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ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND TWELFTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 5 March 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. G. Herder (German Democratic Republic)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. M. DJABALLAH
Mr. A. BENYAITINA

Argentina: Mr. P. JIMENEZ DAVILA
Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD

Australia: Mr. R. STEELE
Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. R. DEYANOV
Mr. K. PRAMOV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U THAN HTUN

Canada: Mr. G. SKINNER
Mr. C. VACHON

China: Mr. YU Peiven
Mr. YU Mengjia
Mr. SA Benwang

Cuba: Mrs. V. BOROWDOSKY JACKLEWICH

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. RUZEK
Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. E. ZAPOTOCKY

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M.N. FAHMY

Ethiopia: Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Mr. P. BUNFIG

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. N. KLINGER
Mr. H. MULLER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. C. GYORFFY
Mr. A. LAKATOS

India: Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. E. SOEPRAPTO
Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. F. QASIM
Mr. KARYONO

Iran: Mr. M. DABIRI

Italy: Mr. V.C. DI MONTEZEMOLO
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. R. ISHII
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya: Mr. S. SHITEMI
Mr. G. MUNIU

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mr. A. CACERES

Mongolia: Mr. S.H. LKHASHID
Mr. S.O. BOLD
Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco: Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. O. ADENIJI
Mr. V.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru: Mr. F. VALDIVIESO
Mr. A. THORNBERRY

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS
Mr. K. TOMASZEWSKI

Romania: Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. S. STROMBACH
Mr. J. LUNDIN
Mr. B. EKHOLM

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. L.S. MOSHKOV
Mr. S.N. RIUKHINE

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMNERHAYES

Mr. J.I. LINK

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. FLOWERREE

Mr. L. FLEISCHER

Mr. F. DE SIMONE

Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER

Mr. J.A. MISKEL

Mr. H. WILSON

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT

Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC

Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. LONGO B. NDAGA

Secretary of the Committee and
Personal Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

Non-Member Representatives

Spain:

Mr. DE LAIGLESIA

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): Comrade Chairman, the Committee on Disarmament is entering a decisive phase in its work of the spring session. In this connection, wishing you at this important junction every success, I would like to express my conviction that, thanks to your political skill and diplomatic experience, we have every reason to expect further progress in our work, taking advantage of the results achieved in February under the chairmanship of Ambassador de la Gorce whom I once again have the pleasure to congratulate.

My delegation wishes to devote today's intervention to the comprehensive programme of disarmament, that is, to the subject which, in accordance with our programme of work, is to be discussed from today till 13 March.

Having attentively followed the interesting discussions that have been going on during the plenary so far, I have come to the conclusion that they should be based on a somewhat wider ground. It appears so because the Disarmament Committee as a forum of concrete negotiations cannot do without certain considerations of a theoretical or even philosophical nature. In such a context, it is understandable that our approach towards specific disarmament objectives cannot be separated from the state of our own awareness, from a certain package of philosophical beliefs which are held by every one of us, and which obviously differ, sometimes substantially. Such a package contains not only different views of the world presented here by the various delegations but also the different historical background of each of the nations represented in this room. What must be emphasized, however, is that our task here under the prevailing circumstances, is to know how to find out what is common in the approach of the different delegations sitting around this table. Based on such knowledge, our further task is to try hard to work out such common solutions that could possibly be accepted by all of us. This reflection came to my mind after I had listened to the polemic which went on last month between the distinguished representatives of India and the United Kingdom. It was further reinforced by the ideas contained in the interesting intervention by Ambassador García Robles of Mexico the day before yesterday.

We should realize that the polemic concerned not only those two delegations. It was, in fact, an exchange of views on two different concepts represented not only by the two aforementioned delegations. This is the reason why I would also like to put in my oar here.

Indeed, we should utilize the plenary meetings, inter alia, to explain to each other thoroughly the general premises of our approach to the details of the negotiation process under way in the Committee on Disarmament.

In his polemic with the representative of India, Ambassador Venkateswaran, the leader of the United Kingdom delegation, Ambassador Summerhayes, in his intervention on 26 February, presented an interpretation of the concept of "strategy of deterrence" on the basis, as I understand, of the policy of his own country. To make the general and theoretical considerations more emphatic, he supported them with a practical example. May I be allowed to quote: "If I see a risk that my house may be broken into, I install a burglar alarm, find myself a guard dog and then put up a notice on my front gate advertising this. I do not wish to hurt a possible intruder -- instead I hope that my preparations will make him reconsider and leave me in peace. In other words, I am trying to deter him."

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

The strategy of deterrence has its own long history. Trying to avoid long quotations, I just wish to recall two sentences from the report of the Secretary-General containing the comprehensive study on nuclear weapons (document A/35/392). "In the nuclear age, however, the meaning of deterrence has acquired totally new dimensions." And again: "In the nuclear age, however, the very cornerstone of what is projected as defence is offensive capability, while defensive capabilities-- in the true sense of the word -- are very limited." (Paras. 285 and 287, respectively, of the report).

In this context, the example offered by Ambassador Summerhayes brings to mind many questions. Let me ask, at the moment, only two of them. First has not just this kind of strategy of deterrence caused a five-fold increase in military expenditure since the Second World War? And, again, does having five guard dogs instead of one make a man five times more secure?

The solutions proposed by Ambassador Summerhayes, besides being well known from the past, have in fact created the situation which President Leonid I. Brezhnev had in mind when he said to the twenty-sixth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: "What has become a reality is a certain vicious circle: the actions of one side provoke counteractions by the other ...".

The next question I would like to ask is the following: does not that vicious circle mean that the balance of power is being sought on the ground of the balance of fear? "How can this chain be broken?" asks President Brezhnev. Having suggested numerous specific measures which, by the way, were reflected in a recent intervention here by Ambassador Issraelyan of the Soviet Union, President Leonid I. Brezhnev stated: "What is, however, indispensable to this end is a far-sighted approach, political will and, also, political courage ...". This means in practice that the balance of security must be sought through the parity of forces but not on the ground of balance of fear and only on the ground of balance of reason and courage. On this philosophical premise are founded the many disarmament proposals which the Soviet Union, Poland and other socialist countries have been putting forward during the post-war years. At this juncture, I would like to pose another question: instead of installing -- out of fear -- ever new "burglar alarms" and getting ever new "guard dogs", would we not be better off if we considered the proposals and tried to reach agreement on diminishing the number of these deterrence measures as they are at present more than enough to blow up several times not only the guarded house but also our common home that is our planet?

How can a permanent build-up of the system of "burglar alarm" -- to use this illustrative although not very accurate expression -- be reconciled with the obstinate rejection of an outstretched hand of someone who is, a priori, called a "possible intruder"? And what if the one who comes up with an outstretched hand is not the "possible intruder"? Having stretched out a hand so many times, that is, having put forward so many disarmament initiatives, we ultimately do not ask for, we call for talks -- not out of fear -- but governed by courage and trust, in a strong conviction that the time must come when these initiatives will be regarded neither as unripe for negotiations nor as mere propaganda but as serious offers in the hope of ensuring a comprehensive security for all homes.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

Such a programme should be worked out and presented to the United Nations General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, to be held next year. It should stipulate specific steps to fight the philosophy of fear and distrust among nations. At the same time, it should propagate a courage to compromise, a will to understand, and it should show the obvious advantages coming from a gradual lowering of the level of armaments, in other words, create the indispensable psychological infrastructure for the disarmament process, enhance a search for common solutions as well as counteract the operation of locking up nations in ever deeper pillboxes with ever more numerous armies of "guard dogs".

