

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDRED AND FOURTEENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 17 August 1995, at 10 a.m.

President:                      Mr. Shirchinjavyn Yumjav                      (Mongolia)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 714th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, allow me to extend a warm welcome to the Assistant Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom, Mr. Roland Smith, who will be addressing the Conference today. His presence among us today is further evidence of the importance attached to our forum by his Government, especially at a crucial time when the Conference is intensifying its negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

I should also like to warmly welcome, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, the newly appointed representative of Canada, Ambassador Moher. I am sure that the experience of Ambassador Moher in multilateral diplomacy and his deep knowledge of arms control and disarmament issues, especially in the nuclear field, will be an asset to this Conference. I should like to assure Ambassador Moher of our full cooperation and support and wish him every success in his tour of duty in Geneva.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the United Kingdom, Argentina, Chile, the United States of America, Germany, Japan and Canada. I now give the floor to the Assistant Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom, Mr. Roland Smith.

Mr. SMITH (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): Mr. President, thank you for your words of introduction. May I begin by congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference and assuring you of the United Kingdom's full support.

I am delighted to be able to take part this morning in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. This body and its predecessors have a distinguished history. It is due to them that the international community has succeeded in agreeing important multilateral instruments for controlling nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. And it is on continued efforts here that hopes for further progress in these and other areas are so largely centred. It is, therefore, not surprising that many States are keen to play a full part in the important negotiations which take place here. In our view, their participation would enhance the work of the Conference and add weight to the agreements which it concludes. So, at the outset, I put on record once again my Government's firm view that we should work for the early admission of all who have applied to date.

During their visits to the Conference over the past two years, both of my predecessors in my present job explained the reasons why we in the United Kingdom believed that an indefinite extension of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty would be in the best interests of all States. That extension has since been achieved. We firmly believe the decision of the parties to extend the Treaty indefinitely, without resort to a vote, is a tribute to the statesmanship of all concerned. The Treaty is now a permanent feature of the international scene, and this can only strengthen the prospects for both nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Smith, United Kingdom)

In our view, with a bit more time, the Conference could also have agreed a final declaration covering the review element of its work. But we certainly do not regret the time spent on agreeing and adopting without a vote three other documents - the decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", the decision on "Strengthening the review process", and the resolution calling for universal adherence to the Treaty and making special mention of the need for all States in the Middle East to accede to the NPT as soon as possible and to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope safeguards. These are important documents and we intend to ensure that they are followed up.

Since the Conference, Chile has acceded to the Treaty, bringing the total number of parties to 179. But further accessions are necessary to secure universal adherence and we must all search for ways to secure these. We shall also need to give thought to precisely how the strengthened review process will operate once it begins in 1997. And, of course, we must make every effort to build on the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. This document contains sections on many important subjects, including security assurances and nuclear-weapon-free zones. We shall continue to address these topics seriously. But, since time presses, I propose to focus today on the section which deals specifically with nuclear disarmament.

The Principles and Objectives rightly state that it is important to complete the negotiations for a comprehensive test-ban treaty no later than 1996. Our record in the negotiations demonstrates our commitment to this objective. We have dropped our reservation on scope and accepted language which would ban all nuclear explosions. We welcome the fact that, in his statement here last week, the distinguished Ambassador of France also accepted this language. Our experts are ready to continue to provide technical support, as required, to the Verification Working Group. In other areas we shall also play whatever part we can to ensure that we achieve our shared objective of a treaty no later than 1996.

We continue to believe that this is a realistic ambition. Through the forest of square brackets, the makings of a workable treaty are now visible. These negotiations were never going to be easy, but the progress which has been made since January 1994 is impressive. We understand that many States would have preferred the negotiations to take place in the absence of any nuclear-weapons testing. For our part, we have no plans to conduct such tests. But it is essential that we should not allow concerns about testing today to eclipse our efforts to ensure an indefinite test ban for tomorrow and the future.

The Principles and Objectives document also states that it is important to achieve the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein. Despite the

(Mr. Smith, United Kingdom)

decision of the Conference in March to establish an ad hoc committee for this purpose, work on the negotiation of a cut-off convention still has not started. We regret this delay in moving forward on a topic which we all agree is important.

We are, however, continuing to give a good deal of thought to the detailed issues which will have to be discussed once the Ad Hoc Committee is up and running. We remain of the view that the scope of the convention should be confined to banning the future production of fissile material for explosive purposes. But it will also be necessary to consider what the detailed arrangements for verifying this obligation should be, how the costs of these arrangements might best be met, and how we can ensure the universal application of the treaty. We hope others are also giving thought to these issues, so that swift progress will be possible once the Ad Hoc Committee does begin its work.

The third point which the nuclear disarmament section of the Principles and Objectives mentions is the need for the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. The last part of this wording draws attention to the need to make progress on non-nuclear as well as nuclear issues, to which I shall refer in a moment.

