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ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND TENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 26 February 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. F. de la Gorce (France)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. M. HATI
Mr. M. DJABALLAH

Argentina:

Mr. F. JIMENEZ DAVILA
Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD

Australia:

Mr. R.A. WALKER
Mr. R. STEELE
Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium:

Mr. A. ONKELINX

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. R. DEYANOV
Miss V. LOTIZOV

Burma:

U SAW HLAING
U THAN HTUN

Canada:

Mr. G. SKINNER
Mr. C. VACHON

China:

Mr. YU Peiwen
Mr. LIANG Yufan
Mrs. WANG Zhiyun

Cuba:

Mrs. V. BOROWDOSKY JACKIEWICH

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. L. STAVINCHA

Egypt:

Mr. D.A. EL REEDY

Mr. I.A. HASSAN

Mr. H.N. FAHMY

Ethiopia:

Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA CORCE

Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE

Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HEIDER

Mr. H. THEELICKE

Mr. M. KAULFUSS

Mr. P. BUNTIG

Germany, Federal Republic of

Mr. G. PFEIFFER

Mr. N. KLINGLER

Mr. H. MULLER

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES

Mr. C. GYORFFY

India:

Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN

Mr. S. SARAN

Mr. S. SINGH

Indonesia:

Mr. E. SOEPRAPTO

Mr. HARYOMATARAH

Mr. F. QASIM

Mr. KARYONO

Iran:

Mr. D. AMERI

Italy:

Mr. V.C. DI MONTEZEMOLO

Mr. A. CIARRAPICO

Mr. B. CABRAS

Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. H. TAKAHASHI
Mr. R. ISHII
Mr. K. SHINADA

Kenya:

Mr. S. SHITEMI
Mr. G. IUNIU

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mr. M.A. CACERES

Mongolia:

Mr. S.H. LKHASHID
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria:

Mr. O. ADEHJI
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. M. AKRAM
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. T. MALITA
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. S. STROMBACH
Mr. J. LUNDIN
Mr. B. EKHOLI

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. L.A. NAUKOV
Mr. L.S. MOSHKOV
Mr. V.M. GAIJA
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO
Mr. S.N. RIUKHINE

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMTERHAYES
Mr. N.H. MARSHALL
Mrs. J.I. LINK

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. FLOWERREE
Mr. L. FLEISCHER
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. J.A. MISKEL
Mr. H. WILSON
Mr. S. FITZGERALD
Mr. F. DE SIMONE

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT
Mr. O.A. AGUILLAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC
Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. LONGO B. NDAGA

Secretary of the Committee
and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): The 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament has got off to a good start and, most important, it seems at first glance to have struck out on a business-like course. In your capacity as Chairman of the Committee for the month of February, you have made an undeniable contribution towards achieving this state of affairs. In sincerely welcoming you as the distinguished representative of France, a country with which Mongolia maintains friendly relations, we share your concern that the Committee should start serious negotiations on the substance of the items on its agenda.

Allow me to express the Mongolian delegation's warm thanks to Ambassador T. Terrefe, the distinguished representative of Ethiopia, under whose guidance the Committee successfully completed its last year's session.

The Mongolian delegation would like to take the opportunity to welcome the new representatives of a number of countries and to assure them of our readiness to co-operate with them in accomplishing our common tasks.

The Mongolian People's Republic has always pinned great hopes upon the activities of the Committee on Disarmament, and continues to do so today. In doing so it proceeds from the consideration that vitally important questions which disturb the whole of mankind must find urgent solution within this forum, this multilateral negotiating body unique of its kind. The Mongolian delegation, aware of its responsibility to assist in the achievement of tangible results towards the halting of the arms race and the adoption of effective measures in the sphere of disarmament, has once more embarked upon its continuing efforts within the framework of this important body.

At its present session, the Committee, as many speakers have rightly pointed out in the course of the general debate, is charged with special responsibility. The second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament scheduled for 1982 imposes on all States, and especially on members of the Committee, a responsibility to work out solutions to priority problems which should help achieve progress towards the curbing of the arms race.

At the same time we ask ourselves whether the Committee on Disarmament will be able to come to the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament with concrete agreements and understandings in the sphere of the limitation of the arms race and disarmament, or whether it will be obliged to acknowledge the absence of any real advance in the consideration of its agenda.

It is our view that the effectiveness and efficiency of this multilateral negotiating body on disarmament questions should be measured by the existence of positive decisions on the substance of these questions. The Committee should not be satisfied with measures of a procedural and organizational nature. The States members of the Committee which are still not ready to show their willingness to join in the common effort should become aware of their great responsibility and display a maximum of political will and determination to conduct constructive negotiations so as to enable a positive contribution to be made towards the achievement of practical steps in the disarmament field.

Together with the delegations of other socialist countries, the Mongolian delegation is prepared to make every effort to continue, to the best of its ability, to contribute towards progress in this direction.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

An important aspect of the Committee's 1981 session for the Mongolian delegation is the fact that it coincides with significant events in the history of present-day Mongolia. The sixtieth anniversary of the establishment of the people's power in Mongolia will be commemorated next July. In the last part of May will be held the 18th Congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, which, like the congresses of other Communist and Workers' parties of the socialist countries, will lay down the tasks ahead in the spheres of domestic and foreign policy for the purposes of strengthening the positions of socialism, preserving international peace and détente, developing peaceful co-operation among States, halting the arms race and achieving disarmament.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the principal feature of whose foreign policy activities is their consistent and active championing of effective measures towards the attainment of détente and genuine disarmament, have made and are continuing to make constructive and original proposals.

It is already widely known to all that at the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union now taking place, Comrade L.I. Brezhnev has made a number of important new proposals which represent a further creative development and expansion of the principal ideas of the well-known Peace Programme being successfully implemented by the Soviet Union together with other fraternal countries of the socialist community. The new Soviet initiatives are aimed at the relaxation of the current international tension, the removal of the threat of war and the strengthening of world peace and the security of nations.

The measures proposed by the Soviet Union for increasing confidence between the States of the European continent, between interested countries of the Far East and in other regions of the world are exceptionally important and timely. Their object is the creation of favourable preconditions for progress in the cause of disarmament.

Fidelity and consistency in pursuit of the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons are vividly reflected in the Soviet Union's new proposals for the limitation of the deployment of new submarines and the prohibition of the production of new ballistic missiles for such submarines and the modernization of existing ones.

We are convinced that the Soviet proposal for moratoria on the deployment in Europe of new medium-range nuclear missiles by the NATO countries and the Soviet Union is of great immediate significance. The implementation of this proposal would represent a concrete step towards curbing the nuclear arms race and the bringing about of military détente in Europe.

In referring to this far from complete list of new constructive proposals by the Soviet Union, the Mongolian delegation would like to emphasize the importance and urgency of putting into effect these and many other proposals by the socialist countries, which would fully coincide with the long-term interests of all peoples.

Attempts have been made in the statements of certain delegations in the general debate in our Committee to connect the causes for the deterioration of the present international situation with the Afghanistan and other questions, as was done at the last session of the General Assembly and in the forums of other international organizations.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

We are convinced that the prime cause for the worsening of the international situation resides, above all, in the attempt of certain NATO circles to disrupt the existing military and strategic balance in favour of their "position of strength" policy, to seek military superiority by giving a new, dangerous twist to the arms race spiral, stepping up military preparations in the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and other areas of the world, sharply increasing arms expenditure and deploying qualitatively new medium-range nuclear missile weapons on the territories of a number of west European countries.

The opponents of peace and international détente have gone so far as to make extremely dangerous plans concerned with the "possibility" and "admissibility" of waging a "limited" nuclear war and the resumption of the production of neutron weapons and their deployment in western Europe.

The actions of certain circles in the West aimed at creating obstacles to the entry into force of the new Soviet-United States strategic arms limitation treaty are causing deep concern to world public opinion. The same circles are to blame for the marked stagnation in a number of bilateral and multilateral negotiations.

In the present complex international situation which has resulted among other things in certain difficulties in disarmament negotiations, the Mongolian delegation believes that maximum efforts should be made to achieve all the more continuity in serious negotiations in the disarmament field and to see to it that these negotiations are constructive and effective. We are convinced that the Committee on Disarmament has a special part to play, and that, with this important aim in mind, it should proceed immediately to a business-like and concrete consideration of the items on its agenda.

The conduct of business-like negotiations undoubtedly requires all participants to display political will and determination. The Mongolian delegation's position on that score is clearly and fully reflected in document CD/141, jointly submitted at the present session of the Committee on Disarmament by the delegations of a group of socialist countries.

I should like to note that the Committee succeeded this year within a relatively short time in adopting decisions on a number of complex organizational issues, despite the blatant attempts made by some delegations to involve it in futile discussions on questions having no direct relation to the agenda.

The problem of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament is regarded as an urgent task and deserves priority attention in the work of our Committee. From this point of view, the Mongolian delegation continues to regard the socialist countries' proposal submitted to the Committee in February 1979 on ending the production of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed (document CD/4) as a good basis for the conduct of multilateral negotiations.

The sponsors of that proposal have repeatedly come forward with explanations of their position in response to the desire of individual members of the Committee for additional information. The delegations of the socialist countries, in turn, of course, expressed their willingness to hear specific comments from their negotiating partners. It seems to us essential that the Committee should turn from a rather protracted discussion of a general character to a detailed consideration of the substance of questions. According to its programme of work the Committee has embarked upon the consideration of questions relating to nuclear disarmament. However, at the present stage of our work we fail to see any substantial shift in that direction.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

In that connection we are regretfully obliged to note that there is at the present stage in the Committee's work, no consensus as regards the adoption of a decision to set up ad hoc working groups for the examination of items 1 and 2 of the agenda of the Committee's present session.

Taking into account the important recommendations, especially in resolutions 35/152 B and 35/152 C, made by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session, the Mongolian delegation is fully in favour of starting real negotiations on nuclear disarmament. We continue to support the establishment of an ad hoc group on that problem in application of the provisions of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It is extremely important, in our view, that all the nuclear-weapon Powers should participate in such negotiations. In that connection I should like once again to express our disagreement with the view that questions of nuclear disarmament should form the subject of negotiations solely among the nuclear-weapon Powers, and that it should be left to the States which are dominant in the nuclear-weapons sphere to take the initiative in the reduction of their nuclear arsenals, while others should adopt a wait-and-see attitude. Such an approach to nuclear disarmament problems is hardly likely to serve as a real basis for reaching a mutually acceptable solution of this very difficult problem, since it radically contravenes the spirit and principle of guaranteeing equal and identical security to all countries.

We also consider it important that the Committee should at the present stage consider the question of the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present. The group of socialist countries has proposed that an appropriate item should be included in the present session's agenda in accordance with resolution 35/156 C of the United Nations General Assembly and that consideration should be given to the setting up of an ad hoc working group on this question. In making this proposal we were guided by the fact that the Committee on Disarmament is called upon to elaborate effective measures for the prevention of the further proliferation of nuclear weapons in any direction and the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime.

As you know, the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session adopted a resolution recommending that the Committee on Disarmament should actively continue the negotiations aimed at achieving agreement and concluding effective international arrangements on security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States. The Mongolian delegation's position on this issue was stated during last year's session. We are in favour of the conclusion of a multilateral convention the object of which would be to provide non-nuclear-weapon States with effective assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We do not consider individual declarations by nuclear-weapon States concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons to be a sufficiently effective or wholly reliable means that could be qualified as "interim measures". Taking into account the proposals made concerning the need for the adoption of interim measures, we support the idea that an appropriate agreement should be formulated in the form of a Security Council resolution. The Mongolian delegation intends to speak on this point at a later stage of our work.

The Mongolian People's Republic is no less interested than others in finding an immediate solution to the question of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. China's persistence in conducting nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere in the immediate vicinity of Mongolia's southern frontiers continues to arouse the profound indignation and concern of the Mongolian people and other peace-loving peoples. We resolutely demand from the Chinese People's Republic that it should immediately cease nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, respect the rules of international law now in force and constructively join in the multilateral efforts to achieve a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

We believe in general that the non-participation of States, particularly nuclear-weapon States, in negotiations on questions of nuclear disarmament to justify their negativist attitude towards a particular international instrument in the disarmament field does not give them the right to act with impunity with the aim of gaining unilateral advantage or obtaining an individual benefit. We think that the achievement of an effective international agreement on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban will be difficult, if not impossible, if one or two nuclear-weapon Powers persistently strive to preserve outsider status.

The interests of the common cause demand that all nuclear-weapon States should refrain from conducting nuclear explosions for a specified period and should make appropriate declarations to that effect, as the Soviet delegation proposed at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly. The proposed moratorium, whose time-frame should be agreed from the outset, should apply to all nuclear-weapon States without exception.

