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NOTE

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NOTE

The *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook* contains a review of the main developments and negotiations in the field of arms control and international security each year. Given the current financial situation of the Organization, the Centre for Disarmament Affairs has made a number of changes of a technical nature in this issue of *The Yearbook* in order to make it as concise as possible without diminishing its usefulness as a reference work. Background information has been greatly condensed; thus readers may wish to consult previous editions of *The Yearbook*. No substantive introduction is provided in chapters dealing with subjects of a technical nature. In addition, with regard to the Conference on Disarmament, *The Yearbook* focuses on the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, providing only a very brief summary of views on other items not dealt with in ad hoc committees.

Factual information in tabular form is provided in the appendices. As the texts of legal instruments concluded or signed in 1995 will be reproduced in the 1997 edition of *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, they do not appear in appendix I of this volume. Sponsors of draft resolutions are no longer listed in the body of the book, all such information being consolidated in appendix II. Appendix III contains the voting patterns of only the disarmament resolutions adopted by the General Assembly.

The Yearbook, produced under the general direction of Prvoslav Davinic, Director of the Centre for Disarmament Affairs, and Evgeniy Gorkovskiy, Chief of Branch, is prepared by the following team: *coordinator/editor*: Carolyn Cooper; *contributors*: Timur Alasaniya, Vladimir Bogomolov, Sammy Kum Buo, Michael Cassandra, Tam Chung, Ivor Fung, Hannelore Hoppe, Eiko Ikegaya, Kuo-Chung Lin, Jenifer Mackby, Agnes Marcaillou, Sola Ogunbanwo, Swadesh Rana, Olga Sukovic, Mary Wells and Jerzy Zaleski; *research assistance/language editing*: Josefina Belamide-Zweig and Nancy Grossman; *typesetting*: Bertha Mae Ortiz.

The Centre for Disarmament Affairs takes this opportunity to honour the memory of Alessandro Corradini, a former Director, who passed away on 29 September 1995. Throughout his long career and also in his years of retirement, Dr. Corradini worked tirelessly for the

cause of disarmament. He made an outstanding contribution to *The Yearbook* series, being responsible for or a major writer of all 19 volumes (1976–1994) that had been published at the time of his death, as well as two comprehensive volumes covering the early years of the United Nations and disarmament.

CHAPTER I

The 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

Introduction

ON THE BASIS OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NPT) of 1968,¹ a global non-proliferation regime has been established, supported by the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which operates to prevent the diversion of nuclear material to military or other prohibited activities. Article VIII of the Treaty provides for the periodic holding of conferences of States parties to the Treaty to review its operation. Such conferences were held in 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990.

The 1995 Review and Extension Conference had, in addition to reviewing the implementation of the Treaty, the responsibility of deciding, as required by article X, paragraph 2, "whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods". The Conference adopted without a vote a decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely, and similarly adopted two other decisions entitled: "Strengthening the review process for the Treaty" and "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" (see annex to this chapter). These decisions strengthened the existing non-proliferation regime and opened the road for further progress towards nuclear disarmament. However, it was not possible to agree

¹ General Assembly resolution 2373(XXII), annex. The text of the Treaty is reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 4th edition: 1992 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E. 93.IX.11) (hereinafter referred to as *Status*), vol. 1, and in *The United Nations and Nuclear Non-Proliferation* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E. 95.I.17). The Treaty entered into force on 5 March 1970.

on a final declaration regarding the aspect of review because of insufficient time to deal with a number of sensitive issues on which positions were highly divergent.

The Conference was held in an international security framework that was very different from that of previous review conferences. In fact, it was the first conference of the States parties to be held since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of bipolarity, and it was also the first in which all five nuclear-weapon States participated as parties. At the time that it was held, 178 States were parties to the Treaty.²

Preparation for the 1995 Review and Extension Conference

In 1992, the parties to the NPT decided to form a committee to prepare for the 1995 Conference. The Preparatory Committee, which held four sessions,³ agreed to make every effort to adopt its decisions by consensus and to allow representatives of non-parties and of non-governmental organizations to attend open meetings of the Committee as observers.

The Committee further decided that the Conference itself should be held in New York in order to ensure the greatest possible participation of the parties, and it endorsed the candidacy of Mr. Jayantha Dhanapala of Sri Lanka for the presidency of the Conference. The Committee also approved the preparation of a number of background papers, which were issued as documents of the Conference.⁴ It decided, however, to

² At the closing session of the Conference, it was announced that Chile had just adhered to the NPT; it deposited its instrument of ratification on 25 May in Washington, thus becoming the 179th party; see document A/50/272.

³ New York, 10–14 May 1993; New York, 17–21 January 1994; Geneva, 12–16 September 1994; and New York, 23–27 January 1995.

⁴ NPT/CONF.1995/2–6 and NPT/CONF.1995/7/Part II (United Nations Secretariat, dealing with various articles of the Treaty); NPT/CONF.1995/7/Part I and NPT/CONF.1995/8 and 9 (IAEA); NPT/CONF.1995/10 and Add.1 (OP-ANAL) and NPT/CONF.1995/11 (South Pacific Forum). A proposal of Nigeria for an additional background paper on the legal interpretation of article X, paragraph 2, was not acted upon by the Preparatory Committee and thus no Conference paper on article X was produced. However, the matter was pursued at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly, leading to the adoption of

defer to the Conference a decision on the question of the final document(s) of the Conference.

Regarding the rules of procedure of the Conference, the Committee agreed to hold further informal consultations just prior to the Conference on rule 28.3, concerning the method of voting on extending the Treaty.⁵ Although it was hoped that the decision would be taken by consensus, the question arose whether, if voting were necessary, it should be conducted by open or secret ballot. The informal consultations were not successful in formulating a compromise, and so they continued at the Conference itself.

The final report of the Preparatory Committee⁶ contains, *inter alia*, the draft rules of procedure, including proposals on rule 28.3; the provisional agenda of the Conference; a proposed allocation of items to the Main Committees, and the schedule for the division of costs.

The 1995 Review and Extension Conference

The 1995 Conference was convened from 17 April to 12 May. Already during the preparatory stage, it was clear that there were deep differences among States parties regarding the review of the operation of the Treaty and its extension and that these two aspects were closely intertwined. The review was dealt with in the Main Committees, while the President himself conducted consultations on the question of extension. In all, 175 States parties to the Treaty participated in the Conference,⁷ more than double the number in 1990. Representatives of the United Nations

resolution 49/75 F (see *The Yearbook*, vol. 19: 1994, chap. I). Pursuant to that resolution, the Secretary-General submitted a report to the General Assembly containing the interpretations and views of Governments pertaining to article X (A/50/115 and Add.1). Replies were received from Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, France (on behalf of the European Union (EU)), Kazakstan, Latvia, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Nigeria, the Philippines, Qatar, South Africa and Suriname.

⁵ The Treaty itself, in article X, paragraph 2, provides that the decision "shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty".

⁶ NPT/CONF.1995/1.

⁷ Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, /.

and the IAEA also participated, and a number of States non-parties, intergovernmental organizations and agencies attended as observers.⁸ In addition, a very large number of research institutes and non-governmental organizations attended in accordance with the rules of procedure.

Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe. On 9 May, the DPRK sent a letter absentsing its delegation from the Conference's decision-making, and stating that "the document drafted at the Conference meetings unreasonably represents the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula according to outdated prejudices, ignoring the realities". (NPT/CONF.1995/30)

⁸ Under the rules of procedure, 10 States attended as observers: Angola, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Djibouti, Israel, Oman, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates and Vanuatu. The status of observer was also granted to Palestine. The Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), the European Union, the League of Arab States, the South Pacific Forum, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the North Atlantic Assembly, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference were granted observer agency status.

At the opening plenary meeting, on 17 April, Mr. Jayantha Dhana-pala of Sri Lanka was elected by acclamation as President of the Conference.⁹ The Conference was then addressed by the President, by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, by the Director General of the IAEA and, on behalf of the host country, by the Secretary of State of the United States.

In the general debate,¹⁰ the future of the Treaty as such was not challenged. An overwhelming majority expressed strong support for indefinite extension of the Treaty. However, a group of States, including several influential developing States, offered a variety of options. Although the question of reviewing the operation of the Treaty and its extension are legally and technically two separate issues, it was expected that the outcome of the former would very much influence the decision on the latter. Recognizing this, South Africa proposed, early in the proceedings, a declaration on principles on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament as a yardstick by which to measure the implementation of obligations under the Treaty, which would be extended indefinitely and would be subject to a strengthened review process.

As anticipated, implementation of the provisions on disarmament (article VI) and on peaceful uses of nuclear energy (articles III and IV) was a focus of contention. As regards article VI, there was a noticeable convergence of views between the developing and developed non-nuclear-weapon States on the need for the nuclear-weapon States to proceed more speedily towards the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament. Steps such as the earliest conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT), agreement on the cut-off of fissile material and a firm commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to go beyond reductions envisaged in the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) received nearly universal endorsement. Although a number of parties that are members of the Non-Aligned Movement insisted on a specific timetable for the elimination of nuclear weapons—an issue that many had expected

⁹ At the same meeting, the chairmen of the three Main Committees and of the Drafting and Credentials Committees, as proposed by the Preparatory Committee, were elected unanimously. The Conference also elected 33 vice-presidents, adopted its agenda and allocated items to the Main Committees.

¹⁰ The general debate, in which 116 States parties took part, was held from 18 to 25 April.

to dominate their position—the non-aligned States, in general, stressed the sequence of specific disarmament measures intended to put an end to the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. They also placed much emphasis on the achievement of an international legally binding instrument on security assurances.

With regard to articles III and IV, all parties expressed overwhelming support for strengthening the IAEA safeguards mechanism and further enhancing the Agency's ability to carry out its functions. Non-aligned countries' criticism of the export control regimes, which had been forceful during the preparations for the Conference, was, with a few exceptions, rather restrained, focusing instead on more transparency and predictability in the field of transfers.

Almost without exception the States parties very strongly emphasized the need to achieve universality of the Treaty. While many supported this as a general principle, quite a few specifically referred to India, Israel and Pakistan. All Arab States were very firm in their position that the accession of Israel and the placing of its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards were crucial to the future of the Treaty.

Review of implementation

On the basis of the recommendations of the Preparatory Committee, the Conference established three Main Committees and a Drafting Committee. The Conference then allocated aspects of the following two substantive items of its agenda among the three Main Committees: "Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII, paragraph 3" and "Role of the Treaty in the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament in strengthening international peace and security and measures aimed at promoting wider acceptance of the Treaty". The Committees were to review the operation of the provisions allocated to them and then work out language for inclusion in a final declaration.

In the course of the negotiations, the Main Committees reviewed the implementation of all substantive articles of the Treaty and the article on adherence, in the context of achieving wider acceptance, as well as most of the preambular paragraphs. The question of security assurances was also covered. As is evident from the brief description of the discussions on each issue provided in the following sections, the themes on which assessment was most contentious were nuclear dis-

armament (allocated to Main Committee I) and access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes (allocated to Main Committee III). The three Committees submitted to the Conference their respective reports,¹¹ containing brackets around formulations on which agreement had not been reached.

The Drafting Committee met during the period 28 April to 12 May, but was not able to overcome differences, in particular those regarding nuclear disarmament. In these circumstances and given the fact that the Conference had, on 11 May, taken a number of important decisions, including that on the extension of the Treaty, the President of the Conference attempted to bring the aspect of review to a successful conclusion. He undertook the task of chairing an open-ended meeting to try to bridge the differences among the States parties and to remove brackets in the three Main Committee reports. However, while a compromise solution for the issues under discussion in Main Committees II and III was in sight, negotiations on bracketed language in Main Committee I's report were not successful, as major differences regarding nuclear disarmament persisted. Consequently, the Drafting Committee submitted only a procedural report to the Conference on 12 May.¹² Subsequently, the Conference decided that "the reports of the Main Committees as submitted to the Conference constitute part of the Final Document".

Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament

There was wide agreement that the full and effective implementation of the Treaty and the regime of non-proliferation in all its aspects had played a vital role in promoting international peace and security and that universal adherence to it was the best way to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The Conference welcomed the accession to the Treaty by an additional 38 States, among them China and France, since the 1990 Review Conference. While at the previous review conferences there had been agreement concerning compliance with articles I and II, in 1995, for the first time, the non-aligned States, with some support from others, argued that some nuclear-weapon States might not have fully complied with the letter and spirit of article I with reference to

¹¹ NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/1 (Main Committee I), NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/1 (Main Committee II) and NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/1 (Main Committee III).

¹² NPT/CONF.1995/DC/1.

transfers among themselves of nuclear weapons or of their control and when acting in cooperation with groups of non-nuclear-weapon States parties under regional arrangements. The nuclear-weapon States, however, maintained that existing security arrangements were implemented in full compliance with articles I and II. There was broad agreement that article II has been complied with, the only violation having been by Iraq. A strong concern was also expressed with regard to the actions of the DPRK. A number of States, particularly from the Middle East, expressed their misgivings regarding horizontal proliferation and referred specifically to the unsafeguarded nuclear facilities of Israel. This issue was discussed in detail in Main Committee I and was ultimately reflected in the Conference's adoption of a special resolution on the Middle East.

As at previous review conferences, the question of implementation of article VI was crucial in the assessment of the operation of the Treaty.¹³ In reviewing its implementation, the following questions were discussed:

(a) *Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament.* There were differences of view as regards the implementation of the obligations of parties called for in article VI. The majority considered that substantial progress had been made in nuclear disarmament since the 1990 Review Conference. The nuclear-weapon States maintained that the arms race had ended, as demonstrated by the deep cuts in nuclear armaments being made by the United States and the Russian Federation following START. Significant reductions by France and the United Kingdom were another sign of this trend. Moreover, the practical steps taken by some nuclear-weapon States, such as no-first use, de-targeting, the removal of warheads and the relaxation of alert status, were, it was felt, in accordance with the spirit and objective of the NPT.

On the other hand, a number of States, while recognizing that some positive developments had taken place, considered that the nuclear-arms race continued, particularly with respect to the qualitative improvement of existing nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. A majority of non-nuclear-weapon States, especially non-aligned, pointed out that, notwithstanding significant cuts in weaponry, the number of nuclear weapons currently existing was more than the number existing at the

¹³ The non-aligned States parties set out their position on article VI in a working paper (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5).

time the Treaty had come into force. They also called for an intensification of negotiations towards further reductions and the elimination of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, with the earliest participation of all nuclear-weapon States and commitments by all of them to a definite, time-bound programme of action.

(b) *Comprehensive test-ban treaty.* The question of conclusion of a CTBT had been one of the most controversial issues at previous review conferences. While two major positive developments had taken place since 1990, that is, unilateral moratoria on nuclear testing by four nuclear-weapon States and the beginning of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on such a treaty, differences of view among States parties were evident not only during the preparations for the 1995 Conference, but at the Conference itself. Some non-nuclear-weapon countries insisted that the CD complete its work on the treaty by the end of 1995; others considered that it should be concluded by the end of 1996. Although the three depositary States were prepared to negotiate a CTBT intensively, within the mandate of the CD, and China was ready to work towards conclusion as early as possible and no later than 1996, the five nuclear-weapon States were not ready to commit themselves to a deadline. At a later stage of the Conference, however, it was agreed that the negotiations on the treaty should be concluded no later than 1996, as reflected in the decision on principles and objectives (see page 25, para. 4 (a)). Moreover, non-nuclear-weapon States called for continuation of the moratoriums on testing, pending conclusion of the treaty, and for the remaining nuclear-weapon State to undertake the same commitment. For developments regarding testing after the Conference, see chapter II.

(c) *Ban on the production of fissile material.* There was general agreement on the need for early conclusion of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. However, the existing differences of opinion concerning the appropriateness of including existing stockpiles—which had prevented the initiation of negotiations in the CD—persisted.

(d) *General and complete disarmament.* In reviewing the progress towards a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, most participants noted the positive results achieved, namely, conclusion of a number of treaties reducing or

eliminating completely certain types of weapons. However, some States, referring to the objectives set out in the twelfth preambular paragraph as well as in article VI of the NPT, considered that these steps were insufficient and that there was a need for an intensified effort to bring about greater confidence and the reduction of armaments in all areas.

Security assurances

The question of granting to the non-nuclear-weapon States adequate security assurances against the threat or use of nuclear weapons has been present since the negotiation of the NPT and had been discussed at previous review conferences. In 1995, action on this question was taken just prior to the Conference. Responding to demands from non-nuclear-weapon States, the nuclear-weapon States issued statements on 5 and 6 April in which they updated their security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.¹⁴ In addition, on 11 April, the Security Council adopted, by consensus, a new resolution on the subject (resolution 984 (1995)). Although at the Conference this resolution was seen as an important and encouraging measure, many States considered that early conclusion of a multilateral legally binding instrument on unconditional security assurances was still required to effectively ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. In this context, several approaches were advocated, and the Conference urged that further steps be taken (see page 25, para. 8). For further information on the subject, see pages 52 to 55.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

The question of nuclear-weapon-free zones (article VII) was allocated to Main Committee I and Main Committee II. The various proposals submitted in connection with this issue focused on: (a) the Middle East;¹⁵ (b) Southeast Asia;¹⁶ and (c) Central Asia;¹⁷ In addition, texts on the subject of zones were submitted by the Movement of Non-Aligned

¹⁴ See documents A/50/151-S/1995/261, A/50/152-S/1995/262, A/50/153-S/1995/263, A/50/154-S/1995/264, A/50/155-S/1995/265.

¹⁵ Proposal by Egypt (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.13).

¹⁶ Proposal by Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.14).

¹⁷ Proposal submitted by Kyrgyzstan, NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP. 17. (This proposal was also supported by Uzbekistan, see NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/1, para. 50.)

Countries¹⁸ and by a group of States¹⁹ members of existing and proposed nuclear-weapon-free zones.

There was wide agreement among the parties that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones enhanced regional and global peace and security and contributed to the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. Satisfaction was expressed that all countries in the region covered by the Treaty of Tlatelolco now adhered to it and that the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone was successful in reinforcing in that region the global norm against nuclear-weapon proliferation. Also, the progress being made towards the conclusion of treaties in Africa and in Southeast Asia was welcomed. There was, however, no agreement on a proposal, put forward by Belarus, for creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Europe.²⁰

Strong support was expressed for a Middle Eastern nuclear-weapon-free zone. In this connection, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Syrian Arab Republic, the United Republic of Tanzania, Jordan and some others expressed concerns regarding Israel's nuclear programme. Criticism was also voiced that technology and assistance had been provided to non-parties to the Treaty, while assistance to parties had been restricted. Although it was not possible for the Committee to reach agreement on the text referring to such a zone, the Conference itself, on 11 May, adopted a resolution on the Middle East.

Safeguards

Considerable attention was given to the implementation of article III. A total of 12 papers were submitted.²¹ The main issues addressed in the papers and in the discussions, either in plenary or in committee meetings, were: support for enhanced safeguards and the IAEA "93+2" programme; the question whether export control imposed by nuclear suppliers was unfair or discriminatory; and full-scope safeguards and

¹⁸ NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.18.

¹⁹ Proposal submitted by Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Fiji, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Peru, Samoa, Solomon Islands and South Africa, which also covered safeguards and export controls (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.16). A similar proposal was also submitted to Main Committee I, as a conference room paper.

²⁰ NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/1, para. 48.

²¹ See NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.1-12 and WP.15 and 18.

the placing of fissile materials from dismantled nuclear weapons under IAEA safeguards. The debate focused on working papers submitted by China²² and the Group of 11.²³ In its paper, China referred to safeguards and the promotion of peaceful nuclear energy as the “two parallel objectives of IAEA” and argued that safeguards should be “fair, objective, rational and transparent” and should “in no way hamper the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy”. The paper submitted by the Group of 11 affirmed the importance of commitments by nuclear-weapon States not to use their civilian nuclear supplies for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and to subject such supplies to safeguards. They further encouraged “the relevant States not to stockpile such material in excess of normal civil operational requirements” and recommended that “no new civilian reactors requiring high-enriched uranium, be constructed”.

In reviewing the implementation of article III, a high degree of unanimity on a vast range of questions was evident. States parties agreed that the IAEA safeguards were an important, integral part of the international regime of non-proliferation and that they played an indispensable role in ensuring the implementation of the Treaty. They further reaffirmed the importance of both the safeguards system and the legitimate right of States to the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with particular attention to the needs of developing countries, and that safeguards should be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties.

Stressing that universal adherence to the Treaty and the application of IAEA full-scope safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in all States parties were essential elements of the non-proliferation regime, the States parties noted that 18 parties had concluded safeguards agreements in compliance with article III, paragraph 4, of the Treaty since 1990. They expressed concern, however, that 68 States parties had not yet done so.

While there was broad agreement on the role of the IAEA in implementing safeguards agreements and its continuing efforts to improve

²² NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.10.

²³ The Group of 11 is composed of: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden.

safeguards effectiveness and efficiency, there were some differences among the States parties concerning its "93+2 programme", reflecting the existing differences in the Board of Governors of the Agency itself. Nevertheless, the States parties were ready to endorse the general direction of the programme for a strengthened and cost-effective safeguards system (see also page 93).

Difficulties were encountered with respect to the texts referring to treaty obligations in the case of two parties to the Treaty. While there was agreement on the positive role that the IAEA had played in carrying out Security Council resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991), Iraq objected to the text in which the need for Iraq "to continue its cooperation fully with the Agency in achieving the complete and long-term implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions" was stressed, stating that it had already been established that it had destroyed its nuclear programme completely. There were additional difficulties regarding the text on the DPRK, which referred to implementation of the safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/403) between that State and the IAEA.

Agreement was reached on the wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States under the relevant voluntary-offer safeguards agreements; separation of the peaceful and military nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States; the importance of State or regional systems of accounting and control, and of cooperation between those systems and the IAEA; safeguards of unirradiated direct-use nuclear material; greater transparency on matters relating to the management of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for civil purposes; effective physical protection of nuclear material, especially that usable for military purposes; the conversion of civilian research reactors from highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium fuel and others.

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

As at previous review conferences, there was broad agreement concerning questions related to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main issues discussed were:

(a) *Cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.* The discussion and the proposals related to article IV revealed agreement on the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research,

production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of the Treaty. The right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material, services and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was reaffirmed. However, regrets were expressed that some non-parties had been able to benefit from cooperation with parties in a way that might have contributed to non-peaceful nuclear programmes.

(b) *Nuclear safety, transport by sea, nuclear waste and liability.* The parties acknowledged the primary responsibility of individual States for maintaining the safety of nuclear installations within their territories or under their jurisdiction, and the crucial importance of an adequate national infrastructure in nuclear safety, radiation protection and waste management. They stressed the role of the IAEA in strengthening nuclear safety in operating both power and research reactors and welcomed the adoption of the 1994 Convention on Nuclear Safety. In addition, they noted that attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardized nuclear safety. Turning to another aspect of safety, they pointed out that it was in the interest of all States that irradiated nuclear fuel, plutonium and high-level nuclear waste be transported in a safe and secure manner and in accordance with international law.

Many States expressed their concerns regarding the dangers posed by nuclear waste, commended the efforts of the IAEA in the field of nuclear waste management, and noted the proposal to hold a diplomatic conference in 1996 to adopt conventions that would both revise the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and provide an effective supplementary funding regime.

(c) *Technical cooperation.* The parties acknowledged the importance of the work of the IAEA as the principal agent for technology transfer among the international organizations referred to in article IV and welcomed the successful operation of the Agency's technical assistance and cooperation programmes. They also welcomed the IAEA's regional cooperative arrangements as an effective means of providing assistance and facilitating technology transfer, complementing its technical cooperation activities in individual countries. The significant level of bilateral cooperation between States parties in the worldwide peaceful uses of nuclear energy was also noted.

In their working paper submitted to Main Committee III,²⁴ the members of the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States expressed their dissatisfaction with the implementation of the seventh preambular paragraph and of article IV of the Treaty. They maintained that some States continued to cooperate and give assistance in the nuclear field to non-parties that were known to have acquired the capability of manufacturing nuclear weapons. The States belonging to this Group also regretted the restrictions and constraints imposed on developing non-nuclear-weapon States regarding full access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. They held that unilaterally enforced restrictive measures, beyond the safeguards required under the Treaty, must not be used to prevent peaceful development, especially in the nuclear area, and should be removed. However, there was no agreement on the relevant texts regarding this issue discussed in Main Committees II and III.²⁵

(d) *Conversion of nuclear material to peaceful purposes.* The majority of States parties welcomed the steps being taken to dismantle and destroy thousands of nuclear weapons and to convert nuclear material formerly produced for military purposes to peaceful activities, stating that this represented an important precedent for linking progress in nuclear disarmament with peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The increased attention being paid to problems of safety and contamination related to the discontinuation of nuclear operations formerly associated with nuclear-weapon programmes was also welcomed.

(e) *Peaceful application of nuclear explosions.* Although article V of the Treaty had been designed so that potential benefits from any peaceful application of nuclear explosions would be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States parties on a non-discriminatory basis, a great number of parties considered that the benefits of such explosions had not materialized and pointed to the serious concerns that had been expressed as to the environmental consequences that could result from the release of radioactivity from such application and to the risk of possible proliferation of nuclear weapons.

²⁴ See the paper submitted by Indonesia on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.5).

²⁵ See NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.18, sect. III (submitted by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries) and NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/1, sect. III, para. 11.

While this view was shared by a large group of States, China had invoked both articles IV and V of the NPT when opposing inclusion of a ban on peaceful nuclear explosions in the text of the CTBT currently under negotiation in Geneva. As a result, in its review of article V, Committee III noted that the envisaged benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions had not materialized, and it recommended that the CD “take this situation and future developments into account” while negotiating a test ban, a compromise to which China agreed.

The decisions “package”

In the President’s negotiations on key decisions, which began early in the Conference, the focus was on the South African proposal for a declaration of principles and objectives and took into account the strong desire, expressed by Indonesia on behalf of the non-aligned States²⁶ and by other States, for a strengthened review process; all participants were fully aware that the result of these negotiations would have a determining effect on the eventual decision on extension.

It was clear that though the majority of States parties were in favour of extending the Treaty indefinitely, there was no consensus on this question. In fact, by 5 May, the deadline for submission, three draft texts on extension had been put forward.²⁷ The first, submitted by Mexico, would extend the Treaty indefinitely, while at the same time prescribing a treaty review process for the future. The second, sponsored by a great majority of States, including the three depositary Governments and France, and introduced by Canada, would extend the Treaty indefinitely. The third, sponsored by a group of non-aligned States, advocated an extension for rolling fixed periods of twenty-five years.

Finally, in the course of the consultations, agreement took shape on a package of decisions containing the elements of review, principles and objectives, and extension (reproduced in the annex to this chapter). On 11 May, in its plenary meeting, the Conference adopted the following

²⁶ Indonesia, following the summit meeting of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries in Bandung from 25 to 27 April, proposed a more explicit linkage between the documents being negotiated on principles and objectives and on the strengthened review process.

²⁷ NPT/CONF.1995/L.1/Rev.1 (Mexico); NPT/CONF.1995/L.2 (Canada) and NPT/CONF.1995/L.3 (non-aligned). The three texts are contained in the Final Document (NPT/CONF.1995/32), part II.

decisions without a vote:²⁸ “Strengthening the review process for the Treaty”; “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”; and “Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”. The operative paragraph of the decision on extension reads as follows: “*Decides* that, as a majority exists among States party to the Treaty for its indefinite extension, in accordance with article X, paragraph 2, the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely”. Thus, in the end, the three draft texts on extension that had been put before the Conference were not acted upon, and consequently it was not necessary to take a procedural vote on the method of voting—whether by open or secret ballot—on the extremely sensitive matter of extension.²⁹

At the same meeting, a fourth element—a resolution on the Middle East (reproduced in the annex to this chapter)—was adopted without a vote, in parallel with the decisions mentioned above. This issue, an aspect of the principle of universality, was of particular concern to the Arab States parties; it had been the subject of negotiations separate from the consultations of the President and a draft resolution had been submitted by 14 sponsors, which called upon Israel to accede to the Treaty.³⁰ Some States parties, however, notably the United States, were against singling out individual States. As a result of intensive consultations conducted by the President, the three depositary Governments sponsored a new version, which was then adopted without a vote.³¹ The resolution, reaffirming the importance of universal adherence to the Treaty, *inter alia*, calls upon all States in the Middle East to accede to it.

²⁸ See decisions 1, 2 and 3 in document NPT/CONF.1995/32 (part I), annex.

²⁹ Owing to differences of view regarding rule 28.3, concerning the method of voting, the Conference had agreed at its opening meeting to apply the rules of procedure provisionally and, only after reaching agreement on that particular rule, did it adopt them, on 10 May. See document NPT/CONF.1995/28 for the rules of procedure

³⁰ NPT/CONF.1995/L. 7, submitted by Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mauritania, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia and Yemen. The text is contained in the Final Document (NPT/CONF.1995/32), part II.

³¹ See “Resolution on the Middle East” in document NPT/CONF.1995/32 (part I), annex.

Following the adoption without a vote of the three decisions and the resolution on the Middle East, many States parties³² elaborated on their positions, reflecting a range of views on various aspects of the negotiations that they had just concluded. In general, a party's assessment was greatly influenced by the degree to which it believed it would be feasible to promote full implementation of all the provisions of the Treaty.

States that expressed misgivings with regard to indefinite extension did so in terms of lack of commitment on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to undertake specific measures leading to nuclear disarmament within a time-bound programme and of lack of universal adherence to the Treaty. Among the States that forcefully stressed the need for stricter accountability of the nuclear-weapon States regarding progress on article VI and for a specific time-frame for measures—the Islamic Republic of Iran, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria and the United Republic of Tanzania—some stated that they would have preferred extension by rolling fixed periods.

Israel's non-membership in the Treaty and the fact that its nuclear facilities are not subject to IAEA safeguards roused strong reservations from a number of Middle Eastern parties, which said they could not agree with indefinite extension as long as that situation continued. The same group of States also said they could not accept the resolution on the Middle East. However, Egypt, noting that the resolution had been sponsored by the three depositary States, expressed the view that it constituted a step in the right direction but required the adoption of the measures necessary for its implementation. For further details concerning the question of the Middle East, see chapter IV.

The decision on indefinite extension was seen in a very favourable light by a considerable number of parties, whose statements reflected a variety of priorities. Some parties—among them Bangladesh, Canada, Japan, Kenya, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Mexico—emphasized that permanent status would facilitate the achievement of

³² Algeria, Bangladesh, Belize, Canada, China, Costa Rica, Egypt, France (on behalf of the EU and its associated countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia), Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Philippines, South Africa, Syria and United Republic of Tanzania.

nuclear disarmament and the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons; in the words of South Africa, the package of decisions provided a “realistic framework” in which parties could faithfully discharge their obligations and reach those goals. In their joint statement welcoming the decision on indefinite extension, the EU and its associated States³³ highlighted their conviction that that step assured the future of the non-proliferation regime; without confidence in the norm of non-proliferation, they believed, no development of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology nor any further progress towards disarmament would be possible. They also felt that permanence of the regime would enhance the opportunity for the Treaty to achieve universality.

China expressed the view that the decision on indefinite extension reaffirmed the role of the Treaty in the new international situation and should not be interpreted as perpetuating the prerogative of the nuclear-weapon States to possess nuclear weapons. It saw the prevention of proliferation as a step towards the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and as a contribution to safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the developing countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

France, the Russian Federation and the United States made individual statements, in which they welcomed the decision on indefinite extension of the Treaty that, in the words of the Russian Federation, had established what were almost universally recognized norms of international law designed to contain the threat of the spread of nuclear weapons. The United States believed the Treaty’s contribution to international peace and security would grow in importance as a result of the those decisions. Each welcomed the package of decisions, viewing it as a framework for future efforts and, while expressing regret that it had not been possible to reach agreement on an assessment of the past, reaffirmed its determination to assure implementation of the Treaty in the future.

The majority of the speakers, whether or not they had reservations, reaffirmed their commitment to the objectives of the Treaty and expressed their appreciation for the efforts of the President that had led to the adoption of the package of decisions without a vote.

³³ Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia.

General Assembly, 1995

On 6 November, Sri Lanka submitted a draft resolution entitled “1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, which it introduced on 17 November. The same day the First Committee adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 155 to none, with 3 abstentions (non-parties to the Treaty: Cuba, India and Israel).

Two non-parties explained their votes. Israel stated that as it was not a party to the Treaty, it was not bound by the decisions and resolution of the Extension Conference. Given the fact that a request had been made to put the text to a vote, Israel had decided to abstain because it could not support any draft resolution that detracted from the sovereignty of the peace process. Israel also stated that it did not accept operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution. India stated that it had called for a vote because it did not consider the draft resolution to be purely procedural, but rather an attempt to make the decisions of an intergovernmental conference outside the United Nations legal tender within a General Assembly resolution.

A number of Arab States—Lebanon, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the Syrian Arab Republic—expressed reservations about the effectiveness of the Treaty and its indefinite extension as long as Israel did not accede to it and place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. They believed that any measure concerning the Treaty, particularly in the Middle East, would fall short of its objective as long as the present situation continued.

On 12 December, the General Assembly voted on the draft resolution. Two non-parties explained their position. Brazil stated that it would not participate. Cuba explained that it had voted in favour, bearing in mind that the text was eminently factual. However, its vote should not be interpreted as a change in its substantive position with regard to the Treaty. The General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 161 to none, with 2 abstentions (India and Israel), as resolution 50/70 Q. It reads as follows:

Resolution 50/70 Q

1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 47/52 A of 9 December 1992, in which it, *inter alia*, took note of the decision of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, following appropriate consultations, to form a preparatory committee for a conference to review the operation of the Treaty and to decide on its extension, as provided for in article VIII, paragraph 3, and also called for in article X, paragraph 2, of the Treaty,

Recalling also that the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons convened in New York from 17 April to 12 May 1995 in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, and article X, paragraph 2, of the Treaty,

Noting that, at the time of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, there were one hundred and seventy-five of the one hundred and seventy-eight States parties to the Treaty present,

1. *Notes* that on 11 May 1995 the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons adopted three decisions on strengthening the review process for the Treaty, principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

2. *Takes note* of the resolution on the Middle East adopted on 11 May 1995 by the parties to the Treaty;

3. *Notes* that the States parties to the Treaty participating in the Review Conference:

(a) Agreed to strengthen the review process for the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty were being realized, and decided that, in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, the Review Conferences should continue to be held every five years, and that, accordingly, the next Review Conference should be held in the year 2000, and that the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee should be held in 1997;

(b) Affirmed the need to continue to move with determination towards the full realization and effective implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, and accordingly adopted a set of principles and objectives;

(c) Decided that, as a majority existed among States parties to the Treaty for its indefinite extension, in accordance with its article X, paragraph 2, the Treaty should continue in force indefinitely;

4. *Notes* that the three decisions and the resolution were adopted without a vote.

Conclusion

The 1995 Review and Extension Conference was the most important event in the field of arms limitation and disarmament in the year. The three decisions reached, all of which were taken without a vote, are of historic significance. By agreeing to extend the duration of the Treaty indefinitely, the States parties have given permanence to the only existing international legal barrier against nuclear proliferation.

The decision on indefinite extension was reinforced by the other two decisions in the package. The decision on a strengthened review process provides that, even at the preparatory stage, substantive issues and the question of universality will be considered, as well as procedural matters, and that the review conference itself will evaluate the results of the period under review and identify the areas in which and the means through which further progress should be sought, thus looking forward as well as back. The decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament could be looked upon as a "summarized" final declaration dealing with nearly all substantive questions and representing the minimum that parties were ready to accept in order to remain committed to the Treaty.

ANNEX

Documents of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference*

Decision 1
Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty
New York, 11 May 1995

1. The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons examined the implementation of article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty and agreed to strengthen the review process for the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized.

2. The States party to the Treaty participating in the Conference decided, in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, that Review Conferences should

* The documents reproduced in this annex are contained in the *Final Document of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, New York, 1995 (NPT/CONF.1995/32). Decisions 1–3 and the resolution on the Middle East are found in part I of the *Final Document*.

continue to be held every five years and that, accordingly, the next Review Conference should be held in the year 2000.

3. The Conference decided that, beginning in 1997, the Preparatory Committee should hold, normally for a duration of 10 working days, a meeting in each of the three years prior to the Review Conference. If necessary, a fourth preparatory meeting may be held in the year of the Conference.

4. The purpose of the Preparatory Committee meetings would be to consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make recommendations thereon to the Review Conference. These include those identified in the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, adopted on 11 May 1995. These meetings should also make the procedural preparations for the next Review Conference.

5. The Conference also concluded that the present structure of three Main Committees should continue and the question of an overlap of issues being discussed in more than one Committee should be resolved in the General Committee, which would coordinate the work of the Committees so that the substantive responsibility for the preparation of the report with respect to each specific issue is undertaken in only one Committee.

6. It was also agreed that subsidiary bodies could be established within the respective Main Committees for specific issues relevant to the Treaty, so as to provide for a focused consideration of such issues. The establishment of such subsidiary bodies would be recommended by the Preparatory Committee for each Review Conference in relation to the specific objectives of the Review Conference.

7. The Conference agreed further that Review Conferences should look forward as well as back. They should evaluate the results of the period they are reviewing, including the implementation of undertakings of the States parties under the Treaty, and identify the areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought in the future. Review Conferences should also address specifically what might be done to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty and to achieve its universality.

Decision 2
Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation
and Disarmament
New York, 11 May 1995

The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Reaffirming the preamble and articles of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Welcoming the end of the cold war, the ensuing easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States,

Desiring a set of principles and objectives in accordance with which nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be vigorously pursued and progress, achievements and shortcomings evaluated periodically within the review process provided for in article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty, the enhancement and strengthening of which is welcomed,

Reiterating the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

The Conference affirms the need to continue to move with determination towards the full realization and effective implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, and accordingly adopts the following principles and objectives:

Universality

1. Universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is an urgent priority. All States not yet party to the Treaty are called upon to accede to the Treaty at the earliest date, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Every effort should be made by all States parties to achieve this objective.

Non-proliferation

2. The proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously increase the danger of nuclear war. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has a vital role to play in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Every effort should be made to implement the Treaty in all its aspects to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty.

Nuclear disarmament

3. Nuclear disarmament is substantially facilitated by the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States which have prevailed following the end of the cold war. The undertakings with regard to nuclear disarmament as set out in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should thus be fulfilled with determination. In this regard, the nuclear-weapon States reaffirm their commitment, as stated in article VI, to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.

4. The achievement of the following measures is important in the full realization and effective implementation of article VI, including the programme of action as reflected below:

(a) The completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty no later than 1996. Pending the entry into force of a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States should exercise utmost restraint;

(b) The immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein;

(c) The determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

5. The conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, enhances global and regional peace and security is reaffirmed.

6. The development of nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in regions of tension, such as in the Middle East, as well as the establishment of zones free of all weapons of mass destruction, should be encouraged as a matter of priority, taking into account the specific characteristics of each region. The establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones by the time of the Review Conference in the year 2000 would be welcome.

7. The cooperation of all the nuclear-weapon States and their respect and support for the relevant protocols is necessary for the maximum effectiveness of such nuclear-weapon-free zones and the relevant protocols.

Security assurances

8. Noting United Nations Security Council resolution 984 (1995), which was adopted unanimously on 11 April 1995, as well as the declarations of the nuclear-weapon States concerning both negative and positive security assurances, further steps should be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These steps could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument.

Safeguards

9. The International Atomic Energy Agency is the competent authority responsible to verify and assure, in accordance with the statute of the Agency

and the Agency's safeguards system, compliance with its safeguards agreements with States parties undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Nothing should be done to undermine the authority of the International Atomic Energy Agency in this regard. States parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty by the States parties should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to the Agency to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate.

10. All States parties required by article III of the Treaty to sign and bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and which have not yet done so should do so without delay.

11. International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards should be regularly assessed and evaluated. Decisions adopted by its Board of Governors aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness of Agency safeguards should be supported and implemented and the Agency's capability to detect undeclared nuclear activities should be increased. Also, States not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be urged to enter into comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency.

12. New supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of the Agency's full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

13. Nuclear fissile material transferred from military use to peaceful nuclear activities should, as soon as practicable, be placed under Agency safeguards in the framework of the voluntary safeguards agreements in place with the nuclear-weapon States. Safeguards should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

14. Particular importance should be attached to ensuring the exercise of the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II as well as III of the Treaty.

15. Undertakings to facilitate participation in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully implemented.

16. In all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment should be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries particularly into account.

17. Transparency in nuclear-related export controls should be promoted within the framework of dialogue and cooperation among all interested States party to the Treaty.

18. All States should, through rigorous national measures and international cooperation, maintain the highest practicable levels of nuclear safety, including in waste management, and observe standards and guidelines in nuclear materials accounting, physical protection and transport of nuclear materials.

19. Every effort should be made to ensure that the International Atomic Energy Agency has the financial and human resources necessary to meet effectively its responsibilities in the areas of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety. The Agency should also be encouraged to intensify its efforts aimed at finding ways and means for funding technical assistance through predictable and assured resources.

20. Attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardize nuclear safety and raise serious concerns regarding the application of international law on the use of force in such cases, which could warrant appropriate action in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

The Conference requests that the President of the Conference bring the present decision, the decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty and the decision on the extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to the attention of the heads of State or Government of all States and seek their full cooperation on these documents and in the furtherance of the goals of the Treaty.

Decision 3

Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons New York, 11 May 1995

The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Having convened in New York from 17 April to 12 May 1995, in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, and article X, paragraph 2, of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Having reviewed the operation of the Treaty and affirming that there is a need for full compliance with the Treaty, its extension and its universal adherence, which are essential to international peace and security and the attainment of the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Having reaffirmed article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty and the need for its continued implementation in a strengthened manner and, to this end, emphasizing the decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty and the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, also adopted by the Conference,

Having established that the Conference is quorate in accordance with article X, paragraph 2, of the Treaty,

Decides that, as a majority exists among States party to the Treaty for its indefinite extension, in accordance with its article X, paragraph 2, the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely.

Resolution on the Middle East
New York, 11 May 1995

The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Reaffirming the purpose and provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Recognizing that, pursuant to article VII of the Treaty, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones contributes to strengthening the international non-proliferation regime,

Recalling that the Security Council, in its statement of 31 January 1992, affirmed that the proliferation of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction constituted a threat to international peace and security,

Recalling also General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus supporting the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, the latest of which is resolution 49/71 of 15 December 1994,

Recalling further the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency concerning the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East, the latest of which is GC(XXXVIII)/RES/21 of 23 September 1994, and noting the danger of nuclear proliferation, especially in areas of tension,

Bearing in mind Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and in particular paragraph 14 thereof,

Noting Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and paragraph 8 of the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted by the Conference on 11 May 1995,

Bearing in mind the other decisions adopted by the Conference on 11 May 1995,

1. *Endorses* the aims and objectives of the Middle East peace process and recognizes that efforts in this regard, as well as other efforts, contribute

to, *inter alia*, a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction;

2. *Notes with satisfaction* that, in its report (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/1), Main Committee III of the Conference recommended that the Conference “call on those remaining States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it, thereby accepting an international legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all their nuclear activities”;

3. *Notes with concern* the continued existence in the Middle East of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, and reaffirms in this connection the recommendation contained in section VI, paragraph 3, of the report of Main Committee III urging those non-parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities to accept full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

4. *Reaffirms* the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty, and calls upon all States of the Middle East that have not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

5. *Calls upon* all States in the Middle East to take practical steps in appropriate forums aimed at making progress towards, *inter alia*, the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems, and to refrain from taking any measures that preclude the achievement of this objective;

6. *Calls upon* all States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to extend their cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

CHAPTER II

Comprehensive test-ban treaty

Introduction

THE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR-WEAPON-TEST EXPLOSIONS represents one of the longest-standing issues on the disarmament agenda of the international community. It has been dealt with in the framework of multilateral, trilateral and bilateral negotiations since 1954. Interest in the subject first arose as the general public became increasingly aware of the harmful nature and effects of the fallout from atmospheric nuclear tests and as it became apparent that no region could avoid being affected by radioactive debris. The issue of the ban on nuclear-weapon tests was subsequently pursued intermittently as an element of comprehensive plans for arms control and disarmament, as a separate measure interlinked with progress in other disarmament areas and as an arms limitation issue on its own. In each case, the question of verification has played an important role and has influenced the course and outcome of the negotiations. As of 1995, three treaties on nuclear testing—one multilateral (Partial Test-Ban Treaty of 1963)¹ and two bilateral (treaties on limitation of yields of nuclear tests for military and peaceful purposes between the USSR and the United States)²—are in effect. None is comprehensive.

Although the Geneva multilateral negotiating body—the CD—has long been involved with the issue of a test ban, only in 1982 did it establish a subsidiary body on the item, but disagreement over a mandate

¹ The text of the Treaty is reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 4th edition: 1992 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.IX.11) (hereafter referred to as *Status*), vol. 1.

² Namely, Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests and Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes. Both Treaties entered into force in 1990, following years of negotiations on verification protocols.

for that body blocked tangible progress. Finally, in 1993, owing to unprecedented improvement in the relationship between the major military Powers, the CD agreed on a mandate³ for an ad hoc committee that allowed for negotiations to begin in 1994. They resulted in the first “rolling text” of a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT), which formed the basis for further elaboration and development.

Parallel to the long efforts in the Conference to achieve a comprehensive test ban, two other approaches evolved: one through amendment of the Partial Test-Ban Treaty and the other through unilateral moratoria on testing.

On the initiative of a number of non-aligned countries concerned about the pace of progress in the CD, an Amendment Conference to convert the Partial Test-Ban Treaty into a comprehensive one through an amendment procedure was held in New York in January 1991. Given the complexity of certain aspects of a test ban, especially with regard to verification, the Conference mandated its President to consult the parties to the Treaty with a view to resuming the work of the Conference at an appropriate time. A special meeting of the parties to the Treaty, held in New York on 10 and 11 August 1993, coincided with the adoption in Geneva of the negotiating mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee of the CD. Expressing the belief that the two approaches should be on a parallel track, the parties requested the President of the Amendment Conference to continue his consultations during 1994 and 1995.

Unilateral moratoria have played an important role in the history of test-ban negotiations since the mid-1980s. In the current decade, a series of unilateral moratoria has built momentum towards the complete cessation of nuclear tests. The former Soviet Union conducted its last nuclear test on 24 October 1990. The dates of the last tests of the United Kingdom and the United States were, respectively, 26 November 1991 and 23 September 1992. France,⁴ the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States continued to observe unilateral moratoria on nuclear testing throughout 1994.⁵

³ CD/1238.

⁴ Before it resumed testing in September 1995, France had not conducted a nuclear test since 15 July 1991.

⁵ For details concerning testing and moratoria since 1990, see the relevant background paper of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT (NPT/CONF.1995/2).

Developments and trends, 1995

The focus of efforts towards a CTBT in 1995 was in the CD, especially in the negotiations conducted by its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, and the measure of the progress achieved was in the recording of agreed language in the rolling text of the draft treaty.⁶ On numerous occasions, the Secretary-General of the United Nations urged the CD to conclude its negotiations as speedily as possible.

At the first meeting of the session of the Conference in January, the United States conveyed the announcement of President Clinton that the United States would continue its moratorium on nuclear testing until a test-ban treaty entered into force, on the assumption that a treaty would be signed before 30 September 1996 and subject to the understandings of its previous moratorium. The United Kingdom confirmed that it would continue a de facto halt of its nuclear-testing programme. In February, the Russian Federation reiterated its commitment to adhere to its indefinite moratorium as long as similar moratoria announced by other nuclear Powers were adhered to.

Also at the same meeting, the United States retracted a proposal it had made in 1994 for a special "right to withdraw" from the CTBT 10 years after it entered into force, noting that the treaty would provide for a State party to withdraw from the future treaty in the event that its "supreme national interest" was threatened. In referring to the national security strategy announced by President Clinton in July 1994, the United States explained that the maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile for purposes of nuclear deterrence was in its supreme national interest.

A significant step forward in the area of the scope of the future treaty was made in April, when the United Kingdom, speaking for itself and France in the CD, withdrew their respective proposals made in 1994 for the treaty to allow nuclear explosions "under exceptional circumstances" in order to check the safety and reliability of their nuclear arsenals.

The CTBT issue was highlighted often in the course of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. The fact that negotiations were under way in the multilateral disarmament forum, that moratoria on nuclear testing were firmly in place, that important progress was regis-

⁶ CD/1273/Rev.1 and CD/1284.

tered in the area of the scope of the future treaty and that the five nuclear-weapon States had all reiterated on various occasions their commitment to achieving a treaty facilitated the adoption of the decision on the indefinite extension of the NPT. During the review phase of the Conference, which did not end in a final declaration, differences of perception among States parties arose in respect to the relative importance of the CTBT in halting the nuclear-arms race, to the timing of its conclusion, to the environmental consequences of further testing and to the need for the four nuclear-weapon States that were observing moratoria to continue to do so. The CTBT was, nonetheless, an essential element in the negotiations on the final overall "package" of decisions adopted. Among the principles and objectives adopted, the parties agreed that completion by the CD of the negotiations on a CTBT no later than 1996 was a measure "important in the full realization and effective implementation of article VI" and, pending the entry into force of a CTBT, the nuclear-weapon States "should exercise utmost restraint" (see page 23). Various non-nuclear-weapon States emphasized at the conclusion of the Conference the extreme importance they attached to these commitments.

On 15 May, China conducted an underground nuclear test at Lop Nor, and two further tests at the same site on 10 June and 17 August. China reiterated its position that it had always exercised great restraint with respect to nuclear testing and had only conducted a very limited number of tests. It was committed to cease nuclear testing forever upon the entry into force of a CTBT. It pointed out that a nuclear-test-ban treaty should be viewed in the context of nuclear disarmament, and that China stood for the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons. It once again called for a treaty on the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear weapons and their total destruction.

Confirming a pledge to maintain the credibility of France's nuclear defence, which he made soon after assuming the presidency, President Chirac announced on 13 June that France would resume testing and would conduct a series of eight nuclear tests between September 1995 and May 1996 at the Mururoa and Fangataufa Atolls in French Polynesia. France needed the tests, he explained, to test the safety and reliability of its nuclear arsenal and to collect data for application in computer simulation tests following conclusion of a test ban. Later on, in July, it was further explained that France needed to complete the

checking of the TN-75 warhead for its submarine-launched ballistic missile, the M-45. At the time of the first announcement, and on many other occasions, President Chirac confirmed France's commitment to the achievement of a CTBT and asserted that the planned series of tests would be the very last to be conducted before France signed the future treaty. In the CD, France emphasized that the nature of the programme showed that France did not intend to design new types of weapons, to increase the number or yield of its existing weapons, to develop miniature weapons, or to modify the role of nuclear weapons in its defence doctrine. In fact, France carried out five nuclear-test explosions in 1995. Towards the end of the year, it was announced that France would end its testing programme earlier than planned.⁷

Apart from direct interventions made to the Governments of China and France, many States from all regional groups made statements and submitted documents to the General Assembly and the CD, expressing their disappointment, regret or condemnation. The Russian Federation and the United States expressed their regret and urged France and China to join the moratorium and to work towards the conclusion of a CTBT as soon as possible. For its part, the United Kingdom believed that renewed French nuclear testing should not interfere with progress towards a test-ban treaty. States located in the South Pacific expressed their strong concern about the possible negative impact of such testing on the fragile environment of the region.