Let me now pass to some specific remarks on the subject-matter by asking these questions. How do we conceive the comprehensive programme of disarmament? What -- our minds -- ought such a document to be, and what can it simply not become? We agree in principle with many views that were largely expressed during the discussions in the Working Group last year, and during the first two meetings of this Group that have taken place so far during this session, that the comprehensive programme of disarmament, by providing the necessary framework for substantive negotiations in the field of disarmament, should be "... a carefully worked-out package of interrelated measures in the field of disarmament, which would lead the international community towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control...". We also agree that it should lay down an agreed framework for sustained international action in the field of disarmament, that is, through negotiations at multilateral, bilateral and regional levels on specific measures of disarmament. In other words, we conceive the programme to be approved by the United Nations as a multilateral declaration of the political intentions of States. We must, at the same time, add that it should be a particular declaration. A particular declaration in the sense that it should not be a general but a specific document committing the States to a further, concrete action, as stated above.

Furthermore, we share the view expressed last year that the said programme should contain the following basic chapters: an introduction or preamble; chapters on objectives, principles, priorities, measures and stages or phases of implementation and a chapter describing the procedural machinery.

I do not wish to elaborate now on all the chapters I have just listed. The delegation of Poland will be prepared to present its views in detail during the forthcoming meetings of the ad hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. I cannot fail, however, to emphasize here that this programme must not only point out the political and military implications of the arms race, but also clearly show its economic implications. We cannot fail to remind the Committee and point out again that the hundreds of billions of dollars which are spent annually on the manufacture or improvement of weapons stand sharply and dramatically in contrast with the poverty of the overwhelming majority of the world's population. I cannot emphasize strongly enough the direct link which exists between development and disarmament. I can only repeat after the declaration contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament that the economic and social consequences of the arms race are so detrimental that its continuation is simply incompatible with the implementation of the new international economic order.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

One other point which I wish to raise in connection with the comprehensive programme of disarmament relates specifically to what I called, in my previous statement in plenary, a psychological infrastructure of disarmament. Indeed, the comprehensive programme of disarmament we want to work out will not really be comprehensive if it does not include building up an infrastructure of peace. The maintenance of peace and security in the world today ultimately means not only a partial truce among separate nations, but above all a permanent way of life for all mankind. What is needed for making such a way of life is, inter alia, a long-term effort to help to plant in the minds of men a strong awareness of the supreme need for a solid foundation of peace. It also means that peace and international security, to be durable, have to be built concurrently -- in the practice of international relations and in the mind of every man as, in fact, the first real line of defence against war is man himself. With this in view, the delegation of Poland submitted during the thirty-third session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1978 a draft resolution which was later adopted at the said session as a Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace. I am confident that the principles and recommendations of this Declaration provide an extremely important and valid guidance for our deliberations on the contents of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. As a matter of fact the ultimate goal of the said programme and of the Declaration is the same: to create conditions of mutual understanding among the nations of the world so that future generations will no longer have to overcome the legacies of ignorance, prejudice and hostility which are still present within the international community. In other words, the comprehensive programme of disarmament, to be effectively implemented, must encompass and enhance deep involvement in the entire process of disarmament, however long and thorny it may prove to be, on the part not only of the Governments but also of the nations of the world. Needless to say, many other speakers before me have already emphasized to this Committee the same point, to recall only a recent working document, CD/155, introduced by the delegation of Italy, or the intervention by Ambassador García Robles already mentioned.

The delegation of Poland pledges, therefore, its full support and flexible approach towards negotiating the framework of the CPD. In more specific terms, we are for a programme which would design the process of disarmament from today to a state of general and complete disarmament. As such it should encompass all disarmament and other measures related in any way to the disarmament process. Trying to avoid at present merely listing these measures, I just wish to emphasize again our flexibility in undertaking an active discussion in which we shall be guided by the documents adopted by the United Nations General Assembly: the Final Document of its first special session devoted to disarmament, the recommendations of the Disarmament Commission, the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade and, as I mentioned above, the Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Sujka, the representative of Poland, for his statement as well as for the congratulations he addressed to me in connection with my assumption of the Chair.

Mr. ADENLJI (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, I wish to address myself today to item 2 of the Committee's 1981 agenda, namely, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". Before going into the substance, however, allow me to extend to you my sincere congratulations on your assumption of the office of Chairman of this Committee. Your vast experience in diplomacy and particularly in multilateral diplomacy and your knowledge of disarmament issues will contribute greatly to progress in our work. My delegation will co-operate closely with you.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

The necessity to take urgent measures for stopping the nuclear arms race is definitely the most important subject to which the Committee on Disarmament should address itself. There is universal consensus on the irrationality both of the basic reasoning behind the accumulation of nuclear weapons and the sheer volume of those weapons in the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States, and particularly of the most advanced nuclear-weapon States. The rationale behind the nuclear arms race is said to derive from the insecurity of the nuclear-weapon States. However, the need for the preservation of national security is not limited only to the nuclear-weapon States. Moreover, nuclear weapons as a protection of that security represent the end of a spectrum which goes far beyond the necessity for national protection. In light of the destructive power of nuclear weapons and the impossibility of confining the effects of the use of nuclear weapons to a prescribed area, it is obvious that reliance on nuclear weapons as a means of national defence jeopardizes the very survival of other countries — friends and foes alike. In any case, it is clear that the continuing insecurity of even the two most advanced nuclear-weapon States, in spite of the period of over 30 years in which they have developed nuclear arsenals, is an indication that the mere accumulation of these weapons does not and will not ensure that security.

The solution of the problem of ensuring security, according to the nuclear-weapon States themselves, cannot be found in the increase of the number of States possessing nuclear weapons. This is why the nuclear-weapon States are in the vanguard of prohibiting the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is therefore incomprehensible that these same nuclear-weapon States who preach to other States that national and world security can only be gravely endangered by the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons, will turn round to defend their own possession of nuclear weapons on the excuse of preserving national security.

If the nuclear-weapon States still believe themselves to be part of the world, then their possession of nuclear weapons is no less a danger to world security than the possession of these weapons by other States. Indeed, the retention of nuclear weapons by the Powers which currently possess them constitutes one of the greatest disservices that can be done to world security because it encourages others to believe in the efficacy of nuclear weapons. Security for all countries will either have to be sought in ways other than the possession of nuclear weapons, or all countries should be accorded the right to determine the means, including the possession of nuclear weapons, for protecting their security.

