


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SPECIAL ECONOMIC, HUMANITARIAN AND DISASTER-RELIEF ASSISTANCE

Note by the Secretary-General

1. The Economic and Social Council, in resolution 1980/43 of 23 July 1980, inter alia, requested the Secretary-General "to prepare, in consultation with the organizations and bodies concerned, and with existing financial resources, a summary report, providing factual information, on the ways and means by which the United Nations system has carried out, over the past decade, its role of co-ordinating and implementing humanitarian emergency assistance in cases other than those caused by natural disasters". In the same resolution, the Council requested that the report be submitted to the Council in time for it to be considered at its spring session in April 1981.
2. Pursuant to the request contained in resolution 1980/43, the Secretary-General arranged for Mr. George F. Davidson (former Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management), to undertake the preparation of the report which is annexed hereto. Since the Council's request was for "a summary report, providing factual information" and not for recommendations or proposals, the report requires no further comment.
3. The Secretary-General notes that concurrently with the preparation of the present report, the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination (ACC) has had under review the question of strengthening the capacity of the United Nations system for responding to exceptional emergencies. In addition, the Council will consider the report of the Joint Inspection Unit on the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator (UNDRO) and the Secretary-General's comments thereon. A number of the broader issues concerning emergency situations addressed in the present report will, consequently, be considered by the Council at its second regular session. Under the circumstances, the Secretary-General suggests that the Council may wish to take note of the present report, submitted in accordance with resolution 1980/43, and defer further consideration of it until the July session, when the report of ACC is expected to be before the Council.

Annex

INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO MEET HUMANITARIAN NEEDS
IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS

SUMMARY REPORT

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INTRODUCTION

1. The present report has been prepared, in consultation with the organizations and bodies concerned, in response to the request contained in Economic and Social Council resolution 1980/43 of 23 July 1980 for a "summary report providing factual information on the ways and means by which the United Nations system has carried out, over the past decade, its role of co-ordinating and implementing humanitarian emergency assistance in cases other than those caused by natural disasters".
2. In the course of preparing the requested report, visits were paid to and consultations held with the competent officials of most, if not all, of the United Nations agencies and organs involved in the provision of humanitarian emergency assistance, including the following:
 - (a) International Labour Organisation (ILO);
 - (b) Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO);
 - (c) World Food Programme (WFP);
 - (d) United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO);
 - (e) World Health Organization (WHO);
 - (f) United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF);
 - (g) Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR);
 - (h) United Nations Development Programme (UNDP);
 - (i) Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator (UNDRO);
 - (j) Office of the Co-ordinator for Special Economic Assistance Programmes.
3. Discussions were also held with a number of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations outside the United Nations system, notably:
 - (a) The European Economic Community (EEC);
 - (b) The Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM); a/
 - (c) The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC);

a/ Formerly the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM).

- (d) The League of Red Cross Societies (LRCS);
- (e) The International Council of Voluntary Agencies. b/

4. The factual information on which the present report is based has been provided, in large part, by these co-operating agencies, either in written form or orally during personal interviews with the respective officers responsible for dealing with emergency situations. The interviews were held during the two-month period extending from mid-October to mid-December 1980. A careful review has also been undertaken of the extensive documentation which has been built up in recent years, inside and outside the United Nations, on the subject of international action and the need for better inter-agency co-ordination in dealing with all types of emergency situations. Most of this material deals with the problem as it relates to natural disasters, which are excluded from the scope of the present report. Despite this, the lessons to be learned from attempts to deal with natural disasters are much the same as those which apply to "man-made" emergencies. The originating cause of the emergency may be different: but the humanitarian considerations - how to feed, clothe and shelter uprooted and helpless people - are the same. The need to co-ordinate the efforts of intergovernmental and voluntary agencies and to achieve prompt, effective and concerted action in accordance with a well-conceived and integrated over-all plan is also common to both types of situations. For these reasons, the study has not hesitated to draw on the accumulated experience, both in written form and otherwise, of UNDR0 and of all co-operating organizations, almost all of which have participated actively, on humanitarian grounds, in both natural and "man-made" disasters, without attempting to differentiate between them.

5. In addition to the Office of the Co-ordinator for United Nations Disaster Relief Operations (established in 1981) there has been established more recently within the Secretariat of the United Nations, an Office of the Co-ordinator for Special Economic Assistance Programmes. This Office has been charged with the responsibility of dealing with a growing number of critical situations, chiefly in Africa, where emergency economic assistance is urgently required in order to prevent a serious threat to the economic viability of a member State. It was necessary to consider whether situations of this kind, calling for emergency economic assistance, were intended to be excluded from the scope of the resolution referring specifically to humanitarian emergency assistance.

6. After consulting with the principal sponsors and seeking advice from other sources as to the intended scope of the resolution, it was concluded that the study should not impose any arbitrary limits which would have the effect of excluding from consideration situations requiring emergency economic aid if it could be shown that humanitarian needs of refugees, displaced persons or other large groups of uprooted people were a contributing factor to the creation of the economic emergency. Thus, situations such as those created in recent years by the influx of people into Sudan, Djibouti and Somalia were considered to come within the scope of

b/ Including, inter alia, Catholic Relief Services, Lutheran World Federation, OXFAM and the World Council of Churches.

the resolution. The same could be said of the economic emergencies faced by a number of former Portuguese colonies which had newly won their independence, only to find their economic viability seriously threatened by an influx of nationals returning from their places of asylum or by an exodus of experienced personnel belonging to the former colonial administration.

7. On the other hand, certain types of economic emergencies, such as those dealt with by the United Nations Emergency Operation (1974-1975), would appear to be beyond the intended scope of the resolution. This operation was intended to ease the anticipated balance-of-payments difficulties of those countries whose economic viability had been most seriously affected - particularly in respect of their balance-of-payments position - by deteriorating economic situations such as the sudden sharp increase in oil prices of 1973-1974. More recently, the severe economic difficulties of a number of newly independent countries have been brought to the attention of the General Assembly and joint inter-agency missions have been dispatched to study and report upon the international measures of assistance required to restore these countries to a state of economic viability. Despite the critical nature of these situations, which fully justify their being considered as emergencies, the difficulties faced by these countries call, for the most part, for economic policies and development aid and only to a lesser extent, for the provision of humanitarian emergency assistance. Consequently, they can only marginally be considered as situations coming within the scope of Economic and Social resolution 1980/43.

8. Within the parameters established by the foregoing examples and in an effort to obtain precise information as to the "ways and means" by which the United Nations system has carried out its role of co-ordinating and implementing humanitarian emergency assistance in individual cases, co-operating agencies were asked to complete a detailed questionnaire prepared specifically for the present study. Each agency to which the questionnaire was sent was asked to provide a list of not more than 12 humanitarian emergencies, in which it had been involved during the 10-year period 1971-1980 and to complete the detailed questionnaire with respect to each of them. A complete list of the situations selected for this purpose by the responding organizations is presented in annex I to the present report.

9. The period under study extends for all practical purposes from the uprising in East Pakistan in 1971 (which led to the establishment of an independent Bangladesh) to the grave emergencies afflicting the world a full decade later in the Horn of Africa, in South-East Asia and in Pakistan as a result of the influx of refugees from Afghanistan. Each of these situations presents to the world a crisis of the gravest dimensions, spilling over into a number of States and posing a serious threat to the stability of the entire region. Bangladesh, viewed in the perspective of a decade later, now typifies a situation which has passed through the first two stages of emergency - that of relief, and that of rehabilitation and reconstruction - and is now concentrating its efforts on long-term development objectives. Kampuchea has hopefully passed through the most critical period of the emergency-relief stage and is now almost ready to move into a phase of rehabilitation and reconstruction. The other two situations, involving the Horn of Africa and the Afghan refugees,

point, at present, to the unrelieved prospect of a continuing relief requirement, based on the most elemental necessities of life, for perhaps as many as 1.5 million people in each case, in the foreseeable future.

10. These four major emergencies provide, in a sense, the cornerstones of the present study. They were and still are the most complex of all the humanitarian emergencies with which the United Nations has had to deal. They involved the largest number of United Nations agencies and other agencies - intergovernmental, bilateral and voluntary. Because of their complexity, they required, more than other situations, the greatest amount of co-ordination. Experience gained through mistakes made here, through coping with delays encountered in responding to specific needs or breakdowns in communication and co-ordination, provided valuable lessons for application in other smaller emergencies. Yet the smaller emergencies are important, too, for they provide the test of the continuing effectiveness of the machinery which the United Nations system - and the world as a whole - has painfully built up over the decades to cope with humanitarian crises, afflicting large numbers of people, crises which lie beyond the powers of individual Governments to deal with.

11. In addition to providing a list of emergency situations and completing the individual questionnaires for each situation listed, co-operating agencies and individuals were invited to submit a brief confidential narrative summarizing their experience and assessing, from their particular point of view, the strengths and weaknesses of international efforts, during the past decade, to achieve more effective co-ordination and, consequently, more effective action in meeting the need for humanitarian assistance in "man-made" emergencies.

12. Economic and Social Council resolution 1980/43 clearly specified that what was wanted was a "summary report providing factual information on the ways and means ..."; consequently, no attempt has been made in the present report to summarize the opinions or comments of the agencies or individuals who responded to this part of the questionnaire. However, these narratives, which provide well-considered assessments of agency experience with the system over the years, have provided invaluable background material for the preparation of the present report.

13. While the foregoing statement applies to both United Nations and other agencies which have co-operated in providing information, it has particular relevance for those responding organizations which find themselves, in these humanitarian emergencies, drawn in as partners with the United Nations agencies while remaining constitutionally outside the United Nations system itself. As Economic and Social Council resolution 1980/43 implies, the present report is expected to deal essentially with co-ordination within the United Nations system, but other intergovernmental agencies such as the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM) and voluntary bodies, such as, the League of Red Cross Societies and the agencies making up the International Council of Voluntary Agencies are inescapably involved in, and affected by, the efforts of the United Nations system to achieve effective co-ordination in dealing with humanitarian emergencies. These agencies see from the outside the efforts put forward by the United Nations system to co-ordinate its humanitarian efforts in these "man-made" situations. Their co-operation and assistance in providing a more complete and well-rounded base of factual information for the present report has been especially valuable.

14. In this connexion, particular recognition must be given to the special place which ICRC occupies in the field of humanitarian assistance in man-made disasters. Unlike the United Nations itself and the specialized agencies (which derive their status from the Charter, their respective statutes and the relationship agreements linking them with the United Nations), ICRC enjoys a unique internationally recognized status, by means of its special statute and by the 1949 Geneva Conventions which have accorded to it a separate and unique position among all international organizations operating in the field of humanitarian aid. Without the unique contribution of ICRC and that of the other responding organizations outside the United Nations system, the present report would have lacked the detached perspective essential to an evaluation of the effectiveness of the United Nations system in co-ordinating international humanitarian emergency assistance in man-made disasters.

