

CD/PV.115
17 March 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTEENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 17 March 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. G. HERDER (German Democratic Republic)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. SALAH-BEY
Mr. A. BENYAMINA

Argentina: Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD

Australia: Mr. R. STEELE
Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUMOV
Mr. R. DEYANOV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U NGWE WIN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL
Mr. G. SKINNER

China: Mr. YU Peiwen
Mr. YU Mengjia
Mrs. WANG Zhiyun
Mrs. GE Yiyun

Cuba: Mrs. V. BOROWDOSKY JACKIEWICH
Mr. C. PAZOS
Mr. F. CUSPINERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. RUZEK
Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. A. CIMA
Mr. J. JIRUSEK

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M.N. FAHMY

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. de la GORCE
Mr. J. de BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Mr. P. BUNFIG

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. G. FEBLIFER
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. C. GYORFTY

India:

Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. S. DARUSMAN
Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. F. QASIM
Mr. KARYONO
Mr. I. DAMANIK
Mr. J. HADI

Iran:

Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA

Italy:

Mr. V.C. DI MONTEZEMOLO
Mr. A. CIARRAPICO
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI
Mr. L. SALAZAR

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. R. ISHII
Mr. K. SHIMADA
Mr. K. ODA

Kenya: Mr. S. SHITEMI
Mr. G. MUNIU

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mr. M.A. CACERES

Mongolia: Mr. S.H. LKHASHID
Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco: Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. M. AKRAM
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru: Mr. A. THORNBERRY

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS
Mr. K. TOMASZEWSKI

Romania: Mr. M. MALITA
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGART
Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. B. EKHOLM

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. MOSHKOV
Mr. A.G. DOULYAN

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES

United States of America:

Mr. C. FLOVERGEE

Mr. F. DESIMONE

Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER

Mr. J.A. MISKEL

Mr. H. WILSON

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT

Mr. H. ARTEAGA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:

Secretary of the Committee
and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

Mr. VOUTOV (Bulgaria): Comrade Chairman, today I wish to speak on item 3 of our agenda, the subject of our discussion in plenary this week, which is, "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". In my opening statement of the session I mentioned that Bulgaria as a non-nuclear-weapon State attaches a particular importance to the efforts aimed at strengthening in most effective forms the security guarantees to the non-nuclear-weapon States. My delegation has also put forward suggestions pertaining to the need for a proper structuring of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances in a way that would hopefully lead us to some further steps in this respect. Today, I should like to take the opportunity of our plenary meeting to set out my delegation's general approach to this important subject.

We consider the problem of providing effective and credible guarantees for the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States as part and parcel of the wider task of strengthening international peace and security, and enhancing the political and juridical foundations for the observance of the principle of the non-use of force in international relations. Its early solution has a direct bearing on securing adequate conditions to avert a further spread of nuclear weapons and to reduce the danger of a nuclear war. It is also our firm belief that non-nuclear-weapon States which cannot become a source of nuclear threat do have the moral right to obtain guarantees that would spare their populations and territories from the appalling consequences of a nuclear holocaust.

It has been generally recognized that the most effective guarantee that nuclear weapons will never be used against the non-nuclear-weapon States, and indeed all nations, is nuclear disarmament. That is why we vigorously support an early commencement in the Committee on Disarmament of meaningful negotiations that would lead us to a cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and a gradual reduction of the stockpiles of such weapons up to their ultimate elimination from the military arsenals. Pending the achievement of this objective, my country favours any initiative aimed at banning the use of nuclear weapons concurrently with the renunciation of the use of force in international relations. Until this comes about as a radical way of ruling out the possibility of any use of nuclear weapons, we are anxious to contribute to negotiating measures designed to strengthen the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States in the whole spectrum of their possible forms.

It is a well-known fact that Bulgaria is among the countries which support solving the problem of strengthening the security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States by the most effective and credible means of an international convention. To this end my country, together with a group of socialist States, sponsored document CD/23 containing a draft of such a convention. In view of the difficulties revealed in building up a consensus on an early solution along these lines, however, we have also expressed our wish to consider another parallel solution which could be considered as a step conducive to the achievement of our final objective.