The deterrent effect of the possession of nuclear weapons in preventing a world war has been used as justification for the retention of these weapons. As I said in my statement at our 103rd meeting on Friday, 10 February, the world will not know until the present nuclear arsenals have been dismantled as a result of disarmament agreements that nuclear weapons have in fact acted as a deterrent. In as much as the modernization of nuclear-weapon systems persists, the world can only marvel at the logic of those who believe in stepping up constantly the level of deterrence. For it will always be a matter of conjecture, how much further destructive capacity is required by the nuclear-weapon States before they consider that they have accumulated sufficient fire-power to serve the avowed purpose. Deterrence naturally rests on the perception of each of the nuclear-weapon States of the capability of the other side. It depends on the assessment of the attainment of parity or balance which is capable of various interpretations depending on what conclusion one wishes to arrive at.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

If the carefully negotiated Salt II agreement has become a matter of dispute in one of the negotiating States as to whether it does or does not assure parity and balance, it is obvious that the security of the world is being made dependent on the subjective interpretations of those who are not necessarily disinterested in stepping up the arms race. The result can only be greater insecurity, inasmuch as further accumulation or even modernization on one side inevitably leads to a reaction from the other side. Indeed, security based on higher levels of nuclear arms will ever remain uncertain and dangerous both to the nuclear-weapon States and to the world at large.

I spoke earlier of the irrationality of the sheer volume of the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States, particularly the Superpowers. They possess enough to destroy the whole world, not just the territories of their adversaries, several times over. Yet there is no end in sight of the accumulation and the further refinement of these weapons. Can this process be justified by the argument of deterrence? My delegation believes, with the experts who conducted the latest comprehensive study on nuclear weapons that the concept of the maintenance of world peace, stability and balance through the process of deterrence is perhaps the most dangerous collective fallacy that exists.

The continuation of the nuclear arms race, echoes of which abound this week, poses very grave threats to world security, at a time when we should all be directing our minds to positive steps towards disarmament. A ban on nuclear-weapon testing as a first step to stop the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons still remains illusory; and this is in spite of the world opinion as formulated in paragraph 51 of the Final Document of the special session on disarmament and several resolutions of the General Assembly. What is required is not a temporary moratorium on nuclear testing, as envisaged in the trilateral negotiations; rather we demand a truly verifiable and comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty negotiated by the Committee on Disarmament. We are all aware that only the political will of two nuclear-weapon States is required in order for this objective to be achieved.

Apart from a comprehensive test-ban treaty, my delegation believes that the following measures can be considered as a beginning in the series of measures for nuclear disarmament:

- (i) Agreement on freezing of nuclear arsenals at the present level;
- (ii) A ban on production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons; and
- (iii) Agreement to place existing storage of fissionable materials under international safeguards.

The time is now "ripe" for nuclear disarmament to be negotiated in an ad hoc working group of the Committee on Disarmament. Paragraph 50 of the Final Document gives a framework for the negotiations. Ample documentation is available for a working group to initiate substantive negotiations. The initiatives of the Group of 21 contained in documents CD/36 and CD/116 of 1980 proposed the following concrete measures that the Group could engage in:

- (1) Elaboration of the stages of nuclear disarmament envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document;

- (2) Issues involved in the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war;

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

(3) Issues involved in eliminating reliance on doctrines of nuclear deterrence; and

(4) Measures to ensure an effective discharge by the Committee on Disarmament of its role as the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament.

Mention should also be made of the initiative contained in document CD/4 which made concrete suggestions for the commencement of negotiations.

Here, as in the case of the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban, only the absence of the political will of certain nuclear-weapon States constitutes an obstacle. My delegation calls on these States to reconsider their position and to co-operate with other members of the Committee to enable it to fulfil its sacred task to humanity.

I shall devote the second part of my statement to the item on the comprehensive programme of disarmament. The history of the efforts to draw up such a programme is well known. In declaring the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade, the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969 requested "... the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, while continuing intensive negotiations with a view to reaching the widest possible agreement on collateral measures, to work out at the same time a comprehensive programme, dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective control".

Seeing that the CCD did not discharge this responsibility, the Nigerian delegation took advantage of the mid-term review of the Decade in 1975 to press for action. However, the struggle for the setting up of an ad hoc working group was not won until March 1978. As a contribution to the substantive work of the Working Group, my delegation submitted working paper CCD/555, which was later updated and submitted to the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

The Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament consolidated the universal consensus on the need for a comprehensive programme. In its paragraph 109 the Final Document enjoined on the Committee on Disarmament to undertake the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated.

General Assembly resolution 34/83 B fixed the time-frame for the elaboration of the programme. The CD, according to that resolution, should complete the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament before the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Obviously, therefore, this is one item on our agenda which has to be concluded in the next 12 months. I am confident that under the wise guidance of Ambassador García Robles, the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme will succeed.

The comprehensive programme of disarmament to be elaborated by this Committee for adoption by the General Assembly at its second special session should provide a clear framework for substantive negotiations, over a number of years, in the field of disarmament. It should contain an orderly, well-balanced package of interrelated measures in the field of disarmament, complete with a system of priorities and co-ordination that will ensure constant discernible progress towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Since the programme will be a once and for all agenda for negotiation leading to the ultimate goal, it should constitute an agreed, and I stress agreed, framework for sustained international action

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

in the field of disarmament divorced from the vagaries of bilateral relations between States. Therefore the comprehensive programme should, from the beginning, enjoy the full commitment of all countries, and a means of ensuring full compliance by all should be devised. Even if it may not be conceived as a legally binding instrument, it should nevertheless not be downgraded to a document which States may or may not implement according to convenience. I believe that a solemn declaration by each country of commitment to implement the programme should be made on its adoption.

An important factor in the comprehensive programme is that of time. It should reflect the alarming fact that unless progress in disarmament negotiations is rapid and sustained, developments in weapons research and development may always render agreements irrelevant. The basic concept on which the programme will be based is the step-by-step approach to disarmament. It should be clearly understood, however, that if negotiations on partial measures of disarmament are to be effective cumulatively, there has to be reflected in the CD the commitment to move without delay to reach agreements that are not rendered meaningless by developments in weapons technology. Otherwise, the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament will for ever be illusory.

Considering, therefore, that the longer the negotiations take, the more difficult it will be to attain the goal of general and complete disarmament, it is essential to demonstrate from the beginning the political will to accomplish the whole process in the shortest possible time. I venture to suggest that the whole programme should be conceived within a time-frame of 20 years, divided into five phases of four years each. If nuclear-weapon States make 20-year plans for modernization stretching to the beginning of the twenty-first century, the comprehensive programme should ensure that another modernization competition is forestalled through general and complete disarmament.

As I said earlier, the 20-year time-frame of the comprehensive programme of disarmament should be divided into five phases of four years each. At the end of each phase a review should be carried out to assess the accomplishment and determine what measures may be needed to stimulate further progress. The four-year review could take the form of a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, thus permitting all States Members of the United Nations to participate actively in the review and follow closely progress in the implementation of the programme.

Naturally, the measures to be accomplished in each phase will be a mixture of nuclear and conventional disarmament, as well as related and other measures bearing on international peace and security and on contributions to the creation and consolidation of the New International Economic Order. Since the measures will constitute an orderly well-balanced package, it goes without saying that no State or group of States will be at a disadvantage as a result of disarmament measures. The States with the largest arsenals, nuclear as well as conventional, will naturally bear a special responsibility for facilitating negotiations at every phase, but particularly in the initial phases.

Finally, the comprehensive programme of disarmament should address itself to the institutional requirements for promoting, facilitating and following up the negotiations and agreements envisaged in it.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Adeniji, the representative of Nigeria, for his statement. I also thank him for the very kind words he addressed to me.