Because of heightened concerns about possible danger to the environment, France requested the IAEA, in September, to undertake a study after the completion of its programme in order to assess the full radiological situation in the Atolls. The IAEA Director General informed the Agency's Board of Governors in December that an agreement to launch the study could be formalized after discussion with French authorities had been completed on the relevant modalities.⁸

⁷ France conducted tests on 5 September, 1 and 27 October, 21 November and 27 December and a sixth, on 27 January 1996, after which President Chirac announced the end of this series of tests and the end of all French nuclear testing.

⁸ The IAEA began the approximately 18-month-long study in March 1996. It was to cover not only the current radiological situation at the two atolls, but also an evaluation of the long-term radiological situation.

In August, New Zealand requested an “examination of the situation” with respect to the resumed testing and the 1974 decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the *Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France)*, which had dealt with atmospheric testing by France in the South Pacific. The Court had closed the case after France undertook not to conduct any more above-ground nuclear tests. In September, the ICJ rejected New Zealand’s arguments for reopening the case⁹ on the grounds that only a resumption of atmospheric testing would have affected the original Judgement.¹⁰

Further advances were made during the year in clarifying the position of three of the nuclear-weapon States on the scope of the future treaty. On 10 August, France announced in the CD that it supported a comprehensive prohibition for the treaty, agreeing that it should ban “any nuclear-weapon test or any other nuclear explosion”. The next day, on 11 August, President Clinton announced that the United States also supported that formulation.¹¹ Clarifying the question of the prohibition of low-yield or hydronuclear tests (HNEs), the head of the United States delegation to the CD further specified that a zero-yield nuclear-test ban would prohibit any nuclear explosions “no matter how small”. In October, the United States Secretary of Energy announced that the United States would conduct subcritical high-explosive experiments with nuclear materials at the Nevada Test Site to support President Clinton’s commitment to a zero-yield nuclear-test ban and to ensure the safety and reliability of the United States nuclear arsenal.¹² On 14 September, the United Kingdom, too, announced its support for

⁹ ICJ communiqués No. 95/29 and 95/29 bis of 22 September carry summaries of the Court’s twelve-to-three decision, as well as summaries of the declarations and opinions of the Judges.

¹⁰ The applications of Australia, Samoa, Solomon Islands, the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia for permission to intervene in the case were also dismissed by the Court.

¹¹ Statement circulated as a document of the CD (CD/1340).

¹² The United States Department of Energy placed the experiments in the context of the safeguards that the United States established as the conditions under which it would enter into a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It said the experiments would be “subcritical” in the sense that they would include nuclear material, such as plutonium, but would be designed to occur without self-sustaining nuclear reactions, and therefore without nuclear explosions. See *DOE News* of 27 October 1995 and the attached *DOE Facts*.

a zero-threshold test ban. Further, at the conclusion of a meeting between President Clinton and President Yeltsin, on 23 October, President Clinton announced that the United States and the Russian Federation would “work together to succeed in getting a zero-yield comprehensive test ban treaty” in 1996.¹³

At the regional level, limits on nuclear testing have been put in place through the adherence of nuclear-weapon States to the protocols of various treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. In 1995 there were several developments in this respect (see chapter IV).

Three resolutions, representing three different approaches to the issue of a nuclear-test ban, were adopted by the General Assembly during its fiftieth session, as discussed in this chapter, beginning on page 42.

Conference on Disarmament, 1995

On 3 February, the CD re-established the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban with the mandate “to negotiate intensively a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty”. The Committee made substantial progress, particularly in the areas of scope or basic obligations; the International Monitoring System (IMS) to be established to verify compliance with the treaty; and the organization charged with implementing it. The Committee succeeded in reorganizing and refining the draft treaty (rolling text), which was adopted by the Conference on 21 September and included in its annual report to the General Assembly.¹⁴ The rolling text was composed of two main parts: part 1 comprised draft treaty provisions that commanded a certain degree of consensus at the time of the adoption of the report; part 2 contained provisions that needed more extensive negotiation.

¹³ Press Conference by President Clinton and President Yeltsin, Hyde Park, New York, 23 October 1995, Office of the Press Secretary of the White House, document number 10149.

¹⁴ The report of the CD was issued as *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fiftieth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/50/27)*. The report of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban lists the documents before it. While working papers (symbol WP) are listed, they are not available as public documents of the Conference.

In discharging its mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee decided to set up two working groups: Working Group 1 on verification and Working Group 2 on legal and institutional issues. In addition, ten friends of the chair and two convenors were appointed to deal with specific issues in private and open-ended consultations.

Working Group 1 made intensive efforts towards structuring and revising treaty language on the verification regime. An expert meeting was held during the first part of the session relating to the overall structure of the IMS. During the third part of the session, the Working Group, with the participation of experts, continued work on narrowing options and specifying the number and location of monitoring stations. As a result, revised draft language on provisions on verification issues was included in part 2 (further negotiating efforts were needed) of the rolling text.

Working Group 2 elaborated revised draft language on legal and institutional aspects of the draft treaty, and included them in part 1 or 2 of the rolling text, depending on their respective stages of development. Thus, part 1 comprised the following provisions: measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance, including sanctions; settlement of disputes; privileges and immunities; signature; ratification; accession; depositary; status of protocols and annexes; authentic texts; national implementation measures; and amendments.

Scope, or basic obligations

Most States favoured a straightforward text for the scope of the treaty, submitted by Australia in March, which would extend the prohibition contained in article 1 of the 1963 Partial Test-Ban Treaty to all environments. The first paragraph of that proposal reads as follows: "Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control."¹⁵

At the close of the negotiations, however, agreement on the language for the basic obligations had not been finalized. China maintained its earlier proposal for a provision for the possibility of conducting

¹⁵ CD/NTB/WP.222.

peaceful nuclear explosions.¹⁶ Others continued to oppose this idea on the grounds that the scientific information that could be obtained from a peaceful nuclear explosion could be used for military purposes as well.¹⁷ China also continued to support its proposal for an article on the granting of security assurances to States parties to the future treaty, which would include a commitment by nuclear-weapon States parties not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other. Others, however, held that undertakings relating to the use of nuclear weapons were beyond the scope of the treaty.¹⁸

No agreement was reached on including a ban on preparations for testing. While some delegations reasserted that such a ban would be an additional protection for the purposes of the treaty, other countries continued to argue that preparatory activities would be extremely difficult to verify, and that verification would be excessively costly if a suspicion of such activities were to arise.¹⁹

Also in connection with the basic prohibition, some disagreement arose about whether the treaty should exclude various types of non-explosive laboratory experiments, such as computer simulations of nuclear explosions (used to model the performance of nuclear weapons for purposes of testing their safety and reliability).²⁰ There was, however, no open discussion on specific language to prohibit such laboratory experiments as the general view was that such a prohibition was beyond the objectives of the CTBT and implied overly intrusive and costly verification procedures.

¹⁶ A/50/27, p. 43.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 41, para. 2.

²⁰ The proposed language was also understood by some to exclude inertial confinement fusion (ICF) experiments, which can be described as research into contained laser-triggered micro-explosions. Such experiments are conducted for maintaining expertise in nuclear-weapons physics and, since they produce no fission products, for peaceful research into alternative energy sources. As in the case of computer simulations, there was no open discussion on specific language to prohibit such laboratory experiments, the general view being that such a prohibition was outside the scope of the CTBT and could not, in any case, be effectively verified.

Entry into force

The provisions that determine when the treaty would enter into force remained unresolved. Three approaches were under consideration: (a) that a certain number of States, e.g., 65, regardless of the States involved, would have to ratify; (b) that all members of an expanded CD—61 States²¹—would need to ratify; or (c) that all States which had nuclear power or research reactors, as listed by the IAEA, would need to ratify. Further, a formula was proposed that would allow States wishing to do so to waive the entry-into-force provision.

Verification of compliance

Substantial progress on the verification system was achieved. It would incorporate an overall IMS, utilizing four techniques,²² and include an international communications system for rapid automatic transmission of the data recorded to an International Data Centre (IDC), which would receive, store, process and supply the information exchanged to participants. The system would also incorporate: procedures for consultation and clarification to address concerns over ambiguous events; a structured arrangement for the conduct of on-site inspections (OSI); and a variety of possible transparency measures for the purpose, *inter alia*, of clarifying misinterpretations of verification data, including a system for the exchange of information on chemical explosions for mining or construction purposes. The role of the IDC in the analysis of information was still to be determined. Some States not endowed with sophisticated information technology stressed that

²¹ On 21 September 1995, the Conference adopted a decision that would expand its membership by 23 members at the earliest possible date to be decided by the Conference (CD/1356). That date has not yet been decided.

²² The IMS would comprise the following components. A two-tiered International Seismic Monitoring System (ISMS), consisting of 50 primary seismic stations and a larger number of civilian stations, would be the central component of the IMS and would record seismic waves caused by nuclear explosions that propagate through the Earth's surface. An International Hydroacoustic Monitoring System (IHMS) would monitor sound waves in the oceans caused by nuclear explosions. An International Radionuclide Monitoring System (IRMS) would monitor radioactive fallout from atmospheric explosions or from leaking underground tests. An International Infrasound Monitoring System (IIMS) would monitor sound waves in the atmosphere caused by nuclear explosions.

the IDC should determine for the States parties, even on a preliminary basis, whether a nuclear-test explosion took place. Others maintained that the responsibility to make that judgement should remain, for the most part, in the hands of individual States parties.

The proposals introduced in 1994 for two other monitoring systems—electromagnetic pulse measurement (EMP) systems, covering atmospheric surveillance, and satellite monitoring systems, covering atmospheric and near-space environments—were maintained in 1995, but no agreement was reached on incorporating them into the IMS. States objecting to folding those two techniques into the IMS stressed that their use would not be cost-effective.

It was generally agreed that procedures for the conduct of OSIs, for those cases where routine monitoring, consultation and cooperation measures did not resolve concerns about compliance, would be an integral part of the future system. Concerns focused on: avoiding frivolous and abusive requests for inspections, balancing the right to collect information against the right of the inspected State party to protect national security information, determining what would trigger an OSI, ensuring that an OSI would be conducted in a timely fashion, and deciding on the role of national technical means (NTM).

Organizational questions

Though some important aspects of the future organization were not agreed, the basic structure was elaborated. A Conference of the States Parties would be the principal legislative organ of the treaty, with the ability to make recommendations and take decisions on any question, matter or issue within the scope of the treaty; an Executive Council would serve as the executive organ of the organization; and a Technical Secretariat, headed by a Director-General, would assist the Conference of States Parties and the Executive Council in the implementation of the treaty, including verification. General agreement was reached about how the costs of the organization's activities would be met (in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessments), while some of the specific modalities for payments by States were still under consideration. No decision was reached on the site of the organization, though the only bid made in 1995 was by Austria. Moreover, the exact terms of how the organization would relate to the IAEA, for instance, in

respect of subcontracting some functions to the Agency, were still under consideration.

Preamble

Negotiations continued in 1995 on the preamble of the draft treaty, with proposals by some delegations to explicitly state the intention of States parties to take further effective measures towards nuclear disarmament. Others, however, did not believe it was necessary to go beyond the negotiating mandate, which stated that the CTBT would contribute to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament, and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security.

Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts

Throughout the year, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts²³ carried out its Third Technical Test, GSETT-3. It tested, for the first time, the concept of a single IDC, a seismograph network of primary and auxiliary stations, National Data Centres (NDCs) in participating countries and a reliable modern communications system to support data exchange.

As the final evaluation of GSETT-3 will not be done until 1996, the Group could draw only preliminary conclusions. Among others, it appeared that a single IDC would be capable of acquiring and archiving not only the volume of seismic data anticipated, but also the radionuclide, hydroacoustic and infrasound data to be exchanged. Further, it was projected that, taken together, the primary and auxiliary seismic networks should be capable of locating seismic events in continental areas of magnitude four and above²⁴ with an uncertainty in location of not more than 1,000 square kilometres. GSETT-3 also confirmed

²³ The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events held three sessions in 1995, 20 February–3 March, 7–18 August and 27 November–1 December, and submitted a report on each session: CD/1296, CD/1341 and CD/1372.

²⁴ Seismic signals are recorded by the magnitude of seismic waves, which are then translated into the yield of an explosion. The yield of an explosion is the energy released in the detonation of a nuclear weapon, measured in terms of kilotons or megatons of TNT required to produce the same energy release.

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a previous estimate made by the Ad Hoc Group that the investment costs for its stations, communications links and the IDC would be approximately \$US 180 million, and yearly operational and maintenance costs would be about \$US 30 million. The Ad Hoc Group recommended that the development and testing of its experimental system be continued to provide for a seamless transition into the IMS under a future treaty.

Inter-sessional meetings of the IMS Expert Group

The IMS Expert Group, which met several times during the annual session of the Ad Hoc Committee to elaborate the networks for the four agreed monitoring systems, convened again during the inter-sessional period, from 4 to 15 December.²⁵ The Expert Group reached agreement on the number and location of the stations to be incorporated in the four monitoring networks, and based, in principle, the number and placement of the auxiliary seismic stations for the ISMS on the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts.

General Assembly, 1995

The General Assembly, on 12 December, adopted three resolutions on the subject of this chapter: the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, nuclear testing, and the amendment of the Partial Test-Ban Treaty. While considering these matters, the First Committee had before it a report of the Secretary-General on notification of nuclear tests.²⁶

On 8 November, Mexico, followed by Australia and New Zealand, introduced a draft resolution entitled “Comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty”. Later, the wording referring to a time-frame, which had read

A magnitude of 4.0 corresponds roughly to a yield of 1 kiloton in a geological environment of hard rock, and 10–15 kilotons in dry, unconsolidated rock. See *In Pursuit of a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty*, UNIDIR publication (Sales No. GVE.91.0.4) (1991).

²⁵ The report of the Expert Group was presented to the Ad Hoc Committee for its consideration during the inter-sessional meeting from 8 to 19 January 1996. For the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on its January 1996 inter-sessional meeting, see CD/1378.

²⁶ A/50/261.

“not later than 30 June”, was revised to read as in operative paragraph 4 (see below). On 17 November, the Committee took action on the draft resolution, adopting operative paragraph 2 by a recorded vote of 161 to none, with 1 abstention (China), and the text as a whole without a vote.

On that occasion, a number of States explained their positions. China believed that completion of the negotiations would require not only political will but also a certain amount of time, and that the setting of a specific date for signature did not indicate a realistic and responsible attitude. China had suggested an amendment to operative paragraph 2 that was not accepted by the sponsors. In its view, that paragraph, as it stood, was not compatible with paragraph 4. Pakistan, too, expressed reservations regarding the time-frame, referring to “artificial deadlines” for conclusion and signature. Canada regretted that it had not been possible to maintain the realistic deadline of 30 June. The United States noted that the draft text constituted a compromise with respect to the timetable proposed for completion of the negotiations and reiterated its preference for completion by April and opening for signature in September. India explained that it had not been able to sponsor the draft text because it did not locate the CTBT in the context of a programme of nuclear disarmament, which, in its view, would have to be within a specific time-frame.

The General Assembly adopted operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 166 to none, with 1 abstention, and then the draft resolution as a whole without a vote; resolution 50/65 reads as follows:

Resolution 50/65

Comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 48/70 of 16 December 1993 and 49/70 of 15 December 1994, in which the entire international community supported the multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty,

Reaffirming that a comprehensive nuclear-test ban is one of the highest priority objectives of the international community in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation,

Convinced that the most effective way to achieve an end to nuclear testing is through the conclusion of a universal and internationally and effectively

verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty that will attract the adherence of all States and will contribute to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security,

Noting the aspirations expressed by the parties to the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, which are recalled in the preamble to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Welcoming the further elaboration of the rolling text in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban of the Conference on Disarmament, as reflected in the report of the Conference and its appendix, and the decision of the Conference to continue its work in inter-sessional meetings,

1. *Welcomes* the continuing efforts in the multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban of the Conference on Disarmament, the significant contributions to the rolling text made by States participating in those negotiations and progress in key areas;

2. *Calls upon* all States participating in the Conference on Disarmament, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to conclude, as a task of the highest priority, a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty which contributes to nuclear disarmament and the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, so as to enable its signature by the outset of the fifty-first session of the General Assembly;

3. *Also calls upon* participants in the Conference on Disarmament to advance work on the basis of the rolling text during the inter-sessional negotiating period so as to proceed to the final phase of the negotiations at the beginning of 1996;

4. *Further calls upon* the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee at the commencement of its 1996 session, and to renew its mandate in order to complete the final text of the treaty as soon as possible in 1996;

5. *Urges* all States to support the multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and their prompt conclusion;

6. *Declares* its readiness to resume consideration of this item, as necessary, before its fifty-first session in order to endorse the text of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to ensure the provision to the Conference on Disarmament of adequate administrative, substantive and conference support services for these negotiations;

8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-first session an item entitled "Implementation of the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty".

On 7 November, Mexico introduced a draft resolution entitled "Nuclear testing", which was adopted on 16 November by a recorded vote of 95 to 12, with 45 abstentions. Prior to the vote, a number of the sponsors spoke. Subsequently, a large number of States explained their positions. The five nuclear-weapon States, too, made statements, and all of them expressed their commitment to and support of the negotiations on a test ban being conducted in the CD.

China, which voted against, reiterated its position: that it had always exercised utmost restraint in nuclear testing, in the development of nuclear weapons and of nuclear stocks, and had never participated in the nuclear-arms race; it was self-reliant in national defence and thus maintained an appropriate capacity for legitimate self-protection. It recalled its unconditional undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

France, voting against, stressed its commitment to a CTBT, noting that it was the first of the nuclear Powers to opt for the zero option. It pointed out that its programme was strictly limited in duration and in number of tests and was aimed at maintaining the credibility of its deterrent force, which contributed to its own security and to that of Europe. The phrase "utmost restraint", agreed to at the Review and Extension Conference, meant neither prohibition nor suspension—as was known at the Conference—and the phrase "negative potential effects ... on health and the environment" was an unfounded assertion. Adoption of the draft would give substance to the idea that the NPT, which had just been extended indefinitely, could go unimplemented, and would make the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty more difficult.

The United Kingdom, which also voted against, stressed that no undertaking to cease testing immediately was included in the decision of the Review and Extension Conference; thus it could not subscribe to the views expressed in the fourth preambular paragraph and in operative paragraphs 2 and 3. Moreover, it had reservations about the allusion

to potential negative effects of testing on health and the environment, made in the fifth preambular paragraph.

The Russian Federation and the United States both abstained. The Russian Federation explained that although it agreed with the general thrust of the draft resolution and the commendation of the nuclear-weapon States that were observing moratoria, it feared that the text might be counter-productive because it did not enjoy consensus. The United States shared that view and regretted that its efforts to achieve a more moderate text had not met with success. It expressed reservations concerning the fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs and operative paragraphs 2 and 3 in terms similar to those of the United Kingdom.

The four States that explained their abstentions stressed their support for an end to nuclear testing and the achievement of a comprehensive test ban. Both Bulgaria and Romania felt that what was crucial at the moment was to avoid any confrontation or condemnation and, instead, to facilitate the negotiations under way. Pakistan considered the draft resolution unbalanced since it commended the moratoria being observed by some of the nuclear-weapon States, which had conducted many tests in the past, and strongly deplored only the nuclear testing currently being conducted. Spain expressed reservations about the fourth preambular paragraph and stressed that the ongoing negotiations must be concluded regardless of passing circumstances.

Some States that voted in favour expressed reservations. Argentina shared the concerns referred to in the fifth preambular paragraph but felt that more scientific data was necessary. Finland believed that the draft text did not recognize the objective of concluding a test-ban treaty in 1996 and, with respect to the fourth preambular paragraph, that it was not in the interest of the international community to imply that commitments undertaken at the Review and Extension Conference were being violated. Luxembourg, speaking on behalf of the Benelux countries, deeply regretted the selective approach to testing reflected in the text: it noted the omission of a reference to the date scheduled for the conclusion of the negotiations in the CD and the implication that the Review and Extension Conference had banned nuclear tests. Malta, too, shared the latter reservation.

Malaysia, the Philippines, and Swaziland expressed wholehearted support for the draft and stated that they would have preferred even stronger language.

In the General Assembly, France reiterated its reasons for voting against the draft resolution and noted two developments since the action in the First Committee: the announcement that France would complete its testing by the end of February and that the IAEA had granted its request to investigate the impact of the testing. Malta, voting in favour, reiterated its position and noted the above-mentioned developments. The Assembly then adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 85 to 18, with 43 abstentions.

Resolution 50/70 A

Nuclear testing

The General Assembly,

Welcoming the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States that have prevailed following the end of the cold war,

Reaffirming that the cessation of all nuclear testing will contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament leading to the ultimate objective of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and therefore to the further enhancement of international peace and security,

Convinced that the cessation of all nuclear testing will provide a favourable climate for the conclusion of negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty,

Considering that nuclear testing is not consistent with undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Deeply concerned about the potential negative effects of underground nuclear testing on health and the environment,

Sharing alarm expressed internationally, regionally and nationally at recent nuclear tests,

1. *Commends* those nuclear-weapon States observing nuclear testing moratoria, and urges them to continue those moratoria pending the entry into force of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty;

2. *Strongly deplores* all current nuclear testing;

3. *Strongly urges* the immediate cessation of all nuclear testing.

On 7 November, Mexico introduced a draft resolution entitled "Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water", which was adopted on 10 November by a recorded vote of 95 to 4, with 44 abstentions. At

that time, the United States voted against the draft resolution because it was not, in its view, helpful to the negotiating process under way in the CD, the appropriate forum for such negotiations, and did not even note in the operative part that work was moving into the final phase in Geneva.

The General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 110 to 4 (Israel, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States), with 45 abstentions. Resolution 50/64 reads as follows:

Resolution 50/64

Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 46/28 of 6 December 1991, in which it noted the convening of the Amendment Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water from 7 to 18 January 1991, its resolution 48/69 of 16 December 1993, in which it noted the convening of a special meeting of the States parties to that Treaty on 10 August 1993, and its resolution 49/69 of 15 December 1994, in which it noted with satisfaction the commencement of multilateral negotiations for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty in the Conference on Disarmament on 1 February 1994,

Reiterating its conviction that a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty is the highest-priority measure for the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and for the achievement of the objective of nuclear disarmament,

Recalling the central role of the United Nations in the field of nuclear disarmament and in particular in the cessation of all nuclear-test explosions, as well as the persistent efforts of non-governmental organizations in the achievement of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty,

Convinced that the Amendment Conference will facilitate the attainment of the objectives set forth in the Treaty and thus serve to strengthen it,

Recalling its recommendation that arrangements be made to ensure that intensive efforts continue, under the auspices of the Amendment Conference, until a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty is achieved, and its call that all parties participate in, and contribute effectively to the success of, the Amendment Conference,

1. *Urges* all States that have not already done so to adhere to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water at the earliest possible date;

2. *Urges* all States parties to the Treaty to contribute to the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty as soon as possible and no later than 1996 and to its expeditious entry into force;

3. *Requests* the President of the Amendment Conference to conduct consultations to those ends;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-first session the item entitled "Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water".

Conclusion

Negotiations on a CTBT continued intensively throughout the annual session of the CD and during inter-sessional meetings. While not all the issues having to do with the scope of the future ban were resolved, three nuclear-weapon Powers agreed to a zero-yield threshold (comprehensive) test ban, and another nuclear-weapon State was reported as working towards such a comprehensive ban. The overall treaty verification regime and the architecture of each of the technologies that it would be composed of were elaborated and many organizational aspects related to the implementation of the future treaty were worked out. However, much work still remained to be done to reach agreement on final language for many key aspects of the rolling text.

The question of a CTBT, which played such a decisive role in past review conferences of the NPT, once again figured prominently in the debates and decisions of the Review and Extension Conference. The intensive negotiations on a CTBT, the continuation of the moratoria on nuclear testing until and during the Conference, and important announcements by France, the United Kingdom and the United States with respect to the future test ban facilitated the consensus decision to indefinitely extend the Treaty. The success of the negotiations on a test ban in 1996 will be crucial in the substantive preparations in 1997 for the next review conference of the NPT.

Security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States

Introduction

SECURITY ASSURANCES TO NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES¹ is an issue that was not fully resolved when the NPT was concluded in 1968. At the time of the negotiations, the non-aligned non-nuclear-weapon States called for inclusion of a firm guarantee by the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against States not having nuclear weapons on their territory. However, as the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States believed that the question of assurances should be pursued outside the Treaty, but in close conjunction with it, no such provision was included.

Instead, at their initiative, the Security Council adopted resolution 255 (1968),² by which it recognized that aggression with nuclear weapons would create a situation in which it, and above all its permanent members, would have to act immediately, and it also welcomed the expressed intention of the three nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to provide or support immediate assistance to any non-nuclear-weapon State party in such circumstances. This assurance, defined as “positive”, was welcomed by non-nuclear-weapon States, but many of them expressed a preference for a “negative” assurance, that is, a commitment by the nuclear-weapon States that they would not use nuclear

¹ For background, see the paper entitled “Developments with regard to effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons” prepared for the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the parties to the NPT (NPT/CONF.1995/6).

² The text of Security Council resolution 255 (1968) is reproduced in *The United Nations and Nuclear Non-Proliferation* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.95.I.17).

weapons against them. Subsequently, all nuclear-weapon States made such unilateral declarations;³ however, only the assurance of China is considered unconditional.

At the regional level, internationally binding negative assurances have been incorporated into two instruments, namely, Additional Protocol II of the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco, and Protocol 2 of the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga. These assurances, in cases where the protocols have been ratified by the nuclear-weapon States, benefit the non-nuclear-weapon States in the respective regions: Latin America and the Caribbean, on the one hand, and the South Pacific, on the other. Further developments regarding security assurances in nuclear-weapon-free zones are described briefly below. For an account of developments in general in nuclear-weapon-free zones, see chapter IV.

Although the issue of security assurances has figured in various disarmament forums since the 1960s, the intricacy of the question—especially in view of varying alliance arrangements—has prevented significant progress. The Geneva negotiating body has considered the subject since 1979 and the General Assembly has adopted numerous resolutions on it. At the Fourth NPT Review Conference,⁴ two proposals were discussed: a draft agreement by Nigeria intended to lead to negotiations on a separate protocol to the NPT and a proposal by Egypt to enhance the effectiveness of resolution 255 (1968) by providing for sanctions against any State using nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapon State party. However, there was no agreement on these proposals. In addition, in a number of instances, assurances have been provided on a unilateral, bilateral and multilateral basis to meet exigencies of a specific situation.⁵

Developments and trends, 1995

The discussion of security assurances was renewed during 1995 in various contexts, but especially in the framework of the preparations for

³ The unilateral declarations made prior to 1995 are reproduced in document NPT/CONF.1995/6, annex II. See also *The Yearbook*, vol. 14: 1989, chap. VIII, annex.

⁴ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 15: 1990, chap. VII.

⁵ For details concerning such security assurances, issued to Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and the DPRK, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 19: 1994, chapter I.

the NPT Review and Extension Conference and at the Conference itself. A great number of non-nuclear-weapon States considered that the question of security assurances should be resolved if the Treaty were to be extended indefinitely. While the five nuclear-weapon States were not ready to accept an internationally binding instrument on the subject before the Conference, they did search for other means that could alleviate the criticism voiced by non-nuclear-weapon States. In April, the five updated their unilateral declarations and initiated negotiations on a new Security Council resolution on the subject. Despite these developments, the issue was one of the most controversial at the Conference. During the General Assembly, the strong feelings aroused by the measures that had been taken earlier in the year and their linkage to other issues were evident at the time of the vote, when a large number of States that had traditionally supported the resolution chose to abstain.

The granting of negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States through the mechanism of a protocol to a nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty was reinforced by a number of events that occurred in 1995 (see chapter IV).

During the year, another instance of the granting of assurances on a bilateral basis occurred. In 1994, China had issued a statement on security assurances with respect to Ukraine.⁶ In 1995, it issued a similar statement with respect to Kazakstan.⁷ Referring to its long-standing unconditional undertaking not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones, China stated that this position also applied to Kazakstan, and it assured that State that it would respect its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Unilateral declarations

In early April, in response to the concerns expressed by the non-nuclear-weapon States, all five nuclear-weapon States issued updated unilateral declarations containing both positive and negative assurances in the course of their preparations for the 1995 Conference.⁸ The negative

⁶ A/49/783, annex.

⁷ A/50/86, annex.

⁸ A/50/151-S/1995/261 (Russian Federation); A/50/152-S/1995/262 (United Kingdom); A/50/153-S/1995/263 (United States); A/50/154-S/1995/264 (France); and A/50/155-S/1995/265 (China).

security assurances of four of the nuclear-weapon States—France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States—were harmonized in the light of efforts being made to draft a new Security Council resolution on assurances. The paragraphs of the declarations that incorporate these negative security assurances are reproduced in annex I to this chapter. The statements of France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States continued to be conditional in a number of respects. China's updated declaration remained unconditional: it applied to all non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones. It also reiterated China's long-standing commitment to no-first use of nuclear weapons. In addition, China called for early conclusion of an international convention on no-first use as well as for one on security assurances.

Security Council resolution 984 (1995)

On 11 April, at the initiative of the five permanent members of the Security Council, the Council adopted a new resolution on assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States that are parties to the NPT, reproduced in annex II to this chapter. Resolution 984 (1995) went further in some aspects than resolution 255 (1968). It recognized, for the first time, the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT in receiving assurances that the Security Council and above all its nuclear-weapon States, permanent members, would act immediately in the event that such States were victims of an act of aggression in which nuclear weapons were used; it also noted the means available to it for assisting such victims and expressed its intention to recommend appropriate procedures in response to a request from victims for compensation. In addition, the new resolution urged all States to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, reflecting the wording of article VI of the NPT.⁹

⁹ Statements were issued by Bulgaria (A/50/151, annex) and by Kazakstan (A/50/134, annex) welcoming the granting of security guarantees by the nuclear-weapon States.

The question of security assurances at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference

Most of the discussion on security assurances at the Conference took place in Main Committee I.¹⁰ While the five nuclear-weapon States believed that their updated unilateral declarations and the fact that Security Council resolution 984 (1995) took note of them would greatly facilitate consideration of the matter, the majority of non-nuclear-weapon States parties held that the declarations did not address their main concerns and that the resolution itself also had some shortcomings. A number of approaches to resolve these difficulties were advocated: (a) conclusion of a protocol on security assurances to be attached to the Treaty—to be negotiated in a special conference or in the CD; this was proposed by a number of States,¹¹ by Mexico¹² and by Nigeria¹³; (b) conclusion of an international legal instrument on security assurances (proposal by China¹⁴ and by Sweden¹⁵); (c) a proposal for a collective commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to remedy the fundamental shortcomings of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) (Egypt);¹⁶ and (d) a proposal for the provision of more elaborate security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to nuclear-weapon-free-zone arrangements (Egypt).¹⁷

¹⁰ See the following documents: NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.1 (Mexico), 2 (China), 4 (Egypt), 6 (12 non-aligned States), 7 (Egypt), 8 (Nigeria), 10 (Indonesia on behalf of the members of the Non-Aligned Movement that are parties to the Treaty) and 11 (Egypt).

¹¹ Originally proposed at the CD by Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Myanmar, Peru, Sri Lanka and Venezuela (CD/1277), and submitted as a working paper of the NPT Conference (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.6). The text of the proposal is reproduced in the *Yearbook*, vol.19: 1994, chap. I, annex.

¹² NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.1. The draft protocol deals with other questions in addition to security assurances.

¹³ NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.8.

¹⁴ NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.2.

¹⁵ See document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/1, sect. III, para.7(g).

¹⁶ NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.7.

¹⁷ NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.11.

China insisted not only that assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States and to nuclear-weapon-free zones be unconditional, but also that an international legal instrument on no-first use be concluded. Similarly, Sweden's¹⁸ proposal for a multilateral treaty, to be negotiated on the basis of the unilateral declarations by the five nuclear-weapon States, included the idea of declarations on no-first use.

The non-aligned States believed that the five unilateral declarations and Security Council resolution 984 (1995) constituted only a first step towards providing the kind of assurances to which non-nuclear-weapon States were entitled: an internationally negotiated, legally binding instrument whereby all the nuclear-weapon States would be obligated to fulfil the same provisions and the same conditions; in their opinion, the resolution should have included language committing the nuclear-weapon States to take action, in the event of a threat or use of nuclear weapons, to suppress that threat.

However, there was no agreement in Main Committee I on language acceptable to all States parties.

The question of security assurances was also addressed in Main Committee II in the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones. In language that was agreed, the Conference would call on those nuclear-weapon States that had not yet done so to give early consideration to signing the relevant protocols of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and adhering to the relevant protocols of the future treaty on an African nuclear-weapon-free zone.¹⁹

Although the persisting differences in approach made agreement on a final declaration impossible, the decision of the Conference on "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" (reproduced on page 23) contains a reference to security assurances. After noting Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and the updated unilateral declarations on both negative and positive assurances, the Conference decided that "further steps should be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" and that such steps "could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument".

¹⁸ The proposal was contained in a conference room paper (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/CRP.14).

¹⁹ See NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/1, part B, paras. 42 and 43.

Conference on Disarmament, 1995

At its 1995 session, the CD was unable to establish an ad hoc committee on assurances because that action was linked to the establishment of ad hoc bodies on some other items on its agenda. However, during the first part of the session, in the light of the ongoing preparations for the Review and Extension Conference, the majority of members and observers expressed the view in plenary meetings that security assurances, both negative and positive, were an integral part of the non-proliferation regime and an essential element for the extension of the NPT.

The five nuclear-weapon States updated their unilateral declarations on assurances in a plenary meeting on 6 April. At the same meeting, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States made a joint declaration in connection with the forthcoming NPT Conference, in which they underlined:

“... the importance of the harmonized security assurances which we have given to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT against the use of nuclear weapons. We also underline the importance of the commitments as regards the provision of appropriate assistance to a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT victim of aggression or the threat of aggression with nuclear weapons. We believe that these decisions strengthen international peace and security.”²⁰

At the same meeting, a number of delegations welcomed the unilateral declarations, expressing the view that they were consistent with the commitments that the non-nuclear-weapon States had entered into in the context of the NPT. However, the Group of 21, in a joint statement,²¹ noted that neither the CD nor any members of the Group was associated with the drafting of the Security Council resolution and stressed that the text did not take into account any of the formal objections made in the past by non-nuclear-weapon States on the “restrictive, restrained, uncertain, conditional and discriminatory character of the guarantees already provided”.

In the second and third parts of the session of the CD, following the Review and Extension Conference, various delegations agreed that

²⁰ CD/PV.705, p. 23. The statement was later issued as documents of the CD (CD/1308) and of the Review and Extension Conference (NPT/CONF.1995/20), annex.

²¹ CD/PV.705, p. 41. The statement was later issued as a document of the CD (CD/1312).

the Security Council resolution and the harmonized declarations by the nuclear Powers constituted a new and genuine contribution to the strengthening of international security, but acknowledged that the measures taken had not fully met the hopes of many States parties to the Treaty, which sought legally binding commitments. Non-parties to the Treaty criticized the conditional nature of the unilateral commitments and stressed that any linkage of security assurances to accession to a particular treaty—the NPT or any other—constituted an erosion of the Charter of the United Nations, specifically the principle of the sovereign equality of all Member States and the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence, stated in Article 51 of the Charter.

Members of the CD generally welcomed the recommendation of the Review and Extension Conference, discussed in the previous section. Some delegations considered that it opened the way for renewed negotiations in the ad hoc committee, leading to a more definite outcome. By the end of the session, all the groups in the Conference had confirmed their readiness to address the issue in the framework of the ad hoc committee, and many recommended its re-establishment at the beginning of the 1996 session.

General Assembly, 1995

On 7 November, Pakistan introduced a draft resolution entitled “Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”. The First Committee adopted the draft resolution on 14 November by a recorded vote of 113 to 1, with 42 abstentions. A number of States explained their votes.

Among those that abstained, Argentina, the Russian Federation and Spain, which spoke on behalf of the EU and States associating themselves with it,²² expressed the view that the draft resolution did not take into account the important developments that had occurred in 1995, *inter alia*, Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and the statement on assurances in the principles and objectives agreed to at the Review and Extension Conference. Spain and the Russian Federation also noted that the draft did not mention the need for reciprocity of

²² Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Norway, Poland, Romania and Slovakia.

commitment between the nuclear-weapon States on the one hand and the non-nuclear-weapon States on the other. The Russian Federation confirmed its support for working out legally binding security assurances and for the renewal of work to that end in an ad hoc committee of the CD. Although voting in favour, Australia voiced strong reservations in similar terms.

On 12 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 122 to 0, with 44 abstentions. Resolution 50/68 reads as follows:

Resolution 50/68

Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the need to allay the legitimate concern of the States of the world with regard to ensuring lasting security for their peoples,

Convinced that nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to mankind and to the survival of civilization,

Welcoming the progress achieved in recent years in both nuclear and conventional disarmament,

Noting that, despite recent progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, further efforts are necessary towards the achievement of the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Also convinced that nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are essential to remove the danger of nuclear war,

Determined strictly to abide by the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations on the non-use of force or threat of force,

Recognizing that the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of non-nuclear-weapon States need to be safeguarded against the use or threat of use of force, including the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective measures and arrangements to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarter,

Recognizing also that effective measures and arrangements to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can contribute positively to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons,

Bearing in mind paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarma-

ment, in which it urged the nuclear-weapon States to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and desirous of promoting the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Final Document,

Recalling the relevant parts of the special report of the Committee on Disarmament, submitted to the General Assembly at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament, and of the special report of the Conference on Disarmament submitted to the Assembly at its fifteenth special session, the third special session devoted to disarmament, as well as of the report of the Conference on its 1992 session,

Recalling also paragraph 12 of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, contained in the annex to its resolution 35/46 of 3 December 1980, which states, *inter alia*, that all efforts should be exerted by the Committee on Disarmament urgently to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Noting the in-depth negotiations undertaken in the Conference on Disarmament and its Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, with a view to reaching agreement on this item,

Taking note of the proposals submitted under that item in the Conference on Disarmament, including the drafts of an international convention,

Taking note also of the relevant decision of the Eleventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, from 18 to 20 October 1995, and also of the decision adopted by the Tenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Jakarta from 1 to 6 September 1992, as well as the relevant recommendations of the Organization of the Islamic Conference reiterated in the Final Communiqué of the Twentieth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, held at Istanbul from 4 to 8 August 1991, calling upon the Conference on Disarmament to reach an urgent agreement on an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Taking note further of the unilateral declarations made by all nuclear-weapon States on their policies of non-use or non-threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States,

Noting the support expressed in the Conference on Disarmament and in the General Assembly for the elaboration of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as well as the difficulties pointed out in evolving a common approach acceptable to all,

Noting also the greater willingness to overcome the difficulties encountered in previous years,

Noting further Security Council resolution 984 (1995) of 11 April 1995 and the views expressed on it,

Recalling its relevant resolutions adopted in previous years, in particular resolutions 45/54 of 4 December 1990, 46/32 of 6 December 1991, 47/50 of 9 December 1992, 48/73 of 16 December 1993 and 49/73 of 15 December 1994,

1. *Reaffirms* the urgent need to reach an early agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

2. *Notes with satisfaction* that in the Conference on Disarmament there is no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, although the difficulties as regards evolving a common approach acceptable to all have also been pointed out;

3. *Appeals* to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to work actively towards an early agreement on a common approach and, in particular, on a common formula that could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character;

4. *Recommends* that further intensive efforts should be devoted to the search for such a common approach or common formula and that the various alternative approaches, including, in particular, those considered in the Conference on Disarmament, should be further explored in order to overcome the difficulties;

5. *Also recommends* that the Conference on Disarmament should actively continue intensive negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement and concluding effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-first session the item entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

Conclusion

With the adoption, on 11 April, on the eve of the NPT Review and Extension Conference, of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and the unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon States, providing negative and positive guarantees, the question of security assurances received

a new impetus. This action may have alleviated somewhat the criticism that might otherwise have been voiced by the non-nuclear-weapon States at the Conference and may have affected the positions of many States with regard to the indefinite extension of the Treaty. Recognizing that these measures did not, however, fully meet the hopes of those States that sought legally binding commitments, the parties to the NPT agreed, in their decision on principles and objectives, to consider further steps that could take the form of a multilateral, legally binding instrument. Negotiation on assurances in an ad hoc committee of the CD would be an important part of this process, and it can be expected that progress on this issue will be closely examined at the next NPT Review Conference.

ANNEX I

Excerpts on negative security assurances*

China

1. China undertakes not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances.

2. China undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones at any time or under any circumstances. This commitment naturally applies to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or non-nuclear-weapon States that have undertaken any comparable internationally binding commitments not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices.

France

Specifically, France reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on it, its territory, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a State, in alliance or association with a nuclear-weapon State.

Russian Federation

The Russian Federation will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the Russian

* Excerpted from the records of the meeting of the CD on 6 April (CD/PV.705). The full declarations were also circulated as United Nations documents (see footnote 8).

Federation, its territory, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or on a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State.

United States

The United States reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the United States, its territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies, or on a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State.

ANNEX II

Security Council resolution 984 (1995)

The Security Council,

Convinced that every effort must be made to avoid and avert the danger of nuclear war, to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to facilitate international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with particular emphasis on the needs of developing countries, and reaffirming the crucial importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to these efforts,

Recognizing the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to receive security assurances,

Welcoming the fact that more than 170 States have become Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and stressing the desirability of universal adherence to it,

Reaffirming the need for all States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to comply fully with all their obligations,

Taking into consideration the legitimate concern of non-nuclear-weapon States that, in conjunction with their adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, further appropriate measures be undertaken to safeguard their security,

Considering that the present resolution constitutes a step in this direction,

Considering further that, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, any aggression with the use of nuclear weapons would endanger international peace and security,

1. *Takes note* with appreciation of the statements made by each of the nuclear-weapon States (S/1995/261, S/1995/262, S/1995/263, S/1995/264, S/1995/265), in which they give security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States that are Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

2. *Recognizes* the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to receive assurances that the Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon State permanent members, will act immediately in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, in the event that such States are the victim of an act of, or object of a threat of, aggression in which nuclear weapons are used;

3. *Recognizes further* that, in case of aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, any State may bring the matter immediately to the attention of the Security Council to enable the Council to take urgent action to provide assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to the State victim of an act of, or object of a threat of, such aggression; and *recognizes also* that the nuclear-weapon State permanent members of the Security Council will bring the matter immediately to the attention of the Council and seek Council action to provide, in accordance with the Charter, the necessary assistance to the State victim;

4. *Notes* the means available to it for assisting such a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including an investigation into the situation and appropriate measures to settle the dispute and restore international peace and security;

5. *Invites* Member States, individually or collectively, if any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is a victim of an act of aggression with nuclear weapons, to take appropriate measures in response to a request from the victim for technical, medical, scientific or humanitarian assistance, and affirms its readiness to consider what measures are needed in this regard in the event of such an act of aggression;

6. *Expresses* its intention to recommend appropriate procedures, in response to any request from a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is the victim of such an act of aggression, regarding compensation under international law from the aggressor for loss, damage or injury sustained as a result of the aggression;

7. *Welcomes* the intention expressed by certain States that they will provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act of, or an object of a threat of, aggression in which nuclear weapons are used;

8. *Urges* all States, as provided for in Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control which remains a universal goal;

9. *Reaffirms* the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security;

10. *Underlines* that the issues raised in this resolution remain of continuing concern to the Council.

CHAPTER IV

Nuclear-weapon-free zones; the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty

Introduction

THE CONCEPT OF A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE was first developed in the late 1950s as a possible complementary measure to efforts to establish a global regime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.¹ Soon, however, it acquired prominence in its own right as a regional approach—as an expression of the desire of a group of non-nuclear-weapon States to protect themselves from nuclear testing and from the potential danger of nuclear confrontation and to preclude the deployment of nuclear weapons on their territories and in adjacent areas. Given this broad objective, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and acceptance of their terms by the nuclear-weapon States had to be considered in the light of the military-strategic situation obtaining during the cold war.

When the NPT was negotiated, it incorporated in article VII, on the initiative of non-aligned States, a provision pertaining to nuclear-weapon-free zones: “Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.” Subsequently, in 1975, a group of experts prepared a study on the subject.² Three years later, in 1978, the General Assembly, meeting in its first

¹ For further information on initiatives for nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace, see the background paper on implementation of article VII of the NPT, prepared for the Review and Extension Conference (NPT/CONF.1995/5).

² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Supplement No. 27 A (A/10027/Add.1)*. The study was mandated by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

special session on disarmament, noted that “the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitutes an important disarmament measure.”³

The two existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, in Latin America and the Caribbean⁴ and in the South Pacific,⁵ and the new zone that is about to be established in Africa are examples of such arrangements. They illustrate how the regional approach accommodates specific regional and subregional characteristics and security concerns, and its flexibility with regard to the verification methods and confidence-building measures adopted. It is, of course, easier to obtain the agreement of the States concerned for a regional arrangement than it would be for a comparable global arrangement.⁶

This chapter focuses on a development of great significance in 1995, in which the United Nations has been closely involved: the conclusion of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty, known as the Pelindaba Treaty. The chapter also discusses the creation of another zone, in the subregion of Southeast Asia, updates the situation regarding the two earlier zones and covers the progress made regarding proposals for zones in the Middle East and in Asia.

³ S-10/2, para. 60.

⁴ Established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), concluded in 1967 and registered with the United Nations (*Treaty Series*, vol. 634, No. 9068). For the status of the Treaty and its Protocols and all other treaties mentioned in this chapter, see appendix I. The texts of this and all other treaties mentioned in this chapter are reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 4th edition: 1992 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.IX.11) (hereafter referred to as *Status*), vol. 1.

⁵ Established by the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), concluded in 1985 and registered with the United Nations (*Treaty Series*, No. 24592).

⁶ Prior to the conclusion of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, two treaties establishing demilitarized or denuclearized zones in uninhabited environments had been concluded: the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 (*Treaty Series*, vol. 402, No. 5778), and the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 (resolution 2222 (XXI), annex). Subsequent to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Sea-Bed Treaty of 1971, (resolution 2660 (XXV), annex), was concluded.

Africa: Pelindaba Treaty

Early initiatives

The proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa was put forward in the United Nations in 1960. The following year, the General Assembly adopted its first resolution on the subject: resolution 1652 (XVI), entitled "Consideration of Africa as a denuclearized zone". In July 1964, the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa was adopted by the OAU,⁷ by which the participating African heads of State and Government solemnly declared that they were ready to undertake, "through an international agreement to be concluded under United Nations auspices, not to manufacture or control atomic weapons".

In the latter half of the 1970s, with international concern regarding South Africa's nuclear intentions and capability rising,⁸ the focus of the resolutions began to shift from concluding a treaty on denuclearization to dealing with obstacles to its achievement posed by South African policy: South Africa's refusal to sign the NPT and conclude an adequate safeguards agreement with the IAEA; indications of nuclear testing;⁹ military incursions into territories of the front-line and neighbouring States; and the continuation of its apartheid policies in the face of universal condemnation. As a result, for more than a decade, no preparatory steps were taken among the States of the region to draw up a draft treaty.

⁷ The text of the OAU Declaration is reproduced in full in General Assembly document A/5975 of 23 September 1965.

⁸ Measures taken by the United Nations as the result of such concern were: the adoption of Security Council resolution 418 (1977), by which the Council decided that all States should refrain from any cooperation with South Africa in the manufacture and development of nuclear weapons; and the preparation of two studies on aspects of South Africa's nuclear capability (South Africa's plan and capability in the nuclear field (A/35/402, Sales No. E.81.I.10) and South Africa's nuclear-tipped ballistic missile capability (A/45/571, Sales No. E.91.IX.15)).

⁹ In 1977, the USSR reported evidence of a nuclear-weapon underground test site in the Kalahari Desert; in 1979, a United States satellite transmitted evidence of a flash of light in the South Atlantic consistent with that caused by a nuclear explosion on or near the Earth's surface.

Commencement of negotiations and work of the Group of Experts

Beginning in 1990, a series of dramatic changes at the regional, as well as at the international, level, led African States to believe that the time was ripe to pursue denuclearization actively again. South Africa acceded to the NPT in 1991 and signed a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, prompting other southern African States to accede also. In 1993, President de Klerk disclosed that South Africa had developed six nuclear explosive devices, but had destroyed them before acceding to the NPT.¹⁰ Destruction was subsequently confirmed by the IAEA. In addition, relations between South Africa and the front-line and other neighbouring States improved, the apartheid system was abolished, democratic elections were held and a government of National Unity was installed. All these developments gradually changed the threat perception of the African States and their general attitude towards the establishment of an African nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Thus, in 1990, the African States met in a strategy session at the United Nations to plan how to transform the OAU 1964 Declaration into a treaty. Subsequently, the General Assembly called for a meeting of experts "to examine the modalities and elements for the preparation and implementation of a convention or treaty on the denuclearization of Africa".¹¹ The Group of Experts, chaired by Nigeria, was composed of representatives of the various subregions of Africa, the OAU, and the IAEA. In addition, parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty of Rarotonga were invited to participate as expert observers so that Africa could benefit from the experience of existing nuclear-weapon-free zones. Representatives of extraregional States with particular concerns *vis-à-vis* the future zone—the five nuclear-weapon States and Spain and Portugal—were also invited to special meetings of the Group to ascertain their views regarding the protocols to the future treaty that would be addressed to them.

¹⁰ President de Klerk's statement was circulated as a document of the General Assembly (A/48/126), annex.

¹¹ See resolution 45/56 A.

The Group of Experts held a total of six meetings between 1991 and 1995.¹² At the meeting in Harare in 1993, the actual drawing up of a draft treaty began¹³ and, following the South African President's disclosure, mentioned above, representatives of South Africa participated in the work of the Group, which was completed in Pelindaba, near Pretoria, in early June 1995. The Pelindaba text, as amended by the OAU Council of Ministers,¹⁴ was adopted by the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Addis Ababa at the end of the month and welcomed with special satisfaction by the General Assembly at its fiftieth session. An agency, the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE), provided by the Treaty to supervise its implementation, will be established with headquarters in South Africa.

Treaty provisions

The Treaty has a dual purpose: to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The *non-proliferation* provisions of the Treaty are all-embracing, covering aspects of renunciation of nuclear explosive devices, prevention of stationing such devices, prohibition of testing and—in the case of a party that had developed nuclear-weapon capability before entry into force—declaration and destruction. Taking into account the evolution of international opinion on the issue of peaceful nuclear explosions, the provisions cover not just nuclear weapons, but nuclear explosive devices defined, in article 1, as any devices capable of releasing nuclear energy, irrespective of the purpose for which it could be used. A party undertakes, in article 3, to renounce not only the development, manufacture, stockpiling or control of such devices, but also research (a

¹² The Group of Experts designated by the United Nations in cooperation with the OAU met in: Addis Ababa (1991), Lomé (1992), Harare (1993), Windhoek and Addis Ababa (1994) and Pelindaba (1995). The Pelindaba meeting was a Joint Meeting of the Group of Experts and the OAU Intergovernmental Group of African Experts, a body established in 1991 to study in detail the report of the UN/OAU Group of Experts.