I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

15. The task entrusted to the Secretary-General by Economic and Social Council resolution 1980/43 has been interpreted as including all those emergency situations which have been created as a result of political, military and other upheavals, originating from man-made policies or actions and which have led to massive dislocations of population - refugees or displaced persons - with consequent human suffering on a large scale, necessitating the provision of humanitarian assistance through a wide range of governmental, intergovernmental and voluntary organizations.

16. Typically in such situations, to meet the first shock of the emergency, help in the form of food, shelter, clothing, medical supplies and personnel has to be mobilized. Following the "crash" phase of the operation, other emergency services - education, employment, resettlement or repatriation - come into play. As emergency relief and subsequent rehabilitation needs are met, the operation merges eventually into the ongoing development-assistance programme for the country concerned. These three phases call typically for the inputs of different agencies, depending on whether their functions are geared to relief, rehabilitation or development. However, the phases themselves are not clearly distinguishable one from the other; and the services which the individual agencies render extend frequently from relief to rehabilitation activities and even at times overflow into the development phase.

17. While Economic and Social Council resolution 1980/43 asks for factual information relating to the past decade on the ways and means by which the United Nations system has carried out its role of co-ordinating and implementing humanitarian emergency assistance in cases other than those caused by natural disasters, the agencies of the United Nations system have, from their inception, been involved in all three phases of such assistance; and the ways and means employed by it for the co-ordination of such assistance have developed from their experience of preceding years. The aftermath of the Second World War brought about the creation of a number of new intergovernmental organizations to cope with particular problems - the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA), the International Refugee Organization (IRO), the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the Office of the United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and others. In 1948, for reasons not directly related to the Second World War, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) was established. Each of these organizations was created to deal with a specific problem, the duration of which, it was hoped, would be limited in time. None of them was visualized as an organization which would serve on a stand-by basis as an element of an emergency system to deal with natural or man-made disasters which might arise in the future. Co-operation among the various agencies engaged in different humanitarian enterprises was ad hoc, intermittent and informal, based on improvisation and the necessities of the situation.

18. Progressively, however, as the United Nations organization itself and the specialized agencies making up the family of permanent post-war organizations began to acquire a greater degree of maturity, the situation began to change. In 1956, for example, a second major humanitarian emergency occurred as a result of developments in Hungary. On this occasion (unlike the preceding Palestinian emergency when a special "temporary" agency was created to deal with the problem), no special new organization was established. Instead, the resources of existing international agencies were mobilized to work with the Austrian authorities and in other neighbouring countries. With the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, because of the nature of the emergency, acting as a "lead agency" (although the term had not been invented at the time), the different elements of the Red Cross network, the International Committee for European Migration (a non-United Nations intergovernmental agency), UNICEF, WHO and a host of national and international voluntary, religious and philanthropic organizations joined forces in a common effort to meet the challenge of human need. The success of the effort, relying on the skills and resources of existing agencies rather than on any new instrumentality, set a pattern for future collaborative action that has endured from the time of the Hungarian uprising to the present day.

19. Food is an indispensable element, frequently the main element, needed in every emergency situation, and the establishment of the World Food Programme gave recognition in its creation to that fact. The World Food Programme, a joint enterprise of the United Nations and FAO during the early 1960s, added a valuable element to the inventory of resources available through the United Nations system to deal with the humanitarian consequences of disaster. Significantly however, the World Food Programme was not brought into being as an interim agency to meet a specific emergency situation. It was conceived as a permanent organization, operating in a specific functional field and mandated on a continuing basis to provide its own particular kind of service to whatever situations - emergency or otherwise - might arise in the future.

20. By the latter part of the 1960s, the world as a whole was clearly better equipped than ever before with the institutional structures necessary to cope with the onset of disasters - both man-made and natural - wherever in the world they might arise. Yet even so, the situation could not be described as satisfactory or adequate. Political disturbances in the Congo and in Nigeria during this decade revealed many weaknesses in the capacity of the various organizations, public and private, to work together and to respond promptly to the major needs presented by these two man-made emergencies.

21. In addition, long-term development aid, rather than short-term humanitarian assistance in response to emergencies, had priority in the minds of most Member States of the United Nations. However, as the involvement of United Nations agencies in various human or natural disaster situations became progressively greater, the concern of Member States with the need to improve methods of dealing with these situations began to manifest itself in different forms. Concerned with the problem of adequate co-ordination of efforts, the Economic and Social Council, in 1965, agreed that the Resident Representative of UNDP should be assigned a co-ordinating role in the field. In 1968, the General Assembly called upon the Secretary-General to prepare a report on action taken by Governments and international organizations in responding to requests for assistance (in cases of natural disaster), which resulted in an interim report by the Secretary-General to the Economic and Social Council on 12 May 1970 (E/4853), in which reference was made, for the first time, to the need for the establishment of a focal point in the United Nations system "from which to initiate action and exercise more effective co-ordination". c/ A succession of natural disasters in the latter part of 1969 and the first half of 1970 - floods in Romania and Hungary, a serious earthquake in Peru - underscored the need for improved arrangements at the international level to deal with these human tragedies. Even though, in the case of Peru, the Resident Representative was on the spot and acted with commendable effectiveness to co-ordinate the efforts of the agencies rendering help, and despite the dispatch of two joint missions and a Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, it was necessary for the latter in his report to the Secretary-General of 2 October 1970 (E/L.1356, para. 7) to state that "at the present time, the United Nations family, as a system of organizations, is not as a whole particularly well-equipped for assisting countries in the kind of operations that are called for in the first emergency phase in cases of natural disasters, nor is it a function which it has been entrusted with by the community of nations. In the first phase, its role is generally speaking, bound to be very modest, the more so the greater the magnitude of the disaster".

22. This lack of readiness of the United Nations system as a whole to respond adequately to emergencies was reiterated by the Secretary-General himself in his comprehensive report on Assistance in Cases of Natural Disaster (E/4994 of 13 May 1971, para. 39) in the following words:

"The United Nations system as a whole - with the major exception of UNICEF and to some extent WHO and FAO/WFP - is not equipped to provide emergency relief. The World Food Programme, although it may sometimes borrow from resources in the area, has usually to transport bulky food supplies to

c/ This need was met by the designation by the Secretary-General on 26 October 1970 of the Assistant Secretary-General for Inter-Agency Affairs as the official to advise the Secretary-General and to represent him in all matters relating to assistance in cases of natural disaster as well as other aspects of United Nations action in natural disasters and similar situations. This was a temporary arrangement, to be replaced a year later by the creation of the Office of the Disaster Relief Co-ordinator as the focal point in the United Nations system for disaster-relief matters (General Assembly resolution 2816 (XXVI), of 14 December 1971, para. 3).

the scene of the disaster, and this takes considerable time. The principal organs equipped for international emergency relief are and will continue to be the League of Red Cross Societies, other voluntary organizations and church groups, and Governments". d/

23. While all of the foregoing was stated in the context of natural disasters, it goes without saying that the assessment applied equally to the ability of the United Nations system to respond to man-made emergencies. The General Assembly's response to this sober and realistic assessment of the United Nations capacity was expressed in General Assembly resolution 2717 (XXV) of 15 December 1970, which called upon the Secretary-General, inter alia, to make recommendations as to "ways and means of ensuring better mobilization and co-ordination of the assistance to be provided through the United Nations, the organizations of the United Nations system, as well as the League of Red Cross Societies and other non-governmental organizations".

24. The similarity between the wording of the paragraph quoted above and that of Economic and Social Council resolution 1980/43 nearly a decade later calling for this present report is striking. The factual summary of the present situation given in the present report, when compared with the realistic assessment of the United Nations capacity a decade ago, should provide a meaningful basis on which to assess the progress which has been achieved in the period under review.

25. The creation of the Office of the Co-ordinator for Disaster Relief by General Assembly resolution 2816 (XXVI) of 14 December 1971 was the first important step taken to remedy the organizational weaknesses revealed in the comprehensive report of the Secretary-General dated 13 May 1971. While the activities of UNDRO in the field of natural disasters lie outside the scope of the present report, it is pertinent to note that (a) the mandate given to the Disaster Relief Co-ordinator by the General Assembly was not limited to natural disasters; and that (b) the Assembly, in its resolution, accepted the Secretary-General's proposal that the permanent office to be established for the Disaster Relief Co-ordinator in Geneva should be the "focal point" in the United Nations system in disaster-relief matters. The original intention in this connexion was never entirely fulfilled, since in practice the Office of the Disaster Relief Co-ordinator has generally confined its efforts to natural disasters, whereas man-made emergencies requiring emergency humanitarian aid have been dealt with in other ways.

26. While steps to strengthen the machinery within the United Nations system for meeting humanitarian assistance needs were thus slowly taking shape, one of the most devastating double disasters of modern times struck the people of East Pakistan.

d/ Interestingly, para. 40 goes on to express the view that "although the United Nations system is not geared for action of this kind, nor is it realistic to suppose that, given its structure, it could become so, it should be able to help in different ways".

In November 1970, floods of unprecedented extent and severity devastated large areas of East Pakistan; to cope with this natural disaster, a special operation known as UNEPRO (United Nations East Pakistan Relief Operation) was set up. Hard upon the heels of this blow came the political upheavals which led eventually to the separation of East Pakistan from West Pakistan and the emergence of the new independent State of Bangladesh. During 1971, however, an estimated 10 million refugees from East Pakistan fled their country and sought refuge in India. To meet this emergency, the Secretary-General designated the High Commissioner for Refugees as the focal point and set in motion the machinery for international action that was to face the largest and, in many ways, the most difficult operation ever undertaken by the United Nations system. While this was taking place outside the boundaries of East Pakistan, the civil war which erupted led to widespread destruction of property, the breakdown of transport and other public services and threatened with starvation the rest of the population remaining in the country. To cope with this problem - a man-made disaster of most awesome proportions, the United Nations Relief Operation Dacca (UNROD) was established, later to be continued as the United Nations Relief Operation - Bangladesh (UNROB).

27. Bangladesh represents one of the truly historic "rescue" operations of modern times - certainly the largest and most important ever undertaken and brought to a successful conclusion by the United Nations system. Three similar situations face the United Nations more or less concurrently today: the situation in South-East Asia created by political upheavals and military action in Kampuchea, the same combination of man-made actions in the Horn of Africa and the situation on the Afghan border in Pakistan where 1.5 million Afghan refugees face an uncertain future and present a major humanitarian challenge to the world community.

28. In the interval between the man-made emergency of Bangladesh and the human tragedies of Kampuchea, the Horn of Africa and the Afghan refugees, a growing number of smaller but nonetheless serious incidents occurred, resulting in the large-scale dislocation of populations and widespread human suffering - calling, in all cases, for international humanitarian action to relieve human suffering and to help in restoring conditions to normal. The situations which were considered significant enough by the agencies concerned to provide the background of information necessary for the present report are listed below in the appendix. The remainder of the present report will review the experience of the last 10 years in order to enable a determination to be made as to how the United Nations has adjusted or improved its facilities and procedures for dealing with the steadily increasing number of humanitarian emergencies which it is called upon to face.

