to which I shall come back later in this intervention.

My Government does not support the view that a chemical weapons convention should include the prohibition of protective activities, facilities and materials. In our opinion, the convention should aim solely at the prohibition of the munitions and devices defined above without undermining elementary protective measures.

I hope that the presence of experts will facilitate our work concerning the difficult question of the definition of chemical weapons. In this connection I should like to refer to a working paper dated 22 July 1975 (CCD/458) in which the Federal Republic of Germany outlined a definition of chemical warfare agents.

The most important and, at the same time, the most difficult problem to be solved is that of adequate verification. We feel, however, that the time has come seriously to try to find a solution which is acceptable to all States. We are encouraged by the fact that two important and comparatively recent documents mention the need for verification.

(Mr. Pfeiffer, Federal Republic of Germany)

First, the joint USSR -- United States report on progress in the bilateral negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons of 7 July 1980 (CD/112) states that both negotiating parties "believe that the fulfilment of the obligations assumed under the future convention must be subject to the important requirement of adequate verification".

Secondly, the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons to the Committee on Disarmament of 4 August 1980 (CD/131/Rev.1) refers to a general convergence of views among the delegations who participated in the discussion in recognizing "the importance of adequate verification" and believing that "verification measures should be commensurate with the scope of the prohibition and other aspects of a convention".

Unfortunately, there still seems to be a rather wide gap between those delegations favouring an approach which primarily relies on national verification measures and those which are of the view that verification should be essentially based on international measures. This question will be further discussed in the Working Group but it is pertinent to express one important point already now: as long as the signature of a State under a treaty is not sufficient to convince all parties that it is indeed observing all the stipulations of the treaty -- and if this were not the case today and in the foreseeable future, there would be no need for verification at all -- so long will the signature of the president of a national verification agency confirming that the State which employs him is not cheating have just as little value. One may deplore this state of affairs, but one cannot deny it.

That is why my Government is firmly convinced that only international verification measures can give States a credible assurance that a ban on chemical weapons is indeed being observed by all parties. To be effective, however, such measures have to include mandatory on-site inspections, which are, as of today, indispensable if a verification body is to satisfy itself as to the non-existence of activities contrary to a convention. My Government therefore welcomes the convergence of views, stated in the report of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, that on-site inspections under certain conditions and procedures should be included in the convention.

Under the Brussels Treaty of 1954, the Federal Republic of Germany renounced the manufacture of chemical weapons. Since then, a special Treaty agency has verified the observance of this commitment. Regular checks are being carried out in chemical plants in the form of on-site inspections in order to verify that no substances which are classified as chemical weapons are produced. The experience of well over twenty years shows that it is possible adequately to verify a ban on the production of chemical weapons with reasonable means and without prejudice to the commercial interests of the chemical industry.

(Mr. Pfeiffer, Federal Republic of Germany)

My Government has, in a workshop which was held in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1979, acquainted a group of 55 experts from 24 States with our experience in the field of on-site verification. The results of this workshop have been submitted to the Committee on Disarmament as a working paper (CD/37 of 12 July 1979). Some more recent considerations were presented last year to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons as CD/CW/WP.5 entitled, "The impact of on-site inspections of current civilian production on the chemical industry". Furthermore, my delegation had the occasion to give a detailed account of the experience of the Federal Republic of Germany in the field of on-site inspections in an informal meeting outside the purview of the Working Group.

From the considerable interest with which these activities have met, we infer a growing appreciation of our position. We hope that the discussions in the Working Group will lead to a further narrowing of the still existing gap between opinions on this matter.

Let me come back to the connecting link --which I mentioned earlier-- between the Geneva Protocol and a chemical weapons ban. My Government feels that this link could be provided by an inclusion in the chemical weapons ban of a verification procedure ensuring the observation of the Protocol. Considering the widespread recognition of the necessity of adequate verification and the fact that the Geneva Protocol does not, in fact, provide for any verification at all, such a provision should not pose insuperable difficulties.

A verification mechanism concerning the Geneva Protocol would, in particular, be of importance in two events:

During the period necessary for the destruction of chemical weapons there could be allegations that a State had used chemical weapons; these would require verification.

After the expiration of this period there could be a need for verification that States had not used any stockpiles which inadvertently or on purpose had not been destroyed.

My delegation would welcome any suggestions which delegations might have concerning this very preliminary proposal which I have just put forward.

Before concluding, I should like to make one remark with reference to the organization of our work. Already in my intervention in plenary on 7 August 1980 I expressed some doubts as to whether the Committee made the best possible use of the time available to it. Even with the presence of experts, and even with a duplication of the sessions of the Working Group, I wonder whether we will be able to solve all the existing problems within an appropriate span of time. If we really think that we are nearing a solution of the outstanding problems, we should perhaps consider setting aside some time of the Committee to deal exclusively with a chemical weapons ban. I know that there are other items on our agenda, and I know that these also are to be dealt with on a priority basis. But if a different organization of our work could significantly accelerate progress in this field, I think it would be worth considering it.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Today the Soviet delegation would like to speak on item 2 of the agenda.

Statements by representatives of a number of States have reflected serious concern over the continuing nuclear arms race. This is a clear indication of growing alarm throughout the world over the fact that an end has not yet been put to the process of further accumulation and refinement of this most dangerous, most lethal type of weapon.

There is, of course, no need to prove that the greatest threat to peace and security of peoples arises from the insane arms race, and more precisely from the nuclear arms race. As has been rightly pointed out, the pace of disarmament negotiations and the results derived from them lag considerably behind the accelerating pace and scope of the arms race, and first and foremost the nuclear arms race. The absence of tangible progress towards a limitation of the arms race is giving rise to an unprecedented growth in world military expenditure, which, as was emphasized in the Secretary-General's message, has now reached \$500 billion a year.

There can be no doubt that the problem of halting the nuclear arms race is an exceedingly complex one. But it must be solved, and solved without delay.

The very first duty of the Committee on Disarmament -- if, of course, it is to adopt a serious and responsible approach -- is to occupy itself forthwith with questions connected with the curbing of the nuclear arms race.

It is perfectly evident that the problem of prohibiting nuclear weapons could have been solved a great deal more easily at the time when such weapons had only just come upon the scene. As you know, at that time, in 1946, the Soviet Union put forward a proposal for the conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition for all time of the production and use of atomic weapons. In the years which followed, the Soviet Union made various other concrete proposals also, the implementation of which could have ensured the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and halted the accumulation of stockpiles of such weapons.

The response to the Soviet proposals was to adopt a policy of speeding up the nuclear arms race, based on what proved to be the completely unrealistic desire to retain and perpetuate a nuclear monopoly.

Our country has never slackened its efforts to put an end to the nuclear arms race and ensure nuclear disarmament.