The Mongolian delegation considers it essential that the Committee on Disarmament, taking into account the relevant General Assembly resolution, should make the necessary efforts to establish an ad hoc working group for the thorough consideration of the question of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban and the drafting of an appropriate treaty, with the participation of all the nuclear-weapon Powers. It seems to us that the consideration of this matter within the framework of the Committee should not complicate the process of the trilateral negotiations in progress between the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the United Kingdom but should assist and promote their successful completion in every possible way.

The Committee on Disarmament is the most suitable body for negotiations in which it could not only ascertain what further progress had been made in the trilateral efforts in this field but also confirm its ability to adopt a decision mutually acceptable to all parties, with the participation of the other two nuclear-weapon Powers which for one reason or another have not up to now shown a desire to participate in the negotiations in progress between nuclear-weapon States.

There is no doubt that if the Committee on Disarmament as at present constituted achieves consensus in the preparation of an international agreement on a comprehensive nuclear-weapon test ban, this will not only represent a historic event in the sense that the draft of the first international instrument with the participation of all the nuclear-weapon Powers and other, non-nuclear-weapon States will have been agreed on within this body, but will also serve to create favourable preconditions for the achievement of positive decisions on other important issues on the Committee's agenda, and in particular questions relating to the limitation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

The Mongolian delegation attaches great importance to the constructive examination of the question of the prohibition of the development and production of new types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

The socialist countries have already made a proposal for the establishment of an ad hoc group of experts on this problem and have expressed their readiness to discuss the question of the group's mandate.

With regard to radiological weapons, one of the new types of weapons of mass destruction, we consider that the requisite conditions now exist for practical work to be done to reach definitive agreement on a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. The Committee could, in our view, direct the work of the ad hoc group on radiological weapons in such a way that it might successfully complete its work by the conclusion of the current session.

In this context I should like to recall that in March 1978 the socialist countries submitted a proposal for the prohibition of neutron weapons. The proposal for the conclusion of an appropriate convention is of considerable importance today, as I have already pointed out, in the light of new attempts to revive plans for the production of this lethal weapon and its deployment in a number of west European States.

Assessing the present position in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, we share the view that a certain amount of progress has been made. The principal task at the present stage is to concentrate attention on those provisions in respect of which a general convergence of views has become apparent, and so to move forward gradually towards practical agreement on specific formulations for the draft of a future international convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

The Mongolian delegation hopes that in the discussion of the question of the elaboration of a comprehensive disarmament programme account will be taken of the appeal made by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session that such a programme should be drafted with a view to its adoption not later than at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The Mongolian delegation is willing to continue actively co-operating with the delegations of other countries with a view to finding constructive solutions to the urgent problems before the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished Ambassador of Mongolia for his statement and for the kind words he was good enough to address to the Chair.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): Mr. Chairman, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic is gratified to note that the overwhelming majority of the States members of the Committee on Disarmament attach foremost importance to the priority question of disarmament negotiations -- the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The peoples of the world rightfully expect the Committee to decide urgently upon measures which would contribute to translating into concrete agreements the provisions on nuclear disarmament contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. This objective is, as is well known, also reflected in important resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

The urgent necessity for concrete measures is accentuated by the actions of certain circles that have lately whipped up the nuclear arms race in order to develop new "invulnerable" and precise weapons. Expenditures for new systems of nuclear weapons are soaring immeasurably. As a consequence of this, the risk of the outbreak of a nuclear war is steadily increasing. The declaration of the so-called Palme Commission (CD/143) introduced some days ago by the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, convincingly points out the serious consequences of the intensified nuclear arms race and, thus, deserves our attention.

The German Democratic Republic, situated in the centre of Europe at the dividing line between the two most powerful military alliances, has been working very actively for the safeguarding of peace in Europe. We are watching with particular attention the development of events in this part of the world. The implementation of NATO's decision to manufacture and deploy medium-range nuclear-missile weapons in western Europe would considerably raise the danger of a nuclear war on the European continent. Recent reports alleging that the world's biggest concentration of nuclear weapons exists already now on the territory of the western neighbour of the German Democratic Republic have become a matter of great concern. This deadly record would even be surpassed if the above-mentioned NATO decision were to be realized. It is obvious that such a concentration of nuclear weapons poses a serious threat to all countries in this region, including the German Democratic Republic. It cannot leave my country indifferent. This threat is recognized by more and more people in Europe, and not only there. We are also concerned about calls made by certain circles in the United States to declare obsolete such an important agreement as the Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of 1972, or to circumvent it by developing new weapons. I believe that we all here are conscious of the important role this Treaty plays in assuring strategic stability.

In view of these alarming signs, we felt particular satisfaction over the fact that one of the nuclear-weapon States, namely, the USSR, reiterated early this week its will to do everything in its power to bring about nuclear disarmament. The German Democratic Republic welcomes and supports the declaration made by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, L.I. Brezhnev, at the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that the Soviet Union intends to continue the policy of détente. This readiness has been borne out by new concrete proposals, in particular on the cessation of the nuclear arms race. Here I have especially in mind the proposals concerning the

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continuation of the negotiations with the United States on the limitation and reduction of strategic armaments, concerning the limitation of the deployment of new submarines and the corresponding missile systems, and concerning a moratorium on the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe.

We fully agree with the repeatedly expressed view that the Committee on Disarmament can and should play a more active part in the efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament. Under the prevailing conditions, a general exchange of views on the pros and cons of dealing with the cessation of the nuclear arms race and with nuclear disarmament no longer suffices. This subject must be tackled with the seriousness it deserves. The relevant objectives are clear; they are contained in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. In their working papers, CD/4, CD/36/Rev.1, CD/109 and CD/116, the Group of Socialist States and the Group of 21 put forward concrete proposals on the organization and substance of corresponding negotiations. Regrettably, we are still waiting for a definite reply of the western group and one nuclear-weapon State concerning the issues raised in these documents.

Now as before, we believe that the most appropriate means for making progress in this field would be the establishment as soon as possible of an ad hoc working group on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament. General Assembly resolutions 35/152 B and 35/152 C and the above-mentioned documents provide the principal guidelines for the elaboration of its mandate. The ad hoc working group should aim at initiating effective negotiations with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States. This goal could be reached in several intermediary stages. As a first step, consultations could be held with interested States in order to harmonize views on the approach to organizational problems and to the elaboration of the mandate for the ad hoc working group to be set up. A mandate to be worked out could involve the following aspects:

A manner of starting negotiations on nuclear disarmament;

The clarification of the stages of nuclear disarmament;

The identification of the responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States and the role of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

In this framework, the ad hoc working group should strive to reach agreement on the basic principles for negotiations on nuclear disarmament, the relationship between conventional and nuclear disarmament, and questions relating to the strengthening of political and legal guarantees for the security of States.

In the course of the discussions which have taken place hitherto the question of ending the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes has been raised. This problem should not be underestimated. But it cannot be separated from the set of issues relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Such an approach would not halt the qualitative arms race. New systems of nuclear weapons could be manufactured even with the existing stockpiles of fissionable material. Therefore, this question should be addressed by the

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

ad hoc working group to be set up within the framework of paragraph 50 of the Final Document. We express the hope that the States advocating the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes could go along with this more comprehensive approach.

Pursuant to resolution 35/156 C adopted at the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Committee on Disarmament has decided to consider the issue of the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present in the context of its agenda item on nuclear disarmament.

The attainment of an appropriate agreement would, in our view, strengthen the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and improve the conditions for agreeing on effective security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

An appropriate agreement should provide for the commitment of the nuclear-weapon States not to deploy nuclear weapons on the territories of countries where there are no such weapons at present, irrespective of whether or not these countries have allied relations with one or another nuclear-weapon State. The main elements of such an agreement could be defined at an initial stage of our work in this sphere. We are in favour of setting up an ad hoc working group on this question.

Concluding my statement, I would like to stress the willingness of my delegation to play an active part in the elaboration of concrete arrangements for solving the tasks in the field of nuclear disarmament fixed in the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Any progress in this direction, however limited it may be, would make an important contribution to a successful preparation of the second special session on disarmament.

Mr. SUMNERHAYES (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, today I wish to refer again to the question of nuclear disarmament, which we are now considering under item 2 of our agenda. The distinguished representative of India, in his interesting and thoughtful statement on 3 February, said that the nuclear-weapon States owed a duty to explain their attitude to nuclear defence and nuclear disarmament. His actual words were that we should explain "the inconsistencies and contradictions" of our policies. I think therefore that a response to these comments is in order, particularly as the policies pursued by my Government are certainly neither inconsistent nor contradictory. I also have in mind that earlier this week, in our informal meeting on the possibility of creating additional working groups, a number of delegations, among which the Indian delegation was again prominent, called for the CD to consider in more detail aspects of nuclear policy such as the concepts of deterrence, nuclear parity and the balance of power.

I shall start by dealing with one particular alleged inconsistency straight away. In his speech to which I have referred, the representative of India suggested that there is an inconsistency between the weapons policies of the nuclear Powers and their declared policy on nuclear disarmament. But, as he will know from his own country's policies, defence and disarmament are not in themselves incompatible

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

aims. The British Government takes exactly this view and has repeatedly committed itself to seeking measures of nuclear disarmament as part of a general disarmament process. But my Government has always taken care to say further that nuclear disarmament would be neither feasible nor desirable on its own. On the contrary, we believe this could result in serious military, and hence political, destabilization. For us it is a fundamental principle of disarmament negotiations that the results should not jeopardize the security of any party. This is recognized in paragraph 22 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which I will quote:

"Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, negotiations should be carried out on the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments, based on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security."

A preoccupation with nuclear affairs in the disarmament discussions has, however, tended to divert attention from the serious imbalance in conventional forces in Europe, which is the main obstacle to substantial conventional as well as nuclear arms reductions by the west.

I am not sure how far it is appropriate for this Committee to become a forum for debates on strategic theory, but since my Indian colleague made a number of comments about the strategy of deterrence, I think it reasonable, as a representative of a country which practises nuclear deterrence, to explain the basic concept underlying our policy. First, let me bring this theoretical subject down to very simple terms. If I see a risk that my house may be broken into, I install a burglar alarm, find myself a guard dog and then put up a notice on my front gate advertising this. I do not wish to hurt a possible intruder; instead, I hope that my preparations will make him reconsider and leave me in peace. In other words, I am trying to deter him. The strategic principle is exactly the same -- and I would venture to say that it is a principle on which many States base their defence. Each country must consider what external threat it faces and what level of defence is necessary to prevent any threat from developing into outright aggression. We all try to achieve the same aim -- to prevent war.

Let me now turn more particularly to the situation in Europe. The NATO alliance faces a situation where there is a growing conventional and nuclear potential ranged against it. The basis of our alliance is that we are pledged to defend each other if attacked. We threaten aggression against no one. Yet we perceive a threat to our security stemming from both conventional and nuclear forces, and the conventional forces which threaten us are far larger than those that we ourselves now deploy. We reject the idea of being blackmailed into a choice of being destroyed in war or surrendering our freedom, and so we have tried to find a way of ensuring that we are not attacked. To achieve this, we make it clear that any possible adversary who might contemplate aggression against us would suffer more than he could possibly hope to gain.

As I said last week, my Government shares with all other Governments a deep sense of horror at the appalling consequences that would flow from any nuclear war. We completely accept that there could be no winners in such a war. Our aim is to ensure that it never happens. So we must have the capability to demonstrate to a would-be aggressor that at whatever level he attacked us, we could defend ourselves in the most appropriate way -- conventional or nuclear.

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

No one need fear that we in the west would willingly take a single step to initiate a war -- conventional or nuclear. No one need fear that we will use our possession of nuclear weapons to impose our political objectives on another country. Nor that we have some misguided belief that a limited nuclear war would in some way be to our advantage. How could we believe such a thing when it is our own homes that would be devastated? We need no convincing on this score. Our aim, and that of our allies, is solely to prevent any risk of violence being exerted against us. It is my Government's belief that in the light of the particular threat -- conventional as well as nuclear -- to our security, the best way to achieve this, the best way to preserve peace, is by a strategy of deterrence -- conventional as well as nuclear.

But that is not the end of it: otherwise we would admittedly be condemning ourselves to an endless arms race. We hope and try to prevent this. Hence my Government's commitment to arms control and disarmament. By seeking arms control agreements, slow and difficult though the process is, we attempt to maintain the balance of forces. By seeking multilateral disarmament we attempt to bring down the appallingly high level of armaments on both sides. We see deterrence and disarmament as both being necessary, and as complementary ways of securing our over-all objective of peace and security.

