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FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTEENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 24 March 1981 at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. G. Herder (German Democratic Republic)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. SALAH-BEY  
Mr. M. MEDKOUR  
Mr. A. ABBA

Argentina: Mr. F. JIMENEZ DAVILA  
Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD

Australia: Mr. R. STEELE

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX  
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE  
Miss G. VAN DEN BERGH  
Mr. DE BISSCHOP

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA  
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV  
Mr. I. SOTIROV

Burma: U SAW HLAING  
U NGWE WIN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL  
Mr. G. SKINNER

China: Mr. YU Peiwen  
Mr. YU Mengjia  
Mr. LIN Chen  
Mr. LI Weinin

Cuba: Mr. C. PAZOS  
Mr. F. CUSPINERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. RUZEK  
Mr. J. FRANIK  
Mr. J. MORAVIC

Egypt:

Mr. I.A. HASSAN  
Mr. M.N. FAHMY  
Mr. ESSMAT EZZ

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE  
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE  
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE  
Mr. GESBERT  
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER  
Mr. K.H. LOLIS  
Mr. H. THIELICKE  
Mr. M. KAULFUSS  
Mr. P. BUNTIG

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. G. PFEIFFER  
Mr. N. KLINGLER  
Mr. H. MULLER  
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES  
Mr. C. GYORFFY  
Mr. A. LAKATOS

India:

Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN  
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. S. DARUSMAN  
Mr. I. DAMANIK  
Mr. HARYOMATARAM  
Mr. F. QASIM  
Mr. J. HADI  
Mr. KARYONO

Iran:

Mr. D. AMERI

Italy: Mr. V.C. DI MONTEZEMOLO  
Mr. B. CABRAS  
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI  
Mr. L. SALAZAR

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA  
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI  
Mr. R. ISHII  
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya: Mr. S. SHITEMI  
Mr. G. MUNIU

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
Mr. M.A. CACERES

Mongolia: Mr. S.H. LKHASHID  
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. A. SKALLI  
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN  
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS  
Mr. A.G.B. OOMS

Nigeria: Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA  
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. M. AHMAD  
Mr. M. AKRAM  
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru: Mr. P. PAREDES PORTELLA

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA  
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ  
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. T. MELESCANU  
Mr. A. SASUV

Sri Lanka: Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD  
Mr. L. NORBERG  
Mr. J. LUNDIN  
Miss G. PUU

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN  
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV  
Mr. L.A. NAUMOV  
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO  
Mr. J.N. RIUKHINE

United Kingdom: Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES  
Mrs. J.I. LINK

United States of America: Mr. C.C. FLOWEREE  
Mr. F. DESIMONE  
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER  
Mr. J.A. MISKEL  
Mr. M. SANCHES  
Mr. C. PIERCY

Venezuela: Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT  
Mr. H. ARTEAGA

Yugoslavia: Mr. V. VOIVODIC  
Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:

Secretary of the Committee and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General: Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the Committee: Mr. V. BIRASAMEGUI

NON-MEMBER REPRESENTATIVES

Denmark: Mr. P. MICHAELSEN

Finland: Mr. J.A. MILTINEN

Mr. YU Peiwen (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a brief statement on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

For a long period of time, the many non-nuclear-weapon States have been making ceaseless efforts against nuclear threats and for security assurances. In recent years, following the acceleration of the nuclear arms race and the heightening of the danger of nuclear warfare, the non-nuclear-weapon States have voiced an ever stronger call for the adoption of effective measures to ensure their security. The final declaration adopted at the meeting of Foreign Ministers of non-aligned countries held in New Delhi recently, also expressed grave concern over the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, demanded in strong terms that nuclear-weapon States refrain from any activities detrimental to the security and well-being of non-nuclear-weapon States and commit themselves to guaranteeing the non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat of nuclear weapons and nuclear attacks. Now, I would like to give my views on the following points.

First, in the world of today, nuclear weapons with their massive destructive power are piled sky-high, while the Superpowers, relying on their military might, are engaged in hegemonist activities, seriously threatening world peace and the securities of the States of the world. The many non-nuclear-weapon States, in particular, lack assurances for their independence, sovereignty and security. That is why the adoption of effective measures for security assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon States is considered an urgent task in the field of disarmament.

All nuclear-weapon States are responsible for providing security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. Before the realization of comprehensive nuclear disarmament, it is the bounden duty of nuclear-weapon States to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons so as to allay this nuclear threat over non-nuclear-weapon States. The major nuclear-weapon Powers possess the greatest nuclear arsenals. Indeed, only they are capable of launching nuclear warfare. Therefore they should bear the main responsibility for giving assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, a responsibility not to be shirked. The above basic approach should be our point of departure in the consideration of the issue of security assurances.

Secondly, since non-nuclear-weapon States possess no nuclear weapons, and most of them are in circumstances where their defences are seriously below par, they cannot constitute a nuclear threat to the nuclear-weapon States and it follows that there is no question of demanding security assurances from them for the nuclear-weapon States. As a matter of fact, quite a number of non-nuclear-weapon States have already, through some international arrangements, assumed concrete obligations. It would be unfair and also irrational to further require the non-nuclear-weapon States to undertake new, additional obligations, particularly those affecting their self-defence rights, which are essential in safeguarding their sovereignty and security. It is perfectly justifiable for non-nuclear-weapon States to require that the nuclear-weapon States should, without attaching any conditions, assume clear-cut obligations against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them. As was pointed out by Ambassador Vrhunec of Yugoslavia at the plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament on 19 March 1981: "Every condition, even if it is a minor one, will undermine the firmness and substance of the guarantees, which thus creates the possibility for the use of nuclear weapons or threat to use them under certain conditions." Since the question of security guarantees touches upon vital interests of the non-nuclear-weapon States, the nuclear-weapon States should give such requests and wishes full consideration.

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Thirdly, the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons will be the best guarantees to non-nuclear weapon States. To provide negative security guarantees is only a measure of a transitional nature. If negotiations on such a transitional measure are dragged out so that agreement cannot be reached, how then can the nuclear-weapon States show their good faith towards security guarantees for the non-nuclear-weapon States? We should do our best to implement our task pointed out in the report of the last session of the Committee on Disarmament, that is, to continue to look for a "common approach acceptable to all which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character". At present, the working paper of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances has listed for us various formulas and alternatives. We would like to take part in serious discussions with the delegates present here so as to find a common approach acceptable to all which conforms to the requirements of the non-nuclear-weapon States. It is our belief that whatever agreement or arrangement we may be able to reach at the present time, it should be, essentially, or most importantly, the kind of security assurance which in substance and content can genuinely be a guarantee of security to the non-nuclear-weapon States instead of a mere empty document, devoid of content.

The Chinese Government has always adopted a positive approach towards the question of security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States. We hold that an international convention giving effective assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States should be concluded. We have reiterated on many occasions that we will not be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances. In connection with this basic stand of ours, we are committed unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. This is an obligation we assume unilaterally. On the basis of this stand of ours we would like to explore, with other delegates, various avenues so as to contribute towards earlier agreement on an effective international arrangement for security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, this is the first time I have made a formal statement in the Committee this month, and I should therefore like to take this opportunity to congratulate you, not only on the assumption of your chairmanship, but also on the success you have achieved in exercising your functions. You have shown skill and ingenuity, and I am quite certain that the month of March will be remembered as a productive and constructive month in the history of this Committee.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I should also like to address myself to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador de la Gorce, and to take this opportunity to express to him, too, our great appreciation of the way in which he conducted our work during the month of February. With a judicious mixture of authority, humour and affability, he succeeded in creating among us an atmosphere of maximum efficiency and optimum co-operativeness.

