

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND NINETEENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 31 March 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. G. Herder (German Democratic Republic)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. M. MEDKOUR
Mr. A. ABBA
Mr. M. MATI

Argentina: Mr. F. JIMENEZ DAVILA
Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD
Miss N. NASCIMBENE

Australia: Mr. R. STEELE
Mr. T. FINDLAY
Ms Shirley FREEMAN

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE
Mr. de BISSCHOP

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. R. DEYANOV
Mrs. V. SOTIZOV

Burma: U SAW LAING
U NGWE WIN
U THAN HTUN

Canada: Mr. G. SKINNER
Mr. M.C. HAMBLIN

China: Mr. YU Peiwen
Mr. YU Mengjia
Mr. YANG Mingliang
Mr. LI Weimin

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLA VILA
Mr. C. PLAZOS

Czechoslovakia: Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. A. CIMA
Mr. J. JIRUSEK
Mr. L. STAVINCHA
Mr. J. FRANIK
Mr. J. MORAVIC

Egypt: Mr. M.N. FAHMY

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. GESBERT
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. K.H. LOLIS
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Mr. P. BUNTIG

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. H. MULLER
Mr. W. ROHR
Mr. J. PFISCHKE

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. A. LAKATOS

India: Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. S. DARUSMAN
Mr. I. DAMANIK
Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. F. QILSIM
Mr. J. HADI
Mr. KARYONO

Iran:

Mr. M. DABIRI
Mr. D. AMERI

Italy:

Mr. V.C. DI MONTEZEMOLO
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI
Mr. L. SALAZAR

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. R. ISHII
Mr. K. SHIMADA
Mr. K. ODA

Kenya:

Mr. S. SHITEMI
Mr. G. MUNIU

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. L. BAYART
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS
Mr. A.G.B. OOMS

Nigeria:

Mr. O. ADENIJI
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. M. AKRAM

Peru: Mr. F. VALDIVIESO

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. M. MALITA
Mr. T. MELESCANU
Mr. A. SASUV

Sri Lanka: Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. S. ERICSON
Mr. J. LUNDIN
Miss G. PUU

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. L.A. NAUMOV
Mr. L.S. MOSHKOV
Mr. V.V. LOSHCININE
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO

United Kingdom: Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES
Mrs. J.I. LINK

United States of America: Mr. F. DESIMONE
Miss K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. J.A. MISKEL
Mr. M. SANCHES
Mr. C. PEARCY

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT

Mr. H. ARTEAGA

Mr. O.A. AGUIRRE

Yugoslavia:

Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. B.A. NZENGEYA

Mr. L.B. NDAGA

Secretary of the Committee
and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 119th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

At the outset, allow me to convey to the delegation of the United States of America my sentiments and, I am sure, those of the Committee in connection with the attempt on President Reagan's life. We wish the President a speedy recovery, and I request the delegation of the United States to transmit those wishes to its Government.

The Committee continues today its consideration of item 4 on its agenda, entitled "Chemical weapons".

Before giving the floor to Ambassador Erdembileg, I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to congratulate him and the Soviet Union on the successful conclusion of the first space flight of a citizen of Mongolia. I have learned that the Soviet-Mongolian team returned successfully to earth yesterday.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Comrade Chairman, the delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic would like to associate itself fully with the high praise of your activities and the words of sincere gratitude which many members of the Committee have addressed to you.

Under your skilful and enterprising leadership the Committee has made great efforts during the month of March to find mutually acceptable solutions to the priority issues on its agenda.

I am particularly pleased to note that much of the credit for this is due to you, the representative of the German Democratic Republic, with which Mongolia is bound by durable ties of fraternal friendship and close and extensive co-operation.

Comrade Chairman, allow me on behalf of the Mongolian delegation to express to you our most sincere thanks for the warm words of greeting and congratulation addressed to us on the occasion of the joint space flight of the Mongolian-Soviet crew of the orbital scientific research unit "Salyut-6" -- "Soyuz-T-4" -- "Soyuz-39" under the long-term "Interkosmos" research programme.

The Mongolian people, together with the peoples of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and with its friends abroad, is experiencing days of great joy and pride.

Yesterday the Soviet-Mongolian crew returned safely to their native earth. In the space of a week they had conducted an extensive programme of scientific research which is, in particular, of immense importance to Mongolia's national economy.

It is significant that this event of historic importance took place shortly before the twentieth anniversary of the legendary flight by Yury Gagarin and immediately before the 18th Congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and the glorious sixtieth anniversary of the establishment of people's power on Mongolia's ancient land. It convincingly demonstrates the remarkable attainments of the countries of the socialist community in the conquest of space in the interests of peace and progress and for the good of all the peoples of our planet.

(Mr. Erdembiles, Mongolia)

We note with profound satisfaction that the impressive results of the first Soviet-Mongolian space flight will not only add a luminous page to the chronicle of Mongolian-Soviet friendship and all-round co-operation, but will also make a worthy contribution to the cause of the peaceful use of space for the good of all mankind.

In my statement today I should like to refer to the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons, on the discussion of which the Committee embarked last week.

The Mongolian People's Republic is one of the consistent advocates of the achievement of practical measures in the sphere of the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons. It has invariably supported and still supports the complete destruction of the material base for the conduct of chemical warfare, the effective prohibition of all types of chemical weapons and the elimination of stockpiles of such weapons of mass destruction.

It may be recalled that in 1972 the Mongolian delegation was a co-author, with the delegations of Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian SSR and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of a draft convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons (CCD/361) which was submitted to the Committee. Our position is unambiguous; it is clear and it has a specific goal.

At the beginning of its 1981 session, the Committee on Disarmament, bearing in mind resolution 35/144 B adopted at the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly, decided to re-establish the Ad Hoc Working Group with a view to the continuation of the all-round examination of the substance of the problems involved and the earliest possible completion of negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Last year a certain degree of progress was achieved in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons. We recall, however, that not all questions were considered in depth owing to shortage of time. At the present stage, the Working Group, having already embarked upon the continuation of its work, has set itself the goal of striving for concrete results. Many speakers have rightly pointed out that it should engage in a more detailed examination of the issues on which there already appears to be a more or less general convergence of views. That applies, above all, to the scope of a prohibition.

