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PROGRAMME QUESTIONS: EVALUATION

In-depth evaluation of peace-keeping operations:
termination phase

Note by the Secretary-General

        In conformity with paragraph 5 (e) (i) of General Assembly resolution
48/218 B of 29 July 1994, the Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to
the Committee for Programme and Coordination the attached report of the Office
of Internal Oversight Services entitled "In-depth evaluation of peace-keeping
operations: termination phase", dated 20 March 1996. The report has been
reviewed by the relevant departments and offices. The Secretary-General is in
agreement with its recommendations.

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        *   E/AC.51/1996/1.

ANNEX

[20 March 1996]

In-depth evaluation of peace-keeping operations:
termination-phase

Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services

SUMMARY

The present report deals with the termination phase of peace-keeping operations and complements two previous evaluation reports on peace-keeping operations (E/AC.51/1994/3 and Corr.1 and E/AC.51/1995/2), which it will be recalled focused on the start-up phase. The report presents findings and recommendations on translating the lessons of experience into practice; designation of responsibility centres; peace-building aspects of missions; learning from experience in the termination aspects of missions; successor arrangements; planning the termination phase; the liquidation of missions; the disposition of assets; and peace-keeping and other field activities in countries with continuing civil strife.

CONTENTS

I.   INTRODUCTION

1.   The present report was prepared in response to the recommendation made to
the General Assembly by the Committee for Programme and Coordination (CPC) at
the first part of its thirty-fourth session that the termination phase of peace-
keeping operations be subject to in-depth evaluation in 1996. a/ Two prior
reports on the start-up phase of peace-keeping (E/AC.51/1994/3 and Corr.1 and
E/AC.51/1995/2) examined the extent to which the United Nations had been able to
learn from its experience and to establish responsibility centres, policy and
standard operating procedures for the major components of peace-keeping
operations. A significant part of the present report is devoted to a review of
compliance with relevant prior recommendations; proposals in it are designed to
consolidate and build on prior decisions of the Committee concerning peace-
keeping.

2.   The present report is based on published United Nations documentation,
including reports to the Security Council and the General Assembly, as well as
resolutions of these bodies, reports of the Board of Auditors and relevant
internal documents of the departments concerned, including end-of-mission
assessments and "lessons learned" studies, audit reports and interviews with
United Nations staff members involved with peace-keeping operations. External
studies by national Governments, non-governmental organizations and individuals
were also reviewed.

3.   The termination issues examined were primarily those of missions that were
successfully completed, although the last chapter examines some issues in the
termination of problematic missions. Recent successfully completed missions
include the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), the
United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) and the United Nations Observer
Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL); in the first case "despite serious
difficulties, UNTAC was able to accomplish its central task of holding a free
and fair election in Cambodia and laying a sound foundation for the people in
Cambodia to build a stable and peaceful future" (S/26360, para. 30); the two
other major missions "were steered to a commendably successful conclusion, both
culminating in elections monitored by the United Nations and the establishment
of elected Governments, with the promise of the consolidation of stability in
both countries". b/

4.   An international colloquium on post-conflict reconstruction strategies was
held in Austria on 23 and 24 June 1995. It was attended by 58 participants from
United Nations political, humanitarian and development units, specialized
agencies, the Bretton Woods institutions, donor countries and non-governmental
organizations, as well as representatives from war-torn societies. A follow-up
meeting is planned for later in 1996. Similarly, the Inter-Agency Working Group
on the Role of the United Nations System in Post-Conflict Situations,
established by the Consultative Committee on Programme and Operational Questions
(CCPOQ), has been addressing the need for a post-conflict recovery strategy and
framework and is preparing a compendium of United Nations system capacities to
respond to post-conflict recovery requirements. The conclusions and
recommendations of these meetings have been kept in mind when formulating the
recommendations of this report. The General Assembly's Informal Open-ended

Working Group on An Agenda for Peace is currently discussing issues related to some topics examined in this report.

> Recommendation 1, Coordination with related activities: The present report and the conclusions and recommendations of CPC on it should be submitted for their consideration to the General Assembly's Informal Open-ended Working Group on An Agenda for Peace, the General Assembly Informal Open-ended Working Group on An Agenda for Development and the Inter-Agency Working Group on the Role of the United Nations System in Post-Conflict Situations.

II. CAPACITY FOR LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE IN PEACE-KEEPING

A. Implementation of prior recommendations

5.   A Lessons Learned Unit was established in the Department of Peace-keeping Operations in April 1995 in response to recommendations 1 to 4 of the progress report on the in-depth evaluation of peace-keeping: start-up phase (E/AC.51/1994/3, paras. 8-10), and recommendation 1 of the final report on the in-depth evaluation of peace-keeping operations: start-up phase (E/AC.51/1995/2, paras. 16-18). The Unit consists of two Professional posts and one General Service post. The Unit is still in the process of building up its files of existing documentation. It is also commissioning new studies and "lessons learned" workshops.