I should now like to address myself to the subject for this week, namely, chemical weapons.

In my statement today my remarks partly reflect the official Swedish position and partly my thinking and feelings as Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons.

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

The negotiations on chemical weapons now going on in this Committee have a long -- but not always so glorious -- history. The neutral and non-aligned countries held a common position, originally shared by the group of socialist States, about the inseparability of biological and chemical weapons prohibitions, but had to give up after the leading military Powers agreed in 1971 on a narrow Treaty dealing only with biological weapons. This Convention was furthermore provided with an unsatisfactory treatment of the verification problems. I think one can say that the neutral and non-aligned countries have been vindicated in the stand they took already then, namely, that the biological weapons Convention is deficient in this respect.

From that period it is worth while to recall one important step, namely, United Nations General Assembly resolution 2603 A (XXIV), of 16 December 1969, which was sponsored by the then 12 neutral and non-aligned members of CCD and which affirmed "that the Geneva Protocol embodies the generally recognized rules of international law prohibiting the use in international armed conflicts of all biological and chemical methods of warfare, regardless of any technical developments". The resolution went on to declare "as contrary to the generally recognized rules of international law, as embodied in the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, the use in international armed conflicts of: (a) any chemical agents of warfare -- chemical substances, whether gaseous, liquid or solid -- which might be employed because of their direct toxic effects on man, animals or plants; ..."

The discussion of a chemical weapons convention continued in CCD after the biological weapons Convention had been concluded. The course these deliberations took was far from straight. At times the leading Powers seemed to tend towards narrowing the scope of a CW convention so that it would include only certain categories of chemical warfare agents. The majority view prevailed, however, that the ban on the use of chemical weapons should be applied to the total spectrum. A number of technical and scientific reports were presented and discussed in the CCD, and the consideration of the issues were enlightened through the submission of four different draft conventions.

We have also witnessed the bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States, which started in 1976 and last took place in the summer of 1980, when a report was presented to the CD which now serves as a valuable basis for our ongoing negotiations.

A chemical weapons convention could, of course, have been concluded a long time ago. The time may, however, not have been entirely lost. It is fair to say that knowledge of the problems involved in the elaboration of a convention, which for ever would abolish chemical weapons, has been considerably deepened over the years. The technological means for verifying compliance with such a convention also have been developed and refined. One could add that the acceptability of certain means of verification has also increased, which would make it easier to come to an agreement.

The substance of a future convention has by now been well penetrated and all main elements have been elucidated. The complexities of the problems involved have also become increasingly evident. The four draft conventions which have been presented since 1972 show differences of opinion between the proposers. They also reflect an evolution from, as we consider it today, a rather simplistic view of the elements of a convention to a growing awareness of the multitude of technically and politically complex problems which have to be agreed upon in order to make a chemical weapons convention fully comprehensive and reliable, if the intention is to abolish chemical warfare for ever.



(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

Possibilities for dealing with the relevant technical, legal and other problems changed significantly when CD last year decided to set up a working group on chemical weapons. The issues were then examined in a more structured and systematic way under the chairmanship of my distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Okawa of Japan. The informal meetings which took place with the participation of a large number of experts in June last year added a considerable amount of valuable knowledge to the work of the Committee.

Naturally, the bilateral negotiations which started in 1976 have also improved the basis for the multilateral negotiations through the two reports which they have produced. The willingness of the two bilateral negotiators to share with us their knowledge and considered views is appreciated.

With the very good start of our negotiations last year, the work has continued at a brisk pace this year. As Chairman of the Working Group I wish to express my great appreciation of the preparedness on all sides to participate actively and constructively in the negotiations. The unavoidable discussions of procedure have been reduced to a minimum.

As to the delegations' views on the substance, the mandate of the Working Group has not made it possible to find out in a more precise way where compromise positions can be established. Our main task has till now been limited to defining the issues and to examining them. Nevertheless, there has emerged a large convergence of views concerning issues such as the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, transfer and acquisition of chemical weapons and the obligations to declare possession, plans of destruction etc. and -- what is not least important -- actually to destroy stocks and production facilities.

Two major issues have so far not been solved concerning the scope, namely, the issues as to the concept of chemical warfare capability and the inclusion of the prohibition of use in the convention.

The Swedish Delegation - and I am now speaking for it - is somewhat disappointed at the fact that some reactions have been negative as to our proposal to broaden the scope of a CW convention. We have, however, noted that the objections and reservations so far expressed basically are of a practical and procedural nature. We are therefore not yet aware of any substantive arguments that contradict the reasoning that has convinced us of the need for a comprehensive conceptual scope for the convention. We certainly realize the practical problems involved in the negotiating process, but we do not think that such obstacles should be permitted to stand in the way of efforts to evolve a truly effective agreement.

Against this background and the fact that a number of delegations support our approach, we feel encouraged to pursue it.

I wish to take this opportunity to express our appreciation of the statements which have expressed agreement with and understanding of our arguments. We hope that the future negotiations will be fruitful and bring forth an agreement which will effectively prohibit and abolish the capability to use chemical weapons, in our view the self-evident aim of the convention.

A commonly accepted solution has to be found also to the question of the inclusion in the convention of a prohibition of use. There seems to be general agreement that nothing should be done to detract from the importance and authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Possibilities will therefore have to be tried in order to establish

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satisfactory links with the Geneva Protocol in the preamble, the operative provisions of the convention, or in a text closely related to it. Adequate links with the Convention on biological weapons will also have to be included.

There are details in the scope which require further negotiations, for instance, questions concerning tear gases, herbicides and binary chemical weapons. Different views have also been expressed concerning the exceptions to the convention. In some cases a specific provision may be required concerning exceptions, whereas in other cases the items should perhaps not be mentioned in the convention at all. Whether protective measures against chemical weapons should be dealt with as exceptions from the prohibition or as express permissions will have to be solved at a later stage. Maybe the concept of chemical weapons capability can play a role in resolving this problem.

On the question of verification, the reports from the bilateral negotiations have unfortunately not been of very great help. We note, however, with satisfaction that verification by challenge seems to be a concept which the bilateral negotiators have accepted. It can also be safely assumed that everybody by now is entirely aware of the crucial importance of a system of adequate verification. Laborious negotiations on this subject are still ahead of us, and difficult political decisions may be required to arrive at mutually and generally acceptable solutions. The will which so far has been shown in the CD this year gives me, however, confidence that the problems will in the end be overcome. The Swedish delegation attaches great importance to the role confidence-building measures will play in this connection, already in the course of our negotiations.

The technical problems connected with verification will no doubt also require much further work. I am referring both to such verification measures as may be required for the control of the destruction of stockpiles, and to such measures as will subsequently give assurance about compliance with the convention. The consultative committee, which most probably will be set up under the convention, will have important tasks in that connection. The complaints procedure will also have to be worked out carefully in order to facilitate the handling of any problems that may arise.

