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THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA

SECURITY COUNCIL
Thirty-sixth year

Letter dated 3 June 1981 from the Permanent Representative of
Democratic Kampuchea to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, for your information, excerpts from the communiqué issued by the Military High Command of the National Army and guerrillas of Democratic Kampuchea on the military results of the 1980-1981 dry season.

I should be grateful if you would have this text circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under item 22 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) THIOUNN Prasith
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
Democratic Kampuchea

* A/36/50.

ANNEX

MILITARY RESULTS OF THE 1980-1981 DRY SEASON

EXCERPTS FROM THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY THE MILITARY HIGH COMMAND OF THE NATIONAL ARMY AND GUERRILLAS OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

The High Command and the General Staff of the National Army and guerrillas of Democratic Kampuchea and the commands from various fronts in the country held a meeting on 5, 6 and 7 May 1981 to provisionally assess the military results of the last 1980-1981 dry season.

The objectives set in October 1980 by the High Command of the National Army and guerrillas of Democratic Kampuchea for the 1980-1981 dry season were as follows:

1. To intensify the guerrilla warfare on every front of Kampuchea and throughout the country by combining the three usual forms of combat, that is to launch commando and annihilating attacks, to pound the enemy positions with heavy artillery, and to cut their communication and transport lines.

2. To set up intervention mobile units so that they can destroy small enemy positions located in remote areas in Western Kampuchea and defended by platoons, destroy some enemy positions defended by companies, stage attacks against their intervention and transport troops, cut off their communication and supply lines.

3. To inflict on the enemy living forces 70,000 casualties.

In order to achieve these objectives, the High Command set up the following plans of operations :

- Fronts of Western Tonle Sap:

These fronts stretch from Kompong Som and Koh Kong up to Sisophon-Northern part of national highway No 5. They were old fronts where hottest fightings took place. The plan was to continue to powerfully fight against the Vietnamese enemy by all means, through a war of attrition by destroying as many of their living forces as possible and through attacks by wiping out as many of their small positions as possible.

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- Fronts of Eastern Tonle Sap:

To open two new fronts on Eastern Tonle Sap: that of Siemreap-national highway No 6, and that of Chhep-Thalaborivat-Siembauk. These two fronts bear a great strategical importance, as much in the military, political and economic fields as in the field of communication, transport and supply. In this Eastern part of Tonle Sap, the objective was to intensify fighting on the fronts of Oddar Meanchey and Choam Ksan (Preah Vihear) in order on the one hand to wear out and eliminate enemy living forces and destroy as many of their positions as possible, and on the other hand to support the fronts of Siemreap-national highway No 6 and Chhep-Thalaborivat-Siembauk.

- Besides the fronts of Eastern and Western Tonle Sap, the plan was to open new fronts, in the Western, Central, South-Western, North-Eastern and Eastern regions, and to carry out guerrilla activities in Phnom Penh. It is essential to recall those objectives of the High Command set up in early October 1980 in order to assess the results attained in the 1980-1981 dry season. As a whole, the National Army and guerrillas of Democratic Kampuchea have fully and successfully achieved those objectives. Everyone has grasped his task, the tactics and forms of combat step by step in line with the High Command plan until it fully has been achieved. For its part, the High Command has closely followed up the operations, transmitting its directives as combats advanced, taking into account lessons drawn up on the battlefields so as to create new favourable conditions of fighting. The National Army, guerrillas and the High Command of Democratic Kampuchea have drawn valuable experiences from the dry season. That is why it has been possible to intensify the combats more strongly than before on the fronts of Western and Eastern Tonle Sap, and to carry them out successfully in accordance with the plan, and on other fronts, to step up the fightings against the Vietnamese enemy.

Consequently, the military map has favourably changed. The hottest battlefields are spreading into large areas, from Kompong Som to Koh Kong up to Choam Ksan, Chhep, Thalaborivat, Siembauk, and finally to the Mekong River. As a result of the opening of the two new Eastern fronts, and the intensification of combats on those two fronts and on the Western and other fronts as well, the enemy living forces have been torn apart, in such a way that their High Command has lost the control of the operations and been driven to a still greater military impasse. Such is the general aspect of the rapid changes occurred on the battlefields of Kampuchea in the 1980-1981 dry season.