¹³ See resolution 47/76.

¹⁴ See OAU resolution CM/Res.1592 (LXII)/Rev.1. The resolution is reproduced as an appendix to the note by the Secretary-General of the United Nations transmitting the final text of the Treaty to the General Assembly (A/50/426). The Treaty was opened for signature in Cairo on 11 April 1996.

unique feature that does not occur in any other nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty). Each party undertakes not to conduct such activities, not to seek or receive any assistance to do so and not to take any action to assist or encourage others to do so.

A party is obliged to prohibit the stationing of devices on its territory (article 4), but remains free, in the exercise of its sovereign rights, to decide for itself whether to allow foreign ships or aircraft suspected of carrying nuclear explosive devices to visit its ports or airfields. This provision, which closely follows the wording of the comparable provision in the Treaty of Rarotonga, was agreed upon after much discussion, but with the addition of the phrase: "Without prejudice to the purposes and objectives of the treaty".

Under article 5 a party commits itself not to test any nuclear explosive device, to prohibit testing in its territory, and not to assist or encourage testing anywhere.

The provisions in article 6 on declaration, dismantling, destruction or conversion of nuclear explosive devices are unique to the African zone. South Africa's disclosure of its former clandestine nuclear-weapon programme necessitated that the Treaty ensure not only that no new nuclear weapons be introduced into the zone, but that those already developed be destroyed together with the facilities for their production, and that such destruction be verified by the IAEA. Thus each party is obliged to permit the IAEA and AFCONE to verify the processes of dismantling and destruction.

The prevention of the dumping of radioactive wastes in Africa—a long-standing concern of African States—was seen as an important element of the Treaty. Thus parties to the Treaty (article 7) undertake to effectively implement or use as guidelines the measures contained in the Bamako Convention,¹⁵ in so far as it pertains to radioactive wastes.

As the Treaty aims to promote the *peaceful use of nuclear energy*, it was decided to designate the zone "nuclear-weapon-free" rather than "nuclear-free". Accordingly, article 8 makes clear that nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as to prevent the use of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes, and it encourages parties to make use of the programme of assistance for Africa available through the

¹⁵ The Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa (1991).

IAEA.¹⁶ Parties undertake to promote individually and collectively the use of nuclear science and technology for economic and social development and to establish and strengthen mechanisms for cooperation.

All civilian nuclear activities are to be conducted in such a way as to give assurance of their exclusively peaceful nature. Each party undertakes, therefore, in article 9, to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA and not to provide source or special fissionable material or equipment to any non-nuclear-weapon State unless subject to a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The purpose of this provision is to ensure that, even in their commercial nuclear activities, parties are conscious of their responsibilities to contribute to the strengthening of the global non-proliferation regime.

Further provision is made to strengthen confidence in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Article 10 enjoins parties to maintain the highest standards of security and effective physical protection of nuclear materials, equipment and facilities to prevent theft or unauthorized use and handling. Article 11 incorporates the prohibition of armed attack by conventional or other means on nuclear installations within the zone—another provision unique to the African Treaty.

The Treaty establishes, in article 12, AFCONE for the purpose of ensuring *compliance* with its provisions. Elected by the Conference of Parties, the highest body created by the Treaty, the Commission shall be responsible for the operation of the Treaty. Any disputes that cannot be resolved between the parties concerned will be brought to the Commission, which, if appropriate, will request the IAEA to conduct an inspection or establish its own inspection mechanism.

The Treaty will *enter into force* on the deposit of the twenty-eighth instrument of ratification, that is, on the ratification of a simple majority of members of the OAU. The Secretary-General of the OAU is designated depositary of the Treaty.

The *application of the Treaty* is set out in article 2 and illustrated in a map. The negotiations on both the wording of the article and the map were very laborious because of disputes with extra-zonal States over a number of territories that were considered by the African States to be part of the African continent. The Treaty does not describe the

¹⁶ The African Regional Cooperation Agreement for Research, Training and Development Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (AFRA).

zone in longitudinal and latitudinal terms, but indicates on the map all the territories which, according to the decisions of the OAU, pertain to Africa, with the understanding that appearance in the map is without prejudice to the issue of sovereignty.

Four annexes form an integral part of the Treaty: annex I consists of the map, annex II deals with IAEA safeguards, annex III with AFCONE and annex IV with complaints procedure and settlement of disputes.

Two of the three protocols are addressed to the nuclear-weapon States. Protocol I incorporates the undertaking not to use or threaten to use a nuclear explosive device against any party to the Treaty or territory within the zone, and Protocol II incorporates the undertaking not to test a nuclear explosive device within the zone. Protocol III, addressed to France and Spain as States which are, *de jure* or *de facto*, responsible for territories within the zone, incorporates the undertaking to apply the relevant provisions of the Treaty to those territories.

Impact of the Treaty

The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty, which is the culmination of more than 30 years of effort to denuclearize the continent, illustrates how a regional agreement can be tailored to accommodate the particular needs and interests of the States concerned and also contribute to global peace and security. It is the first nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty to be negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations in cooperation with a regional organization.

The African zone is the only zone created thus far that includes a State that had previously developed nuclear weapons and subsequently voluntarily renounced them. This fact is reflected in the provisions of the Treaty concerning declaration, dismantling, destruction or conversion of nuclear explosive devices and the inclusion of research in the provision on the renunciation of such devices. The Treaty, taking into account the presence of South Africa with its highly developed nuclear industry and the commercial export of uranium by a number of States, emphasizes the importance of cooperating in the use of nuclear science and technology for economic and social development and in conducting all peaceful nuclear activities under strict safeguards. Finally, the Treaty incorporates a prohibition on the dumping of radioactive wastes—an issue first raised by African States at the United Nations.

Asia

The idea of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the subregion of Southeast Asia was developed in 1971 in a declaration, issued by the original five member States¹⁷ of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Kuala Lumpur, in which they agreed to establish a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and noted the trend towards establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. The creation of a zone in Southeast Asia was formally proposed by Indonesia at an ASEAN foreign ministers meeting held in Jakarta in July 1984. Although substantive discussions on the subject continued during subsequent years, it was only with the end of the cold war that concrete progress was made.

In July 1993, at an ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Singapore, a programme of action on ZOPFAN was adopted. Negotiations on the draft treaty were actively pursued thanks to positive developments in the region, such as the acceptance of Viet Nam as ASEAN's seventh member, and the growing feeling among regional countries that the time was ripe for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone. As a result, the seven members of ASEAN, together with three neighbouring countries—Cambodia, Lao People's Democratic Republic and Myanmar—signed the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ) at the ASEAN Summit in Bangkok on 15 December 1995.

The main objectives of the Treaty include the reaffirmation by the ten signatory States of obligations assumed under the NPT, the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and the protection of the environment from nuclear waste. Consequently, the "basic undertakings" (article 3) of the Treaty contain a ban on the development, manufacture, possession, control, stationing or transport, testing or use of nuclear weapons; and on the dumping of nuclear-related materials at sea or into the atmosphere. The peaceful use of nuclear energy is permitted, however, provided that relevant programmes conform to IAEA guidelines and standards (article 4). Unlike the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty of Rarotonga, the SEANWFZ Treaty defines the zone as the area comprising, in addition to the territories of all States

¹⁷ Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Later, Brunei Darussalam and Viet Nam also became members.

parties, their respective continental shelves and exclusive economic zones (EEZ) (article 1).

The Treaty establishes a Commission, consisting of all States parties, to oversee the implementation of the Treaty and to ensure compliance with its provisions. The provision for settlement of disputes was drafted in such a way as to encourage parties to a dispute to try to resolve their differences by peaceful means, such as negotiation, mediation or conciliation (article 21), prior to initiating legal procedures. An Executive Committee was set up to assist the Commission in activities such as ensuring the proper operation of verification measures, setting up fact-finding missions, and concluding agreements with other international organizations.

The Treaty will enter into force upon ratification by seven States parties and the Commission will convene a meeting to review the operation of the Treaty 10 years after its entry into force. The Treaty also invites the five declared nuclear-weapon States to sign a protocol committing themselves to respect the Treaty and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against States parties to the zone or within the zone itself.

As of the end of 1995, none of the nuclear-weapon States had signed it. The main impediment appeared to be the inclusion of continental shelves and EEZs in the zone of application. Reservations to the effect that the provision might jeopardize the rights of free navigation established under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea have been expressed, particularly by France and the United States. Another concern involves the nature of the negative security assurances contained in the protocol. In addition, conflicting territorial claims within the zone have posed some difficulties, as in the case of China. Nonetheless, the nuclear-weapon States indicated their willingness to support the SEANWFZ provided that their apprehensions were allayed.

South Pacific: Treaty of Rarotonga

At the NPT Review and Extension Conference, the parties reaffirmed their conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized zones enhanced global and regional peace and security, and noted that the relevant protocols of treaties establishing zones had to be respected

and supported by all nuclear-weapon States in order to ensure the maximum effectiveness of such zones (see page 25). This agreed statement was of special significance to parties to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, as three of the nuclear Powers—France, the United Kingdom and the United States—had not yet signed or ratified the protocols addressed to them.¹⁸ Subsequently, on 20 October, the three States issued a joint statement¹⁹ in which they referred to the decision of the NPT Conference and announced their intention to sign the protocols in the first half of 1996.

Latin America and the Caribbean: Treaty of Tlatelolco

The process of consolidation of the nuclear-weapon-free zone established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco continued throughout the year, with an additional signature and ratification. Further steps were also taken by parties to ratify the amendments that had been adopted in 1991, 1992 and 1993. For the status of the Treaty and its amendments, see appendix I.

Middle East

In spite of positive developments in international affairs in general since the early 1990s, the launching of the peace process in 1991—in which the United Nations has participated since 1993—agreements reached between parties in the region in 1993 and 1994,²⁰ and the signing, on 28 September 1995 in Washington, D.C., of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, discussions within and outside the United Nations continued to reveal differences of view regarding how best to advance the concept of a

¹⁸ By Protocol 1, the States internationally responsible for territories situated within the zone would undertake to apply the relevant prohibitions of the Treaty to those territories; by Protocol 2, the five nuclear-weapon States would provide security assurances to parties or to territories within the zone; and by Protocol 3, the five would undertake not to carry out nuclear tests in the zone.

¹⁹ A/50/665-S/1995/877, annex. The protocols were signed on 25 March 1996 in Suva, Fiji.

²⁰ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 18: 1993, pp. 100 and 138, and vol. 19: 1994, pp. 67 and 215.

nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the preferred approach to take to achieve it. Arab States in general held the view that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone would contribute substantially to creating the climate for a comprehensive peace settlement. They also called upon Israel to place all its nuclear installations under IAEA full-scope safeguards.²¹ Israel, for its part, believed that the nuclear issue should be dealt with in the full context of the peace process and all regional security problems; that confidence-building measures of a general nature ought to be the top priority; and that a nuclear-weapon-free zone could best be concluded once peace in the Middle East was assured.

In 1995, the issue of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East figured most prominently at the NPT Review and Extension Conference (see chapter I). Many States, particularly those from the region, expressed the conviction that a single State's refusal to accede to the NPT and to place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards created an obstacle to this objective. They stressed that entrenchment of the status quo by indefinite application of the Treaty to all the Middle Eastern countries, with the exception of Israel, would constitute a serious imbalance and threaten regional security and stability.

In the course of negotiating the various documents to be adopted by the NPT Conference, States²² from the Middle East submitted a draft resolution in which they elaborated on the text of paragraph 6 of the decision on principles and objectives, in which the parties reaffirmed that the development of nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in regions of tension such as the Middle East, should be encouraged as a matter of priority (see page 25). Following major revision and the agreement of the depositaries to sponsor it, the resolution was adopted without a vote (see page 17).

On 21 September, the Council of the League of Arab States adopted a resolution entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East",²³ by which it invited the United Nations

²¹ See General Assembly resolution 49/78. See also documents A/47/538, A/48/494 and A/49/652 containing IAEA resolutions on the application of safeguards in the Middle East.

²² Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mauritania, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia and Yemen.

²³ See document S/1995/873.

Security Council, in view of its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, to ensure the universal implementation, without double standards, of all provisions concerning the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, to take the requisite steps to achieve that aim under chapter VII of the Charter and to provide non-nuclear-weapon States with effective and comprehensive security guarantees against the use or threat of use of such weapons.

General Assembly, 1995

Africa

On 8 November, South Africa, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of African States, introduced a draft resolution entitled "Final text of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (the Pelindaba Treaty)". A minor revision was later incorporated into the draft. On 20 November, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution without a vote.

Israel, explaining its position, noted in connection with the ninth preambular paragraph that each nuclear-weapon-free zone should fit the requirements of the participants in that zone. Four of the nuclear-weapon States affirmed their support for nuclear-weapon-free zones in principle and for the African zone in particular. France qualified its support for regional denuclearization with the participation of all countries concerned with the words "in so far as their strategic situation permits". China, the United Kingdom and the United States referred to the protocols addressed to them. China declared that, once the Treaty was opened for signature, it would actively consider signing them at an early date. As the other two had not yet completed their study of the protocols, they were not able to commit themselves to the timetable envisaged in operative paragraph 5. Nevertheless, they reaffirmed the importance of the commitment of the five nuclear Powers made at the Review and Extension Conference, mentioned above. In their statements, France, the United Kingdom and the United States referred to their involvement in the negotiating process of the Pelindaba Treaty. Spain, a country internationally responsible for territories within the zone, stated that it was in the process of studying Protocol III.

Subsequently, on 12 December, the General Assembly, too, adopted the draft resolution without a vote, as resolution 50/78.

Resolution 50/78

Final text of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty)

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first ordinary session, held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964, in which they solemnly declare their readiness to undertake, through an international agreement to be concluded under United Nations auspices, not to manufacture or acquire control of atomic weapons,

Recalling its resolution 2033 (XX) of 3 December 1965, in which it endorsed the above-mentioned Declaration and expressed the hope that the African States would initiate studies, as they deemed appropriate, with a view to implementing the denuclearization of Africa, and take the necessary measures, through the Organization of African Unity, to achieve that end,

Recalling also article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which acknowledges the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories,

Bearing in mind paragraph 60 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, which states that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitutes an important disarmament measure,

Bearing in mind also the provisions of resolution CM/Res.1592 (LXII)/Rev.1 on the implementation of the Treaty declaring Africa a nuclear-weapon-free zone, adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity at its sixty-second ordinary session, held at Addis Ababa from 21 to 23 June 1995,

Noting the adoption by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its thirty-first ordinary session, held at Addis Ababa from 26 to 28 June 1995, of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (the Pelindaba Treaty),

Noting also that the Treaty contains three Protocols open to the signature of States that, *de jure* or *de facto*, are internationally responsible for territories that lie within the limits of the geographical zone established in the Pelindaba Treaty and to the signature of States possessing nuclear weapons, and convinced that the cooperation of such States is necessary for the greater effectiveness of the Treaty,

Recognizing that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones contributes to the strengthening of the international non-proliferation regime,

Considering that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in the Middle East, would enhance the security of Africa and the viability of the African nuclear-weapon-free zone,

1. *Welcomes with special satisfaction* the adoption by the African leaders of the final text of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (the Pelindaba Treaty), which constitutes an event of historic significance in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security and which, at the same time, recognizes the right of African countries to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in order to accelerate the economic and social development of their peoples;

2. *Invites* the African States to sign and ratify the Pelindaba Treaty as soon as possible;

3. *Calls upon* all States to respect the continent of Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone;

4. *Calls upon* the States contemplated in Protocol III to the Pelindaba Treaty to take all necessary measures to ensure the speedy application of the Treaty to territories for which they are, *de jure* or *de facto*, internationally responsible and which lie within the limits of the geographical zone established in the Treaty;

5. *Calls upon* the nuclear-weapon States to bring the necessary support to the Pelindaba Treaty by signing the Protocols that concern them as soon as the Treaty becomes available for signature;

6. *Expresses its profound gratitude* to the Secretary-General for the diligence with which he has rendered effective technical advice and financial assistance to the Organization of African Unity towards the six meetings of the Group of Experts to Prepare a Draft Treaty on an African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, set up jointly by the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations;

7. *Also expresses its gratitude* to the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency for the diligence with which they assisted the Group of Experts to Prepare a Draft Treaty on an African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General, within existing resources, to extend assistance to the African States in 1996 in order to achieve the aims of the present resolution;

9. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-first session an item entitled "African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty".

Asia

Pakistan introduced a draft resolution entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia", which was substantially the

same as resolution 49/72 of 1994 on the same subject.²⁴ On 10 November, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 133 to 3 (Bhutan, India and Mauritius), with 11 abstentions.

On that occasion, India explained its negative vote by saying that the text did not fulfil any of the United Nations-endorsed criteria and lacked consensus among the countries of the region. Indonesia abstained for substantially the same reasons. Israel, which had supported the corresponding resolution in 1994, decided to abstain in order to emphasize that any attempt to impose regional arrangements by using international organizations would be counter-productive.

Among those that voted in favour, Brazil and the United States made statements. Brazil, noting that nuclear weapons were now banned in a large part of the globe, encouraged and supported the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones. The United States drew the attention of delegates to operative paragraph 2, calling upon the States of the region to refrain from any action contrary to the objective of the resolution. It noted that its support should not be interpreted as a blanket endorsement of such zones.

The General Assembly adopted the draft resolution as resolution 50/67 by a recorded vote of 154 to 3, with 9 abstentions.

Resolution 50/67

Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3265 B (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3476 B (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/73 of 10 December 1976, 32/83 of 12 December 1977, 33/65 of 14 December 1978, 34/78 of 11 December 1979, 35/148 of 12 December 1980, 36/88 of 9 December 1981, 37/76 of 9 December 1982, 38/65 of 15 December 1983, 39/55 of 12 December 1984, 40/83 of 12 December 1985, 41/49 of 3 December 1986, 42/29 of 30 November 1987, 43/66 of 7 December 1988, 44/109 of 15 December 1989, 45/53 of 4 December 1990, 46/31 of 6 December 1991, 47/49 of 9 December 1992, 48/72 of 16 December 1993 and 49/72 of 15 December 1994 concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia,

Reiterating its conviction that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world is one of the measures that can contribute

²⁴ The First Committee had before it a report of the Secretary-General transmitting, pursuant to resolution 49/72, the views of Governments on the matter; the report contained the reply of Maldives (A/50/299).

effectively to the objectives of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and general and complete disarmament,

Believing that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, as in other regions, will assist in the strengthening of the security of the States of the region against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Taking note with appreciation of the declarations issued at the highest level by the Governments of South Asian States that are developing their peaceful nuclear programmes, reaffirming their undertaking not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons and to devote their nuclear programmes exclusively to the economic and social advancement of their peoples,

Welcoming the recent proposal for the conclusion of a bilateral or regional nuclear-test-ban agreement in South Asia,

Noting the proposal to convene, under the auspices of the United Nations, a conference on nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia as soon as possible, with the participation of the regional and other concerned States,

Noting also the proposal to hold consultations among five nations with a view to ensuring nuclear non-proliferation in the region,

Considering that the eventual participation of other States, as appropriate, in this process could be useful,

Bearing in mind the provisions of paragraphs 60 to 63 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly regarding the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, including in the region of South Asia,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General,

1. *Reaffirms its endorsement*, in principle, of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

2. *Urges once again* the States of South Asia to continue to make all possible efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to refrain, in the meantime, from any action contrary to that objective;

3. *Welcomes* the support of all the five nuclear-weapon States for this proposal, and calls upon them to extend the necessary cooperation in the efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to communicate with the States of the region and other concerned States in order to ascertain their views on the issue and to promote consultations among them with a view to exploring the best possibilities of furthering the efforts for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

5. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to report on the subject to the General Assembly at its fifty-first session;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-first session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia".

Latin America and the Caribbean

On 10 November, Mexico introduced in the First Committee a draft resolution entitled "Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)". The draft was later revised by the addition of a preambular paragraph recalling the amendments of the Treaty. The First Committee adopted the draft resolution without a vote on 10 November.

The General Assembly also adopted the draft resolution without a vote, as resolution 50/77.

Resolution 50/77

Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

The General Assembly,

Recalling that in its resolution 1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963 it expressed the hope that the States of Latin America would take appropriate measures to conclude a treaty that would prohibit nuclear weapons in Latin America,

Recalling also that in the same resolution it voiced its confidence that, once such a treaty was concluded, all States, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, would lend it their full cooperation for the effective realization of its peaceful aims,

Considering that in its resolution 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965 it established the principle of an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations between nuclear-weapon States and those which do not possess such weapons,

Recalling that the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) was opened for signature at Mexico City on 14 February 1967,

Recalling also that in its preamble the Treaty of Tlatelolco states that military denuclearized zones are not an end in themselves but rather a means for achieving general and complete disarmament at a later stage,

Recalling further that in its resolution 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967 it welcomed with special satisfaction the Treaty of Tlatelolco as an event of historic significance in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security,

Recalling that in 1990, 1991 and 1992 the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean approved and opened for signature a set of amendments to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, with the aim of enabling the full entry into force of that instrument,

Bearing in mind that, with the full adherence in 1995 of Saint Lucia, the Treaty of Tlatelolco is in force for thirty sovereign States of the region,

Noting with satisfaction that the Government of Saint Kitts and Nevis ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco on 18 April 1995,

Also noting with satisfaction that the Government of Cuba subscribed to the Treaty of Tlatelolco on 25 March 1995, thus contributing to a greater integration among the peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean for the attainment of the aims of the Treaty,

Further noting with satisfaction that the amended Treaty of Tlatelolco is fully in force for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Jamaica, Mexico, Peru, Suriname and Uruguay,

1. *Welcomes* the concrete steps taken by several countries of the region during the past year for the consolidation of the regime of military denuclearization established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco);

2. *Notes with satisfaction* the full adherence of Saint Lucia to the Treaty of Tlatelolco;

3. *Urges* the countries of the region that have not yet done so to deposit their instruments of ratification of the amendments to the Treaty of Tlatelolco approved by the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean in its resolutions 267 (E-V) of 3 July 1990, 268 (XII) of 10 May 1991 and 290 (VII) of 26 August 1992;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-first session the item entitled "Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)".

Middle East

At the time that the First Committee considered the question of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, it had before it a report

of the Secretary-General on the subject.²⁵ On 7 November, Egypt introduced a draft resolution entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East", which the First Committee adopted without a vote on 13 November.

A number of States explained their positions. Jordan stated that it would have liked the text to reflect the language of the resolution adopted at the NPT Conference; it also confirmed its active participation in the multilateral negotiations within the peace process. Israel reiterated its policy with respect to both the modalities of a zone and the timing of its negotiation and establishment, holding that the nuclear issue, as well as all regional security problems, should be dealt with in the full context of the peace process. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya expressed reservations regarding references to the negotiations being carried out as part of the Madrid peace process.

The General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, without a vote, as resolution 50/66.

Resolution 50/66

Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3263 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3474 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/71 of 10 December 1976, 32/82 of 12 December 1977, 33/64 of 14 December 1978, 34/77 of 11 December 1979, 35/147 of 12 December 1980, 36/87 A and B of 9 December 1981, 37/75 of 9 December 1982, 38/64 of 15 December 1983, 39/54 of 12 December 1984, 40/82 of 12 December 1985, 41/48 of 3 December 1986, 42/28 of 30 November 1987, 43/65 of 7 December 1988, 44/108 of 15 December 1989, 45/52 of 4 December 1990, 46/30 of 6 December 1991, 47/48 of 9 December 1992, 48/71 of 16 December 1993 and 49/71 of 15 December 1994 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Recalling also the recommendations for the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East consistent with paragraphs 60 to 63, and in particular paragraph 63 (d), of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

²⁵ The report transmitted the views of Israel and Jordan (A/50/325 and Add.1).

Emphasizing the basic provisions of the above-mentioned resolutions, which call upon all parties directly concerned to consider taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East and, pending and during the establishment of such a zone, to declare solemnly that they will refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party, to agree to place all their nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and to declare their support for the establishment of the zone and to deposit such declarations with the Security Council for consideration, as appropriate,

Reaffirming the inalienable right of all States to acquire and develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,

Emphasizing the need for appropriate measures on the question of the prohibition of military attacks on nuclear facilities,

Bearing in mind the consensus reached by the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security,

Desirous of building on that consensus so that substantial progress can be made towards establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Welcoming all initiatives leading to general and complete disarmament, including in the region of the Middle East, and in particular on the establishment therein of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons,

Noting the peace negotiations in the Middle East, which should be of a comprehensive nature and represent an appropriate framework for the peaceful settlement of contentious issues in the region,

Recognizing the importance of credible regional security, including the establishment of a mutually verifiable nuclear-weapon-free zone,

Emphasizing the essential role of the United Nations in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 49/71,

1. *Urges* all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, and, as a means of promoting this objective, invites the countries concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

2. *Calls upon* all countries of the region that have not done so, pending the establishment of the zone, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

3. *Takes note* of resolution GC(39)/RES/24, adopted on 22 September 1995 by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency at its thirty-ninth regular session, concerning the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East;

4. *Notes* the importance of the ongoing bilateral Middle East peace negotiations and the activities of the multilateral working group on arms control and regional security in promoting mutual confidence and security in the Middle East, including the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone;

5. *Invites* all countries of the region, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, to declare their support for establishing such a zone, consistent with paragraph 63 (d) of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and to deposit those declarations with the Security Council;

6. *Also invites* those countries, pending the establishment of the zone, not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or permit the stationing on their territories, or territories under their control, of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices;

7. *Invites* the nuclear-weapon States and all other States to render their assistance in the establishment of the zone and at the same time to refrain from any action that runs counter to both the letter and the spirit of the present resolution;

8. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General;

9. *Invites* all parties to consider the appropriate means that may contribute towards the goal of general and complete disarmament and the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the region of the Middle East;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to pursue consultations with the States of the region and other concerned States, in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 46/30 and taking into account the evolving situation in the region, and to seek from those States their views on the measures outlined in chapters III and IV of the study annexed to his report or other relevant measures, in order to move towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East;

11. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its fifty-first session a report on the implementation of the present resolution;

12. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-first session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East".

Conclusion

The year 1995 witnessed important developments with respect to nuclear-weapon-free zones—developments pertaining to specific regions and to the international community's support of the concept itself. The chief event was the conclusion of the Pelindaba Treaty, by which the entire continent of Africa will become a zone, marking the culmination of more than 30 years of effort. In addition, a subregional nuclear-weapon-free zone was established in Southeast Asia. The contribution that nuclear-weapon-free zones can make to global and regional peace and security was recognized by the parties to the NPT in May, which agreed that the establishment of additional zones by the year 2000 would be most welcome. Moreover, their acknowledgement that the cooperation of all the nuclear-weapon States is necessary for the maximum effectiveness of zones led France, the United Kingdom and the United States to announce that they would adhere to the protocols of the Treaty of Rarotonga in 1996, thus strengthening the South Pacific zone. The process of consolidation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco also continued.

These events may well have an impact on the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone or a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Both the NPT Review and Extension Conference language and the Pelindaba Treaty highlight the desirability of such a development.

CHAPTER V

Other nuclear issues

Introduction

QUESTIONS CONCERNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS have been considered within and outside the United Nations since the very beginning of the nuclear age, and a number of bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements have been signed to limit and reduce them. Action was also taken to curb the spread of nuclear weapons with the conclusion of the NPT.

The Russian Federation and the United States have reached a number of agreements on nuclear-arms limitation. The most recent rounds of bilateral negotiations on strategic arms, the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), led to the signing of the START I and START II Treaties. The former, signed on 31 July 1991, provides for a significant reduction of Russian and United States offensive strategic nuclear weapons over seven years.¹ The latter, signed on 3 January 1993, provides for the elimination of MIRVed ICBMs² and for the reduction of strategic nuclear warheads to no more than 3,000 to 3,500 each by the year 2003.³

Apart from these bilateral agreements on the reduction of nuclear weapons, there have been regional and multilateral efforts to make progress on other related issues. At the regional level, a number of nuclear-weapon-free zones have been established (see chapter IV). At the multilateral level, efforts have been directed towards the discontinu-

¹ For the text of the Treaty, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 16: 1991, appendix II.

² MIRV: multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle; ICBM: inter-continental ballistic missile.

³ The text of the Treaty is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 18: 1993, appendix II.

ance of nuclear-weapon tests (see chapter II), the provision of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (see chapter III), the cut-off of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology. This chapter deals with a wide range of issues relating to nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear weapons, such as the START Treaties, the fissile-material cut-off, IAEA safeguards and related export control regimes.

Developments and trends, 1995

The NPT Review and Extension Conference had a direct impact on the deliberations on nuclear issues throughout the year. The CD was not able to agree to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. While some members called for this, stressing the importance of making systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons, others stressed the significance of what had already been accomplished⁴ and considered that the Conference should focus on the ongoing CTBT negotiations. Similar differences of view were apparent in the First Committee.

The major developments concerning nuclear-arms limitation, nuclear disarmament and related issues will be discussed in this chapter within the framework of: (a) issues related to START and other bilateral agreements; (b) prohibition of the production of fissile material and related issues; (c) IAEA safeguards; and (d) other nuclear and related issues.

Issues related to START and other bilateral agreements

START I entered into force on 5 December 1994, as a result of Ukraine's accession to the NPT,⁵ and entered into its implementation phase. Even before its entry into force, the Russian Federation and the United States had begun to dismantle and destroy close to 2,000 warheads a year, which they continue to do. The other parties to the Treaty, Belarus,

⁴ See the declaration by France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States issued just prior to the Review and Extension Conference (CD/1308).

⁵ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 19: 1994, chap. III.

Kazakstan and Ukraine, began transferring nuclear warheads on their territories to the Russian Federation for dismantlement. On 24 May, Kazakstan issued a statement to the effect that all nuclear weapons on its territory had been removed.⁶ On 30 October, the defence ministry of Ukraine announced that the majority of the nuclear warheads had been dismantled. In connection with the implementation of the START I Treaty, the Russian Federation and the United States began, in March, mutual inspections of strategic nuclear-arms sites in Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia, Ukraine and the United States.

With respect to ratification of START II, the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee's approval of the Treaty—required for ratification—was not achieved until 12 December.⁷ Ratification in the Russian Federation was delayed mainly because of concerns over proposals in the United States Congress to develop and deploy theatre missile defence (TMD)—an action that, in its opinion, might be in violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. In May, President Yeltsin and President Clinton issued a joint statement in which they set out principles to serve as a basis for discussions on demarcation between ABM systems and TMD systems,⁸ but the two Governments had not come to an agreement by the end of the year. During the fiftieth session of the General Assembly, the Russian Federation stated that preservation of and full compliance with the ABM Treaty was the most important prerequisite for deep cuts in offensive strategic weapons.

Prohibition of the production of fissile material and related issues

Early conclusion of negotiations on a cut-off convention was included as part of a programme of action for nuclear disarmament in the decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament", adopted at the 1995 NPT Conference. (For the text of the decision, see page 23.) However, although the CD established an

⁶ A/50/205-S/1995/435. See also A/50/206-S/1995/439.

⁷ Subsequently, the Treaty was considered by the full Senate and ratified by a vote of 87-4 on 26 January 1996.

⁸ CD/1327, p. 6. The two Powers had been engaged in discussions on this subject since 1993.

ad hoc committee to negotiate a cut-off treaty,⁹ it was unable to commence its work, since the appointment of a chairman for the Committee was linked to the establishment of other ad hoc committees. Thus, further discussion on the issue was carried out in plenary meetings, during which many States reiterated their divergent positions on the scope of the future treaty.

Among those States that called for the inclusion of existing stock-piles, Egypt believed that exclusion would consolidate the status quo for nuclear-weapon States and reward undeclared nuclear-weapon States. It also believed that the ban would have to address all fissile materials, civilian and military, that could be used in nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. On the other hand, India advocated that the convention focus on future production, that production for civilian purposes remain “permissible” and that the convention not be applicable retrospectively. Among the nuclear-weapon States, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States stressed future production. The United States believed that a treaty of such scope could be negotiated in a relatively short period of time, while the negotiation of broader scope would lead to disputes and delay. Other States took the middle ground. Expressing its concern about the safe and controlled handling of fissile material, Norway stated that existing stocks of fissile weapons material should be accounted for within, or parallel to, the future international cut-off regime. Because of persisting difficulty with regard to scope, no resolution was adopted by the General Assembly on the cut-off of fissile material.

At the unilateral level, the United Kingdom announced at the Review and Extension Conference that it had ceased production of fissile material for explosive purposes.¹⁰ At the Russian–United States summit in May in Moscow, the two countries issued a “Joint statement on the transparency and irreversibility of the process of reducing nuclear weapons”, in which they agreed that: (a) fissile materials removed from nuclear weapons being eliminated and excess to national security requirements would not be used to manufacture nuclear weapons; (b) no

⁹ The Committee’s mandate, which called for a treaty “banning the production of fissile material ... ” did not preclude any delegation from raising for consideration in the Ad Hoc Committee the issues relating to the scope of the future treaty. See the report of the CD in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fiftieth Session, Supplement 27 (A/50/27)*, paras. 27 and 28.

¹⁰ NPT/CONF.1995/SR.3, para. 32.

newly produced fissile materials would be used in nuclear weapons; and (c) fissile materials from or within civil nuclear programmes would not be used to manufacture nuclear weapons.¹¹ There was also progress in the implementation of the 1993 agreement whereby the United States would purchase from Russia over 20 years low-enriched uranium (LEU) blended down from highly enriched uranium (HEU) extracted from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons. The first shipment of the LEU arrived in the United States in June. During the fiftieth session of the General Assembly, the United States announced that it had withdrawn 200 tons of fissile material from its defence stockpile in March.

With regard to the problem of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and other radioactive material, the President of the Russian Federation, speaking at the G-7 summit at Halifax in June, called for a summit devoted to nuclear safety, to be held in the spring of 1996. Following the Russian–United States meeting in May, the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission produced a joint report that outlined current and planned programmes of bilateral cooperation for the improvement of nuclear materials security, for the security of nuclear weapons in connection with their dismantlement, and for the construction of a safe and secure long-term storage facility for fissile material from dismantled weapons. At the Russian–United States summit in October, the two Presidents welcomed the report and endorsed the speedy implementation of the plans outlined in it.¹²

The IAEA undertook to establish a database of trafficking incidents to provide factual information to Governments and to the public. It also conducted training courses in the implementation of State systems of accounting and control of nuclear material and in physical protection methods and technology. The 1994 International Convention on Nuclear Safety, which applies to land-based civil nuclear power plants and obliges contracting parties to establish and maintain proper legislative and regulatory frameworks to govern safety, will enter into force after the IAEA, the depositary, receives 22 instruments of ratification. As of 31 December 1995, 62 States had signed the Convention and 15 had deposited instruments of ratification.

¹¹ CD/1327, p. 4.

¹² *Joint Statement on Nuclear Material Security* (The White House Press Release) 23 October.

IAEA safeguards

In March, the IAEA Board of Governors reviewed the progress made by the Secretariat with respect to "Programme 93+2", a plan to design, develop and test a set of comprehensive measures to improve the Agency's safeguards regime, and endorsed its general direction.¹³ The Board noted, however, that some Governors had reservations about the need for greater access to sites. In June, the Secretariat submitted specific proposals in a two-part document, that is, measures that could be implemented under existing legal authority and measures requiring additional legal authority to be conferred by the States involved. Some of the measures foreseen in part 1 were, for example, (a) broader access to information regarding sites and activities relevant to States' nuclear programmes and (b) sensitive analysis of the environment at locations to which the Agency has access. The Board approved the first part of the proposals and decided to consider the second part at a later date. In September the General Conference adopted a resolution¹⁴ by which it requested the Director General to make arrangements to implement the first part of the measures proposed and to put before the Board of Governors clear proposals for the second part. However, at its meeting in December, the Board of Governors did not take any decision on the matter.

As of 31 December, there were 100 safeguards agreements¹⁵ in force with 107 States with respect to the NPT, 6 of which entered

¹³ "Programme 93 + 2" began in December 1993 with the aim of presenting the Board of Governors with the technical, legal and financial implications of a fully integrated set of stronger, more efficient safeguards measures prior to the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. See also the IAEA press release of 31 March 1995.

¹⁴ See resolution GC(39)/RES/17, entitled "Strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system".

¹⁵ The number of safeguards agreements is not necessarily the same as the number of States covered by such agreements. For example, in the case of the agreement between Argentina, Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) and the IAEA, there is only one agreement, but two States are covered.

into force in the course of the year (Belarus, Bolivia, Croatia,¹⁶ Kazakhstan, Myanmar and Zimbabwe). Also in 1995, Barbados, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine signed safeguards agreements under the Treaty, which, however, had not entered into force by the end of the year. With respect to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, there were 20 safeguards agreements in force, 16 of which were Tlatelolco/NPT agreements. Two of these agreements entered into force in the course of the year (Bolivia¹⁷ and Chile). The *sui generis* safeguards agreement between Ukraine and the IAEA, which was signed in September 1994, came into force on 13 January.

During 1995, talks continued between the United States and the DPRK regarding implementation of the Agreed Framework¹⁸ they had signed in 1994. Disagreement over the model of LWRs to be supplied was resolved in June, and a contract was signed in New York in December. As stipulated in the Agreed Framework, the freeze on the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors was monitored by the IAEA. However, in the view of the DPRK, monitoring was carried out under the Framework, not under its safeguards agreement pursuant to the NPT, which, it held, would be fully implemented once a significant portion of the LWR project was completed.¹⁹ On 22 September, the IAEA General Conference called upon the DPRK to comply fully with its safeguards agreement and urged it, pending full compliance, to take all steps the Agency might deem necessary to preserve intact all

¹⁶ Croatia was already covered by a previous safeguards agreement that it succeeded to when it became an independent State. A new agreement was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in June 1994 and came into force on 19 January 1995.

¹⁷ The agreement of Bolivia was pursuant to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the NPT.

¹⁸ Signed 21 October 1994. The text is reproduced in *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*, vol. XVII, No. 2 (1994) pp. 136–140. The Framework provided for an international consortium to finance and supply light-water reactors (LWRs) to replace the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors, which would be frozen and dismantled. Subsequently, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was established for this purpose.

¹⁹ See the report of the Director General on safeguards implementation in the DPRK (S/1995/860), annex.

information relevant to verifying the accuracy and completeness of the DPRK's initial inventory of nuclear material subject to safeguards.²⁰

With respect to Iraq, the Director General of the IAEA reported²¹ in April to the Security Council that he was confident that the essential components of that State's past clandestine nuclear programme had been identified and destroyed, removed or rendered harmless, but raised concerns regarding the completeness of the information received from the Iraqi Government. Later, in August, the Government provided information and documents on a crash programme that had been launched in September 1990 to transform safeguarded highly enriched research reactor fuel for use in a nuclear weapon, but that had been halted in January 1991 by the war in the Persian Gulf. The IAEA reported that, although Iraq's withholding of information, documents and materials constituted a breach of its obligations under Security Council resolutions and the crash programme had been in violation of its safeguards agreement, the new documents and material reviewed so far did not change the Agency's conclusion that Iraq's nuclear weapons programme had been destroyed, removed or rendered harmless.²²

The International Court of Justice

The International Court of Justice held joint public hearings from 30 October to 15 November on two cases concerning nuclear weapons. The first, submitted in 1993 by the World Health Assembly, had requested an advisory opinion on the question whether, in view of health and environmental effects, the use of nuclear weapons by a State in war or other armed conflict would be a breach of its obligations under international law, including the constitution of the World Health Organization (WHO).²³ The second, submitted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1994, related to the question whether the threat or use

²⁰ IAEA General Conference resolution GC(39)/RES/3.

²¹ S/1995/287, p. 4.

²² S/1995/844, p. 6.

²³ Resolution WHA46.40 of 14 May 1993. The following 35 States submitted written statements: Australia, Azerbaijan, Colombia, Costa Rica, DPRK, Finland, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Japan, Kazakstan, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Nauru, /.

of nuclear weapons in any circumstance was permitted under international law.²⁴ In the course of the hearings, 22 States and WHO presented oral arguments to the Court.²⁵

Many States argued that the threat or use of nuclear weapons was illegal under international law, including the United Nations Charter and customary international law. Other States, including four nuclear-weapon States and some Western European States, argued that the Court should decline to provide an opinion since the question was of a political nature and might have a negative impact on current negotiations on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. These States also argued that, in the World Health Assembly case, WHO did not have the competence to request an advisory opinion on the issue. As for the substance of the cases, many of these States argued that there was no rule in international law that expressly prohibited the use of nuclear weapons *per se*. Both cases are still before the Court.

Related export controls

The Nuclear Suppliers Group,²⁶ meeting in Helsinki from 5 to 7 April,

Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States. The following 9 States submitted comments on the written statements: Costa Rica, France, India, Malaysia, Nauru, Russian Federation, Solomon Islands, United Kingdom and United States.

²⁴ General Assembly resolution 49/75 K of 15 December 1994. The following 28 States submitted written statements: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, DPRK, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Japan, Lesotho, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Qatar, Russian Federation, Samoa, San Marino, Solomon Islands, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States. The following 3 States submitted comments on the written statements: Egypt, Nauru and Solomon Islands.

²⁵ The following 22 States presented oral arguments to the Court: Australia, Costa Rica, Egypt, France, Germany, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Mexico, New Zealand, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Samoa, San Marino, Solomon Islands, United Kingdom, United States and Zimbabwe.

²⁶ At the time of its April plenary meeting, the following 31 States were members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bel-

l.

reviewed the guidelines for nuclear transfers and decided to continue its efforts to ensure that exports of nuclear or nuclear-related dual-use items for peaceful purposes would not be diverted to nuclear explosive or unsafeguarded nuclear activities. The Group reaffirmed the principle of openness and agreed that members should continue to brief other countries on its aims and activities.

The Missile Technology Control Regime²⁷ (MTCR) partners, meeting in Bonn between 10 and 12 October, reaffirmed their commitment to controlling exports of missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons, as well as the relevant technology, and made some amendments to their guidelines for sensitive missile-relevant transfers in the light of technical developments. They also discussed the role the regime could play in reducing risks to security in regions where there were tensions related to the acquisition of missile-capability.

Other nuclear and related issues

In July, Argentina submitted to the Security Council a draft resolution that recalled a Council statement of January 1992²⁸ on non-proliferation and requested the Secretary-General, beginning in 1996 and on the basis of information provided by the IAEA or other competent bodies, to submit an annual report on the status of efforts to ensure the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.²⁹ While most

gium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, South Africa, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. Ukraine and the European Commission attended as observers.

²⁷ The membership of the MTCR as of the October meeting was as follows: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. Other States, though not members, have, through unilateral action, declared their adherence to the guidelines.

²⁸ In January 1992, the Security Council, meeting at the level of heads of State and Government, stated that "the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat of international peace and security." (see S/23500).

²⁹ S/1995/567.

Western and Eastern European States welcomed this initiative, other States did not. India, which was not a member of the Security Council at the time, expressed strong reservations, stating that before such action was taken “all substantive, legal and institutional issues, including the role of specific treaty bodies, must be addressed and resolved through an open and transparent debate among the full membership of the United Nations”.³⁰ The Group of 21 at the CD expressed concern that the vertical proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was not mentioned in the draft resolution, called for a legally binding, multilaterally negotiated treaty for eliminating all nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework and noted that the Conference was the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament issues and that circumventing it or undermining the provisions of the existing treaties would seriously prejudice ongoing negotiations”.³¹ Following informal consultations, the Security Council did not pursue the matter.

Disarmament Commission, 1995

The Commission continued to consider the item entitled “Process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons”, which it had begun in 1991, and decided to entrust Working Group I with it.³² The Group faced a myriad of difficulties in its consideration of the item. A number of States that had participated in the Review and Extension Conference, mainly Western and Eastern European States, emphasized the wording and political objectives of the document entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, which had been adopted at the Conference. On the other hand, some States not party to the Treaty refused to recognize the relevance of that document, and insisted on more extensive and radical measures. Despite consultations conducted by the chair, the Working Group was unable to achieve a consensus document on the item.

³⁰ See the letter of India addressed to the President of the Council (S/1995/564), para. 4.

³¹ See the statement of the Group of 21, circulated in document CD/1339.

³² The Group, chaired by the representative of Ecuador, held 10 meetings between 15 and 26 May 1995. See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fiftieth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/50/42)*. The report of the Working Group is contained in paragraph 24.

General Assembly, 1995

The General Assembly adopted seven resolutions and one decision on the subjects discussed in this chapter. In addition, an eighth draft resolution was submitted and withdrawn without action being taken.

One of the resolutions and the decision concerned non-proliferation. The resolution, entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East", was introduced on 8 November by the representative of Egypt in his capacity as chairman of the Group of Arab States. At the time that the First Committee was considering the question, it had before it a report of the Secretary-General on the subject.³³ On 17 November, the First Committee took action on a revised version of the draft. It adopted the sixth preambular paragraph by a recorded vote of 109 to 3 (Guatemala, India and Israel) with 27 abstentions, and the draft resolution as a whole by a recorded vote of 51 to 4, with 88 abstentions.

Israel voted against what it considered a "hostile" text. The United States, voting likewise, considered the singling out of a State engaged in the peace process to be counter-productive and the text redundant, in view of the adoption of the draft resolution on a Middle Eastern nuclear-weapon-free zone (see page 84). The countries that abstained on the draft resolution as a whole and made statements—Canada, the EU,³⁴ India, Myanmar, Turkey and Uruguay—stressed the negative effect of singling out a country. India also voted against the preambular paragraph because it used language from the NPT Conference. Among those voting affirmatively and making statements, Botswana and Fiji voiced reservations about singling out Israel. Australia and Colombia explained their positions in terms of support for the peace process, a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the NPT; and Viet Nam, in terms of its support for a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Jordan believed the text was balanced, *inter alia*, because it referred to positive developments in the peace process, called upon all States to accede to the NPT, and mentioned Israel simply because it was the only regional State with significant unsafeguarded nuclear capabilities. Iraq and the

³³ The report (A/50/513) transmitted IAEA resolution GC(39)RES/24, on the application of safeguards in the Middle East.

³⁴ Speaking also on behalf of Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania and Slovakia.

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya urged strong action by the international community in view of the gravity of the situation. The Islamic Republic of Iran put on record its reservations regarding the seventh preambular paragraph, referring to the Middle East peace process.

On 12 December, the General Assembly adopted the sixth preambular paragraph by a recorded vote of 122 to 2, with 27 abstentions, and the text as a whole by a recorded vote of 56 to 2, with 100 abstentions. Resolution 50/73 reads as follows:

Resolution 50/73

The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the relevant United Nations resolutions,

Taking note of the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the latest of which is GC(39)/RES/24, adopted on 22 September 1995, and noting the danger of nuclear proliferation, especially in areas of tension,

Cognizant that the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region of the Middle East would pose a serious threat to international peace and security,

Aware of the importance that all nuclear facilities in the region be placed under full-scope safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency,

Recalling the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 11 May 1995, in which the Conference noted with concern the continued existence in the Middle East of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, reaffirmed the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty and called upon all States in the Middle East that had not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place all their nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards,

Recalling also the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 11 May 1995, in which the Conference urged universal adherence to the Treaty as an urgent priority and called upon all States not yet party to the Treaty to accede to it at the earliest date, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities,

Encouraged by the recent positive developments in the Middle East peace process, which would be further strengthened by States of the region

undertaking practical confidence-building measures in order to consolidate the non-proliferation regime,

1. *Welcomes* the accession of the United Arab Emirates on 26 September 1995 to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

2. *Calls upon* Israel and all other States of the region that are not yet party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons and to accede to the Treaty at the earliest date;

3. *Calls upon* the States of the region that have not yet done so to place all unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards as an important confidence-building measure among all States of the region and as a step towards enhancing peace and security;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its fifty-first session on the implementation of the present resolution;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-first session the item entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East".

On 7 November, Mexico introduced a draft decision entitled "Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of vehicles for their delivery in all its aspects", which was a follow-up to resolution 48/75 C. Mexico stated that the provisions of resolution 48/75 C had not been entirely fulfilled because the report³⁵ that had been requested—and that was subsequently completed—had not been transmitted to a representative governmental group of experts for consideration, as called for. On 10 November, the First Committee adopted the draft decision by a recorded vote of 102 to 1 (United States), with 45 abstentions. At that time, the United States noted that it had voted against resolution 48/75 C because it had not believed that it was an appropriate or effective tool for advancing non-proliferation objectives, and it had not supported the request therein for a report of the Secretary-General. In its view, the request made in that resolution had now been fulfilled.

The General Assembly subsequently adopted the draft decision by a recorded vote of 114 to 1 (United States), with 49 abstentions. Decision 50/420 reads as follows:

³⁵ The report, entitled like the draft decision, was circulated as document A/INF/49/3.

Decision 50/420

Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of vehicles for their delivery in all its aspects

At its 90th plenary meeting, on 12 December 1995, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the First Committee, recalling its decision 49/427 of 15 December 1994, decided to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-first session the item entitled "Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of vehicles for their delivery in all its aspects".

Two draft resolutions on the subject of nuclear disarmament were introduced in the First Committee and subsequently adopted by the General Assembly, one by Japan and the other by Myanmar on behalf of non-aligned States.

On 7 November, Japan introduced a draft resolution entitled "Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons", which was later revised. On 17 November, the First Committee took action on the revised text. It adopted the fifth preambular paragraph by a recorded vote of 135 to none, with 19 abstentions; operative paragraph 1 by a recorded vote of 146 to 2, with 7 abstentions; and the draft resolution as a whole by a recorded vote of 144 to none, with 13 abstentions.

A number of States explained their abstentions on the draft of Japan. Algeria felt that the title did not reflect the actual content of the draft; moreover, some of the points incorporated contradicted the views of the non-aligned States. Cuba, India and Pakistan—three non-parties to the NPT—and the Islamic Republic of Iran shared that position. Iran noted that while it welcomed the decision on strengthening the review process of the NPT, it was too early to welcome the decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely. India explained that it had abstained on the fifth preambular paragraph and voted against operative paragraph 1 because the text was an attempt to make the language of the decisions of the Review and Extension Conference into customary international law, but because the resolution as a whole was aimed at nuclear disarmament—a goal that India supported—it had decided to abstain on the text as a whole rather than vote negatively. Two other States that abstained explained their positions. Brazil felt that the draft text did not take into account the important role of regional agreements. The DPRK believed that Japan's actions regarding nuclear issues contradicted the text.

Two States, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the Syrian Arab Republic, which voted in favour of the draft resolution as a whole, noted that they had abstained on the fifth preambular paragraph because of their positions regarding extension of the NPT (see page 20). Viet Nam, which supported any efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament, particularly in the nuclear field, would have preferred more specific and stronger content.