Mr. SHITEMI (Kenya): Mr. Chairman, permit me, right from the outset, to congratulate you on your assumption of the Chair of the Committee on Disarmament. You bring to your assignment wide and relevant experience; we feel confident the work of the Committee is in capable hands. We also want to extend our sincere and warm gratitude to the outgoing Chairman, Ambassador F. de la Gorce of France, for the excellent job he did in guiding this Committee over the complicated first part of this spring session.

For more than three decades the international community has continued to seek ways and means of slowing the arms race and achieving the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Although a number of agreements have been reached with a view to limiting nuclear armaments and their proliferation; reducing military tension and creating a political climate conducive to further and more significant achievements in the field of nuclear disarmament, negotiations on genuine disarmament issues have been very discouraging.

As this Committee engages in futile debates on whether certain items on its agenda are ready for negotiation, the international community continues to witness the unprecedented growth of nuclear arsenals and the deployment of new and increasingly sophisticated nuclear-weapon systems, as well as some increase in the number of States with either nuclear-weapon capability or possessing nuclear weapons.

My delegation is therefore deeply concerned that, unless our efforts towards slowing the arms race are successful, the 1980s, which the General Assembly proclaimed as the Second Disarmament Decade, could witness the emergence of additional nuclear-weapon States. This would not be of any help to our disarmament efforts, but it appears inevitable, given the prevailing disillusionment at the pace of nuclear disarmament negotiations and the apparent reluctance on the part of nuclear-weapon States, particularly the two leading nuclear-weapon States, to come to grips with the truth that they no longer have the monopoly in nuclear technology.

Kenya is strongly opposed to nuclear weapons retention and their proliferation, both horizontal and vertical. The international instruments which we have signed and ratified in the field of disarmament stand as clear testimony of our dedication to the course of disarmament.

We welcome Egypt into this club; it was in Cairo that the Organization of African Unity, under the Chairmanship of Egypt, first declared Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Egypt, being at the crossroads of two continents, took the courageous decision to introduce a resolution in the last General Assembly declaring the Middle East as a nuclear-weapon-free zone; with this background as a clear indication of Egypt's intention, it was a logical consequence that Egypt should become a member of the non-proliferation treaty club.

The failure of the second Review Conference of the Parties to the non-proliferation Treaty to reach consensus on the contents of a final declaration raises serious questions about the future of the NPT as the central element of the international régime to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. If that falters, we will be left on very shaky ground indeed.

(Mr. Shitemi, Kenya)

The desire of the people of the continent of Africa, which has been expressed through numerous resolutions of the Organization of African Unity, as well as in those of the United Nations General Assembly, to see their continent free of nuclear weapons is regrettably being frustrated by the actions of certain countries which consider themselves among the strong non-proliferation advocates. The economic self-interest of these countries, among others, seem to have overridden the vital environmental and security interests of the people of the region, as well as those of the world community.

The quiet but steady nuclear collaboration between the racist régime in Pretoria and some nuclear exporting countries Parties to the NPT casts some doubt on the credibility of their pronouncements and efforts towards genuine nuclear disarmament. We have every reason to believe that this collaboration has given South Africa the necessary nuclear technology to enable it to produce nuclear weapons at any time it deems appropriate. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Pretoria régime would have a reverberating political and security effect on the part of African States and would further erode the importance of the NPT.

To expect the rest of Africa to sit idle and watch the nuclear drama unfold in their continent without responding appropriately would be unrealistic. Let us put our minds together to ensure that that drama will never unfold, for, when -- and if -- it indeed materializes, it would be almost impossible to control the chain reaction.

The proclamation by the General Assembly of the 1980s as both a Second Disarmament Decade and a Third United Nations Development Decade calls for a more active pursuit of negotiations by the Committee on Disarmament on disarmament measures with a view to completing the priority items by the end of the decade. It also calls for specific arrangements for the transfer of resources from military to social and economic purposes.

We are all aware of the fact that the resolution by which the General Assembly declared the decade of the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade envisaged a relationship between disarmament and development, anticipating that the resources saved would be diverted to social and economic development for the benefit of the international community. The link between disarmament and development was also underscored in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which stated that resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be devoted to the economic and social development of all nations and contribute to the bridging of the economic gap between the developed and developing countries. It is regrettable that that objective has not been achieved because considerable human and natural resources have been diverted to the manufacture of armaments.

My delegation welcomes the quick decisions reached to re-establish the four ad hoc working groups. We very much hope that the mandate of some of the groups will be made more comprehensive to enable the Committee to come to grips with the real issues of deliberating international conventions. We extend our congratulations and our support to the Chairmen of the ad hoc working groups.

(Mr. Shitemi, Kenya)

The question of the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests has been discussed as a highly important measure of disarmament for more than two decades, and yet no substantial progress has been made to slow down or even reduce the number of testings. Since the conclusion of the partial test-ban Treaty, concerted international efforts towards a comprehensive test-ban have been made, particularly through the General Assembly and the negotiating bodies, predecessors of the CD.

Both the first and the second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have appealed to the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty to take the lead in solving the technical and political difficulties involved and to make every effort to achieve a comprehensive ban at an early date.

Since its establishment in 1976, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events has submitted several reports to this Committee in the hope that they could contribute to the solution of the verification question.

The General Assembly has, through its numerous resolutions, called upon all the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from conducting any testing. That the Assembly attaches the highest priority to this question is indicated in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the special session devoted to disarmament and in its latest resolution, 35/46, in which it called upon the Committee on Disarmament to exert all efforts in order that a draft comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty may be submitted to the General Assembly no later than at its second special session devoted to disarmament to be held in 1982.

Since the beginning, the discussions on this question have been faced by three problems which the nuclear-weapon States appeared to have had difficulties in resolving satisfactorily, namely, the questions of whether the adoption of a comprehensive test-ban should be made contingent upon the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, the control of the conduct of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under a ban, and that of effective means of verification. It is the understanding of my delegation that the first two problems have been solved and that the only major remaining issue is that of verification.

Without dwelling on this subject any longer, I think it would not be unreasonable to conclude that the question of the nuclear test-ban has been discussed exhaustively and that any further deliberations of a general nature will not contribute or even improve the work already done. What we need at this juncture is political will to begin concrete negotiations on the subject in the hope that we will have a draft ready to submit to the Assembly at its second special session on disarmament. We strongly urge the members of this Committee to show their good-will to facilitate the establishment of the two ad hoc working groups, on a nuclear test-ban and on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. We have already expressed our support for the formation of these ad hoc working groups in all our earlier interventions in plenary meetings of this Committee.

We very much hope that the collective stand on this subject taken by the Group of 21 will be heeded.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Mr. Shitemi, the representative of Kenya, for his statement. I thank him also for the friendly welcome he addressed to me in my capacity as Chairman of this Committee.

Mr. RUZEK (Czechoslovakia): Comrade Chairman, my intention today is to deal with items 1 and 2 of the agenda and to touch on agenda item 6 as well. In connection with items 1 and 2 I intend to introduce new proposals of the group of socialist countries and ask you to circulate the paper as an official document of the CD.

But let me, Comrade Chairman, first of all express my deep and sincere satisfaction in seeing you, the representative of a neighbouring socialist country, as the Chairman of our Committee during the month of March. I am fully convinced that your Chairmanship will be marked by further important results of our work. I would like also to assure you of the readiness of my delegation to be of as much help as would be needed in connection with the needs of our common work.