Table 1.   Status of end-of-mission and related assessments as of 31 December 1995

Mission	End-of-mission assessment	Lessons learned workshop	Related United Nations assessments
United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)	Draft for all components	No	
UNTAC	Draft for most components	Yes	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
United Nations Operation in Somalia (ONUMOZ)	Military, civilian police and support functions	Yes	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
UNOSOM	Support functions	Yes; comprehensive report issued	

6.   A detailed review of the status of implementation of the recommendations
aimed at developing at Headquarters a ready capacity to backstop substantive
components, set out in 1994 in the progress report on the evaluation of the
start-up phase, shows that, broadly speaking, there has been a considerable
effort made over the past year or so. The translation of lessons learned into
policies, standard operating procedures, guidelines, handbooks and training
manuals has now begun but is still in its early stages.

7.   The most progress over the last year has been in the civilian police
function. The draft of a field handbook is now in circulation. The draft
handbook has chapters with norms for standard civilian police (CIVPOL) duties,
and other chapters on liaison, negotiation and mediation, communications,
safety, first aid and administrative and logistic matters. The draft handbook
contains sample forms for patrol reports, incident reports and so on, and
annexes on standard guidelines for United Nations civilian police, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and United Nations Criminal Justice Standards for
Peace-keeping Police. In addition, the curriculum of a training course for
United Nations civilian police is in a preliminary draft, with segments on codes
of conduct, communications and other matters and field simulation exercises
using United Nations operating techniques.

Table 2. Status of ready capacity to act for major substantive
components of peace-keeping missions

Major component	Does adequate responsibility centre exist?		Do doctrines (that is, internationally agreed principles of action) exist?		Do standard operating procedures exist?		Is operationality adequate?	
	March 1994	Dec. 1995	March 1994	Dec. 1995	March 1994	Dec. 1995	March 1994	Dec. 1995
Information	No	Some progress	No	No change	No	Some progress	No	Some progress
Electoral	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	In draft	In draft	Adequate	Adequate
Repatriation	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Adequate	Adequate
Human rights	No	No	Some	No change	No	No change	No	No change
Civilian police	No	Considerable progress	Some	Considerable progress	In draft	Advanced draft	No	Considerable progress
Military	Yes	Yes	Some	No change	Yes	Yes	Stand-by arrangements initiated in 1993 continue to be developed	

B.   What prerequisites to learning from experience remain?

8.   Learning from experience requires the intellectual work of making
assessments, but it also requires that this intellectual understanding be
translated into policies, standard operating procedures, guidelines and manuals
that reflect the lessons learned. The mere existence of an end-of-mission
assessment document, however thoughtful, is not sufficient to guarantee that any

lesson will be learned by the United Nations as an institution. For this to happen, new policies and procedures must either be derived from the conclusions and recommendations of the assessments, or existing policies and procedures must be modified. The creation of a Lessons Learned Unit in the Department of Peace-keeping Operations is a first step along the road to institutional arrangements in the United Nations that will permit it to make efficient use in new missions of the lessons of past experience.

9.   Some of the frustration and inefficiency imposed on field operations by the lack of standard operating procedures and policies derived from experience are vividly described in the end-of-mission assessment report on ONUMOZ:

> "In spite of various efforts made on the part of the ONUMOZ staff, they were unable to obtain any reference documents from United Nations Headquarters or other missions with regard to procedures applied in other peace-keeping missions on such important issues as demobilization, cease-fire monitoring, storage and safe-keeping of arms, investigations into violations of the agreement etc. Although one should expect the United Nations to have gained experience over the many years of peace-keeping, ONUMOZ staff had to create all rules applied for the implementation of key elements of its mandate in a complete vacuum. Months of negotiations with the parties were necessary to hammer out these essential operational tools. None of the staff members had any practical or legal experience in such matters as establishing rules for demobilization or investigations into cease-fire violations. It would have saved the mission a lot of time, money and headaches had samples from other missions existed, which could have been adapted to the Mozambican context. It is deemed invaluable that a centralized archive for such purposes is established at United Nations Headquarters."

The ONUMOZ assessment report annexed a great deal of material, which it pointed out "could be of use for any mission that is mandated with overseeing the separation, concentration and demobilization of former warring factions".

10. It is clear that a basic documentation centre that can provide field offices with such material at their request and assist those charged with starting up a new mission is not yet in place. A recommendation on this issue was contained in the end-of-mission assessment of ONUMOZ. The progress report (E/AC.51/1994/3, para. 10) had noted the absence of such a documentation centre, and in recommendation 4 had proposed that the Department of Peace-keeping Operations, in consultation with the Dag Hammarskjöld Library, should establish one.

> Recommendation 2, Headquarters documentation services: The documentation Centre proposed in recommendation four of the Progress Report (E/AC.51/1994/3) should be established, and should inform all missions of its holdings and the hard copy and electronic services it is in a position to provide, by 30 September 1996. The holdings should be indexed (with the assistance of the Dag Hammarskjöld Library) at the level of detail needed to be useful to missions. Whenever possible, an on-line computer link should be established with headquarters, so that field offices can access information from other peace-keeping missions directly

11. At its thirty-fifth session, CPC "recognized the importance of information in peace-keeping operations and recommended that the Secretary-General take all necessary measures to provide adequate support to that area". c/ Subsequently, the Secretary-General designated the Department of Public Information as the responsibility centre for backstopping the information component. The Department of Public Information has established an interdepartmental working group on media strategies for peace-keeping and other field operations, and the Peace and Security Section has been designated as the Department of Public Information focal point for coordination and as the secretariat of the working group, which has adopted a set of guidelines for field operations. These institutional arrangements draw on a wide range of resources but do not assign any individual full time to the backstopping of the information components of field operations. The Office of Internal Oversight Services will keep under review the effectiveness with which the functions listed in annex II of the progress report (E/AC.51/1994/3) are carried out for the information component through these arrangements, and will report on them to CPC at its thirty-seventh session as part of the triennial review referred to in recommendation 5 below.

