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FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTEENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 19 March 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:                      Mr. G. Herder              (German Democratic Republic)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. BENYAMINA

Argentina: Mr. F. JIMENEZ DAVILA  
Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD

Australia: Mr. R. STEELE

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX  
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA  
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV  
Mr. R. DEYANOV

Burma: U SAW HLAING  
U NGWE WIN  
U THAN HTUN

Canada: Mr. D.S. MCPHAIL  
Mr. G. SKINNER

China: Mr. YU Peiwen  
Mr. LIANG Yufan  
Mr. YU Mengjia  
Mrs. WANG Zhiyun  
Mrs. GE Yiyun

Cuba: Mrs. V. BOROWDOSKY JACKLEWICH  
Mr. C. PAZOS  
Mr. F. CUSPINERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. RUZEK  
Mr. P. LUKES  
Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt: Mr. E. A. EL REEDY  
Mr. I. A. HASSAN  
Mr. M. N. FAHMY

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFFE  
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. F. DE LA GORCE  
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE  
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER  
Mr. P. BUNTIG

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. G. PFEIFFER  
Mr. N. KLINGLER  
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES  
Mr. C. GYORFFY  
Mr. A. LAKATOS

India: Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. S. DARUSMAN  
Mr. HARYOMATARAM  
Mr. F. QASIM  
Mr. J. HADI

Iran: Mr. D. AMERI

Italy: Mr. V. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO  
Mr. B. CABRAS  
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA  
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI  
Mr. R. ISHII  
Mr. K. SHIMADA  
Mr. K. ODA

Kenya: Mr. S. SHITIMI  
Mr. G. MUNIU

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
Mr. M. A. CACERES

Mongolia: Mr. S.H. LKHASHID  
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. M. CIRABI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN  
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. O. ADENIJI  
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA  
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. M. AKRAM  
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru: Mr. F. VALDIVIESO  
Mr. A. THORNBERRY

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA  
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ  
Mr. T. STROJWAS  
Mr. K. TOMASZEWSKI

Romania: Mr. M. MALITA  
Mr. O. IONESCU  
Mr. T. MELESCANU  
Mr. L. TOADER

Sri Lanka: Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD  
Mr. L. NORBERG  
Mr. J. LUNDIN  
Mr. L.E. DE GREER

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN  
Mr. V.A. PERFILIEV  
Mr. L.S. MOSHKOV  
Mr. A.G. DOULYAN

United Kingdom:

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Mr. N.H. MARSHALL  
Mrs. J.I. LINK

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. FLOWERREE  
Mr. F. DESIMONE  
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER  
Mr. J.A. MISKEL  
Mr. C. PIERCY

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT  
Mr. H. ARTEAGA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC  
Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. N'KONGO DONTONI BWANDA

Secretary of the Committee  
and Personal Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

NON-MEMBER REPRESENTATIVESFinland:

Mr. P. KEISALO  
Mr. V. SORALAHTI

Switzerland:

Mr. PICTET

Mr. VRHUNEC (Yugoslavia): Mr. Chairman, Yugoslavia attaches great importance to the establishment of international guarantees that nuclear weapons will not be used against non-nuclear-weapon States and will not serve as a means of threat. In the world we live in, with all the contradictions that characterize it, where the arms race, particularly nuclear, still continues, and in which the weapons for mass destruction are becoming increasingly sophisticated, the security of all countries, regardless of their military power, is directly imperilled. However, the small and militarily weak countries which do not possess nuclear weapons are particularly jeopardized.

We are aware that only global security that would be founded on mutual confidence and co-operation can stop the arms race and lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control, a decrease in military effectives and the destruction of all nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Only such security can contribute to an alteration of the existing international relations and the creation of conditions for lasting peace and the further unimpeded and equitable development of all countries. As long as a single country possesses nuclear weapons, peace, confidence and international security cannot be established for any country, regardless whether it does or does not possess nuclear weapons. Nevertheless while this situation lasts, and it will clearly not be settled very soon, the non-nuclear-weapon States, and among them Yugoslavia, rightfully demand that the nuclear Powers agree, through a particularly binding document, to offer the guarantees we are discussing.

For these reasons, this issue has rightfully been given priority in the work of the Committee on Disarmament. In our opinion, the negotiations we have organized must be conducive to the establishment of clear and firm guarantees to which the nuclear Powers will adhere most strictly. In order to achieve this, the guarantees must contain the following basic elements:

First, they must be unconditional, because every condition, even if it is a minor one, will undermine the firmness and substance of the guarantees and thus create the possibility for the use of nuclear weapons or the threat of using them under certain conditions.

Secondly, they must be given by all (five) nuclear-weapon States to all the non-nuclear-weapon States, large and small, and both developed and developing countries.

Thirdly, they must cover all types of nuclear weapons, and the existing and possible new types or systems, both strategic and tactical.

Fourthly, they must be valid for all areas of the globe, whether the sea, the air or outer space be used for this.

Fifthly, they must firmly and irrevocably bind the nuclear-weapon States, regardless of the legal form the assurances will assume,

Sixthly, they must constitute an integral part of the general process of nuclear disarmament, and should enhance it.

(Mr. Vrhunec, Yugoslavia)

Only guarantees which contain these elements would have a strong effect and would ensure a real security for the non-nuclear-weapon States. Only guarantees based on those elements would contribute to general security, the strengthening of confidence and, thus, to the cessation of the arms race.

Such an agreement on the adoption of these guarantees would in a corresponding manner be complementary to the NPT. Both agreements would have the same objective, which is to prevent the continuation of the nuclear arms race. As is known, by adopting the NPT, the countries which do not possess nuclear weapons have assumed the obligation not to acquire or produce nuclear weapons in any circumstances. However, by the same treaty, the nuclear-weapon Powers also assumed their own share of the responsibilities. This, of course, logically requires that they assume the obligation not to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States. This is why the NPT and such guarantees must be complementary international instruments. The NPT Review Conference held in 1980 demonstrated that the obligations of the nuclear-weapon States have not been fulfilled, while the non-nuclear-weapon States have completely fulfilled theirs. By assuming the obligations of the NPT, the non-nuclear-weapon States are fully entitled to demand not only the fulfilment of the obligations of the nuclear-weapon States according to the NPT, but also to be given firm guarantees that nuclear weapons will not be used against them nor will they be threatened with them. By disregarding their obligations, the nuclear-weapon Powers want in fact to retain their monopoly in nuclear armament.

On the other hand, through a more consistent implementation of the NPT and the giving of unconditional guarantees to the non-nuclear-weapon States, strong encouragement could be given to the process of using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to a freer transfer of nuclear technology to the developing countries, in order that they may have a more rapid socio-economic development.

How great a significance the non-aligned countries attach to this issue is best illustrated by the results of the recent meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs that was held in New Delhi, at which the following was said:

"The Ministers declared that the most effective assurance of security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was nuclear disarmament and prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States must refrain from any activity in the nuclear field which would jeopardize the security and well-being of the peoples of non-nuclear States. The nuclear-weapon States have the obligation to guarantee that the non-nuclear-weapon States will not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons. They noted with satisfaction that proposals on that subject had been submitted to the Committee on Disarmament, and that there had been no objection in principle in the Committee to an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States."

In view of the above, Yugoslavia strives for the acceleration by the CD of negotiations on this issue. We express the hope that the Committee will be able to reach, in the nearest future, an agreement on concrete solutions that will give to the non-nuclear-weapon States unconditional guarantees against nuclear aggression or the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, which will be of great importance for their security, independence and sovereignty. My delegation will spare no effort to make its contribution to the positive settlement of this issue.

Mr. MALITA (Romania) (translated from French): The granting of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon countries has been one of the most heavily debated subjects in the sphere of nuclear disarmament. The large number of statements and proposals made by States at least shows that a considerable effort has been made to bring this issue to the point of resolution. The discussions which have taken place have, we believe, sufficiently revealed the importance of the place occupied by security assurances in the general policy concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States. How, indeed, could it be otherwise when, more than 20 years after the resumption of the multilateral negotiations during which the granting of security assurances has so often appeared within reach, these countries see not only that no progress has been made but furthermore, that the nuclear danger has reached unprecedented proportions? These countries cannot accept the idea that their territory, their dwellings and their people are possible targets on maps of strategic objectives, theatres of operation in various conflict scenarios, and involuntary actors in various military theories.

What is more legitimate, just and reasonable than that these States should wish to be removed from the list of nuclear-weapon objectives to be given the assurance that they will not be attacked or threatened with the use of these weapons?

