

The United Nations and
Somalia

1992–1996



With an introduction by
Boutros Boutros-Ghali,
Secretary-General
of the United Nations

The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996

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Secretary-General of the United Nations

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Section One

Introduction



I Overview

1 The efforts of the United Nations to end the human suffering in Somalia, foster reconciliation among the warring factions and promote national reconstruction led to one of the most challenging, arduous undertakings in the Organization's 50-year history. Mounted in 1992 in conditions of exceptional complexity, in a country where all organs of government had collapsed, the operation in Somalia was called upon to deal with a devastating famine and a brutal multi-sided civil war which, collectively, claimed the lives of at least 300,000 people. The response of the United Nations was far-reaching and system-wide, involving peace-making, peace-keeping, peace-enforcement and peace-building. The experience thus provided important lessons for the international community in fashioning policies and instruments for future conflicts involving "failed States", humanitarian emergencies and situations in which armed groups fail to cooperate in efforts to end the violence and negotiate a peaceful settlement of their differences.

2 In the end, the failure of the Somali factions to commit themselves to peace or to cooperate adequately with the United Nations and its agencies made it impossible for the operation to carry out its mandate fully. This contributed to the Security Council's decision to withdraw United Nations forces from Somalia in March 1995, highlighting, as never before, the limits to the international community's ability to sustain indefinitely its support of a costly peace-enforcement operation. Nevertheless, by the time of the withdrawal, insecurity had been markedly reduced in significant parts of Somalia and the immediate threat of further famine had been averted, although the lack of national reconciliation meant that these gains remained precarious.

3 The United Nations response to the crisis in Somalia was unprecedented in numerous respects. Along with the creation of the United Nations Protection Force (for the former Yugoslavia) in early 1992, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I and II) and the United Nations-sanctioned and United States-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) represented one of the rare cases in which an international military force was deployed in large measure to deal with a humanitarian crisis.

4 Unlike conventional peace-keeping operations, the force could not be deployed at the request or with the consent of a host Government (since there was no Government), or on the basis of an agreement among the parties to the conflict. For that reason, the Security Council had to invoke the enforcement provisions of Chapter VII of the

Charter of the United Nations for the United States–led multinational force and for UNOSOM II—the first time this was done to deal with a conflict confined within a State’s borders.

5 The resort to enforcement powers occurred in stages, in response to an evolving and increasingly difficult set of circumstances. In the early and latter part of 1992, an attempt at traditional peace-keeping was made with the deployment of lightly armed UNOSOM I personnel to monitor a cease-fire. This mandate was then expanded to include protection of humanitarian convoys, marked by the dispatch of a Pakistani battalion to Somalia in September. But the warring factions in Somalia placed so many obstacles in the mission’s path—including attacks on international aid workers, looting of warehouses containing relief supplies and the shelling of ships bringing food—that by the end of November, chaos reigned in Somalia and it was clear that more forceful action was necessary. Thus the Security Council, in December 1992, decided to authorize a multinational force, the Unified Task Force, organized and commanded by the United States, to establish a “secure environment” for the delivery of humanitarian relief. Later, in May 1993, the United Nations itself would take command of a mission, UNOSOM II, whose mandate explicitly included enforcement powers—once again, an action unprecedented in its history, with the partial exception of the Organization’s involvement in the Congo in the early 1960s.

6 Another exceptional feature of the operation was the broad mandate given to UNOSOM II to assist Somalis in rebuilding their nation from the ground up. The mission thus became one of the most graphic examples of “multidimensional” peace-keeping. It helped to reconstitute local government and administrative structures, train police and facilitate judicial reform. It also coordinated efforts to improve health care, revitalize the agricultural economy, improve schools, provide water and electricity and facilitate the return of thousands of displaced persons and refugees to their homes. It undertook to implement disarmament and facilitate mine clearance. Many agencies and programmes of the United Nations system were involved in these endeavours, including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Programme (WFP), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), along with humanitarian partners such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and an array of non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

7 The involvement of the United Nations in Somalia occurred at

a turning-point in the Organization's history. The cold war, which had circumscribed the Security Council's power for more than 40 years, was over, giving way to a palpable optimism that the Council and the world body in general would at last be able to fulfil the promise of the Charter—"to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war". The Council reaffirmed this commitment at its January 1992 summit meeting, paving the way for a new era of cooperation in many areas. Peace-keeping, in particular, underwent a period of immediate, tremendous expansion, with four large peace-keeping forces—in the former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Somalia and Mozambique—authorized by the Security Council in 1992 and early 1993.

8 There was no model for the United Nations to follow in its efforts to bring humanitarian assistance and peace to the people of Somalia. It responded flexibly and creatively to an evolving series of unprecedented and unusually complex situations that raised fundamental questions about peace-keeping, peace enforcement, preventive diplomacy and post-conflict peace-building. Despite some set-backs, UNOSOM I and II and the United States-led Unified Task Force were able to succour a people and a country caught in the throes of famine, civil war and the collapse of all institutions of government.

9 The most dramatic accomplishment of the United Nations involvement and that of its NGO partners in Somalia was the success in defeating the famine. At its peak in 1992, the magnitude of human suffering in Somalia was overwhelming. Out of a total estimated population of 8 million, approximately 4.5 million Somalis required urgent external assistance. Of those, some 1.5 million people were at immediate risk of starvation, including 1 million children. By securing the main airport and harbours in Somalia, and by providing security for food distribution centres and humanitarian relief convoys, UNITAF and then UNOSOM II succeeded in delivering food and other relief supplies to famine-stricken populations throughout the south and the centre of the country. More than 250,000 lives are estimated to have been saved during the famine emergency.

10 The United Nations also registered significant achievements in restoring basic services and beginning the rebuilding of Somalia's devastated infrastructure, thereby offering millions of Somalis hope for a more stable future. These efforts encompassed the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons; the reactivation of water supply systems; the construction of wells; the distribution of essential drugs and medical supplies; the vaccination of children against disease; the training of health workers in emergency preparedness and in the diagnosis and treatment of various illnesses; the distribution of seeds, tools and pesticides in order to revive the country's agricultural and livestock export sectors; and the provision of textbooks and teacher's guides to schools and to

camps for refugees and displaced persons; as well as the rehabilitation of the Mogadishu port.

11 UNOSOM II made important contributions in training a new Somali police force, supporting justice programmes, rehabilitating court and prison facilities, promoting self-government through the formation of district and regional councils, and reconstituting government institutions and other administrative structures. UNOSOM troops, in addition to carrying out their mandate to protect the delivery and distribution of humanitarian assistance, also assisted in the implementation of small-scale community development projects and in the provision of medical aid to Somali civilians.

12 The United Nations also actively sought to create an environment conducive for Somali leaders to bring about national reconciliation. Indeed, from its earliest attempts, in 1992, to negotiate a cease-fire, the United Nations recognized that any progress achieved in humanitarian and other areas would remain fragile, vulnerable to the threat of renewed conflict, unless a comprehensive political settlement involving all of Somalia's clans, sub-clans and political factions was attained. My representatives worked tirelessly to help reconcile the armed factions and find a durable solution to the country's political problems.

13 Towards this end, the Organization sponsored several major peace conferences and a number of local reconciliation meetings. A conference held in Addis Ababa from 4 to 15 January 1993, which I opened, drew representatives of 15 Somali political factions as well as leaders of community organizations, elders, scholars and women's groups, and led to the signing of a cease-fire by the 15 groups. A subsequent National Reconciliation Conference, held in Ethiopia in March 1993, included not only the factions and other Somali groups, but also the Standing Committee of the Countries of the Horn of Africa, the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries. It yielded the Addis Ababa Agreement, in which the 15 Somali political movements agreed to put an end to armed conflict, reconcile their differences through peaceful means and seek to establish a transitional governing mechanism. A year later, in March 1994, consultations were convened in Nairobi by my Special Representative and involved the main Somali political organizations, joined by a significant number of elders. The resulting Nairobi Declaration again committed the primary antagonists in the Somali conflict to a cease-fire, voluntary disarmament and a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

14 Unfortunately, implementation of the two accords proceeded at an extremely slow pace, as the Somali parties failed to honour the commitments they had made. This lack of progress and the factions'

failure to cooperate adequately with UNOSOM II, combined with a deterioration in security conditions, led finally to the difficult decision of the Security Council to withdraw the sizeable force of troop contingents in March 1995. Although Somalia had been made a less troubled place than it had been in 1991-1992, the underlying political problems that caused the famine, anarchy and extreme insecurity had not been resolved. Thus, despite significant achievements, the operation did not fully accomplish its mandate.

15 The troop withdrawal by no means meant the abandonment of Somalia by the United Nations. Rather, the Organization's humanitarian agencies remained in Somalia to continue their work, and my Special Representative continued his efforts, within the framework of my good offices, to help find a peaceful political settlement to the crisis. But the withdrawal did signal, as never before in United Nations history, that there were limits to the international community's ability or willingness to support, indefinitely and at great human and financial cost, a humanitarian mission under hostile conditions, and that new criteria would henceforth be applied on all questions relating to peace-keeping.

16 The growing danger that human disasters of the kind that occurred in Somalia, and more recently in Rwanda, will recur underscores the importance of learning from such experiences and improving the international community's preparedness. This book is designed to facilitate that process by making available a large number of key United Nations documents relating to the situation in Somalia, preceded by this account of the Organization's involvement.

17 Following this overview, Part II of the Introduction provides background information on the origins of the civil war in Somalia, the gradual disintegration of authority, the humanitarian catastrophe which ensued and the efforts of the United Nations, with strong support from the African region, to continue its long-standing humanitarian efforts in a conflict-ridden environment. Part III recounts the initial attempts of the United Nations, at the request of the Somali factions, to negotiate a cease-fire agreement, the imposition by the Security Council of an embargo on weapons and military equipment, the creation in April 1992 of UNOSOM I and the obstacles this operation encountered amid deepening famine and intra-factional fighting.

18 Parts IV and V of this Introduction provide an account of the deliberations that led to the deployment, in December 1992, of the United States-led Unified Task Force, the subsequent hand-over to UNOSOM II in May 1993 and the latter operation's broad mandate, which included helping Somalis embark on the monumental task of rebuilding the devastated infrastructure of their nation. Parts VI and VII recount the actions taken by UNOSOM II in response to a major attack on its forces by one of the Somali factions, and the subsequent decision

to revert from an enforcement mandate to an operation based once again on traditional peace-keeping principles. Part VIII relates how, following another year of continuing insecurity and slow progress in the process of reconciliation among the Somali factions, the Security Council took the momentous decision to withdraw the international military presence from Somalia altogether.

19 Its troops gone, the United Nations none the less remains deeply involved in the situation in Somalia. Part IX examines the many challenges that still face Somalia in achieving national reconciliation, rebuilding government structures and making a successful transition from emergency relief to long-term recovery. Finally, Part X offers some concluding remarks on the lessons this experience might hold for future United Nations endeavours, both in Somalia and elsewhere.

II Background


20 When the independent Somali Republic was formed in July 1960 from a merger of the former British and Italian Somalilands, many thought the country had a solid foundation for political stability. Not all Somali speakers lived within the borders of the new State—large communities also resided in Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya. But practically everyone within Somalia was of Somali origin, speaking the same language, adhering to the same religion—Islam—and following similar cultural traditions. This was in sharp contrast to virtually all other African countries, which have societies composed of multiple linguistic and religious groups.

21 For the first nine years of its independence, the country was governed under a parliamentary system. However, the system became marked by a plethora of parties (up to 60 at some points), fleeting political coalitions and occasional violence, including assassinations of public officials and candidates. One reason for this instability lay in the realities of Somalia's social structure. Beneath the apparent homogeneity at the national level, Somali society was divided, not only by social and occupational stratifications and differences between urban and rural sectors, but especially by the clan forms of social organization to which most Somalis belong.

22 The clans consist of aggregations that trace their relations back many generations and traditionally claim specific territories. Considerable authority rests with elders and chiefs, who continued to wield influence after independence. With the establishment of a central State, competition for political positions and State resources became a new element affecting inter-clan relations. In the parliamentary period of the 1960s, for example, clan tensions were reflected to some extent in the divisions among the various political parties. Some national leaders tried to contain and regulate this clan competition by emphasizing Somali nationalism.

23 Following the assassination of President Abdirashid Ali Sharma'arke in October 1969, the armed forces staged a coup and installed a new Government headed by General Mohamed Siad Barre. By the mid-1970s, a single-party State had been created, and henceforth a combination of factors set Somalia on its tragic course towards humanitarian catastrophe. These included the authoritarian character of the Siad Barre Government, compounded by the narrowing political base of the regime in terms of clans; a disastrous war with neighbouring Ethiopia in 1977 and 1978 over the Somali-inhabited Ogaden region of

Somalia



Drought and civil war affected much of Somalia in 1992, but it was in the region between the Shabelle and Juba rivers—the country's traditional breadbasket—that famine and fighting were most intense.

eastern Ethiopia, and the resulting influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees from the Ogaden; and a regional arms race, fuelled by the super-Power rivalry of the cold war, which further militarized the country.

24 As economic, social and political conditions deteriorated in the late 1970s and the 1980s, traditional clan loyalties came to the fore, fragmenting the Somali nation, and by 1988 the country was in the throes of a civil war. This conflict uprooted half a million people, devastated the economy and sharply reduced food production. As the conflict developed, Somalia's limited resources were further diverted from economic and social development to military expenditure. In its final years as a functioning State, Somalia, one of the poorest nations in the world, was also among the most militarized nations on earth, spending five dollars on its armed forces for every dollar it spent on education and health—the second highest such ratio in the world, according to the 1993 *Human Development Report* published by the United Nations Development Programme.

The descent into civil war

25 After Somalia's defeat in the 1977-1978 war with Ethiopia, and the subsequent influx of refugees, which upset the existing clan demography, there was growing political instability in Somalia. In 1978, there was a failed coup attempt. Other groups formed armed opposition movements in an attempt to depose the Government.

26 In the north-east, officers who had escaped arrest after the failure of the 1978 coup formed an opposition movement called the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). In the north-west, opponents of the Siad Barre Government formed the Somali National Movement (SNM) in 1981 and began a guerrilla war. The fighting there escalated dramatically in 1988, when the SNM briefly overran Hargeisa, the region's largest city, and the city was in turn destroyed by government aircraft and artillery. Possibly as many as 50,000 people lost their lives in this fighting, and an estimated 500,000 were driven from their homes. Some 370,000 fled to Ethiopia.

27 In central Somalia, a movement drawing its main support from the Hawiye clan, the United Somali Congress (USC), also took up arms against President Siad Barre's Government and in 1990 formed an alliance with the SNM and an Ogaden-based movement, the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM). In December 1990, President Siad Barre declared a state of emergency. One month later, his army crumbled and he fled from Mogadishu to the south with a rump force. Huge quantities of heavy weapons fell into the hands of the victorious factions.

28 The USC, which took control of Mogadishu, was itself divided into rival factions based on different sub-clans of the Hawiye. One

faction was headed by General Mohamed Farah Aidid of the Habr Gedir sub-clan, who had led the USC's military operations against the Siad Barre Government and had been elected chairman of the USC at a congress held near the Ethiopia-Somalia border in 1990. General Aidid's election had not been recognized, however, by a Mogadishu-based faction of the USC, which proclaimed Mr. Ali Mahdi Mohamed, a member of the Abgal sub-clan, as interim president on 29 January 1991. This move was bitterly opposed by General Aidid and several other faction leaders.

29 Throughout 1991, Somalia was torn apart by battles among the factions' militias and by widespread looting and banditry. With no central Government, the country fragmented, as rival militias seized or fought over different regions and towns. The SSDF took power in the north-east. In central Somalia, the rival factions of the USC competed for control of Mogadishu. Elsewhere, several new factions came into being, with localized power bases, as clans which had not originally possessed movements of their own moved to defend their interests. And at a conference in the town of Burao in May 1991, the SNM proclaimed an independent state in the north-west, to be known as "Somaliland". This part of the country had been administered as a British protectorate until independence, when it merged with the former Italian-administered United Nations Trusteeship Territory of Somalia. As of this writing, the "independence" of "Somaliland" had not been recognized by any country.

30 Despite mediation efforts sponsored by Djibouti, Egypt and Italy, and two conferences of faction leaders in Djibouti in June and July 1991, the political crisis deepened and in November 1991 an all-out war for control of Mogadishu broke out between the forces of General Aidid and those of Mr. Ali Mahdi. The fighting lasted for four months, during which time an estimated 25,000 civilians were killed or wounded, as rival factions bombarded each other's positions in heavily populated areas using tanks, artillery and fleets of "technicals"—pick-up trucks mounted with large-calibre machine-guns, artillery and anti-aircraft guns. Mogadishu was divided into two zones, one in the southern part of the city dominated by General Aidid's forces, the other in north Mogadishu held by Mr. Ali Mahdi's militia. The capital's estimated 500,000 inhabitants were left without even the most basic services.

31 The south of the country also became a battleground. In March-April 1991, there was heavy fighting between USC forces from Mogadishu and the forces of a new movement, the Somali National Front (SNF), constituted by the remnants of ex-President Siad Barre's army. The SNF lost control of Kismayo, Somalia's second largest city, on the southern coast, and retreated to Bardera and parts of the Gedo region which borders Kenya. In the following months, various anti-USC forces regained control of parts of the south, including Kismayo and

Baidoa. They made further advances as fighting between rival USC factions engulfed Mogadishu between November 1991 and March 1992, but were eventually driven south across the Kenyan border between April and June 1992 after a cease-fire concluded in March between the rival USC factions in Mogadishu. The cease-fire was reached following talks involving the factions, the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

32 The chaos and violence during this period in the southern agricultural regions, which are Somalia's traditional breadbasket, resulted in the plundering of grain stores and the uprooting of local farming populations. This was the single most important direct cause of the famine which was to grip southern Somalia in 1992-1993.

The onset of famine

33 Most of Somalia's land is suitable only for raising livestock. Less than 2 per cent of the country's land area can sustain food crops and most of this arable land lies along and between the Shabelle and Juba rivers in the south. Before the large population displacements caused by the war, about one quarter of Somalia's people were settled farmers, growing sorghum, maize, sugar cane and bananas; twice as many were nomadic pastoralists, who moved with their cattle as they grazed the dry rangelands. With so little fertile land, the country has always had a structural food deficit, although it has traditionally been a major exporter of livestock. It is also particularly vulnerable to periods of drought, which can result in both crop failures and large losses of livestock. A quarter of a million nomads lost most of their livestock in a devastating drought in 1974-1975. The vast exodus of ethnic Somalis and related peoples from the Ogaden region of Ethiopia into Somalia in the late 1970s created further pressures on scarce land and water resources, and led to a major humanitarian crisis.

34 Somalia is one of the world's 10 poorest nations, with a gross domestic product of \$106 per person in 1992. Food consumption was inadequate even before the crisis of 1992-1993: it is estimated that the daily calorie supply was only 81 per cent of the minimum requirement in the period 1988-1990. Health services were rudimentary: only 27 per cent of the population had access to them in 1988-1991, compared to an average of 81 per cent for all developing countries. Only 60 per cent had access to safe drinking-water and only 17 per cent to sanitation. Rates of vaccination coverage were barely 20 to 30 per cent. In these conditions, Somalis were particularly vulnerable to disease, especially if a major food crisis further eroded nutritional levels.

35 The difficult natural environment, combined with the nation's poverty, thus made Somalia more susceptible to the danger of a humanitarian crisis in times of drought or other natural calamities. But it was warfare that drove Somalia into famine. The civil war that preceded and followed the fall of the Siad Barre Government uprooted an estimated 1.7 million people, about one fifth of the total population. Well over 700,000 fled to Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Yemen. More than 250,000 displaced persons poured into Mogadishu from rural towns and villages, and there were large influxes into other southern cities, including Kismayo and Baidoa.

36 This huge displacement of people from their homes led to a massive disruption in food production. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the area of cultivated land fell by almost half between 1989 and 1991. During the same period, the production of grains also declined dramatically. In the inter-riverine areas, the armed militias laid waste to the richest farmland in Somalia, plundering grain and seed stocks, damaging irrigation systems, killing livestock and polluting the wells of opposing clans—all to deny their opponents food and water. The war also resulted in enormous losses of livestock, owing to the collapse of veterinary services, constraints on traditional nomadic migrations and the slaughter of animals as food stocks ran low.

37 Furthermore, all the services and institutions that allow society to function and to protect its members collapsed as Somalia slid into chaos. By the beginning of 1992, only 15 of the country's 70 hospitals and clinics were still functioning, and these lacked medicines and equipment. Water and sanitation systems in the cities had ceased operating, creating serious health hazards. Practically all the country's schools had closed down. There was no electricity supply. Local government had collapsed, along with the police and judicial systems. There were no longer any banks. Electrical cables had been looted and stripped to recover their aluminium and copper, while industrial machinery had been dismantled and sold abroad as scrap.

38 Deepening the crisis, the factions and armed bandits prevented deliveries of food and other humanitarian relief supplies by United Nations and bilateral aid agencies, as well as by NGOs. In coastal cities such as Mogadishu and Kismayo, as well as in the interior, the factions saw control of food as a military asset—a source of power to be guarded, and denied to their opponents. Finally, the way in which Somalis were recruited into the various clan militias contributed to the looting that kept food from reaching starving people. Instead of paying their soldiers in cash, the militias promised them a share of the loot they captured from their enemies. Militiamen and bandits alike survived, and in some cases flourished, by terrorizing civilians and aid workers, by

stealing food from aid agencies' warehouses and from the docks and airports, and by attacking trucks delivering food to the needy.

39 By November 1991, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) found that in southern Somalia, 40 per cent of the people were severely malnourished and another 50 per cent were moderately malnourished. In short, much of the population in the south was at risk of starvation. The situation in the north was more stable, but there too, pockets of malnutrition could be found.

Early United Nations involvement

40 The United Nations was deeply involved in Somalia, particularly in the field of humanitarian assistance, long before it first sent military observers and peace-keepers in 1992. From the late 1970s, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), along with the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and other United Nations agencies and programmes provided assistance to several hundred thousand refugees from Ethiopia's Ogaden region in camps in Somalia. When the civil war in Somalia resulted in large population displacements in the north-west in 1988, the need for large-scale humanitarian assistance increased. United Nations agencies began helping the estimated 500,000 Somalis who fled the violence. As conditions deteriorated during 1990, the United Nations provided emergency relief to Somalis who had been displaced by the fighting, particularly in the north. However, the violence also disrupted United Nations access to some people in need.

41 When the civil war swept into Mogadishu in December 1990–January 1991, the United Nations closed its offices in Somalia and, along with most diplomatic missions and international organizations, evacuated its personnel from the country. In February, May and June–July 1991, United Nations officials travelled to Mogadishu to determine whether it was safe to return, and in August 1991, offices were reopened in Mogadishu and two towns in the north-west, Berbera and Borama, with a small number of emergency relief staff. The office in Mogadishu was closed again in November 1991 when fighting broke out in the city between the rival factions of the USC.

42 Despite the insecurity, United Nations agencies, NGOs, local associations and dedicated local and international workers strove to maintain emergency relief programmes. United Nations organizations tried to ensure a steady flow of funds and relief inputs to sustain projects with relief organizations such as the ICRC that remained in Somalia throughout the most dangerous periods. UNICEF pre-positioned relief supplies in Djibouti and Kenya and, with its local staff, helped rehabili-

tate Hargeisa's water system and reopen some health centres in Mogadishu. It also recruited and deployed expatriate nurses for NGO nutrition and health programmes, launched emergency operations in Berbera in April 1991 and, with local and international NGOs, carried out immunization campaigns in Hargeisa, Berbera and Erigavo. UNHCR continued to aid returnees and fund mine-clearing operations in the relatively peaceful north-west.

43 During 1991, many individual voices were raised calling attention to Somalia's plight, declaring it to be both a humanitarian tragedy and a threat to stability and security in the entire Horn of Africa. Unfortunately, Somalia's crisis was occurring at roughly the same time as the break-up of the Soviet Union and the beginning of the war in the former Yugoslavia, events which attracted the greater part of the international community's attention. Moreover, there were no functioning embassies in Mogadishu, and thus no diplomatic cables being sent home to alert the outside world to the impending disaster. For the most part, too, journalists kept out of the country. Heartbreaking images of desperate Somali children had not yet appeared on television or made the front pages of the world's newspapers. Somalia had not yet become a matter of prime concern to the international community.

III UNOSOM I and the famine of 1992

44 The involvement of the United Nations in the search for peace in Somalia began with an attempt, as I took office in January 1992, to bring about a negotiated cease-fire in Mogadishu. The United Nations then attempted to deploy a small number of cease-fire observers and a small force of security personnel for the protection of humanitarian relief operations in the capital, based on conventional peace-keeping premises, including the consent of the parties. However, weak cooperation on the part of the factions, and outright opposition by some of them, led to long delays in the deployment of these units. As the famine toll rose, reaching appalling proportions in mid-1992, it became clear that a much larger force was needed to protect relief supplies and that it had to be deployed quickly, whether or not the faction leaders agreed.

Establishment of UNOSOM I

45 It was on 27 December 1991, during the period of consultations just prior to my taking office as Secretary-General, that my predecessor, Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, in a letter to the Security Council, informed the Council that the Organization of African Unity (OAU) had indicated its support for the prompt consideration by the Security Council of the Somalia question, and that he agreed with the OAU's view that the Council's involvement would facilitate a peaceful settlement of the conflict.¹ In early January 1992, I dispatched the then Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Mr. James O. C. Jonah (Sierra Leone), to Mogadishu, where he met with General Aidid and Mr. Ali Mahdi with the aim of bringing about a cease-fire in the capital and securing access by international relief agencies and NGOs to the civilians caught in the conflict. Little concrete progress was made in this first contact. Battles continued to rage in the capital, and gunmen shelled the airport during Mr. Jonah's visit. But for the first time, both factions declared their support for a United Nations role in bringing about national reconciliation.

46 On 15 January 1992, Somalia's interim Prime Minister appealed for the Security Council to convene to consider the "deteriorating situation in Somalia, particularly the fighting in Mogadishu".² On 23 January, the Security Council adopted its first resolution on Somalia,

1/Document 1
See page 113

2/Document 2
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resolution 733 (1992), in which it urged all the parties to the conflict to cease hostilities, promote reconciliation and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council also imposed a “general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia”.³

3/Document 4
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47 The text of resolution 733 (1992) was sent to Mr. Ali Mahdi and to General Aidid, as well as to other interested parties in Somalia, to Member States and to international organizations. Mr. Ali Mahdi subsequently confirmed his acceptance of the resolution; General Aidid raised some questions but did not indicate specifically whether or not he accepted the resolution. On 31 January, pursuant to paragraph 3 of the resolution, I sent letters to Mr. Ali Mahdi and General Aidid inviting them to participate in consultations in New York during the week of 10 February to explore the best ways of reaching a cease-fire agreement and to draw up a framework for a sustained peacemaking effort in Somalia.

48 The two Mogadishu-based faction leaders each sent representatives to the February consultations at United Nations Headquarters. I also had invited the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference to participate;⁴ the United Nations and these three organizations formed a joint delegation. During the talks, I met separately with representatives of the rival factions and emphasized that the world community would not take the Somalia question seriously unless they made every effort to respect a cease-fire and to facilitate a peaceful and lasting settlement of the conflict in Mogadishu. On 14 February, the two factions signed pledges committing themselves to an immediate cessation of hostilities and to the maintenance of a cease-fire in Mogadishu. They also agreed that a high-level delegation composed of representatives of the United Nations and the three regional and intergovernmental organizations should visit Mogadishu to arrange a cease-fire agreement and work out arrangements for its implementation. In this connection, one of the Somali factions asserted that a cease-fire agreement without international monitoring and supervision would not hold. Both during the talks and subsequent to the signing of the pledges, however, hostilities on the ground in Mogadishu had continued.⁵

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49 The joint delegation, led by my Envoy for Somalia, Mr. Jonah, arrived in Mogadishu on 29 February. On 3 March, after four days of intensive negotiations, the delegation succeeded in persuading Mr. Ali Mahdi and General Aidid to agree on the implementation of a cease-fire “by means of a United Nations monitoring mechanism”. The agreement also declared that the two faction leaders were “desirous of restoring peace with justice to Somalia and of bringing about a return to normalcy under the rule of law as soon as possible”.⁶ The warring factions finally

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stopped battling each other in Mogadishu, although sporadic violent incidents continued to obstruct humanitarian operations in the capital and fighting continued in many other parts of the country. With this first phase of its mission concluded, the joint delegation undertook additional consultations, first with the two factions in Mogadishu and then with a number of Somali groups and movements outside the capital, regarding the convening of a conference of national reconciliation and unity. Support for the idea was widely shared, and consultations continued with a view towards agreeing on the participation, agenda and venue for such a meeting.

50 With a precarious peace re-established in Mogadishu and the two rival factions in the city committed to a United Nations role in monitoring the cease-fire, I proceeded, with the support of the Security Council, to send a technical team to Somalia to prepare an operational plan for the monitoring of the cease-fire and to explore ways of ensuring the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance.⁷ When the team arrived in Mogadishu on 23 March for talks with the leaders of both parties, Mr. Ali Mahdi argued that, unless the United Nations sent a substantial peace-keeping force, the cease-fire would not hold and it would be impossible to distribute food and other emergency assistance effectively. General Aidid expressed reservations about stationing United Nations military observers or peace-keepers in Mogadishu. Following further discussions, both General Aidid and Mr. Ali Mahdi signed agreements on 27 and 28 March, respectively, on mechanisms for monitoring the cease-fire and arrangements for equitable and effective distribution of humanitarian assistance in and around Mogadishu.⁸

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51 These agreements specified that the United Nations would deploy 25 observers in each part of the divided city (north Mogadishu, controlled by Mr. Ali Mahdi's faction, and south Mogadishu, controlled by General Aidid's faction) to monitor the cease-fire, as well as "adequate" security personnel for humanitarian relief operations. The exact number of security personnel was to be determined later in consultations between the United Nations and the parties in Mogadishu. The technical team did not restrict its efforts to Mogadishu. It also met the leaders of several other movements, securing their written commitment to work for peace and to ensure security for relief operations in the areas under their influence.⁹

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52 Accordingly, I recommended in a report to the Security Council on 21 April 1992 that the United Nations send to Mogadishu 50 military observers, who would be unarmed, as is normal practice in such missions, and a lightly armed force of 500 infantry to provide security for relief personnel, equipment and supplies at Mogadishu's port and airport and to escort convoys of relief supplies.¹⁰ On 24 April, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 751 (1992),

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authorizing the establishment of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM).¹¹ (That original United Nations mission is now generally referred to as UNOSOM I, to distinguish it from the later, larger and more broadly mandated operation, UNOSOM II.) In the resolution, the council requested me to deploy immediately the 50 military observers to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu, and to deploy as soon as possible a security force to protect humanitarian relief activities.

53 The Security Council recognized that a political solution to Somalia's crisis would have to be found if the root causes of the humanitarian emergency were to be dealt with effectively. In the words of the resolution, I was asked to continue "consultations with all Somali parties, movements and factions towards the convening of a conference on national reconciliation and unity in Somalia in close cooperation with the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of the Islamic Conference". National reconciliation was therefore, from the beginning, an integral part of UNOSOM's mandate.

54 On 28 April 1992, I appointed Mr. Mohamed Sahnoun (Algeria) as my Special Representative for Somalia. His task would be to coordinate all of the Organization's peace-keeping and humanitarian efforts and to encourage the Somali factions to find a peaceful solution to their conflict. His first priorities upon arrival in Mogadishu on 4 May were to meet with the main political leaders, arrange for the speedy deployment of the 50 unarmed cease-fire monitors, pursue consultations with the factions in Mogadishu about the deployment of the proposed security force to protect relief operations in the city and coordinate a stepped-up humanitarian assistance programme nationwide, particularly in the famine-stricken south. All of these tasks would prove difficult to carry out, however, as the humanitarian emergency deepened and fighting among the factions continued.¹²

The humanitarian crisis

55 By the time UNOSOM I was established in April 1992, the challenge was not so much to prevent the outbreak of famine but to contain it as quickly as possible and save the millions of people at risk of death. The civil war had already ravaged the countryside for over a year, particularly in the agricultural south, and much of the population had been displaced. The towns, where all services had been destroyed, were swollen with people fleeing the violence or searching for food. Hundreds of thousands were in camps without access to food, potable water or sanitation. In the north, drought had hit several regions. Almost everywhere, food stocks were being exhausted and food prices were rising sharply. Water and sanitation systems had been destroyed. The

previously inadequate health services had virtually collapsed and, since vaccination coverage had been so low before the war, malnourished children were exceptionally vulnerable to normally preventable diseases like measles. In these conditions, not only food but basic health services and the restoration of water and sanitation systems were desperately needed. By April 1992, the United Nations estimated that 4.5 million Somalis—nearly 65 per cent of the country's population—required external assistance. Of these, some 1.5 million were considered to be at immediate risk.

56 While the fighting raged in Mogadishu in early 1992, it had been impossible to deliver food aid to the capital by sea. Though large-scale hostilities ended after the 3 March cease-fire, two days later a ship, the *Marco Polo*, carrying wheat donated by the WFP, was shelled in order to prevent the unloading of badly needed foodstuff in Mogadishu port. My Special Representative expressed deep concern at such reckless actions. Indeed, as a result of this incident, no food reached the city by sea until May 1992. The ICRC succeeded in delivering some food to other southern and central ports, including Kismayo, and the United Nations continued to deliver humanitarian assistance to parts of the north. UNICEF, which had re-established a presence in Mogadishu at the end of December 1991, began to airlift medicines, high-energy foods and other emergency supplies into the city early in 1992. Several NGOs remained in the country throughout the fighting in Mogadishu in an attempt to continue relief programmes despite the dangers, thus helping to keep thousands of malnourished children and mothers alive. Owing to the collapse of government services, UNICEF and NGOs also set up, equipped and staffed several mother-and-child health centres in Mogadishu during this critical early period.

57 Meanwhile, a joint WFP/UNICEF team, working in conjunction with other United Nations agencies and the ICRC, began work in Nairobi in February 1992 to prepare for a comprehensive nationwide programme of relief. Still, without the armed factions' full cooperation with relief operations and a stable United Nations presence in the country, these efforts could not possibly meet the increasingly desperate needs of the civilian population. With banditry commonplace, partly as a result of the high value of food aid in conditions of extreme scarcity, several aid workers had already lost their lives.

58 In April 1992, the United Nations, in tandem with the establishment of UNOSOM I, launched a 90-Day Plan of Action to bring food and other vital assistance to the Somali population.¹³ The plan assumed that relief workers would be able to operate in designated corridors, or "zones of peace", which would include key seaports and airports. In May 1992, when the first WFP ship succeeded in docking in Mogadishu,

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the food situation in the capital did begin to improve. For the first time, food supplies crossed the line that divided north and south Mogadishu. Meanwhile, UNICEF and the WFP flew in supplementary food from Nairobi to Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baidoa. All told, in the first half of 1992, the ICRC and the WFP delivered about 80,000 tons of food to Somalia.

59 This amount was, however, much less than was needed. Monthly requirements were estimated at the time to be around 30,000 to 35,000 tons. But donor support was still falling far short of requirements and, without security, it was proving impossible to deliver adequate assistance to many parts of the country. In mid-1992 in southern Somalia, death rates were rising steadily.

60 The crisis in Somalia had still not received the attention it warranted from the international community: of a \$117 million appeal for humanitarian assistance issued by the United Nations in January 1992, only \$41 million had been pledged by July 1992. That month, alarmed by the tragedy in Somalia and the tendency of some Member States to focus primarily on other crises, such as the one in the Balkans, I urged the international community to focus more attention on Somalia and to strengthen UNOSOM and expand it to cover the entire country. I stressed that, while preoccupation with crises in other parts of the world was understandable, it was also the duty of the United Nations to live up to its global responsibilities and respond effectively to the situation in Somalia, where millions of people were facing the threat of death. My comments provoked some controversy at the time but, along with the efforts of my Special Representative and the cries for help coming from the NGOs active in Somalia, they helped rouse the world community. International media coverage of the Somali famine began to expand rapidly. Televised images of desperate Somalis broadcast around the world brought home the need for Governments to act.

61 On 15 July 1992, I issued a consolidated appeal to Member States for humanitarian assistance to the Horn of Africa region, including Somalia, requesting funds for food aid, assistance to refugees, health care, water facilities, veterinary services and the provision of seeds and hand tools. Seven days later, in view of the urgency of the situation and the difficulty of reaching many of the inland areas where the famine was most acute, I proposed an immediate airlift of food. On 27 July, the Security Council approved the airlift.¹⁴ The WFP then began flying food into Baidoa, Bardera and Belet Weyne, three inland towns in the worst-affected southern and central parts of Somalia. Some food was also dropped by air to a dozen small, isolated towns in the south, using a method developed by the WFP to avoid attracting looting. Meanwhile, the United States launched its own airlift operation, known as "Operation Provide Relief", to southern Somalia and to Somali refugee camps in northern Kenya.

62 Even with the donors mobilized, the crisis continued to intensify, because the lawlessness, insecurity and violence prevented the delivery of much of the food aid in the pipeline. On 16 August 1992, for example, armed gangs looted the first large-scale food shipment to reach Kismayo. As a result, by August-September 1992, unprecedented numbers of people were dying of hunger and disease. In Baidoa, the number of recorded burials rose from 687 in the second week of August to 1,780 in the second week of September. There were large outbreaks of infectious diseases, such as measles and dysentery, which wreaked a devastating toll on the weakened, malnourished population. The population of Kismayo had swollen from 50,000 to 200,000 as refugees flooded in from the surrounding countryside. Similar scenes could be found in other cities of southern and central Somalia, such as Bardera, Merca and Belet Weyne. It is not known how many people perished in isolated areas of the country before they could reach food distribution centres in the towns. It has been estimated, however, that between 300,000 and 500,000 Somalis fell victim to the famine and war in 1992.

63 In September 1992, the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs—established in April 1992 to strengthen the coordination of emergency assistance—put together, in consultation with United Nations agencies and NGOs, a comprehensive new assistance plan to address the rapidly deteriorating situation in Somalia. The 100-Day Action Programme for Accelerated Humanitarian Assistance, which was reviewed at a coordination meeting attended by 350 representatives of Governments and NGOs in Geneva on 12 and 13 October 1992, called for \$83 million of humanitarian assistance.¹⁵ The programme envisaged a massive infusion of food aid under which the WFP and the ICRC would provide 50,000 tons of food to Somalia each month. Some of this would be “monetized”—that is, sold to Somali traders who would then make it available in markets. The programme also foresaw an aggressive expansion of supplementary feeding for the severely malnourished; the provision of basic health services and a mass measles vaccination campaign; the provision of clean water, shelter materials, seeds, tools and animal vaccines; and measures to stem the flow of refugees and assist repatriation. In a historic first for the United Nations, the effort would be managed jointly by the Organization and its NGO partners. In view of the NGOs’ role, I appointed Mr. Philip Johnston, then President of CARE USA, as Operational Manager of the programme.

64 In October and November 1992, in parts of Somalia, the airlift and the 100-Day Programme began to stem the tide of famine. Together, the WFP and the ICRC met their monthly targets for the delivery of food to Somali ports. In Mogadishu and some other towns, food began to reappear in market-places. Prices of maize, sorghum and wheat fell during the second half of 1992 as supplies increased and death

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rates began to decline in some areas. In Baidoa, weekly famine deaths had declined dramatically—to 306 by the second week of November from 1,780 three months earlier.

65 The famine was not yet over, however, and the improvement shown by these statistics was exceedingly fragile in most areas. Despite the continued efforts of my Special Representative to maintain agreements by the warring factions on the uninterrupted distribution of relief supplies, the renewed humanitarian drive was badly disrupted by continuing insecurity and persistent looting. Fighting closed the ports of Mogadishu and Kismayo for part of the time, and much of the food that did make its way into the country was failing to reach its intended beneficiaries, because of looting and diversion by gangs. Relief workers continued to work under often impossible, and nearly always dangerous, conditions. Pictures of starving children were now coupled with those of bags of food aid, warehoused because of lack of security for their distribution. Such conscious and deliberate obstruction by the factions and other armed groups of the international community's efforts to fully implement the 100-Day Action Programme would ultimately oblige the Security Council to use more forceful measures.

Obstacles to deployment of UNOSOM I

66 UNOSOM I was conceived as a peace-keeping mission even though, for the first time in the history of United Nations peace-keeping, one of its primary purposes was to make possible the delivery of emergency assistance to a civilian population. Peace-keeping, in contrast with peace enforcement, is not intended to achieve its objectives through the use of force. When peace-keepers are deployed, they make every effort, by peaceful persuasion, to stop the fighting between warring parties or to carry out other aspects of their mandates; they do not force belligerents to cease their hostilities. Indeed, peace-keeping operations use weapons only in self-defence, which is defined to include defence of their mandate as well as of their personnel and property. The rationale for the neutrality of United Nations peace-keeping forces is that it will serve to defuse tensions, deter violence and build confidence among the parties to a conflict. The security force to be sent to Somalia under resolution 751 (1992) was intended to help deter armed attacks on humanitarian relief operations and was to use its weapons only in self-defence if deterrence failed.

67 Peace-keeping operations can succeed only when the parties to the conflict genuinely wish to avoid hostilities. When rivals are intent on making war, the potential effectiveness of peace-keeping can be undermined. Above all, the ability of peace-keepers to function depends

upon the consent of all the parties involved in the conflict. In Somalia, with more than a dozen factional leaders to consult, this consent was extraordinarily difficult to obtain and maintain. One problem from the outset was that the 3 March 1992 cease-fire involved only the two parties in Mogadishu. Meanwhile, intense fighting continued in the agricultural inter-riverine areas of the south between the SNF of ex-President Siad Barre and factions allied to General Aidid. The SNF forces were defeated in a series of battles in April-June 1992 and then retreated across the southern border into Kenya.

68 The efforts of the United Nations were further complicated by shifting alliances among the disparate factions. The fighting in the south in March-June 1992 laid the basis for the creation in August 1992 of the Somali National Alliance (SNA), a loose coalition including General Aidid's faction of the USC and several other factions. Mr. Ali Mahdi's USC faction would later join a rival alliance, known initially as the Group of 11 and later as the Group of 12. The tensions in Mogadishu between the factions of General Aidid and of Mr. Ali Mahdi became intertwined with a host of localized power struggles in other cities and regions, creating a complex and highly unstable assemblage of alliances and divisions. Only in the north-west and the north-east, where the SNM and the SSDF respectively had emerged as the dominant factions, were conditions relatively peaceful.

69 Despite the agreements signed by Mr. Ali Mahdi and General Aidid in March 1992 on the deployment of United Nations military observers and security personnel, it took several weeks of additional discussions to finalize arrangements for their deployment. One of the main issues of contention during this period concerned whether or not the unarmed United Nations military observers would wear uniforms, as is traditional United Nations practice. While Mr. Ali Mahdi's faction had accepted all the elements of the cease-fire arrangement, including the deployment of uniformed observers, General Aidid's side had insisted that they be in civilian attire with some United Nations insignia, i.e. blue berets and armbands. After further difficult negotiations with USC officials, General Aidid formally accepted, on 21 June, the conditions set by the United Nations that the observers would wear uniforms, would be unarmed and would be deployed on both sides of the demarcation line in Mogadishu. With this important step, the deployment could proceed. I appointed Brigadier General Imtiaz Shaheen (Pakistan) as Chief Military Observer, and he arrived in Mogadishu on 5 July 1992. The full complement of 50 observers was in place by 23 July 1992, three months after their mission was authorized by the Security Council.¹⁶

70 My Special Representative also held consultations with General Aidid and Mr. Ali Mahdi about the deployment of the security

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personnel intended for the protection of humanitarian operations in Mogadishu. General Aidid and Mr. Ali Mahdi finally signed letters of agreement on the deployment of a 500-strong security force on 12 August 1992.¹⁷ The force was to guard the port and the main airport, thereby providing protection for incoming aid shipments, to escort convoys of relief supplies to distribution centres in Mogadishu and to protect the centres during distribution. Pakistan contributed a battalion to get the mission started, and the United States offered to airlift it to Mogadishu. By the time the first 40 of the 500 Pakistani peace-keepers arrived in Mogadishu on 14 September, the various delays caused by the factional fighting and by differences between the parties over cease-fire terms meant that a full five months had elapsed since the Security Council had originally approved the deployment of a security unit to protect humanitarian relief operations. The Pakistani battalion consisted of a light infantry force with no artillery, heavy weapons or air support. Though authorized to defend themselves if attacked, they were ill-equipped to do so and had to proceed in their tasks with great caution. For the first two months of their deployment they were unable to fulfil any of their functions.

71 From May, in parallel to the negotiations on Mogadishu, my Special Representative held a series of discussions with the factions that controlled other areas of Somalia, with a view to extending the cease-fire to the rest of the country, establishing a secure environment for relief operations there and promoting the broad process of *national reconciliation*. While the 500-strong force to be deployed in Mogadishu might be able to guard the airport and the docks, it could not hope to operate in the interior, where the famine was at its worst. I therefore concluded that the United Nations needed to adjust the nature of its involvement in Somalia. Its efforts would have to be enlarged so that it could help bring about an effective cease-fire throughout the country while providing protection for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and also pressing forward with efforts to promote national reconciliation. This would require the Organization to establish a presence in all regions and to adopt an innovative and comprehensive approach dealing with all aspects of the Somali situation. For this reason, and because it was clear that the security force was far too small and ill-equipped, given the lawlessness and violence in Mogadishu, I proposed to the Security Council on 22 July 1992 that the United Nations place troops in four operational zones in Somalia: around Berbera in the north-west, Bossaso in the north-east, Mogadishu in central Somalia and Kismayo in the south. In each of the zones, a consolidated United Nations operation would carry out activities relating to emergency relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction and institution-building, cease-fire monitoring and containment

of potential hostilities, demobilization and disarmament, and national reconciliation.¹⁸

72 By its resolution 767 (1992), adopted on 27 July 1992, the Security Council approved the proposal to establish the four operational zones.¹⁹ I then sent a new technical team to Somalia. Headed by Mr. Peter Hansen (Denmark), a former Assistant Secretary-General who is now Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, the team visited Somalia from 6 to 15 August 1992 and obtained the agreement of local political leaders for the deployment of security units in Bossasso in the north-east and in the Gedo region along the south-western border with Kenya, where large numbers of displaced persons were concentrated. Agreement was not finalized, however, with local leaders for the deployment of similar forces in Kismayo and Berbera.²⁰

73 In the light of the technical team's findings, I proposed in a report to the Security Council on 24 August that the Council authorize the deployment of four additional security units, each with 750 troops, in Bossasso, in the south-west and, once consultations with local leaders had reached a successful conclusion, in Berbera and in Kismayo. Including the 500 troops already approved for deployment in Mogadishu, this would increase the total strength of United Nations security forces in Somalia to 3,500.²¹ On 28 August, the Council approved the new deployment in its resolution 775 (1992), and shortly afterwards, on 8 September, it approved the deployment of three logistic units totalling up to 719 personnel to support the enhanced UNOSOM I operation.²²

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UNOSOM I in jeopardy

74 These troops, however, would never be deployed, and UNOSOM I would not extend its reach beyond Mogadishu. Once again, some of the faction leaders refused to approve the deployment of peacekeepers, thereby obstructing efforts to provide adequate security for famine relief. Worse still, some faction leaders were beginning to take an aggressive, threatening stance towards the United Nations, despite the role the Organization was playing in relieving the suffering of millions of their compatriots.

75 The resistance by the factions, particularly by that of General Aidid, subsequently reached disturbing new proportions. On 16 October, the Security Council stated that "persons hampering the deployment of the Operation in Somalia would be responsible for aggravating an already unprecedented humanitarian disaster".²³ On 28 October, General Aidid, who had previously agreed to the deployment of Pakistani troops, raised new objections, declaring that the contingents would

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no longer be tolerated on the streets of Mogadishu. General Aidid also warned that any forcible UNOSOM deployment would be met by violence and that the deployment of United Nations troops in Kismayo and Berbera was not acceptable. He further ordered the immediate expulsion from Somalia of Mr. David Bassiouni, UNOSOM's Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance, on the grounds that his activities were counter to the interests of the Somali people and his security could no longer be guaranteed. At the request of the UNOSOM Force Commander, Mr. Bassiouni's expulsion order was extended by seven days, but efforts to have the decision rescinded were unsuccessful.²⁴

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76 Another disturbing trend had evolved during this period, apparently at the instigation of local faction leaders. This was the widespread perception among Somalis that the United Nations had decided to abandon its policy of cooperation and was planning to "invade" the country, and that the United Nations had thus become the "common enemy" of the Somali factions. I issued a statement declaring that the United Nations was determined to help the people of Somalia overcome the tragic difficulties they faced, and I stressed the importance of cooperation and partnership between Somalia and the international community. To save lives, defeat the spectre of famine and civil strife and pave the way to political reconciliation, the United Nations could only succeed, I stated, with "the consent and support of the Somali people".²⁵

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77 Mr. Sahnoun resigned in October and I appointed Mr. Ismat Kittani (Iraq) as my Special Representative on 2 November. When Mr. Kittani arrived in Mogadishu on 8 November 1992, a tense situation prevailed. On 12 November, General Aidid demanded that UNOSOM I troops leave the airport, where they had taken up positions two days earlier in accordance with the August 1992 agreement and following arrangements made with local security forces at the airport. On my instructions, Mr. Kittani refused to withdraw the troops, and one day later the battalion came under heavy fire. At about the same time, Mr. Ali Mahdi's faction threatened to shell any ship attempting to dock at Mogadishu port, on the grounds that food cargoes were being diverted for the benefit of General Aidid's faction. Mr. Ali Mahdi also urged UNOSOM I to take control of the port. For several days ships were unable to approach the harbour. On 23 November 1992, Mr. Ali Mahdi agreed to allow a WFP ship to dock but the next day artillery shelled the ship as it tried to enter the port.²⁶

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78 Meanwhile, a new confrontation had been developing in the south-west, where the militia of former President Siad Barre succeeded in recapturing Bardera in October 1992. Relief workers from the WFP, UNICEF and NGOs were trapped in the city and food stocks were looted. The daily death rate in the town, which had declined to 60, rose to 300 during the fighting. Whatever progress the international commu-

nity had made in months of effort in Bardera was being erased by the resurgence of fighting. It was evident that until security could be re-established throughout Somalia, there was a permanent danger of similar set-backs to the relief effort.

79 In fact, the international aid provided by the United Nations and voluntary agencies had become a major source of income in Somalia and, as such, the target of armed attacks. So-called “authorities”—sometimes no more than two or three bandits with guns—exacted bribes from donor agencies and organizations at the port and the airport and at innumerable roadblocks and checkpoints along transport routes. Agencies were also forced to pay for “protection”, in particular for escorts of their personnel and convoys. Warehouses were looted and expatriate personnel were detained. The net result, as I said in a letter dated 24 November 1992 to the President of the Security Council, was that the humanitarian assistance reaching its intended beneficiaries was often barely more than a trickle.²⁷ Furthermore, the Somali “authorities” had consented to the deployment of UNOSOM troop contingents in only one of the four areas to which deployment had been authorized by the Security Council. Without these battalions in place, the necessary security conditions that would permit the distribution of relief supplies could not be established, and the cycle of extortion and blackmail could not be broken.

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80 Such distressing circumstances made it exceedingly difficult for the United Nations operation to achieve the objectives approved by the Security Council. Moreover, it appeared likely at this point that chaos would continue to reign in Somalia, to the detriment of hundreds of thousands if not millions of civilians. I thus concluded my letter to the Council by stating that I did not “exclude the possibility that it may become necessary to review the basic premises and principles of the United Nations effort in Somalia”.

IV The Unified Task Force

81 The ongoing warfare, and especially the recalcitrance of the major factions in Somalia in failing to allow for the secure delivery of humanitarian assistance, led to a fundamental change in the international community's approach to the Somali crisis. In December 1992, the Security Council authorized, and the United States agreed to lead, a precedent-setting peace-enforcement operation to provide a secure environment for humanitarian relief.

UNITAF's mandate and structure

82 The Security Council took my letter of 24 November under consideration amid great frustration about the relief effort in Somalia. Not only were the lives of aid workers being put at risk, but the insecurity and violence were threatening to reverse the fragile gains that had been made in reducing the famine's death toll. At an informal meeting on 25 November 1992, the Council agreed that the situation had become intolerable and that it was doubtful whether the methods employed by the United Nations to date would suffice to end the suffering of the civilian population. The Council therefore asked me to come forward with specific recommendations for an appropriate response. During the Council's deliberations, several members expressed strong support for the view that the time had come to consider taking more forceful measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, which permits the Council to authorize military action to restore peace and security. The same day, the Acting Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Lawrence Eagleburger, informed me of his Government's readiness to lead a large military operation if the Security Council approved a more forceful effort to establish security in the country.²⁸

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83 On 29 November 1992, I presented the Security Council with five options.²⁹ They were all addressed to the immediate humanitarian issue, namely, how to create conditions for the unhindered delivery of relief supplies to the Somali people. I noted, however, that this was only part, albeit the most urgent part, of the problem in Somalia and that efforts also had to be made to create conditions for the resolution of the country's underlying political problems and to rehabilitate the economy.

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84 The first option, under which UNOSOM would have continued its efforts to reach agreement with the faction leaders on the

deployment of the full complement of approximately 4,200 peace-keepers in the four operational zones authorized by the Security Council in August 1992, had already proved unrealistic because of the faction leaders' lack of cooperation. A second option was to abandon the idea of using peace-keepers to protect humanitarian activities in Somalia, withdraw the military elements of UNOSOM and leave the humanitarian agencies to negotiate the best protection deals they could with local faction and clan leaders. However, the difficulties being experienced in Somalia were attributable not to the presence of international military personnel but to the fact that not enough of them were there and that they did not have the right mandate. I therefore excluded the option of withdrawal.

85 These considerations led me to conclude that more forceful measures were needed to secure the humanitarian operations in Somalia. The last three options were all based on this premise. Because no Government existed in Somalia that could request the United Nations to intervene, all three options would require the Security Council to make a determination under Chapter VII of the Charter that the Somali crisis posed a threat to international peace and security. It could then authorize military action under Article 42, which states, in part: "Should the Security Council consider that measures [not involving the use of armed force] would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security."

86 I stated that the purpose of each of the last three options would be to ensure on a lasting basis that the violence against the international relief effort was brought to an end. To achieve this, it would be necessary for the heavy weapons of the organized factions to be neutralized and brought under international control and for the irregular forces and gangs to be disarmed.

87 The third option which I presented was for UNOSOM to undertake a show of force in Mogadishu to create conditions there for the safe delivery of humanitarian relief and to deter the factions both there and elsewhere from withholding cooperation with UNOSOM. Since there were reasons to doubt whether a successful operation in Mogadishu alone would be sufficient to persuade the factions elsewhere to cooperate fully with UNOSOM and the relief effort, I favoured a country-wide enforcement operation. The fourth and fifth options provided two variants of this.

88 Option four was for a country-wide enforcement operation empowered by the Security Council but undertaken by a group of Member States. As noted above, the United States had already offered to take the lead in organizing and commanding such an operation. The purpose of the operation would be to resolve the immediate security

problems in Somalia. I suggested that this should include disarming the irregular armed bands and bringing the heavy weapons of the organized factions under international control. Once this had been accomplished, the military operation would be replaced by a conventional United Nations peace-keeping operation.

89 Under the fifth option, the United Nations itself would carry out a country-wide enforcement mission in Somalia, with troop contingents provided by Member States and deployed under the command and control of the United Nations. Unlike traditional peace-keepers, these troops would have the authority to use force to accomplish their mission. An enforcement operation carried out under United Nations command and control would have been consistent with the expansion of the Organization's role in the maintenance of international peace and security, which had been made possible by the end of the cold war. Indeed, at this time, the Organization had 13 peace-keeping missions in the field, with some 55,000 troops and a budget three times that of one year earlier. In 1992 alone, the United Nations had already embarked on two large and expensive new peace-keeping missions, in Cambodia and the former Yugoslavia, and was preparing to organize another in Mozambique. Despite this rapid expansion, the Organization had almost no permanent logistical and contingency planning infrastructure to support its multiplying commitments, and thus lacked the operational capacity to organize a mission of such size, complexity and urgency. The fifth option would thus be viable only if Member States provided personnel not only for headquarters in the field but also in New York, where considerable additional staff would be required.

90 Given these practical constraints, the Security Council selected the fourth option. In its resolution 794 (1992), adopted on 3 December 1992, the Council determined that the conflict in Somalia did indeed constitute a "threat to international peace and security" and endorsed my recommendation that "action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations should be taken in order to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as soon as possible". The Council welcomed the offer of the United States to lead such an operation and welcomed as well offers by other Member States to participate. Acting under Chapter VII, the Council therefore authorized "the Secretary-General and Member States" to use "all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia".³⁰ The key words "all necessary means" meant that the multinational force was authorized to use force to establish secure conditions for humanitarian relief, although the resolution made no specific reference to disarmament or demobilization. The Council also requested the Secretary-General and the Member States to establish appropriate mechanisms for coordination between the

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United Nations and the military forces used in the operation, and it invited the Secretary-General to attach a small liaison staff to the field headquarters of the unified command.

91 The resulting operation, which was to be known as the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and code-named "Operation Restore Hope" by the United States, set a new precedent for the United Nations. Chapter VII had been conceived to deter or repel acts of aggression against sovereign States, and the Security Council had authorized Member States to take military action under Chapter VII only four times before: in response to attacks on the Republic of Korea in 1950, authorizing the interception of tankers carrying oil to Southern Rhodesia in 1966, and twice concerning the Iraq-Kuwait conflict in 1990 and 1991. But in Somalia, the United Nations for the first time in its history authorized a group of Member States to use military force not under United Nations command for humanitarian ends in an internal conflict, albeit one with serious ramifications for regional peace and security because of the huge influx of Somali refugees, many of them armed, into neighbouring countries.

92 Although the United Nations established UNITAF's mandate, the Organization neither organized nor commanded the troops that were sent to fulfil it. The operational command of UNITAF forces was assumed by the United States, which had the largest contingent. Both the United States forces and the contingents from other countries reported to Lieutenant-General Robert Johnston of the United States Marine Corps. UNITAF's command liaised closely, however, with United Nations Headquarters in New York as well as with UNOSOM I staff in Mogadishu, where the 500-man Pakistani battalion, logistical support troops and 50 military observers remained under United Nations command. In New York, a policy group met two or three times each week under my auspices with senior United States Government officials to review the day-to-day progress of the mission. In Mogadishu, my Special Representative and the UNOSOM Force Commander worked with General Johnston to coordinate the activities of the two forces and also liaised with the United States special envoy to Somalia, Ambassador Robert Oakley. Finally, a small UNOSOM liaison staff was attached to the UNITAF headquarters in the capital to plan the eventual transition to a new United Nations force.³¹

93 Another special feature of UNITAF was that it was not financed, like United Nations peace-keeping missions, by mandatory assessments on all Member States or by voluntary contributions following the approval of their budgets by the General Assembly. Since UNITAF was organized by the United States, the United Nations was not involved in preparing its budget. The costs of the mission were borne by the countries supplying troops and by countries which contributed to a

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voluntary trust fund created for UNITAF by the Security Council. In December, I wrote to a number of Governments asking them to contribute to this trust fund.³²

UNITAF's deployment

94 The first UNITAF units, composed of United States Marines, landed on the beach at Mogadishu on 9 December 1992 and quickly secured the city's seaport, meeting no resistance as a result of General Aidid's last-minute acquiescence. UNITAF made its entrance with a show of force. Warships patrolled the coast, and planes and helicopters flew over Mogadishu as soldiers fanned out across the city. As a consequence, Somali militiamen disappeared from the streets, taking their weapons with them. Some of the factions withdrew their heavy weaponry and vehicles to inland regions of Somalia where UNITAF had not deployed, or across the border into neighbouring countries. On the first day Mogadishu airport was secured and a WFP aircraft landed with food aid.

95 At its peak strength, UNITAF consisted of approximately 37,000 troops, including about 8,000 on ships offshore. The largest contingent by far was provided by the United States, with a peak strength of about 28,000 marines and infantry. They were joined by some 9,000 soldiers from more than 20 countries. These forces rapidly spread out across the central and southern parts of the country to secure ports and airports, provide protective convoys for humanitarian relief supplies and guard food distribution centres. The focus was on southern and central Somalia, the areas worst affected by the famine. Within three weeks, UNITAF forces were in control of nine key towns: Mogadishu, Baidoa, Baledogle, Kismayo, Bardera, Hoddur, Belet Weyne, Jalalaqsi and Merca.³³ In most cases, officials of the United Nations and the United States went ahead of the troops and succeeded in convincing Somali militias to leave the towns before the UNITAF forces arrived. As UNITAF achieved its immediate objectives, its troop strength declined gradually, to about 28,000 in early March 1993.

The famine defeated

96 In sanctioning UNITAF, the Security Council's foremost goal had been to address the immediate humanitarian crisis. In a message to the people of Somalia on 8 December 1992, I emphasized that the forces arriving in Somalia had come "to feed the starving, protect the

defenceless and prepare the way for political, economic and social reconstruction”.³⁴

97 Operation Restore Hope at last permitted the full implementation of the United Nations 100-Day Action Programme.³⁵ In Mogadishu, planes began landing 24 hours a day. Between 10 December 1992 and 20 January 1993, 13 WFP ships docked safely at Mogadishu harbour, unloading 40,000 tons of supplies. On 22 January 1993, the first ship was able to dock at Kismayo since the port was closed because of insecurity the previous September. Many provincial airstrips were repaired and made ready for relief flights. Throughout central and southern Somalia, looting, extortion and attacks on relief workers dropped sharply. With the help of UNITAF, many of Somalia’s trunk roads were repaired and, where necessary, cleared of land-mines.

98 Food arriving in Mogadishu could now be safely transported overland by convoy to inland towns. Four days after UNITAF entered Baidoa, the mission was able to escort a convoy of 20 WFP trucks to the desperate city, an operation that would not have been possible by road before. By 20 January 1993, using trucks specially shipped in by the WFP from neighbouring Ethiopia, 25,000 tons of food delivered to Mogadishu had been taken in escorted road convoys to food distribution centres outside the capital, and an additional 9,000 tons had been transported by air.

99 The improved security conditions made it possible for United Nations agencies and NGOs to strengthen their staff in Somalia, and numerous new NGOs arrived. In addition to the WFP’s stepped-up food deliveries, UNICEF expanded its operations, providing medicines and staff to 16 hospitals, 62 mother-and-child health centres and 156 health posts throughout Somalia by January 1993, and, together with its NGO partners, helped feed over 200,000 children a day. The World Health Organization (WHO) opened a central pharmacy in Mogadishu. Indeed, by January 1993, food and medical supplies were getting through to almost all the towns of southern and central Somalia, with immediate and dramatic results. Although many hungry, weak people were still staggering into feeding centres, most could now be saved. Deaths from starvation and disease fell sharply and, reflecting the greatly increased food supply, by March 1993 cereal prices had fallen to a third of their September 1992 level.

100 With the worst of the famine now over, the United Nations and its partners began to address the challenge of helping Somalis revive agricultural production, rebuild their livestock herds and restore the country’s shattered services and infrastructure. At a humanitarian aid coordination meeting of United Nations agencies, NGOs and Somali community leaders held in Addis Ababa from 3 to 5 December 1992, the United Nations was urged to follow up the 100-Day Action Programme

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with a new programme for 1993 that would focus on rehabilitation and reconstruction as well as relief. Meanwhile, work got under way to repair water-supply systems and improve sanitary conditions. UNDP took over responsibility for management of the Mogadishu water-supply system at the end of 1992 following its rehabilitation by UNICEF. By June 1993, efforts by UNESCO and other United Nations agencies had resulted in the reopening of 43 primary schools, the training of over 800 primary-school teachers and the distribution of basic education kits benefiting almost 105,000 children.

101 United Nations agencies and NGOs also distributed seeds and agricultural tools, and began livestock vaccination programmes. These efforts, aided by good rainfall in 1992-1993, helped to increase local food production. The new sense of hope in the country began to encourage private sector activity as well: markets reappeared and commercial vessels returned to the ports of Mogadishu and Kismayo. Action was also taken by international agencies and NGOs to tackle the causes of population displacements and refugee flows and to prepare for repatriation and resettlement. In the south-west, for example, UNHCR had launched a cross-border operation from Kenya in September 1992 which was designed both to stabilize the population in south-western Somalia (and thus stem the flow of refugees into Kenya) and to create conditions conducive to voluntary repatriation. UNHCR opened a series of operational centres in areas contiguous with the Kenyan border. The exodus dwindled and by 1994 some 130,000 refugees had returned home.

102 In a report to the Security Council on 3 March 1993, I highlighted some of the challenges that lay ahead as Somalia strove to return to normalcy.³⁶ The first was to facilitate the return of refugees and to help resettle the even larger numbers of internally displaced persons. Second, work had to be provided for the millions of Somalis who were unemployed. The creation of work was essential, not only to provide income but also to help restore stability by channelling young men from the militias and armed gangs into peaceful, productive pursuits. A third major challenge was to rebuild Somalia's national and regional administrative capacity, which had been completely destroyed.

103 I also stressed the importance of clearing mines. Preliminary estimates suggested that there were about 1 million mines, most of which had been planted in the north-west. They were hazardous to the civilian population and also posed one of the main obstacles to the recovery of the rural economy, as areas littered with land-mines were thereby rendered unsuitable for farming or grazing. UNHCR, which re-established an office in Hargeisa in March 1993, began a mine-clearance programme to facilitate the repatriation of refugees from Ethiopia and Djibouti, and UNOSOM II was later to start assisting Somali NGOs to begin additional mine-clearance programmes.

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104 At the Third Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia, held in Addis Ababa from 11 to 13 March 1993, the United Nations unveiled a comprehensive Relief and Rehabilitation Programme for all of 1993, budgeted at \$159 million.³⁷ The programme included projects in 11 priority areas, ranging from the resettlement of displaced persons and refugees to the rehabilitation of water and sanitation systems and the re-establishment of public administration. With 1.5 million Somalis still at risk from malnutrition and disease, relief remained a high priority; at the same time, greater emphasis was placed on rehabilitation.

105 The WFP's two-phase strategy illustrated this approach. Initially, food aid would continue to meet emergency needs, and much of the WFP's assistance, like that of UNICEF and NGOs, was thus earmarked for the most vulnerable groups, such as orphans, the handicapped, female heads of households, pregnant and lactating mothers and young children. As the situation improved, food aid was to be targeted increasingly to support long-term programmes. For example, a school feeding programme was included in the Relief and Rehabilitation Programme to assist the revival of schools. Programmes also provided food rations to displaced persons returning to their villages of origin and small food-for-work projects which could simultaneously help to generate employment and rehabilitate infrastructure, such as roads, wells and sanitation systems. The WFP also provided food for sale, to help stabilize the market, since the large deliveries of free food had driven down food prices, making it difficult for some farmers to market their crops, thereby hindering the recovery of local food production.

106 There was also consensus at the Third Coordination Conference on the vital importance of national capacity-building. Unless local institutions, including police forces, the judiciary and local administration were re-established, rehabilitation efforts would have only a limited impact.

First steps towards national reconciliation

107 From the beginning of United Nations involvement in Somalia, one of the principal objectives was to help the Somali parties arrive at a durable political settlement of the conflict. Without national reconciliation, involving the establishment of viable political structures and the disarmament and demobilization of the factional militias and armed irregulars, all the progress towards ending hunger would inevitably remain precarious and economic recovery would remain largely impossible. For these reasons, the Security Council, when establishing

UNITAF in its resolution 794 (1992), also called for ongoing efforts to achieve a political settlement in Somalia.

108 At the second humanitarian aid coordination meeting held in Addis Ababa from 3 to 5 December 1992, informal discussions were undertaken with Somali political leaders and clan elders concerning national reconciliation. At the request of all factions attending the meeting, my Special Representative phoned me and I decided to call a reconciliation meeting for 4 January 1993 in Addis Ababa. I subsequently wrote to all the main faction leaders, as well as to the regional organizations, inviting their participation.³⁸ The new situation created by UNITAF's deployment, along with the political initiatives taken by Mr. Kittani and Ambassador Oakley, further encouraged the faction leaders to become more conciliatory. Just two days after UNITAF forces arrived in Mogadishu, General Aidid and Mr. Ali Mahdi met face to face for the first time and reached an agreement to respect the cease-fire to which they had agreed earlier in the year and to remove their heavy weapons from the streets of Mogadishu. Appearing together at a public rally on 28 December, General Aidid and Mr. Ali Mahdi announced that they would stop security checks at the "green line" dividing their respective sectors of the city.

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109 As noted above, I had invited each of the main political factions in Somalia to attend new talks in Addis Ababa, following the breakthrough at the aid coordination meeting. These talks, I suggested, should be aimed at preparing "a framework that will enable the Somali people themselves to develop ideas and suggest arrangements for the formation of a Government in accordance with their own traditions and values".³⁹ The talks opened on 4 January 1993 under my chairmanship and with the participation of the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Standing Committee of the Countries of the Horn of Africa. All the main political factions attended, with the exception of the Somali National Movement, which had proclaimed an "independent" state in the north-west. Somali elders, scholars and representatives of community organizations, women's groups and NGOs also took part. The meeting, I told the participants, was a "precious opportunity" that must not be lost. "The Somali people are watching. Africa is watching. The world is watching."⁴⁰

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110 The leaders of the 15 movements participating in the talks signed three agreements between 8 and 15 January. Besides declaring an immediate cease-fire in all parts of the country under their control, the agreements provided for the establishment of a cease-fire monitoring group composed of UNITAF and United Nations troops, the hand-over of all heavy weaponry to the cease-fire monitoring group, the encampment and disarmament of the militias, the release of prisoners of war and

the free movement of Somalis throughout the country. The parties also established an ad hoc committee to prepare for a national reconciliation conference in Addis Ababa on 15 March 1993.

111 This was not the first time that Somalia's factional leaders had promised to stop fighting, but it was the first time they also pledged to disarm their gunmen, to demobilize their militias and to request the United Nations to take custody of their heavy weapons. According to the agreement, this process was to begin immediately and be completed by March 1993. At that point, the conference on national reconciliation would attempt to resolve Somalia's political crisis. The commitments made in Addis Ababa thus set the agenda for all subsequent discussions on Somalia's future. They also had important implications for UNITAF and later UNOSOM II regarding the disarmament of the militias.

112 There was no guarantee, however, that the militias, still armed, would respect the commitments made at the Addis Ababa talks, given the climate of fear and apprehension that prevailed. Relief work continued to be dangerous, for both Somalis and non-Somalis working for international agencies and NGOs. Two international aid workers, from UNICEF and the ICRC, were assassinated in January 1993.⁴¹ Moreover, there continued to be a gulf of mistrust among clans and sub-clans, and among political faction leaders. Some progress was made towards voluntary disarmament, but it fell far short of the goals set in the Addis Ababa agreements. UNITAF and UNOSOM I officials established a team which engaged in detailed discussions with the factions on the cantonment of their troops and the hand-over of their heavy weapons, and some heavy weapons were placed in storage sites. These sites remained under the control of the factions but were open to inspection by UNITAF and UNOSOM I.

113 The fragility of the Addis Ababa agreements became abundantly clear when forces led by General Mohamed Said Hersi "Morgan", the son-in-law of former President Siad Barre and a leader of one of two rival factions of the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), began infiltrating the city of Kismayo in February 1993 and proceeded in March, despite the presence of UNITAF troops in the city, to drive out forces led by Colonel Omar Jess, an SPM ally of General Aidid in the SNA. The events in Kismayo were a serious violation of the cease-fire and a set-back to hopes that the factions would hand over their heavy weapons.⁴² Action by just one faction was enough to risk unravelling the progress made in Addis Ababa and jeopardize the delicate stability established by UNITAF.

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V From UNITAF to UNOSOM II

114 UNITAF was conceived as a temporary exercise in peace enforcement. The operation was to carry out its mandate—the creation of a secure environment for the delivery of international relief aid to the beleaguered Somali public—and then hand over operational responsibility to a United Nations peace-keeping mission. However, events in Somalia in the first months of 1993 made it increasingly clear that the follow-up mission would also need the authority to use force. The Security Council thus established UNOSOM II as the first peace-enforcement operation explicitly authorized under Chapter VII of the Charter that was both organized and commanded by the United Nations. The Council also instructed UNOSOM II to assist in the process of national reconciliation, in the rehabilitation of Somalia's institutions and economy, and in the re-establishment of the nation's police forces. This was a complex, ambitious agenda, and it sent the Organization and its Member States into uncharted territory.

Conditions for the transition

115 Resolution 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992, in which the Security Council authorized the task force, indicated that by “establishing a secure environment” UNITAF would “enable the Council to make the necessary decision for a prompt transition to continued peace-keeping operations”. To prepare for such a transition, the Council requested me to submit a plan so that “UNOSOM will be able to fulfil its mandate upon the withdrawal of the unified command”.⁴³

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116 Following the adoption of resolution 794 (1992), I held a number of discussions with representatives of the United States Government to discuss how and when the transition could be made. In these discussions, and in a letter to President George Bush on 8 December 1992, I laid emphasis on two conditions which I believed to be of particular importance for a successful transition. The first was that UNITAF, before its withdrawal, should ensure that the heavy weapons of the organized factions were brought under international control and that the irregular gangs were disarmed. As I stated in my letter to President Bush (portions of which were cited in my 19 December report to the Security Council): “Without this action I do not believe that it will be possible to establish the secure environment called for by the Security Council resolution or to create conditions in which the United Nations’

existing efforts to promote national reconciliation can be carried forward and the task of protecting humanitarian activities can safely be transferred to a conventional United Nations peace-keeping operation.”⁴⁴

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117 The second essential condition for a successful transition, I believed, was for UNITAF to exercise its mandate throughout Somalia. Though UNITAF’s mandate was nationwide, the force was in fact deployed only in parts of southern and central Somalia, where the emergency relief needs were concentrated. By March 1993, only 40 per cent of the country was under UNITAF control. There were no UNITAF forces in the north-east or the north-west, or in the extreme south of the country near the border with Kenya, where the security situation was particularly unstable. Country-wide deployment was indispensable, as the militias could simply withdraw their heavy weapons to parts of Somalia where the task force had not been deployed and there bide their time. The problems of reconciliation, disarmament and demobilization were national in character and thus required UNITAF’s presence throughout the country. Indeed, disarmament and demobilization carried out or monitored in only some parts of the country could not work because it risked disturbing the military balance by leaving factions in other areas at a relative advantage.

118 I was particularly concerned that UNITAF should not be withdrawn hastily, before the re-establishment of a truly secure environment in which the transition to traditional peace-keeping envisaged by resolution 794 (1992) could proceed successfully. “It would be a tragedy”, I reported to the Security Council on 19 December 1992, “if the premature departure . . . of the Unified Task Force were to plunge Somalia back into anarchy and starvation.”⁴⁵

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119 However, such broad security objectives were not in fact pursued by UNITAF. The general wording of the mandate in resolution 794 (1992), which made no specific reference to disarmament or demobilization and referred only to the establishment of a “secure environment” for humanitarian relief, was interpreted by the United States command of UNITAF to mean the securing of ports, airports, warehouses, feeding centres and roads to ensure the unimpeded delivery of relief supplies. The United States did not interpret the mandate as extending to the disarmament of armed gangs, the confiscation of heavy weapons or forceful action to stop outbreaks of inter-factional fighting, as had occurred in Kismayo in March 1993. UNITAF did facilitate the placement of some heavy weapons in storage sites under voluntary agreements with faction leaders, in accordance with the Addis Ababa agreements of January 1993, but these storage sites remained under the control of the factions, which could move weapons in and out at will.

120 The events in Kismayo, the continued sporadic acts of banditry and attacks on relief workers, combined with the factions’ broad

failure to honour their disarmament commitments under the Addis Ababa agreements, underlined the precarious nature of the relative peace which UNITAF had restored to southern and central Somalia. It would fall to the new United Nations operation in Somalia, UNOSOM II, to take up where UNITAF left off. To enable it to do so, UNOSOM II would have to be provided with sufficient military strength and endowed with broad enforcement powers.

UNOSOM II's mandate and structure

121 Given the situation in Somalia in early 1993, it became evident that UNITAF could not, as originally envisaged by the Security Council, hand over operational responsibility to a new United Nations operation mandated solely for traditional peace-keeping. Rather, UNOSOM II—like UNITAF—would require enforcement powers, authorized under Chapter VII of the Charter. Indeed, United States officials had proposed this change in the nature of the follow-up force—from peace-keeping to peace enforcement—as early as 18 December 1992 in consultations with senior United Nations officials about the transition from UNITAF. This implied a return to the fifth option I had presented to the Security Council in November 1992: a peace-enforcement mission under the command of the United Nations—an endeavour which the Organization had never before undertaken.

122 Reporting to the Security Council on 3 March 1993, I said that “the effort undertaken by UNITAF to establish a secure environment in Somalia is far from complete and in any case has not attempted to address the situation throughout all of Somalia”.⁴⁶ I repeated that without improved security throughout the country the political reconciliation process could not prosper and humanitarian operations would remain vulnerable to disruption. I therefore proposed that the mandate of UNOSOM II should cover all of Somalia and that UNOSOM II should be endowed with enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the Charter. The mandate would include disarmament, which should be enforceable where factions failed to comply with timetables and modalities established under the Addis Ababa agreements of January 1993.

123 Specifically, I proposed that UNOSOM II should have the following military tasks: (a) to monitor that all factions respected the cessation of hostilities and the Addis Ababa agreements of January 1993; (b) to prevent any resumption of violence and, if necessary, take appropriate action against any faction violating the cease-fire; (c) to maintain control of the heavy weapons of the organized factions pending their destruction or their transfer to a unified national army; (d) to seize the small arms of all unauthorized armed elements; (e) to secure or maintain

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security at all ports, airports and lines of communication needed for deliveries of humanitarian assistance; (f) to protect the civilian staff and facilities of the United Nations, its agencies and NGOs, and to neutralize any armed elements that attacked or threatened to attack them; (g) to clear mines; and (h) to assist refugees and internally displaced persons to return home.

124 I proposed a force of 28,000 troops, including 8,000 for logistic support, to carry out these tasks. The bulk of the logistic units would initially come from forces serving with UNITAF. In addition, the United States promised to make available a tactical “Quick Reaction Force” that could intervene in support of UNOSOM II but would not be part of that operation. Meanwhile, consultations continued in New York and Washington, and detailed planning got under way in Mogadishu between the UNITAF and UNOSOM commands, to prepare for a smooth transition. It was vitally important that there should not be a hiatus in the change-over, as it might be exploited by one or more of the armed factions to resume fighting or attacks on relief workers. UNOSOM II would have to take over “seamlessly” from UNITAF in each area from which it withdrew. To ensure that UNOSOM II had all its military and logistical elements in place, such a transition inevitably would take time, with 1 May 1993 suggested as a benchmark date for the formal transfer of authority from UNITAF to the United Nations. “The task ahead would not be easy”, I warned in my report to the Council. “UNOSOM II might frequently come under criticism for acts of omission or commission.” But, as the first peace-enforcement operation authorized and commanded by the United Nations, it would be “an expression of the international community’s determination not to remain a silent spectator to the sufferings of an entire people for no fault of their own”.⁴⁷

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125 On 26 March 1993, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 814 (1993).⁴⁸ Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council decided to expand the size of UNOSOM and to widen its mandate in accordance with my recommendations. The resolution emphasized the “crucial importance of disarmament” and demanded that the Somali parties, movements and factions comply fully with the commitments they had undertaken in the Addis Ababa agreements of January 1993. The resolution went on to request me to “direct the Force Commander of UNOSOM II to assume responsibility for the consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia, taking account of the particular circumstances in each locality, on an expedited basis in accordance with the recommendations contained in [my] report of 3 March 1993, and in this regard to organize a prompt, smooth and phased transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II”.

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126 UNOSOM II was authorized through 31 October 1993 at an estimated annualized cost of \$1.5 billion. At the 26 March 1993 Security Council session at which resolution 814 (1993) was adopted, there was a mood of strong commitment to the mission's success. The Permanent Representative of the United States called UNOSOM II "an unprecedented enterprise aimed at nothing less than the restoration of an entire country as a proud, functioning and viable member of the community of nations. This is an historic undertaking. We are excited to join it and we will vigorously support it" [S/PV.3188]. On 4 May 1993, command was formally transferred from UNITAF to the United Nations, ending the transition process.

127 There was no precedent for the Organization to follow as it embarked on this course, no example but the one it was about to set, and there were many unanswered questions about the undertaking to which the international community had committed itself. Would member Governments contribute sufficient troops, including the necessary logistic elements, and place them under the command of the United Nations? Would these forces be deployed in time for a smooth transition from UNITAF? Would the troop-contributing countries follow through on an enforcement mission if hostile action by one or more of the factions led to casualties among their troops? And would Member States be willing to pay for what would inevitably be an expensive operation at a time when the United Nations peace-keeping budget was growing faster than at any point in its history?

128 Prior to the adoption of resolution 814 (1993), I had appointed retired Admiral Jonathan Howe (United States) as my new Special Representative for Somalia, and General Çevik Bir (Turkey) was named as Force Commander. Thirty countries eventually contributed troop contingents to UNOSOM II. Among them, for the first time in the history of United Nations peace-keeping operations, were the United States, which contributed most of UNOSOM II's logistical units, and Germany, which despite its constitutional limitations contributed a contingent for non-combat duties. The United States also positioned a Joint Task Force off the Somali coast under a separate command structure reporting directly to the United States Government. Additionally, it provided a small Quick Reaction Force, consisting of a light United States Army battalion with helicopter support, which was originally conceived as a mobile backup or reserve force for rapid combat deployment in special circumstances, at the request of the UNOSOM II Force Commander. Like the Joint Task Force, the Quick Reaction Force was also deployed in support of UNOSOM II but was not part of the United Nations force and instead reported directly to the Government of the United States.

129 The complex overall set-up raised additional questions

concerning the operation's command and control. The presence of the Quick Reaction Force gave UNOSOM II greater military flexibility, but it also meant that United States forces in Somalia would serve under two distinct structures, thus diffusing responsibility. The relationship between the two forces was, however, structured in such a way as to facilitate liaison and thus to minimize the disadvantages of a dual structure. The Quick Reaction Force reported to United States Army Major General Thomas Montgomery, who was also the Deputy Force Commander of UNOSOM II. In August 1993, the United States deployed a third force in Somalia, composed of United States Army Rangers and specially trained units. This force reported not to General Montgomery but to commanders in the United States.

Efforts to promote national reconciliation

130 While establishing UNOSOM II as the first United Nations peace-enforcement mission ever, the Security Council also set a wide-ranging agenda for the United Nations to assist in the process of national reconciliation and in the rehabilitation of political institutions and the economy. In particular, the United Nations was to offer "assistance to help the people of Somalia to promote and advance political reconciliation, through broad participation by all sectors of Somali society, and the re-establishment of national and regional institutions and civil administration in the entire country". Another task would be to help in the re-establishment of police forces at the local, regional and national levels so as to help restore and maintain peace, stability and law and order.⁴⁹

131 Never before had the United Nations embarked on such a far-reaching programme. The Organization had supervised elections in several countries, and took partial responsibility for central government administration during the transition to democratic elections in Cambodia in May 1993, but it had not previously attempted to help build government structures from the ground up. Likewise, the United Nations had monitored or trained police forces in missions in other parts of the world, but it had not created police forces to maintain law and order. In Somalia, the United Nations was to train local police forces, equip them with uniforms, food and equipment, and seek to ensure that they were representative of all clans but remained independent of the rival armed factions. This process had, in fact, already begun under UNITAF, which had set up an interim auxiliary force of former Somali police officers in some areas.

132 A major step towards a political settlement followed just one day after the adoption of resolution 814 (1993), with the signing of a reconciliation agreement in Addis Ababa, which came to be known as

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the Addis Ababa Agreement. The national reconciliation conference foreseen in the earlier Addis Ababa agreements of January 1993 had opened on 15 March 1993, with logistical assistance from the United Nations. All 15 of the main factions present at the previous meeting attended, while the Somali National Movement (SNM) sent observers. The conference also included clan elders, leaders of community and women's organizations, and other prominent representatives of Somali civil society. The United Nations delegation was led by Mr. Lansana Kouyaté (Guinea), the Deputy Special Representative for Somalia. The conference's host, President Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, played a critical role in facilitating the negotiations.⁵⁰ On 27 March 1993, the conference participants, including leaders of the 15 armed factions in attendance, unanimously adopted the "Addis Ababa Agreement of the First Session of the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia", committing themselves to "put an end to armed conflict and to reconcile our differences through peaceful means" and to continue "the peace process under the auspices of the United Nations and in cooperation with the regional organizations and Standing Committee of the Horn as well as with our neighbours in the Horn of Africa".⁵¹

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133 The Agreement set out a blueprint for a two-year transition to a new central Government. The transition, to be accomplished by March 1995, was premised on the notion that "political and administrative structures in Somalia need to be rebuilt to provide the people as a whole with an opportunity to participate in shaping the future of the country". The transitional system of governance would allow for the provision of essential services, the creation of a basis for long-term planning and the resumption of greater administrative responsibility by Somalis.

134 Under the transitional arrangements, local communities would first establish organs of local government at the district level. The members of these "district councils" would be appointed through election or through "consensus-based selection in accordance with Somali traditions". The district councils would then send representatives to "regional councils", to be established in each of the 18 regions which existed at the end of the Siad Barre regime.

135 The next stage would be the creation of a Transitional National Council (TNC), composed of three representatives of each of the 18 regions (including one woman from each region), five additional seats for Mogadishu and one nominee from each of the 15 political factions participating in the Addis Ababa conference. The TNC was to be the "repository of Somali sovereignty" and the prime political authority with legislative functions during the transitional period. It would interact with the international community, including UNOSOM, appoint committees, officers and the heads of administrative departments, oversee the performance of these departments and establish an inde-

pendent judiciary. The TNC would also appoint a special committee to draft a charter for the transitional period, guided by the basic principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Somali traditional ethics. That committee—the Transitional Charter Drafting Committee—was set up by the 15 faction leaders at a follow-up meeting on 30 March 1993. Composed initially of representatives of the factions, it was subsequently broadened to include an equal number of non-faction participants.

136 Under the 27 March 1993 agreement, the leaders of the 15 factions also committed themselves to “complete and simultaneous disarmament throughout the entire country in accordance with the disarmament concept and time frame set by the Cease-Fire Agreement of January 1993”. UNITAF/UNOSOM was asked to assist these efforts so as to achieve a “substantial completion of the disarmament within 90 days”. The agreement reaffirmed the commitment of the factions to “the total and complete hand-over of weapons to UNITAF/UNOSOM” and urged “UNITAF/UNOSOM to apply strong and effective sanctions against those responsible for any violation of the Cease-Fire Agreement of January 1993”. In addition, the participants agreed on the need to establish an impartial national and regional Somali police force in all regions of the country. The Cease-fire and Disarmament Committee established in Addis Ababa for the purpose of implementing the agreements signed there in January 1993 held several meetings after the March conference, undertaking investigations into cease-fire violations and developing procedures and guidelines for disarmament.⁵²

137 The SNM, the party controlling the north-west, was the only major faction which did not officially participate in the Addis Ababa conference. The Addis Ababa agreement therefore provided for the TNC to set up a committee to “bring about reconciliation and seek solutions to outstanding political problems with the SNM”. In the north-west, a “Somaliland Inter-Clan Council Conference” involving clan elders, religious leaders, politicians, former civil servants, intellectuals, businessmen and other civic leaders had been under way in Borama since January 1993. It ended in May 1993 by adopting a constitutional structure for “Somaliland” and electing a new president, Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, who had been Prime Minister of Somalia from 1967 to 1969. The “independence” of “Somaliland” was not recognized by any State.

138 Even without the endorsement of the SNM, the Addis Ababa Agreement of 27 March 1993 marked a milestone in the combined efforts of Somalis and the international community to restore security and rebuild political institutions on democratic foundations. The Agreement concluded with an invitation to the United Nations “to extend all necessary assistance to the people of Somalia for the implementation of this agreement”. Accordingly, UNOSOM II began the process of assist-

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ing local Somali communities in establishing district and regional councils, as well as police forces and judicial and penal systems, in many parts of the country. A major concern was the situation of Somalis who were crowded into jails, without due process, under terrible conditions, especially in Mogadishu.

139 There were worrying signs, however, that some of the faction leaders did not fully embrace the approach of the Addis Ababa Agreement. What was worse, in June 1993, both the political reconciliation process and the arrangements for disarmament and demobilization were derailed when militia in south Mogadishu attacked UNOSOM II troops, inflicting heavy casualties and plunging Mogadishu into a new period of violent confrontation.

VI Conflict in Mogadishu

140 During much of 1993, United Nations agencies and their NGO partners made steady progress in delivering humanitarian assistance to the towns and villages of Somalia's interior. Considerable headway was also made towards the rebuilding of administrative, police and judicial institutions, a critical building block for the restoration of normality and one of the most important components of UNOSOM II's mandate. During the same period, however, the capital itself was convulsed by violence, and United Nations peace-keepers and relief workers came under frequent attack. This unfortunate turn of events prompted a major reassessment of the mission's goals and also raised important questions about the nature and practice of United Nations peace-keeping.

United Nations troops under attack

141 From April to early June 1993, as UNOSOM II began the work of implementing the Addis Ababa Agreement and resolution 814 (1993), tensions increased. Following the Addis Ababa Agreement, the USC/SNA accused UNOSOM II of partiality in the implementation of both the political and the military components of its mandate, and cited several instances of what it said was evidence of bias.⁵³ The USC/SNA claimed that UNOSOM II had interfered in talks among the factions, and it was angered when Belgian forces of UNOSOM II, using the enforcement powers bestowed by resolution 814 (1993), barred the Darod Ogadeni SPM/SNA faction of Colonel Omar Jess, one of the USC/SNA's allies, from retaking Kismayo on 6 and 7 May 1993.

142 The USC/SNA also differed with the efforts made by UNOSOM II, in accordance with the Security Council mandate, to establish police and judicial authorities, along with district and regional councils. Disagreements on these and other issues spilled over into virulent criticism of the United Nations on Radio Mogadishu, which was under USC/SNA control. The radio station itself then became a subject of dispute, as 11 faction leaders who were not allied with General Aidid urged UNOSOM II on 31 May 1993 to take over the radio station.

143 Meanwhile, there were delays in the deployment of UNOSOM II forces. Administrative, financial and logistical problems meant that many of the contingents promised by Member States were not in place by the time of the formal departure of UNITAF on 4 May

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1993. Some countries were unable to provide their forces with adequate weapons and equipment, which then had to be acquired from third countries, causing further delays. As a result, UNOSOM II had only 17,000 troops in Somalia in early May 1993, with another 1,100 in the United States–commanded Quick Reaction Force, compared to a peak of 37,000 for UNITAF and an approved troop strength for UNOSOM II of 28,000. While some UNOSOM II contingents had previously served with UNITAF, others were still familiarizing themselves with the terrain. Furthermore, the Force Commander was just taking up the challenge of welding together forces from numerous countries, with varying types of equipment, training, cultures and languages.

144 In this atmosphere, and while its forces were still considerably below their authorized strength, UNOSOM II forces attempted to carry out an inspection of five of the USC/SNA’s weapons storage facilities in and around Mogadishu on 5 June 1993. These were storage sites for heavy weapons set up under agreements with the factions in Mogadishu early in the year and previously inspected in February 1993. One of the sites was located on the premises of Radio Mogadishu. To ensure that there would be no misunderstanding, on 4 June UNOSOM II formally notified the USC/SNA of the impending inspections, to which one of the faction’s security officers objected strongly.⁵⁴ When the inspections went ahead the next day, gunmen ambushed Pakistani soldiers returning to base, as well as a Pakistani unit guarding a food distribution centre in south Mogadishu. Twenty-four Pakistani peace-keepers were killed and an additional 56 were wounded.⁵⁵

145 These atrocities prompted an international outcry, and the Security Council convened the next day to consider how the United Nations should respond. The 5 June 1993 incident was a direct challenge to the Security Council and to the mandate of UNOSOM II under resolution 814 (1993). Moreover, the Addis Ababa Agreement, signed by the leaders of the main Somali parties and a wide range of clan and community leaders on 27 March 1993, had urged the United Nations to apply strong and effective sanctions against those responsible for violations of the cease-fire agreement of January 1993. If the United Nations did not respond, a dangerous precedent would be set. Not only might UNOSOM II troops be placed in further jeopardy, but the signal would go out to other conflict areas of the world that attacks on United Nations personnel could be carried out with impunity.

146 The Security Council therefore adopted unanimously resolution 837 (1993), in which it reaffirmed that the Secretary-General was authorized under resolution 814 (1993) to take “all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks” on UNOSOM II personnel, including their “arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment”.⁵⁶ The Council also re-emphasized the crucial importance

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of the early disarmament of all Somali factions and of “neutralizing” radio broadcasting systems that contributed to the violence against UNOSOM II.

147 In the discussions in the Security Council on resolution 837 (1993), the representative of Pakistan affirmed that his country’s losses in Somalia on 5 June would “in no way diminish our commitment to peace-keeping efforts of the United Nations in all parts of the world”. The representative of the United Kingdom vowed that the international community would “not tolerate renewed attempts by the warlords in Somalia to challenge UNOSOM in the exercise of its mandate”, while the United States representative warned that those who had challenged the authority of the Security Council would “pay a heavy price”. According to the President of the Security Council, resolution 837 (1993) was intended to serve “as a warning to all those who threaten or harass the peace-keeping forces of the United Nations in any part of the world” [S/PV.3229].

148 In its resolution, the Council had also requested me to inquire into the 5 June incident, “with particular emphasis on the role of those factional leaders involved”. An expert consultant, Professor Tom Farer of American University in Washington, D.C., was engaged to carry out the investigation. His report, which was submitted on 12 August 1993, disclosed that the simultaneous attacks on UNOSOM II troops in different parts of south Mogadishu, all in areas controlled by the USC/SNA, could only have been carried out by that faction, must have been premeditated and would only have been executed on General Aidid’s instructions. “A large and complex body of evidence”, the report stated, “leads ineluctably to the conclusion not simply that General Aidid had the requisite means, motive and opportunity [for the attacks], but that he had that trinity uniquely.”⁵⁷

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The fighting in south Mogadishu

149 Following efforts to determine if peaceful compliance with resolution 837 (1993) might be possible, UNOSOM II forces on 12 June 1993 began a systematic drive to restore law and order in south Mogadishu by destroying or confiscating the USC/SNA’s weapons stocks and by neutralizing its broadcasting facilities. On 14 June, the Security Council endorsed these actions, expressing the Council’s determination that law and order be restored in Somalia and that “the resolutions of the Council are fully and effectively applied for the good of the Somali people as a whole”.⁵⁸ The offensive continued for several days, with aerial bombardments and ground assaults on weapons sites, as well as on the broadcast and relay facilities of Radio Mogadishu.

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Units from UNOSOM II and the Quick Reaction Force of the United States destroyed or seized large quantities of heavy weapons and ammunition and disabled Radio Mogadishu. On 17 June 1993, pursuant to resolution 837 (1993), Admiral Howe publicly called for the arrest and detention of General Aidid.⁵⁹ The Security Council, on 18 June, stressed “the resolve of the international community in establishing a safe environment in Somalia” which would allow the delivery of humanitarian assistance and promote national reconciliation.⁶⁰

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150 As the 5 June 1993 incident itself had demonstrated, disarming the USC/SNA by force was a difficult and dangerous undertaking. Although its forces were small in comparison with UNOSOM II, they were well armed, battle-hardened, apparently willing to suffer casualties and willing as well to use civilians as “screens” for military attacks. The faction possessed another advantage in that its strongholds were located in built-up urban areas of south Mogadishu. Military engagements between UNOSOM II and the USC/SNA thus risked additional civilian casualties, which could possibly have the effect of consolidating, rather than weakening, General Aidid’s political support, particularly in his Habr Gedir sub-clan. There was, finally, a risk of the United Nations becoming deeply involved in Somalia’s civil war.