12. Despite the expected decline in resources for peace-keeping operations, it is vital that the lessons of experience contained in end-of-mission assessments and lessons learned reports be institutionalized in the form of policies, guidelines, handbooks and manuals covering the main tasks of multi-component missions. It would be an extraordinary waste of many hundreds of millions of dollars worth of experience in tasks of continuing significance, such as the demobilization of warring factions, if the additional work needed to translate this experience into guides to practice was not undertaken.

Recommendation 3, Translating the lessons of experience into practice: For each of the major substantive tasks of multi-component peace-keeping missions the Lessons Learned Unit and the responsibility centre associated with the component or task should:

(a) Review the relevant parts of end-of-mission assessments and lessons learned documents and related materials, in consultation with the appropriate organizations of the United Nations system, and derive policies and procedures from them or modify existing policies and procedures;

(b) Issue the results of this process by June 1997;

(c) If necessary, seek secondment of staff from national Governments, particularly staff who have field experience in missions, to supplement the regular budget resources that can be devoted to these tasks.

Recommendation 4, Designation of responsibility centres: The Secretary-General should designate appropriate responsibility centres, with the functions listed in annex II of the progress report (E/AC.51/1994/3) for work on demobilization, resettlement and reintegration of uprooted populations and any other major substantive tasks of multi-component peace-keeping missions for which such centres have not yet been designated.

Recommendation 5, Triennial review of the in-depth evaluation of the start-up phase of peace-keeping operations: The triennial review, to be submitted to CPC at its thirty-seventh session, should consist of an assessment of implementation of the recommendations in the progress report (E/AC.51/1994/3), the related recommendations in the final report (E/AC.51/1995/2) and the present report.

III. LESSONS OF SUCCESSFULLY TERMINATED MISSIONS

A. Peace-building during the mission

13. In section VI of "An Agenda for Peace", the Secretary-General stated, in relation to peace-building activities, that "only sustained, cooperative work to deal with underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems can place an achieved peace on a durable foundation" (A/47/277, para. 57). Post-conflict peace-building should not start after a peace-keeping mission is completed but preferably while the mission is in progress. The peace-keeping operation will often, and perhaps usually, be the largest concentration of external assistance a country will receive from the international community. For the operation to be a durable success it must leave behind a situation that has enough stability for peaceful reconstruction and development to continue, with the assistance of development agencies and other forms of international aid. It is therefore highly desirable for the mission to accomplish its goals in a manner that, to the extent possible, reinforces the peace-building process. Three recent successful missions, UNTAC, ONUMOZ and ONUSAL, all contained significant peace-building elements.

14. In Cambodia, UNTAC was officially designated as a "transitional authority"; the operations "went well beyond either conflict resolution or the provision of humanitarian aid; rather, UNTAC sought actively to support Cambodia's social, political and economic institutions". d/ There was "widespread rebuilding of roads, bridges and other infrastructural installations by UNTAC military engineers" (S/26360, para. 22). Both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank participated in the preparatory mission of November 1991, and in the follow-up economics mission of March 1992; subsequently IMF fielded missions and in collaboration with UNDP rehabilitated the banking, monetary, fiscal and statistics systems. UNTAC staff maintained close contact with these missions. From these working arrangements there emerged a common analysis of the economic situation in Cambodia and of the nature of the necessary remedial steps.

15. In Mozambique, the mandate of ONUMOZ required it, inter alia, to monitor a comprehensive disarmament and demobilization programme and coordinate and monitor humanitarian assistance operations throughout the country, as well as provide assistance and verification for national elections. The Mission undertook the disarming of and demobilization of some 80,000 combatants and facilitated their return to civilian life; coordinated a humanitarian relief effort during which some 4 million refugees and displaced persons returned to their homes. The Mission helped to reduce the level of distrust between two former foes and establish the institutional framework for a democratic process, including the mobilization of resources that enabled the Resistência Nacional Moçambicena (RENAMO) and new political groupings to organize themselves as

parties and contest the elections in an effective manner". e/ A UNDP/Department for Development Support and Management Services project provided technical assistance on the preparation and organization of the elections; ONUMOZ itself aimed at assuring an independent and impartial monitoring of electoral processes. A small technical assistance project, initially composed of only five experts, grew into UNDP's biggest programme in Mozambique, eventually supporting more than 50,000 national electoral officers, and providing a great part of the material and logistic arrangements for the elections.