In the Committee we discuss many subjects connected with international security, all of which are important. But, is it possible to imagine a greater source of insecurity for a small or medium-sized country than the possibility of being completely destroyed by the simple pressing of a button on a weapons system, and never knowing when or for what reason it may be triggered?

Our attitude is based on a fact that exists and is widely recognized, namely that correction of the imbalance in security between those who can use and those who may be the victims of nuclear weapons is not only important, but still more, urgent.

If negative security assurances had come into being, as was expected for a brief period after the positive assurances of 1968, the world would have been different today, for we would have succeeded in eliminating a source of the insecurity, anxiety and uncertainty that are behind the reactions to the present situation.

The non-nuclear-weapon States are naturally concerned that their renunciation of atomic weapons should lead, not to a reduction in their security but rather, on the contrary, to the strengthening of their security. Thus their request that they should be given security assurances until such time as nuclear weapons are totally eliminated and the nuclear danger completely removed is fair, logical and realistic. An international instrument containing the requisite assurances would be a normal continuation of a number of important documents among which I would like to mention the Charter of the United Nations, the principle of non-resort to force and the Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 24 November 1961. Under the terms



(Mr. Malita, Romania)

of this Declaration the use of nuclear weapons is described as being contrary to the spirit and aims of the Charter of the United Nations and, as such, a direct violation of the Charter. The Declaration emphasizes that any State using such weapons is to be considered as violating the Charter of the United Nations, as acting contrary to the laws of humanity and as committing a crime against mankind and civilization. Romania believes that a logical continuation of this process is possible and considers that a new instrument can be drafted, as an integral part of the efforts to increase the security of all. Our position was clearly presented by Nicolae Ceausescu, President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, who declared that any State renouncing nuclear weapons had a legitimate right to be given the assurance that no one would threaten its national independence and sovereignty.

It was on the basis of this position that in the course of the negotiations towards the drawing up of the non-proliferation Treaty, Romania proposed the inclusion of a special article setting forth the obligation of the nuclear-weapon countries never and under no circumstances to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against States not possessing such weapons. At the first Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT in 1975, Romania, together with other delegations, submitted a draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the subject of security assurances, a proposal that was repeated at the second NPT Review Conference held last year. In keeping with the same fundamental position, Romania welcomed the initiative of the USSR when it submitted to the United Nations a draft multilateral international convention on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. At the same time we have also noted with interest the efforts made in this area by Pakistan, as well as proposals by India concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons.

The first conclusion that our delegation has drawn from last year's Report of the Committee and from the agenda of this session is that there is a consensus on the need for the adoption of urgent measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, which would have beneficial effects both for those States and for international security as a whole as well as for the nuclear non-proliferation régime. The declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States at the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to Disarmament with respect to the non-use of these weapons strengthen this conviction.

The second conclusion that can be drawn is that the diversity of situations existing in different areas of the world, the specific conditions, are reflected in the varying approaches of the nuclear-weapon States and certain non-nuclear-weapon States as regards the form and content of a universal undertaking on the non-use of nuclear weapons. Whatever the angle from which this question is approached, there is an evident concern lest the final wording of the general undertaking leaves room for the recognition of some kind of right to use nuclear weapons, even if only in certain specific cases.

(Mr. Malita, Romania)

The Romanian delegation for its part considers that from the point of view of the process of negotiation, our Committee has concluded the stage of finding out the positions of all concerned and has now reached the phase of defining the purpose of its future work in this connection. The report of the Ad Hoc Working Group shows that at the present stage, the most realistic direction for our efforts could be the formulation of interim arrangements with respect to security assurances, until agreement is reached on the incorporation in an international convention of an undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States never and under no circumstances to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons, or force in general, against non-nuclear-weapon States. As a contribution to clarification of the concept of interim arrangements, our delegation would like to make a few remarks.

In our opinion, the idea of interim arrangements must take into consideration two elements:

In the first place, recognition of the fact that the final objective remains an undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to enter into a general commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons, or force in general, against non-nuclear-weapon countries. The formulation of the undertaking of the nuclear-weapon States must be objective and unambiguous and leave no room for subjective interpretations as to which States are to benefit from the security arrangements.

Consequently, an interim arrangement can be acceptable to the extent that it is designed as a partial solution in an irreversible and obligatory process of improvement, with achievement of the final objective constantly in view.

Secondly, whatever the form the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States will take (a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly or the Security Council, a joint solemn declaration by the nuclear-weapon States at the next special session devoted to disarmament, etc.), it must offer all concerned the certainty that their security has been considerably improved and that it represents a practical step forward in the reduction of the danger of a nuclear war.

We are aware that the security of States and of the world in general lies in nuclear disarmament and the outlawing of arsenals of atomic weapons. But until this objective is achieved, an undertaking not to use nuclear weapons would be a solution that would have considerable influence on international life. We see the search for effective international arrangements to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States as part of this effort also. Our work towards this end should prove fruitful, for all the conditions necessary for that purpose now exist in the Committee and in the Ad Hoc Working Group.

Like many other delegations, we entered into these negotiations with all the requisite flexibility and receptivity and with a sincere desire to find, in due course, a unanimously acceptable solution.

Mr. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, my delegation would like to make a few remarks today on the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, which our Committee is taking up this week under item 3 of its agenda.

This issue has been under consideration in multilateral forums for quite some time now. Brazil has consistently supported the view that the only effective assurance against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament itself. From the history of armament, and from the history of military doctrines, it is possible to derive one general trend, and this is that once a new weapon finds its way into the arsenals, that weapon, sooner or later, will also find its way into the battlefield. Modern strategic thinking is predicated upon deterrence, which means that the possibility and the willingness actually to use nuclear weapons must be made credible to potential adversaries; even if such use is presented as a last resort, it must remain, nevertheless, a very real and concrete option. In their continuous effort to make the deterrent power of their arsenals increasingly credible, the nuclear-weapon Powers seem to have overlooked the right of the international community, and particularly of the non-nuclear-weapon countries, to live in a peaceful and secure world. For those reasons, there can certainly be no foolproof guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons as long as there are nuclear weapons in the arsenals of States.

Nuclear disarmament, however, continues to elude the determination of the international community, and those who possess such weapons have been lately more prone to advocate the concept of "controlling" such armament, rather than taking concrete steps to reduce their stockpiles until their complete elimination. So, in the absence of meaningful progress towards nuclear disarmament, and as an interim measure designed at least to provide some kind of assurance to non-nuclear-weapon States, Brazil has supported the idea of a commitment by the nuclear-weapon Powers not to use such weapons. This idea stems from the very nature of the nuclear weapon, and from the fact that the consequences of its use would not be confined to the belligerents alone. It is not by mere fancy that the United Nations has condemned the use of nuclear weapons in the strongest terms. But a commitment not to use nuclear weapons, however, is organically linked to the goal of disarmament, and must be conceived as a two-fold obligation: first, an engagement to enter into concrete negotiations toward nuclear disarmament; secondly, in the period between the acceptance of that obligation and the achievement of nuclear disarmament, an engagement not to use nuclear weapons in any circumstances.

In the absence even of some progress in that direction, proposals have been made, throughout the years, in an effort to achieve an interim solution to the question of negative guarantees. In essence, such proposals have been of two kinds: international conventions and unilateral declarations. The former would spell out the conditions, or circumstances, under which nuclear-weapon Powers and non-nuclear-weapon nations together would set limitations to the use of nuclear weapons by those who possess them; the latter would amount to no more than individual statements, by the nuclear-weapon Powers alone, of the conditions under which they would accept self-imposed limitations. Whether such declarations are made individually, or bunched together in a Security Council resolution, would add little to their binding

(Mr. De Souza E Silva, Brazil)

character. Yet, there seems to be very little sensitivity, on the part of the nuclear-weapon Powers, even for interim measures of the two kinds described above, that would partially respond to the legitimate claims of the international community. In the case of the two Superpowers, for instance, their individual declarations set conditions for self-restraint in the use of their nuclear weapons; but those conditions appear designed to suit rather their own strategic interests than the views and aspirations of the overwhelming majority of nations.

The idea of an international convention has been favoured by non-nuclear-weapon States. Brazil has usually supported General Assembly resolutions endorsing that purpose, although in some cases we have abstained, taking into consideration some important elements of the specific proposals.