151 Mindful of regional concern over the conflict in Mogadishu, I sent a letter to the Presidents of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Kenya on 22 June 1993, reaffirming that UNOSOM II’s “complex military operation” was designed to end the flagrant violations of the cease-fire, to restore law and order and to “initiate the process of disarmament” to which all the Somali factions had committed themselves. These efforts, I hoped, would “contribute to the enhancement of peace and stability in Somalia and thus in the Horn of Africa”.⁶¹

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152 As UNOSOM II and the Quick Reaction Force carried out the part of their mandate that involved attempts to forcibly disarm the militia in south Mogadishu, the USC/SNA resorted to urban guerrilla tactics, and also mobilized crowds of civilians, some of them armed, to try to thwart these operations. In many instances, gunmen mingled with crowds of women and children, making it exceedingly difficult for the UNOSOM II and Quick Reaction Force troops to defend themselves without jeopardizing civilian lives. In one such instance, on 17 June, five Moroccan soldiers lost their lives. Two Pakistanis were killed on 28 June and three Italians on 2 July. Attacks and ambushes of United Nations personnel and facilities also increased during this period, leading to the deaths of a number of Somali employees of UNOSOM. Inevitably, given the urban milieu in which the UNOSOM II operations were taking place and the tactics used by the USC/SNA militia, there were also heavy civilian casualties.⁶² I shared the widespread international horror at the callous way in which local faction leaders had brought women and

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children into the line of fire, and at the loss of innocent life in operations involving UNOSOM II forces.⁶³

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153 On 12 July 1993, the Quick Reaction Force, acting at the request of UNOSOM II, bombed a compound in south Mogadishu which UNOSOM II believed was being used by the USC/SNA to plan its operations; there were heavy casualties. Immediately afterwards, UNOSOM II ground troops swept through the area to confiscate weapons, documents and communications equipment. After they withdrew, journalists from the international press drove to the scene to cover the events. A large crowd of Somalis, some carrying weapons, surrounded the journalists and attacked them. Four journalists were murdered in the course of the attack.⁶⁴

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154 In August-September 1993, as UNOSOM worked to strengthen humanitarian recovery efforts and facilitate the establishment of local government outside of Mogadishu, military forces sought to counter attacks in the southern half of the capital, which continued to intensify during this period. On 8 August, four United States soldiers serving under UNOSOM II were killed when a mine was exploded by remote control under their Jeep, and on 5 September, SNA gunmen killed 7 Nigerian soldiers. All told, the international forces suffered 21 killed between 2 July and 3 October 1993.⁶⁵

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155 By early August 1993, UNOSOM II was still substantially below strength, with around 21,000 troops (from 27 countries), compared to the authorized level of 28,000, although several thousand additional troops were in the pipeline for deployment in the following weeks. The Quick Reaction Force had just over 1,000 troops.⁶⁶ To strengthen the international forces in Mogadishu and step up the effort to find and detain those responsible for the attack on UNOSOM II forces, the United States sent an élite force of United States Army Rangers and other specially trained commandos to Somalia. Operating under a separate command arrangement from the UNOSOM II contingents and the United States Quick Reaction Force, they staged several raids in August-September 1993 and succeeded in seizing a number of General Aidid's aides.⁶⁷ Despite the set-backs and frustrations being experienced during this phase of the mission, the Security Council in its resolution 865 (1993), adopted on 22 September 1993, expressed its unanimous support for UNOSOM II's strategy. As before, the Council affirmed that those who committed or ordered attacks against UNOSOM II personnel would be held individually responsible for their actions.⁶⁸

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
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68/Document 65

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156 Less than two weeks later, however, the international community would reassess, as elaborated in Part VII of this Introduction, the strategy being pursued by UNOSOM II and United States forces in south Mogadishu following heavy casualties incurred during a raid by United

Mogadishu



The conflict in Somalia left the capital, Mogadishu, divided into northern and southern zones controlled by rival factions. UNOSOM Headquarters were located at the United States embassy compound; another UNOSOM office was located near the international airport.

States Army Rangers on a house where USC/SNA leaders were meeting on 3 October. Though they succeeded in apprehending 24 such leaders, the Rangers were trapped after two of their helicopters were shot down, and it took many hours for UNOSOM II reinforcements to reach them through thick fire from the USC/SNA militia. By the time the battle was over, 18 United States soldiers and one Malaysian soldier had been killed, 90 United States, Malaysian and Pakistani soldiers had been wounded and one United States pilot had been captured.⁶⁹

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157 The tragedy exposed weaknesses in UNOSOM II's complicated operational structure, in which the Rangers reported to their commanders in the United States rather than to the UNOSOM II command in Mogadishu. The 3 October operation was planned and ordered by United States forces acting independently of UNOSOM and communicated to UNOSOM II staff, including my Special Representative and the Deputy Force Commander, only just before the Rangers set off in their helicopters. This weakened effective coordination between UNOSOM II troops and the Quick Reaction Force.

158 Beyond the specific question of the Quick Reaction Force's separate command arrangement, I had raised the more general issue of the command and control of UNOSOM II forces in a report to the Security Council on 17 August 1993. The threat of increased casualties, I stated then, was to be expected in cases where the Council authorized a mission under Chapter VII of the Charter, but the danger could be minimized "if there is effective command and control on the ground by the Force Commander". It was clear, I continued, "that it is in the interests of the United Nations that the integrity of the command and control of United Nations military operations be respected in all peace and security operations, whether under Chapter VI or Chapter VII".⁷⁰

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Progress outside Mogadishu


159 The fighting in Mogadishu from June to October 1993 inevitably disrupted relief and rehabilitation activities in the capital, including the distribution of food and medical supplies, on which large numbers of the capital's residents and tens of thousands of displaced persons still depended. After the 5 June attack on the Pakistani contingent, many relief agencies temporarily suspended their work in the capital and moved their foreign staff to Nairobi. None the less, relief agencies were able to continue humanitarian programmes in most other parts of Somalia without significant disruption, despite the fact that Mogadishu was a major distribution point for supplies heading for the country's interior.⁷¹

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160 Indeed, while the bloodshed in Mogadishu was making headlines around the world, gains were being made throughout much of the rest of Somalia. "The Somali people are working hard to get their lives back in order", I noted on 9 September 1993 at a meeting at United Nations Headquarters.⁷² The United Nations cooperated with 43 international and Somali NGOs through zonal offices in Hargeisa, Bossaso, Baidoa and Kismayo, as well as Mogadishu. Security generally improved outside Mogadishu, making it possible to pursue relief and rehabilitation

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UNOSOM II Deployment as of November 1993



The deployment of UNOSOM II peaked in November 1993 with some 29,300 troops, most of them located in the south and centre of the country where armed conflict among the Somali factions had been heaviest. The Joint Task Force (deployment not shown here) and Quick Reaction Force (shown above as QRF), both organized and commanded by the United States, were deployed in support of UNOSOM and comprised an additional 17,700 troops.

programmes, despite worrying signs of receding donor support (by November 1993, only \$32 million of the \$159 million needed had been pledged for the implementation of the Relief and Rehabilitation Programme for 1993). In several parts of the country, there was progress towards inter-clan reconciliation and the rebuilding of local and regional government structures, the police force and judicial and penal systems.

161 By mid-1993, in fact, starvation had been largely eradicated, although there were still pockets of severe malnutrition in certain isolated parts of the country. With relatively good rainfall and the provision of seeds and tools by United Nations agencies and NGOs, harvests improved in 1993, covering about half of the country's cereal needs. Food aid was being increasingly targeted at the most vulnerable population groups and, through food-for-work and school-feeding, for projects to rehabilitate schools, hospitals, water, sanitation and other services. One measure of these positive trends was the fall in free food distribution by the WFP and the ICRC from 35,000 to 7,400 tons a month between April and September 1993. Meanwhile, the FAO, the ICRC and NGOs assisted the reactivation of veterinary services for livestock, and there was a strong recovery in livestock exports to the Gulf countries, one of the traditional pillars of Somalia's export trade. An estimated quarter of a million head of livestock were exported in the second and third quarters of 1993.

162 While huge numbers of children had died of preventable or easily curable diseases in 1992, a vaccination programme unprecedented in the history of Somalia, run by UNICEF and NGOs, had resulted in more than 750,000 children receiving measles vaccinations by the end of 1993. This was a striking achievement, raising the rate of coverage from about 30 per cent before the civil war to more than 75 per cent. By November 1993, 32 hospitals and 81 maternal and child health centres were in operation, compared with only 15 functioning hospitals in 1992. At the same time, United Nations agencies and NGOs drilled wells, installed hand-pumps, rehabilitated water sources and sanitation systems, built water storage tanks and distributed potable water to communities across Somalia by truck. Together with UNOSOM II military contingents, they rehabilitated schools that had been shut down for three or four years, stripped of their equipment and in some cases destroyed. Teacher training resumed and 150,000 textbooks were distributed. By September 1993, 51 schools had reopened in southern Somalia, and by the end of the year some 70,000 children were enrolled in primary schools, more than before the war. These were impressive accomplishments in a relatively short space of time, though there was still much to be done, particularly to resettle hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons and refugees, continue the recovery of the rural econ-

omy, restore physical infrastructure and rebuild national administrative capacity.

163 The fighting between June and October 1993 also had far-reaching political implications. Inevitably, the events in Mogadishu set back the national reconciliation process and discouraged factions in other parts of the country from proceeding with voluntary disarmament. The Transitional Charter Drafting Committee, which had been putting the finishing touches to a draft charter for the transitional period, suspended its work. And although district and regional councils were being established in some other parts of the country, the tensions in Mogadishu contributed to major delays in the capital.⁷³

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164 The Cease-fire and Disarmament Committee, which had been established in Addis Ababa in January 1993 and was developing procedures for handling cease-fire violations and guidelines for voluntary disarmament, stopped functioning after the 5 June 1993 incident, though planning for voluntary disarmament continued in some parts of the country, such as the north-east and the north-west. But since voluntary disarmament can succeed only if it proceeds simultaneously in a fair and balanced manner, it was not surprising that factions became fearful of giving up their weapons after the fighting erupted in Mogadishu.

165 None the less, UNOSOM II helped competing clans and political factions in several parts of the country to resolve their differences in a peaceful manner. UNOSOM II assisted a regional reconciliation conference in Kismayo, a gathering that brought together over 150 elders representing the more than 20 clans and sub-clans inhabiting the Juba region, including the city of Kismayo, which had changed hands several times during the civil war because of inter-clan and inter-factional fighting. On 6 August 1993, these leaders signed an agreement to end all hostilities.⁷⁴ In the north-east, UNOSOM II facilitated the reconciliation of rival factions of the SSDF, and in the Gedo region of southern Somalia, near the border with Kenya, efforts were made to reconcile the Rahaweyn and the Marehan.⁷⁵

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166 The re-establishment of organs of government was also proceeding from the ground up, in accordance with the participatory approach outlined by the Addis Ababa Agreement of 27 March 1993. First, local communities set up district councils. These then sent representatives to the new regional councils. By the end of November 1993, 52 district councils and 8 regional councils had been certified. Excluding the north-west, which remained a special case owing to its self-proclaimed "independence", this meant that councils existed in 8 of the 13 regions in the rest of the country. The district councils were to be responsible for local security, economic development and social services, and thus represented a first step towards the establishment of democratic government structures.

167 Another focus of UNOSOM II's work during this period was the re-establishment of politically neutral police, judicial and penal institutions. On 22 September 1993, the Security Council called on Member States to support, on an "urgent and accelerated basis", the implementation of a strategy devised by UNOSOM II's Justice Division.⁷⁶ Budgeted to cost \$45 million in the first year, the programme was vitally important for the restoration of security and law and order at the local level. UNOSOM II's role was to act as a facilitator, helping the newly created district and regional authorities to revive institutions that had collapsed during the civil war.

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168 UNOSOM II's strategy for the development of police forces was to start at the local level, establishing police forces under the operational control of the district councils; these district-level structures would in turn enable regional police mechanisms to be put in place. To establish national police structures, however, a national Government was of course required. UNOSOM II strove to ensure that the police forces were politically neutral and reflected the diversity of clans in the districts they served. Many of the policemen recruited in the early stages of the programme were drawn from the ranks of the old Somali Police Force, which had about 18,000 personnel before the war, but the strategy also envisaged integrating former militia fighters into the police, using screening procedures, training programmes and operational monitoring to ensure that they had renounced factional loyalties. By November 1993, approximately 5,000 former policemen—3,000 in the Mogadishu area and 2,000 from the other regions—had been recruited. UNOSOM II police experts from several countries were assigned to work with and train local police forces, and Governments began donating equipment.⁷⁷

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169 Another of UNOSOM II's goals was to establish functioning courts and prisons that could enforce the rule of law and ensure respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Somalia's pre-war legal system had already been weakened by the exodus of educated professionals from the country and by the long years in which the abuse of legal authority had become the norm. Despite these constraints, UNOSOM II's Justice Division helped to set up an interim judicial system, based on the Somali Criminal Procedure Code and Penal Code of 1962. (The Indian Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code, which had been in force in the north-west prior to 1960, were used in the north-west in accordance with a decision of the "Somaliland Inter-Clan Council Conference", which had met in Borama during the first half of 1993 to discuss issues relating to the "independence" of "Somaliland".) This interim system would have three levels of courts: district courts, regional courts and courts of appeal. A judicial selection committee, composed of respected Somalis and advised by UNOSOM II Justice Division officials, was set

up in Mogadishu to select judges and magistrates for the court system in the capital, and similar bodies were planned for other parts of the country. UNOSOM II provided training, funding for the renovation of courts, equipment and materials, and modest salaries for judges and other court personnel. Likewise, the Justice Division helped re-establish a penal system by renovating prisons, paying salaries to prison staff and providing food for prisoners. Finally, UNOSOM II set up an Office of Human Rights to investigate and facilitate the prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian law and to assist in the establishment of a local Somali human rights committee, in cooperation with the independent expert I had appointed to assist in developing a long-term programme for re-establishing human rights and the rule of law in Somalia pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1993/86 of 10 March 1993.⁷⁸

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VII A new mandate

170 Although substantial progress was being made outside the capital, both in the humanitarian field and in efforts to re-establish local and regional government, police forces and the judiciary, the violent events in Mogadishu and the persistent unwillingness of the principal Somali factions to work towards peace eroded international commitment to the tasks set for UNOSOM II by the Security Council. Following a decision by the United States to withdraw its forces by March 1994, other troop contributors announced similar reductions in their involvement in Somalia. This, in turn, led the Security Council to end the peace-enforcement operation and redefine UNOSOM as a more limited peace-keeping mission. Throughout this difficult period, I emphasized the need for the international community to remain engaged in the effort to help Somalia rebuild and to find a peaceful settlement of the factions' differences. The Somali people, for their part, continued to express a desire for a United Nations presence.

Aftermath of the 3 October incident

171 The deaths of 18 United States soldiers on 3 October 1993 proved to be a turning-point in the international community's involvement in Somalia. In the United States, television news programmes, which had earlier aroused such a ground swell of public sympathy around the world for the famine victims, now broadcast a distressing video recording of a captured helicopter pilot and footage of a dead American being dragged through the streets of south Mogadishu by a jeering mob.

172 Though the United States Government temporarily bolstered its forces in Somalia immediately after the failed raid as a temporary security measure, President Clinton announced on 7 October 1993 that the United States would withdraw all its combat forces and the bulk of its logistics units from Somalia by 31 March 1994. Several European and other Governments subsequently decided to pull out their contingents as well. President Clinton also announced on 7 October that he would send Ambassador Oakley back to Somalia as a special envoy to negotiate with the captors of the United States helicopter pilot.⁷⁹ The USC/SNA reacted to these developments by declaring a unilateral cease-fire in Mogadishu on 9 October. Governments which had strongly supported the United Nations peace-enforcement strategy in Somalia, and had voted in the

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Security Council for the United Nations to take “all necessary measures” against those responsible for the attacks on UNOSOM II forces, now spoke of the need to place greater emphasis on negotiations.

173 As a result of the troop withdrawals by the United States and several European countries over the next six months, UNOSOM II lost several of its best-equipped contingents, including key logistics units. More than 9,000 UNOSOM II troops (almost one third of the 29,300 troops serving with UNOSOM II in November 1993) were withdrawn, along with the 17,700 troops then serving in the United States’ temporarily reinforced Joint Task Force, including the 1,350 troops in the Quick Reaction Force.⁸⁰ This reduction in strength seriously impaired UNOSOM II’s capability to carry out its mandate long before the date set in resolution 865 (1993) for the completion of the UNOSOM II mission—indeed, a full year before the March 1995 deadline set by the Addis Ababa Agreement for completing the transition to a new national Government.⁸¹

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174 Though all contingents served with exemplary dedication, courage and efficiency, UNOSOM II was particularly dependent on the forces of the United States, both for logistics and, in the case of the Quick Reaction Force, for stand-by combat support. Indeed, they proved difficult to replace, although some logistical services were farmed out, at a higher cost, to commercial contractors. I wrote to 42 Member States in November urging them to contribute additional troops to UNOSOM II, but not a single positive response had been received by the beginning of 1994.⁸² Another worrying development was the accumulation of arrears in Member States’ assessed contributions towards the UNOSOM II budget: while the United Nations had already spent \$765 million on UNOSOM I and II by the end of December 1993, unpaid assessed contributions amounted to \$100 million. As I have stressed on many occasions, the non-payment or late payment of assessed contributions adversely affects the willingness of Member States to participate in United Nations peace-keeping operations.

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
175 Reporting to the Security Council on 12 November 1993, I recognized that “the international community cannot take for granted forever the generosity of the troop-contributing countries, their readiness to put the lives of their sons and daughters on the line in pursuit of what is perceived to be a somewhat distant and ill-defined objective”. But I could not endorse the idea of withdrawing UNOSOM II from Somalia. “The international community”, I said, “must not abandon Somalia in view of the incontrovertible desire of the Somali people for the continued presence of UNOSOM II in their country. Total withdrawal would not be a responsible act.”⁸³

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176 The regional organizations, for their part, reaffirmed their commitment to achieving peace in Somalia. On 14 October in Cairo,

UNOSOM II Deployment as of November 1994



By November 1994, the strength of UNOSOM II had been reduced to some 15,000 peace-keepers, concentrated in three major centres: Baidoa, Kismayo and Mogadishu.

the Chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, hosted a meeting attended by myself and the Secretaries-General of the OAU, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. In a joint statement, we underscored "our common commitment to pursuing a coordinated and comprehensive approach to the search for solutions to the difficult problems that lie ahead for Somalia."⁸⁴

From peace enforcement to peace-keeping

177 Against this background, and after visiting Somalia in mid-October 1993 to review the situation at first hand, I presented the Security Council with three new options as it met to reauthorize UNOSOM II's mandate. Under the first option, the mandate would remain essentially unchanged. UNOSOM II would assist voluntary disarmament, but would retain the capability to resort to coercive disarmament and initiate countermeasures if factions attacked United Nations personnel. If the Security Council selected this option, Governments would need to maintain existing troop levels in Somalia and to send fresh contingents to replace those expected to leave in March 1994. "This option", I pointed out, "calls for sustained political will on the part of the troop-contributing countries, which must be prepared to make available the necessary troops and armament under United Nations command and to accept the risks associated with such a course of action."⁸⁵

178 Under the second option, the Security Council would take a conscious decision that UNOSOM II would not use coercive methods but instead rely entirely on the cooperation of the Somali parties. UNOSOM II would use force only in self-defence, in accordance with traditional peace-keeping practices, and disarmament would be entirely voluntary. At the same time, UNOSOM II would strive to keep the main supply routes open in the south and the centre of the country, so as to ensure the unimpeded flow of humanitarian assistance, and would also focus on the rehabilitation of infrastructure, the repatriation of refugees and resettlement of displaced persons, political reconciliation and the rebuilding of the Somali police and judicial systems. If the Council chose this option, I projected that the troop requirement would be about 16,000 and the departing contingents would not need to be replaced.

179 The third option provided a scaled-down version of the second, requiring only 5,000 troops. UNOSOM II forces would concentrate entirely on maintaining security at the main seaports and airports in order to keep supply routes open for humanitarian assistance. They would assist United Nations agencies and NGOs involved in humanitarian programmes, but local Somali authorities, including the new police forces, would be largely responsible for providing security.

180 In presenting these options, I stated that it was not my inten-

tion that the Security Council should pronounce on them at that stage but that the time might come fairly soon for the Council to consider and decide on them. On 18 November 1993, the Security Council adopted resolution 886 (1993), renewing UNOSOM's mandate until the end of May 1994. The Council did not endorse any of the three options I presented but instead asked me to submit, by 15 January 1994, a progress report on the situation in Somalia, including an updated plan for UNOSOM II's future strategy, so that it could undertake a fundamental review of the mission's mandate by 1 February 1994. The Council also reminded the Somali people that continued United Nations involvement in the country depended "on their active cooperation and tangible progress towards a political settlement".⁸⁶

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181 Two days earlier, the Security Council, by its resolution 885 (1993), had authorized me to appoint a commission of inquiry to investigate the armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel. The Commission was established on 30 November, under the chairmanship of the Chief Justice of Zambia, the Honourable Matthew S. W. Ngulube.⁸⁷ (The Commission of Inquiry submitted its report on 24 February 1994 [S/1994/653].) In the resolution, the Council called for the suspension, pending completion of the report of the Commission, of arrest actions against those individuals who might be implicated but had not been detained, and for "appropriate provision" to be made for dealing with the situation of those already detained.⁸⁸ The arrest warrant for General Aidid was thus suspended and UNOSOM II began releasing the 42 detainees suspected of involvement in attacks on its personnel. The final eight, who included senior aides of General Aidid, were released on 17 January 1994.

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182 For the updated report requested by the Security Council, which I submitted on 6 January 1994, I returned to the three options for UNOSOM II's future strategy that I had outlined in November. "My preference", I stated, "would be for the first option, since I am convinced that only a comprehensive mandate, as laid down by the Security Council in its various resolutions, would make it possible for UNOSOM II to create a secure environment and to accelerate its efforts to help the Somali people as they move along the process of national reconciliation and institution-building."⁸⁹ However, I had to exclude this as a viable option because it was by then evident that Member States were not prepared to commit the troops needed to replace those being withdrawn by the United States and several European and other countries. Only two States had offered to deploy an additional 2,300 personnel—at an unknown future date. Thus the United Nations could not count on having more than 19,700 troops in Somalia by the end of March 1994. I therefore recommended the second option, as a second-best strategy, for the consideration of the Council.

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183 On 4 February 1994, the Security Council adopted resolution 897 (1994), approving a revised mandate for UNOSOM II based on my second option but authorizing a somewhat higher force level of 22,000.⁹⁰ Still, this was substantially less than the almost 29,300 troops serving in UNOSOM II as recently as November 1993. In addition, the 1,350 troops of the Quick Reaction Force were to be withdrawn by the end of March, along with the support units in the United States Joint Task Force.

184 In addition, in contrast with the comprehensive mandate initially given to UNOSOM II by resolution 814 (1993) in March 1993, the new mandate comprised a set of specific tasks, which were as follows: (a) encouraging and assisting the Somali parties in implementing the Addis Ababa Agreements, in particular in their cooperative efforts to achieve disarmament and to respect the cease-fire; (b) protecting major ports and airports and essential infrastructure and safeguarding the lines of communication vital to the provision of humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance; (c) continuing its efforts to provide humanitarian relief to all in need throughout the country; (d) assisting in the reorganization of the Somali police and judicial system; (e) helping with the repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons; (f) assisting in the ongoing political process in Somalia, which should culminate in the installation of a democratically elected Government; and (g) providing protection for the personnel, installations and equipment of the United Nations and its agencies, as well as of non-governmental organizations providing humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance.

185 The peace-enforcement provisions of resolution 814 (1993) were thus no longer part of UNOSOM II's mandate. UNOSOM was not to engage in coercive disarmament, nor was it to use force in response to cease-fire violations by the Somali factions. As in conventional peace-keeping operations, UNOSOM II forces would fire their weapons only in self-defence. In practice, UNOSOM II had already reverted to this peace-keeping mode in October 1993, after the raid by the United States Rangers. Another noteworthy feature of resolution 897 (1994) was the new strategy for rehabilitation giving "priority to directing international reconstruction resources to those regions where security is being re-established and to local Somali institutions which are prepared to cooperate with the international community in setting development priorities".⁹¹ Finally, the resolution reaffirmed the Security Council's objective of completing the mission of UNOSOM II within the two-year time-frame envisaged by the March 1993 Addis Ababa Agreement—that is, by March 1995.

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186 Shortly after the adoption of resolution 897 (1994), Admiral Howe ended his tour of duty as my Special Representative. On 8 March

1994, he was replaced by Ambassador Lansana Kouyaté (Guinea), who had previously been his deputy and now became Acting Special Representative until the appointment of Ambassador James Victor Gbeho (Ghana) as my new Special Representative on 1 July 1994. Earlier, on 12 January, there had been a change in the command of UNOSOM II forces, with Lieutenant-General Aboo Samah Aboo Bakar (Malaysia) succeeding Lieutenant-General Bir as Force Commander.

187 As the last United States and European contingents withdrew in March 1994, there was anxious speculation about how UNOSOM II would pursue its new mandate. Would it have enough troops and equipment, along with the necessary logistics capability, to carry out its assigned tasks? Would the armed factions take advantage of the contraction in UNOSOM II's size and military capability, along with the change in mandate and the withdrawal of the United States forces operating alongside UNOSOM II, to resume their struggle for power?

188 The political reconciliation process, which had ground to a halt at the national level after the resumption of fighting in Mogadishu in June 1993, was only just resuming in early 1994. However, there were disturbing signs of rearming by the factions, an increase in acts of banditry and a renewal of attacks on humanitarian aid workers. Several relief workers were killed or kidnapped during the first few months of 1994, and aid agencies had to withdraw personnel from some towns, including Buale and Kismayo in the south and Belet Weyne in central Somalia. In February, fighting between rival clans and factions resumed in Kismayo. These and other incidents were not related, as many different factions, sub-clans and groups of armed irregulars were involved, but together they created a pattern of spreading violence, raising fears about a descent once again into the violence and chaos that had gripped the country before the arrival of UNITAF in December 1992.

VIII The decision to withdraw

189 Generalized warfare did not break out after the withdrawal of United States and European contingents in late 1993 and early 1994, but security conditions continued to deteriorate in the absence of a political settlement of the country's crisis. To facilitate political reconciliation and communal healing, United Nations officials worked closely with the faction leaders as well as other representatives of Somali society, such as the clan elders and religious leaders. Despite some tentative signs of progress in this painstaking process, in the end the efforts proved unavailing, as the cooperation of the Somali parties was not forthcoming, and the Security Council decided to terminate UNOSOM II's mandate. The mission withdrew in March 1995, but the United Nations retained a strong humanitarian presence in Somalia, and my Special Representative continued to function in a good-offices role to assist in the search for peace and reconciliation.

The security situation worsens

190 In April 1994, the USC/SNA staged an offensive in central Somalia that resulted in the seizure of Merca, a coastal town 30 kilometres south of Mogadishu, and of the area around Mogadishu airport. Also that month, fighting broke out in both Mogadishu and Belet Weyne between the USC/SNA's Habr Gedir militia and the militia of another Hawiye sub-clan, the Hawadle.⁹² In June, there was another serious outbreak of fighting in Mogadishu between the Habr Gedir and the Hawadle.

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191 Violence was also directed at United Nations personnel, resulting in several fatalities. Five Nepalese soldiers were killed in an ambush in Mogadishu on 16 May, and two Malaysian soldiers were killed on 18 July. Seven Indian soldiers were killed on 22 August in an attack on a UNOSOM supply convoy near Baidoa, and nine days later, also in Baidoa, three doctors of the Indian contingent were killed in an attack on a field hospital.⁹³ On 15 July, a convoy escorting my Special Representative came under fire in Mogadishu.

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192 Humanitarian operations were inevitably affected by these developments. In April 1994, security problems forced the WFP to close its operations in both Kismayo and Belet Weyne. Between April and July 1994, access roads to the port of Mogadishu were periodically blocked by armed militias, resulting in the WFP moving less than half of the

programmed food aid from the port.⁹⁴ On 24 July, a convoy of 27 WFP trucks carrying food aid was attacked as it left Mogadishu airport. In mid-1994, security considerations forced UNDP to suspend its support of the Mogadishu water system, on which hundreds of thousands of people depended for a clean water-supply. Inevitably, Somali civilians suffered from the disruption of relief programmes, and in Kismayo and the Juba valley there were once again signs of malnutrition. From April 1994, UNOSOM II forces were about 3,000 soldiers short of the reduced ceiling of 22,000. Member States had not yet provided additional troops and the force was stretched very thin.

Efforts towards political reconciliation

193 This latest upsurge in fighting occurred amid some discernible movement in talks on national political reconciliation. The cessation of hostilities between the USC/SNA and UNOSOM II in October 1993 had paved the way for a concerted effort by the United Nations to revive the national reconciliation process. These efforts were extraordinarily difficult, owing to the deep divisions between the two main rival blocs of factions—the SNA and the Group of 12 (sometimes referred to as the Somali Salvation Alliance or SSA)—and the complexity of the clan and factional alignments and the rivalries within and between them.

194 The first step was a meeting of representatives of the Group of 12 and the SNA, which was held in Addis Ababa from 2 to 11 December 1993. They met at the invitation of the Government of Ethiopia and with the support of UNOSOM II, immediately after the Fourth Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia,⁹⁵ which had demonstrated the strength of the newly selected regional representatives from throughout the country. As the first such meeting since April 1993, it was an achievement in itself simply to bring the two sides together. Although no agreement was reached on a structure for direct talks between the sides' chairmen, the political process continued. In March 1994, my Acting Special Representative took advantage of the presence in Nairobi of many of the faction leaders, including General Aidid and Mr. Ali Mahdi, to embark on an intense mediation effort. On 17 March, he succeeded in bringing General Aidid and Mr. Ali Mahdi together for their first face-to-face talks in almost a year. On 24 March, following mediation by the United Nations, the two leaders, acting on behalf of their respective blocs, signed a declaration on national reconciliation.⁹⁶

195 The Nairobi Declaration committed both sides to the restoration of peace throughout Somalia and stated that a national reconciliation conference was to be convened on 15 May 1994 to elect a president and an undetermined number of vice-presidents, and to appoint a prime

minister. A preparatory meeting of the main factions was also scheduled for 15 April 1994. Neither meeting took place as projected.

196 The Nairobi Declaration reflected a shift in approach by the faction leaders, projecting a shorter, more direct route to the re-establishment of a national Government than the Addis Ababa Agreement, which had envisaged a two-year transitional period of institution-building from the grass roots upwards. Instead of representatives from the regional councils, along with a smaller number of representatives from the factions, constituting a Transitional National Council, which would hold office until the establishment of a Government in March 1995, it was now envisaged that a national reconciliation conference would proceed directly to the creation of a Government by selecting the president, the vice-presidents and a prime minister, followed by the establishment of a National Legislative Assembly.⁹⁷

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197 The Nairobi Declaration also urged the SNM, the governing party in the breakaway "Somaliland Republic", to attend all future national reconciliation conferences, meetings and consultations. General Aidid and Mr. Ali Mahdi also agreed to "complete and review the formation of local authorities, where needed, and establish them, where necessary, as a basis for regional autonomy and respect for community rights", and to establish an independent judiciary. Finally, the two leaders expressed their gratitude to the United Nations, aid donors and the countries of the region for their assistance and requested "the continuation of these efforts until Somalia stands on its own feet".⁹⁸

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198 Concurrent with the talks on national reconciliation in Nairobi, a series of additional initiatives were undertaken to restore peace and tranquillity in some of the towns and regions most troubled by communal tensions and political clashes. In Mogadishu, for example, UNOSOM II encouraged the efforts of clan elders and religious leaders to restore peaceful relations among the Hawiye sub-clans. These efforts included a peace conference in January 1994, organized by the Imam of Hirab, the principal religious leader of both the Abgal and the Habr Gedir. In February 1994, a reconciliation conference took place in Bardera that brought together representatives of the town's three deeply divided communities, the Mirifle sub-clan of the Digil and two Darod sub-clans, the Marehan and the Ogadeni.⁹⁹ Regional peace accords were also signed in Kismayo on 19 June 1994 at the end of a month-long reconciliation conference involving hundreds of elders and faction leaders from numerous clans and sub-clans in the Lower Juba region.¹⁰⁰ Representatives of many of the Absame (Ogadeni) sub-clans in the Lower Juba region held a separate conference at Doblely from 26 June to 9 July. And on 9 July, Absame sub-clans that were absent from the Lower Juba conference concluded a two-week meeting of their own by reaching agreement on a number of reconciliation mechanisms.¹⁰¹

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199 The various meetings appeared, for the moment, to enhance the prospects for national reconciliation. But the extremely slow pace hindered the humanitarian effort, in which the shift from emergency relief to long-term rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes should have occurred much earlier. Indeed, combined with a progressive deterioration of the security situation, donor support began to flag. It was also recognized that no meaningful overall progress could be made without resolving the conflict in Mogadishu and the conflicts within the dominant Hawiye clan, to which both Mr. Ali Mahdi and General Aidid belonged. Indeed, the root causes of dissension and tension among the 15 factions were also, by and large, attributable to rivalries within the Hawiye. Although both General Aidid and Mr. Ali Mahdi expressed their willingness to participate in a Hawiye reconciliation conference, there remained grave misgivings about the seriousness of their commitment, as well as that of other factions, to peace and national reconciliation. For example, the SNA and the SSA continued to encourage and facilitate the creation of new partisan groups, which were not parties to the agreements reached in Addis Ababa and Nairobi.

200 I reported to the Security Council in August 1994 that it was still too early to conclude that UNOSOM II could not achieve the objectives for which it had been established, since there was still a chance that national reconciliation could be achieved and an interim government established by late 1994.¹⁰² I stressed in my report that UNOSOM was continuing to provide essential support and assistance to the humanitarian effort as well as to the police, judicial and penal programmes in Somalia. I offered the Council two scenarios. If, as a result of a *rapprochement* between the Hawiye sub-clans, national reconciliation could be achieved and an interim Government established by the end of 1994, there would be just enough time to complete UNOSOM II's mandate by 31 March 1995. There might even be a case for extending the mission, though at reduced strength. If, on the other hand, no significant progress had been made by the end of September, particularly with respect to the Hawiye conference, the Council would have to decide how much longer it wished to maintain a 15,000-strong force just to provide some degree of protection to humanitarian operations. In this regard, certain members of the Council had indicated their reluctance to continue indefinitely their involvement in Somalia.

201 I thus concluded that the Somali leaders should be given a little more time to demonstrate that they were ready to cooperate with the United Nations and with each other, and I recommended an extension of UNOSOM II's mandate until 31 October. I also recommended an immediate reduction of 1,500 in the Force level, and subsequently to 15,000 as soon possible. On 25 August, the Security Council stated that it was gravely concerned by the fact that the national reconciliation

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conference, which had been scheduled for 15 May 1994, had not taken place.¹⁰³ On 30 September, in its resolution 946 (1994), the Council extended UNOSOM II's mandate until 31 October, prior to which it would undertake a thorough review of the mandate of the operation with a view to deciding on its future. The United States, abstaining in the vote, said that the time had come for the mission to be brought to an end.¹⁰⁴

202 At my request, Mr. Kofi A. Annan (Ghana), then Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, travelled to Somalia during the crucial mid-September period to assess the Somalis' efforts at achieving national reconciliation. Mr. Annan was accompanied by my Military Adviser, Major General J. M. G. Baril (Canada). The Under-Secretary-General reported that the Somali leaders expected to convene before the end of September the long-delayed preparatory meeting for the National Reconciliation Conference called for under the Nairobi Declaration of March 1994, to be followed by the Conference in early October. General Aidid, for his part, informed the Under-Secretary-General that it was now the SNA's view that the Hawiye reconciliation conference was unnecessary. Given that so much had been expected of such a gathering, this was considered a negative development. Intensive contacts and informal consultations were held between the two sides during October, but by the end of the month no agreement on the convening of a broad-based or all-inclusive national reconciliation conference had been reached. Rather, the SNA had announced plans to convene a conference with a view to establishing an interim Government, a unilateral action opposed by both the SSA and my Special Representative.

203 The protracted political stalemate necessarily focused increased attention on the reduction and possible withdrawal of UNOSOM II. Representatives of humanitarian organizations had earlier expressed concern about the effect of a precipitous withdrawal of troops from key regions in which they were operating. Even with the gradual reduction endorsed by the Security Council, the geographical area in which UNOSOM troops could support humanitarian operations had been reduced significantly—by September 1994, to some 50 per cent of what it had been at mid-year. UNOSOM was by this time concentrating its efforts on the protection of key installations such as the seaports and airports of Mogadishu and Kismayo and the airport at Baidoa, and on the provision of military escorts in the central and southern parts of the country.

204 By mid-October 1994, the force level was approximately 15,000—31 per cent below the strength of 22,000 authorized by the Security Council in resolution 897 (1994). In the judgement of the Force Commander, this was the minimum viable level at which the troops could continue to carry out the operation's mandate, as well as for any

closure of the mission being considered by the Council. In regard to the latter, I informed the Council that a secure and orderly withdrawal of troops and assets would require a period of between 60 and 120 days, depending on security conditions. It was considered quite possible at the time that UNOSOM forces would have to withdraw in the face of hostile action by Somali factions and/or widespread banditry. It was incumbent upon Member States, I said, to provide UNOSOM with sufficient military and logistical support.

205 In the light of these considerations, I recommended to the Security Council in my report of 14 October that the mission's mandate be extended until 31 March 1995.¹⁰⁵ I added that a decision by the Council to follow through on its previously declared intention to terminate the UNOSOM II mandate on 31 March would not mean United Nations abandonment of Somalia. Were there to be progress in the Somali leaders' efforts to achieve national reconciliation, at least to the extent of agreeing to establish a transitional Government, I stated that I would not hesitate to revert to the Council with recommendations for the continuation of some United Nations presence in Somalia beyond March 1995. However, I also pointed out that the international community could not sustain indefinitely the generous assistance it had provided thus far. Nor could it impose peace on the people of Somalia. The establishment of a viable and acceptable peace, I stated, could only come from the Somalis themselves.

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Security Council mission

206 On 20 October 1994, the Security Council decided to send a mission to Somalia to convey directly to the Somali political parties the views of the Council on the situation in Somalia and on the future of the United Nations presence there. In a message conveyed to the Somali faction leaders during the visit (26-27 October), the Council stated: "As you know, the Secretary-General has reported to the Security Council that the political reconciliation process is at an impasse. The result has been a vacuum of civil authority and governmental structure. This has left the United Nations with no basis to underpin its efforts to help Somalia to emerge from the present crisis. . . . In the absence of adequate Somali cooperation, the assumptions underlying the UNOSOM deployment in Somalia have been fundamentally undermined and so have the prospects of achieving the United Nations objectives as set out by the Security Council. In these circumstances, continuation of UNOSOM beyond March 1995 cannot be justified."¹⁰⁶

207 The message reaffirmed the United Nations readiness to play a facilitating or mediating political role beyond March 1995 and to do

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its best, together with its agencies and with NGOs, to sustain humanitarian activities throughout Somalia. But, the message continued, "their ability to do so will depend almost entirely on the degree of cooperation and security offered by Somalis".

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208 The Security Council mission, which was led by Ambassador Colin Keating (New Zealand), reported that the Somali factions received the message with a surprising degree of acceptance.¹⁰⁷ None of them requested a longer extension of the mandate, nor did the humanitarian organizations or the NGOs. Assurances were given by the factions on cooperation with UNOSOM's withdrawal, on long-term security for humanitarian assistance and on the factions' intention to bring about genuine political reconciliation. In its report, however, the mission noted that everything it had seen left its members with a profound sense of unease and a fear that, whether or not UNOSOM departed, political reconciliation or the emergence of a Government that enjoyed widespread acceptance was far from certain. The mission concluded that "the risk of a return to civil war is real".

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209 On 31 October 1994, the Security Council approved an interim extension of UNOSOM II's mandate for four days in order to provide time to consider the report of the Council's mission.¹⁰⁸ On 4 November, the Council decided to extend the mandate of UNOSOM II for a final period until 31 March 1995 and affirmed that the primary purpose of the mission until then was to facilitate political reconciliation. The Council called for the withdrawal to be made as soon as possible without compromising the safety of UNOSOM II personnel, and also requested me to submit, prior to 31 March, suggestions concerning the role the United Nations could play in Somalia beyond that date.¹⁰⁹ The resolution also invited neighbouring States and regional organizations to continue their efforts in the search for lasting peace in Somalia, and I personally wrote to the Organization of African Unity, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the League of Arab States expressing confidence in their continued support and assistance in this regard.¹¹⁰

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210 Following the 4 November Security Council vote, the Permanent Representative of Spain stated (S/PV.3447): "The Council's decision today to terminate the mandate of UNOSOM II on 31 March 1995 cannot be construed as a failure of the United Nations involvement in Somalia. It is, rather, evidence that without the effective cooperation of the parties involved any peace-keeping operation will be unable to reach all its objectives. Stability, reconstruction and progress in Somalia must be the fruit of a joint effort by all the Somali parties for the good of the population as a whole. As long as the Somali factions continue to place their partisan interests before those of the people as a whole, Somalia will be unable to regain a normal existence or fully reincorporate itself into the mainstream of today's world."

Further efforts to achieve reconciliation

211 On 1 November 1994, the SNA factions followed through on their stated intention to convene, unilaterally, a conference in south Mogadishu with a view to establishing an interim Government within 45 days. My Special Representative declined an invitation to attend this meeting in an observer capacity, saying in a statement that the move was contrary to understandings that had been reached between the SNA and all other concerned factions. Mr. Ali Mahdi, for his part, convened a parallel meeting of SSA leaders in north Mogadishu, and subsequently informed my Special Representative that that group would establish its own national Government in the event that the SNA-sponsored conference unilaterally announced an interim Government. These potentially destabilizing moves did not materialize, but the situation remained deadlocked until February 1995—during the last two weeks of UNOSOM II's withdrawal—when further efforts at negotiation materialized.

212 First, on 21 February, yet another peace agreement was signed by General Aidid and Mr. Ali Mahdi on behalf of the SNA and the SSA respectively to promote national reconciliation and a peaceful settlement. In the agreement, the two sides accepted the principle of power-sharing, pledged to seek the presidency not by military means but rather through democratic elections, agreed to the resolution of disputes through dialogue and peaceful means and agreed on a common platform for tackling problems. It also included provisions for the confinement of “technicals” to designated areas, discouraged the open carrying of arms in the streets of Mogadishu and called for the removal of roadblocks and the reopening of the main markets in the city. Second, on 23 February, the two sides arrived at an agreement on the establishment of two joint committees to manage the operations of the Mogadishu airport and seaport. The agreement, reached with the involvement of my Special Representative, provided a basis for cooperation between the Somali parties and the organizations and programmes of the United Nations system. In signing the two agreements, both the SNA and the SSA maintained that they would refrain from further fighting, and they recommenced discussions on convening a national reconciliation conference.

213 Meanwhile, to improve security conditions and facilitate the process of reconstruction, United Nations agencies and their partners pursued initiatives for de-mining and the demobilization of combatants. Most of the estimated 1 million land-mines in Somalia were in the north-west and dated back to the war there between the Siad Barre regime and the SNM. The importance of mine clearance in Somalia was specifically cited by the Security Council in its resolution 897 (1994) of 4 February 1994 defining UNOSOM II's new mandate. In that resolu-

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tion, the Council requested the Secretary-General “to make arrangements to ensure the start of de-mining operations as soon as possible wherever conditions permit”.¹¹¹ UNOSOM II subsequently developed a strategy focusing on assisting local self-help mine-clearance operations, and by May 1994, six Somali NGO mine-clearance projects were started and 18 more were in the pipeline.¹¹² At the time of UNOSOM’s withdrawal, however, insecurity in some of the affected areas and shortages of donor funding were impeding greater progress in de-mining.

214 Under UNOSOM II, the rebuilding of local police forces was an important component of the re-establishment of functioning structures of local government. As of 1 March 1995, an 8,500-member police force was operational in 82 district stations throughout the country, through a programme administered by UNOSOM II and funded from voluntary contributions in cash and in kind by the donor community. However, international support for the programme, which included payment of salaries for the Somali police, ceased on 31 March with the expiry of the UNOSOM II mandate and the exhaustion of resources in the Trust Fund established for this purpose. Concerned that this would jeopardize the maintenance of local security conditions, I appealed to the donor community for additional voluntary contributions, to be channelled through appropriate agencies operating in Somalia.¹¹³

Withdrawal of UNOSOM II

215 The withdrawal of UNOSOM II forces from Somalia was carried out in phases and with only minimal interruption. Staff at Mogadishu headquarters was reduced by 50 per cent by 15 January 1995 and relocated from the compound of the United States Embassy to the airport. By 2 February, UNOSOM II troop strength was reduced to 7,956, concentrated in the airport, the new seaport complex and the old seaport area. As the process accelerated, military support to United Nations agencies, human rights organizations and NGOs still engaged in humanitarian activities was, of necessity, greatly reduced. Agencies were advised to evacuate their international staff to Nairobi by 14 February, although I also requested United Nations agencies to continue implementing their programmes and activities and to maintain their presence in areas of Somalia that were considered safe.¹¹⁴ By the end of the month, a balance of approximately 2,500 Pakistani and Bangladeshi military personnel remained as the UNOSOM II rearguard.

216 On 28 February, troops of a combined task force called “United Shield”—composed of troops from France, India, Italy, Malaysia, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and the United States—landed at Mogadishu to provide military cover for the last of UNOSOM’s exiting

contingents. That same day, my Special Representative, the Force Commander and the remaining staff of the force headquarters left Mogadishu by air for relocation to Nairobi. Scattered gunfire and looting, particularly near the airport, accompanied this final stage of UNOSOM's departure. But all of the soldiers and international staff of UNOSOM left Somali soil safely, as did the troops of the combined task force. On 3 March 1995, well ahead of schedule, the withdrawal was completed successfully.

217 The withdrawal of UNOSOM II marked the end of a major phase of the efforts of the international community to facilitate the search for peace and reconciliation and to deliver humanitarian assistance. It also may have triggered among Somali leaders, at least for the moment, an enhanced awareness of their responsibilities in advancing the process of national reconciliation. The political agreements signed between Mr. Ali Mahdi and General Aidid just prior to and after UNOSOM's withdrawal marked the first time since the Nairobi Declaration of March 1994 that the two leaders put their signatures to any peace agreement. As I reported to the Security Council on 28 March 1995, "These indications of a possible *rapprochement* between [Mr. Ali Mahdi and General Aidid] may justify the hope that the Somali leaders will find the strength and the courage to pursue a more productive peace process in the coming weeks. While the recent history of Somalia suggests that such signs must be examined with caution, they could develop into an encouraging trend."¹¹⁵ Subsequent developments, however, served to further dampen such hopes.

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218 Approximately 50 international staff of United Nations agencies and NGOs remained in Somalia following the troop withdrawal, and a United Nations Coordination Team was created by the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs to maintain support to humanitarian programmes. I instructed my Special Representative to remain in Nairobi to monitor the situation. It was my intention to re-establish a United Nations political presence in Mogadishu as soon as practicable. On 6 April, the Security Council supported this step and called on the Somali parties to "pursue national reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction in the interest of peace, security and development".¹¹⁶ The Council also called on the Somali parties to clearly express their willingness to cooperate with the United Nations, regional organizations such as the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the Governments of neighbouring countries in the latter's efforts to provide humanitarian assistance and to promote the reconciliation process.¹¹⁷

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IX Rebuilding amid insecurity

219 Despite the difficult circumstances and uncertain prospects facing Somalia in the immediate aftermath of the departure of the UNOSOM II forces, it was evident that the operation had not been in vain. UNOSOM II had not succeeded in fully meeting its mandate, but as a result of the international assistance that it made possible, the worst aspects of the humanitarian tragedy confronting the country were overcome and the scale of fighting and insecurity were significantly reduced. Many thousands of Somali lives were saved. These achievements contrasted with the lack of tangible progress in national political reconciliation. Faced with continued inter-clan conflict and the absence of central authority, the United Nations, along with its international partners, sought ways to maintain their assistance to the Somali people and to pursue initiatives for Somalia's rehabilitation and recovery. United Nations agencies and organizations worked, in a flexible manner, with whatever community and regional authorities were functioning and remained alert to any opportunities to continue supporting the political reconciliation process. The termination of the UNOSOM II mission did not in any way mean that the United Nations intended to abandon Somalia.

Continuing political insecurity

220 By the time the last of the UNOSOM II forces had departed in March 1995, the acute phase of the emergency in Somalia had been overcome. Owing largely to the international relief effort, the health and nutritional status of the population had improved significantly, contrasting with the situation at the peak of the crisis in 1992, when some 3,000 Somalis were dying from starvation every day. But the country was still a long way from being self-sufficient in meeting the basic needs of its population, which remained vulnerable to any return of drought conditions. In addition, the political instability and climate of insecurity that continued to characterize Somalia provided a prime breeding ground for new emergencies. This situation underlined the continued centrality of peace and national reconciliation to ensure that humanitarian gains were not reversed and to enable Somalia's full recovery.

221 A return to widespread anarchy and disorder following the departure of UNOSOM II did not materialize to the extent that had been feared. The security situation in most parts of the country remained

sufficiently stable to allow the continuation of relief and rehabilitation activities. International agency personnel were able to return to most areas of the country within weeks of the final departure of the United Nations troops, and as of November 1995, United Nations assistance programmes were being carried out in 15 of the country's 18 regions.¹¹⁸ However, instances of inter-clan conflict, violence and banditry continued to occur regularly in some areas, endangering the safety of civilians and humanitarian relief personnel and leading to disruptions and sometimes temporary suspensions of relief and recovery efforts. In Mogadishu, the political and security situation since the UNOSOM II withdrawal had not stabilized sufficiently to allow the return of United Nations international staff on a permanent basis.

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222 To monitor ongoing political developments in Somalia and, if they so desired, to assist the Somali parties in achieving national reconciliation, following UNOSOM II's withdrawal, I established a small political mission, to which the Security Council had agreed in April.¹¹⁹ Although a wide range of Somali leaders representing the main factions, including a wing of the USC/SNA, had called for such a United Nations presence in Somalia, General Aidid's faction expressed an objection to the new mission. In view of those divisions among the Somali parties, I concluded that for the time being the political office would monitor the situation from Nairobi, with the intention of relocating it to Mogadishu when adequate security and other necessary conditions existed.

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223 However, the political atmosphere in the capital grew even more tense. On 15 June 1995, General Aidid was named "interim president" by his supporters, a claim that was disputed by rival factions and that contributed to renewed fighting. Following his announcement of a unilateral "government", General Aidid made an attempt to claim Somalia's seat at the summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity later that month, but the OAU refused to recognize his "government" and decided to keep Somalia's seat open until a generally accepted government was formed. The OAU urged the Somali leaders to promote dialogue to ensure the formation of a broad-based national authority. In September, the militia forces of General Aidid occupied Baidoa, leading to new population movements, the looting of relief equipment and supplies and the threat of possible food shortages.

224 In many parts of the country, however, some progress was being made towards reducing insecurity. As of November 1995, some 2,000 former combatants per month were being assisted through WFP-supported farm rehabilitation projects and vocational training programmes for acquiring income-earning skills, while UNDP was formulating a project to support the socio-economic reintegration of demobilized militia and other war-affected populations in Somalia. UNESCO, as part of its education-for-peace strategy, staged a play

promoting demobilization and disarmament in 15 district headquarters in four regions, and together with UNHCR implemented a mine awareness programme covering 36 towns and villages in the north-west.

225 Large-scale disarmament and demobilization were hampered, however, by the failure of the Somali factions to achieve national reconciliation or to agree on either modalities or timetables for implementing the disarmament provisions of the Addis Ababa agreements to which they had committed themselves. Comprehensive disarmament, if it was to be achieved at all, was thus expected to take considerable time, given the vast arsenal of weapons in the country and the large number of militias and irregular armed groups to which they belonged. In addition, it was unclear what kind of monitoring mechanism for the stockpiling and destruction of weapons could be devised that would enjoy the confidence of the parties concerned.

A community-based focus

226 The chronic crisis of governance in Somalia prompted United Nations agencies and organizations, such as the Life and Peace Institute, to develop appropriate strategies for the post-UNOSOM period to maintain effective operations and ensure that their relief and rehabilitation activities had the most positive impact and reached the intended beneficiaries. They focused on community-based efforts, adopting a low-profile regional approach and maintaining operational centres in those areas where security of personnel could be guaranteed. United Nations agencies took a flexible approach in their relationships with the variety of local authorities and the growing number of regional administrations that were being established in various areas of Somalia.

227 Already under UNOSOM II, development committees had been set up in the various regions to assume responsibility for deciding on rehabilitation and development priorities and for mobilizing local counterpart resources in support of donor-assisted projects.¹²⁰ This flowed from the understanding that Somali control of the rehabilitation and reconstruction process was essential and, as such, a prerequisite for donor assistance. The strategy also dovetailed with the “bottom-up” approach to the rebuilding of political institutions, implemented by the Life and Peace Institute, in which district and regional councils were empowered to take control of social and economic programmes and of local security.

228 To further pursue this strategy in the post-UNOSOM era, a United Nations Coordination Team was established prior to the UNOSOM II withdrawal. Composed of senior representatives of United Nations agencies and organizations operating in Somalia and chaired

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by the UNDP Resident Representative, who is also the Humanitarian Coordinator, the Coordination Team has continued after the withdrawal to provide a weekly forum for information exchange and decision-making on the programmes of the United Nations agencies. It also interacts with the donor consortium for Somalia—the Somali Aid Coordination Body (SACB), which includes NGOs and the main multilateral and bilateral donors—and with recognized district and regional councils in Somalia.

229 Following a review of criteria for continuing their assistance to the country, the donors and other international partners within the framework of the SACB had on 17 February 1995 adopted a Code of Conduct for International Rehabilitation and Development Assistance to Somalia. The Code of Conduct reaffirmed the willingness of donors, United Nations agencies and international NGOs to consider providing rehabilitation and development assistance in areas where a number of conditions were fulfilled, including security for aid agencies and their staff, the mobilization of local resources and support, and the exemption of all aid personnel and aid-related cargo from duties, taxes and other forms of levy. The Code of Conduct also affirmed that responsibility for the effective execution of international assistance for rehabilitation and development should remain with the Somali people and that responsible Somali authorities were therefore expected to assume their proper role in ensuring that conditions existed for the effective implementation of aid activities.

230 Since insecurity in many areas of Somalia remained a hindrance to the pace of recovery, it was understood that there was also a need to continue humanitarian assistance, particularly for vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. At the same time, while recognizing the fragility of the humanitarian situation, United Nations agencies were committed to undertaking efforts to begin the process of rehabilitation and reconstruction even before the achievement of national reconciliation.

From emergency relief to reconstruction

231 Thanks to the easing of drought conditions and to increased agricultural production in 1994, food supply improved in Somalia. The rehabilitation of Mogadishu port, undertaken by UNDP and the WFP in conjunction with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, contributed to the improvement in food supply. In view of this, the WFP continued to shift the focus of its assistance from relief to rehabilitation schemes, reducing the amount of food allocated for relief distribution to approximately 10 per cent of its assistance programme by the end of 1994, a level maintained during 1995 as well. Over 4 million

people in Somalia benefited from this assistance through the implementation of about 10,000 projects, primarily food-for-work schemes. With the departure of UNOSOM II and some international NGOs, the WFP became increasingly reliant on national NGOs, regional administrations and local community structures as its implementing partners.

232 However, with insufficient and scattered rains prior to the *qu* (main) season harvest in August 1995, agricultural output in rain-fed areas was expected to be no more than half the previous year's output. With cereal prices rising above the purchasing power of vulnerable groups, signs of a deteriorating nutritional status began to emerge in the second half of 1995 in some parts of the country, particularly in the Juba valley of southern Somalia and in Mogadishu. Estimated food aid requirements for 1995/96 amounted to 129,500 tons.

233 Although some refugee camps in Kenya were closed as a result of the large number of Somalis repatriated, approximately 140,000 Somali refugees were still registered in camps in Kenya as of November 1995. Another 310,000 Somali refugees were registered in camps in Ethiopia, Djibouti and Eritrea as of November 1995. The UNHCR and its partners continued to implement voluntary repatriation programmes and assist local communities in meeting the needs of the returnees and the communities themselves.

234 The presence of a large number of internally displaced persons, who faced substantial hardships, continued to be a major concern for United Nations agencies and their partners. As of November 1995, the International Organization for Migration had identified 109 camps for internally displaced persons in Mogadishu, suggesting a total displaced population of some 54,000 in the city, out of an estimated 200,000 to 400,000 internally displaced persons country-wide. Unfortunately, all return-to-home programmes for internally displaced persons had been suspended after March 1995 because of financial constraints and, in the case of southern Somalia, owing to insecurity in many potential areas of return.

235 The revitalization of health, sanitation and education services remained high priorities for the United Nations and its partner organizations. UNICEF, WHO and NGOs continued to support health-care facilities, expanding their coverage by November 1995 to include 131 maternity health-care centres, 99 out-patient dispensaries, 470 health posts and 21 hospitals. Between September 1994 and July 1995, UNICEF immunized over 95,000 children against measles, 125,000 against tuberculosis and another 143,000 against four other preventable diseases. By June 1995, concerted action by WHO, UNICEF, the WFP, UNESCO and Médecins sans frontières (Belgium and France) brought under control an outbreak of cholera in Kismayo and Mogadishu. Between September 1994 and September 1995, UNICEF rehabilitated

256 open wells. UNICEF and its partners supported the rehabilitation of 44 schools and distributed 1,865 education kits to a total of 585 primary and Koranic schools throughout the country. UNESCO conducted a total of 87 teacher-training workshops in 12 regions of the country, as well as in Somali refugee camps in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Yemen.

236 United Nations agencies recognized that reviving Somalia's productive sectors and rehabilitating its economic infrastructure were particularly important for the country's long-term reconstruction and development. FAO, in collaboration with NGOs and local authorities, distributed seeds and basic agricultural tools to tens of thousands of destitute farmers and returnees. As of November 1995, about 6,000 farmers were receiving assistance through WFP-supported food-for-work schemes for the rehabilitation of wells, water catchments and irrigation canals. The UNDP-funded Somalia Rural Rehabilitation Programme, with the full participation of community members, began the process of rehabilitating public buildings, schools, community centres, water supplies and health centres. UNDP and the International Labour Organization (ILO) cooperated in formulating a programme to support income-generation and training activities in Baidoa, Bossasso and Kismayo. UNDP, in collaboration with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), provided management support and other assistance to Somalia's main ports. UNDP and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) continued efforts to re-establish acceptable standards of safe civil aviation in the country.

237 Much more could have been achieved. Insufficient financial resources limited the ability of United Nations agencies to carry through the full range of relief and rehabilitation efforts that Somalia needed. As of 15 November 1995, donor contributions for food aid and programme support costs totalled \$14 million, representing just over half the \$25.6 million in food aid and programme costs requested in the United Nations consolidated inter-agency appeal for the first six months of 1995. Of the \$45.5 million requested for the non-food sector, only \$9.7 million had been contributed by November 1995.

238 Thus alongside the continuing search for national reconciliation, for which the responsibility rested squarely with Somalia's leaders, the mobilization of sufficient international support to ensure Somalia's rehabilitation and recovery remained another major challenge to be overcome. Such support for the presence and targeted programmes of the United Nations system remains a prerequisite if we wish to ensure that the country does not slip back into another period of acute crisis.

X Conclusion

239 When the United Nations resolved to help bring peace and end the widespread human suffering in Somalia, the Organization was well aware that it was setting out into uncharted waters. But despite the lack of precedent and the exceptionally complex situation in Somalia, the depth of the crisis made it imperative that the international community take action in an effort to avert an even worse tragedy.

240 Under the circumstances, the United Nations can take considerable satisfaction in having curbed the rampant violence and saved countless thousands of lives. At the same time, however, it is equally clear that UNOSOM I and its successors did not manage to attain all of the ambitious objectives eventually set out for them by the Security Council, particularly the goal of achieving political reconciliation. Moreover, the operation cost the lives of 136 peace-keepers as well as numerous relief workers, and impaired the credibility of the United Nations, both in relation to Somalia and more generally. The euphoric optimism about the role of the United Nations that had developed in capitals worldwide immediately after the end of the cold war gave way to greater realism and, for some of the world's leading powers, a decline in confidence in the Organization's ability to tackle complex peace-keeping missions.

241 However, UNOSOM I and II and the United States-led Unified Task Force, along with the United Nations humanitarian agencies and their NGO partners, can also claim major achievements. The most dramatic was their success in defeating famine. The peak of large-scale human suffering was reached in 1992, and thanks to the concerted mobilization of food and other assistance, the dire projections of even more massive starvation were averted. On top of this accomplishment, United Nations agencies and organizations also registered significant progress in restoring basic services and the commencement of efforts to rebuild Somalia's devastated infrastructure.

242 Much more would have been possible if the Somali leaders and factions had demonstrated a determination to end their armed conflict and forge political reconciliation. Much of the responsibility for the continuing insecurity and hardships experienced by Somalia's people rests with the factions' failure to lay down their arms. This aspect also highlights one of the more crucial lessons of the Somalia operation for the United Nations and its partners: that the success of any international peace effort depends upon the extent of cooperation provided by the leading political forces within the country. This is not to say that

international action should be undertaken only when full cooperation is forthcoming. But the potential difficulties must be well understood and faced squarely, from the outset.

243 Because of the path-breaking nature of United Nations involvement in Somalia and the numerous difficulties encountered there, this experience suggested many specific lessons for future international operations of comparable complexity and scope. They range from broad strategic considerations to ways in which such operations can be more effectively implemented on the ground. I will note only some of the many pertinent lessons derived from the experience of the Somalia operation.

244 An essential element of a successful peace-keeping operation is a clear and practicable mandate. In the case of Somalia, the mandates approved by the Security Council included protecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance, encouraging and assisting in political reconciliation and establishing and maintaining a "secure environment". In some respects these mandates proved to be self-contradictory, imprecise and open to varying interpretations, resulting in disagreements over major issues, for example over whether disarming the factions was necessary to establish a "secure environment".

245 Beyond a clear mandate, success also requires the corresponding means to carry it out. In Somalia, when UNITAF handed over operational responsibility to UNOSOM II, the mandate broadened considerably, but the power to implement it was not provided. If the resources necessary for the implementation of a mandate are not available, the Security Council should revise its objectives accordingly.

246 For peace-keeping operations deployed in a failed State, no issue can be considered purely military or purely humanitarian. Action in one sphere can have direct consequences in the other. It is necessary to enunciate a coherent vision, strategy and plan of action which integrate all the relevant dimensions of the problem, including humanitarian, political and security. Military decisions, for example, must take into account all their potential repercussions. Force, whenever it may become necessary, should be used only as a last resort, should be carried out quickly and decisively and should be thoroughly explained, even beforehand if feasible.

247 To adequately address multidimensional problems, planning for an operation must itself be integrated. It should presuppose nothing. Better information and analysis in advance are needed, and to this end the United Nations should elicit information from Member States, regional organizations, NGOs and academic experts. In the case of Somalia, such consultations did not take place until after the operation was already well under way.

248 Since such an operation requires a fully developed, integrated structure in the field, the central authority of the Special Representative

of the Secretary-General is crucial. The individual filling the post should be not only an experienced and politically skilled negotiator, but also an effective manager able to run the complex operation as a whole.

249 On the military side, unified and clear channels of command are vital. During UNOSOM II, not all of the national contingents operating in Somalia were under the United Nations command, while some contingents that were ostensibly part of UNOSOM were in fact consulting first with their national capitals. This slowed the operation's ability to respond and undermined its overall capacity. The Governments of troop-contributing countries must be more involved in the broader decision-making process, so that their contingents in the field will be responsive to United Nations authority at all times, regardless of the level of the crisis.

250 Integrated plans and budgetary procedures must be rationalized with each other, so that funding becomes available when it is needed. The security and political aspects of the Somalia operation were funded against assessed contributions, while the humanitarian, rehabilitation and development aspects were funded by United Nations agencies and NGOs with voluntary contributions, which were generally inadequate and arrived late. Since current budgetary procedures basically prevent the use of assessed contributions for humanitarian, rehabilitation and development assistance, Member States may wish to consider reviewing the rules.

251 From the experience of the United Nations in Somalia, the activities of NGOs can go a long way towards helping a peace-keeping operation. Effective coordination with NGOs is therefore vital. At certain points, the interests of some NGOs may be at variance with those of the operation, so senior peace-keeping staff must be able to manage such differences as constructively as possible.

252 The slow deployment of troops and staffing deficiencies, both in numbers and experience, were a severe problem in several components of UNOSOM I and II. Military contingents, which are provided by Governments, need to be deployed, along with the necessary equipment, in a timely manner if carefully constructed operational timetables are to have a chance of success. It is also essential to develop a reliable system to quickly deploy qualified and trained civilian personnel.

253 The role of the media in stimulating international involvement in Somalia and, at a later stage, in spurring withdrawal, was enormous. So that all elements of a United Nations operation are giving out a consistent message, there needs to be a comprehensive, long-term information strategy, integrated within the overall operational planning and coordination. An early and comprehensive strategy is also required at the local level, to ensure effective communication with the people about the purpose and goals of United Nations involvement. In major operations

in countries with widespread illiteracy and an emphasis on oral tradition, radio is often the most effective medium; unfortunately in Somalia, UNOSOM did not have its own radio station.

254 Much can be learned from both the successes and the shortcomings of the United Nations efforts to achieve peace and end the humanitarian crisis in Somalia. Future operations certainly can be designed and implemented to greater effect. Ultimately, however, there are limits to what can be achieved by the international community. It is the people and leaders of any given country who must find it in themselves to compromise on their demands, set aside some of their sectional interests and take the necessary steps towards peace. The Security Council concurred in this assessment. "The people of Somalia", it said on 6 April 1995, "bear the ultimate responsibility for achieving national reconciliation and restoring peace to Somalia".¹²¹

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255 It is regrettable that as we enter 1996, the situation in Somalia is again showing signs of deteriorating. With the Security Council and the international community continuing to monitor events in Somalia while simultaneously addressing ongoing or fresh crises elsewhere, the following conclusions drawn from the experience of the United Nations in Somalia seem especially relevant.

256 At the present time, the international community does not seem to have the will or the resources to intervene effectively in support of a failed State. Moreover, the international community will not continue its efforts to resolve an international dispute when it becomes evident that the political will for a solution is lacking among the protagonists. A State that loses its Government—a failed State—loses its place as a member of the international community. This does not mean, however, that the United Nations will not continue to offer assistance, within the means at its disposal, to the people of that failed State.

257 The Charter of the United Nations provides for the admission to the international community of a country which gains the attributes of a sovereign State, for instance, through independence or decolonization. It does not, however, provide for any mechanisms through which the international community can respond when a sovereign State loses one of the attributes of statehood, such as its Government. Further reflection by the international community is required on this issue.

258 The situation in Somalia will continue to deteriorate until the political will exists among the parties to reach a peaceful solution to their dispute, or until the international community gives itself new instruments to address the phenomenon of a failed State.

BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI

Section Two
**Chronology
and Documents**



I Chronology of events

1 July 1960

The independent Somali Republic (Somalia) is established, uniting the Italian-administered Trusteeship Territory of Somalia with the former Protectorate of British Somaliland.

15 October 1969

Somali President Abdirashid Sharma'arke is assassinated.

21 October 1969

The armed forces seize power in a coup; General Mohamed Siad Barre becomes Head of State and President of the Supreme Revolutionary Council.

1977-1978

War between Somalia and Ethiopia over the Somali-inhabited Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia; Somalia's defeat leads to a large influx of refugees from the Ogaden.

April 1978

An unsuccessful coup leads to the formation of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) in north-east Somalia.

January 1981

The Somali National Movement (SNM) is founded in the north-west.

April 1988

Ethiopia and Somalia sign a peace agreement.

1988

In the north-west, rebelling SNM forces occupy Hargeisa; the city is destroyed in subsequent bombardments by Government forces and 500,000 people are displaced in the north-west.

12 January 1989

The opposition United Somali Congress (USC) is founded.

May 1990

A group of prominent Somalis from different clans issues the Manifesto of Mogadishu, which condemns the Siad Barre regime and demands that it begin a dialogue to bring about political reforms.

December 1990–January 1991

In response to large-scale violence, a state of emergency is declared by President Siad Barre; the United Nations office is closed and United Nations and other international personnel working to provide humanitarian assistance are evacuated from Mogadishu; some relief operations continue, mainly but not only in the north, run by UNICEF, UNHCR, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as CARE and Save the Children.

26 January 1991

President Siad Barre flees Mogadishu, which falls to rival factions of the USC, and takes refuge in the south-western Gedo region near the Kenyan border.

29 January 1991

One faction of the USC proclaims an interim government headed by Mr. Ali Mahdi Mohamed as interim President; this move is challenged by General Mohamed Farah Aidid, Chairman of a rival USC faction.

March-April 1991

Forces loyal to ex-President Siad Barre stage an unsuccessful attempt to advance on the capital.

18 May 1991

At a conference in Burao organized by the SNM, the group declares the independent republic of "Somaliland" in the north-west.

June-July 1991

Two conferences of faction leaders in Djibouti fail to overcome the political crisis.

5 July 1991

At its third congress in Mogadishu, the USC elects General Aidid as its chairman.

August 1991

The United Nations reopens its offices in Mogadishu and in the north-west towns of Berbera and Borama.

September 1991

Ex-President Siad Barre's militia seizes Baidoa; fighting continues in the south until April 1992, resulting in large population displacements, the looting of grain stocks and serious damage to agricultural systems in Somalia's main farming area; this is the main direct cause of the famine which grips Somalia in 1992.

17 November 1991

War breaks out in Mogadishu between the factions of the USC led by General Aidid and Mr. Ali Mahdi, and United Nations personnel are again evacuated from the city. Fighting continues for more than four months, resulting in heavy loss of life and the de facto division of Mogadishu.

19 December 1991

The United Nations General Assembly appeals to all States and relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to continue to extend emergency assistance to Somalia (A/RES/46/176).

20 December 1991

The Permanent Mission of Somalia to the United Nations transmits two letters from the interim Prime Minister bringing the situation in Somalia to the attention of the Security Council and requesting a meeting of the Council.

See Document 2, page 114

24 December 1991

The United Nations authorizes UNICEF to reopen its Mogadishu offices.

27 December 1991

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, informs the Security Council of his intention to begin an initiative to resolve the Somali crisis, as well as of his support for the call by the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) for the prompt consideration by the Council of this question.

1 January 1992

Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali takes office as Secretary-General of the United Nations and decides to send Under-Secretary-General James Jonah to meet Somali leaders in Mogadishu.

5 January 1992

The Council of the League of Arab States expresses its deep concern at the fighting in Somalia and calls for a peaceful settlement to the conflict.

See Document 3, page 115

23 January 1992

The Security Council adopts resolution 733 (1992), in which it urges all parties to cease hostilities and imposes an arms embargo on Somalia.

See Document 4, page 116

12-14 February 1992

Consultations with Somali faction leaders are held at

United Nations Headquarters in New York, during which they agree to an immediate cease-fire.

See Document 6, page 119; Document 8, page 120; and Document 9, page 121

3 March 1992

General Aidid and Mr. Ali Mahdi sign an agreement on a cease-fire in Mogadishu, to be monitored by the United Nations; major fighting ends in the capital, though sporadic incidents continue, including the shelling of a ship carrying World Food Programme (WFP) food aid to Mogadishu on 5 March, and war continues in other parts of Somalia, particularly in the south.

See Document 9, page 121

11 March 1992

The Secretary-General reports to the Security Council that he intends to send a technical team to Somalia to prepare a plan to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu and to look into possible mechanisms to ensure the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance.

See Document 9, page 121

17 March 1992

The Security Council adopts resolution 746 (1992) supporting the Secretary-General's decision to send a technical team to Somalia.

See Document 10, page 134

27-28 March 1992

The technical team, in Mogadishu, obtains the agreement of General Aidid and Mr. Ali Mahdi to a possible deployment of 50 United Nations cease-fire observers in Mogadishu (25 on each side of the divided city) and of adequate security personnel for humanitarian relief operations.

See Document 11, page 135

21 April 1992

The Secretary-General recommends that the Security Council establish the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), to consist of 50 unarmed military observers to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu as well as armed security personnel for the protection of humanitarian assistance. The Secretary-General also informs the Council that a Consolidated Inter-Agency 90-Day Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia has been drawn up by United Nations agencies, the ICRC and NGOs.

See Document 11, page 135

24 April 1992

The Security Council adopts resolution 751 (1992), creating UNOSOM I; the Council also requests the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to reconcile

the factions and urges the international community to support the 90-Day Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia.

See Document 12, page 166

25 April 1992

In a counter-offensive against Mr. Siad Barre's forces, General Aidid's faction captures Baidoa; Mr. Siad Barre's Somali National Front (SNF) retreats southward, crossing into Kenya in May-June.

28 April 1992

The Secretary-General appoints Mr. Mohamed Sahnoun (Algeria) as his Special Representative for Somalia.

May-July 1992

The Secretary-General's Special Representative meets with Somali faction leaders and clan elders, seeking approval for the deployment of UNOSOM personnel and safe passage for relief supplies.

31 May-3 June 1992

The Standing Committee of the Horn of Africa, established by the region's heads of State and Government, convenes the All-Party Meeting on Somalia in Bahir Dar, Ethiopia, to discuss the political and humanitarian situation in Somalia.

See Document 14, page 169

23 June 1992

The Secretary-General reports that both factions in Mogadishu have agreed to the immediate deployment of cease-fire observers.

See Document 15, page 171

25 June 1992

The Secretary-General appoints General Imtiaz Shaheen (Pakistan) as Chief Military Observer of UNOSOM.

5-23 July 1992

UNOSOM cease-fire observers arrive in Mogadishu.

See Document 23, page 183

22 July 1992

The Secretary-General recommends to the Security Council that the United Nations enlarge its efforts in Somalia, establishing four operational zones in Berbera, Bossasso, Kismayo and Mogadishu.

See Document 16, page 172

27 July 1992

As the death toll from famine rises, and because of delays in the faction leaders' agreement to the deployment of ground forces to protect humanitarian operations, the Security Council requests the Secretary-

General to mount an emergency airlift of relief supplies, approves the Secretary-General's proposal to establish four operational zones and supports the Secretary-General's decision to send a new technical team to Somalia.

See Document 17, page 179

6-15 August 1992

A United Nations technical team visits Somalia to obtain the faction leaders' agreement to the proposed deployment of UNOSOM forces in the four operational zones.

See Document 23, page 183

12 August 1992

The Secretary-General informs the Security Council that General Aidid and Mr. Ali Mahdi have approved the deployment of a 500-member United Nations security force to protect humanitarian operations in Mogadishu.

See Document 20, page 182; Document 21, page 182; and Document 23, page 183

24 August 1992

The Secretary-General recommends an increase in the strength of UNOSOM to 3,500 military personnel, for deployment in the four proposed operational zones, once agreement has been reached with local faction leaders. These recommendations are subsequently approved by the Security Council on 28 August 1992 in resolution 775 (1992).

See Document 23, page 183; and Document 24, page 189

1 September 1992

The Secretary-General requests 719 additional personnel for logistical support for UNOSOM; the Security Council approves the request on 8 September.

See Document 25, page 191; and Document 26, page 191

14 September 1992

The deployment of the first 500 peace-keepers, from Pakistan, begins in Mogadishu.

12-13 October 1992

The First Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia is held in Geneva and approves a 100-Day Action Programme for Accelerated Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia.

See Document 29, page 194; and Document 31, page 196

16 October 1992

The Security Council states that the rapid deployment

of UNOSOM is essential and that persons hampering the operation's deployment would be responsible for aggravating an already unprecedented humanitarian disaster.

See Document 30, page 196

28 October 1992

General Aidid declares that United Nations peacekeepers would no longer be tolerated on the streets of Mogadishu, demands the expulsion of UNOSOM's coordinator of humanitarian assistance and rejects the deployment of UNOSOM forces in Kismayo or Berbera.

See Document 32, page 207

October 1992

Ex-President Siad Barre's forces recapture Bardera.

2 November 1992

The Secretary-General appoints Mr. Ismat Kittani (Iraq) as his Special Representative following the October resignation of Mr. Sahnoun.

12 November 1992

General Aidid demands the withdrawal of UNOSOM troops from Mogadishu airport two days after the peace-keepers take up positions there. The Secretary-General's Special Representative refuses. The next day, UNOSOM forces at the airport are attacked.

See Document 32, page 207

Mid-November 1992

Forces loyal to Mr. Ali Mahdi prevent ships from approaching Mogadishu port; on 23 November, Mr. Ali Mahdi agrees to allow a WFP ship to enter to unload food at Mogadishu, but the next day the ship is shelled as it attempts to enter the port.

See Document 32, page 207

24 November 1992

The Secretary-General reports to the Security Council that it has become "exceedingly difficult for the United Nations operation to achieve the objectives approved by the Security Council" and that "it may become necessary to review the basic premises and principles of the United Nations effort in Somalia".

See Document 32, page 207

25 November 1992

The United States of America offers to take the lead in organizing and commanding a military operation to ensure the delivery of relief supplies to Somalia if the Security Council authorizes Member States to take such action.

29 November 1992

In a letter to the President of the Security Council, the Secretary-General reviews the basic premises and principles of UNOSOM and presents for the Security Council's consideration five options for creating conditions for the uninterrupted delivery of relief supplies.

See Document 33, page 209

3 December 1992

The Security Council, favouring the fourth of the Secretary-General's five options, adopts resolution 794 (1992) welcoming the offer by the United States and authorizing "the Secretary-General and Member States to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia".

See Document 35, page 214

3-5 December 1992

The second humanitarian aid coordination meeting in Addis Ababa urges the United Nations to follow up the 100-Day Action Programme with a new programme focusing on rehabilitation as well as relief.

See Document 48, page 236

8 December 1992

In a letter to United States President George Bush, the Secretary-General proposes that a United States-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) bring the heavy weapons of organized factions under international control, disarm the irregular gangs and extend its operations to the whole of Somalia, prior to handing over operational responsibility to a new peace-keeping force under United Nations command.

See Document 43, page 225

9 December 1992

The first units of UNITAF arrive in Somalia; in the following few weeks, UNITAF builds up to a peak of 37,000 troops, securing control of nine key towns in southern and central Somalia; UNITAF units guard ports, airports and food distribution centres and escort food convoys to areas hit by famine.

See Document 40, page 221; and Document 47, page 235

18 December 1992

The General Assembly appeals to all States and relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to continue to extend emergency assistance to Somalia. The Assembly also welcomes the idea, put forth by the Chairman of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, President Abdou Diouf of Senegal, of convening an international peace conference on Somalia under the auspices of the United

Nations and in cooperation with the OAU, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the League of Arab States, the Standing Committee of the States of the Horn of Africa on Somalia and governmental and non-governmental organizations.

See Document 31, page 196; Document 41, page 222; and Document 42, page 224

19 December 1992

The Secretary-General reports to the Security Council on implementation of resolution 794 (1992) and on the transition to a new United Nations–commanded operation in Somalia after the withdrawal of UNITAF; in the report, the Secretary-General restates his view that UNITAF should disarm factions and gangs and extend its operations to the whole of Somalia before handing command back to UNOSOM.

See Document 43, page 225

4-15 January 1993

Fifteen Somali factions, meeting in Addis Ababa, reach agreement to cease hostilities, demobilize their militias, hand over heavy weapons to a cease-fire monitoring group constituted by UNITAF and UNOSOM, and prepare for a conference on national reconciliation.

See Document 48, page 236

26 January 1993

The Secretary-General reports to the Security Council on efforts to promote national reconciliation, the military activities of UNITAF and humanitarian operations.

See Document 48, page 236

3 March 1993

The Secretary-General recommends to the Security Council that, since the effort undertaken by UNITAF to establish a secure environment is incomplete, UNITAF should be followed by a new United Nations operation, UNOSOM II, endowed with enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

See Document 49, page 244

9 March 1993

Admiral Jonathan Howe (United States) succeeds Mr. Kittani as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

11-13 March 1993

The Third Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia, held in Addis Ababa, reviews the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Programme for 1993.

See Document 50, page 258

Mid/end March 1993

In violation of the cease-fire provisions of the January 1993 Addis Ababa Agreement, forces commanded by General Said Hersi “Morgan”, son-in-law of ex-President Siad Barre, capture Kismayo after weeks of fighting with the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) faction led by Colonel Omar Jess, allied with General Aidid.

26 March 1993

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council adopts resolution 814 (1993) establishing UNOSOM II and giving it “responsibility for the consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia” after a prompt, smooth and phased transition from UNITAF. General Çevik Bir (Turkey) is the Force Commander of UNOSOM II.

See Document 52, page 261

27 March 1993

Fifteen Somali faction leaders sign a national reconciliation agreement in Addis Ababa, committing themselves to disarmament under United Nations supervision and a two-year transition to the formation of a new national Government, the latter involving the creation of district and regional councils and a Transitional National Council.

See Document 53, page 264

4 May 1993

UNOSOM II formally assumes responsibility for creating a secure environment in Somalia; the operation gradually reaches its authorized troop strength of 28,000 after several months and is supported by a Quick Reaction Force under the direct command of the United States.

See Document 61, page 279

6-7 May 1993

Forces of the militia faction of Colonel Jess conduct a night attack on Kismayo and are repelled by Belgian forces of UNOSOM II.

May 1993

A conference at Borama, in north-west Somalia, elects a new president of “Somaliland”, Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal.

See Document 61, page 279

5 June 1993

Following searches of USC/SNA weapons storage sites in south Mogadishu, Pakistani troops under UNOSOM II are ambushed, resulting in the death of 24 peacekeepers.

See Document 60, page 272

6 June 1993

The Security Council adopts resolution 837 (1993), authorizing UNOSOM II to take "all necessary measures" against those responsible for the attack on UNOSOM II personnel on 5 June 1993, including their "arrest and detention"; the Council also requests the Secretary-General to "inquire into the incident, with particular emphasis on the role of those factional leaders involved".

See Document 53, page 264

12 June 1993

UNOSOM II begins a systematic effort in south Mogadishu to reduce USC/SNA weapons and command-and-control sites from which attacks were being mounted against United Nations forces; clashes between UNOSOM II and USC/SNA last almost four months, resulting in casualties on both sides and numerous civilian deaths. On 14 and 18 June, the Security Council strongly endorses the actions of UNOSOM II and its efforts to restore law and order.

See Document 57, page 269; Document 58, page 270; Document 60, page 272; and Document 75, page 323

17 June 1993

Admiral Howe issues a warrant for the arrest of General Aidid. A number of people suspected of being involved in armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel are detained during the next few months.

See Document 60, page 272

1 July 1993

The Secretary-General reports to the Security Council on the implementation of resolution 837 (1993).

See Document 60, page 272

6 August 1993

With the assistance of the United Nations, leaders of factions and clans in Jubaland, in southern Somalia, sign a regional peace accord, ending months of fighting around Kismayo.

See Document 61, page 279

12 August 1993

An expert consultant, engaged to carry out an investigation into the 5 June 1993 attack on UNOSOM II personnel in Mogadishu, submits his report.

See Document 62, page 296; and Document 63, page 300

17 August 1993

The Secretary-General reports to the Security Council on UNOSOM II, reviewing the organization of the mission; the consolidation, expansion and maintenance

of a secure environment; the re-establishment of police and judicial institutions; the promotion of political reconciliation and the re-establishment of national and regional institutions; the provision of humanitarian assistance and economic rehabilitation; and public information activities in support of UNOSOM II.

See Document 61, page 279

22 September 1993

The Security Council adopts resolution 865 (1993), reaffirming its support for UNOSOM II's strategy and requesting the Secretary-General to implement his recommendations for the re-establishment of the police and judiciary on an "urgent and accelerated basis".

See Document 65, page 302

1 October 1993

After a demand from local Somali authorities that all United Nations personnel withdraw from north-west Somalia, the Security Council expresses the hope that UNOSOM II will be able in due course to continue its work in the area.

See Document 66, page 304; and Document 67, page 305

3 October 1993

During a raid in south Mogadishu by United States Rangers, acting under the direct command of the United States, 18 Rangers and one Malaysian peace-keeping soldier are killed.

See Document 75, page 323; and Document 88, page 368

7 October 1993

President Clinton announces that the United States will withdraw all its combat forces and the bulk of its logistics units from Somalia by the end of March 1994. Several countries subsequently announce they also will withdraw their contingents within the same timeframe.

See Document 75, page 323

9 October 1993

The USC/SNA declares a unilateral cease-fire with the UNOSOM II forces in Mogadishu.

See Document 75, page 323

29 October 1993

The Security Council adopts resolution 878 (1993), extending UNOSOM II's mandate for an interim period up to 18 November 1993.

See Document 72, page 321; and Document 73, page 321

12 November 1993

As UNOSOM II faces a decline in its troop strength, the Secretary-General presents to the Security Council three options for the renewed mandate for the operation. *See Document 75, page 323*

16 November 1993

The Security Council adopts resolution 885 (1993), authorizing the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry into the armed attacks against UNOSOM II personnel and suspending arrest actions against Somalis detained or wanted in connection with the attacks.

See Document 76, page 336

18 November 1993

The Security Council adopts resolution 886 (1993), renewing UNOSOM II's mandate until 31 May 1994 and promising to undertake a "fundamental review" of the mandate by 1 February 1994.

See Document 77, page 337

23 November 1993

The Secretary-General informs the Security Council of the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry to investigate armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel.

See Document 78, page 338; and Document 79, page 339

29 November–1 December 1993

The Fourth Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia, held in Addis Ababa, adopts a regional strategy linking rehabilitation assistance to the restoration of security.

See Document 80, page 339; and Document 83, page 345

2-11 December 1993

At the invitation of the Ethiopian Government and with the support of UNOSOM II, a meeting of representatives of Somali factions in Addis Ababa explores avenues for reconciliation.

See Document 83, page 345

20-21 December 1993

The General Assembly urges all States and relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to continue to assist the Somali people with rehabilitation and institution-building, and appeals to all the Somali parties concerned to terminate hostilities and respect fully the security and safety of personnel of the United Nations and its specialized agencies and of non-governmental organizations. The Assembly also urges all Somalis to guarantee the protection of all

human rights and fundamental freedoms for all Somalis.

See Document 70, page 307; Document 71, page 309; Document 81, page 343; and Document 82, page 343

6 January 1994

The Secretary-General reports to the Security Council on a number of factors affecting UNOSOM II's deployment and sets out options for revising the operation's mandate.

See Document 83, page 345

17 January 1994

In accordance with Security Council resolution 885 (1993), UNOSOM II releases the last eight prisoners held in connection with the incidents of June-October 1993.

18 January 1994

Lieutenant-General Abu Samah Abu Bakar (Malaysia) takes up his post as the new Force Commander, succeeding Lieutenant-General Çevik Bir.

January 1994

A Hawiye peace conference in Mogadishu is organized by the Imam of Hirab, the principal religious leader of both the Abgal and Habr Gedir sub-clans.

4 February 1994

The Security Council adopts resolution 897 (1994), approving a revised mandate for UNOSOM II based on peace-keeping principles, with an authorized force level of 22,000; the resolution also sets out the objective of completing the implementation of the 27 March 1993 Addis Ababa Agreement by March 1995.

See Document 84, page 353

February 1994

Inter-clan fighting resumes in Kismayo, in violation of the regional peace accord of 6 August 1993.

See Document 85, page 355

24 February 1994

The Commission of Inquiry submits its report on armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel.

See Document 86, page 366; and Document 88, page 368

8 March 1994

Admiral Howe ends his tour of duty as the Secretary-General's Special Representative and is replaced on an interim basis by Ambassador Lansana Kouyaté (Guinea), previously Deputy Special Representative.

See Document 85, page 355

17 March 1994

In an attempt to revive the process of political reconciliation, the United Nations brings together General Aidid and Mr. Ali Mahdi in Nairobi for their first face-to-face talks in almost a year.

See Document 85, page 355

24 March 1994

General Aidid and Mr. Ali Mahdi, acting on behalf of two alliances of factions, sign the Nairobi Declaration, proposing that a national reconciliation conference be convened on 15 May to select a president, vice-presidents and a prime minister.

See Document 85, page 355

Late March 1994

The United States and several other countries complete the withdrawal of their contingents from UNOSOM II, reducing the operation's troop strength from 29,000 in November 1993 to 19,000.

See Document 83, page 345; and Document 85, page 355

April 1994

The USC/SNA of General Aidid seizes Merca and clashes with the Hawadle sub-clan of the Hawiye in Mogadishu and Belet Weyne.

See Document 85, page 355

16 May 1994

Five Nepalese soldiers are killed in cross-fire between rival factions in Mogadishu.

See Document 85, page 355

24 May 1994

The Secretary-General reports to the Security Council that there have been considerable delays in the reconciliation process as well as a deterioration of the security situation. He recommends that the Council extend the mandate of UNOSOM II for six months and reaffirm its objective that UNOSOM II complete its mission by March 1995, as originally specified in resolution 865 (1993).

See Document 85, page 355

31 May 1994

The Security Council adopts resolution 923 (1994), extending UNOSOM II's mandate until 30 September 1994.

See Document 87, page 367

1 July 1994

The Secretary-General appoints Ambassador Victor Gbeho (Ghana) as his Special Representative to Somalia.

18 July 1994

The Secretary-General reports to the Security Council his intention to dispatch a special mission to Somalia to discuss the extent of a possible reduction in the level of troops assigned to UNOSOM II.

See Document 89, page 417

17 August 1994

The Secretary-General recommends a further extension of UNOSOM II's mandate to 31 October, to give the Somali leaders the opportunity to demonstrate that they are ready to cooperate with the United Nations and with each other in order to "bring their country back from the abyss".

See Document 91, page 426

22 August 1994

An attack on UNOSOM II forces near Baidoa kills seven Indian peace-keeping soldiers and wounds nine others. On 25 August, the Security Council strongly condemns the attack and expresses grave concern over the deteriorating security situation and over the fact that the national reconciliation conference, which was scheduled for 15 May 1994, did not take place. The Council invites the Secretary-General to submit a report before 30 September on prospects for national reconciliation and on options for the future of UNOSOM II.

See Document 92, page 430

31 August 1994

Three doctors of the Indian contingent of UNOSOM II are killed in an attack on a field hospital in Baidoa. The Secretary-General condemns the attack and asks the Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations to travel to Somalia to review the operation on the ground and present recommendations to him.

17 September 1994

The Secretary-General reports to the Security Council concerning developments in Somalia in the political, security and humanitarian fields, and informs the Council that his assessment of progress concerning national reconciliation and his recommendations will be submitted in a mid-October report.

See Document 93, page 430

30 September 1994

The Security Council extends the mandate of UNOSOM II until 31 October 1994, prior to which the Council intends to decide on the operation's future. The United States, abstaining in the vote, states that the time has come to bring UNOSOM II to a conclusion.

See Document 94, page 435

14 October 1994

In a report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General states that the process of national reconciliation has not kept pace with achievements in the humanitarian area. The Secretary-General recommends an extension of UNOSOM II's mandate until 31 March 1995, the date previously set for the completion of its mission. He also outlines parameters for the reduction and withdrawal of UNOSOM II and informs the Council that he has instructed his Special Representative to maintain his efforts to help the Somali leaders achieve national reconciliation.

See Document 96, page 442

18 October 1994

In a letter to the President of the Security Council, the Group of Arab States declares that, in spite of the slow pace in achieving national reconciliation in Somalia, the Group strongly feels that the mission of United Nations forces in Somalia should be continued.

See Document 97, page 447

20 October 1994

The Security Council decides to send a mission to Somalia to convey directly to the Somali political parties the views of the Council on the situation in Somalia and on the future of the United Nations presence there.

See Document 98, page 448

24-25 October 1994

A special meeting is convened in Nairobi with the participation of representatives of United Nations organizations, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations active in humanitarian assistance operations and other interested entities to review the future of humanitarian operations in Somalia following the anticipated termination of the mandate of UNOSOM II.

26-27 October 1994

The Security Council mission visits Somalia.

31 October 1994

The Security Council extends the mandate of UNOSOM II for an interim period expiring on 4 November 1994 so that it will have time to consider the report of its mission to Somalia.

See Document 99, page 448

3 November 1994

In its report, the Security Council mission to Somalia concludes that 31 March 1995 is the appropriate date to end the mandate of UNOSOM II. On 4 November 1994, the Security Council extends the mandate of UNOSOM II for a final period until 31 March 1995.

Until then, says the Council, the mission's primary purpose is to facilitate political reconciliation in Somalia. *See Document 100, page 449; and Document 101, page 462*

10 November 1994

In a letter to the President of the Security Council, the Secretary-General draws the Council's attention to a statement by the United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee on Somalia in which the Committee reconfirms its commitment to continue to the maximum extent possible emergency and rehabilitation activities beyond the expiration of the UNOSOM mandate. The Security Council welcomes the statement on 7 December.

See Document 102, page 463; and Document 104, page 466

5 December 1994

Amid concern about continued deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) to monitor the arms embargo on Somalia calls on individuals and national and international organizations to forward information relating to violations of the mandatory arms embargo established against Somalia by the Council in its resolution 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992 (UN Press Release PKO/33-SC/5960-SOM/62).

20 December 1994

The General Assembly urges all States and relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to continue to assist the Somali people with rehabilitation and institution-building, and appeals to all the Somali parties concerned to terminate hostilities, engage in a national reconciliation process and respect the security and safety of personnel of the United Nations and its specialized agencies and of NGOs.

See Document 95, page 436; and Document 106, page 467

22 December 1994

The United Nations issues an international appeal for \$70.3 million in emergency relief and short-term rehabilitation activities in Somalia for the six-month period from 1 January to 30 June 1995.

See Document 107, page 468

2 January 1995

Former President Mohamed Siad Barre dies in exile in Nigeria.

2 March 1995

With the support of a combined task force of contin-

gents from France, India, Italy, Malaysia, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and the United States, UNOSOM II completes a safe and orderly withdrawal from Somalia. The Secretary-General states that the efforts of the international community to facilitate the search for peace and reconciliation and to bring humanitarian assistance will continue.

See Document 109, page 474

28 March 1995

The Secretary-General reports on political developments in Somalia, on the achievements of the United Nations in Somalia and on the withdrawal of UNOSOM II, and presents some thoughts on the role that the United Nations could play in Somalia beyond the conclusion of the operation's mandate on 31 March 1995.

See Document 110, page 475

31 March 1995

The mandate of UNOSOM II ends.

6 April 1995

The Security Council reaffirms its view that the people of Somalia bear the ultimate responsibility for achieving national reconciliation and restoring peace to Somalia.

See Document 111, page 486

18 April 1995

The Secretary-General informs the Security Council of his decision to establish a small political office to monitor the situation in Somalia. The office would operate temporarily from Nairobi but would be relocated to

Mogadishu as soon as circumstances permitted. The Security Council welcomes the Secretary-General's decision on 21 April.

See Document 112, page 487; and Document 113, page 488

31 May 1995

The Secretary-General informs the Security Council of his decision that, given the ongoing opposition of the two principal leaders in Somalia, the political office for Somalia would continue to operate from Nairobi until an improvement in the security situation allows it to be transferred to Mogadishu.