The second main contention, or contradiction, on which I should like to comment in the statement by the distinguished representative of India is that the nuclear balance is inherently unstable and contains, as it were, the seeds of its own imbalance. This is an arguable proposition. As in any other field of military technology, there is always an incentive to improve equipment and thus to keep ahead of, or not to fall behind, a potential opponent. This tendency to competition exists in all situations of armed confrontation and is not only a characteristic of nuclear armouries. What is true is that as a result of this technical competition there is a fear that the approximate equilibrium or balance which serves as a mutual restraint will be disturbed. It is not difficult to see the danger inherent in this. It is a major reason for giving priority to seeking to cap the nuclear arms race. And that in turn is precisely why we attach so much importance to the SALT process.

Against this background I should like to reiterate what I said at the informal meeting held on 23 February about the handling of these subjects in this Committee. It is our view that as things now stand, the only States which can participate effectively in the process of capping the strategic arms race are those with the predominant nuclear armouries. That is why we believe that at this stage it is sensible for this question to be dealt with bilaterally through the SALT process. My Government is, however, a party to the negotiations on the question of the cessation of nuclear testing.

It is a fundamental characteristic of negotiations of this kind that they involve highly technical issues affecting the security of the participants. It is for this reason that my Government does not see how the negotiation of nuclear arms control agreements could in the first instance be conducted within this Committee. It follows from this that we do not believe that it would be useful as the initial step to set up working groups on these agenda items. This certainly does not mean, however, either that my Government is satisfied with the way things are or that it is insensitive to the awesome responsibility on the shoulders of nuclear-weapon States.

Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): The latest issue of the monthly journal, Disarmament Times, published under the auspices of the NGO Disarmament Committee, carries on its first page a news item entitled, "'Doomsday Clock' Advances Toward Midnight". This clock, conceived by a group of nuclear scientists in 1947, measures the time that separates us from nuclear disaster, with divisions from 12 to 0. At the time at which the news item in the Disarmament Times was written, as a result of the latest events that had made the danger of a nuclear war much greater, the hands on the clock had been moved to four minutes to "midnight"-- the day of destruction. Since then the hands must have moved still nearer to zero hour. Let us hope that the developments that have occurred in the last two days have delayed the inexorable hour of the end of mankind by a few minutes.

International events in recent times have highlighted the profound changes that have occurred in the world scene as a result of the instability of certain regions and the changes in the interests and strategic objectives of the Superpowers and of the principal military Powers generally.

The transformation of a regional conflict into a world conflict in which the use of nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out becomes increasingly likely. The most recent events in different parts of the world show clearly how delicate is the balance on which international peace and security depend and how the rivalries between the great Powers seem increasingly likely to lead to a large-scale conflict. A local conflict which might begin as a civil war or a war among neighbours could easily drag the great Powers into a direct confrontation and subsequently into a nuclear war.

At the same time, new types and systems of nuclear weapons have recently appeared that by their characteristics increase the probability of a nuclear war rather than consolidate the security of their owners. The development of guided missiles, ever more accurate and less vulnerable, particularly at the level of tactical armaments and new systems designed to prevent detection of the sites where such weapons are installed, make the use of these nuclear weapons more feasible. This dangerous trend has been stimulated by the emergence of new doctrines of dissuasion based on the assumption that it is possible to wage a limited nuclear war for some weeks, and so avoid unleashing a full-scale nuclear war. This assumption we reject as completely crazy and we further consider it absurd and dangerous. Who can guarantee that the detonation of a nuclear device in the territory of either of the two combatants, carried by a tactical means of delivery, or a medium-range ballistic missile will not provoke reprisals or a counter-attack with strategic weapons? Furthermore, in order to appreciate what a tactical nuclear war would mean, it is enough to remember that the most inoffensive of the nuclear devices which would be employed in such a conflict would in any case be several times more powerful than the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima or Nagasaki. And again, in even a limited nuclear war, not one but perhaps many of these devices would be used.

In the statement he made at the 108th plenary meeting, Ambassador Summerhayes, the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, said that his Government "believes that the only secure route to nuclear arms control lies through negotiations between the nuclear-weapon Powers, and in particular between the United States and the Soviet Union". I believe no one would dispute that the nuclear-weapon Powers have primary responsibility in the matter of nuclear disarmament. That is one of the basic principles of disarmament embodied in the Final Document of the General Assembly's first special session devoted to

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

disarmament. But although we recognize, and indeed, insist on this responsibility, we cannot agree that those States which hold the monopoly of power to destroy this planet can also arrogate to themselves the monopoly of exclusive decision on an issue in which the fate of mankind is at stake. The right of the non-nuclear countries to demand nuclear disarmament and to insist on participating in the negotiations on disarmament derives precisely from their need to ensure their own survival. As a result of the growing accumulation of nuclear weapons, mankind is confronted with the real danger of its own annihilation.

In order to understand this, it is enough to read paragraph 495 of the "Comprehensive study on nuclear weapons" submitted by the Secretary-General to the United Nations General Assembly at its last session, and circulated in document A/35/392. I shall venture to presume for a few moments on the patience of my colleagues and read this paragraph which is somewhat lengthy but which in our opinion is very pertinent.

"In a nuclear war, the nuclear-weapon States themselves may suffer the heaviest casualties and the most extensive damage. However, all nations in the world would experience grave physical consequences. Radio-active fall-out could be a serious problem especially in countries adjacent to the belligerent States, and during the decades after a major nuclear war, fall-out would take a toll of millions world-wide, in present and future generations. Even more serious than radio-active fall-out, however, would be the global consequences of a large nuclear war on the world economy and on vital functions of the international community. The sudden collapse of many of the world's leading trading nations as well as of established mechanisms for international transactions would lead to profound disorganization in world affairs and leave most other nations, even if physically intact, in desperate circumstances. Widespread famines could occur, both in poor developing countries and in industrialized nations. Those starving to death might eventually outnumber the direct fatalities in the belligerent countries. Even non-belligerent States might enter a downward spiral leading to utter misery for their populations, and almost all would suffer a loss of standards corresponding to many decades of progress. Economic conditions such as these might trigger latent political instabilities, causing upheavals and civil and local wars."

Briefly, no one on earth would escape the direct or indirect consequences of a nuclear war. How, then, can an attempt be made to deny the non-nuclear-weapon countries, which represent over two thirds of the world population, the right to participate in negotiations where what is at stake and what is being decided is their own destiny?

Of the items on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament, the question of nuclear disarmament in its various aspects is undoubtedly the most important and urgent. As is stated in the Final Document of the General Assembly's first special session devoted to disarmament, effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority among all disarmament measures. Venezuela, together with the other countries in the Group of 21, considers that the Committee should undertake without delay substantive negotiations directed towards the adoption of concrete and effective measures on nuclear disarmament. To the world at large it is incomprehensible that the Committee on Disarmament, the single multilateral disarmament forum, to which the members of the international community entrusted the task of negotiating measures of disarmament, should still, after two years' existence, not really have begun to concern itself seriously with the most important question in the field of disarmament— nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

Although we would not rule out the possibility, or the desirability of negotiations on nuclear disarmament being held in more limited forums, in which the countries most directly involved might participate, we consider that the Committee on Disarmament is the most suitable forum for the preparation and conduct of negotiations on nuclear disarmament. We therefore consider it imperative and urgent that the Committee should begin to discharge its responsibility in the sphere of nuclear disarmament.

In our view, the main basis for the task to be accomplished by the Committee on Disarmament in this sphere is to be found in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the General Assembly's first special session, which sets forth the programme of action to be undertaken in the matter of nuclear disarmament. Moreover that paragraph is one of those that were adopted by consensus at the special session. Like the other countries in the Group of 21, we consider that the Committee's efforts should be directed towards achieving the realization of the objectives specified in this paragraph, which are as follows:

Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems;

Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

A comprehensive, phased programme with agreed time-frames, whenever feasible, for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time.

We also consider that in conducting substantive negotiations on nuclear disarmament, the Committee should take due account of the various concrete proposals which have been submitted. I am referring to the proposal of the socialist countries which appears in document CD/4 and the proposal of Australia and Canada on the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, contained in document CD/90.

Similarly, we consider that, as the Group of 21 has proposed, in the negotiations on nuclear disarmament the Committee should address itself particularly to the following issues, which are mentioned in document CD/116:

- (i) The elaboration and clarification of the stages of nuclear disarmament envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document, which I quoted a moment ago;
- (ii) Clarification of the issues involved in prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, pending nuclear disarmament and in the prevention of nuclear war;
- (iii) Clarification of the issues involved in eliminating reliance on doctrines of nuclear deterrence;
- (iv) Measures to ensure an effective discharge by the Committee on Disarmament of its role as negotiating body in the field of disarmament and in this context the relationship between the Committee and other restricted forums conducting negotiations relating to nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

Together with the Group of 21 we have been advocating the setting up of an ad hoc working group to begin negotiations on the issues I have just mentioned. As will be recalled, my delegation has from the beginning of the Committee's activities been one of the main protagonists of the establishment of working groups. We have maintained, and we continue to maintain, that working groups constitute a form of institutional machinery which, as has been shown in practice, offers the advantage of permitting a rapid and direct dialogue in which, as a result, the positions of countries can be less rigid, less intransigent and more conciliatory, in an atmosphere of serious and constructive work. It is for this reason that we heard with genuine disappointment the statements made by two of the nuclear-weapon Powers to the effect that they did not support the establishment of a working group on the subject of nuclear disarmament. We hope that this position is not unchangeable and that in the near future these countries will show a readiness to go along with the great majority of the members of the Committee in order to form the consensus necessary for the setting up of the working group. But as I said at the informal meeting the Committee held last Monday, when this question was discussed in detail, the rejection by these two countries of the idea of a working group should not prevent the Committee from discharging the responsibility with which it has been entrusted. The Committee is, as its rules of procedure state, "a disarmament negotiating forum". Among the questions which should be the subject of negotiation, the Committee has included in its agenda the item on the cessation of the arms race and nuclear disarmament. The Committee is not obliged to establish working groups for each of the items on the agenda. We believe that when, as in the present instance, the Committee is unable to achieve the necessary consensus to be able to proceed with the setting up of one of these groups, the Committee should take over directly the task of conducting negotiations.

We think, therefore, that for the remainder of this part of the session, the Committee should, in keeping with its programme of work, devote as many informal or unofficial meetings as possible to the subject of nuclear disarmament. At these meetings it should give a preliminary consideration to the specific issues set out in the Group of 21's working paper, document CD/116, as a first step to moving towards a more advanced stage of negotiations which should be conducted during the summer session, let us hope in a working group.

To conclude my statement, I wish to draw attention to the fervent appeal on behalf of nuclear disarmament that Pope John Paul II has just made from Hiroshima, one of the cities martyred by nuclear terror. I think that no place is more appropriate than the Committee on Disarmament in which to recall the following paragraph from the Pope's message:

"To the Heads of State and Government, to those who hold political and economic power, I say, 'Let us pledge ourselves to peace through justice, let us take a solemn decision now that war will never be tolerated as a means of resolving differences. Let us promise the rest of mankind that we will work tirelessly for disarmament and for the prohibition of nuclear weapons'."

The Pope's message, with its deep spiritual content, and with the authority conferred upon it by its genuinely pacifist and human tenor, should be the subject of profound reflection by all the rulers of the world and especially those of the nuclear-weapon Powers, whether believers or non-believers.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished Ambassador of Venezuela for his statement and I should also like to express my gratitude for his very cordial remarks about myself.

Mr. VENKATESWARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, in my statement at the plenary meeting of the Committee held on 3 February 1981, I raised certain doubts concerning the concept of deterrence in a nuclear age and the unfortunate relationship between this concept and the escalating nuclear arms race. In sharing our thoughts on this question with the Committee, we had hoped to be able to initiate an intensive exchange of views on what the famous Danish nuclear physicist and Nobel laureate, Neils Bohr, called a "perpetual menace to society". We are grateful to the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom as also to others around this table for reacting to some of the views expressed by my delegation. We await the detailed comments he has promised on the issues raised by us. Today, Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to develop further some of the ideas put forward by us and also respond in a preliminary way to the arguments contained in the statement of my distinguished British colleague.

Let me first of all take up the points raised by the representative of the United Kingdom. In his statement he asserted that his Government "shares the deep sense of horror at the devastating potential of nuclear weapons". However, he went on to say that "we are all-too-conscious of the appalling loss of life that a conventional war can cause". If by this he meant that we ought to focus attention on the need for conventional disarmament as well, we are at one with him. But I do hope that he will agree that in terms of destructive power, nuclear weapons are a class apart. In the words of the report of the Secretary-General on nuclear weapons, "never before has the destructive capacity of weapons been so immediate, complete and universal". And if the Ambassador of the United Kingdom agrees with this judgement, then surely he should also agree that the first order of business in any disarmament negotiations must be the achievement of nuclear disarmament.