Last year's report of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons as well as the Group's continued work this year have shown that there is a convergence of views on the substantive issues which is sufficiently broad for starting the actual elaboration of a convention. As has been strongly emphasized by my delegation already long ago: the Working Group should without delay be provided with a mandate to carry out such a task in an appropriate way.

A well-known expert on chemical weapons, Julian Perry Robinson, commented upon the negotiations on chemical warfare arms control in an article with that title a year ago (Arms Control, Vol. 1, May 1980, Number 1). He stated therein that the search for a CW convention warranted wider and closer attention than it had so far attracted, not least because of the precedents it could set for negotiations in other fields. First, he said, the negotiating objective subscribed to by all of the participants is not a mere reduction or ceiling, but a full-blown measure of disarmament. In accepting this objective, Governments are, according to his view, tacitly acknowledging that in some circumstances arms control may serve not only as an adjunct but also as an alternative to military strength as a determinant of security. Secondly, he continued, because of the nature of CW weapons, success in

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the negotiations now appears contingent upon general agreement to accept on-site inspection as a verification technique. Thirdly, a successful outcome may also depend upon agreement that specific confidence-building measures should play a concrete role in the régime to be established by the CW convention. The author concluded with the remark that it may be no exaggeration, then, to view the CW talks as a proving ground for the future of arms control.

Even if this last terminology may not be the first choice of everyone here, I think we would all generally agree with his characterizations. There is no need for further underlining the importance of our task.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the Ambassador of Sweden, Ambassador Lidgard, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me in connection with my assumption of the chairmanship for the month of March.

Mr. VENKATESWARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, since I am speaking for the first time after your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament, I would like, at the outset, to convey my sincere felicitations and admiration for your qualities of head and heart, as well as to assure you of the fullest co-operation of my delegation. We have entire confidence in your able helmsmanship.

My statement today will be of a general nature. I intend to speak upon some of the more salient issues concerning nuclear disarmament and the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. I shall also offer my delegation's comments on the comprehensive programme on disarmament.

In our Committee we have had an interesting debate on the question of providing effective assurance to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons. Why is it that non-nuclear-weapon States perceive the need for such assurances? It is first of all because nuclear weapons have introduced an entirely new phenomenon into the technology of war. The nature and destructive power of even a single nuclear warhead far exceeds that of any known conventional weapon. Secondly, the destructive effect of the use of nuclear weapons would encompass not only the States directly involved in a conflict but also those who are not involved at all. That is to say, the impact of the use of nuclear weapons would recognize no national boundaries, no limits drawn between competing alliance systems. Thirdly, we live in an interdependent and ever-shrinking planet, and the massive destruction caused by the use of nuclear weapons in any one part of the world would have incalculable effects on the rest of the world by disrupting the economic, social and political logistics that bind us all together. Nuclear-weapon States and those allied to them constantly remind us of their vital security interests and the role that nuclear weapons supposedly play in safeguarding those security interests. They need to reflect on whether, by any rational standard of security that they may wish to adopt, their continued reliance on nuclear weapons as an instrument of State policy and their espousal of this or that doctrine concerning the use of such weapons are not blatantly endangering the vital security interests of non-nuclear-weapon States. As was recently pointed out in a paper presented by W.K.H. Panofsky at the Colloquium on Science and Disarmament held in Paris in January this year:

"Once nuclear war is initiated by any Power, under any doctrine, in any theatre, or for any strategic or tactical purpose, the outcome will involve truly massive casualties and devastation, leading to incalculable effects on the future of mankind. The predictions of science concerning the effects on large segments of the world's population of large-scale use of nuclear weapons are extremely uncertain."

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What is therefore at issue is in essence, a very simple question: is it permissible, under any recognized principle of international law or any accepted norms of international behaviour, to pursue one's security interests in a manner that endangers the security of third States which are not politically or militarily involved in the confrontation? The answer is clearly in the negative.

How should non-nuclear-weapon States respond to this situation? It has been argued that the present situation of a balance of nuclear terror and the peculiar security environment in Europe where nuclear weapons are claimed to play a peace-keeping role is the result of many historical factors. On the other hand, it is said that the same logic of deterrence and the reliance on nuclear weapons to offset a perceived imbalance in conventional forces would not apply elsewhere, primarily because the acquisition of nuclear weapons by one State would result in insecurity for its neighbours and further endanger international peace and security. But Europe does not exist on another planet. We in Asia or Africa or Latin America are all Europe's neighbours, the more so since the age of intercontinental nuclear missiles has brought us closer to each other in one neighbourhood in more ways than one. We all live in regions that are in close proximity to nuclear-weapon States, and over the past few years we have witnessed the growth of the military reach of the major nuclear-weapon Powers into areas far beyond their own shores. What is currently happening in the Indian Ocean area is a case in point. We must not forget that it is one world that we live in; it is one fate that we all share. I might also add that it is one and the same responsibility that we all shoulder, that is, to ensure the survival and further advancement of the human race.

If this game of brinkmanship were being played merely with guns, perhaps those of us on the sidelines would witness merely a double suicide. But it is not simple guns that will be used in this meaningless game of brinkmanship, but weapons that could easily mean the annihilation of the entire globe.

It is entirely legitimate and understandable that in a world that is threatened by nuclear disaster non-nuclear-weapon States should seek ways and means to protect themselves against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons. Some have espoused proposals for declaring entire regions of the world as nuclear-weapon-free zones in respect of which nuclear-weapon States have pledged not to use nuclear weapons. A nuclear-weapon-free zone already exists in Latin America. Other States have put forward the concept of negative security assurances. The concept is based on the premise that while nuclear weapons continue to exist, non-nuclear-weapon States have the right to guarantees from nuclear-weapon States that they will not be subjected to the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons. We do not question the right of any State or group of States to seek security through such means. However, in our view, the use of nuclear weapons anywhere would have a global impact. A war in which nuclear weapons are used could not, by its very nature, be limited to clear-cut national or regional boundaries. Even if certain regions of the world were not directly hit by nuclear weapons, the effects of a nuclear war involving

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the major Powers and industrialized countries of the North would be incalculable in terms of nuclear fall-out, massive and global economic and social disruption, ecological changes and genetic impairment. In such a situation, it would be small comfort, therefore, that one's country or region had not been the target of a direct nuclear hit. The security of non-nuclear-weapon States which may be part of a nuclear-weapon-free zone or the recipient of guarantees of the non-use of nuclear weapons would still be severely affected. It is for this reason that my Government has taken the consistent position of principle that the only credible and effective guarantee against the use of nuclear weapons is the achievement of nuclear disarmament. Recognizing, however, that the achievement of nuclear disarmament is a complex issue, we have suggested, as a first step, a convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons on the lines of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. This suggestion has also been endorsed by the Foreign Ministers of the non-aligned countries at their meeting in New Delhi last month and we trust that the Committee on Disarmament will be able to give this proposal its consideration.