Thus, in 1978 the Soviet Union together with a number of socialist countries came forward with a proposal for starting negotiations on ending the production of nuclear weapons and destroying such weapons. Concrete proposals were submitted for the consideration of the Committee on Disarmament concerning negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed. I am referring to document CD/4. In making this proposal, we emphasized that the implementation of measures in the field of nuclear disarmament should be buttressed by the parallel strengthening of political and international legal guarantees of the security of all States.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

In advocating the application of radical measures in the field of nuclear disarmament, the Soviet Union has also proposed and is proposing partial measures designed to block, one by one, the avenues of development of the nuclear arms race. In particular, the Soviet Union attaches great importance to the question of a complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, the elaboration of measures for the prevention of the possibility of sudden attack and unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons, measures for strengthening the régime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the problem of providing security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States.

As you know, the recently concluded 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union put forward new large-scale constructive proposals for strengthening peace, deepening détente and curbing the arms race, including the nuclear arms race. These constructive proposals are designed to guide international events into a course of developing mutual understanding and co-operation in the interests of reducing and eliminating the threat of war and ensuring security for all States and peoples.

In the course of the past few weeks many representatives speaking on item 2 of the agenda have referred to general questions, including the principle of national security, the concept of deterrence, parity of strategic forces, and others.

Today the Soviet delegation, in turn, would like to speak on these matters.

The problem of disarmament is one of the most complex problems of contemporary world politics. This is due above all to the fact that, more than any others, it touches upon the security interests of States. Negotiations on this problem involve questions not only of a political but also of a military, scientific and technical nature, as well as others. Concepts of military strategy as well as different approaches to the evaluation of key factors in the development of human society have to be taken into account in this context. This explains, in particular, why the attainment of agreement in the field of disarmament is, as experience shows -- including experience in the Committee on Disarmament -- an extremely difficult matter.

One of the most important preconditions for successful negotiations on the question of disarmament is observance of the principle of non-impairment of the national security interests of countries participating in the negotiations. This principle, as the basis for disarmament agreements, is set forth in a number of international documents. For example, the joint Soviet-United States statement of agreed principles for negotiations on disarmament issued in September 1961 states: "All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and so that security is ensured equally for all".

The final communiqué of the preparatory consultations relating to negotiations on mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

records agreement among the participants in the Vienna talks that concrete measures "should be carefully worked out as regards scope and time so that, in every respect and at every moment, they meet the principle of the non-impairment of the security of any of the parties".

During the preparations for the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and at the session itself, many States emphasized that the most important precondition for the success of disarmament negotiations is that they should be based on the principle of non-impairment of the security interests of States. The importance of observance of this principle was stressed in the document by the socialist countries submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the session.

"The adoption of disarmament measures", says the Final Document of the special session, "should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage. At each stage the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces".

Thus the principle of non-impairment of the security interests of States as a basis of international agreements on disarmament issues has received the widest recognition. At the same time, the most widely divergent points of view may be encountered in the actual interpretation of the concept of "national security interests". Views have even been expressed to the effect that this concept does not lend itself to clear definition at all. The American author J. Frankel, who has written a special study on this question, asserts that the vagueness of this concept and the total lack of agreement on a definition of it and of empirical criteria of any kind make its strict application impossible. The well-known American politician J. Fulbright also considers that the concept of national interests is an extremely subjective one, and is composed of a mixture of elements such as national pride, group emotions, the personal vanity of leaders and various others.

The American writer Lester Brown in his paper, Redefining National Security, asserts that today the concept of guaranteeing national security interests should go far beyond the consideration of military aspects only. "The overwhelmingly military approach to national security", he writes, "is based on the assumption that the principal threat to security comes from other nations. But the threats to security may now arise less from the relationship of nation to nation and more from the relationship of man to nature". In this connection he notes the growing significance for the future of mankind as a whole and of individual States in particular of such factors as environmental pollution, shortages of the most important raw material resources, especially energy sources, etc. In his view, the need for States to confront these threats and to address them co-operatively "suggests that the military's role in securing a nation's well being and survival is relatively less important than it once was".

Of course, environmental pollution and the predatory use of natural resources cause serious prejudice to the interests of the economic development

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

of States and their international co-operation, provoke local conflicts in some cases and may, in certain circumstances, lead to a deterioration of the international situation as a whole. At the same time, under present conditions, when the world is armed to the teeth and the arms race, as is pointed out in one of the documents of the United Nations, has brought mankind to the brink of self-annihilation, universal peace and the national security interests of States are threatened, above all, by the possibility of the use of force or the threat of such use by another State or other States. To put this threat on the same level as the negative effects of any other factors of international life, such as ecological ones, is not only to fail to see the realities of the contemporary world but also to underestimate the urgency and the vital importance of the struggle against the arms race -- the main danger of our time.

How, then, in fact ought we to interpret the concept of guaranteeing the security interests of States? In our view, this concept implies first and foremost the protection of a State's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and the inviolability of its frontiers, and the non-admissibility under any pretext of intervention in its domestic affairs.

The Constitution of the USSR proclaims the defence of the State interests of the Soviet Union as one of the principal tasks of our country's foreign policy. The safeguarding of the national security interests of States is guaranteed by a wide range of ideological, economic, political, scientific, technological and military factors. The application of these factors depends directly on the social, economic and class characteristics of a given State, on its potential capabilities and, lastly, on its role and responsibility in world affairs, its political and strategic interests, and so on.

Thus the guaranteeing of the security interests of States is inseparably linked with their defensive capacity. That is why the Soviet Union so vigorously and insistently demands the strict observance of the principle of the non-impairment of security interests in negotiations on the limitation of the arms race and on disarmament.

The diametrical opposite of the principle of non-impairment of the national security interests of States is the concept of military superiority. This represents one of the principal obstacles to the successful progress of negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament. And yet certain participants in those negotiations make periodic bids for agreements that would give them a military advantage, a superiority over the other party to the negotiations. Such attempts, as we all know, have been foiled more than once; they have merely put additional difficulties in the way of the attainment of agreement. Nevertheless, there are still some who are not yet ready to throw concepts of military superiority, useless as they are in disarmament negotiations, on the scrap-heap.