Any international convention must establish the rights and obligations of its parties, in a balanced and mutually acceptable way, and much more so when it deals with disarmament, security and related matters. In a convention of the type proposed, however, balance could only be struck if the commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons, on the part of the nuclear-weapon Powers, is matched with the non-nuclear status of non-nuclear-weapon countries. In other words, any country not possessing nuclear weapons would, by virtue of its non-nuclear-weapon status, be entitled to exact from the nuclear-weapon Powers the commitment, embodied in the Convention, not to make such non-nuclear-weapon country the object of nuclear attack or threat of attack. The main difficulty in that kind of approach is the characterization of a country as a non-nuclear-weapon State for the purpose of being entitled to the assurance, or negative guarantee. Such a characterization, in our view, derives from a statement of fact and should not entail the imposition of further obligations on the non-nuclear-weapon State, in order to become entitled to the assurances, such as, for instance, participation in any other specific international instruments.

It is the considered opinion of the Brazilian delegation that the obligation not to use, and not to threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, derives simply and directly from the existence of nuclear armaments and from their possession by a handful of States. It would perhaps be in order to emphasize here that the use of such armaments has already been defined in United Nations General Assembly resolution 33/71 B as "a crime against humanity". It follows that non-nuclear-weapon States, which have taken a sovereign decision to forego the nuclear military option, should not be asked to accept new obligations in order to be assured against the use or threat of use of weapons they have of their own will decided not to acquire, and the use of which has been condemned in such a strong way by the international community.

The nuclear option, and even the nuclear military option, is certainly a sovereign right, which a State can only renounce by its own sovereign decision. For such renunciation to become operative, it is obvious that the conditions of national security must have been satisfied, as assessed by the renouncing State. So far, only five nations have exercised their nuclear military option, and their decision to acquire nuclear weapons and continuously to add to their destructive power has been predicated on, and even explained by, their own perception of their security

(Mr. De Souza E. Silva, Brazil)

needs. But because of the very nature of the nuclear weapon, the mere possibility that such arsenals might ever be unleashed entails a situation of growing insecurity for every nation on earth, nuclear and non-nuclear alike. The nations that have chosen not to take the nuclear military option have become increasingly insecure, since their decision prevents them from opposing to a would-be attacker the shield of nuclear deterrence; on the other hand, a decision to go nuclear might add to global insecurity. Yet we have been listening, of late, to the curious argument that nuclear deterrence must be credited for the maintenance of peace in the post-war world. Peace would thus be at the mercy of the arsenals of a few Powers. In today's world, peace has therefore become a hostage to nuclear deterrence.

The primary responsibility for this situation rests squarely on the nuclear-weapon Powers, and it is incumbent upon them to take positive steps to achieve universally acceptable solutions for the dilemma caused by their option. Such solutions must be directed towards the elimination of their nuclear arsenals, because their possession runs counter to the fundamental security interests of humanity as a whole and of every single nation. The capability, and the willingness, to wage nuclear war, let alone the ceaseless improvement of the destructive power of such weapons, results inevitably in a situation of instability and inequality, which is utterly incompatible with the fundamental premises of peaceful international relations.

With regard to the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, Brazil remains, therefore, firmly convinced that nuclear disarmament is still the only permanent and valid form of assurance. The non-use and non-threat of use might be conceived as interim measures, provided such measures would also contain a commitment to nuclear disarmament. The extension of negative assurances must be viewed as a unilateral commitment, on the part of the nuclear-weapon Powers, to be matched by the ascertainable fact of the non-possession of nuclear weapons on the part of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

In the light of these considerations, the Brazilian delegation believes that the proposals currently under examination in the Ad Hoc Working Group established by the Committee should constitute initial steps in the direction of the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament, and in this spirit we continue to participate in that effort. But the modalities and possibilities under scrutiny must not in any way serve the purpose of becoming instruments to legitimize the possession of nuclear weapons or be construed as a justification for the possibility of their utilization.

Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, my intervention this morning is on item 3 of our agenda, effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. This is an item on our agenda which I believe capable of rather rapid conclusion, given the determination of the nuclear-weapon States to arrive at a compromise.

At our 112th plenary meeting on 5 March 1981, I stated: "The retention of nuclear weapons by the Powers which currently possess them constitutes one of the greatest disservices that can be done to world security because it encourages others

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

to believe in the efficacy of nuclear weapons. Security for all countries will either have to be sought in ways other than the possession of nuclear weapons, or all countries should be accorded the right to determine the means, including the possession of nuclear weapons, for protecting their security". My delegation does not believe in the efficacy of nuclear weapons; rather we firmly hold that since nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization, security based on these weapons is dangerous and must be discarded. In its stead, security for all countries will be effectively enhanced through the renunciation by all nuclear-weapon States of the use of nuclear weapons. Such a renunciation will not only encourage the cessation of the nuclear arms race among the nuclear-weapon States, it will also promote horizontal nuclear non-proliferation among non-nuclear-weapon States.

In a situation in which the nuclear-weapon States continue to show reluctance either to undertake nuclear disarmament or even to renounce the use of nuclear weapons as a step towards halting the arms race, the means of safeguarding the security of non-nuclear-weapon States is of increasing concern. The greater the degree of tension between the nuclear-weapon States, the higher the race in the development and deployment of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States in their own territories as well as the territories of some of their allies, the more the fear entertained by non-nuclear-weapon States for their security. After all, if nuclear-weapon States, in spite of all they know of the horror of nuclear weapons and the catastrophic effect of their use, still choose to flirt with self-destruction, then the least service they can render the rest of the world is an acceptance of the fact that their suicidal desire need not be forced on the rest of us. This is particularly relevant in the case where countries have formally committed themselves to a renunciation of their sovereign right to the development, production or acquisition of nuclear weapons. These countries having made the sacrifice are entitled to a credible commitment by the nuclear-weapon States that advantage will not be taken of the sacrifice they have made in the interests of nuclear non-proliferation and world peace and security to subject them to nuclear attack or nuclear blackmail.

The commitment of the Nigerian Government to the non-proliferation regime has been firm and deep. Indeed, Nigeria was one of the very first to sign the non-proliferation Treaty, and second only to Ireland in ratifying that Treaty. There are at present about 110 Parties to the Treaty that are non-nuclear-weapon States. Yet, in spite of two review conferences of the Parties to the Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States Parties have refused to commit themselves legally, even within the context of NPT and to the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty, never and in no circumstances to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT. This is a most unsatisfactory situation.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

I am aware, of course, that the consideration of this item in the Committee goes beyond the specific context of the NPT. Indeed, paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the General Assembly's first special session on disarmament, which forms the major point of departure of the Ad Hoc Working Group which was conceived in the context of nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, called upon nuclear-weapon States to take steps to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

As at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Nigerian delegation has on many occasions made observations on the unilateral declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States. These declarations were helpful but are no substitute for a legally binding instrument which, of course, is the aim of negotiations on this subject in the Committee on Disarmament. It is pertinent here to recall that the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on this subject for 1980 stated that there was no objection in principle to the idea of an international convention. The Ad Hoc Working Group should therefore concentrate its efforts at the initial stage of its work this year on reaching agreement on a common approach acceptable to all which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. We have no doubt that under the able chairmanship of the representative of Italy, the Ad Hoc Working Group will make progress.

I should like to draw attention at this juncture to the time-frame within which the General Assembly expects the Committee to conclude its work on this item. In resolution 35/46 entitled, "Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade", the General Assembly agreed by consensus thus:

"All efforts should be exerted, therefore, by the Committee on Disarmament urgently to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement, and to submit agreed texts where possible before the second special session devoted to disarmament on:

...  
(d) Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons ...".

If we cannot reach agreement before the General Assembly's second special session devoted to disarmament, the Committee should at least be able to present agreed texts to the Assembly at that session.

Turning to the question of a common approach, it seems to me that three elements will have to be borne in mind, namely:

(i) The nature of the obligation to be undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States;

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

- (ii) The nature of the obligation expected to be assumed by non-nuclear-weapon States; and
- (iii) The safeguarding of the security of nuclear-weapon States.

With respect to the obligation to be undertaken by nuclear-weapon States, it is obvious that they have to commit themselves in a legally binding manner not to use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, in any circumstances, subject, of course, to my third point which is the question of safeguarding the security of the nuclear-weapon States.