As far as reducing nuclear weapons globally is concerned, it is clear that substantial reductions have been made, and are being made, as a result of bilaterally negotiated agreements and unilateral actions. In our view, these continue to be the right routes forward for the time being. But certainly there is no doubt that a world in which United States and Russian nuclear forces were counted in hundreds, rather than thousands, would be one in which Britain would respond to the challenge of multilateral talks on the global reduction of nuclear arms. That time has not yet come, however, and accordingly we believe it would be premature for the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. In the nuclear sphere the Conference already has plenty to do in concluding the negotiations for a comprehensive test ban and in pursuing negotiations for a cut-off.

I have dwelt on nuclear issues in these remarks because the United Kingdom is well aware that the decision to extend the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty indefinitely does not mean there should be any relaxation of efforts to promote nuclear disarmament. For our part, we are not conducting any nuclear explosions, and we remain committed to the success of the negotiations in this Conference for a comprehensive test-ban treaty no later than 1996; we have ceased the production of fissile material for explosive purposes, and we look forward to the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations by this Conference for a cut-off convention; we are reducing the total number of our nuclear warheads and their total explosive power, and we will join multilateral talks on the global reduction of nuclear arms once that seems likely to be the best way forward.

(Mr. Smith, United Kingdom)

The Principles and Objectives document rightly states that nuclear disarmament is substantially facilitated by the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States which have prevailed following the end of the cold war. The United Kingdom is striving hard to realize the potential which these favourable developments have brought about.

I hope I have left you in no doubt about the United Kingdom's continued commitment to nuclear disarmament. But that is by no means the whole of the picture. And I turn now to non-nuclear issues.

We continue to attach great importance to the early entry into force of the chemical weapons Convention. So far, 32 States have ratified the Convention, and I am pleased to say that the necessary domestic legislation to make United Kingdom ratification possible has now been published in draft with a view to its being introduced as early as possible in the 1995/96 session of Parliament. The pace of ratifications must speed up if entry into force is to take place, as hoped, in 1996. It is also important that we make faster progress in The Hague with preparations for the establishment of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. We hope all the signatory States represented here will help to move this work forward in a constructive way during the coming months.

We also continue to attach great importance to strengthening the biological and toxin weapons Convention, in particular by adding legally binding verification arrangements. We welcome the fact that a start has been made on this following the Special Conference of the States Parties last year. We believe the recent meeting of the Ad Hoc Group made good progress in identifying the main issues to be addressed. And we hope all the parties represented here will use the time between now and the Group's next meeting in November to facilitate progress. We need to move quickly if we are to complete this work by the time of the biological and toxin weapons review Conference in 1996.

Nor must we forget about conventional weapons. Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons are potential weapons of mass destruction, but now, today, it is conventional weapons which are the actual weapons of mass destruction. One has only to think of the large numbers of people killed and maimed by the sadly all too commonplace land-mine. Like a number of other States, we have introduced an extensive national moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land-mines. We urge others to do so too. We also believe that we must take full advantage of the United Nations weaponry Convention Review Conference next month. Our main objectives will be to broaden adherence to the Convention and to see its provisions on the use of land-mines considerably strengthened and extended. We also remain committed to making progress on the Land-Mine Control Programme - the initiative launched in June at Budapest with a view to restricting the production, stockpiling and transfer of anti-personnel land-mines - in a way which will complement the revised United Nations weaponry Convention.

But land-mines are only one of the many forms of conventional weapon. It is very important not to forget all the others, and I wish to emphasize

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our hope that all States will submit returns for 1994 to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Completion of these annual returns is not a demanding step for States to take, but in the past too many have not taken it. It is also our strong view that this Conference should continue to give thoughtful attention to the problems posed by conventional weapons, including by re-establishing its Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments. The issues posed by conventional weapons require attention. It is no more right for this Conference to ignore these issues than it would be for it to ignore nuclear issues.

Let me in conclusion reiterate our view that concerns about nuclear weapons must be balanced by concerns about other weapons - about chemical and biological weapons, and about conventional weapons. Movement on these issues is also vital if we are to make well-rounded progress towards the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. We continue, therefore, to attach importance to ensuring a balanced programme of work for this Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Assistant Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador Sánchez Arnau.

Mr. SANCHEZ ARNAU (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): First of all, Sir, as I am taking the floor for the first time under your distinguished presidency, I would like to congratulate you on the way you are conducting the business of this body and to offer you all our support and cooperation.

This statement will be distributed in English at the end of this meeting.

Allow me to begin this statement with a brief reference to the draft resolution on non-proliferation submitted by my country on 2 June last in the United Nations Security Council. It is not our intention to put that draft before this Conference on Disarmament for consideration, since we consider that the appropriate forum is the one in which it was tabled. We are only prompted to make this comment by the statement made by the Ambassador of Pakistan at the last meeting of this plenary on behalf of the G21. We have taken note of that statement and forwarded it to our Foreign Ministry and our delegation in New York. Nevertheless we would like to make the following points.