In politics, reliance on the force of arms, on military superiority over others, cannot guarantee lasting and prolonged peace and universal security, nor, by that token, the security of each individual State. History has demonstrated over and over again that every action produces a reaction. The appearance of

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

a new type of weapons in the possession of one party has inevitably led to the same weapons, if not still more highly developed ones, appearing in the possession of the other. Suffice it to recall, by way of example, some well-known facts in this sphere. In the United States of America, the atom bomb was developed and put into use in 1945. The Soviet Union responded to this by developing its own atom bomb four years after the rejection of its proposal for a prohibition of the military use of atomic energy, i.e. in 1950. The first thermonuclear explosion was carried out in the United States of America in 1952; a year later, i.e. in 1953, the Soviet Union was obliged to develop a thermonuclear weapon. In 1960 the United States of America was the initiator of the development of a nuclear submarine with ballistic missiles on board; four years later, the USSR brought similar submarines into service. In 1970 the United States of America began to equip its intercontinental missiles with multi-charge warheads; a few years later, the Soviet Union was obliged to reciprocate by developing systems of the same kind.

And here is a still more recent example. A short time ago our country suggested prohibiting the development of the "Trident" naval missile system in the United States of America, and of a corresponding system in the USSR. This proposal was not accepted, and, as a result, the new "Ohio" submarine equipped with "Trident-1" missiles was developed in the United States and the similar "Taifun" system in the Soviet Union.

The same also applies to the continent of Europe. After all, if there were no forward-based American weapons in Europe and no medium-range nuclear missiles belonging to other NATO countries, the Soviet Union would not be faced with the need to counterbalance these weapons.

And yet attempts continue to be made to secure military superiority over the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. A clear proof of this are the plans being made concerning the production and the deployment in Europe of neutron weapons. This was recently advocated, by, among others, General B. Rogers, Commander-in-Chief of the NATO forces.

All these examples, the number of which could be multiplied, testify to the complete pointlessness of attempts to rely on the possibility of sole possession of any type or system of modern weapons in a situation of scientific and technological revolution when immense scientific resources are put into the development and improvement of military technology. The challenge to the Soviet Union in the sphere of the build-up of weapons has forced it to respond in kind.

The report of a group of experts entitled "Comprehensive study on nuclear weapons" notes that "the conventional view is ... that the military capabilities of the two States (USSR and United States of America) are perceived to increase by a process of action-reaction, the end result being status quo but on a higher level of armaments. This is often referred to as the arms-race spiral". With this observation we can entirely agree. The experts who prepared the study on nuclear weapons I have just mentioned rightly point out that it would seem virtually impossible to obtain nuclear superiority when the strategic forces are as numerous, dispersed and protected as at present.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The only sensible course under such conditions is to halt the costly arms race and to conduct negotiations designed to ensure observance of the principle of equality and equal security of the parties at a lower level.

The arms race does not guarantee the security of any one State or group of States. On the contrary, with every new step in the improvement of modern weapons and the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, the world becomes increasingly unstable and the danger of war draws nearer.

The security interests of States can best be guaranteed in conditions of peace and the relaxation of international tension, supplemented by concrete measures in the sphere of arms limitation and disarmament. The more peace is durable and stable, the greater will be the security in which States and peoples will live. This conclusion emerges from all the many centuries of the history of mankind. The way towards the strengthening of universal peace and security lies, not in attempts to secure military superiority over other States nor in the much-vaunted policy of acting "from a position of strength", but in a sober, responsible approach to the evaluation of the events of international life, in a readiness to adopt effective, concrete measures in the field of disarmament based on the strict observance of the principle of the non-impairment of the security interests of all parties.

The position-of-strength policy and the desire to gain military superiority are vividly reflected in the so-called doctrine of deterrence. In their statements, a number of delegations on the Committee have expressed their views on this doctrine. The representatives of the United Kingdom, Belgium and the Federal Republic of Germany have come forward with vindications of the doctrine. On 26 February the representative of the United Kingdom, in trying to expound the doctrine of deterrence in, so to speak, popular form, compared it with a warning system using a burglar alarm and a guard dog which would help the respectable householder to protect his domestic property from the designs of evil-doers. It seems to us that the example itself is inappropriate both in form and in substance. After all, when we move to the level of relations between States, a different quality comes into play and the principles applying are of a different order from those in the example given.

We take a different approach to this question. The problem should not be seen in terms of respectable householders and burglars but as a matter of ensuring the safety of neighbours living in a single building, the name of which is our planet Earth. We consider that guaranteeing the safety of each of the inhabitants of this house would be facilitated by the elaboration of general measures that would not infringe on anyone's interests and that would not arouse in one neighbour fear of another. Although the United Kingdom representative said that what lies at the basis of the doctrine of deterrence is the desire to "scare off" a potential "burglar", the real truth is that the doctrine of deterrence envisages the possibility of an attack by one neighbour on another and leads to the irreversible exacerbation of the conflict and, to come back to the topic of our discussion, to the unleashing of nuclear war. That the doctrine envisages the possibility of attack can be seen from a number of the practical measures taken by the States which have espoused it.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Take, for example, the now widely-known United States presidential order No. 59. This is essentially inspired by the possibility of carrying out the "preventive" nuclear attack by means of which the inventors of the doctrine hope to win a nuclear war.

Reference to the fact that the doctrine of deterrence is far from defensive in nature can, indeed, be found in a document which has already been mentioned, the "Comprehensive study on nuclear weapons". This observes in particular that deterrence is "based fundamentally on offensive capability, meaning the ability to inflict intolerable damage on the adversary. This holds true also in a situation where deterrence by denial, e.g., by the threat of use of tactical nuclear weapons in a limited battlefield conflict situation, is considered, as this involves a risk of escalation to higher levels of nuclear engagement and thus in itself from the beginning carries an element of deterrence by punishment, which always risks becoming the dominating feature".

The doctrine of nuclear deterrence has been criticized on many accounts: because of the huge degree of risk it creates of the unleashing of a world-wide thermonuclear disaster, because it constitutes a threat principally to vast numbers of civilians and because it is based on an essentially unstable balance. Finally, the doctrine does not provide for any acceptable solution in the event that deterrence proves ineffectual.

Naturally, the delegations present here are well aware that the doctrines of deterrence and of military superiority are condemned in the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. In particular, paragraph 13 of that document states: "Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority". Numerous representatives have made the very same point here in the Committee.

Speaking on 3 February, the representative of India said: "My delegation would submit that inherent in the concept of deterrence is an implicit commitment to a continuing and accelerating nuclear arms race."

It must be obvious now to everyone, if we do not deliberately close our eyes to the reality of the modern world, that the increased stockpiling of nuclear devices -- for it is this that the doctrine of deterrence implies -- cannot contribute in any way to the preservation of a state of peace or the prevention of war. It is equally illusory to count on achieving superiority in nuclear arms when there is parity between strategic armed forces on the international scene. The experience of recent decades has shown how unsuccessful are attempts by one party to outstrip the other in the accumulation of nuclear potential.

We agree with the view expressed by the representative of Mexico on 3 March, when he said that he refused to believe that the so-called "deterrent power" of nuclear weapons could be regarded as justifying their existence. He rightly described as unconvincing the argument that the precarious peace of the past 20 years had been based on a frightening balance of terror.