As a corollary to the legally binding assurance that they will not be attacked or threatened by nuclear weapons, the non-nuclear-weapon States will have to undertake an obligation not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. This undertaking should be embodied in at least one legally binding instrument but can also be expressed by a non-nuclear-weapon State in more than one instrument. Thus a non-nuclear-weapon State party to an instrument such as the NPT or a nuclear-weapon-free-zone Treaty shall be presumed to have fulfilled the necessary obligation, even if such a country is not party to the legal instrument which will embody the security assurances. You will appreciate that a country like mine in a region where the development of nuclear-weapon capability is being clandestinely developed by South Africa cannot presume that a country is a non-nuclear-weapon State just because it says so. South Africa continues to deny that it is developing nuclear weapons even in spite of the obvious and overwhelming evidence. If it continues to persist in its refusal to undertake a legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons, then it cannot hope to enjoy the benefits of the security assurance which we are negotiating.

The point therefore is that the obligation to be assumed in a legally binding instrument on security guarantees will constitute, for those non-nuclear-weapon States that have not done so, an undertaking regarding horizontal non-proliferation.

My third point, i.e., the security of nuclear-weapon States, is linked inextricably with the peculiar cases of those non-nuclear-weapon States that have nuclear weapons on their territories and from which, therefore, conceivably, nuclear attack can be launched by a nuclear-weapon State against another. In consideration of their non-nuclear-weapon status, if expressed in a binding instrument, I believe that in principle such countries may benefit from security guarantees. Nevertheless, their guarantee may be the subject of interpretative statement by nuclear-weapon States other than those nuclear-weapon States which have stationed nuclear weapons on a territory.



Mr. ISSRAELIYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Today we should like to deal with one of the priority items on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament — the item on the strengthening of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

The Soviet Union, as is well known, has attached, and continues to attach, exceptional importance to this item, taking the view that its prompt and effective solution would meet the security interests not only of the non-nuclear-weapon States, which are directly concerned in it, but in fact of all States in the world. A settlement of this question would constitute a substantial contribution towards halting the nuclear arms race and in favour of nuclear disarmament, and would do much to help strengthen the régime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The USSR's position on the question of strengthening security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States is well known. It has been repeatedly set forth in the course of the discussions that have been taking place for nearly three years now in the Committee and in its Working Group. We are in favour of the total exclusion of the use of force in international relations and in favour of nuclear disarmament. This, in our view, would be a really effective measure in the process of strengthening world peace and the security of all States. As Mr. L.I. Brezhnev said in a statement made in 1978: "The Soviet Union is doing and will do everything possible to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war and to prevent peoples from falling victim to nuclear strikes -- whether first or subsequent. This is our firm position, and we will act in accordance with it." However, in the conditions of a continuing nuclear arms race, the problem of strengthening security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is becoming increasingly urgent.

The Soviet Union has unilaterally committed itself not to use, and not to threaten to use, nuclear weapons against those States which do not have such weapons on their territory, under their jurisdiction and control. This commitment was reaffirmed at the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Addressing the Congress, Mr. L.I. Brezhnev said: "We have taken the important step of stating and confirming that we will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which do not allow them to be deployed on their territory".

We still consider that the most effective way of strengthening security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States is the conclusion of an appropriate international legal document of a binding nature, such as a convention. As you know, a draft of such an international convention has already been submitted for the Committee's consideration by a group of Socialist countries, including the USSR, in document CD/23. We again affirm that our proposals are still valid. We did not fully understand a statement made by one of the previous speakers to the effect that the idea of an international convention on security assurances is supported only by non-nuclear-weapon States. I should like to remind the Committee that the USSR submitted the draft of such a convention at the thirty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1978

We listened with interest to the statements made by the Ambassadors of Brazil and Nigeria, and we consider that the views expressed by them should be carefully studied in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

In view of the circumstances, while remaining a firm supporter of the conclusion of an international convention the Soviet Union has at the same time expressed its willingness, if the other nuclear Powers adopt the same approach, to give simultaneous consideration to another possible way of solving this problem, although we still think that the most effective form of assurances would be an international convention.

In a statement made at the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Mr. A.A. Gromyko, specifically called upon all the nuclear-weapon States to make solemn declarations, identical in their substance, concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States having no such weapons on their territories. Such declarations, if they are to serve their purpose, could be confirmed by an authoritative decision of the Security Council.

Last year the Committee on Disarmament and its Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances did some useful work, even though that work was not completed. Several aspects of the problem were considered in detail, and formulae for security assurances proposed both by the nuclear-weapon States and by non-nuclear-weapon States were studied. We are glad to note that as a result of that discussion many delegations stated that the formula proposed by the Soviet Union is the most comprehensive and objective. In the opinion of other States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, their formulae seem to them to be the most appropriate. For example, I have no doubt that the Ambassador of the United Kingdom, who is due to speak after me, will claim that his formula is the most effective. And if we continue in this fashion, basing ourselves on the immutable positions of the major parties, we run the risk of finding ourselves in a blind alley or of being caught up in an unproductive discussion. The question is how to proceed further, in which direction to continue the search for reliable security assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon States.

It is possible, of course, to continue work on identifying the common elements in the various formulae, classifying them, and finally finding a common formula. In this connection some interesting observations have been put forward in the Committee by a number of delegations, including statements made at the last meeting.

As far as our delegation is concerned, we declare that we are ready to display flexibility, to take a definite step towards bringing the various positions together -- but on condition, of course, that such steps are also taken by our partners, primarily those from the nuclear-weapon States. Subsequent negotiations will no doubt show how real are the chances of success in this matter.

The non-nuclear-weapon States -- and, let it be said, not only those States -- expect the Committee on Disarmament to adopt specific measures, however slight, that will mark some progress towards the strengthening of their security assurances. And this task is all the more urgent in so far as we are on the threshold of the second special session of the United Nations General on disarmament.

We therefore consider that, in order to achieve progress in this matter, the Committee on Disarmament should concentrate its main attention on those factors which, as far as the strengthening of security assurances to non-nuclear States is concerned, either bring the participants in the negotiations together or are capable of bringing them together, and not on those factors which separate and divide them one from another.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

In other words, it is a question of identifying the common or nearly common elements to be found in the approaches of States to this problem as a whole. As Ambassador P. Voutov, the representative of Bulgaria, remarked in his interesting statement of 17 March, the final result of such efforts could be a resolution of the United Nations Security Council containing a joint declaration by nuclear-weapon Powers, or a series of identical statements by them. This would undoubtedly serve as a positive contribution and stimulate definite progress towards strengthening security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

We think that the basis for such a concordance of approaches to the problem exists and that it is entirely realistic. In the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances, a group of socialist States had submitted some informal observations in this connection. We believe that they constitute a sound basis for further negotiations aimed at the working out of a generally acceptable document.

The finding of a common denominator in the approaches and positions of States, while not an end in itself, would, it seems to us, help to break the deadlock and definitely advance the Committee's work towards the effective strengthening of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet delegation is willing to listen to and to study any observations which other delegations may make for the purpose of a really businesslike consideration of this and other vital disarmament problems.

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, I wish this morning to say a few words about the British Government's policy on negative security assurances, which we are considering under item 3 of our agenda.

First, let me emphasize that as a nuclear-weapon State Britain recognizes the point made by the distinguished representative of Nigeria in his statement a few minutes ago, namely, that non-nuclear-weapon States are entitled to a guarantee that they will not be the object of attack by weapons which they themselves have forsworn. My Government initially responded to this concern of non-nuclear-weapon States by giving a solemn assurance on the subject in June 1978. Since then my Government has also maintained its response to that concern by participating in this Committee in the further search for any effective international arrangements on which it may be found possible to agree. Furthermore, we have made clear that we have an open mind as to what such international arrangements might consist of.

As a way of handling our subject, I should like to recall that in the Ad Hoc Working Group my delegation has said on several occasions during the session that, within reason, we are willing to accept any method of work which commends itself to the rest of the membership, particularly to the delegations of the non-nuclear-weapon States, for whose benefit the exercise is in progress.

I now turn to the assurance given by the British Government at the time of the first United Nations General Assembly special session on disarmament in 1978. My delegation has described and explained the very clear basis of this assurance on several occasions and I do not intend to repeat today all the points we have previously made. But I think it may help delegations to have some commentary on the record. My delegation will accordingly be circulating shortly -- perhaps next week -- a CD document on the subject. The document will examine aspects of the British assurance in relation to other security assurances and to the various proposals for further action which have been put forward.

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

I will confine myself now to recalling that the security assurance, announced in the British Parliament in June 1978 by the then Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, reads as follows -- and here I am going to read the full text, slightly longer than the one which is being circulated. The text reads:

"We are now ready to give the following assurance to non-nuclear-weapon States which are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or to other internationally binding commitments not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices." The assurance was that: "Britain undertakes not to use nuclear weapons against such States except in the case of an attack on the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its armed forces or its allies by such a State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State."