Argentina fully subscribes to what was said in that statement, to the effect that this Conference on Disarmament is the sole multilateral negotiating body on arms control and disarmament. We also agree with what it says about the impact on the ongoing negotiations if this Conference were to evade or affect the provisions of existing treaties. It would be hard for any member of the Conference to disagree with that view. Similarly it would be hard for any Member of the United Nations to deny that the Security Council has a role to play in maintaining international peace and security or that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a threat to international peace and security. This is the subject of the aforementioned Argentine draft resolution, which, the very day before the statement made by the

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representative of Pakistan in this chamber, was enhanced at a meeting held in New York by proposals from the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement that are members of the Security Council. Therefore let us leave the Security Council to do its job within the framework of its responsibilities and let us continue our efforts to advance the work of this Conference.

If there is one thing that drives the foreign policy of the Argentine Republic, that is its firm commitment to peace, security and disarmament. And we are determined to pursue this policy in a context of dialogue and understanding of the interests and problems of all those that sincerely share these aims. This Argentine commitment is borne out by the fact that on 9 August last our Congress adopted the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and also the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.

If the Conference on Disarmament is to be able to perform its functions properly, we consider that three requirements must be met. In the first place, we must restore the will to negotiate and work together without preconditions. For decades, through the nuclear build-up, a tremendous destructive capability was formed, which was intended to be, and managed to be, a deterrent. Today, the end of the cold war is enabling us to dismantle this capability piece by piece. To attempt to force the pace is, to say the least, unrealistic. To make every step in the negotiations within this Conference, however small it may be, whether we are talking about negotiating a treaty on "cut-off" or extending transparency in conventional weapons, dependent on some predetermined disarmament scheme, does not contribute, but rather hampers this negotiating process.

In the Argentine Republic our view is that we should try to avail ourselves to the full of each and every opportunity that we are offered so as to dismantle the atomic arsenal. It is healthy and positive for the international community to maintain its pressure on the nuclear Powers and those that still aspire to that status, so that the progress towards disarmament becomes irreversible. If we wish to trace a predetermined road, perhaps we shall not get very far. If we had set prior conditions, we should not have had a Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, nor a Convention on the prohibition of biological weapons.

The second requirement for our success is that we should work responsibly on the expansion of the Conference, to make it duly representative, so that its decisions can be readily accepted by the international community as a whole. Without a doubt expansion is a subject of common interest for member and non-member countries of this Conference on Disarmament. Consensus on the principle of expansion is as general as it is pressing. The General Assembly gave us a very precise mandate. It urged us to take this step. All that remains is for us to find a way of ensuring representativeness that is more appropriate to the times we are living in. The Conference must incorporate a significant number of new members in order to regain the degree of representativeness that it enjoyed vis-à-vis the world in 1978, when the last

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expansion of this Conference was carried out. I am not going to recapitulate the oft-told history of the present membership of the CD, but I can say that the decision to establish it included a decision to carry out regular reviews of its membership. There has been no lack of serious efforts made to fulfil that commitment to hold regular reviews. Today we need to include in those exercises the new elements that will allow us to break the deadlock as quickly as possible. One of these is certainly the expectations that the international community has placed in this body since the end of the cold war.

This suggests to us that the Conference membership must bring together the strategically more important countries as well as those which, geographically or for political reasons, provide the necessary balance. We must maintain the consensus achieved by the international community in adopting resolution 49/77 B at the last General Assembly of the United Nations. We, as members of this Conference, have the responsibility to produce an imaginative solution on the basis of that consensus which will enable us to discharge the mandate of the General Assembly to the full.

The third requirement for our success is that we should consolidate the credibility of the Conference by rapidly concluding the nuclear-test-ban treaty. In our reading of the international context there is no lack of elements to suggest that this can be done. Among these elements we believe it is important to highlight the statement made by President Clinton on 11 August on the scope of the treaty. We hail his political courage in making that decision and encourage the remaining nuclear Powers that have still not done so to accept the principle of a complete ban without thresholds. We have also noted with satisfaction the commitment made by President Chirac to sign the treaty, and his definition of scope, which we consider to be another encouraging element for the future of our negotiations. We also appreciate the proposals made by the United States about the funding and structure of the international monitoring system.

Our country considers that the nuclear-test-ban agreement must cover absolutely every type of nuclear test, including small-scale nuclear explosions. This is fully set out in the proposal "to prohibit any nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion" contained in working paper 222 submitted by the Australian delegation on the scope of the treaty. These and other contributions made daily in the context of our negotiations can, we feel, make a sound contribution to the achievement of our objective of rapidly completing the negotiation of the CTBT.

We know that this stage is undoubtedly of the highest importance for bringing positions together on verification. This is why we wish to appeal to all member and non-member countries of the Conference to make an active scientific and technical contribution to this work. Only in this way will it be possible to provide such a system with a properly defined list of facilities in good time. The Argentine Republic considers that such a list of facilities should be included in an appendix to the treaty, so that States are clearly aware, sufficiently in advance, of the commitment that they are entering into. In this regard I would also like to announce that my

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Government is offering to hold a workshop next November in Argentina that will bring together seismic experts from the South American continent with a view to bringing about a stronger and better-organized commitment on the part of countries in the region to participate in defining, establishing and operating the international monitoring system under the CTBT.