The Bulgarian delegation, therefore, believes that in the present circumstances progress may be looked for in practical terms, provided that the problem would be dealt with in a step-by-step manner, going perhaps first through some appropriate interim measures which could additionally enhance the non-nuclear-weapon States' security and demonstrate the political will of the nuclear-weapon States to contribute

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to this effect. In doing so we should not, however, lose sight of the ultimate objective of our common efforts, namely, the conclusion of an international convention. On the contrary, we believe that in parallel with pursuing interim aims, the Committee on Disarmament should continue to search for a common approach to the substance of negative security guarantees with a view to evolving the basis for such an agreement.

In the light of the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament it becomes even more urgent for this Committee to address constructively the problem of how it should best proceed in its endeavour to help develop further what is now available as regards guarantees for the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States. The Bulgarian delegation believes that at this stage progress could be searched for in several directions simultaneously with a view to concentrating, at an appropriate time, on the one that is most promising for an agreement on possible interim or more durable forms of international arrangements. Since the crux of our task undoubtedly is to find solutions on the substance of negative security guarantees, we welcome the determination of the Ad Hoc Working Group to address first this most important aspect of the over-all problem. There are, however, different avenues that could be concurrently followed in the pursuit of such a task.

One avenue of examining substance at this stage which is quite promising to produce prompt results is, for example, the exploration of the existing similarities in the general approaches of the States to the problem of negative security guarantees. This was a new idea put forward in the Ad Hoc Working Group by some delegations.

We have welcomed this useful suggestion, since it seems to be a realistic attempt to identify and develop in general categories what, at present, unifies us all, and first of all the States that are supposed to extend guarantees, in our common willingness to bring about a change for the better in the existing system of negative security guarantees. At least five such similarities in the general approaches have already been pointed out in the Working Group and perhaps some more can also be specified in a common effort during our substantive consideration later on. The result of such an exploration, as we see it, might become a future basis for possible further steps of a political significance, such as an interim Security Council resolution, or a joint declaration or statement, or another appropriate form of giving some kind of impetus to our future pursuits on this subject.

The Bulgarian delegation is one of those delegations in the Committee on Disarmament which are willing to make a constructive effort in exploring also the possibility of evolving a common approach to the substance of negative security guarantees at a deeper level, sometimes called a "common formula". As we stated in our working paper contained in document CD/153, the basic elements of such a common approach may become a general basis for an international instrument of a legally binding character, or for unilateral declarations identical in substance which the nuclear-weapon States might wish to make on their own initiative, taking into due account the results achieved in the negotiations.

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I do not intend to speak now on how we see the prospect of evolving such a general basis since we shall have such an opportunity when the Working Group will be exploring this second avenue. At this juncture I only wish to touch on aspects that might have some bearing on the implementation of the idea of solemn, identical in substance declarations by the nuclear-weapon States concerning guarantees not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

As all members are well aware, the nuclear-weapon States have already been called upon by the General Assembly in its resolution 35/154 to come out with declarations of this kind which may later be approved by the Security Council. In our view, such a development could well also be considered as an important contribution to a step-by-step implementation of paragraph 59 of the Final Document, in which the General Assembly urged the nuclear-weapon States "to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". We believe that the Committee on Disarmament and its Working Group could play an invaluable role in preparing the ground for the above-mentioned declarations to be considered as identical or very close in their substance. This would be a significant step forward in meeting the wish of the non-nuclear-weapon States to be effectively guaranteed against the use of nuclear weapons in a more uniform way. Such a development could also be regarded as a move ahead towards concluding an international convention. Our delegation believes, therefore, that it would be useful if we could have a clear picture of what kind of remedy the existing system of negative security guarantees, already in force, might need at the first stage of the process of improving it.