16. In El Salvador, ONUSAL commenced with a mandate to verify the compliance by the parties with the Agreement on Human Rights signed at San José. Subsequent agreements required the expansion of the mandate of ONUSAL to include the dismantling of the military structure of the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) and the reintegration of its members into civilian life, and United Nations verification of these activities. This was to be followed by the reduction of the El Salvadoran armed forces, the abolition of the treasury police and the National Guard and the creation of an impartial ad hoc commission to evaluate the professional competence of more than 2,000 officers (S/23402, annex, paras. 64-66). The Security Council mandate to ONUSAL in resolution 729 (1992) of 14 January 1992 included "the verification and monitoring of ... the Agreement on the Establishment of a National Civil Police". In a report on all aspects of ONUSAL, the Secretary-General informed the Council of his proposal on land transfers to a maximum of 47,500 people, including ex-combatants of both sides "which by virtue of its acceptance by the two parties ... in effect constitutes an addendum to the Peace Agreement" (S/25812, para. 56).

17. The following are illustrations of conclusions and recommendations in end-of-mission and lessons learned and related assessments that refer to peace-building activities during the mission:

    (a) To achieve the ultimate goal of facilitating the successful reintegration of all returnees, a memorandum of understanding was signed with UNDP in January 1992 subsequent to which UNDP/United Nations Office for Project Services established the Cambodian Resettlement and Reintegration Programme. A Joint Technical Management Unit was created in Phnom Penh to review and approve quick impact projects designed to give communities with large returnee concentrations a "jump start" on the way to a more sustained level of development. UNHCR funded and supervised the implementation of some 80 quick impact projects with a total amount of $9.5 million. Some 60 international and local non-governmental organizations as well as other United Nations agencies (UNDP, the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)) and intergovernmental organizations implemented this programme (UNTAC lessons learned report);

    (b) With the experience gained in the joint UNHCR/UNDP quick impact programme in Cambodia, UNHCR and other aid agencies have suggested that similar rehabilitation activities are an essential consolidating ingredient in the early stages of implementing a comprehensive peace settlement, especially in countries affected by protracted warfare (report and recommendations of IPS/United Nations

Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), International Conference on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia: debriefing and lessons, March 1995);

(c) The United Nations agencies "stressed a long-term educational approach" in the demobilization process while "the peace-keeping personnel had to focus on the smooth conduct of the demobilization". These conflicting views of the United Nations agencies and ONUMOZ produced "tensions in the culture of development versus peace-keeping" (ONUMOZ workshop);

(d) An integral part of any United Nations peace-keeping mission, should be the promotion of "indirect peace-building", i.e., support for the revival of associational life. The resurrection of a web of civic, professional, business, athletic and other associations is a major component of the reconciliation process in war-torn societies. Civil society is the backbone of a sustainable political system (Somalia assessment);

(e) When peace-keeping operations go hand in hand with peace-building efforts, the operation is likely to be more acceptable to the local population. A lack of funds for peace-building in Rwanda went a long way to undercut the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) (Somalia report);

(f) For the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to be effective, he needs to be provided with his own discretionary funds for peace-building. In the ONUMOZ mission, for example, the authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General was enhanced because he controlled a trust fund (Somalia report).

18. For the next programming cycle, the Executive Board of UNDP has, by decision 95/23, earmarked 5 per cent of core resources for development in countries in special situations. The report of the Administrator elaborating on the framework for the next cycle (DP/1995/15), in describing this facility, refers in paragraph 41 to "timely post-conflict peace-building" and notes in paragraph 45 that UNDP is well-placed to cooperate with other involved departments, programmes and agencies of the United Nations system to formulate programmes and projects for rehabilitation including reintegration of displaced populations, demobilization, de-mining, reconstruction of infrastructure, rebuilding governance. UNDP intends to utilize these resources in a catalytic manner to mobilize complementary financial and in-kind resources and pre-investment initiatives in cooperation with the World Bank and within a strategic framework that takes account of macro-economic concerns.

Recommendation 6, Peace-building aspects of missions:

(a) Peace-building should be an integral part of a mission's strategy. The role of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General should include establishing overall policy to guide peace-building activities. Special resources, additional to those provided by United Nations system funds, programmes and agencies, should be mobilized for programming and implementation by operational agencies of the system;

(b) Multi-component peace-keeping missions should, as a general rule, be accompanied by parallel peace-building projects coordinated by the UNDP Resident Coordinator under the leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General;

(c) Active coordination with UNDP and international financial institutions should be initiated early in the planning process by those responsible for a multi-component peace-keeping mission. Survey teams and those involved in the initial planning for the mission should include staff familiar with those institutions;

(d) The Special Coordinator for Economic and Social Development, supported by the Department of Peace-keeping Operations, Department of Political Affairs, Department of Humanitarian Affairs, UNHCR and UNDP, should develop policy guidelines for Resident Coordinators on peace-building aspects of missions, covering such issues as projects on capacity-building relevant to the mandated tasks, reintegrating uprooted populations (including returning refugees, internally displaced persons and demobilized combatants), mine clearance and mechanisms for the mobilization of resources to be deployed by operational agencies.