See Document 114, page 488; and Document 115, page 489

15 June 1995

General Aidid's supporters proclaim him "interim president", a claim disputed by rival factions, contributing to renewed fighting.

19 September 1995

The Secretary-General reports on the ongoing efforts of the United Nations and its agencies to provide humanitarian relief to Somalia and to help further the country's economic and social rehabilitation.

See Document 116, page 489

November 1995

United Nations agencies involved in Somalia relief and rehabilitation efforts project that, owing to a poor harvest and disrupted commerce, the needs of the Somalis will be at least as great in 1996 as during the past two years.

II List of reproduced documents

The documents reproduced on pages 113-500 include resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Security Council, statements by the President of the Security Council, reports and letters of the Secretary-General, appeals for humanitarian assistance and communications from United Nations Member States and regional organizations.

1991

Document 1

Letter dated 27 December 1991 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council noting Somalia's request that the situation in Somalia be included in the Security Council's agenda.

Not issued as a United Nations document.

See page 113

1992

Document 2

Letter dated 20 January 1992 from Somalia bringing the situation in Somalia to the attention of the Security Council.

S/23445, 20 January 1992

See page 114

Document 3

Letter dated 21 January 1992 from Morocco transmitting a resolution on Somalia adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States on 5 January 1992.

S/23448, 21 January 1992

See page 115

Document 4

Security Council resolution urging an immediate cease-fire in Somalia and imposing an embargo on all arms deliveries to Somalia.

S/RES/733 (1992), 23 January 1992

See page 116

Document 5

Letter dated 31 January 1992 from the Secretary-General to the Organization of African Unity, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the League of Arab States inviting them to participate in consultations on Somalia in New York.

Not issued as a United Nations document.

See page 117

Document 6

Joint communiqué dated 12 February 1992 by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and senior officials of the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of the Islamic Conference on the implementation of Security Council resolution 733 (1992).

UN Press Release IHA/431, 12 February 1992

See page 119

Document 7

Letter dated 13 February 1992 from the Secretary-General to Mr. Tony P. Hall, Chairman of the Select Committee on Hunger, United States House of Representatives, concerning the provision of emergency relief to Somalia.

Not issued as a United Nations document.

See page 120

Document 8

Joint communiqué dated 14 February 1992 issued at the conclusion of discussions between United Nations officials and representatives of the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of the Islamic Conference with representatives of the Somali factions in conflict in Mogadishu.

UN Press Release IHA/434, 14 February 1992

See page 120

Document 9

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia, proposing to dispatch a technical team to prepare an operational plan for the monitoring of the cease-fire in Mogadishu and to explore ways of ensuring the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance.

S/23693, 11 March 1992

See page 121

Document 10

Security Council resolution supporting the Secretary-General's decision to send a technical team to Somalia.

S/RES/746 (1992), 17 March 1992

See page 134

Document 11

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia, recommending the establishment of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM); first addendum (Add.1) includes Consolidated Inter-agency 90-Day Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia.

S/23829, 21 April 1992, and addenda: S/23829/Add.1, 21 April 1992, and S/23829/Add.2, 24 April 1992
See page 135

Document 12

Security Council resolution establishing UNOSOM, requesting the immediate deployment of cease-fire observers, agreeing to the deployment of a security force for humanitarian operations as soon as possible and calling on the international community to support the 90-Day Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance. S/RES/751 (1992), 24 April 1992

See page 166

Document 13

Letter dated 5 June 1992 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council reporting on the Special Representative's consultations in Somalia and on the looting of relief supplies.

Not issued as a United Nations document.

See page 168

Document 14

Letter dated 18 June 1992 from Ethiopia transmitting the Bahir Dar Declaration and Agreement on the Humanitarian Aspect of the Problem in Somalia adopted at the All-Party Meeting on Somalia convened by the Standing Committee of the Horn of Africa, 31 May – 3 June 1992.

S/24184, 25 June 1992

See page 169

Document 15

Letter dated 23 June 1992 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council informing the Council that the principal factions in Mogadishu have agreed to the immediate deployment of United Nations cease-fire observers.

S/24179, 25 June 1992

See page 171

Document 16

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia, proposing the expansion of UNOSOM and the creation of four operational zones.

S/24343, 22 July 1992

See page 172

Document 17

Security Council resolution approving the establishment of four operational zones.

S/RES/767 (1992), 27 July 1992

See page 179

Document 18

Letter dated 6 August 1992 from the Secretary-General to United States Senator Nancy Kassebaum discussing the response of the United Nations to the situation in Somalia. Not issued as a United Nations document.

See page 181

Document 19

Letter dated 7 August 1992 from the Secretary-General to United States Senator Paul Simon concerning the situation in Somalia.

Not issued as a United Nations document.

See page 181

Document 20

Letter dated 12 August 1992 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council informing the Council that the principal factions in Mogadishu have accepted the immediate deployment of a 500-member security force as part of UNOSOM and proposing that the force be composed of a contingent from Pakistan.

S/24451, 12 August 1992

See page 182

Document 21

Letter dated 14 August 1992 from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General informing the Secretary-General of the Council's agreement with the proposed composition of the security force to be sent to Mogadishu.

S/24452, 14 August 1992

See page 182

Document 22

Letter dated 17 August from the Secretary-General to United States Representative Bill Emerson concerning the situation in Somalia.

Not issued as a United Nations document.

See page 183

Document 23

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia, proposing the deployment of four additional security units, each with 750 troops, in Bossasso, Berbera, Kismayo and the south-west.

S/24480, 24 August 1992, and addendum, S/24480/Add.1, 28 August 1992

See page 183

Document 24

Security Council resolution approving the establishment of the four zone headquarters and the increase in UNOSOM's strength proposed by the Secretary-General. S/RES/775 (1992), 28 August 1992

See page 189

Document 25

Letter dated 1 September 1992 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council proposing the deployment of three logistic units.

S/24531, 8 September 1992

See page 191

Document 26

Letter dated 8 September 1992 from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General informing the Secretary-General of the Council's agreement with the proposed deployment of logistic units.

S/24532, 8 September 1992

See page 191

Document 27

Letter dated 16 September 1992 from the Secretary-General to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ireland, Mr. David Andrews, T.D., concerning the United Nations effort on behalf of Somalia and commending the role of Irish relief agencies.

Not issued as a United Nations document.

See page 192

Document 28

Letter dated 5 October 1992 from the Secretary-General to the Director-General of Save the Children (London) concerning the need for closer collaboration between the United Nations and non-governmental organizations in Somalia.

Not issued as a United Nations document.

See page 193

Document 29

100-Day Action Programme for Accelerated Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia (excerpt), 6 October 1992.

Not issued as a United Nations document.

See page 194

Document 30

Statement by the President of the Security Council that persons hampering the deployment of UNOSOM would be responsible for aggravating an already unprecedented humanitarian disaster.

S/24674, 16 October 1992

See page 196

Document 31

Report of the Secretary-General on emergency assistance for humanitarian relief and the economic and social rehabilitation of Somalia.

A/47/553, 22 October 1992

See page 196

Document 32

Letter dated 24 November 1992 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council informing the Council of a series of disturbing developments in Somalia and stating that it might become necessary to review the basic premises and principles of the United Nations effort in Somalia.

S/24859, 27 November 1992

See page 207

Document 33

Letter dated 29 November 1992 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council presenting five options for the Security Council's consideration.

S/24868, 30 November 1992

See page 209

Document 34

Letter dated 30 November 1992 from the Secretary-General to the Organization of African Unity, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the League of Arab States reporting the five options presented to the Security Council in document S/24868 (document 33).

Not issued as a United Nations document.

See page 213

Document 35

Security Council resolution authorizing the Secretary-General and Member States, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.

S/RES/794 (1992), 3 December 1992

See page 214

Document 36

Letter dated 8 December 1992 from the Secretary-General to President Bush of the United States discussing the establishment of a secure environment in Somalia and the need for continuous consultations.

Not issued as a United Nations document.

See page 216

Document 37

Statement made by the Secretary-General to the people of Somalia on United Nations action on security, humanitarian relief and political reconciliation in Somalia.

UN Press Release SG/SM/4874, 8 December 1992

See page 218

Document 38

Letter dated 9 December 1992 from the Secretary-General to the Organization of African Unity, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the League of Arab States and the Standing Committee of the Countries of the Horn of Africa inviting them to participate in an informal preparatory meeting on national reconciliation in Somalia.

Not issued as a United Nations document.

See page 218

Document 39

Letter dated 11 December 1992 from the Secretary-General to eleven Somali political factions inviting them to participate in an informal preparatory meeting on national reconciliation: Mr. Mohamed Farah Abdullahi, Chairman, Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA); Mr. Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, Chairman, United Somali Congress (USC); Mr. Abdurahman Dualeh Ali, Chairman, United Somali Front (USF); General Mohamed Farah Aidid, Chairman, Somali National Alliance (SNA); Mr. Haji Mahmoud Barbar, Chairman, Somali Democratic Movement (SDM); Mr. Mahmud Khalif-Shire, Deputy Chairman, Somali National Front (SNF); Mr. Haji Aden Hussein Mohamed, Acting Chairman, Somali Agricultural Muki Organization (SAMO); General Mohamed Abshir Musse, Chairman, Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF); General Aden Abdillahi Noor, Chairman, Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM); Mr. Ibrahim Meigag Samatar, Chairman, Somali National Movement (SNM); Mr. Abdi Dahir Warsame, Chairman, United Somali Party (USP).

Not issued as a United Nations document.

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Document 40

Letter dated 17 December 1992 from the United States to the President of the Security Council transmitting a report on the activities of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF).

S/24976, 17 December 1992

See page 221

Document 41

General Assembly resolution on emergency assistance for humanitarian relief and the economic and social rehabilitation of Somalia.

A/RES/47/160, 18 December 1992

See page 222

Document 42

General Assembly resolution on the convening of an international conference on Somalia.

A/RES/47/167, 18 December 1992

See page 224

Document 43

Report of the Secretary-General submitted in pursuance of paragraphs 18 and 19 of Security Council resolution 794 (1992), proposing that UNITAF extend its operations to the whole of Somalia and disarm the factions before handing over operational responsibility to a new United Nations peace-keeping operation.

S/24992, 19 December 1992

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Document 44

Letter dated 23 December 1992 from the Secretary-General to a number of States appealing for their support in the international effort to overcome the humanitarian tragedy in Somalia.

Not issued as a United Nations document.

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1993**Document 45**

Statement by the Secretary-General on 4 January 1993 at a preparatory meeting on national reconciliation in Addis Ababa urging all Somali parties to pursue reconciliation.

UN Press Release SG/SM/4893, 4 January 1993

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Document 46

Letter dated 18 January 1993 from the Secretary-General to the President of Ireland, Mrs. Mary Robinson, concerning efforts to achieve a political settlement in Somalia.

Not issued as a United Nations document.

See page 234

Document 47

Letter dated 19 January 1993 from the United States to the President of the Security Council transmitting a report on the progress made by UNITAF.

S/25126, 19 January 1993

See page 235

Document 48

Progress report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia, including annexes containing the texts of the agreements reached by the Somali factions at a meeting in Addis Ababa from 4 to 15 January 1993.

S/25168, 26 January 1993

See page 236

Document 49

Further report of the Secretary-General submitted in pursuance of paragraphs 18 and 19 of resolution 794 (1992), proposing that the mandate of UNOSOM II cover the whole country and include enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the Charter.

S/25354, 3 March 1993, and addenda: S/25354/Add.1, 11 March 1993, and S/25354/Add.2, 22 March 1993

See page 244

Document 50

United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Programme for Somalia, 1 March – 31 December 1993, issued on 11 March 1993 (excerpt).

Not issued as a United Nations document.

See page 258

Document 51

Letter dated 11 March 1993 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia, Mr. Meles Zenawi, on the upcoming National Reconciliation Conference and on the appointment of a new Special Representative for Somalia.

Not issued as a United Nations document.

See page 260

Document 52

Security Council resolution on the size and mandate of UNOSOM II, giving UNOSOM II responsibility under Chapter VII of the Charter for the consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia, after a transition from UNITAF.

S/RES/814 (1993), 26 March 1993

See page 261

Document 53

Addis Ababa Agreement concluded at the first session of the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia, 27 March 1993.

Not issued as a United Nations document.

See page 264

Document 54

Letter dated 29 March 1993 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Transitional Government of Ethio-

pia, Mr. Meles Zenawi, expressing appreciation for his role in the National Reconciliation Conference.

Not issued as a United Nations document.

See page 267

Document 55

Security Council resolution authorizing all necessary measures against those responsible for the 5 June 1993 attack on Pakistani troops serving in UNOSOM II.

S/RES/837 (1993), 6 June 1993

See page 267

Document 56

Statement made by the Secretary-General on 12 June 1993 in Vienna on the actions taken by UNOSOM II to restore peace in Mogadishu.

UN Press Release SG/SM/5009, 12 June 1993

See page 268

Document 57

Statement by the President of the Security Council endorsing the actions of UNOSOM II.

UN Press Release SC/5647-SOM/24, 14 June 1993

See page 269

Document 58

Statement by the President of the Security Council in support of actions to restore law and order in Somalia.

UN Press Release SC/5650-SOM/28, 18 June 1993

See page 270

Document 59

Letter dated 22 June 1993 from the Secretary-General to the Presidents of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Kenya explaining UNOSOM II's response to the attack of 5 June in Mogadishu.

Not issued as a United Nations document.

See page 270

Document 60

Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 837 (1993).

S/26022, 1 July 1993

See page 272

Document 61

Further report of the Secretary-General submitted in pursuance of paragraph 18 of resolution 814 (1993), with annex on the re-establishment of police, judicial and penal systems.

S/26317, 17 August 1993

See page 279

Document 62

Executive summary of the report prepared by Professor Tom Farer of American University, Washington, D.C., on the 5 June 1993 attack on United Nations forces in Somalia.
S/26351, 24 August 1993
See page 296

Document 63

Letter dated 27 August from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General concerning the Council's intention to study the recommendations in Professor Farer's report (document 62) on the re-establishment of Somali police forces.
S/26375, 29 August 1993
See page 300

Document 64

Statement made by the Secretary-General on 8 September 1993 to the informal contact group on Somalia stressing progress made in national reconciliation, reconstruction and rehabilitation in Somalia.
UN Press Release SG/SM/5079, 9 September 1993
See page 301

Document 65

Security Council resolution affirming the importance the Council attaches to the successful fulfilment of UNOSOM II's objectives and approving the Secretary-General's recommendations relating to the re-establishment of the Somali police, judicial and penal systems.
S/RES/865 (1993), 22 September 1993
See page 302

Document 66

Letter dated 1 October 1993 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council concerning UNOSOM II's presence in north-west Somalia.
S/26526, 1 October 1993
See page 304

Document 67

Letter dated 1 October from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General concerning UNOSOM II's presence in north-west Somalia.
S/26527, 1 October 1993
See page 305

Document 68

Statement issued by the Spokesman for the Secretary-General on 7 October 1993 concerning the statement made by President Clinton of the United States on the situation in Somalia.
UN Press Release SG/SM/5126, 7 October 1993
See page 305

Document 69

Joint statement dated 14 October 1993 of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference on their meeting on Somalia, held in Cairo.
UN Press Release SG/T/1818-SOM/44, 14 October 1993
See page 306

Document 70

Report by Mr. Fanuel Jarirentundu Kozonquizi, the Independent Expert of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, on conditions in Somalia.
A/48/510, 26 October 1993
See page 307

Document 71

Report of the Secretary-General on emergency assistance for humanitarian relief and the economic and social rehabilitation of Somalia.
A/48/504, 29 October 1993
See page 309

Document 72

Letter dated 28 October 1993 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council requesting the extension of UNOSOM II's mandate until 18 November 1993.
S/26663, 29 October 1993
See page 321

Document 73

Security Council resolution extending the mandate of UNOSOM II until 18 November 1993 and requesting the Secretary-General to report to the Council on recent developments in Somalia.
S/RES/878 (1993), 29 October 1993
See page 321

Document 74

Exchange of letters between Dr. Elisabeth Mann Borgese (11 September 1993) and the Secretary-General (response of 2 November 1993) concerning the situation in Somalia. Not issued as a United Nations document.
See page 322

Document 75

Further report of the Secretary-General submitted in pursuance of paragraph 19 of resolution 814 (1993) and paragraph 5 of resolution 865 (1993) on the situation in Somalia, including the 3 October 1993 incident in Mogadishu, and presenting three options for the continuation of UNOSOM II.
S/26738, 12 November 1993
See page 323

Document 76

Security Council resolution authorizing the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry to investigate armed attacks on UNOSOM II and requesting the Secretary-General to suspend arrest actions pursuant to resolution 837 (1993). S/RES/885 (1993), 16 November 1993

See page 336

Document 77

Security Council resolution renewing UNOSOM II's mandate until 31 May 1994 and requesting the Secretary-General to submit an updated plan for UNOSOM II's future by 15 January 1994 so that the Council could undertake a fundamental review of the mission's mandate by 1 February 1994.

S/RES/886 (1993), 18 November 1993

See page 337

Document 78

Letter dated 23 November 1993 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council informing the Council of the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry authorized by resolution 885 (1993).

S/26823, 1 December 1993

See page 338

Document 79

Letter dated 30 November 1993 from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General taking note of the composition of the Commission of Inquiry.

S/26824, 1 December 1993

See page 339

Document 80

Declaration of the Fourth Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia, Addis Ababa, 1 December 1993

Not issued as a United Nations document.

See page 339

Document 81

General Assembly resolution on the situation of human rights in Somalia.

A/RES/48/146, 20 December 1993

See page 343

Document 82

General Assembly resolution on assistance for humanitarian relief and the economic and social rehabilitation of Somalia.

A/RES/48/201, 21 December 1993

See page 343

1994**Document 83**

Further report of the Secretary-General submitted in pursuance of resolution 886 (1993), reviewing the options for the future mandate of UNOSOM II.

S/1994/12, 6 January 1994

See page 345

Document 84

Security Council resolution reducing the size of UNOSOM II and giving the mission a revised mandate without enforcement powers.

S/RES/897 (1994), 4 February 1994

See page 353

Document 85

Further report of the Secretary-General on UNOSOM, submitted in pursuance of paragraph 14 of resolution 897 (1994), with annex containing the text of the declaration issued by Somali political leaders in Nairobi on 24 March 1994.

S/1994/614, 24 May 1994

See page 355

Document 86

Letter dated 26 May 1994 from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General concerning the Council's decision to release the report of the Commission of Inquiry established pursuant to resolution 885 (1993).

S/1994/652, 1 June 1994

See page 366

Document 87

Security Council resolution renewing the mandate of UNOSOM II until 30 September 1994 subject to a review by the Council no later than 29 July 1994.

S/RES/923 (1994), 31 May 1994

See page 367

Document 88

Report of the Commission of Inquiry established pursuant to resolution 885 (1993) to investigate armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel.

S/1994/653, 1 June 1994

See page 368

Document 89

Further report of the Secretary-General on UNOSOM II submitted in pursuance of paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 923 (1994).

S/1994/839, 18 July 1994

See page 417

Document 90

Letter dated 28 July 1994 from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General welcoming the decision to dispatch a special mission to Somalia and also the directive that an in-depth assessment of the prospects for reconciliation be prepared.

S/1994/898, 30 July 1994

See page 425

Document 91

Report of the Secretary-General on the prospects for national reconciliation in Somalia and the feasibility of beginning a reduction in the UNOSOM II force.

S/1994/977, 17 August 1994

See page 426

Document 92

Statement by the President of the Security Council concerning an attack on United Nations peace-keepers and the killing of seven Indian soldiers near Baidoa on 22 August 1994.

S/PRST/1994/46, 25 August 1994

See page 430

Document 93

Report of the Secretary-General concerning developments in Somalia in the political, security and humanitarian fields.

S/1994/1068, 17 September 1994

See page 430

Document 94

Security Council resolution extending the mandate of UNOSOM II until 31 October 1994, prior to which the Council would decide on the operation's future mandate.

S/RES/946 (1994), 30 September 1994

See page 435

Document 95

Report of the Secretary-General concerning assistance for humanitarian relief and the economic and social rehabilitation of Somalia.

A/49/456, 30 September 1994

See page 436

Document 96

Report of the Secretary-General concerning national reconciliation, humanitarian activities and parameters for the reduction and withdrawal of UNOSOM II.

S/1994/1166, 14 October 1994

See page 442

Document 97

Letter dated 18 October 1994 from Tunisia, as Chairman of the Group of Arab States, transmitting a letter from the Group concerning the situation in Somalia and the importance of a continued United Nations presence there to prevent the deterioration of security conditions and to facilitate national reconciliation.

S/1994/1204, 22 October 1994

See page 447

Document 98

Note by the President of the Security Council concerning the composition of the Security Council mission to be sent to Somalia.

S/1994/1194, 21 October 1994

See page 448

Document 99

Security Council resolution extending the mandate of UNOSOM II for an interim period expiring on 4 November 1994.

S/RES/953 (1994), 31 October 1994

See page 448

Document 100

Report of the Security Council mission to Somalia (26-27 October 1994).

S/1994/1245, 3 November 1994

See page 449

Document 101

Security Council resolution extending the mandate of UNOSOM II for a final period until 31 March 1995.

S/RES/954 (1994), 4 November 1994

See page 462

Document 102

Letter dated 10 November 1994 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council transmitting the statement of the Inter-agency Standing Committee on Somalia concerning the future of humanitarian assistance in Somalia following the termination of the mandate of UNOSOM II.

S/1994/1392, 7 December 1994

See page 463

Document 103

Letter dated 2 December 1994 from the Secretary-General to the Organization of African Unity, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the League of Arab States concerning the situation facing UNOSOM II and inviting the three organizations to continue their peace efforts in Somalia.

Not issued as a United Nations document.

See page 464

Document 104

Letter dated 7 December 1994 from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General concerning emergency and rehabilitation activities in Somalia beyond the expiry of the mandate of UNOSOM II.

S/1994/1393, 7 December 1994

See page 466

Document 105

Note verbale dated 13 December 1994 from the United Republic of Tanzania referring to Security Council resolution 954 (1994) and expressing the full support and cooperation of the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania in facilitating the withdrawal of the military component of UNOSOM II.

S/1994/1437, 21 December 1994

See page 466

Document 106

General Assembly resolution concerning assistance for humanitarian relief and the economic and social rehabilitation of Somalia.

A/RES/49/21 L, 20 December 1994

See page 467

Document 107

United Nations Consolidated Inter-agency Appeal for Somalia, 1 January – 30 June 1995, issued on 22 December 1994 (excerpt).

Not issued as a United Nations document.

See page 468

1995**Document 108**

Letter dated 14 February 1995 from the Secretary-General to the heads or acting heads of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the International Organization for Migration, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations Children's Fund, the United Nations Development Programme, the World Food Programme and the World Health Organization, asking them to continue their programmes in areas of Somalia considered to be safe and to coordinate their efforts with the Special Representative.

Not issued as a United Nations document.

See page 474

Document 109

Statement by the Secretary-General announcing a safe and orderly withdrawal of UNOSOM II.

UN Press Release SG/SM/5571-SOM/66, 2 March 1995

See page 474

Document 110

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia submitted in pursuance of paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 954 (1994).

S/1995/231, 28 March 1995

See page 475

Document 111

Statement by the President of the Security Council calling on the Somali parties to pursue national reconciliation.

S/PRST/1995/15, 6 April 1995

See page 486

Document 112

Letter dated 18 April 1995 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council concerning a continued United Nations political presence in Somalia.

S/1995/322, 21 April 1995

See page 487

Document 113

Letter dated 21 April 1995 from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General concerning a continued United Nations political presence in Somalia.

S/1995/323, 21 April 1995

See page 488

Document 114

Letter dated 31 May 1995 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council concerning the United Nations political office for Somalia.

S/1995/451, 6 June 1995

See page 488

Document 115

Letter dated 2 June 1995 from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General concerning the United Nations political office for Somalia.

S/1995/452, 2 June 1995

See page 489

Document 116

Report of the Secretary-General on assistance for humanitarian relief and the economic and social rehabilitation of Somalia.

A/50/447, 19 September 1995

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The following is a breakdown, by category, of the documents reproduced in this book.

Resolutions of the General Assembly

Documents 41, 42, 81, 82, 106

Resolutions of the Security Council

Documents 4, 10, 12, 17, 24, 35, 52, 55, 65, 73, 76, 77, 84, 87, 94, 99, 101

Statements by the President of the Security Council on behalf of the Council

Documents 30, 57, 58, 92, 111

Letters from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General

Documents 21, 26, 63, 67, 79, 86, 90, 104, 113, 115

Other documents of the Security Council

Documents 98, 100

Statements and other communications from Member States and intergovernmental organizations

Documents 2, 3, 14, 40, 47, 97, 105

Reports and letters of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly and the Security Council

Documents 1, 9, 11, 13, 15, 16, 20, 23, 25, 31, 32, 33, 43, 48, 49, 60, 61, 66, 71, 72, 75, 78, 83, 85, 89, 91, 93, 95, 96, 102, 110, 112, 114, 116

Statements by the Secretary-General

Documents 37, 45, 56, 64, 68, 109

Correspondence of the Secretary-General

Documents 5, 7, 18, 19, 22, 27, 28, 34, 36, 38, 39, 44, 46, 51, 54, 59, 74, 103, 108

Joint statements and communiqués

Documents 6, 8, 69

Other

Documents 29, 50, 53, 62, 70, 80, 88, 107

III Other documents of interest

Readers seeking additional information about the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and the situation in Somalia might wish to consult the following documents, which are available in the Dag Hammarskjöld Library at United Nations Headquarters in New York City, at other libraries in the United Nations system or at libraries around the world which have been designated as depository libraries for United Nations documents.

Emergency assistance to Somalia

Resolutions of the General Assembly
A/RES/43/206, 20 December 1988
A/RES/44/178, 19 December 1989
A/RES/45/229, 21 December 1990

Reports of the Secretary-General
A/44/261, 3 May 1989
A/45/483, 18 September 1990

Emergency assistance for humanitarian relief and the economic and social rehabilitation of Somalia

Resolution of the General Assembly
A/RES/46/176, 19 December 1991
Report of the Secretary-General
A/46/457, 19 September 1991

Humanitarian assistance

(Editor's note: extracts from the following documents are reproduced in this book)

100-Day Action Programme for Accelerated Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia, 6 October 1992 (See Document 29)

United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Programme for Somalia, 1 March – 31 December 1993 (See Document 50)

United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Somalia, 1 January – 30 June 1995 (See Document 107)

Letters from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Somalia to the United Nations

S/23507, 3 February 1992
S/23957, 19 May 1992
S/25014, 24 December 1992
S/26412, 7 September 1993
S/26530, 4 October 1993

Communications from Member States and others

S/23469, 23 January 1992; Statement by the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, 18 December 1991

A/47/440-S/24558, 14 September 1992; Declaration by European Community Foreign Ministers, 12-13 September 1992

A/47/775-S/24942, 10 December 1992; Declaration of the European Community and its member States, 7 December 1992

S/25769, 13 May 1993; Resolution adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States, adopted on 19 April 1993

S/26481, 21 September 1993; Statement by the Government of Eritrea, 17 September 1993

S/26627, 25 October 1993; Letter dated 24 October 1993 from the President of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia to the President of the Security Council

S/26766, 18 November 1993; Letter dated 18 November 1993 from the President of Eritrea to the President of the Security Council

A/49/95-S/1994/309, 18 March 1994; Conclusions of the meetings of the 12 Somali factions held in Cairo from 1 to 7 March 1994

S/1995/330, 25 April 1995; Resolution adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States, 29 March 1995

Financing UNOSOM

Reports of the Secretary-General, of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) and of the Fifth Committee (C.5) of the General Assembly
A/47/607, 2 November 1992
A/47/674, 17 November 1992 (ACABQ)
A/47/734, 27 November 1992 (C.5)
A/47/916, 31 March 1993
A/47/734/Add.1, 13 April 1993 (C.5)
A/47/916/Add.1, 29 June 1993

Reports of the Secretary-General, of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) and of the Fifth Committee (C.5) of the General Assembly (continued)
A/47/984, 27 July 1993 (ACABQ)
A/47/734/Add.2, 9 September 1993 (C.5)
A/C.5/48/40, 9 December 1993
A/48/777, 17 December 1993 (ACABQ)
A/48/820, 23 December 1993 (C.5)
A/48/850, 19 January 1994
A/48/820/Add.1, 4 March 1994 (C.5)
A/48/899, 8 March 1994 (ACABQ)
A/48/820/Add.2, 23 March 1994 (C.5)
A/48/850/Add.1, 15 July 1994
A/49/563, 21 October 1994
A/49/563/Add.1, 15 November 1994
A/49/757, 6 December 1994 (C.5)
A/49/762, 13 December 1994 (ACABQ)
A/49/757/Add.1, 21 December 1994 (C.5)
A/49/843, 2 February 1995

A/49/563/Add.2, 23 March 1995
A/49/563/Add.3, 9 June 1995
A/49/563/Add.4, 17 July 1995
A/49/757/Add.2, 17 July 1995 (C.5)
A/50/741, 9 November 1995

Assessment of Member States' Contributions
ST/ADM/SER.B/393, 22 December 1992 (covering the period from 1 May 1992 to 30 April 1993)

Resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly
A/RES/47/41 A, 1 December 1992
A/RES/47/41 B, 15 April 1993
A/RES/47/41 C, 14 September 1993
A/DEC/48/471 A, 23 December 1993
A/DEC/48/471 B, 9 March 1994
A/RES/48/239, 24 March 1994
A/DEC/49/415 A, 8 December 1994
A/RES/49/229, 23 December 1994
A/DEC/49/415 B, 20 July 1995

IV Texts of documents

The texts of the 116 documents listed on the preceding pages are reproduced below. The appearance of ellipses (. . .) in the text indicates that portions of the document have been omitted. A subject index to the documents begins on page 501.

Document 1

Letter dated 27 December 1991 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council noting Somalia's request that the situation in Somalia be included in the Security Council's agenda

Not issued as a United Nations document

I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 15 December 1991 from the Prime Minister of Somalia, His Excellency Mr. Omer Arteh Ghalib, addressed jointly to the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General in which he stated that he would be most grateful if the situation in Somalia could be included on the agenda of the Security Council, and to advise him as to the most convenient time for him to arrive at United Nations Headquarters in order to discuss the issue with members of the Security Council.

In regard to the request by the Prime Minister of Somalia, I wish to confirm that I have received a letter dated 16 December 1991 from President Abdou Diouf, in his capacity as Chairman of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, in which he draws attention to the resolution on the situation in Somalia adopted by the Sixth Islamic Summit Conference held in Dakar from 9 to 12 December 1991. In operative paragraph 9 of that resolution, the Summit requested its Chairman to undertake appropriate contacts with the Secretary-General of the United Nations with a view to examining the possibility of the United Nations contribution to the re-establishment of peace in Somalia. President Diouf also asked for my views and suggestions regarding ways and means of undertaking a prompt initiative aimed at re-establishing peace in Somalia.

Following these developments, I have asked Under-Secretary-General James O.C. Jonah to maintain contacts with the Government of Senegal as well as with the parties in respect of the OIC resolution, and he will be travelling to Somalia in the immediate future.

Since the commencement of the civil war in Somalia, I have been in contact, through my representatives, with the parties to the conflict. Mr. Jonah, on my behalf, has met twice with the President of Djibouti in regard to the regional initiative by the Government of Djibouti to achieve a peaceful solution. In July 1991, I welcomed the decisions reached at the second round of talks of the Somali groups held in Djibouti which established a framework for a peaceful settlement. Regrettably, the civil strife, which has virtually destroyed the economic and social infrastructure of the country, has continued unabated with severe civilian casualties, including women and children.

As a result of the intensification of the fighting and the deteriorating security situation, United Nations personnel engaged in emergency humanitarian assistance were no longer able to operate in the central and southern parts of the country and were consequently withdrawn. However, such assistance has continued in the north on the clear understanding that it does not imply any form of recognition of the local authorities. In view of the very serious need for the resumption of emergency humanitarian assistance, particularly in the capital, I have authorized some flexibility in the United Nations security procedures in order to permit UN agencies and organizations to return to Somalia to resume their operations as soon as possible.

On 18 December 1991, the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity reiterated his grave concern at the fratricidal fighting in Somalia and appealed to the international community to encourage the parties to seek a peaceful resolution of the conflict. He has since indicated to us his support for the prompt consideration

by the Security Council of this very urgent question in order to facilitate a peaceful settlement.

Taking all the above factors into account, I agree with the view of the Secretary-General of the OAU.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Javier PÉREZ DE CUÉLLAR

Document 2

Letter dated 20 January 1992 from Somalia bringing the situation in Somalia to the attention of the Security Council

S/23445, 20 January 1992

I have the honour to forward a copy of a letter dated 11 January 1992 received from Omer Arteh Qhalib requesting me to present the deteriorating situation of Somalia to the Security Council of the United Nations. I also understand that Mr. Arteh had presented the case to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and to the President of the Security Council in his letter Ref: PR/OF/12/91 dated 15/12/1991 of which a copy is attached.

As you know, Mr. Arteh was appointed as the interim Prime Minister for Somalia within the context of arrangements agreed upon by all the Somali political parties that participated in the Somali National reconciliation conference held in Djibouti in July 1991.

As the civil war situation in Somalia is worsening by the day, I support Mr. Arteh's appeal for the Security Council to convene immediately a meeting to consider the deteriorating human dilemma prevailing in Somalia.

I would be very grateful if this letter and its enclosure be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Fatun Mohamed HASSAN
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex I

Letter dated 11 January 1992 from the Prime Minister of Somalia addressed to the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Somalia to the United Nations

You are hereby authorized to present to the United Nations Security Council the deteriorating situation in Somalia, particularly the fighting in Mogadishu.

I would like to take this opportunity to commend the courageous and effective role played by the Assistant

Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. James Jonah, and his delegation.

I am confident that with the background knowledge of the new Secretary-General, Dr. Boutros-Ghali, and his prior commitment to reconciliation in Somalia, the United Nations Security Council will come up with a programme of effective action to end the fighting and contribute to cementing peace and stability in the country.

On my part, I shall avail myself for any explanation or clarification that I may be required to present when I attend the Security Council meeting.

(Signed) Omer Arteh GHALIB
Prime Minister of Somalia

Annex II

Letter dated 15 December 1991 from the Prime Minister of Somalia addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I understand that the President of the Organization of Islamic Summit Conference, H.E. Mr. Abdou Diouf, has sent a communication to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in connection with the unsettled situation in Somalia.

I shall be most grateful if you could include this item on the agenda and advise me as to the most convenient time for me to arrive at the United Nations Headquarters in order to discuss the issue with members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Omer Arteh GHALIB
Prime Minister of Somalia

Document 3

Letter dated 21 January 1992 from Morocco transmitting a resolution on Somalia adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States on 5 January 1992

S/23448, 21 January 1992

I have the honour to kindly request that the text of the resolution of the Council of the League of Arab States adopted at its extraordinary session convened on 5 January 1992 concerning the situation in the Somali Democratic Republic be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ahmed SNOUSSI

Ambassador

Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Morocco
to the United Nations

Annex

[Original: Arabic]

Resolution adopted on 5 January 1992 by the Council of the League of Arab States at its extraordinary session concerning the situation in the Somali Democratic Republic

Resolution No. 5157 adopted by the Council of the League at its extraordinary session on 5 January 1992 concerning the situation in Somalia

The Council of the League,

Having considered the note of the General Secretariat, as well as note No. 11 dated 2 January 1992 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the explanatory note dated 3 January 1992 from the Arab Republic of Egypt concerning the evolution of the situation in Somalia,

Having considered the serious developments on the Somali political scene resulting from the deterioration of the situation, the internal strife and conflict, and the insecurity and instability that continue to plague the country,

Expressing its deep concern at these developments, which pose an increasing threat to the national unity and territorial integrity of Somalia and are likely, unless they are brought to an end, to cause serious damage to the supreme interests and security of the Arab nation,

Expressing its concern at the tragic plight of the Somali people and deeply regretting the thousands of deaths that occurred during the clashes in the capital, as well as the terrible deterioration of the health, social and security situation, the disintegration of the country's economic infrastructure and the paralysis of the apparatus and institutions of the State,

Reaffirming its determination to preserve the national unity and territorial integrity of Somalia and to work towards that end in order to establish peace and stability, as was stated in its resolution 5097 (eighty-sixth ordinary session) of 12 September 1991,

Having reviewed the ongoing Arab initiatives aimed at creating understanding and national reconciliation in Somalia, and at preserving the unity, security and stability of that country,

Decides:

1. To invite all the protagonists to halt their clashes forthwith in order to pave the way for a peaceful settlement of their disputes on the basis of dialogue and national understanding, the only way to avoid bloodshed among the Somali people and safeguard their supreme interests;

2. To instruct the Secretary-General immediately to undertake negotiations with the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Member States, with a view to establishing a ministerial committee with the task of immediately establishing contact as appropriate with the parties to the conflict in Somalia, in preparation for an emergency meeting to be held within the framework of the League of Arab States in order to decide on the most appropriate way of reaching a settlement that would preserve the unity of the sister nation of Somalia and guarantee security and stability for the Somali people;

3. To provide Somalia with emergency relief, calling on all the Arab countries, so as to enable the Somali people to cope with their tragic plight and avert the spectre of famine that threatens them, and to keep the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States informed;

4. To instruct the Secretary-General to open a special account for Somalia and to take such measures as he may deem necessary to determine and coordinate assistance in kind provided by the Member States, and ensure orderly distribution;

5. To pay tribute to all the regional and international organizations for their efforts in this area, and to urge them to support the efforts of the League of Arab States and coordinate their activities with the League with a view to establishing a lasting cease-fire in Somalia;

6. To thank the Secretary-General for his actions and to request him to continue using his good offices and remain seized of the question, and to leave open the possibility of a resumption of the extraordinary session at any time, if the Secretary-General so requests.

Document 4

Security Council resolution urging an immediate cease-fire in Somalia and imposing an embargo on all arms deliveries to Somalia

S/RES/733(1992), 23 January 1992

The Security Council,

Considering the request by Somalia for the Security Council to consider the situation in Somalia, 1/

Having heard the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia and commending the initiative taken by him in the humanitarian field,

Gravely alarmed at the rapid deterioration of the situation in Somalia and the heavy loss of human life and widespread material damage resulting from the conflict in the country and aware of its consequences on stability and peace in the region,

Concerned that the continuation of this situation constitutes, as stated in the report of the Secretary-General, a threat to international peace and security,

Recalling its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Recalling also the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter,

Expressing its appreciation to the international and regional organizations that have provided assistance to the populations affected by the conflict and deploring that personnel of these organizations have lost their lives in the exercise of their humanitarian tasks,

Taking note of the appeals addressed to the parties by the Chairman of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on 16 December 1991, the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity on 18 December 1991 2/ and the League of Arab States on 5 January 1992, 3/

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia and expresses its concern with the situation prevailing in that country;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General immediately to undertake the necessary actions to increase humanitarian assistance by the United Nations and its specialized agencies to the affected population in all parts of Somalia in liaison with the other international humanitarian organizations and to this end to appoint a coordinator to oversee the effective delivery of this assistance;

3. *Also requests* the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in cooperation with the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, immediately to contact all parties involved in the conflict, to seek their

commitment to the cessation of hostilities in order to permit the humanitarian assistance to be distributed, to promote a cease-fire and compliance therewith, and to assist in the process of a political settlement of the conflict in Somalia;

4. *Strongly urges* all parties to the conflict immediately to cease hostilities and agree to a cease-fire and to promote the process of reconciliation and of political settlement in Somalia;

5. *Decides*, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, that all States shall, for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in Somalia, immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia until the Council decides otherwise;

6. *Calls on* all States to refrain from any action which might contribute to increasing tension and to impeding or delaying a peaceful and negotiated outcome to the conflict in Somalia, which would permit all Somalis to decide upon and to construct their future in peace;

7. *Calls upon* all parties to cooperate with the Secretary-General to this end and to facilitate the delivery by the United Nations, its specialized agencies and other humanitarian organizations of humanitarian assistance to all those in need of it, under the supervision of the coordinator;

8. *Urges* all parties to take all the necessary measures to ensure the safety of personnel sent to provide humanitarian assistance, to assist them in their tasks and to ensure full respect for the rules and principles of international law regarding the protection of civilian populations;

9. *Calls upon* all States and international organizations to contribute to the efforts of humanitarian assistance to the population in Somalia;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council as soon as possible on this matter;

11. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter until a peaceful solution is achieved.

1/ *Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-seventh Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1992*, document S/23445.

2/ *Ibid.*, document S/23469, annex.

3/ *Ibid.*, document S/23448, annex.

Document 5

Letter dated 31 January 1992 from the Secretary-General to the Organization of African Unity, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the League of Arab States inviting them to participate in consultations on Somalia in New York

Not issued as a United Nations document

Letter dated 31 January 1992 from the Secretary-General to Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

As you are aware, the Security Council on 23 January 1992, adopted resolution 733 (1992) on Somalia. The text of the resolution has already been forwarded to the current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity, General Ibrahim Babangida, in light of the interest of the OAU on the matter.

During your recent visit to New York, we had the occasion to exchange preliminary views on how best our two Organizations could cooperate in approaching the broader aspects of the problem in Somalia. At that time, we both agreed that a high priority should be given initially to the call for an immediate cease-fire. I am, therefore, pleased to note that the Security Council in the aforementioned resolution did call on the parties to cease all hostilities and to agree to a cease-fire.

I have already taken the necessary steps to bring the resolution to the attention of the various factions in Somalia, especially Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohammed and the Chairman of United Somali Congress, General Mohammed Farah Aideed. I have already received written confirmation of the acceptance of resolution 733 (1992) from Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohammed.

When the resolution was handed to the First Vice-President to General Aideed, on 25 January, it was agreed that a written response by General Aideed would be forwarded some time this week. I have just today, 31 January 1992, received the official reply of General Aideed to Security Council resolution 733 (1992). In his reply, General Aideed has raised a number of questions regarding the resolution but has not indicated specifically whether or not he has accepted the resolution, particularly as it related to the cease-fire. He has also called on the Security Council to reconsider the matter.

I am sure you will agree that the commitment to a cessation of hostilities is only the first step. The second, crucial, step, that of achieving arrangements for a stable cease-fire, will require, I believe, the cooperation of the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. I should

like, therefore, to consult with you on how best our two Organizations, together with the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, could assist the Somali factions and political groups in attaining these objectives. My present thinking is that it might be useful to have a meeting at United Nations Headquarters to explore the best ways of reaching a cease-fire agreement, as well as to draw up a framework for sustained peace-making in Somalia.

I therefore propose to invite your representative to come to New York during the week of 10 February 1992 for these consultations. I would also propose to invite the principal parties involved in Mogadiscio, i.e. Interim President Ali Mahdi and General Mohammed Farah Aideed, to come to New York for this purpose. When this first phase is completed, we will then determine the modalities for a broader political stability with the participation of all other parties in Somalia.

In the meantime, I wish to inform you that the United Nations and other international humanitarian organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and non-governmental organizations are consulting on appropriate ways and means to give effect to paragraph 2 of resolution 733 (1992) concerning arrangements for increasing humanitarian assistance to the people of Somalia.

I am confident that our cooperation in dealing with the crisis in Somalia will demonstrate further the usefulness of the coordination and cooperation between our organizations.

I look forward to receiving your reaction as soon as possible.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Letter dated 31 January 1992 from the Secretary-General to Dr. Hamid Algabid, Secretary-General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference

Dear Secretary-General,

As you are aware, the Security Council on 23 January 1992 adopted resolution 733 (1992) on Somalia. The text of the resolution has already been forwarded to the current Chairman of the Organization of the Islamic

Conference, President Abdou Diouf, in light of the interest of OIC on the matter. As you will note, in preambular paragraph 8, the Security Council has already taken note of the resolution of OIC with respect to the situation in Somalia.

It would seem to me that preliminary talks should take place on how our two Organizations could best cooperate in approaching the broader aspects of the problem of Somalia. In this regard high priority would need to be given, initially, to the call of the Security Council to the parties to cease all hostilities and to agree to a ceasefire.

I have already taken the necessary steps to bring the resolution to the attention of the various factions in Somalia, especially Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohammed and the Chairman of United Somali Congress, General Mohammed Farah Aideed. I have already received written confirmation of the acceptance of resolution 733 (1992) from Interim-President Ali Mahdi Mohammed.

When the resolution was handed to the First Vice-President to General Aideed, on 25 January, it was agreed that a written response by General Aideed would be forwarded some time this week. I have just today, 31 January 1992, received the official reply of General Aideed to Security Council resolution 733 (1992). In his reply, General Aideed has raised a number of questions regarding the resolution but has not indicated specifically whether or not he has accepted the resolution, particularly as it related to the cease-fire. He has also called on the Security Council to reconsider the matter.

I am sure you will agree that the commitment to a cessation of hostilities is only the first step. The second, crucial, step, that of achieving arrangements for a stable cease-fire, will require, I believe, joint efforts on the part of all interested organizations. I should like, therefore, to consult with you on how best we can jointly assist the Somali factions and political groups in attaining these objectives. My present thinking is that it might be useful to have a meeting at United Nations Headquarters to explore the best ways of reaching a ceasefire agreement, as well as to draw up a framework for sustained peace-making in Somalia.

I therefore propose to invite your representative to come to New York during the week of 10 February 1992 for consultations on this matter together with representatives of the Organization of African Unity and the League of Arab States. I would also propose to invite the principal parties involved in Mogadiscio, i.e. Interim President Ali Mahdi and General Mohammed Farah Aideed, to come to New York for this purpose. When this first phase is completed, we will then determine the modalities for a broader political stability with the participation of all other parties in Somalia.

In the meantime, I wish to inform you that the United Nations and other international humanitarian organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and non-governmental organizations are consulting on appropriate ways and means to give effect to paragraph 2 of resolution 733 (1992) concerning arrangements for increasing humanitarian assistance to the people of Somalia.

I am confident that our cooperation in dealing with the crisis in Somalia will demonstrate further the usefulness of the coordination and cooperation between our organizations.

I look forward to receiving your reaction as soon as possible.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Letter dated 31 January 1992 from the Secretary-General to Mr. Ahmed Esmat Abdel-Meguid, Secretary-General of the Organization of the League of Arab States

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

As you are aware, the Security Council on 23 January 1992 adopted resolution 733 (1992) on Somalia. As you will note, in preambular paragraph 8, the Security Council has already taken note of the decision of the League of Arab States with respect to the situation in Somalia, as contained in United Nations document S/23448.

It would seem to me that preliminary talks should take place on how our two Organizations could best cooperate in approaching the broader aspects of the problem of Somalia. In this regard high priority would need to be given, initially, to the call of the Security Council to the parties to cease all hostilities and to agree to a ceasefire.

I have already taken the necessary steps to bring the resolution to the attention of the various factions in Somalia, especially Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohammed and the Chairman of United Somali Congress, General Mohammed Farah Aideed. I have already received written confirmation of the acceptance of resolution 733 (1992) from Interim-President Ali Mahdi Mohammed.

When the resolution was handed to the First Vice-President to General Aideed, on 25 January, it was agreed that a written response by General Aideed would be forwarded some time this week. I have just today, 31 January 1992, received the official reply of General Aideed to Security Council resolution 733 (1992). In his reply, General Aideed has raised a number of questions regarding the resolution but has not indicated specifically whether or not he has accepted the resolution, particularly as it related to the cease-fire. He has also called on the Security Council to reconsider the matter.

I am sure you will agree that the commitment to a cessation of hostilities is only the first step. The second, crucial, step, that of achieving arrangements for a stable cease-fire, will require, I believe, the cooperation of the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. I should like, therefore, to consult with you on how best our two Organizations, together with the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, could assist the Somali factions and political groups in attaining these objectives. My present thinking is that it might be useful to have a meeting at United Nations Headquarters to explore the best ways of reaching a ceasefire agreement, as well as to draw up a framework for sustained peace-making in Somalia.

I therefore propose to invite your representative to come to New York during the week of 10 February 1992 for these consultations. I would also propose to invite the principal parties involved in Mogadiscio, i.e. Interim President Ali Mahdi and General Mohammed Farah

Aideed, to come to New York for this purpose. When this first phase is completed, we will then determine the modalities for a broader political stability with the participation of all other parties in Somalia.

In the meantime, I wish to inform you that the United Nations and other international humanitarian organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and non-governmental organizations are consulting on appropriate ways and means to give effect to paragraph 2 of resolution 733 (1992) concerning arrangements for increasing humanitarian assistance to the people of Somalia.

I am confident that our cooperation in dealing with the crisis in Somalia will demonstrate further the usefulness of the coordination and cooperation between our organizations.

I look forward to receiving your reaction as soon as possible.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Document 6

Joint communiqué dated 12 February 1992 by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and senior officials of the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of the Islamic Conference on the implementation of Security Council resolution 733 (1992)

UN Press Release IHA/431, 12 February 1992

Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali held consultations this afternoon with senior officials representing the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of the Islamic Conference on the situation in Somalia, in the context of the implementation of Security Council resolution 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, aimed at promoting the restoration of peace and stability in Somalia. The meeting was held on the eve of their consultations with representatives of the warring factions in Mogadiscio. In this regard, they emphasized that these consultations in New York concern only the belligerent parties in Mogadiscio and constitute an essential first step towards achieving durable peace in Somalia. They do not in any way imply recognition of any Somali group or faction.

The meeting underscored the urgency for an immediate cessation of hostilities and an agreement on a cease-fire in order to bring to an end the heavy loss of life and material damage resulting from the conflict, without further delay. It also emphasized that a cease-fire was a necessary precondition for the provision of much needed emergency humanitarian assistance to the affected population in all parts of Somalia.

The meeting agreed that the continuation of the conflict in Somalia affected the peace and stability of the Horn of Africa region. In this regard, the participants reiterated their support for Security Council resolution 733 (1992). They reaffirmed their determination to act jointly towards achieving an agreement for a cease-fire and for the restoration of peace and stability in Somalia.

Document 7

Letter dated 13 February 1992 from the Secretary-General to Mr. Tony P. Hall, Chairman of the Select Committee on Hunger, United States House of Representatives, concerning the provision of emergency relief to Somalia

Not issued as a United Nations document

Dear Representative Hall,

I wish to thank you for your letter of 27 January 1992, in which you conveyed to me your expressions of profound dismay and concern about the present situation in Somalia. I share fully your views on this matter. As you mention, the adoption of Security Council resolution 733 (1992) represents an important step in efforts to bring about an end to this human catastrophe.

The resolution set out certain steps in the effort towards peace in Somalia, of which one of the most important is the agreement to a cease-fire in Mogadiscio. Without this, the United Nations is severely constrained in its efforts to implement relief activities. Accordingly, as is stipulated under the resolution of the Security Council, I have taken an initiative to invite representatives of the two warring factions of the United Somali Congress (USC) to meet here in New York with me, in what I hope will prove to be a positive step towards a cease-fire. At the same time, I have invited representatives of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the League of Arab States (LAS) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to join me in these consultations so as to bring to bear the weight of all concerned parties in an effort to end the tragedy in Somalia.

In the meantime, you may be assured that, together with the agencies of the United Nations system, we are implementing contingency plans to deal with the im-

mediate crises facing the people in southern Somalia. These will envisage, *inter alia*, chartering a "mother ship" from which relief food and non-food assistance can be supplied by landing craft to Mogadiscio and surrounding areas. At present, staff of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Food Programme (WFP) are in southern Somalia to finalize distribution plans for the affected populations, and to arrange for possible airdrops and airlifts of needed supplies. In these arrangements, we are, of course, cooperating with non-governmental organizations and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

As you urge in your letter, we will undertake to seek agreement and guarantees from the conflicting parties for the immediate establishment of corridors and zones of tranquillity so that emergency relief can be provided on a continuing basis as long as is needed. We continue to impress on parties to the conflict that we cannot stand by while thousands of innocent people suffer.

In all its efforts to this end, the United Nations will continue to rely on the moral and practical support of the international community, and especially of that of your Government.

Once again, I thank you for your support on this issue.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Document 8

Joint communiqué dated 14 February 1992 issued at the conclusion of discussions between United Nations officials and representatives of the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of the Islamic Conference with representatives of the Somali factions in conflict in Mogadishu

UN Press Release IHA/434, 14 February 1992

Following his meeting with representatives of the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of the Islamic Conference on 12 February,

Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali met separately with representatives of the two Somali factions to the conflict in Mogadiscio on 13 February.

The Secretary-General drew the attention of the Somali factions to the joint communiqué issued on 12 February 1992 by the United Nations and the three regional organizations, and urged them to commit themselves to an immediate cessation of hostilities in Mogadiscio and to facilitate a peaceful and lasting settlement to the conflict. He emphasized that this would expedite the provision of increased humanitarian assistance to the people of Somalia.

During the course of the last three days, representatives of the United Nations and the regional organizations met separately with representatives of the two Somali factions to discuss with them the urgency for an immediate cessation of hostilities and an agreement on a cease-fire in Mogadiscio.

At the conclusion of the discussions this evening, the two Somali factions committed themselves to an immediate cessation of hostilities and to the maintenance of a cease-fire in Mogadiscio. To this end, they signed pledges to that effect in the presence of the representatives of the United Nations and the three regional organizations. They also agreed to the visit to Mogadiscio before the end

of February of a high-level delegation composed of representatives of the United Nations and the three regional organizations to conclude a cease-fire agreement. In this connection, one of the Somali factions asserted that a cease-fire agreement without international monitoring and supervision will not hold.

The representatives of the United Nations, the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of the Islamic Conference stressed the utmost importance they attached to the commitment that the two Somali factions have undertaken in this regard. They expressed their confidence that the parties will honour fully their commitments as a tangible expression of their goodwill and commitment to peace.

The representatives of the United Nations and the three regional organizations further exchanged views on the modalities for the next phase of their joint efforts, that is, the convening of an all-embracing national reconciliation conference aimed at the achievement of a lasting peaceful solution of the Somali problem. They reached a common understanding on how best to approach the question of participation and venue.

Document 9

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia, proposing to dispatch a technical team to prepare an operational plan for the monitoring of the cease-fire in Mogadishu and to explore ways of ensuring the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance

S/23693, 11 March 1992

Introduction

1. At its 3039th meeting, on 23 January 1992, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 733 (1992) concerning the situation in Somalia. The full text of the resolution reads as follows:

The Security Council,

Considering the request by Somalia for the Security Council to consider the situation in Somalia,

Having heard the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia and commending the initiative taken by him in the humanitarian field,

Gravely alarmed at the rapid deterioration of the situation in Somalia and the heavy loss of human life and widespread material damage resulting from the conflict in the country and aware of its consequences on stability and peace in the region,

Concerned that the continuation of this situation constitutes, as stated in the report of the Secretary-General, a threat to international peace and security,

Recalling its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Recalling also the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter,

Expressing its appreciation to the international and regional organizations that have provided assistance to the populations affected by the conflict and deploring that personnel of these organizations have lost their lives in the exercise of their humanitarian tasks,

Taking note of the appeals addressed to the parties by the Chairman of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on 16 December 1991, the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity on 18 December 1991 and the League of Arab States on 5 January 1992,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia and expresses its concern with the situation prevailing in that country;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General immediately to undertake the necessary actions to increase humanitarian assistance by the United Nations and its specialized agencies to the affected population in all parts of Somalia in liaison with the other international humanitarian organizations and to this end to appoint a coordinator to oversee the effective delivery of this assistance;

3. *Also requests* the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in cooperation with the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, immediately to contact all parties involved in the conflict, to seek their commitment to the cessation of hostilities in order to permit the humanitarian assistance to be distributed, to promote a cease-fire and compliance therewith, and to assist in the process of a political settlement of the conflict in Somalia;

4. *Strongly urges* all parties to the conflict immediately to cease hostilities and agree to a cease-fire and to promote the process of reconciliation and of political settlement in Somalia;

5. *Decides*, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, that all States shall, for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in Somalia, immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia until the Council decides otherwise;

6. *Calls on* all States to refrain from any action which might contribute to increasing tension and to impeding or delaying a peaceful and negotiated outcome to the conflict in Somalia, which would permit all Somalis to decide upon and to construct their future in peace;

7. *Calls upon* all parties to cooperate with the Secretary-General to this end and to facilitate the delivery by the United Nations, its specialized agencies and other humanitarian organizations of humanitarian assistance to all those in need of it, under the supervision of the coordinator;

8. *Urges* all parties to take all the necessary measures to ensure the safety of personnel sent to provide humanitarian assistance, to assist them in their tasks and to ensure full respect for the rules and principles of international law regarding the protection of civilian populations;

9. *Calls upon* all States and international organizations to contribute to the efforts of humanitarian assistance to the population in Somalia;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council as soon as possible on this matter;

11. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter until a peaceful solution is achieved.

2. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 10 of the resolution. It deals particularly with the implementation of paragraph 3 of the resolution, by which the Security Council requested me, in cooperation with the Secretaries-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the League of Arab States (LAS), immediately to contact all parties involved in the conflict, to seek their commitment to the cessation of hostilities to permit the humanitarian assistance to be distributed, to promote a cease-fire and compliance therewith, and to assist in the process of a political settlement of the conflict in Somalia.

3. On 23 January 1992, I transmitted the text of resolution 733 (1992) to Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and General Mohamed Farah Aidid, Chairman of the United Somali Congress (USC), as well as to other interested parties in Somalia.

4. In a communication dated 26 January 1992 addressed to me, Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed confirmed his acceptance of resolution 733 (1992). On 31 January 1992, General Mohamed Farah Aidid sent his reply to the resolution, in which he raised some questions regarding the resolution and called upon the Council to reconsider the matter. He did not, however, indicate specifically whether or not he accepted the resolution.

5. The text of the resolution was also transmitted to all States on 23 January 1992, drawing their attention to paragraphs 5, 6 and 9 and requesting them to submit to me as soon as possible, but not later than 6 February 1992, information on the measures taken by their Governments to implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia and to contribute to the efforts for the provision of humanitarian assistance to the population of Somalia. I also transmitted the text of the resolution to the current Chairman of OAU, H.E. President Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria.

6. Similarly, the text of the resolution was transmitted, on the same date, to international organizations, drawing their attention, in particular, to paragraphs 2 and 9 of the resolution, and requesting information as soon as possible, but not later than 6 February 1992, on any action taken in accordance with those provisions of the resolution.

Arms embargo

7. As stated above, I had addressed a note verbale to all States requesting them to bring to my attention information on measures taken to implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia.

8. As of 6 March 1992, replies had been received from 68 Governments, which have been issued as documents of the Security Council. 1/

9. Despite the replies received from Member States stating that they were strictly observing the terms of paragraph 5 of the resolution, both Somali factions have claimed that the other side was receiving arms from some of the countries in the region.

Efforts to reach a cease-fire

General

10. In paragraph 4 of resolution 733 (1992), the Security Council strongly urged the parties to the conflict to cease hostilities immediately and agree to a cease-fire.

11. Since November 1991, heavy fighting between the two factions has persisted in the capital city, Mogadiscio, with civilian-inhabited areas subjected to persistent direct fire, including from artillery and mortar units. There are also several heavily armed elements who control parts of the city, including the seaport and the airport. Some have declared alliance with one or the other of the two protagonists in Mogadiscio, while others are not controlled by either of them. In recent weeks, there has been an increase in the level of independent military operations by some of these armed elements. Clearly, the existence of these armed elements could be a major complication in the implementation and monitoring of a cease-fire.

12. The fighting has resulted in widespread death and destruction, forced hundreds of thousands of civilians to flee the city, caused dire need for emergency humanitarian assistance, and brought about a grave threat of widespread famine. It has also seriously impeded United Nations efforts to deliver much-needed humanitarian assistance to the affected population in and around Mogadiscio. Furthermore, the conflict has threatened instability in the Horn of Africa region and its continuation has occasioned threats to international peace and security in the area. The countries of the region—Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and the Sudan—some more than the others, are beset by problems that are largely common to all. As a result, the exacerbation of conflict in one of the countries of the region could have serious repercussions in one or more of the others.

Consultations in New York

13. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of resolution 733 (1992), I sent letters on 31 January 1992 to Interim President Mohamed and the Chairman of USC, General Aidid, acknowledging receipt of their replies to my letter of 23 January, by which, as mentioned above, I had brought to their attention the text of resolution 733

(1992). I invited them to participate in consultations in New York during the week of 10 February 1992.

14. I informed the factions that the purpose of the meeting would be to explore the best ways of reaching a cease-fire agreement and to draw up a framework for a sustained peacemaking effort in Somalia. Within such an agreed framework, the meeting would also consider the modalities for broader political stability, in which all other parties in Somalia would be involved.

15. On 31 January 1992, I sent letters to the Secretaries-General of LAS, OAU and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) inviting them to send representatives to the meeting. In my letter, I informed the Secretaries-General of the action I had taken pursuant to Security Council resolution 733 (1992) and of the replies I had received from the two factions regarding the resolution.

16. In communications dated 2, 3 and 5 February 1992 respectively, LAS, OAU and OIC informed me of their acceptance of my invitation and their readiness to cooperate with me in my efforts to facilitate a political settlement of the conflict in Somalia. They also informed me of the steps they had taken to help to bring about a settlement of the conflict. Further, they communicated to me the names of the leaders of their delegations to the meeting as follows: for LAS, Mr. Mahdi Mustafa al-Hadi, Under-Secretary-General; for OAU, Mr. M. T. Mapuranga, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs; and for OIC, Mr. Ibrahim Saleh Bakr, Assistant Secretary-General.

17. Interim President Mohamed informed me in a communication dated 9 February 1992 that his delegation to the meeting would be headed by Mr. Mohamed Qanyare Afrah and would consist also of Mr. Aweys Haji Yusuf and Mr. Huseen Ali Shiddo. He also informed me that the head of his delegation would carry a letter of credentials that conferred upon the delegation power to negotiate and sign an agreement on behalf of the interim Government.

18. For his part, General Aidid informed me in a letter dated 9 February 1992 that the members of his delegation to the consultations in New York would be as follows: Mr. Osman Hassan Ali, head of the delegation; Mr. Sheik Abdi-nur Nur Hashi and Mr. Mohamed Hassan Awale. He stated that the members of his delegation were

1/ S/23527, S/23528 and Corr.1, S/23531, S/23532, S/23533, S/23536, S/23537, S/23538, S/23539, S/23540, S/23541, S/23542, S/23543, S/23544, S/23545, S/23546, S/23548, S/23549, S/23551, S/23555, S/23559, S/23560, S/23561, S/23562, S/23566, S/23568, S/23571, S/23572, S/23577, S/23578, S/23579, S/23582, S/23583, S/23584, S/23586, S/23587, S/23588, S/23589, S/23593, S/23595, S/23599, S/23601, S/23602, S/23607, S/23611, S/23612, S/23614, S/23615, S/23616, S/23621, S/23623, S/23627, S/23629, S/23630, S/23635, S/23637, S/23650, S/23658, S/23659, S/23660, S/23674, S/23675, S/23677, S/23678, S/23681, S/23682, S/23683 and S/23689.

fully authorized to discuss the issues on the agenda as specified in my letter of invitation dated 31 January 1992.

19. The consultations in New York were based on a two-phased strategy. First, to seek the commitment of the belligerent parties in Mogadiscio to the cessation of hostilities to permit the distribution of humanitarian assistance and to promote a cease-fire and compliance therewith. Secondly, to assist in the process of a political settlement of the conflict in Somalia through the convening of a conference on national reconciliation and unity.

20. The talks started at United Nations Headquarters in New York on 12 February 1992. I chaired a meeting of senior officials representing the three regional and intergovernmental organizations to work out a common approach on how to tackle the Somali problem. In this connection, I stressed that, without the cooperation of the regional organizations, the United Nations could not play a meaningful role in Somalia. It is important for the regional and intergovernmental organizations to take the lead and to play an active role in efforts to seek a solution to the problem. Their support, cooperation and contribution are essential to bring the question before the Security Council for the proper action and to assist in the national reconciliation and reconstruction of Somalia. The consultations had in view only the belligerent factions in Mogadiscio and constituted an essential first step towards achieving durable peace in Somalia. They did not in any way imply recognition of any Somali faction.

21. On 13 February 1992, I met separately with representatives of the two factions to the conflict in Mogadiscio. I drew their attention to the common position taken by the United Nations and the three regional and intergovernmental organizations and urged them to commit themselves to an immediate cessation of hostilities and to facilitate a peaceful and lasting settlement of the conflict in Mogadiscio. I also emphasized that such an outcome would expedite the provision of increased humanitarian assistance to the people of Somalia.

22. My Envoy for Somalia, Under-Secretary-General James O. C. Jonah, headed a joint delegation of the United Nations and the three regional and intergovernmental organizations, which met separately with the two Somali factions on 13 and 14 February 1992, to discuss with them the urgency of an immediate cessation of hostilities and an agreement on a cease-fire in Mogadiscio. On 14 February 1992, the two Somali factions committed themselves to an immediate cessation of hostilities and to the maintenance of a cease-fire in Mogadiscio. They signed pledges to that effect in the presence of representatives of the United Nations and the above-mentioned regional and intergovernmental organizations and agreed to a visit to Mogadiscio, before the end of February, of a high-level delegation from those organiza-

tions to arrange a cease-fire agreement (see annex I). The factions welcomed the decision of the United Nations and the three regional and intergovernmental organizations to send the high-level delegation to Mogadiscio. In this connection, the representatives of Interim President Mohamed asserted that a cease-fire agreement without international monitoring and supervision would not hold.

23. Following the signing of the pledges on 14 February, Under-Secretary-General Jonah and the representatives of the three regional and intergovernmental organizations consulted on how best to arrange a cease-fire agreement and on the modalities for the next phase of their joint effort, namely that of convening an all-embracing national reconciliation conference, aimed at the achievement of a lasting, peaceful solution to the Somali problem. They reached a common understanding on how to approach the questions of participation, agenda and the venue of the conference.

24. Both during the consultations and the signing of the cease-fire pledges, attempts were made to bring the two factions together. However, the faction representing General Aidid refused on the basis that it did not recognize Mr. Mohamed as Interim President.

25. Unfortunately, there were hostilities, both during the consultations in New York and subsequent to the signing of the pledges of 14 February. There was some artillery shelling, particularly of the road leading to the airstrip in the area under the control of Interim President Mohamed. I expressed my grave concern regarding these violations of the cease-fire to the representatives of General Aidid and emphasized that the cease-fire must be respected and that it was incumbent upon all concerned to show a seriousness of purpose and commitment.

26. It had been impressed upon the representatives of the two factions during the consultations in New York that the world community would not take the Somalia question seriously unless they made every effort to respect the cease-fire and the commitments they had entered into. The violations of the cease-fire brought to mind the remarks of the representatives of Interim President Mohamed that the cease-fire would not hold without international monitoring or supervision. They also made the mission of the joint delegation to Mogadiscio all the more important.

27. By mutual agreement, the representatives of the United Nations and the three regional and intergovernmental organizations attended the meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers held in Addis Ababa from 24 to 28 February 1992 to be available for the Council's consideration of the question of Somalia. While there, the joint delegation also held consultations on the Somali conflict with the Secretary-General of OAU and the heads of delegation of several States members of OAU. On the eve

of the joint delegation's visit to Mogadiscio, on 29 February, LAS, OAU and OIC issued statements supporting its effort to resolve the conflict in Mogadiscio and calling upon the Somali factions to cooperate fully with the joint delegation (see annex II). The joint delegation travelled to Mogadiscio on the basis of the understandings reached in New York and the pledges made by the two factions to guarantee the security and complete freedom of movement of the joint delegation in and around Mogadiscio.

Consultations in Mogadiscio

28. The joint delegation arrived in Mogadiscio from Addis Ababa, on 29 February. It was composed of, from the United Nations, Mr. James O. C. Jonah, Under-Secretary-General and leader of the joint delegation, Mr. Tayé-Brook Zerihoun, Political Affairs Officer, Major Nauludole V. Mataitini, Assistant Military Adviser; from LAS, Mr. Mahdi Mustafa El-Hadi, Under-Secretary-General, and Mr. Samir Husni Attiya, Second Secretary; from OAU, Mr. M. T. Mapuranga, Assistant Secretary-General, and Mr. Emile Ognimba, Political Officer; and from OIC, Mr. Ibrahim Saleh Bakr, Assistant Secretary-General, and Mr. Salman Bashir, Director. The joint delegation proceeded to the headquarters of General Aidid, which was closest to the airport. In the afternoon, the joint delegation travelled by car to the northern part of the city where Interim President Mohamed has his headquarters.

29. The joint delegation emphasized to both factions that it had come to Mogadiscio to help them to conclude a cease-fire agreement, as agreed in New York on 14 February 1992. For that purpose, the joint delegation had brought with it a United Nations military adviser to help them to work out the details of a cease-fire agreement and to discuss with them the modalities for possible United Nations monitoring of such an agreement.

30. The military adviser held preliminary discussions with the relevant officials of Interim President Mohamed's faction before the joint delegation's departure for Nairobi the same evening. By mutual agreement, the military adviser stayed behind in Mogadiscio to undertake similar discussions with military leaders of General Aidid. Both factions were requested to consider the matter overnight and to give their reactions to the joint delegation when it returned to Mogadiscio the next morning.

31. Two other important questions were also discussed. The joint delegation stressed to both factions that it was not interested in the question of recognition of one faction or the other. Its primary interest was to help the factions to conclude a cease-fire agreement which would hold and, if needed, to discuss arrangements for United

Nations involvement to that end. Beyond that, the joint delegation was interested to hear the views of all Somali factions regarding the convening of a conference of national reconciliation and unity, including the questions of participation, agenda and venue.

32. The joint delegation returned to Mogadiscio on 1 March and continued its discussions with the Somali factions on arrangements to conclude a cease-fire agreement and the modalities for United Nations monitoring of such an agreement. It presented to them two draft documents containing ideas on those issues for their consideration and adoption.

33. It was impressed upon both factions that the possible United Nations monitoring role reflected in the proposals envisaged the stationing of a relatively small, unarmed observer group to supervise, verify and confirm the cease-fire on a continuous basis, pending an agreement on a comprehensive settlement for national reconciliation and unity. The logistics, as well as organizational and operational arrangements, of such a deployment were explained in the proposals and elaborated upon by the military adviser in his earlier meetings with the military experts of the two factions. It was always understood during the discussions that the exploratory ideas presented were subject to the authorization of the Council.

34. The joint delegation suggested to General Aidid that he take some time to study the documents, while it proceeded to the north to deliver the same documents to Interim President Mohamed. It was understood that, in the afternoon, after the joint delegation had returned from the north, General Aidid might be in a position either to give a response on the documents or to seek further clarification on them.

35. When the proposals for a cease-fire agreement were delivered to Interim President Mohamed, he handed them over to his military experts for examination. After he had been briefed by his military experts on the outcome of their review, he met with the joint delegation to give his formal response, which was positive. In doing so, he reiterated his request for a United Nations peace-keeping force, not only to ensure a lasting cease-fire, but also to help to disarm civilians and to protect the stockpiling and distribution of humanitarian assistance. However, in the circumstances, particularly in order to obtain General Aidid's compliance, he agreed to the deployment of a United Nations monitoring group as suggested by the joint delegation and pledged to cooperate with it fully.

36. During the morning's initial meeting with General Aidid, he reiterated his acceptance of a cease-fire without reservation and stated that he remained ready to sign an agreement to that effect. For the first time, he requested "... the United Nations and the [three] regional organizations to send representatives to monitor the

cease-fire accords”, despite his earlier statement that Security Council resolution 733 (1992) was not justified and must be reconsidered by the Council. In the same vein, he also accepted the resolution adopted on 28 February by the OAU Council of Ministers which, *inter alia*, expressed support for resolution 733 (1992).

37. However, during its meeting with General Aidid later the same day, in the afternoon, the joint delegation was informed that his faction was not yet in a position to give a formal reply to the proposals for the deployment of United Nations observers because it had not had adequate time to study them. He said that his faction would be ready to give its reply to the joint delegation at 12 noon on 3 March. The joint delegation received reliable information that General Aidid’s Executive Committee had had extensive and continuous deliberations since the joint delegation had departed to the north that same morning to meet with Interim President Mohamed.

38. While accepting General Aidid’s proposal to return to Mogadiscio on 3 March, the joint delegation impressed upon him and his colleagues that the situation in Mogadiscio, and indeed the entire country, demanded the immediate and undivided attention of all concerned. It also required statesmanship, foresight and courage from its leaders to grasp a historic opportunity that had presented itself at that particular time to end the plight of the Somali people, bearing in mind the heightened concern and commitment shown by the international community, as reflected in the composition of the joint delegation.

39. On 3 March 1992, after four days of intensive negotiations, Interim President Mohamed and General Aidid each signed a copy of an “Agreement on the Implementation of a Cease-fire”, in the presence of the representatives of the United Nations, LAS, OAU and OIC, the operative part of which reads:

“*Hereby agree to take immediate steps, personally as well as through the persons under my command, for the implementation of measures aimed at stabilizing the ceasefire by means of a United Nations monitoring mechanism. The measures will be formulated by a United Nations technical team that will arrive in Mogadiscio shortly.*”

For the full text of the Agreement signed by each party, see annex III.

40. During the discussions, both sides expressed agreement with the main elements for the implementation of the cease-fire, which involves the following arrangements:

- (a) The parties undertake to order their forces to disengage and refrain from all hostilities and

further deployment or action to extend territory under their control;

- (b) Commanders on both sides will ensure that troops under their command remain at their respective positions;
- (c) Both parties will facilitate the unimpeded flow of humanitarian aid and delivery of assistance to all in need, including those internally displaced;
- (d) Both parties will encourage and support the withdrawal of forces from airports and seaports to locations to be agreed upon by the United Nations and the turning over of monitoring and security arrangements at the ports to United Nations observers.

41. While Interim President Mohamed’s faction accepted all the elements of the cease-fire arrangement, General Aidid’s side insisted that the military observers should be in civilian attire with the proper United Nations insignia, i.e. blue berets and United Nations armbands.

42. The signing of the above Agreement opened the way for the next step, the dispatch of a technical team from the United Nations to Mogadiscio to work out with military officials of both factions a possible United Nations monitoring mechanism aimed at stabilizing the cease-fire. The concept of such a mechanism, which both factions agreed to in principle, envisages the designation of a civilian as Special Representative of the Secretary-General who would be assisted by senior officials from the three regional and intergovernmental organizations, and who, together, would constitute a Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC). JMC would be assisted by military observers from the United Nations, with about 20 observers to be deployed on each side of the cease-fire line. In addition, a contingent of United Nations civilian police would be made available to JMC to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance in and around Mogadiscio.

National reconciliation and unity

43. It had been agreed by the joint delegation that at the conclusion of the first phase of its mission to Somalia, i.e., arranging a cease-fire agreement in Mogadiscio, it would assist in the process of national reconciliation and unity in Somalia. In this connection, it undertook consultations with the two warring factions in Mogadiscio and secured their agreement and support for a national reconciliation conference to which all Somali groups would be invited with a view to restoring peace and justice to the country. General Aidid insisted that the conference meet in Mogadiscio. Interim President Mohamed noted that the security situation would make Mogadiscio unsuitable, but said that he was willing and ready to go anywhere to discuss peace and national

reconciliation in Somalia. While Interim President Mohamed insisted that the Djibouti Accords 2/ be used as a basis for convening the conference, General Aidid stressed his rejection of the Accords. The Accords were the outcome of a regional approach sponsored by Djibouti, which succeeded in convening two conferences on Somali national reconciliation in June and July 1991 with the participation of all the major Somali movements except the Somali National Movement (SNM). At the July conference, the participants reiterated their commitment to a united Somalia and agreed on a cease-fire and the establishment of a transitional Government. The conference also appointed Mr. Mohamed as President of the provisional Government of Somalia for a period of two years.

44. The joint delegation travelled to Kismayo on 4 March to solicit the views of Somali groups in the lower Juba region on various aspects of the convening of a conference on national reconciliation and unity. It met with representatives of several Darod subclans organized under the umbrella of the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM).

45. The subclans represented were the Marehan, Lalkasse, Aurtableh, Ogaden, Majesteen, Doblahante and Warsengeli. These subclans are organized in three political groups, namely, United Somali Party (USP), Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and Somali National Democratic Union (SNDU), which, as stated above, are under the umbrella of SPM in the lower Juba region.

46. The joint delegation first met separately with representatives of the three political groups—USP, SSDF and SNDU—and then held a general meeting in which all took part in the context of SPM. The joint delegation impressed upon all the participants that, having concluded the first phase of its objective, it had come to Kismayo to seek their views on whether or not they supported the convening of a conference on national reconciliation and unity and, if so, to be guided by their counsel with respect to the agenda, participation and venue of the conference.

47. As regards their own participation, the political groups informed the joint delegation that the invitation should go to SPM alone. In deciding the composition of its delegation, SPM would ensure their own participation in the conference. Concerning the participation of other groups, they proposed that invitations be sent to the following political groups, on the understanding that the authenticity of their delegations would be established before the conference: Somali National Front (SNF), SNDU, USC, Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA), SNM, United Somali Front (USF), Somali Alliance for National Unity (SANU), SSDF, SPM and USP.

48. On the question of the venue, the political groups expressed preference for Addis Ababa, Nairobi or

Asmara because of their proximity to Somalia and taking into account economic considerations, in order to ensure full participation. Views were also exchanged with these political groups as well as with others as to the possibility of having Abuja, the capital of Nigeria, which currently holds the chairmanship of OAU, as the venue for the conference. While there were no objections, all stressed the cost that would be incurred if Abuja was selected.

49. The political groups suggested a full-fledged agenda for the conference. They noted that, to achieve its stated objective of national reconciliation and unity, the conference must include on its agenda the following items:

- (a) The sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia;
- (b) The end of hostilities among all warring groups and factions and the establishment of a cease-fire throughout the country;
- (c) The formulation of a provisional constitution based on democratic and parliamentary principles;
- (d) The formation of an interim national Government;
- (e) The creation of an administrative system based on regional autonomy;
- (f) The establishment of a provisional national assembly;
- (g) The need for international peace-keeping and disarming of forces.

50. As regards the Djibouti Accords, opinions were divided, with the majority accepting the Accords as a basis, but not the basis, for convening the conference.

51. Since it was not possible to locate the leadership of some of the Somali movements, like SSDF and SNF, arrangements were made to meet with them in Nairobi and to consult them on the convening of the conference on national reconciliation and unity.

52. SSDF stated that it would like the conference to be organized by the United Nations in cooperation with the three regional and intergovernmental organizations. It supported the participation of all Somali groups and movements and expressed preference for Nairobi or Addis Ababa as the venue for the conference.

53. SNF expressed support for the United Nations and the regional and intergovernmental organizations to chair the conference and for all Somali groups and factions to be invited. It rejected the Djibouti Accords as a basis for convening the conference and expressed preference for the conference to be held in one of the countries neighbouring Somalia or in a convenient location in the Arab world such as Yemen or Saudi Arabia.

2/ A/46/257 and A/46/319.

54. Consultations with other Somali groups and movements regarding the convening of the conference on national reconciliation and unity would continue.

Humanitarian assistance

55. In the communications that I sent out to Governments and humanitarian organizations following the adoption of resolution 733 (1992), I drew attention to paragraph 9 of the resolution by which the Security Council had called on all States and international organizations to contribute to the efforts of humanitarian assistance to the population in Somalia.

56. The replies that have been received on this matter have also been issued as documents of the Security Council.

57. Because of the intolerable security situation, it has not been possible to provide food supplies to Mogadiscio since December 1991. However, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was able to provide food aid through the ports of Adale and Merka, which are situated to the north and the south of Mogadiscio, respectively. The United Nations also continued to provide humanitarian assistance to parts of the north, around Berbera and Harguesa. Furthermore, some 4,100 tons of food were transferred by the World Food Programme (WFP) to ICRC in Mombasa and delivered to Kismayo in two shipments during February and March 1992. The joint delegation witnessed delivery of the second shipment when it visited Kismayo on 4 March 1992 (see annex V A).

58. It was possible to supply assistance to Kismayo because the local authorities, the United Nations and other humanitarian organizations had agreed on a workable plan and because the security situation had improved appreciably. Unlike the situation that prevailed in Kismayo in January, when my Envoy for Somalia visited there, no one was seen carrying arms there during the recent joint mission because the local authorities had barred civilians from carrying such weapons.

59. In consultation with international humanitarian organizations, particularly ICRC and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the United Nations has also been endeavouring to extend humanitarian assistance to the people in and around Mogadiscio. While a cease-fire is necessary to allow adequate humanitarian assistance, ways and means have been explored for providing food assistance even with the prevailing conditions.

60. Meetings with agency representatives were held in New York to work out contingency plans for humanitarian assistance with and without a cease-fire. WFP made detailed plans for ocean delivery of relief items by shallow-draft vessels and by beaching with landing craft for places with no port facilities. In case a United Nations presence on land was not possible, plans were

made for a "mother ship" to be positioned offshore that would feed smaller craft with food and medical supplies and double as a floating base where United Nations personnel would live and work. Standby arrangements were also made to organize a series of airdrops/airlifts that could be implemented on an urgent basis.

61. My Envoy for Somalia kept in close contact with WFP on all the aforesaid arrangements. At all times, it was emphasized to the Somali factions that a cease-fire was crucial for the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance.

62. While waiting for conditions that would permit putting the contingency plan into effect, special efforts were made to provide, on an ad hoc basis, 1,000 tons of food to Mogadiscio. In this connection, a vessel carrying 340 tons of food was due to arrive in Mogadiscio on 29 February. Unfortunately the vessel ran into a reef and could not proceed further. However, another vessel, the *Marco Polo*, left Mombasa with a scheduled arrival of 3 March 1992. Owing to bad weather, the arrival of the *Marco Polo* was delayed until 4 March 1992. Even then, while the vessel, loaded with 660 tons of bagged wheat, was being brought through the port on the morning of 5 March 1992, the ship was shelled from on-shore. No damage or injury occurred and the ship was able to remove itself from the area of conflict and to return immediately to Mombasa.

63. The situation in Mogadiscio reached such a point that, on 5 March 1992, my Envoy for Somalia sent from Nairobi an urgent and pressing appeal to Interim President Mohamed and General Aidid regarding the shelling of the WFP vessel. He expressed deep concern that efforts to relieve the starving population of Mogadiscio had been recklessly disrupted by shelling intended to prevent unloading of badly needed foodstuff. He noted that those who bitterly complained that food was not being brought to Mogadiscio must know that whoever had taken reckless actions to bar the delivery of food supplies bore the responsibility.

64. Previously, both factions had shown understanding for the difficulties that had obstructed United Nations efforts to commence delivery of food, on 2 March, as had been planned. In order to assist the United Nations effort, they had issued statements on 29 February and 1 March 1992 guaranteeing the security of vessels using the port of Mogadiscio to deliver humanitarian assistance (see annex IV).

65. In the prevailing circumstances, WFP considers it inadvisable to authorize further deliveries to Mogadiscio until the conditions for a viable and sustained relief effort have been established, namely a written agreement with the combatant groups establishing modalities that enable (a) food to be delivered to needy non-combatants

within and around the city and (b) United Nations and NGO staff to have secure access to beneficiaries for purposes of needs assessment and the oversight of the relief effort. Within such an arrangement the provision of an agreed amount of relief food to combatants controlling the port and relief corridors might be necessary.

66. The prospect of famine deaths is high in much of Somalia and is not confined to Mogadiscio and its environs. WFP is working with other agencies and ICRC to devise a plan that provides for a sharing of responsibilities for a genuinely nationwide programme of relief. With respect to Mogadiscio, this would provide for flexibility to have deliveries made either through the port of Mogadiscio by WFP itself and/or through small ports to the north and south of the capital.

67. My Envoy for Somalia wrote to the Executive Directors of WFP and UNICEF on 31 January 1992 requesting them, as a matter of urgency, to prepare an immediate plan of action for emergency humanitarian assistance for Mogadiscio. The joint WFP/UNICEF team commenced work in Nairobi on 7 February. Following visits to Mogadiscio, Merka, Dahanne and Gwazire ports, the joint team drew up a preliminary draft 90-day plan of action to provide urgent humanitarian assistance for the population of Mogadiscio.

68. By 8 March 1992, a total of 250 tons of non-food assistance consisting of medical supplies, shelter material and supplementary food were airlifted to both north and south of Mogadiscio (see annex V B). A major breakthrough was achieved on 2 March when a convoy moved through the front lines from south to north Mogadiscio and delivered relief supplies to a hospital and camps for internally displaced persons. This breakthrough was followed by daily convoys across the lines, and the informal corridor of safe passage is currently being used by ICRC as well as a number of NGOs.

69. With the increase in UNICEF and WFP non-food supplies reaching Mogadiscio, the United Nations commenced direct distribution of essential medical supplies and equipment to hospitals supported by NGOs, as well as the provision of shelter material to a number of camps for displaced persons, thus supplementing the work of the international NGO community. To oversee the operation and ensure effective distribution and monitoring of supplies, UNICEF increased the number of its international staff in Mogadiscio. This was supplemented by the deployment of a WFP staff member and other international staff provided by the agency CARE, doubling the size of the United Nations international presence on the ground in Mogadiscio.

70. The possibility of providing some food aid to armed elements outside the control of both factions in order to facilitate the passage and distribution of food

was raised by the joint delegation, and both factions acknowledged such a necessity.

71. I wish to acknowledge the valiant efforts of ICRC and NGOs, which have sought to provide, at great risk, assistance to the population affected by the emergency throughout the country. The United Nations and its specialized agencies will continue to collaborate to the fullest extent possible with these organizations in order to respond with priority to the worsening humanitarian crisis threatening the peoples of Somalia.

Observations

72. The tragic situation in Somalia is extraordinarily complex and has so far eluded conventional solutions. New avenues and innovative methods commensurate with the humanitarian and political situation at hand need to be explored in order to facilitate a peaceful settlement. In this connection, the collaborative effort of the United Nations and the regional and intergovernmental organizations undertaken in the context of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations has proved to be very effective and has set a useful precedent for future cooperation.

73. The United Nations and the three regional and intergovernmental organizations concerned, after extensive discussion with the two factions in Mogadiscio, have worked out a general framework for the implementation of the cease-fire. The next step, as agreed by the two principal factions on 3 March, is for me to send to Mogadiscio a technical team to prepare an operational plan for a United Nations monitoring mechanism. It is my intention to dispatch such a team as soon as possible. It would consist of about 20 civilian and military personnel, with previous experience of United Nations activities in connection with the monitoring of cease-fires, together with the representatives of the three regional organizations. It would pursue consultations with representatives of Interim President Mohamed and General Aidid on the arrangements for such a mechanism and on related questions, notably the question of how to ensure that the cease-fire is respected by armed elements that are not at present under the control of either of the two protagonists. The team's report would provide a basis on which I could present a further report to the Security Council containing my recommendation on how the Security Council might respond to the two parties' agreement that the cease-fire should be stabilized by means of a United Nations monitoring mechanism. As stated earlier in this report my Envoy, of course, emphasized to both of them that such an arrangement would require the approval of the Security Council.

74. It would be my intention to request the technical team to look into possible mechanisms to ensure the

unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to the displaced persons in and around Mogadiscio. A similar exercise will also be performed by the team in visits to Berbera and Kismayo. I am aware that this exercise represents an innovation that may require careful consideration by the Security Council. Its objective has already been anticipated by the understanding reached with the two factions that United Nations civilian police would be required to assist in the delivery of humanitarian assistance in and around Mogadiscio.

75. The fighting in Mogadiscio is, for the most part, between two factions of the same movement, one, representing the Chairman of USC, and the other, the Interim President of Somalia appointed on the basis of the Djibouti Accords. The conflict arose because General Aidid did not recognize Mr. Mohamed as Interim President. Recently, I was informed that the Central Committee of USC, with a majority backing Mr. Mohamed, had ousted General Aidid as Chairman. The whole problem is further complicated by the personal animosity between the two leaders, which may account for the ferocity of the fighting and the difficulty in reaching accommodation.

76. Even though priority has urgently been given to achieving a cease-fire in Mogadiscio, that alone will not resolve the Somali problem as a whole. In this connection, it is important to note that, as stated earlier, there are armed elements not under the control of either of the two protagonists whose presence could complicate the implementation and monitoring of the cease-fire. It is also necessary to take account of the situation around Kismayo, where two factions of SPM, under different leadership, have emerged as contenders and could present a potential problem. To complicate matters further, there is evidence that the former President of Somalia is mobilizing his forces in the south-west and may enter the fray. When one takes into account, moreover, the proclaimed secession of the north under the banner of SNM, it becomes all the more evident that the Somali problem is indeed very complicated.

77. I have earlier drawn attention to the absence of any civil society and the breakdown of law and order in Mogadiscio, which has been compounded by the proliferation of arms among civilians. Banditry, looting and reckless firing have complicated all efforts to bring humanitarian assistance to the people of Somalia, particularly the hundreds of thousands of displaced people, mostly women, children and young people in the heart of Mogadiscio.

78. Somalia thus presents a special challenge to the international community in general, and to the Security Council in particular. It needs to be emphasized to the factions in Mogadiscio that they must refrain from pursuing a military victory and must seek to resolve their conflict in

a peaceful way, either through accommodation, or by elections within USC to determine its leadership.

79. It would be important for the Security Council to underline the individual and collective responsibilities of the leaders of the factions to save lives and to assist in the distribution of humanitarian assistance. A sustained relief assistance programme is urgently required for the affected population in Somalia. In the light of the immediate threat posed by severe food shortages to large portions of the country's population, the relief programme should not necessarily be dependent upon the implementation of a cease-fire, but nevertheless cannot be undertaken without adequate measures to ensure the safety of relief officials.

80. The Security Council also needs to make it clear to leaders of the two factions not to obstruct, in any way, the work of international monitors or the operations of any United Nations observer mission that the Security Council might decide to set up. The consequences of such obstruction should be made unmistakably clear to them.

81. As I have already stated earlier in this report, I shall continue my efforts for the implementation of a cease-fire and shall continue consultations on the second phase concerning the convening of a conference on national reconciliation and unity in Somalia. I shall keep the Council informed of my efforts in this regard.

Annex I

A. *Pledge signed at United Nations Headquarters on 14 February 1992 by Mr. Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, Head of Delegation of the Interim Government of Somalia*

The delegation representing the Interim Government of Somalia hereby declares its solemn commitment before representatives of the United Nations, the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of the Islamic Conference to an immediate and effective cessation of hostilities and the maintenance of a cease-fire. The delegation also pledges to honour this commitment.

It also welcomes the decision by the four organizations to send a high-level delegation to Mogadiscio to conclude a cease-fire agreement before the end of February 1992.

It further undertakes to guarantee the security and complete freedom of movement of the delegation in and around Mogadiscio.

(Signed) Mohamed Qanyare AFRAH

Head of Delegation

Signed at United Nations Headquarters in New York
14 February 1992

- B. *Pledge signed at United Nations Headquarters on 14 February 1992 by Mr. Osman Hassan Ali, Head of Delegation, member of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the United Somali Congress*

The delegation representing the United Somali Congress hereby declares its solemn commitment before representatives of the United Nations, the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of the Islamic Conference to an immediate and effective cessation of hostilities and the maintenance of a cease-fire. The delegation also pledges to honour this commitment.

It also welcomes the decision by the four organizations to send a high-level delegation to Mogadiscio to conclude a cease-fire agreement before the end of February 1992.

It further undertakes to guarantee the security and complete freedom of movement of the delegation in and around Mogadiscio.

(Signed) Osman Hassan ALI
Head of Delegation
Member of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee, USC
Signed at United Nations Headquarters in New York
14 February 1992

Annex II

- A. *Decision CM/Plen./Dec.2 (LV) of the OAU Council of Ministers on the situation in Somalia*

The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity calls upon the belligerent factions in Mogadiscio to honour fully the pledges they made in New York on 14 February 1992 to cease hostilities immediately and to maintain a cease-fire. It urges them to cooperate with the joint mission to Somalia comprised of OAU, the United Nations, the Arab League and IOC, in its efforts to conclude a cease-fire agreement aimed at the restoration of peace and stability in Somalia without further delay in accordance with Security Council resolution 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992. The Council of Ministers stresses that the joint mission commands the full support of OAU as well as the international community as a whole. The Council also mandated its Bureau in cooperation with the Secretary-General for the follow-up of the situation and to report to the next Council of Ministers.

- B. *Appeal by the League of Arab States to the factions in Somalia to facilitate the task of the joint delegation*

[Original: Arabic]

The General Secretariat of the League of Arab States (LAS) is following developments in the grave and distressing situation in fraternal Somalia resulting from the con-

tinuation of armed confrontations in the Somali capital. These events have led to the death of thousands and caused large-scale devastation of the Somali economic structure and terrible deterioration of people's living conditions. They now threaten a total collapse of the State structure, with all the certain danger that this entails for the unity, security and stability of Somalia, which constitute an indivisible part of international peace and security.

LAS once again welcomes Security Council resolution 733 (1992) concerning the situation in Somalia, which it regards as a necessary step towards the integration of international effort with Arab effort, as represented in the meetings of the League Council and its resolutions adopted at its ordinary and extraordinary sessions held for this purpose and for the purpose of preserving the unity and integrity and safeguarding the security and independence of Somalia, a League member. To this end, LAS participated in the joint meeting held at United Nations Headquarters in mid-February 1992 by the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, as well as the two parties to the conflict taking place in Mogadiscio. The joint meeting resulted in an undertaking by both Somali parties to the conflict to comply with the cease-fire and in a declaration on their part of their wish to receive the joint delegation of the United Nations and the regional organizations, including LAS, in Mogadiscio in order to discuss the provisions of the cease-fire and sign it. LAS strongly supports these steps and places its hopes on the success of the joint delegation and the success of its delicate mission. It appeals to its brothers in Somalia, in the name of historic responsibility, not to let the opportunity escape, to cease hostilities immediately and to resort to fraternal dialogue in order to spare innocent blood and so that the joint delegation can discharge its mandate of ensuring conditions conducive to a fresh start on the course of national reconciliation.

LAS strongly hopes that the Somali leaders will offer all possible cooperation in order that the efforts of the international and regional organizations may be crowned with success. Unquestionably, that is a duty imposed on them by national commitment to the Somali land and people.

LAS is confident that its Somali brothers will rise to the level of this national responsibility.

- C. *Press release dated 26 February 1992 issued by the Organization of the Islamic Conference*

Dr. Hamid Algabid, Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, calls for an immediate cease-fire in Somalia

Dr. Hamid Algabid, Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, has expressed his

deep sadness at the reports of continued fighting in Mogadiscio despite solemn commitments made in New York to accept an immediate cease-fire.

The Secretary General believes that the immediate cessation of hostilities and conclusion of a cease-fire agreement is of paramount importance.

The Secretary General reiterates that the Organization of the Islamic Conference is deeply concerned over the situation in Somalia and has continuously made efforts to help restore peace and find a just and honourable solution to the current crisis in Somalia.

In this connection OIC is concerting its efforts with those of the United Nations to help the people of Somalia overcome their present hardships and difficulties. In this spirit, OIC is taking part in the joint United Nations/Organization of the Islamic Conference/Organization of African Unity/League of Arab States delegation which will soon visit Mogadiscio to consult with the Somali factions on ways and means of concluding a cease-fire agreement and paving the way for a peaceful solution to the problem of Somalia.

The Secretary General is urging the fighting factions to cooperate fully with the high-ranking UN/OIC/OAU/Arab League joint mission and to ensure favourable conditions for the accomplishment of its task.

In this regard, the Secretary General, on behalf of all the countries and peoples of the Islamic Ummah, urges the fighting factions to honour their solemn commitments and to respond positively to the call for a cease-fire by ordering their forces to immediately stop all fighting.

The Secretary General wishes to reiterate the sincere desire of OIC to cooperate with all the Somali factions so as to help them overcome this tragic crisis.