I can add only three brief comments on this text. The first is that this assurance has been in force since it was made in 1978 and remains fully operative today.

Secondly, the assurance contains a definition of the non-nuclear-weapon States to which it applies that is both precise and reasonable: it applies to all States which have accepted commitments constituting a clear demonstration that they are indeed non-nuclear-weapon States.

Thirdly, the only qualification to the application of the British assurance is that the States to which it applies do not engage in hostilities against us in alliance or in association with a nuclear-weapon Power. It goes without saying that this does not diminish the value of the assurance for those States whose intentions are peaceful. Indeed, the assurance would still apply to any State which actually entered into conflict with us, provided that it was not allied to or associated with a nuclear-weapon State.

I should like here to respond to a comment on the British assurance which was made in our plenary meeting on 17 March by the distinguished representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Voutov. Although he did not mention my country by name, Britain's assurance is evidently one of the "two almost identical" assurances to which he referred at one point in his statement. Ambassador Voutov commented on two aspects of the feature of the British assurance that I have just mentioned, which he called a "self-defence clause". This seems to me a useful phrase.

First he queried the discrepancy in language between the British security assurance, which has in its "self-defence clause" a reference to the alliance status of a non-nuclear-weapon Power, and the analogous statement in the declaration made by my Government on signature of the additional Protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which have no such reference. The simple answer is that there is no difference in substance. At the time of the signature of Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the British Government stated that it would be free to reconsider its commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against a contracting party in the event of any act of aggression by a party when that party was supported by a nuclear-weapon State. The exception in our negative security assurance is "in the case of an attack ... by a State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State". The language of our negative security assurance was designed to clarify what we meant by a nuclear-weapon State "supporting" a non-nuclear-weapon State.

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

Ambassador Voutov's second point was that our self-defence clause was open to what he called "subjective interpretations". In the first place I should point out that our qualification only applies in the event of an actual attack on the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its armed forces or its allies. The qualification is designed to guard against the situation where a non-nuclear-weapon State attacked us or an ally, falsely claiming that it was doing so without the support of a nuclear-weapon State. In such a case we reserve the right to respond at an appropriate level, if necessary with the use of nuclear weapons. There is inevitably an element of subjectivity in this since ultimately we would have to make our own decision. But in practice it will always be clear whether a non-nuclear-weapon State is acting in association with a nuclear-weapon State. And if it did so act, it is difficult in logic to see why such a State should continue to enjoy the advantages of non-nuclear-weapon status.

Furthermore, unlike the Soviet assurance, the British assurance contains no provision excluding a non-nuclear-weapon State from its scope only on the grounds that nuclear weapons are situated on its territory. The British assurance, on the other hand, is valid, as I have just pointed out, in all circumstances except self-defence in extreme circumstances.

All this said, I have noted Ambassador Voutov's suggestion that the right of self-defence could be formulated "in a non-conditional way". My delegation would naturally be interested to look at any language which he may propose to that end.

I have one other point to make arising from the distinguished Ambassador's statement. At several points he referred to "the security assurances already in force". As I have already said, my own Government's assurance is most certainly one of those which are already in force. But I should like to avail myself of the opportunity to put a question, through you Sir, to the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union about the Soviet assurance.

After making its statement in May 1978 which contemplated the negotiation of bilateral agreements -- and I noticed that Ambassador Issraelyan did not refer to this aspect in the statement he has just made -- the Soviet Government proposed a multilateral convention on negative security assurances. Since then the Soviet Union has also suggested the possibility of co-ordinated unilateral action by the nuclear-weapon States. This we note duly. From the statements of the Soviet Government and from the exchanges in this Committee, the current Soviet position appears to be that in the absence of a multilateral convention, or of joint action by the nuclear-weapon States, the Soviet offer of bilateral arrangements remains on the table. Our understanding is therefore that the Soviet assurance is not yet fully operative since, so far as we are aware, no bilateral negotiations have taken place. But the position is not altogether clear. And my question to my distinguished Soviet colleague is therefore as follows: are there specific countries for which the Soviet assurance is already in operation; or is some further action, multilateral or bilateral, needed to bring it into effect?

In conclusion, I should like to emphasize a point I made at the beginning of my statement. My delegation has already, since the beginning of this session, started work on a substantive examination of a way forward and we remain entirely flexible about the structure of the activity in the Working Group on this subject. We have, however, noted a number of different and in part contradictory proposals for the Group's approach to its work. We have indicated which of these approaches seem to us more likely to be productive than others. But we have not raised objection to any of the proposals which have been made which deal with the problem of security assurances. And I repeat that we shall be ready to accept whatever method of work is thought best to meet the particular concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

Mr. EL REEDY (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Mr. Chairman, the subject of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of those weapons against them is of such importance and seriousness that my delegation believes that we must once again reaffirm our concern and our desire to participate in the endeavours being made in this Committee with a view to the furtherance of this issue.

Please allow me, Mr. Chairman, before beginning my comments in this regard, to congratulate you and to express our esteem and appreciation for the sincere and skilful efforts which you are making with a view to ensuring the success of this Committee's work. On the basis of what we have witnessed during the last three weeks, we believe that your chairmanship will be a successful one by virtue of your customary impartial and knowledgeable approach when directing the affairs of the Committee.

While on the subject of security arrangements, I would like to thank all the members of the Committee who commended the efforts of my colleague Dr. Mohamed El-Baradei who presided over the Working Group established in this connection during the last two sessions.

The subject which we are currently considering is undoubtedly a delicate and complicated one since, in one way or another, it affects not only a number of the basic principles governing the thinking of the nuclear-weapon States in general and the two Superpowers in particular, but also the multilateral security systems which they have established, their view of the probabilities of conflict and deterrence and other considerations relating to the phenomenon of nuclear saturation in the shadow of which the world is at present living.

However, we are at the same time working on the basis that there is at least a sincere desire and a definite interest on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and we wish to support the endeavours which are being made in this respect. In our view, the most effective approach would be for those States to look seriously into the question of the guarantees which might be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States and to come up with a reasonable formula capable of reassuring the non-nuclear-weapon States and encouraging them to continue to renounce the nuclear option, thereby promoting the regime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and encouraging those countries which have not yet done so to adhere to this regime.

Although there is a risk that what we will be saying on this occasion may be regarded as reiteration, it is perhaps the kind of reiteration which we should not tire of hearing. We must remember that our discussions in this Committee in fact relate only to the use of the most murderous weapons of mass destruction.

We are talking about weapons which have been rejected by international public opinion. Their use should therefore be prohibited and they should not, under any circumstances, constitute a legitimate tool.

Naturally, a real guarantee can only be provided through the conclusion of an international agreement absolutely prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. However, pending the achievement of this objective, the States which are continuing to manufacture, develop and stockpile those weapons in their arsenals should at least undertake not to use them against non-nuclear-weapon States.

(Mr. El Reedy, Egypt)

In actual fact, the matter should not be regarded as one of reciprocal duties and obligations between the nuclear-weapon States on the one hand and the non-nuclear-weapon States on the other. It should not be interpreted in this way since the dangers of nuclear weapons stem from the policies of States which have chosen to avail themselves of the nuclear option. Those States pursuing those policies should assume the consequent responsibilities vis-à-vis the non-nuclear-weapon States which have renounced the nuclear option.

It is not my intention to discuss the five declarations issued by the nuclear-weapon States although there is a general belief shared by the vast majority that those declarations are, in general, inadequate with regard to both their content and the extent to which they can be regarded as legally binding. This was the reason for our repeated demands in the past for the provision of adequate and binding guarantees. Our ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons makes us even more determined to continue to demand the provision of effective and binding guarantees for the non-nuclear-weapon States.

I do not wish to enter into a discussion on the papers submitted to the working groups or on specific proposals -- our delegation will continue to study them and to participate in the endeavours being made to reach a generally acceptable formula -- but I would like to urge the nuclear-weapon States to adopt a serious approach and to increase their efforts with a view to the achievement of real progress at this session so that effective international arrangements can be made to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador El Reedy, the representative of Egypt, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me, on my assumption of the chairmanship of this Committee.

In accordance with the decision taken by the Committee at its 104th plenary meeting, I now call on the representative of Finland, Mr. Keisalo.