My congratulations go also to your predecessor, the distinguished Ambassador of France, François de la Gorce. During his Chairmanship our Committee succeeded in overcoming the difficulties which usually mark the beginning of every session. The positive results of his term of office are clearly reflected in the work of our Committee and its subsidiary bodies.

Allow me, furthermore, to take this opportunity to extend my warmest greetings to our new colleague from Argentina, Ambassador Jiménez Dávila. Some of us have already had the pleasure and honour of working with him in the past and I am sure we may look forward to a continuation of this co-operation.

The effort to reach the goal of general and complete disarmament fully reflects one of the basic aspirations of the foreign policy of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. We have always in the past supported all constructive initiatives and proposals directed towards this end. We also added our voice to all common peace initiatives of the socialist countries, which provided for partial disarmament measures, the realization of which would pave the way towards general and complete disarmament. We have always attached primary importance in this regard to the question of nuclear disarmament in all its aspects. We thoroughly studied all relevant proposals and together with other socialist countries spared no effort aimed at resolving this key disarmament problem.

We therefore note with a feeling of deep satisfaction that to the numerous existing initiatives of socialist countries, including those submitted in the Committee on Disarmament, new, far-reaching proposals have been made at the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Leonid Brezhnev, stressed that "the new measures we are proposing embrace a wide range of issues. All of them pursue a single aim, our common aspiration -- to do everything possible to relieve the peoples of the danger of a nuclear war, to preserve world peace. This, if you like, is an organic continuation and development of our peace programme in reference to the most burning, topical problems of present-day international life".

We regard the initiatives raised by President Brezhnev, as a strong impetus for the activization of present negotiations on disarmament.

(Mr. Ruzek, Czechoslovakia)

In view of the fact that our Committee has not been able until now to engage in substantive negotiations on items 1 and 2 of its agenda, the group of socialist countries has formulated new proposals in a paper with the title:

"Considerations of a group of socialist countries in the Committee on Disarmament concerning negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and also on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests".

With your permission I would like to read the text in full:

"The socialist countries attach very great importance to the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and also to the question of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, in the belief that nuclear weapons constitute the most serious threat to the existence of mankind.

"Everyone is aware of the many initiatives which have consistently been taken by these countries with a view to the effective solution of the above-mentioned problems, both in the Committee on Disarmament and in the United Nations and other international fora. A group of socialist countries has submitted to the Committee on Disarmament documents CD/4 and CD/109 which contain a specific programme of measures aimed at the solution of the nuclear disarmament problem. These proposals still remain in force.

"The course of the deliberations in the Committee on Disarmament provides evidence of increasing support for these initiatives of the socialist countries. Many delegations in the Committee on Disarmament are expressing serious concern at the unceasing nuclear arms race, and at the continuation of the process of perfecting and accumulating nuclear weapons. An ever wider and more weighty appeal is being made in the Committee for the immediate commencement of negotiations on these questions which are of vital importance for the future of mankind. General Assembly resolution 35/152 B and C and also General Assembly resolution 35/145 A and B -- with respect to the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests -- likewise call upon the members of the Committee to discuss these issues as a matter of priority.

"In the opinion of a group of socialist countries, one constructive contribution to the discussion of the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and also of the problem of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests would be the establishment of two working groups on these topics in the Committee on Disarmament. Proposals to set up such groups have been contained in the statements made by the representatives of socialist countries. They were formulated in document CD/141 tabled at the current session by the delegation of the German Democratic Republic on behalf of a group of socialist countries. Similar ideas have also been expressed by the representatives of many other States. And this is precisely what the above-mentioned resolutions of the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly require the Committee to do.

(Mr. Ruzek, Czechoslovakia)

"Unfortunately, because of the unconstructive positions of certain delegations, the Committee is at present unable to solve positively the question of the establishment of working groups. In these circumstances, a group of socialist countries represented in the Committee, displaying flexibility and the desire to start business-like negotiations on the substance of the above-mentioned questions as soon as possible, proposes that:

1. Informal consultations with the participation of all the nuclear Powers should be started forthwith in the Committee on Disarmament, under the guidance of the Chairman of the Committee, with a view to preparing specific negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament;
2. Informal consultations with the participation of all the nuclear Powers should be initiated without delay, under the guidance of the Chairman of the Committee, for the purpose and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests with a view to the conclusion of a treaty on this matter at the earliest possible date;
3. Informal meetings of the Committee should be held at least once a week on the substantive issues of the cessation of the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament, and the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

"In making this proposal to the Committee on Disarmament, the delegation of a group of socialist countries express the hope that it will serve as a basis for constructive negotiations on the above-mentioned priority questions of disarmament which appear as items 1 and 2 in the agenda for the current session of the Committee on Disarmament."

Let me express our firm conviction that the proposals I have just introduced will contribute to our common endeavours in dealing with the problem of nuclear disarmament. We ask the Chair to distribute the introduced paper as an official document.

Permit me now to say a few words about item 6. My delegation attaches great importance to the question of the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. Today, when practically only a year separates us from the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, we believe that our negotiations on the comprehensive programme should lead to realistic and useful results.

As far as the scope of the programme is concerned, it is our view that it should be broad enough to embrace all main directions of negotiations. At the same time it should duly reflect all major issues which have to be resolved. As regards the principles of the programme, the basic one should be that of equality and equal security. We deem it of outstanding importance that the programme should

(Mr. Ruzek, Czechoslovakia)

unite the efforts of States for the resolution of the basic problems of disarmament in an atmosphere of constructive co-operation. Here I am speaking of the same concern that led the Czechoslovak delegation at the thirty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly to initiate the elaboration and adoption of the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament.

During last year's negotiations the Czechoslovak delegation actively participated in the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. We accordingly submitted four working papers dealing with the subjects of "objectives", "general guidelines", "principles" and "forms and machinery". Then, on behalf of a group of socialist countries we submitted document CD/128 entitled "Proposal for the main elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament". My delegation is of the opinion that together with the documents, working papers and views expressed by many other delegations a solid basis has been created for the preparation of the preliminary drafting of the programme.

At our present session the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, under the experienced guidance of Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, has already engaged in substantive negotiations. Some important questions have already been discussed. At the present stage, the group is considering the chapter, "Measures", of the "Outline of a comprehensive programme of disarmament". We welcome the fact that the working group has turned to this important aspect at this early phase of its proceedings. The content of the future programme will undoubtedly have its bearing on other sections of the "Outline". It therefore, in our view, merits our primary attention and thorough examination. We have at our disposal a set of valuable documents, that are of considerable help to our common work. The Final Document of the first special session on disarmament, the recommendations of the Disarmament Commission concerning elements of the CPD and the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade were all adopted by consensus. For this reason we believe that these documents represent a solid and constructive basis for our further work with the aim of the elaboration and adoption of a mutually acceptable and useful document.

As regards the nature of the programme, we do not think that it should take the form of an international convention or treaty. In fact, we are of the opinion that commitments of this form should materialize in the process of the realization of partial disarmament measures that would be included in the comprehensive programme.

Concerning the stages of implementation, we believe that these stages would primarily depend upon measures we are going to incorporate into the programme. At the same time we do not think it advisable that we try to divide the measures concerned into sharp, clear-cut and unrealistically short stages. However, we can agree with the assumption that some indicative, realistic stages of implementation probably could be agreed upon.