Annex III

A. *Agreement on the implementation of the cease-fire signed by Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed*

The Undersigned,

Having met with the representatives of the United Nations, the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of the Islamic Conference pursuant to the accord signed at United Nations Headquarters in New York on 14 February 1992,

Guided by the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as by those of the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of the Islamic Conference,

Desirous of restoring peace with justice to Somalia and of bringing about a return to normalcy under the rule of law as soon as possible,

Pledging my cooperation with the United Nations, the League of Arab States, the Organization of African

Unity and the Organization of the Islamic Conference and with their representatives in their efforts to bring about a just peace in Somalia,

Hereby agree to take immediate steps, personally as well as through the persons under my command, for the implementation of measures aimed at stabilizing the cease-fire by means of a United Nations monitoring mechanism. The measures will be formulated by a United Nations technical team that will arrive in Mogadiscio shortly.

(Signed)

Interim President Ali Mahdi MOHAMED

Done at Mogadiscio, in the presence of the Undersigned, on 3 March 1992

(Signed) James O. C. JONAH

United Nations

(Signed) Mr. Mahdi Mustafa EL-HADI

League of Arab States

(Signed) Mr. M. T. MAPURANGA

Organization of African Unity

(Signed) Mr. Ibrahim Saleh BAKR

Organization of the Islamic Conference

B. *Agreement on the implementation of the cease-fire signed by Ahmed Farah Aidid*

The Undersigned,

Having met with the representatives of the United Nations, the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of the Islamic Conference pursuant to the accord signed at United Nations Headquarters in New York on 14 February 1992,

Guided by the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as by those of the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of the Islamic Conference,

Desirous of restoring peace with justice to Somalia and of bringing about a return to normalcy under the rule of law as soon as possible,

Pledging my cooperation with the United Nations, the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of the Islamic Conference and with their representatives in their efforts to bring about a just peace in Somalia,

Hereby agree to take immediate steps, personally as well as through the persons under my command, for the implementation of measures aimed at stabilizing the cease-fire by means of a United Nations monitoring mechanism. The measures will be formulated by a United Nations technical team that will arrive in Mogadiscio shortly.

(Signed) General Mohamed Farah AIDID

Chairman of the United Somali Congress

Done at Mogadiscio, in the presence of the Undersigned,
on 3 March 1992

(Signed) James O. C. JONAH
United Nations

(Signed) Mr. Mahdi Mustafa EL-HADI
League of Arab States

(Signed) Mr. M. T. MAPURANGA
Organization of African Unity

(Signed) Mr. Ibrahim Saleh BAKR
Organization of the Islamic Conference

Annex IV

A. Letter dated 29 February 1992 from Ali Mahdi Mohamed, Interim President, addressed to Mr. James Jonah, United Nations Envoy for Somalia

According to the United Nations plan of sending humanitarian relief supplies to Somalia aimed to overcome the imminent plight of mass starvation, the Interim Government of National Unity strongly welcomes the effective humanitarian efforts of the United Nations to provide desperately needed assistance and use Mogadiscio seaport for discharge.

The Interim Government of Somalia shall cooperate and fulfil the required duties and coordination regarding the safety of the vessels heading to Mogadiscio seaport. The Government shall guarantee the security of the seaport.

(Signed) Ali Mahdi MOHAMED
President of Somalia

B. Letter dated 1 March 1992 from Abdi Osman Farah, Vice Chairman of the United Somali Congress addressed to Mr. Arthur Holdbrook, World Food Programme Representative in Somalia

Following our conversation concerning the use of the Mogadiscio port by the World Food Programme, we are happy to inform you that USC welcomes the calling on the port by your ships too.

Following your proposal concerning the use of the Mogadiscio port facilities for the purpose of unloading the humanitarian assistance, we are happy to inform you that USC accepts your request to reopen the port to unload the food aid.

USC further informs you that it will provide security protection for your personnel and the food; moreover, USC has no objection to the provision of food to every part of the city.

(Signed) Abdi Osman FARAH
Vice Chairman of the United Somali Congress

Annex V

A. Food supplies delivered by the World Food Programme since 23 January 1992

The following table provides a list of the food supplies delivered by the World Food Programme in Somalia since the adoption of Security Council resolution 733 (1992) on 23 January 1992.

Food already supplied to Somalia

Month	Quantity (tons)	Destination	Delivered by
January	600	Adale	ICRC
January	700	Merka	ICRC
February	800	Merka	ICRC
February	800	Berbera	CARE/German Emerg. Doct.
February	2 100	Kismayo	ICRC
March	2 000	Kismayo	ICRC

Plans for future supplies

For Mogadiscio - 9,000 tons for 3 months

For Somalia for 1992 - 113,000 tons

B. Food and non-food supplies delivered by the United Nations Children's Fund since 23 January 1992

The following table provides a list of the food and non-food supplies delivered by the United Nations Children's Fund in Somalia since the adoption of Security Council resolution 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992.

Supplies delivered to Somalia

	Other				Total
	Medical	Food	non-med. a/	Shelter	
Mogadiscio south	140	19	7	13	179
Mogadiscio north	5	5	4	3	17
Kismayo	<u>1</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>17</u>
Total tonnage	<u>146</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>213</u>

a/ Other non-medical supplies include generators, water and sanitation equipment, fuel, etc.

Total value: US\$1.3 million

Figures for north Somalia yet to be included.

Future plans

Plans are under way to fly in medical supplies and equipment, supplementary food and shelter material worth US\$2.3 million for distribution to Mogadiscio and the rest of Somalia over the next three months.

Document 10

Security Council resolution supporting the Secretary-General's decision to send a technical team to Somalia

S/RES/746 (1992), 17 March 1992

The Security Council,

Considering the request by Somalia for the Security Council to consider the situation in Somalia, 1/

Reaffirming its resolution 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 11 March 1992 2/ on the situation in Somalia,

Taking note of the signing at Mogadishu on 3 March 1992 of the cease-fire agreements, 3/ including agreements for the implementation of measures aimed at stabilizing the cease-fire through a United Nations monitoring mission,

Deeply regretting that the factions have not yet abided by their commitment to implement the cease-fire and thus have still not permitted the unimpeded provision and distribution of humanitarian assistance to the people in need in Somalia,

Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering caused by the conflict and concerned that the continuation of the situation in Somalia constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Bearing in mind that the factors described in paragraph 76 of the Secretary-General's report must be taken into account,

Cognizant of the importance of cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in the context of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Underlining the importance which it attaches to the international, regional and non-governmental organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, continuing to provide humanitarian and other relief assistance to the people of Somalia under difficult circumstances,

Expressing its appreciation to the regional organizations, including the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, for their cooperation with the United Nations in the effort to resolve the Somali problem,

1. *Takes note with appreciation* of the report of the Secretary-General of 11 March 1992 on the situation in Somalia, 2/

2. *Urges* the Somali factions to honour their commitment under the cease-fire agreements signed at Mogadishu on 3 March 1992, 3/

3. *Urges* all the Somali factions to cooperate with the Secretary-General and to facilitate the delivery by the United Nations, its specialized agencies and other humanitarian organizations of humanitarian assistance to all those in need of it, under the supervision of the Coordinator mentioned in resolution 733 (1992);

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to pursue his humanitarian efforts in Somalia and to use all the resources at his disposal, including those of the relevant United Nations agencies, to address urgently the critical needs of the affected population in Somalia;

5. *Appeals* to all Member States and to all humanitarian organizations to contribute to and to cooperate with these humanitarian relief efforts;

6. *Strongly supports* the Secretary-General's decision urgently to dispatch a technical team to Somalia, accompanied by the Coordinator, in order to work within the framework and objectives outlined in paragraphs 73 and 74 of his report and to submit expeditiously a report to the Security Council on this matter;

7. *Requests* that the technical team also develop a high-priority plan to establish mechanisms to ensure the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance;

8. *Calls on* all parties, movements and factions in Mogadishu in particular, and in Somalia in general, to respect fully the security and safety of the technical team and the personnel of the humanitarian organizations and to guarantee their complete freedom of movement in and around Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia;

9. *Calls upon* the Secretary-General to continue, in close cooperation with the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, his consultations with all Somali parties, movements and factions towards the convening of a conference for national reconciliation and unity in Somalia;

10. *Calls upon* all Somali parties, movements and factions to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General in the implementation of the present resolution;

11. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter until a peaceful solution is achieved.

1/ *Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-seventh Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1992*, document S/23445.

2/ *Ibid.*, document S/23693 and Corr.1.

3/ *Ibid.*, annexes III and IV.

Document 11

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia, recommending the establishment of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM); first addendum (Add.1) includes Consolidated Inter-agency 90-Day Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia

S/23829, 21 April 1992, and addenda: S/23829/Add.1, 21 April 1992, and S/23829/Add.2, 24 April 1992

Introduction

1. At its 3060th meeting, on 17 March 1992, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 746 (1992) concerning the situation in Somalia. The full text of the resolution reads as follows:

The Security Council,

Considering the request by Somalia for the Security Council to consider the situation in Somalia (S/23445),

Reaffirming its resolution 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia (S/23693),

Taking note of the signing of the cease-fire agreements in Mogadishu on 3 March 1992, including agreements for the implementation of measures aimed at stabilizing the cease-fire through a United Nations monitoring mission,

Deeply regretting that the factions have not yet abided by their commitment to implement the cease-fire and thus have still not permitted the unimpeded provision and distribution of humanitarian assistance to the people in need in Somalia,

Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering caused by the conflict and concerned that the continuation of the situation in Somalia constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Bearing in mind that the factors described in paragraph 76 of the Secretary-General's report (S/23693) must be taken into account,

Cognizant of the importance of cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in the context of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Underlining the importance which it attaches to the international, regional and non-governmental organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, continuing to provide humanitarian and other relief assistance to the people of Somalia under difficult circumstances,

Expressing its appreciation to the regional organizations, including the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, for their cooperation with the United Nations in the effort to resolve the Somali problem,

1. *Takes note with appreciation* of the report of the Secretary-General;

2. *Urges* the Somali factions to honour their commitment under the cease-fire agreements of 3 March 1992;

3. *Urges* all the Somali factions to cooperate with the Secretary-General and to facilitate the delivery by the United Nations, its specialized agencies and other humanitarian organizations of humanitarian assistance to all those in need of it, under the supervision of the coordinator mentioned in resolution 733 (1992);

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to pursue his humanitarian efforts in Somalia and to use all the resources at his disposal, including those of the relevant United Nations agencies, to address urgently the critical needs of the affected population in Somalia;

5. *Appeals* to all Member States and to all humanitarian organizations to contribute to and to cooperate with these humanitarian relief efforts;

6. *Strongly supports* the Secretary-General's decision urgently to dispatch a technical team to Somalia, accompanied by the coordinator, in order to work within the framework and objectives outlined in paragraphs 73 and 74 of his report (S/23693) and to submit expeditiously a report to the Security Council on this matter;

7. *Requests* that the technical team also develop a high priority plan to establish mechanisms to ensure the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance;

8. *Calls on* all parties, movements and factions in Mogadishu in particular, and in Somalia in general, to respect fully the security and safety of the technical team and the personnel of the humanitarian organizations and to guarantee their complete freedom of movement in and around Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia;

9. *Calls upon* the Secretary-General of the United Nations to continue, in close cooperation with the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab

States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, his consultations with all Somali parties, movements and factions towards the convening of a conference for national reconciliation and unity in Somalia;

10. *Calls upon* all Somali parties, movements and factions to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General in the implementation of this resolution;

11. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter until a peaceful solution is achieved.

2. The present report is submitted pursuant to the above resolution.

3. Immediately following the adoption of the above resolution, I brought its contents to the attention of the Somali factions as well as to Member States, humanitarian organizations and the Secretaries-General of the League of Arab States (LAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).

4. In accordance with paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, I appointed, on 20 March 1992, Mr. David Bassiouni as Coordinator to oversee the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance of the United Nations and its specialized agencies to the affected population in all parts of Somalia in liaison with the other international humanitarian organizations.

5. On 20 March 1992, I also appointed a 15-member Technical Team to visit Somalia, accompanied by the Coordinator, in order to work within the framework and objectives outlined in paragraphs 73 and 74 of my earlier report to the Security Council. 1/ The Technical Team was led by Mr. Robert Gallagher and included representatives from LAS, OAU, OIC and from a non-governmental organization.

The cease-fire in Mogadishu

6. The cease-fire agreed to by the two factions in Mogadishu came into effect on 3 March 1992. After about a month of relative calm, the cease-fire was violated by the resumption of fighting between some units belonging to the two factions. However, the leaders of the two factions moved quickly to stop the fighting and to re-establish the cease-fire.

7. Since then, there has been little, if any, fighting between the two factions in Mogadishu. However, some sporadic shooting and incidents of apparent banditry by armed elements not under the control of either faction have been reported. The frequency of such incidents themselves has decreased appreciably during the past several weeks.

8. The cease-fire in Mogadishu has created a new and positive political climate which has made it possible for representatives of the two factions in Mogadishu to

meet in the context of the agreement and arrangements concluded with them by the joint delegation last March. On 12 April, representatives of the two factions met face to face for the first time at United Nations offices in Mogadishu to discuss the formation of a joint committee for relief assistance, under the chairmanship of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance. Similarly, the chiefs of staff of the two factions have also met in connection with the monitoring of the cease-fire and the agreements reached on ensuring the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to all in need in and around Mogadishu.

9. Despite the favourable developments in Mogadishu and its environs, I am very concerned about the increased fighting and the deteriorating security situation in the northern part of the country. The situation in the southern part of the country also continues to be tense and the potential for fighting among the contending factions and groups is also a matter of grave concern. Taking these developments into account, the Security Council may wish to consider calling for a general cease-fire throughout the country. Such action by the Security Council, in addition to helping to bring to an end the fighting in the different parts of the country, would create a situation conducive to the convening of a conference on national reconciliation and unity in Somalia.

Activities of the Technical Team

10. The Technical Team assembled in Nairobi on 21 March 1992, and held discussions the following day with representatives of the United Nations agencies and of non-governmental organizations operating in Somalia.

Consultations in Mogadishu

11. The Technical Team arrived in Mogadishu on 23 March and held separate meetings with General Mohamed Farah Aidid, Chairman of the United Somali Congress (USC), and Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed. During these meetings, the Technical Team discussed with the two parties the objectives of its mission pursuant to Security Council resolution 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992. It also drew the attention of the two parties to paragraphs 3 and 8 of the resolution, by which the Security Council urged them to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Somalia and to respect fully the security and safety and guarantee the complete freedom of movement of the Technical Team and the personnel of the humanitarian organizations in Mogadishu.

12. General Aidid stated that USC was observing the cease-fire and reiterated the reservation of his faction to the stationing of a peace-keeping force in Mogadishu or to any identifiable United Nations military presence. He

1/S/23693 and Corr.1

called on the international community to provide humanitarian assistance, especially food for distribution by USC.

13. On his part, Interim President Mohamed emphasized that it was impossible for security and stability to be realized in Mogadishu without a large contingent of a United Nations peace-keeping force. He said that without such a United Nations military presence, the cease-fire would not hold and effective distribution of food and other supplies would not be possible.

14. Following further discussions with the Technical Team, the two leaders signed on 28 and 27 March 1992, respectively, Letters of Agreement on the mechanisms for monitoring the cease-fire and arrangements for equitable and effective distribution of humanitarian assistance in and around Mogadishu (annexes I A and I B). Also attached is a document submitted by Interim President Mohamed (annex I C).

15. Subsequent to the signing of the Agreements, the Technical Team travelled to Hargeisa on 29 March. It met separately with Mr. Abdirahman Ahmed Ali, President of the self-proclaimed Republic of Somaliland, and a group of Elders led by Sheik Ibrahim Sheik Yusuf Sheik Madder, the Chief of the Constitutional Elders, as well as with a group of Colonels of the army of the Somali National Movement (SNM).

16. Both Mr. Ahmed Ali and the Elders stated that the entire northern region of Somalia was in need of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development. They said that assistance was also needed to facilitate the demobilization of the army of SNM to help establish security and stability in the region (see annexes II A and II B). Attached also is a document submitted by the Minister of Planning and Development of the self-proclaimed Republic of Somaliland (annex II C).

17. Owing to the deteriorating security situation in Berbera, it was not possible for the Technical Team to visit that city.

18. The Technical Team was also unable to visit Bossasso. However, General Mohamed Abshir Musse, the Chairman of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), met the Technical Team in Djibouti on 29 March. The General stated that the north-eastern part of the country was relatively calm but was in need of rehabilitation, development and humanitarian assistance. He raised the question of the need for food assistance to armed elements to help maintain peace and stability in the region. On 29 March 1992, General Abshir Musse signed an Agreement (annex III A). Also annexed is a document submitted by SSDF (annex III B).

19. On 31 March, in Kismayo, the Technical Team met with General Aden Abdillahi Gabieou, Chairman of the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), and General Mo-

hamed Said Hersi (Morgan), Commander of the Armed Forces of SPM. The Technical Team also met with the Elders of the area. In addition to requesting humanitarian assistance, the Elders called on the United Nations to help in achieving a comprehensive cease-fire throughout Somalia. The agreement signed by General Aden Abdillahi Gabieou is annexed (annex IV A). A separate agreement was signed by the Elders (annex IV B).

20. On the same day, the Technical Team met with a delegation representing former President Siad Barre. The delegation stated that the south-western region of Somalia had been ignored despite the existence of many displaced people and starvation in the area. It urged the United Nations to send a mission to the area.

21. During its stay in Somalia, the Technical Team also met with representatives of non-governmental organizations in the country.

Monitoring of the cease-fire and delivery of humanitarian assistance

22. The agreements reached in Mogadishu with Interim President Mohamed and General Aidid (annexes I A and I B) require the United Nations:

- (a) To deploy United Nations Observers to monitor the cease-fire;
- (b) To deploy United Nations security personnel to protect its personnel and safeguard its activities in continuing to provide humanitarian and other relief assistance in and around Mogadishu.

23. I have thought carefully about the type of personnel which would be best equipped to perform these two functions, taking into account the following factors:

- (a) The traditions of United Nations observer missions (which are specifically referred to in the Agreements);
- (b) The nature of the tasks to be performed;
- (c) The security conditions in Mogadishu;
- (d) The concerns of the Governments which would be asked to make the necessary personnel available to serve in the United Nations operations in Somalia;
- (e) The views expressed to the Technical Team by its interlocutors in Mogadishu.

I have also borne in mind that under the Agreements the United Nations is to consult with the parties before determining the number of security personnel required for the protection function.

24. As regards the monitoring of the cease-fire, there is no doubt, on the basis of the long experience of the United Nations, that this is a function for which

military skills are required. Only military officers are trained to assess and interpret the positions and moves of the forces of the two sides, to conduct the necessary investigations when violations of the cease-fire occur and to reach convincing conclusions about where responsibility lies and how future violations can be avoided. Military skills are also required to enable observers to operate in potential battle zones and take care of their own safety, without unnecessarily impairing their ability to carry out their tasks. I conclude that the cease-fire in Mogadishu should be monitored, in the traditional United Nations manner, by a group of military observers. They would be 50 in number, in accordance with the agreements.

25. These observers would form mobile teams, each consisting of three observers with one vehicle. In the existing conditions in Mogadishu, their ability to undertake mobile patrols would depend on the security situation. Initially, they would all be based in the headquarters of the United Nations mission. Once the security conditions had improved, the observers would be grouped in observation posts located in the vicinity of the headquarters or other offices of the two parties and, in some cases, at United Nations agency or non-governmental organization sites, taking into account the situation on the ground, the security of the military observers and their need for tolerable living conditions.

26. In accordance with the agreements, 25 of the observers would be stationed on one side of Mogadishu and 25 on the other. As is normal in such missions, they would not be armed and would wear their national uniforms with United Nations insignia. It would be the responsibility of the forces of the two sides to ensure their security at all times. Indeed the mission's ability to carry out its mandate would, to a large extent, depend on such cooperation from the two parties. Discussions were also initiated by the technical mission to obtain such cooperation from other groups and the point will be pursued if the Security Council decides to establish the mission recommended in the present report.

27. As regards humanitarian assistance, the security personnel envisaged in the Agreements would be required to provide security for United Nations personnel, equipment and supplies at the port of Mogadishu and to escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies from there to distribution centres in Mogadishu and its immediate environs. They would also, as necessary, provide security for United Nations personnel, equipment and supplies at the airports in Mogadishu. In this case also, I have come to the conclusion that these tasks require military skills and training.

28. The threat to United Nations activities both at the port of Mogadishu and elsewhere in the city comes from a variety of armed elements—many of whom are

not under the control of any political authority—and who have been attempting to control food supplies in the capital. The United Nations security personnel will not have any law-and-order responsibilities *vis-à-vis* these armed elements. Their task will be to provide the United Nations convoys of relief supplies with a sufficiently strong military escort to deter attack and to fire effectively in self-defence if deterrence should not prove effective.

29. The Technical Team recommended accordingly that the security personnel should take the form of infantry organized in the normal manner. They would be based at Mogadishu port and would undertake their patrols in light vehicles, with a small armoured car element being held in reserve in the port to be used in case of emergencies. The infantry would wear national uniform with United Nations insignia and would be armed. It is estimated that a strength of approximately 500 all ranks would be required but, as noted above, the agreements require that the two parties be consulted about this figure before the plan is finalized.

30. Given the lack of suitable accommodation in Mogadishu at the present time, as well as security considerations, the security personnel would as far as possible be accommodated on a ship which would perform the functions of a base camp, including the provision of logistic support to the mission.

31. The above arrangements represent the requirement for Mogadishu. Should it be decided to undertake similar functions elsewhere in Somalia, additional personnel would be required.

32. In addition to the observers and security personnel, the mission would require the usual civilian administrative support services, headed by a Chief Administrative Officer. Its vehicles would have distinctive United Nations colours and markings. It would require its own telecommunications links for internal and external communications. Under present conditions in Mogadishu it is unlikely that the parties would be able to provide the mission with goods and services required for the implementation of its mandate. They have, however, undertaken to give its personnel full and unrestricted freedom of movement within the areas they control.

33. If the Security Council decides to set up a mission on the lines described above, I would recommend that it be known as the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and be under the command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General, under the authority of the Security Council. Command of UNOSOM in the field would be entrusted to a Commanding Officer with the rank of Brigadier-General, who would be appointed by the Secretary-General after consultation with the two parties and with the consent of the Security Council. The Commanding Officer would report to the

Secretary-General in the manner recommended in paragraph 64 below. The Secretary-General would report regularly to the Security Council on all matters relating to the scope and efficient functioning of UNOSOM. The military personnel of UNOSOM would be contributed by Governments of Member States at the request of the Secretary-General, after consultation with the parties and with the approval of the Security Council.

Humanitarian assistance

34. Security Council resolution 746 (1992) also requested that the Technical Team develop a high-priority plan to establish mechanisms to ensure the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance. As a result of this request and after consultations with relevant United Nations agencies, the Technical Team has established mechanisms to implement the Mogadishu portion of an initial 90-day Plan of Action as well as arrangements to facilitate delivery of humanitarian assistance to other parts of the country. (The Plan is issued as an addendum to the present report.)

35. The need for effective coordination and a commitment to collaboration are of particular importance in the type of crisis prevalent throughout most of Somalia today. It is for that reason that I had instructed the United Nations agencies involved in the delivery of relief assistance to Somalia to work closely with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and non-governmental organizations in drawing up the 90-day Plan of Action.

36. The Plan forms the basis for immediate action to deliver food and non-food relief assistance to an estimated 1.5 million people most immediately at risk. In addition, the Plan also targets assistance for a further 3.5 million people who are in need of food, seeds and basic health and water services. This latter group includes many thousands of soldiers and other armed groups who will be assisted through multifaceted disarmament and demobilization programmes so that they can be reintegrated into civilian life. The present crisis facing the people of Somalia also has regional consequences as already evidenced by the flow of refugees from Somalia into Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia and there are grave concerns about the effect such population movements will have on the Horn of Africa.

37. The estimates of populations to be assisted have been included in the Plan. Also built into the Plan is a process of relief programme evaluations as well as inter-agency/non-governmental organization assessments. These will be used to update requirements and to identify new areas of need.

38. Implementation of the Plan, as well as the continuity of expanded humanitarian relief and recovery

efforts, require that United Nations agencies expand their presence throughout Somalia, under the United Nations Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance in Somalia based in Mogadishu. The World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) have made great efforts to build up their programmes over the past six months. This new phase of expansion of United Nations activities will require not only the active involvement of the United Nations Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance in Somalia in emergency relief and recovery operations, but also the establishment of offices throughout the country where the United Nations will be providing humanitarian assistance. In this connection, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is providing full direct support to the United Nations Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance in Somalia in the form of staff, office accommodation, administrative and logistical backstopping, including aircraft. The United Nations Volunteers programme is currently planning to make available up to 50 experts in the field of logistics, communications, health care and agricultural services to support the humanitarian effort in Somalia.

39. Although the present security situation in Mogadishu remains precarious, the needs of almost 700,000 people, 250,000 of whom are displaced and a further 80,000 representing highly vulnerable groups, make the provision of humanitarian assistance of paramount importance. Hence, over the next 90 days, WFP and ICRC will take the lead in shipments of food to the port of Mogadishu, while UNICEF, the World Health Organization (WHO), ICRC and non-governmental organizations will provide increased supplies of non-food assistance. As regards WFP, food assistance will arrive at the port of Mogadishu as soon as arrangements recommended by the Technical Team are in place or conditions in the area of Mogadishu are deemed propitious by the United Nations Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance in Somalia for food aid deliveries and distribution. It is anticipated that the WFP/CARE free food distribution programme will also be used by authorities to undertake demobilization activities, and to enhance the security arrangements that will enable continuous and unimpeded supplies of relief assistance. Precise modalities still need to be formulated and agreed. If the security situation in and around Mogadishu is adequate and "corridors" and "zones of peace" are respected, UNICEF, WHO, ICRC and non-governmental organizations will also seek to increase their non-food relief activities.

40. In other areas of the country, United Nations agencies, ICRC and non-governmental organizations will collaborate closely not only on means to provide emergency relief assistance to affected populations, but also to generate, wherever possible, economic recovery and to

promote demobilization and disarmament programmes. In this regard, economic recovery must be seen as part of the mechanisms essential to promote stability throughout the country. Without seeds, tools, and livestock revitalization programmes, hundreds of thousands of Somalis will have no recourse [other] than to seek sustenance and security across borders.

41. In the central region, ICRC has expressed its intention to continue to provide assistance to the displaced and other highly vulnerable groups through the coastal ports of Merca, Adale and Obbia, while UNICEF will supply health education materials, as well as materials for health facilities and equipment. In the north-west of Somalia, the Plan includes not only food assistance, but also the establishment by UNDP and UNICEF of basic school facilities, and the creation by WHO of health training programmes. De-mining programmes at present supported by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) will be supplemented by UNDP in the very near future.

42. UNHCR has pre-positioned food and other supplies in preparation for repatriation programmes for Somali refugees returning from Ethiopia as well as complementing the work of non-governmental organizations and other agencies in the rehabilitation of essential services in the health and water sectors. Revitalization of north-eastern Somalia's livestock trade is essential if affected populations are to escape dependency upon relief, and hence, the Plan will provide through the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and ICRC means to ensure the quality of livestock for export. In the south-east of the country, an increasing number of displaced people require basic relief assistance, and here, United Nations agencies, ICRC and non-governmental organizations intend to cover a range of food and non-food needs.

43. These initiatives will incorporate the needs of those groups, such as 250,000 Bantu people, who have no affiliation with traditional clan structures. Of rapidly growing concern are the estimated 200,000 Somalis who now have gathered in south-western Somalia along the Somali-Kenya border. Assistance through ICRC, UNHCR and non-governmental organizations will be essential to help stop the exacerbation of their plight.

44. There are important basic economic programmes incorporated into the Plan which address the particular needs of Somali youth and women. Throughout the Plan, emphasis is also placed upon providing assistance in part through traditional clan structures. This would require conventional forms of accountability to be reconsidered. On their part, the Somali clan leaders must recognize the responsibility which the international community has placed upon them.

45. The effectiveness of the 90-day Plan of Action and subsequent emergency relief and recovery programmes will be determined by all parties' observance of basic principles of international humanitarian assistance. Therefore, it must be fully recognized that distribution of relief assistance will be based upon equity and need, and in no way bound by political or geographical considerations. Furthermore, it must be accepted that designated "corridors" as well as "zones of peace" must be maintained to ensure the passage and distribution of food and non-food assistance. Thus, the inviolability of United Nations-flagged ships, aircraft and relief convoys and protection of relief workers passing to and through designated corridors to zones of peace is a fundamental prerequisite. These zones include seaports, airports and areas in which United Nations and non-governmental organization activities are under way. Finally, these principles should be understood as incorporating the activities and security of all non-governmental organizations providing humanitarian assistance.

46. It should be noted that the implementation of this Plan will fundamentally depend not only upon adequate security within Somalia, but also upon the provision of sufficient resources by the international community to fund its activities.

Arms embargo

47. In my previous report to the Council, 1/ I provided information on measures being taken to implement a general and complete embargo on deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia. I reported to the Council that notwithstanding replies received from 68 Governments stating that they were strictly observing the arms embargo, both factions in Mogadishu had claimed that the other side was receiving arms from some of the countries in the region. Since my last report, a further 14 replies have been received from Governments, which have been issued as documents of the Security Council. 2/

48. However, various reports indicate that arms continue to flow into the country. In view of this, the Security Council might wish to consider putting into place the appropriate arrangements for the monitoring of the arms embargo.

49. In addition, there is a pressing need to recover the enormous number of small and medium-sized arms which are already in the hands of the civilian population throughout Somalia, and particularly in Mogadishu. My representatives have twice raised with Interim President Mohamed and General Aidid the possibility of arrange-

2/ S/23701, S/23707, S/23711, S/23713, S/23718, S/23719, S/23720, S/23725, S/23739, S/23746, S/23747, S/23748, S/23750 and S/23778.

ments under which the United Nations could exchange arms for food, i.e., individuals or groups who voluntarily handed in their weapons and ammunition would receive food in exchange. This has always struck me as an imaginative way of tackling the two most acute problems facing the people of Somalia today, namely the threat of famine and an almost total breakdown of law and order. It would, however, have to be managed as an addition to, and not a substitute for, existing programmes for delivery of humanitarian relief to those in need.

50. Programmes for the provision of supplementary humanitarian assistance could be initiated for those armed individuals who agree voluntarily to surrender their weapons. Arrangements could also be made for the subsequent destruction of the weapons. It is my intention to continue the discussions on this subject and I shall keep the Council informed of my efforts.

National reconciliation

51. In addition to my endeavours regarding the cease-fire and the imperative need to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of Somalia, I have throughout continued to pursue efforts for national reconciliation in Somalia as called for in paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 746 (1992), and have, to this end, kept in contact with LAS, OAU and OIC.

52. In my last report, I informed the Council that in addition to discussing the matter with the leaders of the two factions in Mogadishu, the joint delegation that visited Somalia in late February and early March had also held consultations on this matter in Kismayo and in Nairobi with representatives of the Somali National Front (SNF), SPM, the United Somali Party (USP), SSDF and the Somali National Democratic Union (SNDU) and with several other Somali groups and individuals.

53. Since then, my representatives and I have had further discussions on this matter with the Somali factions, groups and movements. Earlier this month, I also had consultations in New York with Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary-General of OAU, on ways and means of expediting the arrangements for convening a conference on national reconciliation and unity in Somalia.

54. During the Security Council's consideration of the situation in Somalia on 17 March 1992, the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, speaking on behalf of General Ibrahim Babangida, President of Nigeria and current Chairman of OAU, expressed his country's readiness to host the conference in Abuja under the auspices of the United Nations, LAS, OAU and OIC. Subsequently, in a letter dated 19 March 1992 addressed to me, the Foreign Minister stated that his Government was prepared to provide the necessary transportation for

the representatives of the Somali factions, groups and movements who would participate in the conference.

55. In order to achieve further progress on this matter, it will be necessary to continue efforts to assist the various parties, movements and factions to agree among themselves on their representation to the conference on national reconciliation. My efforts, and those of my representatives, will continue to give high priority to this aspect as well as to the modalities for the convening of the conference, including its agenda, participation and venue.

Observations

56. The situation in Somalia continues to be of great concern to the international community. There is hardly any governmental infrastructure in the country that could be relied upon. Physical infrastructure, such as transport, water, electricity, telephone communications, is also largely non-existent. Banditry is widespread and there is wide proliferation of weapons. The crisis in Somalia has regional consequences, as is already evidenced by the flow of Somali refugees to neighbouring countries, and there are grave concerns about the destabilizing effects it could have on the Horn of Africa.

57. The cease-fire in Mogadishu arranged between Interim President Mohamed and General Aidid in March is holding, although sporadic shooting and incidents of apparent banditry are putting a strain on it. The port of Mogadishu and the international airport are in the control of groups not under the command of either major faction. Although clans and sub-clans claim to be in control of certain areas, definitive military or paramilitary organizations at the clan or sub-clan level are almost non-existent.

58. As I pointed out in my report of 11 March 1992 to the Security Council, the tragic situation in Somalia, with its extraordinary complexities, has so far eluded conventional solutions. The need to expand ongoing humanitarian assistance calls for the exploration of innovative methods, commensurate with the humanitarian and political situation. In this regard, the Security Council's decision to relate the modalities of a cease-fire to the implementation of humanitarian relief operations is noteworthy.

59. The threat of dramatic food shortages amongst particularly vulnerable groups is becoming increasingly acute. The lack of clean water, primary health care services and control of communicable diseases is exacerbating the crisis. Owing to the persistent efforts of non-governmental organizations, supported in part by United Nations agencies, some basic health, water and disease control services have been provided, but these efforts need to be intensified. Access to the main ports and acceptance

of the principle of "corridors" and "zones of peace" would enable the United Nations and non-governmental organizations to provide more humanitarian assistance.

60. Although the difficulties of providing relief assistance are fully recognized, the prevailing crisis in Somalia poses a paradox which must be addressed: without security, relief assistance programmes will continue to be severely constrained; but without relief assistance programmes, the prospects for security are at best precarious. Therefore, the necessity of providing humanitarian assistance even before the full complement of United Nations security personnel and cease-fire modalities are in place must be emphasized. However, I wish to emphasize to all parties in Somalia that an expanded United Nations relief effort cannot be authorized without assurances from them for the security of United Nations relief workers and supplies. I appeal to all parties to honour agreements made with the Technical Team to facilitate the expanded delivery of humanitarian assistance and ensure the safe passage of all those engaged in the provision of humanitarian assistance.

61. I attach great importance to the Plan submitted by the agencies. I am convinced that with the cooperation of all concerned, the Plan would provide a sound basis for meeting the request of the Security Council for a high-priority plan to establish mechanisms to ensure the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance.

62. After careful consideration of the situation, I recommend to the Security Council to consider establishing a mission along the lines described in paragraphs 22 to 33 above. This will be for an initial period of six months.

63. I shall circulate shortly an addendum to the present report which will contain the preliminary cost estimate for UNOSOM.

64. As regards national reconciliation, keeping in mind the consideration mentioned in paragraphs 51 to 55 above and the need to expedite matters in this regard, I intend to appoint a Special Representative for Somalia to assist me in the consultations and arrangements for the convening of a conference on national reconciliation and unity in Somalia, in close cooperation with the regional organizations. The Special Representative will also provide overall direction to the United Nations activities recommended in this report including those directed at economic recovery and rehabilitation, as well as demobilization and disarmament programmes in Somalia. The Commanding Officer and the Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance will carry out their duties under the supervision of the Special Representative and will report through him to the Secretary-General. However, at times when the Special Representative is not present in Somalia, each of them will report direct to Headquarters, while

maintaining the closest possible cooperation in the field. Finally, I wish to reiterate my appreciation to the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of the Islamic Conference for their continued cooperation and support for my efforts to resolve the problem in Somalia, and for agreeing to send representatives to Somalia to work closely with their counterparts from the United Nations.

Annex I

A. *Letter of 27 March 1992 from General Mohamed Farah Aidid, Chairman of the United Somali Congress, to the United Nations*

Whereas in March 1992, I, General Mohamed Farah Aidid, Chairman, United Somali Congress, by letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations acknowledged receipt of the Security Council resolution on Somalia (746/(1992)) by which the Security Council

Urges the Somali factions to honour their commitment under the cease-fire agreements of 3 March 1992;

Urges all Somali factions to cooperate with the Secretary-General and to facilitate the delivery by the United Nations, its specialized agencies and other humanitarian organizations of humanitarian assistance to all those in need of it, under the supervision of the coordinator mentioned in resolution 733 (1992);"

Whereas in that letter to the Secretary-General, I, General Mohamed Farah Aidid, expressed our deep appreciation to the United Nations and regional organizations for their concern about the problems in Somalia and their efforts to assist Somalia in order to overcome them;

Desirous to cooperate with the Secretary-General of the United Nations in implementing the cease-fire agreements of 3 March 1992 and to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all in need of it in Somalia;

I, General Mohamed Farah Aidid, do hereby agree that

A. In accordance with the agreement on the implementation of the cease-fire signed 3 March 1992, and in the spirit of

"implementation of the measures aimed at stabilizing the cease-fire by means of a United Nations monitoring mechanism", to

1. The deployment of up to twenty-five (25) observers to each of north and south Mogadishu; and the employment of those observers in accordance with the

traditions of United Nations observer missions; that is to say, to monitor without interference the terms of the cease-fire agreement;

2. Ensure the security of all United Nations observers within my area of influence;

3. The maintenance of law and order within my area of influence as it might affect the freedom and movement of the United Nations observers in their assigned area of responsibility;

4. Provide the United Nations observers with any and all assistance in the investigation of any violation of the cease-fire; and

5. The formation of a cease-fire monitoring team comprising nine members equally distributed among the two sides and the United Nations, for the purpose of addressing issues directly related to the cease-fire;

B. "Underlining the importance which (the Security Council) attaches to the international, regional and non-governmental organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, continuing to provide humanitarian and other relief assistance to the people of Somalia under difficult circumstances"; to

6. Ensure adequate security in and around the Mogadishu port area and handling facilities and management within the port;

7. Ensure the efficient equitable distribution of food and non-food assistance to areas of Mogadishu under my influence and its environs, and that the seaport, airport, hospitals, non-governmental organizations' locations and necessary routes be considered as zones of peace;

8. The deployment of adequate United Nations security personnel to protect its personnel and safeguard its activities, the number to be determined by the United Nations in consultation with the parties when the plan is formalized;

9. Entrust the United Nations with the task of equitable distribution of food and non-food assistance based on need;

10. The formation of a joint committee composed of nine members equally divided among the parties and the United Nations, to be chaired by the United Nations and meet at United Nations premises for the purpose of addressing issues directly related to effective distribution of humanitarian aid;

C. The role of regional and intergovernmental organizations

11. Regional and intergovernmental organizations, such as the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic

Conference, will assist the United Nations in the implementation of this agreement where possible;

D. Immediate delivery of food supply

12. Upon signing this agreement, the United Nations undertakes to land at Mogadishu port approximately 12,000 tons of food and non-food assistance as soon as possible. The United Nations further undertakes that as soon as security is reasonably assured it will encourage its agencies as well as the non-governmental organizations to resume their projects for rehabilitation and development of Somalia.

(Signed) General Mohamed Farah AIDID
Chairman, United Somali Congress

Witnessed by

Robert GALLAGHER

for the United Nations Technical Mission to Somalia including representatives of the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference

B. *Letter of 28 March 1992 from Ali Mahdi Mohamed, Interim President of Somalia, to the United Nations*

Whereas in March 1992, I, Ali Mahdi Mohamed, Interim President of Somalia, by letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations acknowledged receipt of the Security Council resolution on Somalia (746 (1992)) by which the Security Council

"Urges the Somali factions to honour their commitment under the cease-fire agreements of 3 March 1992;

"Urges all Somali factions to cooperate with the Secretary-General and to facilitate the delivery by the United Nations, its specialized agencies and other humanitarian organizations of humanitarian assistance to all those in need of it, under the supervision of the coordinator mentioned in resolution 733 (1992);"

Whereas in that letter to the Secretary-General, I, Ali Mahdi Mohamed, expressed our deep appreciation to the United Nations and regional organizations for their concern about the problems in Somalia and their efforts to assist Somalia in order to overcome them;

Desirous to cooperate with the Secretary-General of the United Nations in implementing the cease-fire agreements of 3 March 1992 and to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all in need of it in Somalia;

I, Ali Mahdi Mohamed, do hereby agree that

A. In accordance with the agreement on the implementation of the cease-fire signed 3 March 1992, and in the spirit of

“implementation of the measures aimed at stabilizing the cease-fire by means of a United Nations monitoring mechanism”, to

1. The deployment of up to twenty-five (25) observers to each of north and south Mogadishu; and the employment of those observers in accordance with the traditions of United Nations observer missions; that is to say, to monitor without interference the terms of the cease-fire agreement;

2. Ensure the security of all United Nations observers within my area of influence;

3. The maintenance of law and order within my area of influence as it might affect the freedom and movement of the United Nations observers in their assigned area of responsibility;

4. Provide the United Nations observers with any and all assistance in the investigation of any violation of the cease-fire; and

5. The formation of a cease-fire monitoring team comprising nine members equally distributed among the two sides and the United Nations for the purpose of addressing issues directly related to the cease-fire;

B. “Underlining the importance which (the Security Council) attaches to the international, regional and non-governmental organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, continuing to provide humanitarian and other relief assistance to the people of Somalia under difficult circumstances”; to

6. Ensure adequate security in and around the Mogadishu port area and handling facilities and management within the port;

7. Ensure the efficient equitable distribution of food and non-food assistance to areas of Mogadishu under my influence and its environs, and that the seaport, airport, hospitals, non-governmental organizations’ locations and necessary routes be considered as zones of peace;

8. The deployment of adequate United Nations security personnel to protect its personnel and safeguard its activities, the number to be determined by the United Nations in consultation with the parties when the plan is formalized;

9. Entrust the United Nations with the task of equitable distribution of food and non-food assistance based on need;

10. The formation of a joint committee composed of nine members equally divided among the parties and the United Nations, to be chaired by the United Nations and meet at United Nations premises for the purpose of

addressing issues directly related to effective distribution of humanitarian aid;

C. The role of regional and intergovernmental organizations

11. Regional and intergovernmental organizations, such as the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, will assist the United Nations in the implementation of this agreement where possible;

D. Immediate delivery of food supply

12. Upon signing this agreement, the United Nations undertakes to land at Mogadishu port approximately 12,000 tons of food and non-food assistance as soon as possible. The United Nations further undertakes that as soon as security is reasonably assured it will encourage its agencies as well as the non-governmental organizations to resume their projects for rehabilitation and development of Somalia.

(Signed) Ali Mahdi MOHAMED

Interim President of Somalia

Witnessed by

Robert GALLAGHER

for the United Nations Technical Mission to Somalia including representatives of the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference

C. Document submitted by Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed

(1)

Somali Republic

Office of the President

25 March 1992

Somalia, from its birth as a nation, has had an historic traditional relationship with the United Nations. Pursuing that remarkable relationship which our people acknowledge, we are still confident that the United Nations will continue assisting Somalia specially today that our people are going through a very critical period. The assistance our people need today is much broader than anything compared to the past history. However, we are hereby extending an appeal to the United Nations and the entire free world to urgently send to Somalia an international contingent in order to save this nation from total destruction. With the help of the United Nations, Somalia needs peace to reign in the whole country and bring back the constitutional order to effectively work.

If, as per our request, the United Nations decides to agree to sending us that contingent, such forces should be

from NATO-EEC countries or from the League of Arab States, OAU and OIC. The proposed contingent will be performing their tasks in Mogadishu and surrounding areas at the first stage and then it will be utilized to restore stability in the entire country. We suggest that the contingent must have the below-indicated military equipment:

1. A mechanized infantry brigade (on APC) consisting of 2,500 men with their supporting elements and logistics unit.
2. Two light armoured cavalry regiments of 1,000 men.
3. A tank battalion (54 M60 tanks) with about 250 men.
4. One self-propelled artillery battalion composed of 6 pieces of 155 mm 109 and 12 pieces of 105 mm with 200 men.
5. A small air wing group composed of:
 - (a) 4-6 helicopter gunships,
 - (b) 2-4 small aircraft.

The total number of the forces should be 4,500 men.

(2)

Responsibilities and division of the forces

- One mechanized infantry battalion shall occupy Halane Military School and its duty shall be to secure the security and safety of the airport, the Military Aviation Garrison, the fuel depot and the Gezira Power Station.
- A mechanized infantry battalion shall occupy the Military Navy Garrison (inside the old port) and their duty shall be to assure the security of the seaport, Central Bank and the Post and Telecommunication Building.
- A mechanized infantry battalion shall occupy National Police Headquarters and their duty shall be to assure the security of Radio Mogadishu, the State House (Villa Somalia) and the Central Power Station.
- One armoured cavalry regiment will occupy the Military Academy and its duty shall be to ensure the security of the radio transmitter station and the water wells of both Afgoi and Balad.
- One light armoured cavalry regiment with a tank company shall occupy Deganley (28 kilometres north of Mogadishu) and its duty shall be to ensure the security, order and stability of the triangle Mogadishu-Afgoi-Balad and shall constitute to perform the Capital's external defence.
- An artillery group and a tank battalion (less a company) shall be located respectively in the first and second Artillery and Tank Garrisons. This team shall be reserve for the Division Command.

- A small air wing group shall be located in the military aviation garrison and shall also be a reserve team for the Division Command.

(Signed) Ali Mahdi MOHAMED

Interim President of the Somali Republic

Annex II

A. *Letter of agreement addressed by Abdirahman Ahmed Ali to the United Nations on 29 March 1992*

Whereas I, Abdirahman Ahmed Ali, am cognizant of the appeal by the United Nations for factions in my country to establish conditions of peace and stability and for all factions to cooperate with the Secretary-General to facilitate the delivery by the United Nations, and its specialized agencies and other humanitarian organizations, of humanitarian assistance to all those in need of it, under the supervision of the Coordinator;

Whereas I, Abdirahman Ahmed Ali, express our deep appreciation to the United Nations and regional organizations for their concern about the problems in my country and their efforts to assist my country in order to overcome them;

Desirous to cooperate with the Secretary-General of the United Nations facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all in need of it in my country;

Underlining the importance which the United Nations attaches to the international, regional and non-governmental organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, continuing to provide humanitarian and other relief assistance to the people of my country under difficult circumstances:

I, Abdirahman Ahmed Ali, *do hereby agree to:*

1. Commit myself to work for peace and stability in my country;
2. Ensure adequate security in and around the seaport area and handling facilities and management within the port;
3. Ensure the efficient equitable distribution of humanitarian assistance to areas under my influence and its environs, and that the seaport, airport, hospitals, non-governmental organizations' locations and necessary routes be considered as zones of peace placed under the protection of the United Nations;
4. Commit myself to a fair and equitable distribution of humanitarian assistance based on need in cooperation with the United Nations and other humanitarian organizations;
5. The formation of a joint committee composed of representatives of all regions, equally divided among them and the United Nations, to be chaired by the United Nations and meet at United Nations premises for the

purposes of addressing issues directly related to effective distribution of humanitarian aid;

The role of regional and intergovernmental organizations

6. Regional and intergovernmental organizations, the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference will assist the United Nations in the implementation of this agreement where possible;

7. Upon signing this agreement, the United Nations undertakes in association with its agencies and other humanitarian organizations to provide unimpeded humanitarian assistance as soon as possible. The United Nations further undertakes that as soon as security is reasonably assured it will encourage its agencies as well as the non-governmental organizations to resume their projects for rehabilitation and development of my country:

(Signed) Abdirahman Ahmed ALI

Witnessed by:

Robert GALLAGHER

for the United Nations Technical Mission to Somalia including representatives of the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference

B. *Letter of agreement addressed by Sheik Ibrahim Sheik Yusuf Sheik Madder, Chief of the Constitutional Elders, to the United Nations on 29 March 1992*

Whereas I, Sheik Ibrahim Sheik Yusuf Sheik Madder, am cognizant of the appeal by the United Nations for factions in my country to establish conditions of peace and stability and for all factions to cooperate with the Secretary-General to facilitate the delivery by the United Nations, and its specialized agencies and other humanitarian organizations, of humanitarian assistance to all those in need of it, under the supervision of the Coordinator;

Whereas I, Sheik Ibrahim Sheik Yusuf Sheik Madder, express our deep appreciation to the United Nations and regional organizations for their concern about the problems in my country and their efforts to assist my country in order to overcome them;

Desirous to cooperate with the Secretary-General of the United Nations in facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all in need of it in my country;

Underlining the importance which the United Nations attaches to the international, regional and non-governmental organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, continuing to provide hu-

manitarian and other relief assistance to the people of my country under difficult circumstances:

I, Sheik Ibrahim Sheik Yusuf Sheik Madder, Chief of the Constitutional Elders, *do hereby agree to:*

1. Commit myself to work for peace and stability in my country;

2. Ensure adequate security in and around the seaport area and handling facilities and management within the port;

3. Ensure the efficient equitable distribution of humanitarian assistance to areas under my influence and its environs, and that the seaport, airport, hospitals, non-governmental organizations' locations and necessary routes be considered as zones of peace placed under the protection of the United Nations;

4. Commit myself to a fair and equitable distribution of humanitarian assistance based on need in cooperation with the United Nations and other humanitarian organizations;

5. The formation of a joint committee composed of representatives of all regions, equally divided among them and the United Nations, to be chaired by the United Nations and meet at United Nations premises for the purposes of addressing issues directly related to effective distribution of humanitarian aid;

The role of regional and intergovernmental organizations

6. Regional and intergovernmental organizations, the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference will assist the United Nations in the implementation of this agreement where possible;

7. Upon signing this agreement, the United Nations undertakes in association with its agencies and other humanitarian organizations to provide unimpeded humanitarian assistance as soon as possible. The United Nations further undertakes that as soon as security is reasonably assured it will encourage its agencies as well as the non-governmental organizations to resume their projects for rehabilitation and development of my country.

(Signed) Sheik Ibrahim Sheik Yussef Sheik MADDER
Chief of the Constitutional Elders

Witnessed by:

Robert GALLAGHER

for the United Nations Technical Mission to Somalia including representatives of the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference

C. *Situation report on Somaliland (27 March 1992)*

SNM started the fight against the dictatorship in 1981, and continued the struggle until its downfall in 1991.

After the SNM took control of the whole north (referred to here as Somaliland) in February 1991, there have been two very important developments without which the creation of Somaliland would have been still-born.

1. The clan reconciliation meeting at Berbera

All clan leaders were invited on 27 March 1991 to attend a conference at Berbera, to air their grievances and hopes. This very historic meeting served to give a signal that all clans in Somaliland crave peace after such a long civil strife in which tens of thousands lost their lives and property, and whose traumatic experiences haunt even today all sections of the community, army, civilian, both young and old alike. The elders decided after due deliberation that there should be reconciliation between SNM supporters and non-supporters; that the communities pursue their respective grievance against each other through peaceful process and good-neighbourliness. This meeting has shown both the Somali traditional method of governance and the clan elders' role at their best.

2. Elders meeting adjoined with scheduled central committee meeting

After an important clan elders meeting took place in Burao in May 1991, a scheduled central committee conference followed to discuss and approve the clan elders' pivotal resolution:

The rebirth of Somaliland as an independent state

The elders had earlier meticulously sought the advice of their constituents, underlining the political importance of the decision. The elders reported as had been confirmed by mass demonstrations in the main towns, the overwhelming support of the majority of Somaliland people for the rebirth of sovereign Somaliland. The central committee duly approved the measure and officially declared Somaliland as an independent state as of 16 May 1991. Ten days later, 26 May 1991, the central committee voted for the chairman of SNM, Mr. Abdirahman Ahmed Ali, as the first President of the newly born state. Mr. Hassan Essa Jama was voted as his first Vice-President; 17 cabinet ministers with portfolios going to all the main clans of Somaliland. There had been grumbles, even then, from certain politicians whose aspirations have not been met, which could contribute in due course to the formation of opposition factions. However, the majority of the people of Somaliland were supportive of the government,

euphoric with the heady fruits of freedom. A criticism against the policy of the government was seen as a sign of disrespect for Somaliland and was roundly condemned. The government succeeded, with the vital help of the public and clan elders, to improve the security and well-being of all persons and their properties. Guns were rarely seen on the main streets of major cities, and robberies were drastically curtailed. A foreign observer would have noticed the significant and upward swing of the chances of Somaliland as a viable state:

The improvement in security;

The movement of goods and people between the region;

The smooth re-establishment of vital trade in live-stock to Gulf States which earned at least six million United States dollars in the first six months after independence;

The freedom of the opposition to air their views in public places, the radio and immediately proliferating local newspapers;

The improved relations with neighbouring countries in the region and the Horn. All boded well for Somaliland.

These achievements, though basic, would be very significant considering the constraints under which Somaliland laboured. The virtual destruction of the country's economy and infrastructure; the almost total lack of government resources, material and manpower; the hundreds of thousands of unemployed youth; the substantial reduction of the remittances for most Somaliland families from the Gulf; the slow international humanitarian assistance; the high expectation of the public and promises of largesse after independence, all worked against Somaliland.

Despite all these major obstacles, the people were starting to rebuild their homes, the markets were flourishing and most people were hopeful of a fresh start in their brutally disrupted lives. But even at this early stage, observers warned of the fragility of peace which was pivotal for the survival of Somaliland as a state.

They cited the increasing number of spontaneous returnees cracking on the back of an already overburdened system; the lack of agreement on methods of demobilization and the creation of a small and responsive loyal national army; the signs of a deepening disillusionment among the unpaid government employees, i.e., teachers, doctors, etc.; which manifested itself in the increasing number of absentees as the virtual desertion of some ministries.

Present security situation of Somaliland

The security situation in Somaliland has seriously deteriorated recently after an initial period of relative stability. The first cracks in the stability of the country appeared during the heavy factional fighting in the central major town of Burao in early January 1992, which led to the evacuation of the majority of its population. This incident coincided and in a sense heralded a tense period on the whole bloodless, confrontation between armed clan-based factions at Berbera and elsewhere. These were followed by the looting of stocks of food, medical supplies, equipment, etc., belonging to United Nations agencies and international NGOs at Berbera port. The lawlessness spread to other parts of the country and was dramatized by the looting of vehicles belonging to NGOs at Hargaisa and in certain cases the breaking into their premises and sacking of their homes. There has been also increasing incidence of harassment of commercial vehicles plying the roads between major towns. So far, however, except for the Burao incident there has been minimal loss of life and private property and commerce is still protected by an unwritten but tribal understanding. Needless to say, if the present anarchy and confrontational, factional politicking continues, as it is all likely to do, there will ensue a lot of bloodshed and human suffering of the greatest magnitude.

Factors that led to the breakdown of security of Somaliland

The present deterioration of security in Somaliland arose out of complex, interacting social, economic and historical reasons which, *inter alia*, include the following:

- The proliferation of heavily armed clan militia. The youth who are predominant in these militia have been traumatized by years of bloody conflict and the peculiar brutalities of civil war. They have missed their schooling and normal upbringing and now face a bleak future of joblessness and redundancy. Their unrealistically high expectation of the "spoils" of victory have been dashed and as a result they are bitter and determined to settle scores with their guns for material gain, disregarding traditional values such as sanctity of life and property.
- The presence of vast quantities of arms of all sizes and description, the legacy of the dictatorship's policy of stockpiling of arms.
- The clan system is the mainspring of Somali culture and identity. It has been useful in its traditional, pastoral setting and even today it is an instrument of survival during times of deep trouble and provides a safety net for the poorest and most vulnerable. However, it has its negative dark side and is in a sense irreconcilable with a modern, democratic

state. Clan politicking is playing havoc with Somaliland security and stability at present.

- The total and almost unprecedented destruction of the economy and infrastructure of an already extremely underdeveloped country (Somaliland) is and shall continue to be a destabilizing factor, specially in combination with other socio-political crises, as is the case at present.
- It has proven difficult to establish a government or central authority in Somaliland. Though the people are committed to peace and the sovereignty of Somaliland and deeply yearn for stability and normality, it has not been possible so far to establish a viable system of government. This has been due to many factors, some of them mentioned above, and others include the lack of stabilizing institutions, the absolute lack of financial resources and the legacy of the dictatorship which destroyed both traditional values and the people's belief in government as well as the self-respect and morale of the professional cadres.
- The lack of meaningful and massive response from the international community at the time when the devastated country had miraculous though relative stability had been most unfortunate and in a sense contributed to the present crisis, not the least because of the high expectations of the people that had been dashed. Timely intervention then, in strengthening the capacity of the government and the demobilization process could conceivably have averted the present crisis, though admittedly the task was daunting even then.

Recommendations

The most critical problem facing the country at the present is securing the peace, which is a precondition to the tackling of the multitude of socio-economic crises besetting Somaliland. Due to the magnitude of destruction that has occurred and the bewildering complexity of socio-economic problems that mostly originated from the long bloody civil conflict and the excesses of the dictatorship, it is impossible to secure the peace without a massive and determined intervention of the international community. We therefore appeal to the United Nations to help us in the demobilization process in which feeding the Mujaahidiin is an integral part.

Specific recommendations

The Government of Somaliland had wholeheartedly tried several times to form a national army, even though all these have not materialized due to the lack of resources, mainly food for those who attend the camps.

The Government hereby requests the following measures of assistance in order to ensure peace and stability:

1. Delivery of food for peace for the security forces and police.
2. Provision of an expert on demobilization to assist the army commanders in the process of demobilization.
3. That the United Nations assists the government in the project of demobilizing.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) Mohamed Abdi DHINBIL (Galbeedi)
Minister of Planning and Development

Annex III

A. *Letter of agreement addressed by General Mohamed Abshir Musse, Chairman of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), to the United Nations on 29 March 1992*

Whereas I, General Mohamed Abshir Musse, am cognizant of the appeal by the United Nations for factions in my country to establish conditions of peace and stability and for all factions to cooperate with the Secretary-General to facilitate the delivery by the United Nations, and its specialized agencies and other humanitarian organizations, of humanitarian assistance to all those in need of it, under the supervision of the Coordinator;

Whereas I, General Mohamed Abshir Musse, express our deep appreciation to the United Nations and regional organizations for their concern about the problems in my country and their efforts to assist my country in order to overcome them;

Desirous to cooperate with the Secretary-General of the United Nations in facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all in need of it in my country;

Underlining the importance which the United Nations attaches to the international, regional and non-governmental organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, continuing to provide humanitarian and other relief assistance to the people of my country under difficult circumstances:

I, General Mohamed Abshir Musse, Chairman of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), do hereby agree to:

1. Commit myself to work for peace and stability in my country;
2. Ensure adequate security in and around the seaport area and handling facilities and management within the port;

3. Ensure the efficient equitable distribution of humanitarian assistance to areas under my influence and its environs, and that the seaport, airport, hospitals, non-governmental organizations' locations and necessary routes be considered as zones of peace placed under the protection of the United Nations;

4. Commit myself to a fair and equitable distribution of humanitarian assistance based on need in cooperation with the United Nations and other humanitarian organizations;

5. The formation of a joint committee composed of representatives of all regions, equally divided among them and the United Nations, to be chaired by the United Nations and meet at United Nations premises for the purposes of addressing issues directly related to effective distribution of humanitarian aid;

The role of regional and intergovernmental organizations

6. Regional and intergovernmental organizations, the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference will assist the United Nations in the implementation of this agreement where possible;

7. Upon signing this agreement, the United Nations undertakes in association with its agencies and other humanitarian organizations to provide unimpeded humanitarian assistance as soon as possible. The United Nations further undertakes that as soon as security is reasonably assured it will encourage its agencies as well as the non-governmental organizations to resume their projects for rehabilitation and development of my country.

(Signed) Mohamed Abshir MUSSE
Chairman of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front

Witnessed by:

Robert GALLAGHER

for the United Nations Technical Mission to Somalia including representatives of the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference

B. *Letter of 29 March 1992 from SSDF Chairman Mohamed Abshir Musse*

SSDF position on peace and national reconciliation in Somalia

The Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) welcomes the current initiatives and mediation efforts of the international community, and particularly the United Nations, OAU, Arab League and OIC. The SSDF urges the United Nations and the three regional organizations

to take more positive action, including direct intervention in peace-keeping, political mediation and management.

The Somali civil war, one of the most murderous and destructive communal strifes in recent memory, has claimed over 100,000 lives; resulted in more than a million starving internal refugees and about 600,000 external refugees since January 1991; it fragmented the country into unviable rebel "republics" and regions; and it caused the total disintegration of all state institutions, infrastructure and socio-economic life of the Somali people. This disaster was brought about by the 21 years of misrule, corruption and clan promotion of Dictator Mohamed Siyad Barre's regime in Somalia.

The Somali crisis is more complex than the international community seems to appreciate. With all the goodwill and necessary dedications, the Somalis are unlikely to resolve the crisis soon by themselves alone. Many Somali national leaders took the initiative on various occasions in an effort to tackle the conflict or conflicts and to bring about peace and reconciliation in Somalia.

But all their efforts were sabotaged and frustrated by tens of thousands of fully armed bandits, ex-convicts/criminals, street-boys and renegade ex-Siyad Barre soldiers, whose business and livelihood is the gun and who are for hire to the highest bidder, work as part-time mercenaries, for power-hungry military officers in all the regions of the country.

It is in consideration of the above and because of a deep knowledge of the culture, traditions and politics of the country as well as a realistic assessment of the impact of the civil war on the people and institutions that the SSDF reached the conclusions contained in this and the attached letters which have been submitted to the United Nations Secretary-General and the Secretaries-General of the OAU, Arab League and OIC. Furthermore, we wish to reconfirm the SSDF position on peace, national reconciliation and relief provision in the following summary:

1. On national reconciliation

- SSDF strongly believes in peaceful solution to the crisis through dialogue and reconciliation.
- The SSDF calls for the convening of an all-embracing National Reconciliation Conference at the earliest possible date under the auspices of the United Nations and the three regional organizations as an essential step for the achievement of a lasting peaceful solution to the Somali problem.
- In view of the close similarity of the Somali crisis to that of Cambodia and the United Nations precedent there, we strongly recommend the United Nations to seriously consider the Cambodian solution as one of the most practical options for Somalia. The National Conference would, therefore, discuss, among other issues:

- (a) The formation of a National Provisional Council;
- (b) The restoration of law and order;
- (c) Official request for a United Nations peace-keeping force and United Nations-managed Transitional Authority in the Cambodian model, and consistent with the sovereignty, cultural and religious values of the Somali nation; and
- (d) An international appeal for relief and rehabilitation.

2. On peace and stability in Somalia and in the Horn

- SSDF supports the call for immediate cease-fire in Mogadishu and wherever else there is fighting in the country.
- SSDF urges the deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping force in Mogadishu and other current and potential trouble spots in the country. We consider such action as indispensable in the effective establishment of peace and stability in all the regions of Somalia by disarming the tribal, factional and renegade armed militias and bandits, and assisting in the formation of a national security police force.
- We believe the peace, stability and economy as well as successful relief activities of the nations of the Horn of Africa are very much interdependent. No one country or region can by itself achieve much progress in isolation of the others. SSDF wishes, therefore, to suggest to the international community to consider the practical benefits of a regional approach along the national, especially now when there is no enmity among the nations in the region.

3. On the fighting in Mogadishu and the national capital

- We are deeply concerned of the bloodshed and misery in the national capital, Mogadishu, resulting from the continued and destructive fighting there and urge the parties to the conflict to maintain the cease-fire and settle their differences through dialogue and in the wider framework of the national reconciliation process.
- However, the international community and the other national parties should bring combined pressure against any defiant and uncompromising party in Mogadishu and be made to bear the serious consequences.
- And if Mogadishu is to remain the national capital of Somalia, it must be accorded new demilitarized and national status free from any clan or tribal claims.

4. *On emergency relief*

- Following the total disruption, disintegration and massive displacement over all Somalia, millions of people are starving inside and outside refugee camps both inside and outside Somalia. Isolated areas in north-eastern, central and south-western regions suffer even more.
- We, as SSDF, are very concerned at recent worrying statements on relief for Somalia by the United Nations and other members of the international community to the effect that the supply of relief to the Somali people was to be conditional on cessation of hostilities in Mogadishu. This statement was unfortunate and unfair. The antagonists in Mogadishu do not represent all the people and all the regions of Somalia and the whole nation is not responsible for the actions of a couple of warlords.
- We appeal to the United Nations agencies, donor nations, NGOs and the international community as a whole to rush relief supplies for the starving and malnourished millions in Somalia on an emergency basis. We further urge that all future relief supplies BE DISTRIBUTED FAIRLY AND EQUITABLY to all regions of the country, which has not been the case so far. Unbalanced and biased distribution of relief may cause unnecessary clan and regional antagonism and suspicion and could, consequently, complicate the search for peace and stability.

5. *On rehabilitation and reconstruction*

- In the event peace and order is hopefully restored in the near future, the more daunting task of rebuilding the totally destroyed and destitute nation remains to be tackled. Somalia does not have the necessary resources—financial or know-how—to rebuild.
- SSDF proposes, therefore, that the United Nations appoint an Administrator General, preferably a Muslim, to head a two/three-year Transitional Authority along the lines of Cambodia, to be appointed for Somalia.
- A Transitional Authority could also enhance Somali national unity as it would most likely encourage and save face for the people of “Somaliland” to rescind from their secession stand. They would see a United Nations Administrator General as neutral and impartial, also removing their main fear of “Southern Domination”, particularly during the period of transition when emotion and suspicion is still high.

Yours faithfully,
SOMALI SALVATION DEMOCRATIC FRONT

(Signed) Mohamed Abshir MUSSE
SSDF Chairman

Enclosures:

1. Copy of a letter to the United Nations Secretary-General dated 20/01/92.
2. Copy of a letter to the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, OAU, Arab League and OIC dated 10/03/92.

Annex IV

- A. *Letter of agreement addressed by General Aden Abdillahi Gabieou, Chairman of the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), to the United Nations on 31 March 1992*

Whereas I, General Aden Abdillahi Gabieou, am cognizant of the appeal by the United Nations for factions in my country to establish conditions of peace and stability and for all factions to cooperate with the Secretary-General to facilitate the delivery by the United Nations, and its specialized agencies and other humanitarian organizations, of humanitarian assistance to all those in need of it, under the supervision of the Coordinator;

Whereas I, General Aden Abdillahi Gabieou, express our deep appreciation to the United Nations and regional organizations for their concern about the problems in my country and their efforts to assist my country in order to overcome them;

Desirous to cooperate with the Secretary-General of the United Nations in facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all in need of it in my country;

Underlining the importance which the United Nations attaches to the international, regional and non-governmental organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, continuing to provide humanitarian and other relief assistance to the people of my country under difficult circumstances:

I, General Aden Abdillahi Gabieou, Chairman SPM (Somali Patriotic Movement), *do hereby agree to:*

1. Commit myself to work for peace and stability in my country;
2. Ensure adequate security in and around the seaport area and handling facilities and management within the port;
3. Ensure the efficient equitable distribution of humanitarian assistance to areas under my influence and its environs, and that the seaport, airport, hospitals, non-governmental organizations' locations and necessary routes be considered as zones of peace placed under the protection of the United Nations;
4. Commit myself to a fair and equitable distribution of humanitarian assistance based on need in coop-

eration with the United Nations and other humanitarian organizations;

5. The formation of a joint committee composed of all regions equally divided among them and the United Nations, to be chaired by the United Nations and meet at United Nations premises for the purposes of addressing issues directly related to effective distribution of humanitarian aid;

The role of regional and intergovernmental organizations

6. Regional and intergovernmental organizations, the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference will assist the United Nations in the implementation of this agreement where possible;

7. Upon signing this agreement, the United Nations undertakes in association with its agencies and other humanitarian organizations to provide unimpeded humanitarian assistance as soon as possible. The United Nations further undertakes that as soon as security is reasonably assured it will encourage its agencies as well as the non-governmental organizations to resume their projects for rehabilitation and development of my country:

(Signed) Aden Abdillahi GABIEU

Witnessed by:

Robert GALLAGHER

for the United Nations Technical Mission to Somalia including representatives of the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference

B. *Letter of agreement addressed by 1. Bashir Omar Samater, Harti Geri-Meheri Representative, 2. Ahmed Mahamud Ato, Lelkase-Awrtable Representative, 3. Jama Sure, Marehan Representative, 4. Mohamud Ali Duh, Absame Representative, 5. Hagi Osman Hasan, Tunni Representative, to the United Nations on 31 March 1992*

Whereas we, 1. Bashir Omar Samater, 2. Ahmed Mahamud Ato, 3. Jama Sure, 4. Mohamud Ali Duh, 5. Hagi Osman Hasan, are cognizant of the appeal by the United Nations for factions in our country to establish conditions of peace and stability and for all factions to cooperate with the Secretary-General to facilitate the delivery by the United Nations, and its specialized agencies and other humanitarian organizations, of humanitarian assistance to all those in need of it, under the supervision of the Coordinator;

Whereas we, Bashir Omar Samater, Ahmed Mahamud Ato, Jama Sure, Mohamud Ali Duh, Hagi Osman Hasan, express our deep appreciation to the United Nations and regional organizations for their concern about the problems in our country and their efforts to assist our country in order to overcome them;

Desirous to cooperate with the Secretary-General of the United Nations in facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all in need of it in our country;

Underlining the importance which the United Nations attaches to the international, regional and non-governmental organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, continuing to provide humanitarian and other relief assistance to the people of our country under difficult circumstances:

We, Bashir Omar Samater: Harti Geri-Meheri Representative

Ahmed Mahamud Ato: Lelkase-Awrtable Representative

Jama Sure: Marehan Representative

Mohamud Ali Duh: Absame Representative

Hagi Osman Hasan: Tunni Representative do hereby agree to:

1. Commit ourselves to work for peace and stability in our country;

2. Ensure adequate security in and around the seaport area and handling facilities and management within the port;

3. Ensure the efficient equitable distribution of humanitarian assistance to areas under our influence and its environs, and that the seaport, airport, hospitals, non-governmental organizations' locations and necessary routes be considered as zones of peace placed under the protection of the United Nations;

4. Commit ourselves to a fair and equitable distribution of humanitarian assistance based on need in cooperation with the United Nations and other humanitarian organizations;

5. The formation of a joint committee composed of all regions equally divided among them and the United Nations, to be chaired by the United Nations and meet at United Nations premises for the purposes of addressing issues directly related to effective distribution of humanitarian aid;

The role of regional and intergovernmental organizations

6. Regional and intergovernmental organizations, the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab

States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference will assist the United Nations in the implementation of this agreement where possible;

7. Upon signing this agreement, the United Nations undertakes in association with its agencies and other humanitarian organizations to provide unimpeded humanitarian assistance as soon as possible. The United Nations further undertakes that as soon as security is reasonably assured it will encourage its agencies as well as the non-governmental organizations to resume their projects for rehabilitation and development of our country.

(Signed) Bashir Omar SAMATER
(Signed) Ahmed Mahamud ATO
(Signed) Jama SURE
(Signed) Mohamud Ali DUH
(Signed) Haji Osman HASAN

Witnessed by:

Robert GALLAGHER

for the United Nations Technical Mission to Somalia including representatives of the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference

Addendum (S/23839/Add.1, 21 April 1992)

Consolidated inter-agency 90-day Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia

Introduction

1. The integrated Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia, covering a 90-day period, sets out the modalities and inputs required for the accelerated and expanded delivery of urgent humanitarian assistance to people in all parts of Somalia. The Plan has been compiled within the context of resolution 746 (1992) which was adopted by the Security Council on 17 March 1992.

2. In that resolution, the Security Council strongly supported the Secretary-General's decision to dispatch urgently to Somalia a United Nations technical team to prepare an operational plan for the monitoring of the cease-fire agreement between the two factions engaged in conflict at Mogadishu. In the same resolution, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to pursue his humanitarian efforts in Somalia and to use all the resources at his disposal, including those of the relevant United Nations agencies, to address urgently the critical needs of the affected population.

3. In view of the severe security constraints on ongoing relief efforts in many parts of Somalia, the Secretary-General requested the Technical Team to look into possible mechanisms to ensure the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to people in need. To facilitate this action, the Technical Team included the Secretary-General's Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia, two representatives from the Department of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat and a representative from the non-governmental organization (NGO) community.

4. The Team, which was dispatched to Somalia from 23 March to 1 April 1992, visited Mogadishu,

Kismayo and Hargeisa and met with the authorities and clan leaders from north-east Somalia and from the south-west of the country. A report of the Team's findings has been submitted to the Secretary-General (S/23829). The present document describes the current situation in the areas visited and the agreements that were made with the various authorities and clan leaders for the delivery of humanitarian assistance through the collaborative efforts of the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and NGOs.

5. The difficulties of providing relief assistance under prevailing conditions in many parts of Somalia are evident and the safety of relief personnel engaged in humanitarian assistance remains a paramount concern. Nevertheless, given the magnitude of the crisis and its threat to the stability of other countries within the Horn of Africa, no time can be lost in mounting large-scale relief efforts. In this regard, the paradox facing the international community should be noted: without security, relief assistance will continue to be severely constrained, but without relief assistance programmes, the prospects for security are at best precarious.

6. In view of the situation, a pragmatic approach has been adopted in the determination of inputs for the 90-day Plan and modalities for the delivery of assistance. Hence, while emergency relief requirements for the 90-day period have been based on needs assessments undertaken earlier in the year and incorporated into the Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal for the Horn of Africa of 1 February 1992, the Plan has also attempted to provide sufficient quantities of relief food to reduce the risk of further deterioration in the already volatile situ-

ation, as well as to promote the demobilization of large numbers of military personnel.

7. It must be recognized, however, that even with such an approach, the effectiveness of the 90-day Plan will be determined by the observance by all parties of the basic principles of international humanitarian assistance, including parity of relief distributions and safe passage for relief personnel and supplies through designated "corridors" and "zones of peace".

8. To date, there has been only limited financial support from donors for the Somalia portion of the Horn of Africa Appeal. Thus it should be noted that the prompt and generous support of the international community in providing sufficient funds for identified needs is essential. Given the fluidity of circumstances in Somalia, revised needs assessments, within the overall context of the 1 February 1992 Appeal, will need to be carried out during the course of the next three months. Thus the Plan should be seen as part of an ongoing process, which will continue to update needs in targeted areas and identify new needs as they emerge, as well as determine inputs required for longer-term programmes.

I. Background

9. Four years of civil war, against a backdrop of years of neglect and lack of investment in human development, basic services and infrastructure, have left much of Somalia in ruins. Major cities in northern Somalia have been reduced to rubble; houses, public buildings, communications and water systems have been destroyed and an already inadequate health sector has been rendered incapable of providing even the most rudimentary services. Agricultural production and Somalia's vital livestock trade have been crippled and an entire generation of Somali children is growing up without access to education.

10. In the 14 months that have passed since the overthrow of the former President Siad Barre, the situation in many parts of Somalia has continued to deteriorate. There is no functioning Government and political instability prevails throughout the country. The struggle for power, which has resulted in inter-clan and intra-clan conflict, has plunged towns and cities into a nightmare of bloodshed and violence. The disruption that has been caused by prolonged conflict and insecurity has seriously affected normal commercial and foreign aid, including donated food supplies. Consequently, the lives of 1.5 million Somali people are at most immediate risk and 3.5 million more also require some form of relief assistance.

11. At Mogadishu, where intense fighting has continued between the two main factions of the United Somali Congress (USC) since November 1991, a cease-fire agreement was signed in February 1992. The relative

calm in the city, however, is fragile. Gangs of armed men and boys continue to prowl the streets, while other sub-clans and factions remain in control of key installations.

12. In the north, which enjoyed almost 12 months of relative stability in 1991, recent months have seen a worsening security situation and increased banditry. In the south, relief efforts are ongoing but intra-clan rivalry and looting of relief supplies has prevented the expansion of activities. Services are thus inadequate and cannot cope with current needs. In recent months there has been further internal displacement of people. Over 100,000 other Somalis have also crossed the border into Kenya as refugees, placing severe strains on already exhausted camp structures and food supplies.

13. In the midst of the chaos that prevails throughout many areas, ICRC and NGOs, with support from the United Nations, have continued to work alongside Somali doctors, nurses, indigenous NGOs and local United Nations staff to alleviate the plight of those most in need. Over the months, however, banditry and looting have become commonplace, resulting in the deaths of a number of local and expatriate relief staff and further disruption of relief efforts.

II. Current situation

A. Mogadishu

14. At Mogadishu, the recent upsurge in factional conflict between Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and General Mohamed Farah Aidid, Chairman of USC (Hawiye clan), for control of the city and the breakdown of law and order have left over 25,000 people dead or wounded and an estimated 500,000 people totally devoid of even rudimentary services.

15. Following the intervention of the Secretary-General and the signing of a cease-fire agreement by the two parties, a joint mission comprising the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the League of Arab States (LAS) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) was dispatched to Somalia from 29 February to 3 March 1992. An agreement was reached with the two sides for a United Nations technical team to visit Mogadishu to work out modalities for monitoring the cease-fire.

16. Since that time, fighting has subsided and large numbers of people who had fled to the outskirts of the city have taken advantage of the break in hostilities to return to the capital to rebuild their homes. Water and food shortages, along with fuel supplies, however, are acute. In spite of significant amounts of non-food relief assistance, shelter, health care and sanitation services continue to be inadequate.

17. Although some food supplies have been brought into Mogadishu by traders, prices in the markets

are high and beyond the means of most of the population. Relief food distributions have been halted since November 1991, when the intense fighting between the two factions began. In January 1992, 7,000 metric tons of food from the World Food Programme (WFP) stored at the port of Mogadishu were looted. Attempts by WFP on 4 March 1992 to deliver food to the capital had to be aborted following an attack on the WFP vessel in Mogadishu harbour. As a result of continued food shortages, it is now estimated that some 700,000 people in Mogadishu are in need of urgent assistance. Of most concern are the displaced persons still living on the outskirts of the city, those who have recently returned to the capital and a further 80,000 representing highly vulnerable groups.

18. Although most of the diplomatic community evacuated the capital in 1991, seven international and indigenous NGOs are presently operating in Mogadishu. The International Medical Corps (IMC) is working in two hospitals in the south of the city and hopes to expand its activities to the north. Médecins sans frontières - France is involved in war-related surgery, the supply of essential drugs to the city's three main hospitals and to health centres. Save the Children Fund (SCF) of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has established 12 maternal and child health (MCH) clinics, supplementary and therapeutic feeding services and is providing nurses to work in the hospitals.

19. SOS and Comitato Internazionale Sviuppo Populi (CISP), an Italian NGO, are also involved in the health care and feeding of malnourished groups, along with similar assistance provided by indigenous NGOs. ICRC is working closely with the Somali Red Crescent Society and focusing its activities on surgical and medical assistance for the wounded in hospitals on the north and south sides of the city. ICRC has also provided medical, surgical, pharmaceutical and other health-related supplies to hospitals and clinics.

20. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has provided coordination and logistics assistance for United Nations and NGO efforts at Mogadishu and elsewhere in the country through a project executed under the Obligations and Payments System. The total value of the indicative planning figure (IPF) project, which has provided aircraft, consultants and radio equipment, is US\$ 3.6 million. Until the end of 1991, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) had supplied over US\$ 10 million in cash and relief items, mainly to NGOs working in the capital. Since re-establishing its presence at Mogadishu in December 1991, UNICEF, using WFP aircraft on loan from the Sudan, airlifted 256 tons of emergency supplies for people in need on both sides of the city. Some fuel has also been supplied to hospitals in order to maintain essential medical services.

21. As part of the airlift operation, the airstrip in the north of the city was rehabilitated. A major breakthrough was achieved during the operation when UNICEF was able to transport supplies by road from the south to the north of the city for the first time since the conflict erupted. In recent weeks, UNICEF has also established six MCH centres in the capital, with plans to extend such services to areas presently uncovered. In the past three months, the World Health Organization (WHO) has supplied emergency health, surgery and laboratory kits, along with essential drugs and medical supplies to support NGO programmes.

B. Central Somalia

22. Owing to conflict and insecurity, around 120,000 people have fled from Mogadishu and are living in precarious conditions around the small coastal port of Merca, south of the capital. Although the needs of the area are urgent, delivery of relief food assistance has been extremely difficult owing to disruptions caused by armed gangs from Mogadishu. Apart from an indigenous NGO, the Committee Against Hunger, which has established a feeding unit for an estimated 1,000 children and about 300 adults, no other NGOs are currently working in the Merca area.

23. The region of Belet Uen, which lies between the riverine environment of the Shabelle river and the drier regions to the north, is also a major cause for concern. The return over the last year of many thousands of people has placed severe strains on food supplies and the nutritional condition of large numbers of people is extremely poor. Because of not being able to use the port of Mogadishu, ICRC has recently started an airlift of food supplies to alleviate the plight of people in the area. The combined total of people in need of food assistance in the region, including Merca, is estimated to be 500,000.

C. North-west Somalia

24. The north-west suffered greatly in the civil war. Its main city, Hargeisa, once home to over 500,000 people, was abandoned by the population, most of them fleeing to refugee camps in Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. Although many of these people have now returned, some 85 per cent of homes and public buildings in the city were destroyed during aerial and ground bombardment and are no longer habitable. Health care services, water systems, schools and sanitation services, as well as communication and banking systems, were virtually wiped out throughout the region. In addition, hundreds of thousands of mines were laid, particularly in and around Hargeisa and Burao. Along with the vast amounts of unexploded ordnance, they remain a major risk to the lives of both Somalis and relief workers.

25. In many areas of the north, the September-October *Dayir* (short rains) failed, seriously affecting pasture and water availability. Consequently, there has been unusually high mortality of livestock. This has been exacerbated by the spread of diseases owing to the almost complete lack of veterinary care over the last four years. The loss and poor condition of animals threaten the future of a substantial portion of the population. In addition, there was little crop cultivation in 1991 and what was planted largely failed owing to the drought.

26. Although the area saw relative peace for almost a year following the overthrow of Siad Barre, in recent months conditions have seriously deteriorated owing to intra-clan conflict and a subsequent breakdown of law and order. The Government formed by the Somali National Movement (SNM) after its declaration of independence barely controls Hargeisa. Earlier attempts to start demobilizing the army that fought in the civil war have also been interrupted and the armies of the opposing factions are reported to be poised for battle. In January 1992, intra-clan conflict spilled over to Burao, resulting in the displacement of large numbers of people.

27. The return of peace to the region in 1991 led to a relatively large number of NGOs re-establishing their programmes in various areas. SCF (United Kingdom) opened three MCH centres and monetized 2,500 tons of food through market traders, as well as providing seeds and tools. The agency also carried out an important nutritional survey of seven of the major cities in the north and a socio-economic assessment of the rural areas in late 1991. Médecins sans frontières (MSF) of the Netherlands has opened five MCH centres and is assisting two hospitals—one at Burao and one at Sheik—as well as a therapeutic feeding centre.

28. Oxfam (United Kingdom) has undertaken emergency water rehabilitation programmes at Hargeisa and other towns in the north and has assisted in the management of water tankers at Hargeisa. Partner Aid International, working mainly in the Sanaag region, has been involved in agricultural rehabilitation, including the supply of vegetable seeds, pest and disease control and gravity-fed irrigation systems. Handicap International, based at Hargeisa, has provided prosthesis assistance. Other NGOs working in the north-west include Help the Aged International, German Emergency Doctors, Action Aid, COPI (an Italian NGO) and Hands.

29. ICRC has been running a hospital at Berbera, catering mainly to victims of the war, and has provided drugs for other hospitals and veterinary supplies. The running of the hospital was recently handed over to the Somali Red Crescent Society, with assistance from the Norwegian Red Cross. Some food rations have also been provided by ICRC for vulnerable groups.

30. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has maintained a presence in Hargeisa from October 1991 to prepare for its planned repatriation programme for 300,000 returnees from refugee camps in eastern Ethiopia. Although large numbers of people have already returned spontaneously from these camps, the official repatriation programme has had to be put on hold owing to prevailing security conditions. Preparatory activities have continued, however, with the pre-positioning of food and non-food items in Djibouti for transshipment to north-west Somalia at the appropriate time. To facilitate the return of refugees, UNHCR has supported NGOs in the region with supplies for MCH centres and hospitals. In 1991 UNHCR provided US\$500,000 for the funding of accelerated de-mining efforts, with an additional US\$2.8 million for de-mining activities anticipated in 1992. This is in support of an earlier programme financed by the Government of the United States of America and the European Community (EC) and implemented by MSF (Netherlands). UNDP also plans, with bilateral cost-sharing, to assist with the expansion of de-mining activities in 1992.

31. UNICEF has been active in the north-west since May 1991, mainly in the health, water, sanitation and nutrition sectors. UNICEF has rehabilitated water systems at Hargeisa and Berbera and has carried out immunization programmes, in addition to providing support to international and indigenous NGOs in the rehabilitation of basic health services, including MCH centres. Maternity and paediatric wards of six hospitals have also been assisted. WHO has provided emergency health, surgical and laboratory kits, essential drugs and supplementary feeding materials to hospitals, NGOs and for local health authorities. Health education and training materials were also supplied by WHO to MSF (Netherlands) and SCF (United Kingdom) for the School of Nursing at Hargeisa.

32. WFP, through Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere, Inc. (CARE), has provided food for a monetization programme aimed at making food available at affordable prices and generating cash for rehabilitation projects. Some 6,000 tons out of a proposed 15,000 tons of food assistance for the WFP programme was delivered in 1991. Of this total, 4,500 tons was successfully monetized. The remaining food stocks, however, along with the proceeds of the monetization programme, were looted in February 1992. Following threats to its staff, CARE recently withdrew from the region. In addition, at the end of 1991, 2,518 tons of food was provided by WFP to UNICEF for vulnerable group feeding. Less than 400 tons of these supplies were able to be distributed. The rest was stolen in the escalating incidents of banditry. Between January and March 1992, large numbers of relief

vehicles were stolen, houses and compounds of United Nations and NGOs attacked and looted and warehouses robbed of food aid, medical supplies and water equipment.

D. *North-east Somalia*

33. The north-east region from the port of Bosaso down to the central region, as far as Galcaio, is largely controlled by the Darod/Majerteyn clan. Although the security situation throughout most parts of the north-east has been relatively stable, clashes have occurred in areas south of Galcaio between the controlling north-east party, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and USC. The port of Bosaso, however, has remained active for commercial traffic, with reported off-take of up to 20 trucks a day ferrying supplies to central Somalia, the Ogaden regions of Ethiopia and as far as Mogadishu.

34. Following scant rains in 1991, the area is experiencing severe drought and pasture-land is depleted. This has had serious repercussions on an economy highly dependent on livestock. Owing to poor livestock health and lack of veterinary services, export markets have been lost and there has been a significant drop in the value of animals. In addition, over the course of the past year, hundreds of thousands of Majerteyn clan members have returned to their homeland from other parts of Somalia, particularly from Mogadishu and the south. The displaced persons are placing a heavy burden on an already destitute community. To date, little relief assistance has been delivered to the north-east. Although there was considerable interest in assisting the region in late 1991, UNICEF, WFP/CARE and NGO plans to begin food aid and non-food assistance were halted, following the murder of a UNICEF doctor at Bosaso. Two other relief workers were wounded in the attack.

E. *South-east Somalia*

35. The region of Kismayo and Gelib encompasses both the town of Kismayo and the lower part of the Jubba valley. The Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), mainly Darod clan, claims control of the vast areas from the north (Brava, 75 kilometers from Mogadishu and 300 kilometres from Kismayo), south and west to the Kenya (Liboi) border. However, three separate factions—SSDF, the Somali National Front (SNF) and the United Somali Party (USP)—occupy various areas of the region. No one single party has total control over either the region or Kismayo and there has been intermittent conflict and tension.

36. Although towns and villages were not significantly damaged during the civil war, mass displacements of people have occurred both into and out of the region. While factional fighting resulted in large-scale population movements out of Kismayo, the population of Kismayo

itself has increased from an estimated 50,000 people in 1990 to around 200,000 owing to influxes of displaced, mostly from Mogadishu. Makeshift shelters housing the displaced are scattered throughout the town and on its outskirts.

37. The consequences of mass movements of populations, together with conflict and disruption to agricultural activities, have been catastrophic. The resources of villages and small towns have been exhausted and severe malnutrition is reported in several areas. In some clinics at Kismayo, 80 per cent of the children seen were malnourished—over a third suffering from severe malnutrition. In addition to Somalis, approximately 250,000 people of Bantu origin, without any affiliation to the Somali clans, are also located in the region and are in urgent need of food aid assistance.

38. The health of large numbers of people throughout the region remains a serious concern. Many deaths from malaria, dysentery and tuberculosis have already occurred. Owing to insecurity and banditry, few relief agencies have re-established programmes in the area. Apart from ICRC and some indigenous NGOs, only World Concern, MSF (Belgium) and UNICEF are working at Kismayo and it has not been possible to reach most of the rural areas. World Concern began implementing an emergency health programme in December 1991 and has established two MCHs and seven medical clinics in key locations along the Jubba river and operates a mobile medical dispensary. MSF (Belgium) has established a surgical unit at Kismayo and is planning to extend its operations to Merca. Peace Aid Somalia, a local NGO, runs four camps for the displaced at Kismayo, providing assistance to over 3,000 people. Two other camps, run by the Somali Women's Concern, are assisting 2,000 people.

39. UNICEF has been working at Kismayo since December 1991 and is providing support to ongoing programmes, including those run by indigenous NGOs. In addition to medical supplies for the Kismayo hospital and shelter materials for the displaced, UNICEF has also provided UNIMIX (a high-protein cereal blend) for supplementary feeding programmes through regular airlifts into the city. WHO has provided UNIMIX and emergency health kits in Kismayo for NGO and ICRC programmes.

40. ICRC has been operating at Kismayo since early 1991. In addition to assisting the Somali Red Crescent Society to operate an MCH clinic and an Outpatients Department at the Kismayo hospital, ICRC has been the only agency to deliver food supplies to the region in recent months. Other relief services provided by ICRC include treatment of the war-wounded, sanitation activities, seeds and drug supply. Some 10 tons of seeds have already been supplied along the south coast and a further

90 tons will be delivered along the coastal areas over the next two months. Fishing lines and hooks are also being delivered to 50,000 families along the Jubba River and the Somali coast.

41. North of Kismayo, the enclave of Brava along the coast is essentially cut off from both Mogadishu and Kismayo. The area was severely affected by fighting throughout 1991 and the population is barely surviving on fishing and a very expensive local market. Malnutrition is reported to be severe.

F. *South-west Somalia*

42. Owing to conflict and intra- and inter-clan tensions, large numbers of people have fled to the Liboi/Doble region on the borders of Kenya. Although many have crossed into Kenya as refugees, up to 200,000 people still remain in makeshift shelters along the border areas. ICRC has begun a cross-border feeding operation from Kenya, but given the pressures on refugee camps in Kenya and the need to stanch the refugee flow, the situation remains a major concern. Catholic Relief Services (CRS), which recently fielded a mission to the area, reports that water holes have dried up owing to drought and that cattle are dying. To support ICRC activities in the Liboi area, WHO has supplied ICRC with emergency health kits.

43. The Gedo and Bay areas have been recently visited by ICRC for the first time and a basic assessment has taken place. The area is under the control of the former Head of State, Siad Barre, and there are political complications in terms of access. Of particular concern, however, is the plight of some 20,000 Ethiopian refugees who have remained in the area and are reported by ICRC to be in extremely poor condition.

III. *Modalities for assistance*

44. It is now estimated that the lives of 1.5 million people in various parts of the country are seriously threatened by lack of access to food and health care provision. A further 3.5 million Somalis are also in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. As the need for urgent action increases daily, however, deteriorating security conditions throughout many parts of the country continue to be a major impediment to the delivery and expansion of relief assistance.

45. The high value of food commodities has made the delivery of food aid to people in need particularly problematic and dangerous. Food aid shipments have been attacked and prevented from being discharged at ports; warehouses have been looted and food aid supplies hijacked by armed gangs or at the instigation of local authorities. In the process of trying to deliver food supplies to those in urgent need, a number of relief workers have been killed and injured. In view of the risks

involved, expatriate relief staff have been reduced to a minimum and most relief organizations are no longer prepared to handle food aid assistance.

46. In spite of these severe constraints, the humanitarian crisis facing the people of Somalia must be rapidly addressed and opportunities found to provide assistance to affected groups. As already evidenced by the flow of refugees from Somalia into Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia, the crisis has regional consequences and there are grave concerns about the effects such population movements will have on the Horn of Africa. Measures to encourage Somalis who also might seek refuge in neighbouring countries to stay in their homeland need to be explored as a matter of urgency.

47. Special attention is also needed to address the plight of Somali women who, despite their role as family providers and sources of family stability, have become increasingly exposed to rape and violence. In addition, with the onset of the rainy season in mid-May, the need to accelerate relief efforts to avoid further serious health hazards and spread of communicable diseases amongst an already weakened population is of paramount importance.

48. The safety of relief workers engaged in the provision of humanitarian assistance in the midst of a complete collapse of law and order and continuing conflict remains a major concern. The 90-day Plan thus relies heavily on the recommendations of the Technical Team and has assumed that security measures, including United Nations security personnel, will be quickly put in place to protect relief workers and relief supplies. It also assumes that agreements reached with the various authorities, factions and clan leaders on facilitating relief assistance will be upheld and that the major ports in the country will be accessible. Furthermore, it must be accepted that designated "corridors" and "zones of peace" must be maintained. These zones include ports, airports and areas in which United Nations and NGO activities are under way.

49. Even with such measures and agreements in place, conditions prevailing in Somalia still call for a pragmatic approach. Conventional mechanisms for the delivery of relief assistance no longer exist and in the absence of government structures, maximum use will have to be made of existing local structures and organizations. Traders, who thus far have been able to continue to bring in commercial food supplies, will also be used to deliver food to various parts of the country.

50. The Plan attempts to address the problems of Somalia on a nation-wide basis to reduce the risk of further deterioration in already volatile conditions and to avoid further large-scale population movements in search of food. Distribution of food supplies, in particular, will

be carried out simultaneously in as many areas as possible to lessen the risk of disruptions at distribution sites.

51. Owing to factors already outlined in the present document, ICRC is currently the only relief agency involved in food aid delivery. Modalities used by ICRC to deliver and distribute food rely mainly on the involvement of the traditional clan elders and chiefs, who under the ICRC programme assume responsibility for the collection, transport and distribution of food supplies. In some areas, however, including Mogadishu, clan structures are now either no longer functioning, or have varying degrees of effectiveness. This has meant that other mechanisms to enable food to reach people in need have had to be considered.

52. Within the context of the 90-day Plan, ICRC will collaborate with the United Nations to enable the immediate acceleration and expansion of food assistance. In Mogadishu, both ICRC and WFP, through its implementing partner, CARE International, have agreed to share responsibility for the delivery of food aid assistance. ICRC will continue its ongoing programmes along the coast, including to Kismayo, as well as to Belet Uen and the cross-border operation from Kenya. WFP will provide food for the north-west and north-east Somalia. In addition to food rations for vulnerable groups and displaced persons, supplementary food assistance will be provided for 180,000 people and a further 100,000 soldiers will be targeted for assistance under special demobilization programmes in Mogadishu and the north-west of Somalia.

53. Livestock remain central to the economy of the Somali people and of critical importance is the need to re-establish the livestock trade. Towards this end, quarantine centres in all of the major trading ports are required to enable disease-free animals to be sold at optimum market rates. The success of such centres will depend upon full-scale vaccination campaigns. Some 3,500 tons of seeds will also be required to enable people to resume agricultural production. Although commitments for vegetable seeds appear to cover needs in areas in the north-west of the country, funds are urgently needed to enable the purchase and delivery of cereal seeds.