In the light of developments at this session of the Conference, we believe the time has come to analyse the situation very carefully and adopt a practical approach that will enable us to return to the path of consensus. We have to admit that our negotiations are not progressing as quickly as they should. In this respect, I wish to add my voice to those who, a week ago, warned of the danger we run if we fail to meet our commitments and disappoint the international community's expectations of this Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Chile, Ambassador Berguño.

Mr. BERGUÑO (Chile) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, allow me to congratulate you on the way you are discharging your duties and offer you my delegation's cooperation.

Today we have a feeling of great opportunities, broad horizons, historic changes. If we are truly capable of living in keeping with the times, we can leave behind the heavy legacy of the nuclear threat and offer future generations a safer and cleaner world. Nuclear weapons are no longer pointed at the adversary's cities; programmes of assistance are being devised for a gradual reduction of nuclear arsenals; and the logic of mass destruction has been replaced by that of reasonable control. This process of containment and stabilization is still a long way from constituting a commitment to halt the nuclear arms race completely and achieve full nuclear disarmament.

While we are moving away from the risks of nuclear confrontation, temporarily and not irrevocably, the proliferation of technology and the manufacture of nuclear weapons constitute a serious threat. Many nations today have scientific personnel, a critical mass of information and data-processing capacity that is superior without a doubt to those available to the designers of the first atomic bomb. The production of fissile material is expensive and technically demanding, but it can be achieved with arduous effort; the equipment is hard to obtain, but there are a range of ways to violate export controls and the international safeguards regime is still imperfect.

With several nations possessing a nuclear capacity and others on the threshold of access, with illegal trafficking and growing problems of nuclear security, we must ask ourselves what is the sense of distinctions between horizontal and vertical proliferation, and the controversy about the comparative risks of one scourge or the other, or the responsibilities of the Security Council and the Conference on Disarmament in these matters. In the face of the nuclear threat, half-hearted action is not appropriate, nor can the privileges of an aristocracy composed of the possessors of a capacity

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for maximum destruction, who endanger the right of life, health and the environment, be maintained indefinitely. The entire international community and all bodies in the United Nations system are called upon to take action to attain the objectives of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

In this context, the continuation of nuclear testing, of which we have had discouraging examples in recent days, is a message from one nuclear State to other non-nuclear States, with an implicit panegyric concerning the importance and legitimacy of nuclear weapons. A nuclear test is an indication of intent or at least resigned acceptance of possible use of such nuclear weapons. To hold that the conduct of nuclear tests is a precondition for agreement on their future elimination, without taking into account the effect that such a position has vis-à-vis the rights of others, is understandable solely from a standpoint that institutionalizes nuclear deterrence sine die (which runs counter to article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty and other solemn commitments). This is without mentioning the environmental risks, the enormous cost of this lavish expenditure and the twisted approach involved in applying the creativity of scientists, technological experts and professionals to the refinement of death-dealing weapons and the management of the toxic waste they generate.

On the anniversary of the tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Chile said that the best tribute that can be paid to the memory of the victims is to work hard for the total prohibition of nuclear weapons. Progress towards that objective requires first of all the planned and sustained application of the set of principles adopted by the Conference on the review and extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Once that stage has been completed (which presupposes agreement on the treaties for the total prohibition of nuclear testing and fissile material for the warlike purposes, the universalization of security assurances, the consolidation of the nuclear-weapon-free zones, the further development of safeguards and checks that would make proliferation impossible), the conditions will have been laid down to obtain through consensus from the General Assembly the historic mandate that the Conference on Disarmament would be called upon to convert into a formal contractual commitment. In this set of actions, the convention for the total prohibition of nuclear testing is the first and most pressing priority.

The statement by the Ambassador of France to the plenary of this Conference on Disarmament and the announcement by the President of the United States who spoke in favour of the "zero option" which would ban all nuclear explosions and tests, together with the reiteration of this position by the Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign Office today, offer a major contribution to the negotiation of an agreement that must be comprehensive, without reservations or scope for turning back, so that it can have its full impact. With such an agreement, as presented in Australian working paper No. 222, with which Chile expresses its full agreement, we support the structural outline of the future organization, its location in Vienna, in accordance with the formula suggested in the Australian paper, and we are ready to make Chile's sound seismological research capabilities available to the international monitoring system with the firm conviction that the

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verification of the nuclear tests to be banned in all environments constitutes the basic premise for the total ban that we seek to institutionalize permanently.