II. DEVELOPMENTS AT THE AGENCY LEVEL

29. The effectiveness of the efforts of the international community to respond to humanitarian emergencies depends on a number of factors, among which are the following:

(a) The resources which potential donor countries are in a position to provide to help in meeting the consequences of human disaster and the extent to which they are organized to respond promptly to international appeals for aid. This depends on the extent to which potential donor countries have organized in advance and co-ordinated their own internal machinery;

(b) The facilities which the affected country or countries have at their disposal to cope with emergencies and the extent to which these facilities and services can be effectively mobilized and co-ordinated within the country itself. This applies not only to the country in which the political or military situation giving rise to the emergency originates, but equally, if not more so, to the adjoining countries which are the first to have to bear the brunt of the refugee or displaced populations and disruption of normal activities such as trade and transport;

(c) The existence of well-co-ordinated machinery within each agency or organization which will ensure an effective response to whatever its role may be in helping to meet the consequences of the emergency;

(d) Finally, and greatly dependent on the three previously mentioned factors, the extent to which, within the United Nations system itself and outside (including non-United Nations and voluntary agencies), effective early warning procedures, adequate financial and personnel resources (at least to ensure a prompt initial response to the plea for help) and machinery for the effective co-ordination of individual agency roles can be assured.

30. The first of these factors, the resources which potential donor countries are in a position to provide to help in meeting the consequences of human disaster, although critical for success of all emergency operations, is not the subject of the present report. The primary concern of the report is with the fourth factor listed above, although this, however, is closely tied to the other two: the adequacy of the facilities available, the state of organization within the country or countries affected and the readiness of individual agencies to respond promptly and in a well-co-ordinated manner to the demands which will be made upon them.

31. In the following pages, the extent to which changes and improvements have taken place in the "state of readiness" of the affected countries and the agencies most concerned with providing humanitarian emergency assistance is reviewed under the following headings:

- (a) National disaster-preparedness units;
- (b) Agency-emergency units;
- (c) Early warning systems;
- (d) Permission to intervene - consent of affected Governments;
- (e) Assessment capabilities;
- (f) Time required by agency to reach initial decision to respond;
- (g) Adequacy of available financial resources;
- (h) Immediate availability of financial resources;
- (i) Stock-piling; pre-positioning of supplies and equipment;
- (j) Enlargement of readily available, experienced manpower pool;
- (k) Elimination of technical obstacles to cross-border movement of supplies, equipment and personnel.

A. National disaster-preparedness units

32. Within the past 10 years, there has been a noticeable increase, both at the country and at the individual agency level, in the advance preparations which have been made to meet sudden human emergencies, both natural and man-made. At the country level, this has been partly owing to the increased awareness of countries which are particularly vulnerable in their exposure to natural, if not man-made disasters. The Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator has contributed to this increased awareness and has stimulated greater efforts in a number of countries to develop preparedness plans and to organize their domestic facilities and resources in a more co-ordinated fashion for the purpose of dealing with future emergencies. For instance, a 1979 study of 49 least-developed and most seriously affected developing countries (LDCs and MSAs) revealed that 11 countries claimed to have both national disaster organizations and national disaster plans in existence, if only on a skeleton basis. Five others had established disaster organizations but lacked a disaster plan, while three others reported disaster plans but no national disaster organization. e/ It is not possible to state with any degree of accuracy how effective these plans would be in a situation requiring action. Most, if not all, of them have been developed either in the context of civil defense or in preparedness for natural disasters. None the less, they

e/ Eighteen of those reporting stated that they had neither a national disaster organization nor a disaster plan, while 12 countries did not reply. More than four-fifths of the countries included in the survey had experienced major natural disasters requiring international assistance during the preceding five years. (Barbara Jean Brown, Disaster Preparedness and the United Nations; Advanced Planning for Disaster Relief, UNITAR Study No. 15 (Elmsford, New York, Pergamon Press, 1979)).

represent an improvement in the degree of readiness to meet and respond to unexpected contingencies, and as such, they have advanced to at least a limited degree the state of preparedness of these countries to react to situations calling for humanitarian emergency assistance in cases other than natural disaster.

B. Agency emergency units

33. Individual agencies, too, have advanced in a number of ways their state of preparedness. Emergency units have been formally established in a number of agencies within the decade under review - UNICEF in 1971, FAO, through the creation of the Office of Special (originally Sahelian) Relief Operations (OSRO) in 1973, WFP in 1976 and UNHCR as recently as the autumn of 1980. The World Health Organization has also designated an officer responsible for Emergency Relief Operations. Other voluntary agencies too, notably the League of Red Cross Societies, have established within the past 10 years especially, strong and effective disaster-relief units within their secretariats for the purpose of planning in advance and organizing their respective responses in the event of emergency. In fact, in some cases, the organization itself is the emergency unit, for the reason that its primary reason for existence is to respond to emergencies. The Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator is an example of this: UNICEF also, as its acronym reminds us (still used today despite the elimination of the word "emergency" from its current title), was originally established as an agency to deal with emergencies affecting children. Its trend through the years of its existence has been in the direction of longer-term programming, although it is still heavily involved in emergency situations, notably as lead agency in Kampuchea. By contrast, UNHCR reflects an opposite trend. At its inception, it was hoped that the accumulation of post-war refugee problems would soon be disposed of, permitting the High Commissioner to concentrate on his function of legal protection - and this objective came near to being realized in the early 1960s when the High Commissioner actually proposed the early abolition of his Emergency Fund. This direction was reversed, however, in the latter half of the 1960s and the decade of the 1970s, with the result that the High Commissioner's Office is today more heavily involved in humanitarian emergencies and on a larger scale than at any previous time in its history.

34. In addition to UNDRO, UNICEF and UNHCR, the United Nations has added within the last few years, a fourth office which is concerned essentially with economic emergencies which threaten the economic viability of Member States. This is the Office of the Co-ordinator for Special Economic Assistance Programmes. Unlike UNICEF and UNHCR, which have substantial resources at their disposal, together with an extensive operational capability to act as lead agency when required, the Office of the Co-ordinator for Special Economic Assistance Programmes functions chiefly through Joint Inter-agency Missions, created for the purpose of assessing the most urgent requirements of a country facing economic disaster and mobilizing to the extent possible from donor countries the resources required to stave off economic collapse.

C. Early warning systems

35. Discussions with the delegates from the developed and developing countries in the course of preparing the present report have clearly highlighted the importance attached by all States to the capacity of the United Nations system and its agencies to respond promptly to appeals for humanitarian assistance when a man-made emergency occurs. Experience has repeatedly demonstrated that timeliness in the provision of aid required stands second in importance only to the quantity and quality of the aid itself. The ability of the United Nations system (and its associated agencies) to respond promptly is critical to its credibility as an effective and reliable network for the provision of needed assistance in times of emergency. This has, in fact, been one of the most difficult problems for the United Nations system to overcome. A certain amount of time is inevitably required to assess the nature and extent of the aid that is needed. The task of mobilizing and delivering large quantities of material aid by air or by surface transport involves logistical delays which are unavoidable; and in cases calling for the intervention of a number of agencies, effective co-ordination of the inputs and roles of the separate, independent entities cannot be accomplished instantly.

36. The possibility of early notification and early warning takes on in these circumstances added significance, since early notification of an impending emergency enables a number of initial preparatory steps to be taken. During the past decade a number of agencies, notably FAO/WFP and WHO, have established early warning systems in order to notify their respective headquarters of imminent emergencies within their respective areas of competence. f/ The United Nations Development Programme has also, through its network of resident representatives, which serve also WFP and UNDRO, developed a considerable degree of expertise in this regard. So far, no mechanism has yet been developed for linking these early warning systems into an integrated network reported to a central "focal point", in the system. The separate early warning systems, however, enable the individual agencies in their respective fields of competence to anticipate and make advance preparations for their participation in emergencies of which they have received early notification.

D. Permission to intervene: consent of affected Governments

37. One of the factors contributing at times to delay in responding to humanitarian emergencies is the necessity of awaiting an official request for help from the

f/ In the case of FAO/WFP, this is known as the Global Information and Early Warning System. In the case of WHO, it is called the Emergency Relief Operations Centre at headquarters (with regional counterparts). WHO has its World-wide Weather Watch to provide advance notification of weather-related emergencies. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have systems to monitor foreign data and foreign-exchange reserves.

Government of the country or countries directly affected. Instances have arisen in the past when the Government of a country has shown itself to be reluctant to acknowledge that a disaster has occurred and that it is not able to deal with it effectively. Situations of this kind are even more likely to arise when the emergency results from political or civil disturbances within a country or because of military upheavals. In such circumstances, Governments are frequently reluctant to request assistance, even though serious suffering may be occurring for large numbers of their people. Assistance from the outside cannot normally be provided or offered by United Nations agencies since such action could be misunderstood or misinterpreted as an attempt to interfere in the domestic affairs of a sovereign State. In such situations, agencies established for the purpose of providing humanitarian assistance in emergencies are, at times, unfairly blamed for delays in providing the needed help.

38. Despite these limitations on the ability of the United Nations to intervene in matters of domestic jurisdiction, successive Secretaries-General have, in a number of instances, intervened to offer the facilities and help of the United Nations on humanitarian grounds. It may also be noted that the position of the Red Cross, in situations of the kind described, is not as circumscribed as that of United Nations agencies, since the Red Cross at times finds it possible in difficult situations to initiate action to help, either through ICRC (in accordance with its constitutional prerogatives as set out in the 1949 Geneva Conventions) or through the national society within the country concerned. Red Cross and other voluntary agency intervention in such circumstances is not as suspect as actions by organizations representing Governments. A number of other organizations such as UNICEF and ICM have also found, on occasion, that an offer to assist, delivered through informal channels on a "good offices" basis is sometimes welcomed by a Government that is otherwise unwilling to make a formal request. Unofficial consent to interventions is sometimes easier to obtain than an official governmental request. On the whole, however, this continues to be a delaying factor in some circumstances, and the situation with respect to the requirement that agencies may act only on request of the Governments affected has undergone relatively little change during the past 10 years.