In the course of discussion of that issue, the delegations of the Soviet Union, Poland and Mongolia jointly submitted to the Working Group document CD/CW/WP.11, which reflects our approach to the question of the scope of a prohibition. I should like to recall that in working document CD/123 the Mongolian delegation demonstrated the unacceptable nature of the proposal by some delegations for the inclusion in the convention of the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. In that connection, allow me to say that our point of view remains unchanged. The use of chemical weapons is prohibited under the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and, consequently, its duplication in another international instrument would lead to the injuring and revision of existing agreements and would be detrimental to authoritative treaties which represent important norms of international law.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

The proposal to extend the scope of the prohibition of chemical weapons to include planning, organization and training for the use of such weapons of mass destruction is also unacceptable to us. The Mongolian delegation has repeatedly adduced arguments in support of its position within the Working Group and, more particularly, in working paper CD/CW/WP.11. We consider that this proposal not only does not make for a "comprehensive" prohibition of chemical weapons but also renders negotiations considerably more complex and creates new, additional difficulties in the elaboration of an appropriate convention.

With regard to the question of what should be prohibited and the principal definitions that should be worked out and included in the text of the convention, the Mongolian delegation fully supports the idea that the convention should prohibit such things as chemical warfare agents, chemical munitions, precursors, chemical weapons, equipment or systems and production means or facilities. As for the formulation of specific definitions, our view is that the definitions agreed on by the Soviet Union and the United States of America for such basic terms as chemical weapons, super-toxic lethal chemical, harmful chemical, etc., would be of considerable help in this respect.

We are generally of the opinion that negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons within the framework of the Committee should follow the lines of the general provisions worked out by the Soviet Union and the United States of America and contained in their joint report dated 7 July 1980. The multilateral efforts undertaken in the Committee on Disarmament should facilitate the resumption and continuation of bilateral negotiations in that field.

Allow me now to make some observations on the question of the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

Mongolia's position on this issue is reflected in document CD/23, jointly prepared by a group of socialist countries, whose contents are well known to Committee members. I shall therefore confine myself simply to reminding the Committee of the central idea of that proposal. In our view, the most effective way of strengthening security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States would be to conclude an appropriate international document of a legally binding character.

As you know, General Assembly resolution 35/154, of which Mongolia was one of the original sponsors, calls upon States participating in talks on the question of providing guarantees to non-nuclear States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to make efforts for the speedy elaboration and conclusion of an international convention on this matter.

Without going into the details of the discussion which has taken place in the past and is continuing at the present stage of the Committee's work, we should like, apart from anything else, to note that in the Ad Hoc Working Group set up by the Committee, efforts are being made to identify the common elements contained in unilateral declarations by nuclear-weapon States with a view to finding eventually a common formula which might serve as the basis for international arrangements on so-called negative guarantees.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

In that connection we note the constructive approach of the Soviet delegation, which recently stated in this forum that it was prepared to display flexibility and to take a definite step towards bringing the various positions together, on condition that such steps are also taken by its negotiating partners and especially those from among the nuclear-weapon States.

The Mongolian delegation, like many others, considers that the Committee on Disarmament can continue studying the proposal concerning the possibility that the Security Council might, upon the recommendation of the General Assembly, consider the question of concrete steps to provide guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

I should add that this, being an interim arrangement, should not take the place of the necessary efforts to reach agreement on a common approach acceptable to all, which could be reflected in an international document of a binding character.

We think it would be useful in this connection if the Ad Hoc Working Group were to make efforts to identify common or similar elements in the approaches of States as a whole to the problem of the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

The General Assembly resolution I have mentioned also calls upon all nuclear-weapon States, as a first step towards the conclusion of such an international convention, to make solemn declarations, identical in substance, concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States having no such weapons on their territories. The resolution further recommends that the Security Council should examine declarations which may be made by nuclear States regarding the strengthening of security guarantees for non-nuclear States and, if all these declarations are found consistent with the above-mentioned objective, should adopt an appropriate resolution approving them.

I should like to remind the Committee that in the voting on this resolution as a whole in the First Committee of the General Assembly, the United States of America voted against, France and the United Kingdom and their allies abstained and China did not participate at all.

It seems to us that positive results in this important matter can be achieved only if all participants in the negotiations, and especially all nuclear-weapon States, display the necessary political will and sufficient determination.

We think that judgements as to the greater or lesser responsibility of certain nuclear Powers are inadmissible, as is a differentiated approach to them as major or secondary Powers depending on the might of their nuclear arsenals. In the matter of strengthening security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States, all nuclear-weapon States should bear equal responsibility in the provision of these guarantees to non-nuclear States.

On this point the Mongolian delegation cannot agree with the representative of one nuclear-weapon Power who, in his recent statement in the Committee, tried to maintain that the major nuclear-weapon Powers alone should bear the basic responsibility for the provision of negative guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

The Mongolian People's Republic proceeds on the principle that the elaboration and application of measures in connection with the limitation of the nuclear arms race and with nuclear disarmament are indissolubly linked with the strengthening of political and international legal guarantees of the security of States.

We continue to attach exceptionally great importance to the question of the renunciation of the use of force in international relations, which is inseparably linked with the prohibition for all time of the use of nuclear weapons. In that connection I should like to draw attention to the timeliness of the Soviet Union's proposal for the elaboration and conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations. It must be said that because of the position adopted by those who do not wish to renounce the use of force and diktat in international relations, that important initiative has not as yet met with a positive solution.

It is Mongolia's view that implementation of the proposal by States members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization for the conclusion among all States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe of a treaty under which each party would undertake not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons against the other parties, as well as their proposal for the holding of an international conference on military détente and disarmament in Europe, would greatly assist the solution of problems connected with the strengthening of security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States.

Among the constructive initiatives aimed at strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation régime and the achievement of a universally acceptable solution directly connected with providing security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States should be counted the Soviet proposal concerning the conclusion of an agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of States where there are no such weapons at present.