We are aware that the unilateral declarations on non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, made in connection with the General Assembly's first special session on disarmament in 1978, are quite divergent in their nature and contain different degrees of commitment. That is why in considering their content, we tend to distinguish between the elements pertaining to the general approach of the nuclear-weapon States and those stipulating the actual undertakings by these States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. These undertakings form the existing system of negative security guarantees already in force. The present system, however, is far from being perfect enough. It is rightly considered not to have the maximum possible credibility and effectiveness owing to its unilateral character, divergence in scope of application and to the fact that some of the non-use undertakings are quite conditional and susceptible of varying interpretations.

In our view, only one of the actual undertakings provides for security guarantees for those non-nuclear-weapon States which can in no way become a source of a nuclear threat and, therefore, have the right to be guaranteed. The minimal necessary qualifications of the States to be assured are stipulated therein in objective clear-cut terms. The requirement relating to the non-nuclear-weapon status of the States to be guaranteed offers different options to them. The right of self-defence of the State extending the guarantee is stipulated therein, not in a conditional

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form but rather as an additional qualification, namely, absence of nuclear weapons on the territory of the State to be assured. This undertaking already now covers practically all non-aligned countries, which as a rule do not accept nuclear weapons on their territories. At the same time, this guarantee applies also to Europe, a continent overloaded with nuclear weapons, where the need to prevent a possible use of nuclear weapons is most acute. This formula contains the minimal requirements that in one form or another may be found in all other non-use undertakings already in force.

The other two non-use declarations already in force, which are almost identical to each other are, in our view, the crux of the difficulty of finding easily a common approach to the substance of negative security guarantees, since they contain certain conditions envisaging possible exemptions from the non-use pledge with a language which is too open to subjective interpretations. The right of self-defence of the State extending the assurances is reflected in these undertakings in a way that seems to be contradictory to the basic idea of negative security guarantees, namely, that nuclear weapons may not be used against the non-nuclear-weapon States which cannot be a source of a nuclear threat. There could be some room for improvement in these two pledges, which would perhaps take into account the fact that the right of self-defence can be formulated in a non-conditional way, and also the fact that no mention of the alliance status of the State to be assured was made in similar guarantees by the same two States extended under the Treaty of Tlatelolco or in the global-scope-guarantee offered by the President of one of them in a 1977 declaration.

The present system of negative security guarantees already in force with respect to non-nuclear-weapon States is also incomplete as regards the participation of all nuclear-weapon States in it. This fact may be properly assessed by analysing the separate non-use declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States as included with their endorsement in the basic document of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances, CD/SA/WP.2, incorporated in the report of the Group for its 1980 session (document CD/125).

We welcome the willingness of one of the nuclear-weapon States, as expressed in this document, "to negotiate with nuclear-free zones participants in order to contract effective and binding commitments, as appropriate, precluding any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of these zones". We cannot overlook, however, the fact that this is a declaration with a regional rather than a global application, which could not be considered as an undertaking already in force with respect to the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. It is our belief, therefore, that it would be highly appreciated by these States if this nuclear-weapon State could unilaterally make a solemn declaration with a global application to the effect that it would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against a clearly specified category of non-nuclear weapon States, preferably those not having nuclear weapons on their territories.

As regards the declaration of the nuclear-weapon State that stands first in the document I have referred to, we welcome the support that this State has given to

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the idea of an international convention. We are aware also of the appeal, or the recommendation made by this nuclear-weapon State, as reflected in the same document, to the effect that "the nuclear-weapon States should at least undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-free-zones". If this position should be taken as an expression of the readiness on the part of this nuclear-weapon State to extend negative security guarantees to all non-nuclear-weapon States, then I believe that those States will only welcome it, if it is coupled with a corresponding unilateral undertaking at a highly respectable level, which would undoubtedly fill an apparent shortcoming in the security assurances system already in force. If, however, this position of the nuclear-weapon State I am referring to, is to be taken as being conditioned on the same attitude by the other nuclear-weapon States, then I am afraid that, in view of the position on the scope of application held by some of them, the extension of such a kind of unlimited guarantees is unlikely to be a matter for the immediate future.