54. As regards the health sector, even prior to the civil war, Somalia had some of the lowest social and economic indices in the world, characterized by low levels of development, high infant and maternal mortality rates and high levels of dependency upon food aid. The present crisis has exacerbated an already dire situation. In the light of the dramatic movements of people throughout the country and the impact on areas not normally covered by relief efforts, a major thrust of the 90-day Plan will be to expand non-food assistance to previously unserved areas, such as the south-west and central regions.

55. Of the estimated 70 hospitals functioning in Somalia in 1988, only 15 remain operational and these for the most part are totally dependent on external assistance and are predominantly curative in nature. Most have no water, electricity, drugs or even basic medical equipment. Malaria, tuberculosis and vaccination programmes have collapsed, along with the primary health care structure. The most immediate need thus entails the provision of a basic minimum of essential medical supplies as well as materials for the repair and rehabilitation of hospitals and MCH clinics. Salaries and food supplies will be required as incentives to encourage health personnel to return to work. Throughout the country, there is also an urgent need to facilitate the resumption of a semblance of family life amongst those who have been displaced in the crisis, through the supply of shelter materials, clothing and household items.

56. Although some major water rehabilitation programmes have been completed, ongoing projects have had to be suspended owing to insecurity and looting of supplies. In addition, some rural areas have experienced a two-year drought. Fuel, pumps, piping and technical assistance are required to enable water programmes to continue and new projects to be undertaken. Priority must be given to the provision of water supplies to health facilities and in displaced camp settlements. In areas with no existing water sources, it will be necessary to truck water and provide storage tanks, household water containers and fuel. The sanitation situation is also extremely serious throughout the country. Contamination of water sources by human excreta, animal carcasses and refuse poses a major public health threat. Shovels, pick-axes and other supplies will also be required for major clean-up campaigns under the 90-day Plan.

57. Under the present circumstances and given the plethora of authorities that exist in each of the targeted regions, it has become impractical to treat Somalia as one entity. The differing conditions, political and security environment of each of the regions have dictated that specific modalities for the delivery of humanitarian assistance be designed according to the prevailing situation in each of the regions. The following sections provide details of inputs required and modalities for delivery of assistance in the six regions targeted under the 90-day Plan.

A. *Mogadishu*

58. While the present security situation at Mogadishu remains precarious and the cease-fire extremely fragile, the needs of over 700,000 displaced persons and other vulnerable groups in the capital make the provision of humanitarian assistance of paramount importance.

59. To facilitate the resumption of large-scale humanitarian assistance, it was agreed by both USC factions

that the port of Mogadishu would be reopened to enable sufficient relief supplies to reach the capital. Both sides have agreed to ensure efficient and equitable distribution of food and non-food assistance to areas of the city under their influence and that the port, airports, hospitals, NGO locations and routes to and from food and non-food distribution points will be declared "corridors and zones of peace".

60. The two parties also agreed to the deployment of adequate United Nations security personnel to protect United Nations and NGO relief personnel and to the formation of a Joint Relief Committee composed of nine members equally divided among the parties and the United Nations. The Committee will be chaired by the United Nations and will meet on United Nations premises for the purpose of addressing issues directly related to effective distribution of humanitarian assistance.

61. Even with these agreements in place, recent experience has shown that owing to the nature of the shifting and loose coalitions that have been formed by both sides with their forces and the need to factor in other neutral sub-clans and factions, the delivery of relief assistance and in particular food aid is likely to continue to be extremely difficult. Efforts are thus continuing to identify leaders from other sub-clans and factions in Mogadishu in order to enlist their cooperation in the delivery of assistance through the 90-day Plan. The large number of armed gangs that are not controlled by either side and the lack of affordable food in the city also pose very serious problems. Currently, all NGOs, ICRC, Somali Red Crescent Society and the United Nations have to employ large numbers of armed guards to protect their personnel and relief supplies.

62. In view of these factors and based on the recommendations of the Technical Team, United Nations security personnel will be needed for the port and to enable the safe passage of relief personnel and humanitarian supplies through agreed "corridors" and "zones of peace".

63. WFP and ICRC will take responsibility for shipments of food supplies to the port of Mogadishu. As regards WFP food, an initial allocation will arrive at the port as soon as appropriate arrangements for the receipt of the food, storage, handling and distribution are in place. WFP and CARE, in consultation with the Joint Relief Committee, will designate amounts of food for onward transport and delivery to beneficiaries. Food deliveries to the port will be consigned to WFP. CARE will arrange storage and transportation from the port through local transport contracts under the auspices of monitors provided by the Joint Relief Committee.

64. At the district level, local relief committees composed of clan elders, religious leaders and local secu-

rity personnel will undertake food distribution to the predetermined beneficiaries. Distribution of supplies will be undertaken in the displaced camps by the Health Committees that have already been established. Until such a time that a detailed assessment of needs can be carried out, an interim apportionment of food aid will be made to each USC faction. It is anticipated that the WFP/CARE free food distribution programme will be used by the authorities to undertake demobilization activities and to enhance security arrangements. Precise modalities for this programme still need to be formulated and agreed.

65. An estimated 80,000 children will receive supplementary rations, either dry, take-home commodities or wet feeding at MCH centres. A number of additional therapeutic feeding units will need to be established for the severely malnourished.

66. If the security situation in and around Mogadishu is adequate and "zones of peace" are respected, UNICEF, WHO and NGOs will also seek to expand their provision of primary health care, water and communicable disease control programmes, as well as programmes for supplying essential drugs and rehabilitating hospitals. UNICEF will re-establish the municipal water supply system at Mogadishu and NGOs, ICRC and UNICEF will continue their efforts to provide adequate water facilities to displaced camps in and around the city. Given the scarcity of adequate water supplies, some water tankers are needed immediately. Shelter materials also remain priority items since the rains have already begun to fall and many people are still without basic shelter.

67. To reduce costs as much as possible, maximum use will be made of sea and road transport. The port at Mogadishu is technically sound and five of the six berths are open and access routes from the port are in good condition. There is, however, a severe problem with fuel supplies since the looting and subsequent fire in the fuel depot. Relief shipments into Mogadishu will need to be accompanied with sufficient fuel stocks for onward forwarding. It is assumed that based on arrangements made for use of Mogadishu port, "corridors" and "zones of peace" can be extended so that the port can be used to serve Merca, Baidoba, Belet Uen and Galcaio.

68. In the 90-day Plan, a substantial and carefully coordinated airlifting and air passenger operation will be required to deliver drugs, medical supplies and supplementary foods to both the north and south of the city, as well as to facilitate the movement of relief personnel. Currently, the traditional Mogadishu international airport in the southern part of the city in the area controlled by General Aidid and an airstrip 12 kilometres north of the city in the Mahdi section are used for the delivery of relief supplies.

B. *Central Somalia*

69. ICRC will continue to provide assistance to the displaced and other highly vulnerable groups situated around the coastal ports of Merca, Adele and Obbia. Distribution of supplies will be undertaken by the clan elders and chiefs. UNICEF will complement the efforts of ICRC by providing medical supplies to health facilities and equipment such as weight-for-height charts, health education materials and, in conjunction with WFP, food items for supplementary feeding, fuel and operating resources.

70. At the same time, ICRC, along with international NGOs, will provide assistance to the displaced persons in Belet Uen. Until the port of Mogadishu can be used, ICRC intends to airlift approximately 2,000 tons of food aid per month into the area. Three international NGOs will support ICRC food activities through the provision of primary health care assistance and medical services, including the supply of medicines and essential drugs.

C. *North-west Somalia*

71. The threat of renewed conflict in the region has already led to a breakdown of law and order in the north-west and has caused serious disruptions to ongoing relief activities. In recent days, further deterioration in the situation and an unprecedented increase in the level of armed robberies and looting of relief warehouses and compounds have resulted in the withdrawal of most NGO and United Nations staff.

72. Although recent surveys indicated that nutritional levels have not yet reached emergency levels, food aid is nevertheless urgently required for vulnerable groups and to reduce tensions in the region and to promote stability. There is also the need to provide food and other assistance for the thousands of Somalis who have spontaneously returned from refugee camps in Ethiopia and for those who have yet to return under the planned UNHCR repatriation programme.

73. Agreements were reached by the United Nations Technical Team with the authorities at Hargeisa and with clan chiefs and elders for the urgent resumption of relief assistance, including food aid. Thus, assuming considerable improvement in the security situation, the 90-day Plan will aim to address four critical areas: food and non-food assistance to highly vulnerable groups, with particular emphasis on the displaced; assistance for promoting demobilization; community-based assistance to returnee-impacted areas and emergency income-generation activities. It should be noted, however, that as with other areas, implementation of activities proposed in the Plan will be dependent upon agreements reached with the Technical Team being upheld, including the safe passage

of all relief workers and supplies and the ability to expand current activities.

74. Based upon this premise, WFP will provide, through the port of Berbera, food assistance to the government authorities to support a military demobilization programme. WFP will also supply additional quantities of food to assist institutional stabilization and rehabilitation measures. One option for delivery of food supplies is through off-shore market sales schemes, but the modalities for such schemes are still being explored.

75. Therapeutic feeding will be needed through hospitals for the most severely malnourished. Supplementary feeding will also be undertaken and expanded to presently uncovered areas of the north-west, if required. To facilitate the UNHCR repatriation programme and to alleviate the pressure on areas impacted by people who have spontaneously returned from refugee camps in Somalia, emphasis must be given as quickly as possible to income-generating opportunities and to the rehabilitation of agriculture. Towards this end, FAO and ICRC are providing seeds, tools and pesticides through NGOs, in addition to what will be provided through the international NGOs themselves.

76. Livestock vaccination programmes also need to be resumed, along with rapid distribution of basic veterinary drugs. In order to protect livestock production from further losses, there is an urgent need to rehabilitate rural water points. The acceleration of de-mining activities is also of critical importance. Particularly affected areas are Hargeisa city and the areas south-west of Hargeisa and east and south of Burao towards the Ethiopian border. UNDP, in close collaboration with UNHCR, intends to intensify de-mining activities in the Hargeisa area; further assistance is required for other areas. UNHCR will also continue pre-positioning supplies in Djibouti in preparation for a full-scale repatriation programme.

77. In spite of the efforts of NGOs, UNICEF, WHO and UNHCR, the level of health services available to people in the north-west remains inadequate. Mortality rates are very high, especially among children and women. Many of these deaths could be avoided through immunization programmes. There is also a very serious problem in communicable diseases, in particular tuberculosis. Under the 90-day Plan, UNICEF will provide drugs and essential supplies to the MCHs and expanded programme on immunization (EPI) activities will be strengthened. Training of health staff in EPI activities is planned. In the same areas where therapeutic feeding centres are established, or already exist, nutritional surveillance units will be created at regional level and training provided to health staff for monitoring purposes. Again assuming that security is stable, WHO will undertake to develop a training programme in communicable disease control. In

order to reduce the risk of losses and demotivation of staff, payments for local health workers are needed.

78. Drought has also caused serious water shortages, particularly in the east of the region and again, if security permits, the rapid expansion of water programmes should be undertaken within the framework of the 90-day Plan. The ongoing rehabilitation of the Sheik water supply system could be completed in the next three months, with works directly undertaken by UNICEF. Additionally the urban water systems of Burao and Las Anod could also be completed by Oxfam with funds provided by UNHCR and UNICEF. The recently started urban sanitation programme in Hargeisa should also be reactivated and similar projects initiated in other towns for garbage collection and waste disposal.

79. Fuel stocks to run water supply systems and for hospitals will be needed for the next three months. In view of the fact that a whole generation of Somalis is growing up without education, UNICEF, UNDP and NGOs also intend to undertake activities to establish urgently needed educational facilities and programmes.

80. The main port of entry to north-west Somalia is Berbera and there are large numbers of private and public warehouses in the town. However, other ports can be considered. Zeila port, for example, could be used for the transport of supplies to the Adwal area. In the Sannag region, Mait port can be used for the transport of supplies to the Erigavo area and Las Qorey port for the transport of supplies to the Badhan district. A smaller port, Hys, could be used for transport of supplies to El-Afweyn. It may also be possible to secure agreements with the authorities in the north-east for the routing of supplies for Las Anod and Sool through the port of Bosaso.

81. The best airstrip in the north-west is at Berbera, which is capable of handling all types of aircraft. The airstrip at Hargeisa can handle Hercules, Antonov and other large cargo carriers. Small aircraft can be flown into Boroma, Burao, Las Anod, Erigavo, Sheik and Odweyne. Roads in the north-west are generally good, particularly the main trunk road from Berbera to Las Anod via Sheik and Burao. Security, however, remains a major problem along most of the routes.

D. North-east Somalia

82. The security situation in the north-east has not allowed for a recent assessment of needs. However, it is evident that the mainstay of the economy is livestock production for export. Following conflict and drought, the livestock sector has been severely disrupted and, owing to lack of veterinary services, export of animals has been substantially reduced. In needs assessments undertaken in 1991, veterinary programmes, water supplies and health care provision were amongst activities most urgently needed. To address this problem, ICRC

intends to provide immediate veterinary assistance to the area, including the rehabilitation by ICRC of the quarantine centre at the port of Bosaso.

83. Following the murder of the UNICEF doctor at Bosaso in early January 1992 and the public threats to all relief personnel, there have been very few visits to the area. Information from the region, however, indicates that between 300,000 and 500,000 displaced persons located between Bosaso and Gardo are in need of assistance. Following an inter-agency/NGO assessment of the region, WFP will seek to supply food under the 90-day Plan for offshore market sales schemes to provide resources for the rehabilitation of the social infrastructure. During the proposed needs assessments, arrangements will also be explored with local authorities for the use of the port of Bosaso to serve as a main logistical base for supplying large parts of central and northern Somalia. Bosaso is currently capable of handling ships of up to several thousand tons.

E. South-east Somalia

84. Within the framework of the 90-day Plan, ICRC will continue to supply food to the region. Given the increasing number of displaced persons at Brava and Kismayo, ICRC intends to provide up to 5,000 tons of food supplies monthly through free delivery. In the past, owing to the constant wrangling and negotiations between the clans and looting, the execution of food relief programmes has been problematic. While not totally satisfactory, the problems in food distribution have been partially solved through arrangements with ICRC that the clan elders and chiefs are responsible for the collection, transport and delivery of food aid supplies to their people.

85. Based on these arrangements, ICRC recently delivered 2,000 tons of food to Kismayo and both delivery and distribution is reported to have gone relatively smoothly. ICRC will thus continue using this system for delivery and distribution of future supplies. Food aid will be brought in through the port of Kismayo. The port functions well and has the capacity to handle the required tonnage.

86. From available information, malnutrition is widespread in the region. Food shortages, however, are most severe in the riverine villages, where looting of food and money by occupying forces has caused most families to resort to eating "famine foods", such as wild edible plants and green mangoes. All villages south of Fanoole have lost most of their grain reserves. At Kismayo, some food is available in the markets but is priced beyond the means of much of the population. Evidence suggests that until food supply levels significantly improve, the health of vulnerable groups will remain at grave risk and looting of food and other supplies will continue.

87. In order to help address the food shortage problems and supplement rations provided by ICRC, UNICEF and WHO will work closely with the traditional communities and authorities to target assistance at the vulnerable groups and the displaced. Supplementary feeding programmes, health care services and the provision of shelter items and water supplies will be expanded. A priority objective will be to organize the estimated 30,000 displaced persons at Kismayo into manageable camps and provide them with adequate shelter, sanitation, water and basic medical and nutritional assistance. An additional 390 tons of food supplies will be needed per month for these 30,000 people.

88. UNICEF will strengthen its presence at Kismayo and collaborate closely with all international and local NGOs to ensure coordination of efforts. As part of its emergency plan, UNICEF intends to establish at least two more MCH centres at Kismayo and one in each accessible town in the region, as well as to expand the provision of medical supplies and equipment to 15 MCH centres in selected districts. As security permits, World Concern will also open up 22 more rural clinics.

89. Given the severe disruption to agricultural activities and the loss of seeds and livestock in the region, UNICEF will collaborate with ICRC and FAO to provide veterinary supplies, seeds, farming equipment.

90. A major constraint to effective delivery of humanitarian assistance is the shortage of human resources. Although, for example, there are many nurses in the region, most are displaced from Mogadishu and their training and technical experience varies. Under the Plan, UNICEF will undertake to organize refresher and in-service training to local health workers so that they can be mobilized to staff the expanded health care programme envisaged under the Plan. There are also a number of indigenous NGOs, such as Peace Aid Somalia and Somali Women's Concern, that are running camps for displaced persons. These NGOs will be supported by UNICEF to extend their programmes. Other international NGOs will be encouraged and supported to establish programmes in the region, including the extension of health services to Brava.

91. To facilitate the 90-day Plan, the Technical Team discussed the provision of humanitarian assistance with the respective leadership of each of the sub-clans at Kismayo and a number of agreements were reached. These were the guaranteed safe movement of international and local personnel working within and outside Kismayo, free and safe passage for all relief supplies and arrangements pertaining to use of Kismayo port.

92. In addition to the Somalis in need in the region, approximately 250,000 people of Bantu origin—without any affiliation to the Somali clans—are reported to be

suffering from severe rates of malnutrition. The needs of this group will be one for priority assessment and response.

F. *South-west Somalia*

93. Grave problems appear to be developing along the Somali side of the Somali-Kenyan border, where an estimated 200,000 people have gathered, poised to cross into Kenya. ICRC is currently the only relief organization assisting these areas through cross-border programmes and it is clear that a major emergency could develop. An inter-agency/NGO assessment mission will be dispatched as quickly as possible to determine the extent of the needs. In the interim, ICRC will continue its food supply programme to the region.

94. Access to the area is best achieved by road through Kenya, but during the rains these roads will be impassible and alternative transport arrangements, such as airlifting, will be required. CRS is currently considering supporting the ICRC programme in at least two of the four ICRC cross-border points (Liboi-Doble and El Wak). Some agricultural inputs may also be provided under the CRS programme.

IV. *Coordination mechanisms*

95. The present Plan of Action has attempted to establish modalities that will facilitate the urgent delivery of humanitarian assistance to all parts of Somalia. However, given prevailing conditions and limited financial and staff resources, it should be clear from the outset that prevention of a high death-toll in Somalia from lack of food and basic services, such as health care, water and sanitation, can only succeed through a carefully coordinated and collaborative effort on the part of the local leadership, clan elders, the international community, ICRC, NGOs and the United Nations system.

96. In addition, given prevailing conditions in many parts of Somalia, the political initiatives which have led to the current cease-fire agreement at Mogadishu must be continued and expanded to other areas of Somalia. "Corridors of peace" for the safe passage of relief workers and supplies and "zones of peace" to enable target groups to receive assistance are of paramount importance.

97. To enable effective coordination of efforts and to ensure that maximum use is made of resources, the Secretary-General has appointed a Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia. Key to the 90-day Plan is the recognized coordinating role of the United Nations and the increased and active presence of United Nations agencies in Somalia. To facilitate coordination and collaborative efforts, the Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance will be based at Mogadishu, as well as maintaining close links with NGOs and donors located in both Nairobi and Djibouti.

98. To support the important work of the national and international NGOs and to ensure that there is close cooperation amongst all partners involved in the implementation of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, the United Nations Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia will undertake to hold regular meetings with all members of the NGO community, ICRC and donors who are actively involved in relief efforts in the country. The United Nations will encourage local authorities to establish effective mechanisms that will facilitate the work of all relief personnel, including NGOs, and will also assist NGOs through the provision of difficult-to-deliver supplies, including fuel. While currently there is no provision for umbrella security arrangements for all relief personnel in Somalia, further discussion on the matter is urgently needed. Given the security constraints in Somalia, as well as in a number of other countries experiencing complex emergencies, the need to explore such arrangements should be brought to the attention of the Security Council as quickly as possible.

99. UNDP is providing direct support to the United Nations Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance in the form of staff, office accommodation, administrative and logistical back-stopping, including the revision of an existing project that will provide two light aircraft, a communications network and de-mining activities, hopefully with bilateral co-financing. Staff in the Coordinator's office will be responsible for receiving and disseminating information to the NGO and donor community. Field officers, reporting to the Coordinator, will be posted in offices at Hargeisa and other key locations. Aircraft services and the communications systems will be made available for the use of all relief partners.

100. WFP will be responsible for the coordination of logistics and for the delivery of WFP food supplies for general food distribution, supplementary feeding, demobilization programmes and market sales schemes in the north. At Mogadishu, supplies will be brought into the port in the name of WFP and handed over to CARE for onward delivery. WFP will provide food monitors. These will complement CARE's 3 expatriate and 15 national staff, who will assist in the distribution of humanitarian assistance. The WFP market sales programme is presently under preparation with CARE.

101. UNHCR continues to have primary responsibility for all matters relating to refugees and returnees. Under the 90-day Plan, UNHCR will continue to work closely with other United Nations agencies and NGOs in the provision of activities for refugee-impacted areas and to pre-position supplies in readiness for its planned repatriation programme for refugees still to return from Ethio-

pia. De-mining activities will be accelerated, if security conditions permit.

102. UNICEF will be responsible for the coordination of non-food assistance and will increase its international staff presence in regions to be targeted for assistance. UNICEF will also significantly increase the number of Somali contract staff in order to serve as non-food relief assistance monitors, as well as enable its own direct implementation of water, health care, immunization and other essential non-food relief programmes.

103. WHO will continue to provide support for all areas of Somalia through international NGOs and where possible with health authorities and with national relief agencies. WHO will support therapeutic feeding centres through the provision of UNIMIX and will supply emergency health and drug kits for health care centres and hospitals. As soon as security permits, WHO will embark on the rehabilitation of the health system and establish a health information and disease surveillance system, training programmes and the repair and rehabilitation of health facilities.

104. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) will continue to support the reactivation of the agricultural and livestock sectors through the provision of seeds and tools, pesticides and veterinary programmes, including livestock watering points and mobile clinics for livestock vaccination.

105. The United Nations Volunteers (UNV) programme has already submitted a proposal for the provision of up to 50 voluntary specialists who can assist the various United Nations agencies and relief organizations in carrying out their work under the 90-day Plan and on longer-term programmes. The recruitment and fielding of UNVs in support of a wide variety of activities, including logistics, communications, agriculture and health, will be undertaken in response to specific requests made by United Nations agencies and other organizations, including NGOs.

Annex

Logistics overview

A. Mogadishu

1. The port of Mogadishu is technically sound. Five of the six berths are open. Berth No. 4 is closed because of a sunken tug boat. There is also a sunken tug boat near the breakwater. The port has two operational tugboats and one pilot boat. The port sheds in berths No. 1 to 3 were damaged in the January 1992 looting.

2. The port handling equipment has been looted and is available for hire on the private market. The port has two mobile cranes although it is unclear whether they are functioning.

3. The port administration and labour force are, for the most part, still at Mogadishu, living in both the Aidid and Mahdi areas of the city. The port administration building is still intact. The port does not have any electricity as the generator is damaged and all electrical wiring has been looted. There are many containers scattered around the port, many of which have been damaged in the fighting.

4. Access to roads to and from the port are in good condition. There appears to be ample supply of trucks on the local market. While most are single-owned operators, two larger transport entities continue to function. Both are based in the Aidid part of the city. There is a severe shortage of fuel since the looting and subsequent fire in the Mogadishu fuel depot. All relief shipments must be accompanied with fuel supplies for onward transport.

5. The Mogadishu road network appears basically intact and in good condition. However, because of the looting of the city's underground wiring network which has left deep trenches next to many roads, it is feared that the rains will cause irreparable damage to many streets.

6. Currently the traditional Mogadishu international airport in the southern part of the city, controlled by the Hawadle sub-clan in an area bordering Aidid's sector, and an airstrip 12 kilometres north of the city in the Mahdi-controlled area are used for the delivery of relief assistance. The Mogadishu south airport can receive any type of aircraft, while the Mogadishu north airstrip can receive only C-130 or Antonov-12 class aircraft. Labour is available at both sites. Access to the Mogadishu south airport is good, but the access road to Mogadishu north is a sandy track, which may be affected by the rain.

B. *North-west Somalia*

7. Although control of Berbera port is contested between the armed factions in north-west Somalia, the port is technically operational. Commercial traffic continues to move through Berbera port and some handling equipment is reportedly still with the port authorities.

8. The road network in the north-west is intact and usable although traffic is limited owing to insecurity. There is a good supply of trucking capacity in the region, although fuel supplies are irregular. Traders continue to rely on dhow traffic to the ports of Zeila for the Boroma area and Mait for the Erigavo and Las Anod areas.

C. *North-east Somalia*

9. Bosaso port is reportedly intact and is being used by commercial traffic. This traffic consists primarily of coastal vessels and dhows, although larger vessels are possible.

D. *Central Somalia*

10. The main entry points in the region are the coastal ports. ICRC has recently completed a survey of minor coastal ports in Somalia from the Kenya border north to Obbia. This report has a wealth of information, including maps, slides and videos, concerning possible maritime relief operations to these ports. The principle conclusion of the report is that during the upcoming rainy season, beginning in mid-May until September, use of most of these ports for landing craft or off-shore ship-to-ship operations will not be feasible.

11. While the use of Gezira and Warsheik ports to meet the needs of Mogadishu had been discussed, it is felt that because of technical constraints these ports will not be able to accommodate the massive food input that Mogadishu requires.

E. *South-east Somalia*

12. The port of Kismayo is intact with four of the five berths open. A sunken navy boat has closed one berth down. The port, however, has no tug boat or pilot boat. Small coastal vessels carrying commercial traffic from Mombasa and passenger traffic to and from Bosaso regularly call at the port. The port sheds, with a capacity of 5,000-7,000 tons, are in good condition and are being used by ICRC. The access road to the town is in good condition. Local transport appears to be in good supply, although fuel is a problem and must accompany any incoming relief shipment. Roads emanating from Kismayo north to Gelib and Brava are plagued with banditry.

F. *South-west Somalia*

13. Traditionally this region was served by Mogadishu and Kismayo ports, but because of insecurity, this is no longer possible. The main points of entry in use presently are overland from Kenya via El Wak and via Mandera. The routes are traditionally affected by rain during mid-May to September. The Baidoba airport is reported to be open.

Addendum (S/23829/Add.2, 24 April 1992)

1. In paragraph 63 of my report to the Security Council (S/23829), I indicated my intention to circulate an addendum to the report which would contain a pre-

liminary cost estimate for the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM).

2. As outlined in paragraphs 22 to 33 of the above-mentioned report, the agreements reached in Mogadishu require the United Nations to deploy military observers to monitor the cease-fire and to deploy United Nations security personnel to protect its personnel and safeguard its activities in continuing to provide humanitarian and other relief assistance to displaced persons in and around Mogadishu.

3. It is estimated that the cost associated with the emplacement and maintenance of UNOSOM, consisting of 550 military and security personnel and 79 civilian personnel, including 40 locally recruited staff, for an initial six-month period would be approximately \$23.1 million. A breakdown of the estimated cost by main objects of expenditure is provided for information purposes in the annex to this addendum.

4. It would be my recommendation to the General Assembly, should the Security Council agree to the deployment of UNOSOM, that the cost relating thereto should be considered as an expense of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations and that the assessment to be levied on Member States be

credited to a Special Account to be established for this purpose.

Annex

Six-month cost estimates by objects of expenditure (In thousands of United States dollars)

Objects of expenditure

1. Military and security component	
(a) Military observers	959
(b) Security personnel, pay and allowances	3 430
(c) Other costs	2 780
2. Civilian personnel, including travel to mission area	2 745
3. Accommodation including premises, construction and maintenance	4 410
4. Vehicle operations	2 000
5. Aircraft operations	2 367
6. Communications	1 458
7. Miscellaneous equipment	1 291
8. Miscellaneous supplies, services freight and support costs	<u>1 660</u>
Total estimate (gross)	<u><u>23 100</u></u>

Document 12

Security Council resolution establishing UNOSOM, requesting the immediate deployment of cease-fire observers, agreeing to the deployment of a security force for humanitarian operations as soon as possible and calling on the international community to support the 90-Day Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance

S/RES/751 (1992), 24 April 1992

The Security Council,

Considering the request by Somalia for the Security Council to consider the situation in Somalia, 1/

Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992 and 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 21 and 24 April 1992 on the situation in Somalia, 2/

Taking note of the signing of the cease-fire agreements in Mogadishu on 3 March 1992, 3/ including agreements for the implementation of measures aimed at stabilizing the cease-fire through a United Nations monitoring mission,

Taking note also of the signing of letters of agreement in Mogadishu, Hargeisa and Kismayo on the mechanism for monitoring the cease-fire and arrange-

ments for the equitable and effective distribution of humanitarian assistance in and around Mogadishu, 4/

Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering caused by the conflict and concerned that the continuation of the situation in Somalia constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Cognizant of the importance of cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in the context of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1/ *Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-seventh Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1992, document S/23445.*

2/ *Ibid., Supplement for April, May and June 1992, documents S/23829 and Add.1 and 2.*

3/ *Ibid., Supplement for January, February and March 1992, documents S/23693 and Corr.1, annexes III and IV.*

4/ *Ibid., Supplement for April, May and June 1992, documents S/23829 and Add.1 and 2, annexes I-IV.*

Underlining the importance which it attaches to the international, regional and non-governmental organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, continuing to provide humanitarian and other relief assistance to the people of Somalia under difficult circumstances,

Expressing its appreciation to the regional organizations, including the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, for their cooperation with the United Nations in the effort to resolve the Somali problem,

1. *Takes note with appreciation* of the report of the Secretary-General of 21 and 24 April 1992 on the situation in Somalia; 2/

2. *Decides* to establish under its authority, and in support of the Secretary-General in accordance with paragraph 7 below, a United Nations Operation in Somalia;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General immediately to deploy a unit of fifty United Nations observers to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu in accordance with paragraphs 24 to 26 of the Secretary-General's report;

4. *Agrees*, in principle, also to establish under the overall direction of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General a United Nations security force to be deployed as soon as possible to perform the functions described in paragraphs 27 to 29 of the report of the Secretary-General;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his consultations with the parties in Mogadishu regarding the proposed United Nations security force and, in the light of those consultations, to submit his further recommendations to the Security Council for its decision as soon as possible;

6. *Welcomes* the intention expressed by the Secretary-General in paragraph 64 of his report to appoint a Special Representative for Somalia to provide overall direction of United Nations activities in Somalia and to assist him in his endeavours to reach a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Somalia;

7. *Also requests* the Secretary-General as part of his continuing mission in Somalia to facilitate an immediate and effective cessation of hostilities and the maintenance of a cease-fire throughout the country in order to promote the process of reconciliation and political settlement in Somalia and to provide urgent humanitarian assistance;

8. *Welcomes* the cooperation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of the Islamic Conference in resolving the problem in Somalia;

9. *Calls upon* all parties, movements and factions in Somalia immediately to cease hostilities and to maintain a cease-fire throughout the country in order to promote the process of reconciliation and political settlement in Somalia;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue as a matter of priority his consultations with all Somali parties, movements and factions towards the convening of a conference on national reconciliation and unity in Somalia in close cooperation with the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of the Islamic Conference;

11. *Decides* to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the following tasks and to report on its work to the Council with its observations and recommendations:

(a) To seek from all States information regarding the action taken by them concerning the effective implementation of the general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia imposed by paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992);

(b) To consider any information brought to its attention by States concerning violations of the embargo, and in that context to make recommendations to the Council on ways of increasing the effectiveness of the embargo;

(c) To recommend appropriate measures in response to violations of the embargo and to provide information on a regular basis to the Secretary-General for general distribution to Member States;

12. *Notes with appreciation* the ongoing efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and humanitarian organizations to ensure delivery of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, particularly to Mogadishu;

13. *Calls upon* the international community to support, with financial and other resources, the implementation of the ninety-day Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia;

14. *Urges* all parties concerned in Somalia to facilitate the efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and humanitarian organizations to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to the affected population in Somalia and reiterates its call for the full respect for the security and safety of the personnel of the humanitarian organizations and the guarantee of their complete freedom of movement in and around Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia;

15. *Calls upon* all Somali parties, movements and factions to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General in the implementation of the present resolution;

16. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter until a peaceful solution is achieved.

Document 13

Letter dated 5 June 1992 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council reporting on the Special Representative's consultations in Somalia and on the looting of relief supplies

Not issued as a United Nations document

You will recall that following the adoption of Security Council resolution 751 (1992) on 24 April 1991, I appointed Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun, on 28 April 1992, as my Special Representative for Somalia, to provide overall direction of United Nations activities in Somalia and to assist me in my endeavours to reach a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Somalia.

Since his appointment, Ambassador Sahnoun has travelled extensively in Somalia and held discussions with representatives of the various factions, movements and parties in the country. He has also met with elders and community leaders in various parts of the country and with Somali individuals from all walks of life both inside and outside the country. In addition, he has held discussions with senior officials of United Nations agencies and other humanitarian organizations associated with the international humanitarian effort for Somalia.

In his discussions of the implementation of the relevant decisions of the Security Council, Ambassador Sahnoun has noted the interdependence between peace and security in Somalia and the provision of increased humanitarian assistance to the country, and has emphasized that one was an indispensable prerequisite for the other. He has also stressed the need for an immediate and effective cessation of hostilities and the maintenance of a cease-fire throughout the country, in order to promote the process of reconciliation and political settlement in Somalia, as well as the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the country, and to facilitate the provision of urgent humanitarian assistance for all those in need in Somalia on a regular basis.

In order to ensure the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance, the Technical Team that visited Somalia in May of this year recommended the deployment of adequate United Nations security personnel to provide security for United Nations personnel, equipment and supplies and to escort deliveries of humanitarian assistance to distribution centres. The modalities for the

deployment of the security personnel is a matter on which agreement has not yet been reached with the faction in Mogadishu headed by General Mohamed Farah Aidid. On this issue, my Special Representative is continuing his discussions with General Aidid and his colleagues as a matter of priority.

A very serious and deplorable incident that occurred at the airport in Mogadishu on 31 May 1991 underscored the imperative need for United Nations security personnel to protect deliveries of humanitarian supplies to Somalia. As you are aware, on that day, an ICRC Cessna aircraft transporting about one metric tonne of medicine and a World Food Programme Antonov aircraft that had delivered six metric tonnes of high-protein food mix (UN-IMIX) for UNICEF for distribution to malnourished children were looted of all their consignments by armed elements. On learning of the incident, the United Nations Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia lodged a strong protest to the United Somali Congress (USC), the faction in control of the sector of the city where the incident occurred. As a precautionary measure and until satisfactory security arrangements were put in place, all United Nations flights to Mogadishu airport were suspended as of 1 June 1992 to ensure the safety of United Nations personnel and property.

You may wish, Your Excellency, to bring the above matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council with a view to invite an appropriate response from the Council in order to ensure that such incidents are not repeated, and to highlight the need for the deployment of United Nations security personnel to ensure the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to Somalia.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS -GHALI

Document 14

Letter dated 18 June 1992 from Ethiopia transmitting the Bahir Dar Declaration and Agreement on the Humanitarian Aspect of the Problem in Somalia adopted at the All-Party Meeting on Somalia convened by the Standing Committee of the Horn of Africa, 31 May – 3 June 1992

S/24184, 25 June 1992

On instructions from my Government, I am pleased to transmit herewith the Bahir Dar Declaration and Agreement on the Humanitarian Aspect of the Problem in Somalia.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mulugeta ETEFFA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Bahir Dar Declaration of the All-Party Meeting on Somalia

The All-Party Meeting on Somalia convened by the Standing Committee of the Horn of Africa from 31 May to 3 June 1992 at Bahir Dar, Ethiopia, dealt with the human and political aspects of the Somali crisis. The major emphasis was on the most immediate and acute human aspect of the crisis with an attempt to lay the groundwork for a lasting political solution in the country.

The Somali organizations attending the meeting unanimously agreed to cooperate in creating an atmosphere of peace for the free distribution of relief supplies to reach all needy Somalis throughout Somalia. They agreed to a total cease-fire and the mechanism for its observation. In addition, they agreed to ensure that all ports, airports, and land routes and distribution centres be open for the movement and distribution of relief supplies. They pledged to ensure the security of relief personnel and observers. This is a major achievement that calls for the support of all those concerned with the plight of the Somali people.

The issue of finding a lasting political solution in Somalia has been the concern of both Somalia and friends of Somalia for quite some time now. Unfortunately, however, no such solution has as yet been achieved. The Bahir Dar All-Party Meeting addressed this fundamental issue and reached a consensus that:

1. All Somali parties, the Somali people at large and all countries concerned for Somalia should do their ut-

most to make the cease-fire agreement reached at this meeting a success;

2. A high-level All-Party Somali National Reconciliation Conference be held within the next three months hosted by the Standing Committee of the Horn on Somalia and attended by observers;

3. An Interim Government will be established in the Conference mentioned above that would:

- (a) Ensure peace and security in the country;
- (b) Secure the provision of the material needs and safeguard the human and political rights of the people;
- (c) Lay the groundwork for the reconstruction of the country;
- (d) Guarantee protection and security to the relief supplies and personnel.

4. The Interim Government so established paves the way to the formation of a democratically elected government.

5. As an immediate measure all Somali organizations agree to send a joint Somali delegation to attend the forthcoming Conference of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) at Dakar to represent Somalia and to inform the Standing Committee of the Horn the formation of such a delegation well in advance of the fifty-sixth session of the Council of Ministers of OAU, to be held from 21 to 27 June 1992.

All the organizations participating in the Bahir Dar Meeting as well as members of the Standing Committee on the Horn call upon the Somali people, the Somali organizations not present at this meeting and all friends of Somalia to support the above declaration and work for its success.

Adopted by

1. United Somali Party (USP)
2. Somali National Front (SNF)
3. Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)
4. United Somali Congress (USC)
5. Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF)
6. Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA)
7. Somali National Democratic Union (SNDU)

8. Somali Intellectuals for Peace and Democracy (SIPD)
9. Somali Peace and Resettlement Organization (SOPRO)
10. Somali Relief Society (SRS)

3 June 1992
Bahir Dar

*All-party meeting on the Somali
humanitarian issues*

The Bahir Dar Agreement

Subsequent to the Summit of Heads of States and Governments of the Horn of Africa which took place at Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) on 8 and 9 April 1992, the Standing Committee on Somalia convened the first All-Party Meeting on Somalia. The meeting was officially opened by H.E. Ato Meles Zenawi, President of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia. In his opening statement, President Meles Zenawi made a passionate appeal to all parties involved in the conflict to join hands to end the senseless civil war that has resulted in the plight of the Somali people; he further emphasized the need of promptly addressing the humanitarian aspect of the Somali problem.

The meeting was attended by the following Somali organizations:

1. United Somali Party (USP)
2. Somali National Movement (SNM)
3. Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA)
4. United Somali Congress (USC)
5. Somali National Front (SNF)
6. Somali National Democratic Union (SNDU)
7. Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)
8. Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF)
9. Somali Peace and Resettlement Organization (SOPRO)
10. Somali Relief Society (SRS)
11. Somali Intellectuals for Peace and Democracy (SIPD)

After lengthy discussions and examining in depth the different dimensions of the problem, all parties agree on the following:

1. Humanitarian assistance particularly food, medicine and other necessities should reach indiscriminately to all the regions.

2. All parties unanimously agree that all seaports, airports and land routes be utilized under the firm guarantee, protection and responsibility of each organization (in the area under their control) for the safe passage and security of the personnel and property in reaching its destinations.

3. The fair distribution of the supplies should be under the responsibility of the indigenous and international NGO personnel and the competent concerned parties.

4. All parties agree to observe an immediate cease-fire and to request the Standing Committee of the Horn of Africa to send an observing civilian team, which includes the United Nations and other international organizations, for the cease-fire and the distribution of aid supplies under the protection and cooperation of each organization.

5. All parties agree that the following routes and distribution centres could be utilized by the relief agencies:

- (a) *Major seaports* – Kismayo, Mogadishu, Bossaso and Berbera;
- (b) *Minor seaports* – Kudha, Baravo, Merka, Adale, Warshekh, Eldher, Hobio, Gar-adag, Eil, Alula, Laskorey, Elayo-Maid, Heis, Lughaya and Zeila;
- (c) *Main airports* – Kismayo, Mogadishu, Baidhabo, Beli-doog, Beledwein, Galkayo, Garowe, Bassaso, Laskargy, Erigabo, Lasanod, Burao, Berbera, Hargeisa and Borama;
- (d) *Airstrips* – Gilib, Afmadow, Shalambod, Afgoye, Lug, Bur-Dhubo, Bar-dheere, Jalalagsi, Hudur, Hobio, Gardo, Iskushuban, Alula, Bendar-Beila, Lascoray, Beran, Hadaftimo, Yube, Erigabo, Eil-Aftein, Garadag, Salahlery and Jihi, Taleh, Buhudleh, Boron;
- (e) *Mainland paved routes:*
Mogadishu – Kismayo
Mogadishu – Baidhabo
Mogadishu – Garowe/Bossaso
Garowe – Burao
Burao – Berbera
Berbera – Hargeisa
Hargeisa – Barama

There are also other unpaved land routes which connect different parts of the country;

(f) *Distribution centres* – Ample distribution centres which were owned by an agricultural development agency exist in all the regions of Somalia. However, owing to the civil war, a large number of them would need minor or major maintenance and rehabilitation in order to be effectively utilized. It is therefore our recommendation that the aid donor organizations take into consideration the need to reconstruct existing distribution centres.

6. All parties appeal to the international organizations, donor countries, non-governmental organizations and relief agencies to accelerate and dispatch sufficient aid to the already starving population in all the affected areas.

7. All parties appeal to the other organizations that have not been able to attend to endorse and abide by this agreement.

8. This agreement shall be effective as of today, 2 June 1992.

2 June 1992, Bahir Dar, Ethiopia

- (Signed) 1. Ali Haji HERSI (SDA)
(Signed) 2. Hassen Ali MIRREH (SSDF)
(Signed) 3. Awad Ahmed ASHAREH (USP)
(Signed) 4. A. Mohammed F. JUMALE (USC)
(Signed) 5. Hassen Omer HORRI (SOPRO)
(Signed) B. Abudulatif M. AFDUB (SPM)
For SDM and SSNM
(Signed) 6. Musa Ahmed SAHAR (SNM)
(Signed) 7. Ali Ismail ABDIGER (SNDU)
(Signed) 8. Adam Mussa JIBRIL (SIPID)
(Signed) 9. Abdi Shire FARAH (SRS)
(Signed) 10. Mohammed Khalif SHIRE (SNF)

After having considered all aspects of the tragic situation of Somalia the All-Party Meeting on Somalia has come to the following consensus to send a joint non-party delegation to represent the interest of the Somalia Nation at the OAU summit Conference at Dakar. The participants of the Bahir Dar Meeting from different Somali Organizations have unanimously nominated the following delegation:

1. Ali Haji Hersi
2. Mohamed Farah Gumale
3. Abdulatif M. Afdhoub
4. Yusuf Omar Al-Azhari
5. Awad A. Ashareh

The Bahir Dar All Somali Party Meeting has also decided to allocate two participants from the other Somali Organization who were not able to attend this conference.

- (Signed) 1. Ali Haji HERSI (SDA)
(Signed) 2. Hassen Ali MIRREH (SSDF)
(Signed) 3. Awad Ahmed ASHAREH (USP)
(Signed) 4. A. Mohammed F. JUMALE (USC)
(Signed) B. Abudulatif M. AFDUB (SPM)
For SDM and SSNM
(Signed) 5. Hassen Omer HORRI (SOPRO)
(Signed) 6. Ali Ismail ABDIGER (SNDU)
(Signed) 7. Adam Mussa JIBRIL (SIPID)
(Signed) 8. Abdi Shire FARAH (SRS)
(Signed) 9. Mohammed Khalif SHIRE (SNF)

4 June 1992
Bahir Dar

Document 15

Letter dated 23 June 1992 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council informing the Council that the principal factions in Mogadishu have agreed to the immediate deployment of United Nations cease-fire observers

S/24179, 25 June 1992

I have the honour to refer to paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992, in which the Council "requests the Secretary-General immediately to deploy a unit of 50 United Nations Observers to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu in accordance with paragraphs 24 to 26 of the Secretary-General's report (S/23829)".

I wish to inform the Security Council that my Special Representative in Somalia, Ambassador Sahnoun, has reported to me that both principal factions in Mogadishu have agreed to the immediate deployment of the uni-

formed and unarmed Observers. Accordingly, I am taking immediate measures to implement the said deployment.

It is anticipated that the advance party of United Nations Observers, under the command of the Chief Military Observer, will arrive in Mogadishu on 5 July 1992. The other Observers will be due to arrive in the Mission area by 10 July 1992.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS -GHALI

Document 16

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia, proposing the expansion of UNOSOM and the creation of four operational zones

S/24343, 22 July 1992

Introduction

1. At its 3069th meeting, on 24 April 1992, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 751 (1992) concerning the situation in Somalia. The present report is submitted pursuant to that resolution.

2. Immediately following the adoption of the resolution, I brought its contents to the attention of the Somali leaders and Elders, who had signed in March 1992 the Letter of Agreement addressed to the United Nations committing themselves to work for peace and stability in the country (S/23829, annexes I-IV). I also transmitted copies of the resolution to the Secretaries-General of the League of Arab States (LAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).

3. On 28 April 1992, I appointed Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun of Algeria as my Special Representative for Somalia. On 4 May 1992, he took up residence in Mogadishu and established the headquarters of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) there.

I. Activities of the Special Representative

4. Between 4 May 1992 and 19 July 1992, my Special Representative undertook consultations with various Somali leaders and Elders and other personalities throughout the country. In most of these meetings he was accompanied by the representatives of the LAS, OAU and OIC. He solicited views on the three major elements of his mandate: the monitoring of the cease-fire in Mogadishu, signed on 3 March 1992, and the cessation of hostilities throughout the country; the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance, as well as the need for rehabilitation and institution building; and the process of national reconciliation.

5. In Mogadishu, which is today a divided city, my Special Representative held several meetings, in the southern area, with delegations of the United Somali Congress (USC), including General Mohammed Farah Aidid, whom he also met at Balad Hawa, Baidowa and Bardhere in the south-west of Somalia. In the north of Mogadishu, he met several times with Mr. Ali Mahdi Mohamed and members of his delegation.

6. In the north-east, he visited Garowe and Bossaso, where he met with delegations of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), including its Chairman,

General Mohamed Abshir Musse, and leaders of regional governments, including Mr. Bogor Abdullahi Bogor Musse, the head of the Regional Administration, and Mr. Mohamed Farah Warsame, the Regional Governor.

7. In the north-west, he visited Hargeisa, where he met with a delegation of the self-proclaimed republic of Somaliland, led by its "Foreign Minister", Mr. Sheikh Yusuf Ali Sheikh Maddar, and with Mr. Abdurahman Ahmed Ali "Toor", the president of the self-proclaimed republic, with whom my Special Representative met again in Berbera. In Burao, he met with local leaders, including the Governor, Mr. Hussein Hersi.

8. In the south, my Special Representative met in Kismayo, in the south, with representatives of the USC, the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), the Southern Somalia National Movement (SSNM), and the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM).

9. He made every effort, wherever he went, to meet with Elders, intellectuals and other leading personalities.

10. He also met in Addis Ababa with Mr. Salim A. Salim, Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, and in Cairo with Mr. Esmat Abdel Meguid, the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States.

11. My Special Representative exchanged views with senior officials of the States of the Horn of Africa in Nairobi, Khartoum, Djibouti and Addis Ababa, including Mr. Lissane Yohannes, the Ethiopian Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, in his capacity as the Chairman of the Standing Committee on Somalia, set up by the heads of State of the Horn of Africa. He was also received by the President of Djibouti, Mr. Hassan Gouled Aptidon, and by the President of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia, Mr. Meles Zenawi.

II. Monitoring of the cease-fire in Mogadishu

12. My Special Representative began his consultations by taking up with the leaders of the factions in Mogadishu the question of the immediate deployment of a unit of 50 United Nations observers to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu, as called for in paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 751 (1992). He also discussed with the leaders of the factions the question of the deployment in Mogadishu, as soon as possible, of a United Nations security force as called for in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the same resolution.

13. On the very day of his arrival, my Special Representative was informed by Mr. Ali Mahdi that the latter's faction of the United Somali Congress (USC) accepted the deployment of up to 50 United Nations military observers to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu and agreed that these observers would be in uniform and unarmed. Mr. Mahdi also accepted the deployment of a United Nations security force in Mogadishu as proposed by the Secretary-General and agreed in principle by the Security Council.

14. On 9 May 1992, my Special Representative met with General Aidid, President of the USC, at Balad Hawa. Notwithstanding his letter of agreement of 27 March 1992 addressed to the United Nations (S/23829, annex I), General Aidid took the position that United Nations personnel monitoring the cease-fire should be unarmed and in civilian attire with some United Nations insignia. He indicated that the strength and status of the United Nations security personnel would require further consultations.

15. After discussions with leaders and Elders in various parts of the country and after difficult further negotiations with USC officials, my Special Representative met again on 21 June in Baidowa in south-west Somalia with General Aidid. On that occasion, General Aidid formally accepted the conditions set by the United Nations that the 50 observers would wear uniforms, which was normal United Nations practice, would be unarmed and would be deployed on both sides of the demarcation line.

16. I thereupon took steps for the deployment of the United Nations observers, whom I proposed to draw from: Austria, Bangladesh, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco and Zimbabwe. The parties were consulted on this list which was then approved by the Security Council (S/24178). With the consent of the Council, I appointed Brigadier General Imtiaz Shaheen (Pakistan) as Chief Military Observer (CMO) of UNOSOM. The CMO, together with three military observers who would constitute the UNOSOM advance party, arrived in Mogadishu on 5 July. The remaining observers were to arrive in Nairobi between 8 and 12 July for onward transport to Mogadishu.

17. On 6 July, the CMO was informed of an incident on 25 June involving an Antonov aircraft which had been under charter by the World Food Programme (WFP). The aircraft was still bearing United Nations markings when it undertook an illegal flight to Mogadishu. The aircraft was said to be carrying Somali currency and military equipment for delivery to the Ali Mahdi faction in Mogadishu. General Aidid's faction thereupon accused United Nations personnel of bias and suspended the deployment of United Nations observers. United Na-

tions Headquarters instructed the CMO to remain at his post, whereupon the USC delivered an "expulsion notice" to him and his party.

18. On 9 July, the Spokesman of the Secretary-General issued the following statement at United Nations Headquarters:

"The Secretary-General has noted with concern reports alleging that an aircraft previously chartered by the United Nations was subsequently used for the illicit transport of money and military equipment intended for delivery to one of the factions in Mogadishu. The Secretary-General has noted that the aircraft was said to be still carrying the insignia of the United Nations while engaged in the activity mentioned above. He is taking steps for a full investigation of this incident."

19. My Special Representative returned to Somalia on 12 July and on 15 July reported that General Aidid had agreed to the advance party staying in Mogadishu and to the remaining 47 military observers moving there from Nairobi. However, the deployment of these observers was to be delayed pending assurances from Mr. Ali Mahdi's faction that it would refrain from circulating the newly printed currency which had been brought in on the illegal Antonov flight. My Special Representative secured these assurances on 16 July. General Aidid then gave his consent to the deployment of the military observers. The full complement of observers is due to be deployed in Mogadishu towards the end of the week of 20 July.

20. I continue to take a strong view of the seriousness of the incident involving the Antonov aircraft and intend to pursue actively the necessary investigation and all legal remedies that are available to me.

21. The cease-fire in Mogadishu has held reasonably well since the adoption of Security Council resolution 751 (1992). However, banditry and looting remain a major problem in both parts of the city, with most incidents being attributable to irregular armed groups. Tension in Mogadishu increased noticeably in July as a consequence of the incident relating to the Antonov plane.

22. My Special Representative's efforts to bring about an improvement in the security situation will be greatly facilitated by the impending deployment of the military observers. Their presence will provide a sense of security to those who need to cross from one part of the city to the other. Nevertheless, my Special Representative considers, and I fully agree, that the security problem in Mogadishu cannot be properly addressed unless the United Nations security force called for in paragraphs 4 and 5 of Security Council resolution 751 (1992) is deployed. That force will play an important deterrent role

not only as regards the safety of the international and local personnel providing humanitarian assistance, but also as regards a general stabilization of the situation in Mogadishu.

III. *Humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation*

23. All the leaders and Elders whom my Special Representative met in Somalia brought to his attention the desperate situation the country faces in terms of needs for humanitarian assistance, recovery programmes and institution-building.

24. Somalia is today a country without central, regional or local administration, and without services: no electricity, no communications, no transport, no schools and no health services. Throughout the country, there are incredible scenes of hunger, disease and dying children.

25. The food situation is critical. Civil conflict has prevented agricultural activity in the normally productive areas of the south, and the north and central regions are suffering from severe drought. The threat of widespread famine in rural areas has become a reality. Food prices are rising sharply everywhere, but most of the population have no money to buy food on the market since virtually all economic activity has been disrupted by war.

26. Over one million children are at risk due to malnutrition. Some 4.5 million people are in urgent need of food assistance. Tens of thousands are in camps; others are isolated and desolate in small groups; hundreds of thousands are refugees in the border areas with Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti; hundreds of thousands more have left the country. Over 300,000 are now registered as refugees in Kenya and, with a daily increase of about 1,000, this could reach some 500,000 refugees in Kenya alone by 1993. Large numbers of refugees are also in Ethiopia, Djibouti and other States in the Horn of Africa. The absence of food is both the cause and the result of the lack of security. Breaking this vicious cycle may be the key to resolving the complex and inextricably linked social and political problems in Somalia.

27. The situation in the health sector is equally grave. Of the estimated 70 hospitals functioning in Somalia in 1988, only 15 remain partially operational today. Most of these hospitals have no water, no electricity, no drugs or even the most basic medical equipment. Malaria, tuberculosis and vaccination programmes have come to a halt with the collapse of the primary health care structure.

28. A potential disaster looms as the sanitary situation throughout the country continues to deteriorate, posing a major threat to public health. Streets are blocked with rubbish. With the onset of the rainy season, the situation could deteriorate even more rapidly. Potable water is no longer available. Large numbers of people are

at serious risk of epidemics; an indeterminate number have already died.

29. Livestock is central to the economy of Somalia and its people. Drought has had a severe impact on livestock. In addition, cattle by the thousands are dying of disease in the absence of basic veterinary services and medicines.

30. Under these circumstances, it is inevitable that people in Somalia have begun to lose any sense of hope for the future. There is thus a need not only for life-saving interventions but also for reconstruction activities and institution-building which would offer promise of a better future.

31. The Consolidated Inter-Agency 90-day Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia, which was brought to the attention of the Security Council in document S/23829/Add.I, provided the initial framework for acceleration of the provision of humanitarian assistance by the United Nations system. In addition, Somalia figures prominently in the two consolidated inter-agency appeals for the Horn of Africa which I issued in February 1992 and in July 1992. These provide details on specific humanitarian assistance programmes for which international assistance is being sought.

32. In accordance with these programmes, and in spite of precarious security conditions which continue to hamper relief activities, the United Nations system, working in close cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and non-governmental organizations, has made a determined effort to bring humanitarian relief assistance to the affected populations in Somalia. As a part of this process, the operational agencies have re-established a presence in the country, not only in Mogadishu but in other centres where this has been feasible.

33. Although not exhaustive, the following are some highlights of the emergency assistance operations now being carried out by the United Nations system and ICRC:

- (a) Since early this year, ICRC and WFP have delivered 60,000 and 19,000 tons of food aid, respectively, and there are currently 213,500 tons in the pipeline. This is against food aid needs estimated to be in the order of 30-35,000 tons per month. The food aid delivered by WFP so far has been distributed mainly in Mogadishu; however, arrangements for the delivery of food aid to Kis Mayo are being finalized and negotiations for delivery to north-western Somalia through the port of Berbera are at an advanced stage. Assessment missions have been undertaken when security conditions permit to explore the possibility of, and work out modalities for, further deliveries to central and southern Somalia. In addition,

WFP has provided assistance in the shipment and distribution of food aid provided directly by bilateral donors, in particular Saudi Arabia.

- (b) Since March, a joint WFP/United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) airlift has transported over 500 tons of supplementary food from Nairobi to Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baidoa. The airlift continues with two flights a day.
- (c) Country-wide activities undertaken by UNICEF include the provision of potable water to towns, villages and displaced camps; training, management and support to mother and child health (MCH) centres; the provision of therapeutic and supplementary feeding supplies, relief and shelter equipment; and educational items for rehabilitation of community schools. UNICEF also facilitates the airlift of essential medical supplies, relief and food items for indigenous and international non-governmental organizations.
- (d) The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has used local staff to maintain its programme of assistance to Ethiopian refugees in north-west Somalia and is finalizing plans to re-establish an international presence to deal with returnees.
- (e) The World Health Organization (WHO) has contributed approximately \$1.2 million to the health sector and is stationing medical officers in Mogadishu, Kismayo, Hargeisa and north-east Somalia.

34. As indicated earlier, Somalia figures prominently in the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals for the Horn of Africa. Total emergency assistance requirements for 1992 are estimated at US\$ 117 million, of which only US\$ 41 million has been pledged to date. The specific projects identified in the most recent appeal of 15 July 1992 give an indication of the range of activities which are envisaged, provided sufficient funding is made available:

- Assistance to returnees in north-west Somalia;
- Emergency food aid;
- Infrastructure rehabilitation (ports and airports);
- Emergency health care;
- Water and sanitation facilities;
- Nutritional support and supplementary feeding;
- Public health services;
- Disease control;
- Restoration of veterinary services;
- Rehabilitation of agricultural and livestock water points;
- Support to small-scale farmers;
- Provision of seeds and hand tools.

35. In addition to the project activities outlined above, the July appeal also proposes a new and innovative approach to the problem of the movement of Somali refugees into Kenya. The proposed preventive zone programme is primarily designed to discourage mass movements of people within and across borders by providing assistance to vulnerable groups in or as near to their places of origin as possible. Special coordination and cooperation zones will be established, corresponding approximately to a 50-to-100-kilometre radius on each side of the Kenya-Somalia border, within which United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations will combine their respective expertise to deal with all affected people including refugees, the internally displaced and the conflict- or drought-stricken.

36. As noted above, the United Nations is carrying out its emergency assistance programme in Somalia in close cooperation with the ICRC and non-governmental organizations. ICRC has played a vital role in Somalia in providing emergency food assistance, operating "community kitchens", carrying out a livestock vaccination campaign, providing seeds and assisting in the health care sector. ICRC and non-governmental organizations have participated fully in the preparation of the overall emergency programme for Somalia as reflected in the consolidated appeals for the Horn of Africa.

IV. *National reconciliation*

37. All the Somali leaders and Elders repeatedly voiced to my Special Representative their commitment to national reconciliation, especially now that former President Siad Barre has left the country. They stated that this offered new opportunities for national reconciliation. Mr. Ali Mahdi expressed his readiness to cooperate in any way possible in the interest of Somalia. General Aidid stated that he was in contact with other major movements in Somalia and that he was attempting to reconcile differences between the various factions in order to arrive at a common understanding before holding a national reconciliation conference, with the support of the United Nations and the States of the Horn of Africa.

38. The leaders in the north-east expressed their support for United Nations peace efforts and welcomed the moves towards a national reconciliation conference, but emphasized that they could not support the idea of a divided Somalia.

39. The leaders in the north-west were of the view that the premise of any reconciliation should be the acceptance of an independent Somaliland. However, once peace and stability had been achieved both in the north-west and in the south, it would be possible to discuss what form of association could be established between them. There was also a need to reconcile the warring factions

within their own self-proclaimed republic. They believed that progress had been made in that direction and this was demonstrated by the reopening of the port of Berbera.

40. All the leaders and the Elders were of the view that there was a need to undertake intense preparations before a national reconciliation conference was called. It was necessary to reconcile warring factions in each region and to develop consensus among the Somalis. It was felt that all major factions, the Elders and intellectuals should be consulted before proceeding to a national reconciliation conference.

41. In the situation that currently prevails there are two major sources of influence remaining in the country, namely the institution of Elders and the political factions. Both must be mobilized and play their part in building a new Somalia. There is a need to consult them and to open lines of communication between them. There is a yearning among the Somali people for dialogue. The United Nations has received numerous pleas from Somalis from all walks of life for it to be a catalyst in this process.

42. With the collapse of government, the institution of Elders, which was used by all successive governments as the intermediary between them and the people, has remained a source of authority in the different regions. The Elders themselves would want to be in the forefront in steering the country towards stability and peaceful reconciliation. There is no doubt that they should not only be consulted, but also be involved as much as possible in the national reconciliation process.

43. Every region in Somalia has become polarized, with disputes and conflicts emerging between members of the same factions. Factions are no longer political or even tribal. They have become fragmented into clans and subclans, in most cases for the defence of local interests or for survival's sake. It is necessary that consensus be developed within each major faction so that when the conference on national reconciliation is held each movement will be represented by persons who can speak for it, and have the authority to make commitments which their followers will respect.

44. My Special Representative also found, in Somalia and abroad, many Somali intellectuals who were eager to submit proposals as to how their country could be rebuilt. They are frustrated and depressed by its present state. The proposals they advance ought not to be ignored.

V. Regional efforts

45. The States of the Horn of Africa have an essential role in assisting and encouraging the process of national reconciliation and it is of the utmost importance that the United Nations continue to consult them.

46. The leaders and high officials of these States informed my Special Representative of the efforts of the

High-Level Horn of Africa Standing Committee on Somalia, comprising the Ambassadors of the Sudan, Kenya and Djibouti accredited to Ethiopia and the representative of Eritrea, and briefed the Special Representative fully on the establishment of the committee, its purpose and functions. The Standing Committee was set up by the heads of the States of the Horn of Africa at the humanitarian summit in April. It was charged with the responsibility of following up the resolutions of the conference by working closely with the Somali factions to bring about a cessation of hostilities and the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance. It invited all the factions to Bahir Dar for a meeting between 30 May and 5 June. A total of 14 factions and organizations were invited, of which 10 attended. The conference agreed on recommendations on humanitarian assistance, including provisions for the protection and monitoring of aid and secure corridors. On the political side, the parties agreed to hold a national conference which will establish an interim government to lay the groundwork for a democratically elected government.

47. I commend the committee for a significant achievement which can be built upon. As my Special Representative pointed out, the Bahir Dar Agreement did not take into account all aspects of the problem. Some important and significant Somali movements were either absent or not adequately represented. It did, however, establish a good groundwork for our common efforts. The leaders informed my Special Representative of the steps and contacts made so far with various factions in this regard and of their efforts directed at boosting humanitarian assistance.

48. My Special Representative reviewed the efforts undertaken by the States of the Horn of Africa with Mr. Salim A. Salim, Secretary-General of OAU. The Secretary-General considered that the initiative taken by the Horn of Africa forum towards Somalia should be supported as a regional initiative. However, all Somali factions should be involved in the peace process and national reconciliation. Both my Special Representative and the Secretary-General discussed developments in Somalia in the context of the ongoing cooperation between the United Nations, OAU and other regional organizations on Somalia and agreed on the need for more frequent consultations and exchanges of information on the question.

49. In Cairo, the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States pledged the League's cooperation and support for the United Nations efforts in Somalia. He informed my Special Representative that he had written to all members of his organization requesting them to provide emergency relief to the people of Somalia.

50. The Council of Ministers and the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU gave priority

consideration to the situation in and relating to Somalia during their meeting in Dakar from 22 June to 2 July 1992. After an in-depth consideration of the issue, the Council of Ministers adopted a resolution—which was later endorsed by the Summit—by which it, *inter alia*, “urged the Secretary-General of OAU to work in close collaboration with the Secretary-General of the United Nations towards the implementation of Security Council resolution 733 (1992)”. The States of the region were encouraged by the Council “to pursue their efforts aimed at promoting peace in Somalia and preserving regional stability”. They were also called upon “to redouble their efforts to convene a national reconciliation conference in close cooperation with OAU, the United Nations, LAS and OIC”.

51. During the course of the OAU meetings in Dakar, members of my delegation met on several occasions with representatives of various Somali factions that were present in Dakar. In those discussions, it was agreed that following the deployment of the cease-fire observers in Mogadishu, efforts by the United Nations should from there on concentrate on the delivery of much-needed emergency humanitarian assistance throughout Somalia. In this regard, the representatives of the Somali factions were in agreement that the efforts of the Bahir Dar group should also focus on humanitarian issues.

52. I am very appreciative of the support and cooperation the regional organizations including OAU, LAS, and OIC have extended to the United Nations in our joint efforts to restore peace and security to Somalia and provide humanitarian assistance to those in need.

VI. Arms embargo

53. It would appear that the situation regarding the flow of arms and ammunition from outside, and the continuing use of military weapons on a large scale inside Somalia, has not changed since my last report on this aspect (S/23829). Meanwhile, by its resolution 751 (1992), the Security Council established a Committee consisting of all the members of the Council to monitor the implementation of the mandatory arms embargo imposed by paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992), and to assist Governments in doing so.

VII. Observations

54. Somalia today is a divided country, fragmented on clan and family lines, without any recognized channels for political action. The quantity of arms in the hands of individuals, factions and groups is enormous. The defeat of the Somali Army, which as a result of the cold war became, under former President Siad Barre, one of the best-equipped military machines in Africa, resulted in a vast number of arms falling into the hands of individuals, factions and groups, thus feeding the conflicts as well as

the banditry and looting which are taking place all over Somalia. Such activities by independent armed groups are, possibly, the biggest and most serious threat to both the Somalis and the expatriates who work for United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations.

55. The complexity of the situation and the inherent dangers of working in Somalia, combined with the almost total absence of central, regional or local government, pose enormous operational difficulties for the United Nations in establishing a large-scale and effective presence. None the less, the threat of mass starvation facing large segments of the population and the potential renewal of hostilities which could affect peace and stability throughout the Horn of Africa region require an immediate and comprehensive response from the United Nations and the international community.

56. I have therefore come to the conclusion that the United Nations must adapt its involvement in Somalia. Its efforts need to be enlarged so that it can help bring about an effective cease-fire throughout the country, while at the same time pressing forward with parallel efforts to promote national reconciliation. This will require the Organization to establish a presence in all regions and to adopt an innovative and comprehensive approach dealing with all aspects of the Somalia situation, namely the humanitarian relief and recovery programme, the cessation of hostilities and security, the peace process and national reconciliation, in a consolidated framework.

57. As far as the regions are concerned, I propose to establish four operational zones: the north-west (Berbera), the north-east (Bossasso), the central rangelands and Mogadishu (Mogadishu) and the south (Kismayo). In each of the zones a consolidated United Nations operation will carry out the primary activities envisaged in Security Council resolution 751 (1992), namely:

- (a) Humanitarian activities: emergency relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction and institution-building;
- (b) Monitoring of the cease-fire and containment of potential hostilities;
- (c) Security, demobilization and disarmament;
- (d) The peace process and national reconciliation efforts through conciliation, mediation and good offices.

58. In its humanitarian activities in Somalia, the United Nations confronts two basic problems: first, securing access to the affected population in such a volatile security situation; and secondly, obtaining the resources necessary to carry out the programme.

59. At the present time, the problem of access and security is the more acute. Without adequate protection for relief personnel and supplies, the implementation of

an effective humanitarian relief programme is not possible. The United Nations has sought, and will continue to seek, every opportunity to reach those in need. In the absence of a central authority, this has required a pragmatic approach, fashioning arrangements for distribution of relief supplies with local authorities when and where conditions permit. But the continuing deterioration of the situation in the country makes it clear that this is not enough. A framework for the security of humanitarian relief operations is the *sine qua non* for effective action.

60. Relevant United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations will be encouraged to strengthen or reactivate their humanitarian and rehabilitation activities in each of the four zones. They will be part of the operational framework, coordinated as appropriate by the Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance, as part of UNOSOM, in order to ensure complementarity in the activities of all the agencies and non-governmental organizations engaged in humanitarian relief in Somalia.

61. The decentralized, zonal approach which I am recommending will improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the humanitarian operations in Somalia. The use of other ports besides Mogadishu, such as the ports of Kismayo, Bossasso and Berbera, will help increase the quantity of food imported for emergency relief and recovery programmes. Many of the most destitute are located in the interior of the country, not easily accessible from the major ports. The mounting of an urgent airlift operation may be the only way to reach those areas and should be undertaken as soon as possible. There will be a particular need for short landing and take-off aircraft. I have asked the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs to look urgently into this possibility with the agencies concerned.

62. As regards cease-fire monitoring and security, the deployment of the military observers in Mogadishu will be a test as to how such matters can best be handled in a Somali context. I believe that the observers' presence will bring great relief to the population who will be able to cross from one part of the city to the other freely and with less risk.

63. The security situation in Mogadishu continues to be precarious. Looting and banditry remain a widespread problem and attacks on United Nations and non-governmental organization personnel have increased recently. I have asked my Special Representative to pursue his consultations for the deployment of a security force there, as called for in paragraphs 4 and 5 of resolution 751 (1992).

64. However, conditions in most of the other regions of Somalia, as described in some of the preceding paragraphs, also call for immediate action. I, therefore, intend to dispatch a technical team to Somalia as soon as

possible. Its terms of reference will be to examine *inter alia*: (a) the possible monitoring of cease-fire arrangements in parts of the country other than Mogadishu; (b) the possible deployment of military observers in the south-west region on Somalia's border with Kenya; (c) the feasibility of an "arms for food" exchange programme, bearing in mind that this would require military personnel adequately armed and equipped for this task; (d) the need for security forces to provide escort and protection for humanitarian aid activities and personnel in other parts of the country; (e) a possible role for the United Nations in assisting the re-establishment of local police forces.

65. All political leaders and Elders in Somalia have requested United Nations assistance in disarming the population and demobilizing the irregular forces. Such a programme has begun in some areas, such as Mogadishu-north and parts of the north-west and the north-east, on the initiative of the local leaders themselves. Some leaders prefer the arms to be destroyed while others suggest that they should be retained for the new regular forces which will be created. My Special Representative, with the help of the Technical Team referred to above, will develop a plan in this regard for application in all four zones. It is also important that the international community continue to enforce the arms embargo as provided for in Security Council resolution 733 (1992).

66. All leaders and Elders in Somalia have also requested United Nations assistance in organizing local police forces. This is an urgent requirement that will also be addressed by the Technical Team.

67. The conflict in Somalia can only be resolved by the people of Somalia themselves in a process of national reconciliation. As stated in resolution 751 (1992) and in my report (S/23829), the objective of the United Nations is to undertake consultations and arrangements for the convening of a conference on national reconciliation and unity in Somalia. This is a process that calls for sustained efforts and demands patience and understanding of the regional environment. Important progress on this matter has been made in my Special Representative's consultations with Somali leaders and Elders and he has already begun to discuss alternative venues for the conference. I call upon all the Somali people, leaders of political movements, Elders and spiritual leaders, to close ranks and work together in order to achieve the desperately needed national reconciliation of their country. The international community can assist them only if they give it the opportunity to do so.

68. My Special Representative has already shown that his personal intervention can help to defuse potential local crises. Qualified UNOSOM personnel will accordingly be located in each of the zones to assist in undertak-

ing mediation and conciliation and in arranging for consultative conferences as needed.

69. When UNOSOM was established in Somalia almost two months ago, severe fighting was going on in southern Somalia including Kismayo and as close as 70 kilometres from Mogadishu. There was hardly any contact between north and south Mogadishu and tension was very high. There was also tension and sporadic fighting between different factions in several cities in the north of the country. Despite this precarious situation, every effort has been made to deliver humanitarian assistance. Armed militia from north Mogadishu are now allowed access to the port in the southern zone to escort supplies destined for the population in the north. There is always the risk of a renewal of hostilities. But these are significant developments which must be consolidated and built upon.

70. The desperate and complex situation in Somalia will require energetic and sustained efforts on the part of the international community to break the circle of violence and hunger. The new, comprehensive approach described above is intended to be a catalyst for achieving the vital objective of national reconciliation and the construction of a peaceful, stable and democratic Somalia.

71. I seek the Security Council's approval of the comprehensive and enlarged approach recommended in this report. I will submit a further report to the Council on its implementation as soon as I have received the conclusions and recommendations of the Technical Team which I propose to dispatch to the area. Preliminary estimates of the additional resources required will also be submitted at that time.

Document 17

Security Council resolution approving the establishment of four operational zones

S/RES/767 (1992), 27 July 1992

The Security Council,

Considering the request by Somalia for the Security Council to consider the situation in Somalia, 1/

Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992 and 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 22 July 1992 on the situation in Somalia, 2/

Considering the letter of 23 June 1992 3/ from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council informing him that all the parties in Mogadishu had agreed to the deployment of the fifty military observers, and that the advance party of observers had arrived in Mogadishu on 5 July 1992 and that the rest of the observers had arrived in the mission area on 23 July 1992,

Deeply concerned about the availability of arms and ammunition in the hands of civilians and the proliferation of armed banditry throughout Somalia,

Alarmed by the sporadic outbreak of hostilities in several parts of Somalia leading to continued loss of life and destruction of property, and putting at risk the personnel of the United Nations, non-governmental organizations and other international humanitarian organizations, as well as disrupting their operations,

Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering caused by the conflict and concerned that the situation in Somalia constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Gravely alarmed by the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Somalia and underlining the urgent need for quick delivery of humanitarian assistance in the whole country,

Recognizing that the provision of humanitarian assistance in Somalia is an important element in the effort of the Council to restore international peace and security in the area,

Responding to the urgent calls by the parties in Somalia for the international community to take measures in Somalia to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance,

Noting the Secretary-General's proposals for a comprehensive decentralized zonal approach in the United Nations involvement in Somalia,

Cognizant that the success of such an approach requires the cooperation of all parties, movements and factions in Somalia,

1. *Takes note with appreciation* of the report of the Secretary-General of 22 July 1992 on the situation in Somalia; 2/

1/ *Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-seventh Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1992*, document S/23445.

2/ *Ibid.*, *Supplement for July, August and September 1992*, document S/24343.

3/ S/24179.

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to make full use of all available means and arrangements, including the mounting of an urgent airlift operation, with a view to facilitating the efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and humanitarian organizations in accelerating the provision of humanitarian assistance to the affected population in Somalia, threatened by mass starvation;

3. *Urges* all parties, movements and factions in Somalia to facilitate the efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and humanitarian organizations to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to the affected population in Somalia and reiterates its call for the full respect for the security and safety of the personnel of the humanitarian organizations and the guarantee of their complete freedom of movement in and around Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia;

4. *Calls upon* all parties, movements and factions in Somalia to cooperate with the United Nations with a view to the urgent deployment of the United Nations security personnel called for in paragraphs 4 and 5 of its resolution 751 (1992), and otherwise to assist in the general stabilization of the situation in Somalia, without which cooperation the Council does not exclude other measures to deliver humanitarian assistance to Somalia;

5. *Reiterates its appeal* to the international community to provide adequate financial and other resources for humanitarian efforts in Somalia;

6. *Encourages* the ongoing efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and humanitarian organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, to ensure delivery of humanitarian assistance to all regions of Somalia;

7. *Appeals* to all parties, movements and factions in Somalia to extend full cooperation to the United Nations military observers and to take measures to ensure their security;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General, as part of his continuing efforts in Somalia, to promote an immediate and effective cessation of hostilities and the maintenance of a cease-fire throughout the country in order to facilitate the urgent delivery of humanitarian assistance and the process of reconciliation and political settlement in Somalia;

9. *Calls upon* all parties, movements and factions in Somalia immediately to cease hostilities and to maintain a cease-fire throughout the country;

10. *Stresses* the need for the observance and strict monitoring of the general and complete embargo of all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia, as decided in paragraph 5 of its resolution 733 (1992);

11. *Welcomes* the cooperation between the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference in resolving the situation in Somalia;

12. *Approves* the Secretary-General's proposal to establish four operational zones in Somalia as part of the consolidated United Nations Operation in Somalia;

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General to ensure that his Special Representative for Somalia is provided with all the necessary support services to enable him to carry out his mandate effectively;

14. *Strongly supports* the decision of the Secretary-General to dispatch urgently a technical team to Somalia, under the overall direction of his Special Representative, in order to work within the framework and objectives outlined in paragraph 64 of his report and to submit expeditiously a report to the Security Council on this matter;

15. *Affirms* that all officials of the United Nations and all experts on mission for the United Nations in Somalia enjoy the privileges and immunities provided for in the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of 13 February 1946 4/ and in any other relevant instruments and that all parties, movements and factions in Somalia are required to allow them full freedom of movement and all necessary facilities;

16. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue urgently his consultations with all parties, movements and factions in Somalia towards the convening of a conference on national reconciliation and unity in Somalia in close cooperation with the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference;

17. *Calls upon* all parties, movements and factions in Somalia to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General in the implementation of the present resolution;

18. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter until a peaceful solution is achieved.

4/ General Assembly resolution 22 A (I) of 13 February 1946.

Document 18

Letter dated 6 August 1992 from the Secretary-General to United States Senator Nancy Kassebaum discussing the response of the United Nations to the situation in Somalia

Not issued as a United Nations document

I should like to thank you for your letter of 24 July 1992 in which you conveyed details of your recent trip to Somalia. Your visit there, and your testimony to the United States House Select Committee on Hunger, will help enhance public awareness of the critical humanitarian crisis confronting that country.

I fully share your concern at the urgent need to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the people of Somalia. As you know, I have stressed this issue in my reports to the Security Council, which has endorsed my recommendation for the deployment of 500 United Nations security personnel in Mogadishu to facilitate the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance. The United Nations has spared no effort to secure the agreement of the factions in Mogadishu on the deployment of such a force.

Regrettably, the delay in resolving this vital question has exacerbated the humanitarian emergency in Somalia and undermined the international efforts to alleviate it. I wish to take this opportunity to express my appreciation for your own strong support for this initiative.

As you are aware, the Security Council addressed these and other crucial issues in its most recent resolution on this subject. In resolution 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992, the Council approved my proposal to establish four

operational zones in Somalia in each of which a consolidated United Nations operation will be carried out in the areas of humanitarian activities; cease-fire monitoring; security, demobilization and disarmament; and national reconciliation.

In this connection, the Council also strongly supported my decision urgently to dispatch a technical team to Somalia to examine, *inter alia*, the feasibility of an "arms for food" exchange programme; the need for security forces to provide escort and protection for humanitarian aid activities and personnel; and a possible role for the United Nations in assisting in the re-establishment of local police forces. The team has now begun arriving in Mogadishu and I shall submit a report to the Council on its findings.

More than ever before, the resolution of the crisis in Somalia—in all its aspects—will require the concerted effort of the international community as a whole. I therefore welcome your readiness to work together on this issue and wish to assure you of my continued support and encouragement for your own efforts in this regard.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS -GHALI

Document 19

Letter dated 7 August 1992 from the Secretary-General to United States Senator Paul Simon concerning the situation in Somalia

Not issued as a United Nations document

I wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 27 July 1992 and to thank you for your support for the United Nations role in Somalia.

Recent reporting on Somalia, albeit somewhat exaggerated, may have inadvertently served a purpose in heightening international awareness of the appalling humanitarian crisis in the country and the imperative need for a concerted international response without further delay. I should not miss this opportunity to note that the real test for Somalia and for the international community

still lies ahead. The people of Somalia and particularly those that claim to represent them bear primary responsibility to end the senseless conflict and seek peace through negotiation. On its part, the international community must assist the parties in this process and, above all, ensure that adequate humanitarian assistance reaches the affected population in Somalia without hindrance or delay.

As you may be aware, pursuant to Security Council resolution 767 (1992) of 24 July 1992, I dispatched a technical team to Somalia which arrived in Mogadiscio

on 6 August, for a two-week stay in the country. Among other things, the team will examine the feasibility of an "arms for food" exchange programme; the need for security forces to provide escort and protection for humanitarian aid activities and personnel; and a possible role for the United Nations in assisting the re-establishment of local police forces.

My next report to the Security Council will draw from the findings and recommendations which the technical team will submit to me upon its return to New York.

Without prejudice to that report, however, it is clear that for any humanitarian programme for Somalia to be effective, there should be adequate protection for the assistance that will be provided and the staff involved. This will be the challenge when the Security Council wishes to take a decision, particularly if there continues to be opposition from some of the Somali factions to the deployment of the United Nations security personnel.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS -GHALI

Document 20

Letter dated 12 August 1992 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council informing the Council that the principal factions in Mogadishu have accepted the immediate deployment of a 500-member security force as part of UNOSOM and proposing that the force be composed of a contingent from Pakistan

S/24451, 12 August 1992

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992, by which the Council urged all parties, movements and factions in Somalia to cooperate with the United Nations with a view to the urgent deployment of the United Nations security personnel called for in paragraphs 4 and 5 of its resolution 751 (1992).

I am happy to be able to inform the Security Council that my Special Representative in Somalia, Ambassador Sahnoun, has reported that both principal factions in Mogadishu have now agreed to the immediate deployment of a 500-strong security force as part of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM).

Having completed the necessary consultations, I propose that this force be composed of a contingent from Pakistan, which has expressed its readiness in principle to make the necessary personnel available to UNOSOM.

I intend to proceed with the deployment of this security force as soon as possible.

I should be grateful if you would bring these matters to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS -GHALI

Document 21

Letter dated 14 August 1992 from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General informing the Secretary-General of the Council's agreement with the proposed composition of the security force to be sent to Mogadishu

S/24452, 14 August 1992

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 12 August 1992 (S/24451) concerning the composition of a 500-strong security force as part of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 767 (1992) has been brought to the

attention of the members of the Council. They agree with the proposal contained in your letter.

(Signed) Li Daoyu
President of the Security Council

Document 22

Letter dated 17 August from the Secretary-General to United States Representative Bill Emerson concerning the situation in Somalia

Not issued as a United Nations document

I wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 30 July 1992 and to thank you for your support for the United Nations role in Somalia.

Recent reporting on Somalia may have served a purpose in heightening international awareness of the appalling humanitarian crisis in the country and the imperative need for a concerted international response without further delay. Yet the real test for Somalia and for the international community still lies ahead. The people of Somalia and particularly those that claim to represent them bear primary responsibility to end the senseless conflict and seek peace through negotiation. On its part, the international community must assist the parties in this process and, above all, ensure that adequate humanitarian assistance reaches the affected population in Somalia without hindrance or delay.

As your letter rightly indicates, pursuant to Security Council resolution 767 of 24 July 1992, I dispatched a technical team to Somalia for a two-week stay in the country. Among other things, the team is examining the feasibility of an "arms for food" exchange programme;

the need for security forces to provide escort and protection for humanitarian aid activities and personnel; and a possible role for the United Nations in assisting the re-establishment of local police forces.

My next report to the Security Council will draw from the findings and recommendations which the technical team will submit to me upon its return to New York. Without prejudice to that report, however, it is clear that for any humanitarian programme for Somalia to be effective, there should be adequate protection for the assistance that will be provided and the staff involved. I was thus greatly encouraged last week to be informed by my Special Representative in Somalia, Ambassador Sahnoun, that the principal factions in Mogadiscio have now agreed to the immediate deployment of a 500-strong security force as part of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM).

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS -GHALI

Document 23

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia, proposing the deployment of four additional security units, each with 750 troops, in Bossasso, Berbera, Kismayo and the south-west

S/24480, 24 August 1992, and addendum, S/24480/Add.1, 28 August 1992

Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution 767 (1992), which was adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 27 July 1992.

2. Immediately after the adoption of the resolution, I brought its contents to the attention of the concerned Somali factions and movements. I also transmitted copies to the current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), President Abdou Diouf of Senegal, and to the Secretaries-General of the League of Arab States (LAS), OAU and the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

3. A technical team was established under the leadership of Mr. Peter Hansen, former Assistant Secretary-

General of the United Nations, and visited Somalia from 6 to 15 August 1992, having assembled in Nairobi on 4 August. During its stay in Somalia, it travelled to Bardera, Baidoa, Belet Wien, Kismayu, Galkaio, Garowe, Bossasso, Hargeisa, Burao and Berbera. At all these places, it met with the leaders and representatives of various Somali factions and movements, as well as with elders. (See the annex to the present report for the team's itinerary and programme of meetings.)

4. Members of the team also visited Haddour and Dushareb, as well as Mandera, Bulacao, Liboi, and Diboi, on both sides of the Kenya-Somalia border. An aerial survey of the border was also undertaken.

5. On 17 August, the team leader held consultations with the Kenyan authorities on issues of particular concern to them.

6. On his return to New York on 21 August 1992, the team leader delivered his report to me. The present report describes the action currently being taken by the United Nations in response to the humanitarian crisis in Somalia and contains my recommendations for other action which needs to be taken immediately. Further reports will in due course be presented on action to be taken in the medium and longer term.

1. Humanitarian assistance

7. My previous reports to the Security Council have described in detail the humanitarian needs of the affected populations in Somalia and the urgency of establishing appropriate arrangements for the delivery and distribution of relief supplies throughout the country. The Council will, in particular, recall the consolidated inter-agency 90-day plan of action for emergency humanitarian assistance to Somalia which was annexed to my report of 21 April 1992 (S/23829/Add.1).

8. United Nations agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), have continued throughout this period to implement the 90-day plan and to intensify and extend their humanitarian activities in Somalia. So far this year, the World Food Programme (WFP) has delivered 36,500 metric tons of food to Somalia, mainly to Mogadishu. WFP is ready to deliver another 30,000 metric tons immediately and plans to deliver the additional 85,000 metric tons called for in the latest of the Special Emergency Programme for the Horn of Africa (SEPHA) appeal, as soon as the necessary conditions can be created and donor support is available. Since the beginning of 1992, ICRC has delivered 83,000 metric tons of food to various parts of Somalia, including Mogadishu. It plans to deliver another 70,000 metric tons during the next five months. Bilateral donors such as Saudi Arabia and France have also shipped food and other assistance.

9. Since March, a joint WFP/United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) airlift has transported over 1,300 metric tons of supplementary food and medical supplies from Nairobi to Mogadishu, Kismayu, Boroma and Baidoa. The airlift is continuing with two flights a day. As of July, UNICEF has been operating 8 mother and child health (MCH) centres at Mogadishu and provides support, including drugs and equipment, to 17 other MCH centres at Mogadishu, 2 at Kismayu, 1 in Baidoa and 7 in the north of Somalia. Medical equipment and fuel have also been supplied by UNICEF to hospitals and medical posts in Kismayu, Mogadishu, Hargeisa and

Boroma. Mobile clinics have been used to assist 19 village health posts in the central and southern regions, in addition to 22 displaced persons camps at Kismayu and 68 in Mogadishu. Vaccination programmes have also been undertaken.

10. The World Health Organization (WHO), while not present in Somalia, has continued to support NGOs and self-help groups through the provision of basic health and drugs kits, equipment and medicines. WHO reports that during the past five months it has sent to Somalia each month an average US\$ 250,000 worth of medical and other supplies.

11. These efforts, however, are in no way adequate to meet the overall needs of the Somali people. Present estimates, which may be conservative, indicate that as many as 4.5 million Somalis are in desperate need of food and other assistance. Death and starvation are widespread, especially in the central and southern parts of Somalia. The absence of food is a significant cause of the large-scale population movements that are taking place from Somalia into Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti.

12. The United Nations and its partners are ready and have the capacity to provide substantially increased assistance but they have been prevented from doing so by the lawlessness and lack of security that prevail throughout Somalia, often including Mogadishu itself. Heavily armed gangs overrun delivery and distribution points and loot supplies directly from docked ships as well as from airports and airstrips. I have previously reported to the Security Council the looting of high protein food and medicines at Mogadishu airport. More recently, on 16 August, while the technical team was in Somalia, armed gangs looted the first large-scale WFP shipment to Kismayu, as well as the entire consignment of diesel oil, which is essential for the transport of food to distribution centres. Current security conditions do not permit the assured delivery of humanitarian assistance by overland transport and are thus the main cause of the current food crisis in Somalia.

13. The crisis is further compounded by drought in the South and the fact that the agriculture, livestock and fisheries sectors have been devastated by the civil war. The food supply situation in Somalia will remain serious for the foreseeable future. In 1992, the cereal harvest will be poor because of insufficient rainfall, the absence of security and the collapse of infrastructure and markets. Food imports required by Somalia during the period from July 1992 to June 1993 are likely to be more than 500,000 metric tons. Food aid distributed free or sold on the market will have to meet most of this requirement.

14. Also because of the war, such health infrastructure as remains in Somalia can, at best, be described as rudimentary. Of the 15 hospitals that remain partially

operational, most have neither water nor electricity nor drugs. The sanitary situation is deteriorating at an alarming pace and primary health care is practically non-existent. Disease is exacerbated by malnutrition and hunger.

15. Given the difficulties, I have come to the conclusion that the present airlift operations (already being carried out by WFP and UNICEF, as well as ICRC) need to be substantially enhanced. The technical team has recommended that for the immediate future airlift operations should be directed to the areas of need located primarily in central and southern Somalia, with priority attention being given to Baidoa, Hoddur, Bardera and Belet Wien.

16. Until Berbera port and the roads leading from it are secured, ad hoc airlifting of non-food items and supplementary food items may also be necessary from Djibouti to destinations in the north-west such as Hargeisa, Burao, Las Anod and Borama, where it is estimated that the displaced population and returnees from camps in Ethiopia number some 350,000 vulnerable persons. A worsening of the general food situation in these northern regions is imminent because of the severe diminution of livestock, which has reached 75 per cent. Unless this can be halted, destitute agro-pastoralists will constitute a new wave of starving people flocking to the towns. There is thus a need for urgent provision of veterinary assistance.

17. The international community has expressed keen interest in contributing to an urgent airlift. The immediate offers of assistance received from the Governments of Canada, France, Germany and the United States of America are most welcome. This relief effort must, however, be carefully coordinated to ensure that there is no duplication of effort, that food and other relief items reach those most in need, and that suitable arrangements are made on the ground to ensure effective distribution and, where necessary, adequate security. Given the overall role, capacity and the experience of WFP in food aid and logistics, I have asked it to coordinate, within the United Nations, the current airlift initiative. Its Regional Logistics Office at Nairobi will be designated to serve as the focal point for these functions. The Regional Logistics Office will organize the airlift, in close liaison with all contributors, as well as relevant United Nations agencies and NGOs.

18. All contributors are asked to contact the Regional Logistics Office with offers of planes, food and non-food relief supplies, regardless of whether the assistance is to be placed at the disposal of United Nations operational organizations, NGOs or ICRC or delivered bilaterally. The Regional Logistics Office will provide the necessary advice and guidance on the capacities of airstrips, the arrangements for handover and distribution and related security considerations. As far as food is

concerned, donors are requested to make available basic food commodities that are not of high value, in order to minimize looting and civil unrest.

19. The Regional Logistics Office will work closely with the Humanitarian Assistance Coordinator for Somalia, Mr. David Bassiouni, who, under the direction of my Special Representative, will continue to exercise overall responsibility for coordination, especially the identification of specific needs, priority areas for the airlift operation and all questions relating to the distribution of assistance. He will cooperate closely with the Commander of the military component of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) in matters relating to the protection of relief operations in Somalia.

20. I would like to reiterate that the critical problem facing the United Nations in its humanitarian activities in Somalia is how to ensure the security of relief supplies at all stages, namely delivery, storage and distribution. It must also be underlined that critically important though the airlift may be, it cannot be a substitute for an effective surface-delivered programme of assistance through Somalia's ports and overland routes with WFP continuing to exercise leadership in logistics and food transportation. For this, effective security and ground arrangements are a *sine qua non*.

21. While concentrating at this stage on the issues of emergency relief and the provision of security for it, the United Nations will continue its efforts to implement the overall humanitarian programme for Somalia as reflected in the updated consolidated inter-agency appeal, which I launched on 15 July 1992. The interrelated issues in the continuum from relief to rehabilitation and development have been identified in the report of the technical team and will be the subject of further reports.

II. *Establishment of preventive zones*

22. Civil war, the insecurity and starvation are causing massive displacements and refugee flows. An emergency relief programme must try to halt these. A particularly serious situation exists along the Kenyan border, where some 280,000 Somali refugees are located, with 2,000 more arriving daily. The "preventive zone" concept reflected in the updated consolidated inter-agency appeal of 15 July 1992 needs to be put into effect immediately and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is ready to take the lead on this. The first phase of this programme will be the establishment of an operation to deliver food and seeds from Kenya to a preventive zone on the Somali side of the border in the Gedo region. This programme is intended to reduce significantly cross-border movements of people in search of food. It will also contribute to a decrease in frictions that are growing in the border area.

III. Security and cease-fire monitoring

23. As noted in paragraph 20 above, the problem in Somalia today is not the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies to ports and airports in the country (though on occasions this can be hazardous) but the protection of the convoys that transport supplies from port or airport to warehouses and distribution centres, together with the protection of those stores and centres themselves. The technical team confirmed my earlier recommendation that this protection should be provided by United Nations security personnel operating on the lines described in paragraphs 27 to 29 of my report of 21 April 1992 (S/23829).

24. As far as Mogadishu is concerned, that recommendation was agreed in principle by the Security Council in paragraph 4 of its resolution 751 (1992). Following consultations with the two parties in Mogadishu, in accordance with paragraph 8 of the agreements signed on 27 and 28 March 1992 (S/23829, annex I), my Special Representative obtained the agreement of both of them on 12 August 1992 to the earliest possible deployment in Mogadishu of a 500-strong security force (S/24451). The Government of Pakistan has agreed to contribute a unit for this purpose and the Government of the United States has agreed to airlift it to Mogadishu. It is hoped that this deployment can take place very early in September. I am convinced that it is required in order to improve the effectiveness of current humanitarian efforts in Mogadishu and its immediate neighbourhood.

25. The technical team obtained the agreement of those concerned for the deployment of similar security units in two other parts of Somalia. The first would be at Bossasso in the north-east and, like its counterpart at Mogadishu, would provide security at the port, escort convoys of relief supplies to distribution centres and protect the centres during distribution. The second would be deployed inland in the south-west and, subject to the consent of the Government of Kenya, would be based at Mandera, which lies just on the Kenyan side of the border some 470 kilometres north-west of Mogadishu. This unit's task would be to escort convoys of relief supplies from Kenya to the preventive zone which is being established along the Somali side of the border, in the Gedo region, as described in paragraph 22 above.

26. There are two other places where I believe that it is necessary for United Nations security units to be deployed for protective purposes. These are Berbera in the north-west and Kismayu in the south-east. The agreement of those concerned has not yet been obtained but I have instructed my Special Representative to give the highest priority to bringing his consultations on this matter to a successful conclusion.

27. The technical team also evaluated the possible extension of the current cease-fire activities of UNOSOM at Mogadishu to other parts of the country. Following the consultations reported in paragraph 19 of my report of 22 July 1992 (S/24343), the 50 military observers authorized for Mogadishu completed their deployment on 23 July 1992. They have since been able to play a valuable role in helping the two sides to maintain the cease-fire. After a number of preliminary meetings between the Chief Military Observer and his military counterparts on both sides, UNOSOM was able to arrange the first meeting, on 2 August 1992, of a Joint Cease-fire Monitoring Committee, chaired by the Chief Military Observer. The military observers are conducting mobile patrols in areas of Mogadishu, including the seaport and airport. Discussions continue to obtain for them freedom of movement to conduct mobile patrols in all parts of the city. The security situation in Mogadishu nevertheless remains precarious. On 4 August, heavy fighting took place in the Medina/Wagajir area of the city. UNOSOM succeeded in getting the parties to agree to a cease-fire and has since exerted strenuous efforts to prevent a resumption of hostilities.

28. As regards cease-fire monitoring in other parts of the country, the technical team paid particular attention to the possible deployment of military observers along the southern part of the Kenya-Somalia border. However, concern was expressed by several regional leaders about the implications of such an operation for the balance of military forces within the country. Given this attitude, the lack of an effective cease-fire and the fluidity of the fighting, I do not believe that it is at present feasible to deploy military observers for cease-fire monitoring purposes outside Mogadishu. The security of unarmed military observers would, in any case, be severely at risk in current circumstances.