Mr. KEISALO (Finland): Mr. Chairman, my Government wishes to place on record its satisfaction at the business-like solution of the question of the participation of Finland in the work of the Committee. We have noted in this regard the positive attitude of all members. In particular, we should like to thank the distinguished representative of France, the Chairman in February, for the manner in which he conducted the proceedings in this matter.

It is also a pleasure for me to express to you, Mr. Chairman, my best wishes for a successful term as the Chairman during the month of March.

May I also be allowed to use this opportunity to welcome the Arab Republic of Egypt as a new Party to the NPT.

(Mr. Keisalo, Finland)

The Government of Finland notes with satisfaction that the Committee on Disarmament, already at its 1979 session, began the substantial consideration of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It is furthermore encouraging that all five nuclear-weapon States have recognized in this respect the legitimacy of the security concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States and declared their willingness to meet those concerns. Finland had the opportunity to communicate to the CD its general views on the matter in a working document (CD/75) of 14 March 1980. As a further expression of the importance my Government attaches to this question, I would like to state the following:

Our interest in the questions concerning the security assurances stems from the fact that Finland is a non-nuclear-weapon State. As a party to the NPT Finland has given up the so-called nuclear-weapon option. As a country pursuing a policy of neutrality and being outside military alliances, Finland has neither nuclear weapons of other States nor any foreign bases or foreign troops on its territory. Instead, as a small European country, Finland has endeavoured to strengthen its security through measures aimed at promoting détente, disarmament and co-operation in the Nordic, the European and the global framework. Finland has both the right and the responsibility before its people to seek to stay aloof from the sphere of threats and speculations to which the new development of nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy in particular has given rise and ensure that Finland remains outside international tensions. At the same time, we desire to work in such a way that our policy of neutrality also serves the cause of peace, which corresponds to both our own security interests and those of other States. This is more vital today than ever.

Pending achievement of effective measures of nuclear arms limitation and nuclear disarmament, Finland welcomes all measures aimed at reducing the potential use of nuclear arms. One such measure is today under discussion in this Committee. The negative security assurances are a facet of the broader question of the strengthening of the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States. Such assurances are interrelated, inter alia, with the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The question of formal guarantees for the security of non-nuclear-weapon States was raised in the negotiation stages of the NPT. Subsequently, the Security Council adopted resolution 255 (1968). The resolution was the companion piece of the pledges by the three nuclear-weapon Powers of their intention to provide positive security guarantees through action by the Security Council. While these declarations were contributions to the collective security system provided for in the United Nations Charter, it remains a political reality that a vast majority of non-nuclear-weapon States have called for additional security assurances by the nuclear-weapon States.

Security assurances are a vital element of the nuclear-weapon-free zones and their establishment. The Treaty of Tlatelolco with its Additional Protocol II is a telling case, providing formal undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against Parties to the Treaty. It is necessary, however, to note in this context the interpretative declarations made by some nuclear-weapon States.



(Mr. Koisalo, Finland)

As the main objective of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone is the strengthening of the security of the zonal States, it is indeed inherent in the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone that as a minimum, its status is respected by all extra-zonal States, and especially by nuclear-weapon States. Equally important, if not more so, is the provision for appropriate assurances by nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against members of the zone. This was also recognized in the findings of the comprehensive study on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones carried out by the ad hoc group of qualified governmental experts under the auspices of the CCD in 1975.

The development, production and deployment of new generations of most sophisticated weapons systems is arousing particular concern. A new armaments spiral, the commencement of which is already in evidence as far as Europe is concerned, might threaten the continuation of a situation which has become established in Northern Europe. Therefore, more than ever before Finland believes that in the Nordic region of Europe special arrangements for arms control would be useful and conceivable. The goal of such arrangements, in conjunction with other measures concerning the whole of Europe, and in accordance with the security needs of all Governments concerned, would be to alleviate, and if possible to do away with, the dangers evoked by nuclear weapons and especially by the new nuclear weapons technology.

Accordingly, Finland has endeavoured to give effect to these ideas by making several proposals both of a general nature and in more specific contexts. In 1963, the President of Finland proposed the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in northern Europe. In 1978, he proposed a Nordic arms control arrangement as a further elaboration of the basic idea. The aim is to isolate the Nordic countries as completely as possible from the effects of nuclear strategy in general and of the consequences of the new nuclear weapons technology in particular. The idea presented in 1963 and elaborated in 1978 has remained pertinent. Although there are differences of opinion as to the form of a suitable approach there seems to be a shared concern in the Nordic countries as to the need for enhancing the security in northern Europe through some kind of arms control arrangement. This fact is reflected in the ongoing debate about a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone.

The position of my Government on the question of security assurances has been clearly expressed on previous occasions in the following way: if certain small States or groups of States knowingly and absolutely commit themselves not to acquire or station in their territories certain types of weapons, they clearly have to receive an assurance that these weapons will not be turned against them and that they will not be threatened with these weapons. The countries entering into an arms control arrangement render a service not only to themselves but also to the international community as a whole. They have the right to expect and demand reciprocation by others.

Moreover, in the view of my Government, the security assurances should be as comprehensive as possible in order to take into account the new and developing nuclear-weapon technology and the threat thereof to the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. Thus, in addition to the need for general non-use assurances, the nuclear-weapon States are obligated to respect the sovereignty of non-nuclear-weapon States. Consequently, their territories, including the air-space, must not be violated in delivering nuclear weapons to their targets.

(Mr. Keisalo, Finland)

All nuclear-weapon States have recently made unilateral statements describing situations in which and States against which they would not use nuclear weapons. Finland, like most other States, has welcomed the unilateral declarations. These declarations do, however, differ from each other to a considerable extent and their amalgamation into one common statement has not, for the time being, proved possible. Furthermore, as these declarations are not attached to any multilateral instrument they remain unilateral and political and can be modified or withdrawn in the same way as they were made. We can acknowledge that they contribute to the further consideration of the question, although they obviously fall short of our goal of effective international arrangements, not to speak of a legally binding instrument. They are functions of the respective military doctrines and based on differing political perceptions. They reflect much less the wishes of the non-nuclear-weapon States and are, besides, diluted by political and legal reservations.

The assurances should be as binding as possible. In principle, there appears to be no objection to the idea of an international convention on the subject, although difficulties remain. A multilateral instrument would be possible if a common formula can be devised that would be acceptable to all nuclear-weapon States and satisfactory to non-nuclear-weapon States.

All approaches to achieving arrangements for non-use assurances should continue to be explored. All interested Governments should be involved in the process and have the opportunity to express their particular security concerns. As a measure in the direction of effective international arrangements the Security Council could appropriately act upon the question, as a number of both nuclear and non-nuclear States have suggested.

To conclude, I wish to reiterate the interest that my Government attaches to the question of negative security assurances, which we consider as one of the most urgent items on the agenda of the CD. We are prepared to contribute to the best of our abilities to the efforts of the Committee and its Ad Hoc Working Group on this subject. We believe that several valuable proposals have already been made during this session and earlier, and that the CD will be able to make considerable progress this year.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Finland for his statement and for his words of welcome addressed to the Chair.

In accordance with the decision taken by the Committee at its 104th plenary meeting, I now give the floor to Ambassador Pictet, the representative of Switzerland.

Mr. PICTET (Switzerland) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, may I first thank you, and through you, all the members of the Committee on Disarmament, for allowing my country to take part in some of your activities during the present session.

Switzerland has always followed the work of the Committee with attention and welcomes the opportunity to take a more active part in it.

I should like also to express my best wishes to you, Mr. Chairman, in the exacting office you have assumed for this month of March.

The question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons has been a matter of concern to the Swiss authorities for nearly 14 years.

This concern was shown, first of all, in the context of the formulation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). For example, in a memorandum of November 1967 to the United Nations General Assembly, my Government expressed its conviction that an effective non-proliferation régime was inseparable from adequate guarantees for States renouncing nuclear weapons against the use or threat of use of such weapons. This viewpoint was reaffirmed in a memorandum sent by the Swiss authorities in May 1968 to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

As we all know, the NPT failed to resolve this important question. The inequality established by the Treaty between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, which violates a fundamental principle of the law of nations, has still not been corrected. It will continue to exist until the negotiations on effective measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and for nuclear disarmament, to which article VI of the Treaty refers, and in particular negotiations towards the conclusion of a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear tests, have produced positive results. A system of effective guarantees for the non-nuclear-weapon countries would also help to correct this inequality and thus to strengthen the NPT, to which Switzerland attaches very great importance. It would, in addition, have considerable impact at the level of international security in general. Switzerland regrets that the two review conferences of the Parties to the NPT produced no result in this connection.