In addition to the above, I should like to draw attention to General Assembly resolution 33/91 F of 16 December 1978, which calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to refrain from stationing nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present, and also calls upon all non-nuclear-weapon States which do not have nuclear weapons on their territory to refrain from any steps which would directly or indirectly result in the stationing of such weapons on their territories.

Committee members will also be familiar with General Assembly resolution 35/156 C which contains a request to our Committee to proceed without delay to talks with a view to elaborating an international agreement on this subject and to submit a report on the question to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.

There can be no doubt that the conclusion of an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present would represent an important step towards the strengthening of peace and international security, and, more particularly, towards the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation régime.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

In this connection I should like to point out that the Committee has yet to examine the question of the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present. We think it would also be useful to discuss the proposal by a group of socialist countries that an ad hoc working group on this question should be set up within the Committee.

We are all aware that nuclear weapons pose an extremely grave danger for the whole of mankind. Few will dispute the truth that the achievement of genuine measures of nuclear disarmament would be the best guarantee of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

That is why the task of reaching agreement on ending the production of nuclear weapons and destroying them is at present coming to the fore.

It is a known fact that the socialist countries have always been and remain firm and consistent advocates of nuclear disarmament. They were responsible for the well-known initiatives reflected in document CD/4 concerning an immediate start to talks in preparation for genuine negotiations on nuclear disarmament. In that document it is stated that appropriate negotiations should be conducted with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States as well as of a certain number of non-nuclear-weapon States and that agreement on ending the production of nuclear weapons and destroying them can be reached only provided there is strict observance of the principle of non-impairment of the security interests of the parties.

The importance of the observance of this principle in disarmament negotiations was once again emphasized in the recent statement by the representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador V. Issraelyan. In particular, he stated with the utmost clarity the Soviet delegation's position on the subject of the currently existing parity of military forces and the military and strategic balance between two States or between the major military-political groupings. The representative of the Soviet Union stated that "Attempts to distort the content of the concept of equal security and military parity do nothing to advance the cause of disarmament. Some people would apparently like to close their eyes to one of the main political realities of the world today, namely, the presence of two opposing military-political blocs, one of which comprises three nuclear-weapon States and many large militarily-prominent States. Furthermore, yet another nuclear-weapon Power acts in parallel with this bloc on the international scene".

I should like to stress once again that the constructive participation of all nuclear-weapon States without exception in negotiations on halting the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, with strict observance of the principles underlying those negotiations, could only lead to a positive solution of that vitally important problem of modern times which is the difficult and complex problem of general and complete disarmament.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Comrade Chairman, we should like to devote our statement today to the issue of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The Soviet Union has been consistently speaking in favour of outlawing and eliminating chemical warfare means. It has endeavoured to reach this objective both before the Second World War and during the post-war period. In March 1972, the USSR together with other socialist countries submitted to the Committee a draft of an international convention to this end. In recent years the Soviet side has been conducting negotiations with the United States on this matter, and sufficiently detailed information thereon was presented to the Committee on Disarmament in 1979 and 1980. From the very outset we have been actively participating in the multilateral negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament. It appears to us that the Ad Hoc Working Group of the Committee on this question has achieved a certain amount of progress. Discussions held in the Group have revealed the closeness of views on some aspects of this complex problem, although so far there are more divergences in views than convergences. Nevertheless, it is to be hoped that eventually the realistic approach will prevail and the work done in the Group will make a useful contribution to the process of working out the convention.

In this context, the Soviet delegation would like to emphasize that it concurs with the opinion of those delegations which deem it particularly necessary to adopt the correct approach to one of the most complex issues, namely, that of ensuring the fulfilment by the States parties to the future convention of the obligations they have assumed.

The question of verification is an important issue. It is well known that in the course of the numerous negotiations on disarmament issues during the post-war period the failure to agree on this particular question was the root cause of the lack of success in the negotiations. We are more and more often facing a situation where the question of verification acts as a brake, hampering the achievement of genuine results. This applies, inter alia, to measures which could substantially limit the sphere of the arms race, and in the first place the qualitative arms race, and reverse it. As a result of the artificial magnification of the verification issues, the attainment of agreements is rendered more difficult, if not impossible. Moreover, there have even been certain attempts to take advantage of the verification issue by making use of the fact that verification is linked with a multitude of complex technical, military and other questions which are difficult for the general public to understand and can therefore be presented in a light that is advantageous to a country which does not want the agreement in question.

The Soviet delegation feels it necessary to present certain general considerations on the verification issue. First of all, we wish to recall certain basic approaches and concepts relating to these matters, some of which in the past have undermined the possibility of reaching agreements in the disarmament field.

What are these concepts? First and foremost, there is the concept which could be expressed in the following words: first verification and then disarmament, that is, essentially, the establishment of verification without disarmament. This

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

concept was widely and persistently advocated by our partners in disarmament negotiations at the end of the 1940s and in the early 1950s. Some proposals which are being advanced even now are in a certain measure an echo of this kind of approach which has turned out to be unsound and has in the past led a number of disarmament negotiations to a deadlock.

Close to this concept is an approach which is based on the assumption that the possibilities of verification determine the scope of an agreement in the disarmament field. What is being suggested is to move from verification to disarmament, and not the other way round -- from agreement on the scope of disarmament to control. Special emphasis is laid on the extensive discussion of every possible technical detail of the verification issues even when the principal questions regarding the scope of a specific disarmament measure have not yet been defined and resolved. Thus, room is created for manoeuvring in the negotiations. One issue is made dependent on another; one technical problem gives rise to many others, and instead of the substantive resolution of major issues, the negotiations become mired down in fruitless and lengthy deliberations on various technical questions.

The "arms control" concept has gained wide dissemination in the West. This concept plays a certain part in the implementation of some measures to restrain the arms race. However, the great drawback of this concept is that control over existing armaments takes the place of verification of disarmament. It would be possible, under this concept, for things to reach the point where the development of new types of weaponry could be interpreted as a positive factor. It must be observed, furthermore, that, under the pretext of arms control, attempts have repeatedly been made to damage the defence interests of the other side.