On 10 November, Myanmar introduced a draft resolution entitled "Nuclear disarmament", which reflected the recommendations on nuclear disarmament contained in the final document of the Cartagena summit meeting of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries;³⁶ the text was subsequently slightly revised. At a later meeting, Colombia informed the Committee that, although the draft had not been submitted by the Movement as such, it enjoyed the broad support of the members of the Movement. On 16 November, the draft resolution introduced by Myanmar was adopted by a recorded vote of 99 to 39, with 15 abstentions. On that occasion, a number of the co-sponsors made statements in support of it.

The United States voted against, stating that the text quoted selectively from earlier international documents—among them the decisions of the Review and Extension Conference—in such a way as to suggest that nuclear-weapon States had undertaken commitments that they had not undertaken, but made no reference to the NPT itself. In the view of the United States, the CD had been unable to undertake the negotiations on nuclear disarmament that had been agreed upon because of the actions of the chief sponsors of the draft resolution.

Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the Republic of Korea all abstained for similar reasons: in their view, the draft resolution was unbalanced in that it ignored the decisions taken at the Review and Extension Conference, which constituted the most important basis for work on nuclear disarmament, and, while calling upon the CD to initiate negotiations on nuclear disarmament, took no account of the urgency of completing a CTBT or a cut-off convention—two key steps towards that goal. Japan also observed that the draft text had not been formulated

³⁶ The meeting was held in Cartagena, Colombia, from 18 to 20 October; the final document of the meeting was circulated as document A/50/752-S/1995/1035, annex III.

through consultation with the countries concerned, the United States and the Russian Federation.

China, which voted in favour, noted that concrete steps for nuclear disarmament—for which the possessors of the largest nuclear arsenals had special responsibility—might be negotiated within the framework of a convention banning nuclear weapons.

The General Assembly took action on both draft resolutions on nuclear disarmament.

It adopted the draft resolution introduced by Japan by a recorded vote. The fifth preambular paragraph was retained by a vote of 143 to none, with 17 abstentions; operative paragraph 1 by 156 to 2, with 4 abstentions; and the draft resolution as a whole was adopted by a vote of 154 to none, with 10 abstentions. Resolution 50/70 C reads as follows:

Resolution 50/70 C

Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 49/75 H of 15 December 1994,

Recognizing that the end of the cold war has increased the possibility of freeing the world from the fear of nuclear war,

Appreciating the entry into force of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, to which Belarus, Kazakstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States of America are party, and looking forward to the early entry into force of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,

Welcoming the reductions in the nuclear arsenals of other nuclear-weapon States,

Welcoming also the decision of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to extend the Treaty indefinitely, taken without a vote, as well as the decisions on strengthening the review process for the Treaty and on the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament,

Noting the reference in the decision on the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament to the importance of the following measures for the full realization and effective implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including the programme of action as reflected below:

(a) The completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty no later than 1996, and utmost restraint that should be exercised by the nuclear-weapon States pending the entry into force of that treaty;

(b) The immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein;

(c) The determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Welcoming positive developments as well as the efforts being made by the States members of the Conference on Disarmament in the negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty at the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva,

Recalling that nuclear non-proliferation and the promotion of nuclear disarmament are key elements in the maintenance of international peace and security, which is one of the most important purposes of the United Nations,

1. *Urges* States not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to accede to it at the earliest possible date, recognizing the importance of universal adherence to the Treaty;

2. *Calls for* the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and invites them to keep States Members of the United Nations duly informed of the progress and efforts made;

3. *Calls upon* all States to implement fully their commitments in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The General Assembly then adopted the draft resolution introduced by Myanmar by a recorded vote of 106 to 39, with 17 abstentions. Resolution 50/70 P reads as follows:

Resolution 50/70 P
Nuclear disarmament

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming the commitment of the international community to the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free world,

Determined to achieve the objective of prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons and their destruction, and to conclude such an international treaty or treaties at an early date,

Bearing in mind paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, calling for the urgent negotiation of agreements for the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems, and for a comprehensive and phased programme with agreed time-frames, wherever feasible, for progressive and balanced reduction of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time,

Recognizing that a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, the proposed treaty on fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons constitute important steps towards the elimination of the nuclear threat, and will contribute to the achievement of the goal of nuclear disarmament within a time-bound framework,

Recognizing also that the end of the cold war has brought about favourable conditions for creating a world free of nuclear weapons,

Welcoming the entry into force of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, to which Belarus, Kazakstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States of America are States parties, as well as the conclusion of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms by the Russian Federation and the United States of America, and looking forward to full implementation of these treaties and to further concrete steps for nuclear disarmament by all nuclear-weapon States,

Noting with appreciation the unilateral measures of nuclear-weapon States for nuclear arms limitation,

Recognizing the complementarity of bilateral and multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament and that bilateral negotiations can never replace multilateral negotiations in this respect,

Recognizing also that a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and the proposed treaty on fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices must both constitute disarmament measures and not only non-proliferation measures, and that they must be important steps leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework,

Noting the support expressed in the Conference on Disarmament and in the General Assembly for the elaboration of an international convention to

assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and the multilateral efforts in the Conference on Disarmament to reach agreement on such an international convention at an early date,

Recalling its resolution 49/75 E of 15 December 1994 on a step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threat,

Taking note of paragraph 84 and other relevant recommendations in the Final Document of the Eleventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, from 18 to 20 October 1995, calling on the Conference on Disarmament to establish, on a priority basis, an ad hoc committee to commence negotiations early in 1996 on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework,

1. *Recognizes* that, in view of the end of the cold war and recent political developments, the time is now opportune for all nuclear-weapon States to undertake effective nuclear disarmament measures with a view to the total elimination of these weapons within a time-bound framework;

2. *Also recognizes* that there is a genuine need to de-emphasize the role of nuclear weapons, and to review and revise nuclear doctrines accordingly;

3. *Urges* the nuclear-weapon States to stop immediately the qualitative improvement, development, stockpiling and production of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems;

4. *Calls upon* the nuclear-weapon States to undertake step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threat and a phased programme of progressive and balanced deep reductions of nuclear weapons, and to carry out effective nuclear disarmament measures with a view to the total elimination of these weapons within a time-bound framework;

5. *Calls upon* the Conference on Disarmament to establish, on a priority basis, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament to commence negotiations early in 1996 on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework;

6. *Expresses its support* for the efforts of the Member States of the Conference on Disarmament to this end;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its fifty-first session a report on the implementation of the present resolution;

8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-first session the item entitled "Nuclear disarmament".

Two draft resolutions containing much identical language and entitled "Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament" were submitted to the First Committee, one an initiative of the Russian

Federation and the United States, and the other, an initiative of States members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

On 6 November, the Russian Federation and the United States submitted their draft resolution, which was subsequently revised.³⁷ On 14 November, the First Committee took action on the draft resolution sponsored by the two major nuclear Powers. It adopted the seventh preambular paragraph by a recorded vote of 116 to none, with 29 abstentions; and the draft resolution as a whole by a recorded vote of 139 to none, with 17 abstentions.

At that time, a number of States explained their positions. Among those abstaining on both votes, India stated that it did not appreciate the indefinite extension of the NPT, referred to in the seventh preambular paragraph, and that the situation with respect to nuclear disarmament was not as bright as portrayed in the draft text. Egypt and Pakistan expressed reservations similar to India's with regard to that preambular paragraph. Pakistan also stated that progress outside the multilateral framework should be reported to the CD, which should be responsible for negotiating a phased programme for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Thailand held that the majority of States wished to see a time-bound framework for the elimination of nuclear weapons and, like Pakistan, believed that the CD should play a greater role in such negotiations. Indonesia, which voted in favour of the preambular paragraph but abstained on the resolution as a whole, noted that wording to the effect that the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament rested with the nuclear-weapon States was conspicuous by its absence, as was the omission of a reference to the need to achieve nuclear disarmament as the immediate and overriding goal.

On 8 November, Colombia introduced the second draft resolution on bilateral negotiations and nuclear disarmament; subsequently, a minor revision was made. On 15 November, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 95 to 37, with 22 abstentions.

The Russian Federation and the United States voted against the non-aligned draft resolution for substantially the same reasons, stating that it attempted to distort the results of the Review and Extension Conference; it avoided mentioning the indefinite extension of the NPT

³⁷ For details concerning the revisions, see document A/50/590, para. 41.

and welcoming the accession of Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine to the Treaty; it avoided or rewrote language agreed upon in the "Principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" (see page 23) and made statements in the eighth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 8 that were, in the words of the Russian Federation, "wishful thinking" and in the words of the United States, "patently untrue".

Among those that abstained, Australia and New Zealand stated that the indefinite extension of the NPT was too important a step to ignore and Australia regretted that the only reference, in the eighth preambular paragraph, to commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States at the Review and Extension Conference was implicit and inaccurate. New Zealand found it unhelpful to suggest that the important goals they all shared had to be approached by time-bound frameworks. Japan, which sought to promote nuclear disarmament by means of steady efforts, could not support the draft resolution because it had not been formulated on the basis of appropriate consultation.

On 12 December, the General Assembly took action on both draft resolutions on bilateral negotiations.

On the draft text sponsored by the major nuclear Powers, the Assembly retained the seventh preambular paragraph by a recorded vote of 128 to none, with 27 abstentions; it then adopted the draft resolution as a whole by a recorded vote of 150 to none, with 14 abstentions. Resolution 50/70 I reads as follows:

Resolution 50/70 I

Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its previous relevant resolutions,

Recognizing the fundamental changes that have taken place with respect to international security, which have permitted agreements on deep reductions in the nuclear armaments of the States possessing the largest inventories of such weapons,

Mindful that it is the responsibility and obligation of all States to contribute to the process of the relaxation of international tension and to the strengthening of international peace and security,

Stressing the importance of strengthening international peace and security through general and complete disarmament, under strict and effective international control,

Stressing also that it is the responsibility of all States to adopt and implement measures towards the attainment of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Appreciating a number of positive developments in the field of nuclear disarmament, in particular the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, and the treaties on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms,

Appreciating also the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and acknowledging the importance of the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Welcoming the steps that have already been taken by the Russian Federation and the United States of America to begin the process of reducing the number of nuclear weapons and removing such weapons from a deployed status, and bilateral agreements on the issue of de-targeting strategic nuclear missiles,

Noting the new climate of relations between the United States of America and the States of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which permits them to intensify their cooperative efforts to ensure the safety, security and environmentally sound destruction of nuclear weapons,

Noting also that the Russian Federation and the United States of America concurred that, once the Treaty between them on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms was ratified, they would proceed to deactivate all nuclear delivery systems to be reduced under the Treaty by removing their nuclear warheads or taking other steps to remove them from alert status,

Noting further the commitment between the Russian Federation and the United States of America to intensify their dialogue to compare conceptual approaches and to develop concrete steps to adapt the nuclear forces and practices on both sides to the changed international security situation, including the possibility, after ratification of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, of further reductions of and limitations on remaining nuclear forces,

Taking note of the joint statement of 10 May 1995 by the Russian Federation and the United States of America on the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems,

Urging the early ratification of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and further intensification of such

efforts to accelerate the implementation of agreements and unilateral decisions relating to nuclear arms reduction,

Welcoming the significant reductions made by other nuclear-weapon States, and encouraging all nuclear-weapon States to consider appropriate measures relating to nuclear disarmament,

1. *Welcomes* the entry into force of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed in Moscow on 31 July 1991 by the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, including the Protocol to that Treaty signed at Lisbon on 23 May 1992 by the parties thereto, and the exchange of documents of ratification between the United States of America, Belarus, Kazakstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine on 5 December 1994 at Budapest;

2. *Also welcomes* the signing of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms in Moscow on 3 January 1993, and urges the parties to take the steps necessary to bring that Treaty into force at the earliest possible date;

3. *Expresses its satisfaction* at the fact that the entry into force of the 1991 Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms clears the way for prompt ratification by the Russian Federation and the United States of America of the 1993 Treaty;

4. *Also expresses its satisfaction* at the continuing implementation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, in particular at the completion by the parties of the destruction of all their declared missiles subject to elimination under the Treaty;

5. *Encourages* the United States of America, the Russian Federation, Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine to continue their cooperative efforts aimed at eliminating nuclear weapons and strategic offensive arms on the basis of existing agreements, and welcomes the contributions that other States are making to such cooperation as well;

6. *Welcomes* the accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine as non-nuclear-weapon States, which thereby provided a notable enhancement to the non-proliferation regime;

7. *Encourages and supports* the Russian Federation and the United States of America in their efforts to reduce their nuclear weapons and to continue to give those efforts the highest priority in order to contribute to the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons;

8. *Invites* the Russian Federation and the United States of America to keep other States Members of the United Nations duly informed of progress

in their discussions and in the implementation of their strategic offensive arms agreements and unilateral decisions.

The General Assembly adopted the non-aligned draft resolution by a recorded vote of 105 to 37, with 20 abstentions. Resolution 50/70 N reads as follows:

Resolution 50/70 N

Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its previous relevant resolutions,

Recognizing the fundamental changes that have taken place with respect to international security, which have permitted agreements on deep reductions in the nuclear armaments of the States possessing the largest inventories of such weapons,

Mindful that it is the responsibility and obligation of all States to contribute to the process of the relaxation of international tension and to the strengthening of international peace and security,

Stressing the importance of strengthening international peace and security through disarmament,

Emphasizing that nuclear disarmament remains one of the principal tasks of our times,

Appreciating a number of positive developments in the field of nuclear disarmament, in particular the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, concluded on 8 December 1987, and the treaties on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms,

Noting that there are still significant nuclear arsenals and that the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons, rests with the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those which possess the largest stockpiles,

Noting also the expressed determination of the nuclear-weapon States to pursue systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons within a time-bound framework,

Welcoming the steps that have already been taken by those States to begin the process of reducing the number of nuclear weapons and removing such weapons from a deployed status, and bilateral agreements on the issue of de-targeting strategic nuclear missiles,

Noting the new climate of relations between the United States of America and the States of the former Soviet Union, which permits them to intensify their cooperative efforts to ensure the safety, security and environmentally sound destruction of nuclear weapons,

Noting also that the Russian Federation and the United States of America concurred that, once the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms was ratified, they would proceed to deactivate all nuclear delivery systems to be reduced under the Treaty by removing their nuclear warheads or taking other steps to remove them from alert status,

Noting further the agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States of America to intensify their dialogue to compare conceptual approaches and to develop concrete steps to adapt the nuclear forces and practices on both sides to the changed international security situation, including the possibility, after ratification of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, of further reductions of and limitations on remaining nuclear forces,

Taking note of the joint statement of 10 May 1995 by the Russian Federation and the United States of America on the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems,

Urging the early ratification of the Treaty on the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and further intensification of such efforts to accelerate the implementation of agreements and unilateral decisions relating to nuclear-arms reduction,

Welcoming the reduction made by other nuclear-weapon States, in some of their nuclear-weapon programmes, and encouraging all nuclear-weapon States to consider appropriate measures relating to nuclear disarmament,

Affirming that bilateral and multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament should facilitate and complement each other,

1. *Welcomes* the entry into force of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed in Moscow on 31 July 1991 by the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, including the Protocol to that Treaty signed at Lisbon on 23 May 1992 by the parties thereto, and the exchange of documents of ratification between the United States of America, Belarus, Kazakstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine on 5 December 1994 at Budapest;

2. *Also welcomes* the signing of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms in Moscow on 3 January 1993, and urges the parties to take the steps necessary to bring that Treaty into force at the earliest possible date;

3. *Expresses its satisfaction* at the fact that the entry into force of the 1991 Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms clears the way to prompt ratification by the Russian Federation and the United States of America of the 1993 Treaty;

4. *Also expresses its satisfaction* at the continuing implementation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, in particular at the completion by the parties of the destruction of all their declared missiles subject to elimination under the Treaty;

5. *Encourages* the United States of America, the Russian Federation, Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine to continue their cooperative efforts aimed at eliminating nuclear weapons and strategic offensive arms on the basis of existing agreements, and welcomes the contributions that other States are making to such cooperation as well;

6. *Encourages and supports* the Russian Federation and the United States of America in their efforts to reduce their nuclear armaments and to continue to give those efforts the highest priority in order to contribute to the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework;

7. *Invites* the Russian Federation and the United States of America to keep other States Members of the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament duly informed of progress in their discussions and in the implementation of their strategic offensive arms agreements and unilateral decisions;

8. *Calls on* the Conference on Disarmament to take this information into account in the negotiations to be held on nuclear disarmament and for the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework.

On 8 November, India introduced a draft resolution entitled "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons". On 10 November, the First Committee adopted it by a recorded vote of 95 to 26, with 26 abstentions.

Among those States that abstained, Japan and New Zealand believed that efforts should focus on making steady progress and negotiating on specific measures that would enhance the process of nuclear disarmament, for instance, the CTBT, rather than on a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. New Zealand believed that recent changes of attitude in the international community had made the use of nuclear weapons a much more remote possibility than even a few years ago. Australia found the draft resolution unbalanced in that it made no reference to the importance of non-proliferation commitments on the path to nuclear disarmament.

China, which voted in favour, believed that the portion of the draft resolution devoted to nuclear disarmament and the draft convention annexed to it could be handled in the context of negotiations on a treaty on the total prohibition of nuclear weapons.

The General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 108 to 27, with 28 abstentions. Resolution 50/71 E reads as follows:

Resolution 50/71 E

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

The General Assembly,

Convinced that the use of nuclear weapons poses the most serious threat to the survival of mankind,

Convinced also that a multilateral agreement prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would strengthen international security and contribute to the climate for negotiations leading to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons,

Conscious that some steps taken by the Russian Federation and the United States of America towards a reduction of their nuclear weapons and the improvement in the international climate can contribute towards the goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons,

Recalling that, in paragraph 58 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, it is stated that all States should actively participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among States in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in international affairs could be agreed upon and that would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Reaffirming that any use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity, as declared in its resolutions 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, 33/71 B of 14 December 1978, 34/83 G of 11 December 1979, 35/152 D of 12 December 1980 and 36/92 I of 9 December 1981,

Stressing that an international convention would be an important step in a phased programme towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework,

Noting with regret that the Conference on Disarmament, during its 1995 session, was unable to undertake negotiations on this subject,

1. *Reiterates its request* to the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations, in order to reach agreement on an international convention

prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, taking as a possible basis the draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons annexed to the present resolution;

2. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly on the results of those negotiations.

ANNEX

Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

The States Parties to the present Convention,

Alarmed by the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons,

Convinced that any use of nuclear weapons constitutes a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity,

Convinced also that the present Convention would be an important step in a phased programme towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework,

Determined to continue negotiations for the achievement of this goal,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The States Parties to the present Convention solemnly undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances.

Article 2

The present Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

Article 3

1. The present Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State that does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of the present article may accede to it at any time.

2. The present Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification or accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

3. The present Convention shall enter into force on the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty-five Governments, including the Governments of the five nuclear-weapon States, in accordance with paragraph 2 of the present article.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of the Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The depositary shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession and the date of entry into force of the present Convention, as well as of the receipt of other notices.

6. The present Convention shall be registered by the depositary in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 4

The present Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send duly certified copies thereof to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed the present Convention, opened for signature at _____ on the _____ day of _____ one thousand nine hundred and _____.

On 15 November, Ukraine introduced a draft resolution entitled "Contribution to nuclear disarmament", which the First Committee adopted without a vote. On that occasion, the Russian Federation noted that the reference to voluntary renunciation of nuclear weapons in operative paragraph 5 had no bearing on the substance of the issue of the possession of nuclear weapons by the former USSR; following the collapse of the USSR, the number of nuclear-weapon States had not changed.

The General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote. Resolution 50/70 R reads as follows:

Resolution 50/70 R

Contribution to nuclear disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 49/75 H, L and P of 15 December 1994,

Noting with satisfaction a number of positive developments in the field of nuclear disarmament, in particular, the entry into force of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,

Noting also with satisfaction the conclusion of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,

Realizing the vital importance of further nuclear disarmament with the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty

on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Bearing in mind the results of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Noting that the vast majority of States Members of the United Nations are now parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

1. *Welcomes* the accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of the following States: Algeria, Argentina, Chile, Comoros, Eritrea, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Palau, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates and Vanuatu;

2. *Also welcomes* the accession on 5 December 1994 to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of Ukraine as a non-nuclear-weapon State, and in this regard acknowledges that this decision, as well as relevant decisions previously taken by Belarus and Kazakhstan, contributed to the entry into force of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, which is a major landmark in the process of nuclear disarmament;

3. *Acknowledges* the progress in the process of implementation of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms to date by the parties to the Treaty;

4. *Welcomes* the signing of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms by the Russian Federation and the United States of America, and urges the parties to take the steps necessary to bring that Treaty into force at the earliest possible date;

5. *Also welcomes* the fact that South Africa has voluntarily given up its nuclear weapon programme as well as the voluntary renunciation of nuclear weapons by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, and recognizes the significant contribution of those States to nuclear disarmament and the strengthening of regional and global security.

On 7 November, Canada introduced a draft resolution, ultimately sponsored by 48 States, entitled "Prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices". Canada stressed that the text did not attempt to address substance, but simply recognized that negotiations should get under way in 1996. A group of six States submitted amendments by which, among other things, the Assembly would note the different views expressed regarding scope. Subsequently, Canada withdrew the draft resolution from further consideration at the session, and Pakistan stated that the sponsors of the amendments would not press them to a vote.

Conclusion

Implementation of START I, which had already begun before its entry into force in December 1994, continued, and by the end of the year, ratification of START II by the United States seemed imminent. In spite of this progress, many States considered that the pace of reductions should accelerate, and different interpretations of the Review and Extension Conference decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament", which outlined a programme of action, were evident in various forums. In the CD, members were not able to agree to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament because of differing interpretations of progress made thus far and differing views of the role the multilateral negotiating body could play in this area. Although the CD established an ad hoc committee to negotiate a fissile material cut-off, it was not able to commence its work because of issues linked with nuclear disarmament. IAEA safeguards continued to play a prominent role in the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and the Agency made some progress in furthering its "Programme 93+2", through which the safeguards system will be strengthened.

CHAPTER VI

Other weapons of mass destruction

Introduction

THE PROLIFERATION OF ALL WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION and their means of delivery continues to preoccupy the international community. A priority of the United Nations has been to pursue universal participation in, and compliance with, multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation agreements. Since 1972 and 1993, respectively, the Biological Weapons Convention¹ (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) have provided the international community with ways and means to eradicate two of the most horrendous categories of weapons. The NPT, which curbs the spread of nuclear weapons, is discussed in chapter I. (For the status of all three treaties, see appendix I of this volume.)

The BWC does not include specific verification provisions. Between 1986 and 1991, in an effort to prevent and reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions and to improve international cooperation in peaceful biological activities, the parties to the Convention agreed upon and elaborated confidence-building measures involving data exchange. Then, at a review conference in 1991,² they decided to establish an open-ended ad hoc group of governmental experts (subsequently known as the VEREX Group) to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical stand-

¹ The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (General Assembly resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex). Concluded in 1971, the BWC was opened for signature in 1972 and entered into force in 1975.

² Three review conferences of the BWC have been held: 1980, 1986 and 1991. See *The Yearbook*, vol. 5: 1980, vol. 11: 1986 and vol. 16: 1991.

point. At the request of a majority of the States parties, the depositary Governments (Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States) convened a special conference in September 1994 to consider the VEREX report. That Conference resulted in the establishment of an ad hoc group, open to all States parties, “to consider appropriate measures, including possible verification measures, and draft proposals to strengthen the Convention, to be included, as appropriate, in a legally binding instrument”.

In 1992, after a decade of intensive negotiations, the CWC was concluded—the first treaty negotiated primarily in a multilateral context to ban an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. Its scope, the obligations assumed by States parties and the system of verification envisaged for its implementation were unprecedented. The Convention was opened for signature in Paris in 1993; it will enter into force after the deposit of 65 instruments of ratification.

This chapter deals with developments related to the BWC and the CWC and to the work of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), established by Security Council 687 (1991) to ensure the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of Iraq’s biological and chemical weapons programmes. In connection with UNSCOM, the chapter also deals with the subject of radiological weapons—a long-standing item on the agenda of the CD, on which, however, no negotiations have been held since 1992.

Developments and trends, 1995

In Geneva much work was done to strengthen the BWC, and in The Hague painstaking efforts were made to iron out the differences that would impede the proper implementation of the CWC. At the same time, under the authority of the Security Council, UNSCOM persevered in gaining a clearer picture of Iraq’s former programmes of weapons of mass destruction and in operating a system of ongoing monitoring.

Biological weapons

Work of the Ad Hoc Group of States parties to the Biological Weapons Convention

The Ad Hoc Group held three sessions³ in 1995. It was agreed, at the first session,⁴ that at each session a report of a procedural nature would be prepared, to which the results of the Group's deliberations would be annexed on the understanding that they would not prejudice the positions of delegations and would not imply agreement on the scope or content. It was later decided, at the third session, that two more sessions would be held in 1996, from 15 to 26 July and from 16 to 27 September. The chairman appointed friends of the chair to assist him in his consultations and negotiations in four subject-areas: (a) measures related to article X; (b) measures to promote compliance; (c) confidence-building and transparency measures and (d) definitions of terms and objective criteria. Following an exchange of views at the second session, the friends of the chair circulated informal papers that were annexed to the report of the Ad Hoc Group⁵ and formed the basis for the exchange of views that took place at the third session.

As expected, the discussions on *article X* reflected differences in approach to the transfer of technology and know-how and to free access to the results of scientific research. Some non-aligned countries

³ Mr. Tibor Toth of Hungary chaired all three sessions of the Ad Hoc Group in 1995: 4–6 January, 10–21 July and 27 November–8 December. The following States parties participated in all sessions: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States. The following States participated only in the first session: Croatia, Yemen and Zimbabwe. The following States participated only in the second session: El Salvador, Iceland, Iraq and Oman. The following States participated only in the third session: Lebanon, Sri Lanka and Thailand. Myanmar participated as a signatory to the Convention at the second and third sessions.

⁴ See the report of the first session (BWC/AD HOC GROUP/3).

⁵ See the report of the second session (BWC/AD HOC GROUP/28).

concentrated on ways and means to increase such transfers. They also advanced the idea that the existing supplier regimes—which they considered impediments to the transfer of technologies required for their national development—should be dismantled as soon as a new verification protocol to the Convention entered into force. Thus they strongly supported the idea of creating an internationally legally binding instrument to formalize scientific and technological cooperation between the parties. The Western and Eastern European Groups of States, on the other hand, maintained that existing cooperation between individual States in technology transfer and exchanges of scientific information was quite satisfactory and was not hampered by the lack of such an instrument. They also believed that cooperation in this field could be expanded without necessarily first dismantling the existing supplier regimes.

Deliberations on *compliance measures* were subdivided into four categories: declarations, on-site measures, other measures, and investigations of alleged use. As a rule, Western States advocated a high level of openness and transparency, while the non-aligned were somewhat more concerned with the problems that intrusiveness could create. Two areas where differences were evident were challenge inspections and investigations of alleged use. A number of countries spoke of the need to clearly define the criteria for triggering each of these two measures and objected to any attempt to automatically turn a challenge inspection into an investigation of alleged use. A long list of possible “triggers”, acting separately as well as in combination, was discussed by the Group.⁶ Western and Eastern States favoured criteria that would allow the capture of a number of facilities sufficient to ensure that the substantial ones would not slip through the net. At the same time, they felt that the criteria should not be so vague as to encompass the entire biological production of any given country. A majority of the participants supported the idea of creating a body that would verify compliance through a core of international inspectors and that would also cover cooperation in the exchange of technology and scientific know-how.

⁶ It was recognized that a State party might be required to submit a declaration if any single one, or any combination of the following criteria applied in its territory: military and military-related bio-defence programmes/facilities; high-containment facilities; work with listed pathogens and toxins; aerobiology-aerosol dissemination; production microbiology; genetic manipulation; equipment and other criteria.

With regard to the surveillance of publications, one of the categories of *confidence-building and transparency measures*, the Group felt that some guidelines limiting the quantity of surveyed publications would be advisable, and duplication should be avoided. Non-aligned countries stressed their interest in gaining broader access to scientific publications, while some Western States felt that publications could be provided only on a voluntary basis.

The collection and survey of data on national exports and imports generated a great deal of interest, but was discussed relatively briefly since it was also under consideration as a mandatory measure in the context of compliance measures. Two issues were examined. There was concern to ensure confidentiality of the information to be provided. It was also expected that the collection of national data might require the introduction of national regulations or changes in existing ones. Since legislation directly related to exports and imports is absent in most countries, it was considered necessary that countries having such legislation provide information on it to serve as a possible model for other States. Meanwhile, the existence or absence of such legislation could not be regarded as an indication of compliance or non-compliance. Other points raised were the advisability of information-sharing between the future organization and non-governmental organizations, given the potentially confidential nature of some of the information to be provided, and exchange visits of experts. It was generally accepted that all these measures would be voluntary and non-mandatory in nature, although the possibility of including them in a legally binding instrument was also envisaged.

Discussions on the *definition of terms and objective criteria* were of a highly scientific and technical nature and were not as politically charged as other issues.

The results of the discussions and the exchange of views in the four areas were reflected in papers by friends of the chair and annexed to the report of the Ad Hoc Group at the end of its third session.⁷

Chemical weapons

The year 1995 marked the 80th anniversary of the first large-scale incident of chemical warfare during World War I. It was also the year

⁷ BWC/AD HOC GROUP/29.

when incidents of chemical terrorism in Japan highlighted the fact that chemical weapons proliferation is indeed a real and serious threat. At a commemorative ceremony on 22 April, in the city of Ypres, Belgium, the international community was again reminded of the necessity of eliminating forever an entire class of weapons of mass destruction—a goal that could now be achieved through universal adherence to and full compliance with the CWC—and efforts towards that end intensified throughout the year. In connection with chemical terrorism, it was recognized that while the Convention was not specifically designed to address that phenomenon, upon entry into force, it would provide a forum and means for coordinating appropriate responses to the threat of terrorist attacks.

The 19 ratifications deposited by the beginning of January 1995 proved that the initial expectations that the Convention would enter into force two years after its opening for signature—some 180 days after the deposit of the 65th instrument of ratification—had been unrealistic.⁸ On the second anniversary of its opening for signature, in a letter sent to all Member States, the Secretary-General, as depositary, reminded them of the importance of universal adherence to and entry into force of this treaty. Subsequently, in anticipation of the 50th anniversary celebration in October, he again communicated with those States that had either not signed, or signed but not yet ratified, the Convention, stating that the number of ratifications so far was not an acceptable state of affairs and concluding that “actions speak louder than words”. In his report to the Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Executive Secretary of the Commission stated that “1995 has been in many ways a disappointing and frustrating year for the Commission”.

In an effort to promote early ratification, the outgoing and incoming chairmen of the Commission and the executive secretary—the three constituting a “Troika”—visited the United States in September and the Russian Federation in October in order to stress the importance of the two major possessors of chemical weapons being among the first 65 States to ratify the Convention. They also conveyed other Member States’ concerns that such delay in the ratification process could have negative implications for the Convention. Very senior officials in both capitals let it be known that they shared these concerns

⁸ As of 24 June 1996, 54 States had ratified the Convention.

and briefed the Troika on the important steps that had been taken in the preparation for the fulfilment of their countries' obligations under the Convention. By the end of the year, the Provisional Technical Secretariat stated officially that it considered late 1996 or early 1997 as a possible time-frame for entry into force of the Convention.

Meanwhile, the lack of progress in resolving outstanding issues was raising some concerns. In the field of verification-related activities, the keystone of the treaty, it was possible only to adopt the draft OPCW confidentiality policy and to agree on technical specifications for inspection equipment. Other issues, some of them essential, still showed no sign of early resolution. In his statement before the First Committee, the executive secretary mentioned among them: technical issues related to declarations in the chemical industry and chemical weapons facilities; detailed procedures related to verification of old and abandoned chemical weapons; the timing of harmonizing national export control legislation with the provisions of article XI, on "Economic and technological development" (discussed below); the ultimate scope of the analytical database and technical aspects of challenge inspection.

In its own area of responsibility, namely, the building of the future institution, the Provisional Technical Secretariat was able to make some progress.⁹ It completed the huge task of selecting the future inspectors who will be recruited and trained before the CWC enters into force. Those who will be trained and employed within the first six months after entry into force will be selected later, in 1996. In a related area, the Secretariat almost completed the general training scheme for the inspector trainees.

A number of legal activities were also undertaken, including agreements on the future OPCW Laboratory and specific assistance to member States by, for example, the elaboration of "the model act to implement the Convention" for those States with no chemical weapons and few or no facilities to declare. Some consultations were carried out on issues related to chemical weapons dumped at sea.

⁹ The Secretariat now employs 116 staff members, representing 45 nationalities. In the area of Technical Cooperation and Assistance, the Secretariat has established a "Website", which makes information on the Convention available to a large audience. It can be reached under the Internet address: <http://www.opcw.nl/>.

Some other issues were still under discussion at the end of the year: the preparation for the first Conference of States Parties; the transition between the Preparatory Commission and the OPCW; and the status of the future Organization *vis-à-vis* the United Nations system.

Lack of agreement between non-aligned, developing States and States members of the Australia Group¹⁰ with respect to implementation of article XI persisted. Several delegations and regional groups objected to the maintenance of a parallel export controls regime after entry into force of the Convention, stating that the non-discriminatory nature of the Convention would be greatly undermined by such action. Moreover, at the non-aligned summit meeting held in Cartagena, Colombia, the heads of State of the Non-Aligned Movement reiterated their concerns,¹¹ noting that restrictions placed on access to technology through the imposition of non-transparent ad hoc export control regimes with exclusive membership tended to impede the economic and social development of developing countries.

The Australia Group, meeting in Paris in October, discussed the continuing incidence of chemical and biological weapons proliferation and the implementation of article XI against the background of obligations under the CWC. The Group considered that "national export licensing policies in the chemical sphere therefore fulfil the obligation established under article I of the CWC that States Parties never assist, in any way, the manufacture of CW. These measures are also consistent with the undertaking in article XI ... as they are focused solely on preventing assistance to activities banned under the CWC."¹² The participants reaffirmed their national commitments to the statement made

¹⁰ The membership of the Australia Group at its October 1995 meeting was as follows: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States, with Romania taking part for the first time. The Australia Group had, in 1985, initiated informal consultations among producers on harmonizing export control policies in the absence of a global agreement on chemical weapons.

¹¹ The Eleventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries was held at Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, from 18 to 20 October (A/50/752-S/1995/1035, annex III, para. 88).

¹² Press release of the Australia Group Meeting, October 1995.

on behalf of the members of the Australia Group participating in the CD in August 1992 to the effect that they would review those measures in the light of the implementation of the Convention.¹³ The terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons was also a topic for discussion at that meeting, which noted that "recent developments had heightened concerns about such risks".

UNSCOM

UNSCOM, under the chairmanship of Rolf Ekeus of Sweden, continued to implement its mandate under Security Council resolution 687 (1991) as well as subsequent resolutions.¹⁴

The year 1995 was an important one for UNSCOM in many respects. It saw the completion and refinement of the ongoing monitoring and verification regime that was designed to ensure that Iraq would not re-acquire proscribed weapons or long-range missiles. The Commission's Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre became fully staffed with resident experts and continued to expand its capabilities. The Commission's experts saw a major increase in their understanding of the proscribed weapons programmes of Iraq, owing in large part to its long-awaited acknowledgement and confirmation of the Commission's own findings of the broad scope and advanced status of Iraq's biological weapons programme. The year also saw ultimatums and threats of cessation of cooperation with the Commission if there was no progress in the Security Council on the lifting of sanctions and the oil embargo.

The August defection of a high-ranking Iraqi official who was heavily involved in Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programmes opened a new phase in UNSCOM's relationship with that State. Following the defection, Iraq admitted that it had been withholding important information from the Commission and the IAEA and agreed to cooperate from then on. As a result, the Commission was able to take possession of a large

¹³ The statement of the Australia Group read in part: "to review, in the light of the implementation of the Convention, the measures that they take to prevent the spread of chemical substances and equipment for purposes contrary to the objectives of the Convention, with the aim of removing such measures for the benefit of States parties to the Convention acting in full compliance with their obligations under the Convention" (CD/1164).

¹⁴ Four reports were submitted by UNSCOM to the Security Council during 1995 (S/1995/284, 494, 864 and 1038).

cache of documents, films, microfiches and other materials relating to Iraq's banned weapons programmes. Thereafter, in a reversal of its earlier denial, Iraq admitted that, prior to the outbreak of the war in the Persian Gulf, it had weaponized biological agents and filled them into a number of bombs and warheads for long-range Al-Hussein missiles. Iraq also acknowledged a much larger and more advanced programme than it had previously admitted for the production and storage of the chemical warfare agent VX. It also admitted to having developed prototypes of binary sarin-filled munitions and having carried out flight tests of long-range missiles with chemical warheads.

The Commission's investigations and Iraq's disclosure of the various prohibited weapons programmes during 1995 continued to narrow the number of unresolved issues. However, UNSCOM still believed that Iraq needed to provide it with more verifiable evidence to ascertain the accuracy of Iraq's declarations on issues such as the quantities of materials produced or acquired or disposed of. At the end of 1995, the Commission remained concerned over ongoing activities in Iraq in prohibited areas, in particularly the missile area; it had information that Iraq was continuing to acquire components and conduct a clandestine programme on missiles capable of reaching beyond the 150 kilometre-range laid down by the Security Council.

General Assembly, 1995

Hungary introduced in the First Committee on 26 October a draft resolution entitled "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction", which was later revised to indicate the dates of the Fourth Review Conference and of the Preparatory Committee.

On 15 November, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution without a vote. After the vote, Israel explained that it joined the consensus because it supported the objective of global prohibition of biological weapons, and that any arrangement reached must include all the States in the region of the Middle East. In addition, Israel stated that the establishment of a credible verification regime for the Convention was necessary.

On 12 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, also without a vote, as resolution 50/79. It reads as follows:

Resolution 50/79

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

The General Assembly,

Recalling its previous resolutions relating to the complete and effective prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and to their destruction,

Noting with satisfaction that there are more than one hundred and thirty States parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, including all the permanent members of the Security Council,

Bearing in mind its call upon all States parties to the Convention to participate in the implementation of the recommendations of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, including the exchange of information and data agreed to in the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference, and to provide such information and data in conformity with standardized procedure to the Secretary-General on an annual basis and no later than 15 April,

Recalling its resolution 46/35 A, adopted without a vote on 6 December 1991, in which it welcomed, *inter alia*, the establishment, proceeding from the recommendations of the Third Review Conference, of an ad hoc group of governmental experts open to all States parties to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint,

Recalling also its resolution 48/65, adopted without a vote on 16 December 1993, in which it commended the final report of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint, agreed to by consensus at the last meeting of the Ad Hoc Group at Geneva on 24 September 1993,

Recalling further its resolution 49/86, adopted without a vote on 15 December 1994, in which it welcomed the final report of the Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, adopted by consensus on 30 September 1994, in which the States parties agreed to establish an ad hoc group, open to all States parties, whose objective should be to consider appropriate measures, including possible verification measures, and draft proposals to strengthen the Convention, to be included, as appropriate, in a legally binding instrument to be submitted for the consideration of the States parties,

Recalling the provisions of the Convention related to scientific and technological cooperation and the related provisions of the Final Document of the Third Review Conference, the final report of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts and the final report of the Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention, held from 19 to 30 September 1994,

1. *Welcomes* the information and data provided to date, and reiterates its call upon all States parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction to participate in the exchange of information and data agreed to in the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention;

2. *Also welcomes* the work begun by the Ad Hoc Group in pursuing the mandate established by the Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on 30 September 1994 and urges the Ad Hoc Group, in accordance with its mandate, to complete its work as soon as possible and submit its report, which shall be adopted by consensus, to the States parties to be considered at the Fourth Review Conference or later at a Special Conference;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to render the necessary assistance to the depositary Governments of the Convention and to provide such services as may be required for the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the Third Review Conference, as well as the decisions contained in the final report of the Special Conference, including all necessary assistance to the Ad Hoc Group;

4. *Notes* that, at the request of the States parties, a Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention will be held at Geneva from 25 November to 13 December 1996, that, following appropriate consultations, a Preparatory Committee for that Conference has been formed, open to all parties to the Convention, and that the Committee will meet at Geneva from 9 to 12 April 1996;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services as may be required for the Fourth Review Conference and its preparations;

6. *Calls upon* all signatory States that have not yet ratified the Convention to do so without delay, and also calls upon those States that have not signed the Convention to become parties thereto at an early date, thus contributing to the achievement of universal adherence to the Convention;

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-first session the item entitled "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction".

On 7 November, Canada introduced a draft resolution entitled "Status of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction", which was ultimately sponsored by 52 States and which the sponsors considered to be procedural. On 10 November, Cuba, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan submitted amendments, which referred, *inter alia*, to the "removal of existing restrictions in the economic and technological areas". In spite of extensive discussions, it was not possible to find consensus text, and, in the end, Canada withdrew the draft resolution. Iran thereupon stated that it would not press the amendments to action.

South Africa, on behalf of the members of the Group of African States, submitted a draft resolution entitled "Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes". On 10 November, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution without a vote.

The United States, while sympathetic to the main thrust of the draft resolution, which, it believed, expressed legitimate concern about the potential hazards of the irresponsible disposal of nuclear wastes, reiterated its view that the First Committee was not the appropriate forum in which to deal with this matter. Australia took the opportunity to inform the Committee of a related development: in September, at the Twenty-sixth South Pacific Forum, held in New Guinea, the Convention to Ban the Importation into Forum Island Countries of Hazardous and Radioactive Wastes and to Control the Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within the South Pacific Region—the Waigani Convention—had been adopted and opened for signature.

On 12 December, the General Assembly also adopted the resolution without a vote, as resolution 50/70 E. It reads as follows:

Resolution 50/70 E

Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind resolutions CM/Res.1153 (XLVIII) of 1988 and CM/Res.1225 (L) of 1989, adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, concerning the dumping of nuclear and industrial wastes in Africa,

Welcoming resolution GC(XXXIV)/Res/530 establishing a Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste,

adopted on 21 September 1990 by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency at its thirty-fourth regular session,

Welcoming also resolution GC(XXXVIII)/Res/6, adopted on 23 September 1994 by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency at its thirty-eighth regular session, inviting the Board of Governors and the Director-General of the Agency to commence preparations for a convention on the safety of radioactive waste management,

Considering its resolution 2602 C (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, in which it requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, *inter alia*, to consider effective methods of control against the use of radiological methods of warfare,

Recalling resolution CM/Res.1356 (LIV) of 1991, adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, on the Bamako Convention on the Ban on the Import of Hazardous Wastes into Africa and on the Control of Their Transboundary Movements within Africa,

Aware of the potential hazards underlying any use of radioactive wastes that would constitute radiological warfare and its implications for regional and international security, in particular for the security of developing countries,

Recalling its resolutions 43/75 Q of 7 December 1988, 44/116 R of 15 December 1989, 45/58 K of 4 December 1990, 46/36 K of 6 December 1991, 47/52 D of 9 December 1992, 48/75 D of 16 December 1993 and 49/75 A of 15 December 1994,

Desirous of promoting the implementation of paragraph 76 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament,

1. *Takes note* of the part of the report of the Conference on Disarmament relating to a future convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons;

2. *Expresses grave concern* regarding any use of nuclear wastes that would constitute radiological warfare and have grave implications for the national security of all States;

3. *Calls upon* all States to take appropriate measures with a view to preventing any dumping of nuclear or radioactive wastes that would infringe upon the sovereignty of States;

4. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to take into account, in the negotiations for a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons, radioactive wastes as part of the scope of such a convention;

5. *Also requests* the Conference on Disarmament to intensify efforts towards an early conclusion of such a convention and to include in its report to the General Assembly at its fifty-first session the progress recorded in the negotiations on this subject;

6. *Takes note* of resolution CM/Res.1356 (LIV) of 1991, adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, on the Bamako Convention on the Ban on the Import of Hazardous Wastes into Africa and on the Control of Their Transboundary Movements within Africa;

7. *Expresses the hope* that the effective implementation of the International Atomic Energy Agency Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste will enhance the protection of all States from the dumping of radioactive wastes on their territories;

8. *Welcomes* current efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the preparation of a draft convention on the safe management of radioactive waste;

9. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-first session the item entitled "Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes".

Conclusion

In spite of its strong resolve in the early 1990s to put an end to two categories of weapons of mass destruction that had actually been used in combat or the use of which had been threatened, by the end of 1995 the international community had not yet reached agreement on how to strengthen the BWC so as to enable it to respond more fully to today's instabilities, and the CWC, confronted with parliamentary delays and lengthy technical discussions, had not yet entered into force. Moreover, in the course of the year, the broad scope and advanced status of Iraq's biological weapons and chemical weapons programmes was confirmed. And last but not least, the world was shocked by the terrorist attacks with chemical weapons in Japan.

As the Secretary-General has stated¹⁵ in strong terms: "At a moment when substantial disarmament is finally beginning to occur, there can be no justification for any State, anywhere, to acquire the tools and technologies of mass destruction". Treaties must be strengthened and implemented; compliance by Member States must be verified. In providing an appropriate forum to foster effective and non-discriminatory solutions to the problems of arms limitation and disarmament, the United Nations stands ready to assist Member States in their pursuit of international peace and security.

¹⁵ See *New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.IX.8), para. 27. The report was originally issued as a document of the First Committee (A/C.1/47/7).

CHAPTER VII

Conventional weapons

Introduction

QUESTIONS OF THE REGULATION AND REDUCTION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS and armed forces have been on the disarmament agenda of the United Nations since the Organization was created, with varying degrees of emphasis.¹ In the 1950s, the General Assembly dealt with the subject in the context of ways and means to achieve the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments and to achieve general and complete disarmament.² Later, when attention shifted towards partial objectives, the emphasis tended to be on nuclear rather than conventional arms.

However, the need to address conventional disarmament in a systematic way was increasingly recognized throughout the 1980s, as evidenced by the preparation of an expert study on the subject³ and the fact that the First Committee and the Disarmament Commission⁴ placed it on their respective agendas. Developments in the early 1990s have given impetus to this trend. The relaxation of East-West tensions facilitated agreement between the two military blocs and led to the end

¹ See *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945–1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), chap. 2. See in particular resolution 41 (I) of 14 December 1946.

² See *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945–1970*, chap. 4.

³ See the 1984 expert study on conventional disarmament (A/39/348), subsequently issued as a United Nations publication (Sales No. E.85.IX.1), and summarized in *The Yearbook*, vol. 9: 1984, chap. XXV.

⁴ See the text on conventional disarmament elaborated by the Disarmament Commission in 1990 (A/45/42), para. 34, and reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 15: 1990, chap. XV, annex.

of the cold war. At the same time, however, there has been an outbreak of devastating intra-State conflicts in which conventional weapons have played a crucial role. In its attempts to address questions of conventional arms, the international community has adopted two approaches: the regulation and, in some instances, the actual reduction, of arms through treaties, on the one hand, and the promotion of transparency and confidence-building, on the other.

The former approach has been implemented at the regional level, in Europe, through the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (discussed in chapter IX) and at the global level, through the Certain Conventional Weapons Convention, which places restrictions on weapons that are considered to be excessively injurious (see chapter VIII).

The latter approach has been taken in addressing the question of arms transfers—a subject that is complex and gives rise to many questions.⁵ The first concrete measure at the global level was taken in 1991, when the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to establish a register of conventional arms to which States could voluntarily report their imports and exports of seven categories of major weapons systems.⁶ The possibility of instituting such a confidence-building mechanism in various regional contexts has also been considered. In addition, the broader question of transparency in armaments has been discussed in the Conference on Disarmament.

This chapter deals with general issues at the global level concerning conventional weapons: transparency, arms transfers and the Arms Register, efforts to curb the flow of light weapons and the new arrangement established for export controls for conventional arms. Regional aspects of these subjects, for instance fact-finding missions, are discussed in chapter IX.

⁵ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 1: 1976, chap. XIX. See also the 1991 expert study on arms transfers (A/46/301), issued as *Study on Ways and Means of Promoting Transparency in International Transfers of Conventional Arms* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.IX.6), and summarized in *The Yearbook*: vol. 18: 1993.

⁶ The Secretary-General established the Register on 1 January 1992. The first submissions, covering the calendar year 1992, were made in April 1993.

Developments and trends, 1995

Register of Conventional Arms

Since its establishment in 1992 as a confidence-building measure designed to improve security relations among States and thus to help prevent excessive accumulations of arms, the Register of Conventional Arms has seen a progressive increase in its relevance and impact. The sustained participation of most major exporter States has been an important factor in that trend. Wider participation, nevertheless, has remained a crucial concern. In his report on the work of the Organization, the Secretary-General stressed that transparency measures, such as the Register, must be strengthened, and confidence-building and disarmament initiatives at the regional level should be developed further.⁷

In October, the Secretary-General published the third annual report on the Register, containing data and information on arms transfers provided by Governments for the calendar year 1994.⁸ Additional information was submitted after the publication of the report⁹ and, as of April 1996, the Register contained data and information provided by 93 Governments on international arms transfers in the seven categories covered. The composite table of replies for the calendar year 1994 is reproduced on page 155.

The level of participation in the Register was similar to that of the preceding two years. A comparative chart of the submissions by

⁷ A/50/1, para. 948.

⁸ A/50/547 and Add.1-4, and Corr.1. The Register submissions for the two previous years were described and assessed in *The Yearbook*, vol. 18:1993, and vol. 19:1994. Information received from Governments is presented in the report as follows: (a) a composite table listing all replies received and indicating whether a reply contains data on imports or on exports or on both, and whether any additional explanations and background information are included; (b) the data submitted by individual Governments, and relevant explanations; (c) an index by State of the type of background information submitted, for example, data on national holdings and procurement, relevant legislation and policies. The background information is available at the Centre for Disarmament Affairs for consultation.

⁹ Information for the calendar year 1994 may be submitted until the close of the fiftieth session and will be issued as addenda to document A/50/547.

Governments from 1992 to 1994, broken down by types of reports on exports and imports, is given below:

**Submissions on exports and imports
1992-1994**

	1992	1993	1994
Exports:			
Data submitted	24	24	22
“Nil” reports	52	58	65
No data submitted	17	9	6
Total submissions	93	91	93
Imports:			
Data submitted	39	30	41
“Nil” reports	41	56	47
No data submitted	13	5	5
Total submissions	93	91	93

Of the 93 Governments submitting data for 1994, 14 reported both exports and imports and 40 reported “nil” for both exports and imports.

As in previous years, the number of countries reporting represented only half of the United Nations membership, thus the Register has not yet reached the much desired goal of universality. Nevertheless, since all major arms exporters submitted data, the bulk of the international arms trade in the seven categories of the Register was once again covered. In fact, compared with other sources of information publicly available, the data provided by Governments to the Register revealed a considerable number of previously unknown arms transfers.