There are certainly other significant priorities within the global multilateral negotiations, notable among them the proposed convention to prohibit fissile material for warlike purposes. However, this and other important issues on the international disarmament agenda remain deadlocked. Today's statements by the United Kingdom and Argentina are important, but I must single out the valuable comments made by Ambassador Sánchez Arnau on the three conditions the Conference on Disarmament must meet in order to fully justify its mission, including the specific reference to resolution 49/77 B, of which this Conference has not formally taken note. The truth is that the Conference on Disarmament is totally deadlocked in the face of the challenge represented by its inappropriate structure and methods of work, as well as the lack of representativeness to negotiate legal instruments that call for universal accession, as has been pointed out in the already mentioned General Assembly resolution adopted by consensus. The Conference should give thought to the prospect, once this first technical and political stage of review of the draft convention is over, since this is the only subject for which it has been possible to begin or trace the path, of transferring this issue to the democratic forum of a specialized diplomatic conference. This procedure could continue to be applied until the Conference is in a position to and able to re-establish its traditional machinery for expansion. There is also a need for an organized link between these global negotiations and the progressive establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, like the Treaty of Tlatelolco zone, in the various regions of the world.

We welcome the announcement by Ambassador Selebi of South Africa concerning the finalization of the African treaty and we note that a new spirit is propitious to the establishment of such zones in the ASEAN and Middle East regions. Beginning with the Treaty of Rarotonga, it is essential for all the nuclear States to sign the protocols that guarantee the obligations entered into, ensuring that no non-peaceful nuclear devices, components or elements will be introduced, transferred or transported through the denuclearized zones. If all nuclear States stop testing; if all countries in the world stop producing, stockpiling or transferring fissile material for military use; if the rights of the parties to agreements banning nuclear weapons are firmly upheld; if the agreed safeguards, verification machinery and confidence-building measures are improved and put into effect; if the rule banning nuclear intimidation is universally applied, what sense would there be in persisting with a doctrine of nuclear deterrence relegated to parts of the Euro-Atlantic, central Asian and north Pacific regions? In this geopolitical framework, Mongolia's decision in 1992 to declare its territory free of nuclear weapons can be seen as a singular harbinger of the new era.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Chile for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me and to my country. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Ledogar.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Mr. President, as this is the first time that I have taken the floor under your presidency, allow me to offer my congratulations on your assumption of the Chair. I extend to you the full support of my delegation. I would also like to take this opportunity to welcome warmly our new colleagues around this table as well as our distinguished visitor, Under-Secretary Roland Smith of the United Kingdom.

At the conclusion of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference three months ago, all NPT parties agreed to work to complete a comprehensive test-ban treaty no later than 1996. I would like to inform the Conference today of the most recent steps taken by my Government toward this very important goal.

Last Friday, 11 August, the President of the United States reaffirmed our commitment to do everything within our power to conclude the CTBT negotiations as rapidly as possible so that a treaty can be signed next year. As part of a major initiative to bring the negotiations to closure as rapidly as possible, the President detailed United States support for concluding a "true zero yield" CTBT that would ban any nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion no matter how small, immediately upon entry into force of a CTBT. In his statement, President Clinton also highlighted specific, concrete safeguards that define the conditions under which the United States will enter into a CTBT, including the centrality of the United States programme for stockpile stewardship in the absence of nuclear testing, and our right to withdraw from the treaty under the "supreme national interests" clause. While clearly important internal considerations for the United States, these safeguards require no action by this Conference. Hence, my delegation will not be proposing any additions or changes to the rolling text in regard to these initiatives.

We hope and expect that President Clinton's announcement, together with the welcome French initiative announced by Ambassador Errera in this body one week ago, will bring the Conference closer to agreement on the text on treaty scope proposed by Australia, namely a treaty which would ban any nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion. In this regard, I would like to acknowledge the positive remarks we just heard from the Ambassadors of Argentina and Chile about the CTBT scope initiatives of last week.

President Clinton has instructed me and my delegation "to redouble efforts to complete and sign a CTBT next year". We therefore call on all members of the Conference to strive to conclude a good treaty as soon as possible. This will require key political decisions that will enable the negotiations to progress expeditiously. I sincerely hope that next week's discussions of the international monitoring system architecture, for example, will result in significant agreement on the CTBT monitoring network. In this same regard, my Government hopes that intensive work on this treaty will continue in the inter-sessional period before the 1996 CD session formally begins its work.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

In closing, may I ask that the text of President Clinton's 11 August statement and an accompanying fact-sheet on safeguards, both of which have been submitted to the CD secretariat today, be circulated as official documents of the CD?

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Germany, Mr. Keller.

Mr. KELLER (Germany): Mr. President, please allow me to make the following statement regarding the scope of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

The Federal Government is committed to concluding a truly comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty no later than 1996. It therefore welcomes the decision of France and the United States to seek a ban on any nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other explosion including explosions of low yield in the ongoing CTBT negotiations. We take it from recent Russian declarations that there might be a convergence of views emerging in this respect. The Federal Government is convinced that these decisions will give a decisive impetus to the CTBT negotiations with a view to enabling an early and successful conclusion of the treaty. A common position of the five nuclear-weapon States regarding the banning of any nuclear explosion including low-yield explosions would be of particular importance for the discussion on the scope article scheduled for 24 August 1995 in Working Group 2 of the CTBT Ad Hoc Committee.