In this context, my delegation has noted with satisfaction that at least one nuclear-weapon State, China, has commented favourably on this proposal and encouraged its further examination. The distinguished Ambassador of China, in his statement of 10 March 1981, stated:

"The goal of nuclear disarmament should be the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons. Pending the attainment of this lofty goal, partial measures are obviously necessary. Here it should be pointed out that the mere cessation of the testing, development and production of nuclear weapons could only curb their quantitative increase and qualitative improvement, but it alone would not remove the danger of a nuclear war, because there would remain the serious threats posed by the enormous nuclear arsenals of the Superpowers. As a result, a number of small and medium-sized countries have called for the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament. This represents a reasonable demand which, in our view, merits our serious attention in the course of our consideration of the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race."

Coming as it does after China's positive vote on resolution 35/152 D entitled "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war" adopted at the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly, this is a useful and constructive development. We would call upon all the other nuclear-weapon States to co-operate with the rest of the world community in negotiating a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

With respect to the comprehensive programme of disarmament, my country's views are already well known. We favour a programme that embodies not merely the intentions of States to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control, but the genuine political will of States to implement all its provisions. The document cannot be yet another listing of measures that are desirable goals, but should reflect the commitment of States to realize these goals. It is in this context that we feel it is essential for the programme to be set within a

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realistic time-frame. We need not be rigid about such a time-frame, but an absence of even an indicative time-table would be a confession that the basic political will to implement the programme is lacking. It would be relevant to recall that in the Final Document of the General Assembly's first special session on disarmament, it was stated that the Programme of Action constituted measures that ought to be implemented in the "next few years" (para. 44). How can we now go back on this consensus document and reject the concept of time-frames as unrealistic? This would be a step backwards from the consensus arrived at during the first special session.

Several delegations have argued that in a world where the international environment is constantly in flux, progress in disarmament measures cannot be predictable, much less subject to artificial deadlines. On a number of occasions our delegation has pointed out that while the so-called international environment has an impact on disarmament negotiations, the absence of or failure to achieve disarmament equally affects the international climate. Progress in disarmament can have a distinct beneficial impact on the relations among States, just as the creation of confidence and trust among States can in turn accelerate the achievement of disarmament measures. To use the pretext of the worsening international climate to delay the achievement of disarmament would betray a lack of political determination to achieve genuine disarmament.

In any event what is the so-called "international environment" which we so easily speak about as the basis for our implementation of disarmament measures? Does this environment only imply the erratic zigzag of the relations existing among the major Powers? Does it only imply the state of relations existing at a given moment among the nuclear-weapon States and their allies? What about the rest of the world? Do not the rest of the countries of the world and the relations existing among them also form part of the "international environment"? The success of the recent Ministerial Conference of the non-aligned countries held in New Delhi is an example of how the majority of the countries of the world, belonging to Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe itself, have, despite their differences, been able to unite together in the pursuit of the larger interest. Throughout the history of the Movement, non-aligned countries have been able to transcend their own particular security and political concerns in the cause of international peace and security. Do they not form part, perhaps the most important part, of the "international environment"? Therefore, in speaking of the impact of the international climate on disarmament negotiations, one should not become hostage to the fickle course of relations existing among the major Powers and their allies. A truly global and comprehensive programme of disarmament must also take account of the other "international environment" as well, an environment which we, the large numbers of non-aligned countries, have created and seek to strengthen further -- an environment that has proved to be stable and predictable.

It is equally clear to us that any comprehensive programme of disarmament must have, as its first priority task, the prevention of nuclear war and the achievement of nuclear disarmament. Weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear weapons, cannot in any sense be equated to conventional weapons. We cannot accept that nuclear and conventional disarmament go hand in hand, that reduction in nuclear arms

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

can in any manner be related to parallel reduction in conventional arms. We are not against conventional disarmament. We would welcome a reduction in conventional forces and armaments. But we do not accept that such reductions are to be interrelated to progress in nuclear disarmament. Time and again we have argued that nuclear armaments are weapons of global destruction, of mass slaughter. Their use would probably lead to the end of human civilization. How can it be argued that their elimination must be predicated upon reduction in conventional armaments? For my delegation, a comprehensive programme of disarmament which does not recognize the urgent priority of nuclear disarmament and which does not set forth credible and immediate measures to prevent a nuclear war, would be a programme that would not serve the collective security interests of all nations of the world.

In this context, my delegation views with great concern attempts to consign the achievement of nuclear disarmament to the latter phase of the programme and link it with the achievement of conventional disarmament. It has even been implied, but not clearly stated, that the achievement of nuclear disarmament must be considered coterminous with conventional disarmament or the achievement of general and complete disarmament. We reject such an approach and regard it as an attempt to reverse the priority in disarmament measures already accepted by the international community and so clearly embodied in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

My final comment relates to measures of regional disarmament. Such measures may have relevance in certain given situations, but their value should not be unduly exaggerated. We live on an ever-shrinking planet. What happens in one part of the world affects another. Regional conflicts are exacerbated by the ambitions of the great Powers and their desire to extend their influence and control. To try to concentrate on certain regions of the world without due regard to the global situation would be unrealistic. Measures for regional disarmament, therefore, must, first and foremost, address themselves to the removal of foreign military presence and interference by outside Powers, particularly the major Powers in regions far away from their shores. It is only in an environment free from such outside interference that the States in a region can evolve a security framework relevant to their common concerns.

It is our hope that under the able guidance of its distinguished Chairman, Ambassador García Robles, the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament would be able to evolve a mutually acceptable text that would truly reflect the concerns and aspirations of the entire international community. While holding firm to our principles, we are willing to contribute to the best of our ability, in a flexible manner, to the process of evolving a consensus on this important issue.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Venkateswaran, representative of India, for his statement and for the kind words of welcome he addressed to me as Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, I have asked for the floor this morning to comment briefly on some of the interesting statements we have heard in the debate regarding effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The Pakistan delegation welcomes the reaffirmation in almost all statements of the principle that non-nuclear-weapon States have the right to be assured against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and that the Committee on Disarmament must continue its efforts to evolve an agreement on this question.

The general approach which Pakistan favours is the one set out in the Declaration of the non-aligned countries adopted at New Delhi a few weeks ago which was quoted in extenso by the distinguished representative of Yugoslavia. We also agree with those delegations, such as Brazil and Yugoslavia, which have stated that security assurances should be organically linked to nuclear disarmament which is the best guarantee against the nuclear threat. A provision calling for a commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to achieve nuclear disarmament is contained in the draft international convention submitted by Pakistan in document CD/10.

We share the view expressed by the distinguished Ambassador of Nigeria that during this session, the Ad Hoc Working Group should concentrate on reaching agreement on a common approach which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. The working paper submitted by my delegation (CD/161) identifies five alternatives that could be explored in the search for a common approach or a common formula. After an examination of these alternatives, as suggested by Bulgaria, we could concentrate on the one that is most promising. This does not mean that Pakistan will be prepared to accept anything that it is possible to agree upon. The outcome of our negotiations will have to be judged by the criterion of whether or not this assures the non-nuclear-weapon States effectively and credibly against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

In this connection, I must confess that my delegation was somewhat puzzled by the suggestion of the distinguished Ambassador of Bulgaria that the Committee should "explore existing similarities" in the "general approach" of various States to this question. I am of the view that by now everyone here is quite familiar with each other's "general approach" on the subject of security assurances. Of course, the identification of similarities and differences in the unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon States and in other proposals, is an integral part of an exercise to evolve a common formula or a common approach. We have therefore agreed to such an exercise which would open the substantive proceedings of the Ad Hoc Working Group this year.