Security Council resolution 255 of 1968, adopted, as it was, with five abstentions, fails to meet the expectations of the non-nuclear-weapon countries as far as security guarantees are concerned. In fact, the operative part of this resolution contains no undertaking on the part of the nuclear-weapon States not to use such weapons. Nor is paragraph 2, in which the Council "welcomes the intention expressed by certain States that they will provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used", satisfactory to a neutral State like Switzerland. For, in accordance with its obligations under the law of nations, Switzerland considers that it alone is responsible, in peace-time, for the organization of its own defence. The preservation of its security cannot be entrusted to any third party. The Swiss authorities therefore share the reservations made by various States, including Sweden and Austria, with regard to a system of so-called "positive" guarantees. In any event, a decision to provide assistance of this nature would have such far-reaching consequences, starting with the danger of the spread of nuclear conflict, that the credibility of such a system may well be doubted.

(Mr. Pictet, Switzerland)

So-called "negative" security guarantees whereby the nuclear-weapon States would undertake never to use nuclear weapons against States not possessing such weapons or not having such weapons on their territory would have no such disadvantages.

Switzerland has followed with great attention the work done in this sphere by the Committee on Disarmament. While fully appreciating the complexity of negotiations on this subject, it believes that it might be useful if it were to inform the Committee of its views on this matter.

Two approaches appear to be open to the Committee: either the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States together enter into a convention, or the nuclear-weapon States give the non-nuclear-weapon States unilateral assurances.

As far as the formulation of a convention is concerned, it could be argued that, since the non-nuclear-weapon States have committed themselves by a treaty to the renunciation of nuclear weapons, it is in the form of a treaty that the nuclear-weapon States ought to give them the security assurances to which they feel entitled. At the first NPT Review Conference in 1975, Switzerland expressed a certain interest in such a solution, since it would satisfy a desire for symmetry in obligations. On reflection, however, the Swiss authorities came to share the doubts on the subject expressed in the Committee by Sweden and Austria in particular. My country now considers that, in acceding to the NPT, the non-nuclear-weapon States have assumed all the obligations that can reasonably be expected of them.

Moreover, Switzerland sees no possibility of its agreeing to commit itself, under such a convention, to any machinery for consultations. Again, the question of the guaranteeing of respect for the convention in the event of a State Party having reason to believe that another State Party, whether a nuclear-weapon State or a non-nuclear-weapon State, has violated its undertakings would also call for very careful consideration by a neutral State like Switzerland.

The unilateral declarations which have so far been made by the five nuclear-weapon States represent progress as compared with the 1968 situation which Switzerland notes with satisfaction. It is true that these declarations were made in varying circumstances and that their content is not identical. The Swiss authorities nevertheless consider that all these declarations constitute legal undertakings which bind their authors vis-à-vis all the non-nuclear-weapon States. As you know, the International Court of Justice, in a recent judgement, recognized that declarations constituting unilateral acts can create legal obligations. In the Court's opinion, there is no need, in such cases, for any counterpart before the declaration takes effect, nor even for a response or reaction from the other States.

It would however, be highly desirable, to strengthen these undertakings further, and in particular to remove the ambiguities from which some of them suffer.

Switzerland sincerely hopes that the Committee on Disarmament will succeed in distilling a common formula from these five declarations. My authorities have noted with interest the comments made on this subject by the representative of the Netherlands in his statement of 26 June 1979. It seems that it would indeed be possible, by careful analysis of the five texts, to find a certain number of common elements. There is however, the risk that a common formula would reflect only the lowest common denominator and would thus result in a reduction of the scope of the undertakings given by some of the five nuclear-weapon States. The form that might be taken by a possible common declaration, free from ambiguity and with the broadest possible scope, remains to be determined.

(Mr. Pictet, Switzerland)

If the development of this text requires some further time, the Swiss authorities wonder, like others, whether it would not be useful meanwhile provisionally to incorporate the five declarations, of which the General Assembly, at its first special session on disarmament, merely took note, in a single document. While not being identical in content, these declarations would thereby at least assume the same form, a clearer and more solemn one.

Switzerland would like to repeat here the hope it expressed last year at the second Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT. At that time it proposed in a working document (NPT/CONF.II/C.I/5) that the Conference should confirm that the five unilateral declarations constituted legal undertakings that were absolutely binding on their originators. As you know, the Review Conference did not succeed in agreeing on a final document in which this proposal might have been included. The Swiss authorities therefore hope that any document containing a joint declaration of assurances or setting forth the five separate declarations that have so far been made, will make express reference to their legally binding character.

In thanking you for giving me the opportunity to address your Committee, I wish to express the good wishes of the Swiss authorities for the success of its work.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Switzerland, our host country, for his statement and for his congratulations addressed to me.

Distinguished delegates, as representatives are aware, the Committee has held several informal meetings to consider proposals for the establishment of ad hoc working groups on items 1 and 2 of the Committee's agenda, as well as the establishment of other subsidiary bodies. After having assessed the present situation of our work in this area, the Chairman has come to the conclusion that it would be appropriate to put forward certain thoughts which could guide the further activities of the Committee on items 1 and 2 during the remaining part of our spring session. In this context, I would like to make the following statement:

With a view to accelerating the pace in dealing with items 1 and 2 of its agenda, the Committee will regularly hold informal meetings to undertake a substantive examination of concrete issues relating to these items. In the course of this substantive examination, proposals to set up ad hoc working groups under these two items for conducting multilateral negotiations may also be considered.

The Chairman considers that it would be useful to concentrate at the forthcoming regular informal meetings on the consideration of substantive issues to be agreed upon by the Committee through consultations on the basis of proposals that have been or may be submitted.

The first informal meeting, on Monday 23 March, under item 2 of the agenda, will be devoted to the examination of the preconditions for negotiations on nuclear disarmament as well as doctrines of deterrence and other theories concerning nuclear weapons. The specific issues relating to item 1 of the agenda, to be taken up at the subsequent informal meeting during the following week, will be the subject of informal consultations to be conducted by the Chairman.

In accordance with established practice, the Chairman intends to hold informal consultations, whenever necessary, to advance the consideration of the issues related to agenda items 1 and 2.

(The Chairman)

In this connection, the Chairman has requested the Secretariat to prepare a tabulation of all proposals on nuclear disarmament submitted since the General Assembly's first special session devoted to disarmament held in 1978. This will be complemented subsequently by a similar tabulation of all proposals on nuclear disarmament submitted between the establishment of the United Nations in 1945 and the holding of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978.

Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): My delegation has taken note of and welcomes the statement which you have just made to the effect that the Committee will hold regular informal meetings to examine agenda items 1 and 2, with a view to embarking on a substantive consideration of specific issues related to these two items.

This statement is consonant with the position taken by my delegation that the lack of consensus on the establishment of working groups on these two items should not prevent the Committee from performing its task or from discharging its responsibility as a multilateral negotiating body and that, while these working groups are being set up, we should devote as many informal meetings of the Committee as possible to trying to move ahead in the consideration of the substantive issues arising in connection with agenda items 1 and 2.

I should also like to draw attention to that part of your statement in which you said that the various proposals relating to the setting up of the working groups may also be considered at the informal meetings.

This part of your statement is of particular importance to my delegation for several reasons. In the first place, as I have already had occasion to state, my delegation believes, and continues to believe, that working groups are the most suitable machinery for the conduct of concrete negotiations on the items on our agenda. Secondly, we consider this procedure of taking up items 1 and 2 at informal meetings is purely exceptional and temporary, and thirdly, in accordance with the decision adopted at the 105th plenary meeting, the Committee must continue to give urgent consideration to the proposals relating to the establishment of the working groups which should undertake the substantive negotiations on agenda items 1 and 2.

I should like to add that my delegation considers that the third and fourth paragraphs of your statement should be interpreted with all due flexibility, and that although they are intended to give a certain amount of order and organization to the informal meetings, at the same time they should not prevent a delegation which considers it necessary and useful to do so from referring at an informal meeting to a question connected with items 1 and 2 other than those you have suggested or may suggest in the light of the consultations you intend to hold.

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, I have listened carefully to your statement about our future work on nuclear disarmament and a nuclear test ban, and I agree with the main lines of it.

