

REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE STATES
PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON
PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS ON
THE USE OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL
WEAPONS WHICH MAY BE DEEMED TO BE
EXCESSIVELY INJURIOUS OR TO HAVE
INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS

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SUMMARY RECORD OF THE (FIRST PART)* OF THE 14th MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday, 3 May 1996, at 4 p.m.

President: Mr. MOLANDER (Sweden)

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* The summary record of the second part of the meeting appears as
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the Conference.

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The meeting was called to order at 4.25 p.m.

TRIBUTE TO THE VICTIMS OF LAND-MINES

1. At the invitation of the President, the participants in the Conference observed a minute of silence.

REPORT OF THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE (agenda item 16) (CCW/CONF.I/CC/1)

2. The PRESIDENT said that, if he heard no objection, he would take it that the Conference wished to adopt the report of the Credentials Committee, by adopting the draft resolution contained in paragraph 11 of its report.

3. It was so decided.

CONSIDERATION AND ADOPTION OF THE FINAL DOCUMENTS (agenda item 19)
(CCW/CONF.I/14)

Adoption of the draft amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices (Amended Protocol II)
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4. The PRESIDENT noted that the Conference had adopted some amendments to the beginning of document CCW/CONF.I/14 at an informal meeting. The secretariat would also make some drafting changes approved by the Drafting Committee. The errors in certain versions would be corrected by the secretariat before the official text of the amended Protocol was communicated to States by the Depositary. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Conference wished to adopt the draft amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices (Amended Protocol II).

5. It was so decided.

Interpretative statements by States on amended Protocol II

6. Baron GUILLAUME (Belgium) read out a statement on article 1 of amended Protocol II, according to which the provisions of the Protocol must be observed at all times, depending on circumstances. The statement was made on behalf of the following States: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Latvia, Netherlands, Pakistan, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

7. Mr. DIAZ-DUQUE (Guatemala) supported the Belgian statement.

8. Mr. HARTMANN (Germany) read out an interpretative statement on article 2, on behalf of Germany and the following countries: Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, South Africa, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America. According to the statement, it was understood that the word "primarily" was included in article 2, paragraph 3, to clarify that

mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle, as opposed to a person, that were equipped with anti-handling devices, were not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.

9. Mr. MATHESON (United States of America) said that the United States fully endorsed the Belgian statement concerning the observation of the provisions of the Protocol during peacetime. Among the provisions that must, in his country's view, be observed at all times were: the provisions regarding the recording, marking, monitoring and protection of areas containing mines and the provisions of articles 8, 13 and 14.

10. Second, the United States, supported by Belgium, Canada, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Netherlands and Pakistan, considered that article 4 and the Technical Annex did not require removal or replacement of mines already emplaced, while the provisions of the amended Protocol regarding marking, monitoring, fencing and protection of areas under the control of a party containing mines applied regardless of when those mines had been placed.

11. Third, it was the understanding of the United States, with respect to the provisions of article 3, that an area of land could itself be a legitimate military objective for the purpose of the use of land-mines, if its neutralization or denial, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offered a definite military advantage.

12. Fourth, the United States agreed entirely with the German statement with respect to the word "primarily" in article 2, paragraph 3.

13. Mr. AZHAR ELLAHI (Pakistan) said that, in Pakistan's view, the provisions of article 1 took precedence over those of any other article: the observance of any other provision could not be construed either directly or indirectly as affecting the right of peoples struggling against colonial or other forms of alien domination and foreign occupation in the exercise of their inalienable right of self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

14. Mr. WALKER (Australia) read out an interpretative statement on article 5, paragraph 2 (b), on behalf of Australia and the following countries: Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden and United States of America. According to the statement, article 5, paragraph 2, did not preclude agreement among the States concerned, in connection with peace treaties or similar arrangements, to allocate responsibilities under paragraph 2 (b) in another manner which nevertheless respected the essential spirit and purpose of the article.

15. Mr. ZMEEVSKY (Russian Federation) welcomed the significant contribution to the development of international humanitarian law which the Conference had made by adopting amended Protocol II. Despite their divergences of viewpoint on certain sensitive issues, States had worked hard to find generally acceptable compromise solutions.

16. According to the interpretation of the Russian Federation, however, each Party would apply the provisions of article 8, paragraph 3, of the Protocol and those of paragraph 2 (a) and (b) of the Technical Annex in conformity with national laws and regulations.

17. Mr. SHA Zukang (China) said that, in his country's view, article 6, paragraph 3, did not prohibit the use of remotely-delivered land-mines other than anti-personnel land-mines which were not equipped with an effective self-destruction or self-neutralization mechanism.

18. Mr. REID (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) said that the Government of the United Kingdom would examine certain of the Protocol's provisions at a later date and reserved the right, at the time of notification of the Depositary of its consent to be bound by the Protocol, to make formal statements concerning the Protocol in addition to those made by other countries endorsed by the United Kingdom.

Adoption of the draft Final Declaration of the Conference
(CCW/CONF.I/WP.1/Rev.1)

19. The PRESIDENT noted that the draft Final Declaration prepared by Main Committee I had been orally amended at an informal meeting held that morning. It had been agreed that a fifth paragraph should be added to the preamble, in which the High Contracting Parties welcomed the adoption of an amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices (Amended Protocol II). It had also been agreed that a subparagraph preceded by a dash should be added to the Solemn Declaration indicating that nothing in amended Protocol II should be used for the purposes of undermining the principles and purposes set forth in the Charter of the United Nations. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Conference wished to adopt the draft Final Declaration as orally amended.

20. It was so decided.

Adoption of the draft Final Report of the Conference (CCW/CONF.I/CRP.20/Rev.1)

21. The PRESIDENT said that a few gaps would be filled in the Final Report when the Conference had completed its work. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Conference agreed to adopt the draft Final Report.

22. It was so decided.

23. The draft texts constituting the Final Report of the Conference, as a whole, as amended, were adopted.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

24. The PRESIDENT said that the difficult negotiations drawing to a close had dealt not only with weapons and legal procedures, but also, at a more fundamental level, with human values. The test of their success lay in adherence to and compliance with the new rules.