E. Assessment capabilities

39. Even when requests for assistance are forthcoming from Governments, and some advance notification is possible, it is necessary, before agencies are in a position to do more than take preliminary steps of an organizational nature, to have a reasonable assessment of the help required. Much depends, in this regard, on the ability of the emergency organization (if any) within the country or countries affected to accurately assess the need, or, failing that, on the ability of the organizations concerned to make their own expert assessments. Where a major emergency occurs, involving the facilities and resources of a number of organizations the most practical first step may well be prompt assembling and dispatch of a joint inter-agency mission to assess the over-all need for outside help. This does not have to hold up the immediate dispatch of interim quantities of materials known to be basic requirements in any disaster situation: but an early and comprehensive

over-all assessment of needs is essential if there is to be a saving of time, effort and expense and an avoidance of confusion at a later stage. g/

40. In this area of expertise, the United Nations system has acquired a considerable amount of experience and competence in recent years. The idea of joint inter-agency missions is not a new one, having been used on occasion in earlier decades; as stated above, not one but two inter-agency missions h/ were dispatched to Peru on the occasion of the disastrous earthquake there in May 1970, and earlier examples could also be cited. But as experience in dealing with disasters of various kinds became more extensive, as the number of situations increased in which the United Nations family was called upon for assistance and following the establishment of UNDR0, in particular, the device of the joint inter-agency assessment mission became more and more common. Agency responses to the questionnaires completed in response to the present study recorded 30 instances (some of them overlapping) in which agencies participated in joint assessment missions, as well as 46 missions which they themselves dispatched for their own purposes.

41. Within very recent years, the joint assessment missions have come into more frequent use as a result of the establishment of the Office of the Co-ordinator for Special Economic Assistance Programmes. Here, an interesting difference in approach would appear to be emerging, as between this new Office on the one hand and the functional or operational agencies (such as UNICEF, UNHCR and WFP) on the other. This Office, having essentially co-ordinating responsibilities but lacking financial resources of any kind to enable it to carry out an operational role, appears to be more disposed to turn to the device of an inter-agency assessment mission than do the functional or operational agencies, which are more likely to identify a situation as one calling for direct action on their part and to initiate action accordingly. In the case of UNICEF, UNHCR and WFP, the need to take direct action would appear to have top priority in their minds. This is undoubtedly a result of the fact that these agencies, unlike the Office of the Co-ordinator for Special Economic Assistance Programmes, have substantial financial and other resources at their disposal which they are in a position to deploy immediately.

g/ In this connexion, the following comment is worthy of attention. "The crucial question here is: how to balance informed decision with speed of intervention. In other words, should assistance be rushed with the risk that action will be partly irrelevant, or should action be delayed with the risk that relief will come too late? Field data collected over the last decade suggest that the over-all effectiveness of relief would indeed be improved if speed was traded off for better information." Quoted from Michel F. Lechat, "Medical care and natural disasters", UNDR0 News, September 1980. (Professor Lechat is Director of the International Centre for Disaster Epidemiology, Louvain University, Belgium).

h/ One of these, a joint mission of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Latin American Institute for Economic and Social Planning had as its object to make a broad assessment of the disaster impact: the other UNDP/IBRD mission aimed at identifying specific projects to be undertaken by the United Nations family as part of the rehabilitation-reconstruction process.

42. Another point worth noting is that the joint assessment mission seems to be utilized more frequently within the United Nations system - whose agencies recorded 27 of the 30 joint missions reported -- than the non-United Nations agencies such as ICN, ICRC and LRCS which would appear to have a preference for the single agency missions, as shown by the fact that 23 of the 46 agency missions were recorded by these three non-United Nations agencies, compared to only two joint inter-agency missions.

43. The development of the joint assessment mission as a device for co-ordinating, at the initial stages of a disaster, the assessment of needs represents one of the most important advances in handling emergencies by the United Nations system during the past 10 years. A considerable amount of experience and expertise has been gained: the techniques of gathering relevant data have been acquired and improved; standards and units of measurement for assessing needs have been developed. Most important of all perhaps, the process of producing a joint assessment by a team of individuals, each one representing a different element in the United Nations system (together with the related voluntary organizations) has had the result of producing, in the report which emerges, a collective inventory of need and, at times, a general plan of action; and has, through the co-ordinated approach taken in the production of the report itself, set the stage for (although it could not guarantee) a substantial degree of co-ordination in the implementation of the emergency assistance programme.

F. Time required by agency to reach initial decision to respond

44. The questionnaire circulated to agencies sought to obtain information as to the details of the process leading up to an agency's decision to respond to an appeal for humanitarian emergency assistance, in order to determine whether this was a possible source of delay. The responses provided were reassuring. Without exception, agencies reported that they do not have to await a decision from any of the United Nations legislative organs before taking a decision, provided that the nature of the aid requested falls within the agency's terms of reference. Resolutions of the General Assembly, Security Council or the Economic and Social Council typically follow and endorse, rather than precede action taken to provide humanitarian emergency assistance. The same is true of resolutions adopted by agencies. Agencies generally reported that the executive head of the organization has the authority, i/ without further reference to the legislative level, to take whatever action is required within the agency's mandate -- and of course within the agency's financial limits. The information provided in the questionnaires as to the exact dates on which requests for assistance were received and the dates on which a decision to respond favourably was reached confirmed that responses were prompt and almost immediate. Undoubtedly delays have occurred at the country level, in

i/ In the case of WFP, the Executive Director acts upon a decision that is taken by the Director-General of FAO which is, to all intents and purposes, automatic. No further reference to a legislative authority is needed.

launching an appeal - sometimes for political, at other times, for bureaucratic or administrative reasons. Occasionally, delays have also occurred because of the necessity of relaying the appeal from one point (to which the appeal was directed) to another (which was in a better position to deal with it). Delays have also arisen on occasion as a result of legislative decisions; but the evidence presented by the responding agencies themselves and confirmed from other sources establishes clearly that with rare and occasional exceptions, the agency decision to respond favourably rests with the executive head (on delegation from his legislative authority) and is given promptly - in most cases immediately - on receipt of the appeal for help.

G. Adequacy of available financial resources

45. One of the most significant facts emerging from a review of the United Nations system's activity in the field of humanitarian emergency assistance relates to the remarkable growth in the volume of financial resources placed at the disposal of the participating agencies. This has, of course, been necessitated by the increasing number of humanitarian emergencies calling for international action which have erupted in recent years and the large-scale nature of a number of these emergencies. Agency responses to the questionnaires distributed in connexion with the present report confirmed that the amount of financial support provided from the "regular" budgets of individual agencies has grown substantially in recent years but remains at a relatively modest level in relation to the total amounts now being spent. In fact, contributions from regular budgets now constitute a smaller percentage of the whole than they did earlier when the total volume of expenditure was lower.

46. To illustrate the extent of the growth in expenditures on humanitarian assistance, the budget of the High Commissioner for Refugees which seven years ago was of the order of \$25 million (regular budget and extrabudgetary funds) reached a level close to \$500 million in 1980. Emergency food aid, provided through WFP from its own emergency funds and from the International Emergency Food Reserve (established within the past decade) has grown from \$7 million annually seven years ago to \$122.5 million in 1979 and approximately \$150 million in 1980. Until recent years, these amounts have been expended principally for assistance in cases of natural disaster, but FAO/WFP reports that for 1980, 60 per cent of the food relief provided has been for man-made disasters.

47. Expenditures of UNICEF outside of its normal programme of activity, for purposes of humanitarian assistance in cases of man-made emergencies have also increased greatly in the period under review. Not only was UNICEF a major participating agency in the provision of emergency humanitarian assistance to Bangladesh, but more recently, in association with the International Committee of the Red Cross, it has served as the lead agency for the provision of emergency aid with Kampuchea. As such, UNICEF and ICRC were jointly responsible for an operation involving a total expenditure of approximately \$500 million in the 15-month period ending 31 December 1980 - of which UNICEF itself expended from extra-budgetary sources, approximately \$75 million.

48. The World Health Organization, too, has established, in order to meet its responsibilities in emergency situations, an Executive Board Special Fund and more recently, a Special Account for Disasters and National Catastrophes. The resources available from these funds are relatively modest in comparison to those made available to WHO for its health-support activities from other sources.

49. Increased personnel and financial resources have also been provided for these humanitarian assistance programmes by the major voluntary agencies. While detailed figures are not available on this point, the League of Red Cross Societies reports a total of approximately 100 million Swiss francs annually expended from its funds on emergency situations averaging 22 annually during the period under review. During this period also (1973-1979), ICRC has reported that its staff resources to meet the increasing number of emergency situations have had to be increased from 570 to 750 - an increase of almost one third. The staff growth of the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees has been even more remarkable: from less than 300 as recently as 1974 to more than 900 (excluding project staff) in 1980.

H. Immediate availability of financial resources

50. Second only to the volume of financial resources available in cases of emergency is the question of their prompt availability when needed. The most critical period, in emergencies calling for humanitarian assistance from the international community, is the first few weeks and months of any man-made disaster. The dispatch of needed supplies - especially bulk supplies - inevitably involves logistical delays; but before the supplies themselves can be ordered or sent on their way, financial commitments must be made and the necessary funds must be available. Here, a considerable amount of progress has been made in the past 10 years. A number of agencies have entrusted to their executive heads the authority to enter into immediate financial commitments without being required to seek additional authority before doing so. Prior to the creation of United Nations Disaster Relief, the Secretary-General himself was authorized to draw immediately upon the Working Capital Fund of the United Nations to the extent of \$20,000 for any one natural disaster up to a total of \$200,000 in any one year. The United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator today has had this authority extended to a level of \$30,000 per country, with a limit of 12 requests for emergency assistance annually. The Executive Committee of UNHCR has created a \$10 million Emergency Fund and has authorized the High Commissioner to draw upon it in case of an emergency not provided for in his regular programme, up to a maximum of \$4 million for any country in any one year. The Governing Council of UNDP has given to its Administrator, the authority, following a natural disaster, to commit up to \$30,000 in immediate relief assistance. Moreover, the Council established limits of \$1 million per disaster, \$2 million a year per country from the UNDP Programme Reserve for post-disaster technical assistance following a natural disaster. The Executive Board of UNICEF, also, has increased its Emergency Reserve in the last 10 years and from \$200,000 to \$3 million per year may be expended at the discretion

of the Executive Director. j/ Some of the other agencies, however, particularly those less directly or continuously involved in disaster operations, still lack provision in their regular budgets or other financial arrangements for "instant" money that can be expended by the executive head without further appropriation or authority, necessitating legislative authority or special contributions from outside donors. In the case of the United Nations, for example, while the Secretary-General has the authority under the Financial Regulations to draw upon the Working Capital Fund up to a maximum of \$2 million in an emergency relating to peace and security, he has no such authority to provide instant initial funding to meet urgent needs, even on a reimbursable basis, in situations calling for humanitarian emergency assistance. Where advance authority has not been given by the legislative authority to the executive head, the response inevitably involves greater delay in the mobilization of the needed financial resources to enable an agency to carry out the particular responsibilities assigned to it.

51. In assessing the promptness with which funds can be made available to assist in emergencies, it is necessary to take into account not only the delegation of authority from the legislative body to the executive head, but the further delegation of spending authority to officers in the field. Here, the need to maintain effective control over, and accountability for, monies disbursed presents a problem. However, progress is being made on this front as well, as evidenced by the action currently being taken by the High Commissioner for Refugees to broaden the authority of officers in the field to incur expenditures and obligations up to prescribed limits, when faced with immediate emergency needs. The United Nations Children's Fund, too, has given to its local representatives authority to spend up to \$25,000 on their own authority in an emergency without having first to seek authority from the head office.