These are some of our thoughts regarding the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Ruzek, the representative of Czechoslovakia, for his statement and for the congratulations he addressed to me on the occasion of my assumption of the Chairmanship. The working paper he submitted will be translated into all working languages and circulated as an official document as soon as possible.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Today the Soviet delegation would like to outline its position on the consideration of the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament. We have already pointed out more than once that among the whole set of disarmament problems the Soviet Union specially singles out those relating to nuclear disarmament; the same point was made once more at the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which concluded its work a few days ago.

Without delving into past history and without going beyond the limits of the work of the Committee on Disarmament, I should like to recall that the Soviet Union, together with other socialist countries, is in favour of our multilateral negotiating body occupying itself, as a matter of first priority and without delay, with the issues which relate to curbing the nuclear arms race. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, I should like to make it clear that we are not proposing simply a discussion of these issues but their business-like examination, the conduct of concrete negotiations with the participation of all nuclear-weapon Powers and also of non-nuclear-weapon States. In doing so we understand and emphasize that the problem of nuclear disarmament is a complex one whose solution will require a great deal of time. We have no illusions on this score and we would not wish such illusions to be entertained by others.

In 1979, document CD/4 entitled "Negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed", which is known to us all, was submitted to the Committee. That document naturally retains all its force and has lost none of its urgency. Its sponsors -- the Soviet Union and other socialist countries -- pointed out that progress towards the final goal -- the complete destruction of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons -- could take place by stages on a mutually acceptable and agreed basis. In this connection it was envisaged that the existing balance in the field of nuclear strength should remain undisturbed at all stages, with the levels of nuclear strength being constantly reduced. The proposal in document CD/4 to the effect that the implementation of measures in the field of nuclear disarmament should proceed parallel with the adoption of international political and legal guarantees strengthening the security of all States without exception is also of fundamental significance.

At meetings of the Committee in 1979 and 1980 the Soviet delegation explained and clarified its position on the subject of document CD/4. That document also provides an answer to the question of fissionable materials which has been raised by some delegations. We consider that the question of the prohibition of the

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

production of fissionable materials for military purposes should not be considered in isolation but in conjunction with the whole set of nuclear disarmament problems, in particular that of gradual reduction of the accumulated stockpiles of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. Let me remind you that, in development of this theme, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic also submitted document CD/109.

Our position on various subjects, including that of problems of nuclear disarmament, is also stated in document CD/141, submitted to the Committee at its present session. The document emphasizes the urgent need for the setting up of an appropriate working group as soon as possible. The activities of such a group with the participation of all nuclear-weapon Powers as well as non-nuclear-weapon countries should, we are firmly convinced, facilitate the earliest start of negotiations -- and I say negotiations, let me emphasize it once more -- on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed.

The Soviet delegation has heard with great attention and interest the statements made by representatives of various countries on the first and second items of our agenda. It seems to us that common to all those statements, with rare exceptions, was the absolutely clearly and unambiguously displayed desire to embark at last upon negotiations, upon a business-like examination of the principal aspects of nuclear disarmament within the framework of our Committee.

The grounds and motives underlying this proposal have been convincingly and comprehensively expounded by representatives of both the socialist and the developing countries, as well as by some western States. It therefore seems to us that there is no need to adduce fresh arguments -- although one could, if one wished, advance many -- in favour of the setting up of an appropriate working group. In that connection, I should like to refer to the statement by the Cuban representative on 3 March, in which he reviewed a large number of official documents of the Committee on Disarmament relating to this topic. Among them, mention was made in particular, of document CD/116, referred to by representatives of the "Group of 21". In that connection, we should like to support the statement by the Yugoslav delegation on 3 March suggesting that documents CD/116 and CD/4, as well as other documents, should form the basis of the activities of the working group on nuclear disarmament.

To our great regret, however, we are obliged to note that in the Committee there is no unanimity, no consensus on the question of using the Committee for negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament or, accordingly, on the setting up of an ad hoc working group. The statements by the United Kingdom and United States delegations on that subject have been subjected to what we consider to be just criticism.

The Soviet delegation would also like to support those delegations which entirely disagree with assertions to the effect that the time has not yet come for negotiations on nuclear disarmament, that conditions for this are not yet ripe. For the nuclear arms race itself -- the accumulation of nuclear weapons itself, as has been convincingly demonstrated in the statements of many delegations including that made by the Nigerian Ambassador today -- is fraught with the gravest danger to mankind,

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

to say nothing of the sombre prospect of their use. In our view, which, as we see, is shared by many members of the Committee, it is never too soon to curb the arms race and, first and foremost, the nuclear arms race. On the contrary, this must be done as quickly as possible, while the possibility of exercising control and, consequently, of agreed arms limitation has not yet been completely lost.

In the absence of consensus on the establishment of a working group on nuclear disarmament, many representatives of the "Group of 21" have said that they are in favour of keeping open the possibility of discussing nuclear disarmament issues through the holding of informal meetings or consultations. Without, of course, objecting to this, we should like to stress once more that the obligatory and principal purpose of work of such a kind done by us under the guidance of the Chairman of the Committee should be to prepare the ground for negotiations on the substance of this problem. Otherwise such work would be, to put it mildly, a waste of time, and could degenerate into a fruitless academic debate.

In the statement by my esteemed Indian colleague, supported by other delegations, it was proposed that the basis of discussion at the informal meetings should be the report of a group of experts on a comprehensive study on nuclear weapons. Let me recall that mention was made of chapters V and VI and of the conclusion. We have some reservations on this document as a whole, but we are not opposed to the discussion of a number of topics connected with nuclear disarmament questions. However, it does not seem desirable that we should confine ourselves to this one document. The delegations of the various countries are entitled -- and that, I believe, is what will actually happen -- to make use of all possible sources and studies relating to that subject.

The representative of Brazil, supported by the delegation of Venezuela, suggested that the Secretariat should prepare a list of proposals on nuclear disarmament. While recognizing the usefulness of that idea, we should merely like to point out that in the interests of saving time and funds it might be worth while to look through the United Nations archives for a document of that kind and simply make the necessary additions to it. Something similar was prepared before the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The representative of Czechoslovakia, speaking just before me, submitted for the Committee's examination a paper entitled "Considerations of a group of socialist countries in the Committee on Disarmament concerning negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and also on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests". In associating myself with the statement made by the Ambassador of Czechoslovakia, I wish to stress that this document also reflects the Soviet delegation's position on the questions concerned in the light of the situation which has come about in the Committee.

We hope that the views of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries stated in that document will prove useful for our common work and will be studied with due attention by other delegations.

Mr. VRHUNEC (Yugoslavia): We have examined the situation that has been created in the Committee in connection with the setting up of working groups for the comprehensive test ban and nuclear disarmament and with regard to the opening of negotiations within the framework of the Committee on the complex of nuclear disarmament questions. We believe that the creation of the corresponding working groups is the most effective way to initiate negotiations as soon as possible. In view of the fact that, owing to the refusal of a few countries, it was not possible so far for the Committee to reach a consensus to this effect, we think it is imperative to continue the informal meetings for consideration of the proposals for the establishment of ad hoc working groups on items 1 and 2 of the Committee's agenda, as well as for consideration of the establishment of other subsidiary bodies.