25. Inevitably, many delegations felt that not enough had been achieved, but that was because the amended Protocol reflected the consensus of all States parties. A growing number of States parties favoured an international ban, but the probable majority of States were of a different opinion. Many States considered anti-personnel land-mines to be an indispensable military asset.

26. In any event, the Conference had considerably improved the old Protocol by extending its scope to cover internal armed conflicts, significantly increasing restrictions on the use of all types of mines, prohibiting - albeit with a relatively long period of deferral - the use of non-detectable anti-personnel mines, prohibiting the use of non-self-destructing and non-self-deactivating mines outside fenced, monitored and marked areas, prohibiting the transfer of non-detectable anti-personnel mines and broadening obligations to protect peace-keeping and other humanitarian missions. The amended Protocol also called for penal sanctions in case of violation and decisions had been taken to hold annual Conferences of States parties and regular Review Conferences.

27. It was urgent for all States to accede to the Protocol and all parties to take steps to become bound by the new instrument. Compliance was crucial. Significant progress had been made, but efforts must continue. Mine victims were ultimately the international community's constituency. The only viable long-term solution was a total ban on all anti-personnel land-mines.

28. It should also be noted that the dynamic nature of the Convention had been demonstrated by the addition of a new protocol, banning the use of blinding laser weapons, at the very moment when such weapons had been about to be deployed.

MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

29. The PRESIDENT invited the Director General of the United Nations Office at Geneva to make a statement on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

30. Mr. PETROVSKY (Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva) read out a message to the Conference from the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in which the Secretary-General stated the following:

31. Land-mines, and especially anti-personnel mines, were having horrendously destructive effects on individuals and communities throughout the world and were ravaging the economies of certain countries. Land-mines were weapons whose widespread use against civilian populations was indefensible and an affront to the human conscience.

32. He congratulated the President and the other participants in the Conference on the great efforts that had been made in the course of a long and sometimes difficult process. Some progress had been made, for example the extension of scope of the Convention, the inclusion of provisions restricting the transfer of mines and the clear attribution of responsibility for mine clearance. The number of countries favouring a total ban was increasing

almost daily, in large part due to the work of the hundreds of non-governmental organizations which formed the International Campaign to Ban Land-mines.

33. He noted with deep disappointment that the progress achieved fell far short of what he had hoped for. The revised Protocol failed to resolve some of the crucial issues. It would disappoint international public opinion and, in particular, the hundreds of thousands of mine victims worldwide. It was disappointing, for example, that States which accepted binding obligations had not been able to agree on independent verification of their compliance. The international community recognized the need for the eventual elimination of anti-personnel mines, but was not ready to prohibit their supply. There had been attempts to differentiate between "smart" mines or "good" mines and "bad" ones, yet no mechanism, no contraption, could legitimize a weapon that inflicted such appalling, yet random, suffering on so many societies. With its shortcomings, however, the amended Protocol still represented a step forward in the development of international humanitarian law. It represented the common denominator of all States parties and it was essential for all States to accede to it.

34. The United Nations and its agencies would continue to work closely with non-governmental organizations worldwide to seek to ensure that humanitarian considerations, which were all too often subordinated to military and geopolitical considerations, remained in the forefront of the minds of Governments. The United Nations would continue to strengthen its programmes of humanitarian mine clearance in affected countries, which required increased human, financial and technical support from all Governments.

35. According to estimates, by the next Review Conference five years hence, an additional 50,000 human beings would have been killed, and a further 80,000 injured, by land-mines. Ten to 25 million land-mines would have been added to the 110 million already uncleared. Thousands of de-miners would continue to have to risk their lives every day. The only solution was a total ban on all anti-personnel mines, which must be the aim of the next Review Conference. The United Nations would work with Governments, Member States and non-governmental organizations to achieve that goal. He encouraged all States immediately to enact legislation prohibiting the manufacture, stockpiling, use or sale of land-mines. The world could not wait indefinitely: mines must be eliminated without delay.

36. The PRESIDENT associated himself with the Secretary-General's appeal to States to accede to the amended Protocol.

CLOSING STATEMENTS

37. Mr. PERUGINI (Italy), speaking on behalf of the European Union, the central and eastern European countries associated with the European Union, the associated countries Cyprus and Malta, as well as the EFTA country members of the EEA (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway), said that, in order to reconfirm its commitment to the objective of an overall strengthened Protocol II, the European Union had adopted a Joint Action in May 1995. The member States of the European Union had undertaken thereby to extend the scope of Protocol II to non-international armed conflicts, substantially strengthen restrictions or

bans on anti-personnel mines and seek an effective verification regime and provisions on technical assistance for mine clearance. The European Union had since engaged in many consultations, with the support of the above-mentioned countries, to promote that aim.

38. The Conference had made considerable progress in terms of the Joint Action of the European Union: the scope of Protocol II had been significantly extended; the strengthening of restrictions or prohibitions of the use of anti-personnel land-mines had been partially achieved; an immediate prohibition on transfers of land-mines the use of which was prohibited and other general restrictions on transfers had been introduced; and the provisions on technological cooperation and assistance had been significantly strengthened, in particular to facilitate mine-clearance operations.

39. Additional progress was expected in the following areas: greater protection for United Nations, ICRC and humanitarian missions; the obligation for States to take penal sanctions against individuals seriously violating the Protocol; and the commitment reflected in the text of the Final Declaration to follow up the review process begun at the first Review Conference so as to establish a regular review mechanism for the Convention and its annexed Protocols. Among the overall achievements of the current Conference were the adoption of Protocol IV banning the use and transfer of laser weapons specifically designed to blind.

40. However, the results of the Conference were disappointing in comparison with the goals set out in the Joint Action of the European Union in a number of important respects. The European Union would have liked to reach agreement on an effective and binding verification mechanism, with no periods of deferral of compliance - or at least much shorter ones - with the standards set in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Technical Annex, and much stricter constraints on detectability during the deferral period.

41. However, those failings should not discourage States from pursuing their efforts, in particular to keep the issue of anti-personnel land-mines high on the international agenda. He was encouraged to note that the Conference had agreed in Protocol II (art. 13) to establish annual consultations among the High Contracting Parties on all issues related to the implementation of the Protocol.