I. Stockpiling: pre-positioning of supplies

52. It is one thing of course to assure, through early notification, and delegation of decision-making and financial authority to an executive head, that a favourable response to an appeal for emergency help can be quickly given; it is quite another matter to get the needed help on its way and into position in the country or countries affected. Medical or other supplies required in relatively small quantities or which need relatively little space can, of course, be mobilized quickly and shipped by air; but bulk supplies - notably staple foods and shelter materials which are typically among the items most urgently required are not so easily moved to the desired destination. The assurance of adequate and quickly available transport for materials and personnel generally remains one of the more intractable difficulties faced by agencies working in the emergency-assistance field.

j/ The Executive Director of UNICEF has recently announced his intention to propose a further increase in the size of its Emergency Fund to \$5 million.

53. The organizations with the greatest experience in this highly complex area of operations are undoubtedly WFP itself and ICM. The former of these has acquired the greatest experience of any organization in arranging the surface transportation of bulk supplies: ICM has specialized in making the transportation arrangements for resettling almost 3 million refugees and migrants over the last 30 years, with transportation of materials as a secondary concern. Together, these two agencies provide a valuable resource in the area of transport for other agencies.

54. However, even the expertise provided by these two organizations in mobilizing needed transport could not, in the best of circumstances, assure immediate delivery of the bulk supplies, particularly food, required as one of the first items of need in any large-scale emergency. As a consequence, a number of agencies have resorted to stockpiling, in strategic locations, quantities of needed materials on which emergency-relief agencies may draw should the need arise. The comprehensive report of the Secretary-General on assistance in cases of natural disaster (E/4994 of 13 May 1971) described briefly the various stockpiling programmes which were in effect at the time of preparing that report - notably the UNICEF depot in Copenhagen (known as UNIPAC), the modest medical stockpile of WHO at headquarters and in the regions, the several regional supply centres of LRCS and also the United Nations Supply Depot at Pisa. k/ These centres provide modest, but readily available quantities of medical supplies and equipment, as well as other needed non-perishable items such as tents, blankets, clothing, footwear and even limited quantities of transport vehicles. The size of these stockpiling programmes has grown considerably in the years since the report of the Secretary-General was written. Taken together, they represent an investment in the range of tens of millions of dollars: their value consists essentially in the speed with which needed materials and supplies can be transported by air to the place where they are needed. National disaster stockpiles, including, in some cases, civil defence stockpiles, stand as a second line of reserve to be drawn upon, with the consent of the Governments concerned and with the assurance of eventual replacement of the supplies thus borrowed.

55. With respect to food aid, the creation of the International Emergency Food Reserve (IEFR) in 1976 as a supplement to the World Food Programme's own emergency food resources represented a major advance towards the goal of providing a continuing reserve on which agencies and Member States facing emergency situations could draw with confidence. The problem of transport and prompt availability still remained, however, and continues to present a problem. The World Food Programme has adopted a variety of devices to cope with this problem: reliance on national stocks; drawing upon reserves available in other countries within a region; pre-positioning of emergency food supplies when information as to the onset of a slowly developing emergency can be obtained; ad hoc expedient measures

k/ The League of Red Cross Societies reports that it is currently negotiating for a number of additional regional centres (four exist at the present time) and that its policy is also to encourage its national societies to build emergency stockpiles of non-perishable items.

such as temporary borrowing from stocks in situ but reserved for development projects in the country affected or in neighbouring countries; and, diversion of shipments, already en route, from their scheduled destinations to the afflicted country. All of these expedients have helped to alleviate but have not succeeded fully in eliminating the delays inherent in the problem presented by the need to utilize slow-moving surface transport to move bulky supplies over long distances from the donor countries to the crisis area.

56. The problem of transportation logistics to a stricken area and equally of distribution logistics within the afflicted country remains one of the most intractable in the entire field of disaster relief. In most of the developing countries which are most susceptible to disasters, rail, highway, air and water transportation facilities are less than adequate and highly susceptible to disruption in times of crisis. As a consequence, delays in the distribution of needed supplies to the stricken areas occur and result in criticism, often unwarranted, of the agencies in the field.

J. Enlargement of readily available experienced manpower pool

57. Money, material and manpower are the three essential ingredients in any administrative task and the task of organizing to meet the consequences of man-made disasters is not unique in this regard. Not only is it necessary to recruit and deploy additional personnel to meet these emergencies; but, in large part, the types of personnel required are different from those normally employed in planning and implementing long-range programmes of health improvement, social betterment or development assistance. Personnel with operational experience in the face of emergency situations are extremely difficult to recruit at short notice: in this case, it is not the problem of transportation, but rather that of selection, recruitment and release from current assignments that creates delay.

58. The expanded nature of emergency-relief operations within recent years has created a particularly acute shortage of experienced and competent manpower in all agencies. Yet this fact in itself has a more positive side which may represent, in the longer run, a distinct advantage to the hard-pressed organizations. Large numbers of personnel, both experienced and inexperienced, are employed today in emergency operations of various kinds. It has already been pointed out that agencies such as UNHCR and ICRC are operating today with greatly increased numbers of personnel as compared to previous years. The same is true of the other major agencies concerned with the provision of humanitarian emergency assistance. From this enlarged pool of manpower, concerted efforts need to be made to ensure that experienced and competent personnel will emerge in greater numbers than before to contribute their skills in future emergencies. With a modicum of training (token amounts of which appear to have been undertaken to date), a valuable pool of personnel, experienced in various aspects of relief operations, can be assured in this way. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other agencies have developed intensive training programmes for both field and headquarters personnel to improve the skills of

existing and newly recruited staff. The World Health Organization, as well, in addition to training key personnel in over-all disaster management, has built up a roster of health personnel experienced and available for service in emergencies; other agencies have undoubtedly done the same to a greater or lesser degree. But organized, co-ordinated training programmes for personnel to deal in the emergencies have been slow to develop.

59. In this connexion, Sweden and a number of other member States have taken a valuable initiative in organizing, training and making available on short notice, when needed, teams of skilled experienced persons to supplement the personnel resources of agencies working in disaster situations. The Swedish Stand-by Force, created by law to assist in "relief activities abroad in connexion with natural disasters or similar events", was actually established in the late 1960s and has, since then, served in a number of disaster situations, beginning with the 1970 earthquake in Peru and continuing to the present day. It was completely restructured in 1972 and is currently rendering important assistance in the field of camp management and other tasks to the High Commissioner for Refugees in Somalia. Personnel recruited for the Stand-by Force are enrolled for a year at a time and must be available within 7 to 10 days at most to serve abroad for a maximum period of 6 months. They serve in small self-contained units which specialize in command and administrative functions, survival techniques, health, technical assistance, transportation and storing.

K. Elimination of technical obstacles to international movement of emergency supplies, equipment and personnel

60. It might logically be expected when a major disaster occurs, requiring the speedy mobilization of personnel and material resources to be rushed to the aid of masses of suffering humanity, that Governments would do everything possible to set aside the arrangements which normally regulate the movement of supplies, equipment and personnel across international borders but create delays in responding to emergencies. Such, unfortunately, is not always the case. Not infrequently, agencies responding to appeals for emergency assistance find that donor Governments, neighbouring Governments and even recipient Governments have shown considerable reluctance to waive the normal bureaucratic requirements for the exit, entry or trans-shipment of supplies, equipment and personnel destined for the relief of suffering masses of population. Responses by Governments to a survey conducted a few years ago by UNDRO in association with the League of Red Cross Societies showed that not all Governments were willing to lift the normal restrictions on food imports, even for essential relief supplies. Fewer than half of those responding were prepared to offer free concessional rates for the shipment of supplies abroad on their national airlines. Some countries still will not allow overflight or transit-landing rights to non-scheduled aircraft carrying relief supplies. Fewer than half provide priority access to international communications facilities for relief personnel. Normal commercial documentation for relief consignments (certificates of origin, consular invoices, import licences and fumigation certificates) continues to be required by fully half the

recipient countries. Entry visas are required in half to two thirds of the cases for United Nations and other personnel coming to assist in the humanitarian effort, and exit visas are also required of United Nations personnel in many instances, including by some donor Governments.

61. In an effort to initiate action which might eventually cut through some of this jungle of bureaucratic obstacles to smooth and efficient relief operations, the Economic and Social Council at its sixty-third session, by resolution 2102 (LXIII) of 3 August 1977, requested UNDR0 to assemble information with regard to this problem. At latest report (A/35/228, paras. 65-68 and A/32/64, annex II) fewer than one third of all member States (16 donor and 26 potential recipient Governments) had taken the trouble to respond to the inquiry sent to them by UNDR0. Despite this poor response, efforts to gather more complete information are continuing, and even the incomplete information made available thus far provides a useful base on which planning for remedial action can be undertaken. Some progress has already been achieved in recent years in removing or lowering a number of these barriers to the expeditious movement of relief supplies and personnel. More will undoubtedly be achieved as time goes on and as Governments come to realize that not only the international organizations to whom they look for help in these emergencies, but also Governments themselves can do much, by their own actions, to improve the speed and efficiency of international relief operations when disaster strikes.

III. INTER-AGENCY CO-ORDINATION

62. The previous section of the present report has concentrated on the ways in which individual agencies have moved to strengthen their respective capacities to implement the roles assigned to them by their mandates in emergency situations. Effective interagency co-ordination obviously depends very heavily on the capacity of the individual agencies in the team to implement their particular tasks. There can be little doubt that the capabilities of the individual agencies to do their part in meeting emergency situations are substantially greater today than they were when the Secretary-General presented his last comprehensive review in May 1971. The reasons for this improvement are numerous - the additional agencies or instrumentalities for assistance (for example, UNDR0 and the International Emergency Food Reserve (IEFR)) which have been created in this period; the much larger volumes of emergency aid which the agencies have been able to mobilize, thanks to the generosity of the donor Governments; and the additional experience which agencies have acquired over the last decade as they have faced and successfully overcome, in large part, the difficulties inherent in coping with sudden, frequently chaotic, emergency situations.

63. The concluding section of the report will consider, as requested in Economic and Social Council resolution 1980/43, the developments which have taken place within the past 10 years to improve interagency co-ordination in coping with man-made emergencies. In fact, the "ways and means" by which the United Nations system has, during this period, carried out its role of co-ordinating and

implementing humanitarian emergency assistance activities, are essentially the same as those of previous decades. It was for that reason that a considerable amount of attention was devoted, in an earlier part of the present report (chap. I) to the evolution of the procedures, in the decades of the 1950s and 1960s, by which the United Nations system's capabilities for dealing with emergencies were strengthened and developed. It is not, however, the invention of new ways and means that determines the effectiveness of the efforts of the United Nations system to render assistance in times of emergency; much less depends on the sheer mechanics of co-ordination than on the co-operative spirit and attitude which agencies manifest in sharing their common burden.