However, he has stated that "we should not give undue prominence to nuclear weapons". How can we not give undue prominence to such monstrous weapons of mass destruction? In fact, my delegation believes that, far from giving undue prominence to such weapons, we have, in fact, neglected the cataclysmic danger they pose. In 1965 Lord Chalfont, the British Disarmament Minister, in a statement before the ENDC made on 19 August, quoted the following words from Shakespeare's Julius Caesar:

There is a tide in the affairs of men,
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;
Omitted, all the voyage of their life
Is bound in shallows and in miseries.

Lord Chalfont went on to say:

"I believe, quite simply and without any wish to over-dramatize the dangers, that unless we can stop and set back the nuclear arms race before many more months have passed, we may have little to look forward to but shallows and miseries."

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

It is 16 years since then and can we doubt that we are indeed looking into shallows and miseries? It is small comfort that only one-fifth of the world's military expenditure is on nuclear weapons. And if we wish to play with statistics, then I would like to point out that when there are only five nuclear-weapon States, it is not such a great surprise that only 20 per cent of global military expenditure is on such weapons. Further, one should also not forget that 80 per cent of the total military expenditure is incurred by five or six militarily significant States, including the very same nuclear-weapon States. So, if conventional disarmament should be a matter of concern, it is again on these States that the major responsibility falls.

The distinguished representative of the United Kingdom also sought to justify the doctrine of deterrence by asserting that its purpose is the prevention of war. This aim is served, he argued, by "being seen to be able to defend ourselves", and by convincing a potential adversary that a conventional or nuclear attack would entail risks that would far outweigh any potential benefits. On the face of it, the argument appears reasonable. However, as I argued in my earlier statement, in a nuclear age, deterrence involves not only the theoretical ability of a State to impose unacceptable destruction on its adversary, but at the same time its willingness to withstand massive destruction, perhaps even to the point of self-annihilation. Deterrence in this context, as I stated, is in the last analysis based on dangerous bluff. My colleague from the United Kingdom argues that the "policy of deterrence has kept the peace in Europe for 35 years and it remains valid today". We regard this as an oversimplified conclusion. As the Secretary-General's report on nuclear weapons observes, "it is a truism to say that deterrence works because that statement will hold true only until history disproves it". And I need not comment on what would happen if deterrence failed. My British colleague himself has acknowledged that even in a limited nuclear war there would be no winners or losers.

We cannot share the optimism regarding the ability of nuclear-weapon Powers to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war. The more so if this were to happen by accident. The fact that the decision to use nuclear weapons would be taken at the highest political level does not necessarily mean that such a decision need be taken with appropriate caution. Human beings are fallible and they are subject to stresses and strains. Leaders at the highest political level are no exceptions to this rule. And should they turn out to be fallible, the consequences of their actions would be visited upon the entire globe. Let us imagine for a moment that a nuclear missile from country X has been accidentally triggered off and is on its way to a target in country Y. Suppose, further, that the President or Prime Minister of country X gets on the "hot line" and calls his counterpart in country Y and says, "I am terribly sorry, but one of these crazy nukes has been triggered off accidentally. Since this is all a mistake, I do hope you will not retaliate". When the relations between the States concerned are avowedly strained and there is lack of trust generally, it would be difficult to believe that the matter would end there.

It has frequently been argued that at least in the European theatre, nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament cannot be pursued without regard to the conventional imbalance in Central Europe. We do not concede this view since in essence this means that nuclear weapons are to serve as a substitute for

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

conventional weapons. To rephrase something that Lord Canning said many years ago, weapons of the new age have been brought in to redress the balance of the old. However, would the proponents of this argument limit its applicability only to Europe? There are several regions of the world where a particular nation may feel threatened by a neighbour with larger conventional armaments and forces. The perception of threat may not be based on objective criteria, but then perceptions, especially when they concern national security, very rarely are. In other regions of the world, therefore, where similar perceptions of conventional imbalance may prevail, would the recourse to nuclear weaponry to redress the balance be considered valid and justified? The strong support for horizontal non-proliferation of nuclear weapons that emanates from countries of Europe would lead us to believe otherwise. And this is precisely because nuclear weapons cannot in any manner be equated to conventional weapons. But the force of example is important, and it is for the nuclear-weapon States and their allies to demonstrate that it is not valid for other countries to seek to balance their conventional arms accounts by recourse to nuclear overdrafts.

This is how we look at some of the points raised by the delegation of the United Kingdom. I am willing to admit that the problem has to be examined in all its aspects and that perhaps we may have overlooked certain important factors relevant to our discussion. We are willing as ever to be educated on this as well as other matters in our negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament.

I would now like to turn to the question of halting the nuclear arms race. In my previous statement, I put forward the proposition that at the heart of the phenomenon was the concept of deterrence and related to that concept the notion of strategic parity. In developing this theme I would like to commence by quoting from the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on a comprehensive study on nuclear weapons:

"Peace resting on the system of deterrence has been said to require approximate parity or balance between the forces of the States involved. The view is held that parity ceases to exist if one side acquires a 'first-strike capability', i.e. the capacity to deliver a nuclear strike against the other without risking an intolerable reprisal. In these conditions, the general fear is that deterrence can or may fail. Yet the concept of parity rests on a situation which is inherently difficult to evaluate. Each Superpower's nuclear arsenal consists of many components of different size, function and importance. Since each of these components may be subject to constant technological development on both sides, but not always simultaneously, parity is a process whose equilibrium must continuously be re-established. Hence, the notion of balance is then, by definition almost, unstable."

My delegation has argued that reliance on the doctrine of deterrence inherently involves the search for superiority over a potential adversary. However, even if it is argued that deterrence involves merely the establishment of a parity and not a search for superiority, that parity cannot be a stable one. In the present situation, no objective and quantifiable criteria have been found in order to take "parity" or "balance" from the realm of subjective security perceptions to the world of objective and mutually acceptable judgement. And the more complex and sophisticated nuclear weapons become, the more difficult it would be to create such objective criteria. Furthermore, in practice, there is always a tendency to overestimate an adversary's capabilities while under-estimating one's own in order to allow for miscalculation or lack of information.

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

This factor alone could keep fuelling a nuclear arms race. In a recent article in the Washington Post, General Maxwell Taylor stated that a weapons programme to achieve parity or superiority was "too ill-defined" and in any case, the location of the finish line, even if it is discernible, could be changed at will by the adversary. Recent developments in nuclear-weapon technology, including the testing of more accurate warheads and anti-satellite systems, indeed makes one wonder if there is a finish line at all in the nuclear arms race, except the inexorable occurrence of what is intended to be deterred, a global nuclear war.

It should be clear from this that the concept of parity and any arms control negotiations that are built around it cannot therefore serve to preserve the peace among the nuclear-weapon Powers. Perhaps if a nuclear war could be limited to the nuclear-weapon States and their allies alone, the rest of the world could hopefully still survive. However, as we have pointed out time and again, the problem of the continuing nuclear arms race and the danger of nuclear war are issues which deeply affect the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. It is clearly impermissible for a handful of nuclear-weapon States to seek to promote their own perceived narrow security concerns and thereby hold the rest of the world hostage to the threat of total annihilation. It is, therefore, both right and necessary that non-nuclear-weapon States should actively participate in negotiations to remove what is a major and appalling threat to their security. Nuclear-weapon States must acknowledge these legitimate concerns of the world community. They must respond to the doubts and misgivings that have been expressed in this and other forums over the cynical pursuit of a competitive accumulation of ever-more sophisticated weapons of mass destruction. National security or the security of competing alliances can no longer serve as a pretext for deferring debate and concrete negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

It has been stated here in this Committee that the stage has not yet arrived for our undertaking multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament. I would like to ask, when will that stage arrive? Will the proponents of such a view enlighten us as to what specific circumstances, what specific developments, what conjunction of stars would make the situation ripe for multilateral negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament? It is not enough to say that the situation is not ripe. We would like to know as rational beings why the situation is not ripe, now at this very moment?

The nuclear-weapon States have had more than three decades in which to deal with the problem of nuclear disarmament. A whole new generation has grown up and what we have witnessed is an unrestrained nuclear arms race, the dimensions of which have become increasingly difficult for the human mind to comprehend. The subject was complex to start with. The main actors involved have done their best to complicate the subject further. And at every stage, the complexity of the subject has been used to prevent the non-nuclear-weapon States from bringing their justifiable concerns to bear on negotiation concerning nuclear weapons. At the same time, the goal of nuclear disarmament has been pushed more and more into the background, while arms limitation and arms control have become the catchwords of the present time. Perhaps it would be useful to recall what a delegate from France, a nuclear-weapon State, said in a statement to the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on 9 November 1970 concerning the nature of arms control measures. I quote:

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

"But who can fail to see that the policy of the mastery of armaments, whether it is devoted to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, to their non-dissemination in new environments, or to the limitation of strategic weapons, tends mainly to cause the present situation to harden, and does not constitute a step towards true disarmament? This is so because, on the contrary, it postulates that, in the name of the virtues of mutual dissuasion, stockpiles of armaments can be maintained at a sufficiently high level. Is it really, as is claimed, a realistic policy, even if it is considered -- at least by the two greatest Powers -- as the only one possible under present conditions ...? For who would doubt the precarious nature of a balance that is always at the mercy of a technological breakthrough, a mistake in calculation, even an adventurous decision, as a monopoly of armaments would not necessarily ensure a monopoly of wisdom, even in the case of the most sophisticated weapons.

"Moreover, the policy of armaments control adds to the risk of unavowed renunciation of nuclear disarmament, that of a sharing of power between the States responsible for the balance -- a sharing or distribution which Mr. Maurice Schumann denounced recently from the rostrum of the United Nations General Assembly, and which he declared would, if we are not careful, perpetuate the division of the world".

Prophetic words, uttered more than a decade ago. Is it necessary to argue the case further for this Committee's undertaking multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament forthwith, so that the risk of the unavowed renunciation of nuclear disarmament and the perpetuation of the division of the world into nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States does not become a permanent reality?

Some members of this Committee have referred to the unfavourable international situation which could inevitably affect our work in this forum. I would respond by saying that it is precisely when growing suspicions and mistrust characterize the relations among the major Powers, including the nuclear-weapon States that this Committee provides a forum where hopefully some of that suspicion and mistrust can be dissipated. Perhaps an exposure to the security concerns and genuine apprehensions of the non-nuclear-weapon States, especially those belonging to the developing world, would enable the nuclear-weapon States and their allies to break out of the narrow confines of their security perceptions and become aware of their responsibilities to the rest of the world. This itself would have a sobering and positive impact on their separate negotiations. For what I argue for is not that this Committee should supplant their restricted negotiations but that it should supplement them. It is for this reason that we recommended the setting up of an ad hoc working group of this Committee to consider certain concrete issues relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. We regret that we have so far been unable to reach a consensus on this proposal. For the present, therefore, my delegation would support the suggestion that we schedule a sufficient number of informal meetings of the Committee devoted to this agenda item. We could begin with a substantive examination of the report of the Secretary-General on a comprehensive study on nuclear weapons. Perhaps the first few informal meetings could be devoted to an in-depth discussion of chapter V of the report which is entitled "The doctrines of deterrence and other theories concerning nuclear weapons". We could then

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

move on to chapter VI, which deals with the security implications of the continued quantitative increase and qualitative improvement of nuclear-weapon systems. Another round of discussions could be centred upon the main conclusions of the report. What we have in mind is that members of the Committee, and especially nuclear-weapon States, put forward their considered views on each of the chapters, explaining why they agree or disagree with the observations contained in the report. By commencing our discussions in this manner, we may be able to impart a degree of specificity to our debate. We could then structure our subsequent negotiations on the basis of the preliminary examination of the main issues involved. I hope that this very modest proposal will find favour with all members of the Committee.

This month in New Delhi the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the non-aligned States observed the twentieth anniversary of the first Conference of Heads of States and Governments of Non-Aligned Countries which had issued a Declaration in which they had stressed the danger posed by nuclear weapons and called for "the total prohibition of the production, possession and utilization of nuclear and thermonuclear arms and bacteriological and chemical weapons as well as the elimination of equipment and installations for the delivery and placement and operational use of weapons of mass destruction on national territories". May we hope that these words will be heeded at least now by the nuclear-weapon Powers and will engage especially the attention of members of this Committee, which is the only multilateral negotiating body in which such an agreement can be reached?

