



SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

THIRTY-THIRD YEAR

2094th

MEETING: 1 NOVEMBER 1978

NEW YORK

CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2094)	1
Expression of thanks to the retiring President	1
Adoption of the agenda	1
The situation in Namibia:	
(a) Report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) (S/12903);	
(b) Letter dated 24 October 1978 from the Permanent Representative of Burundi to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/12906)	1

191576

NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

2094th MEETING

Held in New York on Wednesday, 1 November 1978, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. Léon N'DONG (Gabon).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Bolivia, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, France, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, India, Kuwait, Mauritius, Nigeria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2094)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation in Namibia:
 - (a) Report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) (S/12903);
 - (b) Letter dated 24 October 1978 from the Permanent Representative of Burundi to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/12906)

The meeting was called to order at 11.25 a.m.

Expression of thanks to the retiring President

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): It is a most pleasant duty for me to open this first meeting of the month of November by paying a tribute on behalf of all the members of the Council to the Permanent Representative of France, Ambassador Jacques Leprette, who, as President during the month of October—a particularly heavy one—guided our work with the efficiency, diplomacy and courtesy for which he is well known.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Namibia:

- (a) Report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) (S/12903);
- (b) Letter dated 24 October 1978 from the Permanent Representative of Burundi to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/12906)

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2092nd meeting, I invite the representatives of Burundi, Egypt and Ghana to

take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Simbananiye (Burundi), Mr. Abdel Meguid (Egypt) and Mr. Boaten (Ghana) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Bangladesh, Benin, Guyana, Saudi Arabia, Somalia and Zambia, in which they ask to be invited to participate in the discussion. In accordance with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Huq (Bangladesh), Mr. Houngavou (Benin), Mr. Sinclair (Guyana), Mr. Baroody (Saudi Arabia), Mr. Hussen (Somalia) and Miss Konie (Zambia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

4. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2092nd meeting, I invite the Vice-President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the delegation of the Council to be seated at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Cuevas Cancino (Vice-President of the United Nations Council for Namibia) and the other members of the delegation took places at the Council table.

5. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2092nd meeting, I invite Mr. Gurirab to take a seat at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Gurirab (Permanent Observer of the South West Africa People's Organization) took a place at the Council table.

6. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The first speaker is the representative of Egypt. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make a statement.

7. Mr. ABDEL MEGUID (Egypt): Mr. President, allow me at the outset to express my delegation's sincere gratitude to you and the other members of the Security Council for giving me this opportunity to address the Council at a time

when you, the representative of Gabon, a sister African country, are presiding over its work. We are confident that with your diplomatic ability and skill the deliberations of the Council concerning Namibia at this crucial and decisive stage will be fruitful and successful.

8. My delegation has asked to participate in the debate on the situation in Namibia not only because it touches on the life of a brother African people or because Egypt is a member of the United Nations Council for Namibia, but above all because of the grave nature of the developments and the crucial stage they have reached. The situation in Namibia as it is now portends ominous developments and threatens a catastrophe the responsibility for which would be pinned on all those who failed to take speedy action to avert its occurrence.

9. The life and future of an entire nation are hanging in the balance, pending the decision of the Council. The blood of thousands of innocent Namibians would be shed if the Council should fail to take quick action to shoulder its responsibility in its capacity as the highest international authority.

10. The meeting today is the third occasion in three months when the Council has considered the question of Namibia. It should by now have been reviewing the progress achieved in the implementation of the report of the Secretary-General [S/12827], approved in resolution 435 (1978). One month after the adoption of the resolution the Council is meeting once again to confront the new obstacles created by the racist minority régime of South Africa and the confusion caused by the joint statement of 19 October issued by the Foreign Ministers of the five Western Powers and the South African Government, which is contained in documents S/12900 and S/12902.

11. The African countries have received the joint statement with astonishment and indignation. In relation to the implementation of resolution 435 (1978), we consider the statement a step backwards and an anticlimax to all the expectations raised by recent Council resolutions, which heralded an imminent settlement of the problem based on the withdrawal of the illegal South African administration from the Territory so that the Namibian people might achieve their legitimate aspirations to self-determination and genuine independence.

12. We are not pessimistic, nor do we entertain any illusions, but a cursory look at paragraph 4 of the joint statement reveals the true intentions of the racist minority régime at Pretoria. That Government openly declares its determination unilaterally to hold elections in Namibia in December, in clear defiance of resolution 431 (1978), which approved the Western plan providing for the elections to be held under United Nations supervision and control.

13. We should like to know how the five Western countries could allow themselves to be parties to that statement, which clearly violates the very plan they had proposed which was adopted by the Security Council. It is evident that they have failed to dissuade the Pretoria Government from unilaterally holding elections. It would

have been more appropriate for them to have declared this and requested the Council to take such measures as would compel the Pretoria régime to abide by and respect its resolutions. However, the five Western countries elected to issue such a confusing statement as could only provoke indignation and further complicate the situation rather than help to achieve any progress towards a just settlement of the problem.

14. The five Western Powers are calling for Pretoria to be provided with an opportunity of proving its intentions, but is not that precisely what we have been doing for the past 12 years, since the General Assembly adopted its historic resolution 2145 (XXI) in 1966 terminating South Africa's Mandate over Namibia and assuming direct responsibility over the Territory? We should like also to recall the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971,¹ which clearly and categorically resolved all the equivocation and misrepresentation by the South African régime about Namibia. That verdict stated that the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia was illegal. Time and again the General Assembly and the Security Council have adopted resolutions, in particular resolution 385 (1976), all of which have been flouted by the racist régime at Pretoria. That régime, instead of observing those resolutions, tightened its hold on Namibia, practising all forms of oppression and injustice in arrogant defiance of the will of the international community. Moreover, South Africa has repeatedly launched acts of brutal aggression against neighbouring African countries, mercilessly attacking the camps of refugees from Namibia and the SWAPO forces in a bid to terrorize the people of Namibia and to undermine their resistance to the illegal occupation of the Territory.

15. All that is a more than adequate test of the intentions of the racist régime at Pretoria. Why should we take the trouble to await the outcome of the present test of intentions, when we already have the statement made by South Africa's Prime Minister, Mr. Botha, contained in document S/12900? The South African régime carefully published that statement in the same document as contained the joint statement on Namibia of the South African Government and the five Western Powers. The special significance of that action could hardly escape the notice of anyone, and it clearly establishes the true intentions of the Pretoria Government. In his statement, full of distortions and misrepresentations, Mr. Botha showered SWAPO with accusations, claiming that, should SWAPO come to power, it would be detrimental to southern Africa and the free world. That statement simply means that South Africa has no intention whatsoever of withdrawing from Namibia or conducting free and just elections. It is fully convinced that SWAPO, which enjoys the overwhelming support of the people of Namibia, as well as that of the international community, will win the elections with a sweeping majority; that is why South Africa is levelling such preposterous and untrue accusations.