Doctrines of this kind can only -- and do in fact -- serve to whip up the arms race, including the nuclear arms race, and to postpone indefinitely, if not altogether preclude, the possibility of fulfilling the urgent tasks in the sphere of disarmament.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

As has been pointed out in many authoritative studies, the practical pursuit of such doctrines leads to an increase in the risk of nuclear war, with the tremendously destructive consequences for mankind with which it is fraught. Order No. 59 which I have mentioned is aimed at "legalizing" in some degree the idea of the acceptability of nuclear war, and at forcing mankind to come to terms with this sombre prospect. At the same time, even the initiators of the concept themselves -- I am thinking in particular of the former United States Secretary of Defense -- basically recognize the unsoundness of the thesis that it will be possible to contain a nuclear war within limited boundaries and that it will not develop into a full-scale nuclear conflict with all the consequences that would entail.

The doctrine of deterrence and nuclear superiority also includes the intention of implementing plans for the deployment of neutron weapons in Europe. Of course, according to the United States Secretary of Defense, the deployment of neutron warheads in Europe is intended to help "strengthen the tactical nuclear forces" of the United States on the European mainland. It is easy to see what impact such plans might have on the situation in Europe and, more generally, on the over-all world situation. It is no accident if these intentions have given rise to widespread international condemnation and to the reflection thereof in statements by many members of the Committee, particularly the statement made by Mrs. Thorsson at the Committee's plenary meeting on 5 February. Further evidence of this condemnation can be found in the recent statement by the Netherlands Minister of Defence to the effect that the Netherlands Government will not permit the stationing of neutron weapons on its territory.

In his statement, the United Kingdom representative said that "the policy of deterrence has kept the peace in Europe for 35 years and remains valid today". We flatly disagree with this opinion. The consequence of the policy of deterrence has been an unceasing arms race, the flooding of the European continent with the latest, most dangerous types of nuclear weapon, and the bringing of Europe to the brink of a potential nuclear confrontation.

If there has been peace in Europe for 35 years, it is thanks to the policy of détente, to the striving of all peace-loving peoples to prevent nuclear war and curb the nuclear arms race.

A favourite trick of those who shy away from the solution of disarmament problems and steadily build up their military potential under the cover of a doctrine of deterrence and on the basis of an assortment of theoretical inventions is to allege that the Soviet Union is seeking military supremacy, that such supremacy had already been achieved, and that everybody else is virtually obliged to top up their arsenals in order to catch up with the USSR.

We have even heard statements of this kind in the Committee on Disarmament. At one of our meetings for example, the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany expressed concern at the "substantial imbalance" that he claimed exists "in the field of nuclear medium-range systems in favour of the Soviet Union". This, it would seem, was necessary in order to give justification in practice to the decision taken by NATO in December 1979 to modernize certain types of United States nuclear device and to deploy them in Europe. We had no intention of touching on this question, but now that it has been done, we should like to draw attention to the enormous concentration of nuclear weapons of various kinds in Western Europe, and especially in the Federal Republic of Germany, that are aimed at the USSR and its allies in the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

In just a few minutes, according to an article published recently in the magazine Der Stern, under the very revealing title, "The Federal Republic of Germany - a disguised nuclear Power", the Bundeswehr and the United States forces can launch against pre-programmed targets warheads with a total capacity equivalent to 6 million tonnes of conventional explosive. According to data in the "White Book" of the Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, there are already 386 nuclear-tipped missiles with a range of over 1,000 kilometres stationed in the territory of that country alone. But according to information issued by Harvard University, there are in the Federal Republic of Germany 1,428 nuclear missiles with a range of over 1,000 kilometres. To these must be added the no less than 512 nuclear warheads that can be launched on strategic missiles from the four submarines under NATO control.

No comment is needed on these figures.

As a number of commentators have noted, the planned rearmament of NATO in Western Europe means, from the military point of view, the creation of the capacity to make a first "disabling strike" against the USSR, following which, it is hoped, that country would be unable to launch any retaliatory attack. This leads to the justified conclusion that "the possibility of nuclear war is increasing". I should like to quote in this respect a statement by Dieter Lutz of the Hamburg University Institute concerned with problems of peace and security policy to the effect that "even now, the quantity of nuclear weapons in the form of long-range missiles in Europe is sufficient to thrust the Soviet Union back into the Stone Age".

In a series of statements containing reasoned criticism of the doctrines of deterrence, military superiority and limited nuclear war which have been made in our Committee, it has been conclusively demonstrated that claims that the existing military-strategic balance has been destroyed are unfounded and at variance with numerous assessments by authoritative political and military leaders, including leaders of the United States military establishment. I should like to draw your attention in this connection to the speech by the representative of Mexico which I have already mentioned and which contains precisely this sort of statement. The speaker referred in particular to the conclusion reached after careful study by Mr. A.M. Cox, a former official of the CIA, that "the combined NATO defense budget is greater than the combined Soviet-Warsaw Pact defense budget which, if the China factor is included, ... is less than 75 per cent of that of the NATO powers".

Evidence of the lack of justification for assertions of the need to restore the allegedly shattered balance in the military-strategic field is provided in particular by a statement made by the former United States Defense Secretary in January 1981, when he recognized the existence of a roughly equivalent over-all strategic balance between the Soviet Union and the United States.

It is perfectly understandable that someone might not like the parity with respect to armed forces that has grown up and that exists between the two main military-political alliances of the modern world. But a military and strategic balance is a fact of contemporary international life and one that cannot be ignored.

Many delegations have also touched on the question of parity, and, in doing so, some speakers have endeavoured to call generally into question the possibility of defining a military-strategic balance. What is there to say about this?

Naturally a military-strategic balance or parity is not something that can be weighed on apothecaries' scales and does not imply that the quantitative and qualitative indicators for all types of armed forces and weapons exactly coincide

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

for the two sides. That would, to put it mildly, be a simplistic approach. The military potential of each of the parties naturally consists of items that are defined by a whole complex of varying factors, each of which has its own special significance. The problem must be viewed as a whole, taking due account of all its constituent parts.

Comparing even equivalent items of the military potentials of different parties is sometimes extremely difficult. When the term "balance" is employed with respect to the relationship of forces between two States or between groups of States, what is meant is that, from the point of view of over-all military-strategic capacity, both parties are in approximately the same position, with neither of them enjoying military superiority over the other. That is precisely the situation today.