64. Interagency co-ordination is not, of course, an end in itself; in fact, as long as the emergency situation is relatively simple in nature, involving the responses of a single major agency, or at most one or two other supporting agencies, the problem of interagency co-ordination need not occasion great concern or call for elaborate procedures to ensure effective co-ordination. This is, in fact, the situation with most humanitarian emergencies of normal size and complexity. Where refugees are concerned, it is clear that the major responsibility is that of UNHCR; in case of an epidemic or health emergency in some other form, WHO is obviously the agency primarily concerned. Large-scale emergency food requirements resulting from the uprooting of masses of population, with the consequent disruption of local food production, clearly involves the twin capacities of FAO and WFP. When hostilities break out, it is ICRC which, in accordance with the 1949 Geneva Conventions, carries the main responsibility for caring for the wounded, ensuring the humane treatment of prisoners and tracing missing persons with a view to family reunion. Situations of the kind described are fairly obvious. One particular agency is clearly responsible: it takes the lead and the others (usually a number of smaller intergovernmental or voluntary agencies), provide supplementary support services to those provided by the leading agency. It is not in these kinds of situations, but in more complex and difficult ones, involving political factors and a multiplicity of agencies, that the real need for effective co-ordinating mechanisms arises.

65. Here, the United Nations system faces its greatest challenge - to work effectively as a team, not as an aggregation of agencies - within the circle of the United Nations family itself and beyond that, within the larger group of public and voluntary humanitarian agencies whose respective inputs are indispensable to a successful resolution of the numerous humanitarian crises confronting the international community in today's unsettled world. If the components of the United Nations system and the co-operating intergovernmental and voluntary agencies are not to speak with "one voice", the least that can be expected of them is that they perform as a harmonious chorus and not as a babel of dissonant and discordant voices. The "one voice" concept of interagency co-operation, based upon a willing acceptance of the need for integrated and co-ordinated effort and a central role of leadership to ensure effective over-all performance has proven its value in the most important and extensive humanitarian activities in which the United Nations has been involved over the past decade. In one form or another - either as a focal point, a lead agency, a co-ordinator or a special representative - the "one voice" principle has been adopted for most of the major man-made emergencies of the period under review.

A. Clear definition of roles

66. Co-ordination among equals is frequently difficult to achieve, even in the best of circumstances. Even more is this likely to be true in the rush and pressure of efforts to organize to meet sudden emergencies. One of the most essential requirements is a clear definition of the roles of each participating agency and a clear understanding of that role on the part of all concerned. Each agency must have a clear definition and understanding of its own role, as well as that of the other agencies with which it is called upon to co-operate. The larger the number of participating agencies, the greater the difficulty in this regard.

67. In various ways, the United Nations has attempted to meet this difficult problem. The decision in 1965 to recognize the UNDP resident representative in the field as the person responsible for bringing together the local representatives of the other agencies (both public and private) and also representatives of donor and other interested Governments represents one constructive approach to this problem. In an effort to ensure a better understanding of their respective roles, UNDR0 and UNDP, in December 1979, agreed upon and issued revised instructions for UNDP resident representatives regarding their duties as representatives ex officio of UNDR0 in the event of natural disaster. The principles embodied in this agreement, while limited to natural disasters, could readily be extended, with adaptations if necessary, to other disaster situations.

68. In addition to the UNDR0-UNDP revised agreement of 1979, Memoranda of Understanding have also been signed between UNDR0 and most, if not all, of the specialized agencies concerned with disaster situations. Basically these Memoranda attempt to set out, between each agency and UNDR0, the ground rules for the co-ordination of their functions and activities on a bilateral basis. Some of these agreements, as in the case of WFP, go back to 1976 or earlier years. Similar agreements have also been entered into between UNDR0 and other United Nations organs such as UNHCR, UNEP, UNIDO etc. The United Nations Children's Fund and WFP have also concluded a formal working agreement relating to their respective roles in meeting the needs of children and other vulnerable groups in times of emergency. Less formal arrangements for the mutual definition of roles have been made between WFP and UNHCR, LRCS, ICRC and numbers of voluntary organizations, all of them for the purpose of improving the flow of information concerning emergencies, speeding up relief deliveries and increasing the effectiveness of food distribution.

69. Properly developed and elaborated, first on a bilateral and later on a multilateral basis, these mutually agreed statements of the respective roles of the various agencies can do much to define and give precision to the tasks that each one is capable of carrying out, in time of actual need.

B. Adequacy of agency mandates

70. As roles are defined and clarified between and among agencies, it becomes possible to identify areas of potential confusion due to overlapping, as well as gaps in service for which no agency is clearly responsible. Not all of the agencies have clear or precisely defined terms of reference. The World Health Organization, for example, is one of the few agencies which has responsibility for emergencies written into its constitution (arts. 2 (d), 28 (i) and 58). The United Nations Children's Fund is one of the few whose mandate extends to all peoples and territories without regard to the question of membership in the United Nations or any of its specialized agencies. The World Food Programme and most, if not all, United Nations agencies and organs have, within the past few years, recognized most liberation movements as eligible for emergency food aid, provided they have been recognized by the United Nations General Assembly or the governing bodies of at least one United Nations specialized agency. In these ways, gaps to eligibility for assistance are gradually being closed. There are still, however, a number of lacunae; for example, in the case of non-food agricultural assistance provided by FAO, this is limited to States members of the organization, and there is still a good deal of uncertainty as to where the responsibility for meeting the needs of displaced persons (other than refugees) within a country resides. The Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees has filled this void in a number of instances (for example, in Cyprus) either on the request of the Secretary-General, the United Nations General Assembly or on his own initiative; but uncertainty remains as to where this responsibility officially lies.

C. Difficulties of implementation

71. Problems arise also with respect to the transport of emergency food supplies, equipment and personnel and, in particular, the logistics of distribution within an affected country. The World Food Programme is recognized as the co-ordinating agency, responsible for multilateral food movements from the points where donor Governments make them available to their ports of destination in the affected country. Frequently also, WFP is asked to act as co-ordinator of bilateral food movements on behalf of donor Governments. On occasion, it has even taken the responsibility for co-ordination of distribution within a country. The difficulties inherent in this area of activity are well known and have been referred to earlier in the present report. They include not only the problem of mobilizing and redeploying surface transport for the shipment of bulk food items but also the difficulties presented by limited capacity at the ports of destination and the lack of adequate road transport facilities within the affected countries - in some of which only minimal highway systems exist. Equally important in some instances is the problem of financing the costs of distribution of supplies within the country when the Government itself is unable to do so. The World Food Programme normally meets the cost of transport of bulk food supplies to the port of entry and, in some cases, shares in the responsibility for internal distribution; but there is no clear-cut agreement in all cases on the responsibility for meeting the costs of internal distribution, and this represents a grey area

in the over-all assignment of responsibility for coping with major food emergencies. While, as previously stated, WFP and ICM are the agencies with the greatest experience and capability in the furnishing of transport facilities, it is clear that this remains one of the problem areas in the provision of humanitarian emergency assistance, and that untimely delays in the transportation and distribution of food supplies and other essential materials are frequently attributed to the responsible agencies without adequate consideration being given to the overwhelming difficulties which they inevitably encounter.

D. Mechanisms for improved co-ordination

72. Throughout the years of the United Nations existence, a number of formal mechanisms have been developed within the system for the purpose of ensuring better co-ordination of individual agency efforts. This is not an easy thing to ensure in a context which involves the contributions, in terms of money, materials and personnel, of a variety of United Nations agencies, each one of them operating as a fully independent or largely autonomous entity and an equally large number of intergovernmental or voluntary organizations working in a complex series of multilateral as well as bilateral relationships in the same emergency. As long ago as 1950, the first Secretary-General of the United Nations, Trygve Lie, in a much simpler situation than exists today, set a precedent by appointing a co-ordinator to act for him in the Ecuadorian earthquake-relief operation. As time went on, the concept of "co-ordination" gave way to "concerted action", which gave greater emphasis to the equal status of the various agencies within the United Nations family. 1/ In 1970 (as mentioned above), Secretary-General U Thant proposed, and later confirmed by appointment, the establishment of a focal point in the United Nations, "from which to initiate action and exercise more effective co-ordination". The original idea was that the individual working in this capacity should serve at Headquarters and be the adviser to the Secretary-General as well as represent him in all situations involving natural or human-disaster situations. Shortly thereafter, with the onset of the troubles in East Pakistan, leading to the flight of millions of refugees into India, the High Commissioner for Refugees was designated on the spot as the "focal point" for the specific purpose of co-ordinating international relief assistance to these uprooted people. The focal point, as illustrated by the two examples given, could be either an individual designated for the purpose or an agency principally concerned with the provision of assistance in the particular situation.

73. More recently, the practice has developed of singling out a lead agency and assigning to it, in addition to its own specialized function, the task of acting as the leader of the team, the central point of reference for information and advice, and at times, the intermediary accepted by all concerned to assist in resolving problems that may arise among the participating agencies themselves or

1/ It appears that the expression "concerted action" while widely used in other United Nations contexts, was not adopted for use in disaster or emergency situations.

between the agencies and the Governments that are involved. Most, if not all, of the major United Nations organs active in providing emergency assistance have, at times, functioned as lead agency. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNICEF, FAO, WHO, UNDP etc., WFP, UNICEF and WHO have also acted as subco-ordinators, working with the lead agency, for food aid, health or other specialized purposes in a number of situations. In association with UNICEF, ICRC has acted as lead agency in Kampuchea; in other situations, it has acted on its own. The League of Red Cross Societies and ICM have also acted as lead agencies in situations where, for particular reasons, the agencies of the United Nations system have not been heavily involved.

74. Emergency situations other than natural disasters are frequently related to political upheavals or military action, and these factors occasionally have made it more difficult for the humanitarian agencies to carry out their functions without interference. When situations of this kind have occurred, the Secretary-General has frequently found it advantageous to designate a special representative - not for the purpose of assuming the responsibilities that would normally be those of a co-ordinator, a focal point or a lead agency, but rather to serve as a political or diplomatic go-between, thus freeing the agencies to devote their attention exclusively to their assigned tasks. The difference between the role of the special representative and that of the co-ordinator, focal point or lead agency is an important one and not at all easy to maintain - particularly since, in situations where a special representative does not need to be appointed, the co-ordinator, focal point or lead agency is frequently called upon to deal with delicate political or diplomatic problems which arise from time to time even in the best of situations.

75. Reference to the details set out in the annex to the present report will indicate the frequency with which these various devices for interagency co-ordination have been utilized and which agencies or individuals have functioned most frequently in these capacities.