At the same time, as reflected in document CD/SA/WP.2, to which I have repeatedly referred, the same nuclear-weapon State, on its own initiative and unilaterally, declared long ago that at no time and in no circumstances would it be the first to use nuclear weapons. We are afraid, however, that this non-first-use undertaking, which I admit is already in force, is perhaps more relevant to the relations between the nuclear-weapon States than to those with a non-nuclear-weapon status. If this pledge may be considered as a non-use undertaking with respect to non-nuclear-weapon States, there is nothing in it that could preclude this nuclear-weapon State from possibly using nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State, provided that another nuclear-weapon State has used such weapons first.

It is our view, therefore, that it would be a very positive step forward and a contribution to completing the present system of negative security guarantees in respect of non-nuclear-weapon States, if this nuclear-weapon State could also consider the possibility of making unilaterally a solemn declaration which spells out its commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against a clearly specified category of non-nuclear-weapon States.

The Bulgarian delegation believes that the period prior to and during the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament could, as in 1978, be considered as an opportunity for the nuclear-weapon States to contribute to a further development of the existing system of negative security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States along the lines I have just tried to outline.

These are some of the thoughts we wanted to share today as regards possible avenues of strengthening the guarantees for the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States which could be kept in mind while examining the substance of the problem in the Ad Hoc Working Group.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, my delegation would like to offer its views regarding the comprehensive programme of disarmament and to introduce the working paper submitted by us in document CD/161 on "effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

The Pakistan delegation is convinced that in the context of the current disturbed international situation the elaboration of a comprehensive programme for disarmament has assumed even greater importance. We believe that a genuine agreement, on a meaningful comprehensive programme can influence the policies of the great Powers towards restraint, as well as realize concrete disarmament measures.

The Pakistan delegation therefore welcomes the resumption of the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Working Group set up last year to elaborate a comprehensive programme. We note with satisfaction that serious work has commenced, under the most experienced guidance of Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, to build upon the outline of the programme agreed upon at the last session. The Pakistan delegation would like to take this opportunity to reiterate what we regard should be some of the main features of the comprehensive programme.

We believe that the central objective of the comprehensive programme must be the achievement of general and complete disarmament and the elimination of war as an instrument of State policy. The specific measures in the programme must be logical parts of an integral process leading to general and complete disarmament. The programme could, of course, additionally include secondary objectives such as that of decreasing the danger of nuclear war and the acceleration of negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

A most important issue upon which agreement is to be reached is the nature of the comprehensive programme. The Pakistan delegation believes that the CPD must be both a programme of action as well as a commitment to act. It must create obligations of a legally binding character on the part of all States to negotiate in good faith and implement measures which are included in the programme. As Ambassador Issraelyan of the Soviet Union stated at our last meeting, the comprehensive programme should not be another "hollow paper which will suffer the same unenviable fate of the many solemn declarations which have never been put into practice". My delegation, of course, recognizes, as the distinguished Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany stated here on 12 March 1981, that "the stronger the commitment of States to the implementation of the programme is to be, the more difficult it would be to agree on its contents". Yet to us the choice appears obvious. It would be better to confront the difficulties in the way of agreement to specific measures in the programme here and now rather than elaborate a programme which, from the start, States may have no intention of observing.

We recognize that the realities of the present day do appear daunting. But this should in no way imply that the Committee on Disarmament must accept these realities as unchangeable or lower its sights with regard to the comprehensive programme because of the possible "unforeseeable turn of developments of the international situation". For my delegation the comprehensive programme should indeed be a serious attempt on the part of the international community to ensure that the turn of developments in the international situation are in the direction of disarmament rather than of an unbridled and unpredictable arms race.

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That the comprehensive programme should create legal obligations for States appears to my delegation to be inherent in the fact that the task of elaborating the programme has been assigned to the Committee on Disarmament. This is a body entrusted with conducting negotiations for concrete disarmament agreements as distinct from the General Assembly or other forums which usually issue documents of a solemn but essentially exhortative character. By itself, a political commitment to the comprehensive programme would not be sufficient, since such political commitments are given by Governments and usually do not bind their successors in power. On the other hand, a legal commitment is binding on States.