42. Regarding the entry into force of the amended Protocol, the European Union would endeavour to seek early ratification. It would also take urgent steps to ensure compliance by members with all the provisions of the Protocol and of new Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons.

43. Noting that only 57 States had ratified or acceded to the Convention, he said that the European Union would devote further efforts to achieving the universal nature of the Convention and amended Protocol II.

44. The European Union would strive to meet the goal of the eventual elimination of anti-personnel land-mines, as stated in General Assembly resolution 50/70 (O).

45. Mrs. ARIAS (Observer for Colombia), speaking on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and Other Observer States, welcomed the adoption at the current session of amended Protocol II and the adoption on 13 October 1995 of Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons. Those were important stages in the process of strengthening international law on conventional weapons, which might encourage States to accede to the Convention and help to make it universal. She hoped that the flexibility and spirit of compromise present throughout the work of the past two weeks would mark future review conferences. The work of the Committee chairmen, the Friends of the Chair and the secretariat had been crucial to the success of the Conference's work and she expressed her gratitude to them.

46. Mr. PARREIRA (Observer for Angola) said that it was very unfortunate indeed that the Conference had not succeeded in taking substantial steps towards the total ban of anti-personnel land-mines. It seemed that Governments of countries producing such weapons were indifferent to the tragic consequences among the civilian population of the generalized and indiscriminate use of such weapons and that those countries, as well as those that transported such weapons, did not have the political will to amend the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons such as anti-personnel land-mines. He sincerely deplored that no feasible mechanism for verification of the implementation of the restrictions imposed on the use of anti-personnel land-mines had been established and that the security and protection of civilian populations had not been safeguarded. His delegation felt grief and frustration because the transition period agreed for the new arrangements to come into force was too long. From the humanitarian law standpoint, the revised Protocol II, with the exception of article 8, was misleading and did not at all meet the legitimate expectation of all those who were alarmed at the devastating effects of anti-personnel land-mines: governmental authorities in developing countries, NGOs, religious entities, victims and their relatives.

47. Of the more than 100 million anti-personnel land-mines planted in third world countries, 15 to 20 million were planted in Angola, killing 7 to 10 people a day and wounding still more, the great majority being civilians. Lack of medical assistance and hospitals, inadequate first-aid treatment, absence of transport facilities, starvation, illness and the deep trauma and depression caused by injuries, poverty and underdevelopment were all factors contributing to the high mortality rate among the victims of anti-personnel land-mines. Beyond the physical and psychological damage they caused, mines severely jeopardized the Angolan economy: as one-third of the country was mined, part of its best arable land could not be cultivated, and that forced the authorities to rely on loans and credits at high interest rates in order to guarantee imports of basic commodities. The Angolan Government was also deeply concerned at the high cost involved in mine clearing and the rehabilitation of the affected areas. The appropriate arrangements, technical personnel and equipment needed for land-mine clearance in Angola would cost more than \$6.6 billion, an amount far beyond the country's financial capacity. Due to lack of financing, only a very small amount of mine clearance had taken place.

48. In conformity with Organization of African Unity resolutions 1593 (LXII) and 1628 (LVIII), the Government of Angola appealed to the international

community to give increased support to the ongoing efforts by national institutions and non-governmental organizations responsible for assistance to victims of anti-personnel land-mines and for mine clearance in Angola.

49. As recommended in the above-mentioned resolutions of the Organization of African Unity, his Government supported a total prohibition of anti-personnel land-mines.

50. Mrs. BOURGOIS (France), noting that her country had asked in February 1993 for the current meeting to be held, expressed appreciation for the agreement that marked the end of the work of the first Review Conference of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons.

51. The adoption of a new text for the mines Protocol should be welcomed despite the instrument's inadequacies. In that connection, she fully endorsed the remarks made by the representative of Italy on behalf of the European Union.

52. It was true that the new version of Protocol II which had been adopted fell short of the hopes and ideals which France shared with many other participants in the Conference and with field staff. Even as it stood, however, it was a substantial achievement. The adoption of an annual consultation mechanism and the commitment to hold a new Review Conference in five years bore witness to the will of the States parties to the Convention to continue to work together.

53. France considered that the goal of the efforts to put an end to the scourge of anti-personnel land-mines could be none other than the adoption of a verifiable international agreement on the total elimination of such devices. Although unilateral initiatives could not and should not replace it, they were signs of hope and helped to establish a climate conducive to patient legislative work. France declared itself in favour of the total elimination of anti-personnel land-mines. She congratulated the countries that had announced unilateral decisions of broad scope at the Conference and expressed her hope that more countries would follow their example.

54. Mr. VALERIO (Observer for Portugal) informed the Conference that his Government had already formally approved the text of the Convention and its Protocols, including amended Protocol II, and had requested Parliament to initiate ratification procedures.

55. The Portuguese Government had joined international efforts towards a worldwide total ban on anti-personnel land-mines by issuing a declaration announcing that, in conformity with the Joint Action of the European Union, it had implemented a moratorium on exports of anti-personnel land-mines, which it had decided to extend to the production and stockpiling of land-mines. The Portuguese Government also stated that Portugal had ceased to produce or export anti-personnel land-mines, that anti-personnel land-mines stockpiled by the Portuguese armed forces were gradually being destroyed, with the exception of those necessary for military training, especially de-mining operations, and that Portugal would aim all its efforts at a complete ban on the production and use of anti-personnel land-mines worldwide; it was understood that, under

exceptional circumstances, the Portuguese State reserved the right to go back on that decision, with strict respect for the international rules applicable to armed conflicts, in particular the provisions of Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices.

56. Mr. MOHER (Canada) recalled that, in its opening statement to the September 1995 session of the Conference, his Government had stated that the objective of the international community should be the elimination of anti-personnel land-mines. On 17 January 1996, the Canadian Government had decided to establish an indefinite moratorium on the production and export of those devices as well as their use in battle. Canada's objective at the current session - regrettably but necessarily - was more limited, i.e. to introduce prohibitions and restrictions on those weapons in order to secure a humanitarian goal. Against that yardstick, he believed that significant progress, admittedly insufficient, had been made: the amended Protocol contained a wide range of provisions imposing new prohibitions and restrictions on anti-personnel land-mines.