We wish particularly to speak of what might be called the "concept of distrust" which we quite frequently encounter in the Committee on Disarmament also. Under this concept, every party to a convention is regarded as a potential violator of its provisions, as one who will do everything possible to ensure that his neighbours ban and destroy their weapons while he himself keeps his so that he can use them either for deterrence or for a direct attack. On the basis of this approach, the significance of intrusive international verification is being exaggerated in every possible way and comprehensive, systematic and total international on-site inspections are being proposed, while at the same time the effectiveness of the contemporary national means of verification is being underestimated and neglected.

Let us examine what this concept of distrust can lead to, using as an example the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

As everyone knows, modern industrial chemical production is characterized by its tremendous scale. Already now in some countries the number of enterprises amounts to many thousands. Moreover, we are witnessing an extremely complex interlinkage of chemical production with other branches of industry, in particular mechanical engineering. In these conditions, if we proceed on the basis of the concept of distrust, no matter how much we expand and complicate the verification system, no matter how comprehensive we strive to render it, we shall never reach the point at which we can be sure that no uncertainties have been left concerning some important aspect or other of the activities of States related to the observance of all the provisions of a convention banning chemical weapons.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

To take another example, in the debates on questions of the prohibition of chemical weapons, mention has frequently been made of such chemicals as phosgene and hydrogen cyanide, which were used to fill munitions during the First World War. Incidentally, these chemicals are also mentioned in the working paper by the Chinese delegation which was distributed today. At the same time, their production for peaceful purposes at present is measured in hundreds of thousands of tons. It appears neither possible nor advisable to restrict the use of phosgene and hydrogen cyanide for peaceful purposes. Well, do we have now to place under control the entire production of these substances? Or do we have to fill enterprises with hundreds and thousands of foreign inspectors? And once again the same question arises: guided by the concept of distrust, can we be sure that a suspect State is not using these chemicals for prohibited purposes?

One more example. Many delegations have rightly pointed to the need to destroy chemical munitions and to end their development and production. Certainly, appropriate provisions should be included in the future convention, but it is also clear that there are probably nowhere in the world metalworking industries whose sole object is to produce unfilled munitions exclusively and only for chemical weapons. What follows from this? Would we really have to place under control all metalworking enterprises?

Further, the need to verify the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles is obvious. But what kind of verification, and in what forms? Let us suppose, for example, that through the conduct of systematic international on-site inspections with the help of a whole army of inspectors we manage to confirm accurately enough that States have indeed destroyed the declared stocks of chemical weapons. But since those inspections would be based on the concept of distrust, on a presumption of the inclination of States to cheat, then we would have to be consistent and assume that States would try not to declare all the chemical weapons at their disposal. In that case, we may ask, what would be gained by such verification of the destruction of the declared stocks?

There is also the question as to how it would be possible to check whether or not this or that State was developing new types of chemical weapons, such as binary or multicomponent weapons. In her book entitled The Game of Disarmament, Alva Myrdal writes that it is virtually impossible to control binary weapons because their components are not weapons as such until they are combined. Of course, binary weapons will be subject to prohibition, but how will it be in this case? Do we have to ensure that all chemical production is the subject of on-site verification involving a countless number of inspectors? Obviously not.

Or again, for example, what about a situation where a State which is a potential violator of the convention is preparing for a chemical war by using the production capacities of its allies, which are not parties to the convention, or is using their territories for activities prohibited under the convention?

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Many other examples could be given to demonstrate the unsoundness of the "concept of distrust" and of the proposals it gives rise to regarding intrusive verification.

What, then, is the position of the Soviet Union on the question of verification? We wish to stress that we are in favour of strict and effective international control. The many proposals put forward by the Soviet Union with regard to the limitation of the arms race and disarmament have always provided for some form of verification of the implementation of the measure we have proposed. We are parties to agreements which provide for both national and international measures of verification and some of them envisage a combination of these.

I should like to point out that we have no reason for trusting others any more than others trust us. The Soviet Union believes that the main function of a system for ensuring compliance with disarmament agreements -- of which verification is an integral part -- is to give the parties to these agreements assurance of their observance by other parties, and through the employment of certain forms of co-operation to facilitate the resolution of questions in dispute thus ensuring the implementation by the States parties in good faith of the obligations they have assumed and building confidence between them. At the same time, the elaboration of specific forms of verification and other elements of the system for ensuring compliance with the relevant agreements, so that they fulfil their ultimate purpose, should be based on a number of important political principles.

Certain basic principles underlying our approach to questions of verification may be summarized as follows: (1) the conduct of verification should in no way prejudice the sovereign rights of States or permit interference in their internal affairs; (2) verification cannot exist without disarmament but must stem from a precise and clear agreement on measures for the limitation of armaments and for disarmament; (3) the scope and forms of verification should be commensurate with the character and scope of the specific obligations established in the relevant agreement relating to the limitation of armaments and disarmament; (4) the detailed elaboration of the verification provisions is possible only after an agreement on the scope of the prohibition has been mapped out; (5) we proceed from the assumption that a State becomes a party to a convention not in order to violate it but in order to abide strictly by the obligations it has assumed under it, and therefore that verification should not be built upon the principle of total distrust by States of one another, and should not take the form of global suspiciousness, but should simply be a link -- perhaps a very important one but still only a link -- in the chain of other measures ensuring confidence in the observance of the convention by all its parties; (6) international forms of verification should be limited; and lastly, (7) we also take into account the very

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

important circumstance that in the conditions of the present-day development of science and technology, any fairly less serious violation of an agreement in the field of disarmament, including the sphere of chemical weapons, has no chance of remaining undetected for very long.

Past experience shows that the settlement of verification issues has always depended on whether or not the various parties have the political will to conclude the relevant agreement. In spite of the difficulties involved in the solution of the complex technical problems of verification, it has proved possible for treaties to be concluded between the USSR and the United States of America on, for example, the limitation of strategic armaments and on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, which contain appropriate provisions relating to verification.