At its meeting in June, the Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters recommended that States currently participating in the Register should encourage others to do so through a “partnership approach”, and should offer to assist them in the political and technical aspects of reporting. The Secretary-General commended that suggestion.¹⁰

¹⁰ A/50/391, para. 20.

Twenty-two Governments reported exports and 41 reported imports for 1994. The majority of replies on exports and imports came from Governments that were not involved in transactions covered by the Register and that, therefore, submitted “nil” reports. The submission of such reports is considered to be an important contribution to the value of the Register as a confidence-building mechanism.

As Member States are asked to report both exports and imports, the Register allows for cross-checking or comparison of the data provided. Thus it is possible to determine the extent to which the report on the exports of one State and the imports of another match when reporting the same transfer. Cross-checking by itself does not, however, permit any judgement on the accuracy of either set of figures. In 1994, the level of consistency between exports and imports reported for the categories of large calibre artillery systems, attack helicopters or warships remained very high. Greater discrepancies appeared to exist in the categories of armoured combat vehicles and missiles and missile launchers. Non-participation of one side in the reporting of a transaction—because of national security concerns, difficulties in compiling national statistics, legal obstacles, and conflicting interpretations of what constitutes a “transfer” or of the definitions of the categories—are certainly factors that may account for the mismatches or discrepancies.

Not all importers participated in the Register.¹¹ Most “import” transactions were nonetheless reflected in the submissions by the major exporters. In 1994, 20 States that were identified by exporting States as recipients of arms covered by the Register—as compared to 22 in 1993 and 28 in 1992—either did not report on those imports or did not participate at all in the information exchange.

Participation among regions continued to vary widely but fairly consistently, as had already been observed by the 1994 Group of Governmental Experts.¹² The submissions for 1994 revealed again high participation from Western Europe and a continuing rise in participation from Asia and from Latin America and the Caribbean. Participation from Africa and the Middle East was still low. These trends could be attributed to differences in the security environments and concerns

¹¹ The number of transfers reported on export forms was 155 and the number of transfers reported on import forms was 116.

¹² See the report of the Group of Governmental Experts (A/49/316), annex.

of the States involved. For instance, many Central African delegations held the view that the Register in its present form was too restrictive in the categories of weapons that it covered.¹³

The question of establishing regional or subregional registers as a means to promote wider participation continued to receive broad attention in a number of regional forums during 1995. The Secretary-General's Advisory Board expressed its support again for this concept and commended the Centre for Disarmament Affairs, and its regional centres, for including this option in its programme to promulgate the merits of transparency through the Register.¹⁴ The Centre for Disarmament Affairs, in cooperation with the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, organized a one-day workshop on the Register in March in Brazzaville, Congo, for members of the Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa.¹⁵ Many of the participants, addressing the question of a subregional arms register and the promotion of transparency, believed that a register established within the Committee, which would take into account data such as force levels and light weapons, could be a valid contribution to the United Nations Register. They also reiterated a particular regional concern: effective control over the illicit flow of arms. In the context of other regional efforts to complement global measures, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), at its 1995 session, considered participation in the Register among the approaches to transparency that could be discussed in a specific regional security context.¹⁶

In addition to the data and information on international arms transfers in the seven categories of the Register, resolution 46/36 L and subsequent resolutions invited Member States to provide information on their military holdings and procurement through national production, national export and import policies and legislation. In 1995, the number of Governments submitting relevant background information remained at the level of previous years. Of the 33 Governments report-

¹³ See the report of the 6th and 7th meetings of the Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa (A/50/474), para. 11.

¹⁴ A/50/391, para. 20.

¹⁵ See footnote 13.

¹⁶ See document A/50/276/Add.1, Australia.

ing this information, 24 reported on military holdings and 17 on procurement through national production.

The differences in approach that had characterized discussions in 1994 on the Register's continuing operation and further development, preventing the Group of Governmental Experts from formulating a consensus proposal, persisted. Almost all the Member States¹⁷ that expressed their views on the Register, as requested at the forty-ninth session, stressed that its effectiveness as a global confidence-building measure would be enhanced if the widest possible participation could be secured. Their positions with regard to early expansion of its scope, however, still varied. Those who argued for expansion to include data and information on military holdings and procurement through national production believed that such information would increase its value as a confidence-building measure. Others held that the Register should be expanded to include weapons of mass destruction. Still others believed that sweeping changes to the Register process would jeopardize its consolidation and would have adverse effects on the objective of achieving its universality.

Micro-disarmament

In his "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace", the Secretary-General coined the term "micro-disarmament" to describe disarmament in the context of weapons used in conflicts everyday.¹⁸ Later, in various forums, he explained the term more fully. He cast micro-disarmament in operational terms, as "action to control and reduce the massive production, transfer, and stockpiling of light weapons around the world".¹⁹

¹⁷ The following Member States provided their views: Australia, France (on behalf of EU), Jamaica, Japan, Philippines, Slovenia and United Kingdom (A/50/276 and Add.1).

¹⁸ A/50/60-S/1995/1, paras. 60–65. In the "Supplement", the Secretary-General also included practical enforcement action, such as UNSCOM, in the field of micro-disarmament. In subsequent statements, however, he has not emphasized that particular aspect.

¹⁹ In the UNIDIR study entitled "Small Arms and Intra-State Conflicts" of March 1995 (see next section) small arms are described, *inter alia*, as conventional weapons that can be carried by an individual combatant or by a light vehicle, and do not require an extensive logistical and maintenance capability. (UNIDIR Research Paper No. 34, Sales No. G.V.E.95.0.7, pp. 2–7).

He stressed the practical role it was already playing in United Nations-sponsored peace-keeping operations and post-conflict peace-building—fields in which the Organization had seen a dramatic increase in activity since the end of the cold war. Especially in the area of post-conflict peace-building, the Secretary-General has consistently drawn the attention of Member States to the land-mines crisis and has often referred to the issue in the context of micro-disarmament. During his 1995 message to the First Committee, he emphasized the need for micro-disarmament to “deal with specific, pragmatic, and achievable goals in the area of conventional weapons.”

Because light weapons are readily available at minimal cost, are widely used, and are difficult to track, initial efforts at the multilateral level in micro-disarmament have concentrated on regions experiencing severe difficulties in regulating the flow of small arms. A case in point was the advisory mission in the Saharo-Sahelian subregion. The Secretary-General’s involvement came at the request of the President of Mali in 1994, who recognized that his country’s problem might best be addressed with United Nations assistance. In 1995, the mission continued its efforts there and outlined recommendations. (See chapter IX.)

In 1995, United Nations interest in micro-disarmament rapidly began to expand, not because it is a new field—the proliferation and use of light weapons has existed for centuries—but because this field now lends itself to further development owing to recent progress in disarmament: notably, the reduced threat of nuclear annihilation since the end of the cold war, substantial bilateral cuts in nuclear arsenals, wide support and intensive efforts towards the completion of the CTBT, and progress in the non-proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction. During the fiftieth session of the Assembly, the international community increased efforts to stem the proliferation of light weapons by adopting resolutions on a study on small arms, on curbing the illicit flow of small arms, on conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels, and on banning the export of anti-personnel land-mines.

Small and light arms

The Secretary-General was among the first to urge that a search should begin to effectively tackle the problems related to small arms. He said in his “Supplement to an Agenda for Peace”:

“The world is awash with them and traffic in them is very difficult to monitor, let alone intercept. The causes are many: the earlier supply of weapons to client States by the parties to the cold war, internal conflicts, competition for commercial markets, criminal activity and the collapse of governmental law and order functions (which both gives free rein to the criminals and creates a legitimate reason for ordinary citizens to acquire weapons for their own defence).”²⁰

The issues raised in his report were discussed at a workshop organized by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in cooperation with the United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs in November 1994. Based upon the discussions at the workshop, UNIDIR published, in 1995, a study entitled *Small Arms and Intra-State Conflicts*. The study described the distinguishing characteristics of small arms and highlighted the major trends in their acquisition. It provided a global profile of intra-State conflicts to examine linkages between easy availability of small arms and increasing incidence of intra-State armed conflicts. The findings and conclusions of the study pointed to some limitations in applying the existing paradigms of disarmament in dealing with issues raised by small arms.²¹

The findings and conclusions of the UNIDIR study were presented to the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters at its meeting held in New York in June 1995. At that meeting, members of the Board discussed the possibility of introducing a resolution on the subject of small arms at the fiftieth session of the General Assembly.

The draft resolution that was subsequently submitted—an initiative of Japan—was the subject of an extensive debate in the First Committee, reflecting the varying perspectives and concerns of Member States. The resolution requested the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of a panel of governmental experts, a report on the types of small arms and light weapons actually being used in conflicts dealt with by the United Nations; the nature and causes of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons, including their illicit production and trade; and the ways and means to prevent such an occurrence. (See page 149 for an account of action on resolution 50/70 B.)

²⁰ A/50/60-S/1995/1, para 63.

²¹ UNIDIR – Research Paper No. 34, “Small Arms and Intra-State Conflicts”.

The text was sponsored by States belonging to all geographical, political and military groupings. Ten of the sponsors belonging to the Western Group later withdrew their sponsorship after the text was amended to include a reference to the right to self-determination, but voted nevertheless in favour of the resolution as a whole. The resolution was adopted with no negative votes and with 16 abstentions, among them, India, Indonesia and Pakistan. Some States pointed out that, as a separate category of weapons, "small arms" had yet to be defined and that the text did not distinguish between conventional arms transfers (a broad issue) and illicit arms transfers (which apply only to specific countries). Others expressed serious reservations regarding the modalities for carrying out the study. The report is to be submitted to the the General Assembly at its fifty-second session.

Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls

After the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), established in 1949 to prevent the transfer of sensitive technology to Eastern Europe, was officially disbanded in March 1994, talks were held to create a successor regime with a much broader membership. On 19 December, 28 States,²² comprising both Western and Eastern countries, agreed to establish the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, with a secretariat in Vienna.

Disarmament Commission, 1995

The Disarmament Commission studied the item "International arms transfers, with particular reference to General Assembly resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991" for the second year of its three-year consideration. The relevant Working Group, chaired by the representative of Germany, agreed that the guidelines to be elaborated, while

²² Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States. The Wassenaar Arrangement takes its name from the town outside The Hague where the negotiations took place.

pertaining to the broad subject area of international arms transfers, would focus on the illicit arms trade, as does resolution 46/36 H. The chairman of the Group proposed a structure for the guidelines, and the Group decided to use as a basis for its work a paper that he submitted. In the course of the deliberations, many delegations put forward their views and proposals, which were taken into account in revisions of the working paper. At its last meeting, the Group decided to annex to its report the latest revision of the working paper as a basis for future work, without prejudice to the position of any delegation.²³

Conference on Disarmament, 1995

Despite general agreement that the item of transparency in armaments was an important matter for the CD to consider, divergent views persisted on what subjects the item should cover and whether to continue deliberations within the same framework as in 1994. Consequently, there was no consensus on the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments during the 1995 session of the Conference. Moreover, the question of its re-establishment became linked to the re-establishment of other Conference committees.

The Western and Eastern European Groups proposed that the Committee be re-established on the basis of the same mandate it had in 1993 and 1994.²⁴ There was a general feeling in both Groups that consideration of the item during the previous two years had resulted in a number of interesting proposals that deserved further discussion.

The Group of 21, however, reiterated its strong opposition to limiting transparency to only certain types of conventional weapons. It called, instead, for linking transparency in conventional arms to transparency in weapons of mass destruction. Many developing countries also maintained that the mandate of the previous Ad Hoc Committee had been exhausted, and proposed the appointment of a special coordinator to conduct consultations on a new mandate.

²³ See the report of the Disarmament Commission to the General Assembly in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fiftieth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/50/42)*, para. 25.

²⁴ CD/1150.

General Assembly, 1995

A draft resolution entitled "Transparency in armaments" was introduced by the representative of the Netherlands on 7 November. He explained that the draft resolution reconfirmed the provisions of the previous year's resolution, requesting the convening of a group of governmental experts in 1997 to review the operation of the Register and its further development and inviting the CD to consider continuing its work in the field of transparency.

On 15 November, the First Committee took separate votes on the draft resolution as follows: it adopted operative paragraph 3(b) by a recorded vote of 133 to none, with 12 abstentions and operative paragraph 5 by a vote of 133 to none, with 15 abstentions. It then adopted the draft resolution as a whole by a recorded vote of 137 to none, with 15 abstentions.

A number of States that had abstained on the draft resolution as a whole explained their positions. Algeria, which did not participate in the separate votes, abstained because the frameworks defined in paragraphs 3 (b) and 5 had shown their limitations. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya abstained because it felt that the Register's scope was limited with regard to conventional weapons and would serve no real purpose unless it included the domestic production and stockpiling of those weapons. Moreover, Libya argued that the Register did not underscore the relationship between conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction. Cuba and Mexico believed that 1997 would be too soon to establish a group to prepare an in-depth report on the Register and its further development. They also questioned the need for the CD to continue work on the issue at this time. Mexico stated that a new mandate for an ad hoc committee on transparency would first have to be defined clearly and on a joint basis.

Among other abstaining States, the DPRK questioned whether the Register helped confidence-building and disarmament. In Egypt's view, the emphasis should not be simply on wide participation in a register of selective and limited conventional arms transfers, but rather on true transparency. India, focusing on the need for consolidation of work and greater participation in the Register, doubted the efficacy of convening another expert group in 1997; it voted in favour of having the CD consider transparency in armaments. Indonesia shared India's view regarding the establishment of the group of experts, but did not

believe it was appropriate for the CD to take up the item on transparency. The Islamic Republic of Iran could not support the draft resolution owing to the reference to the work of the CD and specifically the manner in which that work should be treated. Sri Lanka believed that transparency could not be achieved by considering only conventional weapons and ignoring weapons of mass destruction. In the view of the Sudan, the Register should be supplemented by another on weapons of mass destruction; moreover, it believed that the information currently submitted to the Register was usually inaccurate and incomplete.

Both Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, which also abstained, felt that the text did not take account of the situation in the Middle East, and Lebanon noted that it did not provide for all relevant information on national overall production and stockpiling, including nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction.

Among those States that voted in favour of the draft resolution, but with reservations, Israel did not support the references to "military holdings", "procurement through national production" and "weapons of mass destruction". It believed that greater participation in the Register among the countries of the Middle East and the establishment of confidence- and security-building measures in the framework of the Madrid peace process would improve the confidence and transparency of the region. China and Pakistan both abstained on the separate votes. China believed that it was more important to enhance the Register's universality than to expand it, and felt that the CD itself should consider whether to continue the work it had undertaken on the subject. Pakistan had reservations with regard to the supply-side approach to conventional arms control, felt that more time was needed before establishing another expert group, and stated that the CD was not the appropriate forum to deal with the issue of transparency in armaments.

On 12 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution. It was decided, by a recorded vote 142 to none, with 13 abstentions, to retain operative paragraph 3(b), and by a recorded vote of 143 to none, with 17 abstentions, to retain operative paragraph 5. It then adopted the draft resolution, as a whole, by a recorded vote of 149 to none, with 15 abstentions, as resolution 50/70 D. It reads as follows:

Resolution 50/70 D
Transparency in armaments

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 46/36 L of 9 December 1991, 47/52 L of 15 December 1992, 48/75 E of 16 December 1993 and 49/75 C of 15 December 1994,

Continuing to take the view that an enhanced level of transparency in armaments contributes greatly to confidence-building and security among States and that the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms constitutes an important step forward in the promotion of transparency in military matters,

Welcoming the consolidated report of the Secretary-General on the Register, which includes the returns of Member States for 1994,

Welcoming also the response of Member States to the requests contained in paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 46/36 L to provide data on their imports and exports of arms, as well as available background information regarding their military holdings, procurement through national production and relevant policies,

Stressing that the continuing operation of the Register and its further development should be reviewed in order to secure a Register that is capable of attracting the widest possible participation,

1. *Reaffirms its determination* to ensure the effective operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms as provided for in paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and 10 of resolution 46/36 L;

2. *Calls upon* Member States to provide the requested data and information for the Register, on the basis of resolutions 46/36 L and 47/52 L and the annex and appendices to the report of the Secretary-General on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development, to the Secretary-General by 30 April annually;

3. *Reaffirms* its decision, with a view to further development of the Register, to keep the scope of and participation in the Register under review, and, to that end:

(a) *Recalls* its request to Member States to provide the Secretary-General with their views on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development and on transparency measures related to weapons of mass destruction;

(b) *Recalls* its request to the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of governmental experts to be convened in 1997, on the basis of equitable geographical representation, to prepare a report on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development, taking into account the work

of the Conference on Disarmament, the views expressed by Member States and the report of the Secretary-General on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development, with a view to a decision at its fifty-second session;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to ensure that sufficient resources are made available for the Secretariat to operate and maintain the Register;

5. *Invites* the Conference on Disarmament to consider continuing its work undertaken in the field of transparency in armaments;

6. *Reiterates its call upon* all Member States to cooperate at the regional and subregional levels, taking fully into account the specific conditions prevailing in the region or subregion, with a view to enhancing and coordinating international efforts aimed at increased openness and transparency in armaments;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its fifty-first session on the progress made in implementing the present resolution;

8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-first session the item entitled "Transparency in armaments".

On 8 November, Japan introduced a draft resolution entitled "Small arms", the purpose of which was to request the Secretary-General to prepare an expert report on the subject.

In an effort to incorporate a reference to the principle of self-determination in the draft resolution, a number of non-aligned countries—Colombia, Egypt, and Pakistan and the Syrian Arab Republic—put forward amendments. In the end, on 20 November, the Colombian proposal was adopted by a vote of 54 to none, with 88 abstentions. At that time, 10 of the original sponsors of the draft resolution withdrew their sponsorship.²⁵ Among them, the United Kingdom and the United States stated that the amendment was not appropriate in a disarmament forum.

Several States made statements before the vote in the First Committee. Uruguay mentioned that there was no explicit consideration of the phenomenon of mercenary organizations in the draft resolution. Pakistan suggested that it would have been best to invite the views of Member States on the actual situations of instability in various parts of the world instead of entrusting the study to an unknown group of experts with preconceived notions of arms control and peace and security.

²⁵ Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Italy, Malta, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom and United States.

The First Committee then adopted the draft resolution as a whole, as amended, by a recorded vote of 134 to none, with 16 abstentions.

Among those abstaining, India believed the setting up of a panel of experts at this stage was premature. Indonesia maintained that conventional arms transfers and the illegal acquisition of small arms were two distinct issues that should be treated separately; consequently, the group of governmental experts should be given a mandate to examine either the illicit trade in conventional arms or conventional arms transfers. The Russian Federation felt the Colombian amendment politicized the draft resolution, and so it abstained on both votes.

Among those States that voted in favour of the draft resolution as a whole, a number expressed reservations concerning the modalities of the study. The Islamic Republic of Iran questioned the basis upon which the panel of experts would work and noted the absence of concrete views among Member States and the financial implications of the draft resolution. Singapore felt that the panel members, who were to be governmental experts, would merely represent the national positions of their countries; moreover, the draft resolution did not propose any specific criteria for choosing them.

Other States that also voted in favour of the resolution as a whole had reservations regarding the amendment. Spain, on behalf of the EU and 13 other countries,²⁶ stated that they had abstained on the amendment because it was not possible to make references that exceeded the context in which they were drafted. Papua New Guinea, though fully committed to the issue of the self-determination of all peoples, believed that the oral amendment could be handled by other relevant committees.

China, which did not participate in the voting, stated that although it agreed in principle that the Secretary-General should organize a panel of experts to study the issue, it felt the need to study further the meaning and scope of the concept of small arms.

Subsequently, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 140 to none, with 19 abstentions. Resolution 50/70 B reads as follows:

²⁶ Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Norway, Poland, Romania and Slovakia.

Resolution 50/70 B

Small arms

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and the commitment of Member States to take concrete steps in order to strengthen that role,

Realizing the urgent need to resolve underlying conflicts, to diminish tensions and to accelerate efforts towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control with a view to maintaining regional and international peace and security in a world free from the scourge of war and the burden of armaments,

Reaffirming the inherent right to individual or collective self-defence recognized in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, which implies that States also have the right to acquire arms with which to defend themselves,

Reaffirming also the right of self-determination of all peoples, in particular peoples under colonial or other forms of alien domination or foreign occupation, and the importance of the effective realization of this right, as enunciated, *inter alia*, in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights on 25 June 1993,

Realizing that arms obtained through the illicit arms trade are most likely to be used for violent purposes and that even small arms when so obtained, directly or indirectly, by terrorist groups, drug traffickers or underground organizations can pose a danger to regional and international security, and certainly to the security and political stability of the countries affected,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council entitled "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace", which stressed the urgent need for practical disarmament in the context of the conflicts the United Nations is actually dealing with and of the weapons, most of them light weapons, that are actually killing people in the hundreds of thousands, and which identified light weapons as including, *inter alia*, small arms and anti-personnel landmines,

Recalling its resolution 49/75 G of 15 December 1994, in which it welcomed the initiative taken by Mali concerning the question of the illicit circulation of small arms and their collection in the affected States of the Saharo-Saharan subregion, as well as the action taken by the Secretary-General in implementation of this initiative,

Noting the work of the Disarmament Commission on international arms transfers,

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General, within the existing resources, to prepare a report, with the assistance of a panel group of qualified governmental

experts to be nominated by him on the basis of equitable geographical representation, on:

(a) The types of small arms and light weapons actually being used in conflicts being dealt with by the United Nations;

(b) The nature and causes of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons, including their illicit production and trade;

(c) The ways and means to prevent and reduce the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons, in particular as they cause or exacerbate conflict; with particular attention to the role of the United Nations in this field and to the complementary role of regional organizations, and taking into account views and proposals of Member States and all other relevant information, for submission to the General Assembly at its fifty-second session;

2. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to seek the views and proposals of Member States on the matters mentioned in paragraph 1 above, to collect all other relevant information and to make them available for consideration by the panel of governmental experts referred to in paragraph 1 above;

3. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-second session an item entitled "Small arms".

Afghanistan introduced a draft resolution on 8 November entitled "Measures to curb the illicit transfer and use of conventional arms", which was later revised.²⁷

On 15 November, the First Committee took action on it. Prior to the vote, two States, Georgia and Sri Lanka, which were among the sponsors, made statements. The First Committee then adopted the draft resolution without a vote. In explanation of its vote, Spain, on behalf of the EU and 12 other States,²⁸ stated that, with respect to operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution, the member States of the EU wished to affirm their strict adherence to all the arms embargoes imposed by the Security Council and the EU and to reiterate that they were adopting all possible measures to prevent the illicit export of arms and military *matériel*.

²⁷ See the following reports of the Secretary-General concerning illicit traffic: A/50/405 and A/50/465. The latter report contains the views of Belarus, Chile, Finland, San Marino, Ukraine and United Kingdom.

²⁸ Argentina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Lithuania, Malta, Norway, Poland, Romania and Slovakia.

On 12 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, without a vote, as resolution 50/70 J. It reads as follows:

Resolution 50/70 J
Measures to curb the illicit transfer
and use of conventional arms

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991 and its decision 47/419 of 9 December 1992 on international arms transfers,

Recalling also its resolutions 48/75 F and H of 16 December 1993 and 49/75 M of 15 December 1994 on measures to curb the illicit transfer and use of conventional arms,

Recognizing that the availability of massive quantities of conventional weapons and especially their illicit transfer, often associated with destabilizing activities, are most disturbing and dangerous phenomena, in particular for the internal situation of affected States and the violation of human rights,

Bearing in mind that in certain situations mercenaries, terrorists and child soldiers are supplied with weapons acquired from illicit transfers of conventional arms,

Convinced that peace and security are inextricably interlinked with and in some cases imperative for economic development and reconstruction, including in war-stricken countries,

Realizing the urgent need to resolve conflicts and to diminish tension, and to accelerate efforts towards general and complete disarmament with a view to maintaining regional and international peace and security,

Recognizing the curbing of the illicit transfer of arms as an important contribution to the relaxation of tension and peaceful reconciliation processes,

Stressing the need for effective national control measures on the transfer of conventional weapons,

Convinced that effective measures to curb the illicit transfer and use of conventional arms will help enhance regional and international peace, security and economic development,

1. *Invites* Member States:

(a) To take appropriate and effective enforcement measures to seek to ensure that illicit transfers of arms are immediately discontinued;

(b) To provide the Secretary-General promptly with relevant information on national control measures on arms transfers with a view to preventing illicit arms transfers;

2. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission:

(a) To expedite its consideration of the agenda item on international arms transfers, with special emphasis on the adverse consequences of the illicit transfer of arms and ammunition;

(b) To study and report on measures to curb the illicit transfer and use of conventional arms, bearing in mind concrete problems in various regions of the world;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General:

(a) To seek the views of Member States on effective ways and means of collecting weapons transferred illicitly, in particular in the light of experience gained by the United Nations;

(b) To seek the views of Member States on concrete proposals concerning measures at the national, regional and international levels to curb the illicit transfer and use of conventional arms;

(c) To submit to the General Assembly at its fifty-first session a report containing the views expressed by Member States;

4. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its fifty-first session on the effective implementation of the present resolution;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-first session the item entitled "Measures to curb the illicit transfer and use of conventional arms".

Conclusion

This chapter has dealt with only some facets—transparency in international transfers of major weapons systems, micro-disarmament and efforts to curb illicit arms trafficking—of the broad issue of conventional weapons. Developments with respect to land-mines are discussed in chapter VIII and regional aspects in chapter IX.

Despite the continuing differences in approach regarding the Register's further development, the reporting process has stimulated discussions on confidence-building and transparency among all States in all regions. In the context of efforts to increase participation in the Register to the greatest possible extent—which is essential to its further consolidation and effectiveness—steps were taken in 1995 to promote it at the regional and subregional levels through consultation and dialogue on transparency and security, taking into account specific regional security situations.

In his "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace", the Secretary-General focused multilateral attention on avenues to explore for regulating, reducing or eliminating altogether the production, sale, spread and use of small and light arms, including land-mines. In this connection, he referred to his advisory mission to the Government of Mali and other Governments of the Saharo-Sahelian region on possible ways to control the proliferation of small and light weapons.

The publication of the UNIDIR study entitled *Small Arms and Intra-State Conflicts*, the General Assembly's mandate for a report by a group of governmental experts on various aspects of the issue of small arms and light weapons, and the ongoing work of the Disarmament Commission in elaborating guidelines for international arms transfers, focusing on illicit arms trafficking, are all developments that can be expected to give further impetus to international efforts in this field.

ANNEX

Composite table of replies of Governments for the Register of Conventional Arms: 1994

<i>State</i>	<i>Data on imports</i>	<i>Data on exports</i>	<i>Explanation submitted in note verbale</i>	<i>Background information</i>
Argentina	yes	nil		yes
Armenia	nil	nil		yes
Australia	yes	nil		yes
Austria	yes	nil	yes	yes
Bahamas	nil	nil		no
Barbados	nil	nil		no
Belarus		yes		no
Belgium	nil	yes		yes
Belize	nil	nil		no
Benin	nil	nil		no
Bhutan	nil	nil		no
Brazil	yes	nil		yes

<i>State</i>	<i>Data on imports</i>	<i>Data on exports</i>	<i>Explanation submitted in note verbale</i>	<i>Background information</i>
Bulgaria		yes		yes
Burkina Faso	nil	nil		no
Cameroon	nil	nil		no
Canada	yes	yes		yes
Chad	nil	nil		no
Chile	yes	nil		no
China	yes	yes		no
Croatia	nil	nil	yes	no
Cuba	nil	nil		no
Cyprus	yes	nil		no
Czech Republic	nil	yes		yes
Denmark	yes	nil		yes
Dominica	nil	nil		no
Ecuador	nil	nil		no
El Salvador				yes
Estonia	yes	nil		no
Fiji	nil	nil		no
Finland	yes	yes		no
France	yes	yes		yes
Georgia	nil	nil		no
Germany	yes	yes		yes
Greece	yes			yes
Grenada	nil	nil		no
Guyana	nil	nil		no
Hungary	yes			no
Iceland	nil	nil		no
India	yes	nil		no
Indonesia	yes			no

<i>State</i>	<i>Data on imports</i>	<i>Data on exports</i>	<i>Explanation submitted in note verbale</i>	<i>Background information</i>
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	yes	nil		no
Ireland	yes	nil		no
Israel	yes	yes		no
Italy	yes	yes		yes
Jamaica	nil	nil	yes	yes
Japan	yes	nil		yes
Kazakstan	nil	nil		no
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	nil	nil	yes	no
Liechtenstein	nil	nil		no
Luxembourg		nil		no
Malaysia	yes	nil		no
Maldives	nil	nil		no
Malta	nil	nil		yes
Marshall Islands	nil	nil		yes
Mauritania	nil	nil		no
Mexico	yes	nil		yes
Mongolia	nil	nil		no
Nepal	nil	nil		no
Netherlands	yes	yes		yes
New Zealand	yes	nil		yes
Niger	nil	nil		yes
Norway	nil	nil		no
Pakistan	yes	nil		no
Panama	nil	nil	yes	no
Papua New Guinea	nil	nil	yes	no

<i>State</i>	<i>Data on imports</i>	<i>Data on exports</i>	<i>Explanation submitted in note verbale</i>	<i>Background information</i>
Paraguay				yes
Peru	yes	nil		no
Philippines	yes			no
Poland	nil	yes		yes
Portugal	yes	nil		yes
Republic of Korea	yes	yes		yes
Republic of Moldova	yes	yes		no
Romania	yes	yes		no
Russian Federation	nil	yes		no
Saint Lucia	nil	nil		no
Samoa	nil	nil		no
Singapore	yes	nil		no
Slovakia	yes	yes		no
Slovenia	nil	nil		no
Solomon Islands	nil	nil		no
South Africa	nil	yes		yes
Spain	yes	nil		yes
Sweden	yes	nil		yes
Switzerland	nil	nil		yes
Tajikistan	nil	nil		no
Thailand	yes	nil		no
Turkey	yes	nil		no
Ukraine	nil	yes		no

<i>State</i>	<i>Data on imports</i>	<i>Data on exports</i>	<i>Explanation submitted in note verbale</i>	<i>Background information</i>
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	yes	yes		yes
United Republic of Tanzania	nil	nil		no
United States of America	yes	yes	yes	yes
Viet Nam	nil			no
Yugoslavia	nil	nil	yes	no

CHAPTER VIII

Convention on certain conventional weapons

Introduction

THE CONVENTION ON CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS (CCWC) was concluded in 1980¹ as an “umbrella” treaty to which additional specific agreements might be attached in the form of protocols; at the time, three such protocols were concluded, dealing with: non-detectable fragments (Protocol I); mines and booby-traps (Protocol II and a technical annex); and incendiary weapons (Protocol III).² The Convention, of which the Secretary-General is the depositary, entered into force in 1983. It is kept under review in two contexts: wider adherence and broader scope, the latter either through the amendment of its existing protocols to make them more stringent or through the elaboration of additional protocols. By the end of 1995, the Convention had been ratified by 57 States.

The last few years have witnessed a growing number of instances of indiscriminate use of weapons such as land-mines and booby-traps in various conflicts, especially internal conflicts, which take a high toll in human lives and cause widespread economic damage long after hostilities have ceased. Efforts carried out by individual Governments, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), States parties

¹ The full title of the CCWC is Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. A summary of the negotiations leading to its conclusion is contained in document CCW/CONF/I/GE/5.

² The text of the Convention is reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 4th edition: 1992 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.IX.11) (hereinafter referred to as *Status*), vol. 1.

to the Convention, United Nations offices and the non-governmental community resulted in several initiatives to put an end to land-mine proliferation and environmental contamination. Following a request by the States parties in 1993, upon an initiative of France, the Secretary-General established a group of governmental experts to prepare for a review conference of the Convention. The experts met three times in 1994, focusing their attention on strengthening the Convention, especially Protocol II. It was agreed at the end of 1994 that the Review Conference would be convened in 1995.

Pending agreement on how to resolve the crisis caused by the indiscriminate use of land-mines, the United Nations, on the initiative of the United States, has adopted resolutions by consensus since 1993 calling for a moratorium on the export of such weapons. Also since that date, the General Assembly has dealt with an item on mine clearance, and the Secretariat—the Department of Humanitarian Affairs and the Department of Peace-keeping Operations—has undertaken a coordinated programme of action for mine clearance, involving training, in an attempt to address this problem.

Developments and trends, 1995

Efforts to curb the indiscriminate use of certain conventional weapons centred on the first phase of the Review Conference of the CCWC, convened primarily for the purpose of strengthening Protocol II, on land-mines, as discussed below. With a view to strengthening the Convention itself, the Secretary-General, in June, sent letters to the foreign ministers of States not parties to the CCWC, urging their Governments to participate in the Conference as observers and to take steps to ratify or accede to the Convention.

There was also much activity at the unilateral and regional levels directed towards limiting the export of anti-personnel land-mines. By the end of 1995, a large number of countries had instituted or extended moratoria on exports,³ or expanded the scope of already existing regulatory legislation to include, for instance, production of these weapons. The OAU and the ICRC organized in Addis Ababa, on 11 and 12

³ See the report of the Secretary-General on moratoria on such exports, containing information received from Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Ecuador, EU, Japan, Jordan, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States (A/50/701).

April, a seminar on international humanitarian law and the Convention, at which a common African position was elaborated, calling for a total ban on the manufacture and use of mines, extension of the scope of the CCWC to non-international armed conflicts, mechanisms to guarantee the Convention's effective implementation and increased resources for demining.⁴ The EU, on 23 June, adopted a resolution establishing a moratorium on the export of non-self-destructing and non-detectable anti-personnel land-mines, as well as on the export of all anti-personnel land-mines to countries that had not yet ratified or acceded to the CCWC and Protocol II.

The United Nations and its agencies also continued efforts in some ten countries to deal with the land-mines already in place, conducting mine-related activities ranging from assessments of the extent of the problem in a specific country to mine surveys, mine-awareness, mine-clearance and training programmes. The International Meeting on Mine Clearance was convened at Geneva from 5 to 7 July to enhance awareness of the different dimensions of the land-mine problem, to seek further political and financial support for United Nations activities and to promote greater international cooperation.⁵

Group of Governmental Experts, 1995

The Group of Governmental Experts held its fourth and final session in Geneva from 9 to 20 January, continuing to concentrate on the preparation of amendments to Protocol II on the basis of the revised rolling text submitted by the chairman at the end of the third session.⁶ During the course of the deliberations, various views were expressed and proposals submitted.

Agreement was reached in principle for provisions on certain prohibitions and restrictions on the use of anti-personnel mines that are not self-destructing or do not comply with the Protocol's provisions

⁴ See the follow-up resolution adopted by the Council of Ministers of the OAU (CM/Res.1593 (LXII)), reproduced in document A/50/701, para. 12.

⁵ See the report of the Secretary-General on mine-clearance (A/50/408). In 1994, the Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance was established with the primary aim of facilitating the *launching* of mine-clearance operations, the stage at which most costs occur.

⁶ CCW/CONF.I/GE/21, annex.

on detectability. However, the proposal to ban the use, development, manufacture, stockpiling and transfer of all anti-personnel mines without self-destructing or self-deactivating mechanisms and all booby-traps was not supported by a majority of delegations, particularly non-aligned countries and China. Extensive discussions on all aspects of a possible verification system, fact-finding missions and measures of compliance were held. Although three different, but not mutually exclusive, proposals were put forward, there was no consensus. Most non-aligned countries and China preferred to consider a set of confidence-building measures, while the Western Group insisted on a stringent verification regime. With respect to the scope of application of the Protocol, it seemed possible to reach agreement to extend it to all armed conflicts, including conflicts not of an international character, and, in this connection, two alternative provisions were proposed.

The Group of Experts elaborated an integrated draft text of the amendments to Protocol II, which was eventually contained in the chairman's rolling text annexed to the final report of the Group.⁷

In addition to its work on Protocol II, the Group dealt with other proposals relating to the Convention, among them, wording for a protocol on blinding weapons. As a result of extensive consultations, agreement was reached to transmit to the Review Conference a draft protocol on this subject.⁸ In addition, the Group considered how to pursue further discussions on naval mines and small calibre weapon systems. The Group also considered organizational matters for the Conference: it decided that it would be held in Vienna from 25 September to 13 October and approved a draft provisional agenda. The Group of Governmental Experts then adopted its final report to the Conference.⁹

Review Conference, first phase

Participation, organizational matters and debate

The Review Conference met in Vienna on the dates indicated above

⁷ CCW/CONF.I/GE/23, annex I.

⁸ CCW/CONF.I/GE/23, annex II.

⁹ The final report of the experts (CCW/CONF.I/GE/23) was reissued as the first document of the Conference (CCW/CONF.I/1).

with 44 States parties participating.¹⁰ Its main task was to prepare amendments to Protocol II. By the third week, however, it became apparent that it would not be possible to bridge the wide divergence of views in the remaining time allotted to the Conference. Following consultations, it was decided that resumed sessions of the Conference would take place in 1996, with the 1995 session constituting the first phase.

At its first plenary meeting, on 25 September, the Conference elected, by acclamation, Mr. Johan Molander of Sweden as President, adopted its programme of work and established three main committees: (a) Main Committee I—review of the scope and operation of the Convention and its annexed protocols, consideration of any proposals relating to the Convention and preparation and consideration of the final documents; (b) Main Committee II—consideration of any proposal relating to the annexed protocols; and (c) Main Committee III—consideration of proposals for additional protocols. A drafting Committee and a Credentials Committee were also established.

The Conference held a general exchange of views from 26 to 28 September, in which a number of non-governmental organizations also participated. In his statement, the President of the Conference poin-

¹⁰ Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States and Uruguay. The following States non-parties participated as observers: Albania, Angola, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Burundi, Cambodia, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Holy See, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Jordan, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Oman, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Turkey, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela and Viet Nam. In addition, representatives of the United Nations Children's Fund, United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations Development Programme, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, European Community, League of Arab States, International Committee of the Red Cross and International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies participated as observers. A number of non-governmental organizations attended public meetings of the Conference and its Main Committees.

ted out that the present Convention had two major deficiencies: it was adhered to by only some 50 States and it did not apply to internal conflicts. Noting the differences of position regarding mines—on the one hand, they are inherently indiscriminate weapons and should be banned and, on the other, they are necessary and legitimate weapons of self-defence when properly and responsibly used—he stated that, in recent conflicts, it seemed that their use was always abused. He also urged agreement on a ban on blinding laser weapons.

In the general exchange of views on Protocol II, the following aspects were discussed: extension of the scope of application to non-international armed conflicts; measures to strengthen restrictions or prohibitions on mines and their export; provision for technical assistance; and verification.

There was wide agreement that the scope of application of the Protocol should be extended to domestic armed conflicts. China cautioned, however, that this should not change the legal status of the parties to a conflict nor the status of the disputed territories involved.

All States parties were in favour of strengthening the prohibitions and restrictions on anti-personnel mines to some degree, particularly the aspect of export, but expressed a range of views with regard to the extent. China and Cuba, for example, expressed concern that a balance be maintained between humanitarian ideals and legitimate military needs for self-defence. The EU favoured substantially strengthening restrictions or prohibitions on mines and their export. A number of parties—Australia, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden—advocated a very broad prohibition: not only a ban on anti-personnel land-mines comprising transfer, production and stockpiling, but a ban on all mines, including anti-tank mines.

Discussion continued concerning the criteria for detectability and for self-destructing mechanisms and the modalities for their implementation, which the Group of Governmental Experts had agreed in principle should be provided for in the amended Protocol. The United States proposed that all remotely-delivered mines be equipped with self-destructing devices and back-up self-deactivating features to ensure that they would not detonate even if the self-destructing mechanism failed, and that mines without such features should be used only within controlled, marked and monitored minefields and that, moreover, the lifespan of self-destructing devices should be specified. Both China

and Japan considered that, for technical and financial reasons, a transitional period should be permitted so as to enable States parties to comply with any requirement for detectability.

A range of views was evident with respect to the question of technical assistance. The EU advocated that such assistance be provided for mine clearance. However, a number of developing countries emphasized that assistance should also be provided to States parties with less advanced capabilities in order for them to meet the technical criteria that were being proposed with respect to detectability and self-destructing mechanisms. It was pointed out, in this connection, that the promotion of international cooperation among parties in mine clearance and the transfer of technology, equipment and experts would provide an important incentive for non-parties to accede to the Convention.

With respect to verification and compliance, the positions of parties remained the same as they had been in the Group of Governmental Experts. This aspect was not extensively elaborated during the Conference, as it was tacitly acknowledged that the divergence of views was too great to allow for compromise at that time.

In the course of the exchange of views moreover, an overwhelming majority of parties supported the proposed ban on blinding laser weapons, to be incorporated into the Convention as Protocol IV. The EU Council noted that it had, on 18 September, adopted a common position on these weapons with the aim of strengthening such an initiative at the Review Conference. The United States stated that, although it had initially wanted the Conference to discuss only land-mines, in view of the widespread wish for a protocol on laser weapons, it had reviewed its position. It supported the preparation of a protocol prohibiting the use of lasers specifically designed to cause permanent blindness of unenhanced vision. It would not, however, be able to accept restrictions on the use of lasers designed for other purposes such as targeting, range-finding or countering optical or electro-optical devices.

All these different positions of States parties were later reflected in the work of the subsidiary bodies of the Review Conference, particularly in Main Committee II, dealing with the land-mines Protocol.

Work of Main Committee I

In connection with the first part of its task, to consider the scope and operation of the Convention and its annexed protocols, Main Committee

I discussed a proposal for eliminating the “waiting period” for States to become full parties. It also considered amending the Convention to provide for a structured process of periodic review conferences. It was argued by some that amendment would result in the creation of two different legal instruments and thus affect implementation and the achievement of universal adherence. Those parties supporting a provision for periodic review—which, they believed, could be achieved only through amendment—were also receptive to the idea of including in the final declaration a decision on the convening of the next review conference. Several proposals for subjects to be considered at the next review conference were advanced: naval mines, by Sweden; small calibre weapons and ammunition, by Switzerland; and other conventional weapons, such as cluster bombs, *fléchettes* and air-fuel explosives, by Mexico. The second part of the task of Main Committee I, to prepare a final declaration for the Conference, depended to a considerable degree on the conclusion of the work of Main Committee II, charged with preparing amendments to Protocol II. Main Committee II did not, however, complete its work as planned.

Work of Main Committee II

To assist itself in preparing amendments to Protocol II, Main Committee II established a Technical Military Experts Group to deal with proposals for article 2, on definitions, and proposals for specifications of the Technical Annex. In the course of its deliberations and negotiations, it considered a large number of proposals. Divergent views of parties persisted, however, on various issues, in particular, on criteria for detectability and for self-destructing and self-deactivating mechanisms, and a transitional period for achieving compliance with such technical requirements; a verification system and compliance mechanism; and arrangements for technical cooperation and assistance in mine clearance. With regard to the scope of application, no consensus could be reached on the exact wording of article 1, although there was agreement in principle on the substance. In the end, the Committee was unable to reach consensus on an amended text.

Work of Main Committee III

Main Committee III, dealing with proposals for additional protocols, concentrated on the question of blinding laser weapons.¹¹ At its last meeting, on 6 October, it adopted by consensus its report, which contained a draft text entitled "Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV)".¹²

During the deliberations, proposals were made and views expressed on various aspects: the scope of application, the prohibition itself (use, production, stockpiling and transfer), compliance, and other pertinent issues such as the definition of "permanent blindness". The Committee did not elaborate extensively on the scope of application, but decided to leave this issue, referred to in article 1 of its draft protocol, to be decided by the Drafting Committee, pending agreement on the text on scope being negotiated in Main Committee II with respect to Protocol II. A number of parties, among them, Austria and Sweden, proposed the inclusion of production in the prohibition, and the Islamic Republic of Iran suggested the inclusion of stockpiling. In view of the fact that production and stockpiling would entail questions of verification and compliance, the Committee finally decided to include only the prohibition of use and transfer. Also, as a result of intensive consultations among delegations as well as with the World Health Organization, the Committee adopted a compromise definition of the term "permanent blindness", referred to in article 5 of its draft.

The report of Main Committee III was subsequently transmitted through the Conference to the Drafting Committee for its consideration. The Drafting Committee decided to delete article 1 and to maintain the remaining articles as provisions of the new Protocol IV, an additional protocol to the Convention.

Conclusion of the first phase of the Review Conference

At its final meeting, on 13 October, the Review Conference adopted by consensus the text of the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons and the interim report on the organization and work of the first phase of

¹¹ The Committee worked on the basis of the text annexed to the report of the Group of Governmental Experts (see footnotes 8 and 9).

¹² CCW/CONF.I/4, annex.

the Conference.¹³ It decided to continue its work at resumed sessions, to be held in Geneva from 15 to 19 January and from 22 April to 3 May 1996.

In their concluding statements a number of States parties and non-parties hailed the successful adoption of the new Protocol, but expressed disappointment at the lack of progress in amending Protocol II, on land-mines.

General Assembly, 1995

At the time of its consideration of the item on the CCWC, the First Committee had before it a report of the Secretary-General on its status.¹⁴ On 8 November, Sweden introduced a draft resolution entitled "Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects", which was adopted on 16 November without a vote.

Two States parties explained their positions. China and Israel believed that a balance should be achieved between humanitarian concerns and legitimate security and military needs. In addition, Israel reiterated its call to regional partners to accede to the Convention as a regional confidence-building step. Two signatories also made statements. Egypt regretted the indecisiveness of the Review Conference, particularly its failure to agree on amendments that would urge States parties to provide assistance in mine clearance. Turkey, speaking as a signatory, noted that operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution would become meaningful only if and when the Review Conference completed its work.

On 12 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, also without a vote, as resolution 50/74. It reads as follows:

Resolution 50/74

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

The General Assembly,

¹³ CCW/CONF.I/8/Rev.1.

¹⁴ A/50/326. See also appendix I of this volume.

Recalling its resolution 49/79 of 15 December 1994 and previous resolutions referring to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,

Recalling with satisfaction the adoption, on 10 October 1980, of the Convention, together with the Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I), the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II) and the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III), which entered into force on 2 December 1983,

Recalling the commitment by the States that are parties to the Convention and the Protocols annexed thereto to respect the objectives and the provisions thereof,

Reaffirming its conviction that a general and verifiable agreement on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons would significantly reduce the suffering of civilians and combatants,

Noting that, in conformity with article 8 of the Convention, conferences may be convened to examine amendments to the Convention or to any of the Protocols thereto, to examine additional protocols concerning other categories of conventional weapons not covered by the existing Protocols or to review the scope and application of the Convention and the Protocols annexed thereto and to examine any proposed amendments or additional protocols,

Noting with satisfaction that the group of governmental experts established to prepare a conference to review the Convention and the Protocols annexed thereto held four meetings and completed its work by submitting a final report,

Welcoming the fact that the Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects met at Vienna from 25 September to 13 October 1995, in accordance with article 8, paragraph 3, of the Convention and that, in addition to the States parties, forty other States attended and took an active part in the Conference,

Particularly welcoming the adoption on 13 October 1995 of the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV) annexed to the Convention,

Noting that the Review Conference was not able to complete its work in reviewing the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II), and the decision of the Conference therefore to continue its work,

Recalling the role played by the International Committee of the Red Cross in the elaboration of the Convention and the Protocols annexed thereto,

Noting with satisfaction the convening by the Secretary-General of the International Meeting on Mine Clearance at Geneva from 5 to 7 July 1995, and that substantial contributions to the Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance were pledged at the Conference,

Welcoming the national measures adopted by Member States relating to the transfer, the production or the reduction of existing stockpiles of anti-personnel land-mines,

Desirous of reinforcing international cooperation in the area of prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons, in particular for the removal of minefields, mines and booby traps,

Recalling in this respect its resolutions 48/7 of 19 October 1993 and 49/215 of 23 December 1994 on assistance in mine clearance,

1. *Registers its satisfaction* with the report of the Secretary-General;
2. *Welcomes* the fact that additional States have ratified or accepted the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, which was opened for signature in New York on 10 April 1981, or have acceded to the Convention;
3. *Urgently calls upon* all States that have not yet done so to take all measures to become parties, as soon as possible, to the Convention and its Protocols and upon successor States to take appropriate measures so that ultimately access to these instruments will be universal;
4. *Calls upon* the Secretary-General, in his capacity as depositary of the Convention and the Protocols annexed thereto, to continue to inform it periodically of accessions to the Convention and the Protocols;
5. *Takes note* of the interim report of the Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, held at Vienna from 25 September to 13 October 1995;
6. *Commends* the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV) to all States, with a view to achieving the widest possible adherence to this instrument at an early date;
7. *Calls upon* the States parties to intensify their efforts in order to conclude negotiations on a strengthened Protocol II;
8. *Takes note* of the decision of the Review Conference to continue its work at resumed sessions at Geneva from 15 to 19 January and 22 April to 3 May 1996;
9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue furnishing needed assistance to the Review Conference;

10. *Again calls upon* the maximum number of States to attend the Review Conference;

11. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-first session the item entitled "Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects".

On 6 November, the United States introduced a draft resolution entitled "Moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land-mines". On 10 November, the Islamic Republic of Iran, India and Pakistan submitted amendments relating to the transfer of technology, in particular technology related to mine clearance, which were subsequently withdrawn after consultations with the sponsor. The First Committee, on 17 November, adopted the draft resolution without a vote.

A number of countries explained their positions or voiced reservations. China viewed land-mines as a legitimate means of self-defence for many countries. India had been unable to sponsor the draft resolution because of the mention, in the fifteenth preambular paragraph, of the necessity of other measures, in addition to Protocol II. Israel advocated extending the scope of Protocol II to non-international armed conflicts in times of peace and war, and called upon regional States to declare a moratorium on anti-personnel land-mines. Turkey would have abstained on operative paragraph 6 had it been put to a vote.