57. Canada had devoted considerable efforts to negotiating the provision that, if anti-personnel land-mines must be used by some countries in the short term, at the very least they must be detectable immediately. At the cost of having to accept a deferral period - too long in Canada's view - for the universal implementation of that provision, the Conference had collectively agreed on the principle of detectability, its implementation over a fixed time period and the non-export of undetectable mines in the interim. He drew attention to the fact that the participants in the Conference had in the Final Declaration promised their best efforts to make detectable all anti-personnel land-mines used nationally in the interim. That was modest progress, but significant humanitarian progress all the same.

58. Canada would continue to work along two tracks to attain its overall objective of elimination. On track one, i.e. in the context of the Convention and amended Protocol II, it would continue to press vigorously for increased restrictions and prohibitions in the short term in order to move closer to an absolute ban; it would also work with all concerned to secure the earliest possible entry into force of the amended Protocol. Track two consisted of a number of initiatives. At the United Nations General Assembly the following autumn, Canada would be putting forward a resolution calling for further concrete steps towards the elimination of anti-personnel land-mines. It would forcefully advocate, in all of the regional organizations and forums to which it belonged, additional actions towards that objective. In the Organization of American States, for example, it was pressing for the Americas to be declared an "anti-personnel mines free zone". He was pleased to confirm Canada's intention to host a meeting in Ottawa the following September for those Governments and NGOs which supported a comprehensive ban on anti-personnel land-mines.

59. Tens of thousands of innocent civilians were the victims of anti-personnel mines throughout the world and more such victims were unavoidable. That horrendous reality would demand redoubled efforts, in the Conference and elsewhere, to eliminate those weapons. He wished to

acknowledge the commitment of the many non-governmental organizations which had supported the participants in the Review Conference in their difficult task.

60. Another significant achievement of the Review Conference should be borne in mind, i.e. the adoption of Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons, and he hoped that all States would move expeditiously to accede to it.

61. Mr. VIEGAS (Brazil) expressed sympathy for the victims of land-mines, especially in Africa, Asia and Europe, regions that suffered particularly from the scourge of war.

62. As was the case in any genuine negotiation, the results of the Review Conference could not fully satisfy all the parties concerned. It was of course possible to find deficiencies in the texts of Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons and on amended Protocol II on Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices. Given the gravity of the situation generated by the indiscriminate deployment of land-mines, only a limited effect of the provisions adopted could unfortunately be expected. However, the adoption of amended Protocol II by the Conference had deep significance, for it attested to the international community's resolve to take a decisive step to put an end to the indiscriminate and abusive use of land-mines.

63. Among the most important results of the Conference were the total ban on non-detectable anti-personnel land-mines and the requirements regarding the early self-destruction and self-deactivation of mines placed out of clearly marked and monitored areas. Other achievements with important implications were the extension of the scope of application of Protocol II to cover armed conflicts not of an international character. Efforts should henceforth concentrate on practical matters such as substantially increasing capabilities for mine clearance, establishing effective national quality controls on the mechanisms of self-destruction and self-deactivation and devoting new resources to help poor countries meet the technical requirements established, for humanitarian purposes.

64. Mr. SOOD (India) said that the Review Conference had conducted its work against the backdrop of the growing realization of the tragic crisis caused by the irresponsible exports of land-mines and their indiscriminate use, which occurred on such a scale that clearing the land-mines strewn throughout the world was tantamount to attempting the impossible. Throughout the work of the Conference, his delegation had maintained that the focus of efforts should be the protection of civilians' lives and livelihood. Aware that the predominant damage caused by land-mines did not necessarily lie in international conflicts, India had agreed to the extension of the scope of Protocol II to internal conflicts. It had even proposed a complete prohibition on the use of land-mines, booby-traps and other devices in all internal conflicts and had drawn the attention of the Review Conference to the many innocent civilian victims caused by improvised explosive devices, which were likely to be used even more than land-mines in situations of internal conflict.

65. It was clear that merely imposing limited restrictions on the use of land-mines in non-international conflicts would be difficult to monitor and enforce, especially when one of the parties was not a High Contracting Party.

Extending the scope of the land-mines Protocol to internal armed conflict without a comprehensive ban only served to legitimize the use of "smart" mines. India believed that the use of anti-personnel land-mines should be permitted only for long-term defence of borders, perimeters and peripheries of States. His delegation regretted that those proposals had not found consensus. For its part, India had never used land-mines and was determined not to use them in armed conflicts not of an international character.

66. The Conference had succeeded in ensuring that henceforth all anti-personnel mines that did not possess self-destruction and self-deactivating mechanisms would be used within a marked perimeter that was monitored by military personnel and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the exclusion of civilians. As everyone knew, however, remotely delivered mines with or without self-destruct mechanisms could not be accurately located and accurate maps could not be made to indicate their deployment. It was for that reason that his delegation had consistently called for a complete ban on the use of remotely-delivered mines. He hoped that delegations that had resisted that idea would review their position.

67. In view of the fact that the land-mines used in many countries were not produced locally, India had proposed a ban on the transfers of all mines. His delegation welcomed the moratoria announced by certain States, but would have preferred an international ban. To enhance transparency and encourage universal adherence, India urged all the States in question to consider making voluntary declarations on their exports of land-mines during the past five years.

68. While the work on Protocol II had been concluded, the land-mine crisis remained to be fought. All States should, at one level, pool their resources, both human and material, to tackle the challenge of removing the mines that had been laid throughout the world during recent conflicts and, at another level, promote universal adherence to the standards established by the international community by taking specific steps such as prohibiting transfers, prohibiting remotely-delivered mines and prohibiting use in internal conflicts. Such collective efforts would help achieve the goal of total elimination of anti-personnel land-mines in the near future.