However, for reasons which I have explained on a number of occasions, I am obliged to reserve my delegation's position on the proposal to include in our work consultations on specific topics to be taken up under a comprehensive test ban.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): We have noted with satisfaction, Mr. Chairman, your observations concerning the holding of informal meetings of the Committee on Disarmament to consider items 1 and 2 of the Committee's agenda.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries are consistent supporters and proponents of measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race, the halting of the production of nuclear weapons and their destruction, and a general and complete ban on nuclear-weapon tests. For many years past the Soviet Union has consistently advocated the speediest possible initiation in the Committee of business-like negotiations on the question of nuclear disarmament.

We take it that the informal meetings of the Committee on these matters will be aimed at the earliest possible commencement of such negotiations and will facilitate their due preparation. In the course of these meetings we might, in particular, define the range of topics for consideration, resolve organizational aspects of the negotiations, and also discuss certain particular matters having a direct bearing on negotiations concerning nuclear disarmament.

We are opposed to there being any academic debate at the informal meetings; the whole of our deliberations must be aimed at the successful preparation of negotiations on the substance of this problem, rather than at diverting the attention of members of the Committee to other matters unrelated to such negotiations and deflecting the Committee from this priority task.

Mr. VRIHUNEK (Yugoslavia): I have listened with great attention to the statement you made a few minutes ago, Mr. Chairman, and would like to make a few remarks on behalf of my delegation.

We do not consider the negotiations which are going to start on 23 March as a substitute for the possible establishment of working groups on items 1 and 2, and we still consider that we should try our best to establish those working groups as soon as possible, as we think that they are the best method of negotiating on items 1 and 2.

I have to say that my delegation has some difficulties with the text which you read, which says that the meeting on 23 March will be devoted to the examination of the preconditions for negotiations on nuclear disarmament, and so on. In fulfilling our duties as members of this Committee I feel that none of us should place any preconditions on the negotiations, even if we have to proceed with negotiations on nuclear disarmament. I would prefer to have had some kind of understanding which could perhaps be the examination of the basic elements for negotiations. But as I see that the statement you have read is a compromise, with which it is possible to achieve consensus in the Committee, my delegation will not press for a possible amendment and will go along, in a spirit of compromise, with the statement you have just made.

Mr. FLOWERREE (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, my delegation is in accord with the general approach to our informal discussions of questions under agenda items 1 and 2 as you have described it. We appreciate very much the efforts you have made to find a mutually acceptable basis for our discussions, and trust that your statement today signals the end of our concentration on procedural aspects, and that we have overcome the final hurdle before we turn to substance.

(Mr. Flowerree, United States of America)

As my Yugoslav colleague mentioned, there are particular points in your statement which might have been formulated in a way more acceptable to my delegation, but I accept the formulation as the best compromise that could be achieved.

In regard to the selection of specific topics to be discussed on item 1 of the agenda, I must remind the Committee that my delegation's participation will be circumscribed by the same factors that underlay the inability of the United States to agree to a consensus on the establishment of a working group on a comprehensive test ban.

With that understanding, my delegation is prepared to proceed along the lines you have suggested.

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, the Pakistan delegation also welcomes the statement which you have just read out to us, because it does constitute a step forward in the direction which we all desire, that is, towards concrete negotiations on the items regarding a nuclear test ban and nuclear disarmament.

My delegation would like to take this occasion to state that we too consider that the best modality for embarking on negotiations under these two items is through the establishment of ad hoc working groups, and we are happy to note that your statement indicates that in these informal meetings consideration may also be given, again, to the proposals regarding the creation of these working groups.

We should also like to say that we construe these informal meetings that will be held as being designed to lay the foundations for negotiations on both these items, and we shall be guided by this consideration in our participation in these meetings.

We have agreed that the first meeting to be held in this series would consider, under item 2, the subject of preconditions for negotiations and the strategies of nuclear deterrence. At the same time, I should like to express the hope and expectation that the other subjects which will be chosen for consideration in these informal meetings will take into account the proposals that have been submitted by various delegations, including the Pakistan delegation, with regard to both items 1 and 2.

Finally, I should like to state that it is our interpretation of your statement that equal consideration will be given to subjects under both items 1 and 2, and while we have agreed to take up at our next meeting the consideration of the subject under item 2, we note with satisfaction that the subsequent meeting will be devoted to a consideration of subjects under item 1 of our agenda. We hope that at the informal consultations which are envisaged we shall be able, in the nearest possible future, to agree upon a specific issue to be considered under item 1 at the following meeting in this series.

Mr. DE LA GORCE (France) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, as this is the first time my delegation has taken the floor in plenary meeting since the beginning of the month, I should like first to congratulate you and offer my good wishes for your period of chairmanship, which has so far been most successful, and to express our gratitude for the courtesy and efficiency with which you are conducting our work. My delegation appreciates the effort you have made as regards the organization of these informal discussions, to which it gave its support. We consider it in



(Mr. De La Gorce, France)

fact most useful to devote our attention to two items on our agenda, the fundamental importance of which my delegation fully recognizes, for discussions on questions of substance which will enable us to explore each others' views and to draw conclusions -- we hope positive -- about the sequel to this examination. We think this operation should be handled flexibly; it is an experiment and we hope, of course, that it will be conclusive. The subjects you have suggested for the start of these discussions on agenda item 2 are acceptable to my delegation. I should like, however, to note that they are not strictly speaking questions of substance; but in view of the importance they have for the preliminary exploration of this matter, we think that it will in fact be useful to examine them and hope that the examination will bring out clearly and realistically the conditions for achieving the goals we have in mind.

Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, I also would like to thank you for the statement you have made, which has also been circulated. I have asked for the floor only to underline one point, made a few minutes ago by the distinguished representative of Pakistan, a point which is very dear to my delegation as well. It is that we should always bear in mind that we are grouping two items for consideration, items 1 and 2, and therefore there should be no attempt to discuss one to the total exclusion of the other.

My delegation would certainly be most happy if, as you suggested, while discussing item 2 at the meeting on the 23rd, we bear in mind that at the subsequent meeting we shall discuss item 1, which is just as important.

The CHAIRMAN: Before concluding, I should like to make the following announcement:

I have requested the Secretariat to circulate today an informal paper containing the timetable for the meetings to be held by the Committee on Disarmament and its subsidiary bodies during the week 25-27 March 1981. As usual, this timetable is indicative and can be adjusted as we proceed.

In that connection, may I note that next week the Committee will start its consideration of item 4 on its agenda, dealing with chemical weapons. I have so far received nine communications from members of the Committee informing me of the presence of their experts who will participate as members of their national delegations. I have also been informed by Ambassador Lidgard, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, that he would like to hold an additional weekly meeting of that Working Group. Accordingly, provision has been made for an additional meeting of the Working Group next Friday, 27 March, at 3 p.m.

Since there are no objections, I will take it that the Committee agrees with this timetable.

Mr. GYORFFY (Hungary): On behalf of Dr. Imre Kómives, Ambassador, Chairman of the Working Group on Radiological Weapons, I should like to make a short statement in connection with the timetable of meetings to be held by the Committee and its subsidiary bodies which has just been distributed.

(Mr. Gyorffy, Hungary)

On behalf of the Chairman of the Working Group on Radiological Weapons, I wish to state that my delegation has no difficulty in agreeing to the proposed timetable for next week, which allocates two meetings to the Working Group on Chemical Weapons. However, at the same time, I should like to emphasize that the same possibility should be accorded to the Working Group on Radiological Weapons, which is now entering its drafting stage and which inevitably will require more meetings.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to request you to take this into account.

The CHAIRMAN: I have taken note of your observations.

Mr. SARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, I would like to request one point of clarification: is our understanding correct that the meeting with experts will be only in the context of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, or is it contemplated also to hold informal meetings of the Committee with the participation of experts?

Secondly, with respect to the proposal that we might have additional meetings of the Working Group on Radiological Weapons, I must once again emphasize something which I have said before, that for delegations like mine, which are very short-staffed and have to attend meetings both morning and afternoon, throughout the entire week, it would not be possible to visualize additional meetings of any other Working Group.

The CHAIRMAN: With regard to your first question, I can say that experts will have the possibility to participate in the plenary meetings that we are going to hold on chemical weapons, and in the Working Groups. That was the understanding reached after consultations with various delegations and the sponsors of the proposal to have additional informal meetings on chemical weapons. It was a compromise.

Mr. SARAN (India): Therefore, is my understanding correct, that there will be no informal meetings of the Committee with chemical weapons experts, but that the experts will be making their presentations in the plenary meeting devoted to chemical weapons?

The CHAIRMAN: Your understanding is correct. Can I then conclude that we have agreement on the timetable?

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 24 March 1961, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.