My delegation also has some doubts about the idea of "evolving identical or in substance similar unilateral declarations" by the nuclear-weapon States. Unilateral declarations are, in our view, the prerogative of each State and are not normally negotiated before issue. If identical or similar declarations could be recommended by this Committee to the nuclear-weapon States, and accepted by them, surely it should also be possible to negotiate in this Committee a



(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

common formula to be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. We would regard this suggestion as even less attractive if the unilateral declarations that are contemplated would attach conditions and limitations to the single existing declaration which is categorical and unconditional.

In this context it is necessary to say that a subjective evaluation of any of the unilateral declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States is perhaps not the most helpful way of seeking the evolution of a common approach. What we can all agree upon, as the representative of Brazil has stated, is that each of these declarations is conceived in the context of the security perceptions of the nuclear-weapon State concerned rather than the security preoccupations of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

I would like to comment on three important issues which have been raised in the debate relating to the substance or nature of the assurances to be extended to non-nuclear-weapon States. First, Pakistan shares the view expressed by Yugoslavia and other non-nuclear-weapon States that the assurances to be provided should be unconditional and legally binding in character. However, we are prepared to take into account the legitimate security interests of the nuclear-weapon States, provided these do not negate the effectiveness and credibility of the assurances which they are called upon to provide to the non-nuclear-weapon States. My delegation believes that an effort must be made in the Working Group to examine whether the conditions and limitations included in the unilateral declarations of four nuclear-weapon States are of such a fundamental nature that they must form an integral part of the provisions of an international instrument and whether these could not be expressed in some other way. Two kinds of limitations are reflected in the unilateral declarations: first, those relating to the non-nuclear status of States and secondly, those concerning the circumstances in which the use of nuclear weapons is contemplated even against non-nuclear-weapon States.

As regards the first condition, it has been argued by certain States that non-nuclear-weapon countries, in order to qualify for security assurances, must give a reciprocal commitment not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons because, as the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom stated, such assurances would only be extended to States which "clearly demonstrate their non-nuclear status".

This is a fundamental point and should be examined in perspective. First of all, I would like to state that Pakistan is not opposed to the extension of international commitments by non-nuclear-weapon States that they will not acquire or develop nuclear weapons, provided such commitments are universal and non-discriminatory in nature. As far as the Non-Proliferation Treaty is concerned, other representatives in this Committee have noted that it is "basically flawed" and inherently discriminatory. I do not need to add anything to this evaluation. Another option, which would be non-discriminatory, is the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions. However, the difficulty in this context is that the creation of such regional arrangements can be stalled by the opposition of even one State in the region. Pakistan remains prepared to explore other avenues in the context of the efforts to evolve a new international consensus on nuclear non-proliferation as envisaged in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

On the other hand, we object, as a matter of principle, to the transforming of the legitimate quest of non-nuclear-weapon States for assurances against the threat of nuclear weapons into another instrument of non-proliferation. As the representative of India stated in the Security Council at the time of the adoption of its resolution 255 in 1968:

"Any security assurances that might be offered by nuclear-weapon States could not and should not be regarded as a quid pro quo for the signature of a non-proliferation treaty ... The assurance of security to non-nuclear-weapon States is an obligation on the nuclear-weapon States, and not something which they could or should offer in return for the signature by non-nuclear-weapon States of a non-proliferation treaty."

A similar view was expressed by the distinguished representative of Brazil the other day in this Committee when he stated that the characterization of a country as a non-nuclear-weapon State "derives from a statement of fact and should not entail the imposition of further obligations on the non-nuclear-weapon State in order to become entitled to the assurances, such as, for instance, participation in any other specific international instruments". He went on to say that the obligation not to use and not to threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States derives simply and directly from the existence of nuclear armaments and from their possession by a handful of States. My delegation shares this view and the assertion that non-nuclear-weapon States should not be asked to accept new obligations merely in exchange for an agreement by the nuclear-weapon Powers not to commit an act -- that is, the use of nuclear weapons -- which has been described by the United Nations as a "crime against humanity".

Of course, we acknowledge the legitimacy of the concern felt by Nigeria and other States of Africa regarding the nuclear ambitions of South Africa. Yet, it is a fact that this concern is aroused not so much by the prospect of a nuclear-armed Pretoria as by the fact of the inherently aggressive nature of the South African entity. My delegation believes that the case of South Africa, and that of Israel, should be considered as constituting exceptional cases of States which have placed themselves beyond the pale of international law as a result of their aggressive policies and actions. In our view, the danger posed by nuclear weapons in the hands of these States can best be dealt with through the Security Council and other international machinery available to ensure the preservation of international peace and security. Pakistan will continue to support such measures in the United Nations.

However, for the purposes of the international instrument of security assurances, we think that the non-nuclear-weapon status of the non-nuclear-weapon countries has been established in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NPT recognizes only five nuclear-weapon States. It is the submission of my delegation that it would be a disservice to the very objective which is sought, if at this time even de facto recognition were given to the aspirations of certain States for a place in the nuclear club.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

The second category of qualifications is, of course, the crux of the problem in evolving a common formula or common approach to the question of security assurances. I will not enter into the debate as to whether the exception to the principles of non-use contained in the unilateral declarations constitute a "self-defence clause" or are merely a reflection of the narrow national interests of the State concerned, although I would lean to the latter opinion. Leaving aside for the moment the French declaration, which has unique characteristics, the other declarations contain two different kinds of exceptions. The unilateral declarations of the United States of America and the United Kingdom would reserve the right to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States which attack these Powers, their allies or forces in alliance or association with a nuclear-weapon State. We have previously pointed to the ambiguity of the reference to the question of "association" with a nuclear-weapon State. This condition also suffers from the characteristic of subjectivity to which reference was made by the representative of Bulgaria. This was not denied by the representative of the United Kingdom. At the same time, we have noted the important point made by the representative of the United Kingdom that ipso facto that country's unilateral declaration does not exclude any non-nuclear-weapon State and that the qualification relates only to exceptional circumstances. In examining this qualification, one is led to the conclusion that what is being referred to here is not so much an attack by a non-nuclear-weapon State with the support of a nuclear-weapon Power but rather an attack which, under current international circumstances, would be by a nuclear-weapon State together with one or more non-nuclear-weapon States. Formulated in this way, the qualification would be very similar to the statement made by the President of the Soviet Union in 1968 to the effect that "only extraordinary circumstances, only aggression against our country or its allies by another nuclear Power, could compel us to have recourse to that extreme means of self-defence".