69. Mr. SHA Zukang (China) welcomed the significant results achieved by the Conference, especially the adoption of a protocol banning the use and transfer of blinding laser weapons. For the first time in human history, an inhumane weapon had been declared illegal and prohibited before it had actually been used. The Conference had also adopted amended Protocol II, which strengthened restrictions on the use and transfer of land-mines and established technical specifications on the detectability, self-destruction and self-deactivation of land-mines.

70. China had always attached the highest importance to humanitarian matters and supported the international community's efforts in that area. It had been one of the first countries to sign and ratify the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, in 1982. At the Review Conference, the Chinese Government had solemnly declared that it would prohibit exports of booby-traps and that, pending the entry into force of the amended Protocol, it would introduce a moratorium on exports of anti-personnel mines that did not meet

the technical specifications on detectability, self-destruction and self-deactivation. To guarantee the safety and economic development of the local population, the Chinese Government had carried out large-scale mine-clearance campaigns in certain border areas to eliminate land-mines left over from past wars. It had also engaged in international cooperation in mine-clearance and provided assistance to the best of its ability to other countries affected by land-mines.

71. While emphasizing humanitarianism and the prevention of the abuse of land-mines, the international community should also note that, in the modern world interference, in other countries' internal affairs, infringement on other countries' sovereignty and the use or threat of use of force in State-to-State relations were far from extinct. As such, land-mines remained an effective means for many countries to exercise their right of self-defence in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Therefore, in considering issues involving mines and other conventional weapons, a balance should be sought between humanitarian considerations and the right of self-defence of sovereign States.

72. Mr. POPCHEV (Bulgaria), speaking as coordinator of the Group of Eastern and Central European countries, paid a tribute to all those in the Group - representatives of both Governments and non-governmental organizations - who had contributed to the success of the negotiations. While much could be desired of the two new Protocols from the humanitarian point of view, they were considerable improvements in the international regulations concerning anti-personnel land-mines and blinding laser weapons.

73. Speaking on behalf of the Bulgarian delegation, he informed the Conference that the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria had enacted a decision to impose a unilateral moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land-mines, effective immediately. He asked that the text of the announcement should be distributed as an official document of the Conference.

74. Mr. CAFLISCH (Switzerland) noted that, on 10 October 1981, at the closing meeting of the Conference at which the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons had been adopted, the head of the Swiss delegation had stated that the new instrument represented only modest progress in comparison with the development of methods and means of combat, but that, thanks to the review and amendments mechanism in article 8, it would be possible to improve the regime. What was the situation 16 years later, at the conclusion of the first Review Conference? Once more the record was mixed.

75. Among the positive elements was the adoption of a new protocol on blinding laser weapons, in which, anticipating weapons developments, the Conference had taken steps to prevent their most harmful consequences. Also worthy of note were the improvements made in Protocol II, especially with regard to the technical specifications on the detectability, self-destruction and self-deactivation of anti-personnel land-mines, the immediate ban on the transfer of anti-personnel mines not in conformity with the Protocol, the holding of annual conferences to study the implementation of the new rules and the extension of the scope of the rules to internal conflicts.

76. There were also negative elements, however, in particular the long deferral periods for the implementation of the technical specifications. Since amended Protocol II would not enter into force for two or three years, the provisions would not become applicable for 11 or 12 years. The Conference had legislated for the future, whereas it was necessary to act now by proclaiming a general and complete ban on anti-personnel land-mines. Another negative aspect was the lack of an effective international mechanism for ascertaining and punishing violations of the Protocol.

77. For humanitarian reasons, his delegation had agreed to the document drafted by the Conference. Even when they were insufficient, restrictions applicable to the entire international community were preferable to no restrictions. He hoped, however, that amended Protocol II would be merely a step in the long march towards an absolute ban on anti-personnel land-mines.

78. Mr. DUHR (Observer for Luxembourg) noted with satisfaction that, after two weeks of hard work, many countries had taken steps to enable the international community to limit the suffering caused by anti-personnel land-mines. As a contribution to international efforts, on 25 April 1996 the Government of Luxembourg had announced the introduction of a complete moratorium on the production, transfer, stockpiling or use of land-mines. The Luxembourg army had agreed not to use them and, with the exception of a small number of devices intended for training de-miners, existing stockpiles would be destroyed. The Government of Luxembourg was determined to continue participating in de-mining operations in the context of its humanitarian activities.

79. Mrs. FORSYTH (New Zealand) said that the amended Protocol contained a number of features which should, over time, contribute to alleviating the terrible problems caused by anti-personnel mines throughout the world. The broadening of the scope of the Protocol to cover internal conflicts went to the heart of the way mines had been used against civilians in recent years. The ban on non-detectable anti-personnel mines was an important step given the huge difficulties they created for mine-clearing operations. The restrictions on the use of non-self-destructing and non-self-deactivating mines, particularly in the case of remotely-delivered mines, were a step in the right direction. She was pleased that a provision on transfers had been included in the revised Protocol, although New Zealand would have preferred a clearer commitment by States not to transfer prohibited mines prior to the entry into force of the Protocol and not to transfer to non-parties.

80. At the same time, the Protocol fell short in a number of areas. New Zealand regretted very much the lengthy default periods agreed to in cases where States were unable to comply with the requirements on detectability, self-destruction and self-deactivation. In the case of detectability, it saw no reason why mines could not be fitted with the necessary device prior to emplacement. It urged all contracting parties contemplating the default option to give the question some hard thought before choosing it. The problems associated with remotely-delivered anti-tank mines and mines fitted with anti-handling devices had not been satisfactorily treated. Similarly, the provisions on compliance, in article 14, should have been stricter. She

would have liked to see agreement on effective measures to enable verification of breaches of the Protocol. As experience with the unamended Protocol showed, States could not be relied on to be self-policing.

81. Those and other outstanding issues might be dealt with at the following Review Conference in the year 2001. It was important to keep up the momentum, which was why New Zealand had favoured Review Conferences at five-yearly intervals. However, she hoped that, even before 2001, the world community would have the courage to ban all anti-personnel land-mines, in line with the unilateral actions taken by a growing number of States, including New Zealand. A total ban was the only measure that would, over time, put an end to the suffering caused by land-mines. For that reason, New Zealand would continue to work with other like-minded nations to promote such a ban. In that context, she welcomed the offer made by the delegation of Canada to host a meeting in Ottawa later in 1996.