29. I have accordingly instructed my Special Representative to inform me as soon as, in his judgement, conditions exist for the effective deployment of military observers, in reasonable security, to monitor cease-fires which can be negotiated in various regions, in addition to Mogadishu.

IV. Establishment of four zone headquarters

30. It will be recalled that in my report of 22 July 1992 (S/24343, paras. 56 ff) I recommended that UNOSOM establish four operational zones, which would enable the Organization to establish a presence in all parts of Somalia and adopt an innovative and comprehensive approach dealing with the humanitarian relief and recovery programmes, the cessation of hostilities and security, the peace process and national reconciliation, in a consolidated framework.

31. The technical team has confirmed the validity of this concept. I therefore propose to establish the four zone headquarters as quickly as possible. Each headquarters will be headed by a civilian official who will assist my Special Representative in all aspects of his duties. It is envisaged that at this stage the nucleus of each headquarters, consisting of the Zone Director and the necessary administrative staff, will be put in place, with additional elements being added as the volume of United Nations activities increases in connection with the humanitarian programmes, the cease-fire, security and national reconciliation.

V. Observations

32. Somalia poses a particularly difficult challenge to the United Nations, which must find a means of responding to the urgent and overwhelming needs of a population growing increasingly desperate in the face of widespread hunger, the absence of national administration, almost complete destruction of basic infrastructure, and acute insecurity. This report has described urgent steps, which are planned or already being taken, to mitigate the current widespread starvation in the areas most seriously affected by internal strife and drought and to prevent the incidence of hunger escalating in other parts of the country. The delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia is fraught with difficulties because of the vicious cycle of insecurity and hunger. Lack of security prevents the delivery of food, while food shortages contribute significantly to the level of violence and insecurity.

33. The immediate need is to break this vicious cycle. There must then be a comprehensive programme of action covering humanitarian relief, the cessation of hostilities, the reduction of organized and unorganized violence, and national reconciliation. Action to achieve the necessary improvement of the security situation must be comprehensive and multifaceted. There will need to be measures to demobilize regular and irregular forces and to re-establish law and order, initially on a local basis. A wide range of supporting interventions will be required to help re-establish local police forces: training, uniforms, communications and other equipment, as well as advisory services. However, such United Nations assistance will have to be contingent upon conditions that will ensure the neutrality of such forces: agreement by all relevant local authorities on the need for a unified local police force and on a neutral command structure, recruitment based on objective criteria and external monitoring.

34. I continue to believe that "food for arms" could be an important component of an effort to improve security conditions through a disarmament and demobilization programme. The technical team has, however, advised that at this stage the general effectiveness of such

a programme in isolation is doubtful. Under present circumstances, Somalis see arms as a means not only of personal security but also of survival.

35. The programme of action will also have to include educational and vocational training programmes that offer alternative employment opportunities. The basic thrust must be to provide people with real alternatives for survival other than possession of arms. Equal consideration must be given to the reintegration of militia forces into a normal society.

36. A fundamental consideration that should guide all United Nations activities in Somalia is that the Somalis themselves should progressively assume responsibility for establishing conditions and arrangements for the distribution of humanitarian assistance. Thus, a stronger United Nations role in securing access, transport and distribution of relief supplies must be paralleled by an effort to involve Somali entities fully in all aspects of this process. It is important that Somalis should be able to see the advantage to them of working with the international community rather than obliging the international community to take initiatives of its own without them. The fact is that the international community cannot stand idly by and witness the unnecessary loss of human lives in Somalia.

37. Much of the action described and recommended in this report is covered by existing mandates. However, it will be necessary for the Security Council to authorize the increases in UNOSOM strength that I have recommended. I will circulate as soon as possible an addendum to the present report containing preliminary cost estimates for these. They relate to the establishment of the four zone headquarters of UNOSOM and to the deployment of four additional security units, each with a strength of up to 750 all ranks. The first two will serve in Bossaso and the south-west, where those concerned have already given their agreement. The others will be deployed in Berbera and Kismayu as soon as consultations with those concerned have reached a successful conclusion. The total strength of United Nations security personnel whom I currently envisage deploying to Somalia is thus up to 3,500 all ranks, including the unit of 500 which has already been authorized for Mogadishu and will be assuming its duties there very shortly.

Annex

United Nations technical team to Somalia: itinerary and programme of meetings

Mogadishu: 6 August 1992

The team met with the following members of the Interim Administration:

1. Ali Mahdi, Interim President

2. Dr. Aweys, Minister in the Presidency
3. General Mohammed Abdi, Commander, Government Forces

and with the following officials of the United Somali Congress (USC):

1. General Mohamad Farah Aidid, Commander, USC forces
2. Abdel-Karim Ali Ahmad, Secretary General, USC
3. Professor Issa

Bardera: 7 August 1992

The team met with the following officials:

1. General Mohamad Farah Aidid, Commander, USC forces
2. Colonel Omar Jess, Chairman, Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)
3. Mohamad Abdi Warsame, Chairman, Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM)
4. Mohamad Nur Aliyu, Chairman, Somali Democratic Movement (SDM)

Baidoa: 7 August 1992

The team met with the Governor and other local officials.

Belet Wien: 8 August 1992

The team met with the following officials:

1. Hassan Abdalle Qalad, Regional Governor
2. Ahmed Hagi Habibullah, Assistant Regional Governor
3. Mohamad Dado, District Commissioner
4. Mohamad Ahmed Hubero, Regional Security Commander
5. Omar Arte-Abdi, Police Commissioner

Kismayu: 9 August 1992

The team met with the following officials:

1. Ahmed Hoshe, Commander, SPM
2. Kismayu officials of the USC, SSNM, and SDM
3. Mr. Ahmed Jimale Geech, Commander, Somali Liberation Army (SLA), Kismayu

Galkaio/Garowe: 10 August 1992

The team met with the following officials:

1. Abdulahi Yusuf Ahmed, Chairman of State Emergency Committee
2. Colonel Said Mohamed Salah, Local Commander of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) Forces
3. Local Elders

Bossaso: 11 August 1992

The team met with the following officials:

1. General Mohamad Abshir Musa, Chairman, SSDF
2. Mr. Bogor Abdulahi Bogor Muse, Head of Regional Administration
3. General Abdulahi Yousef, Commander, SSDF forces
4. General Osman S. Samanutar

Hargeisa/Burao: 12 August 1992

The team met with the following officials:

1. Abdurahman Ahmad Ali "Toor", President, Somali National Movement (SNM)
2. Ahmad Mohamad, Foreign Minister, SNM
3. Ahmad Mohamad Silanyo, Former President, SNM
Currently leader of Habr Toljaalo, Burao

Berbera: 13 August 1992

The team met with the following officials:

1. Ibrahim Hussein, Commander of Berbera Forces and Leader of Movement
2. Musa Hirsi, Chief of Elders
3. Abdilahi Abdi Muse, Head of Rehabilitation
4. Osman Hassan, Elders and Administration Committee

Addendum

1. In paragraph 37 of my report to the Security Council on the Situation in Somalia (S/24480), I indicated my intention to circulate as soon as possible an addendum to the report which would contain a preliminary cost estimate for the establishment of four operational zones and for an increase in the strength of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) security personnel of up to 3,500 all ranks, including the unit of 500 which has already been authorized for Mogadishu. An operation of this size and complexity would require an elaborate logistic, communications and medical support. In the precarious situation of Somalia, such support would be best provided by three specialized units, estimated at up to 719 all ranks at the early stage of deployment.

2. As stated in paragraph 31 of the report, I propose to establish four operational zone headquarters, as quickly as possible. Each zone headquarters will be headed by a civilian Zone Director, who with the necessary administrative staff will assist my Special Representative in all aspects of his duties. Additional civilian staff would be added as the volume of the United Nations activities increases in connection with the humanitarian programmes, the cease-fire, security and national reconciliation.

3. Should the Security Council agree to the proposed increase in the strength of UNOSOM, it is estimated that the overall cost, for a six-month period from 1 September 1992 to 28 February 1993, would amount to some \$129.2 million. Thereafter, it is estimated that the monthly cost relating to these activities would be approximately \$12.1 million. A breakdown of the estimated cost by category of expenditure is provided for information purposes in the annex to the present addendum.

4. It would be my recommendation to the General Assembly, should the Security Council decide to enlarge the strength of UNOSOM, that the additional cost relating thereto should be considered an expense of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations and that the assessments to be levied on Member States be credited to the UNOSOM Special Account.

Annex

Cost estimate for the enlargement of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (In thousands of United States dollars)

	<i>Initial</i>	<i>Monthly</i>
	<i>six months</i>	<i>thereafter</i>
1. Security component		
(a) Military observers	880	170
(b) Security personnel, pay and allowances	30 262	6 378
(c) Logistical support personnel	6 923	894
2. Civilian personnel, including travel to mission area 1/	14 135	2 830
3. Accommodation including premises, construction and maintenance 2/	52 680	110
4. Vehicle operations	4 780	245
5. Aircraft operations	5 400	1 030
6. Communications	7 502	105
7. Miscellaneous equipment	3 040	30
8. Miscellaneous supplies, services, freight and support costs	<u>3 587</u>	<u>331</u>
Total	<u>129 189</u>	<u>12 123</u>

1/ Provides for 212 international staff and 195 locally recruited staff.
2/ This estimate is based on the assumption that no facilities are available in the Mission area.

Document 24

Security Council resolution approving the establishment of the four zone headquarters and the increase in UNOSOM's strength proposed by the Secretary-General

S/RES/775 (1992), 28 August 1992

The Security Council,

Considering the request by Somalia for the Security Council to consider the situation in Somalia, 1/

Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992, 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992 and 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 24 and 28 August 1992 on the situation in Somalia, 2/

Deeply concerned about the availability of arms and ammunition and the proliferation of armed banditry throughout Somalia,

Alarmed by the continued sporadic outbreak of hostilities in several parts of Somalia leading to continued loss of life and destruction of property, and putting at risk the personnel of the United Nations, non-governmental organizations and other international humanitarian organizations, as well as disrupting their operations,

Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering caused by the conflict and concerned that the

1/ *Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-seventh Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1992, document S/23445.*

2/ *Ibid., Supplement for July, August and September 1992, documents S/24480 and Add.1.*

situation in Somalia constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Gravely alarmed by the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Somalia and underlining the urgent need for quick delivery of humanitarian assistance in the whole country,

Reaffirming that the provision of humanitarian assistance in Somalia is an important element in the effort of the Council to restore international peace and security in the area,

Welcoming the ongoing efforts by the United Nations organizations as well as the International Committee of the Red Cross, non-governmental organizations and States to provide humanitarian assistance to the affected population in Somalia,

Welcoming in particular the initiatives to provide relief through airlift operations,

Convinced that no durable progress will be achieved in the absence of an overall political solution in Somalia,

Taking note in particular of paragraph 24 of the report of the Secretary-General,

1. *Takes note with appreciation* of the report of the Secretary-General of 24 and 28 August 1992 on the situation in Somalia 2/ on the findings of the technical team and the recommendations of the Secretary-General contained therein;

2. *Invites* the Secretary-General to establish four zone headquarters as proposed in paragraph 31 of the report;

3. *Authorizes* the increase in strength of the United Nations Operation in Somalia and the subsequent deployment as recommended in paragraph 37 of the Secretary-General's report;

4. *Welcomes* the decision of the Secretary-General to increase substantially the airlift operation to areas of priority attention;

5. *Calls upon* all parties, movements and factions in Somalia to cooperate with the United Nations with a view to the urgent deployment of the United Nations security personnel called for in paragraphs 4 and 5 of its resolution 751 (1992) and as recommended in paragraph 37 of the Secretary-General's report;

6. *Welcomes also* the material and logistical support from a number of States and urges that the airlift operation be effectively coordinated by the United Nations as described in paragraphs 17 to 21 of the report of the Secretary-General;

7. *Urges* all parties, movements and factions in Somalia to facilitate the efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and humanitarian organizations to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to the affected population in Somalia and reiterates its call for full respect for the security and safety of the personnel of these organizations and the guarantee of their complete freedom of movement in and around Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia;

8. *Reiterates its appeal* to the international community to provide adequate financial and other resources for humanitarian efforts in Somalia;

9. *Encourages* ongoing efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and humanitarian organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, and non-governmental organizations to ensure delivery of humanitarian assistance to all regions of Somalia, and underlines the importance of coordination between these efforts;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue, in close cooperation with the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, his efforts to seek a comprehensive political solution to the crisis in Somalia;

11. *Calls upon* all parties, movements and factions in Somalia immediately to cease hostilities and to maintain a cease-fire throughout the country;

12. *Stresses* the need for the observance and strict monitoring of the general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia, as decided in paragraph 5 of its resolution 733 (1992);

13. *Calls upon* all parties, movements and factions in Somalia to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General in the implementation of the present resolution;

14. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter until a peaceful solution is achieved.

Document 25

Letter dated 1 September 1992 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council proposing the deployment of three logistic units

S/24531, 8 September 1992

In paragraph 37 of my report dated 24 August 1992 on the situation in Somalia (S/24480), I indicated that it would be necessary for the Security Council to authorize the increases in UNOSOM strength that I had recommended in the body of the report. These would relate to the establishment of four zone headquarters and to the deployment of four additional security units, each with a strength of up to 750 all ranks. On 28 August, I circulated an addendum to my report (S/24480/Add.1) indicating that "An operation of this size and complexity would require an elaborate logistic, communications and medical support. In the precarious situation on Somalia, such support would be best provided by three specialized units, estimated at up to 719 all ranks at the early stage of deployment." This addendum also contained the cost estimates for the enlargement of UNOSOM, including the logistic components mentioned above.

It would appear that in its resolution 775 (1992) of 28 August 1992, the Security Council only referred to

paragraph 37 of the report of 24 August but not to the addendum. The members of the Council will appreciate that these logistic support arrangements mentioned in that addendum are indispensable for the proper functioning of UNOSOM.

The purpose of this letter is to bring this matter to the attention of the Security Council and to request the Council, through you, to extend the applicability of the authorization contained in paragraph 3 of resolution 775 (1992) to cover also the logistic support unit.

Consequently, the total strength of UNOSOM should be 4,219 all ranks (3,500 security personnel, including the unit of 500 already authorized for Mogadishu, and 719 all ranks for the logistic units).

I should be grateful if the Council would take urgent action along the lines indicated above.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS -GHALI

Document 26

Letter dated 8 September 1992 from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General informing the Secretary-General of the Council's agreement with the proposed deployment of logistic units

S/24532, 8 September 1992

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 1 September 1992 concerning the logistic support unit of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) (S/24531) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. The members of the Council

are in agreement with the proposal contained in that letter.

(Signed) José AYALA LASSO
President of the Security Council

Document 27

Letter dated 16 September 1992 from the Secretary-General to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ireland, Mr. David Andrews, T.D., concerning the United Nations effort on behalf of Somalia and commending the role of Irish relief agencies

Not issued as a United Nations document

I wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 9 September 1992 and to thank you for your recognition of and support for the United Nations effort on behalf of Somalia.

The United Nations became involved with the crisis in Somalia soon after the breakdown last November of the interim arrangement agreed to in Djibouti and the fighting that began in its wake in Mogadishu between two factions of the United Somali Congress. Before I assumed office, my predecessor and I agreed last December to a visit by Under-Secretary-General James O.C. Jonah to Somalia to discuss with the parties how the United Nations could assist in ending the hostilities.

Following meetings which I personally conducted at the United Nations Headquarters, a joint mission by the United Nations and three regional organizations last March helped negotiate a formal cease-fire agreement between the two warring factions in Mogadishu. The mission also sought the views of Somali parties and clan leaders on the best approach to the convening of a conference on national reconciliation and unity.

Since his appointment as my Special Representative for Somalia last April, Mr. Mohammed Sahnoun has devoted considerable effort to see how best the United Nations could assist the Somali factions and movements in reaching a negotiated settlement of their dispute and ensuring the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance. In addition, a number of technical missions from the United Nations have visited Somalia to prepare operational plans for monitoring the cease-fire and providing security for relief personnel, equipment and supplies.

As you have noted, the humanitarian effort for Somalia has been seriously hampered by armed elements

which have attacked convoys delivering emergency assistance and looted relief supplies. On 28 August, the Security Council endorsed my proposal to establish four zone headquarters in Somalia to facilitate the delivery and protection of humanitarian assistance and authorized the increase in strength of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) to 3,500 security personnel.

The deployment of 500 United Nations battalion security personnel agreed to by the factions in Mogadishu has already commenced and full deployment is expected before the end of September. As you are aware, the United Nations has also reached agreement with the relevant Somali parties and movements for the deployment of additional security personnel in the north-eastern part of Somalia (Bosaso) and on the Somali-Kenya border. Consultations are continuing regarding the deployment of similar personnel in the south (Kismayo) and north-west (Hargeisa/Berbera) of Somalia.

It is expected that the full deployment of those forces will facilitate the unimpeded delivery of much-needed humanitarian assistance to the people of Somalia. In this regard, I wish to note that the role that the Irish relief agencies are playing in Somalia is extremely important. They continue to be the first to reach those in need of assistance and to save valuable lives. They deserve to be highly commended, and their humanitarian work should continue to be encouraged and supported.

Accept, Mr. Foreign Minister, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS -GHALI

Document 28

Letter dated 5 October 1992 from the Secretary-General to the Director-General of Save the Children (London) concerning the need for closer collaboration between the United Nations and non-governmental organizations in Somalia

Not issued as a United Nations document

Dear Mr. Hinton,

I should like to assure you that the situation in Somalia has been a matter of deep concern to me, both in my previous responsibilities and, now, in my present capacity as Secretary-General of the United Nations.

In my own statements and reports, including those to the Security Council, I have repeatedly drawn attention to the Somalia tragedy. Having said that, I agree that there is an urgent need for enhancing coordination and substantially increasing international relief efforts if we are to avert an even greater calamity in Somalia. This will require an intensified and innovative response from the United Nations system, as well as the support and commitment of *all* partners in this endeavour.

It should be realized that what is seriously impeding international relief efforts in Somalia is the brutal civil war that has been raging in that country since late 1990. Humanitarian activities and relief workers have not been spared by this violence. Unfortunately, while we have been prevented from supplying food to the Somali people, the supply of arms to the various clans and warlords in Somalia has continued unabated.

Security remains a major impediment. The much too frequent incidents of looting of relief supplies, and the continued harassment and even killing of international humanitarian relief workers, has tended to erode the morale of the relief personnel as well as donor support.

In ensuring security, the United Nations has to be guided by the principle of consent, which you have touched upon in your letter. Experts, however, remain divided on this issue. I have received many communications from relief workers and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) insisting that deployment of force will endanger their security, while others call for the immediate despatch of security forces to Somalia. The Security Council has now accepted my proposal to increase the number of UN security personnel in Somalia to 3,000 to be deployed within the framework of established principles governing United Nations operations. I am sure that this will provide a degree of protection to enable the United Nations to substantially enhance its humanitarian activities in Somalia.

The International Committee of the Red Cross, many NGOs and the United Nations have been working

even in these difficult conditions, although with interruptions when security conditions have prevented even modest activities from being carried out. Now, when the United Nations humanitarian organizations are ready to substantially increase deliveries to Somalia, they need support from their traditional partners, the NGO community, for food distribution. I am confident that this support will be forthcoming.

I also agree with you that coordination and leadership are critically important. This was fully recognized by the General Assembly in December 1991 when it adopted resolution 46/182, which resulted in the setting up of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs in March of this year. That resolution acknowledges the distinction between coordination and operational capacity. The operational mandates of the various United Nations organizations are well known. However, in a field where there are so many different actors, often operating independently of the United Nations system, recognition of the fact that no single organization can alone provide an effective response to complex emergencies (as in Somalia) will be key to the new Department's effective coordination in crises. Quite a lot of work has already been done to lay the foundation for such a central coordination capacity within the United Nations system, and more specifically, to create a coordination mechanism in Somalia.

As you already know, Under-Secretary-General Eliasson visited Somalia earlier this month. He was accompanied by Mr. James Grant, the Executive Director of UNICEF, and senior-level officials from UNDP, WFP, UNHCR, WHO and FAO. During this mission, Mr. Eliasson, in consultation with my Special Representative, Ambassador Sahnoun, has consolidated the overall coordination arrangements for the delivery of humanitarian assistance throughout the country. The mission also agreed on an accelerated 100-day Action Programme to meet not only the emergency needs but also initiate action on mobilization and reconstruction in vital sectors such as water, electricity, health care, agriculture, and on re-establishing institutional structures.

Cooperation and coordination with the NGO community is essential to the success of any humanitarian relief operation of magnitude. I know that Save the

Children Fund has an active role in Somalia and that we can count on your commitment to substantially enhance it, especially in the context of secondary and tertiary food distribution. Under-Secretary-General Eliasson will continue to take measures to strengthen institutional links

between the United Nations and its NGO partners in the field.

I hope that together we can make this operation a success.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Document 29

100-Day Action Programme for Accelerated Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia (excerpt), 6 October 1992

Not issued as a United Nations document.

I. Executive Summary

Almost one million Somalis are on the brink of death by starvation and disease, and millions more may die if urgent assistance is not forthcoming. Furthermore, hundreds of thousands of Somalis may be forced to join the one million Somali refugees who have already fled. The 100-Day Action Programme for Accelerated Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia outlines the immediate priority measures required to meet the most urgent needs of what has already become one of the worst catastrophes in living memory.

To accelerate vitally required relief efforts and pave the way for eventual recovery of the Somali society, the United Nations and NGOs have agreed to take immediate action within the context of this 100-day programme. This plan includes eight main components:

- (i) massive infusion of food aid;
- (ii) aggressive expansion of supplementary feeding;
- (iii) provision of basic health services and a mass measles immunization campaign;
- (iv) urgent provision of clean water, sanitation and hygiene;
- (v) provision of shelter materials, including blankets and clothes;
- (vi) simultaneous delivery of seeds, tools and animal vaccines with food rations;
- (vii) prevention of further refugee outflows and promoting returnee programmes; and
- (viii) building institution, and civil society rehabilitation and recovery.

Adequate security is essential to implement the accelerated programme. United Nations security forces will be deployed to help ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian relief goods from the ports to distribution points. Ways of involving the security forces in the escort

and protection of relief convoys to their end destinations and at food distribution sites are being actively explored.

The support to be provided by the United Nations to its NGO partners who implement many UN agency programmes will consist of:

- (i) protection of relief workers and supplies;
- (ii) negotiations;
- (iii) logistics support;
- (iv) provision of funding and in-kind resources for implementing partners; and
- (v) provision of a system-wide communications network.

The UN agencies will strengthen their presence in Somalia.

The UN agencies and NGOs are committed to assist in building a civil society, strengthening local capacity and working with indigenous NGOs.

The United Nations operations in Somalia falls under the overall coordination of the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Somalia. Under his responsibility, and within UNOSOM, the Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance will promote close practical collaboration among UN agencies, NGOs and local community institutions. Senior field officers from UNOSOM in the four operational zones will monitor and report on humanitarian activities and will facilitate UN, NGO and local humanitarian operations when so requested. Each UN agency will make specific arrangements with implementing partners.

The urgent activities required to save millions of lives, as outlined in the 100-day programme, will depend upon the delivery of contributions from the donor community. With implementation mechanisms in place and increased staff on the ground, it is essential that the accelerated 100-day programme be funded now.

II. Introduction

1. Over the past months conditions in many parts of Somalia have continued to deteriorate exponentially. Against this grim backdrop of urgent needs and an escalating death rate from starvation and disease, relief efforts continue to be impeded by looting and diversion of relief supplies. The onset of the rains in many places has further exacerbated a desperate situation. Unless humanitarian assistance programmes are accelerated, as many as 250,000 Somalis may die before the end of this year.

2. The situation in Somalia is unique. There is no functioning government. The country's infrastructure, administration, power and water systems, as well as communications, has been largely destroyed or has ceased to function. Clan, sub-clan and factional fighting continues. In many areas, law and order has broken down. In addition to greatly impeding relief efforts, the proliferation of weapons and gangs remains a threat to the lives of Somalis and to international relief workers.

3. At the same time, due to the deteriorating security situation in Somalia exacerbated by drought, some 700,000 Somalis have sought refuge in neighbouring countries and another 300,000 are exiled, *inter alia*, in Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Europe and North America. In Kenya alone, close to 300,000 Somalis have taken refuge in eight camps and three border reception centres over the past eighteen months. Another 20,000-50,000 are said to have spontaneously settled in Nairobi and in border and coastal towns. Security problems and drought prevail in the refugee-affected areas, making it difficult to deliver adequate assistance and to improve conditions in the camps.

4. As part of an overall effort to determine ways to accelerate relief efforts in Somalia, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Mr. Jan Eliasson, led a high-level Inter-Agency Mission, including UNICEF's Executive Director, Mr. James Grant, to Somalia between 10 and 12 September 1992. The Mission Team met with various political leaders and clan elders, and with NGO, ICRC and United Nations relief workers. Those organisations participating in the Mission not present in Somalia will re-establish their offices. Other agencies already working in Somalia agreed to expand their activities further. All United Nations agencies committed themselves to providing full support to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to enable them to intensify their activities and expand programmes to areas where assistance is urgent. It was agreed by the Mission that the accelerated programme would be part of an ongoing process, initially covering a 100-day phase.

5. Following the Mission, inter-agency, NGO working groups were formed and principles were established to provide the framework for accelerated activities.

In this context, it should be noted that this present document does not replace the updated Special Emergency Programme of the Horn of Africa Appeal of July 1992, but seeks to provide donors with a clear understanding of resources which are immediately required to enable ongoing activities to be accelerated and expanded.

6. Of fundamental importance to the success of the accelerated programme, and future relief efforts is the commitment by United Nations agencies and NGOs to a system of close and regular collaborative efforts in providing humanitarian assistance. This process will be guided by the UN-NGO Task Force which meets regularly. This Task Force will assess implementation of the 100-day plan, organise needs assessments and plan future relief and recovery activities. Based upon initial discussions, a clear division of labour between NGOs and United Nations operational agencies has emerged. Collaboration and coordination is essential at every point in the process, at the national, regional and community levels.

7. In developing the programme for accelerated assistance, the United Nations and international NGOs are fully cognisant of the need to re-establish local institutions and national capacity. It is a fundamental premise that, where possible, the accelerated programme and subsequent activities will utilise and strengthen the capacities of the local community groups engaged in humanitarian assistance.

8. Security and the ability to deliver sufficient food aid for people in need remain the key factors to the accelerated programme detailed in this document. It cannot be emphasised enough that if present conditions are allowed to continue, adequate supplies of food aid cannot be distributed to people in need. With regards to security issues, it should be noted that various political leaders have given their support to the accelerated programme. This includes free and safe access for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to affected populations. In support of the humanitarian programme, United Nations security forces will be employed to improve off-take from the ports to the towns and to the hinterland. Ways of involving the security forces in the escort and protection of relief convoys to their end destinations and at food distribution sites are being actively explored.

9. The present document takes into account past and present activities of the ICRC, as well as future ICRC-operations, as laid out in the joint ICRC/WFP plan of action for Somalia. However, in accordance with its specific mandate, ICRC will pursue independent operations and maintain its own contacts with parties, donors and the public. ICRC and the UN Secretary General's Special Representative to Somalia will remain in close

consultation so as to promote complementarity of UN, NGO and ICRC operation.

III. Thrust of the Accelerated Programme

10. The overall objective of the 100-Day Accelerated Programme is to save over one million human lives that are immediately at risk from starvation and disease. The programme also highlights urgent actions required to prevent millions of other Somalis from rapidly succumbing to a similar fate. The key elements of this Accelerated Programme are:

- (i) Massive infusion of food aid;
- (ii) Aggressive expansion of supplementary feeding;

- (iii) Provision of basic health services and mass measles vaccination campaign;
- (iv) Provision of clean water, sanitation and hygiene;
- (v) Provision of shelter materials, including blankets and clothes;
- (vi) Delivery of seeds, tools and animal vaccines with food rations;
- (vii) Prevention of further refugee outflows and encouraging repatriation;
- (viii) Strengthening Somali civil society at the national, regional and local level.

Document 30

Statement by the President of the Security Council that persons hampering the deployment of UNOSOM would be responsible for aggravating an already unprecedented humanitarian disaster

S/24674, 16 October 1992

The Security Council heard today a communication from Mr. Sahnoun, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Somalia. On this occasion, the members of the Security Council reiterated their full support for the action of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative. They also expressed the wish that the appeal recently made in Geneva for an increase in the humanitarian assistance to Somalia should be heeded.

The members of the Council expressed their deep concern over the information communicated to them by Mr. Sahnoun, particularly regarding the difficulties he is encountering in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In this regard, the rapid deployment of ONUSOM personnel is essential. The members of the Council consider that persons hampering the deployment of ONUSOM would be responsible for aggravating an already unprecedented humanitarian disaster.

Document 31

Report of the Secretary-General on emergency assistance for humanitarian relief and the economic and social rehabilitation of Somalia

A/47/553, 22 October 1992

I. Introduction

1. In its resolution 46/176 of 19 December 1991, on emergency assistance for humanitarian relief and the economic and social rehabilitation of Somalia, the General Assembly, *inter alia*:

- (a) Appealed to all States and relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to

continue to extend emergency assistance to Somalia, taking into account the statement on the Special Emergency Programme for the Horn of Africa made before the Second Committee of the General Assembly on 31 October 1991 by the Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Questions, Regional Cooperation, Decolonization and Trusteeship (see A/C.2/46/SR.26);

- (b) Urged the concerned specialized agencies and other organizations of the United Nations system, in particular the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), to resume on the most urgent basis their assistance programmes in their respective fields of competence in order to alleviate the suffering of all the affected population in accessible areas;
- (c) Appealed to all parties concerned to terminate hostilities and to engage in a national reconciliation process which would lead to the re-establishment of peace, order and stability and also facilitate the relief and rehabilitation efforts;
- (d) Called upon the Secretary-General to continue to mobilize international humanitarian assistance for Somalia;
- (e) Requested the Secretary-General, in view of the critical situation prevailing in Somalia, to take all necessary measures for the implementation of the resolution and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session.

II. Background

2. Four years of civil war, against a backdrop of years of neglect and lack of investment in human development, basic services and infrastructure, have left Somalia in ruins. Major cities in northern Somalia have been reduced to rubble; houses, public buildings, communications and water systems have been destroyed and an already inadequate health sector has been rendered incapable of providing even the most rudimentary services. It is estimated that at least 60 per cent of the country's basic infrastructure has been destroyed, and 80 per cent of all social services have been rendered non-operational. Agricultural production and Somalia's vital livestock trade have been crippled and an entire generation of Somali children is growing up without access to education.

3. In the 22 months that have passed since the overthrow of President Siad Barre, the situation in most parts of the country has continued to deteriorate. As foreseen early in 1992, almost 4.5 million people are threatened by severe malnutrition and malnutrition-related disease. Of these, at least 1.5 million lives are

immediately at risk, and it is estimated that 300,000 people have already died since November 1991.

4. Throughout the period covered by the present report, there has been no functioning government in most parts of the country. Political instability is rife, and inter- and intra-clan violence abounds. The struggle for power has plunged towns and cities into a nightmare of insecurity, which in turn has hampered the delivery of vitally needed humanitarian assistance and increasingly threatens the well-being of relief workers.

5. Owing to a combination of deteriorating security and drought, some 700,000 Somalis have sought refuge in neighbouring countries and another 300,000 are exiled in Europe, North America, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and elsewhere. In Kenya alone, over 300,000 Somalis have taken refuge during the past 18 months.

6. Despite a situation which for most of the year has bordered on anarchy, a determined band of non-governmental organizations and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) maintained a continuous presence, principally at Mogadishu and Hargeisa during these tumultuous times. United Nations agencies had officially evacuated the capital by September 1991. However, the Secretary-General gave UNICEF, which had been working in northern Somalia, an unprecedented dispensation to re-establish its presence in Mogadishu on 24 December 1991. WFP re-established its operations in the country in March of the following year.

7. The relief efforts of the non-governmental organizations, ICRC, WFP and UNICEF continued to be severely hampered throughout much of the year. Deliveries of humanitarian assistance were subject to extensive theft and looting, and relief workers laboured under extremely hazardous conditions. In the midst of this chaos, many hundreds of Somali doctors and a number of indigenous non-governmental organizations and local community groups also placed themselves at risk in their attempts to help people. Over the months, the fundamental breakdown in law and order has resulted in the deaths of many local and expatriate relief staff.

III. Impact of the crisis

8. The crisis affecting Somalia took its toll in different ways and at different times throughout the country.

Mogadishu

9. During the first half of the year, considerable attention was focused on the capital, Mogadishu, where factional fighting between interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and General Mohamed Farah Aidid, chairman of the United Somali Congress (USC), had resulted in the death or wounding of approximately 25,000 people. By March, over 500,000 people were reported to have vir-

tually no access to basic services. Two months later this figure had increased to 700,000.

10. Although some food supplies had been brought into Mogadishu by traders, market prices were exorbitant and beyond the means of most of the population. Food distributions had stopped in November 1991 and, in January 1992, 7,000 metric tons of WFP food stored at the port of Mogadishu were looted. WFP attempted to deliver additional food in March, but the delivery had to be aborted following an attack on the WFP vessel on 4 March outside Mogadishu port.

11. With a United Nations-brokered cease-fire in place in the capital by 3 March, opportunities to provide relief assistance gradually improved. In May, lengthy and difficult negotiations between the United Nations and representatives of both factions of USC culminated in a major breakthrough, with the reopening of the Mogadishu port for a WFP vessel. Though always fraught with hazards, the delivery of food and non-food relief by WFP, UNICEF and ICRC to north and south Mogadishu had eased to a significant extent by June. Nevertheless, the need to ensure a continuous flow of relief assistance into the city and its environs remains of prime importance.

Central region

12. The central region held a total of 500,000 displaced people by April 1992. Some 120,000 people who had fled Mogadishu were living in precarious conditions around the small coastal port of Merca, south of the capital. Delivery of relief food had been disrupted by Mogadishu-based armed gangs, although an indigenous non-governmental organization was able to assist about 1,300 vulnerable people on a regular basis. ICRC sought to provide for displaced populations in the area by deliveries brought to shore by small craft.

13. The area of Belet Uen, which lies between the riverine environment of the Shabelle River and the drier regions to the north, also rapidly became a centre for large numbers of displaced people. Belet Uen, the capital of Hiran region, became a catchment point for tens of thousands of people in search of relief assistance from Bakool, Bay and even distant Mogadishu. ICRC provided assistance through an extensive airlift operation, while non-governmental organizations undertook medical, supplementary feeding and mother and child health care programmes.

South-west Somalia

14. Gedo and Bay regions in the south-west served as a transit point for hundreds of thousands of refugees crossing into Kenya. These regions were also a major battleground between the forces of Mr. Siad Barre and General Aidid, and access for the provision of humani-

tarian assistance has proved extremely difficult. As greater access was gained to these regions towards the middle of the year, the full scope of the tragedy that was emerging because of the drought and civil conflict began to become apparent.

15. In the Bay region, Baidoa, one of the worst affected areas in terms of looting, also became one of the first symbols of the extensive human tragedy afflicting the rural populations of Somalia. Access to the area was often difficult, and relief airlifts became an essential means of delivery. UNICEF, WFP and a wide range of non-governmental organizations continue to expand their activities both in Baidoa and in the rural areas adjacent to the town. Similarly, Hoddur, in Gedo region, and Bardera in Middle Juba region, have become major centres for displaced populations in desperate search of food, basic medical assistance and shelter.

South-east Somalia

16. In Lower Juba region, Kismayo was one of the last Somali towns to suffer destruction in interfactional battles; it finally came under the control of the Somali National Alliance (SNA) on 15 May. The town's population is estimated to be 160,000, including displaced persons. In August, there were 40 camps containing 50,000 displaced people in total. The port is essential for deliveries of assistance to the hinterland but security in the port has frequently been uncertain.

17. The Lower Juba area has also witnessed the build-up of hundreds of thousands of displaced people close to the border of Kenya. This potential refugee influx has been of grave concern to the Government of Kenya and UNHCR, particularly in the light of the large numbers of Somalis who have already sought refuge in Kenya.

North-west Somalia

18. The north-west suffered heavily during the civil war in 1990. Its main city, Hargeisa, once home to over 500,000 people, was virtually abandoned by the population, most of whom fled to refugee camps in Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya. Although many of them have now returned to the city, some 85 per cent of homes and public buildings were destroyed. Health care services, water systems, schools and sanitation, as well as communication and banking systems, were virtually wiped out throughout the region. In addition, hundreds of thousands of land-mines continue to pose a major risk to the lives of Somalis as well as relief workers.

19. Throughout most of 1991, the north-west remained relatively stable. However, continued stability was perceived by many to be dependent on a large-scale infusion of rehabilitation assistance, particularly to meet essential infrastructural and institutional needs. Such as-

sistance has not been forthcoming, despite frequent appeals, and the consequent lack of institutional and infrastructural recovery has been reflected in an upsurge of inter-clan rivalries, robbery and looting since the early months of 1992.

North-east Somalia

20. Although the security situation throughout most parts of the north-east has been relatively stable for much of the year, clashes between the controlling party, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), and other groups have occurred periodically. With the assassination of a UNICEF staff member in January 1992 at Bossasso, it was deemed necessary to withdraw the United Nations presence. To date, there is no representative of an international organization in the region.

21. The port of Bossasso, however, remained active for commercial traffic, with off-take reportedly up to 20 trucks a day ferrying supplies to central Somalia, the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and down to Mogadishu.

22. Much of the area experienced severe drought in 1991 and pasturelands were seriously depleted. This has had serious repercussions on an economy highly dependent upon livestock. Because of poor livestock health and lack of veterinary services, export markets have suffered greatly. In addition, many tens of thousands of displaced persons from Mogadishu and other areas in the south place a severe burden on the fragile economy of the north-east region.

IV. Initiatives taken by the United Nations for emergency relief and rehabilitation

23. In March 1992, following a series of meetings in Mogadishu and New York, the United Nations successfully negotiated a cease-fire between the two factions of USC contesting Mogadishu. The cease-fire has held since then despite periodic breaches, making it possible for humanitarian assistance to reach both sides of the divided city. Access to the city was further enhanced when UNICEF, in the course of a dramatic rescue of a staff member trapped in crossfire, was able to move a convoy through the front lines between south and north Mogadishu. In May, the United Nations negotiated and established a vital route along the beach for convoys coming from the north to pick up food from the port. Now large numbers of people from both north and south Mogadishu cross the front lines daily using established corridors.

24. On 18 March 1992, the Secretary-General, conscious of the urgent need to coordinate all aspects of the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, appointed a United Nations Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia.

25. The Security Council, by its resolution 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992, approved deployment of a 50-member observer force to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu; agreed in principle to the deployment of a 500-member security force to protect relief goods and personnel; and endorsed a 90-day Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia proposed by a technical mission which had visited the country earlier in the month. These three elements were brought under the aegis of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), and a Special Representative of the Secretary-General was appointed to provide overall direction of United Nations activities in the country and assist in promoting peace and national reconciliation. The 50 military observers were deployed in July-August 1992 and the 500-member security force arrived at Mogadishu during the month of September.

26. To ensure that the distribution of relief assistance in the capital would not become embroiled in the continuing disputes between the two contending USC factions, the technical mission had obtained the agreement of both parties that a Joint Committee on Relief Assistance, under the supervision of the United Nations, would determine allocations from the port of Mogadishu. The Committee has since become instrumental in the apportioning, overseeing and monitoring of the relief operation, though there are growing concerns that it is becoming a hindrance to the rapid provision of assistance outside the capital.

27. A United Nations technical team visited Somalia from 6 to 15 August 1992 to examine means of expanding the scope and effectiveness of UNOSOM. On the basis of the technical team's findings, the Secretary-General recommended in his report to the Security Council (S/24480 and Add.1):

- (a) To increase substantially the airlift operations in which WFP, UNICEF and ICRC were already active;
- (b) To establish a "preventive zone" on the Kenya-Somalia border for special deliveries of food and seed, in an attempt to reduce famine-induced population movements;
- (c) To deploy four additional security units of up to 750 each in different parts of the country, subject to agreement by the concerned parties;
- (d) To establish four UNOSOM zone headquarters, each headed by a civilian official, as the operational basis for a comprehensive approach to the Somali problem. This approach would deal with humanitarian relief and recovery, the cessation of hostilities and security, the peace process

and national reconciliation in a consolidated framework.

28. The Security Council, by its resolution 775 (1992) of 28 August 1992, endorsed these proposals and called upon all parties, movements and factions in Somalia to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General in his efforts. The Council had earlier asserted, in its resolution 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992, that, in the absence of the cooperation of the parties in the deployment of the United Nations security personnel, it did not exclude other measures to deliver humanitarian assistance to Somalia.

29. As part of the overall effort to accelerate humanitarian relief activities, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs led a high-level inter-agency mission to Somalia between 10 and 12 September 1992. He was accompanied by the Executive Director of UNICEF and high-level officials of UNDP, WFP, UNHCR, FAO and WHO. The mission team met with various political leaders and clan elders, and with non-governmental organizations, ICRC and United Nations relief workers. A major outcome of the mission was the decision to develop a 100-day Action Programme for Accelerated Humanitarian Assistance, for the period until the end of 1992.

30. The 100-day Programme was drafted and refined through a collaborative process involving United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations, and other relevant entities. It identifies the priority actions that must be taken before the end of 1992 in order to meet the most urgent humanitarian needs in Somalia. It also identifies the mechanisms required to implement the programme, the obstacles to be expected and ways in which they might be overcome.

31. The 100-day Programme was reviewed at the coordination meeting on humanitarian assistance for Somalia, held at Geneva on 12 and 13 October 1992 under the chairmanship of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia. The attendance at the meeting, reflecting the heightened international concern for Somalia, included over 350 representatives from 89 countries, 15 non-governmental organizations, ICRC, 5 intergovernmental organizations and 15 organizations and agencies of the United Nations system.

32. The priority actions of the 100-day Programme include eight main components:

- (a) Massive infusion of food aid;
- (b) Expansion of supplementary feeding;
- (c) Provision of basic health services and a mass immunization campaign;
- (d) Urgent provision of clean water, sanitation and hygiene;

- (e) Provision of shelter materials, including blankets and clothes;
- (f) Simultaneous delivery of seeds, tools and animal vaccines with food rations;
- (g) Prevention of further refugee outflows and displacements and initiation of returnee programmes;
- (h) Promoting the rebuilding of civil society and local institutions, and economic and social recovery and rehabilitation.

33. Resources of up to \$83 million are required for the implementation of the 100-day Programme. While virtually all major donors expressed strong support for the Programme, most indicated that they would need more time to review it and respond in detail. None the less, many countries demonstrated their solidarity with the plight of the Somali people by pledging a wide range of assistance. Some Governments offered additional aid support, while others pledged food, cash, supplementary food and medicines. Donors were encouraged to transform their pledges into actual contributions with all due speed, and to pay special attention to the non-food sectors, where donor response in most large relief efforts has traditionally been weaker.

34. During the Geneva meeting, there emerged a number of conclusions that bear on both the implementation of the 100-day Programme and the humanitarian efforts that will follow it.

35. All agreed that insecurity continues to create massive humanitarian needs and is the major obstacle to the provision of humanitarian aid. Strong support was voiced for the deployment of United Nations security personnel, as well as for the deployment of additional UNOSOM staff to carry out increased negotiations of security arrangements in sites where relief efforts are under way. The United Nations and others were encouraged to help build up and support local security elements under the aegis of credible local authorities and traditional leaders.

36. It was agreed at the meeting that the creation of peace and security in Somalia depends ultimately on the success of a process of national reconciliation. Continued United Nations efforts in this regard were strongly supported. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General expressed the hope that a conference to discuss such political matters, attended by a wide range of Somali leaders, might be convened by the end of 1992.

37. Regarding logistics and delivery, the 100-day Programme calls for some 50,000 metric tons of food per month to be delivered and distributed in Somalia. From the United Nations side, while sufficient food has been pledged to meet this target, additional funds are needed

for transport and distribution. Programmes will be undertaken to monetize food aid, especially higher value commodities, through sales to Somali merchants. Further attention will be given to providing United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations with the bulk fuel deliveries they need for their operations, for which the major problem is security.

38. Coordination of relief efforts remains an important concern. The Geneva meeting heard strong support for a clear division of responsibility among the respective United Nations agencies, under the overall direction of the office of the Special Representative. Efforts will be made by UNOSOM to improve such coordination in part by accelerating the fielding of staff, both at Mogadishu and in the four designated zones, especially to the office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance. Suggestions for improving the coordination of relief efforts based in Kenya will be examined closely.

39. It is abundantly clear that non-governmental organizations play a critical role in providing humanitarian aid to Somalia. Participants at the Geneva meeting urged UNOSOM and the United Nations agencies to enhance their support for non-governmental organizations activities through:

- (a) Increased efforts for the protection of relief workers and supplies;
- (b) Increased negotiations on behalf of non-governmental organizations with the various factions and political leaders regarding obstacles to relief delivery;
- (c) Increased logistical support;
- (d) Provision of funding and in-kind resources for non-governmental organizations implementing partners;
- (e) Provision of a system-wide communications network.

40. While the 100-day Programme focuses primarily on immediate relief needs, many participants in the Geneva meeting stressed the importance of simultaneously undertaking rehabilitation efforts. This is especially true of parts of north-west, north-east and central Somalia, where such efforts are both needed and viable. Helping Somalis to rebuild their physical and human infrastructure, from water systems to schools, and providing key inputs in areas such as animal vaccination, will not only address humanitarian needs but also promote stability and eliminate the need for more relief efforts later. While it is difficult to predict the course of events into 1993, it is hoped that efforts after the end of the 100-day Programme can incorporate a larger rehabilitation component.

41. The implementation of the 100-day Programme, as well as the follow-on actions in 1993, will depend upon the full cooperation of all segments of Somali society. In this regard, the Special Representative proposed a follow-up conference to take place towards the end of November 1992 at Addis Ababa. This would be a conference of aid agencies, donors and concerned countries as well as relevant Somali groupings. Its objective would be to review the practical implementation arrangements with a view to ensuring that the 100-day Programme has the full support of all concerned.

42. Plans for humanitarian assistance to Somalia in 1993 will be reviewed in November and December as part of the overall review of needs encompassed in the revised appeal for the Special Emergency Programme for the Horn of Africa.

V. Summary of progress achieved

Food aid

43. The main providers of food aid are WFP and ICRC, which since June 1991 have been working in close cooperation in directing relief assistance to targeted areas. As at early September, ICRC had brought 83,000 tons of food into Somalia and was working on a pipeline of about 20,000 tons per month. WFP had brought 50,000 tons and pre-positioned another 30,000 tons, with 100,000 tons *en route*. Thenceforth WFP planned to move 33,000 tons into Somalia per month with coverage dependent on security. The combined WFP and ICRC targets would meet the food needs of 3 million people.

44. Bilaterally, the Governments of France and Saudi Arabia have sent ships bearing relief goods to Mogadishu port. CARE International, which is in charge of distributing WFP food supplies, provided 4,500 tons on its own account. In mid-August, the Government of the United States of America announced that it would provide 145,000 tons of foodstuffs. By September, 70,000 tons were already moving or had arrived for distribution through WFP, ICRC and Catholic Relief Services programmes. The United States military had also begun airlifting ICRC food stocks to southern Somalia and WFP food stocks to refugee sites in Kenya. Other donor Governments such as Canada, France and Germany were also contributing to the urgent airlift. WFP had airlifted over 780 tons to four different locations in Somalia and had initiated air-drops to the most remote areas.

Non-food assistance

45. In September, UNICEF had more than 40 staff members in Somalia, with offices at Mogadishu and seven other cities. It operated eight mother and child health centres and provided support to 27 other such centres, 7

hospitals, 30 village health posts and scores of camps for displaced persons. In July alone, 10,000 children under the age of five were vaccinated.

46. Since January 1992, UNICEF has been operating relief flights and has provided more than 800 tons of medical supplies, shelter material, supplementary food and water equipment.

47. WHO provides basic drugs and medical equipment to indigenous and international health agencies working in Somalia, at an average expenditure of \$250,000 per month. It proposes to station four medical coordinators in the country, subject to adequate security arrangements. ICRC activities are focused on surgery for the war wounded and assistance to medical facilities. UNICEF, non-governmental organizations and bilateral agencies have started rehabilitation of water supply and sewer systems in a number of cities.

48. ICRC has distributed seeds and hand tools in farming regions. OXFAM and UNICEF have committed themselves to a joint programme of seeds and tool provision to up to 16,000 farming families in the Juba valley. FAO has four emergency projects aimed at rehabilitation of refugee farmers in north-western Somalia. Livestock vaccination and veterinary assistance need urgent attention in the pastoral zones.

Assistance to refugees

49. UNHCR has decided to reopen its office at Hargeisa, initially with three international staff. The office will resume implementation of a multi-agency returnee programme in sectors such as water supply, sanitation, health services and education.

50. UNHCR will also play a major role in the preventive zone programme, involving cross-border deliveries of food and seed from Kenya to Somalia.

Rehabilitation and recovery

51. A UNDP consultant visited south and central Somalia in August to assess the conditions of displaced persons. His final report will recommend measures to prioritize ongoing relief activities as well as rehabilitation and recovery strategies to complement the humanitarian relief effort.

52. UNDP is also sponsoring a project to support Mogadishu's water supply and has contacted the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) concerning technical expertise to improve airport safety, management and administration.

VI. Assistance by Member States and United Nations organizations

53. In addition to the activities described above, several Member States and United Nations organizations

have provided information on assistance rendered to Somalia in compliance with General Assembly resolution 46/176.

*A. Member States**

Canada

54. As part of its response to the 1992 appeal for the Special Emergency Programme for the Horn of Africa, the Government of Canada provided, as at mid-May 1992, \$Can 3,500,000 for food aid and a total of \$Can 1,900,000 in non-food aid for Somalia. Food aid was provided through ICRC, whereas non-food aid consisted of contributions of \$700,000 to UNICEF for health and nutrition support, \$500,000 to WHO for restoration of health facilities and the control of communicable diseases, \$200,000 to FAO to help control animal health deterioration, and \$500,000 to UNHCR for the maintenance of Ethiopian refugees in Somalia and the repatriation and reintegration of 200,000 Somalis.

Cyprus

55. Cyprus contributed \$3,000 as humanitarian aid for Somalia.

Denmark

56. Denmark's contribution for emergency assistance to Somalia in 1991 amounted to DKr 2 million, of which DKr 1 million has been channelled through the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNDRO) and DKr 1 million through Danish non-governmental organizations.

France

57. France just shipped substantial food aid to Somalia on the vessel *Le Briantais*, which arrived in the port of Mogadishu on 4 August 1992. Its cargo consisted of food supplies (flour, oil and rice) and fuel: a total of 2,500 tons were delivered in this way, at a total cost of F 13 million.

58. Air links have also been used to ship food: the first C-130 arrived on 4 August at the airport of Baidoa carrying 20 tons of food on board. A second one landed on 8 August in that city with 20 tons of food and medical supplies. The overall cost for these two flights amounted to F 1 million. Regular civil aviation links are also being used: an Air France flight bound for Djibouti delivered medicine and blankets on 6 August.

59. For upcoming operations, there are plans to send a second vessel carrying approximately 2,500 to 5,000 tons of aid. There are also plans to increase the shipment of aid by air through civil aviation links with

*Responses reflect contributions received as at 15 October 1992. Future contributions will be included in an addendum to the present document.

Djibouti. Lastly, medical and nutritional teams could be strengthened in order to "medicalize" humanitarian assistance.

Germany

60. In 1992 the Government of Germany will support two food aid projects in Somalia:

- (a) The overall amount for the first project will be DM 4.7 million, comprising DM 3,860,000 for non-cereals and DM 840,000 for transportation costs;
- (b) The overall amount for the second project will be DM 6.8 million, consisting of DM 4.8 million for cereals and DM 2 million for transportation costs. The country of purchase of the cereals (4,800 metric tons of rice) is Pakistan.

61. For technical cooperation projects DM 657,205,217 has been approved, of which DM 561,083,304 have been transferred until 30 June 1992.

62. Furthermore, the German Government made the following special contributions to multilateral organizations for humanitarian assistance to Somalia:

1991: UNHCR	DM 1 million
ICRC	DM 1 million
1992: ICRC	DM 700,000

63. In addition, the following amounts were provided through German non-governmental organizations:

1991: Somalia Society and others	DM 103,000
1992: HELP (2,000 tent covers for Mogadishu)	DM 150,000

Ireland

64. The Government of Ireland has contributed to the efforts for humanitarian assistance to the population of Somalia in the form of cash grants to the following organizations:

1991 UNICEF: Emergency programme for mothers and children	£Ir 25,000
1992 UNICEF/WHO: Preventative care and supplementary feeding programmes for refugees and displaced persons (phase II of the Special Emergency Programme for the Horn of Africa)	£Ir 50,000
Irish Red Cross Society: Emergency food and medical supplies	£Ir 25,000
CONCERN: Essential medicines for supplementary feeding centres	£Ir 25,000
GOAL: Essential drugs and medicines, Benadin Hospital, Mogadishu	£Ir 25,000

Japan

65. The Government of Japan has provided the following bilateral official development assistance to Somalia since December 1991:

(a) Food aid amounting to \$1,226,880 disbursed through WFP and the International Emergency Food Reserve in January 1992;

(b) Grant aid of \$600,000 (emergency relief assistance), extended through UNICEF in March 1992;

(c) Grant aid-in-kind (pharmaceuticals, blankets, tents and other materials) to Somalian refugees in Kenya in March 1992, valued at \$136,434.

66. In addition, Japan provided the following assistance for the relief of Somalian refugees in neighbouring countries:

(a) A contribution of \$298,619 for the general programme in Ethiopia and \$149,309 for the general programme in Kenya, as part of a total contribution of \$821,202 to the UNHCR general programme for African refugees made in March 1992;

(b) Food aid of \$697 million to refugees in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Sudan.

New Zealand

67. In the current financial year, the New Zealand Government has contributed \$NZ 250,000 through non-governmental organizations for the relief of children in the Horn of Africa, particularly Somalia.

Norway

68. The assistance of Norway to Somalia totals so far Nkr 26.7 million, or about US\$ 4.2 million, broken down as follows:

UNICEF: 100 tons of BP-5 biscuits (Nkr 2,623,400)	\$409,906
Norwegian Church Aid: 36 tons of BP-5 biscuits, emergency stocks (Nkr 911,910)	\$142,486
UNHCR: 8 Rubbhalls for an airlift of Somali refugees in Kenya (Nkr 1,270,000)	\$198,438
UNHCR: 8 Rubbhalls for the emergency programme in Kenya for, <i>inter alia</i> , Somali refugees (Nkr 1,040,000)	\$162,500
UNHCR: One field hospital (NORSHOP) unit for Mogadishu (Nkr 2,325,790)	\$363,405
Norwegian Red Cross/ICRC, cash contribution for relief operations in Mogadishu and Berbera (Nkr 6,000,000)	\$937,500
Norwegian Church Aid: 4 Rubbhalls, emergency stocks (Nkr 520,000)	\$81,250

Norwegian Peoples Aid: Mine-clearing project in northern Somalia (Nkr 8,000,000) \$1,250,000

Norwegian Red Cross/ICRC: Emergency relief aid, medical and technical personnel (Nkr 4,000,000) \$625,000

Pakistan

69. The Government of Pakistan has contributed US\$ 25,000 to the United Nations humanitarian relief programme in Somalia.

Saudi Arabia

70. The Government of Saudi Arabia has donated \$10 million in food items for those affected in Somalia. The first batch of this aid, around 4,300 tons of nutritional food (about 175,000 cartons, containing small boxes, each of which holds 10 kg of rice, 5 kg of sugar, 5 kg of flour, 3 litres of corn oil and a box of powdered milk of 1,800 grams) has been transported to the United Nations operation for the needy in Somalia. It is estimated that around 215,000 persons are benefiting from it. At the same time preparations are being made to send 1,700 tons of the second batch (around 60,000 packages).

Sweden

71. During fiscal year 1990/91 Somalia has received SKr 22.1 million of disaster relief assistance from the Government of Sweden. In fiscal year 1991/92, SKr 1.2 million was allocated to the Under-Secretary-General's mission. Additional assistance to Somalia has been given through the Special Emergency Programme for the Horn of Africa and other regional appeals. Since November 1991, SKr 186 million has been transferred to that Programme, as shown below:

UNHCR	SKr 33 million
WFP	SKr 65 million
UNICEF	SKr 45 million
FAO	SKr 12 million
WHO	SKr 4 million
UNV	SKr 1 million

The non-governmental organization Lutherhjälpen and Médecins sans Frontières have received SKr 23 million and 3 million, respectively, for operative assistance within the Special Emergency Programme. The ICRC regional appeal for Africa received SKr 46 million in 1991 and approximately SKr 80 million for 1992. The UNHCR appeal for Africa received SKr 70 million in 1992. Large portions of these amounts are reserved for the Horn of Africa.

B. United Nations organizations

United Nations Children's Fund

72. Since December 1991, UNICEF has maintained a permanent presence in Mogadishu and re-established activities in various other parts of Somalia. In northern Somalia, several mother and child health centres had been reactivated and limited water resources and educational facilities restored. The murder of Dr. Marta Pumpalova in January 1992 forced the suspension of operations in the north-east as the security situation deteriorated. Despite the precarious working conditions, UNICEF continues to have the largest contingent of international staff of any United Nations agency on the ground in Somalia. The cease-fire in Mogadishu has made possible the distribution of emergency medical supplies and equipment to indigenous non-governmental organizations and other partners UNICEF has been working with. The 90-day Plan of Action is in effect and will be completed at the end of July. During the month of June the number of airlifts increased immensely, with over 300 tons of supplies delivered. UNICEF has recently expanded its operations to Kismayo and Baidoa.

United Nations Development Programme

73. Insecurity in the capital and throughout most of the country forced UNDP to suspend its development activities in 1992. UNDP has continued to operate its Emergency Unit in support of the work of the United Nations Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia and is exploring ways in which it may help provide limited rehabilitation assistance in parts of the country that may be accessible. In this context it is providing air transportation and telecommunications service to the United Nations and non-governmental organization staff working in Somalia, and is cooperating with the European Economic Community, the United States Agency for International Development and UNICEF in the rehabilitation of the water supply system of Mogadishu.

United Nations Environment Programme

74. Prior to the escalation of the civil war, UNEP, UNDP and the World Bank had initiated efforts for the preparation of a national environmental action plan. This initiative will be intensified as soon as the situation makes it possible.

75. Somalia benefited from the various forms of assistance provided by UNEP to the Eastern Africa Subregional Environment Group, which is a grouping of the national directors of the environment in the eastern African subregion. Through the Group, subregional cooperation concerning the environment is being promoted. It also serves as a forum for assessing national environ-

mental problems, actions being taken by individual Governments and for considering strategies for dealing with common environmental problems in eastern Africa.

76. Similar benefits derive from the cooperative activities of UNEP and the Intergovernmental Authority for Drought and Development, which are largely in the area of desertification control in Somalia.

World Food Programme

77. Under the 90-day Plan of Action, WFP and ICRC are complementing each other's actions in order to obtain a food assistance coverage as complete as possible. WFP is concentrating its efforts on Mogadishu and the northern parts of Somalia using Mogadishu port and exploring the capacities of the ports of Zeila, Mait, Laskorey and Bossasso. ICRC is mainly aiming at addressing the needs in the southern parts and in the rural areas of the country from 18 different entry points.

78. The distribution modalities vary from free food distribution to offshore market sales schemes, depending on the regional particularities and the security conditions. In Mogadishu particularly, distribution has not been risk-free and monitoring has been difficult because of the proliferation of arms in the city. Deliveries of high value commodities have also increased insecurity.

79. WFP will provide 68,756 tons of food commodities at a total cost of about US\$ 19 million. To date, 93 per cent of the requirements have been resourced. The food commodities are targeted to some 1.8 million persons who are located in Mogadishu and the north-west and north-east regions of Somalia.

80. WFP initiated air operations from Nairobi to Mogadishu in which some 258 tons of essential supplies such as UNIMIX, drugs and shelter materials were delivered to UNICEF between 26 February and 8 March 1992, utilizing Ilyushin-76 aircraft. The air operations have continued and to date 352 tons of essential supplies have been delivered to UNICEF from Nairobi, utilizing Antonov-12 aircraft.

81. In March 1992, WFP made a first attempt to enter the port of Mogadishu. The boat was shelled and had to return to Mombasa without being able to unload.

82. On 3 May 1992, the WFP-chartered ship *Felix* arrived in Mogadishu port with 5,000 metric tons of relief wheat, enough to feed 1,270,000 persons in 15 districts for 10 days. The ship was the first to enter the port since 17 November 1991. This came about as the result of long, delicate and difficult negotiations which the United Nations conducted with the two parties through the Joint Committee for Relief Assistance.

83. On 5 May 1992 the delivery of food from the port to distribution centres around the divided city was initiated. Through the singular effort of WFP, joint food convoys involving trucks from opposing factions were

able to deliver food to three districts in Mogadishu which straddle the frontlines, without incident. The operation has been considered to be a major success for the United Nations emergency programme in Mogadishu. The breakthrough allowed the first commercial food shipment to dock in Mogadishu on 19 May. ICRC ships are now also able to use Mogadishu's port facilities.

84. The arrival of the relief food was accompanied by a significant decrease in the prices of essential food items in Mogadishu markets. Preparatory work has started for the arrival at Mogadishu of the next consignment of 7,000 tons of wheat from Djibouti.

85. As regards northern Somalia, four critical areas will be addressed, namely, assistance to highly vulnerable groups, with emphasis on the displaced; assistance for promoting demobilization; community-based assistance to returnee-impacted areas; and emergency income-generation activities. Offshore market sales schemes administered by CARE International will provide the resources for the rehabilitation of the social services infrastructure. These programmes will be initiated once security arrangements are in place and the design of the modalities completed. Leaders in both north-west and north-east Somalia fully endorse the offshore sales mechanism.

United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat)

86. Since the beginning of 1991, Habitat has been actively consulting with the Somalia field office of UNDP, temporarily stationed at Nairobi, regarding the participation of the Centre in an inter-agency needs assessment mission to Somalia on specific areas, including basic infrastructure; upgrading, rehabilitation and improvement of shelter and other structures; institutional and municipal support; organization and management; training and capacity building; and environmental issues such as water supply and solid waste management.

87. In view of the breakdown in administration and the resulting volatile situation in Somalia the mission has been postponed.

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

88. The FAO assessment of the food supply situation in Somalia was included in the consolidated inter-agency appeal for the Horn of Africa issued on 1 February 1992. The FAO Global Information and Early Warning System continues to monitor the food supply situation from a special office at Nairobi; direct in-country monitoring will be resumed when conditions permit the re-opening of the FAO office at Mogadishu.

89. Under the FAO technical cooperation programme project on assistance to the food security programme,

phase I, a workshop was held at FAO headquarters for two weeks in February 1992 to discuss the various problems related to the food security situation in Somalia. This will be followed by another workshop in the country when the security situation improves.

90. Under the Special Emergency Programme for the Horn of Africa, FAO has identified two project proposals in the field of agriculture and livestock rehabilitation for donor consideration. The proposals relate to (a) urgent provision of seeds and hand tools to restore agricultural productivity among the small-scale farmers of Somalia and (b) urgent provision of mobile polyclinics to arrest health deterioration in Somalia.

91. In the meantime, FAO has identified and is currently financing modest emergency projects involving provision of vegetable seeds, pesticides, farm tools and veterinary drugs and supplies to smallholders and livestock herders as follows: (a) emergency supply of pesticides for vegetable crop protection; (b) emergency provision of seeds and hand tools to smallholders in irrigated areas of north-west Somalia; (c) emergency assistance to control trypanosomiasis in Badhade district; (d) emergency disposal of old pesticides; and (e) emergency supply of veterinary drugs and supplies to northern Somalia.

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

92. Since the ousting of the former regime in early 1991, UNHCR has no presence in southern Somalia following the evacuation for the second time of all United Nations staff from Mogadishu in April 1991. Since then, UNHCR has concentrated on resuming its presence and operations in north-west Somalia in anticipation of a mass voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees from neighbouring Ethiopia.

93. Some 100,000 individuals were reported to have returned to the areas surrounding Hargeisa, Burao and Berbera. UNHCR re-established its office at Hargeisa in November 1991 to prepare for the returnee programme but the deteriorating security situation in north-west Somalia in April 1992 forced it temporarily to suspend its operations. In spite of the precarious security situation, preparations for the provision of relief items in the form of a one-time returnee package, comprising blankets, plastic sheeting for roofs, basic construction

tools and water containers, continued during the period April 1991 to April 1992. UNHCR was also giving assistance in Hargeisa to some 450 military and civilian asylum-seekers from Ethiopia. The promotion of voluntary repatriation by UNHCR will depend on the evolution of the situation in Somalia and Ethiopia.

94. In addition to the provision of the one-time package to returnees, the UNHCR plan includes community-based projects for the rehabilitation of existing health, water, agriculture and education infrastructure. UNHCR has also contributed some \$3 million to the mine-clearing operation in north-west Somalia in 1991 and 1992.

95. UNHCR is in the process of reviewing the present security situation in Somalia in close consultation with other concerned United Nations agencies and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs of the Secretariat in the hope of resuming its presence and implementing its planned returnee programme in north-west Somalia. UNHCR is fully committed to the implementation of the returnee/reintegration programme and it is for this that UNHCR and CARE International teams are in Djibouti awaiting security clearance to return to north-west Somalia.

World Health Organization

96. In 1991, WHO maintained its assistance to Somalia in spite of the withdrawal of its team of experts from the country by maintaining the team functioning in Nairobi and visiting the country whenever the situation permitted. Total WHO assistance amounted to US\$2,513,000 from its regular budget, over \$1 million of this sum being spent on the purchase of emergency supplies and medicines for dealing with the ongoing emergency in the country.

97. In the first five months of 1992, WHO allocation from its regular budget fund totalled \$1,244,000. In addition, WHO obligated a total of \$558,000 received from donors after the launching of a consolidated appeal under the auspices of the Special Emergency Programme for the Horn of Africa.

98. While this assistance has been instrumental in improving the health standards of the population affected by this emergency, it is not sufficient to meet the massive needs of the country.

Document 32

Letter dated 24 November 1992 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council informing the Council of a series of disturbing developments in Somalia and stating that it might become necessary to review the basic premises and principles of the United Nations effort in Somalia

S/24859, 27 November 1992

I should like to report to the Security Council on recent events relating to the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM).

In the days immediately prior to the arrival in Mogadishu of my new Special Representative, Mr. Kittani, there were a number of disturbing developments. On 28 October, General Aidid:

- (a) Declared that the Pakistani battalion, which had been carrying out peace-keeping patrols, would no longer be tolerated in the streets of Mogadishu;
- (b) Ordered the expulsion within 48 hours of the UNOSOM Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance, Mr. Bassiouni, on the grounds that his activities went counter to the interests of the Somali people and his security could no longer be guaranteed;
- (c) Warned that any forcible UNOSOM deployment would be met by violence and that the deployment of United Nations troops in Kismayo and Berbera was no longer acceptable.

At the request of the UNOSOM Force Commander, General Shaheen, Mr. Bassiouni's expulsion order was extended by seven days. However, subsequent efforts to have the decision rescinded were unsuccessful, and Mr. Bassiouni is now on a mission assignment in Nairobi.

Another disturbing trend, which has evolved in recent weeks, apparently at the instigation of local faction leaders, is the widespread perception among Somalis that the United Nations has decided to abandon its policy of cooperation and is planning to "invade" the country.

In an effort to dispel these misperceptions, I authorized my Spokesman to issue the following statement on 2 November:

"The appointment of the new Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia is meant to reaffirm the determination of the United Nations to help the people of Somalia in overcoming the tragic difficulties that their country faces. It is the occasion for renewed cooperation and partnership between Somalia and the international community. Its object

is to save lives, defeat the spectre of famine and civil strife and pave the way to political reconciliation.

"In undertaking this task, the United Nations can only succeed with the consent and support of the Somali people. The purposes and methods of the United Nations under Mr. Kittani's leadership will remain unchanged as set forth by the Security Council. The Secretary-General has no doubt that Mr. Kittani will have the full cooperation of his Somali partners in this endeavour."

Nevertheless, apprehensions over the alleged intention of the United Nations to resort to forcible action in Somalia have persisted. As a consequence of this "invasion syndrome", there are reports that General Aidid may have made some tentative moves towards a *rapprochement* with Mr. Ali Mahdi against the "common enemy", i.e., the United Nations.

On 6 November, two patrol vehicles driven by unarmed UNOSOM military observers along the demarcation line in Mogadishu were hijacked by armed elements. The military observers were robbed of all their possessions. UNOSOM obtained information that the vehicles had been taken to the area controlled by Mr. Ali Mahdi (Mogadishu North). However, the latter has denied responsibility for the incident.

On 8 November, Mr. Kittani arrived in Mogadishu, where he immediately paid courtesy calls on Mr. Ali Mahdi and General Aidid. While assuring them that UNOSOM's mandate of peace and cooperation, as laid down by the Security Council, remained unchanged, Mr. Kittani pointed out that the international community was growing impatient over the obstacles to the delivery of humanitarian assistance. He stressed that it was incumbent on the Somalis themselves to bring about an improvement of conditions on the ground so as to facilitate the delivery of aid.

On 10 November 1992, the Pakistani battalion took control of the airport for the first time pursuant to an arrangement negotiated between UNOSOM and the airport security officials. The arrangement called for the deployment of 150 Pakistani troops at the airport termi-

nal. In addition, 200 Somali guards, controlled and uniformed by UNOSOM, were to be deployed around the airport periphery.

On 12 November, General Aidid demanded the withdrawal of United Nations troops from the airport on the grounds that the Somali officials who had negotiated arrangements for the United Nations deployment had no authority to do so. A new agreement would have to be negotiated. If the United Nations troops were not withdrawn, he said, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General would have to bear responsibility for the consequences. Mr. Kittani recalled that the letter of agreement signed by Ambassador Sahnoun on 12 August called for UNOSOM to provide security for humanitarian personnel, equipment and supplies at Mogadishu port and airport and did not require any supplementary agreement to be made in that regard. On my instructions, he told General Aidid that the United Nations troops would not be withdrawn and that General Aidid would be held accountable for any action that he might initiate to displace them.

On 13 November, the airport came under heavy machine-gun, recoilless rifle and mortar fire. The Pakistani troops were compelled to return fire. They did not sustain casualties in this encounter and have remained in control of the airport.

During this period, Mr. Ali Mahdi prohibited inbound ships from docking at the port of Mogadishu on the grounds that the cargoes were being diverted for the benefit of General Aidid's faction. For several days, a number of ships carrying humanitarian supplies were unable to dock and accumulated vast demurrage charges. Mr. Ali Mahdi warned that any ship attempting to move into the port would be shelled unless all his demands were met, including a demand that UNOSOM take over full control of the port. On 23 November, after intensive persuasive efforts by my Special Representative, Mr. Ali Mahdi agreed to the resumption of operations at the port. Nevertheless, on 24 November, a World Food Programme ship carrying humanitarian supplies was shelled and its bridge set on fire as it attempted to enter the port.

On 16 November, I received from my Special Representative an assessment of his first week in Somalia, in which he highlights factors that until now have inhibited the distribution of food and other humanitarian assistance, particularly in areas outside Mogadishu. One of his principal concerns, like that of Ambassador Sahnoun before him, is that, in the absence of a government or governing authority capable of maintaining law and order, Somali "authorities" at all levels of society compete for anything of value in the country. Armed threats and killings often decide the outcome. Looting and banditry are rife. Amidst this chaos, the international aid provided

by the United Nations and voluntary agencies has become a major (and in some areas the only) source of income and as such is the target of all the "authorities", who may sometimes be no more than two or three bandits with guns. In essence, humanitarian supplies have become the basis of an otherwise non-existent Somali economy.

At the same time, large sums of cash are extorted from donor agencies and organizations to allow them to operate. For example, agencies are compelled to pay for "protection", in particular for Somali escorts of their personnel and convoys. Additional sums of money, which can only be described as bribes, must also be paid at the airport and port and at every roadblock and checkpoint in order to transport supplies across the innumerable lines that divide the country.

Relief organizations also experienced increased hijacking of vehicles, looting of relief convoys and warehouses and detention of expatriate personnel. In the south-west, as a result of confrontation between the supporters of General Aidid and those of former President Siad Barré, delivery of humanitarian aid in the Baidoa/Bardera region has become exceedingly difficult, resulting in large-scale starvation.

The net result is that, while massive amounts of relief supplies have been readied in the pipeline for the implementation of the 100-day action programme, the humanitarian assistance that reaches its intended beneficiaries is often barely more than a trickle. Unless the problems relating to security and protection of relief are effectively addressed, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) will not be able to provide the relief assistance urgently in the amounts needed now in Somalia.

As a follow-up to the meeting on humanitarian assistance for Somalia, which was held in Geneva on 12 and 13 October, I have asked my Special Representative, Mr. Kittani, and the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Mr. Jan Eliasson, to co-chair a technical meeting in Addis Ababa from 3 to 5 December with the participation of Governments, United Nations agencies and NGOs as well as the Somali political movements, clan elders and local voluntary organizations. This meeting will provide an important opportunity for the international community, together with the Somalis, to put into place arrangements for the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance throughout Somalia. The meeting will also initiate the process of rebuilding a civil society, including the generation of alternative sources of livelihood for Somalis besides the United Nations relief operations.

In the meantime, the cycle of extortion and blackmail described above must be broken and security conditions established that will permit the distribution of relief

supplies. It is therefore of the utmost importance that the deployment in Somalia of the four additional UNOSOM battalions be achieved as quickly as possible.

In this connection, I should like to inform the Council that the consent of Somali authorities has been secured only for deployment of the Canadian battalion at Bossasso. The Canadian advance party (150 all ranks) is expected to arrive around 4 to 6 December and the remainder of the battalion by late December.

Despite the intensive efforts of my Special Representative, it has not proved possible to secure Somali consent for deployment in other parts of the country, especially Kismayo and Berbera where agreement seemed to be within reach a short time ago.

I wish on this occasion to pay a heartfelt tribute to the staff of UNOSOM and United Nations agencies, as

well as to NGOs, for their devoted efforts to save lives and mitigate suffering.

However, I cannot conceal from the Security Council that the situation is not improving and the conditions that have developed in Somalia since the fall of the previous regime make it exceedingly difficult for the United Nations operation to achieve the objectives approved by the Security Council. I am giving urgent consideration to this state of affairs and do not exclude the possibility that it may become necessary to review the basic premises and principles of the United Nations effort in Somalia.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS -GHALI

Document 33

Letter dated 29 November 1992 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council presenting five options for the Security Council's consideration

S/24868, 30 November 1992

I have the honour to refer to my letter to you of 24 November 1992 (S/24859), in which I conveyed to the Security Council a report on the deteriorating situation in Somalia, with particular reference to the factors that were preventing the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) from implementing the mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council.

I referred especially to the present lack of a government in Somalia, to the failure of various factions to cooperate with UNOSOM, to the extortion, blackmail and robbery to which the international relief effort is subjected and to repeated attacks on the personnel and equipment of the United Nations and other relief agencies.

In the last paragraph of my letter I stated that I was giving urgent consideration to this problem and that I did not exclude the possibility that it might become necessary to review the basic premises and principles of the United Nations effort in Somalia.

The members of the Security Council discussed my letter during informal consultations on 25 November 1992. They expressed the view that the situation that I had described was intolerable. They doubted whether the methods employed by the United Nations to date would be capable of bringing that situation under control. Strong support was expressed for my view that the time had come when it was necessary to move into Chapter

VII of the Charter of the United Nations. The members of the Council therefore welcomed my reference to a re-examination of basic premises and principles and they asked me to come forward with specific recommendations on how the United Nations could remedy the present situation.

In the present letter I have set out five options for the Security Council's consideration. They are all addressed to the immediate humanitarian issue, namely the question of how to create conditions for the uninterrupted delivery of relief supplies to the starving people of Somalia. It is necessary to bear in mind, however, that this is only part, albeit the most urgent part, of the problem in Somalia and that efforts are also required to create the political conditions in which Somalia can begin to resolve its political problems and rehabilitate its economy. This is an integral part of UNOSOM's mandate and it is important that further measures to protect humanitarian relief supplies should be accompanied by continuing efforts to promote national reconciliation. In my letter of 24 November I expressed the hope that the technical meeting that is to be held in Addis Ababa from 3 to 5 December 1992 would not only discuss humanitarian matters but also try to initiate the process of rebuilding a civil society.

The *first option* would be to continue and intensify my efforts of recent months to deploy UNOSOM in the strength of approximately 4,200 troops authorized by resolution 775 (1992) of 28 August 1992 and the letter of 8 September 1992 from the President of the Security Council addressed to me (S/24532). Under this option UNOSOM would continue to be guided by the existing principles and practices of United Nations peace-keeping operations. This means that it would not deploy without the agreement of the *de facto* authorities at each location where it was to operate and that it would not use force except in self-defence, though self-defence would, as at present, be deemed to include situations in which armed persons attempted by force to prevent it from carrying out its mandate.

However, the conclusion that emerged clearly from my letter of 24 November 1992 and from the Security Council's discussion of it the following day is that the situation in Somalia has deteriorated beyond the point at which it is susceptible to the peace-keeping treatment. Several of the *de facto* authorities, including especially General Aidid, have refused to agree to the deployment of United Nations troops in areas where the need for humanitarian relief is most acute. Even when they have agreed, their subsequent cooperation with UNOSOM has been at best spasmodic and, by their own admission, they do not exercise effective authority over all the armed elements in the areas which they claim to control. In Mogadishu, for instance, neither Mr. Ali Mahdi nor General Aidid will admit responsibility for the forces that have shelled and rocketed the Pakistani battalion and shelled a World Food Programme ship in recent days. The reality is that there are at present very few authorities in Somalia with whom a peace-keeping force can safely negotiate an agreed basis for its operations.

I am accordingly confirmed in the view that to continue to pursue UNOSOM's existing course would not in present circumstances be an adequate response to the humanitarian crisis in Somalia.

A *second option* would be to abandon the idea of using international military personnel to protect humanitarian activities, withdraw the military elements of UNOSOM and leave the humanitarian agencies to negotiate the best arrangements they can with the various faction and clan leaders. When I first proposed, in my report of 21 April 1992 (S/23829), that the United Nations deploy "security personnel" to Somalia, some humanitarian agencies expressed the view that the injection of United Nations military personnel into an already complex situation would increase the dangers they faced. Other agencies, however, have pressed for a greater and more effective United Nations military presence.

The experience of recent months has been that, without international military protection, the agencies have felt obliged to pay what is in effect protection money to the various factions, clans and sub-clans. If the international community were to allow this to continue, it would be committing itself to an endless process in which less and less of the aid it provided would reach vulnerable groups and in which lawless trading in that aid would become, even more than at present, the foundation of Somalia's economy. Such an outcome would encourage further fragmentation and destroy hopes of national reconciliation.

While acknowledging that the expectations that I had of UNOSOM have not been fulfilled, I am more than ever convinced of the need for international military personnel to be deployed in Somalia. The current difficulties are due not to their presence but to the fact that not enough of them are there and that they do not have the right mandate. I therefore exclude the option of withdrawal.

The above considerations have led me to the conclusion that the Security Council now has no alternative but to decide to adopt more forceful measures to secure the humanitarian operations in Somalia. In the remainder of this letter, therefore, I have set out, for the Security Council's appraisal and eventual decision, three alternative options, all of which involve the possible use of force by the United Nations or by Member States so authorized by the Security Council.

At present no government exists in Somalia that could request and allow such use of force. It would therefore be necessary for the Security Council to make a determination under Article 39 of the Charter that a threat to the peace exists, as a result of the repercussions of the Somali conflict on the entire region, and to decide what measures should be taken to maintain international peace and security. The Council would also have to determine that non-military measures as referred to in Chapter VII were not capable of giving effect to the Council's decisions.

The purpose of each of the three options involving the possible use of force would be to ensure, on a lasting basis, that the current violence against the international relief effort was brought to an end. To achieve this, it would be necessary for at least the heavy weapons of the organized factions to be neutralized and brought under international control and for the irregular forces and gangs to be disarmed. It is to be noted that this action would help *de facto* to bring about a cease-fire between the warring factions and that this would be a positive factor in the context of national reconciliation.

I should at this point like to make another observation which is common to all three of these options. It

relates to the security of the 400 or so international civilian personnel (in UNOSOM and international agencies and non-governmental organizations engaged in relief work) and the 550 military personnel of UNOSOM who are already in Somalia. Their security is already threatened as a result of recent public speculation about military intervention. It is imperative that plans for a more forceful approach should include adequate arrangements to ensure their security.

The *third option* would be for UNOSOM to undertake a show of force in the city of Mogadishu, in order to create conditions there for the safe delivery of humanitarian relief and to deter factions and other armed groups there and elsewhere in Somalia from withholding cooperation from UNOSOM. It would be based on the belief held by some, but by no means all, experts on Somalia that a determined show, and if necessary use, of force by UNOSOM would be enough to convince those who are currently abusing and exploiting the international relief effort that they should cease their lawless activities.

After my Military Adviser visited Somalia recently I asked him to define various scenarios for more forceful action by UNOSOM. In the context of a possible show of force in Mogadishu he advised me that the arms at the disposal of the various factions and armed groups are not negligible:

“The troops in the city number several thousand when counting all the clans, sub-clans and free-roaming bandits. In Mogadishu South alone, there are approximately 150 ‘technical’ vehicles. Each vehicle carries a heavy machine gun or 106 mm RR anti-tank gun. In each of these vehicles there are 8 to 12 soldiers armed mainly with AK 47s, G3 rifles and anti-armour RPG-7s. The local forces have no uniforms and no communication. Vehicles are of different types, colours, patterns and shapes. The state of training of these troops is unknown but almost all would have had some kind of combat experience and they know how to operate all their weapons. The condition of their weapons is surprisingly good; ammunition is old but plentiful and still operational. In addition, they have several operational armoured wheeled vehicles with cannons of 20 mm and dump trucks with twin 30 mm AA guns. It must be assumed that the equivalent military force exists in Mogadishu North. Both sides have indirect fire capabilities (mortars, field guns and free flight rockets).”

If the Security Council decided in favour of this third option, it would wish to satisfy itself that a show of force in Mogadishu would succeed in creating conditions throughout Somalia for the secure delivery of relief sup-

plies. Starvation can be ended only if the relief agencies can use all the ports and airports in the country and if they have unimpeded access to all places where need exists. There may be reasons to doubt whether a successful operation in Mogadishu would be sufficient to persuade the factions and armed groups elsewhere to mend their ways and give up the substantial material benefits which they gain from their current abuse of the international relief effort. I am therefore inclined to think that if action is to be effective, a country-wide operation may be required. This would be a major military undertaking and would give rise to many difficult questions, especially as regards organization, command and control.

One possibility—and this is the *fourth option*—would be a country-wide enforcement operation undertaken by a group of Member States authorized to do so by the Security Council.

In this connection, I wish to inform the members of the Council that on 25 November 1992 I received a visit from Mr. Lawrence Eagleburger, the Acting Secretary of State of the United States of America, who informed me that if the Security Council were to decide to authorize Member States to use forceful means to ensure the delivery of relief supplies to the people of Somalia, the United States would be ready to take the lead in organizing and commanding such an operation, in which a number of other Member States would also participate.

If the members of the Security Council were to favour this option, my advice would be that the Council should seek to agree with the Member States who would undertake the operation on ways of recognizing the fact that it had been authorized by the Security Council and that the Security Council therefore had a legitimate interest in the manner in which it was carried out.

Various possibilities could be considered. The enabling resolution could underline that the military operation was being authorized in support of the wider mandate entrusted to the Secretary-General to provide humanitarian relief and promote national reconciliation and reconstruction in Somalia. The initial authorization could be for a specific period of time and the Member States concerned could be asked to furnish the Security Council with regular reports, on the basis of which the Council would, at specified intervals, review the authority it had given for the operation to take place. It could also be stated in the enabling resolution that the purpose of the operation was to resolve the immediate security problem and that it would be replaced by a United Nations peace-keeping operation, organized on conventional lines, as soon as the irregular groups had been disarmed and the heavy weapons of the organized factions brought under international control. The resolution could also stipulate that the operation would be conducted with full

respect for the applicable rules of humanitarian law. The Security Council, or the Secretary-General on its behalf, could attach a small liaison staff to the field headquarters of the operation. The Council could appoint an ad hoc commission of some of its members, which would visit the operation in the field from time to time. If the members of the Security Council decide in favour of this fourth option, they may wish to give thought to these ideas.

A *fifth option*, which would be consistent with the recent expansion of the Organization's role in the maintenance of international peace and security and which would strengthen its long-term evolution as an effective system of collective security, would be for a country-wide enforcement operation to be carried out under United Nations command and control. This could be exercised by the Secretary-General, mandated by the Security Council in an arrangement similar to that followed in the Organization's peace-keeping operations, or by some other arrangement which the Security Council might decide upon. The Secretariat, already overstretched in managing greatly enlarged peace-keeping commitments, does not at present have the capability to command and control an enforcement operation of the size and urgency required by the present crisis in Somalia. It would therefore be necessary for the Member States contributing troops for such an operation to provide personnel not only for the headquarters in the field but also in New York, where considerable additional staff would be required. Those Member States would also have to be ready to accept that the United Nations would command and control the operation and that the staff officers whom they would provide in the field and in New York would take their orders from the United Nations and not from their national authorities.

These are points which some Member States might find difficult to accept when many lives and much valuable equipment could be at stake. Those who found it impossible to accept them could still support the opera-

tion by providing logistic support under national command and control. But the Security Council would have to satisfy itself that enough troops would be available on this basis for an operation on the scale required in Somalia.

To sum up, I recommend that the Security Council take a very early decision to adjust its approach to the crisis in Somalia. That crisis results from the fact that Somalia has become a country without a government or other political authorities with whom the basis for humanitarian activities can be negotiated. The focus of the Council's immediate action should be to create conditions in which relief supplies can be delivered to those in need. Experience has shown that this cannot be achieved by a United Nations operation based on the accepted principles of peace-keeping. There is now no alternative but to resort to Chapter VII of the Charter. In parallel, there must also be action to promote national reconciliation and thus remove the main factors that have created the humanitarian emergency. If forceful action is taken, it should preferably be under United Nations command and control. If this is not feasible, an alternative would be an operation undertaken by Member States acting with the authorization of the Security Council. In either case the objectives of the operation should be precisely defined and limited in time, in order to prepare the way for a return to peace-keeping and post-conflict peace building.

I should be grateful, Mr. President, if you would bring the contents of this letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council. For my part, I intend, in accordance with resolution 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992 and subsequent resolutions of the Security Council, to convey to the heads of the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference my assessment of the present situation in Somalia.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS -GHALI

Document 34

Letter dated 30 November 1992 from the Secretary-General to the Organization of African Unity, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the League of Arab States reporting the five options presented to the Security Council in document S/24868 (document 33)

Not issued as a United Nations document

Letter dated 30 November 1992 from the Secretary-General to His Excellency Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

As you may be aware, for some time now I have been concerned about the deteriorating situation in Somalia, particularly the enormous obstacles placed in the way of the international community in its efforts to deliver humanitarian assistance to starving people in that country.

Last Tuesday afternoon I conveyed these concerns to the Security Council in a letter delivered to its President. I was greatly heartened that the members of the Security Council supported my assessment of the situation and requested me to put before the Council a number of options that could enhance the capacity of the United Nations to successfully deliver humanitarian assistance to the target population in Somalia.

I have today responded to the Council's request by presenting a set of options for its decision which involve enforcement action under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. These options are contained in my letter to the Security Council dated 29 November 1992, a copy of which is attached [see document 33]. I shall inform you of the outcome of the Council's deliberations as soon as a decision has been taken.

In developing a United Nations response to this situation, I have from the outset worked closely with the Organization of African Unity and other regional organizations, as provided for in relevant resolutions of the Security Council. I would like to take this opportunity to assure you of my continued cooperation in this undertaking.

In conclusion I should like to express my profound gratitude and appreciation for the assistance and support which you have extended to me in regard to the responsibilities entrusted to me by the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Letter dated 30 November 1992 from the Secretary-General to His Excellency Dr. Hamid Algabid, Secretary-General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

As you may be aware, for some time now I have been concerned about the deteriorating situation in Somalia, particularly the enormous obstacles placed in the way of the international community in its efforts to deliver humanitarian assistance to starving people in that country.

Last Tuesday afternoon I conveyed these concerns to the Security Council in a letter delivered to its President. I was greatly heartened that the members of the Security Council supported my assessment of the situation and requested me to put before the Council a number of options that could enhance the capacity of the United Nations to successfully deliver humanitarian assistance to the target population in Somalia.

I have today responded to the Council's request by presenting a set of options for its decision which involve enforcement action under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. These options are contained in my letter to the Security Council dated 29 November 1992, a copy of which is attached. I shall inform you of the outcome of the Council's deliberations as soon as a decision has been taken.

In developing a United Nations response to this situation, I have from the outset worked closely with the Organization of the Islamic Conference and other regional organizations, as provided for in relevant resolutions of the Security Council. I would like to take this opportunity to assure you of my continued cooperation in this undertaking.

I would very much appreciate, Mr. Secretary-General, if you could bring this letter and its attachment [not included herein; see document 33] to the attention of the members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in the hope that they can take advantage of the Ministerial meeting which is to begin tomorrow to signal the support of the OIC for the United Nations' peace

enforcement action to bring humanitarian assistance to the people of Somalia.

Please accept, Mr. Secretary-General, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Letter dated 30 November 1992 from the Secretary-General to His Excellency Dr. Ahmed Esmat Abdel Meguid, Secretary-General of the Organization of the League of Arab States

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

As you may be aware, for some time now I have been concerned about the deteriorating situation in Somalia, particularly the enormous obstacles placed in the way of the international community in its efforts to deliver humanitarian assistance to starving people in that country.

Last Tuesday afternoon I conveyed these concerns to the Security Council in a letter delivered to its President. I was greatly heartened that the members of the Security Council supported my assessment of the situation and requested me to put before the Council a

number of options that could enhance the capacity of the United Nations to successfully deliver humanitarian assistance to the target population in Somalia.

I have today responded to the Council's request by presenting a set of options for its decision which involve enforcement action under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. These options are contained in my letter to the Security Council dated 29 November 1992, a copy of which is attached [see document 33]. I shall inform you of the outcome of the Council's deliberations as soon as a decision has been taken.

In developing a United Nations response to this situation, I have from the outset worked closely with the League of Arab States and other regional organizations, as provided for in relevant resolutions of the Security Council. I would like to take this opportunity to assure you of my continued cooperation in this undertaking.

In conclusion I should like to express my profound gratitude and appreciation for the assistance and support which you have extended to me in regard to the responsibilities entrusted to me by the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Document 35

Security Council resolution authorizing the Secretary-General and Member States, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia

S/RES/794 (1992), 3 December 1992

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992, 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992, 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992 and 775 (1992) of 28 August 1992,

Recognizing the unique character of the present situation in Somalia and mindful of its deteriorating, complex and extraordinary nature, requiring an immediate and exceptional response,

Determining that the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Gravely alarmed by the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Somalia and underlining the urgent need for the quick delivery of humanitarian assistance in the whole country,

Noting the efforts of the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity, and in particular the proposal made by the current Chairman of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at the forty-seventh regular session of the General Assembly for the organization of an international conference on Somalia, 1/ and the Organization of the Islamic Conference and other regional agencies and arrangements to promote reconciliation and political settlement in Somalia and to address the humanitarian needs of the people of that country,

Commending the ongoing efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and humanitarian organizations and of non-governmental organizations and of States to ensure delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia,

1/ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-seventh Session, Plenary meetings, 18th meeting (A/47/PV.18)*.

Responding to the urgent calls from Somalia for the international community to take measures to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia,

Expressing grave alarm at continuing reports of widespread violations of international humanitarian law occurring in Somalia, including reports of violence and threats of violence against personnel participating lawfully in impartial humanitarian relief activities; deliberate attacks on non-combatants, relief consignments and vehicles, and medical and relief facilities; and the impeding of the delivery of food and medical supplies essential for the survival of the civilian population,

Dismayed by the continuation of conditions that impede the delivery of humanitarian supplies to destinations within Somalia, and in particular reports of looting of relief supplies destined for starving people, attacks on aircraft and ships bringing in humanitarian relief supplies, and attacks on the Pakistani contingent in Mogadishu of the United Nations Operation in Somalia,

Taking note with appreciation of the letters of 24/2 and 29 November 1992 3/ from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council,

Sharing the Secretary-General's assessment that the situation in Somalia is intolerable and that it has become necessary to review the basic premises and principles of the United Nations effort in Somalia, and that the Operation's existing course would not in present circumstances be an adequate response to the tragedy in Somalia,

Determined to establish as soon as possible the necessary conditions for the delivery of humanitarian assistance wherever needed in Somalia, in conformity with resolutions 751 (1992) and 767 (1992),

Noting the offer by Member States aimed at establishing a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as soon as possible,

Determined also to restore peace, stability and law and order with a view to facilitating the process of a political settlement under the auspices of the United Nations, aimed at national reconciliation in Somalia, and encouraging the Secretary-General and his Special Representative for Somalia to continue and intensify their work at the national and regional levels to promote these objectives,

Recognizing that the people of Somalia bear ultimate responsibility for national reconciliation and the reconstruction of their own country,

1. *Reaffirms* its demand that all parties, movements and factions in Somalia immediately cease hostilities, maintain a cease-fire throughout the country, and cooperate with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia as well as with the military forces to be established pursuant to the authorization given in paragraph 10 below in order to promote the

process of relief distribution, reconciliation and political settlement in Somalia;

2. *Demands* that all parties, movements and factions in Somalia take all measures necessary to facilitate the efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and humanitarian organizations to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to the affected population in Somalia;

3. *Also demands* that all parties, movements and factions in Somalia take all measures necessary to ensure the safety of United Nations and all other personnel engaged in the delivery of humanitarian assistance, including the military forces to be established pursuant to the authorization given in paragraph 10 below;

4. *Further demands* that all parties, movements and factions in Somalia immediately cease and desist from all breaches of international humanitarian law including from actions such as those described above;

5. *Strongly condemns* all violations of international humanitarian law occurring in Somalia, including in particular the deliberate impeding of the delivery of food and medical supplies essential for the survival of the civilian population, and affirms that those who commit or order the commission of such acts will be held individually responsible in respect of such acts;

6. *Decides* that the operations and the further deployment of the three thousand five hundred personnel of the United Nations Operation in Somalia authorized by paragraph 3 of resolution 775 (1992) should proceed at the discretion of the Secretary-General in the light of his assessment of conditions on the ground; and requests him to keep the Council informed and to make such recommendations as may be appropriate for the fulfilment of the mandate of the Operation where conditions permit;

7. *Endorses* the recommendation by the Secretary-General in his letter of 29 November 1992 3/ to the President of the Security Council that action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations should be taken in order to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as soon as possible;

8. *Welcomes* the offer by a Member State described in the Secretary-General's above-mentioned letter concerning the establishment of an operation to create such a secure environment;

9. *Welcomes also* offers by other Member States to participate in that operation;

2/ *Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-seventh Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1992*, document S/24859.

3/ *Ibid.*, document S/24868.

10. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, *authorizes* the Secretary-General and Member States cooperating to implement the offer referred to in paragraph 8 above to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia;

11. *Calls on* all Member States which are in a position to do so to provide military forces and to make additional contributions, in cash or in kind, in accordance with paragraph 10 above and requests the Secretary-General to establish a fund through which the contributions, where appropriate, could be channelled to the States or operations concerned;

12. *Also authorizes* the Secretary-General and the Member States concerned to make the necessary arrangements for the unified command and control of the forces involved, which will reflect the offer referred to in paragraph 8 above;

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General and the Member States acting under paragraph 10 to establish appropriate mechanisms for coordination between the United Nations and their military forces;

14. *Decides* to appoint an ad hoc commission composed of members of the Security Council to report to the Council on the implementation of the present resolution;

15. *Invites* the Secretary-General to attach a small Operation liaison staff to the field headquarters of the unified command;

16. Acting under Chapters VII and VIII of the Charter, *calls upon* States, nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements, to use such measures as may be necessary to ensure strict implementation of paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992);

17. *Requests* all States, in particular those in the region, to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken by States, nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements, pursuant to the present and other relevant resolutions;

18. *Requests* the Secretary-General and, as appropriate, the States concerned to report to the Council on a regular basis, the first such report to be made no later than fifteen days after the adoption of the present resolution, on the implementation of the present resolution and the attainment of the objective of establishing a secure environment so as to enable the Council to make the necessary decision for a prompt transition to continued peace-keeping operations;

19. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to submit a plan to the Council initially within fifteen days after the adoption of the present resolution to ensure that the Operation will be able to fulfil its mandate upon the withdrawal of the unified command;

20. *Invites* the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue their efforts to achieve a political settlement in Somalia;

21. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Document 36

Letter dated 8 December 1992 from the Secretary-General to President Bush of the United States discussing the establishment of a secure environment in Somalia and the need for continuous consultations

Not issued as a United Nations document

Dear Mr. President,

I should like to thank you for your letter of 4 December on the situation in Somalia and for your kind words addressed to me. For my part, I wish to express my deep appreciation for your full personal commitment to this process.

I share your satisfaction at the adoption of Security Council resolution 794. It underlines the grave concern felt by the international community at the humanitarian crisis in Somalia. It also marks a significant step forward

in the evolution of the United Nations' role in the post-Cold War era and will, I believe, strengthen the Organization's ability to intervene to maintain the peace and bring humanitarian relief to the afflicted. I would like to share with you some thoughts on how, working together, we can best ensure that the resolution is successfully implemented.

Our success will depend, to an important extent, on continuous and effective consultation between the United Nations and the United States, which has assumed the

unified command of the new operation in accordance with the Security Council resolution. I am most grateful for your prompt action in sending experts to New York to consult with me and my staff. I have discussed with them the arrangements which I have set up, both in New York and in Mogadishu, to enable us to consult on a continuous basis and to coordinate our actions as we carry out our complementary roles in this endeavour.

I have also raised with your representatives three points which seem to me to be of cardinal importance in this formative phase of the new operation.

The first relates to the need to disarm the lawless gangs which have been terrorizing Somalia in recent months. As I stated in my letter of 29 November to the President of the Security Council, any forceful action by the international community in Somalia must have the objective of ensuring that at least the heavy weapons of the organized factions are neutralized and brought under international control and that the irregular forces and gangs are disarmed.

Without this action I do not believe that it will be possible to establish the secure environment called for by the Security Council resolution or to create conditions in which the United Nations' existing efforts to promote national reconciliation can be carried forward and the task of protecting humanitarian activities can safely be transferred to a conventional United Nations peace-keeping operation.

Secondly, I believe it essential that the purpose of the new operation should be to create a secure environment throughout Somalia and that this should be apparent from the outset. It is true that the quantity of suffering is greatest in the areas where it is planned to deploy the unified command's forces in the first phases. But qualitatively the situation is just as bad elsewhere, especially in the North. I was heartened to hear that the unified command is studying how the new operation could be extended to all parts of Somalia.

Thirdly, it seems to me important that there should be, and should be seen to be, a division of labour between the United Nations and the United States in the execution

of the new operation. The United States has undertaken to take the lead in creating the secure environment which is an inescapable condition for the United Nations to provide humanitarian relief and promote national reconciliation and economic reconstruction, objectives which have from the outset been included in the various Security Council resolutions on Somalia.

As the operation evolves, there will be a number of other aspects on which close and continuous consultation between the United Nations and the unified command will be needed. It will, for instance, be necessary to ensure that the United Nations' activities in the humanitarian and political fields are compatible with those of the unified command in the security field, and vice versa. It will also be necessary for us to keep in the closest touch in planning for the eventual transfer of responsibilities from the unified command to a United Nations peace-keeping operation in the form of an enlarged UNOSOM, perhaps with a modified mandate.

While the unified command's operation proceeds and planning goes ahead for it to hand over in due course to UNOSOM, I shall maintain vigorous efforts to advance national reconciliation on which some promising results were achieved at the technical meeting in Addis Ababa from 3 to 5 December. I will seek the support of the three regional organizations concerned for these efforts and will keep you fully informed.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I wish to express my appreciation for the significant contribution which the United States, under your leadership, is making to this endeavour. I should also like to assure you of my full commitment, and that of my Special Representative, Mr. Ismat Kittani, to working as closely as possible with you to ensure that together we can succeed in relieving the appalling suffering in Somalia and putting that country on course to a peaceful and more secure future.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Document 37

Statement made by the Secretary-General to the people of Somalia on United Nations action on security, humanitarian relief and political reconciliation in Somalia

UN Press Release SG/SM/4874, 8 December 1992

To all the people of Somalia I send a message of hope and goodwill.

The people of the world have been deeply moved by the unique and desperate situation in Somalia. The world refuses to accept your suffering and death. An end to hopelessness and despair is possible.

The United Nations is taking action in Somalia in the cause of security, humanitarian relief and political reconciliation. The United Nations intends to restore the hope of the Somali people.

The unified military command which is arriving in Somalia under the United Nations mandate comes to feed the starving, protect the defenceless and prepare the way for political, economic and social reconstruction.

They come to create areas of security and to feed the hungry. As this effort continues, the United Nations will be working towards long-term solutions for the problems of Somalia.

We ask for the cooperation of the Somali people in this vast undertaking. Together we can restore peace to your suffering land.

Document 38

Letters dated 9 December 1992 from the Secretary-General to the Organization of African Unity, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the League of Arab States and the Standing Committee of the Countries of the Horn of Africa inviting them to participate in an informal preparatory meeting on national reconciliation in Somalia

Not issued as a United Nations document

Letter dated 9 December 1992 from the Secretary-General to Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

As you are aware, the Security Council, on 3 December 1992, adopted resolution 794 (1992) by which it authorized action under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter in order to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.

The United States Government has taken the lead in establishing a multinational operation for this purpose. There will be the closest cooperation as well as a clear division of labour between the United States and the United Nations in carrying out the tasks identified by the Security Council in this and in preceding Council resolutions on Somalia. The operation, which is already underway, will enable the United Nations to intensify its efforts to provide humanitarian relief. It will also facilitate the efforts of the Organization to promote national reconciliation and reconstruction in Somalia.

I attach the highest importance to bringing about a reconciliation between the parties in Somalia. It is with this purpose in mind that I am writing to invite your Organization to participate in an informal preparatory meeting for a conference of national reconciliation and unity in Somalia. This preparatory meeting, which I will personally chair, will be held at the Headquarters of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa in Addis Ababa on 4 January 1993. The Organization of the Islamic Conference and the League of Arab States have also been invited to attend along with the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Countries of the Horn of Africa. My Special Representative, Ambassador Kittani, has already made initial contacts with the Somali political movements concerning their participation.

I look forward to receiving your reply at your earliest convenience.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Letter dated 9 December 1992 from the Secretary-General to Dr. Hamid Algabid, Secretary-General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

As you are aware, the Security Council, on 3 December 1992, adopted resolution 794 (1992) by which it authorized action under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter in order to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.

The United States Government has taken the lead in establishing a multinational operation for this purpose. There will be the closest cooperation as well as a clear division of labour between the United States and the United Nations in carrying out the tasks identified by the Security Council in this and in preceding Council resolutions on Somalia. The operation, which is already underway, will enable the United Nations to intensify its efforts to provide humanitarian relief. It will also facilitate the efforts of the Organization to promote national reconciliation and reconstruction in Somalia.

I attach the highest importance to bringing about a reconciliation between the parties in Somalia. It is with this purpose in mind that I am writing to invite your Organization to participate in an informal preparatory meeting for a conference of national reconciliation and unity in Somalia. This preparatory meeting, which I will personally chair, will be held at the Headquarters of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa in Addis Ababa on 4 January 1993. The Organization of African Unity and the League of Arab States have also been invited to attend along with the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Countries of the Horn of Africa. My Special Representative, Ambassador Kittani, has already made initial contacts with the Somali political movements concerning their participation.

I look forward to receiving your reply at your earliest convenience.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Letter dated 9 December 1992 from the Secretary-General to Dr. Ahmed Esmat Abdel Meguid, Secretary-General of the Organization of the League of Arab States

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

As you are aware, the Security Council, on 3 December 1992, adopted resolution 794 (1992) by which it authorized action under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter in order to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.

The United States Government has taken the lead in establishing a multinational operation for this purpose. There will be the closest cooperation as well as a clear division of labour between the United States and the United Nations in carrying out the tasks identified by the Security Council in this and in preceding Council resolutions on Somalia. The operation, which is already underway, will enable the United Nations to intensify its efforts to provide humanitarian relief. It will also facilitate the efforts of the Organization to promote national reconciliation and reconstruction in Somalia.

I attach the highest importance to bringing about a reconciliation between the parties in Somalia. It is with this purpose in mind that I am writing to invite your Organization to participate in an informal preparatory meeting for a conference of national reconciliation and unity in Somalia. This preparatory meeting, which I will personally chair, will be held at the Headquarters of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa in Addis Ababa on 4 January 1993. The Organization of African Unity and the Organization of the Islamic Conference have also been invited to attend along with the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Countries of the Horn of Africa. My Special Representative, Ambassador Kittani, has already made initial contacts with the Somali political movements concerning their participation.

I look forward to receiving your reply at your earliest convenience.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Letter dated 9 December 1992 from the Secretary-General to Mr. Lissane Yohannes, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Horn of Africa

Excellency,

As you are aware, the Security Council, on 3 December 1992, adopted resolution 794 (1992) by which it authorized action under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter in order to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.

The United States Government has taken the lead in establishing a multinational operation for this purpose. There will be the closest cooperation as well as a clear division of labour between the United States and the United Nations in carrying out the tasks identified by the Security Council in this and in preceding Council resolutions on Somalia. The operation, which is already underway, will enable the United Nations to intensify its efforts to provide humanitarian relief. It will also facilitate the efforts of the Organization to promote national reconciliation and reconstruction in Somalia.

I attach the highest importance to bringing about a reconciliation between the parties in Somalia. It is with this purpose in mind that I am writing to invite you, in your capacity as Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Countries of the Horn of Africa, to participate, along with two other members of your Committee whom you may wish to designate, in an informal preparatory meeting for a conference of national reconciliation and unity in Somalia. This preparatory meeting, which I will personally chair will be held at the Headquarters of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa in Ad-

dis Ababa on 4 January 1993. The Organization of African Unity, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the League of Arab States have also been invited to attend. My Special Representative, Ambassador Kitani, has already made initial contacts with the Somali political movements concerning their participation.

I look forward to receiving your reply at your earliest convenience.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Document 39

Letter dated 11 December 1992 from the Secretary-General to 11 Somali political factions inviting them to participate in an informal preparatory meeting on national reconciliation: Mr. Mohamed Farah Abdullahi, Chairman, Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA); Mr. Mohamed Qanyare Afrab, Chairman, United Somali Congress (USC); Mr. Abdurahman Dualeh Ali, Chairman, United Somali Front (USF); General Mohamed Farah Aidid, Chairman, Somali National Alliance (SNA); Mr. Haji Mahmoud Barbar, Chairman, Somali Democratic Movement (SDM); Mr. Mahmud Khalif-Shire, Deputy Chairman, Somali National Front (SNF); Mr. Haji Aden Hussein Mohamed, Acting Chairman, Somali Agricultural Muki Organization (SAMO); General Mohamed Abshir Musse, Chairman, Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF); General Aden Abdillahi Noor, Chairman, Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM); Mr. Ibrahim Meigag Samatar, Chairman, Somali National Movement (SNM); Mr. Abdi Dahir Warsame, Chairman, United Somali Party (USP)

Not issued as a United Nations document

[Editor's note: The letter reproduced below was sent to each of the 11 Somali political faction leaders.]

As you are aware, the Security Council, on 3 December 1992, adopted resolution 794 (1992), by which it authorized action under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, in order to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.

The United States Government has taken the lead in establishing a multinational operation for this purpose. There will be the closest cooperation as well as a clear division of labour between the United States and the United Nations in carrying out the tasks identified by the Security Council in this and in preceding Council resolutions on Somalia. The operation, which is already underway, will enable the United Nations to intensify its efforts to provide humanitarian relief. It will also facilitate the efforts of the Organization to pro-

mote national reconciliation and reconstruction in Somalia.

The international community attaches the highest importance to bringing about a reconciliation between the parties in Somalia. Successive resolutions of the Security Council have called upon me to assist and facilitate a process leading to a political settlement of the conflict in Somalia. Resolution 794 (1992) encouraged me to intensify efforts in this regard. The resolution also noted the efforts of the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity, and in particular the proposal made by its Chairman at the current session of the General Assembly for the organization of an international conference on Somalia, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference to promote reconciliation and political settlement in Somalia.

It is with this purpose in mind that I am writing to invite your movement to participate in an informal preparatory meeting for a conference of national reconciliation and unity in Somalia. This preparatory meeting, which I will personally chair, will be held at the headquarters of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa in Addis Ababa on 4 January 1993. The Organization of African Unity, the Organization of the

Islamic Conference and the League of Arab States have also been invited to attend, along with the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Countries of the Horn of Africa. My Special Representative, Ambassador Kittani, will be in contact with you concerning your participation.

I look forward to your participation at this meeting.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Document 40

Letter dated 17 December 1992 from the United States to the President of the Security Council transmitting a report on the activities of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF)

S/24976, 17 December 1992

On behalf of the United States Government and pursuant to paragraph 18 of Security Council resolution 794 (1992), I have the honour to submit a report on the activities of the Unified Task Force directed towards the implementation of that resolution.

I request that this letter, together with the enclosed report, be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Edward J. PERKINS

Annex

Report by the United States pursuant to Security Council resolution 794 (1992)

In response to Security Council resolution 794 (1992), the President directed the execution of Operation Restore Hope on 4 December 1992. The United States central command (USCENTCOM) was given the mission of conducting joint and combined military operations in Somalia, under United Nations auspices, to secure major airports and seaports, key installations and food distribution points, to provide open and free passage of relief supplies, to provide security for convoys and relief organizations and to assist United Nations and non-governmental organizations in providing humanitarian relief.

The Commander-in-Chief, USCENTCOM, developed a four-phased concept of operations which focuses on the area of greatest need and suffering. Phase I consists of securing the airfield and seaport at Mogadishu with United States marine amphibious forces and elements of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), and expanding the operation to Baledogle and Baidoa with follow-on United States Marine elements and initial United States Army elements. Phase II involves the deployment of a brigade

of United States Army and UNITAF forces to secure Baidoa and expand the lodgement area to secure the relief centres of Oddur, Belet Weyne and Gialassi. In phase III, operations will be expanded to the south to secure the port and airfield at Kismayo, Bardera, and the land route from Bardera to Baidoa. Phase IV is the transfer of the responsibility for maintaining a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief to United Nations peace-keeping forces. This transfer may occur concurrently with other phases as peace-keeping forces are available to assume responsibility for secured areas.

On 9 December, phase I began with the successful seizure of the airfield and port in Mogadishu by a United States Marine special-purpose air-ground task force supported by United States Navy elements. Follow-on forces, including initial UNITAF elements, have continued to expand the security zones in Mogadishu and improve the capabilities of the airfield and port facilities. On 13 December, United States Marine forces secured the airfield at Baledogle to support the deployment of United States Army forces. Initial elements of the Army's 10th Mountain Division closed into Baledogle. This was followed by the seizure of Baidoa on 16 December. United States forces will build to approximately 28,000 personnel, augmented with UNITAF forces from the 20 countries that have committed to provide over 17,000 personnel to date.

The operation is proceeding generally as planned and is primarily driven by the ability of the Somalia port and airfield infrastructure to support the deployment of UNITAF forces. The rapid and extensive response of United Nations Member nations to the resolution, the recent cease-fire agreement between two major factions and the lessening of violence in Mogadishu are positive indications that operations will continue successfully.

The best measure of effectiveness is the impact our security operations have had on relief efforts. Preliminary indications from relief organizations on the ground in areas

where we have operated suggest that our efforts have been very successful. The seaport in Mogadishu is now open and relief supplies are moving throughout the city.

Document 41

General Assembly resolution on emergency assistance for humanitarian relief and the economic and social rehabilitation of Somalia

A/RES/47/160, 18 December 1992

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 43/206 of 20 December 1988, 44/178 of 19 December 1989, 45/229 of 21 December 1990 and 46/176 of 19 December 1991 and the resolutions and decisions of the Economic and Social Council on emergency assistance to Somalia,

Taking note of Security Council resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992, 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992, 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992 and 775 (1992) of 28 August 1992, in which the Council, *inter alia*, urged all parties, movements and factions in Somalia to facilitate the efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and humanitarian organizations to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to the affected population in Somalia and reiterated the call for the full respect of the security and safety of the personnel of those organizations and the guarantee of their complete freedom of movement in and around Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia,

Noting with appreciation the cooperation between the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference in their efforts to resolve the humanitarian, security and political crisis in Somalia,

Noting the efforts of the countries of the Horn of Africa and the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement to alleviate the situation in Somalia,

Noting with appreciation the measures taken by the Secretary-General to mobilize international assistance for Somalia,

Deeply concerned at the magnitude of human suffering in Somalia, the extensive damage to and destruction of villages, towns and cities, the heavy damage inflicted by the civil conflict on the infrastructure of the country and the widespread disruption of public facilities and services,

Gravely concerned about the continually deteriorating situation in Somalia, which underlines the urgent need for the accelerated delivery of adequate humanitarian assistance to all parts of the country,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on emergency assistance to Somalia 1/ and the statement made before the Second Committee of the General Assembly on 29 October 1992 by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs on special economic and disaster relief assistance, 2/

Deeply appreciative of the humanitarian assistance rendered by a number of Member States to alleviate the hardship and suffering of the affected population,

Recalling the principle enunciated in the annex to its resolution 46/182 of 19 December 1991, which states that contributions for humanitarian assistance should be provided in a way that is not to the detriment of resources made available for international cooperation for development,

Noting the importance of the four operational zones for more effective humanitarian and relief assistance under current conditions in the country,

Noting with great satisfaction the humanitarian efforts being made by the various entities of the United Nations system and by intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations,

Noting with concern the disastrous impact that the conflict is having on the educational system of the country and the total disruption of schooling for all students at the primary, secondary and university levels,

Recognizing the importance of rehabilitating the basic social and economic services at the local level in all operational zones,

Cognizant that the exodus and displacement of skilled and professional manpower is eliminating the human resources of the country, which are much needed for rehabilitation, reconstruction and development,

Welcoming the policy initiatives taken by some Member States in providing educational assistance and scholarships to eligible Somali asylum seekers,

1/ A/47/553.

2/ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-seventh Session, Second Committee, 25th meeting, and corrigendum.*

Further recognizing that emergency assistance must be provided in ways that will be supportive of recovery and long-term development,

1. *Expresses its gratitude* to the Member States and the intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations that have responded to the appeals of the Secretary-General and others by extending emergency assistance to Somalia;

2. *Expresses its appreciation* to the Secretary-General for the measures taken to mobilize emergency assistance to the affected population in Somalia;

3. *Appeals to all States and relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations* to continue to extend emergency assistance to Somalia, taking into account the report of the Secretary-General and the 100-day Action Programme for Accelerated Humanitarian Assistance endorsed at the Coordination Meeting for Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia held at Geneva on 12 and 13 October 1992; 1/

4. *Welcomes* the ongoing efforts of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the countries of the Horn of Africa and the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement to resolve the situation in Somalia;

5. *Urges* all States and relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to assist in embarking on the rehabilitation of basic social and economic services as well as institution-building assistance aimed at the restoration of civil administration at the local level in all those parts of Somalia where peace, security and stability prevail;

6. *Encourages* all Member States, United Nations entities and non-governmental organizations to ensure that all assistance programmes draw as much as possible on local and regional priorities and build on indigenous capacities, making maximum use of educationally qualified and skilled Somalis from within and outside the country;

7. *Appeals to all States and relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations* to provide financial and material assistance for the reopening of primary and secondary schools in those areas where conditions permit;

8. *Decides* to establish, through extrabudgetary resources, a United Nations scholarship programme for Somali undergraduate university students whose studies have been disrupted by the ongoing civil strife, so as to

enable them to complete their studies at higher institutes and universities abroad and thus enhance the human resource capacity of Somalia, and to review the situation when the Somali university and higher institutes re-open, and urges Member States and relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to contribute to this programme;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to ensure, within existing regular budgetary resources, that information about the scholarships that have been offered will be disseminated to those Somali students, within and outside Somalia, who might qualify for such scholarships;

10. *Urges* the specialized agencies and other organizations of the United Nations system concerned, in particular the United Nations Development Programme, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations Children's Fund, the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the World Food Programme, the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements and the United Nations Environment Programme, to continue to implement their assistance programmes in their respective fields of competence, within the framework of the United Nations Operation in Somalia, on the most urgent basis, in order to alleviate the suffering of the affected population in all parts of Somalia;

11. *Appeals to all parties concerned* to terminate hostilities and to engage in a national reconciliation process that will lead to the re-establishment of peace, order and stability and also facilitate relief and rehabilitation efforts;

12. *Calls upon* the Secretary-General to continue to mobilize international humanitarian assistance for Somalia;

13. *Calls upon all parties, movements and factions* in Somalia to respect fully the security and safety of personnel of the United Nations and its specialized agencies and of non-governmental organizations, and to guarantee their complete freedom of movement throughout Somalia;

14. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in view of the critical situation in Somalia, to take all measures necessary for the implementation of the present resolution, to apprise the Economic and Social Council at its substantive session of 1993 of the progress made and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session.

Document 42

General Assembly resolution on the convening of an international conference on Somalia

A/RES/47/167, 18 December 1992

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned about the tragic situation in Somalia,

Taking into account the statement made in the General Assembly by the current Chairman of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity on 30 September 1992 and especially his proposal to convene an international conference on Somalia, 1/

Taking note of relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992,

Taking note also of the outcome of the Second Coordination Meeting on Somalia, held at Addis Ababa from 3 to 5 December 1992,

Realizing that lasting peace, stability and unity in the country can be achieved through a process of national reconciliation culminating in a final, comprehensive, politically negotiated settlement among all the political entities and segments of the Somali people,

Deeply convinced that a final negotiated settlement of the Somali conflict is an ultimate responsibility of the Somalis themselves,

Recognizing that the idea of convening an international conference on Somalia has gained widespread acceptance and is viewed as part of the important initiatives currently being undertaken by the Secretary-General, the Security Council and the international community to contribute to creating the conditions necessary for national reconciliation, peace and stability and for reconstruction of the national economy of Somalia,

Welcoming in this regard the efforts being exerted by the Security Council, the Secretary-General and the international community,

Welcoming also the efforts of the Organization of African Unity, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the League of Arab States, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the Standing Committee of the States of the Horn of Africa on Somalia,

Stressing the need to coordinate the efforts being made by the international community towards the restoration of national unity and peace and the reconstruction of the national economy of Somalia,

1. *Affirms* the need for a comprehensive and lasting solution to the Somali crisis;

2. *Welcomes* the idea of convening an international peace conference on Somalia under the auspices of the United Nations and in cooperation with the Organization of African Unity, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the League of Arab States, the Standing Committee of the States of the Horn of Africa on Somalia and governmental and non-governmental organizations, which would contribute to the establishment of peace and security in the subregion;

3. *Recognizes* that the restoration of much-needed peace and stability in Somalia must be governed, *inter alia*, by the following considerations: strict observance of a cease-fire, full cooperation with United Nations peace-keeping forces, national reconciliation, assistance for refugees, displaced persons and returnees, a constitution that guarantees democracy, freedom and justice, and free and fair elections;

4. *Welcomes* the efforts of the Secretary-General, in close cooperation with the Organization of African Unity, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the League of Arab States, the Standing Committee of the States of the Horn of Africa on Somalia and with the support of other governmental and non-governmental organizations, aimed at national reconciliation in Somalia, and emphasizes the need to consider the practical modalities for convening an international conference on Somalia as soon as possible;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly during its current session on this matter.

1/ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-seventh Session, Plenary Meetings*, 18th meeting (A/47/PV.18).

Document 43

Report of the Secretary-General submitted in pursuance of paragraphs 18 and 19 of Security Council resolution 794 (1992), proposing that UNITAF extend its operations to the whole of Somalia and disarm the factions before handing over operational responsibility to a new United Nations peace-keeping operation

S/24992, 19 December 1992

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of paragraphs 18 and 19 of Security Council resolution 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992. In those paragraphs, the Security Council:

“Requests the Secretary-General and, as appropriate, the States concerned to report to the Council on a regular basis, the first such report to be made no later than fifteen days after the adoption of this resolution, on the implementation of this resolution and the attainment of the objective of establishing a secure environment so as to enable the Council to make the necessary decision for a prompt transition to continued peace-keeping operations;

“Requests the Secretary-General to submit a plan to the Council initially within fifteen days after the adoption of this resolution to ensure that the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) will be able to fulfil its mandate upon the withdrawal of the unified command”.

2. Section I of the present report contains a factual description of the action taken up to 18 December 1992 to implement resolution 794 (1992). I had intended to include in that section a report on the military operations of the unified command (now referred to as the “Unified Task Force”). However, on 17 December 1992, the Permanent Representative of the United States of America sent a letter to the President of the Security Council containing a report “on the activities of the Unified Task Force directed towards the implementation of that resolution.” The letter has been circulated as document S/24976.

3. Section II sets out my current thinking on a new mandate for UNOSOM and the modalities for effecting the transition from the Unified Task Force to continued peace-keeping operations.

4. My observations are contained in section III.

I. Implementation of Security Council Resolution 794 (1992)

5. The specific mandates entrusted to the Secretary-General by resolution 794 (1992) concerned:

- (a) The operations of UNOSOM (para. 6);
- (b) Implementation of the operation to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations (para. 10);
- (c) Establishment of a fund for contributions (para. 11);
- (d) Establishment of mechanisms for coordination (para. 13), including the attachment of a UNOSOM liaison staff to the headquarters of the Unified Task Force (para. 15);
- (e) Continued efforts to achieve a political settlement (para. 20).

The action taken under each of these mandates is described below.

A. The operations of the United Nations Operation in Somalia

6. UNOSOM’s military component currently has a strength of 564 all ranks, composed mainly of a 500-strong battalion, 50 military observers, movement-and-logistics elements and a small headquarters staff. After the adoption of resolution 794 (1992), further deployment into Somalia was put on hold pending assessment of conditions on the ground. However, on 18 December 1992, on the advice of my Special Representative and the Force Commander, I authorized the deployment of about 100 additional personnel to strengthen UNOSOM’s headquarters.

7. The main activities currently carried out by the UNOSOM military component are as follows:

- (a) UNOSOM has deployed two companies of its infantry battalion to Mogadishu international airport, where they are working with the Unified Task Force to maintain security;
- (b) Movement control is provided for United Nations flights at the airport;
- (c) Escorts are provided for all UNOSOM personnel;
- (d) A liaison team has been deployed to Unified Task Force headquarters, in accordance with paragraph 15 of resolution 794 (1992);
- (e) Food convoys are escorted within the city of Mogadishu.

B. Implementation of the operation to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations

8. As stated above, a report by the United States authorities has been circulated in document S/24976.

9. With the deployment of the Unified Task Force, the United Nations and other relief organizations are expected to implement fully their humanitarian programmes. They will also extend humanitarian assistance to areas which hitherto have been inaccessible due to security constraints. In that context, UNOSOM will enhance its capacity to discharge fully its coordination responsibilities as well as to take the lead in extending relief assistance to all parts of Somalia.

C. Establishment of a fund for contributions

10. The fund requested by the Security Council in paragraph 11 of resolution 794 (1992) has been established by the Secretariat and is to be known as the "Trust Fund for Somalia - Unified Command". An initial target figure has been set at \$400 million. A general appeal for voluntary contributions has been issued to all Member States by the Controller. I am coordinating my fund-raising efforts with the Governments of Japan and the United States, which are working in partnership to ensure that we attain our goal. This active fund-raising campaign will include special appeals to heads of State and Government of selected countries. As of 18 December 1992, pledges to the Fund have been made as follows:

	\$
Finland	700 000
Japan	100 000 000
Philippines	5 000
Saudi Arabia	<u>10 000 000</u>
TOTAL	<u>110 705 000</u>

Saudi Arabia is also contributing troops to the Unified Task Force. I shall keep the Security Council informed on further developments.

D. Mechanisms for coordination

11. The following mechanisms for coordination have been established:

(a) At United Nations Headquarters:

- (i) A policy group on Somalia, chaired by the Secretary-General. This group currently meets twice or three times a week and at least once a week with senior representatives of the United States Government to review the progress of the operation, composition of the Force, funding and planning for the future role of UNOSOM and the

transition to continued peace-keeping operations;

- (ii) An operational task force (chaired by the Assistant Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, Mr. Kofi Annan), comprising representatives from the Secretariat departments concerned. This group meets at least once a day and representatives of the United States attend its meetings several times a week;
 - (iii) A cell in the Department of Peace-keeping Operations which maintains contact with UNOSOM 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
- (b) At UNOSOM headquarters, Mogadishu:**
- (i) My Special Representative, Mr. Kittani, and the Force Commander, General Shaheen, are working closely with the Commander of the Unified Task Force, General Johnson, and with the United States Special Envoy, Ambassador Oakley, in order to ensure coordination of the activities of the two forces. Much of the detailed planning of the eventual transition to peace-keeping operations will take place in Mogadishu and, as already noted, UNOSOM headquarters is being strengthened for this purpose;
 - (ii) A small UNOSOM liaison staff has been attached to Unified Task Force headquarters, as already described above, and has secure communications with United Nations Headquarters.

12. Several of the Member States which are cooperating with the United States in the Unified Task Force have asked to participate in discussions with myself and my staff about the current operations of the Force and planning for the transition to continued peace-keeping operations. I am therefore initiating regular meetings to which all States participating in the Force will be invited.

E. Continued efforts to achieve a political settlement

13. Since the adoption of resolution 794 (1992), I have continued my efforts to achieve a political settlement, believing it essential that such efforts should proceed in parallel with the establishment of a secure environment in Somalia. Progress on the political front is a necessary condition for the United Nations to be able to assist Somalia in launching the economic and social programmes for rehabilitation and reconstruction which will be needed to support post-conflict peace-building. In a letter of 8 December 1992 to President Bush, I described my vision of a division of labour between the United Nations and the United States in the following terms:

"The United States has undertaken to take the lead in creating the secure environment which is an ines-

capable condition for the United Nations to provide humanitarian relief and promote national reconciliation and economic reconstruction, objectives which have from the outset been included in the various Security Council resolutions on Somalia.”

14. As soon as resolution 794 (1992) was adopted, I communicated its text to the Secretaries-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the League of Arab States. These regional organizations have been associated, with the United Nations, in efforts to promote national reconciliation in Somalia. My Special Representative, Ambassador Kittani, was requested to inform political parties and movements in Somalia of the implications of the adoption of the resolution. He has remained in close contact with the parties and movements.

15. The results of the technical meeting between the United Nations and various Somali groups at Addis Ababa from 3 to 5 December 1992 were encouraging. Taking this into account, as well as advice from my Special Representative and appeals from the Somali parties, I have decided to initiate the process of national reconciliation during the first phase of action by the Unified Task Force. Accordingly, I am convening an informal preparatory meeting for a conference of national reconciliation and unity on Somalia, to be held at United Nations headquarters in Addis Ababa on 4 January 1993.

16. The objective of this informal meeting is to prepare a framework that will enable the Somali people themselves to develop ideas and suggest arrangements for the formation of a government in accordance with their own traditions and values. Looking ahead to the convening of a national reconciliation conference, the meeting will seek consensus on the date, venue and list of participants for such a formal conference. If possible, the meeting will prepare a draft agenda for the conference.

17. In the meantime, and only for this informal meeting, the Special Representative, as a result of his consultations with Somalis at the local level, has proposed a list of 12 Somali political movements to be invited to the informal meeting on 4 January 1993. The 12 movements are:

- (1) Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF)
- (2) Somali National Movement (SNM)
- (3) Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)
- (4) United Somali Congress (USC) – Ali Mahdi
- (5) Somali National Front (SNF)
- (6) United Somali Party (USP)
- (7) Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA)
- (8) United Somali Front (USF)
- (9) Somali Democratic Movement (SDM)
- (10) Somali Agricultural Muki Organization (SAMO)

(11) Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM)

(12) United Somali Congress (USC) – Aidid

18. I have extended invitations to the informal meeting to these 12 Somali political movements, as well as to the Secretaries-General of OAU, OIC and the League of Arab States and the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Countries of the Horn. It is also my intention to invite the current Chairman of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries to be represented. I plan to visit the countries of the Horn, tentatively including Somalia, during the first part of January of 1993 to give further impetus to the process of national reconciliation.

II. The future mandate of the United Nations Operation in Somalia and the modalities for transition to continued peace-keeping operations

19. Paragraph 1 of resolution 794 (1992) encapsulates the mandate which the Security Council has entrusted to the Secretary-General since it adopted resolution 733 (1992) on 23 January 1992. This mandate has been to help the parties to establish and maintain a cease-fire, to distribute humanitarian relief and to promote national reconciliation and a political settlement. In resolution 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992 the Council took the further step of agreeing in principle to establish a security force to provide security for humanitarian activities in Mogadishu. In resolution 775 (1992) of 28 August 1992 the Council decided to extend this mandate to cover other areas in Somalia. It was to be implemented, as originally stipulated in paragraph 5 of resolution 751 (1992), in consultation with the parties concerned. In practice, fulfilment of that condition proved to be impossible. The agreement of “the parties” could not be obtained for the deployment of United Nations forces in areas where the protection of humanitarian operations was most desperately needed; when agreement was obtained, it was violated; and the small unit whose deployment in Mogadishu was agreed was not large enough to control the increasingly violent and lawless situation in that city.

20. My new Special Representative, Mr. Ismat Kittani, took up his duties in Mogadishu on 8 November 1992. His initial reports, which I summarized in my letter of 24 November 1992 to the President of the Security Council (S/24859), described graphically the obstacles which UNOSOM was facing. I accordingly suggested in that letter that the time might have come when it was necessary to review the basic premises and principles of the United Nations effort in Somalia. The following afternoon I was informed that if the Security Council were to decide to authorize Member States to use forceful means to ensure the delivery of relief supplies to the people of Somalia, the United States would be ready to

take the lead in organizing and commanding such an operation, in which a number of other Member States would also participate. The Council responded promptly and positively to these initiatives and adopted resolution 794 (1992) in which, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, it authorized the Secretary-General and Member States to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. In the same resolution the Council stated the objective of establishing a secure environment so as to enable it to make the necessary decision for a prompt transition to continued peace-keeping operations.

21. The present position is thus that the Security Council, having accepted my advice that the traditional peace-keeping model was not suitable to the Somali situation, and acting under Chapter VII, has entrusted to certain Member States, on a temporary basis, the responsibility of creating a secure environment for the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance. It is the wish of the Security Council that the transition back to peace-keeping operations should be achieved promptly. It is therefore of great importance that the conditions for such a transition should be achieved as soon as possible.

22. Since resolution 794 (1992) was adopted, I and senior members of my staff have had a number of meetings with representatives of the United States Government to discuss, *inter alia*, how and when the transition to continued peace-keeping operations could be made. In these discussions I have laid emphasis on two conditions in particular, whose importance I also stressed in a letter of 8 December 1992 to President Bush.

23. The first condition is that the Unified Task Force should take effective action to ensure that the heavy weapons of the organized factions are neutralized and brought under international control and that the irregular forces and gangs are disarmed before the Unified Task Force withdraws. In my letter to President Bush I referred to this need, and continued:

“As I stated in my letter of 29 November to the President of the Security Council, any forceful action by the international community in Somalia must have the objective of ensuring that at least the heavy weapons of the organized factions are neutralized and brought under international control and that the irregular forces and gangs are disarmed. Without this action I do not believe that it will be possible to establish the secure environment called for by the Security Council resolution or to create conditions in which the United Nations existing efforts to promote national reconciliation can be carried forward and the task of protecting humanitarian activities

can safely be transferred to a conventional United Nations peace-keeping operation.”

24. The fulfilment of this condition demands action on two fronts. First, it is necessary to establish or consolidate agreements with the leaders of all the organized factions for effective cease-fires in the various conflicts between them. These agreements must include provisions for the concentration of all the heavy weapons of each faction at designated locations where they can be brought under international control, exercised initially by the Unified Task Force and thereafter by UNOSOM. I am glad to be able to report that the leaders of the two principal factions in Mogadishu have recently agreed to a new cease-fire and to the concentration of their weapons. It is important that this agreement be quickly implemented and become the model for similar agreements elsewhere in Somalia.

25. Secondly, it is necessary to disarm the lawless gangs who have been the principal threat to humanitarian operations. In their armament and mode of operation (as described in my letter of 29 November 1992 to the President of the Security Council (S/24868)) they are little different from the forces of the organized factions and, indeed, sometimes cooperate with them. Once the heavy weapons of the organized factions have been concentrated, all other heavy weapons should in my view be confiscated and destroyed during the Unified Task Force's stay in the country.

26. Unless effective action is taken on these two fronts, the international community's efforts to help the people of Somalia will continue to be at risk from civil war and the predation of heavily armed and lawless gangs. The necessary secure environment for humanitarian operations and the promotion of a political settlement, in accordance with resolution 794 (1992), would not be established. In such circumstances I would not be in a position to recommend to the Council that it decide to make the transition to continued peace-keeping operations.

27. There remains the question of small arms held by individuals. Somalia has for long been a society in which it is normal for individuals to bear arms. However, the number of weapons held, and their calibres, have increased greatly in recent years, as a result of the vast influx of arms into the country during the cold war and developments in neighbouring countries, to the extent that they have become a standing threat to the maintenance of law and order. It will be for a new Somali Government to determine laws and regulations on the bearing of arms by individuals, and those laws and regulations will be enforced by a new police force. Meanwhile, I believe it important that the Unified Task Force and thereafter UNOSOM should do all they can to induce

individuals to hand in their weapons in order to foster a more secure environment.

28. It is also important that the Unified Task Force and UNOSOM should begin the task of clearing mines and other munitions, especially where these prevent the use of roads, bridges and other facilities required for the efficient distribution of humanitarian supplies. This is a particular problem in the north.

29. The second, and equally essential, condition is that the authority entrusted to the Unified Task Force should be exercised throughout Somalia. Paragraph 10 of resolution 794 (1992) imposes no geographical limitation, other than "in Somalia", on the mandate it confers and there are many other passages in the resolution (especially its paragraph 1) which show that "in Somalia" should be interpreted to mean the whole of the country. I raised this point too in my letter of 8 December to President Bush, in which I wrote:

"I believe it essential that the purpose of the new operation should be to create a secure environment throughout Somalia and that this should be apparent from the outset. It is true that the quantity of suffering is greatest in the areas where it is planned to deploy the unified command's forces in the first phases. But qualitatively the situation is just as bad elsewhere, especially in the north. I was therefore heartened to hear that the unified command is studying how the new operation could be extended to all parts of Somalia."

In addition to the humanitarian argument for country-wide deployment of the Unified Task Force, there is also a compelling security argument. The objectives of the Unified Task Force would not have been achieved, nor the conditions created for the transition to peace-keeping operations, if heavy weapons and lawless gangs simply withdrew from parts of Somalia controlled by the Unified Task Force to continue their action in other parts while waiting to return and resume their harassment and exploitation of the international relief effort after the Unified Task Force had handed over control to a less numerous and powerful United Nations force.

30. A third, if somewhat longer-term, factor is the need to create a new, professional police force. I am studying how this might be done, both politically and technically. It is clear that considerable financial, material and technical help will be required from the international community to establish a neutral police force. There have already been some helpful offers from Member States in this regard and I am pursuing them.

31. My discussions with the United States authorities have also touched on the revised mandate which the Security Council might entrust to a new UNOSOM. The

mission's military mandate has to date been to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu and to provide security for United Nations humanitarian activities there and elsewhere in Somalia (para. 22 of my report of 21 April 1992 (S/23829) and paras. 23-26 of my report of 24 August 1992 (S/24480), which were approved by resolutions 751 (1992) and 775 (1992) respectively). It is clear that this mandate will have to be enlarged in conceptual and other terms when UNOSOM takes over from the Unified Task Force.

32. My current view is that the mandate would need to continue to cover the whole territory of Somalia and to include the following tasks, which are based on the assumption that during its presence in Somalia the Unified Task Force will have brought about an effective cessation of hostilities throughout the country and will have established the secure environment called for in resolution 794 (1992):

- (a) To monitor that all factions continue to respect the cessation of hostilities and other military arrangements to which they will have agreed during the Unified Task Force's presence in the country;
- (b) To prevent any resumption of violence and, if necessary, take appropriate action against a faction which violates, or threatens to violate, the cessation of hostilities;
- (c) To maintain control of the heavy weapons of the organized factions which will have been brought under international control by the Unified Task Force, pending their eventual destruction or transfer to a newly constituted national army;
- (d) To maintain security at all ports and airports required for delivery of humanitarian assistance;
- (e) To protect, as required, warehouses, distribution centres and convoys of United Nations and other humanitarian agencies and to take such forceful action as may be required to neutralize armed elements which attack, or threaten to attack, such facilities, pending the establishment of a new Somali police force which can assume this responsibility;
- (f) To continue a programme for de-mining in the most afflicted areas;
- (g) To provide, as requested, advice on, and technical assistance to, the formation of a police force and a new national army;
- (h) To carry out such other functions as may subsequently be authorized by the Security Council.

33. The strength of the forces required to implement such a mandate would, to an important extent, depend upon the success of the Unified Task Force in establishing a secure environment throughout Somalia

before it withdrew, and cannot therefore be estimated at this early stage of its operations. My recommendation to the Council is likely to be that the initial deployment should be rather substantial, in order to minimize the risk of any deterioration in the security established by the Unified Task Force, but that it should be reduced progressively as the political process advances and the new national army and police force become operational.

34. I and my colleagues have agreed with our United States interlocutors that there must be a smooth transition from the Unified Task Force to UNOSOM without any hiatus which could be exploited by factions or gangs to compromise the secure environment created by the Unified Task Force. UNOSOM will need to have sufficient troops and logistic support elements deployed in Somalia to take over instantly from the Unified Task Force in each area from which it withdraws. This transition will have to be effected progressively, area by area; it could not be implemented throughout the country on a single day.

35. A number of the Member States which are cooperating with the United States in the Unified Task Force have expressed to the United States authorities and/or to me a willingness for their contingents to serve eventually in UNOSOM. I welcome these offers and will present recommendations to the Security Council on the national composition of the new UNOSOM as soon as it is possible to determine its resource requirements. In formulating such recommendations I shall take into account the established criteria which the Security Council has endorsed in the past, including the necessary regional and political balance, military capacity and previous peace-keeping experience. Subject to these criteria, it will be my intention, for obvious reasons of practical convenience and economy, to include in the new UNOSOM as many contingents as possible which will already be in Somalia serving under the command of the Unified Task Force. Subject to the Security Council's approval in due course, and that of the contributing Governments concerned, arrangements would be coordinated for each such unit to pass on an appointed day from the operational command of the Unified Task Force to that of the United Nations, as required by the phased transfer of responsibility referred to in the preceding paragraph.

36. Any resources required by the new UNOSOM which cannot, for one reason or another, be made available from units already serving with the Unified Task Force will need to be deployed to Somalia in good time for the planned transition. In this context I am particularly concerned about the logistic units which will be required. It is my understanding that the bulk of the logistic support for the Unified Task Force will be provided by the United States. Logistic units are always the

most difficult to find when a new peace-keeping operation is being put together. I have therefore indicated to the United States authorities that they are likely to be asked to keep some logistic units in Somalia in support of UNOSOM for some time after the main body of their troops has been withdrawn.

37. My and my colleagues' discussions with the United States authorities have been useful in clarifying many points and establishing much common ground about the modalities for the transition to continued peace-keeping operations. However, they have brought to light certain differences of approach as regards the timing of detailed planning for the transition. The United States representatives have pressed for such planning to begin now. I and my representatives, on the other hand, have taken the line that it would be difficult to move from discussion of concepts to the formulation of concrete plans until more is known about the success of the Unified Task Force in establishing a secure environment which would permit the transition to take place. I have also had in mind the effect, positive or negative, that the evolution of the political process can have on the security environment. It is to be hoped that this factor will become easier to assess after the meeting which is to be held at Addis Ababa on 4 January 1993.

38. At the most recent meeting with United States representatives, which took place on 18 December 1992, it also became clear that their thinking differed somewhat from the concept described in the preceding paragraphs of the present report. They envisaged the Unified Task Force being replaced by a new UNOSOM which would be under United Nations command and control but whose mandate, concept of operations, level of armament and rules of engagement would be little different from those of the Unified Task Force itself. It was argued that a force mandated and organized on normal peace-keeping lines would not be capable of protecting humanitarian activities from factional forces or gangs which would not have been neutralized or disarmed during the presence of the Unified Task Force in Somalia. The United States representatives hoped that the transition from the Unified Task Force to this new UNOSOM could begin as soon as possible. My representatives undertook to convey this new approach to me and to consider whether joint planning could proceed on this basis.

III. Observations

39. In paragraph 19 of resolution 794 (1992) the Security Council asked me to "submit a plan ... to ensure that UNOSOM will be able to fulfil its mandate upon the withdrawal of the unified command". Section II of the present report sets out my current ideas on the kind of mandate UNOSOM would require to maintain the secure

environment for humanitarian relief operations which will have been established by the Unified Task Force. It also sets out my ideas on the conditions which will have to be fulfilled before I would feel able to recommend to the Security Council that it make the necessary decision for a prompt transition to continued peace-keeping operations. To that extent, the present report can be regarded as a conceptual plan for UNOSOM's new tasks after the Unified Task Force has completed the mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council in paragraph 10 of resolution 794 (1992).

40. It will obviously be necessary to convert the conceptual plan into a specific plan detailing the troops and equipment required for UNOSOM, their deployment, arrangements for their logistic support, their rules of engagement and so on. Once these details are established it will be possible to work out quickly how the transition to continued peace-keeping operations can be put into effect. I share the United States authorities' wish that this work should be undertaken as soon as possible. But in my view the moment for it has not yet come. The Unified Task Force has been on the ground for only 10 days and it is too soon to make an evaluation of its success in establishing a secure environment for humanitarian operations and of the resources that will be required to enable UNOSOM to maintain that environment. At this stage, therefore, I am not in a position to offer the Council a specific and concrete plan for the transition to continued peace-keeping operations.

41. By the same token it is too soon to take a decision on the approach described in paragraph 38 above. This differs from the peace-keeping model by which I have so far been guided in accordance with resolution 794 (1992). It reflects a view that the Unified Task Force will not establish a secure environment of a kind that could be maintained by a normally mandated and armed peace-keeping force and that a considerable capacity for enforcement will therefore have to be kept in existence under United Nations command. This concept would require a further decision by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and would be analogous to the fifth option for which I expressed a preference in my letter of 29 November 1992 to the President of the Security Council.

42. The question which will have to be addressed in due course is whether such an operation would be feasible, taking into account the considerations referred to in that letter. To answer that question it will be necessary to know much more about the extent and success of the Unified Task Force's operations. It will also be necessary to know how many Member States, those already contributing to the Unified Task Force or others, would be ready to participate

in an operation of this kind and whether their number would be sufficient for the task proposed.

43. There are wider reasons, extending beyond the success of the Unified Task Force or the readiness of Member States to support a peace enforcement operation under United Nations command, which lead me to conclude that it would be premature to determine at this stage how and when the Unified Task Force should be replaced. For the United Nations that decision will have very far-reaching consequences. Resolution 794 (1992) commits it to taking on another major peace-keeping operation at a time when both the Organization's capacity to manage such operations and Member States' readiness to finance them have been stretched almost to the limit by the huge expansion in peace-keeping in 1992. The approach described in paragraph 38 above presents an even more daunting prospect, namely the first peace-enforcement operation to be carried out under United Nations command. Whichever of these two options the Security Council may eventually choose, the Secretary-General has to do what he can to ensure, before decisions are taken, that conditions exist which offer a reasonable prospect of the operation succeeding. One of these conditions is confidence in continuing support from Member States, upon whom that success would be critically dependent.

44. In addressing these questions, I am conscious not only of the overriding humanitarian imperative but also of the interrelationship between the political process and security. Without improved security the political process cannot prosper. But there is little prospect of a sustained improvement in security unless the political process does prosper. A number of the factors identified in the present report as being relevant to the establishment of a secure environment will be strengthened if momentum can be maintained in the political process, just as they will be weakened if momentum is lost. Examples are the establishment of cease-fires, the control of heavy weapons, the disarming of lawless gangs, the creation of a new police force. Without for one moment suggesting that the Unified Task Force should remain in Somalia until the peace process achieves its goals, I do believe that progress in the peace process must be taken into account in deciding how and when the Force should be replaced by a new UNOSOM. The informal meeting over which I shall preside at Addis Ababa on 4 January 1993 is of special importance in this regard.

45. Another consideration underlining what may seem an over-cautious approach is the fact that the international community faces a long haul in helping the people of Somalia to put their country on its feet again. There will have to be an integrated approach towards the restoration of security, political reconciliation, the re-creation of institutions, the return of refugees, rehabilitation, reconstruc-

tion—in short, all the elements of post-conflict peacebuilding. Hasty decisions at the very beginning of this process could have far-reaching and nefarious consequences. It would be a tragedy if the premature departure, or remodelling, of the Unified Task Force were to plunge Somalia back into anarchy and starvation and destroy the fragile political progress of recent weeks.

46. For all these reasons, I recommend that the Security Council defer a decision on these questions until the situation on the ground in Somalia becomes clearer.

47. In conclusion, I would like to pay tribute to the United States of America for the leadership which it has shown in its response to the crisis in Somalia. In my letter of 8 December 1992 to President Bush I wrote:

“I wish to express my appreciation for the significant contribution which the United States, under your leadership, is making to this endeavour. I should also

like to assure you of my full commitment, and that of my Special Representative, Mr. Ismat Kittani, to working as closely as possible with you to ensure that together we can succeed in relieving the appalling suffering in Somalia and putting that country on course to a peaceful and more secure future”.

The frankness with which, in the present report, I have described certain differences of approach between the Secretariat and the United States is a measure of the excellent working relationship that has been established between us since the adoption of resolution 794 (1992), both in New York and in Mogadishu. That close cooperation will continue. Equally, I pay tribute to the more than 20 Member States from all continents that have decided to participate in the Unified Task Force and to those that have contributed, or will contribute, to the Trust Fund which has been established to support the Force.

Document 44

Letter dated 23 December 1992 from the Secretary-General to a number of States appealing for their support in the international effort to overcome the humanitarian tragedy in Somalia

Not issued as a United Nations document

[Editor's note: The letter reproduced below was sent to the following Member States contributing troops to the operation in Somalia: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Similar letters were sent, in English, French or Spanish, to other troop-contributors as well as to nations not contributing troops. The recipients were: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of South Korea, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay and Venezuela. A similar letter was also sent to Mr. Jacques Delors in his capacity as President of the Commission of the European Communities.]

I am writing to you to appeal for the support of your Government in helping the United Nations to overcome the human tragedy in Somalia.

For nearly two years, Somalia has faced the twin disasters of famine and civil strife. Despite the efforts of the international community, conditions throughout the country have grown from bad to worse, and have so far claimed the lives of several hundred thousand Somalis. An estimated two million more are at risk.

As I reported to the Security Council, Somalia's Government, social infrastructure and economy have utterly collapsed. There are no government services, no central or regional administration, no schools, virtually

no hospitals or health services, no transport, and no public utilities. There has been an almost complete breakdown of law and order. In the towns, armed bandits and looters roam the streets. In large parts of the country, cattle and crops have been stolen and destroyed. Famine stalks the land.

In this situation, the United Nations, its humanitarian agencies and associated nongovernmental organizations have mounted a large-scale relief programme. However, deteriorating security conditions have made it increasingly difficult to deliver relief to those affected.

In light of these circumstances, the Security Council concluded that an enforcement action under the Charter

would be needed if the humanitarian purposes of the United Nations were to have a chance of success.

Consequently, on 3 December the Security Council adopted resolution 794 (1992) by which, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, it authorized the Secretary-General and Member States cooperating "to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia".

To support this effort, the Council also "called on all Member States which are in a position to do so to provide military forces and to make additional contributions, in cash or in kind, ... and requested the Secretary-General to establish a fund through which the contributions, where appropriate, could be channelled to the States or operations concerned".

I am pleased by the support offered by many countries to our effort in Somalia. Over thirty countries have offered to provide troops to help establish the peace in Somalia. These countries include some of the poorest countries in the world. We expect that other countries will also make appropriate contributions.

The Fund, called for by resolution 794 (1992), has been established in accordance with United Nations financial regulations and rules. Its purpose is to meet the costs of transporting and maintaining troops of contributing states that are unable to finance their own costs for this operation. Such countries have offered to contribute troops to a significant force, numbering at least 10,000

troops, to support our peace-making effort in Somalia. These countries do not, however, have the financial means to transport their troops to Somalia and to sustain them once they are there. While we have not yet made any final decisions on which of these troops will be deployed, I estimate that the Somalia Fund will need a minimum of several hundred million dollars to deploy and sustain these troops for a period of several months.

I wish to express my deep appreciation for your country's offer to provide troops to this urgent humanitarian effort. In order to allow the United Nations to take full advantage of offers by other countries to participate in this operation, I strongly urge your Government to respond generously to support the "Trust Fund for Somalia—Unified Command".

I am pleased to announce that the Government of Japan, which has taken a leading role in establishing the Fund, has agreed to contribute US\$100 million. Generous contributions by other Governments can build on this foundation to ensure the participation of the maximum number of countries in this unprecedented effort of the United Nations.

Transfer of funds may be made to the United Nations General Trust Fund account number 015-004473 with Chemical Bank, United Nations Branch, New York, N.Y. 10017, with an indication of the title of the Fund.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Document 45

Statement by the Secretary-General on 4 January 1993 at a preparatory meeting on national reconciliation in Addis Ababa urging all Somali parties to pursue reconciliation

UN Press Release SG/SM/4893, 4 January 1993

It gives me great pleasure to welcome you to the Headquarters of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, where we shall begin today our informal preparatory meeting for the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia. At the outset, I wish to pay tribute to all the Somali leaders who are present on this occasion—for it is they, ultimately, who must ensure that peace is restored and national reconciliation achieved in their country. I would also like to express my deep gratitude to His Excellency, President Meles Zenawi, for his tireless efforts in this regard, and for the hospitality of the Ethiopian Government in helping to facilitate the convening of this preparatory meeting. I wish also to thank my colleagues and brothers, Salim Ahmed Salim,

Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU); Esmat Abdel-Meguid, Secretary-General of the League of Arab States; and Hamid Abulghabid, Secretary-General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference who, for one year now, have cooperated closely with the United Nations in the search for a solution to the tragic situation in Somalia. Finally, I wish to pay tribute to the Movement of Non-Aligned States and the Standing Committee of the Horn of Africa for their crucial support of these efforts.

We are gathered today to prepare the way for the rebirth of Somalia. The future of the Somali people, and the future of Somalia as a State, will be shaped by your work here.

The Somali people are watching. Africa is watching. The world is watching.

You, who represent the many groups and movements of Somalia, deserve credit for being here today. You bear a great responsibility. I am confident that, with dedication and good will, important progress can be demonstrated here in Addis Ababa.

The time is right. Positive momentum now exists. Food, medicine, and humanitarian aid are now reaching the afflicted people of Somalia.

In many cities and villages, and along the roads of the country, Somalis are beginning to feel a sense of security again. Chaos, despair and horror have begun to give way to hope. Somalia is stirring with new life.

Cease-fires are holding in many parts of the country. Leaders have begun to express a willingness to reconcile with their enemies. The first signs of political accommodation can be detected.

This is, therefore, an opportune time to meet. Everyone here has a duty to build upon this positive momentum.

Today's preparatory meeting provides a precious opportunity. Fragmentation and fighting in Somalia have made dialogue nearly impossible. It is crucial that this occasion be used to exchange ideas and promote mutual understanding in a positive spirit.

The crisis of Somalia can only be resolved by the Somali people themselves, through a process of national reconciliation.

For this informal preparatory meeting, we have invited 14 political movements. However, it is imperative that all parties, movements and factions participate in the process without preconditions. The concerns of all—inside and outside Somalia—must be addressed.

The process of national reconciliation will be long and difficult. It will take months, and perhaps years. It

will require dedication, compromise, and the utmost seriousness of purpose.

We are here today to begin this process. What begins well can end well.

This meeting must make some fundamental decisions. We are here to reach agreement on a date, a venue, and an agenda for a national reconciliation conference. We should also agree on participation and on the establishment of a preparatory mechanism. As President Zenawi said, my personal preference is that the conference be held in Somalia.

The national reconciliation conference will be the forum where representatives of all Somali elements and areas may speak. It will provide a mechanism for negotiating an end to major disputes. Through this Conference, an agreement acceptable to all—and carried out by all—can be achieved.

The international community attaches the highest importance to national reconciliation for Somalia. The United Nations Security Council has called upon me, as Secretary-General, to assist, facilitate and intensify this effort.

Regional organizations are committed to this process as well. The OAU, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the League of Arab States, and the Standing Committee of the Horn of Africa are all represented here today. A representative of the Non-Aligned Movement is also present. Cooperation between the United Nations and the regional organizations will be essential.

The time has come to move beyond starvation, pain and fear. The time has come to put aside deadly rivalries. It is time to re-create the Somali State so that it may fulfil its role in the community of nations.

Let us dedicate ourselves to make a new start. And let us now go to work on the task of reconciliation for Somalia.

Document 46

Letter dated 18 January 1993 from the Secretary-General to the President of Ireland, Mrs. Mary Robinson, concerning efforts to achieve a political settlement in Somalia

Not issued as a United Nations document

Madam President,

Thank you very much for so kindly sending me a copy of your published diary account of your visit to Somalia last year. It is an eloquent and moving testimony. The photographs are excellent.

As you know, I visited Somalia at the beginning of this month (indeed, I have been away from New York

since before Christmas, which explains why I have not written to you sooner).

Efforts to achieve a political settlement in Somalia are now under way, with the aim of preparing a framework which will allow the Somali people themselves to develop ideas and suggest arrangements for the formation of a government in accordance with their own traditions

and values. The informal meeting which I chaired in Addis Ababa on 4 January was a useful first step in that direction. I have stressed that the process is likely to be long and difficult, and that it requires an integrated approach involving the whole range of activities which we now describe as "peace-building".

The wholesale, if perhaps somewhat belated, mobilization of international effort—to which your visit con-

tributed—is an optimistic sign. I very much hope that the worst is now over for the Somali people.

Please accept, Madam President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Document 47

Letter dated 19 January 1993 from the United States to the President of the Security Council transmitting a report on the progress made by UNITAF

S/25126, 19 January 1993

Please find enclosed the latest United States report on the implementation of Security Council resolution 794 (1992) on Somalia.

I should be grateful if this report could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Edward J. PERKINS

Annex

Report dated 16 January 1993 by the United States of America pursuant to Security Council resolution 794 (1992)

Since the submission of our previous report on this subject (S/24976, 17 December 1992), Operation Restore Hope and the forces of the Unified Task Force in Somalia (UNITAF) have made significant progress towards achieving the objective stated in resolution 794 (1992) of using "all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia".

Initial selected population centres, as well as the port and airfield serving Mogadishu, are now secure. Land routes necessary for the movement of relief supplies are now being made secure, and UNITAF will soon be in a position to commence the transition process whereby the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) will begin to maintain the secure environment already established.

Phase I of Operation Restore Hope was completed on 16 December as the Commander Task Force Somalia reported that the airfield and port facilities at Mogadishu and the airfields in Bale Dogle and Baidoa were secure.

Phase II of the Operation was completed on 28 December with the securing of all eight major relief centres to include Kismayo, Bardera, Oddur, Gialalassi and Belet Weyne. The completion of phase II operations was important not only because the major food distribution centres were secured, but also because operations were conducted by forces of both the United States and other countries participating in UNITAF.

Phase III is ongoing and will be complete when security for land movement of relief supplies from seaports to interior relief centres has been established.

On 31 December, United States Army and Italian forces secured the coastal city of Marka. Security of Marka has now been passed to forces of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Coalition forces continue to expand security operations in Mogadishu and the other major relief centres.

There are approximately 21,000 United States military personnel deployed in support of Operation Restore Hope.

Non-United States UNITAF forces in Somalia as of 7 January 1993 total 9,995 and include these from France (2,783), Italy (2,150), Canada (1,262), Belgium (572), Saudi Arabia (643), Turkey (309), Botswana (303), Egypt (270), Morocco (1,356), United Kingdom (90), Germany (60), New Zealand (42) and Kuwait (43). Additionally, the following countries currently have advance parties in country: Australia, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, India, Tunisia, Sweden and Pakistan.

UNITAF forces continue to build up sustainment bases in Mogadishu, Bale Dogle, Baidoa and Kismayo, and continue to expand security operations in the countryside. Security operations in the countryside continue to be important to encourage the resettlement of rural

farmers and herdsmen, and the transition from the relief to the rehabilitation phase.

The efforts of UNITAF to accomplish its objective have for the most part been welcomed by the Somali population. Typically, advance parties consisting of representatives from the United States Special Envoy to Somalia and the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Somalia have preceded the movement of UNITAF forces into a new area. These advance parties have generally been successful in securing the withdrawal from the immediate area of any offensive capabilities that might threaten UNITAF forces.

On other occasions, segments of the Somali population have attempted to interfere with UNITAF forces. When no other recourse was possible, UNITAF forces engaged in action against those elements. As it also became necessary to accomplish its mission, UNITAF

forces have either convinced those Somalis holding heavy weapons to isolate them in specified areas or have taken action to seize such weapons.

The progress of UNITAF forces thus far means that measures may now be taken to prepare for the transition to UNOSOM forces under United Nations command. United States government officials have begun initial discussions of this process with United Nations officials in New York and the United States Commander of UNITAF has discussed this with UNITAF Commanders of other countries and with United Nations officials in Somalia. The United States Government looks forward to prompt consideration of a Security Council resolution that will authorize an increased troop strength for UNOSOM, give it an appropriate mandate, and ensure it is properly equipped to handle that mandate.

Document 48

Progress report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia, including annexes containing the texts of the agreements reached by the Somali factions at a meeting in Addis Ababa from 4 to 15 January 1993

S/25168, 26 January 1993

1. The present report is the second report submitted to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 17 of resolution 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992 on the situation in Somalia.

2. Section I of the report describes efforts undertaken to promote national reconciliation in Somalia. Section II concerns the military activities of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM). Section III concerns humanitarian activities. The report also contains four annexes.

I. Efforts of national reconciliation and unity

3. As I previously reported to the Security Council (S/24992), I convened an informal preparatory meeting for a conference of national reconciliation and unity on Somalia at United Nations headquarters in Addis Ababa on 4 and 5 January 1993. Since additional time was requested by the participants, I authorized an extension of two more days to 7 January. In actual fact, the meeting did not conclude until 15 January 1993.

4. Twelve Somali political movements were initially invited to participate in the informal meeting. Two additional movements were invited at a later stage. A total

of 14 political movements thus took part in the meeting. A list of those participating is contained in annex I.

5. Also attending the meeting were the Secretaries-General of the League of Arab States (LAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Countries of the Horn, as well as the representative of the current Chairman of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

6. On 4 January 1993, I opened the informal meeting at the headquarters of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) in Addis Ababa. The President of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia, H.E. Ato Meles Zenawi, delivered the keynote address. Statements were also made by the Secretaries-General and the representatives of the regional and intergovernmental organizations mentioned above.

7. At my suggestion, all the subsequent sessions of the meeting were attended by only the representatives of the Somali movements invited to participate. It was these sessions, which were conducted by chairmen elected from among the Somali representatives, that continued until 15 January 1993.

8. The following three agreements were concluded and signed at the informal meeting: (a) General Agreement of 8 January 1993; (b) Agreement on implementing the cease-fire and on modalities of disarmament (Supplement to the General Agreement); and, (c) Agreement on the establishment of an ad hoc committee to help resolve the criteria for participation at and the agenda for the national reconciliation conference as well as any other issues pending from the informal meeting. Copies of these agreements are contained in annexes II, III and IV, respectively.

9. Among other things, the informal meeting agreed on the convening of a national reconciliation conference in Addis Ababa on 15 March 1993. Although nearly all the Somali political movements preferred to hold the national reconciliation conference in Mogadishu, the lack of facilities in the city and security concerns argued against it. The meeting also agreed to an immediate and binding cease-fire in all parts of the country under the control of the signatories and to the immediate cessation of all hostile propaganda. Agreement was furthermore reached on disarmament and on monitoring the cease-fire, as well as on the release of prisoners-of-war.

10. It was agreed that the ad hoc committee will hold its first meeting in Addis Ababa on 22 January 1993 and submit its recommendations on the criteria for participation at the national reconciliation conference to the meeting of the whole before 1 March 1993. The committee will have a rotating membership and will be composed of seven members at any one time, with two of its members coming from the Somali National Alliance (SNA) and the remaining five from other political movements, with the proviso that the SNA could rotate its participants at every session of the committee.

11. As agreed, the first meeting of the ad hoc committee was convened in Addis Ababa on 22 January 1993. However, the meeting was suspended in order to consider an allegation by the SNA that the Somali National Front (SNF) had violated the cease-fire agreement of 15 January 1993. According to the SNA, several towns in the Galgaduud region in the south were attacked and captured by the SNF. Neither UNOSOM nor UNITAF was able to confirm the allegation. The meeting could not be reconvened because the SNA decided not to participate. In a statement they issued, the other five participants in the committee called the suspension unjustified because alleged violations of the cease-fire fell under the competence of the Cease-fire Monitoring Committee and should not be a reason to suspend the first meeting of the ad hoc committee.

12. The informal meeting failed to agree on the agenda for the national reconciliation conference but

decided that the question should be addressed by the ad hoc committee.

13. The General Agreement requests the United Nations, in consultation with the relevant regional and subregional organizations, to provide logistic support both prior to and during the conference. The former concerns the availability of telecommunications and printing facilities as well as road and air transportation. ECA, in cooperation with UNOSOM, is expected to service the conference.

14. The crisis in Somalia can only be resolved by the Somali people themselves, through a process of national reconciliation. The process will be long and difficult. It will require dedication, compromise and the utmost seriousness of purpose. It is hoped that the conference will be a forum where representatives of all Somali movements, factions and groups will have the opportunity freely and fully to express their views. It will provide a mechanism for negotiating an end to the major disputes in the country. Through the negotiation process, an agreement acceptable to all—and carried out by all—can be achieved. It needs to be noted that the Security Council has from the beginning of its consideration of the situation in Somalia urged all parties to the conflict in Somalia immediately to cease hostilities and agree to a cease-fire and to promote the process of reconciliation and of political settlement in the country.

15. As I stated at the informal preparatory meeting, the international community attaches the highest importance to national reconciliation in Somalia. Regional organizations are committed to this process as well. It would still be preferable to convene meetings on national reconciliation in Somalia. Beyond its obvious symbolic significance, Somalia, as a venue, could provide added impetus and urgency to the search for a political solution.

II. Military activities

16. A major preoccupation for UNOSOM at the present juncture is the planning for the transition from the operations of UNITAF to UNOSOM II. This planning exercise is proceeding smoothly in close cooperation and consultation with the Command of UNITAF. The planning for UNOSOM II includes plans for deployment of troops to northern Somalia and it will also cover appropriate proposals for de-mining, as reliable information indicates that there are several million mines in the country, most of them uncharted. The major concentration of mine-fields is to be found in the north where UNITAF has not been deployed.

17. The first preparatory step for accelerating the transition to UNOSOM II will be the strengthening of the headquarters of the UNOSOM military component. In this connection, the Secretary-General has authorized the

addition of 30 officers to UNOSOM headquarters. A new Force Commander for UNOSOM II will be appointed shortly so that he can participate effectively in the planning process for the transition as well as the transfer of the operation from UNITAF to UNOSOM. A number of the Member States cooperating with the United States in UNITAF have expressed their willingness to have their contingents serve with UNOSOM II under a new mandate. I will present recommendations to the Security Council on the composition of the new UNOSOM as soon as it is practicable. It will be my intention, for obvious reasons of practical convenience and economy, to include in the new UNOSOM as many contingents as possible which are currently deployed in Somalia, and serving under the command of UNITAF.

18. As indicated in paragraph 12 of my report to the Security Council of 19 December 1992 (S/24992), I have initiated a series of meetings that bring together all the participating Governments of UNITAF and UNOSOM so as to give an opportunity to the troop-contributing countries to participate in discussions about the current operations of the Force and planning for the transition to UNOSOM II. The first of these meetings took place on Wednesday, 13 January 1993, and the second is scheduled for 26 January 1993.

19. UNOSOM's military component currently has a strength of 634 all ranks. It is composed of a 500 all ranks battalion, 50 military observers, movement and logistics elements, a headquarters company and a small headquarters staff. After the adoption of resolution 794 (1992), further deployment into Somalia was put on hold pending assessment of conditions on the ground. In addition to the augmentation of UNOSOM headquarters mentioned in paragraph 2 above, it has been decided to authorize the deployment of an additional 250 soldiers from Pakistan to augment and enhance the flexibility of the Pakistani Infantry Battalion. As indicated in paragraph 17 above, 30 officers will shortly join the headquarters of UNOSOM.

20. It must be noted that a separate report submitted by the United States on the achievements of UNITAF has been circulated to the Security Council (S/25126).

21. UNITAF must be congratulated for rapidly and successfully securing major population centres and ensuring that humanitarian assistance is delivered and distributed without impediment. Whilst the general security situation has improved considerably, the security threat to the personnel of the United Nations, UNITAF and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is still high in some areas of the city of Mogadishu and other places, including Bardera, Bale Doble and Baidoa. Inter-clan fighting still tends to break out from time to time, along with sniper attacks. Within the past few weeks a staff

member of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), one United States marine and one delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross were killed in incidents of this kind.

22. It is important to note that the primary responsibility for the implementation of the Addis Ababa agreements lies with the Somalis themselves. At the same time, UNITAF and UNOSOM will have important functions in assisting the Somalis in their task of discharging these responsibilities. In the area of disarmament, it will be necessary to monitor the weapons and technical vehicles which will have been placed under the supervision of the cease-fire monitoring group. This will present a particular difficulty in the north, where there is no UNITAF or UNOSOM military presence at this stage. Consequently, there is no ready capability to assist in the disarming exercise in that region, even if a decision were to be taken to do so. A related problem concerns the fact that if the north were not to be disarmed effectively or if the disarmament were not to be monitored by the international community, the factions in central and southern Somalia might hesitate to implement the agreement as such implementation would place them at a disadvantage. There is also the question of encampment of the troops of the various factions and their upkeep and retraining until a new Somali Government is formed. These issues would be reviewed with the UNITAF command to determine the nature of the UNITAF/UNOSOM response to the recommendations of the Addis Ababa Informal Preparatory Meeting.

23. The establishment of a Somali police force will be a crucial step in the efforts of UNITAF and UNOSOM to create a secure environment in Somalia for the purposes of humanitarian assistance and political reconciliation as well as for the rehabilitation of the country. I have therefore decided to send an expert team to Somalia which, under the guidance of my Special Representative, will prepare a plan for the establishment of a neutral police force in Somalia. In the meantime, under the supervision of UNITAF, working in close cooperation with UNOSOM, an auxiliary force composed of former police officers is being constituted in Mogadishu. This group could be entrusted with certain security functions under the guidance of UNITAF and subsequently UNOSOM.

III. Humanitarian activities

24. The arrival of UNITAF forces has opened up access to more remote areas and has enabled the delivery of relief food and other essential supplies, such as medicines, vaccines and water equipment. Between 10 December 1992 and 20 January 1993, 13 vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP) and other relief organizations

carrying humanitarian supplies have berthed in Mogadishu port. Some 40,000 tons of humanitarian relief supplies have been delivered to Somalia through Mogadishu port and its main airport. This included 8,000 tons of medical drugs, seeds, tools and veterinary supplies.

25. In addition to greater security, the efficiency of Mogadishu port has greatly improved; extortion payments have been stopped and the port itself and its buildings have been cleaned and minor construction work undertaken. Extensive salvage operations are also planned to fully open the port of Kismayo.

26. At Mogadishu main airport, security is provided by UNOSOM and UNITAF; electric lighting has been installed and the airport is now open 24 hours of the day. Air traffic control has been established and its capacity to handle aircraft has been expanded. Improvements have also been made to the airports at Baledogle and Baidoa. Dirt airstrips at Hoddur, Belet Weyne and Bardhere have been upgraded.

27. Access is being further increased through repair work on six major relief supply routes. These are: Mogadishu-Baledogle-Baidoa; Baidoa-Bardhere; Baidoa-Wajit-Hoddur; Mogadishu-Kismayo; Kismayo-Bardhere; Mogadishu-Jalalaqsi-Belet Weyne. Mines have been cleared from the Baidoa-Wajit-Hoddur road. Improved security has allowed WFP to bring some of its extensive truck fleet into Somalia from Ethiopia. This has accelerated the amount of relief supplies which can be delivered and has served to reduce the exceedingly high prices previously charged by local truck owners. Without the help of UNITAF, this would not have been possible.

28. Since the arrival of UNITAF, many new NGOs are establishing programmes in central and southern parts of Somalia. Many existing NGOs, as well as the United Nations system, have significantly increased their staff so that relief activities can be expanded.

29. Of the total food delivered, 25,000 tons brought into Mogadishu have been delivered by escorted road convoys to people in need in the Mogadishu area, Kismayo, Baidoa, Bardhere, Merca, Jalalaqsi, Hoddur and Belet Weyne. An additional 9,000 tons have been airlifted to Saco Uen, Kismayo, Baidoa, Bardhere, Wajit, Hoddur, Jalalaqsi and Belet Weyne. One hundred tons of food supplies have been airdropped to Afmadu and in the Jelib region.

30. In conjunction with WFP, CARE is establishing dry ration distribution in Mogadishu. Some 12,000 tons of food supplies will be delivered to people in the city per month. Thirty per cent of the food will be distributed in the form of dry rations to displaced persons and others in severe need. NGOs are supervising the programme, working closely with Somali women's groups. The re-

maining 70 per cent will be monetized in small lots through local traders. The first shipment of wheat flour has already been sold and the funds generated are being made available to NGOs for labour-intensive projects. UNITAF will escort convoys from the port to the sites and will also be present during the distributions to deter would-be looters.

31. A shipment of 3,000 tons of food arrived in Kismayo around 22 January 1993. This is the first shipment since the port was closed because of insecurity at the end of September 1992.

32. WFP has shipped 1,000 tons of food to Bosasso in the north-east. On 17 January 1,350 tons of food arrived in the north-western port of Berbera and a further 200 tons has been shipped from Djibouti to the seaports of Zeila and Mait in northern Somalia.

33. Provision of assistance by UNICEF markedly increased following the Geneva Conference on Somalia in October 1992 with the launching of the United Nations 100-Day Programme of Action and the subsequent arrival of UNITAF. UNICEF's objectives focused on improving access to food supplies, supplementary feeding for the vulnerable and "at-risk" population, provision of essential health services, provision of safe water and improvement of sanitary conditions, and relief assistance and support for resettlement and the resumption of agricultural activities.

34. UNICEF continues to provide medicines, drugs and support to 16 hospitals, 62 mother and child health centres and 156 health posts throughout Somalia. In December, some 60,000 children were vaccinated against measles and given vitamin A supplements. In collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO) and NGO partners, epidemiological assessments have been conducted in four regions of Somalia. UNICEF continues to support 14 international NGOs providing assistance to 136 supplementary feeding centres, feeding over 200,000 children per day.

35. Work is under way to repair, install and rehabilitate water supply systems, while efforts are being made to improve the sanitary conditions. Over 18,000 families have received agricultural tools and seeds through the joint UNICEF/OXFAM programme for agricultural communities in Lower Juba and Lower Shebelle, and seeds and tools have been distributed to small-scale farmers in 71 villages.

36. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has assisted in the restoration of the Mogadishu water supply system, and has been instrumental in the successful sanitation clean-up programme in the city. Similar efforts are under way in other urban centres. A major UNDP mission is under way in north-western Somalia, identifying rehabilitation projects as well as

schemes to help rebuild administrative services. UNDP is also assisting the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), WHO and UNESCO to extend their activities throughout Somalia by providing the usual logistics, administrative and financial support. UNDP has significantly increased its international staff presence following the arrival of the UNITAF.

37. UNESCO has recently re-established its presence in Somalia and is very active, along with NGOs and other United Nations agencies, in reopening schools and in assisting in the provision of educational materials. FAO has expanded its activities considerably and is providing essential assistance to the thousands of displaced families so that they have the seeds, tools and other agricultural equipment to resettle in home villages and re-establish livestock herds. FAO is also providing much-needed animal health assistance in an attempt to rehabilitate the pastoral economy, a mainstay of much of the Somali population. WHO has continued to provide significant assistance to the health sector, providing NGOs with material assistance, essential drugs and technical advice, especially in the areas of malaria and tuberculosis. Along with UNICEF and a number of NGOs, WHO has opened a central pharmacy in Mogadishu, and assisted in the development of an epidemiological surveillance system.

38. The improved access and security in some areas has enabled health and nutrition assessments to take place. Some of these assessments have been made with helicopter transportation provided by UNITAF. Agricultural surveys to determine harvests and hence food needs for 1993 are also being undertaken.

39. Security forces in the hinterland are also involved in assisting local communities through improved water supplies and support for health facilities. Another positive aspect of UNITAF is the increase in commercial activities. Markets are functioning again and commercial vessels are using the ports of Mogadishu and Kismayo.

40. As regards coordination, the Humanitarian Operations Centre (HOC), which was established in Mogadishu to serve as the interface between UNITAF and the relief community, has worked exceptionally well. UNITAF liaison personnel have been attached to UNOSOM's Humanitarian Division since the start of the operation. The Operations Coordination Structure enables the different partners involved in the delivery of humanitarian assistance to discuss security issues, convoy escorts and requests for emergency assistance. Attended by representatives of the security forces provided by the various countries, this forum provides the relief community with a unique opportunity to share information and raise issues that have an impact on relief efforts.

41. Humanitarian Operations Centres have also been established at Baidoa, Kismayo, Belet Weyne, Hud-dor, Bardhere and Jalalaqsi.

42. The Operations Coordination Structure also includes a 12-member Standing Liaison Committee representing all international partners in the relief effort. This Committee meets on a weekly basis to discuss problems which have arisen and to propose solutions.

43. In spite of the many positive aspects of the presence of UNITAF forces, the risk to relief workers remains exceedingly high. Theft, looting and extortion continue to plague relief efforts, albeit on a lesser scale. The recent murder of UNICEF and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) staff only serves to highlight the dangerous climate in which relief workers continue to operate.

44. Insecurity has also adversely affected the planning of future relief operations. UNICEF was planning to establish a presence in the Mudug and Galgaduud regions in early December. Increased insecurity in these regions, however, has resulted in the decision to postpone the programmes. In the north-eastern portion of the country, an area previously considered relatively secure, increased troop movements and fighting amongst rival groups have adversely affected plans by aid agencies and NGOs to establish relief programmes in the region. The security situation in Kismayo has improved as UNITAF patrols have been stepped up and a local police force created. All five UNICEF supplementary feeding centres are operating and UNICEF is continuing its support to health facilities in Lower Juba.

45. Concerns are growing about the movement of technicals into border areas with Kenya and Ethiopia. The problems created by armed gangs in refugee camps in Kenya recently prompted the authorities to threaten to oust Somali refugees residing in that country. The destabilizing effect of such movements into these countries as well as the lurking threat which they pose for any future stability in Somalia itself are matters which must be addressed.

Future plans

46. It will be recalled that the United Nations 100-Day Action Programme for Accelerated Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia was reviewed at the Second Coordination Meeting held in Addis Ababa from 3 to 5 December 1992. In addition to reviewing progress made under the plan, the Meeting provided an opportunity for Somali leaders and indigenous NGOs to forge a stronger degree of partnership with United Nations agencies and international NGOs in planning and implementing relief and rehabilitation activities.

47. One of the major conclusions of the Meeting was that the 100-Day Programme should be followed by a new plan for 1993 which should also address rehabilitation and reconstruction. It was further agreed that the participation of Somali representatives in the planning process of future programmes was fundamental.

48. With these considerations in mind, a Relief and Rehabilitation Programme for 1993 is in the process of being finalized. Core groups, comprising representatives of the United Nations system and international and indigenous NGOs, are collaborating closely in formulating activities in the sectors of food security, health, water and sanitation, food production, livestock, basic education, and resettlement of displaced people and refugees. In order to ensure that requirements in different parts of the country are adequately taken into consideration, inputs from different regions are being obtained with assistance from regional Humanitarian Operations Centres.

49. In spite of the difficulties in the country, a major effort is being made to ensure the involvement of the Somalis themselves in planning programmes designed to move as quickly as circumstances permit from relief to rehabilitation and reconstruction.

50. The Relief and Rehabilitation Programme will include activities covering all parts of Somalia and its effective implementation will be contingent upon the existence of adequate security. This applies to areas currently covered by the Unified Task Force in the central and southern parts of Somalia as well as to the north-east and the north-west. As part of the Programme, steps will be taken to rebuild civil administrations and to establish police forces.

51. A United Nations Conference on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia will be held in Addis Ababa in March 1993 to review the Relief and Rehabilitation Programme and receive pledges from donors. The active involvement of a wide spectrum of Somalis is indispensable to the effective implementation of the Programme. Every effort will therefore be made to achieve broad Somali participation in the Conference. This Conference could be held immediately after the United Nations Conference on National Reconciliation in order to minimize cost and to maximize Somali participation. A positive outcome of the Humanitarian Conference could provide added incentives for the national reconciliation process.

Annex I

Somali Africans Muki Organization (SAMO)
Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA)
Somali Democratic Movement (SDM)
Somali National Democratic Union (SNDU)
Somali National Front (SNF)
Somali National Union (SNU)

Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)
Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)(sna)
Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF)
Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM)(sna)
United Somali Congress (USC)(sna)
United Somali Congress (USC)
United Somali Front (USF)
United Somali Party (USP)

Annex II

The General Agreement signed in Addis Ababa on 8 January 1993

We, the undersigned Somali political leaders, meeting at the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 4 January 1993 at the Informal Preparatory Meeting on National Reconciliation in Somalia, would like to thank the Secretary-General of the United Nations, H.E. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who has facilitated this meeting in collaboration with the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Standing Committee of the Horn of Africa.

We also thank the Government and people of Ethiopia, and H.E. Meles Zenawi, President of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia, for hosting the Meeting and for his personal engagement in assisting our efforts to reach the following agreement.

We, the Somali participants, further express our deep appreciation for the concern of the international community for the humanitarian crisis in our country and recognize their wish for us to reach a peaceful solution to our country's severe problems.

After discussing our problems and considering all options, we have agreed on the following points:

1. The convening of a National Reconciliation Conference in Addis Ababa on 15 March 1993;
2. The declaration of an immediate and binding cease-fire in all parts of the country under the control of the concerned warring factions, subject to paragraph (a) below;
3. The immediate cessation of all hostile propaganda against each other and the creation of an atmosphere conducive to reconciliation and peace;
4. The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), in consultation with the relevant regional and subregional organizations, will be responsible for the logistical preparations of the National Reconciliation Conference;
5. The establishment of further mechanisms for the continuation of free dialogue amongst all political factions and leaders in Somalia in preparation for the National Reconciliation Conference;

6. To continue and enhance our full and unrestrained cooperation with all international organizations working inside and outside Somalia to distribute humanitarian relief to our people;

7. To commit ourselves, without reservation, to facilitating the free movement of Somali people throughout the entire country as a measure of confidence-building before the National Reconciliation Conference.

This agreement shall be valid upon completion and adoption by consensus on the following three points, and a separate communiqué will be issued before leaving Addis Ababa:

- (a) The establishment of the modalities for implementing the cease-fire amongst all warring parties and the creation of a mechanism for disarmament;
- (b) The agenda of the National Reconciliation Conference;
- (c) The criteria for participation in the National Reconciliation Conference.

This agreement, signed in Addis Ababa on 8 January 1993, shall be considered binding on all the undersigned parties henceforth and all signatories shall be obliged to secure the support and implementation of this agreement amongst their movements and followers.

1. Somali Africans Muki Organization (SAMO)
Mr. Mohamed Ramadan Arbaw, Chairman
2. Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA)
Mr. Mohamed Farah Abdullahi, Chairman
3. Somali Democratic Movement (SDM)
Abdi Muse Mayow, Chairman
Col. Mohamed Nur Aliyou, Chairman (SNA)
4. Somali National Democratic Union (SNDU)
Mr. Ali Ismael Abdi, Chairman
5. Somali National Front (SNF)
General Omar Hagi Mohamed Hersi, Chairman
6. Somali National Union (SNU)
Dr. Mohamed Ragis Mohamed, Chairman
7. Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)
General Aden Abdillahi Noor, Chairman
8. Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) (sna)
Col. Ahmed Omar Jess, Chairman
9. Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF)
General Mohamed Abshir Musse, Chairman
10. Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM) (sna)
Col. Abdi Warsame Isaaq, Chairman

11. United Somali Congress (USC) (sna)
General Mohamed Farah Aidid, Chairman
12. United Somali Congress (USC)
Mr. Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, Chairman
13. United Somali Front (USF)
Mr. Abdurahman Dualeh Ali, Chairman
14. United Somali Party (USP)
Mohamed Abdi Hashi, Chairman

8 January 1993
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Africa Hall

Annex III

Agreement on implementing the cease-fire and on modalities of disarmament

(Supplement to the General Agreement signed in Addis Ababa on 8 January 1993)

We, the undersigned Somali political leaders, meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 15 January 1993, at the Informal Preparatory Meeting on National Reconciliation in Somalia;

Having agreed on the need for a viable and verifiable cease-fire to promote the peace process in Somalia;

Recognizing that such cease-fire is intricately linked to questions of disarmament;

Further recognizing that disarmament cannot be accomplished in a single event but through a sustained process;

Hereby agree on the following:

I. *Disarmament*

1.1 All heavy weaponry under the control of political movements shall be handed over to a cease-fire monitoring group for safekeeping until such time as a legitimate Somali Government can take them over. This process shall commence immediately and be completed in March 1993.

1.2 The militias of all political movements shall be encamped in appropriate areas outside major towns where the encampment will not pose difficulties for peace. The encamped militias shall be disarmed following a process which will commence as soon as possible. This action shall be carried out simultaneously throughout Somalia. The international community will be requested to provide the encamped militias with upkeep.

1.3 The future status of the encamped militia shall be decided at the time of the final political settlement in Somalia. Meanwhile, the international community will be requested to assist in training them for civilian skills in preparation for possible demobilization.

1.4 All other armed elements, including bandits, shall be disarmed immediately and assisted through rehabilitation and integration into civil society.

II. *Cease-fire monitoring group*

2.1 A cease-fire monitoring group comprising UNITAF/United Nations troops shall be established immediately. There shall also be a committee composed of representatives of the warring factions to interlopute with the monitoring group and observe the implementation of the agreement by UNITAF/United Nations troops.

III. All sides agree in principle that properties unlawfully taken during the fighting shall be returned to the lawful owners. This shall be implemented as and when the situation allows.

IV. All POWs shall be freed and handed over to the International Committee of the Red Cross and/or UNITAF. This process shall commence immediately and be completed by 1 March 1993.

The present agreement shall enter into effect on 15 January 1993.

1. Somali Africans Muki Organization (SAMO)
Mr. Mohamed Ramadan Arbow, Chairman
2. Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA)
Mr. Mohamed Farah Abdullahi, Chairman
3. Somali Democratic Movement (SDM)
Mr. Abdi Muse Mayow, Chairman
Col. Mohamed Nur Aliyou, Chairman (SNA)
4. Somali National Democratic Union (SNDU)
Mr. Ali Ismael Abdi, Chairman
5. Somali National Front (SNF)
General Omar Hagi Mohamed Hersi, Chairman
6. Somali National Union (SNU)
Dr. Mohamed Ragis Mohamed, Chairman
7. Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)
General Aden Abdillahi Noor, Chairman
8. Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) (sna)
Col. Ahmed Omar Jess, Chairman
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General Mohamed Abshir Musse, Chairman
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Col. Abdi Warsame Isaaq, Chairman
11. United Somali Congress (USC) (sna)
General Mohamed Farah Aidid, Chairman
12. United Somali Congress (USC)
Mr. Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, Chairman

13. United Somali Front (USF)
Mr. Abdurahman Dualeh Ali, Chairman
14. United Somali Party (USP)
Mr. Mohamed Abdi Hashi, Chairman
15. January 1993, Addis Ababa

Annex IV

Agreement on the establishment of an ad hoc committee, signed in Addis Ababa, on 15 January 1993

We, the undersigned Somali political leaders, meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 15 January 1993, at the Informal Preparatory Meeting on National Reconciliation in Somalia;

Determined to continue our efforts to resolve all pending issues from the Informal Preparatory Meeting, in particular, the question of criteria for participation at and the agenda for the National Reconciliation Conference scheduled to begin on 15 March 1993;

Further determined to ensure the immediate implementation of all agreements reached during the Informal Preparatory Meeting;

1. Hereby decide to establish an Ad Hoc Committee to continue the discussion aimed at resolving the question of criteria for participation and the agenda for the National Reconciliation Conference, as well as any other issues pending from the Informal Preparatory Meeting;

2. The Ad Hoc Committee, whose sole purpose is to provide a mechanism for continuing the search for a solution to outstanding issues, shall work in consultation with all Somali political movements;

3. The Ad Hoc Committee shall hold its first meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 22 January 1993;

4. The Ad Hoc Committee shall submit its recommendations on the criteria for participation at the National Reconciliation Conference and on other outstanding issues to the meeting of the whole before 1 March 1993;

5. The following facilities, to be utilized solely for the purpose of carrying out the mandate set out in the present agreement, shall be placed at the disposal of the Ad Hoc Committee: an office in Mogadishu and Addis Ababa to facilitate consultations with the United Nations and the relevant regional and subregional organizations, as well as telecommunication and transportation facilities;

6. The Ad Hoc Committee shall be composed of seven members at any one time with two coming from the SNA and five from the other political movements. The SNA shall have the right to rotate its participants at every session of the Ad Hoc Committee if it so wishes;

7. Notwithstanding the pending status of the agenda and the issue of criteria for participation at the

National Reconciliation Conference, the General Agreement signed in Addis Ababa on 8 January 1993 shall enter into force with immediate effect.

1. Somali Africans Muki Organization (SAMO)
Mr. Mohamed Ramadan Arbow, Chairman
2. Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA)
Mr. Mohamed Farah Abdullahi, Chairman
3. Somali Democratic Movement (SDM)
Mr. Abdi Muse Mayow, Chairman
Col. Mohamed Nur Aliyou, Chairman (SNA)
4. Somali National Democratic Union (SNDU)
Mr. Ali Ismael Abdi, Chairman
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General Omar Hagi Mohamed Hersi, Chairman
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General Mohamed Farah Aidid, Chairman
12. United Somali Congress (USC)
Mr. Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, Chairman
13. United Somali Front (USF)
Mr. Abdurahman Dualeh Ali, Chairman
14. United Somali Party (USP)
Mr. Mohamed Abdi Hashi, Chairman

15 January 1993, Addis Ababa

Document 49

Further report of the Secretary-General submitted in pursuance of paragraphs 18 and 19 of resolution 794 (1992), proposing that the mandate of UNOSOM II cover the whole country and include enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the Charter

S/25354, 3 March 1993, and addenda: S/25354/Add.1, 11 March 1993, and S/25354/Add.2, 22 March 1993

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of paragraphs 18 and 19 of Security Council resolution 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992 in which the Security Council:

“Requests the Secretary-General and, as appropriate, the States concerned to report to the Council on a regular basis, the first such report to be made no later than fifteen days after the adoption of this resolution, on the implementation of this resolution and the attainment of the objective of establishing a secure environment so as to enable the Council to make the necessary decision for a prompt transition to continued peace-keeping operations;

“Requests the Secretary-General to submit a plan to the Council initially within fifteen days after the adoption of this resolution to ensure that UNOSOM will be able to fulfil its mandate upon the withdrawal of the unified command;”

2. Section I of the present report contains a factual description of the further action taken since my report of 26 January 1993 to implement resolution 794 (1992). Humanitarian activities are covered in section II, political reconciliation in section III, establishment of a Somali police force in section IV and public information activities in section V. Section VI sets out my current thinking on the modalities for effecting the transition from the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to what will become UNOSOM II. Financial aspects are covered in section VII and my observations are contained in section VIII.

I. **Implementation of Security Council Resolution 794 (1992) (26 January–28 February 1993)**

3. The specific terms of reference entrusted to the Secretary-General by resolution 794 (1992) concern:

- (a) The operations and further deployment of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) (para. 6);
- (b) Implementation of the operation to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations (para. 10);
- (c) The establishment of mechanisms for coordination between the United Nations and UNITAF (para. 13), including the attachment of UNOSOM liaison staff to the headquarters of UNITAF (para. 15);
- (d) Continued efforts to achieve a political settlement (para. 20).

The action taken under each of these mandates is described below.

A. *The operations of UNOSOM*

4. In my report of 26 January 1993 to the Security Council (S/25168), I indicated that a major preoccupation for UNOSOM at that juncture was the planning for the arrangements for the transition of UNITAF to UNOSOM II. The planning included present plans for deployment of troops to northern Somalia, proposals for mine clearance, creation of a Somali police force and gradual strengthening of the UNOSOM headquarters military component.

5. The military component of UNOSOM currently has a strength of 715 all ranks, composed mainly of an infantry battalion of 500 all ranks, 50 military observers, movement and logistics elements and a small headquarters company and staff. After the adoption of resolution 794 (1992), further deployment into Somalia, which had been authorized under Security Council resolution 775 (1992) of 28 August 1992, was put on hold pending assessment of conditions on the ground. However, I am continuing to strengthen UNOSOM headquarters. I have also appointed a Force Commander who will manage the transition process and command UNOSOM II when it is established.

B. *Implementation of the operation to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations*

6. Since the adoption of Security Council resolution 794 (1992) UNITAF has deployed approximately 37,000 troops in southern and central Somalia. No troops have been deployed in the north and in border areas. The overall security situation in the sectors under the control of UNITAF has slowly improved, although incidents of violence continue to occur in the major population centres and in some rural areas. The UNITAF Commander has declared that "all areas are stable or relatively stable".

However, UNITAF forces have continued to be the target of sniper fire and harassment, and, especially in recent weeks, major incidents of resumed fighting or rioting have been reported from Kismayo and Mogadishu. While most major clans and factions have welcomed the deployment of UNITAF and have cooperated, the positions of some of the faction leaders have not always remained consistent. UNITAF's presence in key areas of the country has reduced the influence of those whose power was based on their heavy weapons. A number of disarmament forays have been carried out on a limited scale, both in Mogadishu and in other locations within the designated sectors. It should be noted that the area under UNITAF control comprises only 40 per cent of the country's territory. No systematic attempt has been made to establish a secure environment outside this area.