Recommendation 7, Learning from experience in peace-building aspects of missions:

(a) All end-of-mission and lessons learned assessments should review peace-building activities during the mission, and the institutional arrangements for these activities;

(b) The Lessons Learned Unit of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations, the UNDP Office of Evaluation and Strategic Planning and the Lessons Learned Unit of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs should collaborate on all assessments of multi-component peace-keeping missions with UNDP and Department of Humanitarian Affairs involvement.

B. A protracted termination phase

19. Termination has not proved to be a simple process even for successful missions; the mandated tasks were various, and were not completed simultaneously. Ad hoc extensions and additions to the mandate have been common in recently completed missions as part of the effort to establish conditions for durable success.

20. The mandate for ONUMOZ was extended several times. The Security Council in resolution 797 (1992) of 16 December 1992 decided to establish for a period until 31 October 1993 the ONUMOZ in order to accomplish the objectives described in the report of the Secretary-General (S/24635 and Corr.1). In resolution 916 (1994) of 5 May 1994 the Council decided to renew the operation for a final period until 15 November 1994 but again extended the operation by resolution 957 (1994) of 15 November 1994 until the new Government of Mozambique took office - but not later than 15 December 1994, and authorized a limited number of civilian logisticians, specialists staff officers and a small detachment of

infantry, to complete its residual operations prior to its withdrawal on or before 31 January 1995. An international workshop on ONUMOZ concluded that, in spite of this protracted termination process and the mission's overall success, it had been a mistake not to have a follow-up for ONUMOZ so that the gains from the United Nations investment would not be endangered afterwards.

21. In El Salvador, the United Nations continued to have verification responsibilities after the election. The cessation of armed conflict and the formation and deployment of a new National Civil Police proceeded at a pace slower than envisioned in the peace process as did the phasing out of the national police. Programmes for the reintegration of ex-combatants from FMLN and the armed forces of El Salvador continued to encounter difficulties. f/ In a joint declaration issued on 4 October 1994 the Government and FMLN reaffirmed their commitment to the Peace Accords and to that end decided to establish a joint mechanism with the participation of ONUSAL (S/1994/1144, annex). The Secretary-General citing this invitation recommended the extension of ONUSAL until April 1995 (S/1994/1212). In its resolution 961 (1994) of 23 November 1994, the Council extended the end date of the mandate of ONUSAL for a final period of five months starting 1 December 1994.

22. The following illustrations, drawn from end-of-mission and lessons learned and related assessments, refer to the transitional phase:

     (a) In UNTAC, most of the electoral staff departed once the results of the elections were endorsed by the Security Council as free and fair. However, the Director of the Electoral Component and his immediate staff remained for a short time to assist the Constituent Assembly as required with advice about constitutional and related matters;

     (b) Cooperation between the Bretton Woods institutions and UNTAC was one of the signal characteristics of the mission, the importance of which cannot be overestimated. Although neither institution succeeded in restoring normal relations with Cambodia before the elections, their activities during this period allowed them to become operational very quickly after the elections, thereby assisting greatly in the transition from UNTAC to the post-UNTAC period;

     (c) The anticipated departure of ONUSAL demonstrated the importance of the work of permanent national bodies such as the Office of the National Counsel for the Defence of Human Rights and non-governmental human rights organizations for the protection and promotion of human rights. It was to be hoped that the Office of the National Counsel would be able to assume the task of active verification fully when ONUSAL terminated its activities (A/49/281-S/1994/886, annex, para. 132);

     (d) In Mozambique, "the verification of weapons and ammunition was not finalized by ONUMOZ, the result being that 'there is a lot of lethal material still hidden away, which for obvious reason is not conducive to the promotion of law and order or reconciliation'. This was demonstrated by the rise in crime in Mozambique ... A mechanism should be created which links the progress of demobilizing soldiers with strict controls on lethal war material" (international workshop on the successful conclusion of ONUMOZ, March 1995).

23.   In the supplement to An Agenda for Peace, the Secretary-General stated
that:

> "The timing and modalities of the departure of the peace-keeping operation
> and the transfer of its peace-building functions to others must therefore
> be carefully managed in the fullest possible consultation with the
> Government concerned. The latter's wishes must be paramount; but the
> United Nations, having invested much effort in helping to end the conflict,
> can legitimately express views and offer advice about actions the
> Government could take to reduce the danger of losing what has been
> achieved. The timing and modalities also need to take into account any
> residual verification for which the United Nations remains responsible." g/

> Conclusion: Protracted Termination Phase: Ad hoc extensions of parts
> of the mandate, or additions to it for specific tasks needed to
> establish the conditions for durable success, are to be expected
> during the termination phase of missions.

> Recommendation 8, Learning from experience in the termination aspects
> of missions: All end-of-mission and lessons learned assessments
> should review activities during the termination phase of a mission
> aimed at establishing proper conditions for the transfer of
> responsibility to successor arrangements. An attempt should be made
> to draw lessons concerning the nature of conditions that would make
> durable success likely and so reduce the danger of losing what had
> been achieved.

C.   Successor arrangements

24.   Continuity in the international community's assistance activities is
required; the understanding of the needs of the country, further enhanced during
the mission's activities, must not be lost when the mission terminates and
successor arrangements are established.

25.   Activities carried out by the United Nations in Cambodia after the
departure of UNTAC included rehabilitation, mine clearance, and the
reintegration of refugees and displaced persons. In addition, article 17 of the
Paris Agreements provided that, after the end of the transitional period, the
United Nations Commission on Human Rights should continue to monitor closely the
human rights situation in Cambodia, including, if necessary, by the appointment
of a Special Rapporteur who would report his findings annually to the Commission
and the General Assembly (S/26360, para. 27). A Special Rapporteur was
appointed by the Commission in its resolution 1993/6 (see A/50/681). The Centre
for Human Rights established an operational presence in Cambodia on
1 October 1993. Activities of the Centre for Human Rights in Cambodia include
assistance in legislative reform, the development and strengthening of national
institutions, and the administration of justice (see A/50/681/Add.1).

26.   In his report before the expiry of the final mandate of ONUSAL, the
Secretary-General informed the Council that "a number of commitments remain
still to be fulfilled before the Salvadorian peace can be pronounced a

success. ... These commitments pertain to aspects of the peace accords ...
which ... will call into question the irreversibility of the peace process as a
whole as long as they are unfulfilled. Indeed, some of them are potentially
explosive and need to be defused urgently" (S/1995/220, para. 68). The
Secretary-General informed the Council that he intended to leave behind a small
team that would conduct the remaining verification and good-offices
responsibilities of the United Nations (ibid, para. 70). On 28 April 1995, the
Council, in resolution 991 (1995), formally terminated the operation but also
welcomed the arrangements proposed by the Secretary-General (S/1995/144) on the
establishment of a United Nations Mission in El Salvador (MINUSAL). On
1 May 1995, the Secretary-General established the Trust Fund for MINUSAL in
order to support the mission activities (A/50/517, para. 3). The programme of
work of the Mission comprises six areas (public security, land transfer, human
settlements, reinsertion programmes, the Fund for the Protection of the Wounded
and Disabled, and legislative reforms) (ibid., para. 4).

27. The ONUMOZ end-of-mission assessment contained proposals for follow-up
activities after the mission was terminated. The proposals in the ONUMOZ
assessment concerning electoral and civic education activities included:

    (a) Immediate activities (time-frame: two to three months) aimed at
ensuring the preservation of the material and non-material assets acquired
throughout the electoral process and to ensure that preparations begin
immediately to create the necessary conditions for holding local elections in
1996:

    (i)   Conclusion of the inventory and collection of all the material assets
          acquired for the election process and final decisions as to their
          destination, so as to ensure their immediate conservation and their
          availability for the local elections;

    (ii) Conclusion of the collection, organization and systematization of the
          informational patrimony obtained during the registration in such a way
          that they can be reused in the near future;

    (iii) Continued coordination with and mobilization of the donor community to
          obtain technical and financial support for the new electoral process;

    (b) Other proposals involved medium-term activities, such as the
continuation of civic education activities.

    Recommendation 9, Project proposals for successor arrangements: Enhanced
    joint planning with the Office of the United Nations Resident Coordinator
    should ensure that assistance activities initiated during the mission are
    appropriately maintained by the United Nations system within the framework
    of operational activities for development. It should be standard practice
    for end-of-mission assessments to include, for each component, proposals to
    enhance the strategic framework for national and international action,
    developed in full collaboration with the Office of the United Nations
    Resident Coordinator. This strategic framework, including proposals for
    appropriate programmes for implementation under the successor arrangements,

would be revised accordingly with the participation of national authorities and United Nations system organizations and agencies.

Recommendation 10, <u>Learning from experience in the transfer of responsibility to successor arrangements</u>: As a matter of standard procedure, the Lessons Learned Unit of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations, in cooperation with the relevant institutions, should, within one year of the termination of a mission, review experience with the transfer of responsibility to successor arrangements.

Recommendation 11, <u>Inter-agency policy on successor arrangements</u>:

(a) On the basis of the information currently available, the Department of Peace-keeping Operations, the Department of Political Affairs and the Special Coordinator for Economic and Social Development, with the support of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, UNHCR and UNDP, should: (i) analyse the functions which multi-component peace-keeping operations perform recurrently; (ii) identify those organizations of the United Nations system that should take over those mandated functions still required after the peace-keeping operation is terminated; and (iii) develop policy guidelines on the manner in which the transition should be planned and executed;

(b) These draft proposals should be submitted to the appropriate ACC machinery for review and adoption as a system-wide policy on successor arrangements.

D. <u>Planning the termination phase</u>

28. Planning for the termination phase is "usually in greater detail than for the deployment phase" (United Nations Logistics Working Group - Recommendations and products, United Nations, Field Administration and Logistics Division/ Department of Peace-keeping Operations). Responsibility for phasing out personnel, both military and civilian, is shared between the Special Representative of the Secretary-General who is the head of the mission and the Personnel Management and Support Service, Field Administration and Logistics Division/Department of Peace-keeping Operations). The phasing out modality is contained in a report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council outlining withdrawal plans which take into account security and logistics considerations. Standard operating procedures exist for repatriating military and national civilian personnel and for the return of United Nations staff members to their releasing departments/agencies. There is relatively little on the planning of the termination phase in the end-of-mission reports and related assessments. The foreword to the comprehensive report on the lessons learned from UNOSOM states that the withdrawal from Somalia was conducted in an exemplary way and can be considered an organizational masterpiece. However, there appeared to be no extensive assessment report on this success.