To conclude, I would like once again to emphasize that unless we are able to make some progress in the most urgent of items on our agenda, the Committee's credibility as a multilateral negotiating body will suffer irreparable harm. Let us do everything possible, therefore, to ensure that we go to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament with some tangible results in this area and demonstrate that we have not neglected what the first special session considered to be a problem affecting the very survival of mankind.

Mr. SOEPRAPTO (Indonesia): Mr. Chairman, addressing myself to the second item of our agenda "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", may I begin by referring to the final Declaration of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of May 1975 which states, inter alia, as follows:

"While welcoming the various agreements on arms limitation and disarmament elaborated and concluded over the last few years as steps contributing to the implementation of article VI of the Treaty, the Conference expresses its serious concern that the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, is continuing unabated.

The Conference therefore urges constant and resolute efforts by each of the Parties to the Treaty, in particular by the nuclear-weapon States, to achieve an early and effective implementation of article VI of the Treaty."

(Mr. Soeprapto, Indonesia)

During the years that have followed since the adoption of the said Declaration, there has been an increasing concern on the part of the international community in general and the developing nations in particular due to the fact that, despite the Declaration referred to, the nuclear arms race has continued to take place, not only quantitatively but also qualitatively, as a result of technical innovations that have led to the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems. The necessity of the fulfilment of balanced obligations and responsibilities on the part both of nuclear-weapon States and of non-nuclear-weapon States for the attainment of the two-fold purposes of the NPT, namely, the prevention of the emergence of additional nuclear-weapon States (envisaged in article II) and to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons (article VI), was emphasized, three years after the first NPT Review Conference, by the General Assembly at its tenth special session, held in 1978 (para. 65 of the Final Document).

When the parties to the NPT met again in August last year, the developing States parties to the Treaty participating in the Conference, all of them non-nuclear-weapon States, did not hide their disappointment at the continued non-implementation of the provisions of article VI of the Treaty by the nuclear-weapon States parties to it, despite the two instruments I referred to earlier (the Final Declaration of the first NPT Review Conference, of 1975, and the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, of 1978).

Taking a close look at the pertinent provisions of various documents relating to the questions of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, such as paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, the Committee's report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session (A/35/27, paras. 37-44), paragraphs 7 (a) and (b) and 14 (a) of General Assembly resolution 35/46 on the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, paragraph 3 of resolution 35/152 B and paragraph 2 of resolution 35/152 C, the endeavours aiming at the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament suggested in those documents could perhaps be listed as follows:

1. With regard to the existing nuclear weapons, the endeavours suggested consist of:

- (a) Reduction of nuclear weapon stockpiles;
- (b) Limitation of nuclear weapon stockpiles.

2. Regarding the ongoing process leading to increases in the quality and quantity of nuclear weapons, the proposed endeavours include:

- (a) Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapon systems;

(Mr. Soeprapto, Indonesia)

- (b) Cessation of production of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery;
- (c) Cessation of production of fissionable material for weapon purposes.

3. The tasks to be performed by the Committee on Disarmament during its 1981 session consist of:

- (a) Commencing negotiations on the substance of the problem of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament;
- (b) Undertaking consultations to consider, inter alia, the establishment of an ad hoc working group; and
- (c) If such an ad hoc working group could eventually be established, beginning negotiations on the following questions:

- (1) The stages of nuclear disarmament (envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly) which comprise:
 - (a) Elaboration of the envisaged stages;
 - (b) Clarification of the said stages;
- (2) Identification, in the process of achieving nuclear disarmament, of:
 - (a) The responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States; and
 - (b) The role of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

In the view of my delegation, the issues I have just listed may perhaps be used as a basis for the further work of our Committee in dealing with item 2 of its agenda. But since this Committee is a negotiating body, and since negotiations can be conducted most effectively in working groups, it is therefore the hope of my delegation that an ad hoc working group on the subject could finally be established, if not immediately then perhaps at a later stage of the current session.

Reportedly, there may exist today some 50,000 nuclear weapons in the world's arsenals, with a combined explosive power of more than one million Hiroshima bombs, representing not less than 3 tons of TNT for every individual in the world. If the nuclear arms race is not halted and if nuclear disarmament is not attained the world will therefore be confronted with a most serious danger, one unprecedented in the history of mankind.

Mr. DI MONTEZEMOLO (Italy) (translated from French): I have asked for the floor today in order briefly to introduce working paper CD/155, dated 24 February 1981, on behalf of my delegation.

This working paper represents a first contribution by the Italian delegation to this year's work on the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. It contains a text which will, we hope, be of use in the drafting of the section of the comprehensive programme entitled "Objectives".

We submit it today so that it may be placed immediately at the disposal of the Ad Hoc Working Group which is meeting this afternoon.

In drafting it, my delegation took into account, of course, last year's contributions on the same subject by other delegations, in particular those of Mexico, Pakistan and Czechoslovakia.

It has not failed to seek common ground with those contributions, even as regards actual wordings.

I do not think there is any need for additional comments; however, I should like to stress the concept contained in the first paragraph of the paper in question, namely, that it should be one of the objectives of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, whose elaboration has been entrusted to our Committee, to pursue simultaneously the two approaches which have, from the beginning, marked the international community's disarmament efforts -- the one aimed at promoting general and complete disarmament and the other aimed at achieving specific and limited measures. This idea derives, moreover, from paragraph 109 of the Final Document which states: "Negotiations on general and complete disarmament shall be conducted concurrently with negotiations on partial measures of disarmament. With this purpose in mind, the Committee on Disarmament will undertake the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament ..."

The Italian delegation has always had a special interest in the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. In his statement at the plenary meeting held on 3 February last, Mr. Speranza, our Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, explained the reasons for that interest. For many countries, including my own, the criterion of balance in the disarmament process is a fundamental one, and one of the principal attractions of a programme which sets out to be comprehensive consists precisely in the possibility of adopting a balanced approach which minimizes the risks of unilateral advantages at every stage of the disarmament process and guarantees that every step forward shall correspond to the same logic of balance and stability.

Mr. MALITA (Romania) (translated from French): In my statement today, I would like to put forward some observations of the Romanian delegation on the agenda item concerning the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Malita, Romania)

Romania has always maintained that the outlawing of nuclear weapons, the halting of their production and the liquidation of existing stocks are a fundamental requirement of international life and that, consequently, nuclear disarmament negotiations must have the highest priority in our Committee.

Priority for nuclear disarmament is required by the very nature of these weapons -- weapons of mass destruction -- in fact, the absolute weapon of total annihilation. A concern to eliminate the most deadly weapons from the arsenals of States has always been at the core of an elementary human reaction, that of ensuring survival.

The urgency of such measures has been recognized by the United Nations in more than 100 resolutions, beginning with resolution 1 (I) of 24 January 1946, which spoke of the elimination of atomic weapons from the arsenals of all States. However, it has never proved possible to initiate multilateral negotiations on the subject of nuclear weapons. That is why the Romanian delegation considers that our Committee has an exceptionally important task before it.

We do not wish to repeat here the well-founded arguments that the non-nuclear-weapon States have invoked in support of their demand that negotiations on nuclear weapons should begin without further delay.

The dangers imposed on those States as a result of the existence of stocks of nuclear weapons, held by others -- weapons over which they have no control -- the bitter division that such weapons create in an already divided world which aspires to equality, their role as a means of pressure and threat and their negative influence on the peaceful uses of the atom of which the whole world is in need -- these are only some of the reasons to which a vast literature has been devoted.

Negotiation has, however, a fundamental rule, which is, that an attempt must be made to understand and study the arguments of the other parties to the negotiation. While having no pretension to reasoning in the place of others, it appears to us useful to recall that the commencement of negotiations would to a large extent meet the interests of all countries, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, even if their attitude as to a desire to negotiate is not the same.

Firstly, negotiations provide an opportunity for the nuclear countries to fulfil a moral, and, for some of them a legal obligation towards the rest of the world. Reference has rightly been made in this connection to the undertakings assumed under article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty. The present position with regard to nuclear weapons is based on an undertaking to continue in good faith negotiations on effective measures to halt the arms race at an early date.

Secondly, it is obvious that the unanimously recognized threat of nuclear weapons is no less for those who possess and stockpile them. We are given assurances about the safety of handling such weapons despite proof to the contrary and doubts based on elementary calculations of risk which highlight the danger of accidents, errors and miscalculation. In our opinion, it is necessary to deal openly with these subjects.

(Mr. Malita, Romania)

Thirdly, no weapon has shown such a propensity for growth. Despite the claim that the aim is to maintain a balance, this is constantly being pushed to higher levels, with no limit in sight. The development of nuclear weapons shows no pause. Moreover, technological improvements, and more particularly electronic innovations clearly have a destabilizing effect.

It has been asked whether the balance could not be maintained at lower levels. Where can this theme of universal interest be discussed?

The argument of a link between nuclear and conventional arsenals and of the fact that these two elements are inseparable for the security of certain States has also been advanced. Our delegation does not deny the existence of a link between nuclear and conventional weapons. But we believe that this fact should be the subject of a discussion with a view to elucidating all the implications. The bald statement of the fact without any consequent action merely strengthens the arguments of other States for undertaking the production of nuclear weapons in order to ensure their security.

Lastly, many references have been made to the complexity of disarmament. Our delegation is far from minimizing the complexity of the subject. But Romania has always maintained that international questions, no matter how difficult, can and must be settled through negotiation and talks, for we believe that there is no alternative in the nuclear age. Consequently, the complexity of nuclear disarmament, in our view, calls for negotiations on the subject to be started without further delay, without indefinite postponement.

We have not put forward all these arguments with a view to ignoring other types of reasoning but rather to stress the indisputable fact that they represent specific questions which call for an adequate approach with the instruments that are appropriate to any negotiation.

For all these reasons, our delegation considers that there are no valid arguments against the start of negotiations on nuclear disarmament. Moreover, the Committee on Disarmament, in which all the nuclear-weapon States are represented, together with a number of non-nuclear-weapon States, offers the most appropriate forum for the conduct of such negotiations. Specific proposals on this subject have been put forward by the socialist countries, in document CD/4, and by the countries members of the Group of 21, in document CD/116, as well as by other delegations. Other ideas may and, we are convinced, will appear during the negotiations.

All these arguments favour the establishment of a working group on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament at the Committee's present session.

The terms of reference of such a group could include the holding of a broad exchange of views and opinions on ways of initiating negotiations on nuclear disarmament in the Committee. This is all the more necessary in that, as we have already seen, a number of delegations have raised questions which, in their view, we should take up in order to facilitate the start of negotiations on nuclear matters.

(Mr. Malita, Romania)

It is quite obvious that such a dialogue cannot take place solely at plenary meetings, where the only working instrument is the presentation of positions by means of statements. For the achievement of our aims, a real dialogue is necessary, and persevering and informal work, and it was for this purpose that the negotiating groups were set up.

As we have already had occasion to state, the Romanian delegation does not consider the establishment of a working group as an end in itself. We regret the fact that some delegations attach a special connotation to what ought to be a simple organizational decision. The Romanian delegation is of the view that a request by any delegation for the establishment of such a group on the items on the agenda cannot be refused. We firmly support the idea of establishing a working group on the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests. On this subject, as on that of nuclear disarmament, we cannot agree to the Committee's again this year putting off the start of a structured activity.

It is our duty to tackle these questions and try to go into their substance.

In view of all these arguments, the Romanian delegation endorses the Indian delegation's proposal for the holding of a special meeting to be devoted to an examination of the conclusions of the report of the United Nations Secretary-General containing the comprehensive study on nuclear weapons.

We also propose the organization, under the auspices of the Chairman of the Committee, of a number of informal meetings with the participation of experts, during which each State member of the Committee should have an opportunity to submit its views on specific questions relating to the start of negotiations on nuclear disarmament in the Committee. A constructive dialogue on this subject, imbued with a sincere desire to identify the real obstacles in the way of such negotiations, would constitute a valuable contribution by our Committee to the starting of the process of nuclear disarmament.

There is no need to emphasize here the special importance that an affirmation of the political will to negotiate measures of nuclear disarmament would have in present international conditions. Not only would this in no way affect the military balance but, on the contrary, it would be likely to contribute to a strengthening of mutual political and military confidence.