82. Mr. GOMEZ ROBLEDO (Mexico) said that his country had come to participate in the Review Conference with the firm intention - and hope - of putting an end to a tragedy of gigantic proportions. According to the most conservative estimates, 1,100 years would be needed to eliminate the mines scattered during conflicts that were already over. Before the amended Protocol even began to produce its limited effects, anti-personnel land-mines would have claimed 260,000 new victims. And yet the Conference had not succeeded in banning the production, transfer and use of land-mines, as proposed by Mexico and 34 other States, supported by more than 500 non-governmental organizations and figures as important as the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

83. He wondered what progress the Conference was supposed to have achieved by adopting the amended Protocol. Detectability would facilitate mine clearance work without sparing a single victim as long as the mine stayed in place, the requirements of self-destruction and self-deactivation had the effect of eliminating inexpensive mines and fostering the use of costly devices and the periods of deferral legitimized the use of the millions of mines currently in stock, for at least a decade.

84. He expressed deep sympathy for the victims of that horror and said that Mexico had adopted the new Protocol in the hope that the next Review Conferences would make it possible to move towards the only possible solution: the elimination of land-mines. Mexico's action could in no way be considered as legitimizing any use whatever of land-mines. All use of such devices was indiscriminate and illegitimate under international humanitarian law and Mexico would continue to advocate a complete ban on land-mines in the framework of both the Convention and the international forums of which it was a member.

85. Mr. MADEY (Croatia) noted with satisfaction that many countries had committed themselves unilaterally to a comprehensive ban on all land-mines. The results achieved at the Conference were an important step towards that goal. The changes in Protocol II were the result of very intense negotiations and the delicate balance they represented should be viewed as an encouraging result. His delegation especially welcomed the adoption of the new Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons as an important development in the regulation of new

kinds of weapons, the broadening of the scope of Protocol II to include internal conflicts and the fact that Protocol II covered technical developments and mine transfers, as well as provisions on consultation and cooperation of States parties, especially those on the holding of annual Conferences to discuss issues related to the operation of Protocol II.

86. At the same time, his delegation had the feeling that even more might have been achieved. Since the international community had committed itself to taking effective measures to reduce the dangers to civilians from land-mines, it was regrettable that the provisions on the effectiveness percentage had been lowered to 90 per cent and, in particular, that consensus had not been achieved concerning a shorter deferral period for certain provisions. Although the Conference had succeeded in establishing a practically new regime for land-mines, because of a concern for balance between humanitarian concerns and defence needs of countries, as well as economic considerations, it had not been able to agree on tougher restrictions.

87. The Republic of Croatia had announced a moratorium on the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of all anti-personnel land-mines. That decision should be viewed as the contribution of a country with experience of recent aggression and its desire to reduce the suffering and loss of human life in any conflict.

88. Mr. WALKER (Australia) noted that, since the beginning of the preparatory meetings for the Review Conference, the number of States parties to the Convention had grown from 40 or so to approaching 60. At that rate, the instrument might soon become universal. There was no doubt that the reason for that rapid increase in accession was that the Convention had become the focus of efforts to address the appalling problems caused by anti-personnel mines in recent years.

89. His delegation had already informed the Conference, on 22 April 1996, of the contents of a recent land-mines policy announcement by the Australian Foreign and Defence Ministers, which included a commitment to a ban on anti-personnel land-mines. Australians were very conscious that, beyond the efforts of the Conference to develop the international legislation applicable to mines, the international community must also address the challenge of mine clearance and the rehabilitation of victims. His delegation was therefore happy to announce that the Australian Foreign Minister would shortly be making a significant statement on the important humanitarian issue of mine clearance in Indo-China, a region close to Australia which had suffered and continued to suffer abominably from the unprincipled and indiscriminate misuse of land-mines.

90. The written text of his statement as circulated contained a list of the areas of the Protocol which his delegation believed were in need of improvement. He would simply note that Protocol II did not ban anti-personnel land-mines, as Australia would have wished, and that the measures for interim protection for civilians were insufficient. Nevertheless, he welcomed the amended Protocol as an important first step on the road to a legally binding global ban, a step which Australia was determined to seek with vigour in the months ahead. A small number of States parties had considered it necessary to provide for a long - up to nine years - phase-in period for the technical

standards on detectability, self-destruction and self-deactivation. Australia regretted that that had been a precondition for agreement. It hoped very few States parties would avail themselves of that option and that those that did would make every effort in the transition period to meet the new standards as rapidly as possible.

91. The five-yearly Review Conferences provided for in the Final Declaration would serve to improve Protocol II. Some of the themes to be addressed by those Conferences were identified in the Final Declaration. In any event, the adoption of amended Protocol II was not the end of the campaign to eliminate anti-personnel land-mines. It was only the first step in a process in which Australia was determined to see rapid progress.

92. Mrs. KUROKOCHI (Japan) said that the Conference had succeeded in strengthening the restrictions and prohibitions contained in Protocol II. She hoped that the implementation of and strict compliance with the new provisions by all States would save numerous civilian lives. Complacency should be avoided, however. A challenging task lay ahead of the international community, which must continue its strenuous efforts. She hoped that the annual meeting of the High Contracting Parties, as specified in article 13 of the amended Protocol, would be held at an early date. That meeting might serve as a useful vehicle further to discuss issues that had been raised at the Review Conference, in particular the detectability of land-mines other than anti-personnel land-mines and the establishment of an effective system for verifying compliance.

93. For its part, Japan was firmly opposed to the use and transfer of anti-personnel land-mines. Since its creation in 1954, the Japanese Self-Defence Force had never used land-mines and continued to familiarize its personnel with international humanitarian legislation. Japan also observed a total ban on the export of any type of mine. In addition, the Japanese authorities played an active role in the international community's de-mining efforts. To date, it had contributed nearly \$25 million to the mine clearance activities of the United Nations. In view of the strong need for assistance to the victims of land-mines, Japan had sent many specialists to Cambodia, where it had established rehabilitation and artificial limbs factories. The Japanese Government intended to expand its effort by offering financial and technical assistance wherever it was needed. All the participants in the Conference agreed that amended Protocol II, together with the new Protocol IV, should enter into force as soon as possible. The Japanese Government would make every effort to ensure early ratification of the two Protocols and to promote the universality of the Convention and its annexed Protocols.