16. The international community, including the five Western Powers themselves, has been witness to the flexibility

¹ *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16.*

and co-operation shown by SWAPO in all the efforts exerted to achieve a peaceful settlement in Namibia. It has even gone to the extent of offering enormous concessions, by accepting the plan of the five Western Powers, adopted by the Security Council in its resolution 431 (1978), despite some negative elements it contained. That resolution also found a response in many international forums, including the African Summit Conference held at Khartoum last July and the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries which met at Belgrade during the same month. That leaves South Africa with the decision to abide by what it committed itself to when it announced its acceptance of the Western plan. It is worthwhile stating here that Pretoria was not acting in good faith when it announced its acceptance of the Western plan. It pretended to accept the plan in the expectation that it would be rejected by SWAPO. That, Pretoria believed, would cast it in the role of the flexible party while SWAPO would appear as the intransigent one. When SWAPO declared its acceptance of the plan, Pretoria found itself in a dilemma. It sought excuses and pretexts for backing out, since it had already made all preparations to carry out its own plan in the Territory. This plan provides for the holding of unilateral elections that would result in the bringing to power of a puppet government to guarantee South Africa's continued domination. We have no doubt that such a puppet government would immediately proclaim the unilateral independence of Namibia and ask the international community, including the United Nations, to keep their hands off the Territory.

17. Will the Western Powers bear the responsibility for this crime which is about to be committed in Namibia and for its consequences? Will they content themselves with the statement they made that the outcome of such unilateral elections would be regarded as null and void? Do we have to await the result of the test of Pretoria's intentions?

18. It is time for us to ask the five Western Powers unequivocally to declare their position on these developments. We should like to know specifically what they will do if the Pretoria Government should insist on holding in Namibia unilateral elections that would result in the creation of a leadership that would proclaim the independence of Namibia in the manner to which we have referred. We also want to know very clearly whether the five Powers recognize SWAPO as the sole legitimate representative of the people of Namibia. We sincerely hope to receive from the five Powers a clear and categorical answer—and the sooner the better.

19. We cannot afford to await the outcome of these developments. We have to take a clear-cut position before it is too late. We should learn a lesson from what is happening now in Southern Rhodesia. The racist régime of Ian Smith proclaimed the so-called internal settlement last March. The international community, including most of the five Western Powers, denounced that settlement. That did not, however, avert the present massacres involving thousands of innocents in Zimbabwe. The same tragedy is about to be repeated in Namibia. Unless the Security Council takes prompt action together with the five Powers which can influence Pretoria, there will be an outbreak of bloody

conflict with grave consequences that will directly threaten international peace and security.

20. The only option left to us is to compel South Africa to respect the will of the international community, the United Nations and Security Council resolutions. In our view that could be achieved only by enforcing the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter. The African countries and the international community, now more than at any other time, insist on the necessity of this action. There is no time for hesitation. Nor is there time for testing the intentions of the racist régime. Otherwise we shall be overtaken by events and have a catastrophe on our hands.

21. Egypt will consistently support the struggle of the people of Namibia led by SWAPO, its sole and authentic representative. It will also continue to support the struggle of all liberation movements in southern Africa. Equally, it will remain convinced of the possibility of settling international disputes by peaceful means. Guided by this concept, my country has offered to contribute to the implementation of resolution 431 (1978), and we have formally informed the Secretary-General of our decision in this respect.

22. We have no doubt that the efforts exerted by the United Nations, other sincere efforts and the Security Council's persistence in shouldering its responsibility will ultimately lead to the triumph of the will of the African people in Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa.

23. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Ghana. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

24. Mr. BOATEN (Ghana): Mr. President, in the first place I should like to thank you and the other members of the Council for allowing me to participate in this debate. It is gratifying to see you, a son of Africa, preside over this crucial meeting of the Council.

25. The Government of Ghana is as committed today as it has ever been to the proposition—the dictum of its first President—that the independence of Ghana is meaningless unless it is linked with the total liberation of Africa. We have asked to participate in this debate because of our conviction that that process of liberation has most unwarrantedly been checked and has been placed in jeopardy at a crucial point once again by the seemingly inexhaustible trickery, by the sinister scheming of the Pretoria régime.

26. Namibia must be free. But is its freedom to be of the genuine kind which the United Nations, as the successor of the League of Nations, must ensure in the discharge of its sacred trust, or is it to be a travesty and a farce such as we see in bantustans, a puppet show manipulated by the *apartheid* régime for the protection of its Namibian profits and its access to Namibian uranium?

27. At this juncture the question must also arise whether the United Nations will ever be enabled to assert and enforce its authority in what until its genuine independence is and must remain, legally, a United Nations Territory, or whether the *apartheid* régime will be enabled to vitiate our

efforts for us long as it chooses by merely pretending to negotiate until that not-far-distant day when it will choose to end the whole tragicomedy by means of a nuclear stalemate. This debate may well hold the answers to these questions.

28. We all know that the present crisis has been precipitated by the Pretoria régime's decision to proceed unilaterally with elections which it now calls internal after pretending for 15 months to negotiate on elections under United Nations supervision and control, as required by resolutions 366 (1974) and 385 (1976), and after making a feint of accepting a scheme for such elections proposed by the five Western members of the Council. The internal elections were intended, of course, and still are intended to be held outside United Nations supervision and control.

29. The Security Council adopted resolution 435 (1978), thus adopting the plan apparently accepted by the Pretoria régime and approving the Secretary-General's proposals for its implementation submitted at the Council's request. The resolution is but the most recent of a whole series of resolutions whereby the Council, ever since 1969, has called on the *apartheid* régime to carry out the immediate withdrawal of its illegal administration from Namibia, declare its acceptance of the decisions of the United Nations and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on Namibia, transfer power to the people of that Territory with the assistance of the United Nations after holding free elections under United Nations supervision and control, or else face the possibility, by given deadlines, of appropriate action under the Charter. By resolution 435 (1978), the Council reaffirms those demands by recalling its predecessors, draws attention to the need for elections that are not only free but fair, under United Nations supervision and control, declares null and void all unilateral measures relating to the electoral process and all unilateral transfers of power, calls on the Pretoria régime to co-operate forthwith with the Secretary-General in the implementation of the entire resolution, including, of course, the adopted plan and proposals for its implementation, and requests the Secretary-General to report on that by the given deadline, 23 October 1978.

30. The Secretary-General duly made his report on 21 October [S/12903] and, on the subject of South Africa's co-operation, made mention of the efforts of the five Western members to persuade the régime to comply with the terms of the resolution. Indeed, the results of those efforts are available, in part, for our examination in document S/12900. But the real task before the Council today, at least in our view, is not so much to examine that particular document as to determine from the evidence contained in it and available from any other source whether the Pretoria régime has taken the action it should have taken and discontinued the action it should have discontinued in order to meet the requirements of resolution 435 (1978) and its precursors; and, if it has not, what measures should be taken to make it do so.

31. It seems clear enough from the evidence before us that the *apartheid* régime has not only failed so far to take the action required under resolution 435 (1978) but has embarked upon and is still insisting on a course of action that

is irreconcilable with it, as suggested in the joint statement, and so in a sense already violates it. What is infinitely worse, however, is that this course of action, the internal elections, if not checked would create an entirely new political and military situation which would abort the entire plan and the entire resolution, and pose a grave threat to international peace and stability.

32. This will, we hope, become clearer as we go along. But first permit me to point out that the Pretoria régime does not appear to accept even the requirement of United Nations control, as distinct from mere supervision, of the elections. In paragraph 3 of the joint statement issued on 19 October by the Pretoria régime and the five Western Foreign Ministers it is suggested that Mr. Ahtisaari should proceed to hold discussions with the so-called Administrator-General to work out the modalities of the proposed elections under United Nations supervision only. But resolution 435 (1978) and all the other relevant decisions of the Security Council invariably speak of United Nations supervision and control. Is the deviation from that standard formula due to objections by Pretoria and the acquiescence of the Five? Whatever the clarification, the Pretoria régime has yet to show any evidence, by word or deed, of any unequivocal acceptance of elections controlled and supervised by the United Nations; nor has it ever made a clear declaration of its acceptance of the decisions of the Security Council or of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on Namibia, as required by resolution 385 (1976) and recalled in resolution 435 (1978). On that count, it has definitely failed so far to satisfy the requirements of those resolutions. Indeed, in some ways a most disturbing retrogression from positions already reached appears to have taken place.

33. But we maintain that the principal violation of resolution 435 (1978) and its precursors, the principal source of the crisis we now face, is the decision to proceed unilaterally with elections on the pretext that they are merely an internal process despite which the plan approved and established through the resolution may very well go on, for the plan is neither clearly accepted nor clearly rejected. In resolution 435 (1978), of course, the Council warned that any such unilateral act with respect to the electoral process would be null and void; and the warning, on the evidence before us, was repeated by the Western Foreign Ministers. But this is hardly a new element in the situation. The International Court of Justice by its advisory opinion, and the Security Council by its decisions, determined long ago that subsequent to the valid termination of its Mandate South Africa's presence in Namibia was illegal, and all its acts there were illegal and invalid. And its acts would certainly include its political creation, the body elected by the unilateral decision of the Pretoria régime.

34. However, it is not enough to point to the obvious illegality of that body's status and withhold recognition but then tolerate its existence and allow its effects—for it does have certain effects which are not neutralized whether or not we call it legal, whether we choose to recognize or ignore its existence. A body so elected will certainly use its position to perpetuate its own existence by whatever means it is allowed at the expense of its rivals; and to introduce an additional factor prejudicial to the fair elections envisaged

by resolution 435 (1978) is certainly an act in violation of the resolution and irreconcilable with the aims of the plan. The two cannot coexist: one of them must go, and it must be the "internal" elections, not the plan. But even that does not seem to us to be the most alarming or dangerous consequence of tolerating the existence of a new, unilaterally elected, illegal Turnhalle-type body.

35. In the joint statement, the *apartheid* régime has said that it will use its best efforts to persuade the body elected by the unilateral internal process "to consider ways and means of achieving international recognition through the good offices of the Special Representative and the Administrator-General" [S/12900, annex II, para. 4]. Does that not mean that they have the option and may decide, if they so choose, not to seek international recognition through an internationally acceptable solution?

36. In this regard the declared intentions of the *apartheid* régime are truly revealing. In its reply to the Five on 6 October, the régime wrote:

"All options will be open to the elected representatives and they will, therefore, also be free to recommend acceptance of the Secretary-General's report. South Africa will, at that time, point out to them the various alternatives and their likely consequences, both internally and externally. South Africa will also again bring to their attention the views of the Five in regard to the requirements for international recognition of an independent South West Africa." [Ibid., annex I.]

The language is significant. They will also be free to recommend acceptance of the Secretary-General's report, among a number of alternatives with external as well as internal consequences; and they will, of course, also be free to prefer any one of those other alternatives. What other alternatives then does the *apartheid* régime intend to offer them?

37. According to Mr. Vorster, speaking on 20 September on the decision of the *apartheid* Cabinet to hold unilateral elections, all options were to remain open: to accept or not to accept the Secretary-General's report; to implement or not to implement the proposals of the Five; to draw up their own constitution, or to postpone it. Drawing up a constitution for Namibia is of course tantamount to the outright rejection of the whole plan the aim of which is to create a freely and fairly elected constituent assembly. After enumerating the options just mentioned, Mr. Vorster is reported to have added revealingly: "They will, of course, also be free to express themselves on numerous other matters." [S/12853, annex.] Those are significant words. Which "other matters"? Do they include an internal settlement, a unilateral declaration of independence sustained by the guns and sanctions-breaking of the *apartheid* régime? What would prevent a Turnhalle II body dominated or vetoed by the National Party and the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, teleguided by Pretoria, from resuming or provoking hostilities with delaying indefinitely by that ruse the withdrawal of *apartheid* forces and, therefore, the implementation of the plan and then resorting to a sham election and a unilateral declaration of independence under the protection of *apartheid* guns? Do we have an

assurance worth the paper it is written on that such an option would be closed to them by the *apartheid* régime? What we do have now from that quarter is a categorical declaration that any outbreak of hostilities would delay indefinitely the withdrawal of their forces but certainly not the date of elections.

38. If the Turnhalle II group were to make such a defiant choice, backed by the notoriously defiant Pretoria régime, what courses of action would remain open to the Security Council? To call it null and void and to condemn it? That would be welcome enough but neither very new nor very helpful. To try to reassert United Nations authority by introducing the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) by force under Article 42 of the Charter? Not likely before every resource under Article 41 is tried. To impose sanctions under Article 41, then, on a United Nations Territory, even as Britain has caused sanctions to be imposed on its colony? Those would be breached and rendered ineffective by and through South Africa. So what then? To impose sanctions on South Africa itself as the only practical and effective course left? But when? Is it to be attempted as a remedy after the situation has deteriorated to the point where a truly Rhodesian-type situation is in full swing? Or should it be used as a measure to prevent that? We are on the side of prevention.

39. The Pretoria régime, in its fourth and fifth such manoeuvres pretended to negotiate in order to stave off the sanctions threatening under resolution 385 (1976). It negotiated for a situation in which it could—to put it in plain English—rig the Namibian elections in favour of its puppets, United Nations or no United Nations. That does not seem to be succeeding. Its next manoeuvre is to make a show of negotiating a withdrawal of its illegal administration in accordance with resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978), but in reality to reintroduce into the Territory those same puppets who, whether recognized by us or not, have been given the motive for and the option and means of sabotaging the implementation of both resolutions and indeed creating a breach of the peace in defiance of the United Nations.

40. To set up a body which may checkmate, as it were, resolution 435 (1978) is to defy that resolution, and that calls for appropriate measures under the Charter, as so often warned about in the past but, alas, with no follow-up action. To set up a body which is given the motive for and the option and means of committing a breach of the peace in the Rhodesian manner is to create a situation that threatens international peace and stability. And that calls for urgent preventive measures.