We resolutely oppose the elaboration of verification measures in isolation from the specific contents of this or that measure pertaining to the limitation of armaments or disarmament, its nature and significance in a broader context of disarmament, in isolation from the possible existence of other international norms or agreements ensuring the observance of the measure in question, and without seeing in due proportion the danger of non-compliance with this measure as compared with the negative consequences of superfluous interference in the peaceful activities of States and of the disclosure of commercial and technical secrets in certain spheres of industry. In other words, we are against giving absolute pre-eminence to verification and carrying it to absurd lengths; we are in favour of reasonable, balanced verification on the scale that is truly necessary -- no more, no less.

This is not merely our own point of view. As a result of the discussions held last year in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, agreement has been reached on a balanced approach to questions of verifying compliance with obligations under a convention on the prohibition of such weapons. The statements at the plenary meetings of the Committee on Disarmament and the papers presented by a number of States also contain quite a number of interesting thoughts on this subject. They were expressed, in particular, by the delegations of Brazil, Netherlands, France, Canada, Belgium and a number of others.

We believe that we should listen to the voice of all those who are in favour of well-founded moderation in the approach to the scope, forms, nature and methods of verification, and of ensuring that verification is a means of guaranteeing compliance with the convention and not an end in itself.

The Soviet Union delegation, for its part, intends to be guided by this precise approach, remembering that it alone leads to a success.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, the Pakistan delegation would like to offer a few comments regarding the item on chemical weapons which the Committee is currently examining in plenary.

My delegation appreciates the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons and admires the energetic efforts made by Ambassador Lidgard to structure its deliberations with a view to resolving the numerous issues that are involved in the elaboration of an international convention. The discussions in the Ad Hoc Working Group, including in particular the contributions made by experts from various countries, have been illuminating. However, it remains the position of my delegation that the first order of business is to reach political decisions on the major issues involved in the elaboration of a chemical weapon convention. But these political decisions can be reached only once the Ad Hoc Working Group is entrusted with the task of actually negotiating an international convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons. We are, therefore, happy to note the statement of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group that he perceives a sufficient degree of convergence in views to enable the group to commence the task of negotiating a CW convention in the very near future. We hope that the appropriate mandate will be given to the Working Group before the end of our spring session.

I wish to elaborate Pakistan's views on some of the major issues on which political decisions will be necessary in the course of elaborating a CW convention.

A most important issue on which there is as yet considerable divergence of views concerns the scope of the proposed convention. Pakistan favours a comprehensive, effective and equitable treaty which would prohibit the development, stockpiling, acquisition and use of CW and entail the total destruction of existing stockpiles, facilities and delivery systems of chemical weapons.

Certain delegations have reservations regarding the inclusion of the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in this convention. My delegation does not consider that this would in any way erode the effectiveness of the 1925 Geneva Protocol to which the CW convention should constitute an essential supplement. Such a reaffirmation of the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons is necessary if the convention is to be truly comprehensive in nature. However, my delegation remains flexible about the precise manner in which the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons can be reflected in the convention. This could be included in the definition of its scope, separately, in a Protocol or in an annex, or in some way linked with the provisions relating to verification of the obligations entailed in the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

In seeking the most comprehensive scope for a CW convention we reacted positively towards the proposal submitted by Sweden also to ban "chemical warfare capabilities". But we are prepared to be convinced that a ban on such activities cannot be realistically verified. At the same time, my delegation would reject any partial approach to the prohibition of chemical weapons, since this would leave open the danger of the use of CW and discriminate against the developing countries which do not at present possess the capability to produce such weapons.

Therefore, in the definition of chemical warfare, we would accept the inclusion of all kinds of chemical weapons whose toxic properties can be used to cause death, injury or harm to human beings, animals and plant life as a means of securing military or political objectives. The ban should encompass not only lethal chemical agents but also incapacitants. The latter can also prove to be lethal if used in concentrated forms or against unprotected populations. Reports about the use of chemical agents in certain current conflicts bear out this contention.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

While the convention would have to allow certain "permitted uses", these should be defined as clearly as possible and, if necessary, a list of permitted uses should be included in an annex to the convention. Obviously, the maintenance of law and order would be one of the permitted uses; but this should not be interpreted so broadly as to include even armed conflicts as defined in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Protocols to those Conventions adopted recently.

The central provision of the chemical weapons convention will be the one requiring the declaration and early destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles, facilities and means of delivery. We share the view expressed by the representative of Brazil that the CW convention should constitute an exchange of obligations between States which agree not to acquire such weapons and those States which possess such chemical weapons and are in turn expected to destroy them completely. In agreeing to the destruction of chemical stockpiles, facilities and delivery systems, those States which currently possess chemical weapons would do well to bear in mind that such weapons, in contrast with other weapons of mass destruction, are relatively cheap and easy to manufacture and could be acquired by more than a score of States should the prohibition and destruction of such weapons be inordinately delayed.

Ideally, the declarations to be made by States possessing chemical weapons should be made even before the signature of the convention as a confidence building measure in order to induce and encourage other States to adhere to the convention. In any case, there would be no justification for delaying such declarations beyond the signature by the States concerned of the convention. Secondly, these declarations should be detailed and comprehensive, covering the size, nature and location of stockpiles, production facilities, munition-filling facilities and delivery systems, together with an indication of the timing and methods for their destruction or mothballing. The time between the declaration and the destruction of stocks and facilities should not be too long and should commence as soon as possible after the treaty comes into force.

The Pakistan delegation is as yet to be convinced by the assertion in the joint report of the United States of America and the USSR that the destruction of stocks and facilities would take up to 10 years, especially in the light of the statement made by a distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany last week that installations have been developed to destroy toxic agents "at a reasonable cost and without danger to the environment". If the destruction of stocks and facilities is to involve a long period, we would propose that in the interim between their declaration and destruction, they should be placed under some sort of direct or indirect international control. We realize that certain technical and conceptual problems relating to the destruction of stocks and facilities have to be resolved and that agreement is still pending on such questions as the definition of production facilities, the problem of precursors and so forth, but we do not believe that these technical problems are insurmountable.