The provisional results compiled by the High Command of the National Army and guerrillas of Democratic Kampuchea are as follows:

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1- Enemy forces wiped out:

We have eliminated 75,000 enemy living forces, 45,000 of which were killed or wounded, definitively put out of action. Due to these casualties, occurrences have come into sight, on every front of Kampuchea, which showed that the Vietnamese enemy have not been able to maintain a great number of their troops in every place, in particular in the Central and Eastern regions of Kampuchea, and they have not been able to mass important forces on any front of Kampuchea so that to stage strong attacks against the National Army and guerrillas of Democratic Kampuchea.

So, all over the past dry season, the Vietnamese enemy were not in a position to launch important mopping-up operations. Only small operations at company, battalion, or some at regimental levels were launched. Besides, the enemy forces which already had been bogged down on the Western fronts of the Tonle Sap have found themselves in a worsening situation, for they have had to face continued attacks which daily weakened them furthermore. As for the Eastern front of the Tonle Sap, the enemy have been short of effectives to counter the attacks staged by the National Army and guerrillas of Democratic Kampuchea, and they have seen their forces progressively crumbling away.

In this war against the Hanoi authorities and confronted with their troops of aggression superior in number, an army 250,000 men strong, the main objective of the High Command of the National Army and guerrillas of Democratic Kampuchea is to eliminate as many enemy living forces as possible. That is the line of the guerrilla warfare of the Government of Democratic Kampuchea. It is being guided by such an objective that the forces of Democratic Kampuchea have been able to constantly show their initiative, ponderation and self-control refraining from liberating such or such provincial chief-town for a temporary pride. This objective is aimed at wearing out and destroying the enemy living forces every day, every month, every season, so as they never stop becoming thinner and the enemy are constrained to disperse their forces everywhere in the country to protect themselves against the guerrilla war being waged by the people, the National Army and guerrillas of Democratic Kampuchea. The more the enemy disperse their forces, the weaker they become, the more vulnerable they are and the more easily they may be eliminated daily until they more and more lose the control of the situation and are reduced to entrench in their positions to protect themselves. That is the implementation of the military line of the Government of Democratic Kampuchea which advocates three strategic combat stages in order to bring to a successful conclusion the war of national liberation for the very survival of the nation and people of Kampuchea. The first stage is that of strategic defence where the forces of Democratic Kampuchea were from 1979 to late 1980. So in 1979, although they were in a most difficult

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situation, Democratic Kampuchea's forces succeeded, by implementing this strategy in wearing out and destroying the enemy living forces progressively, while safeguarding and developing themselves. They ended this stage successfully at the end of 1980 and has been entering, at the beginning of the 1980-1981 dry season, the second stage, that of the balance of forces. At the end of the 1980-1981 dry season, the High Command of Democratic Kampuchea assessed that the forces of Democratic Kampuchea are from now on in the height of this second strategic stage. Efforts have been and are being made to end this stage of balance of forces in the nearest future and to enter the third one, that of strategic offensive stage.

2- Attacks launched to destroy and seize the enemy positions:

The plan set up on this point has been achieved, even overfulfilled. According to the plan, isolated enemy positions defended by platoons, in remote Western areas of Kampuchea were to be destroyed, so were some isolated enemy positions defended by companies. On the other hand, the destruction of enemy positions defended by battalions or regiments was not put down on the plan which advocated only attacks of their defence systems. The results achieved have exceeded the objective. The following enemy positions were destroyed or seized:

- 138 isolated positions defended by platoons, that is almost the totality of this category of positions in the Western part of Kampuchea from Kompong Som, Koh Kong up to Choam Ksan, Chhep and Thalaborivat.
- 97 isolated positions defended by companies.
- 43 independent positions defended by battalions, that is positions that were not part of a defence system.
- 7 isolated positions defended by regiments.
- 75 positions defended by platoons and being part of defence systems defended by battalions.
- 81 positions defended by companies and being part of defence system of positions defended by battalions.
- 49 positions defended by platoons and being part of defence system of positions defended by regiments.
- 22 positions defended by companies and being part of defence system of positions defended by regiments.