41. Negotiation has repeatedly failed to end the intransigence and endless trickery of Vorster, so let action be taken at long last. Therefore we call for action under Chapter VII of the Charter at the present stage to prevent the unilaterally arranged elections threatened in Namibia, to frustrate the new version of Turnhalle and to stop Namibia going the way of Rhodesia.

42. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bangladesh. I welcome him and invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

43. Mr. HUQ (Bangladesh): Allow me at the outset to express my delegation's sincere appreciation of this opportunity to address the Security Council during its current deliberations on the situation in Namibia. I should like also to congratulate you most warmly, Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency on the occasion of this meeting, which has a profound bearing on the destiny of the people of Namibia. I am confident that under your wise guidance the Council will be fruitful in finding a just, speedy and effective way of ensuring the fulfilment of the aspirations of the Namibian people.

44. Bangladesh has consistently and categorically declared what we consider to be the irrefutable premises governing the transition to a sovereign independent Namibia. These are: First, that South Africa's armed occupation and presence in Namibia is illegal and constitutes aggression against the people of the Territory and the United Nations, its legal Administering Authority, and that South Africa's continued presence remains a potent threat to peace and security; secondly, that independence in Namibia must be achieved without concessions on the basic principles embodied in the resolutions of the United Nations, particularly Security Council resolution 385 (1976); thirdly, that the United Nations recognizes the special position of SWAPO as the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people and supports its commitment to end the illegal South African occupation by any means, including the armed liberation struggle of SWAPO, if necessary; finally, that no initiative on or solution of the Namibian question can be recognized, nor the problem resolved, outside the framework of the United Nations.

45. In sum, Bangladesh believes that the cardinal objectives governing a just and lasting solution for Namibia require the immediate withdrawal from the Territory of the illegal administering and military presence of South Africa, and the ushering in of independence in Namibia on the basis of genuine elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations. Thus means that every Namibian voter must be enabled to cast his ballot free from coercion or intimidation and that all political prisoners must be unconditionally released and all exiles permitted to return under conditions that will enable them to participate fully in the campaign preceding the elections. It also requires that South Africa should cease forthwith all actions designed to undermine the unity and territorial integrity of Namibia.

46. During the last few months, expectations had been raised that Namibia would soon indeed become a sovereign independent State. Such a position was reached as a result of three powerful forces. The first was the relentless war of liberation launched by SWAPO in 1966 as the only remaining alternative to ineffectual peaceful struggle. Despite tremendous odds, the tenacity, fortitude and courage of the Namibian patriots resulted in significant success, enough indeed to compel Pretoria to move towards the acceptance of resolution 385 (1976). The second was the consistent pressure imposed on South Africa by the overwhelming majority of the international community led by the Organization of African Unity in the vanguard of the non-aligned nations. This, ultimately, was to push the Security Council to commit itself to a Namibian solution

through the adoption of resolution 385 (1976). The contribution of the United Nations Council for Namibia in this process cannot be over-emphasized. The third important force was the valuable role of the five Western members of the Security Council who applied their considerable individual and collective weight on South Africa for negotiating practical arrangements to implement the main substance of resolution 385 (1976)

47. On the basis of the Western plan, the Secretary-General submitted a comprehensive report on the implementation of the proposal of the Five [S/12827]. This report was approved and adopted by the Security Council in its resolution 435 (1978). We take this opportunity to record Bangladesh's endorsement of this resolution and also our formal tribute in appreciation of the work done by the Secretary-General and his Special Representative.

48. Resolution 435 (1978) expressly welcomes SWAPO's preparedness "to co-operate in the implementation of the Secretary-General's report, including its readiness to sign and observe the cease-fire provisions". That it did so was only right and proper, for it underlines the unprecedented concessions acceded to by SWAPO under the persuasion of leading African nations. Thus SWAPO agreed, *inter alia*, to the retainment in Namibia of a residual South African force of 1,500 troops, even though resolution 385 (1976) called for total withdrawal of its military presence. Furthermore, SWAPO accepted the Secretary-General's proposal that the primary responsibility for maintaining law and order in Namibia during the transition period would rest with the South African police as at present. Finally, SWAPO accepted an extremely circumscribed and diluted resolution on the future of Walvis Bay.

49. These concessions assume particular relevance in the face of the objective realities of the situation actually obtaining within Namibia. South Africa continues to maintain an iron hold through a military force approaching 60,000 men. Evidence of South Africa's ill-concealed efforts to develop its nuclear potential is now well recorded and exposed. Past history in the Territory has been replete with all the ills that characterize classical colonialism with the heartless brutality inherent in the repressive régime of *apartheid*. There is little expectation or evidence that there has been an abatement in the manifestation of this abhorrent policy. On the contrary, the process of harassment, intimidation and subjugation continues to escalate through arbitrary mass arrests, torture, detention and imprisonment of SWAPO sympathizers and the growing use of local mercenaries from tribal armies and *agents provocateurs*. The logical extension of this policy has seen an organized and systematic fragmentation of the Territory along ethnic and racial lines exemplified by the contrivance of bantustanization. South Africa's brutality has even extended to genocidal attacks on hapless and uprooted Namibian refugees, harried and pursued by aerial bombardment and paratroop units into the neighbouring States of Angola and Zambia, thereby violating the territorial integrity of these sovereign States.

50. The existing environment in Namibia serves undeniably to demonstrate the true extent of SWAPO's co-operation and flexibility in accepting the Western plan and the Secretary-General's proposed implementation plan.

51. At the last Security Council debate in September, and during the current debate, many members, as well as the President of SWAPO, highlighted the dual strategy with which South Africa seeks to undermine the current Western initiative, a strategy whose prime objective, by whatever means possible, was to exclude and negate SWAPO's role in the future of Namibia on the one hand, and on the other through a variety of subterfuges and propaganda to project South Africa in a positive light as having made substantial concessions

52. The stage for the current Council consideration of Namibia must be viewed against this historical background. The take-off point arises specifically from South Africa's blatant announcement on 20 September 1978 that it will hold elections in Namibia unilaterally, without United Nations supervision, in December this year. This decision is the latest in a series of premeditated measures taken by South Africa to compromise and circumvent any plan not of its own making on the future of Namibia.

53. My Government views with serious concern the joint statement issued by the Foreign Ministers of the Western Five and the South African Government [*S/12900, annex II*]. The statement conveys the impression that South Africa's position as stated therein will find reflection in the final implementation of the Western plan. In that event, the joint statement would go far beyond the already substantial concessions made by SWAPO in the original plan, namely that the functions of the existing racist police forces would not be affected by the deployment of UNTAG civilian personnel for police-monitoring responsibilities envisaged by the Secretary-General, and that the principle of "fair consultation" would be maintained even on the composition and actual size of the military contingent, thus implicitly allowing South Africa, at any stage, to delay matters.

