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SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

Letter dated 13 September 1996 from the Permanent
Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith for your attention and that of the membership of the General Assembly and of the Security Council the text of a letter dated 11 September 1996 from the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Glafcos Clerides, addressed to the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. Rauf Denktash (annex I), enclosing a copy of a letter dated 17 December 1993 from President Clerides addressed to you regarding his proposal on the demilitarization of the Republic of Cyprus.

I also enclose a copy of a public statement made today (13 September 1996) regarding the situation created after the recent tragic events in Cyprus (annex II).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annexes could be circulated as a document of the fiftieth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 55, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nicos AGATHOCLEOUS
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

ANNEX I

Letter dated 11 September 1996 from the President of Cyprus
addressed to Mr. Rauf Denktash

My attention has been drawn to a public interview in which you are reported to have said, inter alia, that we should meet in order to cool the atmosphere and that it does not matter if we do not discuss the Cyprus problem, the fact alone that the two leaders can meet and that we are on speaking terms will mean something.

I fully share your view that steps are needed to cool the situation, but in my view such steps must be convincing. A meeting between us at this stage and a common statement will be unconvincing and will not defuse the situation, but it will give ground for public arguments that will add to the tension.

The reasons I am holding this view are as follows.

There is indisputable photographic and other evidence that in the case of the murder of Solomos Solomou, which occurred on 14 August, Kenan Akin, a settler from Turkey, was aiming his pistol in the direction of the victim and Ertal Emanet, "Police Chief Inspector and Commander of Special Forces", was actually firing his weapon at the victim. Present at the time also were Attila Sav, "Chief of the Turkish Cypriot Police", Lieutenant-General Hassan Kountaksi, Commander at the time of the Turkish Forces in Cyprus, and Major-General Mehmet Karli, Commander of the 28th Infantry Division. Mr. Akin was made "Minister of Agriculture and Forest" on the Turkish side three days after the murder of Solomos Solomou.

You will realize that, as far as the Greek Cypriot community is concerned, a murder committed before so many officials and with the participation of some of them cannot be washed away by a meeting between us and by an appeal for calm.

Regarding the killing of one soldier and the wounding of another of the Turkish side, you have already drawn the premature conclusion and stated publicly that it was a revenge killing by the Greek Cypriot side, without waiting for the result of the independent inquiry of the United Nations or the British bases and without waiting for the result of our investigations.

May I remind you of a similar situation in 1975, when there was much greater tension than now. You telephoned me that a Turkish woman and her children were missing and that a revenge killing was suspected. Despite the great tension at that time, as Acting President of the Republic, I ordered an investigation. As a result, John Antoniou Vouniotis was arrested and tried by a Court. He was convicted and sentenced to death. President Makarios, who as a priest was against the death penalty, reduced his sentence to life imprisonment. He served his sentence. The conviction and sentence contributed greatly to the reduction of tension.

May I also remind you that on another occasion when a Turkish Cypriot was fired upon and killed by a sentry of a National Guard camp, though one might

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have claimed that he was unlawfully trying to get into the camp, full compensation was paid to his family.

In my view, a convincing step that we can now take together and which will really and permanently defuse the tension is to meet and discuss the issue of demilitarization on the lines of the proposal I made in my letter to the Secretary-General on 17 December 1993, a copy of which is attached herewith for easy reference (see appendix).

I am also enclosing copies of the photographic evidence.

APPENDIX

Letter dated 17 December 1993 from the President of Cyprus
addressed to the Secretary-General

I am writing to inform you that I have paid special attention and given deep consideration to paragraph 102 of your report to the Security Council of 22 November 1993 (S/26777), in which you point out:

"There is every justification for demanding that the two sides on the island, as well as Turkey and Greece, work more effectively for a negotiated settlement, in return for the great efforts of the international community".

During my deliberations regarding what could be done by my Government to contribute effectively towards a negotiated settlement, I took into consideration, inter alia, paragraph 101 (c) of your report, which states

"The status quo, which the Security Council has deemed to be unacceptable, was established through the use of force and is sustained by military strength",

and paragraph 105, which states:

"I would urge once again that as a first step towards the withdrawal of non-Cypriot troops envisaged in the set of ideas, the Turkish forces, on the island be reduced to their level of 1982 and this be reciprocated by a suspension of weapons acquisition programmes on the Greek Cypriot side."

There is no doubt that the massive presence of Turkish military forces in the occupied part of Cyprus creates serious anxieties and mistrust amongst the Greek Cypriot community regarding Turkish intentions. It also imposes on the Government of the Republic the need to increase the defensive capabilities of the country by purchasing arms. Further, it makes it necessary to request military help from Greece and to include Cyprus in the Greek defensive plans. There are also indications that the above preparations, though entirely defensive in their nature, are misinterpreted and cause anxiety and mistrust within the Turkish Cypriot community regarding Greek intentions.

After careful consideration, I came to the conclusion that in order to brake the counter-productive climate of fear and mistrust and thus enhance the prospects of a negotiated settlement the Government of the Republic should take the following steps:

(a) Repeal the National Guard Law, disband the National Guard and hand all its arms and military equipment to the custody of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force;

(b) Undertake to maintain the police force of the Republic at its present numerical strength, armed only with light personal weapons;

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(c) Undertake the total cost of a substantially numerically increased United Nations Peace-keeping Force;

(d) Agree that the United Nations Peace-keeping Force will have the right of inspection to ascertain compliance with the above;

(e) Agree that the National Guard armoured cars, armoured personnel vehicles and tanks, which will be handed to the United Nations Peace-keeping Force for custody, can be used by the United Nations Peace-keeping Force to patrol the buffer zone and to prevent intrusions into it;

(f) Deposit in a United Nations account all money saved from disbanding the National Guard and from stopping the purchase of arms, after deducting the cost of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force, to be used after the solution of the problem for the benefit of both communities.

The above offer is made provided the Turkish side agrees also that parallel to the above the Turkish forces are withdrawn from Cyprus and that the Turkish Cypriot armed forces disband and hand their weapons and military equipment to the custody of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force.

I wish also to reaffirm what I told Mr. Feissel before leaving for New York, that is, that I am ready to discuss the modalities regarding the implementation of the confidence-building measures and of course the solution of the Cyprus problem.

I hope the Turkish side will respond positively to my proposal, otherwise the only logical inference to be drawn will be that the massive presence of Turkish forces is not for the alleged safety of the Turkish Cypriot community, but for the perpetuation of the status quo, which, as stated in your report, has been created by military force and is sustained by military strength and which the Security Council has deemed unacceptable. Such an inference will impose on my Government the need to increase substantially the defensive capabilities of the Republic and to enter into arrangements with Greece regarding a common defensive plan.

(Signed) Glafcos CLERIDES
President of the Republic
of Cyprus

ANNEX II

Statement made on 13 September 1996 by the President of Cyprus

I have been carefully considering the situation created after the tragic events that have taken place over the past month. It is my considered view that, despite the fact that the crimes committed have been condemned, nevertheless considerable anxiety exists in Cyprus as a result of the tension they have created.

I therefore felt the necessity to make it absolutely clear that we have not and will not waver from our intention to continue with even more energy the effort to find a solution to the Cyprus problem by peaceful means, through negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, based on the high-level agreements and the relevant United Nations resolutions for a bi-zonal bi-communal federation.

The tragic events should not in any way be interpreted as showing an incompatibility of both communities to live together in peace and prosperity in Cyprus, our common home.

We will take the necessary measures to prevent any escalation of the present tension. I call therefore upon the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots to make every effort to defuse the tension in the interest of peace.