A second feature of the comprehensive programme about which various views have been advanced concerns its time-frame and stages of implementation. We can all agree that the comprehensive programme will be a step-by-step process which could begin with the tasks that are urgent and possible and proceed to others which are most ambitious and difficult. This step-by-step process will have to be defined in the programme as clearly as possible and set within a temporal perspective. Unfortunately, there still appears to be considerable confusion about the question of a time-frame. Pakistan has suggested that the target of the comprehensive programme should be to achieve the goal of general and complete disarmament by the year 2000. We do not believe that this is an overly ambitious date for the achievement of our ultimate objective. Nor is it an inflexible target; rather, we envisage it as an indicative time-frame for the completion of the process of disarmament set out in the comprehensive programme. We are sure that no one would chide the Governments of the world if the programme is in fact not accomplished by that date if, during this time-period, substantial progress has been made towards the final goal. On the other hand, to elaborate a programme which provides no indication of the urgency of achieving the measures incorporated therein may well consign our endeavours to oblivion.

For the sake of convenience, a comprehensive programme could be categorized into various phases for implementation. These phases could be three, four or more depending on the criteria used for the categorization. The Pakistan delegation has proposed that the comprehensive programme could be divided into three broad phases: first, immediate measures; second, short-term measures, and third, final or concluding measures.

The first and immediate phase, in our view, would include those measures that are indispensable to prevent the further escalation of the arms race, to bring it to a halt, as well as those measures on which an international consensus has been evolved. Thus, measures such as the comprehensive test ban, the prohibition of chemical weapons, security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, the elaboration of the international consensus on non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear technology as well as the promotion of nuclear-weapon-free zones, would fall within the category of immediate disarmament measures. The identification of the measures to be included in the first phase of the programme should not be too difficult since most of them have in fact been incorporated in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in the "elements" of the comprehensive programme elaborated by the Disarmament Commission and in the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade. What would be of importance in the context of immediate measures is to give greater precision and direction to the agreements that are to be achieved on these disarmament issues.

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The second phase, or short-term measures, should, in our view, comprise those designed to reduce the existing arsenals of nuclear, conventional and other weapons. The Pakistan delegation has previously identified some of the possible steps which could be included in this phase, e.g. the conclusion of a third agreement on the limitation of strategic arms between the Superpowers, the conclusion of an agreement on medium-range nuclear weapons and an agreement among the nuclear Powers not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. However, we believe that the measures in this phase of the comprehensive programme need to be more clearly identified and elaborated since the guidance available, e.g. in paragraph 50 of the Final Document with respect to nuclear disarmament, although helpful, is not sufficient. We have in our statement of 10 March 1981 spelt out our ideas concerning the necessity of further elaborating the provisions of paragraph 50 of the Final Document. We believe that a similar exercise would also be necessary in relation to conventional and other weapons. Since guidance in this respect is lacking in existing programmes and declarations, my delegation would submit that this may be sought from the proposals which have been submitted in the past, including the draft treaties on general and complete disarmament submitted by the United States of America and the Soviet Union in 1961.

It is natural that the measures to be incorporated in the comprehensive programme regarding the third and final stage are more difficult to envisage and to agree upon. My delegation therefore believes that the final measures relating to the complete elimination and destruction of nuclear, conventional and other weapons, and for the establishment of an international authority and other mechanisms to supervise the implementation of disarmament measures, could perhaps be identified in the comprehensive programme in more general terms than the measures to be included in the first and second phases.

The Pakistan delegation agrees that the comprehensive programme will have to be reviewed periodically to provide impetus to such negotiations as might have lagged behind, or to elaborate with greater precision those measures which, because of circumstances, were defined in general terms in the programme as initially adopted. Conferences to review the comprehensive programme could be scheduled to coincide with each phase of the programme that has been agreed upon.

In categorizing various measures, another principle which will have to be borne in mind is that of maintaining a balance of security between various States at each stage of the disarmament process. However, this balance should not be construed as a maintenance of the present inequitable distribution of military capability among various countries of the world. Therefore, the measures under the comprehensive programme would necessarily place primary responsibility for the achievement of disarmament measures, at least in the initial phase, on the two major nuclear-weapon Powers which possess predominant military capability in the world today. Further, the measures included in the various phases of the process leading to general and complete disarmament must keep in view the linkages which exist between different kinds of disarmament negotiations. In our view, three kinds of linkages seem inevitable: first, between nuclear and conventional disarmament; secondly, between global and regional measures, and thirdly, between disarmament and measures to promote international security and confidence among States. Several speakers, particularly the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, have referred to these points.

The Pakistan delegation will continue to contribute to the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Working Group on the CPD with a view to completing an international legal instrument for submission to the General Assembly at its second special session on disarmament. We believe that at this stage the Ad Hoc Working Group could most

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usefully prepare a complete list of measures to be included in the programme. At the second stage these measures could be placed in the various phases of the comprehensive programme that may be agreed upon. Thereafter, negotiations could focus on the fundamental issues, namely, the nature of the programme and the question of its time-frame.

The Committee is today resuming its plenary consideration of the item on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pakistan's position on the subject has been elaborated at previous meetings of the Committee, most recently in my statement of 17 February this year. I will not repeat our views except to state that we are most disappointed that with one exception the nuclear-weapon Powers have continued to exhibit a lack of sensitivity to the security concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

Nevertheless, some progress has been made in the negotiations held so far. Regarding the form of the assurances, there is no objection, in principle, to an international convention, although the difficulties involved have also been pointed out. On the substance or nature of the assurances, the advance in negotiations has been less evident; indeed, there may have been a retrogression in the positions of certain major nuclear-weapon Powers. However, in its report to the Committee at the last session, the Ad Hoc Working Group stressed the need to continue the search for "a common approach acceptable to all which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character".

The working paper submitted by the Pakistan delegation in document CD/161 represents a sincere effort on our part to bring into the negotiations the various alternatives that could be explored in the search for a "common approach". So far, negotiations have been restricted to only one of the alternatives -- the fourth alternative listed in our working paper -- and have been confronted by the unyielding positions of the nuclear-weapon Powers reflected in their unilateral declarations. What we have suggested in our working paper is that all possibilities for evolving a common approach should be fully explored.

The working paper in CD/161 is largely self-explanatory. I would like to add only a few comments by way of further clarification.

First, the consideration of one or other of the alternatives identified in the paper would not compromise the position of any State. As far as Pakistan is concerned, we believe that the search for a "common approach" must commence from the fundamental proposition that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved, the nuclear-weapon Powers are under an obligation to assure all non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear power. Thus our preference and, I feel, that of most non-nuclear-weapon States is for the first alternative identified in our working paper. Yet, in a spirit of accommodation, we are prepared to take into account the legitimate security preoccupations of the nuclear-weapon States, provided these do not negate the effectiveness and credibility of the assurances provided to the non-nuclear-weapon States.

Secondly, some of the alternatives identified in the working paper, especially the second alternative, have not been explored at all in our negotiations so far. Although the impact of the approach outlined in the second alternative on the security of non-nuclear-weapon States may be eroded to a certain extent by the reservations that would be made by some of the nuclear-weapon Powers, we believe that it would be

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preferable to certain other courses of action that have been suggested. The third alternative in our paper would also imply that efforts to evolve a common approach be based on certain new premises, one that would define the legitimate security interests of the nuclear-weapon Powers through negotiations and more narrowly than they have themselves done in their existing unilateral declarations. An illustration of the kind of new premises that could be examined is provided by the statement of President Brezhnev of 25 April 1978, in which it was declared that the Soviet Union would be obliged to use nuclear weapons only in case of an aggression against it by a nuclear-weapon Power.

Thirdly, although the Ad Hoc Working Group has already made efforts to reconcile the unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon Powers, perhaps some fresh ideas may be forthcoming to break the impasse. My delegation, of course, continues to believe that the compromise formula contained in Pakistan's draft convention in document CD/10, providing for an undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States "not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the nuclear security arrangements of some nuclear-weapon States" is a most realistic basis for reconciling the positions reflected in the unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon Powers. But we are open to suggestions for further refinement of this formula.