While I have the floor, Mr. President, allow me to make a comment on the most recent Chinese nuclear test. We think that this most recent Chinese nuclear test underscores once more the necessity to bring about a ban on nuclear testing as rapidly as possible. To our mind, nuclear tests are no longer appropriate today. They are not in line with the spirit of the results brought about in the NPT extension Conference and the goals of the ongoing CTBT negotiations. The Federal Government will do its best to drive forward the CTBT negotiations and conclude them no later than in the autumn of 1996. As already mentioned, the American and French decision to extend a treaty ban to all nuclear explosions has given an important impetus to the CTBT negotiations.

Mrs. KUROKOCHI (Japan): Mr. President, at the outset, since this is the first time that I take the floor under your presidency, I would like to extend to you my warmest congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I pledge the fullest cooperation and support of my delegation to you in the discharge of your important duties to guide the work of the Conference. At the same time, allow me to extend a heartfelt welcome to all our distinguished colleagues, the Ambassador of South Africa, His Excellency Mr. J.S. Selebi, the Ambassador of India, Her Excellency Ms. Arundhati Ghose, and the Ambassador of Canada, His Excellency Mr. Mark Moher, who recently joined us in our common endeavour. It is also a great pleasure to have among us the distinguished Assistant Under-Secretary of State, Mr. Roland Smith of the United Kingdom.

(Mrs. Kurokochi, Japan)

It is with profound regret that I am obliged to make a statement concerning the nuclear test conducted by the People's Republic of China today. While Japan and indeed the international community as a whole renew our hope for peace and our desire for nuclear disarmament in this year of the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War and the atomic bombing, China again conducted a nuclear-weapon test, in addition to that in May this year, despite the agreement that the nuclear-weapon States should exercise utmost restraint on nuclear testing reached at the NPT Review and Extension Conference.

Japan attaches great importance to the ban on nuclear testing as one of the most important tasks in the field of nuclear disarmament, and, therefore, takes it seriously that China conducted yet another nuclear test today despite our repeated calls to halt testing. Japan strongly urges China not to repeat nuclear testing any more. At the same time, it is important that all nuclear-weapon States refrain from conducting any nuclear test.

On 11 August, President Clinton of the United States made an announcement that he supports a true zero-yield comprehensive test-ban treaty which prohibits any nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion. Japan wholeheartedly welcomes and highly values this decision as it is in accord with Japan's stance to seek a total ban on nuclear explosions by a CTBT.

The fact that the United States, a nuclear-weapon State, made this decision will give a significant impetus to the negotiations on a CTBT for its completion no later than 1996, the undertaking that was agreed at the NPT Review and Extension Conference in May this year. On 10 August, the Ambassador of France, His Excellency Mr. Gérard Errera, announced in this room that France had decided to adopt the formulation of a CTBT which shall prohibit any nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion. Japan expects that these recent developments will contribute to the acceleration of the CTBT negotiations.

It is Japan's strong hope that other nuclear-weapon States will immediately take positions of supporting a total ban on nuclear-test explosions under a CTBT, taking into account the recent decisions of the United States and France. Japan, too, will make its utmost efforts together with other participating countries toward the completion of the CTBT negotiations early next year.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Japan for her statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Canada, Ambassador Moher.

Mr. MOHER (Canada): Mr. President, I wish first of all to express my sincere appreciation for your very generous welcoming comments at the opening of this session, and also for the welcoming comments of other delegations around this table. On this my first occasion to address the Conference, I also wish to emphasize my desire to work with all delegations, both members and observers, to achieve more effective arms control and disarmament

(Mr. Moher, Canada)

measures. You can be assured of the full support of the Canadian delegation as you continue your presidency. I would also like to pay tribute to the hard work and commitment of your predecessors, Ambassadors de Icaza, Nanjira, Kurokochi and Vattani, as well as those of the secretariat of the Conference.

Canada's priority at this time, as for many around this table, is the early conclusion of a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty. Much has been accomplished in the last 18 months. My Government welcomes the recent developments respecting the scope of the treaty, particularly the express commitment by the President of the United States of America to a true "zero"-yield CTBT and the adoption by the Government of France of the proposal to "prohibit any nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion". These extremely important decisions, and the timing of their announcement, will help the progress of our negotiations significantly.

We all appreciate as well the important work being conducted by the Group of Scientific Experts, who have been meeting this week and last under the chairmanship of Dr. Dahlman, particularly the GSETT-III experiment in which many Governments, including that of Canada, are involved.

The necessity for early progress is particularly significant. We share the goal expressed by others of obtaining the signature of the CTBT before the fifty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly, that is, during the resumed session of UNGA 50 next September. We believe that such a goal is achievable. The CD can achieve this aim through a structured process, with careful planning and strong political commitment.

As all are aware, much work remains to be done. Canada attaches particular importance to the following issues at this stage.