The procedures for verification included in the convention would constitute its backbone, and will be essential to give assurance that the obligations regarding the destruction of stockpiles and facilities and for the non-acquisition of chemical weapons are being complied with by all parties. There is agreement that verification would involve a combination of national and international means and that international verification would, in certain circumstances, entail intrusive procedures to ensure compliance. It is necessary to build on this broad agreement of principle. As regards national verification procedures, it is obvious that they will differ from State to State in accordance with the level of development and nature of its chemical industry. On the other hand, the nature and intrusiveness of international

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

verification procedures would have to be determined in relation to the kind of activity that is to be verified. For instance, it is clear that some form of on-site inspection would be required to oversee the destruction of stockpiles and facilities. We believe that it would be beneficial to conduct an in-depth examination of the contention reiterated by the Federal Republic of Germany that it is possible to conduct on-site verification without compromising the commercial secrets of the chemical industry.

As regards international procedures for verification, we favour the establishment of an independent international organization which would have the technical and financial resources to undertake the collection and dissemination of information and to conduct on-site and off-site inspection as well as to investigate suspected violations of the convention. One essential feature of the verification system should be to provide equal access for all parties to information regarding compliance, and equal opportunity to raise complaints regarding suspected violations of the convention. Therefore, my delegation could not agree to place ultimate reliance on the Security Council for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the convention, in view of the inherent inequality entailed in the procedures of the Council between the five permanent members and other States.

The convention should include provisions relating to protective measures. Such measures would have to distinguish carefully between offensive and defensive capabilities. An important aspect of such protective measures is to redress the disadvantage of the developing countries with respect to a CW capability. The developing countries have virtually no protection against even a low-level chemical attack. The convention should create categorical obligations for assistance to developing countries in training and equipping them with protective measures. It should commit specific resources for this purpose. The universal availability of at least some basic measures of protection would provide an added assurance that the use of chemical weapons will not be contemplated since a potential aggressor would have to use more sophisticated chemical weapons and consequently increase the risk of detection and retaliation.

But protection should not be restricted only to the technical measures. My delegation believes that until the chemical weapons stocks and facilities in the possession of some States have been completely destroyed, the convention should contain a reaffirmation of the obligation of States under Article 51 of the Charter, whereby a State which is the victim of a chemical attack, or threat of attack, should be assisted by other States, jointly or individually, in exercising its right of self-defence.

Finally, my delegation shares the views expressed by many non-aligned and neutral countries that the chemical weapons convention should include specific provisions regarding the promotion of international co-operation in the field of chemical technology. It should also include a provision for the transfer of resources released as a result of chemical disarmament for the economic and social development of the developing countries.

In conclusion, let me once again express the hope that after the conclusion of the current phase of its work, the Ad Hoc Working Group will be given a mandate to commence concrete negotiations for the elaboration of an international convention to ban chemical weapons.

Mr. LUKES (Czechoslovakia): Comrade Chairman, our plenary meeting today is the last one of our Committee in the month of March. It is also the last one under your effective guidance. Let me therefore express the highest appreciation of my delegation for your wisdom and skill in acting as Chairman during this important period. It is of great significance that our Committee has succeeded in moving forward on the important agenda items on CTB and nuclear disarmament. We are sure that a fair basis for the creation of working groups on these two items has been formed. This gives me one more reason to congratulate you, the representative of a neighbouring socialist country, the German Democratic Republic, once again.

My delegation is firmly convinced that your endeavour will be of great assistance to your successor, Ambassador Pfeiffer, the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany. We are looking forward to co-operating with him in the month of April.

In my intervention today, which is going to be a brief one, I would like to comment on agenda items 4 and 5, dealing with chemical weapons and new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons and radiological weapons.

My delegation attaches an extreme importance to the negotiations of the CD devoted to the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, and otherwise acquiring or retaining of chemical warfare agents and chemical munitions.

The rapid development of the natural sciences as well as a deeper understanding of biochemical processes in living organisms and the development of the chemical industry provide new possibilities for increasing the destructiveness of these means of mass destruction. This makes them more accessible and more effective and creates possibilities for producing and accumulating enormous quantities of these chemical warfare agents.

Therefore there is an increasing need to conclude the convention under negotiation.

In this connection we appreciate the report on the USSR-United States bilateral negotiations in document CD/112. This report is evidently based on detailed technical analysis and should be evaluated as a distinct progress in the preparation of the convention.

It has become also a most useful background for discussion in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. We are hopeful that a new round of bilateral negotiations will start in the nearest future in order to help the Committee to proceed to the final discussion with a view to the early conclusion of the convention.

We must be aware that while the discussion in the CD is going on, new chemical weapons and new improved chemical warfare agents are being developed, according to press reports. Discussion on starting the production of chemical warfare agents seems to be proceeding in countries which have stopped their production. Higher amounts of military budgets are being devoted to research into how to increase the destructiveness of chemical weapons and chemical warfare agents. We have to make a historic choice. Either we succeed in banning all the chemical weapons or the accumulation of more destructive chemical warfare agents, which even now are a serious menace to mankind, will continue in a new spiral of the arms race.

(Mr. Lukes, Czechoslovakia)

--Our country attaches a great importance to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which provides for the prohibition of the use of chemical warfare agents. The validity of this significant agreement, which was signed by more than 100 countries, should be emphasized in the future treaty.

Our delegation welcomed the establishment of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons and appreciates the efforts of Ambassador Lidgard in the post of its Chairman.

According to ongoing discussions in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, there exists a consensus of many delegations on some problems, particularly on the relevance of the use of the general purpose criterion and the additional criteria of toxicity and the basic classification of chemicals, which would enable us to adopt different degrees of verification of compliance with the future treaty. In this connection we would like to stress the role of States parties to the future treaty which will evidently have the obligation to take internal legislative measures ensuring the observance of the treaty.

By application of the general purpose criterion the State party to the treaty should elaborate a method of control of toxic chemicals produced, with special emphasis on control of the amount and the final use. All States parties to the treaty should guarantee the evaluation of all toxic chemicals which are to be brought into production.

The evaluation of chemicals as well as the control of production can be realized with the help of national control organs. The national control could, if necessary, be supplemented by certain international procedures in the case of allegations.