54. What is most disquieting is the lack of agreement over the fixing of a firm date for the elections and the essential prerequisites governing the start of official campaigning. This assumes an ominous significance when we consider the inclusion in the joint statement of South Africa's plan to continue its unilateral December elections for "internal leadership", as they call it, with a view to achieving international recognition for such leadership through the good offices of the Secretary-General's Special Representative and the South African Administrator-General. Add to this South Africa's conditions governing future troop reductions, and the prospects of genuine independence in Namibia become more bleak and remote than ever.

55. The Western Five categorically stated that they saw no way of reconciling such elections with the proposal they had put forward and that, in relation to the electoral process to be instituted by the United Nations, "any such unilateral measures . . . will be regarded as null and void" [*ibid.*, para. 5]. Nevertheless, the question arises whether in the very act of issuing of the joint statement there is a tacit acknowledgement that there will indeed be two sets of elections.

56. Bangladesh believes that the doubts that have been expressed over the joint statement and its interpretation have caused a serious break in the momentum towards

independence in Namibia. Acceptance of South Africa's stance, even by implication, would be tantamount to appeasement particularly in the face of the already substantial concessions accorded to South Africa.

57. The time has now come for forthright action. South Africa must be made to perceive that it cannot any longer tax the patience of the international community with further pretexts for delaying the process of the attainment of genuine independence in Namibia. It must be made crystal clear that any unilateral attempt by South Africa to pursue a so-called internal solution without the participation of all the parties involved is totally unacceptable to the international community and will be unequivocally condemned. In our opinion, the Secretary-General's implementation plan, as already backed and rendered mandatory by the accord of the Security Council, should be treated as the basis for the transfer of power to the Namibian people. Failure on the part of South Africa to co-operate in its implementation and vacate Namibia would justifiably warrant the imposition of measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. Bangladesh believes that any further delay in finding a just and speedy solution to the deepening crisis in Namibia, Zimbabwe and Azania poses a serious threat to global peace and security.

58. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Somalia. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

59. Mr. HUSSEN (Somalia): Mr. President, I wish to thank you and the other members of the Council for having afforded my delegation the opportunity to express my Government's views on the matter before the Council.

60. As this is the first time I have addressed the Council this month, permit me at the outset, on behalf of my delegation, to extend our warmest congratulations to you on your assumption of the high office of the presidency. There is no doubt in my mind that during your tenure the work of the Council will be both fruitful and successful. It is indeed gratifying to my delegation that you are presiding over this momentous meeting of the Council when the question of Namibia is on the agenda.

61. I would also express my delegation's appreciation and admiration to your predecessor, Ambassador Leprette of France, for the skilful manner in which he conducted the business of the Council for the month of October.

62. The Security Council is now entering a crucial phase of the implementation of its resolutions 385 (1976), 431 (1978) and 435 (1978), which seek to bring about the genuine and full independence of Namibia on the basis of free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations.

63. We have asked to be allowed to participate in the debate in order to express the deep sense of frustration, and indeed of outrage, felt by my Government at the fact that, after 33 successive years of United Nations efforts to free the Namibian people from oppression, the Organization is still being hampered in this task by the intransigence of the racist régime in South Africa.

64. The 12 years that have passed since the United Nations assumed direct responsibility for Namibia have been particularly bitter ones for the Namibian people, as time after time their trust in the effectiveness of the Organization has been betrayed. During this period they have courageously assumed the main responsibility for bringing pressure to bear on South Africa, through armed struggle, under the leadership of SWAPO, their liberation movement and their authentic representative. Their struggle has been remarkably successful, in spite of the fact that they were faced with overwhelming odds in the form of South Africa's vast military machine and its extensive economic links and resources.

65. Today, when the fate of the Namibian people hangs in the balance and when yet another crossroads in Namibian affairs has been reached, the Security Council must not fail to take action commensurate with its responsibilities towards the Namibian people, which will ensure for them the enjoyment of their inalienable rights. The present Namibian crisis, like others in the past, stems from South Africa's continued defiance of the authority of the United Nations. The situation is particularly disappointing because only a short time ago it seemed, from the assurances given to us by the Western Five, that a peaceful settlement of this long-standing threat to regional and international peace would be achieved.

66. The adoption of resolution 385 (1976) set in motion a promising train of events which included the formulation of the initiative of the five Western Powers on the Council, the acceptance of their plan for Namibian independence by SWAPO and the Pretoria régime, the issuance of the thoroughly professional and well-reasoned report of the Secretary-General on the modalities for implementing the plan, and the endorsement of that report by the Council. Of particular importance was the acceptance of the report by SWAPO, in spite of that organization's legitimate reservations in cases where internationally accepted elements of a Namibian settlement seemed endangered.

67. SWAPO's reservations were rightly based on the role envisaged by the Pretoria régime in the independence process in Namibia. The ambiguity of the relationship between the role of the Secretary-General's representative and that of the Administrator-General, unilaterally appointed by South Africa, could not be overlooked. Nor could there be indifference to the process of voter registration, accompanied by fraud and intimidation, and again, unilaterally undertaken by the Pretoria régime in violation of the principle of United Nations supervision and control of the election process.

68. SWAPO's acceptance of the independence plan in spite of its flaws provided compelling evidence of its statesman-like determination to explore all avenues of peaceful change and to show the maximum amount of flexibility compatible with the true interests of the Namibian people. Further evidence of SWAPO's moderate and responsible attitude was its proposal for an official cease-fire agreement which it would sign either separately or jointly with the Secretary-General. Somalia, along with other African States, welcomed this constructive attitude. It demonstrated that the main concern was to pursue a course of

action which would be both objective and realistic and which had as its sole purpose the well-being of the Namibian people.

69. Unfortunately, the grave doubts of many African States, including my own country, about South Africa's good faith have now proved to be justified. We suspended judgement against South Africa temporarily in a bid to give the Western proposal the benefit of the doubt, hoping that it would lead to a peaceful settlement. However, we could not help being troubled by the fact that, even while the initiative of the five Western States was being pursued, South Africa was still applying oppressive and discriminatory laws and practices. Far from releasing political prisoners and creating a climate necessary for free political expression, it was intensifying its campaign of repression against SWAPO and its supporters. Far from preparing to withdraw its military presence, it was building up its armed forces and armaments in Namibia and arming divisive groups, in order to intimidate and, where possible, to liquidate SWAPO. Furthermore, as the Council is well aware, it continued to use Namibia as a base for launching acts of aggression against neighbouring African States. The savage attacks on unarmed refugees at Kassinga in Angola clearly illustrated the continuing threat to peace presented by the Pretoria régime and its racist policies. If these matters were not sufficient cause for alarm, the decision of the Pretoria régime to annex Walvis Bay, an integral part of Namibia, shows its flagrant disregard for the unity and territorial integrity of the Territory and its obvious resolve to retain control by establishing an economic stranglehold over an independent Namibia.