3- Interceptions and attacks against enemy troops of intervention, troops carrying out mopping up operations and units of transport:

The National Army and guerrillas of Democratic Kampuchea broke down the following attacks by the

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enemy troops of intervention and enemy troops carrying out mopping up operations at the level of

- platoon : 170 times.
- company : 127 times.
- battalion : 45 times.
- regiment : 31 times.

The National Army and guerrillas of Democratic Kampuchea attacked and dispersed the enemy transport units at the level of :

- platoon : 31 times.
- company : 49 times.
- battalion : 8 times.

At the same time, the National Army and guerrillas of Democratic Kampuchea :

- destroyed 2 enemy command posts of division.
- captured 2 enemy command posts of division.
- liberated 26 communes and 120 villages.

4- Attacks and cutting of communication and transport lines of the enemy :

The National Army and guerrillas of Democratic Kampuchea have paid particular attention to cut the communication and transport lines, mainly strategic highways of vital importance to the enemy in particular national highways No 4, 5 and 6, and Phnom Penh-Kompong Som and Phnom Penh-Battambang railways as well as other strategic ways such as highway No 10 (Battambang-Pailin), highway No 12 (Kompong Thom-Preah Vihear), and communication lines linking the enemy defence systems of positions in the Western part of Kampuchea. The results attained are as follows :

- 127 bridges of all sizes destroyed, on an overall length of 1,133 metres.
- Highways destroyed in 703 places, on an overall length of 11,300 metres.
- railways destroyed in 41 places, on an overall length of 7,300 metres.

Those destructions have resulted in the cutting of the enemy communication lines, blocking of their transports of troops and supply in food, armaments, ammunitions and medicines, and their transports of casualties.

5- Desertions and mutinies of the Vietnamese soldiers :

The provisional figures are as follows :

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- 5,289 soldiers deserted.
 - 477 soldiers killed or wounded in mutinies.
 - 589 Vietnamese soldiers killed or wounded by Kampuchean soldiers and self-defence guards forcibly enlisted by the Vietnamese enemy.
 - 481 Vietnamese soldiers killed by the Kampuchean people.
 - 136 Vietnamese soldiers surrendered to the National Army and guerrillas of Democratic Kampuchea.
- 6- Situation of the Command of the Vietnamese troops of aggression in Kampuchea :

In the dry season, specially during the period from January to April 1981, while the military situation of the Vietnamese troops was deteriorating, more and more obvious signs showed that their High Command and their commands at other levels were losing initiative and control over their troops and operations. At the same time, there have been news about dissatisfaction expressed by the Vietnamese Communist Party's Politburo and by Le Duan himself with Le Duc Tho, known as being Le Duan's right hand, and with Van Tien Dung, both directly answerable for the war of aggression against Kampuchea, the first one for the political field and the second one for the military field.

All these facts are ominous and are not in favour of a re-establishment of the situation of the Hanoi authorities and their troops of aggression in Kampuchea.

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NOTE : After having assessed the military results, the military High Command of Democratic Kampuchea paid a tribute to the ardent patriotism of the people of Kampuchea, the National Army and guerrillas of Democratic Kampuchea, to their firm determination to serve the sacred cause for national liberation and to their abnegation in front of the immeasurable sufferings caused by the genocide of this war of aggression waged by the Hanoi authorities. It is this patriotism, this determination and this abnegation which have enabled the success of the 1980-1981 dry season.

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At the same time, the military High Command of Democratic Kampuchea appealed to cadres and combatants to be vigilant, and warned them against the manoeuvres to which the Vietnamese enemy resort, in the field of the military operations, in the political and diplomatic fields, in an attempt to extricate themselves from their quagmire while trying to perpetuate their occupation of Kampuchea.

Finally, the military High Command of Democratic Kampuchea gave appropriate directives to the cadres and combatants so as they can achieve successfully their tasks for the 1981 rainy season and for the end of 1981.

Democratic Kampuchea,
May 12, 1981


The High Command
of the National Army and guerrillas
of Democratic Kampuchea.

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DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

THAILAND

LAOS



Published by the High Command of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea