United Nations A/C.1/50/PV.24



# **General Assembly**

Fiftieth session

First Committee

24th Meeting

Thursday, 16 November 1995, 3 p.m. New York

Official Records

Chairman: Mr. Erdenechuluun . . . . . . . . (Mongolia)

The meeting was called to order at 3.40 p.m.

Agenda items 57 to 81 (continued)

Action on draft resolutions submitted under all disarmament and international security agenda items

**The Chairman**: At this meeting the Committee will proceed to take decisions on the following draft resolutions: in cluster 1, draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3; and in cluster 8, draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.13 and the amendments to it contained in document A/C.1/50/L.53; and draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.48.

Upon the request of a number of delegations the Committee will defer action on draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.28/Rev.1, in cluster 7, to a later date.

I shall now call on those delegations wishing to make statements on draft resolutions in cluster 1.

Mr. Edwards (Marshall Islands): I wish to reaffirm the statements my delegation has made at the Special Commemorative Meeting of the General Assembly, in other plenary meetings and in this Committee. I reiterate the urgent and heartfelt appeal of my Government to delegations here at the United Nations to consider draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3 in a favourable manner. It is our view that the draft resolution is balanced and to the point. It does not condemn any people or Government; it does not attack or undermine any country's role in international relations. It merely points out that a certain action is wrong, and that it must be stopped.

As I stated earlier in this Committee, any single nuclear weapons test anywhere is one test too many. Any single nuclear test in the Pacific adds to the burden we in the Marshall Islands will face in the future.

In particular we appeal to those developing countries which have come under immense pressure owing to the threats of a certain country, which has threatened to withhold assistance to them should they vote in favour of this draft resolution. Our eyes will be upon them; we will hold every delegation accountable for its decision on this issue.

Marshall Islands is a sponsor of this draft resolution because we recognize that what is occurring is simply wrong, and we must put a stop to it.

Mr. Samana (Papua New Guinea): I wish on behalf of Papua New Guinea to make a statement on draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3, on nuclear testing. Papua New Guinea wishes to congratulate and thank the sponsors and supporters of this important draft resolution, on which action is about to be taken. The draft resolution clearly reflects the overwhelming global opinion against nuclear testing in any part of the world. It also dispatches the strong message to the countries involved in current nuclear testing that the international community neither welcomes nor approves of their outdated, digressive and intolerable behaviour.

The international community, for the sake of our common vision and in the hope of stability, and for the protection of our common human heritage, the protection of our environment, our families, our women and children, our

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livelihood and survival and a sustainable living, must agree to send the clear message that it is against nuclear testing anywhere in the world. The money that goes to support this horrendous experiment that deprives people of their basic livelihood is being spent in a way that runs counter to the purposes and principles for which the United Nations stands and to the universal values to which we all adhere: unity, friendship and fraternal relations among all peoples and States.

I wish therefore to reiterate what my delegation said when this draft resolution was first submitted: that a vote in support of the draft resolution is a vote against intolerance, a vote against those who dare to threaten international peace and security, a vote against those whose actions threaten our national, regional and global environment and ecosystem, and a vote against the abuse of political power against humanity. A positive vote for the draft resolution is a vote for peace, a vote for a future based on confidence. A positive vote is a vote for tolerance, a vote for the protection of our environment and a vote for humanity.

We call upon members to vote in favour of the draft resolution, in the name of moral courage and good conscience, in the name of international solidarity and universalism, to pave the way for a new moral order, to promote and not havoc, to promote human development and not human destruction, and to ensure good will among all peoples and nations. A positive vote for this draft resolution will once again remind the countries involved in nuclear testing to heed global opinion against nuclear testing.

Finally, we appeal to the States represented in this Committee to reject archaic and outdated policies and support global consensus on nuclear non-proliferation by voting in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3.

**Mr. Starr** (Australia): Before action is taken on draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3, on nuclear testing, I would like to make a brief statement. There has been a full debate on this subject in the First Committee; there is no need to add much to it. The draft resolution has been before us for more than two weeks and has presumably been considered by all. This draft resolution is simple. Its core is the call upon those States which continue to conduct nuclear tests to stop immediately. As I said in my earlier statement on this subject, the word "immediate" signifies a unique point in time. That time is now.

This draft resolution has a broad and diverse range of sponsors, but beyond this, it gives expression to the view expressed by peoples all around the world that now is the time for all nuclear testing to cease. That same view has been strongly endorsed at a number of major international meetings in recent months. More than 50 Commonwealth Heads of Government, meeting in Auckland last week, condemned continuing nuclear testing and urged its immediate cessation. Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, meeting in Cartagena three weeks ago, strongly deplored the resumption and continuation of nuclear testing and called on all nuclear-weapon States to cease conducting any nuclear testing.

States parties to the nuclear-weapon-free-zone Treaties of Rarotonga and Tlatelolco, at a joint meeting in New York in September, rejected continued nuclear testing and demanded that those States which continue to test join the other nuclear-weapon States in observing a moratorium. Leaders of the countries of the South Pacific Forum, meeting in Papua New Guinea in September, expressed their extreme outrage at the resumption of nuclear testing in the Pacific and demanded that it end.

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3 gives expression in this General Assembly to precisely what has been called for by the peoples of the world and endorsed by the overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations outside this Assembly. We must bring into this forum what we have stood for outside it.

**Mr. Tello** (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): The Committee will soon take action on draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3, by which the General Assembly would strongly deplore nuclear testing and strongly urge its immediate cessation. This is an opportunity for the international community, through its representatives here, to reaffirm that given the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States the continued development of nuclear arsenals is no longer permissible or tolerable. It is also an opportunity for the international community to reaffirm its commitment to nuclear nonproliferation in all its aspects and to the process of nuclear disarmament with the ultimate objective of eliminating these weapons, the very existence of which poses a threat to the survival of mankind. Above all, it is an opportunity to help create the propitious climate necessary for the prompt conclusion of a treaty prohibiting completely and for ever all nuclear-weapons tests, a goal we have been pursuing for more than three decades, and which now appears to be within our grasp.

And finally, it is an opportunity for delegations to reiterate in the United Nations the concern of their peoples and Governments about the possible ill effects of underground nuclear tests on health and the environment.

We appeal to all delegations to seize these opportunities by voting in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3. Not to do so will entail serious responsibilities. It would, for instance, be serious to accept the reasoning that the current tests will permit the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty because they will make it possible to develop the technology necessary to improve nuclear weapons without the need to test them. Such reasoning calls into question the usefulness of a comprehensive test-ban treaty with respect to qualitative non-proliferation. This lack of credibility will undoubtedly prolong the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, to which we all say we are committed.

It would also be serious to accept the assertion that nuclear tests are harmless and safe in the absence of convincing evidence from independent, impartial international specialized institutions. It would be serious — very serious — to affect, by omission, the credibility of the international non-proliferation regime and thus fuel a nuclear arms race, which should be a thing of the past.

Finally, it would be serious because we would lack moral authority in the future in declaring ourselves against nuclear weapons tests anywhere, or in calling on any country from any region which has not yet done so to join the international non-proliferation regime.

Let us not take on such a serious responsibility. Let us take this opportunity to say loud and clear that we reject nuclear weapons testing and that this must cease immediately.

**Mr. Bune** (Fiji): Fiji will vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3. The draft resolution reflects the genuine anguish of Fiji and many other countries over current nuclear testing. It is measured and balanced. As much as we would have liked a stronger text, in the interests of securing broad support we have joined the list of sponsors. We would like to emphasize that the draft resolution is not anti-government and certainly not anti-people. Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3 is simply a statement that nuclear testing is wrong and must be stopped now. It is important that the draft resolution be adopted with universal, broad-based support.

Just as we were united 36 years ago in this very Committee in stopping nuclear testing in the Sahara, I urge members to unite in voting in favour of this draft resolution to put an end to nuclear testing in our part of the world. In so doing, members will join many others who want to make a real contribution to global nuclear disarmament.

**The Chairman:** I call now on delegations wishing to make statements in explanation of vote before the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3.

**Sir Michael Weston** (United Kingdom): I wish to explain the position of the United Kingdom with respect to draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3, on nuclear testing. The United Kingdom has not conducted a nuclear-weapon test since 1991, and I can confirm again that we have no plans to test in the future. We understand public concern about nuclear testing. However, the United Kingdom will vote against draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3 because we consider it to be seriously deficient in a number of respects.

First, the fourth preambular paragraph is a gross misrepresentation of the facts. When the document on Principles and Objectives was being negotiated at the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) earlier this year, many delegations had wanted to include an undertaking on an immediate cessation of testing. At least two of the nuclear-weapon States made clear that they were not in a position to accept such an undertaking at that time, in one case because they intended to complete a series of tests already under way, and in the other because they were obliged to reserve their position on a possible resumption of testing for a limited period.

Because of those positions, no undertaking to cease testing immediately was included in the Principles and Objectives adopted by the Conference. Instead, it was agreed that the nuclear-weapon States should exercise utmost restraint pending the entry into force of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

There are therefore no grounds for the allegation in the fourth preambular paragraph that nuclear testing *per se* is not consistent with undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States at the NPT Review and Extension Conference. All the nuclear-weapon States, together with all other NPT States parties participating in the Review and Extension Conference, at the same time acknowledged the importance of the completion of the negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament on a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty no later than 1996.

We welcome this and we believe that the early conclusion of such a treaty is now in sight. We regret the fact that the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/50/L.3 makes no mention of the good progress being made in the comprehensive test-ban treaty negotiations, nor of the importance attached by all five nuclear-weapon States, as well as the other participants, to the conclusion of these negotiations as soon as possible and no later than in 1996, as reflected in the Report of the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly. While the United Kingdom will continue to work hard for an early and successful conclusion of the negotiations on comprehensive test-ban treaty and hence for an early cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, we cannot subscribe to the views expressed in operative paragraphs 2 and 3 of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3, nor do we subscribe to the views expressed in some other preambular paragraphs. These include the fifth preambular paragraph, since we believe that underground testing, when properly conducted, does not have the negative effects on health and the environment alluded to in that paragraph.

For all these reasons, the United Kingdom will vote against the draft resolution contained in A/C.1/50/L.3. Since the representative of Australia referred in his statement a moment ago to the Commonwealth statement on disarmament issued at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Auckland on 10 November 1995, I should like to recall that the British Prime Minister made clear in the meeting of Heads of Government that the United Kingdom could not associate itself with the fifth paragraph of the statement on disarmament concerned with nuclear testing. He said that in the view of the British Government, this paragraph was both factually inaccurate and seriously misrepresented an important subject.

Mr. Mabilangan (Philippines): Before us today is a draft resolution which is as timely as it is important. This draft resolution represents the valiant and sincere efforts of many who have sincerely placed themselves against nuclear tests and weapons of mass destruction. In its current state, the draft resolution achieves much of what those of us who began this endeavour had hoped for. For many of us, it appears that the draft resolution as it stands is more than satisfactory. For others, the draft resolution is unacceptable for it falls short of singing the praises of nuclear testing and their precepts of geopolitics and nuclear deterrence. For my delegation, the draft resolution against nuclear testing is most desirable and, if only for that reason, we are not going to vote against it.

It is clear, on the face of it, that the resolution contains strong language against nuclear testing. That in itself is a welcome development. It is also heartening to see that attempts by others to introduce language that practically welcomes nuclear testing did not succeed. However, the original stronger language which was initially supported by a number of countries and which my delegation fought for has been discarded, ostensibly to gain support for the draft resolution.

The Philippines does not subscribe to the belief that this draft resolution would be made more meaningful by sheer force of numbers alone. Its true meaning will be in its substance and in the forcefulness of its stand in condemning nuclear testing. We believe that the issue of nuclear testing is not one which States can hide from by obscuring what should be said. The issue of nuclear testing is of such critical importance that States have to take sides. States have to make clear their positions. The tragedy in all this is perhaps that although the cold war has ended, the weapons that fostered it and the attitudes that sustained it still plague us. It is hoped that the substance of the message in this resolution and the spirit of compromise that has been shown by many on this issue will serve to convince those that conduct nuclear tests and those with nuclear-testing programmes, even those that pretend not to be involved with the corruption of the atom, to end all nuclear testing.

Mr. Zainuddin (Malaysia): My delegation would also like to take this opportunity to explain our position before the Committee takes action on the very important item before us this afternoon with regard to the question of nuclear testing as contained in document A/C.1/50/L.3. We appreciate the initiative undertaken by the sponsors of this draft resolution to bring to the attention of this Committee the issue of nuclear testing, which to us undermines international peace and security.

It is outrageous that in the face of the overwhelming international opposition and widespread protests against the resumption of these tests, nuclear tests have continued. The conducting of these nuclear tests in quick succession makes a mockery of the commitment to the exercise of "utmost restraint" that was solemnly entered into during the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Malaysians, in all walks of life, are angered by this testing and have appealed to the peoples of the world, including those in States conducting these tests to insist that their Governments desist from this testing. The Malaysian Parliament has unanimously condemned these tests. Our delegation also had the privilege to submit to the

International Court of Justice earlier this month a statement on the need to outlaw the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons. The overwhelming majority of Commonwealth leaders have unequivocally condemned this testing and called for its immediate cessation.

In the light of these deep concerns, we would have preferred stronger language, especially in operative paragraph 2, which should have called for condemnation of the current nuclear testing. We find the present formulation, which only "strongly deplores", unsatisfactory. Hence, Malaysia is only able to vote in favour of this draft resolution but not to co-sponsor it. We hope that by the time the plenary Assembly meets, the international community will be prepared to support the need for stronger language.

Mr. Cassar (Malta): Malta has a consistent and unequivocal position on the question of nuclear weapons. We strongly encourage and support all measures aimed at nuclear disarmament. We are party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and have urged the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. This policy is an integral part of our overall policy on disarmament issues, on which we are supportive of effective measures aimed at reducing the levels of all armaments. We support and encourage disarmament measures in Europe and the Mediterranean in the framework of broader confidence- and security-building measures. We recognize and appreciate the endeavours of nuclear-weapon States to promote peace and stability. We welcome the indefinite extension of the NPT and their contribution to the efforts to reach a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

In casting its vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3, Malta would like to express its reservation on the fourth preambular paragraph. Malta feels that this paragraph does not correctly reflect the undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Malta stresses its desire for the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, and acknowledges and welcomes the commitment of all nuclear-power States to agreement on such a step.

**Mr. Sha Zukang** (China) (*interpretation from Chinese*): The Chinese delegation has carefully studied the draft resolution on nuclear testing (A/C.1/50/L.3) and has listened attentively to the views expressed by various delegations.

Before the Committee takes action on this draft resolution, I wish once again to explain the Chinese delegation's position on the question of nuclear testing. I emphasize that the Chinese Government's position on this matter is consistent and clear-cut.

The Chinese Government has always exercised the utmost restraint in nuclear testing. During the period of the cold war the two countries with the largest and most advanced nuclear arsenals conducted about 1,000 nuclear tests each, in their rivalry for supremacy and their nuclear-arms race. China, for its part, has never participated in the nuclear-arms race. It did not do so during the cold war, when the United States and the former Soviet Union were heatedly engaged in that race, and it has not done so subsequently. Indeed, it has consistently stood for the complete prohibition and complete destruction of nuclear weapons, as well as for the complete prohibition of chemical and biological weapons.

China has also exercised the utmost restraint in the development of nuclear weapons, and its stocks of such weapons have always been kept at a minimum. The number and scale of its nuclear tests, too, have been kept at the lowest level. In fact, the total number of tests carried out by China during the past 30 years equals only the average number conducted by some nuclear Powers in just one year.

Having been repeatedly subjected to the nuclear threat by certain nuclear Powers, and in view of the fact that these Powers maintain their policy of nuclear deterrence, China has conducted a limited number of nuclear tests, and it possesses a small stock of nuclear weapons, solely for the purpose of self-defence.

China opposes hegemony, and it pursues an independent foreign policy of peace. China is not allied with any major Power, nor does it belong to any such military bloc. Being independent and self-reliant in the field of national defence, China has no foreign nuclear umbrella. It has never harmed any other country. On the contrary, it was repeatedly subjected to invasion and occupation by imperialists of the world before the founding of the People's Republic, and on many subsequent occasions certain Powers threatened it with nuclear weapons.

China does not want to be harmed again. It believes that all countries should have a right to maintain an appropriate capacity for national defence and legitimate self-protection. Precisely because of its own experience, China does not base its security on a nuclear threat against other countries. Indeed, it is resolutely opposed to the policy of

nuclear deterrence. As China's nuclear weapons are not directed against any other country, they do not constitute a threat to any State.

There is no question of our threatening international peace and security. Long ago China gave an unconditional undertaking that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons, and it gave all non-nuclear-weapon States an unconditional assurance that it would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them. Besides, China was one of the first nuclear-weapon countries to undertake international legal commitments in respect of the nuclear-free zones of Latin America and the South Pacific.

China consistently supports the goal of a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon tests, within the framework of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all nuclear weapons. We are pleased to note that gratifying progress has been made in the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. China supports the conclusion of a reliable comprehensive test-ban treaty that would truly ban all nuclear-weapon-test explosions as soon as possible, and no later than 1996, and it will continue to engage with the other countries concerned in a common effort to achieve that goal.

China sincerely believes that the fundamental approach to the realization of a comprehensive test ban should be through the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and its entry into force as soon as possible. I wish to state once again that upon the entry into force of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, China will cease nuclear-weapon-test explosions.

China understands the legitimate concerns expressed by many non-nuclear-weapon States about nuclear testing, and it wishes to thank all those countries that appreciate and sympathize with its position. Needless to say, the Chinese delegation has serious reservations about some elements of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3, which will be put to a vote. We believe that the adoption of such a draft resolution would not help to create an atmosphere conducive to success in the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Indeed, it would only damage such negotiations.

In these circumstances, the Chinese delegation will have to vote against draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3.

**Mr. Ledogar** (United States of America): I wish to explain why the United States will abstain in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3.

The United States Government is committed to a nuclear-testing moratorium. We imposed a testing moratorium on ourselves three years ago, and we have consistently advocated that all nuclear-weapon States observe moratoriums during the negotiations on the comprehensive test-ban treaty. We firmly believe that this is the way to create and enhance the political atmosphere most conducive to rapid success in the nuclear-test-ban negotiations. Accordingly, the United Nations regrets both the Chinese and the French tests that have taken place.

None the less, we cannot support draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3. We do not believe that its tone and content would contribute to the achievement of our common objective of securing a comprehensive test-ban treaty early in 1996. This is regrettable. We should have greatly preferred a moderate and dispassionate anti-testing draft resolution that we could have supported. However, that is not what the sponsors came up with.

The United States does not support the assertion, in the fourth preambular paragraph, that testing is not consistent with undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Indeed, the language of that Conference regarding the utmost restraint was compromise language reflecting well-known facts — that China would continue to test, and that France was keeping its options open in the run-up to the then forthcoming elections. Those of us who participated in the negotiations on the Final Document of the NPT Conference know this.

The supposition, in the fifth preambular paragraph, that underground nuclear testing has negative effects on health and the environment goes too far for my delegation.

We are reluctant to make such judgements on the effects testing will have on the environment and health without first seeing relevant evidence.

As for operative paragraph 2, the United States cannot join in strongly deploring all current nuclear testing, for the reasons already mentioned.

Again, concerning operative paragraph 3, which "strongly urges immediate cessation of all testing", we thought that a phrase such as "as soon as possible" or "at the earliest possible time" might have moderated the tone of the draft resolution.

Finally, the draft resolution makes no reference to the good progress in the negotiations on the comprehensive test-ban treaty in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. This is the vehicle for a total and final ban on all nuclear testing. We hope that that will come about by concluding the treaty in April next year.

My Government regrets that its efforts to seek a more moderate draft resolution did not meet with success. We also regret, consequently, that the United States is compelled to abstain.

**Mr. Dlamini** (Swaziland): I will just take a second to speak on behalf of the Swaziland delegation.

What concerns our delegation here is the thrust of the draft resolution and the effects it has and may have. Let us not be circumvented here. The time to tell the truth is now. The time to tell the truth about the nuclear testing is now. Whether testing is done by a small country, a poor country or a rich country, and as long as, in the final analysis, it violates the principle of peaceful coexistence within any country's neighbourhood, the time has come for the United Nations to condemn it.

Let us then not, as a United Nations body, compromise the truth. Nuclear weapons are a threat wherever they may be on this planet. My delegation therefore will never agree with or support views, no matter where they come from, that compromise the truth concerning the testing of nuclear armaments.

**Mrs. Bourgois** (France) (*interpretation from French*): The First Committee is about to vote on a draft resolution regarding nuclear testing. My country will vote against it. French policy is the target pursued by the instigators of this draft. That policy is legitimate.

What does France want? It wants to safeguard its national independence and help to further the cause of peace. What is it doing? It is completing a nuclear-testing programme that is strictly limited, both in terms of duration and in terms of the number of tests carried out. This programme is aimed at maintaining the credibility of its deterrence force, which contributes to its own security and, beyond, to that of Europe.

Simultaneously, France commits itself to conclude, as soon as possible, a comprehensive and definitive nuclear-test-ban treaty. France was the first among the nuclear Powers to make this commitment and has opted for the zero option.

The text submitted to this Assembly is based on false statements and unfounded assertions. Everyone here knows that the nuclear-weapon States, during the Review and Extension Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), never committed themselves to putting an immediate end to their nuclear testing. "Utmost restraint" means neither prohibition nor suspension. Words mean what they mean. Furthermore, France has stated clearly that it retains its right to conduct nuclear tests. This was said in May. To suggest the contrary today is simply untrue.

Everyone knows that the precautions we have taken, the scientific studies that have been conducted and the transparency we have accepted prove the harmlessness of the French experiments. To refer to "negative potential effects ... on health and the environment" is an unfounded assertion.

I urge us all to think. What will be the outcome of such a resolution? How will it contribute to the United Nations credibility? What are the risks at stake?

The outcome: France will keep to its course. It will put an end to its tests very soon, but it will do so because it committed itself to do so and because it has spared no efforts to conclude the comprehensive test-ban treaty as soon as possible.

The credibility: An emotional and polemical atmosphere has prevailed over our Committee's work. Precious time has thus been wasted while we have failed to deal with concrete issues of non-proliferation and disarmament, including nuclear disarmament.

The risks: The draft will give substance to the idea that the NPT could go unimplemented, even though it has just been extended indefinitely.

This draft resolution, along with other attempts of the same kind now under way, will contribute to undermining the very achievements we should strengthen. The negotiation of the comprehensive test-ban treaty will be made all the more difficult. By not urging a speedy conclusion of this treaty, by 30 June 1996 if possible, this draft resolution will allow certain countries to take a stand today, the better to evade the issue tomorrow.

All in all, this text is inspired by feelings rather than seriousness, by passion rather than reason, by short-term calculations rather than long-term aims. The countries that vote in favour of the text will work against the very cause General Assembly 24th meeting A/C.1/50/PV.24 16 November 1995

which they wish to defend and which we defend as we do the cause of non-proliferation, disarmament and peace.

The Chairman: As no other delegation wishes to speak in explanation of vote before the vote, I now call on the Secretary of the Committee.

**Mr. Kheradi** (Secretary of the Committee): This may be somewhat anticlimactic but I would like to inform the Committee that the following countries have joined in sponsoring the following draft resolutions: A/C.1/50/L.3: Dominican Republic and Barbados; A/C.1/50/Rev.1: Liechtenstein, Malta and Gabon; A/C.1/50/L.17/Rev.2: Venezuela, and A/C.1/50/L.45: Honduras.

**The Chairman:** The Committee will now proceed to take a decision on the draft resolutions contained in Cluster 1, beginning with draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3. I call on the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Kheradi (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3 entitled "Nuclear testing", which was introduced by the representative of Mexico at the Committee's 14th meeting on Tuesday, 7 November 1995. It is sponsored by the following States: Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Barbados, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Fiji, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kyrgyzstan, Maldives, the Marshall Islands, Mexico, the Federated States of Micronesia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, the Republic of Korea, San Marino, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukraine, Uruguay and Venezuela.

**The Chairman:** A recorded vote has been requested. I call on the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

A recorded vote was taken.

#### In favour:

Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Ecuador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan,

Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malta, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Tajikistan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Ukraine, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Zambia, Zimbabwe

## Against:

China, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, France, Gabon, Mali, Mauritania, Monaco, Niger, Senegal, Togo, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

## Abstaining:

Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Angola, Armenia, Benin, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guinea Bissau, Hungary, Israel, Kenya, Latvia, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Lithuania, Madagascar, Morocco, Pakistan, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Syrian Arab Republic, the former Yugoslav Republic Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United States of America, Zaire

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3 was adopted by 95 votes to 12, with 45 abstentions.

**The Chairman:** I now call on those representatives wishing to explain their vote or position.

**Mr. Deimundo** (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The delegation of Argentina would like to state its position on draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3, on nuclear testing. Taking into account the position we took in our statement to the Rio Group in Quito on 16 June 1995, and in the Declaration of the Fifth Ibero-America Summit Conference held in Bariloci last October, Argentina voted in favour of the draft resolution.

In this connection, Argentina would like once again to state the importance that we attribute to the early conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Furthermore, the Republic of Argentina welcomes the commitment by France to accede to the comprehensive test-ban treaty and President Chirac's commitment to eliminate all testing in the future.

Another matter that we find encouraging in this area is the joint statement by the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States in which they made a commitment to sign in the first semester of 1996, the Protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga on a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific.

Finally, as regards the fifth paragraph of the preamble, my delegation, while sharing the concerns expressed, considers that it is necessary to have more scientific data in this area.

**Mr. Berdennikov** (Russian Federation) (*interpretation from Russian*): The Russian delegation abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3, entitled "Nuclear testing".

We agree with the general thrust of the draft — its intention to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty as soon as possible and also its high praise of the actions of the nuclear States which have observed the moratorium.

At the same time, in our view, at this stage when agreement on a comprehensive test-ban treaty is in view, the draft resolution, which does not unite participants parties to the treaty, may turn out to be counter-productive.

**Mr. Breitenstein** (Finland): My delegation decided to vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3 and I should now like to take the opportunity to explain our vote.

Finland has expressed its regret over the nuclear tests which have been conducted in the course of the past few months. Our opposition to any nuclear testing anywhere has been consistent and is therefore well known.

For my Government, however, a comprehensive testban treaty is a matter of the highest priority. Only a multilateral agreement providing for the complete cessation of nuclear-test explosions for all time can assure us of a world in which nuclear-test explosions will never again be conducted. Regrettably, General Assembly resolutions do not provide such assurances, nor do unilateral moratoria.

My Government participates actively in the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty within the Conference on Disarmament. The international community shares the objective of concluding a comprehensive test-ban

treaty in 1996. The draft resolution on which we have just voted fails, regrettably, to recognize and express support for this objective.

In addition, we note that the draft resolution omits any mention of the significant progress achieved within the Conference on Disarmament thus far. The declarations by four nuclear-weapon States in support of the true zero-yield option have generated significant positive momentum in the Geneva negotiations. This momentum should have been given the credit it deserves in the draft resolution.

Furthermore, in our view, the draft resolution reflects inaccurately an important consensus outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The nuclear-weapon States committed themselves to exercise utmost restraint in nuclear testing. It is not in the interest of the international community to give credence to an implication that NPT commitments have been or are somehow being violated.

Finland will continue to voice its opposition to any nuclear-test explosions and will continue to stress the primacy of the comprehensive test-ban treaty negotiations as the means for dealing with nuclear explosions and will give credit to any progress achieved towards our common goal. It is regrettable that the draft resolution only addresses admittedly serious yet momentary concerns while ignoring the objective which we all share.

**The Chairman:** I now call on the representative of Luxembourg, who will speak on behalf of the Benelux countries.

**Mr. Wolzfeld** (Luxembourg) (*interpretation from French*): I am honoured to speak on behalf of the Benelux countries — Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg.

It was with great difficulty that our countries finally decided to vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3, on nuclear testing — not because we have any doubt about what we think about the continuation of these tests in the post-cold-war period. We have repeatedly deplored these tests. They seem to us to belong to another era and to involve risks which we were ready to run when the bloc confrontations imperilled our existence, but in the new era in which we now live they seem to us superfluous. The three Benelux countries deplore these tests and do so without hesitation.

Public opinion in our countries has often expressed itself vehemently against these tests and in democratic countries like our own, Governments cannot disregard such feelings and such messages.

The Benelux countries wish, however, to express their view calmly and objectively.

We should also like to point out how disturbed we are at the inadequacies of the text. The Benelux countries intend to refrain from emotional and transient reactions. We regret the excesses of all kinds to which this matter has recently given rise. Different views of an issue, no matter how important, cannot justify some of the turbulence we have been witnessing.

Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg cannot forget the ties of friendship between us and certain countries which are particularly affected by these lapses of conduct. We would have liked to see more restraint exercised by all delegations and the adoption of a less selective approach to nuclear tests.

In the immediate future, nuclear disarmament will be dominated by the negotiation of a treaty banning all tests. In this regard we welcome the undertakings as to the date of the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, including undertakings by States which are still conducting tests. We are not forgetting, however, that in this regard France was the first to make a commitment without reservation.

Furthermore, our vote in favour of the draft resolution should not lead the Committee to believe that we are endorsing its imperfections. They are quite considerable. It is indeed unfortunate that it was deemed necessary to specify the date scheduled for the conclusion of negotiations. Obviously, such an omission is not due to inadvertence. It presupposes an approach to negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty which we do not share. This treaty, for some time to come, benefits from the momentum imparted to it by the happy outcome of the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This momentum guarantees success for us in the months to come, and advantage must be taken of this momentum. To ignore this date may give rise to doubts as to our willingness to conclude this Treaty within the schedule established by the international community. For our three countries and for many others this is an important objective.

It is also unfortunate that a document drafted by experts is making wrongful use of the NPT text. In

particular, I have in mind the fourth paragraph of the preamble because none of the NPT texts in fact ban nuclear tests. If we deplore them we still refuse to commit ourselves to opportunistic interpretations of important international treaties.

In these circumstances, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg would like to remind the Assembly of their regret at any undertaking which is contrary to our common objective — that of nuclear disarmament. And this was the only reason for our vote today.

**Mr. Martínez-Morcillo** (Spain)(interpretation from Spanish): The delegation of Spain abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3, on nuclear testing. This abstention does not affect the general position of the Spanish Government on nuclear testing, which can be summed up as follows.

The Spanish Government deeply regrets the holding of nuclear tests. It attributes maximum importance and priority to the conclusion of negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, which should be concluded no later than 1996 to allow for its early signing and entry into force. In these negotiations, my Government unreservedly supports the so-called zero option. My delegation abstained in the vote on this draft resolution because it has certain reservations regarding the interpretation therein of the scope of the decisions and resolutions adopted at the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Finally, my delegation wishes to stress that it considers that the negotiations on the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty must be concluded regardless of any temporal circumstances.

**Mr. Neagu** (Romania): The position of Romania on nuclear testing is well known. My country actively participates in the negotiations with a view to a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

At this stage in the negotiations, it is of crucial importance to avoid any confrontation, condemnation or exclusion, and to concentrate, in a climate of partnership, on all efforts with a view to the conclusion of the drafting of the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty — by mid-1996, we hope, or even earlier — to ensure the early signing of the treaty by all nuclear-weapon States and its entry into force without delay. It was in order to contribute to the creation of a political climate conducive to an acceleration of the negotiations on the comprehensive test-ban treaty in

Geneva, and to achieve as soon as possible, the elimination and prohibition of all nuclear tests, that my delegation abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3, on "Nuclear testing".

**Mr. Akram** (Pakistan): Pakistan has supported the goal of a comprehensive test-ban for the past 30 years. We are happy that the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty is now in sight. My delegation supports the objectives of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3. We share the desire for the cessation of all nuclear testing. We share the concern for the environment.

However, my delegation was constrained to abstain in the vote on the draft resolution because we think that some of its central provisions reveal an imbalance. In operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution, the General Assembly would commend the moratorium observed by certain nuclear-weapons States which have conducted almost 2,000 nuclear tests in the past. It would strongly deplore only current nuclear testing. Because of this imbalance, which we believe is unfair, my delegation has been constrained to abstain in the vote.

Mr. Dimitrov (Bulgaria): I would like to explain the position of the delegation of Bulgaria on draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3. Bulgaria attaches great importance to the cessation of nuclear testing and has been a long-time supporter of a conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The achievement of this goal, in our view, is one of the major means of meeting the security concerns of the international community in the post-cold-war era in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3, however — as became evident during consultations — could not command consensus, which in our view does not contribute to the successful conclusion of the important negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on the comprehensive test-ban treaty. This is the reason why the Bulgarian delegation abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.3.

**The Chairman:** We have heard the last speaker in explanation of vote.

The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolutions contained in cluster 8: draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.13 and the amendments to it, which are contained in document A/C.1/50/L.53; and draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.48.

Are there any delegations wishing to make a statement other than in explanation of vote or position before the voting?

I call on the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Mr. Moradi (Islamic Republic of Iran): On behalf of the delegations of Cuba, India, Myanmar, Pakistan and my own delegation, as sponsors of the amendment contained in document A/C.1/50/L.53, I have the privilege of informing the First Committee that, after intense and fruitful consultations with the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.13, entitled "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields", we agreed not to press our amendment to action. The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.13 agreed to delete the second preambular paragraph and to make a statement that dispels some of the apprehensions that exist with respect to some of the elements of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.13.

We hope our dialogue on this important issue will continue, with a view to further accommodation and understanding and, we hope, submission of a single resolution on this important issue in coming years. We also encourage the members of the Committee to cast a positive vote on a similar draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/50/L.48.

**The Chairman:** The Committee takes note of the fact that Iran will not press for action on the amendments contained in document A/C.1/50/L.53.

I now call on the representative of Canada.

**Mr. Moher** (Canada): I would like, first of all, to express my appreciation to our colleague from Iran for the statement that he has just made. As he indicated, a considerable effort has, in fact, been made to find a basis for positive action on this topic. Canada appreciates the efforts made by all delegations in that regard — including those made by the co-sponsors of document A/C.1/50/L.53.

I would also like to express Canada's particular appreciation for the intensive and extremely positive efforts made by the delegation of Brazil, our partner in this endeavour.

I should like to request that all delegations listen carefully, because what I do want to say, with regard to draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.13, is important. As a result of

the discussions that we have had with the co-sponsors of document A/C.1/50/L.53, the co-sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.13 are requesting from the floor the deletion of the second paragraph of the preamble to draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.13. This is a significant gesture by the co-sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.13 in the effort to find a consensus on this issue.

I would also like to go on to read a very brief statement, if I may. I make this statement on behalf of all 33 co-sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.13. The draft resolution contained in A/C.1/50/L.13 clearly refers to two areas in which enhanced bilateral and multilateral dialogues are invited on the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields.

The first deals with ensuring the implementation of relevant commitments already undertaken under international legal instruments. Examples of such instruments are: the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

The second refers to exploring ways and means of further developing international legal rules on transfers of high technology with military applications. This is a straightforward statement inviting States to continue efforts to find greater international consensus in this field.

This draft resolution does not attempt to address or to resolve significant differences of opinion which exist in this field. In particular, the draft resolution does not deal with the subject of export-control regimes. Many countries, including Canada, consider such regimes as positive and acceptable mechanisms. Other countries, as is well known, disagree with this view. As this draft resolution is an attempt to encourage enhanced dialogues without prejudging their outcomes, it does not address this or other specific issues.

That concludes the brief statement that I wanted to make, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to go on to make two final points. First, it is clear that members of the First Committee are invited to vote according to their national positions on both draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.13 and draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.48.

My second point is that — and this is meant very sincerely and very strongly — we would like to express our appreciation, and that of our Brazilian partner, to the 33 cosponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.13.

**The Chairman**: The Committee has taken due note of the statement by the representative of Canada, especially in regard to the statement concerning the deletion of the second paragraph of the preamble.

Are there any other statements to be made on the cluster?

If there are none, the Committee will now proceed to hear statements, if any, in explanation of position or vote before action is taken on the draft resolution.

There seem to be none. The Committee will proceed to take action on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/50/L.13.

A recorded vote has been requested.

I call on the Secretary of the Committee.

**Mr. Kheradi** (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now proceed to take a recorded vote on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/50/L.13, with the revision that was read out by the representative of Canada — that is, the deletion of the second paragraph of the preamble.

In connection with that draft resolution, the Committee will also take note of the fact that, as stated by the representative of Iran, and as agreed by the co-sponsors, the amendment in document A/C.1/50/L.53 will not be pressed to a vote.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana,

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Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Lithuania, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

None

#### Abstaining:

Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, France, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Japan, Pakistan, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.13, as orally revised, was adopted by 148 votes to none, with 9 abstentions.

**The Chairman**: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.48. A recorded vote has been requested.

I call on the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Kheradi (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now commence its voting on draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.48, entitled "The role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament". The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of India at the 16th meeting of the Committee on 8 November 1995. It is sponsored by the following States: Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cuba, Guyana, India, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kenya, Lesotho, Malaysia, Malawi, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines and Sri Lanka.

A recorded vote was taken.

#### *In favour*:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

#### Against:

France, Israel, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

### Abstaining:

Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Samoa, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.48 was adopted by 98 votes to 6, with 51 abstentions.

[Subsequently, the delegation of Myanmar advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.]

**The Chairman**: I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their votes or positions.

**Mr. Deimundo** (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The delegation of Argentina wishes to state its position on draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.13, entitled "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields", which the Committee has just adopted.

We attribute great importance to science and technology, not only as a source of social well-being and economic development, but also as a significant contribution to the full effectiveness and implementation of agreements on the control and limitation of armaments, the conversion of military industry to peaceful uses, and the verification of agreements.

Moreover, as this delegation has already stated in the general debate in this Committee, Argentina would especially like to see the responsible use of technology by all States, and we support the establishment of national and international controls that would prevent the diversion of technology to a proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons that would lead to qualitative improvements that would have destabilizing effects and threaten international peace and security.

In this connection, in order to avoid the transfer of technology for military purposes, we think it is imperative to make sure that this is done in a responsible way, under strict controls which would guarantee its use for strictly peaceful purposes.

**Ms. Ghose** (India): I should like to explain very briefly my delegation's vote on draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.13. I should like to thank the delegation of Canada for its efforts to try to resolve what had appeared to be a log-jam. I hope sincerely that next year we can start in time to try to work towards a single draft resolution on this very important subject.

**The Chairman**: Are there any other statements in explanation of vote? There seem to be none.

We have thus concluded the work for today.

Originally the Committee was scheduled to meet only once tomorrow. I have just been informed that our request for a room for two meetings has been approved; therefore we could have two meetings tomorrow. In that case, I very much hope that the Committee will be able to take action on as many draft resolutions as possible tomorrow.

I should like to consult delegations on the work to be carried out tomorrow. In cluster 1, the Chair proposes to take up the following draft resolutions: A/C.1/50/L.8/Rev.1, A/C.1/50/L.17/Rev.2, A/C.1/50/L.19/Rev.1, A/C.1/50/L.49/Rev.1. Does any representative have any comments on cluster 1?

**Mr. Goonetilleke** (Sri Lanka): I should bring it to the notice of the Committee that my delegation has asked that draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.49/Rev.1 be reissued for technical reasons. My delegation hopes that the new text will be available tomorrow morning when we are ready to take a vote on the matter.

**The Chairman**: I am being informed that the corrected version of the text will be available tomorrow morning. In that case the Committee can take up that draft resolution.

If there are no other comments on cluster 1, may we now proceed to cluster 3. In cluster 3 the Chair proposes to take up two draft resolutions: A/C.1/50/L.29/Rev.2 and A/C.1/50/L.45.

I call on the representative of the United States.

Mr. Ledogar (United States): I regret to say that at this time the necessary consultations on draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.45, the draft resolution on a moratorium on antipersonnel land-mines, have not been completed and it may be that we will need more time. It is possible that tomorrow this difficulty for us, which is created by proposed amendments, may be compromised, but I cannot say at this time that we will be ready tomorrow. I ask that you, Sir, be prepared to put this issue off until Monday, if necessary.

**The Chairman**: May I propose that we return to this issue tomorrow morning when we see the results of the consultations. Then perhaps, if the consultations have been fruitful we could take it up tomorrow afternoon.

If there are no other comments on cluster 3, may we move to cluster 7? In cluster 7 the Chair proposes to take up the following draft resolutions: A/C.1/50/L.24, A/C.1/50/L.28/Rev.1 and A/C.1/50/L.31/Rev.1.

If there are no comments on cluster 7, may we proceed to cluster 8? In cluster 8 the Chair proposes to take up draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.41/Rev.1. Are there any comments?

**Mr. García** (Colombia) (*interpretation from Spanish*): In regard to draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.41/Rev.1, consultations are still going on. It is possible that significant progress will be made but it would be a good idea nevertheless to consider postponing this draft resolution until next Monday.

**The Chairman**: Perhaps we could also refer back to that draft resolution tomorrow morning. If the consultations have been completed we may take it up in the afternoon also. If not we will probably have to defer action on it until Monday.

Let us now move to cluster 11. In cluster 11 the Chair proposes to take up draft resolutions A/C.1/50/L.7 and the amendments to that draft resolution contained in A/C.1/50/L.58, and draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.25. Are there any comments on cluster 11?

**Mr. Akram** (Pakistan): I should just like to point out that a revised version of the amendments proposed to draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.7 has been issued, in document A/C.1/50/L.58/Rev.1.

**The Chairman**: Then A/C.1/50/L.58/Rev.1 will be taken up tomorrow.

I call on the representative of Japan.

**Mr. Yamamoto** (Japan): My delegation does not wish action on draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.7 to be postponed until Monday. We request that the Secretariat make the necessary arrangements.

I would ask the co-sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.7 to meet immediately after the adjournment of this meeting since a new amendment to A/C.1/50/L.7 has been proposed.

**The Chairman:** Note has been taken of the request from the representative of Japan and the co-sponsors of that draft resolution. Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.7 will receive the same treatment. We will refer back to that draft resolution tomorrow to see if progress has been made and

whether there is also a possibility of taking it up tomorrow afternoon.

I shall now call on the Secretary of the Committee to make some announcements.

**Mr. Kheradi** (Secretary of the Committee): We have been requested to make the following announcements.

There will be a meeting of the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement of the First Committee on First Committee matters tomorrow at 9 a.m. in Conference Room D. There will also be a meeting of the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement in this Conference Room immediately following the adjournment of this meeting.

I know that the representative of Japan has also announced that a meeting would be held in this room. We will see what arrangements can be made.

**The Chairman**: Tomorrow the Committee will take up the following draft resolutions:

In cluster 1: A/C.1/50/L.8/Rev.1, A/C.1/50/L.17/Rev.2, A/C.1/50/L.19/Rev.1 and A/C.1/50/L.49/Rev.1;

In cluster 3: A/C.1/50/L.29/Rev.2 — on draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.45 representatives have heard the request from the United States delegation;

In cluster 7: A/C.1/50/L.24, A/C.1/50/L.28/Rev.1, A/C.1/50/L.31/Rev.1;

In cluster 8: the consultations on draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.41/Rev.1 are still going on and the same will apply to that draft resolution. We may not be able to take it up tomorrow afternoon.

In cluster 11 there has also been a request to postpone action on draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.7 and the amendment in A/C.1/50/L.58/Rev.1 until Monday. We will also revert to this issue tomorrow if the consultations are fruitful. If not, we may have to defer the decision on A/C.1/50/L.7 until Monday. Tomorrow we will take action on draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.25.

The meeting rose at 5.35 p.m.