For its part, the Romanian delegation is prepared to make a contribution to the initiation of this process. The ideas put forward in this statement are preliminary in nature. We are ready to consider any other working possibility that may be advanced with a view to mobilizing the constructive efforts of all members of the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: (translated from French) I thank the distinguished Ambassador of Romania for his statement. It is now 12.55 p.m. but we have a further request from a delegation which wishes to make a statement in plenary, and I was hoping to take up three particular points with you, very briefly, at an informal meeting. If you agree, we could go into an informal meeting now for just a few minutes. I suggest that we resume this plenary meeting or hold another, very short one, at 3 p.m., and if our distinguished colleague from Mexico so agrees, that meeting would be followed immediately about 20 minutes later, by the meeting of the Working Group of which Ambassador García Robles is Chairman.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, as you know, the Working Group of which I have the honour to be the Chairman has a strict schedule: it must finish its work in time for the comprehensive programme to be ready for consideration by the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament. The Working Group has only one meeting per week. I would therefore suggest that if it is necessary to resume this meeting or hold an extra meeting, this could be done tomorrow morning. I believe that the Working Group on Radiological Weapons, which is the one that is to meet tomorrow morning, is in a much better position than the Group of which I have the honour to be the Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank Ambassador García Robles for his statement. I think we really need to settle a few points at once in informal meeting. Of course there is no reason why -- I am in the hands of the Committee in this matter -- we should not hold the brief plenary meeting I am suggesting tomorrow morning, if Ambassador Komives so agrees. In fact, however, for this afternoon, it would be a matter of hearing two statements which would be short and would certainly not delay the work of the Group presided over by Ambassador García Robles very much. If the Committee agrees, can we meet in plenary meeting for a short time tomorrow at 10.30 a.m.? I am anxious that we should not spend more time discussing how we are going to discuss than in discussing what we have to discuss.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I propose that we now close the formal meeting and go into an informal one to consider these questions and also to decide the question of the next plenary meeting. I wonder really if anything is sufficiently urgent to interfere with the work either of the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament or of the Working Group on Radiological Weapons; perhaps we might discuss this point at the informal meeting and request the delegation which has not had time to speak to do so on Tuesday and to make its statement then.

The meeting was suspended at 1 p.m. and resumed on Friday, 27 February 1981, at 3 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I declare open the 110th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament. At our informal meeting yesterday, the Committee agreed on a draft decision concerning the participation of the representative of Norway in the meetings of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons. The Secretariat has distributed this draft decision in Working Paper No. 34. If there are no objections or comments, the Chair will note that there is consensus in this connection. There are no comments.

It was so decided.

Mr. EL REEDY (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): During my opening statement I mentioned that the Egyptian constitutional organs had agreed to ratify the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. I am now happy to inform you that yesterday, 26 February 1981, in the city of London, the instruments of ratification were deposited with the Government of the United Kingdom. On that occasion, the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued an official statement which I requested you, Mr. Chairman, to have circulated as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament. I thank you for complying with that request.

Egypt, which was one of the first States to call for the speedy conclusion of that Treaty, played a constructive role in the preparatory negotiations in [Eighteen-Nation] Committee on Disarmament here in Geneva. Egypt was also among the first States to sign the Treaty when it was opened for signature on 1 July 1968. Our ratification of that Treaty is an affirmation of our belief, which is shared by many others, that it is necessary to put an end to the proliferation of nuclear weapons which are threatening the security of mankind.

In taking this step and accepting the obligations arising out of its adherence to the Treaty, Egypt hopes that the nuclear-weapon States will also meet their obligations. In this connection, I would like to draw your attention to the reference made in the statement of the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the obligations of the nuclear-weapon States under the terms of article IV of the Treaty. I quote:

"Egypt's commitment by virtue of the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to refrain, in any way, from acquiring or manufacturing nuclear weapons shall not impair its inalienable right to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in conformity with the provisions of article IV of the Treaty, which affirms the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. The stipulation of that right in the Treaty itself is, in fact, a codification of a basic human right, which can neither be waived nor impaired.

From this premise, Egypt also views with special attention the provisions of article IV of the Treaty calling on the parties to the Treaty who are in a position to do so to co-operate in contributing to the further development of the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world."

With regard to article V of the Treaty, the statement notes that:

"Within the framework of the rights provided for in the Treaty for all parties thereto in as far as the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is concerned, Egypt wishes to refer to the provisions of article V of the Treaty, which state that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States party to this Treaty."

(Mr. El Reedy, Egypt)

Regarding the obligations of nuclear-weapon States with respect to the cessation of the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament and the achievement of a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests, the statement goes on to say:

"Egypt wishes to express its strong dissatisfaction at the nuclear-weapon States, in particular the two Superpowers, because of their failure to take effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. Although it welcomes the 1972 and 1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties, known as SALT I and SALT II, Egypt cannot but admit that the Treaties have failed to bring about an effective cessation of the nuclear arms race, quantitatively and qualitatively, and have even permitted the development of a new generation of weapons of mass destruction.

"Moreover, in spite of the fact that more than 17 years have elapsed since the conclusion of the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, the nuclear-weapon States are alleging that various difficulties still stand in the way of a permanent ban on all nuclear-weapon tests, when there is only need for a political will to achieve that end.

"Consequently, Egypt avails itself of this opportunity, namely the deposit of its instruments of ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to appeal to the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to fulfil their obligation whereby the nuclear arms race will be stopped and nuclear disarmament achieved.

"Egypt also calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to exert all possible efforts so as to achieve a permanent ban of all nuclear-weapon tests at an early date. This will bring to an end the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction, inasmuch as the cutoff of fissionable material for military purposes will curb the quantitative increase of nuclear weapons."

In addition to the above, there are two issues to which I would like to refer in spite of the fact that they are not the subject at present under consideration by the Committee. These two issues, namely, international assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States and the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, are directly related to and have a positive impact on the cessation of the nuclear arms race. I quote from the statement:

"As regards the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, Egypt deems that Security Council resolution 255 of 19 June 1968 does not provide non-nuclear-weapon States with a genuine guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States. Egypt therefore appeals to the nuclear-weapon States to exert their effort with a view to concluding an agreement prohibiting once and for all the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any State.

"In this respect, Egypt expresses its great satisfaction with the United Nations General Assembly resolution adopted by consensus at its thirty-fifth session inviting the countries of the Middle East, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the area, to declare solemnly their support for the achievement of this objective, that they will refrain on a reciprocal basis from producing, acquiring or possessing nuclear weapons, and to deposit their declarations with the United Nations Security Council."

(Mr. El Reedy, Egypt)

In our view, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would represent a tangible contribution towards the achievement of the over-all objective, namely, the cessation of the nuclear arms race. This step would also contribute towards the achievement of peace and prosperity for the peoples of the region of the Middle East. We hope that the nuclear-weapon States, together with all the other States concerned, will support these endeavours.

At the same time, we believe that the provision of effective security guarantees will also encourage other States to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In conclusion, I would like to refer to a point which we regard as essential, namely, that we on this Committee have a special responsibility as the body to which the General Assembly of the United Nations has assigned the task of conducting the necessary negotiations in connection with the cessation of the arms race and the achievement of disarmament. Since the international community attaches high priority to the two topics for discussion under the first and second items of our agenda, we have the additional responsibility of ensuring progress in those two fields.

Although the important negotiations which are taking place among the nuclear-weapon States are indispensable if there are to be any real achievements in the field of disarmament, they do not absolve this Committee of its responsibility under the terms of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The useful negotiations conducted within the framework of the working groups established last year prove the validity of the argument that working groups constitute the most appropriate method of negotiation in connection with the items on our agenda. We therefore believe that the establishment of two working groups on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the prohibition of nuclear tests, as called for by the Group of 21, would provide us with the machinery whereby we would be able to fulfil the task assigned to us by the General Assembly. Therefore, I wish to express support, once again, for my colleagues who have already called for the establishment of the two above-mentioned working groups. In the meantime, we ought to devote a number of informal meetings to the discussion of those topics.

Having followed the work of this Committee during the month of your chairmanship, please allow me, Mr. Chairman, before you hand over your office, to express the admiration and esteem in which my colleagues and I hold you personally for your outstanding skill in directing the work of this Committee and for your remarkable humanitarian qualities which complement your technical and diplomatic abilities. You have attained this lofty position not only in the annals of the Chairmen of this Committee, but also in the hearts of every one of its members.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Egypt for his statement and I also wish to express my warm appreciation for his kind and friendly words with regard to myself.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, the Committee on Disarmament has started its current session with the consideration of the issues concerning the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests as well as the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament -- issues which undoubtedly have priority both in the work of our Committee and among the tasks in the sphere of the limitation of the arms race and disarmament as a whole. The speediest solution of these issues would be of immense importance for the fate of all mankind.

We feel particular satisfaction at the fact that these issues are being raised by many members of the Committee in a very firm and resolute way owing to their genuine interest in the earliest practical solution of these problems. The Soviet Union has every reason to consider itself a country which took the initiative in raising the question of nuclear disarmament in its various aspects and in its entirety on a broad international scale; our country has for a long time been a staunch advocate of the settlement of this global problem. For the Soviet Union, the active and purposeful struggle for nuclear disarmament is a fundamental and consistent policy.

As early as 1946 the Soviet Union put forward a proposal for the conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition for all time of the production and use of atomic weapons, so that the great scientific discoveries associated with the fission of an atomic nucleus might be used exclusively for the purposes of increasing the well-being and raising the living standards of the peoples of the world, as well as for developing culture and science to the benefit of mankind.

However, in response to this, certain Powers took the course of accelerating the nuclear arms race.

Today again, an analysis of the situation in the sphere of nuclear disarmament clearly shows that in this matter the effect of the passage of time is such that the opportunities let slip today cannot be recovered tomorrow. The later negotiations on nuclear disarmament are started, the more difficult it will be to conduct them.

We are wholly in accord with those who are now concerned about the existing situation and who are searching for ways and means to bring about the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapons testing, tangible progress in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, the limitation of the race in strategic and other armaments, and the strengthening of world peace and the security of States. We wish the States members of the Committee to have no doubts on that score.

The deliberations in the Committee on Disarmament on the questions of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and nuclear disarmament have also revealed, regrettably, another tendency -- the tendency, in the face of the slow progress in finding a solution to these problems and of the difficulties which have arisen in defining the role of the Committee on Disarmament in these areas, to try to create the impression that certain Powers bear some collective responsibility for this and, ignoring the facts, to overlook the substantial and, sometimes, fundamental differences in their positions, thus confusing the objective picture and hampering the correct understanding of the tasks facing the Committee. This applies both to the question of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and to that of nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Allow me to dwell on the question of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

There are some who contend, for example, that the Soviet Union is opposed to the active consideration of the question of the prohibition of nuclear-weapons testing within the framework of our multilateral body and prefers to conduct tripartite negotiations on that matter. I would remind you that in 1975 the Soviet Union proposed the establishment within the United Nations of a special committee with the participation of all five nuclear-weapon Powers and 25-30 non-nuclear-weapon States for the purpose of working out a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, a draft of which was submitted by the Soviet Union. The following non-nuclear-weapon States agreed to participate in the work of the committee: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Bolivia, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, Grenada, Egypt, Zaire, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Cyprus, Cuba, Morocco, Mexico, Mongolia, Nigeria, the United Republic of Tanzania, Peru, Poland, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Sudan, Finland, Czechoslovakia and Ethiopia. Of the nuclear-weapon States only the Soviet Union expressed its willingness to initiate, within the framework of the proposed committee, negotiations on a complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. However, multilateral negotiations were not started because of the positions of the other nuclear-weapon States and certain western countries which refused to take part in the committee's work. In 1977 the Soviet Union, together with other socialist countries, submitted a draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests for consideration by the Committee on Disarmament. I should like to underline that the above-mentioned document is still lying on the negotiating table in the Committee. In the light of these facts how can it be contended that the Soviet Union is opposed to the active participation of the Committee on Disarmament in the negotiations on this issue?

Sometimes, assertions of the opposite kind can also be heard, namely, that the Soviet Union is disappointed with the trilateral negotiations and now wants to abandon them. In this context we, together with the United States and the United Kingdom, have been called upon, as was done, for example, by the representative of Canada on 19 February, to resume these negotiations forthwith. I will be straightforward: these calls are addressed to the wrong party. As to the Soviet Union, it has been ready to start the next round of the negotiations and its willingness continues to hold good. The responsibility for the failure to resume the tripartite negotiations does not rest with us.

There are some who have expressed "a fear" that the United States and the United Kingdom succeeded in "twisting the arm" of the Soviet Union so that the joint report on the tripartite negotiations submitted to the Committee on Disarmament should emphasize the importance of these negotiations. Well, for my part I can only express my sympathy to the creator of those fears who has such a poor knowledge of the Soviet Union and its position. As is well known, attempts to "twist the arm" or to "bring pressure to bear" on the USSR have never been successful.