70. South Africa's trumped-up charge that the Secretary-General's implementation plan went beyond the original agreement was clearly dismissed by the Secretary-General's explanation of 29 September before the Council [2087th meeting]. My Government fully supports the stand of the Secretary-General. Such issues as the size and functions of UNTAG and of the proposed police component, as well as those of consultation and of the date of elections, were shown to be logically founded on the decisions already made and capable of resolution on the basis of good faith. In particular, the readjusted election schedule was shown to be essential for the proper assumption by the United Nations of its responsibility for the supervision and control of the election process. The new time schedule is, of course, necessary for establishing a free political climate, for allowing the return of political exiles, to give all parties time to organize their political campaigns, and for carrying out a new and impartial registration of voters.

71. The Botha régime has not accepted the implementation plan which was approved by the members of the Security Council, including, significantly, the five Western Powers. Its declaration of intent to proceed in unseemly haste with its own elections on 4 December must therefore be taken as a rejection of the plan and as open defiance of the United Nations.

72. One cannot help noting the striking similarity between the Salisbury and the Pretoria régimes as they twist and turn in their attempts to continue their oppressive control of Zimbabwe and Namibia respectively, and as they

attempt to impose internal settlements through political trickery and the manipulation of susceptible elements. The international community which has rejected the internal settlement of the illegal Ian Smith régime must vigorously reject the current attempt of the Botha régime to impose an internal settlement in Namibia. We must resist the creation of a puppet government through which South Africa can continue to control Namibia and its rich resources. The alternative would be to allow the Territory to become another bantustan or another version of Ian Smith's infamous unilateral declaration of independence in 1965.

73. The question is whether it is still possible to salvage the Western initiative without prejudice to the true interests of the Namibian people or to the principles which were internationally approved for the solution of the Namibian problem in resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978).

74. My delegation must express disappointment at the fact that the five Western Powers, in their joint statement on the most recent talks with the South African Government, have resigned themselves to a process which includes the strong probability that South Africa will install a puppet régime in Namibia. Our suspicions about the proposed December elections have not been allayed by the statement of the five Western members that they would consider them to be "null and void". What will happen if the South African régime reports after the December elections that it has failed to persuade the so-called elected representatives to co-operate with the United Nations? That and many other questions remain to be answered. The five Western members should have used their undoubted leverage with South Africa to head off that attempt at creating a fait accompli. Certainly, they must not retreat now from the position they adopted during the September debate which resulted in the adoption of resolution 435 (1978), which approved the Secretary-General's report. It is pertinent to recall that the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, for example, said in that debate that South African reactions to the Secretary-General's report would show whether the concerns expressed were genuine or merely excuses made to avoid the unpalatable fact of a free choice for all the people in Namibia. Mr. Owen also had this to say:

"the South African Government must face up to the question of whether it genuinely wants an internationally acceptable solution for Namibia or is really seeking pretexts for imposing the internal solution" [*ibid.*, para. 80].

He went on to say:

"My Government's approach, if the Security Council needs to meet at the end of October, will be governed by the attitude displayed by the new South African Government over the next few weeks. We are issuing no threats, but they should not underestimate the gravity of the situation that could arise if there were no solution in sight and we met here in the Council again." [*Ibid.*, para. 81.]

75. I shall refrain from citing other pertinent statements made by the representatives of the five Western Governments since they were all in the same vein and have been quoted by speakers who preceded me.

76. The attitude of the South African régime over the past few weeks has been one of stringent intransigence. As long as that régime persists in its present course there will be no solution in sight. Should South Africa persist in holding its so-called elections in the Territory, the least that the United Nations can do is to ensure that it will not become a witness to illegal procedures. For that reason, we believe that any United Nations official who might be in the Territory should be withdrawn well before that date. Nothing should be done that could embarrass the United Nations or allow it to be even remotely connected with the exercise.

77. My Government believes that the time has come when the Security Council must take resolute action against the South African régime in line with the requirements of the present situation. It should no longer tolerate the defiance and contempt which that régime has displayed regarding Council decisions. If South Africa is not prepared to offer its co-operation in the implementation of resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978), then the international community must be prepared to proceed with a course of action strong enough to induce South Africa to abide by those decisions. My delegation has in mind the imposition of comprehensive economic sanctions, including an oil embargo.

78. The long struggle for Namibia's independence has been waged in international forums and, what is of even greater significance, it has been carried on at the cost of the lives of Namibian freedom fighters. That struggle must not be undermined yet again by the working of special interests.

79. In 1966, when the question of Namibia came before the General Assembly, the Somali delegation warned that South Africa's intransigence over Namibia, which threatened regional and international peace and security, could be countered only by enforcement measures taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. We call once again on the Security Council, as we did over a decade ago, to fulfil honestly and resolutely the responsibility assumed by the United Nations to bring about the independence of the Namibian people.

80. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Saudi Arabia. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

81. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): Mr. President, it is heartening to see a son of Africa in the Chair during this discussion. However, let me hasten to say that it is no longer an African problem: the question of Namibia is a universal problem.

82. I should like to say a few words about your predecessor. As President of the Council, Mr. Leprette discharged his duties in the best French tradition. He exuded courtesy: at the same time, his authority was clearly felt by all of us who attended the Council meetings under his chairmanship.

83. We lose sight of the fact that the question of Namibia has not been with us only since the United Nations was

founded; it has been with us ever since South Africa assumed the responsibility of the Mandate. I addressed myself to this question, I believe, in the Fourth Committee over 20 years ago, after I, together with some of my friends, had finished elaborating the principle of self-determination into a fully-fledged right. Why did we do that, here in the United Nations, starting in the last 1940s, and not succeed in including an article on self-determination in the International Covenants on human rights? Because we found that the victor nations placed many Territories—or countries, if you like, because they are filled with people who have their own culture and national identity—under mandates.

84 As I have said time and again, mandates were nothing but colonialism in disguise. I remember them in the countries of the Fertile Crescent, meaning Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. There were two French High Commissioners and two British High Commissioners. Of course, there were local authorities, but they were under the aegis of the foreign High Commissioners. What were they there for? Allegedly, to train the people for self-rule, but that was not the fact; they were there in order to make sure that no one took those Territories, which they regarded as essential for their trade and also for strategic purposes. They clung to those Territories. It was not until after the Second World War that they relinquished their authority. They had to. That was by way of a preface. There were other mandates, classified as A, B, C. I do not recall what the classification was for South West Africa, which as we all know was a German colony. We look around and we find that all the mandates have been liquidated. I stand to be corrected if I am wrong, but I do not think there is any mandated Territory besides South West Africa, which we have christened Namibia.

85. Why? I do not want to parrot platitudes, saying what South Africa should do, and I really should direct some praise to the efforts of the five Western Powers which during the last three or four years have been doing their very best to find a solution, but I must tell them here in the Council that I personally believe they have failed. Let us be good Boy Scouts and try, try and try again; never give up. Yes, but life comes to an end, our individual lives, and we do not know whether those who will take over from us will succeed or not.

86. There is a peculiarity about South West Africa, or Namibia as we have come to know it. There are three factors that come into it.