Fourthly, the last alternative in our paper will not involve the development of a "common formula" on security assurances; although it could be portrayed as a "common approach" to the question. This alternative, in our view, represents the lowest common denominator of what can be achieved on the question of security assurances.

There may well be additional alternatives to a common approach apart from the ones identified in document CD/161. We have carefully examined the ideas contained in document CD/153 submitted by the delegation of Bulgaria. The Pakistan delegation is prepared to examine all possible avenues to evolving a "common approach" which offers credible and effective assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat posed by nuclear weapons.

Mr. OKAWA (Japan): Mr. Chairman, I finally have pleasure in congratulating you officially on behalf of the Japanese delegation on your assumption of the chair of our Committee for the month of March. I wish you well in your very important function and pledge to you the fullest co-operation of my delegation. I have already praised your distinguished predecessor for the most efficient manner in which he got us started last month and it remains for me to express to Ambassador de la Gorce the deep gratitude of my delegation.

Today I wish to make a few remarks on behalf of my Government regarding the comprehensive programme of disarmament that is now under consideration in the Ad Hoc Working Group under the most distinguished chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador García Robles.

Disarmament issues are closely related to the international political situation which, by nature, is changing at all times and is hardly predictable even a year beforehand, let alone several years in advance. They are also vitally connected with the security framework of each State whether at the regional or at the global level.

(Mr. Okawa, Japan)

Consequently, my delegation considers that the disarmament process has to be conceived in the context of the ever-evolving international situation in the widest sense of the word, including, inter alia, its political and security aspects; more specifically, the disarmament process can only be conceived to the extent that it takes into consideration the individual and collective security requirements of the States involved.

From this point of view, my delegation is not convinced of the merits of attempting to set up specific target-dates for the implementation of individual disarmament measures that are to be included in the comprehensive programme of disarmament. Such target-dates will not prove to be workable in the light of realities.

The concept of an indicative time-frame divided into a number of successive phases has also been advanced by certain delegations. Basically this concept can be said to be a corollary of the idea of target-dates and my delegation fears that this will be just as unrealistic and unworkable as the original idea of target-dates. We can, however, associate ourselves with the idea of some sort of logical sequence being envisaged for a number of specific disarmament measures: those measures which could be conceived to be attainable in the short term -- without specifying the number of years that the short term would encompass -- to be followed by those which could possibly be realized in subsequent terms. These measures would thus be set forth in a sequence that would be logical but only indicative. In this connection, my delegation would like to draw the attention of the Committee to the "Draft programme of action" prepared by a number of countries, including Japan, and presented to the Preparatory Committee for the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, contained in document A/AC.187/96 dated 1 February 1978. Our basic thoughts on envisaged programmes of disarmament were clearly presented in this document and are still viable and could be conducive to our task in formulating the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

My delegation also shares the view of those many delegations who have pointed out that the comprehensive programme of disarmament should not be of a legally binding nature. For obvious reasons, a legally binding programme would be neither realistic nor appropriate.

What is much more important, indeed essential, is that each specific disarmament measure listed in the comprehensive programme should be accompanied by an effective verification system so as to ensure that the measure will be duly observed, thus enhancing confidence in its credibility.

Our comprehensive programme should be nothing more and nothing less than a workable framework within which our aspirations for disarmament can be transformed and geared into a series of concrete actions taking the form of specific and practical measures on disarmament--measures that are feasible at given moments in the course of time.

Furthermore, the programme should be designed so as to permit the various disarmament measures included therein to be implemented without breaking the delicate balance of the organic interrelationship among the different measures. This also means that each measure must be achieved without eroding the existing framework of international security.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Japan for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

You will recall that, at the end of the informal meeting held yesterday afternoon, I announced that I would hold open-ended informal consultations on the subjects discussed during the series of informal meetings held under items 1 and 2 of the Committee's agenda. I wish now to inform members that those open-ended consultations will start tomorrow, Wednesday, at 3 p.m., in Conference Room 1, which is adjacent to the Council Chamber.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 19 March 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.