The qualifications contained in the declaration of the Soviet Union would exclude non-nuclear-weapon States which have nuclear weapons stationed on their territory. The distinguished representative of Bulgaria formulated this condition in a slightly different way when he stated that only those non-nuclear-weapon countries should be excluded which "can be a source of nuclear attack". On the face of it, this argument has merit. However, it must be taken into account that the nuclear weapons which are present on the territories of certain non-nuclear-weapon States remain under the control of the nuclear-weapon State concerned and a decision to use them would be that of the nuclear-weapon State and not of the non-nuclear-weapon State. In the circumstances, we wonder whether the formulation of the qualifications contained in the Soviet declaration is the best means of expressing the preoccupation that a nuclear attack can be launched from the territory of a non-nuclear-weapon State. Since the object of nuclear retaliation would be not simply to punish the State which is the source of attack, but to pre-empt the possibilities of an attack, the difference between defence and offence becomes blurred. In our view, the concern reflected in the Soviet declaration is better expressed in the statement of President Brezhnev to which I have referred earlier and which is, in substance, similar to the underlying preoccupations of the United States and the United Kingdom.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

With regard to the so-called self-defence clauses in the declarations of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, two general comments could be made. First, the qualifications both in the United States and United Kingdom declarations and in the Soviet declaration are related to strategic considerations in central Europe. These strategic considerations should not be elevated to the status of general prescriptions in the common formula to be included in an international instrument. Secondly, these strategic considerations do not erode the general principle that non-nuclear-weapon States are entitled to assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

In the circumstances, we believe that it is possible to achieve agreement on a formula which would have as its central provision the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States concerning the non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States. The security preoccupations of the nuclear-weapon States relating to the peculiar situation in Europe could be reflected as an adjunct to this general principle. More than one of the alternatives identified in the working paper submitted by Pakistan provides an answer to evolving a common formula along these lines which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character.

Mr. DARUSMAN (Indonesia): Mr. Chairman, since the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons under the chairmanship of Ambassador Curt Lidgard is now progressing, I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to present the general position of my delegation on some pertinent questions relating to the matter.

Although the term "chemical weapons" has been used only since the Second World War, the destructive effects to nature and human beings of various agents that may be considered as belonging to the category of "chemical weapons" and the use of which should be prohibited, has been the subject of concern of the international community for more than a century. The term "poison or poisoned weapons" was used in the Brussels Declaration of 1874, "asphyxiating or deleterious gases" was used by the First Hague Declaration of 1899, and, between the two world war periods, the term "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or devices", was used in the preambular paragraph of the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

Now that we are drafting a convention on the prohibition of a type of weapons called "chemical weapons", we should naturally agree on what we actually mean by that term. As I started earlier, the pre-war international instruments did not use the term "chemical weapons" and the agents prohibited by those instruments were not defined as such ("chemical weapons"). A number of suggestions on the matter have been made by some delegations, including mine, in document CD/124, during the 1980 session of the Committee, which may be useful to the relevant Working Group. We are aware, though, that drawing up a definition on a particular subject in a convention is always a difficult exercise.

(Mr. Darusman, Indonesia)

As regards the aim of the proposed convention, it is the view of my delegation that it should not only prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, but that it should also comprise the prohibition of the use of such weapons. A new convention prohibiting the use of chemical weapons would not only complement the Geneva Protocol of 1925 but would also strengthen it. Chemical weapons that are to be defined by the new convention may cover not only gases, liquids, materials or devices referred to in that Protocol; it may include other agents for warfare as well. In addition to this, and as has been stated by my delegation during the meeting of the Working Group on 5 March, the existence of more than one international instrument having a number of provisions identical in content is not unusual. As an example, the Indonesian delegation referred to the 1910 Brussels Convention, the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, and the draft Caracas convention on the law of the sea. All of them contain provisions imposing obligations on shipmasters to render assistance to persons at sea whose life is in danger. If the definition of "chemical weapons" in the new convention to be negotiated in the Ad Hoc Working Group is to cover agents or substances other than those prohibited in the 1925 Protocol, this will have the effect that States parties to the 1925 Protocol are at liberty to use such agents or substances for non-peaceful purposes, while legally complying with the provisions of the Protocol. My delegation therefore recommends that the new convention should not only aim at the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, but should also aim at prohibiting the use of them.

One of the weaknesses of the 1925 Protocol is the absence of a verification machinery to ensure that the provisions of the instrument are complied with by the parties to it.

As stated in the Indonesian working paper, CD/124, we support the idea of an international as well as a national system of verification for the new convention for all the prohibited activities, namely, the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. As regards the international aspect of the verification system, a variety of mechanisms has been proposed. My delegation will continue to co-operate with other delegations in trying to arrive at an agreed machinery.

These were some more aspects of the question of the banning of chemical weapons which I wished to mention in a brief and general manner. I did not go into detail, because the most suitable forum to do so is the Working Group. We hope to be able to do this, in the Working Group, at a later stage.

The CHAIRMAN: Distinguished representatives, in accordance with the decision taken by the Committee at its 104th plenary meeting, I take pleasure in calling on the distinguished representative of Denmark, Ambassador Peter Michaelsen. Ambassador Michaelsen is the Special Adviser on Disarmament to the Danish Government and is currently Chairman of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, a position to which he was elected in December 1980.

Mr. MICHAELSEN (Denmark): Mr. Chairman, since this is the first time I have the honour to address this Committee, allow me first of all to pay tribute to you in your capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament for this month.

I should furthermore like to express to the members of the CD our appreciation for the decision to let my country take part in the work of the Committee in the capacity of observer. I might add that we are following with the greatest interest the discussions on a possible extension of the membership of the CD which have been initiated lately in connection with the starting of preparations for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

It is our intention to contribute to the work of this Committee especially with regard to efforts to reach agreement on the contents of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons and to a treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests. During this session Denmark is participating in the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons and in the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events.

Since, as I have said, this is the first time Denmark has taken the floor in this Committee during the current session I beg your indulgence for making a few remarks of a general nature before dealing with today's agenda item -- chemical weapons.

Unfortunately the present international climate is not favourable for disarmament and arms control. The tension in the world remains for the time being an impediment to progress in the international negotiations on these problems.

In the perspective of the present economic world crisis and the problems it creates, especially for the poorest countries, the enormous requirements of the military budgets seem even more meaningless. Experiencing an energy crisis, it seems highly unsatisfactory that a proportionally large part of the total world research and development is bound in the military field instead of being used for generating new sources of energy. These two paradoxes are evident to all of us. It is easy to moralize and to give reasons for the present standstill in international negotiations on disarmament and arms control. Though difficult, it is nevertheless most necessary to find a way to ease the tension and obtain progress in these negotiations in the future.

In fact both the nuclear and the conventional arms race are heavily concentrated in a limited number of countries which account for the major part of the world's military arsenals. These Powers carry a special responsibility for setting an international example of good conduct in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, born from a will not to use force in international relations and inspiring confidence by openness.

(Mr. Michaelsen, Denmark)

We cannot afford to neglect, however, that local armed conflicts in many regions of the world present grave risks of escalation. Such local conflicts and regional arms races do furthermore imply deleterious consequences for the economic and social development of the countries concerned and of other countries in their regions.

One may ask what the small or medium-sized countries can do to contribute to a positive course of events?

Obviously any realistic solution to the problems facing us must take into account the fundamental interests of the leading military Powers. The discussions in this Committee have to reflect this fact, however strong the feelings for purely multilateral negotiations might be.

On the other hand, the vital problems of disarmament and arms control concern the lives of all of us and cannot be left exclusively to the discretion of the Superpowers, especially not when year after year only limited progress can be observed. Consequently, the duty of the small countries is to act as the bad conscience of the Superpowers and to contribute with constructive ideas and proposals which can help keep the process going also in areas subject to negotiations among a limited number of directly involved States. The Committee on Disarmament has proved to be an expedient instrument to this end.