Some delegations, including the representative of Japan, have in their statements asked us to explain our position. We will willingly reiterate it, although I believe that the majority of the Committee's members are well aware of our position.

We should like to stress once again that the Soviet Union attaches very great importance to the attainment of agreements on the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. This approach of ours has been embodied in a large number of documents including those which we have tabled in the United Nations and in the

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Committee on Disarmament. The prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, established in 1963 with the direct and active participation of the Soviet Union, has been in force for 18 years. In the bilateral agreement between the USSR and the United States of America limits were set on the power of underground nuclear explosions, and, although up to now this agreement has been in force only on a de facto basis, we are not to blame for the fact that it has not yet been ratified.

We have attached and we continue to attach foremost importance to the trilateral negotiations between the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union on a treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests in all environments. Why to these negotiations in particular? We are convinced that in present-day conditions this is the most dependable way to make substantial progress towards the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests within the shortest possible span of time. In the course of the negotiations the Soviet Union has taken important steps to meet its partners half-way. Among other things, it gave its assent to the establishment of a moratorium on peaceful nuclear explosions and agreed that the treaty would enter into force even if initially only three of the five nuclear-weapon Powers, namely, the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom, become parties to it. However, to the great disappointment of the world at large, a tendency to drag things out has become apparent in the trilateral negotiations and as I have already said, it does not come from our side. We wish to emphasize that the Soviet Union is willing to continue to display a constructive approach with a view to using the tripartite negotiations for the successful completion of the task of achieving a complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

At the same time, from the point of view of ensuring a really universal prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests for all time, the Committee on Disarmament could, in our view, play a substantial and active part also. In his statement on 17 February, the representative of Pakistan gave his evaluation of the possible results of the tripartite negotiations, calling them a "temporary" moratorium on nuclear testing by the United States, the United Kingdom and the USSR, and an "indication of their commitment to the goal of nuclear disarmament". He also said: "At the same time, the CD should be enabled to initiate negotiations on a truly comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty". Well, one can agree to such an approach. We ourselves have already more than once pointed out the positive aspects which discussion of the problem of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests in the Committee on Disarmament might have, especially in view of the participation in it of all five nuclear-weapon Powers. Many non-nuclear-weapon countries also are represented in the Committee, and they have a vital interest in the elimination of the threat of a nuclear cataclysm and are in a position to help find the necessary solutions both in word and in deed.

Obviously, an agreement on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, formalized in an appropriate international treaty with the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States, would contribute greatly to the improvement of the human environment which unfortunately continues to suffer from the pernicious consequences of the continuing nuclear explosions, especially in the atmosphere. But of course the main purpose of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is to limit and reduce to the minimum the possibility of the further improvement of nuclear weapons and of the development of newer and still more lethal types of such weapons.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

To sum up: the Soviet Union has been consistently in favour of the Committee on Disarmament playing an active part in dealing with the matter of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. The non-aligned and neutral countries have put forward a proposal for the setting up within the Committee of an ad hoc working group on this question. The Soviet delegation supports the proposal on the establishment of such an ad hoc group provided all the nuclear-weapon Powers participate in its work. We have been asked what are our thoughts about the mandate of such a working group.

Speaking now in general terms, without going into detail as to what this group could deal with, we believe that its task should be to explore the problem of nuclear tests in all its aspects with a view to the earliest possible conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests with the participation of all the nuclear-weapon Powers.

Naturally, the examination of the issue of a nuclear-weapon test-ban within the Committee and its working group ought not to complicate the process of the trilateral negotiations on this matter. Indeed it is obvious that if this were to happen, instead of helping to achieve the speediest possible prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, it would cause serious and perhaps irreparable harm.

Some delegations in the Committee on Disarmament have expressed a certain misunderstanding of the position of the Soviet Union as regards the testing of an international global network to detect and identify seismic events. The question is sometimes asked why the Soviet Union is in favour of establishing such a network only after a treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests has been concluded and not in the immediate future. Let us ask frankly what is this network required for? The answer is, to verify compliance with the treaty. And if there is no treaty? Let us suppose for a moment that we fail to reach agreement on such a treaty, then what will be the use of establishing such a network, spending huge sums of money on it and carrying out an extremely expensive global testing of it to boot? And will this not be a weakening factor, will it not cause States to slacken their efforts to achieve a complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests?

We sometimes have the impression that certain delegations instead of mobilizing all their energies and efforts towards the attainment of a treaty with the participation of the five nuclear-weapon Powers, are directing them at a secondary matter and exaggerating the importance of the difficulties of ensuring in the future the reliable operation of a global international network. We are anxious that there should be no doubts as to the position of the USSR in this regard and that it should be clear to everyone that we see the network as being useful once the treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests is in existence. At the same time, we want to emphasize that we are not against a consideration of the institutional and administrative steps necessary for the establishment, testing and operation of an international global network for the detection of seismic events. This issue also could be considered within the framework of the proposed working group. Of course, the network itself could be established only after a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests has been concluded.

Those are some observations the Soviet delegation wished to make concerning the consideration of the question of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests in the Committee on Disarmament. We reserve the right to express our views on the role of the Committee in negotiations on nuclear disarmament at one of its future meetings.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished Ambassador of the Soviet Union for his statement and I wish to thank him, too, for his kind words about myself.

Mr. WALKER (Australia): Mr. Chairman, a country dedicated, as Australia is, to nuclear non-proliferation, and which values the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, could not take the floor today without first saluting the announcement which has been made today by the distinguished Ambassador El Reedy of Egypt, informing us of his country's ratification of the Treaty. I am sure my Government will respond more formally to mark this important development. It is a courageous and wise decision of his country, which will add to the strength of the Treaty and help to achieve its objectives which, I venture to suggest, despite differences that may exist among us in this room, are objectives to which we are all committed, and I therefore applaud that decision and thank the Ambassador for its announcement. I would like to show it physically by joining hands.

You will recall, Mr. Chairman, as will members of the Committee, that at our first plenary meeting, almost a month ago, the distinguished representative of the Netherlands raised an idea which my delegation later made its own. This was that, given the considerable success of the holding last year of informal meetings between this Committee and experts on chemical weapons it might be valuable to try to repeat this experience again this year. A long discussion on this subject was held more than a week ago in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons and, at that time, several delegations made helpful suggestions concerning the proper role of experts in the work of the CD and their proper relationship to the work of the Working Group. I think most of us here will recall, in that connection, interventions by the representatives of Egypt, India, Pakistan and Sweden. My delegation then had extensive discussions with these delegates which enabled us to prepare Working Paper No. 33 which was circulated yesterday for consideration today. Also, about a week ago, I showed a draft of this paper to your distinguished successor and obtained his concurrence. I did not, however, at that time, raise with him the question of which particular days might be possible, or the details of possible arrangements, because I think that is a question which is better discussed when he enters into his functions and which I feel also require discussion with others including, of course, the distinguished Chairman of the Working Group.

One Ambassador has raised with me some uncertainties about the readiness of the Committee to consider this question at this stage, but as we had previously explained in the Committee, this matter is of special importance to countries like mine which are at great geographical distance from Geneva, and for which a month's notice is the bare minimum necessary to arrange for an expert to come. For that reason, I would pray the indulgence of the Ambassador who has had some hesitation about the Committee discussing and finalizing the matter at this stage, and I was hoping that we might be able to come to a decision this afternoon, both before I myself leave Geneva for a while and in time to enable other representatives of distant countries to report to Headquarters and to prepare accordingly. Therefore, I would seek your guidance, Mr. Chairman, as to whether the appropriate way of doing so would be to pass briefly into an informal meeting at which we could discuss any remaining questions that still need to be refined in connection with this proposal, or whether you feel it is the sentiment of the Committee that we discuss it in plenary. My delegation, I must say, is very open on this matter.

Mr. PFEIFFER (Federal Republic of Germany): On behalf of my delegation I would like to express our deep satisfaction that Egypt has ratified the non-proliferation Treaty and by doing so has joined the States signatories of this important Treaty. We see this decision of the Egyptian Government as a confirmation of the fundamental importance which the non-proliferation Treaty has, in the view of my delegation, in preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, I should like to make some brief remarks on three topics: first, I should like to express my delegation's satisfaction at the announcement the distinguished representative of Egypt has made to us concerning his country's ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

In this connection, although we have not specifically been asked to do so, my delegation wishes to endorse the statements made by Egypt when it deposited its instrument of ratification, and in particular the following:

"Moreover, in spite of the fact that more than 17 years have elapsed since the conclusion of the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear-Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, the nuclear-weapon States are alleging that various difficulties still stand in the way of a permanent ban on all nuclear-weapon tests, when there is only need for a political will to achieve that end.

"Consequently, Egypt avails itself of this opportunity, namely, the deposit of its instruments of ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to appeal to the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to fulfil their obligation whereby the nuclear arms race will be stopped and nuclear disarmament achieved.

"Egypt also calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to exert all possible efforts so as to achieve a permanent ban of all nuclear-weapon tests at an early date."

My delegation endorses this statement because it has always considered that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was concluded for the purpose of preventing not only the horizontal proliferation but also the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. That was the first point to which I wished to refer.

The second is much shorter, and concerns the statements we have heard this afternoon from the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union. My delegation fully appreciates the concessions the Soviet Union has made in the tripartite talks, and I have already referred to these in earlier statements. With respect to one of them, of which Ambassador Issraelyan has reminded us here today, I should like to say that this is a concession the importance of which can certainly not be overstated if we remember the USSR's previous position, and it consists in acceptance of the idea that a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests can take effect -- can come into force -- even if at first only three of the nuclear-weapon Powers are parties to that treaty.

On this matter, I would like to make the following observation: to my delegation -- and my delegation is one of the members of the Group of 21 which have fought most persistently for the establishment of an ad hoc working group to deal with this subject -- to my delegation, I say, a working group concerned

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

with the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests would not mean a nullification of this concession by the Soviet Union. We thus envisage the possibility that a working group of the Committee on Disarmament might succeed in achieving a nuclear-test-ban treaty which would come into force, at first, if it were not possible to secure the participation of the five nuclear-weapon States, then with the initial participation of three of them. If this were not to be the case, we should be taking a step backward as regards the extremely important concession made by the Soviet Union in the tripartite talks.

That was my second point; the third thing I wish to say, and the most agreeable, is simply a matter of reiterating to you, Mr. Chairman, the very sincere congratulations I offered you in the first statement I had the pleasure of making under your distinguished chairmanship.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico for his statement and for the kind words he has just addressed to myself. I am very grateful to him for them.

Mr. SARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, I would simply like to touch upon the question of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty which has been referred to at this meeting today. Of course, the sovereign decision has been taken by the Government of Egypt to sign and ratify this Treaty and should be recognized as such. I would like to refer to some comments which have been made in applauding Egypt's decision to the effect that this would be an example for other countries to follow. I would like to put on record that my country considers the non-proliferation Treaty as an unequal Treaty which imposes unequal obligations on States and addresses itself only to the problem of the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and not to the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons which we consider to be equally if not far more important.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): If the Netherlands representative wishes to continue to extend greetings and congratulations to the Egyptian delegation, then I have already done this and I will give up my turn to him because I should like to reply to the Ambassador of Australia. If not, then I will continue. There seems to have been some misunderstanding here. I have spoken to the Ambassador of Australia and have addressed to him, speaking on behalf of a group of delegations -- let me stress: not on behalf of one country, as he tried to suggest, but on behalf of a group of delegations -- a request not to insist, not only on the adoption of a decision on the question of inviting experts, but also on discussing this issue today, at an informal meeting. The group of delegations which I have the honour to represent wishes to say once again that we are not ready to adopt a decision on this question as suggested in the document which, as the Ambassador of Australia rightly pointed out, was circulated yesterday and is dated 24 February. We wanted to consider this request, this proposal by Australia and the Netherlands, at our Group's meeting next Wednesday and then give our reply. In conclusion, we note the Australian representative's statement that he will shortly be going away, and I would like to wish him, on behalf simply of the Soviet delegation, bon voyage and a speedy return. We shall be glad to see him back and by that time we shall in all probability have given an answer.

Mr. WAGENMAKERS (Netherlands): Mr. Chairman, first of all, I would like to salute the important statement which has been made this afternoon by the distinguished representative of Egypt. Indeed, we are very happy about this major decision taken by the Government of Egypt, and we express the hope that this example might give an impetus for a further increase in membership of the non-proliferation Treaty.