Recommendation 12, Learning from experience in the planning of termination: All end-of-mission and lessons learned assessments should include reviews of experience with the planning of the termination phase.

Recommendation 13, Responsibility for the termination phase: Assignments of responsibility to those in charge of components of a peace-keeping mission should include the transfer of responsibility to successor arrangements, contributions to lessons learned and end-of-mission assessments, and the formulation of proposals for adjustments to policies and procedures based on the lessons learned.

E. Liquidation of missions

29. The primary responsibility for the liquidation of missions rests with the Field Administration and Logistics Division. This includes providing liquidation guidelines to closing missions; ensuring those guidelines are adhered to by the mission; providing clarification and guidance on procedures to be followed; reviewing the field accounts in conjunction with Accounts Division; and finally, preparing and submitting the reports pertaining to the final financial performance and disposal of assets to the Controller.

30. The Audit and Management Consulting Division of the Office for Internal Oversight Services has audited the liquidation of several large peace-keeping missions including UNTAC, UNOSOM II and most recently the United Nations Peace Forces. The audits focused on high risk areas including the settlement of accounts, property and inventory controls, planning and logistics for withdrawing personnel and equipment, and transportation issues. In accordance with standard procedures, the organizational entities concerned had an opportunity to comment on the audit findings. In general, they concurred with OIOS recommendations and agreed to take necessary remedial action.

31. The Office for Internal Oversight Services is providing continuing audit coverage for the liquidation of UNPF, the restructuring of United Nations peace operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the implementation of the new United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES). The Office for Internal Oversight Services will also closely monitor the Department of Peace-keeping Operations plans and preparations for the impending liquidations of UNAMIR and UNMIH and will intensify its field audits of these missions as the liquidations progress.

32. End-of-mission and lessons learned assessments of UNTAC and ONUMOZ contained conclusions very similar to the findings of the Office for Internal Oversight Services audits and investigations. The ONUMOZ end-of-mission report identified several problems associated with the security of the operation's assets, and made some recommendations which are reflected in those below.

33. Guidelines for planning the liquidation of field missions are available in draft and incorporate lessons learned from the liquidation of UNOSOM and ONUMOZ. Comments on earlier draft guidelines, dated 25 October 1994, included these points among others:

(a) The liquidation processes of missions such as UNTAG, the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG), the United Nations Office of the Secretary-General in Iran and more recently UNTAC and the United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA) revealed time and time again that the number and volume of the residual tasks associated with the closing of a mission and the time-frame required to conduct their execution in a proper manner are usually underestimated significantly. In order to keep the liquidation period and the size of the liquidation team to the necessary minimum, and thus contain costs, it is crucial that a more methodical and coordinated approach be taken when planning the closure of a field mission;

(b) The typical tasks associated with the liquidation of a field mission, should be grouped by the respective responsibility centre. Under these headings the tasks should either be listed in the order of their respective importance or by sequential order. Critical path activities should be clearly identified as such.

Recommendation 14, Liquidation of missions:

(a) End-of-mission and lessons learned assessments and audit and investigation reports should, where their findings point to problems of a general nature, propose suitable modifications to the provisional guidelines on the liquidation of missions;

(b) A critical path analysis undertaken for the liquidation process and incorporated in the guidelines should be introduced into the field mission planning process. Software for the application of such an analysis should be made available to each mission and the appropriate training conducted;

(c) Arrangements should be made where needed for troop-contributing Governments to provide some military personnel to assist in securing the assets of the mission. The terms of reference of the civilian police component assigned to a mission should include the investigations of incidents involving United Nations personnel and thefts of United Nations property.

F. Disposition of assets

34. Current policy on the disposition of assets is that when liquidating a mission, its equipment and other property shall be disposed of in the manner indicated below:

(a) Equipment in good condition that conforms to established standardization or is considered compatible with existing equipment will be redeployed to other United Nations operations or will be placed in reserve in the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi to form the start-up kits for future use;

(b) Serviceable equipment not required by other peace-keeping missions that might be of use to other United Nations agencies, international

organizations or non-governmental organizations in the area of operation and that is not feasible to keep in reserve, may be sold to a relevant agency or organization in accordance with applicable United Nations procedures;

(c) Any equipment or property no longer required or not feasible to dispose of in the manner described in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above, or which is in poor condition, will be subject to commercial disposal within the country, following standard United Nations regulations and procedures and national regulations;

(d) Any mission surplus assets remaining after disposition under the terms referred to under subparagraphs (a) to (c) above, and/or any assets that have already been installed in the country and that, if dismantled, would set back the rehabilitation process of the country, may be residual for contribution to the duly recognized Government of the respective country. This refers, in particular, to airfield installations and related equipment bridges, wells and related water supply installations, permanent buildings and mine-clearing equipment.