76. One fact emerges clearly from the foregoing recital of the different "labels" which have from time to time been used to describe the process of interagency collaboration in a common effort to cope effectively with the consequences of massive human tragedies. These changing "labels" - co-ordination, focal point, lead agency, concerted action, one voice, special representative - all reflect the constant and continuing concern of the United Nations system and its associated governmental and voluntary agencies to improve the effectiveness of the co-ordinating mechanisms by which they work together in a common effort. These mechanisms may not always function as effectively as they should, particularly at the initial stages of a critical emergency, when time-pressures are greatest, when fear and insecurity is at its height and when emotions are at their peak. In the midst of the criticisms that arise, particularly at the earliest stages of the emergency, when delays occur, when communications break down and when there is confusion as to exactly what is happening, it is, at times, overlooked that it is the emergency itself which creates the chaos and that the true criterion of the effectiveness of agency or interagency operations is the speed with which order is gradually restored and not the chaos or confusion which inevitably exists at the time the agencies enter on the scene.

77. Efforts to improve interagency co-ordination and to provide an effective focal point for interagency action have resulted also in a number of developments of a different kind. At least three of these are worthy of mention, all of them the product of the last 10 years. The creation, in 1971, of UNDRO represented an effort on the part of the General Assembly to provide a central point for co-ordination of effort in cases of natural disaster. Several years later, in January 1977, the Secretary-General decided to establish an Office of the Co-ordinator of Special Economic Assistance Programmes for the purpose of providing leadership and a central point of reference to deal with the steadily increasing number of emergencies threatening the economic viability of member States, particularly in Africa. During this same period, in Geneva, LRCS, in co-operation with other major voluntary organizations which were active in the disaster-relief field, decided to establish a Standing Committee on Disasters with a view to achieving closer co-operation and a common understanding of purposes and objectives among all organizations working in this field. The Standing Committee meets monthly at the League offices, bringing together all the major relief agencies both voluntary and intergovernmental (chiefly the United Nations agencies based in Geneva), and provides a forum for the exchange of current disaster-relief information and for undertaking disaster-preparedness studies. While the nature and the methods of operation of the Standing Committee are markedly different from those of UNDRO and OCSEAP, the goals of the Committee are essentially the same: to foster a spirit of co-operation among the participating agencies and to create a climate which will be conducive to improved interagency co-ordination of effort, both at their respective headquarters and in the field.

78. While no special mechanism for co-ordination has been created for the purpose of concerning itself exclusively with the work of the agencies providing humanitarian emergency assistance (as distinct from assistance in natural disasters or economic emergencies), the co-ordination problems which arise in the process of providing humanitarian relief are essentially the same as those in other situations. The three co-ordinating mechanisms mentioned would, therefore, seem to be in a position to deal with any problems arising in the humanitarian field as well, since the participating agencies are certain to be the same in any case.

79. Reference has been made in an earlier part of the present report to one of the most important devices adopted for facilitating effective interagency co-ordination: the joint interagency assessment mission which has been increasingly utilized in recent years. Responses to the questionnaires distributed in connexion with preparation of the present report revealed that agencies reported participation on 30 occasions in interagency missions in recent years. The advantages of proceeding by way of an interagency mission are at least twofold. First, they ensure that an integrated over-all picture of need - not a partial, segmented picture - is obtained as a basis for soliciting the help of donor Governments; and, second, they establish at the local level, where the emergency exists, a "climate" of co-operation on the part of the participants that is conducive, in turn, to greater co-operation on the part of the participating agencies, with the result being a more effectively co-ordinated total effort.

E. Co-ordination of financial appeals

80. The problem of overlapping financial appeals is, in view of the increasing number of appeals of different kinds, a matter of grave concern to both donor and recipient Governments. The Secretary-General too, is no less concerned, because it is in his name that the majority of global appeals are made, and the continuous repetition of appeals for aid, however meritorious the individual cases may be, makes it increasingly difficult to achieve the results which are desired and expected; and this, if not carefully guarded against, can eventually affect the credibility and the reputation of the United Nations itself.

81. Here, it should be noted that there can be no separate consideration of appeals for funds to provide humanitarian assistance in cases of man-made disasters, as distinct from financial appeals for natural disasters or in connexion with economic emergencies. The donor Governments are in any case the same; and, in most cases, the recipient Governments are also the same. The essential problem is how to organize and co-ordinate all appeals in such a way as to avoid confusion and achieve results which will give the greatest degree of satisfaction, both to the recipient and to the donor Government involved.

82. In this, as in other matters, overly simplistic solutions do not work. It is not possible to take the position that each agency, intergovernmental or voluntary, should be responsible for raising its own funds for each humanitarian or other relief project in which it is engaged; nor is it possible to insist that, in all circumstances, separate agency appeals be consolidated into one. Voluntary agencies generally appeal to a distinct and separate public: philanthropic institutions, private corporations or the private citizen, and except for occasional appeals which they make to Governments, their money-raising efforts do not interfere to any significant extent with those of intergovernmental organizations. The voluntary agencies have, of course, their own problems of co-ordination in respect to their fund-raising activities, but to a considerable extent, at least these are minimized by the fact that many of the numerous individual agencies have their own characteristic constituencies - religious, national or other.

83. In the case of the United Nations organs with which the present report is primarily concerned, there has been a trend, over the years, to favour, where possible, the consolidation of appeals, especially in cases involving major disasters or emergencies where the complexity of the problem requires several United Nations agencies to become involved and for the Secretary-General to issue a global appeal on behalf of all the agencies involved, basing his appeal on the results of the joint-assessment mission which has already assessed the extent and nature of the appeal. The Secretary-General's appeal normally leaves it open to each donor Government to earmark its contribution to a particular agency or agencies which are participating in the emergency effort or to make the contribution available for such general purposes as the Secretary-General, through the co-ordinator, special representative or lead agency, may decide. The reason for the option of earmarking to particular agencies is that this encourages agencies

to agree to combine their appeals with others rather than launch each its own separate appeal. In addition, it has two other advantages. Each agency, as in the case of the voluntary agencies, tends to have its own constituency and its own channels of access to Governments - whether it be the Health Department, the Agriculture Ministry or some other. In addition, some Governments have their funds which they make available for international aid, "locked up" in different departments or compartments, and access to these funds can be granted only to particular international organizations with functions related to those for which the funds in question were appropriated by the legislative authority. Considerations such as those outlined above make it clear that it would not be a practical solution to the problem created by overlapping appeals to insist, in all circumstances, on a single consolidated appeal for each emergency situation.

84. In some cases, too, it has been recognized that even if an individual agency joins in a global appeal, it may be justified for it to launch a separate, subordinate appeal, connected with the same emergency, at a later date. The subordinate appeal may involve particular commodities rather than cash: medical supplies, agricultural needs, food aid in kind, heavy equipment such as trucks, bulldozers, etc. Usually the justification for these special-purpose appeals is self-evident; if not, care must be taken to avoid creating a situation in which such appeals undermine the effectiveness of the global appeal.

85. While Governments from time to time, for good and sufficient reasons, choose to earmark their responses to a global appeal for a particular agency, experience shows that in most situations, a proportion of the funds pledged and contributed is placed at the disposal of the Secretary-General without restriction. Funds so contributed have a special value for two reasons; firstly, they strengthen the hand of the co-ordinator in influencing action and in achieving effective co-ordination. The second advantage of unearmarked funds is that it makes it possible for the co-ordinator to provide funds to fill in the miscellaneous gaps between different agency programmes, as well as to advance funds from those at his disposal to agencies temporarily in need of them.

86. The alternative arrangements outlined in the above paragraphs represent current policies and practices with respect to fund-raising appeals as they have evolved over the years. In many instances, the nature of the emergency is such that a more limited appeal is called for; in such cases, or in situations which are principally the responsibility of a single major organization, it is normal for the appeal to be launched by the executive head of the agency or organ responsible. On occasion, two or more agencies may launch a joint appeal. Appeals such as those described in the paragraphs above relate, of course, to extraordinary, unforeseen emergencies and do not apply to the "normal" extrabudgetary requirements of agencies or bodies of the United Nations, many of which are included in the single pledging conference held in November each year at the time of the General Assembly.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

87. The present report has endeavoured to record the progress which has been made during the past 10 years in strengthening the capacity of the United Nations system to respond to complex man-made emergencies in an increasingly effective and well co-ordinated way. Because of the wording of the resolution which led to its preparation, the report has concentrated its efforts on recording the evidences of growing capability on the part of individual agencies and of the slowly improving ways and means of interagency co-ordination.

88. No one would suggest that perfect techniques have yet been developed - or that they can be devised - for solving all the problems of the United Nations system and its associated agencies or for assuring maximum co-ordination of agency actions in meeting emergency situations of the kind which are the concern of the present report. Effective collaboration cannot be achieved by simple formulas or mechanisms: it depends on attitudes and personalities as well, on a disposition to work together as a team and to voluntarily submerge individual or institutional identity, if necessary, in the common interest. While discussions in interagency or intergovernmental forums may occasionally expose conceptual, philosophical or doctrinal differences of opinion as to how international humanitarian emergency assistance can be best co-ordinated and implemented, the crucial test of effectiveness is not to be found in council chambers or committee meetings, but in the practical working arrangements at the headquarters of the respective agencies and, above all, in the field. The preponderance of evidence gathered in the course of preparing the present report points to the conclusion that while problems still remain and difficulties owing to the lack of adequate co-ordination arise from time to time, the basic facilities and services required for coping with man-made emergencies are now reasonably well in place and can be made available, usually fairly smoothly and without unreasonable delays in time of need. The essence of the progress which has been achieved during the past 10 years has consisted, not in the invention of new procedures or mechanisms for co-ordination, but in strengthening the facilities - the human and material resources - available to the individual agencies to enable them to play their part more promptly and effectively. This phase of the task has now been largely accomplished and considerable experience has been gained in learning how to work more effectively together. The learning process, in this regard, is by no means complete; but further improvement will depend not so much on the development of new or different mechanisms, as on the flexibility and ingenuity which each participating organization and each participant can show in adjusting to constantly unforeseen situations. It is on the human factor (for example, the interplay of personalities, the ability to work as members of a team, the clear definition of roles, consistency in adhering to these roles with the flexibility to make adjustments when necessary), more than on the development of new mechanisms for co-ordination, that the prospects of further improving the effectiveness of concerted action by the agencies of the United Nations system and their associated humanitarian organizations will, in future, depend.

89. It has often been said that in dealing with sudden emergencies, the United Nations system must speak with one voice. No one would quarrel with this concept:

but the voice which speaks on behalf of the United Nations system must be the voice of unity, of consensus, of a leadership which is not imposed from above, but supported and reinforced by common accord of all the members of the team. When this is achieved, the process of interagency co-ordination will become a process of co-ordination among the agencies themselves, marked by a willing acceptance of the need for unity, co-operation and concerted action.

90. In one of the narratives submitted by an agency which responded to the questionnaire, the following paragraph appears and is cited here as providing a fitting conclusion to the present report:

"Finally, the success of all arrangements, even at the highest level, depends on personal confidence, good and easy contacts between the persons concerned. It could all be jeopardized if there is no confidence and if participants in any type of co-ordination groups feel that their main task is to defend the 'interests' of their own organization. If there is any field where a 'UN Team Spirit' is necessary, this is it."