The negotiations in the CD on a comprehensive programme for disarmament have shown considerable progress, and it is our hope that the Committee in the course of the present session will be able to agree on such a programme, which could form a major input to the discussions at the General Assembly's second special session on disarmament next year. Given our well-known interest in conventional disarmament alongside nuclear disarmament I express our expectations with regard to the proper inclusion of this aspect in the programme.

Though recognizing the differences of opinion which have to be reflected, it is the opinion of my Government that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons should expedite its work on the text of a convention regarding these weapons of mass destruction. We have noted with satisfaction the agreement reached between the United States of America and the Soviet Union in 1979, and I should like to take this opportunity to urge the Committee to make full use of the work accomplished by the two Superpowers. Though limited in scope, such a convention would represent a highly welcome achievement in a period marked by tension and lack of confidence.

Two subjects on the agenda are, as I have already said, of particular interest to Denmark, i.e. the efforts to reach agreement on a comprehensive test ban and the work on the elements to be included in a future convention on chemical weapons.

In the field of a CTB the CD, in our opinion, could fruitfully initiate active considerations on the detailed institutional framework for the effective verification of a treaty. In this respect the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts which is expected to be finalized later this year could form a constructive point of departure.

(Mr. Michaelsen, Denmark)

Let me take this opportunity to state that we regard the work accomplished in the Ad Hoc Group of Experts up till now highly valuable and we consider the discussions and experimental tests carried out by the group as a major contribution to paving the way for a future comprehensive test-ban treaty. A Danish expert is actively participating in the work of the Ad Hoc Group and we are prepared to give the Group our fullest support in its future work. In this connection let me recall the offer made by the Prime Minister of Denmark in his general intervention at the General Assembly's first special session on disarmament, when he said that Danish experts and seismic installations in Greenland might prove useful in solving the problems of verifying compliance with a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Thus, Denmark is prepared to participate in a multilateral seismic co-operation system.

At its first special session devoted to disarmament the United Nations General Assembly declared the prohibition of chemical weapons to be one of the most vital and urgent problems in the area of disarmament. In paragraph 75 of the Final Document of that special session, the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction are described as one of the most urgent measures of disarmament, and the conclusion of a convention to this end is emphasized as one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral negotiations.

Since the first special session on disarmament, chemical weapons have apparently assumed a growing importance in military planning. It is, therefore, most urgent to obtain progress in the Committee's work in order to prevent the start of an intense chemical arms race like the one we have seen in the nuclear area.

A great amount of work has been done to prepare the conclusion of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons. A considerable number of proposals and working papers have been tabled in the CD and the two reports on the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union indicate active efforts to reach an agreement. It seems that the technical basis for the agreement has been rather well surveyed but still no agreement is in sight, mainly because the extremely important problem of verification is not fully solved.

The Danish Government, being opposed to the storage of chemical weapons on Danish territory under present circumstances, i.e. in time of peace, firmly supports the early conclusion of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons. The recent debate on the alleged use of chemical weapons in some parts of the world has shown that the 1925 Protocol prohibiting the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases in war is not comprehensive enough, especially but not only because it lacks an instrument of verification. As for the scope of the convention, it is our view that it should be as comprehensive as possible and from the start include development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, retention, transfer, assistance and use. This corresponds to alternatives 1 and 3 in the working paper CD/CW/WP.7 of 16 February 1981, circulated by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on CW. We thus prefer a ban on the use of chemical weapons be included in the convention, though already prohibited by the 1925 Protocol, in order to ensure that the use of CW is also subjected to verification. However, we do see advantages in a less comprehensive convention -- if more ambitious proposals prove impossible to realize -- in order to get the process started now.



(Mr. Michaelsen, Denmark)

As mentioned before, experiences with the 1925 Protocol -- and, I might add, the Convention on biological weapons -- have proved that reliable verification procedures are a must.

Adequate verification of a CW ban must cover the following areas in particular:

- (a) Destruction of existing stocks of chemical weapons;
- (b) Destruction or closing down of existing production facilities for such weapons;
- (c) Control of current production of sensitive chemical agents to the extent necessary for the observance of a production ban.

In a number of working papers and documents tabled in the CD it is anticipated that the parties upon accession to a CW convention will be obliged to declare stocks and means of CW as well as the means of production of chemicals covered by the convention. Further, the plans for the destruction of CW stockpiles and for the destruction or dismantling of production facilities will have to be declared. I might add that Denmark takes a special interest in the question of means and procedures for destruction with regard to CW.

In view of the extremely complicated nature of the issues raised by verification of a CW convention it is felt that consideration should be given to the development of verification procedures which would involve the minimum element of intrusion. For the time being it appears, however, that on-site inspections constitute the only fully effective means of verification. Accordingly, such visits require the expertise of a highly qualified international agency which can ensure that inspections are properly arranged and carried out without unwarranted intrusion.

I have touched upon some topics under consideration in this Committee, all of them important and extremely difficult questions involving varying points of view among member States and in the international community as a whole. It is encouraging, however, that the proceedings of the Committee, despite world tension and recession, are still progressing.

Since it was reorganized pursuant to the recommendations of the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly, the CD has evolved into a true negotiating body. The work of the four ad hoc working groups established indicates a positive will to discuss openly and frankly the differences of opinion. This leaves considerable hope for the future.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Michaelsen, the representative of Denmark, for his statement and for the congratulations he addressed to me.

In accordance with the decision taken by the Committee at its 104th plenary meeting, I now give the floor to the representative of Finland, Mr. Miettinen, Professor of Radio-chemistry and Director of the Finnish Project on Chemical Weapons Verification.

Mr. MIETTINEN (Finland): Mr. Chairman, although there is unanimity about the ultimate goal of the disarmament negotiation, namely, complete and general disarmament, there is also a common understanding that the first practical step to be taken would be to limit and ban nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Among these other weapons, chemical weapons appear to be by far the most dangerous. Consequently, their prohibition is really an urgent task before the CD.

This fact is recognized in the agenda of the CD. It is the subject of intensive and, we are glad to state, constructive discussion in an ad hoc working group. It is also being discussed bilaterally between the United States of America and the USSR. We hope that the latter discussions will soon be resumed and that they will result in a joint draft for a convention.

The Finnish delegation has followed closely the debate in this Committee and its Working Group. In our view, work is proceeding in a good atmosphere. Thanks to the commendable efforts of its Chairman, Ambassador Lidgard, the Working Group can work in a structured way and tackle real practical problems. The Chairman has circulated to the Group several working papers which we find generally very useful.

The main outstanding problems are questions pertaining to the scope, definitions, criteria and verification. This is not surprising, since the same problems are equally difficult in any arms control or other agreements. But as they have been solved elsewhere they cannot be impossible here either.

In all these deliberations the problem of verifying compliance with an eventual treaty has often been on the forefront. Finland as a neutral country has a natural interest in disarmament and has thus endeavoured to make its contribution also to the efforts to solve this problem. As early as in 1972 Finland took a decision to create, on a national basis, a chemical warfare control capacity for a possible future international use. A working group of chemists has been employed to study analytical methods for chemical warfare agents for the purpose of such a control capacity.