The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, like other socialist countries, has already for a long time been stressing the need to agree as soon as possible on effective measures aimed at preventing further misuse of new scientific and technological achievements for military purposes in general and for the development and production of still more destructive and sophisticated types of weapons of mass destruction in particular. It cannot be denied that science and technology have now reached such a level that the danger of the creation of more and more sophisticated and dangerous weapons than those already existing is really very grave and acute. We therefore cannot accept arguments asking for further postponement of the solution of this essential and vital problem.

This attitude leads us to voice once again our full support for last year's proposal by the Soviet Union for the establishment of a special group of qualified governmental experts which should meet on a regular basis and consider either the preparation of the general prohibition treaty or specific agreements on banning individual types of new weapons of mass destruction. My delegation, as was already stressed in our statement of 10 April 1980, is ready to participate in such a group as soon as necessary. The sooner this necessity arrives the better.

At present, when the world community is fearfully following NATO's plans as regards neutron weapons, the proposal for a convention prohibiting the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of neutron weapons is more and more urgent. The CD has been waiting for the initiation of negotiations on this vital problem for three successive years.

(Mr. Lukes, Czechoslovakia)

May I now turn to the next main item on the agenda, the prohibition of radiological weapons. The item has been dealt with in the Working Group under the skilled chairmanship of Ambassador Kómives. We appreciate the positive approach of the majority of delegations, enabling the Working Group to carry out substantive deliberations on the definition of radiological weapons, the scope of the prohibition and some other main elements of the future convention. However, in spite of a considerable effort, only a modest progress has been achieved in drafting a commonly acceptable text for the main paragraphs.

In the view of the Czechoslovak delegation, one of the main obstacles is the controversy regarding the understanding of the scope of the convention, as well as its role within the general context of disarmament negotiations.

In spite of the fact that we are dealing with a potential weapons system we are convinced that the existing information does allow the establishment of a reasonably sound framework for the convention.

At the same time it should be clear that the convention cannot become a substitute for urgently needed efforts in various other fields. It certainly cannot solve the much more complex problem of the prohibition of nuclear weapons. Within this context it has, however, an important supporting role, eliminating all other uses of radioactive material for military purposes.

Nor can a convention prohibiting radiological weapons solve the extremely complicated complex of questions regarding the peaceful deployment of nuclear energy, including also such problems as the risk of nuclear reactor accidents in wartime.

The importance of the last problem has been well recognized, and it has been reflected in important documents of international law, specifically in the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. This fact has already been stressed by a number of delegations, and we share the view that the Additional Protocols are the most adequate instrument of international law in this case.

Trying to examine the problem with regard to the disarmament negotiations and the RW Convention we find the situation rather confusing.

According to the qualified opinion of experts, the operations of nuclear reactors have several important characteristics. Reactor operations must to a large extent go on indefinitely, whether the plant produces power or not. The cooling system cannot be switched off. If the cooling and the emergency cooling systems stopped, disaster would follow, resulting in widespread contamination of the environment with radionuclides. This would probably be the most likely mechanism of serious accidents.

Under normal conditions the nuclear installation can be kept under reliable control. This requires, however, sophisticated systems of technical measures and devices, as well as perfectly organized work by highly qualified personnel.

There seems little doubt that under the conditions of a modern total war the vulnerability of the nuclear reactors, that is, the probability of such accidents, would be enormous. No direct attack would be needed. The over-all destruction

(Mr. Lukes, Czechoslovakia)

of water-supply, communications and other systems, so common during a war, could make the normal maintenance of the reactor, including the measures needed for safety, impossible. It seems evident that a number of largely unpredictable factors might play the fatal role. We consider it really impossible to include all such complex and variable elements in one specific convention prohibiting radiological weapons.

The problem of nuclear reactors makes it once more clear that in a highly developed society war can no more be a means of solving the problems of international life. The risk of annihilation of the whole of civilization has become too high. The disarmament negotiations are aimed at the abolition of such a risk. It seems clear enough, however, that a step-by-step solution of different concrete questions is the only way to reach the general goal.

In the view of the Czechoslovak delegation, the conclusion of an *EW* convention will be a valuable contribution to this process. We are ready to work with all other delegations to solve the problems still existing as efficiently as possible. We should like to express our sincere belief that the Committee will be in a position to submit a draft treaty to the General Assembly in the near future.

The convention must have a clearly formulated scope, corresponding to the general principles of disarmament negotiations and to the mandate of this Committee. That is, it should be aimed at prohibiting well-defined radiological weapons, their development, production, stockpiling and use.

As already mentioned in one of the Czechoslovak delegation's statements in the Working Group, the term radiological weapons has a specific historical background and a distinct, broadly accepted meaning.

In a contemporary war, weapons are used for different purposes, and not only for their immediate effect against man on the battlefield. They are also employed to make the enemy unable to use the human and material resources of the country. The rear, large population centres, transportation systems, industrial bases, etc., are equally or even more important targets. If these aspects and the dimensions of the total war are taken into consideration, the possible military deployment of radiological weapons might be assessed more realistically.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Lukes, the representative of Czechoslovakia, for his statement, as well as for the very kind words he addressed to me.

Mr. DESIMOIE (United States of America): I wanted to take the floor to respond, on behalf of the delegation of the United States of America, to the remarks that you made at the beginning of this meeting. I should like to convey to you, Mr. Chairman, and through you to all my distinguished colleagues here present, our appreciation and gratitude for the numerous expressions of concern, good wishes and encouragement concerning the incident to which you referred in your remarks.

As all the distinguished representatives here are, no doubt, aware, President Reagan sustained a gunshot wound yesterday in Washington, as a result of a senseless act of violence against a small group in a public place. I am pleased to convey to you, to be able to say, that we have received a most optimistic report, that the President is in a good, stable condition, and that the medical prognosis is for a complete and speedy recovery.