Appendix

TABULATION OF SITUATIONS SPECIALLY MENTIONED BY ORGANIZATIONS IN ANSWER
TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE

1. In order to provide an overview of the numerous humanitarian emergencies in which the agencies of the United Nations system have been involved during the past decade, the tabulation which follows lists, by year of occurrence, the situations which the responding organizations considered to be worthy of special mention in the questionnaires which they completed as a contribution to the present report. In a number of instances, organizations reported on situations which went back to an earlier period beyond the decade under review: these have been omitted from the tabulation. The years and months shown as the starting point of the emergency are, in some cases, fairly arbitrary, since many of the situations listed have existed as chronic but more or less controllable emergencies for several years and come to the attention of the organized world community only when they exceed the capacities of the local authorities to cope with them.

2. Underlining indicates the agencies which have themselves listed the situation as one in which they have participated. Where the name of an agency is not underlined, this indicates that its participation has been reported by another agency and not by itself.

3. Numerous voluntary organizations, members of the International Council of Voluntary Agencies and others, have shared in many, indeed most of the humanitarian assistance efforts listed in the present appendix. Bilateral and multilateral programmes of individual Governments and groups of Governments have also contributed greatly to the alleviation of distress and the economic and social rehabilitation of the peoples and territories affected by these human disasters in which the agencies of the United Nations system have been involved. Since the present report is concerned essentially with the co-ordination of the efforts of the United Nations system, it has not been possible to list, for each of the emergencies listed in this tabulation, the contributions made by the numerous voluntary agencies which have played their part in providing assistance. Their contribution, singly and collectively, and that of individual Governments in providing bilateral assistance, is recognized as an indispensable part of the total effort to alleviate the human suffering which is the inevitable by-product of the kinds of man-made disasters with which the present report is concerned.

Tabulation

- 1971 - March - India and East Pakistan - food aid to victims of civil strife in East Pakistan and assistance to East Pakistan refugees in India - UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, ICM, ICRC, LRCS; also FAO, WHO, UNDP, UNEPRO (United Nations East Pakistan Relief Operation). Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees designated by Secretary-General as focal point for assistance to refugees in India.
- 1971 - December - India; Pakistan, Bangladesh - post-hostilities relief and rehabilitation for Bangladesh: repatriation of refugees from India: exchange of populations (Bengalis and Biharis) between Pakistan and Bangladesh - UNROD (later UNROB), UNHCR, UNICEF, ICM, ICRC; also LRCS. Paul-Marc Henri (later Sir Robert Jackson) designated as Co-ordinator by Secretary-General.
- 1972 - February - March - Sudan - South Sudanese returnees - UNHCR, LRCS; also FAO/WFP, WHO, UNESCO, UNICEF, UNDP.
- 1972 - April - resettlement of emigrés from Eastern Europe - ICM.
- 1972 - Summer - Burundi - exodus of refugees into Rwanda, United Republic of Tanzania and Zaire - UNHCR.
- 1972 - September - Uganda - expulsion of persons of Asian origin - ICM; also UNHCR, UNDP, ICRC. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees designated as Co-ordinator by Secretary-General.
- 1973 - June - July - Indo-China - relief assistance requested by various authorities contesting for control in Viet Nam, Laos, Cambodia, (Republic of Viet Nam, Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam (PRG), Royal Lao Government, Pathet Lao, Khmer - UNICEF; also, later, UNHCR, WHO, UNESCO, Red Cross.
- 1973 - September - Chile - resettlement of detainees etc, outside Chile - UNESCO, ICM, ICRC.
- 1973 - Southern Africa liberation movements - food aid and other assistance - pursuant to General Assembly resolution 2704 (XXV) - WFP.
- 1974 - August - Cyprus - displaced persons within Cyprus: humanitarian relief assistance - UNHCR, ILO, WHO, ICM; also UNICEF, WFP, UNDRO, UNDP, ICRC, LRCS.
- 1974 - November - Mozambique - return of refugees from neighbouring countries - UNHCR, OSCEAP (Office of Special Co-ordinator for Special Economic Assistance Programmes); also WFP, UNDP.

- 1975 - January - Eritrea - hostilities involving Eritrean Liberation Movement and Ethiopian authorities: exodus of refugees to the Sudan - ICRC (pursuant to Geneva Conventions of 1949); also UNHCR.
- 1975 - April - South-East Asia (Viet Nam and neighbouring countries) - post-war exodus and resettlement of refugees from South Viet Nam - UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, ICM; also WHO, UNESCO. Sir Robert Jackson designated as Special Representative of the Secretary-General to co-ordinate humanitarian assistance to Indo-China.
- 1975 - Portugal - resettlement of returnees to Portugal from former Portuguese colonies (Timor, Cape Verde, Angola, Mozambique) - ICM, LRCS.
- 1975 - November - Lebanon - relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction - FAO, WHO, ILO, UNESCO, WFP, UNICEF, UNDP; also UNHCR, UNRWA, IBRD, LRCS. Resident representative of UNDP designated as Special Representative of the Secretary-General.
- 1975 - December - Algeria - refugees from Western Sahara - LRCS; also UNHCR, ICRC.
- 1976 - February - Angola - resettlement within Angola of displaced persons and repatriates - UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP; also WHO, UNESCO, UNDP, ICRC. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees designated as Co-ordinator by Secretary-General.
- 1976 - Early - Viet Nam - rehabilitation and reconstruction - UNESCO, UNICEF; also WHO, UNHCR, WFP, UNDP: Victor Umbricht designated as Co-ordinator for Rehabilitation Assistance by Secretary-General.
- 1976 - September - the Sudan and Zaire - medical emergency - outbreak of viral haemorrhagic fever - WHO, also UNDRO.
- 1977 - Rhodesia - outbreak of hostilities within country - material aid and other forms of assistance for detainees, missing persons, refugees and efforts on behalf of children taken to Botswana - ICRC, (pursuant to Geneva Convention), OXFAM.
- 1977 - January - Zambia - effects of continuing Rhodesian conflicts - ICRC (pursuant to Geneva Convention re prisoners, refugees, etc); OCSEAP; also WHO, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP.
- 1977 - February - Botswana - refugees from Rhodesia, including children - ICRC (pursuant to Geneva Convention), OCSEAP; also UNHCR, WFP.
- 1977 - Lesotho - OCSEAP, UNDP.

- 1977 - May - Mozambique - response to a United Nations Conference on assistance to peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia - material and medical aid, visits to refugee camps - ICRC; also UNHCR, UNDP.
- 1977 - August - Angola - refugees from Shaba province, Zaire - LRCS; also UNHCR.
- 1977 - Late - Somalia - conflict involving Ethiopia and Somalia; refugees in Somalia from Ogaden region of Ethiopia - UNHCR, ICRC (pursuant to Geneva Convention), LRCS.
- 1978 - March - Bangladesh - Burma - repatriation to Bangladesh of returnees from Burma - UNHCR, WFP, LRCS, OXFAM; also WHO, UNICEF, UNDP. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees designated by Secretary-General as Co-ordinator of Humanitarian Assistance.
- 1978 - July - August - Nicaragua - uprising in Nicaragua, resulting in flight of refugees to Honduras and Costa Rica - FAO, ICM, ICRC (pursuant to Geneva Convention); also UNHCR, WFP, UNDP, ECLA, EEC, LRCS. Resident Representative UNDP designated as Co-ordinator.
- 1978 - August - September - Vietnamese boat people seeking refuge in Malaysia, Indonesia, Hong Kong, Macau - UNHCR, LRCS, OXFAM, ICM; also WHO, UNICEF, WFP, UNDP, ICRC (joint LRCS-ICRC Task Force), United Nations Volunteers. Ilter Turkmen (later M'Hamed Essaafi) designated Special Representative of Secretary-General for South-East Asia.
- 1979 - April - Pakistan - refugees from Afghanistan - WHO, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, ICM, ICRC, LRCS, also UNDP. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees designated as Co-ordinator - Lead Agency by the Secretary-General.
- 1979 - September - declaration of state of emergency by Government of Somalia - intensified influx of refugees from Ogaden - FAO, WFP, WHO, UNHCR, UNICEF, OCSEAP; also ILO, UNESCO, IBRD, EEC, UNDRO, ICRC, LRCS. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees designated by Secretary-General as over-all Co-ordinator (Lead Agency); WHO as Health Co-ordinator; UNICEF as Emergency Water Supply Co-ordinator; WFP as Co-ordinator for mobilization and delivery of food assistance.
- 1979 - April - May - Ethiopia - displaced persons within Ethiopia - UNICEF, FAO (later March-April 1980), WFP; also UNDRO, UNDP, EEC.
- 1979 - May - relief and rehabilitation within Uganda following overthrow of Government; return of refugees and resettlement of displaced persons inside Uganda - large-scale emergency food aid - UNHCR, UNICEF, ILO, WFP, OCSEAP; OXFAM; also WHO, UNDRO, UNDP, EEC, LRCS. Resident Representative UNDP designated by Secretary-General as Special Representative for relief operations.

- 1979 - June - July - Kampuchea - internal disorders - exodus of refugees to Thailand and neighbouring countries - threat of widespread famine conditions and acute need of large-scale emergency food aid - UNICEF, ICRC, FAO, WFP, ICRC, OXFAM; also UNESCO, LRCS, EEC. The United Nations Children's Fund designated by Secretary-General as Lead Agency; jointly with ICRC, for all emergency assistance within Kampuchea and in Thai-Kampuchea border areas (except for refugee camps) - Sir Robert Jackson later appointed by Secretary-General as over-all Co-ordinator and Special Representative (see below).
- 1979 - September - Thailand - refugees from Kampuchea; UNHCR, WFP, ICRC; also, WHO, UNICEF, UNDP, EEC, LRCS. Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees designated by the Secretary-General as Lead Agency: Sir Robert Jackson as over-all Co-ordinator and Special Representative.
- 1979 - August - Equatorial Guinea - assistance for reconstruction, rehabilitation and development; assistance to returnees; FAO, ILO, OCSEAP; also WHO, UNESCO, UNCTAD, UNTCD, UNHCR, WFP. Resident Representative designated by Secretary-General as Co-ordinator.
- 1979-
- 1980 - October 1979 - El Salvador - internal uprising leading to overthrow of Government - ICRC (pursuant to Geneva Convention).
- 1980 - April - Sudan - emergency aid for refugees from Ethiopia - UNESCO; also UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP, FAO/WFP.
- 1980 - April - Djibouti - post-independence relief and rehabilitation - assistance re refugees from Ethiopia; OCSEAP; also UNHCR, WFP, UNDP, LRCS.
- 1980 - April - Cuba - movement of emigrés from Cuba - ICM; also UNHCR.
- 1980 - July - Bolivia - movement and resettlement of detainees - ICM; also UNHCR.