87. The first is the geographical proximity of the Mandated Territory to the Mandatory Power. All the other Mandated Territories were overseas. I do not know the Mandatory Powers will correct me if I am wrong if there was any mandate over any Territory that was not overseas. But Namibia, South West Africa, is contiguous with the Republic of South Africa and that factor becomes very evident in the reply of South Africa to our friends, the Foreign Ministers or representatives of the five Western Powers to which the Council delegated the handling of this question. It does not mention that proximity or contiguity, but it becomes evident that they are afraid that none other than the Russians might, shall I say, permeate the Territory.

88. The Russians have been quietly watching things, and I do not blame them; but for our South African colleagues—I do not know whether any of them are here, but I will tell them *in absentia*—the proximity of South West Africa has been a deterrent to the acceleration of the process of emancipation from the Mandate.

89. I have marked some of the passages that have to do with this. Here is the bugbear, as I call it, which makes the West afraid of the real bear, the Russian bear. This is from annex I to the letter dated 19 October 1978 from the Chargé d'Affaires of the Permanent Mission of South Africa to the Secretary-General, the statement of the Prime Minister of South Africa addressed to the Foreign Ministers of the five Western members of the Security Council:

“[The] new developments to which I refer concern, of course, the entry of Soviet Russia into Africa and, more especially, into southern Africa. Soviet activity in the Horn of Africa”—that is very far away and we are not concerned with it—“... I would suggest, gentlemen, that, for your countries and for the whole of the free world, you should be vitally concerned at these developments throughout the African continent. I am not so presumptuous as to suggest that you are not so concerned.”
[S/12900, annex I.]

I do not know whether that last remark has to be replied to by the Western Powers or not.

90. Why should the people of Namibia suffer because it so happens that, allegedly, the Russians are permeating Africa? Have not the Western countries permeated Africa ever since colonial days? Have we not mentioned time and again, and not only in the Security Council, that the approach of the major Powers is not new, whatever their ideology may be? They try to weaken one another, not necessarily by military confrontation but by interventions which have an adverse economic impact on each other's spheres of influence.

91. Look at what is happening. What gave Mr. Stalin and Mr. Truman the right to create spheres of influence? The Balkans—I am not going to enumerate the countries, they know themselves—were to be under Soviet influence. I do not say “Russian”; you have become nationalistic now. The great Mr. Churchill and Mr. Truman saw to it that all the area from the Pacific to Afghanistan would be under Western influence. China was in the midst of a revolution. It is emerging now. God help us if it emerges and uses the same approach. It is the wrong approach. Two world wars did not teach those countries that were exercising power anything.

92. Power politics and spheres of influence, and here we come back to this paragraph. I do not know about the Russians. We do not have an intelligence service in Saudi Arabia to let us know what is going on. We have to depend on the Americans and the Russians to learn what transpires. The Russians are deeper than the Americans anyway, but sometimes they let things out when they talk here. The British are the best now because they have relinquished their empire and have become very human. I judge that by my good friend and neighbour here. Honestly, I mean that.

They still have a lot of weight. They have atomic bombs. They have culture. Look—I am speaking in their language, you can see what an impact they have had on us. Theirs is a beautiful language, the language of Shakespeare. This is not an aside; it is to show that Baroody, I hope, puts things in their right perspective. And the French are the same. They are happier now without their erstwhile empire.

93. To return to the letter of 19 October:

“Let us suppose that in addition to Angola and Mozambique, the Soviet Union were to get a firm foothold in South West Africa by imposing a satellite government. This is not a far-fetched possibility. There could be little doubt that Sam Nujoma’s SWAPO has already become a Soviet pawn.”

I have spoken to that gentleman. He is as free as any nationalist. After five decades in international affairs, I should know a little about people. He is a nationalist, but he is made to appear to be a Soviet satellite.

94. Now, we must be fair to the Russians. As I have said, because they have no new approaches, they are now doing in Africa what the British did at one time—and the French, and the Italians, and the Spanish, and the Portuguese before them—they are interfering directly. Of course, they are doing so in the name of liberty, in the name of liberating those countries. Leave them alone, both of you, you Americans and you Russians; please leave Africa alone; leave Asia alone. Of course, you may have commerce with them, have everything with them, but leave them alone politically.

95. The letter I have been quoting states: “say the Soviets and SWAPO succeed, what then?” That would be the end of the world. Therefore, judging by this document, we are stymied and there does not seem to be any solution if this is the attitude of South Africa.

96. Again I quote the letter: “An independent South West Africa with a responsible government will have to take cognizance of these facts.” Otherwise there will be a chaotic South West Africa. SWAPO, being a stooge of the Soviets, has no place there. They want to have their own stooges. That is the whole story. South Africa wants to have its own stooges there, just as, in my part of the world, the High Commissioners selected the people who were to run the show, so to speak, but the High Commissioners always supervised them.

97. The letter also says, and this is pathetic: “My advice is stop shouting at us.” That is South Africa speaking. Who is shouting at whom? They sent their Foreign Ministers. Good Lord, I never thought they paid so much attention to South Africa. They sent their Foreign Ministers, those five Powers, Canada, the United Kingdom, France and the rest of them. The only thing left is to send the Prime Ministers, the Monarch or the Presidents of the Republics to plead with the South Africans to be reasonable. No; South Africa is a stooge; Namibia is a stooge of the Soviet Union. Therefore there is no hope of a solution along these lines if we take this document into account.

98. I am not being critical, but I want to show the thinking of our good friends from the Western world in the letter dated 21 October 1978 from the representatives of Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the United States to the President of the Security Council [S/12902]. At this very table, I have mentioned that politicians have a way of appeasing people—not only the man in the street, but even the so-called intellectual—with clichés, with platitudes. In annex II of that document, entitled “Statement issued on 19 October 1978 by the five Governments”, it is said: “The fixing of a date is necessary to provide a firm framework.” It is the new fashion to use the word “framework”. It was used at Camp David. Mr. Kissinger used “step-by-step diplomacy”. I once said to him, and I said it here in public also, “If I want to walk from one door to another, about 20 steps, and each step takes three years, then it will take 60 years, and neither you nor I nor anybody here will be alive to see whether such step-by-step diplomacy has succeeded”. And do not forget that our friend Mr. Kissinger borrowed the word “détente”. What kind of détente? Détente to all appearances, but with everybody subverting the others through intelligence agencies that have budgets far exceeding the budgets necessary for the legitimate collecting of information to see if any party has designs on another State. What for? Subversion. In détente, the subversion is under the surface. We are not true to ourselves.

99. “To provide a firm framework”. With what shall we fill that framework? Of course, language is not mathematical, and words denote certain things; they are symbols. But what framework? I am not saying this in bitter criticism. I am giving an analysis. In other words, the question will be postponed and the Security Council will meet again, and everybody will vie one with the other and the rest will watch and see what happens and how they talk. And, as I have said, we shall begin to parrot the platitudes again.

100. But is there a solution? Of course there is a solution. It should be an innovative solution. We should not follow the same road like horses with blinkers, seeing nothing but the road. There must be something on the wayside that we may pick up so that we may find out how we can solve this problem.