Secondly, I would like to associate my delegation with the statement made by the distinguished representative of Australia, which was further to an informal proposal by our delegation. I would like to state that as far as we and our expert, Dr. Ooms are concerned, we found the informal discussions on chemical weapons in the Committee in 1980 very useful and indeed conducive to an increase in the tempo of the deliberations of the Working Group, and we would ask the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, and the Group that he represents, kindly to take into account our interest in their deliberations, which I now understand are going to take place next Wednesday. My delegation would indeed have preferred this afternoon to enter into an informal exchange of views on this matter. We think that the distinguished Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons has already given us a useful tool to guide our informal deliberations in a very informal document which was circulated in the Working Group and which gave us some five or six subjects on which our future informal meetings might focus as regards chemical weapons. In conclusion, I would like to express the very great interest that my delegation attaches to the Committee deciding once again to hold these informal meetings, hoping that, as in 1980, they would have a positive overspill on the work of the Group on Chemical Weapons.

Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): Mr. Chairman, first of all, I would like to express the deep satisfaction of the Hungarian delegation for the statement made by the distinguished representative of Egypt, informing us of the depositing of the instrument of ratification of the non-proliferation Treaty by Egypt. Secondly, my delegation fully agrees with the statement made by Ambassador Issraelyan on behalf of the group of the socialist countries, for it too considers that the proposal contained in Working Paper No. 33 requires more detailed and substantive consideration.

Mr. SARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, I would like to comment briefly on Working Paper No. 33 which has been presented by the delegations of Australia and the Netherlands. As we have stated earlier in discussions of this question, we do not wish to give the impression that the Committee itself would be holding sessions with chemical weapons experts, like a panel, to examine certain questions. We said that the experts who would come to Geneva to attend the Pugwash meeting, could perhaps make presentations in their capacity as members of individual delegations. This is perhaps a more correctly worded decision. What we are really deciding upon is whether to hold a series of informal meetings where the chemical weapons experts attached to various delegations may make presentations on various specific issues. We feel that this decision could be reworded in a manner that would reflect this point of view because, as I stated earlier, for my delegation a matter of principle is concerned.

Mr. WALKER (Australia): Mr. Chairman, allow me, through you, to thank the distinguished representative of India for his constructive comments. I am sure that the concern which he expresses is one which can be readily accommodated, at least as far as my own delegation is concerned.

On the matter raised by the distinguished Ambassador of the Soviet Union and supported by the distinguished Ambassador of Hungary, it is obvious that if there are groups of countries which are not yet ready to address this matter, and who wish to discuss it within their group, then it would be absurd for me to raise any obstacle. I am sorry that I misunderstood my informal conversation with Ambassador Issraelyan before the meeting and gained the impression that he was speaking only for himself rather than on behalf of the group. This came from my understanding of the terms he used and from my recollection of the fact that all members of his group had been represented in earlier discussions in the Working Group, and since he himself has only just rejoined Geneva, I had assumed that what was concerned was the personal situation of the Ambassador, who had not been present in person during these discussions. I would just like to repeat that my delegation and a number of others have an urgent practical interest in this matter and therefore, as regards the delegations which still want to clarify their thoughts, we would be grateful if they would be so kind as to bear in mind that some of us do have to consider the practical element of urgency in this matter.

Mr. EL REEDY (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Mr. Chairman, since you have always been generous with me, I will appeal to your generosity to allow me to speak briefly once again, just to express my deep gratitude and appreciation, on behalf of my country's delegation, for the expressions of esteem which I have heard from all my colleagues. I refer in particular to the kind and generous words of congratulation on Egypt's ratification of the non-proliferation Treaty, and would especially like to thank Mrs. Thorsson, who was the first to congratulate Egypt in this respect, Ambassador Okawa of Japan, Ambassador Summerhayes, representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Issraelyan, representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Walker, representative of Australia, Ambassador Pfeiffer, representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador García Robles, representative of Mexico and also Mr. Wagenmakers, representative of the Netherlands and Ambassador Komives, representative of Hungary. I thank them all for their kind words of congratulation and for the esteem which they have expressed towards my country and my delegation. My sincere thanks to them and to you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished Ambassador of Egypt for his statement. The Committee will recall that at our informal meeting yesterday we agreed to invite the Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research to make a short statement in plenary. I therefore welcome Mr. Liviu Bota, Director of the Institute, and I give him the floor.

Mr. BOTA (Director, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research): The General Assembly has recognized that negotiations on disarmament and the continuing effort to ensure greater security must be based on objective in-depth technical studies. The Assembly has expressed the view that sustained research and study activity by the United Nations in the field of disarmament would promote informed participation by all States in disarmament efforts, and has considered that it is advisable to undertake more forward-looking research within the framework of the United Nations. The General Assembly has repeatedly stressed the need of the International Community to be provided with more diversified and complete information on problems relating to disarmament as well as the importance of ensuring that disarmament studies should be conducted in accordance with the criteria of scientific independence. Disarmament research is in fact an integral part of disarmament efforts.

(Mr. Bota, UNIDIR)

It is against this background that the General Assembly decided to establish the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). The Institute was established with effect from 1 October 1980 at Geneva within the framework of UNITAR on an interim basis until the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and is subject to review at that session.

The Institute's mandate is simple and pragmatic. It is to carry out research for the purpose of assisting ongoing negotiations in the field of disarmament and arms limitation, stimulating initiatives for new negotiations and providing a general insight into the problems involved. In carrying out its mandate, the Institute will be guided by the provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. In short, the Institute is basically meant to conduct objective, scientific research aimed at facilitating progress towards disarmament and to facilitate the access of a large number of States, in particular the developing ones, to existing information, studies and research on disarmament.

UNIDIR has an Advisory Council. As the Secretary-General stated in his report to the General Assembly (A/35/574), the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament is an ex officio member of the Institute's Advisory Council, whose membership also includes a number of other eminent persons. The Advisory Council will meet in New York at the beginning of May 1981.

The Institute has already started work on a number of projects, which I should like briefly to describe to you:

(a) "Disarmament". This will be a general analysis of the field of disarmament, defining it in the general context of contemporary international relations, presenting its goals, principles and institutions as well as the efforts to reach its objectives, including national and international machinery for disarmament, procedures, etc. It could be completed by autumn this year.

(b) "Repertory of disarmament research". This should be completed by next June. The repertory will list, under separate headings, major research efforts already completed or under way, all over the world, on disarmament affairs during the past decade, specialized bibliographies and basic United Nations documents containing research papers prepared by the United Nations or submitted by Member States. It will also list major disarmament research centres and specialized periodicals. An attempt will be made to analyse the factual material contained in the Repertory.

(c) "Security and Disarmament: Security of States and lowering of levels of armaments". The objective of this project is to analyse the presently prevailing security concepts and doctrines, the extent to which these are guiding the foreign policies of States and their role in disarmament efforts, with a view to finding possible new ways and means to strengthen the security of States through disarmament. The project, the title of which is provisional, could be completed by the end of this year or the beginning of 1982.

(d) "Prevention of war by accident". We assume that the possibility of a nuclear war by design is remote. However, a nuclear war might start because of an accident or miscalculation/misperception (technological or political). This problem, which is to be considered as part of the more general preoccupations relating to crisis management and prevention of nuclear war, is topical. No date for the completion of the study is set.

(Mr. Bota, UNIDIR)

(e) "Science and technology for disarmament". The disarmament process requires adequate technologies. The availability of technologies to verify compliance with agreements might be, in some instances, a condition for the conclusion of an agreement. Technologies used so far for verification purposes were those originally produced for other, particularly military pursuits. It is felt that a study on the availability of technologies and the indication of needs in areas that are presently or are likely to be the subject for negotiations might have a positive impact on the progress of disarmament efforts. The disarmament community should be in a position, when necessary, to request scientists and industry to work for the elaboration and production of such technologies. This project will only start this year and will be completed in 1982.

In addition to the above-mentioned projects, on which we have already started work, we have prepared a list of some 17 projects which will be submitted to the Advisory Council of the Institute when it meets next May.

All over the world there are other institutes, centres and universities engaged in disarmament research. We proposed to co-operate with them to our mutual benefit. UNIDIR therefore intends to convene, in the autumn of this year, a conference of directors of disarmament research institutes to exchange views and information on disarmament research. It is hoped that this first meeting will bring about the institutionalization of such gatherings with the purpose of better using the material and intellectual resources available and of strengthening the efficiency of research in terms of impact on policies and negotiations.

I should also like to mention the financial aspect of the Institute. UNIDIR is a United Nations organ which forms an integral part of the modernization of disarmament structures undertaken by the special session of the General Assembly. Nevertheless, its budget is financed by voluntary contributions. I hope that Member States will encourage the Institute's activities by making voluntary contributions.

In the present international situation, when most disarmament discussions and negotiations are deadlocked, it is particularly important to encourage reflection and to explore all possibilities of restarting bilateral and multilateral talks. Our Institute offers a framework for activities of this kind and I hope that it will be used accordingly.

In conclusion, I should like to thank the members of the Committee for inviting me and giving me this opportunity to introduce briefly the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. I am also grateful to Mr. Jaipal, Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, for the support so generously provided to UNIDIR. It has been a particular pleasure to make this introduction under your Chairmanship, the Chairmanship of France, the country which proposed the establishment of UNIDIR and on whose support we are counting so much.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, it was not my intention to intervene unless you had finished with all other business as I just wanted to make a brief announcement. Although I have made this announcement already I would like to be certain that it reaches all delegations, so I should like to repeat it. In my capacity as Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, I will hold an open-ended informal consultation on Monday, 2 March, at 11 a.m. in this Council Chamber, in order to present working paper CD/CW/WP.8 which has been distributed and which contains Part 2 of the suggested outline of the work of the Working Group.

Mr. FLOWERREE (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, I would like to add my delegations's congratulations to those that have already been made to the delegation of Egypt. I have remained silent only because I had expected there to be another occasion but I understand that the distinguished representative of Egypt will be leaving and when the roll is called up in heaven I did not want the United States to be absent from the list of those who had congratulated him. I also wish to assure the distinguished representative of Egypt that I was listening carefully and understood the statements made at the time of the deposit of the instrument of ratification by his Government, even before they were read to us again by the distinguished representative of Mexico. I respect those statements of views of sovereign States and take them in the spirit in which we all deal with each other in this forum. I would like to add my congratulations to his Government for taking what we regard as a courageous and statesman-like act in ratifying the NPT.

Mr. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a few brief comments on the paper that has been read by the distinguished representative of the Disarmament Research Institute

We attach great importance to this question and that is why I should like to say a few words about it. The new Institute runs three different risks: the first one is the possibility of repetition or overlapping. If we read the bibliography on disarmament and related matters, we are aware of the hundreds of publications issued by other institutes, organizations and universities on this question. This means that the new Institute will have to find its own way, in order to avoid the risk of repeating what has already been done by other older, richer and more experienced sources.

The second risk, which I should perhaps call scholasticism or academism, is that research progress reports may be well prepared, but sometimes with little contact with our daily realities. In this field of disarmament we know that one can go from science fiction to metaphysics, but in print there must be a middle of the road that will lead to the right path to be followed by the Institute in its activities.

The third risk is that of a proliferation of targets both in the horizontal and in the vertical sense. I think that what we need is concrete objectives, condensed in papers that might help us in our actual work as well as in our long range endeavours.

However, I did not come here to bury the Institute but to praise it. I have had the opportunity of holding a long conversation with Mr. Bota and was favourably impressed by the objective, practical and meaningful direction he wants to impart to the Institute as well as the useful and helpful assistance we shall gain from this new organ. Finally, I should like to express the gratitude of my delegation for the initiative taken by the French Government in this respect.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): If no other delegation wishes to take the floor I shall close this meeting, but before concluding, since this is the last time I shall be presiding over the Committee on Disarmament, I should of course like to take the opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to all my colleagues for the spirit of co-operation they have shown, for the very valuable support they have been kind enough to give the Chair, and also for their many demonstrations of friendship towards myself. Thanks to everyone's co-operation and the desire for

(The Chairman)

accommodation that has been shown, the Committee was able in a very short period of time to organize its third annual session and to take up its work on substantive questions without delay. I would also like to express my warm gratitude to Ambassador Jaipal, whose advice and assistance were most valuable to me, and also of course to Mr. Berasategui, whose help I particularly appreciated. I would also like to express my appreciation to all the members of the Committee's secretariat and to the interpreters and translators. I would also, of course, like to offer my successor, Ambassador Herder of the German Democratic Republic, my very warm wishes for success in the exercise of his mandate. I am certain that under his chairmanship and under that of the other colleagues who will assume the task after him during this session, the Committee will make progress in its work and more nearly meet the expectations of the international community this year.

The meeting rose at 5 p.m.