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LETTER DATED 14 MAY 1976 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF MOZAMBIQUE
TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit the text of two communications from the Democratic Republic of East Timor. I would be grateful if Your Excellency would arrange for both communications to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Jose Carlos LOBO
Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative to
the United Nations

Annexes

I. Telegram dated 4 May 1976 from Mr. Jose Ramos Horta
addressed to the Permanent Representative of
Mozambique to the United Nations

Please arrange for the following communication to be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

"Secretary-General United Nations. The Security Council resolution 389 (1976) in its paragraph three 'requests the Secretary-General to have his special representative to continue the assignment entrusted to him under paragraph five of the Security Council resolution 384 (1975) and pursue consultation with the parties concerned'.

I have been entrusted by my Government, the Democratic Republic of East Timor, to inform Your Excellency that such a visit must take place urgently. Therefore, I am extending to Your Excellency the invitation of Australian trade unions and aid organisation to have the United Nations Special Envoy to travel on the boat which is due to leave on May 22 from Cairns on the north-east coast of Australia.

In document S/12060 of 28 April 1976 I have given details of this humanitarian venture. It has been reported that the Indonesian authorities will sink ship when it reaches East Timor territorial waters. Such a threat must be taken seriously as it is a blatant violation of the most fundamental human rights. No peace-loving people can remain silent facing this criminal action that has been carried on by Indonesian generals in preventing humanitarian assistance from reaching the people of East Timor. Therefore I appeal to Your Excellency to use your good offices to facilitate the success of this mission. I wish to take this opportunity to appeal to all United Nations Member States to endorse this truly humanitarian mission."

Jose Ramos HORTA
Minister of External Relations
and Information
Democratic Republic of East Timor

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II. Letter dated 4 May 1976 from Mr. Jose Ramos Horta
addressed to the Secretary-General

The following report was prepared and sent to Australia by a prominent Indonesian politician who opposes the invasion of East Timor.

For obvious reasons, his name cannot be published. This report throws further evidence on the Indonesian military intervention in East Timor. By circulating it to the United Nations Member States, we hope that peace-loving countries around the world voice their strong condemnation for Indonesian continued aggression against the people of the Democratic Republic of East Timor in defiance of the United Nations resolutions:

"During the December 7 invasion in Dili, I heard there were already 10 battalions - about 10 thousand people - Indonesian soldiers in Timor from the Navy, Air Force, Army, and even from the Police (Mobile Brigade). The Dili invasion was well planned. The Army troops intermingled with the anti-Fretilin forces, would invade Dili from the West and South. That is why there were two 'movements': a long march along the northern coast from Batugade-Maubara-Liquica to Dili, and another group tried to march along the mountain roads from Bobonaro-Atsabe, Aileu to Dili. But it seems that this last group failed because of the wet monsoon and Fretilin forces in the highlands.

The group marching on to Dili along the northern coast was protected by the Naval forces, who had built strongholds in the island of Alor (East Nusa Tenggara) and Wetar (Maluku). The Alor base was meant as a stepping-stone to invade Dili, and Wetar was the stronghold to invade Baucau. The occupation of Dili and later the march from Baucau to Dili was meant to invade the capital from four directions. But not all succeeded according to the plan because of Fretilin resistance in the highlands, Baucau, and even along the north coast. One small town west to Dili was occupied only after 8 hours of fighting. Even the invasion of Dili was 6 hours too late (the plan was H-hour 6-o'clock, but the invasion was realized at 12 o'clock). So, tough fighting indeed!

After Dili was occupied by the Indonesian troops, reinforcements were sent non-stop to East Timor. Now I have heard that there are already 35,000 troops there. A big portion from all the elite/commando troops have been sent to Timor like the red berets (RPKAD), orange berets (kopasgat), violet berets (Korps Marinir/KKo), plus troops from Java (especially from West Java (Diponegoro) mostly got dispensation not to be sent to Timor, because they are Soeharto's troops), Sumatera and Sulawesi. Most of our war machines are sent to Timor, too, or stationed at the nearest bases like Kupang and Ambon. Armoured cars (Panser) from the Cavalry Headquarters in Bandung in West Java were sent to Surabaya by special trains in the night, so it would not attract too much attention.

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Actually it is no secret anymore in Indonesia. Especially in Jakarta, where the Army Hospital (RS Catot Subroto) and the Air Force hospital at Halim air base is overflooded with war victims. And what makes it more tragic is that the families - even their wives - are not allowed to visit their husbands in the hospital. At the same time, news that many Indonesian soldiers were killed by the Timorese is just trickling down in Jakarta and whole Java. So knowing that your husband, son or father has to go to Timor is nearly as shocking as a death trial/penalty. So, when I saw troops coming back from Timor last month (red berets), I was not surprised to see them so delightful, released, talkative because they have escaped from hell. But to be correct, the battle front is hell but life in Dili - as they tell it - has its bright colours, too. They were happily telling of how cheap cars and motorbikes are in Timor now. And without any reluctance, they were just showing their T-shirts with the letters and symbol 'Team Rajawali' (Hawk) and 'Around the Timport'. They were advanced groups that had been sent to Timor 9 months ago! Imagine!

I don't know how it will go on there in the next months. Just accepting East Timor already as Indonesian territory to be defended by the Indonesian troops, the Armed Forces have already decided to divide Timor in military districts (Kodim) complete with the officers to be stationed as district commander (Komandan Kodim or Dandim) in every Kodim. That task is called 'territorial task' to distinguish it with the so-called volunteers 'infantry tasks'. And maybe you can take this as a sign that not the whole East Timor territory is already under Indonesian control; the military to be sent to Timor find it the more harder to be sent for a 'territorial' task than an 'infantry' task. It seems that they realised that they cannot yet trust the population's attitude towards those intruders.

According to military sources, this 'Operasi Komodo' is the biggest military operation after independence. I am wondering who actually pays for this big military adventure, because if it is really paid from our national funds it would be a very big burden for the national economy already suffering from the \$10 billion Pertamina/Ibnu Sutowo debts. Maybe, the CIA is playing here also, because it is actually not a Hankam (Ministry of Defence) project but only a very limited number of Kostrade generals are responsible for it, headed by general Benny Murdani (ex Ganyang Malaysia field officer in Kalimantan) and supported by general Soeharto himself. The political operations, especially through Apodeti, is commanded by Ali Moertopo. So this trio is actually responsible for Timor."

(Signed) Jose Ramos HORTA
Minister of External Relations and Information,
Democratic Republic of East Timor