101. Do not think I am very harsh on South Africa. The South Africans are scared. They know that the white man there has no future. They will fight with their backs to the wall. Why do they not change their policies? It takes time.

102. Having disposed of the geographical proximity factor, I come to the economic factor.

103. For heaven’s sake, my African friends and brothers, do not ask the impossible of the five Western Powers or any other Powers and ask them to apply sanctions which would not be respected. They will be truthful. The five Western Powers want to see an end to this question. It is not in their interests to have trouble in Africa perpetuated, whether on one side of Africa or the other. It is a question of their being so-called democracies, and today democracies are influenced by their constituents, and many of their constituents are in pressure groups.

104. Here again I must refer to the rationalization of South Africa as it tries to play on the emotions of the Western Powers with regard to their so-called democracies:

“... South Africa, as a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, was to be found playing its part in the defence of the common ideals of Western democracy. In Korea, we joined the group of Western countries in the fight against communist aggression and expansionism.”
[S/12900, annex I.]

105. Who told Mr. Stalin and Mr. Truman to draw a line at the 38th parallel—I have been saying this since 1950—and then create problems for us at the United Nations because of spheres of influence? The North is the communist sphere of influence and the South is the democratic sphere of influence. What kind of communism and what kind of democracy is that? We know very well now. I am not going to say anything which would hurt the susceptibilities of my friends here; the so-called democratic way suits them. Very well, we all have to use votes and so on. But has not democracy to a great extent been reduced to democracy by subscription and contribution? What kind of democracy is it? You communists too have your elite. You have your technocrats with dachas and cars. Many of you act like capitalists. The poorest democracies are getting to be socialist by attrition and you communists are adopting the mechanics of capitalism by accelerated evolution.

106. Newspapers tell the man in the street whatever they want and people are like sheep. But I hope that they will not be marched to the slaughterhouse as they were in bygone years. Youth has awakened, and my faith is in youth. You cannot help being emotional whatever your ideology—democracy, communism or what have you. You know that do you not?

107. Why should the Namibians suffer? Why should they be pushed to a point where, not because of the influence of any ideology, they might be activated to create more anarchy instead of stability? Why? The economic question is very pertinent. The Americans and the British have interests in South Africa, as I said, and we decided that pressure groups in those democracies have a great deal of say. So, for heaven's sake, you, my good friend Mr. Boatman from Ghana who are an idealist, and others, do not think that sanctions can do this. Sanctions will not be enforced. Let us be frank. It is not because the Governments of the Western countries do not want to see them enforced, but because they are under pressure.

108. Then comes the third factor, the political factor and the political factor emanates from the economic. If South West Africa, Namibia in other words, becomes politically viable—and there is no reason why it should not, if South Africa does not persist in its policy and the five Western Powers have come to the realization that there should be a solution, and as I said I am really thankful for the efforts they have made—then what is the answer? Political? We can have political policies, provided we do something which is innovative yet not so innovative, not so radical. Perhaps I should present it to you concisely—and I reserve my right to speak again because it is late; though your appetites will be whetted and you will eat better if you have to wait another five or 10 minutes.

109. Fellow colleagues, let me tell you what it is, so that we may allay the fears of South Africa. I remember when U Thant approached me and we worked on the neutrality of Austria. I remember very well in this very United Nations how Austria was occupied by four countries—the United Kingdom, Russia, France, and I forget which was the fourth. They were suffering under that occupation and we found a formula to neutralize Austria, and rightly so. In order to do that for South West Africa, or Namibia, we should have to place it for a short period—and you Africans, do not get me wrong and do not be impatient, listen to me—under the Trusteeship Council which is still functioning. Or we would have to revive it for six months or so and work through that gentleman from Finland, Mr. Ahtisaari, who will be in charge—after all, he has our confidence, he has the confidence of the Secretary-General—to see to it that South West Africa, Namibia, becomes independent with neutrality. That is the paramount solution to the impasse with which we are faced.

110. What is wrong with that? If we do not do that the five Western Powers will again be shuttling to and from South West Africa. Do not ask for sanctions through third persons. I know what happened after the First World War. I was a young man in the 1920s and 1930s in Europe and I knew about those who sold arms and smuggled. Sir Basil Zaharoff—he was even knighted by the British—was a Greek living on the Riviera. He was still alive when I was there. Some people I knew knew him and they told me that he would sell anything to the Devil for money. He was selling to everybody in the First World War. As I have said, steel was sold to both sides by a European country, not by the country itself, but through another small country in Europe.

111. Therefore, I say to my African brothers, do not count on sanctions. Even if the Western Powers were in a position to apply sanctions, they would not be enforced. Third parties and other flags would see to it that they received everything they needed.

112. Why should the innocent South African people suffer? Should there be a crisis in South Africa we know that the blacks would suffer more than the whites. The whites may have some savings but the blacks work for wages. Do we want the blacks to be in a worse state of penury than many of them are now? There would be no work for the blacks, and they would rebel. Is anarchy what we want? Is anarchy what the United Nations works for? Let us be sensible. I can say things which my Western friends cannot say because they would be misinterpreted, but dare anyone challenge what I say? Do we want anarchy in South Africa where only the minority is white and the majority is black? The wage earners are black. How would we benefit?

113. I am not saying “don't”, my African friends; if you feel strongly about sanctions, follow it up, but I tell you now that it will not work. Therefore, because of the economic factor, we know what the picture is. Because of Namibia's geographical proximity, which they are playing on, they are raising the bugbear and saying that the communists will come. All right, what if the communist States or socialist States, or whatever name they might

bear, the major Powers, came? We would all do something to ensure the neutralization of South West Africa. What is wrong with being neutral? It would allow no military operations from outside. But I shall not go into details because we do not know whether it will come to such a solution.

114. To sum up, and, for heaven's sake, please listen to me. Instead of all parties addressing the Secretary-General and then the latter trying to play politics with everybody—because he is a political figure, too, and cannot antagonize any party; he is in the middle—put South West Africa under the Trusteeship Council for a short period of time. And have a High Commissioner; not in the old colonial sense, but this gentleman, who seems to be very calm and collected, Mr. Ahtisaari, and his aides, to hasten the emancipation of Namibia, provided it will be a neutral State. Then the South Africans will not be able to say that the Russians are coming to be mischievous, or, for that

matter, that the Americans or others have certain interests which they should protect. Then every country that wants to will be free to go and develop the resources with the indigenous people of South West Africa, without politics. Otherwise, I warn the Council, this matter will remain with us, as it has for the last 20 years. It will go on and on. But the world is impatient. We cannot afford impatience, lest there be anarchy, lest there be trouble, lest the whole of Africa, and the Asians with it, become aflame emotionally, and lest activists in Europe, no matter of what ideology, work on this for political advantage rather than to find a just solution.

115. I apologize for having taken so much of the Council's time, but I hope that my message will be acceptable, if not *in toto* at least in part, and that we shall open up a new avenue towards a viable solution.

The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m.