On 12 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote, as resolution 50/70 O. It reads as follows:

Resolution 50/70 O

Moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land-mines

The General Assembly,

Recalling with satisfaction its resolutions 48/75 K of 16 December 1993 and 49/75 D of 15 December 1994, in which it, *inter alia*, called upon States to agree to a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land-mines that pose grave dangers to civilian populations, and urged States to implement moratoria on the export of anti-personnel land-mines,

Also recalling with satisfaction its resolution 49/75 D, in which it, *inter alia*, established as a goal of the international community the eventual elimination of anti-personnel land-mines,

Noting that, according to the 1994 report of the Secretary-General entitled "Assistance in mine clearance", it is estimated that there are more than one

hundred and ten million land-mines in the ground in more than sixty countries throughout the world,

Noting also that, according to the same report, the global land-mine crisis continues to worsen as an estimated two to five million new land-mines are laid each year, while only an estimated one hundred thousand were cleared in 1994,

Expressing deep concern that anti-personnel land-mines kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement, which include inhibiting the repatriation of refugees and the return of internally displaced persons,

Gravely concerned over the suffering and casualties caused to non-combatants as a result of the proliferation, as well as the indiscriminate and irresponsible use, of anti-personnel land-mines,

Recalling with satisfaction its resolutions 48/7 of 19 October 1993 and 49/215 A of 23 December 1994 calling for assistance in mine clearance,

Welcoming the programmes of assistance that exist for demining and humanitarian support for the victims of anti-personnel land-mines,

Welcoming also the International Meeting on Mine Clearance, held at Geneva from 5 to 7 July 1995, and noting the statement of the Secretary-General at the meeting that the international community must take specific and tangible steps to address the intolerable situation caused by the proliferation of anti-personnel land-mines throughout the world,

Recalling with satisfaction the report of the Secretary-General concerning progress on the initiative in resolution 49/75 D,

Convinced that moratoria by States on the export of anti-personnel land-mines that pose grave dangers to civilian populations are important measures in helping to reduce substantially the human and economic costs resulting from the proliferation, as well as the indiscriminate and irresponsible use, of such devices,

Noting with satisfaction that more than twenty-five States already have declared moratoria on the export, transfer or sale of anti-personnel land-mines, with many of these moratoria being declared as a result of the aforementioned resolutions,

Believing that ongoing efforts to strengthen the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, in particular Protocol II thereto, are an essential part of the overall effort to address problems caused by the proliferation, as well as the indiscriminate and irresponsible use, of anti-personnel land-mines,

Noting the efforts that were made at the Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention, held at Vienna from 25 September to 13 October

1995, to strengthen prohibitions and restrictions in Protocol II governing land-mine use and transfer, and urging parties to build consensus towards agreement on such prohibitions and restrictions when the Review Conference reconvenes in January and April 1996,

Believing that, in addition to Protocol II, other measures to control the production, stockpiling and transfer of anti-personnel land-mines are also necessary to address problems caused by anti-personnel land-mines, especially the indiscriminate or illegal use of anti-personnel land-mines that continue to inflict harm on civilian populations long after emplacement,

Recognizing that States can move most effectively towards the goal of the eventual elimination of anti-personnel land-mines as viable alternatives are developed that significantly reduce the risk to the civilian population, and emphasizing the need for States to work on developing such alternatives on an urgent basis,

1. *Welcomes* the moratoria already declared by certain States on the export of anti-personnel land-mines;

2. *Urges* States that have not yet done so to declare such moratoria at the earliest possible date;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to prepare a report on steps taken by Member States to implement such moratoria, and to submit it to the General Assembly at its fifty-first session under the item entitled "General and complete disarmament";

4. *Emphasizes* the importance of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and Protocol II thereto as the authoritative international instrument governing the responsible use of anti-personnel land-mines and related devices, and urges parties to build consensus towards an agreement when the Review Conference reconvenes;

5. *Encourages* the widest possible accession to the Convention and to Protocol II thereto, and further urges all States to comply immediately and fully with the applicable rules of Protocol II;

6. *Also encourages* further immediate international efforts to seek solutions to the problems caused by anti-personnel land-mines, with a view to the eventual elimination of anti-personnel land-mines.

Conclusion

In 1995, the Group of Governmental Experts made substantive preparations for the scheduled Review Conference of the CCWC. Despite persistent divergent views on various sensitive issues, delegations seemed

confident that compromise could be achieved at the Review Conference itself, which would allow Protocol II, on land-mines, to be strengthened, provided that the proposal for a stringent verification regime was modified or withdrawn.

During the Conference, negotiations on amendments to Protocol II were deadlocked primarily on a number of technical, rather than political, issues. As the Review Conference approached the end of its schedule, it became apparent that additional time would be required for another round of negotiations at resumed sessions. With the understanding reached concerning what verification measures it would be feasible to incorporate in the amended Protocol and with further consultations on those key issues during the interval between the first phase and the resumed sessions, it can be expected that the Conference will succeed in agreeing on amendments to Protocol II in 1996.

Contrary to expectations, the first phase of the Review Conference was able to achieve consensus, without much difficulty, on an additional protocol on blinding laser weapons (Protocol IV). This achievement was mainly attributable to the political will of all States, and particularly to a revision of the position of the United States. Although Protocol IV is not a comprehensive prohibition, it was welcomed by all delegations.

The General Assembly adopted, without a vote, a resolution on the CCWC and the work of the first phase of the Review Conference, urging parties to conclude negotiations on a strengthened Protocol II. It also adopted, without a vote, a resolution urging States to declare moratoria on the export of anti-personnel land-mines and to seek solutions to the problems of such mines, with a view to their eventual elimination.

CHAPTER IX

Regional approaches to disarmament

Introduction

IT IS THE CONDITIONS IN THEIR OWN REGION that determine most States' perception of security and their policies and requirements in the military field—hence the need for regional confidence-building and disarmament measures.¹ Suspicions among States regarding their neighbours' military capability and intentions may be allayed by confidence-building measures such as prior notification of force manoeuvres, exchanges of data on military budgets and arms transfers, exchanges of military delegations and cooperation in military training. Agreement on such measures may lead, as in the case of Europe—a region where opposing military blocs faced each other for over 40 years—to a reduction not only of tension, but also of numbers of weapons. It is generally accepted that the goal of regional confidence-building and arms limitation should be to increase stability and security within the region. It is up to those States to consider, in the light of local conditions, the appropriate arms limitation measures and the approaches to be utilized. When the various regional achievements complement wider, global efforts, they contribute to the consolidation of international peace and security.

Developments and trends, 1995

Throughout 1995, Member States continued to make determined efforts, within their respective regional contexts, to devise and strengthen appropriate approaches to prevent nuclear proliferation, to curb the flow

¹ See *Study on All the Aspects of Regional Disarmament (A/35/416)*, subsequently issued as a United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.IX.2.

of light arms, to introduce and promote confidence-building and transparency measures, and to adjust security structures to respond effectively to threats to the peace and to resolve conflict, increasingly of an intra-State nature. The United Nations has been involved in many of these endeavours. The following sections give an overview of some of the most significant developments in the various regions during 1995.

Specific regional developments

Africa

In 1995, Africa achieved a long-sought objective: conclusion of a nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty for the continent (for details, see pages 67–72). With respect to conventional weapons, disarmament efforts focused on the regulation of the flow of small arms, especially measures to curb the illicit trade, and arrangements to facilitate the restoration of peace in societies recently torn by conflict.

In the Central African context, the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa² issued the Brazzaville Declaration on Cooperation for Peace and Security in Central Africa, which noted, *inter alia*, that the proliferation of arms, including among civilians, was the main factor in the violence and insecurity prevailing in the subregion. A confidence-building measure considered by the Committee was the establishment of a subregional arms register that would take into account data on force levels and light weapons. In addition, Committee members agreed to convene, in 1996, a meeting of their defence and interior ministers to consider effective ways and means to halt the acquisition of arms by unauthorized private armed groups and citizens.

In response to the situation in Rwanda and Burundi, in August the Security Council³ suspended the restrictions it had imposed on the

² The proceedings of the sixth and seventh ministerial meetings of the Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa are contained in a report of the Secretary-General (A/50/474), to which is annexed the Brazzaville Declaration. The members of the Committee are Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe and Zaire.

³ Security Council resolution 1011 (1995) of 16 August, referring to resolution 918 (1994).

sale or supply of arms and related *matériel* to the Government of Rwanda, requesting that the Government notify it of all imports and requiring that States notify the Council of all exports to Rwanda. Subsequently, the Secretary-General, at the request of the Council, established the International Commission of Inquiry to investigate reports of military training and arms transfers to former Rwandese government forces in the Great Lakes region.

The Advisory Mission on the Control and Collection of Light Weapons in the Sahelo-Saharan Subregion⁴ undertook the second phase of its work, visiting six countries in February and March: Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal. The Mission concluded that the subregion as a whole was suffering from severe socio-economic deprivation and intra-State conflict, aggravated by and contributing to the presence of large numbers of illicit light weapons. Development funding was available from donor States, but much of it could not be used because of the security situation. The mission recommended that the United Nations system work with the States and the donor community to develop support for a proportional and integrated approach to security and development, including the identification of appropriate assistance for the internal security forces, that is, police, gendarmerie, national guard and customs.

Practical measures of disarmament, including demobilization, were recognized as being crucial to furthering the peace processes in Angola, Liberia and Sierra Leone. In Angola,⁵ talks were held on the completion of the formation of the Forças Armadas Angolanas (FAA), including the global incorporation of the troops of the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) in the FAA, but the process of quartering UNITA troops had not progressed far by the end of the year. The United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) and the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Ob-

⁴ The Advisory Mission, which began its work with a visit to Mali in August 1994, operates within the context of General Assembly resolution 40/151 H of 1985, which, *inter alia*, provides for advisory services to Governments at their request, and resolution 46/36 H of 1991, on international arms transfers. For background on the mission, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 19: 1994, chapter IX.

⁵ See reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission: S/1995/588, S/1995/842 and S/1996/75.

server Group (ECOMOG) elaborated a detailed plan for disarmament and demobilization in consultation with the Liberian National Transitional Government, the factions and the humanitarian community. The plan, which was based on the provisions of the Abuja Agreement of 19 August,⁶ was being revised as of the end of the year. With respect to Sierra Leone, the Secretary-General requested the Department of Humanitarian Affairs and the United Nations Development Programme to collaborate with the Government in the drafting of an action plan comprising, *inter alia*, components relating to demobilization and reintegration of combatants.

The activities of the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa were curtailed owing to severe financial constraints, which entailed some cuts in staff. (The three regional centres are financed on the basis of voluntary contributions.) Nevertheless, the Centre held monthly informal meetings at its Lomé headquarters on topical issues, and it widened the distribution of its quarterly bilingual publication, *The African Peace Bulletin/Bulletin Africain de la Paix*. The remaining staff members of the Centre provided substantive and administrative support to the Standing Advisory Committee and to the Secretary-General's Advisory Mission, both mentioned above.

Americas

Regional efforts to promote peace and security in the Americas continued throughout 1995. Following the outbreak of border conflict between Ecuador and Peru in January, the parties, with support from other Latin American countries and the United States⁷ held negotiations and agreed to establish a demilitarized zone in the area of dispute. During the Santiago Conference of the Organization of American States (OAS) in November, Ecuador and Peru jointly announced the adoption

⁶ The text of the Abuja Agreement is annexed to Security Council document S/1995/742. See also the "Fifteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia" (S/1996/47 and Add.1).

⁷ The Itamaraty Declaration of Peace between Ecuador and Peru was signed on 17 February with the participation of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the United States in their capacity as Guarantor Countries of the Rio de Janeiro Protocol of 1942.

of a declaration on confidence-building measures,⁸ by which they reported on the measures that they were implementing and reaffirmed their strong commitment to the principles of the OAS Charter. As of the end of the year, they were reportedly pursuing negotiations on additional confidence-building measures and were expected to hold further meetings in early 1996.

The OAS Conference on Security and Confidence-Building Measures adopted a declaration⁹ outlining specific measures for the Latin American and Caribbean region, including the prior notification of military exercises; the exchange of information and participation in the United Nations Arms Register; the exchange of military observers; the strengthening of civilian-military communications; and consultations to enhance the limitation and control of conventional weapons.

The Governments of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama signed a Treaty of Democratic Security in Central America on 15 December,¹⁰ which included provisions for the establishment of confidence-building measures and cooperation in combating the illegal trafficking of arms and other military equipment. In Haiti, the multinational force was replaced by the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), progress was made in establishing and training a national police force, and elections were conducted.

The Regional Centre for Latin America and the Caribbean, which, like the Lomé Centre, was operating under financial constraints, continued to publish its quarterly, the *Boletín*, to disseminate information and promote awareness of disarmament-related issues in the region. During Disarmament Week, the Centre organized a conference for the Association of Defence Attachés accredited to Lima, at which presentations were made and discussions held on global and regional security issues, civilian-military relations, the emergence of new threats to security and the changing concepts of national sovereignty.

⁸ A/50/783-S/1995/983, annex.

⁹ The Declaration was circulated as a document of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/1371).

¹⁰ See A/51/67, annex II.

Asia

Significant developments occurred in the Asia-Pacific region in 1995 in disarmament-related security matters. The announcement by France, the United Kingdom and the United States on 20 October of their intention to sign the protocols of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty during the first half of 1996¹¹ was a major boost for the Treaty. Another major event was the signing of the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty on 15 December in Bangkok. Although none of the world's declared nuclear Powers had endorsed the Treaty as of the end of the year, the creation of the zone reflects a concerted effort by countries of the subregion to promote and strengthen regional security through nuclear non-proliferation. (See page 73 for a discussion of this Treaty.)

Regional initiatives to promote peace and security in Asia have been gradually increasing in recent years. The 19-member ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)¹² has emerged as one of the main vehicles for talks on regional security matters. The Forum, composed of Asian, European and North American countries, held its second major meeting from 31 July to 3 August in Brunei Darussalam and was attended by foreign and defence ministers. The participants agreed that the ARF process would take place in three stages: the promotion of confidence-building measures, the development of preventive diplomacy and the elaboration of approaches to conflict-resolution. They also agreed to further institutionalize the process through the establishment of inter-sessional support groups. Working-level meetings of the Forum are scheduled for 1996 to exchange views on future cooperation in the security dialogue, disclosure of defence "White Papers", promotion of defence-related personnel exchanges and other confidence-building measures prior to a high-level meeting in Indonesia in July.

On the bilateral side, Australia and Indonesia signed a security agreement on 18 December. Both sides stressed, however, that the agreement was not a defence treaty or alliance. Instead, it called for

¹¹ A/50/665-S/1995/877, annex. The protocols were signed in Suva, Fiji, on 25 March 1996.

¹² ASEAN members: Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam. In addition: Australia, Cambodia, Canada, China, EU, Japan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation and United States. The Forum met for the first time in 1994.

broad cooperation in such fields as joint military exercises and regular consultations on common security-related issues.

Despite multifaceted efforts to promote peace and regional security, concerns continued to be expressed over a possible military build-up in the Asia-Pacific region. Increased military spending has been attributed to the growing wealth of many regional States, enabling them to acquire more sophisticated hardware; to unsettled territorial disputes and perceived threats from neighbouring countries; and to a possible decline in the role of the United States in the region in the near future.

Meanwhile, the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, the only centre that enjoys sufficient extra-budgetary resources for its programmes, continued to disseminate information on United Nations disarmament- and security-related activities. It organized three major regional meetings: in Kathmandu, Nagasaki, and Kanazawa. The Kathmandu meeting discussed, *inter alia*, openness and regional approaches to disarmament, risk reduction and maritime confidence-building measures in the Asia-Pacific area.¹³ The Nagasaki Conference dealt with the outcome of the NPT Review Conference, the prospects for further reductions in nuclear weapons, negotiations on a CTBT, transparency in military matters, the transfer of conventional arms and the strengthening of the United Nations Arms Register.¹⁴ The Kanazawa meeting, organized as a non-governmental symposium, dealt with multi-faceted cooperation in Northeast Asia.

Europe

The year 1995 saw a number of major steps in arms control and disarmament in Europe. In the nuclear field, the dismantlement and destruction of the nuclear weapons of the Russian Federation and the United States mandated by the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), which had already begun, continued. In addition, because they did not have warhead dismantlement facilities, Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine transferred to Russia the weapons deployed on their territories that

¹³ A number of the papers at the Kathmandu meeting were published in *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*, vol. XVIII, No. 3, 1995.

¹⁴ The papers presented at the Nagasaki Conference were published in *Disarmament in the Last Half Century and Its Future Prospects* (Topical Papers 21) (Sales No. E.96.IX.2), 1995.

were scheduled for dismantlement under the Treaty. The entry into force of START I at the end of 1994 opened the way for the ratification of START II, which provides for further reductions in strategic arms. (For more information on the status of the START Treaties, see page 89.)

In the conventional field, the parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)¹⁵ completed the destruction of over 50,000 tanks and other heavy weapons. However, some problems persisted after the 16 November deadline for full implementation had passed. As at the end of the year, agreement had still to be reached on the level of equipment that the Russian Federation would maintain in the Treaty's flank areas.¹⁶

In the light of the fragmentation and intra-State conflict that Europe has experienced since the end of the cold war, various organizations and many high-level meetings devoted themselves to rethinking European security models for the next century. The goal of the various efforts was to evolve a cohesive European security architecture taking into account the seemingly diverse undertakings of such organizations as NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Western European Union (WEU).

On 14 December, at the Paris Peace Conference, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Yugoslavia signed the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 15 December, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council¹⁷ welcomed the Agreement; supported the OSCE's commitment to assist the parties with the negotiation and implementation of progressive measures for regional stability and arms control; authorized the establish-

¹⁵ The 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was negotiated within the framework of the OSCE among members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The text of the treaty is reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 4th edition: 1992 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.IX.11) (hereinafter referred to as *Status*), vol. 1.

¹⁶ The flank includes the area around St. Petersburg in the North and the Caucasus Mountains region in the South. A CFE review conference is scheduled to be convened in May 1996.

¹⁷ Security Council resolution 1031 (1995) was adopted on 15 December without a vote. The Peace Agreement had been initialled in Dayton, Ohio, on 21 November.

ment of a multinational implementation force (IFOR) for one year; and decided to transfer the authority from the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to IFOR.¹⁸

Middle East

For developments in the Middle East, see chapter IV, page 75.

General Assembly, 1995

The First Committee took action on a series of resolutions dealing with regional approaches to disarmament in general and covering specific regions. It also adopted two resolutions on the three United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament. These resolutions are discussed below.

Regional approaches in general

Regional disarmament

A draft resolution entitled "Regional disarmament" was introduced on 8 November by Pakistan. On 15 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 156 to none, with 1 abstention (India).

India explained that it had abstained because the draft resolution did not take into account the ideas contained in the Disarmament Commission's "Guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security".¹⁹ It believed it was more realistic to recognize that the security concerns of all States must be equally met in order to reduce the risk of regional conflicts. In India's view, nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects could be tackled effectively only on a global basis. Cuba, which voted in favour, held that certain important ideas from the Guidelines, such as the initiat-

¹⁸ IFOR is to be composed of troops from NATO, NATO partners in Central and Eastern Europe, the Russian Federation, Finland and Sweden, as well as some non-European countries, and is thus a concrete expression of an integrated and cooperative approach to security in the new Europe.

¹⁹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/48/42)*, annex II.

ive and participation of all States in a given region in negotiating and adopting regional disarmament measures, had been omitted.

On 12 December the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 165 to none, with 1 abstention (India), as resolution 50/70 K. It reads as follows:

Resolution 50/70 K
Regional disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 45/58 P of 4 December 1990, 46/36 I of 6 December 1991, 47/52 J of 9 December 1992, 48/75 I of 16 December 1993 and 49/75 N of 15 December 1994 on regional disarmament,

Believing that the efforts of the international community to move towards the ideal of general and complete disarmament are guided by the inherent human desire for genuine peace and security, the elimination of the danger of war and the release of economic, intellectual and other resources for peaceful pursuits,

Affirming the abiding commitment of all States to the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations in the conduct of their international relations,

Noting that essential guidelines for progress towards general and complete disarmament were adopted at the tenth special session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament,

Taking note of the guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security adopted by the Disarmament Commission at its 1993 substantive session,

Welcoming the prospects of genuine progress in the field of disarmament engendered in recent years as a result of negotiations between the two super-Powers,

Taking note of the recent proposals for disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation at the regional and subregional levels,

Recognizing the importance of confidence-building measures for regional and international peace and security,

Convinced that endeavours by countries to promote regional disarmament, taking into account the specific characteristics of each region and in accordance with the principle of undiminished security at the lowest level of armaments, would enhance the security of smaller States and would thus contribute to international peace and security by reducing the risk of regional conflicts,

1. *Stresses* that sustained efforts are needed, within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament and under the umbrella of the United Nations, to make progress on the entire range of disarmament issues;
2. *Affirms* that global and regional approaches to disarmament complement each other and should therefore be pursued simultaneously to promote regional and international peace and security;
3. *Calls upon* States to conclude agreements, wherever possible, for nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and confidence-building measures at the regional and subregional levels;
4. *Welcomes* the initiatives towards disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and security undertaken by some countries at the regional and subregional levels;
5. *Supports and encourages* efforts aimed at promoting confidence-building measures at the regional and subregional levels in order to ease regional tensions and to further disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation measures at the regional and subregional levels;
6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-first session the item entitled "Regional disarmament".

Conventional arms control

On 8 November, Pakistan introduced a draft resolution entitled "Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels", which the First Committee, on 15 November, approved by a recorded vote of 150 to none, with 7 abstentions.

Brazil, which abstained, stated that it could not agree with the third preambular paragraph, since it believed that regional disarmament was complementary to global efforts towards disarmament. Furthermore, Brazil felt that it was not appropriate for the Conference on Disarmament—whose primary task was the negotiation of disarmament agreements—to embark on the formulation of principles as requested in operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution. Cuba abstained because it felt that the text, like the one discussed above, was not in keeping with the Commission's Guidelines. Moreover, it overlooked the need for global control of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Both Brazil and Cuba believed that the Conference on Disarmament should not be distracted from its work on high priority items. India abstained for similar reasons as those it expressed regarding the draft resolution "Regional disarmament" (see above). It also pointed out that

militarily significant States had wider security concerns and that each State must contribute to regional disarmament to the maximum extent it could.

On 12 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 158 to none, with 7 abstentions, as resolution 50/70 L. It reads as follows:

Resolution 50/70 L

Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 48/75 J of 16 December 1993 and 49/75 O of 15 December 1994,

Recognizing the crucial role of conventional arms control in promoting regional and international peace and security,

Convinced that conventional arms control needs to be pursued primarily in the regional and subregional contexts since most threats to peace and security in the post-cold-war era arise mainly among States located in the same region or subregion,

Aware that the preservation of a balance in the defence capabilities of States at the lowest level of armaments would contribute to peace and stability and should be a prime objective of conventional arms control,

Desirous of promoting agreements to strengthen regional peace and security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces,

Believing that militarily significant States, and States with larger military capabilities, have a special responsibility in promoting such agreements for regional security,

Believing also that two of the principal objectives of conventional arms control should be to prevent the possibility of military attack launched by surprise and to avoid aggression,

1. *Decides* to give urgent consideration to the issues involved in conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels;

2. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament, as a first step, to consider the formulation of principles that can serve as a framework for regional agreements on conventional arms control, and looks forward to a report of the Conference on this subject;

3. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-first session the item entitled "Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels".

Regional approaches in specific regions

Central Africa

On 8 November, the representative of the Congo, on behalf of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, introduced a draft resolution entitled "Regional confidence-building measures". On 9 November, the sponsors submitted a revised draft resolution.

On 20 November, the First Committee adopted the revised draft resolution without a vote. After the vote, the representative of the United States noted that the focus of the draft resolution, especially in operative paragraphs 7, 8 and 9, was not disarmament, but peace operations, a term related to peace-keeping, and that the peace-keeping issue was inappropriate for the First Committee.

On 12 December, the General Assembly adopted the revised draft resolution, also without a vote, as resolution 50/71 B. It reads as follows:

Resolution 50/71 B

Regional confidence-building measures

The General Assembly,

Recalling the purposes and principles of the United Nations and its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

Bearing in mind the guidelines for general and complete disarmament adopted at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament,

Recalling its resolutions 43/78 H and 43/85 of 7 December 1988, 44/21 of 15 November 1989, 45/58 M of 4 December 1990, 46/37 B of 6 December 1991, 47/53 F of 15 December 1992, 48/76 A of 16 December 1993 and 49/76 C of 15 December 1994,

Considering the importance and effectiveness of confidence-building measures taken at the initiative and with the participation of all States concerned and taking into account the specific characteristics of each region, in that they can contribute to regional disarmament and to international security, in accordance with the principles of the Charter,

Convinced that the resources released by disarmament, including regional disarmament, can be devoted to economic and social development and to the protection of the environment for the benefit of all peoples, in particular those of the developing countries,

Bearing in mind the establishment by the Secretary-General on 28 May 1992 of the Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, the purpose of which is to encourage arms limitation, disarmament, non-proliferation and development in the subregion,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General on regional confidence-building measures, which deals with the sixth and seventh meetings of the Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, held at Brazzaville in March and August 1995;

2. *Reaffirms its support* for efforts aimed at promoting confidence-building measures at regional and subregional levels in order to ease tensions and conflicts in the subregion and to further disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful settlement of disputes in Central Africa;

3. *Also reaffirms its support* for the programme of work of the Standing Advisory Committee adopted at the organizational meeting of the Committee held at Yaoundé in July 1992;

4. *Takes note* of the Brazzaville Declaration on Cooperation for Peace and Security in Central Africa and urges the States members of the Standing Advisory Committee to implement it promptly;

5. *Notes* the readiness of the States members of the Standing Advisory Committee to reduce the military forces, equipment and budgets in the subregion and to continue reviewing the studies carried out on the subject with a view to reaching agreements to that end;

6. *Welcomes* the initialling of the Non-Aggression Pact between the States members of the Standing Advisory Committee, which is likely to contribute to the prevention of conflicts and to confidence-building in the subregion, and encourages those States to sign the Pact as soon as possible;

7. *Welcomes with satisfaction* the decision by the States members of the Standing Advisory Committee to participate in peace operations of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity and, to that end, to establish units specializing in peace operations within their respective armed forces;

8. *Also welcomes with satisfaction* the participation of some of the States members of the Standing Advisory Committee in the peace operations deployed in the subregion;

9. *Requests* Member States and governmental and non-governmental organizations to promote and to facilitate the holding of a training programme on peace operations in the subregion with a view to strengthening the capacity of the units specializing in peace operations in the armed forces of the States members of the Standing Advisory Committee;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to provide assistance to the States members of the Standing Advisory Committee and to establish a trust fund to which Member States and governmental and non-governmental

organizations may make additional voluntary contributions for the implementation of the programme of work of the Committee;

11. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its fifty-first session a report on the implementation of the present resolution;

12. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-first session the item entitled "Regional confidence-building measures".

Sahelo-Saharan subregion

On 7 November, Mali introduced a draft resolution entitled "Assistance to States for curbing illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them", which was twice revised. The First Committee, on 17 November, approved the revised draft resolution without a vote.

In a statement before the vote, Haiti emphasized the importance of ending the illicit circulation and collection of small arms, which constituted a threat to the safety of civilian populations and to political stability, particularly to countries serving their apprenticeship in democracy like itself.

In explanation of its vote after the vote, the United Kingdom expressed two concerns. First, the advisory missions referred to in the draft resolution should not place any additional burden on the United Nations regular budget and the costs should be met from within existing resources, and second, the focus of the draft resolution should be clearly maintained on the illicit traffic of small arms, and thus the word "illicit" should be inserted before the word "circulation" in the second preambular paragraph.

On 12 December, the General Assembly adopted the revised draft text, also without a vote, as resolution 50/70 H. It reads as follows:

Resolution 50/70 H

Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 46/36 H of 6 December 1991, 47/52 G and J of 9 December 1992, 48/75 H and J of 16 December 1993 and 49/75 G of 15 December 1994,

Considering that the circulation of massive quantities of small arms throughout the world impedes development and is a source of increased insecurity,

Considering also that the illicit international transfer of small arms and their accumulation in many countries constitute a threat to the populations and to national and regional security and are a factor contributing to the destabilization of States,

Basing itself on the statement of the Secretary-General relating to the request of Mali concerning United Nations assistance for the collection of small arms,

Gravely concerned at the extent of the insecurity and banditry linked to the illicit circulation of small arms in Mali and the other affected States of the Saharo-Sahelian subregion,

Taking note of the first conclusions of the United Nations advisory missions sent to the affected countries of the subregion by the Secretary-General to study the best way of curbing the illicit circulation of small arms and ensuring their collection,

Taking note also of the interest shown by other States of the subregion in receiving the United Nations Advisory Mission,

Noting the actions taken and those recommended at the meetings of the States of the subregion held at Banjul, Algiers and Bamako to establish close regional cooperation with a view to strengthening security,

1. *Welcomes* the initiative taken by Mali concerning the question of the illicit circulation of small arms and their collection in the affected States of the Saharo-Sahelian subregion;

2. *Also welcomes* the action taken by the Secretary-General in implementation of this initiative in the context of General Assembly resolution 40/151 H of 16 December 1985;

3. *Thanks* the Governments concerned in the subregion for the substantial support that they have given to the United Nations advisory missions and welcomes the declared readiness of other States to receive the United Nations Advisory Mission;

4. *Encourages* the Secretary-General to continue his efforts in the context of the implementation of resolution 49/75 G and of the recommendations of the United Nations advisory missions, to curb the illicit circulation of small arms and to collect such arms in the affected States that so request, with the support of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa and in close cooperation with the Organization of African Unity;

5. *Invites* Member States to implement national control measures in order to check the illicit circulation of small arms, in particular by curbing the illegal export of such arms;

6. *Invites* the international community to give appropriate support to the efforts made by the affected countries to suppress the illicit circulation of small arms, which is likely to hamper their development;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to examine the issue and to report to the General Assembly at its fifty-first session.

Regional centres

At the time that the First Committee was considering the item on the regional centres, it had before it a report of the Secretary-General²⁰ that contained, in addition to sections on the substantive activities of the centres, a section on their financing. The Secretary-General pointed out that the centres were unable to function in the manner intended by the General Assembly because of a steady fall in voluntary contributions, in particular from the Member States within the regions concerned, and that the substantive activities of the centres, to which some States contributed, could not be carried out unless funds were also made available to meet administrative and operational requirements. He warned that unless Member States took early and effective action, the centres would have to be closed and regional disarmament activities would have to be carried out only by staff members based in New York or Geneva. Subsequently, two draft resolutions on the subject of the regional centres were adopted.

A draft resolution entitled "United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa and United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean" was introduced on 8 November by Peru.

On 17 November, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution without a vote. After the vote, Spain, on behalf of the EU and 12 other countries,²¹ expressed regret that the centres in Lomé and Lima were unable to carry out substantive activities because of a lack of resources and would have to be closed if it was impossible to secure financing through voluntary contributions. It noted that the regional centre in Kathmandu attracted sufficient voluntary resources. Spain requested that the text of its explanation of vote be annexed to next year's report of the Secretary-General on these centres. The representative of the United States supported the position taken by the EU and associated himself with Spain's statement.

²⁰ A/50/380.

²¹ Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Norway, Poland, Romania and Slovakia.

On 12 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, also without a vote, as resolution 50/71 C. It reads as follows:

Resolution 50/71 C

United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa and United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 40/151 G of 16 December 1985, 41/60 D of 3 December 1986, 42/39 J of 30 November 1987 and 43/76 D of 7 December 1988 on the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, its resolutions 41/60 J of 3 December 1986, 42/39 K of 30 November 1987 and 43/76 H of 7 December 1988 on the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, and its resolutions 45/59 E of 4 December 1990 and 46/37 F of 9 December 1991 on the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean,

Reaffirming its resolutions 46/36 F of 6 December 1991 and 47/52 G of 9 December 1992 on regional disarmament, including confidence-building measures,

Recalling its resolutions 48/76 E of 16 December 1993 and 49/76 D of 15 December 1994 on the regional disarmament centres,

Mindful of the provisions of Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations stipulating that a function of the General Assembly is to consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and arms limitation,

Bearing in mind that the changed international environment has created new opportunities for the pursuit of disarmament, as well as posed new challenges,

Convinced that the initiatives and activities mutually agreed upon by Member States of the respective regions aimed at fostering mutual confidence and security, as well as the implementation and coordination of regional activities under the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme, would encourage and facilitate the development of effective measures of confidence-building, arms limitation and disarmament in these regions,

Welcoming the programme of activities carried out by the regional centres, which have contributed substantially to understanding and cooperation among the States in each particular region and have thereby strengthened the

role assigned to each regional centre in the areas of peace, disarmament and development,

Bearing in mind the importance of education for peace, disarmament and development for understanding and cooperation among States and for the promotion of international peace and security,

Recognizing with concern the financial situation of the regional centres as described in the 1994 report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the regional centres,

Underlining, therefore, the need to provide the centres with financial viability and stability so as to facilitate the effective planning and implementation of their respective programmes of activities,

Expressing its gratitude to the Member States, international governmental and non-governmental organizations and foundations that have, so far, contributed to the trust funds of the regional centres in Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean,

1. *Commends* the activities being carried out by the regional centres in identifying and broadening the understanding of pressing disarmament and security issues and exploring optimum solutions under given specific conditions prevailing in each region, in accordance with their mandates;

2. *Reaffirms its strong support* for the further operation and strengthening of the two regional centres and encourages them to continue intensifying their efforts in promoting cooperation with subregional and regional organizations and among the States in their respective regions to facilitate the development of effective measures of confidence-building, arms limitation and disarmament, with a view to promoting peace and security;

3. *Also encourages* further use of the potential of the regional centres to maintain the increased interest in and momentum for revitalization of the Organization to meet the challenges of a new phase of international relations in order to fulfil the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations related to peace, disarmament and development, taking into account the guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security as adopted by the Disarmament Commission at its 1993 substantive session;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, to promote the development of activities within the programmes of the United Nations regional disarmament centres related to education for disarmament;

5. *Strongly appeals once again* to Member States, as well as to international governmental and non-governmental organizations and foundations, to make more substantial voluntary contributions in order to revitalize the two

centres, strengthen their programmes of activities and facilitate the effective implementation of those programmes;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in the light of the current financial situation of the two centres, to explore new alternative ways of financial resources and to continue to provide all necessary support to the regional centres in fulfilling their mandates;

7. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to ensure that the directors of the two regional centres are, as far as possible, locally based in order to revitalize the activities in the centres;

8. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its fifty-first session on his efforts to seek new alternative sources of financing for the two regional centres and on the implementation of the present resolution;

9. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-first session the item entitled "United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific and United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean".

A draft resolution entitled "United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific" was introduced on 7 November by Mongolia and later slightly revised.

The First Committee, on 17 November, took a separate vote on operative paragraph 4 of the revised draft text, adopting it by a recorded vote of 143 to none, with 3 abstentions (China, DPRK and India). The Committee then approved the revised draft as a whole without a vote.

After the vote, China explained that it had abstained in the vote on operative paragraph 4 because there was no need to make a separate reference to any city other than the site of the centre, Kathmandu. India expressed a similar reservation. Meanwhile, China, the Islamic Republic of Iran and India expressed the view that the activities of the centre should be established jointly by all the countries of the region. Iran also hoped that the centre would pay more attention to all the subregions of Asia, in particular the Middle East region, where there was a need to promote disarmament and security issues.

On 12 December, the General Assembly also took a separate vote on operative paragraph 4 of the revised draft text and adopted it by a recorded vote of 161 to none, with 3 abstentions. It then adopted the revised draft as a whole, also without a vote, as resolution 50/71 D. It reads as follows:

Resolution 50/71 D

United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 39/63 J of 12 December 1984, in which it requested the Secretary-General to provide assistance to such Member States in the regions concerned as might request it with a view to establishing regional and institutional arrangements for the implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign, on the basis of existing resources and of voluntary contributions that Member States might make to that end,

Recalling also its resolution 42/39 D of 30 November 1987, by which it established the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia, with headquarters at Kathmandu and with the mandate of providing, on request, substantive support for the initiatives and other activities mutually agreed upon by the Member States of the Asian region for the implementation of measures for peace and disarmament, through appropriate utilization of available resources,

Mindful of its resolution 44/117 F of 15 December 1989, in which it decided to rename the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia as the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific,

Commending the useful activities carried out by the Regional Centre in encouraging regional and subregional dialogue for the enhancement of openness, transparency and confidence-building, as well as the promotion of disarmament and security through the organization of regional meetings, which has come to be widely known within the Asia-Pacific region as the "Kathmandu process",

Noting that trends in the post-cold-war era have emphasized the function of the Regional Centre in assisting Member States as they deal with new security concerns and disarmament issues emerging in the region,

Noting also the efforts of the Member States to respond to these concerns and issues through the formulation of a common approach,

Appreciating highly the important role Nepal has played as the host nation of the headquarters of the Regional Centre,

Recognizing the need for the Regional Centre to pursue effectively its above-mentioned expanded function,

Expressing its appreciation to the Regional Centre for its organization of substantive regional meetings at Kathmandu and at Nagasaki and Kanazawa, Japan, in 1995,

1. *Commends* the important work carried out by the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, with its headquarters at Kathmandu;

2. *Reaffirms its strong support* for the continued operation and further strengthening of the Regional Centre as an essential promoter of the regional peace and disarmament dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region known as the "Kathmandu process";

3. *Decides* that the Director of the Regional Centre at Kathmandu should operate as before until a reliable means can be found to finance the operational needs of the Regional Centre;

4. *Recommends* that the Regional Centre organize the scheduled regional meetings at Kathmandu, Hiroshima, Japan, and other cities in 1996, within the available resources voluntarily contributed by Member States and organizations for that purpose;

5. *Expresses its appreciation* for the contributions received by the Regional Centre;

6. *Appeals* to Member States, in particular those within the Asia-Pacific region, as well as to international governmental and non-governmental organizations and foundations, to make voluntary contributions in order to strengthen the programme of activities of the Regional Centre and its implementation;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide all necessary support, within existing resources, to the Regional Centre in carrying out its programme of activities;

8. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its fifty-first session on the implementation of the present resolution;

9. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-first session the item entitled "United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific and United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean".

Other related resolutions

The General Assembly adopted without a vote three resolutions that focused on regional matters from the perspective of security and cooperation: 50/80 A, on the status of permanent neutrality declared by Turkmenistan; resolution 50/80 B, on the development of good neighbourly relations among Balkan States; and 50/75, on the strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region. It also decided (decision 50/418), by a recorded vote of 109 to none, with 54 abstentions,

to include in its 1996 agenda an item on review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security. In addition, the Assembly adopted resolution 50/76, on the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, by a recorded vote of 123 to 3 (France, United Kingdom and United States), with 39 abstentions.

Conclusion

The regional approach has long been seen as a valuable one in the disarmament and security-related field. The diversity of situations in various parts of the world and the consequent diversity of priorities being pursued have become increasingly apparent with the end of the cold war. It has also become clear that there is great potential for innovative action on the part of Governments and regional and subregional organizations as they seek to meet their specific concerns. The brief overview of activities presented in this chapter demonstrates that much effort was made in all regions in 1995. The growing range of applications of the regional approach to disarmament and other security-related activities can be expected to continue to contribute to the enhancement and consolidation of the central role of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security.

CHAPTER X

Other issues and approaches

Introduction

IN 1995 THERE WERE A NUMBER OF ISSUES that had, in most instances, been before the international community for some time, but that, for a variety of reasons, were not directly addressed to any great extent in the different disarmament forums. They were, however, the subject of resolutions in the General Assembly. They are dealt with in this chapter under the title "Other issues", because they do not lend themselves to placement in any of the topical chapters of this volume, nor do they share a common theme among themselves. This chapter thus covers: outer space issues, the relationship between disarmament and development, the role of science and technology, and two aspects of arms limitation and disarmament agreements: compliance with treaty provisions and observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of treaties.

Outer space issues

Conference on Disarmament, 1995

The Conference on Disarmament did not succeed in re-establishing the Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space during the session despite general agreement among member States on the need to do so. This was partly due to the lack of agreement on the re-establishment of other ad hoc committees, including those for transparency and negative security assurances. Consequently, the subject was discussed only in plenary meetings.

Many delegations from various regional groups called for the re-establishment of the Committee. Some members of the Group of 21, such

as India and Mexico, however, went a step further and urged the Conference to ensure that outer space be used for peaceful purposes only. Egypt expressed the hope that the militarization of space would be rapidly and conclusively halted and also commented that discussion of the item should not be limited to confidence-building. Members of the Western and Eastern European Groups also voiced support for the re-establishment of the Committee. Germany favoured a negotiating mandate but, if that was not possible, believed the Committee should focus on confidence-building measures aimed at enhancing cooperation in outer space. Romania stated that conditions were ripe to seek out areas of convergence.

Some of the observer States also commented on the agenda item. Switzerland wished to see the adoption of specific measures to impede an arms race in space while allowing the use of ballistic technology for peaceful purposes. Slovakia believed that, given current technological advances, the time had come to study the possibility of concluding a comprehensive multilateral treaty banning the deployment of weapons in outer space. It also proposed the establishment of a code of conduct for outer space activities.

General Assembly, 1995

Sri Lanka introduced a draft resolution entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" on 9 November, which the First Committee acted upon on 15 November. It took separate votes on the nineteenth preambular paragraph and on operative paragraphs 8 and 10. It decided, by a recorded vote of 99 to 1, with 55 abstentions, to retain the nineteenth preambular paragraph; by a vote of 100 to 1, with 55 abstentions, to retain paragraph 8; and by a vote of 91 to 1, with 63 abstentions, to retain paragraph 10. The Committee then approved the draft as a whole by a recorded vote of 113 to none, with 46 abstentions.

The Russian Federation, which voted in favour of the draft resolution as a whole, believed that the most promising area of work was the formulation of concrete confidence-building proposals. However, it abstained on operative paragraph 10 because the draft resolution did not fully reflect present-day realities. Spain's statement on behalf of the members of the EU,¹ all of which abstained on all the votes,

¹ Also on behalf of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Norway, Poland, Romania and Slovakia.

was substantially the same as Russia's. The United States, voting against in the separate votes, objected to the language in operative paragraph 8, believing that, owing to existing legal agreements, there was no arms race in outer space and further negotiation was not required. For these reasons, it also objected to the seventh and nineteenth preambular paragraphs.

On 12 December, the General Assembly took action on the draft resolution. By a recorded vote of 106 to 1, with 57 abstentions, it decided to retain the nineteenth preambular paragraph; by a recorded vote of 108 to 1, with 57 abstentions, it decided to retain operative paragraph 8; by a recorded vote of 99 to 1, with 64 abstentions, it decided to retain operative paragraph 10; and by a recorded vote of 121 to none, with 46 abstentions, it adopted the draft resolution as a whole, as resolution 50/69. In explanation of its abstention, Canada stated that, as the Conference on Disarmament should focus on concluding a CTBT in 1996, it could not support the establishment of an ad hoc committee. Resolution 50/69 reads as follows:

Resolution 50/69

Prevention of an arms race in outer space

The General Assembly,

Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,

Reaffirming the will of all States that the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be for peaceful purposes, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind,

Reaffirming also provisions of articles III and IV of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,

Recalling the obligation of all States to observe the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations regarding the use or threat of use of force in their international relations, including in their space activities,

Reaffirming further paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which it is stated that in order to prevent an arms race in outer space further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty,

Recalling also its previous resolutions on this issue and taking note of the proposals submitted to the General Assembly at its tenth special session and at its regular sessions, and of the recommendations made to the competent organs of the United Nations and to the Conference on Disarmament,

Recognizing the grave danger for international peace and security of an arms race in outer space and of developments contributing to it,

Emphasizing the paramount importance of strict compliance with existing arms limitation and disarmament agreements relevant to outer space, including bilateral agreements, and with the existing legal regime concerning the use of outer space,

Considering that wide participation in the legal regime applicable to outer space could contribute to enhancing its effectiveness,

Noting that bilateral negotiations, begun in 1985 between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, were conducted with the declared objective of working out effective agreements aimed, *inter alia*, at preventing an arms race in outer space,

Welcoming the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space at the 1994 session of the Conference on Disarmament, in the exercise of the negotiating responsibilities of this sole multilateral body on disarmament, to continue to examine and identify, through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space,

Noting that the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, taking into account its previous efforts since its establishment in 1985 and seeking to enhance its functioning in qualitative terms, continued the examination and identification of various issues, existing agreements and existing proposals, as well as future initiatives relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and that this contributed to a better understanding of a number of problems and to a clearer perception of the various positions,

Regretting the inability of the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space in 1995,

Emphasizing the mutually complementary nature of bilateral and multilateral efforts in the field of preventing an arms race in outer space, and hoping that concrete results will emerge from those efforts as soon as possible,

Convinced that further measures should be examined in the search for effective and verifiable bilateral and multilateral agreements in order to prevent an arms race in outer space,

Stressing that the growing use of outer space increases the need for greater transparency and better information on the part of the international community,

Recalling in this context its previous resolutions, in particular resolutions 45/55 B of 4 December 1990, 47/51 of 9 December 1992 and 48/74 A of 16 December 1993, in which, *inter alia*, it reaffirmed the importance of confidence-building measures as means conducive to ensuring the attainment of the objective of the prevention of an arms race in outer space,

Conscious of the benefits of confidence- and security-building measures in the military field,

Recognizing that there has been agreement in the Ad Hoc Committee that the conclusion of an international agreement or agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space remained the fundamental task of the Committee and that the concrete proposals on confidence-building measures could form an integral part of such agreements,

1. *Reaffirms* the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space and the readiness of all States to contribute to that common objective, in conformity with the provisions of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies;

2. *Reaffirms its recognition*, as stated in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, that the legal regime applicable to outer space by itself does not guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space, that this legal regime plays a significant role in the prevention of an arms race in that environment, that there is a need to consolidate and reinforce that regime and enhance its effectiveness, and that it is important strictly to comply with existing agreements, both bilateral and multilateral;

3. *Emphasizes* the necessity of further measures with appropriate and effective provisions for verification to prevent an arms race in outer space;

4. *Calls upon* all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and of the prevention of an arms race in outer space and to refrain from actions contrary to that objective and to the relevant existing treaties in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation;

5. *Reiterates* that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects;

6. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space in 1996 and to consider the question of preventing an arms race in outer space;

7. *Also requests* the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its consideration of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space in

all its aspects, building upon areas of convergence and taking into account relevant proposals and initiatives, including those presented in the Ad Hoc Committee at the 1994 session of the Conference and at the forty-ninth and fiftieth sessions of the General Assembly;

8. *Further requests* the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish an ad hoc committee with an adequate mandate at the beginning of its 1996 session and to continue building upon areas of convergence, taking into account the work undertaken since 1985, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects;

9. *Recognizes*, in this respect, the growing convergence of views on the elaboration of measures designed to strengthen transparency, confidence and security in the peaceful uses of outer space;

10. *Urges* the Russian Federation and the United States of America to resume their bilateral negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement for preventing an arms race in outer space and to advise the Conference on Disarmament periodically of the progress of their bilateral sessions so as to facilitate its work;

11. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-first session the item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

Relationship between disarmament and development

General Assembly, 1995

In submitting his report on the relationship between disarmament and development to the General Assembly in 1994,² the Secretary-General had urged Member States, in the light of the changed international situation, to carry out a critical review of the action programme adopted at the International Conference of 1987 and then to provide further guidance for Secretariat activity in that area. However, no such evaluation was made in 1995. In his report to the Assembly at its fiftieth session,³ the Secretary-General again stressed that current global economic issues and national experiences in reducing military spending⁴

² A/49/476.

³ A/50/388.

⁴ See the report of the Secretary-General on the reduction of military budgets, a compilation of the military expenditures in standardized form re-

made it critical to review the whole issue, which affected both security and developmental concerns.

On 8 November, Colombia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, introduced a draft resolution entitled "Relationship between disarmament and development".

On 10 November, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution without a vote. On that occasion, Israel stated that if a separate vote had been taken on the fourth preambular paragraph, which referred to the documents of the Cartagena summit, it would have voted against it because the documents of that meeting singled out Israel and did not support the peace process in the Middle East. Germany, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom all expressed strong reservations regarding operative paragraph 2—a new element inserted in what had traditionally been consensus text. Both Germany and the United Kingdom were of the view that there was no simple, automatic link between disarmament and development and held that no such link was reflected in their national accounting procedures. The United States did not participate in the consensus on the draft resolution since it believed that disarmament and development were two distinct issues that could not be considered organically linked.

On 12 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote, as resolution 50/70 G. It reads as follows:

Resolution 50/70 G

Relationship between disarmament and development

The General Assembly,

Recalling the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, concerning the relationship between disarmament and development,

Recalling also the adoption on 11 September 1987 of the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development,

ported by States for 1994 (A/50/277 and Add.1). The following States reported: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.

Recalling further its resolution 49/75 J of 15 December 1994,

Bearing in mind the final documents of the Eleventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, from 18 to 20 October 1995,

Stressing the growing importance of the symbiotic relationship between disarmament and development in current international relations,

1. *Takes note* of the note by the Secretary-General and of actions taken in accordance with the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development;

2. *Urges* the international community to devote part of the resources made available by the implementation of disarmament and arms limitation agreements to economic and social development, with a view to reducing the ever-widening gap between developed and developing countries;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to take action, through appropriate organs and within available resources, for the implementation of the action programme adopted at the International Conference;

4. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General Assembly at its fifty-first session;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-first session the item entitled "Relationship between disarmament and development".

Role of science and technology

General Assembly, 1995

Two reports of the Secretary-General relating to scientific and technological developments were before the First Committee. The first⁵ was in response to a request, contained in resolution 49/67, that he follow and assess scientific and technological developments and develop a database of research institutions and experts with a view to promoting transparency and international cooperation in the application of such knowledge to disarmament objectives. The Secretary-General noted in his report that, although he lacked sufficient resources for making assessments, support from Member States would enable him to do so periodically. In addition, he pointed out that the Centre for Disarmament Affairs was in the process of expanding its database to include informa-

⁵ See document A/50/409. The two States that replied were Qatar and Ukraine.

tion of the kind requested. The report also contained the views of two States regarding the impact of scientific and technological developments on international security. The second report,⁶ submitted in response to resolution 44/116 O, conveyed information solicited from Governments relevant to the Sea-Bed Treaty and to verification of compliance with its provisions.

Two draft resolutions on the subject of science and technology were introduced in the First Committee. The first, entitled "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields", was introduced on 7 November by Canada. On 10 November, amendments were submitted⁷ that substituted, in the second preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 1(b), the ideas of negotiation, universal acceptance and international, non-discriminatory agreement on transfers for the phrases "continued multilateral dialogue" and "further developing international legal rules on transfers" in the Canadian version. Following negotiations between the sponsors of the draft resolution and the sponsors of the amendments, the Islamic Republic of Iran announced that the latter would not press their amendments for action. Canada then deleted the second preambular paragraph. On 8 November, India introduced the second draft resolution, entitled "The role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament". The First Committee adopted the draft resolution, as orally revised by Canada, by a recorded vote of 148 to none, with 9 abstentions, and the draft resolution introduced by India by a recorded vote of 98 to 6, with 51 abstentions.

At the time of the vote on the two draft resolutions, Argentina, which voted in favour of the Canadian text and abstained on the Indian text, expressed its conviction that, in order to avoid the transfer of technology for military purposes, it was imperative to ensure that transfers took place in a responsible way, under strict controls. India, which abstained on the Canadian text, expressed the hope that work to achieve a single draft resolution on the subject would get under way early on at the next session.

⁶ A/50/383; the report contained a reply received from Poland.

⁷ The amendments were submitted by Cuba, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Myanmar and Pakistan.