We consider it indispensable most urgently to open a discussion at the informal meetings of the Committee with regard to the report of the Secretary-General containing the comprehensive study on nuclear weapons which was presented at the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly, and particularly chapters V and VI and the conclusions.

In order to have as effective as possible a consideration of the problems under the agenda item, Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, we think it would be useful that the Committee's secretariat prepare as soon as possible the materials compiled with regard to the proposals on nuclear disarmament that were submitted to the Committee from 1979 until the present as well as all other proposals on this subject (including resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly). In our opinion this task should be carried out in two stages. However, the materials having to do with the proposals submitted to the Committee from 1979 until the present should be presented as soon as possible.

We consider that the complex of nuclear disarmament questions, as one of the most important issues of disarmament, should constantly be the subject of consideration in the Committee and we therefore propose that the Committee proceed, as soon as possible, with the consideration of and negotiations on concrete arrangements and solutions for nuclear disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: Distinguished delegates, in accordance with the decision taken by the Committee at its 104th plenary meeting, the distinguished representative of Spain, Ambassador de Laiglesia, has asked for the floor. Thus, he has become the first representative of a State non-member of the Committee to address a plenary meeting of our Committee during this session. I extend to him a warm welcome. May I invite you, Ambassador, to take the floor.

Mr. de LAIGLESIA (Spain) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, allow me first to express my gratitude for your kind words and my pleasure in seeing you discharging the office of Chairman of this Committee and also my appreciation of the opportunity you have given me to speak at this plenary meeting. This is the third time that I have had the honour of addressing this Committee, for Spain attaches the greatest importance to its work. Although hitherto in this forum we have been particularly concerned with chemical weapons, all aspects of its activities deserve our attention.

In the first place, we wish to make it clear that we share the conviction that nuclear disarmament should be the primary concern of the international community, for these weapons are a "sword of Damocles" hanging over the heads of all human beings in this period of history. It is of fundamental importance to check the proliferation of nuclear weapons, both horizontally and in the growth of the arsenals of such weapons held by the five nuclear-weapon Powers.

(Mr. de Laiglesia, Spain)

Along this line of thinking, we followed with great interest the trilateral negotiations directed towards the preparation of a convention to ban all nuclear explosions. We believe that verification is the most complex problem in that connection and we therefore hope that the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events will have favourable repercussions on the work of the Committee on this subject and will facilitate the achievement of positive results.

We are also concerned with the question of radiological weapons and for this reason we welcome the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Working Group which is to examine all aspects connected with such weapons and to prepare proposals that would facilitate the elaboration of a draft treaty designed to check their development. It is our view that with regard to weapons of mass destruction, it is necessary to avoid drafting texts that are too general and that it is also necessary to delimit the sphere of their application. In this connection, in our view, the result of the work of the Conference last autumn on the subject of weapons deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects constitutes an example which should be borne in mind because, if subjects can be divided up and limited protocols drafted, it may be possible to achieve partial progress that will simplify the solution of the problems deriving from such weapons.

As for the negotiations towards the preparation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, we should like to recall that this programme is to be submitted to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament which will be held in the spring of 1982. Thus, there is very little time and it will be necessary to speed up the work if it is hoped to achieve the objective that the Committee has set itself.

I also wish to mention briefly the question of effective safeguards for non-nuclear-weapon States. So far there has been little progress in this field and the Ad Hoc Working Group on this subject reached the conclusion that it was not possible to achieve a common approach. We hope that it will prove possible at this session to resolve this issue so that the next report to the General Assembly may include some conclusions offering hope that, in the not too distant future, draft arrangements will be worked out which will help alleviate the nuclear threat that weighs heavily on non-nuclear-weapon States.

We would again like to express our conviction that pragmatic criteria must prevail and that if it does not prove possible to work out treaties on a high international level, instruments should be prepared in the form deemed viable since that would enable us to make progress towards the entry into force of the effective safeguards that we all wish to see implemented.

In addition to what I have just said, I wish to refer at greater length in this statement to a particular aspect of the problem of chemical weapons since, as I have already said, these constitute the part of the Committee's work to which we have devoted special attention. This is the question of verification within the framework of a system of measures to prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of such weapons. In fact, I spoke about this question in my statement in this Committee on 1 July 1980.

(Mr. de Laiglesia, Spain)

Furthermore, at the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly, we co-sponsored resolution 35/144 C which, under agenda item 34, requested the Secretary-General to carry out an impartial investigation to ascertain the significance of reports on activities prohibited by the General Protocol, signed at Geneva in 1925 which deals with the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare. It is our belief that all measures which may help increase compliance with international instruments on disarmament and related matters deserve all our attention.

Today I should like to mention a point referred to in the interesting report submitted by the Ad Hoc Working Group which was given the task of defining the issues to be dealt with in the negotiation of a convention to prohibit the production of chemical weapons -- the Group that was presided over very efficiently by Ambassador Okawa. This involves the question of confidence-building measures, and especially those which might be adopted prior to the entry into force of a treaty on the subject. Indeed, if it were possible to put before the international community a set of voluntary rules in that sense, it is clear that a very favourable climate would be created for the acceptance by the greater part of the community of an agreement that might subsequently be submitted to it.

When the General Assembly was drawing up the Final Document on its first special session devoted to disarmament, our delegation stressed the importance of unilateral measures in the sphere of the limitation of the arms race. We thus consider that any confidence-building measures that may be adopted as regards restrictions on the development of chemical weapons would have an extremely positive effect and would pave the way for the negotiation of the relevant treaty.

It has been said that the objective of these measures is to restrain the urge to competition provoked by ignorance about the extent of possible threats, and in fact the race which we are unfortunately witnessing at this time in the chemical weapons sector is in large measure the fruit of the profound mistrust which exists about the possibility of attack by one side or the other with such weapons.

All these facts, in our opinion, make it essential for us to dispel this atmosphere and in order to do so it is important that confidence-building measures should be adopted. Since it cannot be anticipated that within a short space of time a treaty including such measures will enter into force, it seems to us useful to propose some measures which States might adopt voluntarily. In this connection we wish to recall once more the proposals of the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany which, although they referred particularly to the problems of verification, could also to a certain extent be regarded as voluntary confidence-building measures.

The close relationship between chemical weapons and the industry which manufactures the whole range of products required by mankind in this productive sector, makes it necessary in studying the matter to take account of the interests of the industry and to seek its direct co-operation.

The Chairman's aide-mémoire, annexed to the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group -- includes among pre-convention measures the declaration of stocks and production facilities and the possibility of invitations to visit CW facilities.

(Mr. de Laiglesia, Spain)

Undoubtedly, if countries which are in a position to do so were to adopt measures of this kind, that would be extremely useful, for a very precise knowledge of the offensive capacity of this type of weapon of mass destruction would reduce the interest in it of countries which, lacking such knowledge, might wish not to be in a position of inferiority in respect of such weapons.

However, we think that these declarations and visits should not be confined to the purely military sector but should also include civilian facilities in view of the close relationship these may have with production for warlike purposes.

We therefore believe that it would be very desirable to promote an exchange of information which, without compromising the right of factories to preserve their industrial secrets, would provide greater information about their potential for the production of chemical weapons. To this end, we suggest that international congresses should be organized with the participation of enterprises in the chemical sector so that they can, so far as they are willing and able, exchange information on the various aspects of the development, production, destruction and conversion of chemical weapons of all classes.