If we look, for example, at strategic nuclear weapons or medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, we find that in both cases there is an approximate balance between the parties concerned. There are not infrequent arguments about tanks, about their numbers. We make no secret of the fact that the Soviet Union has substantially more of them. But after all, the NATO countries have quite a few tanks too. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that, as those States themselves admit, they have significantly more anti-tank devices. Here, too, then, the situation may be considered as mutually balanced. Affirmations of "Soviet superiority" in total numbers of armed forces are mistaken. If we stick strictly to facts, there can be only one conclusion: the total size of the armed forces of the United States of America and the other NATO countries is actually somewhat greater than that of the forces of the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Treaty countries.

Attempts to distort the content of the concept of equal security and military parity do nothing to advance the cause of disarmament. Some people would apparently like to close their eyes to one of the main political realities of the world today, namely, the presence of two opposing military-political blocs, one of which comprises three nuclear-weapon States and many large militarily-prominent States. Furthermore, yet another nuclear-weapon Power acts in parallel with this bloc on the international scene. Would anyone care to deny this?

Hence, attempts to exclude any nuclear-weapon States from the process of nuclear disarmament, without taking into account the entire range of factors I have mentioned, are entirely indefensible. Nor is it possible to take seriously assertions that there exists some category of minor nuclear States whose weapons are of no account. Let us turn once again to the evidence provided by the experts who prepared the comprehensive study on nuclear weapons. This is what they say: that the nuclear arsenals of China, France and the United Kingdom "are far from insignificant and include both fission and fusion weapons that could cause vast damage, particularly if used against urban targets".

We should like to state clearly that those who attempt to limit the process of nuclear disarmament to certain States, whether they intend to or not, create a serious, or, to be frank, an insuperable obstacle to negotiations on nuclear disarmament. This position has been set out quite clearly in the document submitted by the socialist countries. There are still further extremely important military, geographical, economic and other factors which must be taken into account in assessing the state of the military-strategic balance.

It is our basic belief that destruction of the existing balance of military forces would have an adverse effect on the totality of international relations and could lead to a serious aggravation of the international situation and create

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

a threat to peace and universal security. It is no accident that the West's hard-headed statesmen and politicians, as well as many influential scientists, are urging in particular that no attempts should be made in disarmament negotiations to destroy the existing balance of forces.

I should like especially to emphasize that while being opposed to attempts to shatter the existing military-strategic balance the Soviet Union by no means considers that this balance, with its high level of military confrontation, should be maintained in the future. The essence of our entire policy in disarmament matters -- as has repeatedly been emphasized at the highest level -- is to seek to bring about a reduction in the level of military confrontation and to lead things towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control. We consider that the genuine security of States, and indeed international security in general, can be guaranteed, not through a continuation of the arms race but through a limitation of it. This is the very point that is driven home by every Soviet proposal on disarmament.

As L.I. Brezhnev observed in a statement made on 2 November 1977, "It goes without saying that the maintenance of the existing balance is not an end in itself. In order to begin to turn the curve of the arms race downwards, we are in favour of the gradual lowering of the level of military confrontation. We wish substantially to reduce, and subsequently to eliminate, the threat of nuclear war, which is the most terrible danger facing mankind".

Our country has never been an advocate of "a balance of terror", of peace propped up by mountains of arms. As regards Soviet military doctrine, it is -- and this deserves particular emphasis -- of a profoundly defensive nature. As was stated in the message of greetings from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the foundation of the Soviet Army and Navy, "the essence of our military policy lies entirely in effective defence, and nothing more. The Soviet Union has never armed itself for the sake of doing so and has never been, and never will be, the instigator of an arms race".

It is precisely for this reason that the central theme of Soviet foreign policy is the curbing of the arms race and the achievement of disarmament. The USSR has consistently called for the lowering of the level of military confrontation in the world, with the unconditional maintenance of equality and identical security, if for the time being it is not possible to eliminate that confrontation completely. The Soviet Union is active in putting forward concrete proposals concerning the most vital disarmament questions and is ready to respond positively to any other initiatives in this area, whether they are of a fundamental or of a partial nature.

Finally, my last point. Many delegations have rightly referred to the recent increase in the threat of war. This threat indeed hangs over all the countries in the world, but its source is not the Soviet Union, nor its mythical superiority, but the arms race itself, the continuing tension in the world. "This genuine, and not imaginary, threat", declared L.I. Brezhnev at the 26th Congress of the CPSU, "we are ready to combat -- hand in hand with America, with the European States, with all the countries on our planet".

Mr. McPHAIL (Canada): This is my first intervention in the Committee during the month of March and I would like to congratulate you on taking the Chair and on your effective and imaginative leadership of the Committee during the month, which you have already displayed and which, I know will continue during the remaining days of your office. I take this opportunity to pay my respects to Ambassador de la Gorce for his skilful efforts in launching the Committee so successfully on its 1981 session.

This morning I want to offer some comments on the principal topic on the agenda of the Committee during this period, item 4: chemical weapons. I would like to make a suggestion or two, in relation to substance, and to make what I trust will be regarded as a particular contribution, in the form of a documentary analysis which we shall table in the Committee to further its substantive work on this subject.

I would first of all like to express my Government's satisfaction at the speedy reconvening of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons. We are also pleased to see that the Working Group has wasted no time in getting into the substance of the issues involved in the elaboration of an international agreement on the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons and on their destruction. In this regard, Ambassador Lidgard is to be commended for his devoted and knowledgeable efforts in conducting and inspiring the proceedings of the Working Group.

Secondly, I want to express my authorities' appreciation for the significant and valuable reports which the Soviet Union and the United States of America have made on their bilateral negotiations.

Thirdly, I would like to put on record the importance Canada attaches to this concentrated period of work on chemical weapons, especially as it is providing an opportunity for experts to participate as members of their delegations. We are confident that we can benefit from their presence to make progress on some of the technical issues before us.

We note that during the past year some differences have come to light concerning both the definition of chemical weapon agents and the criteria such as that of toxicity. It is of the utmost importance that these definitions be agreed upon in order to achieve further progress on the scope of a convention.

The conclusion of a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons is of the utmost priority. Canada is prepared to devote all efforts which may be needed for the elaboration of such an agreement.

There is now an urgency in this matter which we cannot ignore. This urgency is reflected in the newspapers every day. Chemical weapons are capable of being used effectively on the battlefield. Chemical weapons exist at this moment, and are being improved still further through ongoing research and development. In terms of the military balance they are as much a consideration as any other weapon of massive destructive power. In the absence of agreement, a chemical arms race is possible, and events in the next several years will determine whether or not this happens.

The successful implementation of an agreement on chemical weapons is going to depend in part on the degree of confidence each party has that the other parties are complying with the agreement -- particularly with one in which weapons systems are to be destroyed. Verification will play a pivotal role. Its adequacy in the eyes of all signatories will be a prerequisite to an agreement. To insist upon verification is not to question the good faith of any countries entering into an agreement but rather, through the reciprocity of the provisions, to build confidence and ultimately strengthen mutual trust amongst all parties.