The General Assembly adopted the two draft resolutions on 12 December. Resolution 50/62 was adopted by a recorded vote of 104 to 6, with 53 abstentions, and resolution 50/63 by a recorded vote of 157 to none, with 9 abstentions. The resolutions read as follows:

Resolution 50/62

The role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recognizing that scientific and technological developments can have both civilian and military applications and that progress in science and technology for civilian applications needs to be maintained and encouraged,

Stressing the interests of the international community in the subject and the need to follow closely the scientific and technological developments that may have a negative impact on the security environment and on the process of arms limitation and disarmament, and to channel scientific and technological developments for beneficial purposes,

Cognizant that the international transfer of high-technology products, services and know-how for peaceful purposes is important for the economic and social development of States,

Recalling that the Final Declaration of the Eleventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, from 18 to 20 October 1995, noted that restrictions being placed on access to technology through the imposition of non-transparent ad hoc export control regimes with exclusive membership tended to impede the economic and social development of developing countries,

Emphasizing that the internationally negotiated guidelines for the transfer of high technology with military applications should take into account the legitimate defence requirements of all States, while ensuring that access to high-technology products and services and know-how for peaceful purposes is not denied,

1. *Affirms* that scientific and technological achievements should be used for the benefit of all mankind to promote the sustainable economic and social development of all States and to safeguard international security, and that international cooperation in the use of science and technology through the transfer and exchange of technological know-how for peaceful purposes should be promoted;

2. *Invites Member States* to undertake additional efforts to apply science and technology for disarmament-related purposes and to make disarmament-related technologies available to interested States;

3. *Urges* Member States to undertake multilateral negotiations with the participation of all interested States in order to establish universally acceptable, non-discriminatory guidelines for international transfers of high technology with military applications;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to develop a database of concerned research institutions and experts with a view to promoting transparency and international cooperation in the applications of the scientific and technological developments for pursuing disarmament objectives such as disposal of weapons, conversion and verification, among others;

5. *Encourages* the United Nations to contribute, within existing mandates, to promoting the application of science and technology for peaceful purposes;

6. *Invites* all Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General their views and assessment;

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-first session an item entitled "The role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament".

Resolution 50/63

The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields

The General Assembly,

Recalling its previous resolutions on the subject of the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields, in which, *inter alia*, it recognized that scientific and technological developments could have both civilian and military applications and that progress in science and technology for civilian applications needed to be maintained and encouraged,

1. *Invites* Member States to enhance bilateral and multilateral dialogue on the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields, with a view to:

(a) Ensuring implementation of relevant commitments already undertaken under international legal instruments;

(b) Exploring ways and means of further developing international legal rules on transfers of high technology with military applications;

2. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-first session the item entitled "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields".

Arms limitation and disarmament agreements

General Assembly, 1995

On 27 November, the United States introduced a revised draft resolution entitled "Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements", following intensive consultations between the sponsors of the resolution and the sponsors of an amendment.⁸ The aim of the amendment was to underline that compliance should be with all the provisions of agreements and that compliance concerns should be effectively addressed, in a manner consistent with the relevant provisions, by all States parties. Myanmar, on behalf of the sponsors of the amendment, stated that, as the main concerns of the sponsors of the amendments had been accommodated in the revision, they would not press the amendments to action. The First Committee then adopted the draft resolution without a vote. Subsequently, on 12 December, the General Assembly also adopted it without a vote. Resolution 50/60 reads as follows:

Resolution 50/60

Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 48/63 of 16 December 1993 and other relevant resolutions on the question,

Recognizing the abiding concern of all Member States for maintaining respect for rights and obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law,

Convinced that observance of the Charter of the United Nations, relevant treaties and other sources of international law is essential for the strengthening of international security,

Mindful, in particular, of the fundamental importance of full implementation and strict observance of agreements and other obligations on arms limitation and disarmament if individual nations and the international community are to derive enhanced security from them,

Stressing that any violation of such agreements and other obligations not only adversely affects the security of States parties but can also create security risks for other States relying on the constraints and commitments stipulated in those agreements and other obligations,

⁸ The sponsors of the amendment were Iran (Islamic Republic of), Myanmar and Pakistan.

Stressing also that any weakening of confidence in such agreements and other obligations diminishes their contribution to global or regional stability and to further disarmament and arms limitation efforts and undermines the credibility and effectiveness of the international legal system,

Recognizing, in this context, that full compliance by parties with all provisions of existing agreements and the resolving of compliance concerns effectively by means consistent with such agreements and international law can, *inter alia*, facilitate the conclusion of additional arms limitation and disarmament agreements, and thereby contribute to better relations among States and the strengthening of world peace and security,

Believing that compliance with all provisions of arms limitation and disarmament agreements by States parties is a matter of interest and concern to all members of the international community, and noting the role that the United Nations has played and should continue to play in that regard,

Welcoming the universal recognition of the critical importance of the question of compliance with and verification of arms limitation and disarmament agreements and other obligations,

1. *Urges* all States parties to arms limitation and disarmament agreements to implement and comply with the entirety of the spirit and all provisions of such agreements;

2. *Calls upon* all Member States to give serious consideration to the implications that non-compliance with any provisions of arms limitation and disarmament obligations has for international security and stability, as well as for the prospects for further progress in the field of disarmament;

3. *Also calls upon* all Member States to support efforts aimed at the resolution of compliance questions by means consistent with such agreements and international law, with a view to encouraging strict observance by all parties of the provisions of arms limitation and disarmament agreements and maintaining or restoring the integrity of such agreements;

4. *Welcomes* the role that the United Nations has played in restoring the integrity of, and fostering negotiations on, certain arms limitation and disarmament agreements and in the removal of threats to peace;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to provide assistance that may be necessary in restoring and protecting the integrity of arms limitation and disarmament agreements;

6. *Encourages* efforts by States parties to develop additional cooperative measures, as appropriate, that can increase confidence in compliance with existing arms limitation and disarmament obligations and reduce the possibility of misinterpretation and misunderstanding;

7. *Notes* the contribution that verification experiments and research can make and already have made in confirming and improving verification pro-

cedures for arms limitation and disarmament agreements under study or negotiation, thereby providing an opportunity, from the time that such agreements enter into force, for enhancing confidence in the effectiveness of verification procedures as a basis for determining compliance;

8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-second session the item entitled "Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament obligations".

On 8 November, Colombia, on behalf of the States members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, introduced a revised draft resolution⁹ entitled "Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control". Subsequently, the draft was further revised. On 20 November, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 149 to 4, with 4 abstentions. At that time, the United States explained that although it strongly supported efforts to protect the environment, it questioned the purpose and utility of the text and objected to the fact that it singled out certain arms control and disarmament agreements. Moreover, the United States did not accept the implication that all nuclear testing had a negative impact on the environment.

On 12 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 157 to 4, with 2 abstentions. Resolution 50/70 M reads as follows:

Resolution 50/70 M

Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control

The General Assembly,

Recognizing the importance of the observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms limitation,

Taking note of the relevant provisions of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction regarding the environment,

Convinced of the importance of the environmentally sound implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction,

⁹ The original draft resolution, submitted by Cuba, was entitled "Adherence to environmental standards in the elaboration and implementation of disarmament and arms control agreements".

Mindful of the detrimental environmental effects of the use of nuclear weapons,

Conscious of the positive potential implications for the environment of a future comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty,

Desirous of banning effectively military or any other hostile use of environment modification techniques, with a view to removing the dangers for mankind that might arise from such uses,

1. *Invites* the Conference on Disarmament to take every necessary measure to include in negotiating treaties and agreements on disarmament and arms limitation the corresponding environmental norms, with a view to ensuring that the process of implementation of such treaties and agreements is environmentally sound, in particular the destruction of weapons covered by them;

2. *Emphasizes* the importance of the compliance of all States parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, and calls upon them to cooperate and ensure that the process of implementation of the Convention in all relevant aspects is environmentally sound;

3. *Urges* all States parties to consider all relevant norms related to the protection of the environment in implementing the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction;

4. *Calls upon* the Conference on Disarmament to conclude, as a task of the highest priority, a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty as soon as possible in 1996;

5. *Urges* the States that are not yet party to the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques to consider adhering to it as soon as possible, in order to assure the universality of the Convention.

CHAPTER XI

Institutional aspects

THE ACTIVITIES OF DISARMAMENT BODIES as they relate to organizational and institutional matters are discussed in this chapter.

Disarmament Commission, 1995

At its organizational session held in December 1994, the Commission was not able to reach agreement on a provisional agenda for its 1995 session. At a further organizational meeting, in April 1995, the matter was settled; thus, at its substantive session, held from 15 to 30 May under the chairmanship of Mr. Luvsangiin Erdenechuluun of Mongolia, the Commission had before it the following agenda:

1. Process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons
2. International arms transfers, with particular reference to General Assembly resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991
3. Review of the Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade

The first and second items had been on the agenda since 1991 and 1994 respectively; the third was new. The Commission established a working group to deal with each one. By the end of the session, as noted in its report to the General Assembly,¹ the Commission had concluded its consideration of the first and third items, although without reaching agreement on relevant texts. For an account of the Commission's work on the nuclear item, assigned to Working Group I, see page

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fiftieth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/50/42)*; the report lists all the documents before the Commission and its working groups.

98; and for the arms transfers item, assigned to Working Group II, see page 144; its work on the question of the Third Disarmament Decade, assigned to Working Group III, is discussed below.

Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade

In December 1994, the General Assembly undertook to carry out, at its fiftieth session, a review and appraisal of the implementation of the Declaration and requested the Disarmament Commission to make a preliminary assessment at its 1995 session. Working Group III, established for this purpose and chaired by the representative of Nigeria, met between 18 and 26 May.

Although there were only minor differences of view on most issues, fundamental difficulties surfaced with respect to nuclear disarmament. While, in general, the nuclear-weapon States felt that they were not in a position to incorporate any wording with regard to their commitments beyond what they had agreed to at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT,² certain non-nuclear-weapon States, in particular Egypt, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Mexico, wished to express their concern regarding implementation of article VI of the Treaty. Moreover, the nuclear-weapon States and Belarus, Ukraine and South Africa wished to refer to the progress made in nuclear disarmament since 1990 in a manner considered overly positive by a number of other States. In spite of intensive efforts, therefore, the Working Group was not able to reach consensus on a text.

Resolution concerning the Disarmament Commission

On 17 November, the representative of Mongolia, in his capacity as chairman of the Commission for its 1995 session, introduced a revised draft resolution entitled "Report of the Disarmament Commission", stating that at its organizational session in December, the Commission would decide on the two new items to be added to its 1996 agenda. At the same meeting, the First Committee took a separate vote on operative paragraph 12, adopting it by a recorded vote of 147 to none, with 3 abstentions (Israel, United Kingdom and United States). The Committee then adopted the revised draft resolution as a whole without a vote.

² See "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" (NPT/CONF.1995/32), part II, decision 2. The document is reproduced on page 23 of this volume.

In a statement explaining its position and that of the United States regarding operative paragraph 12, the United Kingdom questioned whether the production of the compilation was a sensible use of scarce resources at a time when the United Nations was seriously handicapped by financial problems.

On 12 December, the General Assembly adopted operative paragraph 12 by a recorded vote of 162 to none, with 4 abstentions (Israel, United Kingdom, United States and Uzbekistan) and then adopted the revised draft resolution without a vote as resolution 50/72 D. It reads as follows:

Resolution 50/72 D
Report of the Disarmament Commission

The General Assembly,

Having considered the annual report of the Disarmament Commission, *Recalling* its resolutions 47/54 A of 9 December 1992, 47/54 G of 8 April 1993, 48/77 A of 16 December 1993 and 49/77 A of 15 December 1994,

Considering the role that the Disarmament Commission has been called upon to play and the contribution that it should make in examining and submitting recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament and in the promotion of the implementation of the relevant decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session,

1. *Takes note* of the annual report of the Disarmament Commission;
2. *Notes with regret* that the Disarmament Commission was unable to achieve agreement on guidelines and recommendations under its agenda item entitled "Process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons" and on recommendations under its agenda item entitled "Review of the Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade", both of which were concluded in 1995;
3. *Notes* the progress made and continuing consideration by the Disarmament Commission of its agenda item entitled "International arms transfers, with particular reference to General Assembly resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991", which is to be concluded in 1996;
4. *Reaffirms* the importance of further enhancing the dialogue and cooperation among the First Committee, the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament;
5. *Also reaffirms* the role of the Disarmament Commission as the specialized, deliberative body within the United Nations multilateral disarmament

machinery that allows for in-depth deliberations on specific disarmament issues, leading to the submission of concrete recommendations on those issues;

6. *Encourages* the Disarmament Commission to continue to make every effort to enhance its working methods so as to enable it to give focused consideration to a limited number of priority issues in the field of disarmament, bearing in mind the decision it has taken to move its agenda towards a three-item phased approach;

7. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to continue its work in accordance with its mandate, as set forth in paragraph 118 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and with paragraph 3 of Assembly resolution 37/78 H of 9 December 1982, and to that end to make every effort to achieve specific recommendations on the items on its agenda, taking into account the adopted "Ways and means to enhance the functioning of the Disarmament Commission";

8. *Recommends* that, pursuant to the adopted three-item phased approach, the Disarmament Commission, at its 1995 organizational session, adopt the following items for consideration at its 1996 substantive session:

(a) International arms transfers, with particular reference to General Assembly resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991;

(b) [to be added];*

(c) [to be added];*

9. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to meet for a period not exceeding four weeks during 1996 and to submit a substantive report to the General Assembly at its fifty-first session;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Disarmament Commission the annual report of the Conference on Disarmament, together with all the official records of the fiftieth session of the General Assembly relating to disarmament matters, and to render all assistance that the Commission may require for implementing the present resolution;

11. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to ensure full provision to the Commission and its subsidiary bodies of interpretation and translation facilities in the official languages and to assign, as a matter of priority, all the necessary resources and services, including verbatim records, to that end;

* The new item will be decided by the Disarmament Commission at its 1995 Organizational session. [At its 203rd plenary meeting, on 24 April 1996, the Disarmament Commission adopted the agenda for its 1996 substantive session, including as a second substantive item, the item entitled "Exchange of views on the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament". The Commission did not reach a consensus on a third substantive item.]

12. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to prepare a compilation, in the format of a note by the Secretary-General, of all texts of principles, guidelines or recommendations on subject items that have been unanimously adopted by the Disarmament Commission since its inception in 1978;

13. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-first session the item entitled "Report of the Disarmament Commission".

Conference on Disarmament, 1995

The Conference on Disarmament was in session from 30 January to 7 April, from 29 May to 7 July and from 31 July to 22 September and submitted its report to the General Assembly.³ In addition to the 37 members⁴ participating in the session, a number of other States,⁵ at their request, were invited to take part. The agenda under consideration was the same as that of the 1994 session:

1. Nuclear test ban
2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament
3. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters
4. Prevention of an arms race in outer space
5. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fiftieth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/50/27)*. The following member States successively assumed the presidency of the Conference: Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia and Morocco, the last-mentioned serving as president during the recess until the 1996 session.

⁴ The members participating were: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Sri Lanka, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela and Zaire.

⁵ The non-members participating were: Armenia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Brunei Darussalam, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, DPRK, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, Ghana, Greece, Holy See, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Jordan, Kazakstan, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Swaziland, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Republic of Tanzania, Viet Nam, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

6. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons
7. Comprehensive programme of disarmament
8. Transparency in armaments

The proceedings of the Conference on Disarmament were marked by serious organizational difficulties arising from differences of view concerning its agenda and membership. Although it re-established two ad hoc committees, the first on a nuclear test ban and the second on a cut-off in fissile material, only the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban carried out its work, as discussed in chapter II. The Committee to deal with a cut-off in fissile material could not proceed until agreement could be reached on the re-establishment of ad hoc committees on negative security assurances, prevention of an arms race in outer space, and transparency in armaments, and on the commencement of substantive consideration of nuclear disarmament. As no such agreement was in fact reached, these questions were dealt with only in plenary meetings.

Some progress, however, was made with respect to the expansion of membership. On 21 September, the Conference adopted a decision⁶ whereby 23 more States would, together, assume membership in the Conference at the earliest date, to be decided by the Conference. As the 23 States are to assume membership simultaneously, the effective implementation of the decision and its timing are predicated on the lifting of the Security Council sanctions imposed on Iraq. In an effort to speed up full implementation for those States whose candidature raised no difficulties, the United States proposed that the 23 States assume membership together immediately and that an addition be made to the decision to the effect that, in the case of a member subject to comprehensive enforcement measures under chapter VII of the Charter, the State would not have the right to deny consensus on any decision to be adopted by the Conference.⁷ However, no action was taken to implement the decision. In any case, it was agreed that the decision was without preju-

⁶ See document CD/1356. The following States are to be admitted as members: Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, DPRK, Finland, Iraq, Israel, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, Ukraine, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe. The list had been originally proposed in 1993 and circulated as document CD/1214.

⁷ See CD/1362.

dice to consideration of other candidates,⁸ the rules of procedure of the Conference providing for a review of membership at regular intervals.

Resolutions concerning the Conference on Disarmament

On 26 October, the representative of Morocco, in his capacity as President of the Conference on Disarmament, introduced a draft resolution entitled "Report of the Conference on Disarmament". On 10 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote. In its explanation of position, the Czech Republic stated that the linking of agenda items was counter-productive and could, if prolonged, lead to the loss of the Conference's ability to function. The Czech Republic was especially concerned with problems over the expansion of the membership of the Conference, since it had now only observer status.

On 12 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, also without a vote, as resolution 50/72 A. It reads as follows:

Resolution 50/72 A

Report of the Conference on Disarmament

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Conference on Disarmament,

Convinced that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community, has the primary role in substantive negotiations on priority questions of disarmament,

Noting with satisfaction the results achieved so far on the subject of a comprehensive test ban, as well as the commitment to complete the negotiations on the issue as soon as possible and not later than 1996,

1. *Reaffirms* the role of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community;

2. *Welcomes* the determination of the Conference on Disarmament to fulfil that role in the light of the evolving international situation, with a view to making early substantive progress on priority items of its agenda;

3. *Urges* the Conference on Disarmament to continue as the highest priority task its negotiations to conclude a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty;

⁸ States that had requested membership but were not included in the decision contained in CD/1356: Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Greece, Ireland, Kuwait, Malaysia, Portugal, Slovenia and Tunisia.

4. *Acknowledges* decision CD/1356 taken by the Conference on Disarmament on 21 September 1995 regarding its composition and the commitment to implement that decision at the earliest possible date;

5. *Encourages* the review of the agenda and methods of work of the Conference on Disarmament;

6. *Urges* the Conference on Disarmament to make every effort to reach a consensus on its programme of work at the beginning of its 1996 session;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to ensure the provision to the Conference on Disarmament of adequate administrative, substantive and conference support services;

8. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to submit a report on its work to the General Assembly at its fifty-first session;

9. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-first session the item entitled "Report of the Conference on Disarmament".

On 8 November, South Africa introduced a draft resolution entitled "Expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament", which was later revised. The First Committee adopted the revised draft without a vote on 15 November. A number of States members of the Conference—the Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan and the United States—explained their positions, in all cases urging speedy implementation of the decision to expand the membership. Pakistan maintained, with respect to implementation, that no conditions should be imposed on sovereign States. The United States referred to its proposal, (see page 219) as one among several put forward to facilitate implementation. Malaysia, a non-member, urged that its application, together with those of the other candidates to date, should be given serious consideration as a matter of the highest priority.

On 12 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote as resolution 50/72 C. The resolution reads as follows:

Resolution 50/72 C

Expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Conference on Disarmament, and in particular the part concerning expansion of the membership of the Conference,

Stressing the role of the Conference on Disarmament as the sole multilateral global negotiating body on disarmament,

Emphasizing the fact that, notwithstanding dramatic changes in the international situation and continuous consultations, there has been no expansion of the membership of the Conference during the last seventeen years,

Fully convinced that an enlarged membership is desirable in order to take advantage of the current propitious international climate to negotiate and conclude, on the solid basis of a more representative participation, a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and other important agreements requiring universal adherence,

Recognizing the legitimate aspirations of all candidate countries to participate fully in the work of the Conference on Disarmament, and recalling relevant decisions taken to review the composition of the Conference, including the agreement reached among Member States during the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament on a further expansion and on the wish to review the membership of the then Committee on Disarmament at regular intervals,

Noting that the Conference on Disarmament, which is funded from the regular budget, was granted, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 48/77 B of 16 December 1993, supplementary administrative, substantive and conference support services, *inter alia*, in anticipation of its expansion,

Recalling in particular its resolution 49/77 B of 15 December 1994, adopted without a vote, urging the Conference on Disarmament to make every effort to reach a solution resulting, by the beginning of 1995, in a significant expansion of its composition, which would then include at least sixty countries,

Strongly regretting, nevertheless, that the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to adopt the report of the then Special Coordinator for Membership, and the recommended composition attached to it, taken at the end of the 1995 session did not result in the immediate expansion of its membership,

1. *Recalls* the report of 12 August 1993 of the Special Coordinator for Membership designated by the Conference on Disarmament and the subsequent statement made by the Special Coordinator on 26 August 1993, recommending a dynamic solution to the question of membership;

2. *Recognizes* the legitimate aspirations of all countries that have applied for membership to participate fully in the work of the Conference on Disarmament;

3. *Acknowledges* decision CD/1356, taken at the 719th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament on 21 September 1995, including the commitment to implement the decision at the earliest possible date;

4. *Calls* for the implementation of decision CD/1356 on the expansion of membership of the Conference on Disarmament on an urgent basis;

5. *Strongly urges* that the new members should, in pursuance of decision CD/1356 and with particular reference to the provisions contained in the second

paragraph of that decision, all assume together membership of the Conference at the start of the 1996 session of the Conference;

6. *Calls on* the Conference on Disarmament, in accordance with its decision CD/1356, to review the situation following the presentation of progress reports by the President of the Conference on ongoing consultations at the end of each part of its annual session;

7. *Urges* that, following the presentation of progress reports by the President of the Conference, the other candidatures to date be further considered by the Conference at its 1996 session.

General Assembly, 1995

At its plenary meetings between 25 September and 5 October,⁹ the General Assembly held a general debate, in the course of which a large number of Member States addressed different aspects of disarmament and international security questions. The First Committee, meeting under the chairmanship of Mr. Luvsangiin Erdenechuluun of Mongolia, held both formal substantive meetings and informal meetings for structured discussion on the following items between 16 October and 21 November.¹⁰

1. Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament obligations (57)
2. Education and information for disarmament (58)
3. Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification (59)
4. Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security (60)
5. Reduction of military budgets (61)
6. Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security (62)
7. The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields (63)
8. Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (64)
9. Comprehensive test-ban treaty (65)
10. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East (66)

⁹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fiftieth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 4th to 21st meetings.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, *First Committee*, 3rd to 29th meetings. (The numbers in parentheses are the item-numbers on the agenda of the General Assembly.)

11. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia (67)
12. Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (68)
13. Prevention of an arms race in outer space (69)
14. General and complete disarmament (70):
 - (a) Notification of nuclear tests
 - (b) Further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof
 - (c) Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes
 - (d) Review of the Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade
 - (e) Transparency in armaments
 - (f) Step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threat
 - (g) Fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament
 - (h) Relationship between disarmament and development
 - (i) Measures to curb the illicit transfer and use of conventional arms
 - (j) Regional disarmament
 - (k) Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels
 - (l) Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of vehicles for their delivery in all its aspects
15. Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly (71):
 - (a) United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services
 - (b) Regional confidence-building measures
 - (c) United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific and United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean
 - (d) Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons
16. Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session (72):
 - (a) Report of the Disarmament Commission
 - (b) Report of the Conference on Disarmament
 - (c) Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters

- (d) United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
- (e) Disarmament Week
- 17. The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (73)
- 18. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (74)
- 19. Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region (75)
- 20. Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace (76)
- 21. Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) (77)
- 22. Final text of a treaty on an African nuclear-weapon-free zone (78)
- 23. Rationalization of the work and reform of the agenda of the First Committee (79)
- 24. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (80)
- 25. Maintenance of international security (81)

Of the 44 draft texts adopted by the First Committee with regard to items on disarmament and the rationalization of the work of the First Committee, one dealing with the convening of the fourth special session and four dealing with the work of the various disarmament bodies are discussed in this chapter.

Resolution concerning the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament

The non-aligned States pursued their efforts, initiated in 1994, to have a fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament convened at an early date to review, from a perspective more in tune with the current international situation, the most critical aspects of the process of disarmament—the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and the control and reduction of conventional weapons. This move elicited a sharp divergence of view in the First Committee, with most States not belonging to the Non-Aligned Movement feeling that the session should not be held in the near future, and with some opposing such action before the year 2000.

On 8 November, Colombia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, introduced a draft resolution entitled "Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament", which was later revised with respect to the paragraphs pertaining to the timing of the session and a preparatory committee.

On 21 November, the United States, observing that the revised draft resolution clearly did not enjoy consensus and that a special session could not result in anything useful if not all of the major Powers participated, introduced a series of amendments. It believed its proposal would offer an opportunity to arrive at a rational, common decision, taking into account the major developments that were expected by the end of the century: the Assembly would decide to keep under consideration until the year 2000 the prospects and timing of a fourth special session. At the same meeting, Norway proposed an oral amendment to change the words "in 1997" to "by 1999" in operative paragraph 1 of the revised draft resolution. However, it withdrew its amendment after the Committee adopted a Colombian motion that no action be taken on the United States amendments.

The Committee adopted the motion proposed by Colombia by a recorded vote of 88 to 47, with 7 abstentions. It then adopted operative paragraph 1 of the revised draft resolution by a recorded vote of 96 to 39, with 10 abstentions; operative paragraph 2 by a vote of 96 to 39, with 9 abstentions; operative paragraph 4 by a vote of 95 to 39, with 11 abstentions; and operative paragraph 5 by a vote of 95 to 39, with 11 abstentions. It proceeded to adopt the revised draft resolution as a whole by a vote of 98 to 2 (Israel and United States), with 46 abstentions.

In explanations of vote, Spain, on behalf of the EU and associated States,¹¹ stated that they had abstained because they were not in a position to accept any specific date. Ukraine, which also abstained, felt that it should have been possible to agree that the special session should be convened at a convenient time before 1999. New Zealand explained that it had voted in favour of the motion to take no action because it did not believe that the proposed amendments would bring the Com-

¹¹ Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

mittee closer to consensus and, although it had also voted in favour of the draft resolution, it felt that more preparation would be required than would be feasible by 1997.

On 12 December, the General Assembly voted on the revised draft resolution as follows. It adopted operative paragraph 1 by a recorded vote of 109 to 40, with 12 abstentions; operative paragraph 2 by a vote of 109 to 41, with 10 abstentions; operative paragraph 4 by a vote of 107 to 40, with 11 abstentions; operative paragraph 5 by a vote of 107 to 40, with 11 abstentions; and the revised draft resolution as a whole by a vote of 111 to 2, with 49 abstentions. Resolution 50/70 F reads as follows:

Resolution 50/70 F

Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 49/75 I of 15 December 1994,

Recalling also that three special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament were held in 1978, 1982 and 1988,

Bearing in mind the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, and the final objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Welcoming the recent positive changes in the international landscape, characterized by the end of the cold war, the relaxation of tensions at the global level and the emergence of a new spirit governing relations among nations,

Taking note of paragraph 108 of the Final Declaration of the Eleventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, from 18 to 20 October 1995, which supported the convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1997, which would offer an opportunity to review, from a perspective more in tune with the current international situation, the most critical aspects of the process of disarmament and to mobilize the international community and public opinion in favour of the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and of the control and reduction of conventional weapons,

Expecting that, since negotiations and action on important disarmament issues will be completed by the end of 1996, the year 1997 would be an opportune time to review the progress in the entire field of disarmament in the post-cold-war era,

1. *Decides* to convene its fourth special session on disarmament in 1997, if possible, the exact date and agenda to be decided upon before the end of the current session of the General Assembly through consultations;

2. *Also decides* to establish a Preparatory Committee to prepare a draft agenda for the special session, to examine all relevant questions relating to that session and to submit its recommendations thereon to the General Assembly at its fifty-first session;

3. *Invites* all Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General, no later than 1 April 1996, their views on the draft agenda and other relevant questions relating to the fourth special session on disarmament;

4. *Requests* the Preparatory Committee to meet for a short organizational session before the end of the fifty-first session of the General Assembly in order, *inter alia*, to set the date for its substantive session;

5. *Also requests* the Preparatory Committee to submit its progress report to the General Assembly at its fifty-first session;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-first session an item entitled "Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament: report of the Preparatory Committee for the Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament".

Decision concerning the First Committee

On 9 November, the chairman submitted a draft decision entitled "Rationalization of the work and reform of the agenda of the First Committee". On 13 November, the First Committee approved it without a vote, and on 12 December, it was adopted by the General Assembly, also without a vote, as decision 50/421. It reads as follows:

Decision 50/421

Rationalization of the work and reform of the agenda of the First Committee

At its 90th plenary meeting, on 12 December 1995, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the First Committee, welcoming the progress achieved in the rationalization and improvement of the work of the First Committee, requested the Chairman of the First Committee to continue consultations on the further rationalization of the work of the Committee with a view to improving further its effective functioning and decided to defer until its fifty-second session consideration of the item entitled "Rationalization of the work and reform of the agenda of the First Committee" and to include it in the provisional agenda of that session.

CHAPTER XII

Studies; information and training

THE ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN BY THE UNITED NATIONS for information and training in the field of disarmament include expert studies on various topics, an information programme, fellowships, training and advisory services, publications and research. This chapter gives a brief account of such activities carried out in 1995 and lists, in annex II, the publications prepared by the Centre for Disarmament Affairs and by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). The Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters¹ advises the Secretary-General, *inter alia*, on the studies programme and implementation of the information programme, and serves as the Board of Trustees of UNIDIR.

Disarmament studies programme

Study completed in 1995

By resolution 48/68 of 16 December 1993, the General Assembly had requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, to carry out an in-depth study to review the conclusions of the 1990 study on verification,² to examine the lessons of recent developments and to explore the further development of guidelines and principles for the involvement of the United Nations

¹ See the report of the Secretary-General on the two sessions of the Board held during 1995: from 10 to 12 January in Geneva and from 19 to 23 June in New York (A/50/391).

² A/45/372. The study was subsequently issued as a United Nations publication: *The Role of the United Nations in the Field of Verification* (Sales No. E.91.IX.11).

in verification. The consensus report that was subsequently prepared was submitted to the General Assembly in September 1995.³

On 7 November, Canada introduced a draft resolution entitled "Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification". On 15 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 140 to 1 (United States), with 7 abstentions.

The United States, in its explanation of vote, reiterated that it had not supported the initiation of the study and, after reviewing its conclusions and recommendations, could not endorse them. The United States was prepared to join in a consensus on a procedural resolution along traditional lines, but the resolution before the Committee presumed that the recommendations were broadly supported and were to be implemented by the Secretary-General. The United Kingdom, which abstained, stated that it, too, had not supported the study and could not endorse its recommendations, some of which ran counter to its view that verification measures should be treaty-specific. It would, however, have been prepared to join consensus on the draft resolution, which had been considerably revised, had there been no request for a vote. France abstained for reasons similar to those expressed by the United States. Noting that the report of the Secretary-General mentioned the nuclear issue in the Korean peninsula, the DPRK stated that the subject, in its view, was not a question to be debated in the United Nations and would not be helpful to the settlement of the issue.

On 12 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 157 to 1, with 6 abstentions, as resolution 50/61. It reads as follows:

Resolution 50/61

**Verification in all its aspects,
including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification**

The General Assembly,

Affirming its continued support for the sixteen principles of verification drawn up by the Disarmament Commission,

³ A/50/377, annex. The 16 experts appointed by the Secretary-General to prepare the report are listed in annex II to this chapter. The Group of Experts, chaired by Canada, held four sessions in New York: from 22 to 25 February and from 11 July to 22 July 1994, and from 30 January to 10 February and from 17 to 28 July 1995.

Stressing that the critical importance of verification of and compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements is universally recognized and that the issue of verification is a matter of concern to all nations,

Recalling its resolution 48/68 of 16 December 1993, in which it requested the Secretary-General, as a further follow-up to the 1990 study on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification and in view of significant developments in international relations since that study, to undertake, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, an in-depth study on verification issues identified in that resolution,

Also recalling that, in its resolution 48/68, it requested the Secretary-General to submit a report on the subject to the General Assembly at its fiftieth session,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General, which was unanimously approved by the Group of Governmental Experts on Verification in All its Aspects, including the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Verification, and commends the report to the attention of Member States;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to give the report the widest possible circulation and to seek the views of Member States on the report;

3. *Encourages* Member States to consider the recommendations contained in the report and to assist the Secretary-General in their implementation where they consider it appropriate;

4. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its fifty-second session on the views received from Member States on the report and on actions taken by Member States and by the Secretariat with respect to the recommendations contained in the report;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-second session the item entitled "Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification".

Study initiated in 1995

Reflecting growing concern about the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons—the weapons actually being used in conflicts being dealt with by the United Nations—the General Assembly adopted resolution 50/70 B, entitled "Small arms". By the resolution, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare a report on the subject with the assistance of a panel of qualified governmental experts, to seek the views and proposals of Member States, to collect other relevant information and to make such material available to the panel of experts. The report is to be submitted

to the General Assembly in 1997. For an account of the Assembly's action on this resolution, see page 149.

Disarmament Information Programme and Disarmament Week

In carrying out its mandated information and education activities, the Centre for Disarmament Affairs gave increasing attention to the most topical issues of global concern in the field, such as non-proliferation in all its aspects, the achievement of a CTBT and ways and means of promoting regional approaches to disarmament and confidence-building measures, including greater openness and transparency in military matters. For a list of the publications issued by the Centre during the year, see annex II.

The Centre for Disarmament Affairs worked closely with the NGO Committee on Disarmament, especially during the celebration of Disarmament Week. The Week, beginning 24 October, was observed by a special meeting of the First Committee. On 26 and 30 October and on 9 November, the NGO Committee on Disarmament, the Centre for Disarmament Affairs and the Department of Public Information sponsored panel discussions that focused on the nuclear-test-ban negotiations, a fissile material cut-off, the reduction of military budgets and land-mines.⁴

The Thirteenth Pledging Conference for the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme, presided over by the representative of Sri Lanka, was held in New York on 27 October with 56 delegations participating. In calling attention to the importance of the programme, the President noted that despite unparalleled advances in the technology of dissemination in the developed world, there were still parts of the globe where people lacked access to even basic information. He also pointed out that despite the fact that there was widespread agreement that regional approaches to disarmament and security matters were

⁴ At the time that it was considering the information programme and related events and activities, the First Committee had before it two relevant reports of the Secretary-General on: (a) Disarmament Week, covering the period from 1992 to 1994 (A/50/291) and (b) education and information for disarmament, containing the views of three Member States (Cuba, Estonia and Japan) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (A/50/309).

important, there had been a steady decline each year in voluntary contributions to the three regional centres.

Fourteen countries pledged \$279,755 at the Conference, with various amounts earmarked for the regional centres and UNIDIR as well as for the information programme itself,⁵ while three more countries indicated their intention to pledge at a later date. In accordance with the Final Act of the Conference, the list of pledges will remain open in order to incorporate any additional contributions up until 31 March 1996.⁶

On 7 November, Mongolia introduced a draft resolution entitled "Disarmament Week". It was adopted by the First Committee without a vote on 10 November and, similarly, by the General Assembly on 12 December, as resolution 50/72 B. The resolution reads as follows:

Resolution 50/72 B
Disarmament Week

The General Assembly,

Noting the fundamental change that has been brought about by the end of the cold war and bipolar confrontation, and welcoming the important achievements of late in the areas of arms limitation and disarmament,

Noting with satisfaction that this year's observance of Disarmament Week coincides with the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations,

Stressing the increasing role and prestige of the United Nations as a focal point for coordinating and harmonizing the efforts of States,

Emphasizing anew the need for and the importance of world public opinion in support of disarmament efforts in all their aspects,

Noting with satisfaction the broad and active support by Governments and international and national organizations of the decision taken by the General Assembly at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament, regarding the proclamation of the week starting 24 October, the day of the founding of the United Nations, as a week devoted to fostering the objectives of disarmament,

Recalling the recommendations concerning the World Disarmament Campaign contained in annex V to the Concluding Document of the Twelfth

⁵ The comparable amount pledged at the 1994 Pledging Conference was \$654,972.

⁶ A/CONF.179/2. The list of pledges made at the Twelfth Pledging Conference, in October 1994, and thereafter up to 31 March 1995 was contained in a document of that Conference (A/CONF.174/2) and issued in August 1995.

Special Session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament, in particular the recommendation that Disarmament Week should continue to be widely observed,

Noting the support for the further observance of Disarmament Week expressed by Member States at the fifteenth special session of the General Assembly, the third special session devoted to disarmament,

Recognizing the significance of the annual observance of Disarmament Week, including by the United Nations,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General on the observance of Disarmament Week;

2. *Commends* all States, international and national governmental and non-governmental organizations for their active support for and participation in Disarmament Week;

3. *Invites* all States that so desire, in carrying out appropriate measures at the local level on the occasion of Disarmament Week, to take into account the elements of the model programme for Disarmament Week prepared by the Secretary-General;

4. *Invites* Governments and international and national non-governmental organizations to continue to take an active part in Disarmament Week;

5. *Invites* the Secretary-General to continue to use the United Nations informational organs as widely as possible to promote better understanding among the world public of disarmament problems and the objectives of Disarmament Week;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-fifth session the item entitled "Disarmament Week".

Disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services

The 1995 programme, in which 30 fellows participated,⁷ began on 16 August in Geneva and ended on 28 October in New York. It included a series of lectures; speaking, drafting and simulation exercises; the preparation of individual research papers on various disarmament and security issues; and attendance at meetings of the Conference on Dis-

⁷ The fellows were nationals of the following countries: Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Belarus, Benin, Brazil, Croatia, Cuba, Egypt, Georgia, Greece, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Namibia, Netherlands, Peru, Russian Federation, Sierra Leone, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates and United States.

armament and the First Committee. The fellows paid study visits to Germany and Japan. In Germany, they attended lectures on arms control and missile conversion, and visited the Federal Foreign Office and the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government. In Japan, they attended lectures on arms control and security, participated in a seminar on the physical, social and medical effects of the atomic bombing, visited Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In The Hague, the fellows visited the OPCW, where they attended lectures dealing with the verification regime, national implementation measures and assistance to Member States with respect to the Chemical Weapons Convention. In Vienna, the fellows visited the IAEA, where they were briefed on safeguards activities and the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

On 9 November, Nigeria introduced a draft resolution entitled "United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services". On 10 November, the First Committee adopted it without a vote. In its explanation of position, Jordan recognized the useful contribution the programme made and called for additional financial and other support for it. On 12 December, the General Assembly adopted the resolution without a vote, as resolution 50/71 A. It reads as follows:

Resolution 50/71 A

United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services

The General Assembly,

Recalling its decision, contained in paragraph 108 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, to establish a programme of fellowships on disarmament, as well as its decisions contained in annex IV to the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament, in which it decided, *inter alia*, to continue the programme,

Noting with satisfaction that the programme has already trained an appreciable number of public officials selected from geographical regions represented in the United Nations system, most of whom are now in positions of responsibility in the field of disarmament affairs in their respective countries or Governments,

Recalling all the annual resolutions on the matter since the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly, in 1982, including Assembly resolution 49/76 B of 15 December 1994,

Noting also with satisfaction that the programme, as designed, continues to enable an increased number of public officials, particularly from the developing countries, to acquire more expertise in the sphere of disarmament,

Believing that the forms of assistance available to Member States, particularly to developing countries, under the programme will enhance the capabilities of their officials to follow ongoing deliberations and negotiations on disarmament, both bilateral and multilateral,

1. *Reaffirms* its decisions contained in annex IV to the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly and the report of the Secretary-General approved by the Assembly in its resolution 33/71 E of 14 December 1978;

2. *Expresses its appreciation* to the Governments of Germany and Japan for inviting the 1995 fellows to study selected activities in the field of disarmament, thereby contributing to the fulfilment of the overall objectives of the programme;

3. *Commends* the Secretary-General for the diligence with which the programme has continued to be carried out;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue the implementation of the Geneva-based programme within existing resources and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its fifty-first session;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-first session the item entitled "United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services".

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

The Secretary-General transmitted to the General Assembly his report⁸ to which were annexed the report of the Director of UNIDIR concerning the activities of the Institute for the period from July 1994 to June 1995 and the report of the Board of Trustees concerning the work programme for 1996. During the period under review, the research programme focused on three areas: non-proliferation with respect to nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction and dual-use technology transfers; disarmament and conflict resolution, in particular the utility and modalities of disarming warring parties as an element of efforts to resolve intra-State conflicts; and regional security issues, devoted to confidence-building and arms control in the Middle East. The recent publications of UNIDIR are listed in annex II.

⁸ A/50/416.

ANNEX I

Composition of the Group of Governmental Experts to Carry Out a Study on Verification in All Its Aspects, including the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Verification*

- Perla Carvalho, Minister, Permanent Mission of Mexico to International Organizations and the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva (first, second and fourth sessions)
- Suchitra, Durai, Under-Secretary, Disarmament and International Security Affairs Division, Ministry of External Affairs of India (first session)
- Ferenc Gajda, Senior Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Hungary to the United Nations, New York
- Henny J. van der Graaf, Brigadier General (Rtd.); Director, Centre for Arms Control & Verification Technology, Eindhoven University of Technology, Eindhoven, Netherlands
- Alaa Issa, Second Secretary, Permanent Mission of Egypt to the United Nations, New York (fourth session)
- Flora I. Karugu, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Kenya to the United Nations, New York (first and second sessions)
- Tor A. Larsson, Director of Research, National Defence Research Institute of Sweden
- Peggy Mason, Ambassador, Senior External Fellow, York University Centre for International and Strategic Studies, Toronto, Canada
- Ekundayo B. Opaleye, Chief of Defence Research, Development and Planning, Ministry of Defence of Nigeria (first and second sessions)
- Philip R. O. Owade, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Kenya to the United Nations, New York (third and fourth sessions)
- Park Tong-Hyong, Colonel, Chief of the Arms Control Verification Division, Arms Control Office, Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Korea (third and fourth sessions)
- Héctor Raúl Peláez, Counsellor, Department of International Security, Nuclear and Spatial Matters, Ministry of Foreign Relations of Argentina
- D. E. Nihal Rodrigo, Deputy Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the United Nations, New York
- Sameh Shoukry, Minister Plenipotentiary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt (first, second and third sessions)
- T. M. Shelpidi, Major-General, Office of the Chief of Defence Research, Development and Planning, Ministry of Defence of Nigeria (third and fourth sessions)

* Member attended all four sessions unless noted otherwise.

Son Chang-keun, Commander, Arms Control Verification Division, Arms Control Office, Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Korea (first and second sessions)

Rakesh Sood, Director, Disarmament and International Security Affairs Division, Ministry of External Affairs of India (second, third and fourth sessions)

Thomas Stelzer, Minister Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Austria to the United Nations, New York

Adolfo R. Taylhardat, Ambassador, Venezuela

Wu Chengjiang, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of China to the United Nations, New York

Dmitri Youdin, First Deputy Director, Department of International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

ANNEX II

Publications

Centre for Disarmament Affairs

Books

The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, vol. 19: 1994 (Sales No. E.95.IX.1)

Periodical

Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations, vol. XVIII, Nos. 1, 2 and 3

Topical Papers

Disarmament in the Last Half Century and Its Future Prospects, Topical Papers 21 (Sales No. E.96.IX.2)

Newsletter

Disarmament Newsletter, vol. 13, No. 1

Miscellaneous publications

The United Nations and Disarmament since 1945

The Chemical Weapons Convention: Questions and Answers (an update),
DPI/1426/Rev.1

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

Research Reports

Disarmament and Arms Limitation Obligations: Problems of Compliance and Enforcement, by Serge Sur (ed.), 1994, published for UNIDIR by Dartmouth (Aldershot)

Arms and Technology Transfers: Security and Economic Considerations Among Importing and Exporting States, Proceedings of the Geneva (Switzerland) Conference, 14–15 February 1994, by Sverre Lodgaard and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff (eds.), 1995 (Sales No. GVE.95.0.10)

Nuclear Policies in Northeast Asia, Proceedings of the Seoul (South Korea) Conference, 25–27 May 1994, by Andrew Mack (ed.), 1995 (Sales No. GVE.95.0.8)

Building Confidence in Outer Space Activities: CSBMs and Earth-to-Space Monitoring, by Péricles Gasparini Alves (ed.), 1995 (published for UNIDIR by Dartmouth (Aldershot))

Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project – Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia, by Clement Adibe, 1995 (Sales No. GVE.95.0.20)

Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project – Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, by Jeremy Ginifer, 1995 (Sales No. GVE.95.0.28)

Research Papers

No. 33—*Nuclear disarmament and Non-Proliferation in Northeast Asia*, by Yong-Sup Han, 1995 (Sales No. GVE.95.0.3)

No. 34—*Small Arms and Intra-State Conflicts*, by Swadesh Rana, 1995 (Sales No. GVE.95.0.7)

No. 35—*The Missing Link? Nuclear Proliferation and the International Mobility of Russian Nuclear Experts*, by Dorothy S. Zinberg, 1995 (Sales No. GVE.95.0.18)

No. 36—*Guardian Soldier: On the Future Role and Use of Armed Forces*, by Gustav Däniker, 1995 (Sales No. GVE.95.0.19)

No. 37—*National Threat Perceptions in the Middle East*, by James Leonard, Shmuel Limone, Abdel Monem Said Aly, Yezid Sayigh, Center for Strategic Studies (University of Jordan), Abdulhay Sayed and Saleh Al-Mani, 1995 (Sales No. GVE.95.0.24)

Newsletter

No. 28/29, December 1994–May 1995/décembre–mai 1995, Land Mines and the CCW Review Conference/Les mines terrestres et la Conférence d'examen de la Convention sur certaines armes classiques

A P P E N D I C E S

APPENDIX I

Status of multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements

The data contained in this appendix have been furnished by the depositaries of the treaties or agreements concerned.

The Secretary-General is the depositary of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques; the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects; and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.

Canada and Hungary are depositaries of the Treaty on Open Skies.

France is the depositary of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

Mexico is the depositary of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco).

The Netherlands is the depositary of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty).

The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America are depositaries of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water; the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof; and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

Thailand is the depositary of the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Bangkok Treaty).

The United States of America is the depositary of the Antarctic Treaty.

The Secretary General of the Forum Secretariat (formerly the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation) is the depositary for the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga).

Inclusion of information concerning the treaties and agreements of which the Secretary-General is not the depositary is as reported by the respective depositaries and implies no position on the part of the United Nations with respect to the data reported.

The total number of parties has been calculated on the basis of information received from the depositaries.

Actions reported in the period 1 January to 31 December 1995

The following list shows actions reported,^a if any, during the period 1 January to 31 December 1995 with regard to the multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements for which full information is provided in the fourth edition of *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*.^b

Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare

SIGNED AT GENEVA: 17 June 1925

ENTERED INTO FORCE: for each signatory as from the date of deposit of its ratification; accessions take effect on the date of the notification by the depositary Government

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: France^c

New Parties: none

^a Accession is indicated by (a), acceptance by (A) and succession by (s). In the case of multi-depositary clauses, depositary action may be completed with one or more of the several depositaries. The letters "O", "B", "M", "L", and "W" indicate where the reported action was completed: "O" for Ottawa, "B" for Budapest, "M" for Moscow, "L" for London, and "W" for Washington.

^b *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 4th edition: 1992 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.IX.11), vols. 1 and 2.

^c On 17 July 1995, the depositary Government received a notification from the Government of the Netherlands that it was withdrawing the reservation that it had expressed upon ratification of the Protocol on 31 October 1930. The notification stated precisely that the withdrawal of reservation concerned the Kingdom in Europe, the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba.

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 130

The Antarctic Treaty

SIGNED AT WASHINGTON: 1 December 1959

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 23 June 1961

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: United States of America

New Parties: none

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 42^d

Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water

SIGNED BY THE ORIGINAL PARTIES^e IN MOSCOW: 5 August 1963

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON:
8 August 1963

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 10 October 1963

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: none

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 124

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON:
27 January 1967

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 10 October 1967

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: none

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 93

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT MEXICO CITY: 14 February 1967

^d Consultative parties are: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, Uruguay and United States.

^e The original parties are the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

ENTERED INTO FORCE: for each Government individually

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: Mexico

SIGNATURES: Guyana —16 January
Cuba^f —25 March

RATIFICATIONS:^g Guyana —16 January
Saint Kitts and Nevis —18 April
Saint Lucia — 2 June

Amendment to article 7^h

SIGNATURES: Guyana —16 January

RATIFICATIONS: Guyana —16 January
Peru —14 July

Amendment to article 25ⁱ

SIGNATURES: Guyana —16 January

RATIFICATIONS: Guyana —16 January

^f With the following declaration:

“The Government of the Republic of Cuba declares that the obstacles which, up to the present time, have prevented the Republic of Cuba from fully acceding to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean still exist and continue to have serious implications for Cuba’s security. The only nuclear Power in this part of the world, the United States of America, is maintaining a policy of hostility against Cuba; tightening its economic, commercial and financial embargo; strengthening its campaign against our country; and continuing, by force and against the wishes of our people, its illegal occupation of part of the national territory, and even allowing its ships to pass through that area when they are carrying nuclear weapons. In the future, the solution of this problem must be considered a precondition for our country’s continued adherence to this Treaty.

^g In a noted dated 19 May 1995 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mexico, the United Kingdom Government made the following comments on the Argentine Government’s declaration upon deposit of its instrument of ratification on 18 January 1994:

“The British Government is in no doubt about the United Kingdom’s sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, as well as over South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, and therefore is also in no doubt about its right to extend the aforesaid Treaty to these territories. The British Government cannot but reject the unjustified claim of the Argentine Government that the islands form part of Argentine territory.”

^h Amendment adopted by the General Conference of OPANAL, pursuant to resolution 267 (E-V) of 3 July 1990.

ⁱ Amendment adopted by the General Conference of OPANAL, pursuant to resolution 268 (XII) of 10 May 1991.

	Peru	—14 July
	<i>Amendment to articles 14, 15, 16, 19 and 20^j</i>	
SIGNATURES:	Guyana	—16 January
RATIFICATIONS:	Guyana	—16 January
	Uruguay	—20 February
	Peru	—14 July
TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 38 ^k		

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON:

1 July 1968

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 5 March 1970

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES:	Algeria	—12 January (L) (M) (W) (a)
	Marshall Islands	—30 January (W) (a)
	Argentina	—10 February (W) (a) ^l
		—17 February (L) (a)
	Monaco	—13 March (W) (a)
	Eritrea	—16 March (W) (a)
	the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	—30 March (L) (s)
		—12 April (W) (s)

^j Amendment adopted by the General Conference of OPANAL pursuant to resolution 290 (VII) of 26 August 1993.

^k Total includes the five nuclear-weapon States and the Netherlands, which have ratified one or both of the Additional Protocols. The Treaty is fully in force for all the regional States that ratify it and waive the requirements under article 28.

^l With the following declaration:

1. Argentina firmly supports the total elimination of weapons of mass destruction, thereby resolving the problem of asymmetry or imbalance existing with regard to non-nuclear weapons countries that have renounced the possession thereof.

2. The provisions of the NPT, which shall be the subject of a Review and Extension Conference in April 1995, must not be interpreted as impeding present cooperation between Argentina and the organs of the United Nations or the OAS, or with other UN member States signatories to the Full Safeguards Accords in effect with the IAEA, in a series of exclusively peaceful nuclear activities also fully subject to the IAEA system of international safeguards.