(Mr. DeSimone, United States)

Mr. Chairman, I should also like to take this opportunity to assure you and, through you, my distinguished colleagues here that, of course, the continuity of the Government of the United States of America is ensured, and that that Government is functioning fully and effectively in spite of this unfortunate circumstance.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, thank you again. We shall convey your message to Washington and in closing, in passing, I should like to say that the absence of Ambassador Flowerree this morning of course has nothing to do with the subject of your remarks and mine: he is temporarily indisposed owing to the effect of what is apparently a virus of local origin and he hopes to be back in his place here very soon.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. Our greetings to Ambassador Flowerree, we wish him a good recovery.

Distinguished delegates, since this is the last plenary meeting in the month of March, I wish to express my gratitude to all of you for your co-operation with the chair during a period of very intensive work in the Committee on Disarmament. Thanks to the spirit of co-operation and flexibility which prevailed in this Committee during this month, very useful exchanges of views and negotiations took place on quite a number of substantive questions.

Thus, the CD was able to move one step forward -- although a very limited one -- in discharging its responsibilities concerning its priority items, namely, a nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The four ad hoc working groups, re-established or resumed under the able guidance of my predecessor, have intensified their negotiations.

It is a matter of satisfaction to me, and I trust to all delegations sitting around this table, that after a series of informal meetings and consultations by the chair, agreement was achieved on starting our substantive work concerning items 1 and 2 of the Committee's agenda. During two informal meetings the Committee held an exchange of views on prerequisites for international negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and the doctrine of deterrence.

In these informal meetings as well as at plenary meetings devoted to nuclear disarmament, many delegations have expressed interesting thoughts and tabled important proposals. In this regard let me just mention the initiatives of the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which have been submitted to the CD by the Soviet delegation. These proposals refer to the main items inscribed in our agenda. There can be no doubt that they will be thoroughly studied and taken into consideration in our future work.

Distinguished delegates, I think our exchange of views on items 1 and 2 has demonstrated that even in a tense international situation it was possible to start and to proceed with a business-like discussion of very complicated questions in the field of disarmament.

Most delegations held the view that this exercise should lead the Committee to a very practical aim -- the preparation of concrete negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

(The Chairman)

Today it is certainly too early to draw any definite conclusion from the discussions mentioned. This will have to be done later in the framework of preparations for the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Allow me, therefore, at this stage to make only some very preliminary remarks.

In the meetings on agenda items 1 and 2, virtually all delegations emphasized the urgency of effective steps to remove the threat of a nuclear war and to achieve nuclear disarmament. Many delegations rejected the doctrine of deterrence as well as other theories justifying any use of nuclear weapons.

The importance of the early starting of concrete negotiations on nuclear disarmament was widely recognized. It was stressed that this question is closely connected with the international environment. In this regard many delegations emphasized the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, stipulating that the increase in weapons, especially nuclear weapons, weakens international security, and that lasting peace can only be created through the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces. Quite a few delegations deemed the time ripe for negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

There was a widely shared view that the CD should play an active part in clarifying issues for and starting those negotiations. But it is a matter of deep regret that no consensus could be reached on the establishment of ad hoc working groups on items 1 and 2. The CD will have to deal with the corresponding proposals later on.

The failure to react quickly in a positive manner on this question should not prevent us from addressing in a more detailed manner and in the immediate future such issues as the identification of prerequisites for negotiations and the definition of their main elements.

To my mind, the first exchange of views held so far revealed the following main problems in this respect:

Which States should take part in the negotiations, and to what extent?

How should the principle of undiminished security find its application?

What relationship should exist between measures of nuclear disarmament and steps of conventional disarmament and strengthening international security?

My distinguished successors and our whole Committee will have to respond to these questions in the further course of our session. Here, as in other cases, we should bear in mind the relevant principles of the Final Document. As to participation, it states in paragraph 28: "While disarmament is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear-weapon States have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and, together with other militarily significant States, for halting and reversing the arms race. It is therefore important to secure their active participation".

I think these questions are also of relevance to the issue of a nuclear test ban which the CD will address in the forthcoming two informal meetings. Consultations by the chair will be very useful in defining the concrete items for these meetings.

(The Chairman)

They have proved their value in the month of March. May I assure my successor, Ambassador Pfeiffer of the Federal Republic of Germany, of my full co-operation in this as in other matters.

At the outset of my statement I emphasized the great importance of the negotiations taking place in our four ad hoc working groups. The Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons has entered a new stage of work in negotiating draft texts submitted by its Chairman. We all hope that this exercise will lead to a quick elaboration of a corresponding draft treaty. The Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament is in the midst of a preliminary consideration of the concrete phases and measures of the programme which will be of great importance for the forthcoming special session devoted to disarmament. Certain progress was made by the ad hoc working groups on chemical weapons and negative security guarantees in identifying the main elements of corresponding international agreements or other measures.

In this connection the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons was ably supported by well-known experts, present in these days in our midst.

Distinguished delegates, may I avail myself of this opportunity to appeal to all of you to advance by all means the negotiations in the ad hoc working groups in order to achieve tangible results before the General Assembly's second special session devoted to disarmament. I would also like to take this occasion to thank the Chairmen of the working groups for their close and fruitful co-operation with me.

In recognizing the progress in our work I cannot but express my concern that the CD has not been able to respond in an adequate manner to proposals for the establishment of an ad hoc working group on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present and an ad hoc group of experts on new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. These as well as other complicated issues can be solved if there is the corresponding political will on all sides.

In conclusion, allow me once again to express my thanks to all delegations for their understanding of my difficult tasks. I also wish to thank Ambassador Jaipal, representative of the United Nations Secretary-General and Secretary of the CD, Mr. Berasategui, his deputy, and all the staff of the Secretariat, including the interpreters and translators. Through their persistent work they have greatly assisted me in the performance of my duties.

I wish my successor, Ambassador Pfeiffer, good luck in discharging his responsible post during the month of April.

I have been requested by the incoming Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Pfeiffer, of the Federal Republic of Germany, to announce that he will hold informal consultations in Conference Room I tomorrow, Wednesday, at 3 p.m., with a view to reaching agreement on the specific subjects to be examined under item 1 at the informal meetings on 6 and 13 April, and also to exchange views on some organizational matters.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 2 April, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.