First, scope. Canada supports the Australian formulation calling for a prohibition of all nuclear-weapons test explosions and any other nuclear explosion, that is, a total and complete ban. We urge the earliest possible consensus on this point.

Second, verification. It is a matter of great priority for us all to obtain agreements on the component elements of the international monitoring system (including the nature of data processing by the international data centre), synergetic meshing of the four agreed technologies and convergence on a concept for on-site inspections. We for our part will continue to do our best to promote such agreements.

Third, organization. Canada believes that the treaty should be implemented through the most cost-effective arrangement possible. Independent management and co-location of the CTBT organization with the International Atomic Energy Agency with carefully negotiated linkages can help achieve these objectives.

As I have already observed the recent highly positive decisions of the United States and French Governments are greatly encouraging. We welcome the

(Mr. Moher, Canada)

further statement by Mr. Roland Smith of the United Kingdom Government here this morning. We call on all remaining nuclear-weapon States to adopt such positions. These vital political decisions coupled with the valuable work being carried out in this Conference portend well for our efforts. It is our hope that this momentum can be maintained. We are prepared to do our best to assist in that regard.

A complete end to all nuclear testing is vital to international security. The Canadian delegation expressed in June of this year its regret that two nuclear-weapon States intend to continue testing. It is, therefore, with particular regret we have learned of the latest Chinese test this morning. We strongly urge the cessation of all nuclear testing.

On a separate matter, the Conference is well aware that the Government of Canada has long been committed to the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. I pay respectful tribute to the work of my predecessor and good friend Ambassador Gerald Shannon for his achievement in March of this year of a mandate for such a negotiation following 14 months of consultations. We consider this as one of the principal achievements of the Conference this year and salute the commitment of all delegations to common objectives that led to the adoption of the mandate. It is therefore my Government's firm desire that work of the Ad Hoc Committee established by this Conference in the first part of the current session be initiated as soon as possible under agenda item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

As a final point I should note that expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament continues to be a pressing issue. It becomes increasingly difficult for members of the Conference to claim the title of a truly credible multilateral negotiating body when so many worthy applicants are excluded from full membership. I look forward to resolution of this pressing issue as well.

In concluding, I would like to reconfirm my commitment and that of my delegation to advancing the work of this Conference. We look forward to working with all delegations and the secretariat in the future.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Canada for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. That concludes my list of speakers. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I give the floor to the representative of New Zealand, Ambassador Armstrong.

Mr. ARMSTRONG (New Zealand): Firstly, Mr. President, I congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency, and assure you of my delegation's full cooperation.

On 1 June I conveyed to this Conference New Zealand's shock and disappointment at the conduct by China of a nuclear-weapon test on 15 May. Today the New Zealand Prime Minister has expressed New Zealand's serious concern and regret at China's action in proceeding with yet another nuclear

(Mr. Armstrong, New Zealand)

test. This is the more reprehensible in light of the current widespread protest at France's decision to resume nuclear testing in the South Pacific.

The New Zealand Prime Minister has also drawn attention to the recent decision by 18 nations for the Asia-Pacific region to call for an immediate end to all nuclear testing in the region.

New Zealand opposes nuclear testing wherever it occurs and by whomever it is conducted. The Prime Minister has recalled that, after its last nuclear test, the Chinese Government confirmed that it was committed to the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and would stop testing once the treaty had been concluded. In this context, the New Zealand Government urges the Chinese Government to show its serious commitment to the completion next year of the CTBT negotiations in this Conference. In particular, New Zealand calls upon China to announce its agreement to a zero threshold for testing and to withdraw its proposal to allow for so-called "peaceful nuclear explosions".

New Zealand's serious concerns regarding this further nuclear test are also being conveyed direct to the Chinese authorities.

While I have the floor, can I also express New Zealand's support for the constructive statement on the issue of expansion made earlier by the distinguished Ambassador of Argentina? It is also New Zealand's view that the United Nations General Assembly has provided this Conference with a basis for itself achieving consensus on this question.

Mr. STARR (Australia): I have asked for the floor to inform the Conference that the Australian Prime Minister has condemned the nuclear test conducted by China and detected by Australian monitoring stations at 3 a.m. this morning Geneva time.

I would like to read to the Conference the statement by the Prime Minister of Australia. The Prime Minister has said that:

"Australia condemns the latest test of a nuclear weapon by China.

"This test is the second in only three months since the extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in May this year. At the NPT Review and Extension Conference all nuclear-weapons States agreed to exercise 'utmost restraint' with respect to nuclear testing pending the entry into force of a comprehensive test-ban treaty in 1996, and to work sincerely towards the elimination of all nuclear weapons. China's action flies in the face of these undertakings, which it supported in the NPT conference.

"One of the unfortunate consequences of China's decision to continue testing is that nations which aspire to possess nuclear weapons will question the sincerity of nuclear-weapons States to eventual nuclear disarmament and their interest in developing nuclear weapons may be reinforced. Such a development would be a serious threat to world peace.