94. Baron GUILLAUME (Belgium) said that Belgium fully shared the feelings of the other members of the European Union as expressed by the representative of Italy. He had taken the floor only to express some concerns that were particular to his country. Belgium had been the first country to declare anti-personnel land-mines to be unlawful and the Belgian Parliament had established extensive legislation in that area; it had obviously been emulated since more than 30 countries had decided to introduce a total ban on anti-personnel land-mines. Belgium could rightfully be proud of that result, although it was hardly satisfied with the results of the Conference.

95. The Protocol that had been adopted might be considered from two points of view. By comparison with the 1980 text, it was obviously an improvement. First, its provisions had been extended to internal conflicts, which was precisely where humanitarian crises originated. Secondly - and the main reason for satisfaction as far as Belgium was concerned - it was henceforth prohibited to produce and export non-detectable mines. Inasmuch as the work of the Conference had been aimed at paving the way for the elimination of the devices, which unfortunately would continue to be emplaced, that provision was vital. The Belgian delegation noted with satisfaction the new system for the protection of the peace-keeping forces: for a country that had sent men to Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, such an improvement was welcome.

96. However, given the extent of the disaster, Belgium could not hide its disappointment at a text which left much to be desired and which it had accepted as the only way of preventing the Conference from being a failure. As for detectability, his delegation regretted that a deferral period had been necessary and especially that it would be possible to use non-detectable mines for several years more, creating thousands of further victims. Belgium condemned the political attitudes that had made that provision necessary. Equally serious was the fact that the above-mentioned improvements were weakened at the outset by the lack of a verification system. Without a mechanism for verification and punishment, States would be able to avoid the new obligations whenever they wished.

97. Belgium drew two lessons from that situation. The first was that, despite its shortcomings, the Conference would have helped to mobilize world opinion in favour of a universal and complete ban on anti-personnel land-mines, which was the only way to prevent the situation from worsening. The second lesson was that anti-personnel land-mines must be fought on all fronts. The question of a general ban should be taken up at the next Review Conference and raised in other forums. A maximum of human and financial resources should be devoted to mine clearance operations and due attention given to the rehabilitation of the victims.

98. Mrs. ANDERSON (Ireland) said that, out of consideration for world opinion and most of all for the victims of land-mines, the international community should take a clear-eyed look at the achievements of the Conference. Italy, speaking on behalf of the member States of the European Union, had sought to make such an assessment. Amended Protocol II represented a significant advance over the 1980 text. She welcomed that advance, for every step mattered and every life saved was immensely worthwhile. However, it must also be asked whether the negotiating result adequately reflected the changes that had taken place in the intervening period. A legal text should speak for its own times. Frankly, it was difficult to recognize the post-cold-war world in the text adopted, which was riddled with restrictions.

99. Her delegation had accepted amended Protocol II because it represented the outside limit of what was possible to secure by consensus at the current time. Those who were the most disappointed should also be the most determined. However flawed the text adopted, the Conference had laid building blocks for the future. Until the next Review Conference in five years, every possibility of progress must be seized. As one phase in the process came to a close, her delegation invited those Governments which continued to assert that

anti-personnel land-mines were indispensable for their defence needs to consider that they might be wrong, that the price in human terms was impossible to justify any longer and that it was high time that common sense and humanitarian concerns prevailed.

100. Mr. GRYSCHENKO (Ukraine) expressed satisfaction at the fact that the participants in the Conference had succeeded in elaborating an amended Protocol II that struck a delicate balance between common humanitarian aspirations and the serious concerns in many countries at the possibility of diminishing their defence capabilities due to the imposition of new restrictions. However, amended Protocol II was quite far from meeting the expectations of the majority of States and the hopes of millions of people throughout the world. Provisions ensuring reliable verification of compliance were still lacking and the restrictions on mine transfers were not entirely satisfactory.

101. Nevertheless, an extremely important step had been taken to eliminate the threat posed by land-mines to the civilian population. Ukraine welcomed the prohibition of the use of anti-personnel mines without appropriate detectability elements and the prohibition of the use of remotely-delivered anti-personnel mines without self-destruction elements, as well as the restrictions on the use of anti-personnel mines other than those remotely delivered. He noted with satisfaction that the requirements concerning anti-personnel mines which had been proposed by Ukraine at the previous sessions of the Conference coincided almost entirely with the requirements set forth in the Technical Annex.

102. Ukraine fully supported new article 8 of the Protocol concerning transfers of anti-personnel mines. Together with 46 other countries, it was respecting a four-year moratorium on the export of all types of anti-personnel mines, effective since 1 September 1995. It continued to believe that the establishment of a comprehensive moratorium on the export of anti-personnel mines by all States would play an important role in overcoming humanitarian crises caused by their use.

103. Ukraine was actively engaged in reducing its stockpiles of anti-personnel mines and did not rule out a future decision on completely banning their production. It paid special attention to international cooperation in the field of de-mining: it contributed to mine-clearance operations in Angola and the former Yugoslavia and provided training in mine clearance for foreign experts.

104. At the same time, mine clearance would eliminate the threat of mines to civilians only if no new mines were laid. The international community therefore had to multiply its efforts to achieve the universality of the Protocol and find effective leverage to influence those using anti-personnel land-mines indiscriminately during military conflicts. Ukraine appealed to all participants in the Conference to make the most effective use of the possibility of using the annual conferences of the parties to the Protocol to negotiate additional measures to resolve outstanding issues and reduce the threat of anti-personnel land-mines to the civilian population.