Probably the various participants in "symposia" of this kind would react very differently according to the security requirements of their countries or their own economic interests; nevertheless, in our view, the more information the international community has on this category of weapons, the fewer will be the chances that their manufacture will become widespread, since their purely tactical nature gives them limited value as a deterrent and the difficulties involved in their use make them militarily less useful than other conventional weapons, which is the reason why they have been used relatively little since the first world war.

Another aspect of confidence-building measures on which I wish to comment is that of the precautions taken by countries to defend themselves against possible attacks with chemical weapons. Here again we believe that it would be useful to hold international meetings for exchanges of information about protection against asphyxiating and poisonous gases both as regards the armed forces and as regards the protection of civilian populations. It is clear that everything that tends to reduce the effectiveness of chemical weapons will help to reduce interest in the possession of this type of weapon.

I also wish to point out the very great importance of the joint United States-USSR report of 7 July 1980 on progress in the bilateral negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which was circulated to the Committee in document CD/112. The report reiterates the desirability of setting up a consultative committee to exercise functions connected with the verification of compliance with a future convention.

In view of what was agreed in resolution 35/144 C, which I mentioned earlier, it seems to us that it would be desirable for Member States voluntarily to accept the competence of the United Nations Secretary-General as regards the conduct of investigations to clear up situations of doubt resulting from reports that may circulate on the use, or even the existence, of stocks and on the production of chemical weapons. We believe that everything that may serve to increase the information of States with respect to the offensive capacity, as regards this category of weapons, of other members of the international community would have very favourable repercussions for the acceptance by it of a convention on the total prohibition of everything associated with such weapons.

(Mr. de Laiglesia, Spain)

Confidence-building measures are relatively new in the field of disarmament and arms control, although they pre-date the Final Act of Helsinki, since it may be said that the settlements after the first world war which provided for the demilitarization of the Rhineland had such a character. Nevertheless, their increase in popularity began, precisely at Helsinki, and although they have not developed as much as could be wished, we believe that their future is promising. To this end, we urge that a study should be made of their application in the field of chemical weapons, where we believe that they would be perfectly appropriate, owing to the particular characteristic of these weapons of mass destruction.

We believe in the value of the voluntary character of confidence-building measures that might precede the adoption of a convention on the subject, because the necessarily asymmetrical nature of such measures would imply unilateral decisions not susceptible of strict reciprocity, although logically their adoption by some countries could give rise to similar reactions on the part of others.

Similarly, we think this approach limits the risk of escalation which is the great problem always affecting everything connected with arms control and disarmament. We must also state that the problems relating to chemical weapons are very different from those relating to other conventional weapons and thus the characteristics of possible confidence-building measures in this sector must of necessity differ from those concerned with other aspects of the war potential of States.

Finally, I wish to notify the Committee on Disarmament of my Government's desire to participate not only in plenary meetings of the Committee but also in the other bodies negotiating issues which appear on its agenda, in accordance, naturally, with the possibilities offered by its rules of procedure to non-member countries.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador de Laiglesia for his statement; we will take note of his suggestions and examine them in accordance with the rules of procedure.

Mr. SARAI (India): Permit me, Mr. Chairman, first of all to extend to you, the warm congratulations and best wishes of my delegation on your assumption of the Chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of March, and offer you the full co-operation of our delegation in the discharge of your heavy responsibilities. My delegation would also like to express its deep admiration for His Excellency, Ambassador de la Gorce of France, who so skilfully guided the work of our Committee in the month of February. But for his invaluable contribution, our Committee might not have been able to get down to substantive work at such an early phase of our spring session.

I have taken the floor to associate my delegation fully with the recommendation made by the distinguished Ambassador of Yugoslavia. We continue to believe that an ad hoc working group would offer the best mechanism for the conduct of substantive negotiations on nuclear disarmament. However, until the States which are opposed to this recommendation change their position, we feel that we must get down to a substantive examination of concrete issues in informal meetings of the CD.

(Mr. Saran, India)

I would also like to address myself briefly to the comments made by the distinguished Ambassador of the Soviet Union on the proposal of our delegation that we initiate substantive discussions by concentrating on some of the issues which have been raised in the comprehensive study on nuclear weapons which was prepared by a group of experts. In making this recommendation, we did not imply that our discussions should somehow be fenced in within the four walls of the study. If we have specifically referred to chapters 5 and 6 and the conclusions of the study, it is in order to ensure that our substantive debate may have a certain focus and structure; otherwise, we would merely hold a repetitive and general debate. We have supported the proposals made by the delegations of Brazil and Venezuela; the documentation made available to the Committee could form the basis of our future discussions. And it goes without saying that any delegation may raise issues it considers valuable to the discussion.

Mr. ALTAF (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, I have requested the floor primarily to offer our congratulations to you on your accession to the Chairmanship of the Committee. We are confident that the Committee will benefit from your able guidance of its affairs as much as it did during the Chairmanship of your very distinguished predecessor, the Ambassador of France, to whom we offer our thanks and felicitations.

My delegation agrees with the distinguished Ambassador of Yugoslavia that we should continue to work for the establishment of the two ad hoc working groups on items 1 and 2 of our agenda. We also feel that it may be useful to begin with a study of chapters 5 and 6 of the Secretary-General's report, but there are many other documents and compilations which may be of equal usefulness. My delegation is in agreement with the distinguished Ambassador of the USSR that, in his words, we should not fence ourselves in within the ambit of one single document, and I am glad that the distinguished representative of India has also expressed his agreement with that. There are other documents mentioned by the distinguished Soviet Ambassador, such as the working paper of the Group of 21 in document CD/116, which contain important proposals meriting our renewed consideration. We should also occupy ourselves with the preparation of negotiations on the substantive question of the ad hoc working groups on items 1 and 2. It could be helpful to express our views on the specific tasks of these two proposed working groups. That, we believe, will advance the work entrusted to this Committee, especially in view of the limited time available before we have to report progress in our negotiations to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament.

Mr. de QUEIROZ DUARTE (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, my delegation wishes to put on record that it supports the proposals made by the distinguished representative of Yugoslavia. We believe that the time is more than ripe for this Committee to take decisions that will enable it to organize meaningful, concrete negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. In our view, a discussion of substantive issues in informal meetings of the Committee should start immediately and should focus on chapters 5 and 6 and the conclusions of the Secretary-General's report on the comprehensive study on nuclear weapons as well as

(Mr. de Queiroz Duarte, Brazil)

on proposals presented since the inception of the CD, to be compiled by the Secretariat and on other relevant material presented in the United Nations that could be added to the compilation at a second stage. We realize that there might be other sensible ways of providing substantive material for the informal meetings, but the important point, to our delegation, is that the Committee should succeed in establishing a meaningful dialogue aimed at setting up a working group on item 2, as has been proposed by the Group of 21.

The CHAIRMAN: Distinguished delegates, I had the intention to suggest holding a short informal meeting to discuss some questions. Unfortunately, our time has run out, so that I am obliged to take up these matters at our next informal meeting on Monday, to be able to formalize these questions at our next plenary meeting.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 10 March 1981, at 10.30 a.m. The meeting is closed.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.