35. The provision in subparagraph 34 (d) appears consistent with peace-building efforts that are so important for the durable success of a mission. However, there are two considerations that indicate this policy is too constricted:

(a) Audits have found that some of the equipment stored at Brindisi was not in good enough condition to be worth the costs of transportation and storage;

(b) The new Governments of devastated States, such as Rwanda, desperately need mission equipment, such as vehicles and computers, often to simply maintain civilian police and other functions carried out by the mission.

These considerations indicate that greater flexibility than the above policy appears to permit may be advisable to allow the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the senior officials in charge of the liquidation of the mission to evoke the provision in subparagraph 34 (d). Care must be taken to avoid a conception of efficiency that is so narrow it undermines the conditions for the durability of the success of a mission.

Recommendation 15, Policy on disposition of assets during the liquidation of the mission:

(a) The existing policy on the disposition of assets during the liquidation of a mission after a peaceful transfer of power to duly constituted government should be reviewed by the end of 1996 in the light of recent experience on the costs and benefits of shipment of equipment through Brindisi, and the continuing peace-building requirements of the new situation created by the mission;

(b) Subsequent to this review, detailed guidelines for working out a cost-benefit analysis of transfer of assets should be drafted, as recommended by the Board of Auditors in its liquidation audit of ONUMOZ.

IV. SOME TERMINATION ISSUES IN PROBLEMATIC MISSIONS

36. UNAVEM II, UNMIH and UNOSOM II were suspended or terminated before completion of their objectives. In the case of Angola, the operations were suspended following the collapse of the election process and subsequent outbreak of violence. The Security Council however, renewed the mandate of a United Nations good-offices mission and reauthorized the peace-keeping mission as UNAVEM III following the successful conclusion of a new accord mediated through the United Nations good-offices mission. In Haiti, an advance team deployed in September-October 1993 was withdrawn when the bulk of UNMIH observers was prevented from deployment. In response, the Security Council in resolution 940 (1994) of 31 July 1994, authorized Member States to form a multinational force to restore the legitimate Government by all necessary means. The multinational force was deployed in September 1994. Following the restoration of the legitimate Government of Haiti, an enlarged UNMIH was restarted. The United Nations operations in Somalia experienced protracted difficulties and was finally terminated in March 1995, two years after it was started. The Secretary-General established a small office at Nairobi to monitor developments in Somalia. UNDP also continues to maintain at Nairobi, the office of its Resident Coordinator for Somalia and a United Nations development office established, in 1994, to coordinate the planning of rehabilitation assistance to Somalia during the operation and once a Government has been established.

37. The Department of Peace-keeping Operations plans to complete end-of-mission reports on UNMIH as well as UNAMIR and UNPROFOR and a mid-mission assessment of UNAVEM III in 1996. General lessons on the termination of problematic missions must await the completion of these reports. Where peace enforcement is conducted through multinational task forces outside the command and control of the United Nations, the omission of analysis of such experience would limit the value of lessons learned studies.

38. The Department of Peace-keeping Operations has organized, in cooperation with external organizations, three seminars assessing the lessons learned from the United Nations operations in Somalia. Illustrations of some of the conclusions and lessons pertaining to UNOSOM follow:

    (a) Initial planning should presuppose nothing. In the case of UNOSOM I, it was assumed that peace-keepers were the right tool for the task. It was never asked whether the involvement of the military in a humanitarian assistance programme could be counter-productive to the long-term humanitarian strategy (comprehensive report on lessons learned from UNOSOM);

    (b) In collapsed States, there usually exist "conflict constituencies" with a vested interest in continued instability, communal tension and an economy of plunder. An incremental approach to this dilemma could aim at transforming the interests of these elements, which necessitates adequate resources to fund demobilization, training and income-generating activities for ex-militiamen (comprehensive report on lessons from UNOSOM);

    (c) There is wide agreement that it was a mistake in Somalia for a Chapter VII operation (UNITAF) to co-exist with a Chapter VI operation (UNOSOM I). This lesson was well applied in Haiti, where a multinational force

with Chapter VII powers was phased out before a Chapter VI operation, UNMIH, was deployed (comprehensive report on the lessons learned from UNOSOM).

Recommendation 16, Peace-keeping and other field activities in countries with continuing civil strife: On the basis of a paper drawing on the end-of-mission reports for UNOSOM, UNAVEM III, UNMIH, UNAMIR and UNPROFOR, and other relevant assessments of field experience, the Department of Peace-keeping Operations, in cooperation with the Department for Humanitarian Affairs, UNDP and the World Bank, should convene an expert group meeting in 1997 to draft guidelines for field operations in countries experiencing continuing civil strife.

Notes

a/   Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 16 (A/49/16), part one, para. 34.

b/   Ibid., Fiftieth Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/50/1), para. 598.

c/   Ibid., Supplement No. 16 (A/50/16), para. 256.

d/   The United Nations and Cambodia, 1991-1995, The United Nations Blue Books Series, vol. II (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.95.I.9), para. 135.

e/   The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-1995, The United Nations Blue Books Series, vol. V (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.95.I.20) paras. 237-241.

f/   The United Nations and El Salvador, 1990-1995, The United Nations Blue Books Series, vol. IV (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.95.I.12), para. 169.

g/   A/50/60, para. 52.