(Mr. McPhail, Canada)

I would therefore suggest that members now centre their efforts on an analysis of adequate verification procedures and ways by which they could be implemented. These questions remain major stumbling blocks. National experts who are with us can make an important contribution to resolving them.

First and foremost amongst these questions is the form that verification will take and the interrelationship between the concepts of international and national methods. I am tabling today (as CD/167, which will be distributed in all languages) a first step by Canadian experts to consider some of the implications of this aspect. I trust that this analysis in support of the Working Group's overall mandate will form a useful basis for discussion.

Our preliminary analysis suggests that each signatory must maintain a national verification group, and of course knowledge of its organization and responsibilities would be most useful. For nations without stocks of weapons and without production facilities this national commitment would be very small.

There must be as well an international verification agency. Thoughts on this have been advanced by a variety of nations in the past. Our analysis suggests that adequate assurance to the international community should be achievable through available resources. It is clear, however, that for certain activities some form of on-site inspection will have to be accepted to provide this assurance, since remote sensing by national technical means will be insufficient.

I invite other members to comment and to build on this paper. Canada agrees with the Chairman of the Chemical Weapons Working Group, Ambassador Lidgard, that problems related to verification are not insurmountable and that ways can always be found to deal with them.

Finally, I would like to make a suggestion which could lead to a clarification of the issues and of States' views on these issues. The suggestion is not meant to supplant the present efforts of the Working Group under Ambassador Lidgard's leadership, but would be supplementary to them. More than 150 working papers on aspects of the chemical weapons problem have been submitted to this Committee and its predecessors since 1960 by 17 member nations directly and by many others indirectly in the form of multinational working papers. To our knowledge, little has been done to co-ordinate and consolidate this information into a useful working document.

All Governments and not only those directly concerned with the negotiations, have a vital interest in being fully informed of the issues at stake, and the attitudes of those in this Committee towards those issues. We therefore suggest that the Secretariat compile all working papers on chemical weapons which have been submitted to date and to present an analysis of the views on the most difficult issues such as scope, definitions and the verification problem.

Such a measure, we believe, would be a valuable contribution to progress on one of the most complex, yet most promising, fields of our endeavour.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Canada, Ambassador McPhail, for his statement and for the kind words of welcome he addressed to me as Chairman of this Committee. The chair has received your working paper. It will be circulated as document CD/167.

Mr. YU Peiven (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons has been one of universal concern to the peoples of the world for a long time. It is also an important item in the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament Paragraph 75 of the Final Document adopted by the General Assembly at its first special session on disarmament points out: "The complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represent one of the most urgent measures of disarmament. Consequently, the conclusion of a convention to this end, on which negotiations have been going on for several years, is one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral negotiations."

As is well known, during the First World War nearly 1,300,000 people were injured or killed by poisonous gases. Since then, the chemical weapons developed have been more numerous in type and characterized by their greater capacity for mass destruction.

The Geneva Protocol of 1925 already provides for the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in war; nevertheless, in many wars, including some wars that took place recently in the Asian region, chemical weapons have been used all along.

Chemical weapons possess these characteristics: they are multiple in their effects, low in cost, easy to manufacture and convenient to proliferate. The rapid development of modern science and technology has provided various necessary conditions and new possibilities for the production of chemical weapons. The appearance of new chemical warfare agents of higher toxicity that are more rapid in their effects, and whose physical and chemical characteristics are more suitable to the requirements of utilization, and the improvement of dissemination techniques will all substantially increase the lethal and injurious capabilities of chemical weapons. In particular, after the emergence of binary chemical weapon technology: the production of chemical warfare agents has already become part of general chemical and industrial production, thus enabling preparations for chemical warfare to be conducted in greater secrecy and with greater ease. The Superpowers are developing and stockpiling large quantities of chemical weapons and have made chemical weapons one of their important means of warfare. Under these circumstances, it is all the more urgent that a convention completely prohibiting chemical weapons be concluded.

The Chinese Government has always attached great importance to the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. In various United Nations forums, the Chinese delegation has clearly stood for the complete prohibition and total destruction of all chemical weapons, and the conclusion, as soon as possible, of an international convention on the complete prohibition and total destruction of all chemical weapons. In 1980, after participating for the first time in the work of the Committee on Disarmament, the Chinese delegation put forward working paper CD/102 in which we clearly indicated our basic position on the main contents of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons. Today, I wish to make some further comments on certain substantive issues relating to the prohibition of chemical weapons:

The Chinese delegation proposes that the scope of the future convention prohibiting chemical weapons should include the prohibition of their development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, transfer and use. Today I would like to speak more specifically on the question of the prohibition of the use of these weapons. Our proposal to include use in the scope of prohibition of the future convention is based on the following considerations.

(Mr. YU Peiwen, China)

Firstly, we are engaged in negotiations on the conclusion of a separate convention which has not been in existence, aimed at the complete prohibition of chemical weapons. It is very important that such a convention should be truly comprehensive in nature.

Secondly, the 1925 Geneva Protocol only provides for the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in war, but does not provide for the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in other armed conflicts apart from wars. This no longer responds to the realities of the international situation.

Thirdly, from a juridical point of view, with the ceaseless development and evolution of military technology and methods of warfare, there can be found many examples of international treaties regulating wars reaffirming and supplementing each other. For example, in the two Additional Protocols to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 on the protection of victims of international armed conflicts, which were elaborated in 1977, there are some articles which reaffirm the provisions of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, and others which supplement and develop the Geneva Conventions. The 1925 Geneva Protocol itself is also a reaffirmation of and complement to the 1907 Hague Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Poison and Poisoned Weapons. It can thus be seen that the strengthening of existing protocols or treaties by reaffirming and supplementing them with new international instruments is after all a normal phenomenon in the constant development of international treaties regulating wars. This has been done in the past, and will certainly be done again in future.

In accordance with the above considerations, we believe that the inclusion of use in the scope of prohibition of the future convention prohibiting chemical weapons could only strengthen the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Such a convention will strengthen trust between countries, and we believe that more countries will accede to it as a result.

The Chinese delegation is of the view that in drafting a convention on the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons, it is imperative first to arrive at a clear definition of the chemical warfare agents to be prohibited. The question of definition not only concerns the scope of prohibition and the contents of the convention, but also has a bearing upon the relevant means and methods of verification. Many delegations have already made quite a number of useful suggestions in respect of the question of definition, and I would now also like to briefly state our views on this subject.

In our view, the definition of a chemical warfare agent must be both comprehensive and accurate. Its comprehensiveness is designed to ensure that all chemical warfare agents which should be prohibited are brought within the scope of prohibition. It should not only include supertoxic lethal agents, but also include incapacitating agents and irritant agents; it should not only include single-purpose chemical warfare agents but also dual-purpose chemical warfare agents and precursors which can turn into chemical warfare agents during the process of their use; it should not only include existing chemical warfare agents but also potential chemical warfare agents. The accuracy of the definition is designed to avoid erroneously including in the scope of prohibition chemical substances which should not be prohibited, since that would adversely affect the development of the industrial and agricultural production of States and their scientific and technological progress. In this connection, the Chinese delegation intends to submit to the plenary Committee a working paper on the definition of chemical warfare agents.

(Mr. YU Peiwen, China)

The Chinese delegation, like many other delegations, has consistently favoured stringent and effective international monitoring and verification measures for prohibiting chemical weapons. We share the view expressed in working paper CD/106 put forward by the French delegation that "it would be more dangerous for the security of the countries affected to prohibit the manufacture and possession of chemical agents and weapons without providing means of verifying the strict application of the prohibition than to have no agreement whatsoever." This is completely in accord with the actual situation. The fact that the 1925 Geneva Protocol does not contain articles on complaint and verification procedures with regard to violations of the convention prohibiting the use of chemical weapons has resulted in no investigation and confirmation of chemical weapons having been used in many wars and armed conflicts. This has emboldened some countries to use chemical weapons unbridled.

In its working paper CD/102, the Chinese delegation also clearly states that there should be stringent and effective measures for international control and supervision to ensure the strict implementation of the provisions of the convention. An appropriate organ of international control should be set up for this purpose charged with the responsibility of verifying the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles and the dismantling of facilities for their production. The organ should also be empowered to investigate charges on the use of chemical weapons and on any other violations of the convention. Appropriate measures should be spelled out to deal with verified cases of violations of the convention with a view to bringing about their prompt cessation. Moreover, the organ should provide strong assistance to imperilled contracting parties.

How then can the organ of international control be enabled to carry out "stringent and effective" verification? In a statement which I made at the plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament on 3 July 1980, I clearly stated the position of the Chinese delegation: "In view of the uneven levels of scientific and technological development of the contracting parties, there is a great disparity between the parties in verification techniques and devices. If we depend on the parties themselves to monitor each other with the verification devices which they possess, this could prejudice the effectiveness and authoritativeness of such verification." Therefore, the organ of international control "should have qualified experts and advanced and effective verification techniques and devices to enable it to discharge the function of clear verification with which it is charged. In this way all contracting parties will be subject to equal control thereby ensuring the strict implementation of the convention."

Many delegations attach very great importance to the question of on-site inspection, and have put forward quite a number of specific proposals. The Chinese delegation is of the view that in order to ensure strict implementation of the articles of a convention on the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons, provision must be made for certain necessary on-site inspection measures. For instance, there should be international on-site inspection measures with regard to charges on the use of chemical weapons, the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles and the dismantling of facilities for their production.

Various delegations have suggested three methods of dealing with the question of production facilities for chemical weapons: dismantling, conversion to peaceful purposes and shutting them down. We consider dismantling to be conducive to enhancing a sense of security and trust between States and is the most appropriate method for dealing with facilities for the production of chemical weapons. Converting them to peaceful production and shutting them down are not ideal measures, since they would not only make verification more difficult, but would also carry the potential risk of the facilities being utilized again within a short period of time to renew production of chemical weapons.

(Mr. YU Peiwen, China)

If it is argued that the dismantling of production facilities for chemical weapons could take years, and that an interim measure is required, we can agree to consider the use of the method of shutting down the facilities as an auxiliary measure of supervision. In this connection also, the Chinese delegation intends to submit a working paper on the dismantling of production facilities/means of production for chemical weapons.

In some disarmament negotiating bodies, the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons has been discussed for many years. In 1980 the Committee on Disarmament established for the first time an Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. Under the chairmanship of Ambassador Okawa of Japan, it carried out substantive deliberations on the scope of prohibition of the future convention, verification and other related issues and achieved fairly good progress. At this session the Committee on Disarmament has once again set up this Ad Hoc Working Group which, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden, is continuing its deliberations on substantive issues. The Chinese delegation believes that, through the co-operation of all delegations, the Ad Hoc Working Group will certainly make new progress this year.

Finally, I would like to welcome the chemical weapon experts of various delegations that are participating in discussions on this question. Their participation in deliberations will enable us better to understand technical questions related to the convention. The Working Group will be focusing its discussions this year on several technical issues directly relevant to the convention, and it is in this area that the experts will be playing their due role.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of China, Ambassador Yu Peiwen, for his statement. The documents he mentioned will be circulated as soon as the chair receives them.

Mr. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, I would like to make some comments to-day on item 4 of the Committee's agenda, chemical weapons. The Brazilian delegation has been participating actively in the Working Group that is currently examining, through substantive negotiation, issues to be dealt with in a convention on the subject. I wish to pay tribute here to Ambassador Lidgard, Chairman of the Working Group, for his efforts to achieve progress during this session of the Committee, as well as to Ambassador Okawa, the former Chairman of the Group.

Brazil attaches particular importance to the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the production, development and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. Together with the other members of the Group of 21, my delegation played an active part in the efforts made in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to achieve progress in this field. The basic stand of those delegations is contained in document CCD/400 of 1973. We believe that a convention to ban chemical weapons can be a significant measure of disarmament, in so far as it is aimed at eliminating a whole category of weapons in the armouries of some States, as opposed to measures designed merely to prevent the development of certain kinds of weapons that have not yet gone beyond the blueprint stage. For this reason, my delegation believes that the most salient feature of the proposed convention is the destruction of existing stockpiles of chemical weapons, besides the prohibition of their production, development, stockpiling and transfer.

(Mr. De Souza E Silva, Brazil)

The scope of the convention, thus, to our mind, embraces two sets of obligations: a positive obligation to destroy existing stocks and the facilities for the production of chemical weapons, or their conversion to peaceful applications, coupled with the negative obligation not to manufacture, stock up, develop or transfer such weapons. To fulfil those obligations, States should be required to declare in detail, at the time of their signature of the instrument, all stocks in their possession, their nature, quantities and places of storage, as well as the plans, methods and timing for their destruction. Facilities used for the production of chemicals for warfare purposes and of delivery systems specifically designed for use in chemical war should also be the object of the declaration, together with precise information on their location and production capacity, and on plans for their destruction, mothballing or conversion. Additional information to be provided should include means of research and testing of chemical weapons, special military units and programmes and activities in the field of training. There should be no reason for delay in the presentation of such declarations since they would embrace information already available to the Governments of the few States which possess such weapons and facilities.

The destruction of stocks, to be strictly enforced by adequate measures of verification, will ensure that no discrimination arises from the proposed convention, in as much as the few States which possess chemical weapons in their arsenals will undertake to dispose of such armaments in exchange for the commitment, on the part of those who do not possess them, not to manufacture, develop and stockpile their own chemical weapons in the future. Since there must necessarily be a time-lag between the entry into force of the convention and the completion of the process of destruction, Brazil deems it imperative that the mechanism of implementation of the convention be designed in such a way as to permit the full realization of the twofold objectives of the instrument in the shortest possible delay. Fulfilment of the obligation to destroy the stocks currently in the possession of only a few Powers must then be seen as a necessary corollary to the obligation undertaken by the large majority of States, which do not possess chemical weapons, not to acquire them. Brazil is therefore of the opinion that the provisions and the title of the convention should adequately reflect that concern, and this is why my delegation proposed, at the 105th meeting of the Committee on 12 February, that the convention be titled "Convention on the destruction of chemical weapons and on the prohibition of their production, development, stockpiling and transfer".

We are aware of the interest of some delegations in our proposal, and we look forward to hearing the views of other members of the Committee, in the plenary and in the Working Group, on that idea. My delegation would be particularly interested in learning from the bilateral negotiators their opinion on the technical and practical questions related to the process of destruction, especially as regards the timing for the implementation of obligations entered into and any specific problems connected with the substance of the declarations.

Another important feature of the convention, in the view of the Brazilian delegation, is its role as an instrument for the promotion of international co-operation in the field of the peaceful uses of chemical technology. In this connection, the convention should be conceived according to the principle that civil industrial activities and the full use of technology for peaceful purposes should not only be allowed but actually encouraged; the production, development, stockpiling and transfer of chemical agents for warlike purposes is the exception that must be prohibited, rather than the other way around. Since the convention will hopefully result in the cessation of activities currently under way in certain countries, it is also important that it contains provisions to ensure that savings generated from the process of chemical disarmament will be channelled to peaceful objectives, especially in developing countries, in accordance with the principles embodied in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

(Mr. De Souza E Silva, Brazil)

Other issues currently under examination by the Working Group include the system of measures designed to ensure compliance with the provisions of the convention, through a combination of national and international means of verification. Brazil believes that an independent international control authority should be established under the convention on an egalitarian basis, and entrusted with the administration of the international verification system. Its duties would include the compilation of data provided to it by the national systems organized by each State party, the analysis and circulation of such data to all States party, as well as co-operation and assistance to the parties with regard to the national mechanism of control and verification. On-site inspections, on a voluntary basis, could be performed by the international authority, subject, in each case, to express agreement by the State party in question. Furthermore, the international procedures of verification should be periodically reviewed, taking into account new scientific and technological developments. The complaints procedure and the mechanism of periodical review of the Convention should not result in discriminatory arrangements; all States party to the instrument are entitled to equal treatment and equal rights.

These are the main ideas that the Brazilian delegation wished to share today with the members of this Committee, in connection with the current work on a convention on the destruction of chemical weapons and on the prohibition of their production, development, stockpiling and transfer. My delegation continues to support the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons and will elaborate on the suggestions presented above as the occasion arises in that subsidiary body. We fully agree with the assessment made by Ambassador Lidgard at our last plenary meeting to the effect that the convergence of views on substantive issues pertaining to the convention is sufficiently broad to warrant the start of work on the actual drafting in the very near future. We are confident that with the invaluable assistance of Ambassadors Lidgard and Okawa and in consultation with all delegations, the necessary steps will be taken by the Chair of the Committee, actually during the current spring session, to lay the basis for providing the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons with a more precise and objective mandate so as to enable the Committee to discharge the task entrusted to it by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Mr. PFEIFFER (Federal Republic of Germany) I should like to make a brief remark with respect to the intervention of the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan, in which he dealt with nuclear disarmament. In the course of his statement, he based some of his remarks on an article in the German weekly magazine, Der Stern. It goes without saying that the figures and conclusions which he quoted from this magazine have no official character, nor do they reflect the position of the Federal Government. This position has been stated on several occasions in interventions of my delegation in this Committee, as well as in other official documents.

My delegation has repeated that the decision taken by NATO in December 1979 is a "double check" decision, with the special specific aim of avoiding another turn of the arms spiral, which was referred to by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union. My country, together with its allies, has asked for early negotiations on the limitation and reduction of long-range theatre nuclear missiles in Europe. This offer is still valid and on the table.

The CHAIRMAN: Before concluding, I should like to make a few announcements.

I have requested the Secretariat to circulate today an informal paper containing the timetable for the meetings to be held by the Committee on Disarmament and its subsidiary bodies during the week 30 March to 3 April. You will note that the informal paper follows the programme of activities of previous weeks, with the exception of an additional meeting for the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, which will be held on Monday at 10.30 a.m.

In that connection, I should also like to inform the Committee that, after consultation with the Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Working Groups and bearing in mind that some meetings of Working Groups might not be held on certain dates in April when the Palais des Nations will be closed, it was agreed that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons will meet on Monday, 6 April, at 10.30 a.m., and the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will be convened on Monday, 13 April, also at 10.30 a.m.

If there are no objections, I will consider that the Committee agrees with the timetable and with the recommendation I have just made on the basis of consultations with the Chairmen of these Working Groups.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: I should now like to turn to another subject. At our 117th plenary meeting, I convened informal consultations in connection with the consideration of issues relating to agenda items 1 and 2. As a result of those informal consultations, I have reached the conclusion that there is general agreement that the informal meeting on Monday 30 March should continue to examine, under item 2 of the agenda, the prerequisites for negotiations on nuclear disarmament, as well as doctrines of deterrence and other theories concerning nuclear weapons.

I have also taken note of the wish that the informal meetings on 6 and 13 April should be devoted to the examination, under item 1 of the agenda, of specific issues relating to that item.

In the course of informal consultations, five concrete issues were proposed under item 1 for examination at informal meetings. No consensus has so far been reached, and it is therefore my intention to continue informal consultations with a view to reaching agreement on the specific subjects to be examined under item 1 at the forthcoming informal meetings on that subject. I shall keep the Committee informed of the results of my consultations.

Finally, you will recall that at our informal meeting on Tuesday, I announced the intention of holding an informal meeting today, immediately after the plenary meeting, in order to discuss a question which is still pending and on which the secretariat of the Committee has provided us with the relevant information. As we have run out of time I propose to consider this request, if possible, on Monday. I therefore appeal to delegations to conclude their consultations on that request, if possible before these informal meetings on Monday.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 31 March, at 10.30 a.m.

The Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will meet this afternoon at 3.15 p.m. instead of 3 o'clock.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.