Against this background, Finland has tried to develop its project on the role of instrumental analysis of chemical warfare agents and their verification. A working document (CD/164) has been distributed today to the members of this Committee which explains the present stage of the project we have under way. The project has been conceived as a multipurpose one, both substantively and functionally. Substantively, the planned control capacity could be used in three different verification activities: verification of the destruction of stocks, of the non-production of chemical weapons, and of alleged use. Functionally, the capacity could be used regardless of the modalities of agreed verification. This means that it could be used for national verification or any combination of national and international inspection; it could be used in connection with an investigation ordered by an appropriate international authority, and finally it could meet some of the concerns expressed by some developing countries about possible difficulties in carrying out verification by their national means only.

The progress of the Finnish project has been described in working papers and handbooks that Finland has annually presented to the CCD and the CD. These are listed in the working document we are presenting today.

(Mr. Miettinen, Finland)

The Finnish project concentrates on the development of the methodology necessary for a detailed trace analysis of any control samples that could be collected to verify a ban of chemical weapons. After the development of satisfactory methodology and the corresponding data bank, problems connected with the collection and preparation of samples for analysis will be studied.

The first step in the Finnish project was to synthesize model nerve agents and related chemical compounds, and examine their relevant properties with respect to possible verification analyses. After that, the suitability of available instrumental techniques for the identification of CW agents was studied. By using the most suitable techniques, and selected repeatable measuring conditions, an initial data base was recorded for about 150 agents and their degradation products. The selected techniques were arranged in the form of a system of microanalytical methods, and this system was proposed for consideration as a basis of international standardization of CW verification analysis. The proposed system was published by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland in 1979 and 1980 in the form of handbooks as referred to earlier (CD/14 and CD/103).

The Finnish project has also trained several research workers in the field of CW verification analysis. The head laboratory of the project is located at the Department of Chemistry of the University of Helsinki but the research is carried out in close co-operation with several other Finnish laboratories.

The primary goal of the first phase of the Finnish project was reached in summer 1980. It was a sensitive identification system for the most important supertoxic agents. The goal of the next phase is the development of detailed procedures for sample pre-preparation and quantitative organic determination on the trace level of known and potential agents. Accurate methods are necessary for obtaining useful information also on complex and metabolized sample matrices. Parallel with these studies, the Finnish project concentrates on the automation of the verification analysis, including the development of automatic monitoring instrumentation. Automated verification analysis makes possible sensitive monitoring of the prohibited chemicals alone, decreasing the fear of revealing commercial and industrial secrets from industrial samples by unnecessary revelation of other, peaceful compounds. The third future goal is the extension of the original data base to any chemical compound relevant to a CW ban.

Detailed studies on sample collection can be initiated only after completing the present methodological development of trace analysis. Such studies are, however, of primary importance in preparing detailed instructions for sample collection for verification analysis. Miniature field tests in the open air are necessary, and are being planned. They will include experiments for remote monitoring of air and water.

During the eight years when the Finnish project has been functioning, the sensitivity and specificity of analysis of organic chemical compounds has improved tremendously, by many orders of magnitude. Ten years ago one had to be happy if one could identify by comparison a known substance of which only a millionth of a gram,  $10^{-6}$ g, was present in the sample. Today one can identify and structurally elucidate unknown compounds in  $10^{-9}$ , or -- in favourable cases --  $10^{-12}$ g -- amounts which means up to a million times higher sensitivity. And there is still much room for improvement because  $10^{-12}$ g contains a million times a million, or  $10^{12}$ , molecules of the average molecular weight of nerve agents. It is quite possible and even probable that during the next 10 years the sensitivity of organic analysis will further increase by several orders of magnitude.

(Mr. Miettinen, Finland)

What was said above concerns the sensitivity of instrumental analysis. One can further increase the sensitivity of the total, i.e. environmental analysis, by increasing the size of the environmental sample. One can, for instance, instead of the customary few litres of air pump many cubic metres, even thousands of cubic metres, of air through a trap where the desired compounds are captured, and process the condensate for analysis. The more complex the matrix -- a condensate of air, clean surface water, polluted water or a sample of soil, plant or animal tissue, etc. -- the more complicated the preparation, enrichment and pre-fractionation of the sample. This is a vast and demanding field which will require a lot of research in the coming years.

But soon it will be possible to identify any use of chemical agents in the open air like field testing, anti-insurgency activities or chemical warfare -- from distances of hundreds or thousands of kilometres below the wind. If good meteorological data are available, as is today the case for large parts of the globe, a trajectory can be calculated for the air package containing the agent and with known wind speeds its approximate location of origin can be calculated. If satellite observations are available from this region, an idea of the nature of the release may be formed.

The eight years' experience of the Finnish project shows that continuous research is needed to keep the methodology of analysis of CW agents abreast of the rapid technical development in instrumental technology. Even more demanding is the sample collection and pre-treatment. However, soon it will be possible to verify any wide area use (covering hectares) of CW agents in the open air from great distances but not production or destruction of such agents in hermetic facilities or their stockpiling in hermetic shelters. Verification of these activities will require on-site inspection, the terms of which have to be defined in the convention. This is the political part of the total problem of verification. Organo-analytical research cannot solve the political part of the problem but it can guarantee that the samples can be adequately analysed if they can be obtained.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, I should like to take this opportunity to confirm the announcement which I made previously, that I shall hold an open-ended informal consultation this afternoon at 3 o'clock in Room 1, in order to discuss the organization of the work of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons tomorrow.

Mr. de la GORCE (France) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, the French delegation wishes to make a brief observation on the question of the distribution of documents in the official languages, and it would like to do so in plenary meeting.

This morning we received two documents both of which were distributed to us in English: one of them, the one submitted by the Finnish delegation, is obviously a recent text -- it is dated 19 March -- and it is only two pages long, and I think it could probably have been distributed to us in French and in the other languages of the Committee this morning.

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

But I would like to point out another example: document CD/166, the original of which is in Russian and which was distributed to us this morning in English. This text, except for the covering letter by Ambassador Issraelyan, which is only one line long, was presented by His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union to the United Nations General Assembly on 23 September 1980. It must therefore exist in all the official languages of the United Nations. We have some difficulty in understanding why this document has not been distributed to us today in all the working languages. I should like to know incidentally, if the Soviet delegation has received this text in Russian.

Mr. Chairman, I wish very seriously to draw the attention of the secretariat to the importance of its issuing documents, so far as possible simultaneously -- and they ought normally to be issued simultaneously -- in the languages of the Committee. My delegation has very strict permanent instructions on this point, and we shall be obliged to reiterate it very emphatically.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you for your statement. I and the secretariat have taken note of your request and we shall give you an appropriate answer at a later stage.

Distinguished delegates, I should like to record that the Chair will conduct informal consultations in connection with the consideration of issues relating to agenda items 1 and 2 tomorrow, Wednesday, at 3 p.m. in Conference Room I. I would now suggest that immediately after this plenary meeting the Committee hold a short informal meeting to listen to a brief statement by Ambassador Jaipal, the Secretary of the Committee and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, who will provide information to the Committee on some pending matters.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 26 March 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.