105. Mrs. AQUILINA (Malta) said that Malta had acceded to the Convention on 5 June 1996 and the Convention had entered into force in Malta in December 1995. The Government of Malta was fully committed to the immediate and total elimination of anti-personnel land-mines and joined other States that had declared support for a total ban. The global prohibition of anti-personnel land-mines should preferably be introduced no later than the following Review Conference and States that had not yet ratified the Convention should do so as soon as possible.

106. Mr. AZHAR ELLAHI (Pakistan) said that Pakistan had been a longstanding adherent to the Convention and, even before the Convention had come into existence, had strictly observed the rules which had later been embodied in the Convention and its Protocols. It was ironic that the escalation of the irresponsible and indiscriminate use of land-mines, which victimized innocent people, had been at its worst after Protocol II had entered into force. Its rules were obviously ignored by many who were not parties to the Protocol and violated by others despite their obligations.

107. Pakistan wholeheartedly commended the adoption of the new Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons. The Conference had adopted an amended Protocol on Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices. Despite the divergences of viewpoint on the quality of the achievement, an important step had been taken: the Parties had strengthened restrictions and prohibitions and had broken new ground, especially in promoting technical cooperation and preventing transfers of mines where they might be used contrary to the norms of humanitarian law. The Review Conference had also contributed significantly to raising international awareness of the tragic problem of land-mines.

108. Each country participating in the negotiations had been expected to make concessions in order to achieve consensus and Pakistan had contributed to that endeavour. The Government of Pakistan had decided to freeze an entire programme on the production of a category of remotely-delivered mines which, in its assessment, would not be in conformity with the technical requirements of the new Protocol. It had also issued instructions to cease production of non-detectable mines. Pakistan would achieve the required standards of the Technical Annex regarding detectability much earlier than the permitted deferral period.

109. The amended Protocol represented a compromise package and many of its provisions would remain a subject of legal speculation. Pakistan had proposed to redress possible anomalies by including a stipulation that the provisions of the amended Protocol could not be construed in a manner inconsistent with the scope of the instrument or the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. He was pleased to note that that had been affirmed in the Final Declaration. There had been certain conjectures on Pakistan's aims during the negotiations. He pointed out that Pakistan used mines only for its national security and defence. It did not export land-mines and it would continue to remain actively engaged in efforts to attain a complete prohibition of land-mines.

110. The war against the irresponsible and indiscriminate use of land-mines had only begun. To save civilians from the effects of land-mines, considerable efforts and financial resources must be used for de-mining. It

was unfortunate that the United Nations had received only one third of the resources needed for its modest de-mining programme. The Final Declaration reflected an unambiguous commitment to resolve the land-mines problem once and for all. Pakistan was satisfied that the issue would remain permanently on the agenda of the annual conferences of State parties envisaged in the revised Protocol. The Conference's appeal to uphold international instruments and norms of international humanitarian law in times of conflict would be heard throughout the world. It was an important and necessary message, but well-meaning assertions were not enough; the response of the international community to massive violations of humanitarian law and of human rights should be resolute, non-selective and without considerations of political expediency.

111. Mr. CABALLERO (Cuba) welcomed the achievement of the Review Conference. Cuba attached special importance to the adoption of amended Protocol II, which would lead to a better response to the humanitarian concerns raised by the irresponsible and indiscriminate use of land-mines while guaranteeing the legitimate national security interests of States. Protocol II had been strengthened by the prohibition of the use of non-detectable mines, the establishment of new specifications on self-destruction and self-deactivation mechanisms and the introduction of a mechanism for consultation among States parties on the implementation of the Protocol. To guarantee respect for the provisions of the Protocol, it was essential to develop consultations and increased transparency and cooperation among States parties. Articles 13 and 14 of the amended Protocol reflected that basic principle.

112. It was unfortunate, however, that the Conference had not resulted in a complete ban on remotely-delivered mines in view of the highly offensive nature of those devices. Cuba hoped that the restrictions adopted for that type of land-mine would be a first step in that direction. He noted with concern that, despite the international community's growing awareness of the problem, a limited number of States had ratified the Conventional Weapons Convention. Universal accession to the Convention and its Protocols must be a priority task for all.

113. According to Cuban military doctrine, anti-personnel land-mines were used only as a means of defence in the event of imminent threat or outside aggression and account must always be taken of the regulations on marking, signs and recording to prevent the civilian population from being affected. In peacetime, Cuba used anti-personnel land-mines only for protecting its national borders, for example, around the naval base at Guantanamo, a Cuban territory that was being illegally occupied by the United States. Cuba manufactured only the mines it needed to defend its territory and, in that respect, was already meeting all the technical requirements set forth in amended Protocol II. It did not export any mines and it urgently appealed to all States to respect the provisions set forth in article 8 on transfers of mines. Cuba would continue to cooperate in any activity that would make it possible to find better solutions to the humanitarian problems caused by land-mines, while taking into account the legitimate security interests of States and the international community's desire for greater security.

114. The adoption of Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons was another important achievement of the Review Conference, even if that instrument did not prohibit the manufacture of such weapons. Cuba hoped that that Protocol

would be strengthened without delay in order to eliminate any possibility, even slight, that mankind would have to suffer the consequences of the use of such appalling weapons.

115. Mrs. LAZARO (Observer for the Philippines) noted that the Philippines had recently renounced the use, production, import and export of land-mines. Until then, it had stocked only a limited number of Claymore mines for training purposes that it was in the process of disarming and safely eliminating. It was completing the constitutional requirements for the ratification of the Convention. It was also participating in regional and international initiatives aiming at a total ban on land-mines. The Philippines had co-sponsored General Assembly resolutions against the export and manufacture of land-mines and on assistance in mine-clearing activities and had contributed to the UNDP mine-clearance programme in Cambodia.

116. The Philippines welcomed the initiative of the Canadian Government to convene a meeting to discuss concrete steps towards a complete ban on anti-personnel land-mines. While it continued to hold to the ideal of a total ban on land-mines, it was aware that only international cooperation would achieve that objective. Although the amended Protocol was insufficient, its adoption was a step towards that objective. The Philippines hoped that the international community would continue to move toward that end, for the military utility of anti-personnel land-mines would always be outweighed by the appalling consequences of their application in actual conflicts.

The first part of the meeting rose at 7.45 p.m.