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Micronesia	—14 April (W) (a)
Palau	—14 April (W) (a)
Chile	—25 May (W) (a)
United Arab Emirates	—26 September (W) (a)
Comoros	— 4 October (W) (a)
Vanuatu	—24 August (L) (a)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 182

Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON:

11 February 1971

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 18 May 1972

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: none

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 90

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stock-piling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 10 April 1972

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 26 March 1975

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: none

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 132

Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques

3. Similarly, Argentina's bilateral or multilateral cooperation with other Latin American States of the region must not be affected with respect to the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy carried out in accordance with the obligations assumed under the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (the Tlatelolco Treaty) and with the provisions of the NPT, it being understood that these two agreements are instruments that include the promotion of the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy.

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT GENEVA: 18 May 1977

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 5 October 1978

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES: none

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 63

Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT NEW YORK: 18 December 1979

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 11 July 1984

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES: none

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 9

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT NEW YORK: 10 April 1981

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 2 December 1983

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

Ratifications: ^m	Italy	—20 January
	Belgium	— 7 February
	Ireland	—13 March
	United Kingdom	—13 February ⁿ

^m Article 5, subparagraph 2, of the Convention states:

“For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force six months after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.”

ⁿ With the following declaration:

“(a) Generally

- (i) The term “armed conflict” of itself and in its context denotes a situation of a kind which is not constituted by the commission of ordinary crimes, including acts of terrorism, whether concerted or in isolation.

./.

- (ii) The United Kingdom will not, in relation to any situation in which it is involved, consider itself bound in consequence of any declaration purporting to be made for the purposes of article 7 (4), unless the United Kingdom shall have expressly recognized that it has been made by a body which is genuinely an authority representing a people engaged in an armed conflict of the type to which that paragraph applies.
- (iii) The terms "civilian" and "civilian population" have the same meaning as in article 50 of the first Additional Protocol of 1977 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Convention unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.
- (iv) Military commanders and others responsible for planning, deciding on, or executing attacks necessarily have to reach decisions on the basis of their assessment of the information from all sources which is reasonably available to them at the relevant time.

"(b) Re: Protocol II, article 2; and Protocol III, article 1

A specific area of land may be a military objective if, because of its location or other reasons specified in this article, its total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization in the circumstances ruling at the time offers a definite military advantage.

"(c) Re: Protocol II, article 3

In the view of the United Kingdom, the military advantage anticipated from an attack is intended to refer to the advantage anticipated from the attack considered as a whole and not only from isolated or particular parts of the attack.

"(d) Re: Protocol III, article 2

The United Kingdom accepts the provisions of article 2 (2) and (3) on the understanding that the terms of those paragraphs of that article do not imply that the air-delivery of incendiary weapons, or of any other weapons, projectiles or munitions, is less accurate or less capable of being carried out discriminately than all or any other means of delivery."

^a With the following declarations and understandings:

"1. Declarations:

(a) With reference to the scope of application defined in article 1 of the Convention, the Government of the State of Israel will apply the provisions of the Convention and those annexed Protocols to which Israel has agreed to become bound to all armed conflicts involving regular armed forces of States referred to in article 2 common to the General Conventions of 12 August 1949, as well as to all armed conflicts referred to in article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.

./.

United States —24 March^P (Prot. I&II)
Malta —26 June (a)

(b) Article 7, paragraph 4, of the Convention will have no effect.

(c) The application of this Convention will have no effect on the legal status of the parties to a conflict.

“2. Understandings:

(a) It is the understanding of the Government of the State of Israel that the compliance of commanders and others responsible for planning, deciding upon, or executing attacks to which the Convention and its Protocols apply, cannot be judged on the basis of information which subsequently comes to light, but must be assessed on the basis of the information available to them at the time that such actions were taken.

(b) With respect to Protocol I, it is the understanding of the Government of Israel that the use of plastics or similar materials for detonators or other weapon parts not designed to cause injury is not prohibited.

(c) With respect to Protocol I, it is the understanding of the Government of Israel that:

(i) Any obligation to record the location of remotely delivered mines pursuant to subparagraph 1 (a) of article 5 refers to the location of minefields and not to the location of individual remotely delivered mines;

(ii) The term pre-planned, as used in subparagraph 1 (a) of article 7, means that the position of the minefield in question should have been determined in advance so that an accurate record of the location of the minefield, when laid, can be made.”

^P With the following reservation, declaration and understandings:

“(1) Reservation:

Article 7 (4) (b) of the Convention shall not apply with respect to the United States.

“(2) Declaration:

The United States declares, with reference to the scope of application defined in article 1 of the Convention, that the United States will apply the provisions of the Convention, Protocol I, and Protocol II to all armed conflicts referred to in articles 2 and 3 common to the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims of 12 August 1949.

“(3) Understanding:

The United States understands that article 6 (1) of Protocol II does not prohibit the adaptation for use as booby-traps of portable objects created for a purpose other than as a booby-trap if the adaptation does not violate paragraph (1) (b) of the article.

J.

Romania	—26 July
South Africa	—13 September (a)
Argentina	— 2 October ⁴
Brazil	— 3 October (a)
Uganda	—14 November (a)
Jordan	—19 October (a) (Prot. I&III)
Togo	— 4 December (A)

TOTAL NUMBER OF RATIFICATIONS: 57

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT RAROTONGA: 6 August 1985

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 11 December 1986

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary General of the Forum Secretariat

SIGNATORIES: Vanuatu—16 September 1995

NEW PARTIES:[†] none

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 13[‡]

“(4) Understanding:

The United States considers that the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the Convention, which refers to the substance of provisions of article 35 (3) and article 55 (1) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims of 12 August 1949, applies only to States which have accepted those provisions.”

⁴ With the following reservation:

“The Argentine Republic makes the express reservation that any references to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 that are contained in the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and its Protocols I, II and III shall be interpreted in the light of the interpretative declarations in the instrument of accession of the Argentine Republic to the aforementioned Additional Protocols of 1977.”

[†] On 20 October 1995, France, the United Kingdom and the United States announced their intention to sign the relevant protocols to the Treaty in the first half of 1996.

[‡] Total includes the two nuclear-weapon States, China and the Russian Federation, which have ratified Protocols 2 and 3.

Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty)

SIGNED AT PARIS: 19 November 1990

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 9 November 1992

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: The Netherlands

NEW PARTIES: none

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 30

Treaty on Open Skies

SIGNED AT HELSINKI: 24 March 1992

NOT YET IN FORCE

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Canada and Hungary

RATIFICATIONS:	Poland	—29 May (O)
	Belgium	—28 June (O)
	Luxembourg	—28 June (O)
	Netherlands	—28 June (O)

TOTAL NUMBER OF RATIFICATIONS: 22

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction

SIGNED AT Paris: 13 January 1993

NOT YET IN FORCE

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

SIGNATORIES: Uzbekistan —24 November

TOTAL NUMBER OF SIGNATORIES: 160

RATIFICATIONS:	Tajikistan	—11 January
	Mongolia	—17 January
	Armenia	—27 January
	Finland	— 7 February
	Oman	— 8 February
	Romania	—15 February
	France	— 2 March
	Switzerland	—10 March
	Croatia	—23 May
	Monaco	— 1 June
	Netherlands	—30 June
	Denmark	—13 July
	Peru	—20 July
	Algeria	—14 August

Austria	—17 August ^t
Poland	—23 August
Ecuador	— 6 September
South Africa	—13 September
Japan	—15 September
Canada	—26 September
Argentina	— 2 October
Slovakia	—27 October
El Salvador	—30 October
Namibia	—24 November
Georgia	—27 November
Italy	— 8 December ^u
Côte d'Ivoire	—18 December
Morocco	—28 December

TOTAL NUMBER OF RATIFICATIONS: 47

Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty)

SIGNED AT BANGKOK: 15 December 1995

NOT YET IN FORCE

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: Thailand

SIGNATORIES:	Brunei Darussalam	—15 December
	Cambodia	—15 December
	Indonesia	—15 December
	Lao People's Democratic Republic	—15 December
	Malaysia	—15 December
	Myanmar	—15 December
	Philippines	—15 December
	Singapore	—15 December
	Thailand	—15 December
	Viet Nam	—15 December

TOTAL NUMBER OF SIGNATORIES: 10

^t With the following declaration:

“As a Member State of the European Community, the Government of Austria will implement the provisions of the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, in accordance with its obligations arising from the rules of the Treaties establishing the European Communities to the extent that such rules are applicable.”

^u Upon deposit of the instrument of ratification, the Government of Italy reconfirmed the declaration it made upon signature of the Convention.

The following pages present in tabular form the signatories and parties of the various treaties dealt with in this appendix. Because of the increase in the number of treaties, the data have been broken down into two tables: "Composite table of signatories and parties of multilateral treaties" and "Composite table of signatories and parties of regional treaties".

**Composite table of signatories and parties of multilateral treaties
as of 31 December 1995, as reported by depositaries**

(s) signed; (r) ratified (including accessions and successions)

Signatory or party reported	Geneva Protocol	Antarctic Treaty	Partial Test Ban	Outer Space
Afghanistan	r		s r	s r
Albania	r			
Algeria	r		s	r
Angola	r			
Antigua and Barbuda	r		r	r
Argentina	r	s r	s r	s r
Armenia			r	
Australia	r	s r	s r	s r
Austria	s r	r	s r	s r
Azerbaijan				
Bahamas			r	r
Bahrain	r			
Bangladesh	r		r	r
Barbados	r			r
Belarus			s r	s r
Belgium	s r	s r	s r	s r
Belize				
Benin	r		s r	r
Bhutan	r		r	
Bolivia	r		s r	s
Bosnia and Herzegovina			r	
Botswana			r	s
Brazil	s r	r	s r	s r
Brunei Darussalam				
Bulgaria	s r	r	s r	s r
Burkina Faso	r		s	s r
Burundi			s	s

NPT	Sea-Bed	BW	ENMOD	Celestial Bodies	CCWC ^a	CWC
s r	s r	s r	r		s	s
r		r				s r
r	r		r			s r
r	r		r			
r	s r	s r	r		s r	s r
r		r				s r
s r	s r	s r	s r	r	s r	s r
s r	s r	s r	r	s r	s r	s r
r						s
r	r	r				s
r		r				s
r		r	r			s
s r		s r				
r	s r	s r	s r		s r	s
s r	s r	s r	s r		s r	s
r		r				
s r	s r	s r	s r		r (I & III)	s
r		r				
s r	s	s r	s			s
r	r	r			r	
s r	s r	s r				
	s r	s r	s r		r	s
r		r				s
s r	s r	s r	s r		s r	s r
s r		r				s
r	s	s				s

**Composite table of signatories and parties of multilateral treaties
as of 31 December 1995, as reported by depositaries (continued)**

Signatory or party reported	Geneva Protocol	Antarctic Treaty	Partial Test Ban	Outer Space
Cambodia	r			
Cameroon	r		s	s
Canada	s r	r	s r	s r
Cape Verde	r		r	
Central African Republic	r		r	s
Chad			s r	
Chile	s r	s r	s r	s r
China	r	r		r
Colombia		r	s r	s
Comoros				
Congo				
Cook Islands				
Costa Rica			s r	
Côte d'Ivoire	r		s r	
Croatia			r	
Cuba	r	r		r
Cyprus	r		s r	s r
Czech Republic		r	s r	s r
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	r	r		
Denmark	s r	r	s r	s r
Djibouti				
Dominica				
Dominican Republic	r		s r	s r
Ecuador	r	r	s r	s r
Egypt	s r		s r	s r
El Salvador	s		s r	s r
Equatorial Guinea	r		r	r
Eritrea				

NPT	Sea- Bed	BW	ENMOD	Celestial Bodies	CCWC*	CWC
r	s	s r				s
s r	s					s
s r	s r	s r	s r		s r	s r
r	r	r	r			s
r	s r	s				s
s r						s
r		s r	r	s r		s
r	r	r			s r	s
s r	s	s r				s
r						s
r	r	r				s
						s r
s r	s	s r				s
s r	r	s				s r
r		r			r	s r
	r	s r	s r		s r	s
s r	s r	s r	s r		r	s
s r	s r	s r	s r		s r	s
r		r	r			
s r	s r	s r	s r		s r	s r
						s
r			r			s
s r	s r	s r				s
s r		s r			s r	s r
s r		s	r		s	
s r		s r				s r
r	s	r				s
r						

**Composite table of signatories and parties of multilateral treaties
as of 31 December 1995, as reported by depositaries (continued)**

Signatory or party reported	Geneva Protocol	Antarctic Treaty	Partial Test Ban	Outer Space
Estonia	r			
Ethiopia	s r		s	s
Fiji	r		r	r
Finland	s r	r	s r	s r
France	s r	s r		s r
Gabon			s r	
Gambia	r		r	s
Georgia				
Germany	s r	r	s r	s r
Ghana	r		s r	s
Greece	s r	r	s r	s r
Grenada	r			
Guatemala	r	r	s r	
Guinea				
Guinea-Bissau	r		r	r
Guyana				s
Haiti			s	s
Holy See	r			s
Honduras			s r	s
Hungary	r	r	s r	s r
Iceland	r		s r	s r
India	s r	r	s r	s r
Indonesia	r		s r	s
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	r		s r	s
Iraq	r		s r	s r
Ireland	r		s r	s r
Israel	r		s r	s r
Italy	s r	r	s r	s r

NPT	Sea Bed	BW	ENMOD	Celestial Bodies	CCWC ^a	CWC
r		r				s
s r	s r	s r	s			s
r		s r				s r
s r	s r	s r	s r		s r	s r
r		r		s	s r (I & II)	s r
r		s				s
s r	s	s				s
r						s r
s r	s r	s r	s r		s r	s r
s r	s r	s r	s r			s
s r	s r	s r	r		s r	s r
r		r				
s r	s	s r	r	s	r	s
r	s					s
r	r	r				s
r		s				s
s r		s				s
r			s			s
s r	s	s r				s
s r	s r	s r	s r		s r	s
s r	s r	s r	s		s	s
	r	s r	s r	s	s r	s
s r		s r				s
s r	s r	s r	s			s
s r	s r	s r	s			
s r	s r	s r	s r		s r	s
					r (I&II)	s
s r	s r	s r	s r		s r	s r

**Composite table of signatories and parties of multilateral treaties
as of 31 December 1995, as reported by depositaries (continued)**

Signatory or party reported	Geneva Protocol	Antarctic Treaty	Partial Test Ban	Outer Space
Jamaica	r		s r	s r
Japan	s r	s r	s r	s r
Jordan	r		s r	s
Kazakstan				
Kenya	r		r	r
Kiribati				
Kuwait	r		s r	r
Kyrgyzstan				
Lao People's Democratic Republic	r		s r	s r
Latvia	r			
Lebanon	r		s r	s r
Lesotho	r			s
Liberia	r		s r	
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	r		s r	r
Liechtenstein	r			
Lithuania	r			
Luxembourg	s r		s r	s
Madagascar	r		s r	r
Malawi	r		r	
Malaysia	r		s r	s
Maldives	r			
Mali			s	r
Malta	r		r	
Marshall Islands				
Mauritania			s r	
Mauritius	r		r	r
Mexico	r		s r	s r

NPT	Sea-Bed	BW	ENMOD	Celestial Bodies	CCWC ^a	CWC
S I	S I	I				
S I	S I	S I	I		S I	S I
S I	S I	S I			I (I&III)	
I						S
S I		I				S
I						
S I		S I	I			S
I						S
S I	S I	S I	S I		I	S
I	I				I	S
S I	S	S I	S			
S I	S I	S I				S I
S I	S	S	S			S
S I	I	I				
I	I	I			S I	S
I						S
S I	S I	S I	S		S	S
S I	S	S				S
I		S	I			S
S I	S I	S I				S
S I		I				S I
S I	S	S				S
S I	S I	S I			I	S
I						S
I						S
S I	S I	S I	I			S I
S I	I	S I		I	S I	S I

**Composite table of signatories and parties of multilateral treaties
as of 31 December 1995, as reported by depositaries (continued)**

Signatory or party reported	Geneva Protocol	Antarctic Treaty	Partial Test Ban	Outer Space
Micronesia (Federated States of)				
Monaco	r			
Mongolia	r		s r	s r
Morocco	r		s r	r
Mozambique				
Myanmar			s r	s r
Namibia				
Nauru				
Nepal	r		s r	s r
Netherlands	s r	r	s r	s r
New Zealand	r	s r	s r	s r
Nicaragua	s r		s r	s
Niger	r		s r	s r
Nigeria	r		s r	r
Niue				
Norway	s r	s r	s r	s r
Oman				
Pakistan	r		s r	s r
Palau				
Panama	r		s r	s
Papua New Guinea	r	r	r	r
Paraguay	r		s	
Peru	r	r	s r	s r
Philippines	r		s r	s
Poland	s r	r	s r	s r
Portugal	s r		s	
Qatar	r			
Republic of Korea	r	r	s r	s r

NPT	Sea- Bed	BW	ENMOD	Celestial Bodies	CCWC ^a	CWC
r						s
r						s r
s r	s r	s r	s r		s r	s r
s r	s r	s	s	s r	s	s r
r						
r	s	s				s
r						s r
r						s
s r	s r	s				s
s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r
s r	s r	s r	r		s r	s
s r	s r	s r	s		s	s
r	s r	s r	r		r	s
s r		s r			s	s
s r	s r	s r	s r		s r	s r
		r				s r
		s r	r	r	s r	s
r						
s r	s r	s r				s
r		r	r			s
s r	s	r				s r
s r		s r		s		s r
s r	r	s r		s r	s	s
s r	s r	s r	s r		s r	s r
r	r	s r	s		s	s
r	r	s r				s
s r	s r	s r	r			s

**Composite table of signatories and parties of multilateral treaties
as of 31 December 1995, as reported by depositaries (continued)**

Signatory or party reported	Geneva Protocol	Antarctic Treaty	Partial Test Ban	Outer Space
Republic of Moldova				
Romania	s r	r	s r	s r
Russian Federation	r	s r	s r	s r
Rwanda	r		s r	s
Saint Kitts and Nevis	r			
Saint Lucia	r			
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines				
Samoa			s r	
San Marino			s r	s r
Sao Tome and Principe				
Saudi Arabia	r			r
Senegal	r		s r	
Seychelles			r	r
Sierra Leone	r		s r	s r
Singapore			r	r
Slovakia	r	r	r	r
Slovenia			r	
Solomon Islands	r			
Somalia			s	s
South Africa	r	s r	r	s r
Spain	s r	r	s r	r
Sri Lanka	r		s r	s r
Sudan	r		s r	
Suriname			r	
Swaziland	r		r	
Sweden	s r	r	s r	s r
Switzerland	s r	r	s r	s r
Syrian Arab Republic	r		s r	r

NPT	Sea-Bed	BW	ENMOD	Celestial Bodies	CCWC ^a	CWC
r						s
s r	s r	s r	s r	s	s r	s r
s r	s r	s r	s r		s r	s
r	s r	s r				s
r		r				s
r		r	r			s
r						s
r						s
s r		s r				s
r	r	r	r			
r	s r	s r				s
s r	s	s r				s
r	r	r				s r
r	s	s r	s		s	s
s r	s r	s r				s
r	r	r	r		r	s r
r	r	r			r	s
r	r	r	r			
s r		s				
r	s r	s r			r	s r
r	r	s r	s r		s r	s r
s r		s r	s r			s r
s r	s				s	
r		r				
s r	s r	r				s
s r	s r	s r	r		s r	s r
s r	s r	s r	r		s r	s r
s r		s	s			

**Composite table of signatories and parties of multilateral treaties
as of 31 December 1995, as reported by depositaries (continued)**

Signatory or party reported	Geneva Protocol	Antarctic Treaty	Partial Test Ban	Outer Space
Tajikistan				
Thailand	s r		s r	s r
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia				
Togo	r		s r	s r
Tonga	r		r	r
Trinidad and Tobago	r		s r	s
Tunisia	r		s r	s r
Turkey	s r		s r	s r
Turkmenistan				
Tuvalu				
Uganda	r		s r	r
Ukraine		r	s r	s r
United Arab Emirates				
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	s r	s r	s r	s r
United Republic of Tanzania	r		s r	
United States of America	s r	s r	s r	s r
Uruguay	s r	r	s r	s r
Uzbekistan				
Vanuatu				
Venezuela	s r		s r	s r
Viet Nam	r			r
Yemen	r		s r	r
Yugoslavia	s r		s r	s
Zaire			s r	s
Zambia			r	r
Zimbabwe				

NPT	Sea- Bed	BW	ENMOD	Celestial Bodies	CCWC ^a	CWC
r						s r
r		s r				s
r						
s r	s r	s r			s r	s
r		r				
s r						
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^a Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, known as the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCWC). Protocols I, II and III have been accepted except where noted otherwise. On 13 October 1995, Protocol IV, on blinding laser weapons, was adopted. See footnote *m*, page 249, regarding entry into force of individual parties.

**Composite table of signatories and parties of regional treaties
as of 31 December 1995, as reported by depositaries**

(s) signed; (r) ratified (including accessions and successions)

Signatory or party reported	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Treaty of Rarotonga	CFE	Open Skies	Bangkok Treaty	Pelindaba Treaty ^c
Afghanistan						
Albania						
Algeria						
Angola						
Antigua and Barbuda	s r					
Argentina	s r					
Armenia			r			
Australia		s r				
Austria						
Azerbaijan			r			
Bahamas	s r					
Bahrain						
Bangladesh						
Barbados	s r					
Belarus			r	s		
Belgium			s r	s r		
Belize	s r					
Benin						
Bhutan						
Bolivia	s r					
Bosnia and Herzegovina						
Botswana						
Brazil	s r					
Brunei Darussalam					s	
Bulgaria			s r	s r		
Burkina Faso						
Burundi						

**Composite table of signatories and parties of regional treaties
as of 31 December 1995, as reported by depositaries (continued)**

Signatory or party reported	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Treaty of Rarotonga	CFE	Open Skies	Bangkok Treaty	Pelindaba Treaty ^c
Cambodia					s	
Cameroon						
Canada			s r	s r		
Cape Verde						
Central African Republic						
Chad						
Chile	s r					
China	s r (A.P.II) ^a	s r (P.2 & 3) ^b				
Colombia	s r					
Comoros						
Congo						
Cook Islands		s r				
Costa Rica	s r					
Côte d'Ivoire						
Croatia						
Cuba	s					
Cyprus						
Czech Republic			s r	s r		
Democratic People's Republic of Korea						
Denmark			s r	s r		
Djibouti						
Dominica	s r					
Dominican Republic	s r					
Ecuador	s r					
El Salvador	s r					

Signatory or party reported	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Treaty of Rarotonga	CFE	Open Skies	Bangkok Treaty	Pelindaba Treaty ^c
Egypt						
Equatorial Guinea						
Eritrea						
Estonia						
Ethiopia						
Fiji		s r				
Finland						
France	s r (A.P.I & II)		s r	s r		
Gabon						
Gambia						
Georgia			r	s		
Germany			s r	s r		
Ghana						
Greece			s r	s r		
Grenada	s r					
Guatemala	s r					
Guinea						
Guinea-Bissau						
Guyana	s r					
Haiti	s r					
Holy See						
Honduras	s r					
Hungary			s r	s r		
Iceland			s r	s r		
India						
Indonesia					s	
Iran (Islamic Republic of)						

**Composite table of signatories and parties of regional treaties
as of 31 December 1995, as reported by depositaries (continued)**

Signatory or party reported	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Treaty of Rarotonga	CFE	Open Skies	Bangkok Treaty	Pelindaba Treaty ^c
Iraq						
Ireland						
Israel						
Italy			s r	s r		
Jamaica	s r					
Japan						
Jordan						
Kazakstan			r			
Kenya						
Kiribati		s r				
Kuwait						
Kyrgyzstan				s		
Lao People's Democratic Republic					s	
Latvia						
Lebanon						
Lesotho						
Liberia						
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya						
Liechtenstein						
Lithuania						
Luxembourg			s r	s r		
Madagascar						
Malawi						
Malaysia					s	
Maldives						
Mali						
Malta						

Signatory or party reported	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Treaty of Rarotonga	CFE	Open Skies	Bangkok Treaty	Pelindaba Treaty ^c
Marshall Islands						
Mauritania						
Mauritius						
Mexico	s r					
Micronesia (Federated States of)						
Monaco						
Mongolia						
Morocco						
Mozambique						
Myanmar					s	
Namibia						
Nauru		s r				
Nepal						
Netherlands	s r (A.P.I)		s r	s r		
New Zealand		s r				
Nicaragua	s r					
Niger						
Nigeria						
Niue		s r				
Norway			s r	s r		
Oman						
Pakistan						
Palau						
Panama	s r					
Papua New Guinea		s r				
Paraguay	s r					

**Composite table of signatories and parties of regional treaties
as of 31 December 1995, as reported by depositaries (continued)**

Signatory or party reported	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Treaty of Rarotonga	CFE	Open Skies	Bangkok Treaty	Pelindaba Treaty ^c
Peru	s r					
Philippines					s	
Poland			s r	s r		
Portugal			s r	s r		
Qatar						
Republic of Korea						
Republic of Moldova			r			
Romania			s r	s r		
Russian Federation	s r (A.P.II)	s r (P.2 & 3)	s r	s		
Rwanda						
Saint Kitts and Nevis	s r					
Saint Lucia	s r					
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	s r					
Samoa		s r				
San Marino						
Sao Tome and Principe						
Saudi Arabia						
Senegal						
Seychelles						
Sierra Leone						
Singapore					s	
Slovakia			r	s r		
Slovenia						
Solomon Islands		s r				
Somalia						
South Africa						
Spain			s r	s r		

Signatory or party reported	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Treaty of Rarotonga	CFE	Open Skies	Bangkok Treaty	Pelindaba Treaty ^c
Sri Lanka						
Sudan						
Suriname	s r					
Swaziland						
Sweden						
Switzerland						
Syrian Arab Republic						
Tajikistan						
Thailand					s	
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia						
Togo						
Tonga						
Trinidad and Tobago	s r					
Tunisia						
Turkey			s r	s r		
Turkmenistan						
Tuvalu		s r				
Uganda						
Ukraine			r	s		
United Arab Emirates						
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	s r (A.P.I & II)		s r	s r		
United Republic of Tanzania						

**Composite table of signatories and parties of regional treaties
as of 31 December 1995, as reported by depositaries (continued)**

Signatory or party reported	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Treaty of Rarotonga	CFE	Open Skies	Bangkok Treaty	Pelindaba Treaty ^c
United States of America	s r (A.P.I & II)		s r	s r		
Uruguay	s r					
Uzbekistan						
Vanuatu		s				
Venezuela	s r					
Viet Nam					s	
Yemen						
Yugoslavia						
Zaire						
Zambia						
Zimbabwe						

^a A.P. means Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

^b P. means Protocol to the Treaty of Rarotonga.

^c Concluded in 1995; opened for signature in 1996.

APPENDIX II

TABLE OF RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS ON DISARMAMENT QUESTIONS

1 R.50
 2 R.51
 3 R.52
 4 R.53
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<i>Resolution/ </i>

<i>Resolution/ Decision No.</i>	<i>Title/Agenda Item</i>	<i>Resolution/ Decision on Page</i>	<i>Sponsors*Vote</i>
50/60 (cont.)			Thailand, theFYR Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States , Uruguay, Venezuela and Zambia (without a vote)
50/61	Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification (59)	230	Australia, Bangladesh, Canada , Czech Republic, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kenya, New Zealand, Nigeria, Paraguay, Poland, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova, Russian Fed, Singapore, Slovakia, Sri Lanka and Venezuela (157-1-6)
50/62	The role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament (62)	208	Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cuba, Guyana, India , Indonesia, Iran (Islamic R), Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Malaysia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines and Sri Lanka (104-6-53)
50/63	The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields (63)	209	Afghanistan, Australia, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada , Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Peru, Poland, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova, Romania, South Africa, Sweden, theFYR Macedonia, Turkey and Uruguay (157-0-9)

- 50/64 Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (64) 48
- Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Benin, Brunei Dar-salam, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic R), Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Nepal, Nigeria, Papua N Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, U R Tanzania and Venezuela (110-4-45)
- 50/65 Comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (65) 43
- Afghanistan, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Brunei Dar-salam, Bulgaria, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic R), Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (FS), Monaco, Mongolia, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Russian Fed, Samoa, Senegal, Singapore, Slovakia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Thailand, theFYR Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, U R Tanzania, United States, Venezuela and Viet Nam (without a vote)

<i>Resolution/ Decision No.</i>	<i>Title/Agenda Item</i>	<i>Resolution/ Decision on Page</i>	<i>Sponsors*/Vote</i>
50/66	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East (66)	84	Afghanistan and Egypt (without a vote)
50/67	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia (67)	80	Bangladesh and Pakistan (154-3-9)
50/68	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (68)	58	Bangladesh, Brunei Dar-salam, Colombia, Dem PR of Korea, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic R), Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan , Philippines, Sri Lanka, Sudan, theFYR Macedonia and Viet Nam (122-0-44)
50/69	Prevention of an arms race in outer space (69)	201	Algeria, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Brunei Dar-salam, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic R), Kenya, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, Papua N Guinea, Sri Lanka , Sudan and Ukraine (121-0-46)
50/70	General and complete disarmament A. Nuclear testing (70)	47	Antigua-Barbuda, Australia, Barbados, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, Fiji, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Jamaica, Japan, Kyrgyzstan, Maldives, Marshall

Islands, Mexico, Micronesia (FS), Mongolia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Palau, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Rep of Korea, Samoa, San Marino, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Thailand, Trinidad-Tobago, Ukraine, Uruguay and Venezuela (85-18-43)

B. Small arms (70)

151

Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belarus, Canada, Côte d'Ivoire, Costa Rica, Cape Verde, Ecuador, Germany, Japan, Mali, Peru, Rep of Moldova, Romania, South Africa, Sweden, theFYR Macedonia and Venezuela (140-0-19)

C. Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons (70)

104

Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden and Venezuela (154-0-10)

D. Transparency in armaments (70 (e))

148

Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belarus, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Monaco,

<i>Resolution/ Decision No.</i>	<i>Title/Agenda Item</i>	<i>Resolution/ Decision on Page</i>	<i>Sponsors*/Vote</i>
50/70 (cont.)			Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Russian Fed, Samoa, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, theFYR Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States (149-0-15)
E.	Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes (70 (c))	132	South Africa (on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the African Group of States) (without a vote)
F.	Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (70 (g))	227	Colombia (on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries) (111-2-49)
G.	Relationship between disarmament and development (70 (h))	205	Colombia (on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries) (without a vote)
H.	Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them (70)	190	Belize, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,

I. Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament (70)	109	Haiti, Japan, Mali , Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal and Togo (without a vote) Australia, Argentina, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Fed , Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States (150-0-14)
J. Measures to curb the illicit transfer and use of conventional arms (70 (i))	153	Afghanistan , Bangladesh, Bhutan, Botswana, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Georgia, Guatemala, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Turkmenistan and Zimbabwe (without a vote)
K. Regional disarmament (70 (j))	185	Albania, Armenia, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Djibouti, Egypt, Ghana, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Nepal, New Zealand, Niger, Pakistan , Papua N Guinea, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, theFYR Macedonia, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Zambia and Zimbabwe (165-0-1)
L. Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels (70 (k))	187	Bangladesh, Benin, Czech Republic, Djibouti, Haiti, Nepal, Pakistan and theFYR Macedonia (158-0-7)

<i>Resolution/ Decision No.</i>	<i>Title/Agenda Item</i>	<i>Resolution/ Decision on Page</i>	<i>Sponsors*Note</i>
50/70 (cont.)	M. Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control (70)	212	Colombia (on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries) (157-4-2)
	N. Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament (70)	112	Colombia (on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries) (105-37-20)
	O. Moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land-mines (70)	172	Afghanistan, Andorra, Angola, Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia/Herzeg, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Micronesia (FS), Monaco,

	Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Tajikistan, theFYR Macedonia, Togo, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen and Zambia (without a vote)		
	Algeria, Angola, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Colombia, Cuba, Dem PR of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic R), Iraq, Kenya, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua N Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, U R of Tanzania, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe (106-39-17)		
P. Nuclear disarmament (70)		105	
Q. 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (70 (I))		20	Bangladesh, South Africa and Sri Lanka (161-0-2)
R. Contribution to nuclear disarmament (70)		117	Australia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Marshall Islands, Monaco and Ukraine (without a vote)

<i>Resolution/ Decision No.</i>	<i>Title/Agenda Item</i>	<i>Resolution/ Decision on Page</i>	<i>Sponsors*/Vote</i>
50/71	<p>Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of SSOD II</p> <p>A. United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services (71 (a))</p>	235	<p>Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Cape Verde, China, Cuba, Ethiopia, Germany, Greece, Guinea, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic R.), Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Mali, Mongolia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua N Guinea, Peru, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Russian Fed, Senegal, South Africa, Sweden, Thailand, theFYR Macedonia, Togo, United States and Viet Nam (without a vote)</p>
	B. Regional confidence-building measures (71 (b))	188	<p>Cape Verde and Congo (in his capacity as Chairman of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa) (without a vote)</p>
	C. United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa and United Nations Regional Centre for Peace,	193	<p>Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Japan, Mongolia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,</p>

50/71 (cont.)	Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (71 (c))	196	Peru, South Africa (on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the African Group of States), Suriname, Trinidad-Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela (without a vote)
	D. United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific (71 (c))		Afghanistan, Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei Dar-salam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan, Lao PDR, Marshall Islands, Mongolia , Myanmar, Nepal, New Zealand, Peru, Philippines, Rep of Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Viet Nam (without a vote)
	E. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons (71 (d))	115	Bangladesh, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Dar-salam, Colombia, Dem PR of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Haiti, India , Indonesia, Iran (Islamic R), Kenya, Lao PDR, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, Micronesia (FS), Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, Philippines, Sudan and Viet Nam (108-27-28)
50/72	Review of the implementation of the recommendations of SSOD I		
	A. Report of the Conference on Disarmament (72 (b))	220	Morocco (in its capacity as President of the Conference on Disarmament) (without a vote)
	B. Disarmament Week (72 (e))	233	Afghanistan, Bangladesh, China, Costa Rica, Fiji, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic R), Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (FS), Mongolia , Myanmar, Nepal, New

<i>Resolution/ Decision No.</i>	<i>Title/Agenda Item</i>	<i>Resolution/ Decision on Page</i>	<i>Sponsors*Note</i>
50/72 (cont.)	C. Expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament (72 (b))	221	Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua N Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, South Africa, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Viet Nam (without a vote)
	D. Report of the Disarmament Commission (72 (a))	216	Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Dem PR of Korea, Finland, Iraq, Israel, New Zealand, Norway, Rep of Korea, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa , Spain, Syrian AR, Turkey, Ukraine, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe (without a vote)
50/73	The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (73)	100	Belarus, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Germany, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic R), Mongolia (in its capacity as Chairman of the United Nations Disarmament Commission), Netherlands, Nigeria, Peru, Poland, South Africa, Sweden and Uruguay (without a vote)
			Afghanistan, Egypt (in its capacity as Chairman of the Group of Arab States for the month of November 1995) and Malaysia (56-2-100)

50/74	Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (74)	169	Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia/Herzeg, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Russian Fed, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, theFYR Macedonia, Tunisia, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States (without a vote)
50/77	Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) (77)	82	Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Lucia, Suriname, Trinidad-Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela (without a vote)
50/78	Final text of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (the Pelindaba Treaty) (78)	78	Marshall Islands and South Africa (on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the African Group of States) (without a vote)

<i>Resolution/ Decision No.</i>	<i>Title/Agenda Item</i>	<i>Resolution/ Decision on Page</i>	<i>Sponsors*Note</i>
50/79	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (80)	130	Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary , Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic R), Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Lithuania, Monaco, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Russian Fed, Singapore, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States (without a vote)
DECISIONS			
50/420	Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of vehicles for their delivery in all its aspects (70 (I))	102	Mexico (114-1-49)
50/421	Rationalization of the work and reform of the agenda of the First Committee (79)	228	Chairman (without a vote)

* The State that introduced the draft resolution or decision is shown in bold type.

APPENDIX III

Voting patterns of resolutions and decisions on disarmament and related questions adopted by the General Assembly at its fiftieth session

	<i>Reference in text</i>	
Resolutions on disarmament questions		
50/60	Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements	210
	<i>Adopted without a vote</i>	
50/61	Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification	230
	<i>Adopted by a recorded vote of 157 to 1, with 6 abstentions as follows:^a</i>	
	<i>In favour:</i> Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Antigua-Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia/Herzeg, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan AJ, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar,	

^a Subsequent to the voting the delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour of the draft resolution.

50/61 Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall
(cont.) Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (FS),
Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia,
Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger,
Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua N
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal,
Qatar, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Russian
Fed, Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands,
South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname,
Swaziland, Sweden, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, theFYR
Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey,
Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, U A Emirates, U R
Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam,
Yemen, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: United States

Abstaining: Dem PR of Korea, France, Georgia, Israel,
Monaco, United Kingdom

50/62 The role of science and technology in the context of inter- 208
national security and disarmament

Adopted by a recorded vote of 104 to 6, with 53 abstentions, as follows:^b

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahamas, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia,
Botswana, Brunei Dar-Salam, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China,
Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba,
Cyprus, Dem PR of Korea, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El
Salvador, Equat Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana,
Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti,
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya,
Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan AJ,
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Marshall
Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (FS),
Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia,
Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama,

^b Subsequent to the voting the delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

50/62 Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar,
(cont.) Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Sri Lanka,
Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Togo,
Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, U A
Emirates, U R Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela,
Viet Nam, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: France, Israel, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
United Kingdom, United States

Abstaining: Albania, Andorra, Antigua-Barbuda,
Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia/Herzeg, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Fiji,
Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein,
Lithuania, Malta, Monaco, New Zealand, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova,
Romania, Russian Fed, Samoa, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Tajikistan,
theFYR Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine

50/63 The role of science and technology in the context of inter-
national security, disarmament and other related fields

209

Adopted by a recorded vote of 157 to none, with 9 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra,
Angola, Antigua-Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia,
Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh,
Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan,
Bolivia, Bosnia/Herzeg, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei
Dar-Salam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia,
Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China,
Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador,
Egypt, El Salvador, Equat Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia,
Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana,
Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakstan, Kenya, Kuwait,
Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan AJ,

50/63
(cont.) Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (FS), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Russian Fed, Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, theFYR Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, U A Emirates, U R Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Cuba, Dem PR of Korea, France, India, Iran (Islamic R), Japan, Pakistan, United Kingdom, United States

50/64 Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water

48

Adopted by a recorded vote of 110 to 4, with 45 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua-Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People's Rep of Korea, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equat Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic R), Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan AJ, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (FS), Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar,

- 50/64
(cont.) Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, U A Emirates, U R Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe
- Against:* Israel, Russian Fed, United Kingdom, United States
- Abstaining:* Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, theFYR Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine
- 50/65 Comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty 43
Adopted without a vote
- 50/66 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 84
Adopted without a vote
- 50/67 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia 80
Adopted by a recorded vote of 154 to 3, with 9 abstentions, as follows:
- In favour:* Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua-Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia/Herzeg, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti,

50/67 (cont.) Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equat Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iran (Islamic R), Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Libyan AJ, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mexico, Micronesia (FS), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Russian Fed, Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Tajikistan, Thailand, theFYR Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, U A Emirates, United Kingdom, U R Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Bhutan, India, Mauritius

Abstaining: Algeria, Cuba, Cyprus, Indonesia, Israel, Lao PDR, Madagascar, Myanmar, Viet Nam

50/68 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

58

Adopted by a recorded vote of 122 to none, with 44 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua-Barbuda, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Dem PR of Korea, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equat Guinea, Eritrea,

50/68
(cont.)

Ethiopia, Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic R), Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan AJ, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (FS), Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rep of Korea, Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, theFYR Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, U A Emirates, U R Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Russian Fed, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uzbekistan

50/69

Prevention of an arms race in outer space

201

Adopted by a recorded vote of 121 to none, with 46 abstentions, as follows:^c

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Dem PR of Korea, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equat Guinea,

^c Subsequent to the voting the delegation of France advised the Secretariat that it had intended to abstain.

50/69 Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Georgia, Ghana,
(cont.) Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti,
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic R), Jamaica,
Japan, Jordan, Kazakstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan,
Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan AJ, Madagascar,
Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Marshall Islands,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco,
Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand,
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama,
Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rep
of Korea, Russian Fed, Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South
Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria,
Thailand, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan,
Uganda, Ukraine, U A Emirates, U R Tanzania, Uruguay,
Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia,
Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Albania, Andorra, Antigua-Barbuda,
Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Belize,
Bosnia/Herzeg, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia,
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Micronesia
(FS), Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Rep of Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, Tajikistan, the former Republic of Macedonia,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uzbekistan

50/70 General and complete disarmament

A Nuclear testing

47

*Adopted by a recorded vote of of 85 to 18, with 43 absten-
tions, as follows:*^d

In favour: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria,
Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium,

^d Subsequent to the voting the delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote against the draft resolution; the delegation of Turkmenistan advised the Secretariat that it had intended to abstain.

50/70 A Belize, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam,
(cont.) Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark,
Ecuador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Ghana,
Guatemala, Guyana, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland,
Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lesotho,
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives,
Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia
(FS), Mongolia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway,
Palau, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Portugal, Rep of Korea, Rwanda, Samoa,
Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa,
Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand,
Trinidad-Tobago, Uganda, Ukraine, U R Tanzania,
Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Benin, Cameroon, Chad, China, Congo, Côte
d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Equat Guinea, France, Gabon,
Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Monaco, Niger, Senegal,
Togo, United Kingdom

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Angola,
Armenia, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Croatia, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Dem PR of Korea, El Salvador, Estonia,
Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Hungary, Israel, Kenya, Latvia, Lebanon, Libyan AJ,
Lithuania, Morocco, Namibia, Pakistan, Poland, Rep of
Moldova, Romania, Russian Fed, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, Sudan, Syria, theFYR Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey,
United States, Zaire

B Small arms

*Adopted by a recorded vote of 140 to none, with 19 absten-
tions, as follows:*^e 151

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra,
Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria,
Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium,

^e Subsequent to the voting the delegations of Azerbaijan and Lithuania advised the Secretariat that they had intended to vote in favour of the draft resolution; the delegation of Indonesia advised the Secretariat that it had intended to abstain.

50/70 B Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei
(cont.) Dar-Salam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia,
Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, Colombia,
Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equat Guinea,
Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon,
Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary,
Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic R), Ireland, Italy,
Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakstan, Kenya, Kuwait,
Lao PDR, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan AJ,
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi,
Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (FS), Monaco,
Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia,
Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger,
Norway, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Rep of Korea, Rep of
Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Singapore,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain,
Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Tajikistan,
Thailand, theFYR Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago,
Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, U R
Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela,
Yemen, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cuba, Djibouti, Dem
PR of Korea, Egypt, Fiji, India, Israel, Lithuania, Nigeria,
Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Russian Fed, Samoa, Saudi
Arabia, Sudan, U A Emirates

C Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimina- 104
tion of nuclear weapons

*Adopted by a recorded vote of 154 to none, with 10 absten-
tions, as follows:*

In favour: Albania, Andorra, Antigua-Barbuda,
Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan,
Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus,
Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia/Herzeg,
Botswana, Brunei Dar-Salam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso,

50/70 C Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde,
(cont.) Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire,
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti,
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equat Guinea, Eritrea,
Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia,
Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland,
Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan,
Kazakstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Latvia,
Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan AJ, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives,
Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius,
Mexico, Micronesia (FS), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco,
Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Oman, Panama,
Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Qatar, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova, Romania,
Russian Fed, Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon
Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname,
Swaziland, Sweden, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, theFYR
Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey,
Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, U A Emirates, United
Kingdom, U R Tanzania, United States, Uruguay,
Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia,
Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Algeria, Brazil, China, Cuba, Dem PR of
Korea, India, Iran (Islamic R), Israel, Myanmar, Pakistan

D Transparency in armaments

148

*Adopted by a recorded vote of 149 to none, with 15 absten-
tions, as follows:*

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Angola,
Antigua-Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria,
Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados,
Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia,
Bosnia/Herzeg, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam,
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon,

50/70 D (cont.) Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equat Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Micronesia (FS), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Russian Fed, Rwanda, Samoa, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Tajikistan, Thailand, theFYR Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, U A Emirates, United Kingdom, U R Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Algeria, Cuba, Dem PR of Korea, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic R), Lebanon, Libyan AJ, Mexico, Myanmar, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria

E Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes 132

Adopted without a vote

F Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament 227

Adopted by a recorded vote of 111 to 2, with 49 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Antigua-Barbuda, Australia, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia,

50/70 F (cont.) Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Dem PR of Korea, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic R), Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan AJ, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (FS), Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, U A Emirates, U R Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Israel, United States

Abstaining: Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Equat Guinea, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Russian Fed, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, theFYR Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom

G	Relationship between disarmament and development	205
	<i>Adopted without a vote</i>	
H	Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them	190
	<i>Adopted without a vote</i>	
I	Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament	109 ^{1/2}

50/70 I *Adopted with a recorded vote of 150 to none, with 14
(cont.) abstentions, as follows:^f*

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua-Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia/Herzeg, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equat Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (FS), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Russian Fed, Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syria, theFYR Macedonia, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, U A Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Cuba, Dem PR of Korea, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic R), Lebanon, Libyan AJ, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Togo, U R Tanzania

^f Subsequent to the voting the delegation of Lebanon advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour of the draft resolution.

	<i>Reference in text</i>	
50/70 J	Measures to curb the illicit transfer and use of conventional arms	153
	<i>Adopted without a vote</i>	
K	Regional disarmament	185
	<i>Adopted with a vote of 165 to none, with 1 abstention, as follows:</i>	
	<i>In favour:</i> Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua-Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia/Herzeg, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dem PR of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equat Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iran (Islamic R), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan AJ, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (FS), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Russian Fed, Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, theFYR Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, U A Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, U R Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe	

50/70 K *Against:* None
(cont.) *Abstaining:* India

L Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels 187

Adopted by a recorded vote of 158 to none, with 7 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua-Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia/Herzeg, Botswana, Brunei Dar-Salam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dem PR of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equat Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic R), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Micronesia (FS), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Russian Fed, Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, theFYR Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, U A Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, U R Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe,

Against: None

50/70 L *Abstaining:* Brazil, Cuba, India, Libyan AJ, Mexico,
(cont.) Nigeria, Venezuela

M Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and
implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms
control

212

*Adopted by a recorded vote of 157 to 4, with 2 abstentions,
as follows:*

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua-Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia/Herzeg, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dem PR of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Equat Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic R), Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan AJ, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (FS), Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Russian Fed, Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, theFYR Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, U A Emirates, U R Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

50/70 M *Against:* France, Israel, United Kingdom, United States
(cont.) *Abstaining:* Canada, Japan

N Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament 112

Adopted by a recorded vote of 105 to 37, with 20 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Dem PR of Korea, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic R), Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan AJ, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, U A Emirates, U R Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Russian Fed, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, theFYR Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States

Abstaining: Antigua-Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Belarus, Equat Guinea, Fiji,

- 50/70 N Ireland, Japan, Kazakstan, Liechtenstein, Malta,
(cont.) Micronesia (FS), New Zealand, Paraguay, Rep of Korea,
Sweden, Tajikistan, Ukraine
- O Moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land-mines 172
Adopted without a vote
- P Nuclear disarmament 105
Adopted by a recorded vote of 106 to 39, with 17 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Rep of Korea, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic R), Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan AJ, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (FS), Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, U A Emirates, U R Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, theFYR Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States

50/70 P *Abstaining:* Antigua-Barbuda, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Belarus, Benin, Croatia, Cyprus, Equat Guinea, Georgia, Japan, Kazakstan, New Zealand, Rep of Korea, Russian Fed, Ukraine
(cont.)

Q 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

20

Adopted by a recorded vote of 161 to none, with 2 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Antigua-Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia/Herzeg, Botswana, Brunei Dar-Salam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equat Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic R), Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan AJ, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (FS), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Russian Fed, Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, theFYR Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, U A Emirates, United Kingdom, U R Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

50/70 Q (cont.)	<i>Against:</i> None <i>Abstaining:</i> India, Israel	
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D	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific <i>Adopted without a vote</i>	196
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	<i>In favour:</i> Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Dem PR of Korea, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic R), Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho,	

- 50/71 E Libyan AJ, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives,
(cont.) Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico,
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Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay,
Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South
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Thailand, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, U A
Emirates, U R Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela,
Viet Nam, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe
- Against:* Andorra, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom,
United States
- Abstaining:* Afghanistan, Albania, Antigua-Barbuda,
Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahamas,
Barbados, Belarus, Croatia, Equat Guinea, Estonia,
Georgia, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Liechtenstein, Malta, New
Zealand, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova, Russian Fed,
Slovenia, Sweden, theFYR Macedonia, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan
- 50/72 Review of the implementation of the recommendations
of SSOD I
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- B Disarmament Week 233
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- D Report of the Disarmament Commission 216
Adopted without a vote

50/73

The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East

100

Adopted by a recorded vote of 56 to 2, with 100 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Botswana, Brunei Dar-Salam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dem PR of Korea, Djibouti, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic R), Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan AJ, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Namibia, New Zealand, Niger, Oman, Pakistan, Papua N Guinea, Philippines, Qatar, Rep of Korea, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, U A Emirates, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, Yemen,

Against: Israel, United States

Abstaining: Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua-Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia/Herzeg, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equat Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia (FS), Monaco, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Russian Fed, Rwanda, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, theFYR Macedonia, Trinidad-Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Zaire, Zambia

	<i>Reference in text</i>
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<i>Adopted by a recorded vote of 114 to 1, with 49 abstentions, as follows:</i>	
<i>In favour:</i> Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua-Barbuda, Australia, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Dem PR of Korea, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic R), Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan AJ, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (FS), Mongolia, Morocco,	

50/420 Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand,
(*cont.*) Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama,
Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar,
Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone,
Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka,
Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Togo,
Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, U A Emirates, U R
Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam,
Yemen, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: United States

Abstaining: Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia,
Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia/Herzeg,
Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Equat Guinea, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Russian Fed,
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Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom

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the First Committee 228

Adopted without a vote

APPENDIX IV

Abbreviations and acronyms

ABACC	Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile
AFCONE	African Commission on Nuclear Energy
AFRA	African Regional Cooperation Agreement for Research, Training and Development Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BWC	Biological Weapons Convention
CCWC	Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
CD	Conference on Disarmament
CFE	Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
COCOM	Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
CTBT	Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Observer Group
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EMP	Electro-Magnetic Pulse
EU	European Union
FAA	Forças Armadas Angolanas
GSETT-3	Group of Scientific Experts Technical Test Three
HEU	Highly Enriched Uranium
HNEs	Hydronuclear Explosions
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDC	International Data Centre

IFOR	Implementation Force
IHMS	International Hydroacoustic Monitoring System
IIMS	International Infrasound Monitoring System
IMS	International Monitoring System
IRMS	International Radionuclide Monitoring System
ISMS	International Seismic Monitoring System
KEDO	Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization
LEU	Low-Enriched Uranium
LWR	Light-Water Reactor
MIRV	Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDCs	National Data Centres
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NTM	National Technical Means
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPANAL	Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
OPCW	Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OSI	On-Site Inspection
SEANWFZ	Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (I and II)
TMD	Theatre Missile Defence
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNITA	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNSCOM	United Nations Special Commission
VEREX	Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint
WEU	Western European Union
WHO	World Health Organization
ZOPFAN	Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality

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