(Mr. Starr, Australia)

"Australia welcomes the recent statement of the ASEAN Regional Forum, which called on nuclear-weapon States to bring an immediate end to nuclear testing, as a clear expression of regional and international concerns about the continued and unwarranted testing of nuclear weapons.

"Australians are angry that despite the end of the cold war and the successful extension of the NPT both China and France have decided to continue testing nuclear weapons. Our disappointment is the greater because of the restraint exhibited by the other nuclear-weapons States and the fact that these weapons-testing programmes are occurring at a critical time in international negotiations on a number of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament initiatives.

"Australia urges China to cease its nuclear-weapons testing programme now as both an important boost to global non-proliferation and disarmament efforts and global security."

That concludes the statement by the Prime Minister. I would like to continue that, from the point of view of my delegation, this explosion unfortunately follows most positive developments arising from significant steps by France and the United States in the context of this Conference's work which gave rise to expectations that we were advancing strongly towards our goal of concluding negotiations on a genuinely comprehensive ban within our 1996 target.

Thus in the context of these negotiations and of our shared expectations my delegation, like that of New Zealand, urges China to reaffirm its 1994 call for a zero threshold, to withdraw its proposal for an exception for "peaceful nuclear explosions" and to endorse explicitly the goal of concluding negotiations by mid-1996 to enable signature of this treaty by September of that year.

Mr. RUSSELL (Ireland): Mr. President, I should like first to offer you congratulations on your taking up the office of President of the Conference and to wish you well during your weeks of office.

I have asked for the floor this morning to register the concern and disappointment of Ireland at the news that China has conducted yet another nuclear test. This news is all the more disconcerting coming as it does at a time when the negotiations of the Conference on a comprehensive test-ban treaty are clearly entering their final phase. Now is surely a time for the practice of utmost restraint, in a way which most States understand that phrase to mean.

As we have made clear in previous statements to the Conference, and on the occasion of the previous Chinese test on 15 May, Ireland is opposed to all nuclear testing. We would ask those nuclear-weapon Powers who are not observing a moratorium on testing to do so, and we would also ask all members of the Conference to redouble their already productive work and bring the CTBT to a conclusion at the earliest possible stage.

(Mr. Russell, Ireland)

As I have the floor, I would like to record Ireland's appreciation of the remarks made this morning by the United Kingdom, Argentina, Chile and Canada on the expansion of the Conference, and we hope that this work will proceed productively.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Ireland for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I give the floor to the representative of China, Ambassador Sha.

Mr. SHA (China) (translated from Chinese): At the outset, Mr. President, I would like to warmly congratulate you on taking up the office of President of the Conference on Disarmament. The Chinese delegation will closely cooperate with you. At the same time I would like to extend a warm welcome to our colleagues who have just joined us, the Ambassadors from India, Canada and South Africa. I wish them success in their fulfilment of their responsibilities.

China understands the concerns of the non-nuclear States on the question of nuclear tests. On the matter of nuclear testing, China has always adopted an attitude of extreme restraint and has so far conducted a very limited number of tests. It is the hope of China that the Ad Hoc Committee on an NTB of the Conference on Disarmament will, in accordance with its mandate, conclude as early as possible and no later than in 1996 an "excellent" comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. The Chinese delegation will, as always, participate in the negotiations with a positive, serious and responsible attitude so as to make its contribution to the early conclusion of such a treaty. Once the comprehensive test-ban treaty enters into force, China will abide by the treaty and stop nuclear testing for ever.

China possess a small number of nuclear weapons solely for the purpose of self-defence. The nuclear weaponry of China poses no threat to any State. On the contrary, China itself has always lived under the shadow of the nuclear threat.

From the first day China came into possession of its nuclear weapons, it committed itself unconditionally not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States or nuclear-free zones. On many occasions China has suggested that the nuclear-weapon States should negotiate and conclude a legally binding international treaty against the first use and on the non-use of nuclear weapons. China suggested long ago that, as in the case of the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons and biological weapons, we should try to conclude a treaty on the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear weapons and their total destruction. It is our hope that the above-mentioned suggestion of China will secure an early positive response from the parties concerned.

China has its own views with regard to some members of military alliances which, while enjoying the protection of a nuclear umbrella and supporting the policy of nuclear deterrence, resort to the practice of making remarks about a small number of limited nuclear tests conducted by another State.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of China for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? This is not the case.

As you are aware, consultations are still under way on all of the outstanding issues facing the Conference. However, we have not yet identified enough common ground to enable us to move forward. Nevertheless, it is incumbent upon me to persist in my efforts to try and bring positions closer together before the end of my term of office. Therefore, I shall continue to hold consultations, both bilaterally and with groups of delegations, and shall report to you next week on the outcome of my endeavours.

The secretariat has circulated, at my request, a timetable of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for next week. The timetable was prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. It is, as usual, tentative and subject to change if necessary. On this understanding, may I suggest that the Conference adopts it?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 24 August 1995 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.