C. *Mechanisms for coordination*

7. The following mechanisms for coordination have been established:

(a) At United Nations Headquarters:

(i) A policy group on Somalia is chaired by the Secretary-General and meets regularly with senior representatives of the United States Government. It reviews the progress of the operation, composition of the Force, funding and planning for the future role of UNOSOM;

(ii) An operational task force (chaired by the Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations), comprising representatives from the Secretariat departments concerned and representatives of the United States, meets weekly;

(iii) A liaison team composed of United States officers has been attached to the Department of Peace-keeping Operations since early January;

(iv) A UNOSOM planning team is now in place in the Department of Peace-keeping Operations.

(b) At UNOSOM headquarters, Mogadishu, the UNOSOM Force Commander and the Commander of UNITAF are working closely in order to ensure coordination of the activities of the two Forces. Much of the detailed planning of the transition will take place in Mogadishu and, as already noted, UNOSOM headquarters is being strengthened for this purpose. A UNOSOM liaison staff has been working with UNITAF headquarters.

8. Several of the Member States that are cooperating with the United States in UNITAF have asked to be consulted on the current operations of the Force and progress on planning for the transition. I have initiated

regular meetings to which all States participating in the Force are invited.

D. Continued efforts to achieve a political settlement

9. In addition to my endeavours regarding the cessation of hostilities and the observance of the cease-fire as well as the imperative need to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of Somalia, I have, in accordance with the mandate given to me by the Security Council, continued to promote efforts for national reconciliation and unity in the country, in cooperation with regional organizations, the League of Arab States (LAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).

10. In my last report (S/25168), I informed the Security Council about the outcome of the informal preparatory meeting for a Conference on National Reconciliation and Unity in Somalia which I convened at the headquarters of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa in Addis Ababa (4-15 January 1993). I noted in particular that the following three agreements were concluded and signed at the meeting:

- (a) General Agreement of 8 January 1993;
- (b) Agreement on implementing the cease-fire and modalities of disarmament (Supplement to the General Agreement);
- (c) Agreement on the establishment of an ad hoc committee to help to resolve the criteria for participation at and the agenda for the National Reconciliation Conference as well as other issues pending from the informal meeting.

11. I also reported that, as stipulated in the latter Agreement, the first meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee was scheduled to be held in Addis Ababa on 22 January 1993 to submit recommendations to the meeting of the whole before 1 March 1993 on the criteria for participation at the National Reconciliation Conference. Regrettably, the Committee was unable to meet because the Somali National Alliance (SNA) refused to participate, alleging that the Somali National Front (SNF) and the Somali Patriotic Front (SPF) had violated the cease-fire agreement by attacking its forces in and around Kismayo.

12. A further meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee, scheduled for the beginning of February in Mogadishu, could not be convened because of the position taken by SNA that its representatives would not attend as long as SNF and Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) forces continued to violate the cease-fire around Kismayo. As a result, the broad agreement reached in consultation with the individual Committee members on the agenda, the rules of procedures and the list of international observers

to be invited to the Conference could not be formally endorsed by the Committee.

13. Subsequent consultations with SNA on the criteria for participation at the National Reconciliation Conference have helped to clear the way for convening a formal meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee. SNA has agreed not to insist on the exclusion of the smaller parties from participation at the Conference. It was also agreed that the participants should include politicians, community leaders, women and military representatives of the warring parties.

14. The only aspect of participation which has yet to be resolved is the size of the respective delegations of the parties. The parties have requested the United Nations to devise a formula for a fair allocation of delegates to each party.

15. Following these encouraging developments, my Special Representative issued invitations to the parties to attend a formal meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee in Mogadishu. The Committee held its first formal meeting on 23 February 1993 and completed its work when it resumed its meeting on 27 February following three days of interruption owing to rioting and fighting in Mogadishu (24-26 February). All Committee members, except the Somali National Democratic Union (SNDU), were represented at the meeting. In addition to the United Nations, representatives of the Horn of Africa Committee and of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries were also present at the meeting.

16. On the first day of the meeting, the Committee adopted a report on participation, the draft agenda and procedures for reaching decisions. When the meeting resumed on 27 February, SNA submitted written reservations notably on the criteria for participation. The Committee agreed to circulate immediately its report to all political movements since time constraints would not allow the reconvening of the informal preparatory meeting of the whole to which it was expected to submit its report.

17. The progress achieved by the Committee has cleared the way for proceeding with arrangements for a meeting on national reconciliation. It is my intention to invite a broad cross-section of Somalis, representing political movements, community, religious and women's groups, civic and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as well as elders and eminent persons to a Conference on National Reconciliation, to be held in Addis Ababa from 15 to 19 March 1993. The categories of participants have been agreed to by the Ad Hoc Committee. In addition to national reconciliation, the meeting will also consider organizational matters.

18. I have stressed that my efforts and those of my Special Representative will continue to give high priority to national reconciliation in Somalia in accordance with

the mandate given to me by the Security Council. UNOSOM will therefore continue to promote and facilitate dialogue and communication between the various Somali parties, movements and factions in order to help to keep lines of communication open between them and to promote confidence-building measures so essential to the success of the efforts deployed for national reconciliation.

II. Humanitarian activities

19. As mentioned in my progress report of 26 January 1993, the deployment of UNITAF forces has facilitated the flow of food and other emergency relief supplies into the neediest areas of Somalia at a quickly increased rate. The level of malnutrition and death from starvation has fallen dramatically in many areas.

20. At the same time, it must be borne in mind that the delivery of humanitarian assistance is bound to be affected by the security situation, which has tended to vary at times from week to week and from region to region, even though during the early period of the deployment of UNITAF the security situation had improved. Many of the "technical" vehicles were reported to have been withdrawn or placed in cantonment and large-scale looting decreased substantially. Commercial and market activities appeared to be picking up and some schools were reopened. Agricultural activities have been on the increase. However, in recent weeks the security situation has deteriorated.

21. As of the time of writing of the present report, the situation in many parts of the country remains complex and tense. Especially in rural areas and along Somalia's borders with Ethiopia and Kenya, security conditions remain unstable. The murders in January and February 1993 of United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other relief workers highlight the extreme fragility of the security situation in spite of the presence of large numbers of military forces. This also highlights again the importance of a secure environment for the effective delivery of emergency relief and rehabilitation assistance.

22. It is in this context that the United Nations, in close cooperation with relevant organizations of the United Nations system and international NGOs as well as Somali representatives, is in the process of preparing a relief and rehabilitation programme for 1993.

23. The needs of Somalia are immense and urgent. In the southern and central parts of the country, large numbers of people remain destitute and totally dependent on relief food assistance. Measles, diarrhoea and other infections continue to take a heavy toll, particularly on small children. Lack of access to clean water sources and poor sanitation present major health threats. With the

present security arrangements enabling areas hitherto inaccessible to be reached, some for the first time in many months, it has been confirmed that increased and expanded emergency programmes will be needed through most—if not all—of 1993.

24. It has become apparent that a substantial portion of Somalis are ready to rebuild their lives and their society. The first steps towards recovery and normalcy must be rapidly and judiciously supported to prevent further social and economic deterioration or a lapse into a new cycle of internecine killing and brutality.

25. Two major challenges in 1993 will be to facilitate the voluntary return of approximately 300,000 refugees, according to figures provided by Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and internally displaced persons as well as providing jobs and work for the many millions of Somalis who are presently unemployed. Among these groups are the many thousands of crews of "technicals", armed gangs, militias and private armies of the various factions. While channelling these people into lawful pursuits may be difficult, the creation of work through large-scale labour forces carrying out activities such as road repairs, canal clearing and sanitation is essential if Somalia is ever to become stable. Alongside such endeavours, vocational training programmes and adult literacy courses must also be explored.

26. As regards refugees and displaced persons, some have already spontaneously returned to their home areas in recent months. These groups will need assistance to return to agricultural and/or livestock pursuits. However, many refugees and displaced people have indicated they are not yet willing to return home because of uncertain security in their areas of origin. These groups require continued relief assistance. For others who have lost their homes and their land, or where other families now occupy those areas, new alternative sites must be found. Given the current situation on the borders with Ethiopia and Kenya and political pressures for the Somali refugees to return to their own country, it is also imperative that contingency plans and stocks of household goods, food and other commodities are in hand to cope with sudden mass influxes back to Somalia.

27. A third major challenge concerns national capacity-building. National and regional Somali institutions and civil administration have virtually ceased to exist. None the less there remains considerable institutional memory and expertise on the part of former civil servants and local leaders. Programmes planned in 1993 must utilize these resources to the fullest extent possible, particularly in the consultative process of project identification and subsequent implementation. Somali women have assumed a stronger economic and political role as a

result of civil strife. This trend will be encouraged in 1993 through the close involvement of Somali women's groups in both the planning and the delivery of assistance.

28. Countrywide, Somalis are calling for assistance in re-establishing education facilities. Most youngsters have no access to schools and the education of former students in the 15-25 age group has been totally disrupted. For want of alternatives, many of them have joined the bands of armed gangs roaming the streets and the countryside. The reopening of schools countrywide will be of vital importance to the process of returning to peace and stability.

29. The 100-day accelerated and expanded programme of assistance for Somalia, which ended on 19 January 1993, was launched at the height of the crisis in 1992 at a time when the focus was rightly on saving lives. At the Addis Ababa follow-up conference on the 100-day programme in early December 1992, participants agreed that efforts in 1993 should focus on beginning to return Somalia to normalcy. While the present relief and recovery programme for 1993 recognizes the need for continued large-scale relief assistance, it has been designed to go beyond the ongoing relief effort to pave the way for large-scale rehabilitation and reconstruction.

30. The cost of restoring Somalia as a nation and society will be enormous. It will take many years even to reach pre-war levels. As prospects for peace and stability improve, the international community will undoubtedly be called upon to assist the people of Somalia in supporting long-term national reconstruction and development. In the interim, much can be done immediately through the joint efforts of the international community and the Somali people. A main objective of the 1993 programme is thus to set the stage for such initiatives by enhancing the absorptive capacity of Somalia's human and institutional resources.

31. Underlying the programming process is a sectoral core group structure to assess needs and devise projects for the 1993 programme. Ten core groups, comprising representatives of local and international NGOs, Somali organizations, donor Governments, ICRC and United Nations agencies, have been formed to cover the following priority sectors: health, water, food, security, nutrition, sanitation, employment, administrative rehabilitation, police forces, agriculture and livestock. These core groups will serve as the focal points for sectoral monitoring and reviews, leading to periodic updates. Simultaneously with this process, a regional input was sought through the established relief communities in the nine regional centres in the southern and central parts of the country. Inputs from the north-east and the north-west, primarily for rehabilitation, are put together through the UNOSOM regional offices in those areas.

Their inputs have also been reflected in the present document.

32. A United Nations Conference on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia will be held in Addis Ababa in March 1993 to review the relief and rehabilitation programme and receive pledges from donors. The active involvement of a wide spectrum of Somalis is indispensable to the effective implementation of the programme. Every effort will therefore be made to achieve broad Somali participation in the conference. A positive outcome of the humanitarian conference could provide added incentives for the national reconciliation process.

33. In order to ensure the effective implementation of the programme, particularly the coordination of relief efforts and the smooth transition from relief to rehabilitation, the United Nations Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia will be provided in the context of UNOSOM II with the necessary support in order to enable him to discharge his responsibilities.

Mine clearance

34. The mine-clearance problems facing Somalia have not yet been seriously addressed. According to a report issued by Physicians for Human Rights, an NGO, much of northern Somalia remains contaminated by mines. Most of the mines lie scattered across pastoral lands or hidden near wells or water holes. Others have been laid on secondary roads or in former military installations. They are considered to be more prevalent in the countryside surrounding two of Somalia's principal cities, Hargeisa and Burao, and in the pastoral and agricultural lands west of Burao. The victims of the mines have been mainly civilians, of whom many are women and children.

35. No estimate has been made of the total number of mines laid, but some relief agencies have reported that many hundreds of thousands may still be in the ground. Some of these are in minefields, but many have been used as weapons of terror for denying access to homes, villages and water. There are an estimated 1,200 kilometres of roads to be demined in the Hargeisa area alone.

36. Some limited mine clearance has been undertaken by the Somali National Movement (SNM) when it reoccupied northern Somalia but out of its team of 60, some 40 per cent became mine casualties. A United Kingdom company, RIMFIRE, has been operating under contract from Médecins sans Frontières and UNHCR. It is reported that it has lifted some 25,000 mines in the Hargeisa area and enabled the repopulation of the town. This has probably only scratched the surface of the problem.

37. The UNOSOM military component will not have clearance of minefields as a mission objective although some clearance effort will be needed if any logistic

base is set up in the Hargeisa region, because the airport area is still mined. There may well be a requirement for route clearance since mines may be used in a harassing role by some of the factions.

38. The humanitarian relief efforts will be more severely hampered, especially when they spread into the north. The humanitarian problems will become acute when large-scale attempts are made to rehabilitate the land and re-establish the rural economy. Much of the grazing land used by nomadic tribesmen will be unusable, and villages for returning refugees will require complete clearing before they can be restored to use.

39. It will therefore be necessary to establish a coherent and integrated programme for the removal of mines in Somalia. As a start, it is my intention to send the United Nations de-mining team of experts to Somalia to establish the extent of the problem. Following this visit, a mine-clearing plan should be drawn up, using the models at present in use or being built up in Afghanistan, Cambodia and Mozambique. The main components of the plan will include a proper minefield survey and extended contract mine clearance. If it becomes clear that the mines number millions rather than thousands, a mine-clearance training facility will have to be established, and a force of Somali mine clearers will have to be trained, as in Cambodia, to undertake the major part of the mine-clearance task, in a plan lasting years rather than months.

40. In a separate programme, a mine awareness programme will have to be established among refugees and displaced persons and known mined areas will have to be fenced or marked off to prevent nomadic tribesmen from using mined areas for grazing.

III. Political reconciliation

41. Ultimately, all the efforts being undertaken by the United Nations in Somalia are directed towards one central goal: to assist the people of Somalia to create and maintain order and new institutions for their own governance. The absence of a central government has aggravated the social, economic and political difficulties in the country. In fact, the non-existence of a government in Somalia is one of the main reasons for the now more robust role of the Organization in the country.

42. Various avenues have been actively explored to enhance Somalia's capability to govern itself. In this connection, my Special Representative and other senior officials have been consulting with elders, leaders, warring factions and women's professional groups on how best to create a broad-based government.

43. I and my Special Representative have encountered difficulties in our efforts aimed at promoting national reconciliation in Somalia. National reconciliation

is a difficult process in the best of circumstances; it is particularly difficult in Somalia because of the multiplicity of parties, factions and other leaders and the total absence of law and order in all parts of the country. The primary initiative for national reconciliation must be left to the Somalis themselves. While this may be the ideal approach, the experience thus far has clearly shown the need for the United Nations to be given a broader mandate, not only in organizing, but also in promoting and advancing, the cause of national reconciliation.

44. As reported to the Security Council in my progress report of 26 January 1993 (S/25168), I convened an informal preparatory meeting for a Conference on National Reconciliation and Unity in Addis Ababa on 4 January 1993. The participants reached agreement on three major documents (see para. 10 above).

45. As indicated in paragraph 32 above, a United Nations Conference on Humanitarian Assistance is to be held in Addis Ababa from 11 to 13 March 1993, to be followed immediately by the Conference on National Reconciliation. These meetings are expected to provide an opportunity for all segments of Somali society, including the political factions, movements, community leaders, women, intellectuals and others to meet under one roof and discuss the problems of political reconciliation, humanitarian assistance as well as programmes for viable rehabilitation and reconstruction.

IV. Establishment of a Somali police force

46. I had indicated in my previous reports to the Council (S/24992, para. 30 and S/25168, para. 23) that I considered the establishment of a Somali police force as a crucial step in the efforts of UNITAF and UNOSOM to create a secure environment in Somalia. With that in mind, I had sent an expert team which, under the guidance of my Special Representative, would prepare a plan for the establishment of a neutral police force in Somalia.

47. The team was requested to study the feasibility of establishing such a national police force, make recommendations and develop a strategy for implementation.

48. The expert team was also requested to outline the appropriate modalities for training Somali personnel in the maintenance of law and order as well as the discharge of police responsibilities, while adhering to internationally accepted principles and practices for the protection of human rights.

49. As mentioned in paragraph 23 of my report of 26 January 1993, UNITAF, under its supervision and in close consultation with my Special Representative, has now constituted an interim auxiliary force composed of former police officers. This auxiliary force will, as a temporary arrangement, oversee road traffic control and undertake the protection of feeding centres, thus relieving

United Nations agencies and NGOs from the dependency on locally hired guards and freeing UNOSOM soldiers for more demanding and urgent tasks. I have requested the expert team to study the arrangements established for the auxiliary force with a view eventually to integrating some of its elements into a new civilian police force.

50. Bearing the above in mind, I consider it a matter of expediency to include an international civilian police component in the future UNOSOM II, but would refrain from making any specific recommendations at this time pending the receipt of the expert team's recommendations. I will therefore shortly bring to the attention of the Council a more detailed assessment on the establishment of this civilian police force.

V. Public information activities

51. To support the execution of the new mandate for UNOSOM II, an intensive and expanded information campaign will be required. Transitional arrangements from UNITAF to UNOSOM II will have to be conveyed to the general public. The new mandate under which UNOSOM II will be operating must be translated into vernacular languages and broadcast at large. In addition and as the political climate changes, new information inputs will have to be designed in order to support every aspect of the operation and stimulate a stable social climate. It is also my intention to use public information activities in Somalia as an educational tool to strengthen the peace process, human rights and overall productive economic integration.

52. The information component in UNOSOM II will absorb themes developed on a day-to-day basis from the different highlights of the United Nations presence in Somalia such as transitional arrangements, cease-fire observances, disarmament, demobilization of armed groups, training of civilian police, refugee resettlement, safety, health and hygiene, just to mention the most important. The collaboration of United Nations specialized agencies and programmes will be sought in the elaboration of some of these broadcast elements.

53. The Department of Public Information of the United Nations Secretariat has secured an agreement with Radio Cairo as of 15 January 1993, by which Radio Cairo's External Services Network translates and broadcasts in Somalia United Nations-produced material. This arrangement is expected to be in place for approximately three months, after which time the United Nations will be in a position to evaluate the service in the light of internal developments and the evolving requirements of the UNOSOM II information programme. Similar arrangements with radio stations in the neighbouring countries will be explored. In the meantime the United Nations is arranging the modalities for UNOSOM II to assume

responsibility for the operation of a daily newspaper and a radio station, which are currently managed by the United States under UNITAF.

VI. The modalities for transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II

The present situation

54. The Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, had authorized the Secretary-General and certain Member States to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.

55. There is no doubt that the presence and operations of UNITAF have had, especially during the initial period of its deployment, a positive impact on the security situation in Somalia and on the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance. However, as indicated in paragraphs 19 and 20 above, this improvement cannot yet be regarded as irreversible and conditions are still volatile. The security threat to personnel of the United Nations and its agencies, UNITAF, ICRC and NGOs is still high in some areas of the city of Mogadishu and other places in Somalia. As mentioned above, UNITAF has deployed only in the central and southern parts of the country. Disarmament is far from complete.

The new mandate

56. The Council will now have to consider whether to authorize an enlargement of UNOSOM and redefine its mandate to include operations under Chapter VII of the Charter. The consequence of such a decision would be far-reaching for political, legal and logistical reasons and would entail a major financial commitment. The view which I have conveyed to the Security Council during the last two months is still current and valid: without improved security all over the country the political process cannot prosper and humanitarian operations will remain vulnerable to disruption. I have, therefore, devoted a great deal of my efforts to ensure that parallel steps are taken: cease-fire and reconciliation mechanisms, disarmament and creation of a civilian police force, rehabilitation alongside political dialogue. I have insisted with all the factions and elders that it is up to them to change the course of violence towards peace and I have assured them that the international community stands ready to support their efforts in this direction.

57. My firm view, as stated in my letter to President Bush of 8 December 1992, remains that the mandate of UNOSOM II must cover the whole territory of Somalia and include disarmament. Moreover, as indicated in my report of 19 December 1992 (S/24992), UNOSOM II's mandate will include the following military tasks:

- (a) To monitor that all factions continue to respect the cessation of hostilities and other agreements to which they have agreed, particularly the Addis Ababa agreements of January 1993;
- (b) To prevent any resumption of violence and, if necessary, take appropriate action against any faction that violates or threatens to violate the cessation of hostilities;
- (c) To maintain control of the heavy weapons of the organized factions which will have been brought under international control pending their eventual destruction or transfer to a newly constituted national army;
- (d) To seize the small arms of all unauthorized armed elements and to assist in the registration and security of such arms;
- (e) To secure or maintain security at all ports, airports and lines of communications required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance;
- (f) To protect, as required, the personnel, installations and equipments of the United Nations and its agencies, ICRC as well as NGOs and to take such forceful action as may be required to neutralize armed elements that attack, or threaten to attack, such facilities and personnel, pending the establishment of a new Somali police force which can assume this responsibility;
- (g) To continue the programme for mine-clearing in the most afflicted areas;
- (h) To assist in the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons within Somalia;
- (i) To carry out such other functions as may be authorized by the Security Council.

58. It is clear to me that the effort undertaken by UNITAF to establish a secure environment in Somalia is far from complete and in any case has not attempted to address the situation throughout all of Somalia. Moreover, there have been, especially recently, some disheartening reverses. Accordingly, the threat to international peace and security which the Security Council ascertained in the third preambular paragraph of resolution 794 (1992) is still in existence. Consequently UNOSOM II will not be able to implement the above mandate unless it is endowed with enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the Charter.

Cease-fire and disarmament concept

59. In my report of 26 January 1993 (S/25168), I informed the Council of the agreements reached at the informal preparatory meeting for a Conference on National Reconciliation and Unity held in Addis Ababa from

4 to 15 January 1993. Annex III to that report, "Agreement on implementing the cease-fire and on modalities of disarmament", concluded that it would enter into force on 15 January 1993. Paragraph 1.2 stipulates that the militias of all political movements shall be encamped and disarmed simultaneously throughout Somalia and that the international community "will be requested to provide the encamped militias with upkeep". Paragraph 1.3 requires that the future of the encamped militias shall be decided at the time of the final political settlement in Somalia.

60. On the basis of the Addis Ababa agreements, a combined planning committee composed of senior officers from both UNITAF and UNOSOM has developed a Somalia cease-fire disarmament concept.

61. Under this concept, the disarmament process would be continuous and irreversible. It would continue as long as required or until a Somali government was functioning effectively. A standardized and simple process would be used to disarm all factions. Once a faction had committed itself to disarmament by placing its heavy weapons in cantonment sites or relinquishing its small arms at a transition site, it would not be entitled to reclaim those weapons.

62. Throughout the process, it would be useful to keep the major faction leaders informed about progress in disarming all the factions. This would place political pressure on factions that seek to delay or fail to comply with the disarmament process and would provide a sense of security for the factions complying with that process.

63. To be effective the disarmament process should be enforceable. Those factions or personnel who fail to comply with timetables or other modalities of the process would have their weapons and equipment confiscated and/or destroyed.

64. As called for in the Addis Ababa agreements, both the cease-fire and the disarmament process should be carried out under modalities agreed to by the Somalis themselves under the supervision and with the cooperation of UNOSOM II.

65. The concept outlined above would require the establishment of cantonment and transition sites. A cantonment is defined as a location where heavy weapons, including all crew-served weapons and anti-armour weapons/rockets, would be stored. A transition site is defined as a location where factional forces would be given temporary accommodation while they turned in their small arms, registered for future governmental and non-governmental support and received guidance and training for their eventual reintegration in civilian life.

66. Cantonment sites should be designated in the vicinity of current force locations. Transition sites should be selected by the United Nations after consultation with

the Somali factions. Cantonment and transition sites should be separated from each other to prevent any temptation by factions or groups to seize the heavy weapons.

67. A committee composed of United Nations and faction representatives should jointly determine those heavy weapons which would be an asset to a new Somali national army and which would be retained in the cantonments and the rest would be destroyed. The heavy weapons should be delivered to cantonment sites by faction personnel before they proceed to the transition sites. Cantonment site security would be the responsibility of UNOSOM II.

68. Some personnel in the transition sites should be allowed to retain a limited number of small arms for security purposes. Accommodation in the new sites should be temporary, pending relocation and reintegration in civilian society. The transition sites should at all times be open for verification by UNOSOM. Limited assistance would be offered by the United Nations in transporting faction personnel to the transition sites. Transition sites within each region/geographical area would be occupied simultaneously, in order to provide a sense of security for all participants.

69. The operational concept outlined above is based on the assumption that UNOSOM will assist in implementing the Addis Ababa agreements. Both UNITAF and my staff are aware of the administrative and financial problems that will arise in the storage of heavy weapons and in the accommodation and upkeep of demobilized militias for an indeterminate period of time. I consider, however, that alternative methods, such as material or financial incentives for disarmament, should be considered an option to be kept under review in the light of the experience that will be gathered in this process.

Military concept of operations

70. The strength of the forces required to implement such a mandate would have to be substantial in the early stage in order to minimize the risk of any deterioration in the security conditions and to ensure a secure environment as quickly as possible both in those areas covered by UNITAF and in those that are not. It could be reduced progressively as the political process advances and the new police force becomes operational.

71. It is estimated that it would be necessary to deploy a military component of 20,000 all ranks to carry out the assigned tasks and an additional 8,000 personnel to provide the logistic support required. The logistic contingent, the bulk of which would initially come from UNITAF, will constitute an integral part of UNOSOM. I have also received an understanding from the United States Government that a tactical quick reaction force

would be available in support of the Force Commander of UNOSOM II; a memorandum of understanding will be concluded between the United States and UNOSOM during the transfer phase.

72. To put the proposed strength in perspective, it is useful to bear in mind that UNITAF, with an initial strength of 37,000, is deployed in 40 per cent of the territory. It might be asked why in that case the recommendation is for a total military component of only 28,000 for deployment in the entire territory of Somalia.

73. At the beginning of the operation, UNITAF introduced into the theatre a large force of approximately 37,000, including approximately 8,000 at sea, in order to break down resistance and take control of the situation. Once this was done and organized fighting with heavy weapons had largely ceased, the requirements were scaled down. At present there are approximately 28,400 UNITAF forces ashore, including heavy construction forces. The task at hand now is to control sporadic and localized fighting and can therefore be dealt with by fewer troops. Secondly, intelligence-gathering capabilities that have been developed on the ground will give UNOSOM warning of violent situations developing and allow the Force Commander to readjust his troop deployment. Thirdly, it is believed that the establishment of an auxiliary police force should help in improving law and order and in releasing UNOSOM soldiers from guard duties for other more demanding tasks. Lastly, a tactical quick reaction force will be available at the request of the Force Commander.

74. In the light of the above, I am prepared to accept the above-mentioned recommendations at this stage, given the need for maximum economy and efficiency and my constant endeavour to keep the size of the United Nations presence in any situation to the minimum. However, I should like to emphasize that I must reserve my right to revert to the Council in case I feel the need for additional troops to increase the strength of UNOSOM II, depending on the progress made in establishing a secure environment throughout the country. In conclusion I must point out that the security conditions in Somalia might compel me periodically to review the troop strength required to implement the mandate of UNOSOM II.

75. The force mentioned in paragraph 71 above will include:

- (a) A Force headquarters;
- (b) Five brigades;
- (c) A logistic support group.

76. The logistic support group would, in the first and second phases, be provided mainly by the UNITAF logistics forces, until UNOSOM II can establish the necessary logistic support through organic forces or by con-

tract. I would like to stress, however, that the ability of UNOSOM to carry out its mandate will depend on critical logistical and other support from the United States, including a tactical quick reaction force.

77. The combat forces would need the following capabilities:

- (a) Patrolling and close-combat;
- (b) Information-gathering and interpretation;
- (c) Indirect fire;
- (d) Anti-armour fire;
- (e) All-weather night and day operations;
- (f) Casualty evacuation;
- (g) Tactical communications;
- (h) Air support (fire power and transport).

78. The UNOSOM Force Commander would report directly to the Secretary-General's Special Representative. Areas of operations would be allocated to brigade commanders who would report directly to the UNOSOM II Force Commander. These commanders would be responsible for conducting military operations and assisting in the implementation of cease-fire/disarmament agreements in their respective areas of operations. A tactical quick reaction force of at least battalion strength to be provided by the United States will be available in support of UNOSOM II.

79. UNOSOM military operations would be conducted in four phases:

- Phase I – Transition from UNITAF;
- Phase II – Consolidation and expansion of security;
- Phase III – Transfer to civilian institutions;
- Phase IV – Redeployment.

These phases are not meant to be applied rigidly or uniformly throughout Somalia, but merely describe a general sequence. For example, some areas of operations might be implementing phase III while in another area phase I or II would still be in effect. The exact timing of transition from phase to phase would be determined to a large extent by political reconciliation efforts and rehabilitation programmes. The Force Commander may shift forces within country to meet these changing requirements.

Phase I

80. In this phase, military operations would concentrate on the transition of operational control from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. Military support to relief activity and the disarming of factions would continue throughout the transition.

81. Prior to the UNOSOM II Force Commander's formal assumption of operational responsibility from UNITAF, certain preparatory steps would be required. The expansion of UNOSOM II Force headquarters would have to continue until it was operationally capable. UNITAF would have to ensure that subordinate elements that would remain in Somalia under UNOSOM II were given appropri-

ate command and control structures. The United States Government would be asked to form a tactical quick reaction force to support UNOSOM II's Force Commander.

82. Upon receipt of a joint recommendation by the Commander of UNITAF and the UNOSOM II Force Commander, I would approve UNOSOM II's assumption of operational responsibility for the unit or units concerned. At the appropriate stage the UNOSOM II Force Commander would also take over the logistic support forces previously controlled by UNITAF. In all phases, the United States tactical quick reaction force would be placed in support of the UNOSOM II Force Commander.

83. When the UNOSOM II Force Commander has assumed operational responsibility within an area of operation, UNITAF personnel in that area of operation will be redeployed to their countries of origin at the discretion of their Government(s) and under the protection of UNOSOM II troops.

84. This phase would be complete when all UNITAF forces participating in UNOSOM, as well as other forces provided by other troop-contributing countries, have been placed under operational control of the UNOSOM II Force Commander.

Phase II

85. Military operations in phase II would be designed to consolidate United Nations operational control over all assigned elements and designated activity. Continued efforts to assist relief activity and participate in the implementation of the Addis Ababa agreements would involve all military forces. Operations would be extended into northern Somalia, based on the port cities of Berbera and Bossaso, and moving to Hargeisa and Garoe. UNOSOM II military forces would assist any new humanitarian initiatives started in this region, particularly mine-clearance projects as addressed above. Phase II would conclude when UNOSOM II was deployed and operating effectively throughout Somalia and the border regions.

Phase III

86. In this period, major efforts would be made to reduce military activity and assist civil authorities to exercise greater responsibility, according to their ability to do so. National rehabilitation and reconciliation initiatives under Somali leadership would be encouraged and supported by United Nations representatives. Military presence might be scaled down in the more stable areas and the tempo of military operations reduced as circumstances allow. Phase III would end when a Somali national police force was operational and major United Nations military operations were no longer required.

Phase IV

87. At an appropriate stage, I would make a recommendation to the Council to redeploy or reduce the forces.

Rules of engagement

88. The rules of engagement would be defined by the UNOSOM II Force Commander. They would authorize and direct commanders to take certain specific actions if they were judged necessary to fulfil the mandate.

VII. Financial aspects

89. The concept outlined in the present report would require a substantial input of financial resources. I shall circulate shortly an addendum to the present report that will contain the preliminary cost estimate for UNOSOM II for a period of 12 months. Overall operations will require 20,000 military personnel of all ranks plus 8,000 logistical support staff, as well as a considerably strengthened civilian staff of approximately 2,800 individuals. It would be my recommendation to the General Assembly, should the Security Council agree to the deployment of UNOSOM II, that the cost relating thereto should be considered as an expense of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations and that the assessment to be levied on Member States be credited to a special account to be established for this purpose. It would further be my intention to maintain the United Nations fund for operations in Somalia authorized by paragraph 11 of Security Council resolution 794 (1992). I appeal to all Member States that are in a position to do so to contribute generously to that fund. Such voluntary contributions would reduce the burden that Member States would have to bear under the assessment scheme. With this in mind, I intend to send emissaries to certain heads of State or Government to explain the operations and to encourage them to make generous donations to the fund.

VIII. Observations

90. As the members of the Council are aware, the mission of UNITAF was originally envisaged as a short-term police action. I believe that UNITAF has made an important contribution in the international effort to stop the lawlessness and disarm the warring factions in its area of operations. However, events in Kismayo and Mogadishu during the week of 21 February 1993 have demonstrated the volatile situation that still exists. They underscore the fact, which I have indicated in the present report, that a secure environment has not yet been established. Moreover, there has been no deployment of UNITAF or UNOSOM troops to the north-east and north-west, or along the Kenyan-Somali border, where security is a matter of grave concern. I believe, therefore, that, if the Council determines that the time has come to move to another stage in its operations in Somalia, it

should be prepared to ensure that UNOSOM II is fully in a position to carry out its tasks.

91. The mandate of UNOSOM II, as conceived in the present report, would confer authority for appropriate action, including enforcement action as necessary, to establish throughout Somalia a secure environment for humanitarian assistance. To that end, UNOSOM II would seek to complete, through disarmament and reconciliation, the task begun by UNITAF for the restoration of peace, stability, law and order. The mandate would also empower UNOSOM II to provide assistance to the Somali people in rebuilding their shattered economy and social and political life, re-establishing the country's institutional structure, achieving national political reconciliation, recreating a Somali State based on democratic governance and rehabilitating the country's economy and infrastructure.

92. Notwithstanding the compelling necessity for authority to use enforcement measures as appropriate, I continue to hold to my conviction that the political will to achieve security, reconciliation and peace must spring from the Somalis themselves. Even if it is authorized to resort to forceful action in certain circumstances, UNOSOM II cannot and must not be expected to substitute itself for the Somali people. Nor can or should it use its authority to impose one or another system of governmental organization. It may and should, however, be in a position to press for the observance of United Nations standards of human rights and justice.

93. UNOSOM II will continue to assist the factions in completing the total disarmament and demobilization process called for in the Addis Ababa accords, to ensure that the secure environment is established on a country-wide basis, and to monitor the strict observance of the cease-fire.

94. A secure environment continues to be essential for the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance and for the reconstruction of the country. The deployment of UNITAF forces has permitted a substantial increase in the delivery of humanitarian assistance and opened up access to more remote areas. Emergency relief assistance will continue to be required throughout 1993. There is also an urgent need for the international community to accelerate its efforts to assist the Somalis to rebuild their society, rehabilitate the decayed infrastructure and pave the way for a secure return of all refugees. To achieve these objectives, the United Nations is putting together a humanitarian programme for 1993 with the active participation of the Somalis, United Nations organizations, ICRC and NGOs. I look forward to the support of donors for this programme at the United Nations Humanitarian Conference to be convened in Addis Ababa from 11 to 13 March 1993.

95. There must be a smooth transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II without any hiatus that could be exploited by factions or gangs. UNOSOM II will need to have sufficient troops and logistic support elements deployed in Somalia to take over seamlessly from UNITAF in each area from which it withdraws and to deploy troops in the north and along the boundary with Kenya. This transition will have to be effected progressively, area by area, when adequate troops, command and control and logistics are available to UNOSOM II in a given area.

96. A number of the Member States that are cooperating with the United States in UNITAF have expressed willingness to have their contingents serve eventually in UNOSOM II. It is my intention, for obvious reasons of practical convenience and economy, to include in UNOSOM II as many contingents as possible that are already in Somalia serving under the command of UNITAF. Subject to the Security Council's approval in due course, and that of the contributing Governments concerned, arrangements would be coordinated for each such unit to pass on an appointed day from the operational command of UNITAF to that of the United Nations, as required by the phased transfer of responsibility referred to above. While it is difficult to determine when this transfer will be completed, for budgetary and administrative purposes, the formal date of transfer of command from UNITAF to UNOSOM II will be 1 May 1993.

97. One further point would need to be clarified in any Security Council resolution authorizing the deployment of UNOSOM II under the new mandate, namely that the deployment will be at the discretion of the Secretary-General, his Special Representative and the Force Commander acting under the authority of the Security Council. Such deployment would not be subject to the agreement of any local faction leaders. The deployment of UNOSOM II would have to cover the whole country, including its borders, both for the purpose of controlling the movement of refugees and to prevent the illicit introduction of arms into Somalia and to avoid destabilization of the neighbouring countries. Furthermore, Member States should be encouraged to monitor and report violations of the arms embargo established by the Security Council in its resolution 733 (1992), particularly those Member States that have ships operating off the coast of Somalia and the neighbouring countries of the Horn of Africa, namely Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya.

98. I am aware of the very delicate question of the secession proclamation in the north. However, as the mandate of UNOSOM covers the entire country, troops will be deployed in the north as well as in the south. Such an international presence should help the process of rehabilitation and delivery of international assistance. The deployment of UNOSOM to the north would not

prejudice in any way the decision of the Somali people on their national future. I believe that the Somali political reconciliation process is broad enough to accommodate discussions and negotiations among all groups and factions.

99. With regard to political reconciliation, it is essential to maintain the momentum gained in Addis Ababa and convene a national reconciliation conference which could build on the results of the informal preparatory meeting of January 1993. This may be particularly important in view of the difficulties encountered in activating the Ad Hoc Committee established at Addis Ababa. It would also be desirable for such a conference to have broad participation by all Somali movements, factions, community leaders, women, intellectuals, etc. This would help to ensure that the validity and decisions of the conference would be recognized by the Somali public at large. I am also reassured by the tangible support extended to me by LAS, OAU and OIC, as well as the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the Horn of Africa Committee. Their assistance in the creation of the Somali trust fund and in our efforts to establish a rehabilitation programme as well as their contribution towards political reconciliation have been valuable.

100. It was the uniqueness of the situation in Somalia that led to the adoption of resolution 794 (1992) by the Security Council. While the emergency operation launched by the international community in the form of UNITAF has achieved, to a considerable extent, the immediate objective of making sure humanitarian assistance reaches the needy, I must emphasize that the unique features of the situation continue to prevail. There is still no effective functioning government in the country. There is still no organized civilian police force. There is still no disciplined national armed force. As recent events have tragically demonstrated, the atmosphere of lawlessness and tension is far from being eliminated. I have repeatedly stated that my major concern has been with the existence of large amounts of armaments in the hands of the factions and guerrilla bands. The operations launched by UNITAF, especially in the past few weeks, have undoubtedly succeeded in getting some of these stocks of weaponry confiscated and destroyed. It is, however, obvious that we have only scratched the surface of the problem so far. Disarming the factions and placing their heavy weaponry under international control for eventual destruction or placement at the disposal of the new national army of Somalia is, in my view, the most urgent and pressing task for UNOSOM II.

101. UNOSOM II would be the first operation of its kind to be authorized by the international community. It would be an expression of the international community's determination not to remain a silent spectator to the sufferings of an entire people for no fault of their own.

It would also be an answer of the international community to the universally shared concern that the situation in Somalia, though primarily of a domestic nature, could affect the peace and stability of the entire region of which Somalia forms an integral part, unless energetic and timely action is taken to avert a major humanitarian and security disaster. The task ahead would not be easy. UNOSOM II might frequently come under criticism for acts of omission or commission. It is also difficult to anticipate, with any degree of certainty, the duration of UNOSOM II'S mandate. None the less, I am satisfied that the recommendations I have made in the present report are a necessary, indeed inescapable response of the international community to the tragedy in Somalia.

102. As the mission of UNITAF nears completion, I wish to express my profound appreciation to the Government of the United States for its timely initiative in offering its assistance to the United Nations at a crucial stage of its operation in Somalia, and for the skill and efficiency with which UNITAF has carried out its mandate. I also wish to express my gratitude to all the other Governments that have contributed contingents to UNITAF, and to their soldiers for their dedicated service to this operation.

103. I wish to express my heartfelt gratitude to Mr. Kittani, my Special Representative, and to Brigadier-General Shaheen, the Force Commander, and the staff of UNOSOM, as well as the staff of ICRC and NGOs, for the devotion, skill and leadership that they have demonstrated, often in extremely trying circumstances, in the service of the United Nations in Somalia.

104. Lastly, I wish to express my sincere condolences to the Government of the United States upon the death of members of its contingent while serving with UNITAF in Somalia. I should also like to pay a heartfelt tribute to the staff members who died in the performance of their duties in Somalia as well as the members of the relief community, including those of UNICEF, ICRC and NGOs who sacrificed their lives while assisting the Somali people.

Addendum

1. In paragraph 89 of my main report to the Security Council (S/25354), I indicated my intention to circulate an addendum to the report, which would contain the preliminary cost estimate for the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) for a period of 12 months, should the Council decide to authorize an enlargement of UNOSOM and redefine its mandate.

2. The concept of the new mandate is outlined in paragraphs 56 to 58 of the main report.

3. It is estimated that the costs associated with the deployment of UNOSOM, whose overall operations would require 20,000 personnel of all ranks plus 8,000 logistical support staff as well as civilian staff of approxi-

mately 2,800 individuals for a 12-month period, would be \$1,550 million. A breakdown of the estimated cost by main objects of expenditure is provided for information purposes in the annex to this addendum. The estimate does not take into consideration any unencumbered balance of appropriations that may exist from UNOSOM. The unencumbered balance is estimated at some \$70 million at this time.

4. It would be my recommendation to the General Assembly that, should the Security Council agree to the enlargement of UNOSOM, the cost relating thereto should continue to be considered as an expense of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations. I would further recommend to the Assembly that the assessment to be levied on Member States be credited to the existing UNOSOM special account.

Annex
Twelve-month cost estimate for the enlargement
of UNOSOM
(thousands of United States dollars)

Objects of expenditure

1. Military component	
(a) Contingent personnel	598 550.0
(b) Other costs pertaining to contingents	237 450.0
2. Civilian police	8 900.0
3. Civilian staff costs, including travel to the mission area a/	166 950.0
4. Premises, rental and maintenance	166 300.0
5. Vehicle operations	61 600.0
6. Air operations	179 990.0
7. Communications and other equipment	59 900.0
8. Miscellaneous supplies, services, freight and support costs	52 260.0
9. Mine clearance	18 100.0
Total estimate (gross)	<u>1 550 000.0</u>

a/ Provides for 2,545 international staff including locally recruited staff and 255 United Nations volunteers.

Addendum

1. The cost of enlarging the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) for a period of 12 months was indicated in document S/25354/Add.1. The present addendum provides the cost estimate for the first six-month period, from 1 May to 31 October 1993.

2. Should the Security Council decide to authorize an enlargement of UNOSOM and redefine its mandate and taking into account the existing equipment procured for UNOSOM, it is estimated that the cost for the first six months would be approximately \$856.4 million. This

amount does not take into consideration a projected unencumbered balance of appropriations, estimated at \$70 million, that may exist from UNOSOM at 30 April 1993. The unencumbered balance will be utilized to partially fund start-up requirements for UNOSOM II.

3. The estimate in the present report is based on the information currently available on the operation in Somalia and includes \$189.5 million for start-up costs consisting primarily of additional requirements for premises and accommodation, emplacement costs and transport, communication and miscellaneous equipment. A breakdown of the cost estimate for the first six months by main objects of expenditure is provided for information purposes in the annex to this addendum.

4. It would be my recommendation to the General Assembly that, should the Security Council agree to the enlargement of UNOSOM, the cost relating thereto should continue to be considered as an expense of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations. I would further recommend to the Assembly that the assessment to be levied on Member States be credited to the existing UNOSOM special account.

Annex

Six-month cost estimate for the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) (in thousands of United States dollars)

<p>1. <i>Military component</i></p> <p>(a) <i>Contingent personnel</i> 320,022.0 Provides for standard troop cost reimbursement for up to 28,000 troops, rations emplacement of some 10,400 and rotation of up to 24,000 troops and recreational leave, welfare and daily allowance for troops.</p> <p>(b) <i>Other costs pertaining to contingents</i> 117,000.0 Provides for claims pertaining to contingent-owned equipment and death and disability compensation.</p> <p>2. <i>Civilian police</i> 9,246.0 Provides for subsistence allowance, equipment and supplies and travel costs pertaining to the training programme to establish an auxiliary police force in the Mogadishu area.</p> <p>3. <i>Civilian staff costs</i> 57,231.0 Provides for the salaries of up to 2,545 international and local staff, common staff costs including mission subsis-</p>	<p>tence allowance and other travel costs and for up to 255 United Nations volunteers.</p> <p>4. <i>Premises, rental and maintenance</i> 122,445.0 Provides for the purchase of prefabricated housing units, infrastructure repairs throughout Somalia covering the repair of bridges, airport and harbour facilities, the rental of office and living accommodations, regular maintenance, repairs, renovations and alterations of premises under contractual arrangements as well as utility costs.</p> <p>5. <i>Vehicle operations</i> 39,664.0 Provides for the purchase of commercial and military pattern vehicles including armoured personnel carriers, spare parts, repairs, maintenance, workshop equipment, petrol, oil, lubricants and vehicle insurance.</p> <p>6. <i>Air operations</i> 91,120.0 Provides for the hire cost, preparation and insurance of 50 tactical helicopters. Also provides for the hire cost and for aviation fuel, lubricants, positioning and painting of aircraft as well as air crew subsistence allowance.</p> <p>7. <i>Communications and other equipment</i> 48,215.0 Provides for communication equipment, spare parts, supplies, workshop and test equipment and other miscellaneous equipment including generators, electronic data-processing equipment, accommodation and office furniture, observation equipment, and the rental of satellite transponders.</p> <p>8. <i>Miscellaneous supplies, services, freight and support costs</i> 39,362.0 Provides for electrical supplies and office, medical, field defence stores and quartermaster and general stores. Also provides for contractual, audit and medical treatment services, air and surface freight and support costs.</p> <p>9. <i>Mine clearance</i> 12,050.0 Provides for equipment, supplies, technical expertise and the rental of training facilities.</p> <p>TOTAL ESTIMATE <u>856,355.0</u></p>
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Document 50

United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Programme for Somalia, 1 March - 31 December 1993, issued on 11 March 1993 (excerpt)

Not issued as a United Nations document

Executive summary

Somalia as a nation lies in ruins. Two years of civil war followed by factional fighting have created extensive social upheaval, massive population displacement and widespread destruction of the country's infrastructure and services. The breakdown of law and order, coupled with the worst looting and extortion ever experienced by relief operations, has prevented relief supplies from reaching the sick and the starving. In the last year alone, between 300,000 and 500,000 Somalis, mostly young children, have died. Today, an estimated two million Somalis remain at great risk and another 800,000 Somalis are living in precarious conditions as refugees in neighbouring countries. Countrywide, as many as 4.5 million Somalis are believed to need some form of assistance.

Recognising that the situation in Somalia required an exceptional response, the Security Council in resolution 794 of 3 December 1992 authorised the immediate deployment of US-led humanitarian intervention forces to establish security for the movement and distribution of emergency relief assistance in areas deemed to be most in need. Now known as the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), security personnel number 34,759 with contributions from 24 countries. These forces have established an increasing presence throughout Mogadishu and have moved into the eight main urban centres of central and southern Somalia: Baidoa, Bardhere, Belet Weyn, Hod-dur, Wajit, Kismayo, Jalalaqsi and Merca.

Thirteen weeks after the arrival of UNITAF forces, food is flowing into most of the neediest areas at a greatly increased rate. Under military escort, large convoys are able to transport relief supplies to the eight secured regions and beyond to village level. Most of the heavily armed gangs have fled from urban areas and large-scale looting of relief organisations has substantially decreased. With improved access to food, child malnutrition levels and deaths from starvation have been halved.

Despite these early signs of "stabilisation", the social and the political situation throughout Somalia remains extremely tense and uncertain. Fear and mistrust permeate inter-clan relations and many blood feuds are yet to be settled. Millions of weapons and ammunition—in part the legacy of the cold war era—remain in the country. Theft and extortion continue whenever security forces are not patrolling. In some areas secured by UNITAF, looting

of food supplies at village level is occurring. Roving armed gangs have also led to worsening insecurity and heightened tensions in rural areas, the Northeast and along the borders with Ethiopia and Kenya. Due to the threat from bandits, repatriation of Somali refugees from Kenya has been halted and efforts to resettle displaced persons in Somalia are in increasing jeopardy. The recent murder of UNICEF, ICRC and CONCERN staff and continued attacks on relief workers and their vehicles serve to highlight the extreme fragility of present conditions.

The emergency relief needs of Somalia continue to be immense. In spite of recent improvements, surveys in the Centre and South conclude that death rates of the very young, pregnant women and the aged remain higher than those recorded in the 1984/1985 famine in Ethiopia. In the North, while there are some hopeful signs of a return to normal life, local authorities are struggling to provide even the most basic of services because of lack of funds.

The 100-Day Action Programme for Accelerated Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia, launched on 11 October 1992 and extended up to March, focused attention on saving lives (see Annex 1). At the Second Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia, held in Addis Ababa from 3-5 December 1992, participants reviewed the Programme and concluded that while emergency relief was essential, the arrival of humanitarian intervention forces provided important opportunities to begin to address Somalia's pressing need for rehabilitation and reconstruction. It was further agreed that the participation of Somali representatives in the planning and implementation of future programmes was fundamental.

The 1993 Relief and Rehabilitation Programme reflects the agreements reached at the Addis Ababa meeting. As noted earlier in the document, insecurity persists in many parts of Somalia and continues to have a detrimental effect on humanitarian efforts. Since improved security throughout Somalia is a prerequisite to continued operations, the Programme attempts to put into place a series of corrective measures and activities which enhance the peace process, foster economic recovery and generate employment opportunities. Activities included have been identified by core groups covering the main relief and rehabilitation sectors. Each core group consists of representatives from among indigenous and international NGOs, Somali organisations and professionals, women's

groups, UN agencies, the ICRC and donors. As part of this sectoral process, regional involvement was sought through UNOSOM Field Coordinators deployed in the Centre, South and North. The priorities which were determined reflect the broad consensus of opinion among the core groups, as well as underscoring the aspirations of a society weary of war, anarchy and abject poverty.

It is recognised that the Programme is ambitious and that not all of the objectives may be met in 1993. Nonetheless, there are large numbers of Somali people who are ready to begin rebuilding their lives and their country. No time can be lost in helping them take the first steps towards restoring Somalia to more stable conditions.

The urgency of capacity-building efforts is clear. National and regional Somali institutions, as well as public administration, have all but disappeared. Hence, of vital importance is the inclusion of Somali institutions, professionals, local NGOs and community groups in the identification, formulation and implementation of planned activities.

The return of law and order is a crucial step in creating a secure environment for the purposes of humanitarian assistance, national reconciliation and rehabilitation. In this regard, the Secretary-General dispatched a team to Somalia in early February to prepare a plan for the establishment of a neutral police force. This plan is now being finalised. In the interim, auxiliary forces comprising former police officers are being constituted in various parts of the country. These forces, wherever legitimate, are being supported by UNOSOM, UNITAF, UNDP and WFP. Such assistance will extend under UNOSOM II to both the Northwest and the Northeast.

Throughout the war and subsequent lawlessness, women have been increasingly exposed to violence and rape. The resulting trauma and humiliation are compounded by unwanted pregnancies and sexually transmitted diseases. Notwithstanding, some women have assumed a stronger economic and political role as a result of civil strife. This trend will be encouraged in 1993 through the close involvement of Somali women's groups in both the planning and delivery of assistance.

Over the course of the next ten months, actions will be taken to create jobs, provide vocational training and reestablish primary education. The provision of seeds and tools and activities to enhance livestock health is essential, as are programmes to assist refugees and displaced persons to return to their areas of origin and become productive. Measures must also be taken to establish a minimum degree of health and food security for a significant portion of the Somali people and to provide them with access to potable water and sanitation services.

In light of the uncertainties that exist at the time of writing this appeal, the 1993 Programme needs to be seen

as a dynamic process, subject to changing conditions and hence assumptions. The results of assessment missions and surveys currently being undertaken will undoubtedly impact project planning. Similarly, the new relief and rehabilitation opportunities that might arise with greater security cannot be anticipated at this stage. Hence, periodic reviews within the structure of the sectorial core groups will be essential throughout 1993. It is envisaged that the first updated report will be made at the end of April 1993, with further reviews in August.

In this context, it should be noted that the level of funding requested in the Programme, US\$ 166.5 million covers only those projects which have already been prepared by the UN system and can be implemented immediately. While many of these projects include funds which will be made available to collaborating NGOs, it should be noted that many NGOs have already submitted projects directly to donors for funding and will continue to do so as plans are further developed. Additional funds should hence be earmarked for disbursement to NGOs and the UN system through the course of the year.

Consistent with procedures established under SEPHA and the 100-Day Action Programme, donors are requested to provide project resources directly to UN agencies and NGOs. Specific UN projects will be submitted for funding in the form of an annex to be attached to this document for distribution at the Addis Ababa Conference.

The Secretary-General's Special Representative for Somalia has the responsibility to oversee all UN activities in Somalia under the umbrella of UNOSOM, including its military, political, humanitarian and administrative components. As for humanitarian activities, the Humanitarian Coordinator is responsible for the harmonisation of all UN agency relief and rehabilitation activities in order to ensure coherent and coordinated implementation of the 1993 Programme. The Humanitarian Coordinator is also responsible for the effective liaison between the UN system, national and international NGOs and the military forces. He is also responsible for the collection, analysis and dissemination of information and data. To this end, Humanitarian Operations Centres (HOCs) have been established. These presently number nine. It is expected that additional HOCs will be established in all regions of Somalia to help facilitate effective delivery of humanitarian assistance.

The need to strengthen UNOSOM's coordination and facilitation structures in Nairobi and Djibouti has been fully recognised. Towards this end, discussions are presently underway to determine the precise functions of each, and, therefore, appropriate staffing levels. Donors are requested to consider the secondment of personnel to

enable the strengthening and expansion of its offices in Mogadishu as well as in the field.

The success of the 1993 Programme depends upon a number of interrelated factors. One factor relates to the capacity of the UN to provide a coherent, coordinated response to the crisis. Another is the capacity of the international community to build upon initial investments, be they relief or military and to underwrite the cost of reconstruction and rehabilitation activities. In turn, all

these factors are inextricably linked to the establishment of a secure environment and achievement of national reconciliation. However, the success of any programme lies with the Somali people themselves and their leaders who are ultimately responsible for creating conditions conducive to peace and development. If by the end of 1993 these objectives are met, it is expected that UNDP will present a mid-term development plan to cover the period 1994 to 1996.

Document 51

Letter dated 11 March 1993 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia, Mr. Meles Zenawi, on the upcoming National Reconciliation Conference and on the appointment of a new Special Representative for Somalia

Not issued as a United Nations document

Dear Mr. President,

I have great pleasure in introducing to you Admiral Jonathan Howe, my new Special Representative for Somalia, and to request your continued support and contribution to the efforts to facilitate national reconciliation in Somalia.

On 9 March 1993, I appointed Admiral Howe to oversee the transition from the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM). He will also continue the important task of promoting political reconciliation, coordinating humanitarian assistance and paving the way for rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country. I have asked Admiral Howe to continue the close links and cooperation that his predecessor, Ambassador Ismat Kittani, had maintained with your Government and with those of the other countries of the Horn. Such close cooperation is essential for the success of the efforts deployed to facilitate a resolution of the conflict in Somalia.

As you are aware, I have invited the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Countries of the Horn of Africa, and the other regional and intergovernmental organizations to participate in the National Reconciliation Conference to be held in Addis Ababa, from 15 to 19 March 1993. Unfortunately, it would not be possible for me to attend the Conference due to other pressing matters which require my presence in New York. I am

confident that you will play an active and indispensable role in the Conference as you did during the Informal Preparatory Meeting in January 1993. That meeting would not have succeeded in reaching the Agreements it did without your personal commitment and contributions and the support of your Government.

It is my hope that the Conference will succeed in advancing the peace process by building on the results of the Informal Meeting. The fact that the Conference will have a broader participation would help to ensure that its validity and its decisions stand a better chance of recognition and acceptance by the Somali people at large. Expectations regarding the outcome of the Conference need to be tempered by realism. Important organizational issues must first be addressed before agreement can be reached on the substance of a transitional arrangement.

I believe that the new mandate which UNOSOM is expected to receive from the Security Council will help advance the peace process in Somalia. With the continued support and cooperation of Ethiopia and the other countries of the Horn as well as the international community at large, the prospects for peace and reconciliation in Somalia will be further enhanced.

Accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Document 52

Security Council resolution on the size and mandate of UNOSOM II, giving UNOSOM II responsibility under Chapter VII of the Charter for the consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia, after a transition from UNITAF

S/RES/814 (1993), 26 March 1993

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992, 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992, 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992, 775 (1992) of 28 August 1992 and 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992,

Bearing in mind General Assembly resolution 47/167 of 18 December 1992,

Commending the efforts of Member States acting pursuant to resolution 794 (1992) to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia,

Acknowledging the need for a prompt, smooth and phased transition from the Unified Task Force to the expanded United Nations Operation in Somalia,

Regretting the continuing incidents of violence in Somalia and the threat they pose to the reconciliation process,

Deploing the acts of violence against persons engaging in humanitarian efforts on behalf of the United Nations, States, and non-governmental organizations,

Noting with deep regret and concern the continuing reports of widespread violations of international humanitarian law and the general absence of the rule of law in Somalia,

Recognizing that the people of Somalia bear the ultimate responsibility for national reconciliation and reconstruction of their own country,

Acknowledging the fundamental importance of a comprehensive and effective programme for disarming Somali parties, including movements and factions,

Noting the need for continued humanitarian relief assistance and for the rehabilitation of Somalia's political institutions and economy,

Concerned that the crippling famine and drought in Somalia, compounded by the civil strife, have caused massive destruction of the means of production and the natural and human resources of that country,

Expressing its appreciation to the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries for their cooperation with, and support of, the efforts of the United Nations in Somalia,

Also expressing its appreciation to all Member States which have made contributions to the fund estab-

lished pursuant to paragraph 11 of resolution 794 (1992) and to all those who have provided humanitarian assistance to Somalia,

Commending the efforts, in difficult circumstances, of the initial United Nations Operation in Somalia established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992),

Further expressing its appreciation for the invaluable assistance the neighbouring countries have been providing to the international community in its efforts to restore peace and security in Somalia and to host large numbers of refugees displaced by the conflict, and noting the difficulties caused to them by the presence of refugees in their territories,

Convinced that the restoration of law and order throughout Somalia would contribute to humanitarian relief operations, reconciliation and political settlement, as well as to the rehabilitation of Somalia's political institutions and economy,

Convinced also of the need for broad-based consultations and deliberations to achieve reconciliation, agreement on the setting up of transitional government institutions and consensus on basic principles and steps leading to the establishment of representative democratic institutions,

Recognizing that the re-establishment of local and regional administrative institutions is essential to the restoration of domestic tranquillity,

Encouraging the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue and intensify their work at the national, regional and local levels, including and encouraging broad participation by all sectors of Somali society, to promote the process of political settlement and national reconciliation and to assist the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy,

Expressing its readiness to assist the people of Somalia, as appropriate, on a local, regional or national level, to participate in free and fair elections, with a view towards achieving and implementing a political settlement,

Welcoming the progress made at the United Nations-sponsored informal preparatory meeting on Somali political reconciliation held at Addis Ababa from 4 to 15 January 1993, in particular the conclusion at that meeting

of three agreements 1/ by the Somali parties, including movements and factions, and welcoming also any progress made at the Conference on National Reconciliation which began in Addis Ababa on 15 March 1993,

Emphasizing the need for the Somali people, including movements and factions, to show the political will to achieve security, reconciliation and peace,

Taking note of the reports of States concerned of 17 December 1992 2/ and 19 January 1993 3/ and of the reports of the Secretary-General of 19 December 1992 4/ and 26 January 1993 5/ on the implementation of resolution 794 (1992),

Having examined the further report of the Secretary-General of 3, 11 and 22 March 1993, 6/

Welcoming the intention of the Secretary-General to seek maximum economy and efficiency and to keep the size of the United Nations presence, both military and civilian, to the minimum necessary to fulfil its mandate,

Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to threaten peace and security in the region,

A

1. *Approves* the further report of the Secretary-General of 3, 11 and 22 March 1993; 6/

2. *Expresses its appreciation* to the Secretary-General for convening the Conference on National Reconciliation for Somalia in accordance with the agreements reached during the informal preparatory meeting on Somali political reconciliation in Addis Ababa in January 1993 and for the progress achieved towards political reconciliation in Somalia, and also for his efforts to ensure that, as appropriate, all Somalis, including movements, factions, community leaders, women, professionals, intellectuals, elders and other representative groups are suitably represented at such conferences;

3. *Welcomes* the holding of the Third United Nations Coordination Meeting for Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia at Addis Ababa from 11 to 13 March 1993 and the willingness expressed by Governments through this process to contribute to relief and rehabilitation efforts in Somalia, where and when possible;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative and with assistance, as appropriate, from all relevant United Nations entities, offices and specialized agencies, to provide humanitarian and other assistance to the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy and promoting political settlement and national reconciliation, in accordance with the recommendations contained in his report of 3 March 1993, 7/ including in particular:

(a) Assistance in the provision of relief and in the economic rehabilitation of Somalia, based on an assessment of clear, prioritized needs and taking into account,

as appropriate, the 1993 Relief and Rehabilitation Programme for Somalia prepared by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs of the Secretariat;

(b) Assistance in the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons within Somalia;

(c) Assistance to help the people of Somalia to promote and advance political reconciliation, through broad participation by all sectors of Somali society, and the re-establishment of national and regional institutions and civil administration in the entire country;

(d) Assistance in the re-establishment of Somali police, as appropriate at the local, regional or national level, to assist in the restoration and maintenance of peace, stability and law and order, including in the investigation and facilitating the prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian law;

(e) Assistance to the people of Somalia in the development of a coherent and integrated programme for the removal of mines throughout Somalia;

(f) Development of appropriate public information activities in support of the United Nations activities in Somalia;

(g) Creation of conditions under which Somali civil society may have a role, at every level, in the process of political reconciliation and in the formulation and realization of rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes;

B

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

5. *Decides* to expand the size of the force of the United Nations Operation in Somalia and its mandate in accordance with the recommendations contained in paragraphs 56 to 88 of the report of the Secretary-General of 3 March 1993 7/ and the provisions of the present resolution;

6. *Authorizes* the mandate for the expanded Operation for an initial period through 31 October 1993, unless previously renewed by the Security Council;

7. *Emphasizes* the crucial importance of disarmament and the urgent need to build on the efforts of the Unified Task Force in accordance with paragraphs 56 to

1/ *Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-eighth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1993*, document S/25168, annexes II, III and IV.

2/ *Ibid.*, *Forty-seventh Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1992*, document S/24976.

3/ *Ibid.*, *Forty-eighth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1993*, document S/25126.

4/ *Ibid.*, *Forty-seventh Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1992*, document S/24992.

5/ *Ibid.*, *Forty-eighth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1993*, document S/25168.

6/ *Ibid.*, documents S/25354 and Add. 1 and 2.

7/ *Ibid.*, document S/25354.

69 of the report of the Secretary-General of 3 March 1993;

8. *Demands* that all Somali parties, including movements and factions, comply fully with the commitments they have undertaken in the agreements they concluded at the informal preparatory meeting on Somali political reconciliation at Addis Ababa, and in particular with their agreement on implementing the cease-fire and on modalities of disarmament; 8/

9. *Also demands* that all Somali parties, including movements and factions, take all measures to ensure the safety of the personnel of the United Nations and its agencies as well as the staff of the International Committee of the Red Cross, intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations engaged in providing humanitarian and other assistance to the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy and promoting political settlement and national reconciliation;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to support from within Somalia the implementation of the arms embargo established by resolution 733 (1992), utilizing as available and appropriate the forces of the expanded Operation authorized by the present resolution, and to report on this subject, with any recommendations regarding more effective measures if necessary, to the Security Council;

11. *Calls upon* all States, in particular neighbouring States, to cooperate in the implementation of the arms embargo established by resolution 733 (1992);

12. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to provide security, as appropriate, to assist in the repatriation of refugees and the assisted resettlement of displaced persons, utilizing Operation forces, paying particular attention to those areas where major instability continues to threaten peace and security in the region;

13. *Reiterates its demand* that all Somali parties, including movements and factions, immediately cease and desist from all breaches of international humanitarian law, and reaffirms that those responsible for such acts be held individually accountable;

14. *Further requests* the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative, to direct the Force Commander of the Operation to assume responsibility

for the consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia, taking account of the particular circumstances in each locality, on an expedited basis in accordance with the recommendations contained in his report of 3 March 1993, and in this regard to organize a prompt, smooth and phased transition from the Unified Task Force to the expanded Operation;

C

15. *Requests* the Secretary-General to maintain the fund established pursuant to resolution 794 (1992) for the additional purpose of receiving contributions for maintenance of forces of the expanded Operation following the departure of forces of the Unified Task Force and for the establishment of Somali police, and calls on Member States to make contributions to this fund, in addition to their assessed contributions;

16. *Expresses appreciation* to the United Nations agencies, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and the International Committee of the Red Cross for their contributions and assistance and requests the Secretary-General to ask them to continue to extend financial, material and technical support to the Somali people in all regions of the country;

17. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to seek, as appropriate, pledges and contributions from States and others to assist in financing the rehabilitation of the political institutions and economy of Somalia;

18. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council fully informed on action taken to implement the present resolution, in particular to submit to the Council as soon as possible a report containing recommendations for establishment of Somali police forces and thereafter to report no later than every ninety days on the progress achieved in accomplishing the objectives set out in the present resolution;

19. *Decides* to conduct a formal review of the progress towards accomplishing the purposes of the present resolution no later than 31 October 1993;

20. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

8/ Ibid., document S/25168, annex III.

Document 53

Addis Ababa Agreement concluded at the first session of the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia, 27 March 1993

Not issued as a United Nations document

After long and costly years of civil war that ravaged our country, plunged it into famine, and caused acute suffering and loss of life among our people, there is the light hope at last: progress has been made towards the restoration of peace, security and reconciliation in Somalia.

We, the Somali political leaders recognize how vital it is that this process continue. It has our full commitment.

By our attendance at this historic Conference, we have resolved to put an end to armed conflict and to reconcile our differences through peaceful means. We pledge to consolidate and carry forward advances in peace, security and dialogue made since the beginning of this year. National reconciliation is now the most fervent wish of the Somali people.

We commit ourselves to continuing the peace process under the auspices of the United Nations and in cooperation with the regional organizations and the Standing Committee of the Horn as well as with our neighbors in the Horn of Africa.

After an era of pain, destruction and bloodshed that turned Somalis against Somalis, we have confronted our responsibility. We now pledge to work toward the rebirth of Somalia, to restore its dignity as a country and rightful place in the community of nations. At the close of the Holy Month of Ramadan, we believe this is the most precious gift we can give to our people.

The serenity and shade of a tree, which according to our Somali tradition is a place of reverence and rapprochement, has been replaced by the conference hall. Yet the promises made here are no less sacred or binding.

Therefore, we, the undersigned Somali political leaders, meeting at Africa Hall in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia between 15 and 27 March 1993, hereby reaffirm our commitment to the agreements signed during the Informal Preparatory Meeting on National Reconciliation in January 1993.

In concord to end hostilities and to build on the foundation of peace for reconstruction and rehabilitation in Somalia, we agree to proceed within the framework of the following provisions and decisions:

I. Disarmament and security:

1. Affirm that uprooting of banditry and crime is necessary for peace, stability, security, reconciliation, reconstruction and development in Somalia;

2. Further affirm that disarmament must and shall be comprehensive, impartial and transparent;

3. Commit ourselves to complete, and simultaneous disarmament throughout the entire country in accordance with the disarmament concept and timeframe set by the Cease-fire Agreement of January 1991, and request that UNITAF/UNOSOM assist these efforts so as to achieve a substantial completion of the disarmament within 90 days;

4. Further reiterate our commitment to the strict, effective and expeditious implementation of the Cease-fire Disarmament Agreement signed on 8 and 15 January 1993;

5. Reaffirm our commitment to comply with the requirements of the Cease-fire Agreement signed in January of 1993, including the total and complete handover of weapons to UNITAF/UNOSOM;

6. Urge UNITAF/UNOSOM to apply strong and effective sanctions against those responsible for any violation of the Cease-fire Agreement of January 1993;

7. Stress the need for the air, sea and land borders of Somalia to be closely guarded by UNITAF/UNOSOM in order to prevent any flow of arms into the country and to prevent violation of the territorial waters of Somalia;

8. Further stress the need for maximum cooperation by neighboring countries to assure that their common borders with Somalia are not used for the movement of weapons in Somalia, in keeping with the United Nations arms embargo against Somalia;

9. Agree on the need to establish an impartial National and Regional Somali Police Force in all regions of the country on an urgent basis through the reinstatement of the former Somali Police Force and recruitment and training of young Somalis from all regions, and request the assistance of the international community in this regard.

II. Rehabilitation and reconstruction:

1. Affirm the need to accelerate the supply and operation of relief, reconstruction and rehabilitation programs in Somalia;

2. Welcome the conclusion of the Third Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia;

3. Express our appreciation to donor countries for their continued humanitarian assistance to Somalia and, in particular, for the generous pledge, made at the Third

Coordination Meeting, to mobilize \$142 million for relief and rehabilitation efforts in Somalia;

4. Call upon UNOSOM, aid agencies and donor countries to immediately assist in the rehabilitation of essential public and social services, and of necessary infrastructure, on a priority basis by the end of June 1993;

5. Assure the international community of the full desire of Somali leaders to establish with the assistance of UNOSOM, a secure environment for relief, reconstruction and rehabilitation operations and the protection of relief and rehabilitation workers and supplies;

6. Condemn the acts of violence committed against relief workers and all forms of extortion regarding humanitarian operations;

7. Urge the organizations within the UN system and NGOs to effectively utilize Somali human resources in the rehabilitation and reconstruction process in Somalia.

III. Restoration of property and settlement of disputes:

1. Affirm that all disputes must henceforth be settled by dialogue, negotiations and other peaceful and legal means;

2. Further affirm that all private or public properties that were illegally confiscated, robbed, stolen, seized, embezzled or taken by other fraudulent means must be returned to their rightful owners;

3. Decide to deal with this matter within the framework specified in the report of the committee on the peaceful settlement of disputes.

IV. Transitional mechanisms:

The Somali people believe that there is concurrence among the people of Somalia that Somalia must retain its rightful place in the community of nations and that they must express their political views and make the decisions that affect them. This is an essential component of the search for peace.

To achieve this, political and administrative structures in Somalia need to be rebuilt to provide the people as a whole with an opportunity to participate in shaping the future of the country.

In this context, the establishment of transitional mechanisms which prepare the country for a stable and democratic future is absolutely essential. During the transitional period, which will last for a period of *two years* effective from the date of signature to the agreement, the emphasis will be upon the provision of essential services, complete disarmament, restoration of peace and domestic tranquility and on the attainment of reconciliation of the Somali people. Emphasis will also be put on the rehabilitation and reconstruction of basic infrastructure and on the building of democratic institutions. All of this will

prepare the country to enter a constitutional phase in which the institutions of democratic governance, rule of law, decentralization of power, protection of human rights and individual liberties, and the safeguarding of the integrity of the Somali Republic are all in place.

Therefore we have agreed to a broad outline of a framework for a transitional system of governance to allow for the provision of essential services, the creation of a basis for long-term planning, and for the resumption of greater administrative responsibility by Somalis. In general terms, this system will be composed of four basic administrative components that will be mandated to function during the transitional period.

Taking into account the reality of the situation in Somalia today and the need for stability, we hereby agree to the establishment of the following four basic transitional organs of authority:

1. *The Transitional National Council (TNC)*

The TNC will:

- (a) be the repository of Somali sovereignty;
- (b) be the prime political authority having legislative functions during the period in question;
- (c) interact, as appropriate, with the international community, including UNOSOM;
- (d) appoint various committees, including the Transitional Charter Drafting Committee, as required;
- (e) appoint Officers for its various functions;
- (f) appoint the heads of administrative departments;
- (g) oversee the performance of the departments created; and
- (h) establish an independent Judiciary.

The TNC shall be composed of:

- (a) three representatives from each of the 18 regions currently recognized, including one woman from each region;
- (b) five additional seats for Mogadishu;
- (c) one nominee from each of the political factions currently participating in the first session of the National Reconciliation Conference;

2. *The Central Administrative Departments (CADs)*

The TNC will appoint the heads of the Central Administrative Departments, whose prime function will be to re-establish and operate the departments of civil administration, social affairs, economic affairs and humanitarian affairs, paving the way for the establishment

and operation of a formal government. The CADs shall comprise skilled professionals having the ability to reinstate gradually, the administrative functions of national public administration. The performance of these departments will be overseen by the TNC.

3. Regional Council (RCs)

Regional Councils shall be established in all the existing 18 regions of Somalia. At present 18 regions shall be maintained during the transitional period. The Regional Council shall be entrusted primarily with the task of implementing humanitarian, social and economic programs in coordination with the TNC and will also assist in the conducting of an internationally-supervised census. The Regional Councils will liaise with UNOSOM II, UN specialized agencies, NGOs and other relevant organizations directly and through the Central Administrative Departments and Transitional National Council. The Regional Councils shall also be responsible for law and order at the regional level. In this regard, the law enforcement institution will be a regional police force and a regional judiciary. The District Councils (see below) in each region shall send representatives who will constitute the Regional Councils.

4. District Councils

District Councils shall be established in the present districts in every region. District council members shall be appointed through election or through consensus-based selection in accordance with Somali traditions. The District Councils shall be responsible for managing the affairs of the district including public safety, health, education and reconstruction.

V. Conclusions

The Conference agreed on the appointment, by the TNC, of a Transitional Charter Drafting Committee referred to in section IV 1 (d) above. In drafting the Transitional Charter, the Committee shall be guided by the basic principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and by Somali traditional ethics.

The Conference agreed that the TNC shall appoint a "Peace Delegation" composed of political movements and other social elements to travel to all parts of the country for the purpose of advancing the peace and reconciliation process as well as to explain the agreements reached in Addis Ababa.

We further agree that the TNC shall appoint a National Committee to bring about reconciliation and

seek solutions to outstanding political problems with the SNM.

The Conference also calls upon the international community and in particular on neighboring states to facilitate the noble effort at reconciliation by providing moral and material support.

In conclusion, we the undersigned in agreeing to the above, resolve that never again will Somalia suffer the tragedy of the recent past. Emerging from the darkness of catastrophe and war, we Somalis herald the beginning of a new era of peace, healing and rebuilding, in which cooperation and trust will overcome hatred and suspicion. It is a message we must pass on to our children and our grandchildren, that the proud Somali family, as we knew it, can once again become whole.

We, the undersigned, hereby pledge to abandon the logic of force for the ethic of dialogue. We will pursue the process of national reconciliation with vigor and sincerity, in accordance with this declaration and with the cooperation of the people of Somalia as a whole.

Recognizing the tragic and painful recent history of problems in our country, we pledge to achieve comprehensive national reconciliation through peaceful means. We also pledge to adopt, in all parts of Somalia, transitional measures that will contribute to harmony and healing of wounds among all the people of Somalia.

We invite the Secretary-General of the United Nations and his Special Representative in Somalia, in accordance with the mandate entrusted to them by the Security Council, to extend all necessary assistance to the people of Somalia for the implementation of this agreement.

Signatories

1. SAMO	Mohamed R. Arbow	Chairman
2. SDA	Mohamed F. Abdullahi	Chairman
3. SDM	Addi Musse Mavow	Chairman
4. SDM (SNA)	Mohamed Nur Alio	Chairman
5. SNDU	Ali Ismail Abdi	Chairman
6. SNF	Gen. Omar Haji Mohamed	Chairman
7. SNU	Mohamed Rajis Mohamed	Chairman
8. SPM	Gen. Aden Abdullahi Nur	Chairman
9. SPM (SNA)	Ahmed Hashi Mahmud	V/Chairman
10. SSDF	Gen. Mohdammad Abshir Mussa	Chairman
11. SSNM	Abdi Warsame Isaq	Chairman
12. USC (SWA)	Gen. Mohammed Farah H. Aidid	Chairman
13. USC	Mohammed Qanyare Afrah	Chairman
14. USF	Abdurahman Dualch Ali	Chairman
15. USP	Mohamed Abdi Hashi	Chairman

Document 54

Letter dated 29 March 1993 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia, Mr. Meles Zenawi, expressing appreciation for his role in the National Reconciliation Conference

Not issued as a United Nations document

Dear Mr. President,

As you may be aware, in the statement I issued today I have publicly expressed my profound appreciation for the imaginative role you played to ensure the successful conclusion of the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia, and for your tenacity which contributed enormously to the signing of the Agreement.

My Deputy Special Representative, Ambassador Lansana Kouyate, has informed me of the critical role you played in every aspect of the negotiations. On many occasions, you personally intervened and called the parties to extended meetings with you in order to overcome impediments and to resolve differences which threatened to scuttle the negotiations. Without your skilful and timely intervention, the Conference would not have concluded with a far-reaching Agreement which included the

establishment of a Transitional National Council with broad-based representation.

I wish to reiterate to you my gratitude and appreciation for helping make the Conference a success. I am confident that the Somali participants highly valued your role and the strong support and constructive contribution that you and your Government have continued to make to the peace process in Somalia. I know I can continue to count on your interest and cooperation in the difficult and challenging task that lies ahead in support of the efforts of the people of Somalia to bring stability to their country, to establish a functioning transitional arrangement and to rebuild their nation.

Accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Document 55

Security Council resolution authorizing all necessary measures against those responsible for the 5 June 1993 attack on Pakistani troops serving in UNOSOM II

S/RES/837 (1993), 6 June 1993

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992, 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992, 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992, 775 1992 of 28 August 1992, 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992 and 814 (1993) of 26 March 1993,

Bearing in mind General Assembly resolution 47/167 of 18 December 1992,

Gravely alarmed at the premeditated armed attacks launched by forces apparently belonging to the United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance against the personnel of the United Nations Operation in Somalia II on 5 June 1993,

Strongly condemning such actions, which directly undermine international efforts aimed at the restoration of peace and normalcy in Somalia,

Expressing outrage at the loss of life as a result of these criminal attacks,

Reaffirming its commitment to assist the people of Somalia in re-establishing conditions of normal life,

Stressing that the international community is involved in Somalia in order to help the people of Somalia who have suffered untold miseries due to years of civil strife in that country,

Acknowledging the fundamental importance of completing the comprehensive and effective programme for disarming all Somali parties, including movements and factions,

Convinced that the restoration of law and order throughout Somalia would contribute to humanitarian relief operations, reconciliation and political settlement,

as well as to the rehabilitation of Somalia's political institutions and economy,

Condemning strongly the use of radio broadcasts, in particular by the United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance, to incite attacks against United Nations personnel,

Recalling the statement made by the President of the Security Council on 31 March 1993 concerning the safety of United Nations forces and personnel deployed in conditions of strife, 1/ and committed to consider promptly measures appropriate to the particular circumstances to ensure that persons responsible for attacks and other acts of violence against United Nations forces and personnel are held to account for their actions,

Noting the information provided to the Council by the Secretary-General on 6 June 1993,

Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to threaten peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Strongly condemns* the unprovoked armed attacks against the personnel of the United Nations Operation in Somalia II on 5 June 1993, which appear to have been part of a calculated and premeditated series of cease-fire violations to prevent by intimidation the Operation from carrying out its mandate as provided for in resolution 814 (1993);

2. *Expresses its condolences* to the Government and people of Pakistan and the families of the Operation personnel who have lost their lives;

3. *Re-emphasizes* the crucial importance of the early implementation of the disarmament of all Somali parties, including movements and factions, in accordance with paragraphs 56 to 69 of the report of the Secretary-General of 3 March 1993, 2/ and of neutralizing radio broadcasting systems that contribute to the violence and attacks directed against the Operation;

4. *Demands once again* that all Somali parties, including movements and factions, comply fully with the

commitments they have undertaken in the agreements they concluded at the informal preparatory meeting on Somali political reconciliation at Addis Ababa, 3/ and in particular with their agreement on implementing the cease-fire and on modalities of disarmament; 4/

5. *Reaffirms* that the Secretary-General is authorized under resolution 814 (1993) to take all measures necessary against all those responsible for the armed attacks referred to in paragraph 1 above, including against those responsible for publicly inciting such attacks, to establish the effective authority of the Operation throughout Somalia, including to secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General urgently to inquire into the incident, with particular emphasis on the role of those factional leaders involved;

7. *Encourages* the rapid and accelerated deployment of all Operation contingents to meet the full requirements of 28,000 men, all ranks, as well as equipment, as indicated in the report of the Secretary-General of 3 March 1993;

8. *Urges* Member States to contribute, on an emergency basis, military support and transportation, including armoured personnel carriers, tanks and attack helicopters, in order to provide the Operation the capability appropriately to confront and deter armed attacks directed against it in the accomplishment of its mandate;

9. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report to the Council on the implementation of the present resolution, if possible within seven days from the date of its adoption;

10. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

1/ S/25493.

2/ *Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-eighth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1993*, document S/25354.

3/ *Ibid.*, document S/25168, annexes II, III and IV.

4/ *Ibid.*, document S/25168, annex III.

Document 56

Statement made by the Secretary-General on 12 June 1993 in Vienna on the actions taken by UNOSOM II to restore peace in Mogadishu

UN Press Release SG/SM/5009, 12 June 1993

At 0400 hours Somalia time, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) initiated decisive action to restore peace to Mogadishu so that the political reconciliation, rehabilitation and disarmament process can continue to move forward throughout Somalia.

In a series of precision air and ground military actions, UNOSOM II has removed Radio Mogadishu from control of the Somali National Alliance (SNA); and has disabled or destroyed militia ordnance, weapons and equipment located in three previously author-

ized storage sites and a related clandestine military facility.

UNOSOM II has taken a number of steps to inform the Somali public of the events which are taking place, and the part these events will play in getting Mogadishu and Somalia on the road to peaceful reconciliation and rehabilitation.

The actions undertaken by UNOSOM II should be seen in the context of the international community's commitment to the national disarmament programme endorsed by all Somali parties, as reflected in the unanimously adopted Security Council resolution 837 (1993) of 6 June. The United Nations is determined to continue working with responsible Somali leaders and factions to eliminate the heavy weapons which have been used to terrorize the Somali people for so long. Today's action

was also undertaken to facilitate the restoration of law and order by neutralizing a radio broadcasting system that has contributed to violence in Mogadishu. Radio Mogadishu, heretofore controlled by the SNA, will be returned to the Somali people.

These actions have been authorized in pursuance of Security Council resolution 837, in particular paragraph 3. Paragraph 5 of the resolution also authorized the arrest and detention of those responsible for the attacks of 5 June.

The intent of the action taken by UNOSOM II today is to stabilize a volatile situation and to enable steps to be taken towards initiation of serious disarmament. Now that this has begun, the political reconciliation process and the rehabilitation of Somalia can move rapidly ahead.

Document 57

Statement by the President of the Security Council endorsing the actions of UNOSOM II

UN Press Release SC/5647-SOM/24, 14 June 1993

The Security Council has received an interim report by the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia, particularly regarding the actions undertaken by the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) in the past three days.

The members of the Security Council strongly endorse these actions which have been carried out in accordance with resolutions 814 (1993) and 837 (1993), as well as other relevant resolutions adopted by the Council.

These actions form part of a continuing programme to disarm the Somali society and neutralize all heavy weapons. Another major objective of the coordinated military actions was the neutralization of radio Mogadishu, which has been used to incite violence against UNOSOM II.

The primary objective of the mandate entrusted by the Security Council to UNOSOM II is to put an end to the plight of the Somali people. Therefore, the restoration of law and order is essential if UNOSOM II is to effectively carry out its tasks relating to the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the promotion of national reconciliation and social and economic reconstruction in Somalia.

The members of the Security Council deeply regret the casualties which have occurred among Somali civilians. An investigation on the 13 June incident is under way. Preliminary reports indicate that civilian crowds, including women and children, have been used by General Aidid and his supporters as human shields to screen attacks on fixed guard posts or strong points. Furthermore, it would appear that shots were fired from the crowd at United Nations soldiers on the ground.

The members of the Security Council are determined that law and order is restored in Somalia and that the resolutions of the Council are fully and effectively applied for the good of the Somali people as a whole.

Once again, the members of the Council wish to pay tribute to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Admiral Jonathan Howe; the Force Commander, Lieutenant-General Cevik Bir and to all UNOSOM II personnel for their courage and commitment in the performance of their mission.

Document 58

Statement by the President of the Security Council in support of actions to restore law and order in Somalia

UN Press Release SC/5650-SOM/28, 18 June 1993

The Security Council has been receiving continuous and punctual information from the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia. This morning, the members of the Council received a further interim report by the Secretary-General on the very latest developments.

The members of the Council are following with great attention and interest the actions undertaken by the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) in the implementation of relevant resolutions adopted by the Council aimed at the restoration of law and order in Somalia. They wish to reiterate their support to the efforts carried out by the Secretary-General, his Special Representative and UNOSOM forces in the very difficult circumstances currently prevailing in Somalia.

The members of the Council firmly condemn the practice of some Somali factions and movements in using women and children as human shields to perpetrate their

attacks against UNOSOM, and deplore the deaths of civilian population that have resulted despite the timely measures adopted to prevent this from happening.

The members of the Council wish to express their condolences to the Governments and people of Morocco and Pakistan whose forces in UNOSOM have suffered casualties in the past days, as well as to the bereaved families of the soldiers that died. Also, they wish to express their regret and sympathy to those that have been wounded.

The members of the Council want to stress the resolve of the international community in establishing a safe environment in Somalia which will allow the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the Somali people, as well as in promoting national reconciliation and social and economic reconstruction in this country.

Document 59

Letter dated 22 June 1993 from the Secretary-General to the Presidents of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Kenya explaining UNOSOM II's response to the attack of 5 June in Mogadishu

Not issued as a United Nations document

Letter dated 22 June 1993 from the Secretary-General to Mr. Hassan Gouled Aptidon, President of the Republic of Djibouti

Sir,

During the last 10 days, the United Nations forces in Somalia (UNOSOM II) have carried out a delicate military operation, in accordance with resolution 837 (1993), adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 6 June.

The purpose of that operation was to put an end to the flagrant violations of the cease-fire that occurred in Mogadishu on 5 June, to restore law and order and to commence the disarmament process to which all the Somali parties had committed themselves under the agreements concluded at Addis Ababa. It is essential to create a safe and stable environment, in order to permit UNOSOM II to perform its other tasks, in particular, the provision of humanitarian assistance, promotion of na-

tional reconciliation and social and economic reconstruction.

The military operation carried out by UNOSOM II was largely successful in neutralizing weapons and command and control structures that were used to stir up violence in the southern sector of Mogadishu. I think that it will now be possible to re-establish peace, achieve normal conditions in the city and relaunch the political process. I would assure you that UNOSOM II will actively pursue the implementation of the mandate entrusted to it by the international community in order to contribute to the strengthening of peace and stability in Somalia and, consequently, in the Horn of Africa region.

I wish to convey to you my keen appreciation for the support and cooperation that you have given to UNOSOM II in its efforts to deal with the difficult situation in Somalia. I shall keep you informed of any other development in this regard.

I look forward to meeting you on the occasion of the next OAU Summit in Cairo.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Letter dated 22 June 1993 from the Secretary-General to Mr. Issaias Afwerki, President of the State of Eritrea

Dear Mr. President,

I wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 15 June 1993 and to thank you most sincerely for sharing with me your concerns and views regarding recent developments in Somalia. During the last few days, the United Nations forces (UNOSOM II) have conducted in that country a complex military operation, in pursuance of resolution 837 (1993), adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 6 June.

The purpose of this operation was to put an end to the flagrant violations of the cease-fire of 5 June in Mogadishu, to restore law and order in the city and to initiate the process of disarmament to which all the Somali factions have committed themselves under the Addis Ababa agreements. I am sure you will agree that the creation of a stable and secure environment is essential to enable UNOSOM II to effectively carry out its other tasks, namely the delivery of humanitarian relief assistance, the promotion of national reconciliation, as well as social rehabilitation and economic reconstruction.

The military operation has largely succeeded in neutralizing the weapons and the command and control facilities which had been used to incite violence against UNOSOM II in the south Mogadishu area. I am therefore hopeful that it will now be possible to restore peace and normalcy in the city and to revive the political process. I can assure you that UNOSOM II is determined to actively pursue the mandate entrusted to it by the international community, so as to contribute to the enhancement of peace and stability in Somalia and thus in the Horn of Africa.

I also wish to express to you my strong appreciation for the invaluable support and cooperation which you have extended to UNOSOM II in its efforts to respond to the challenges which it has faced since its inception. I shall keep you informed of any further developments in the situation in Somalia and look forward to exchanging views with you on this and other issues of common interest in the near future.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS -GHALI

Letter dated 22 June 1993 from the Secretary-General to Mr. Meles Zenawi, President of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia

Dear Mr. President,

During the last few days, the United Nations forces in Somalia (UNOSOM II) have conducted a complex military operation, in pursuance of resolution 837 (1993), adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 6 June.

The purpose of this operation was to put an end to the flagrant violations of the cease-fire of 5 June in Mogadishu, to restore law and order in the city and to initiate the process of disarmament to which all the Somali factions have committed themselves under the Addis Ababa agreements. I am sure you will agree that the creation of a stable and secure environment is essential to enable UNOSOM II to effectively carry out its other tasks, namely the delivery of humanitarian relief assistance, the promotion of national reconciliation, as well as social rehabilitation and economic reconstruction.

The military operation has largely succeeded in neutralizing the weapons and the command and control facilities which had been used to incite violence against UNOSOM II in the south Mogadishu area. I am therefore hopeful that it will now be possible to restore peace and normalcy in the city and to revive the political process. I can assure you that UNOSOM II is determined to actively pursue the mandate entrusted to it by the international community, so as to contribute to the enhancement of peace and stability in Somalia and thus in the Horn of Africa.

I also wish to express to you my strong appreciation for the invaluable support and cooperation which you have extended to UNOSOM II in its efforts to respond to the challenges which it has faced since its inception. I shall keep you informed of any further developments in the situation in Somalia and look forward to exchanging views with you on this and other issues of common interest, on the occasion of the upcoming OAU Summit in Cairo.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Letter dated 22 June 1993 from the Secretary-General to Daniel Toroitich arap Moi, C.G.H., M.P., President of the Republic of Kenya and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces

Dear Mr. President,

During the last few days, the United Nations forces in Somalia (UNOSOM II) have conducted a complex mili-

tary operation, in pursuance of resolution 837 (1993), adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 6 June.

The purpose of this operation was to put an end to the flagrant violations of the cease-fire of 5 June in Mogadishu, to restore law and order in the city and to initiate the process of disarmament to which all the Somali factions have committed themselves under the Addis Ababa agreements. I am sure you will agree that the creation of a stable and secure environment is essential to enable UNOSOM II to effectively carry out its other tasks, namely the delivery of humanitarian relief assistance, the promotion of national reconciliation, as well as social rehabilitation and economic reconstruction.

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Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Document 60

Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 837 (1993)

S/26022, 1 July 1993

Introduction

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 837 (1993) of 6 June 1993. In that resolution, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations:

"1. *Strongly condemns* the unprovoked armed attacks against the personnel of UNOSOM II on 5 June 1993, which appear to have been part of a calculated and premeditated series of cease-fire violations to prevent by intimidation UNOSOM II from carrying out its mandate as provided for in resolution 814 (1993);

"2. *Expresses* its condolences to the Government and people of Pakistan and the families of the UNOSOM II personnel who have lost their lives;

"3. *Re-emphasizes* the crucial importance of the early implementation of the disarmament of all Somali parties, including movements and factions, in accordance with paragraphs 56 to 69 of the report of the Secretary-General of 3 March 1993 (S/25354), and of neutralizing radio broadcasting

systems that contribute to the violence and attacks directed against UNOSOM II;

"4. *Demands once again* that all Somali parties, including movements and factions, comply fully with the commitments they have undertaken in the agreements they concluded at the informal preparatory meeting on Somali political reconciliation in Addis Ababa, and in particular with their Agreement on implementing the cease-fire and on modalities of disarmament (S/25168, annex III);

"5. *Reaffirms* that the Secretary-General is authorized under resolution 814 (1993) to take all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks referred to in paragraph 1 above, including against those responsible for publicly inciting such attacks, to establish the effective authority of UNOSOM II throughout Somalia, including to secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment;

"6. *Requests* the Secretary-General urgently to inquire into the incident, with particular emphasis on the role of those factional leaders involved;

"7. *Encourages* the rapid and accelerated deployment of all UNOSOM II contingents to meet the full requirements of 28,000 men, all ranks, as well as equipment, as indicated in the Secretary-General's report of 3 March 1993 (S/25354);

"8. *Urges* Member States to contribute, on an emergency basis, military support and transportation, including armoured personnel carriers, tanks and attack helicopters, to provide UNOSOM II the capability appropriately to confront and deter armed attacks directed against it in the accomplishment of its mandate;

"9. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report to the Council on the implementation of the present resolution, if possible within seven days from the date of its adoption."

2. In paragraph 57 of his report of 3 March 1993 (S/25354), which is referred to in section B, paragraph 5, of Security Council resolution 814 (1993) and paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 837 (1993), the Secretary-General listed the military tasks included in UNOSOM II's mandate.

3. The present report is divided into five sections, of which the first three are based on the interim reports submitted to the members of the Security Council and the UNOSOM II troop-contributing countries on 6, 14 and 18 June 1993. Section I provides a brief account of the events leading up to the ambush of UNOSOM II troops in Mogadishu on 5 June 1993 and to the adoption of Security Council resolution 837 (1993). Section II covers the first phase of the implementation of the UNOSOM II programme, pursuant to resolution 837 (1993), to disarm South Mogadishu and neutralize broadcasting systems there that were inciting violence against UNOSOM II. Section III covers UNOSOM II's coordinated ground and air operation, launched on 17 June, to search and disarm the headquarters area in South Mogadishu of General Aidid (Chairman of the United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA)). Section IV deals with the effect of the recent events on UNOSOM II humanitarian activities. Section V contains my observations on the events set out in the preceding four sections.

I. Attacks on UNOSOM II troops on 5 June 1993

4. I wish to mention that, during the course of the events described in the present report, I remained in constant touch with my Special Representative in Somalia.

5. The events of 5 June 1993 in Mogadishu were triggered by a scheduled inventory by UNOSOM II of five

militia weapon-storage sites, one of which was co-located with the radio transmission relay facility north of the city, with another at the radio broadcast studio in the city itself. Prior written notice of the inspection had been given to the staff of General Aidid, Chairman of USC/SNA. However, while the inspection was in progress, several apparently organized demonstrations, roadblocks, ambushes and armed attacks began throughout Mogadishu South, all of them directed against UNOSOM II troops, including Pakistani troops guarding a feeding point for Somali civilians. Ostensibly these events were in protest against an alleged action by UNOSOM II, announced by General Aidid, to "seize" Radio Mogadishu (Aidid). No such seizure had taken place, nor was it intended. While General Aidid and USC/SNA denied it, the attacks that occurred on 5 June 1993 appeared to be a calculated, premeditated series of major cease-fire violations meant to challenge and intimidate UNOSOM II. The sequence of events is described in the following paragraphs.

6. At 4 p.m. on 4 June 1993, UNOSOM II sent letters to the USC/SNA faction in Mogadishu informing the latter of its plan to conduct, on the following day, weapons verification inspections of the authorized weapons storage sites in four locations in South Mogadishu and one site in Afgoy. The last inspections had been conducted by the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in January and February 1993.

7. On the morning of 5 June 1993, the inspections began. Those at the Afgoy site and two of the four sites in Mogadishu were conducted without incident. The inspection at Site 5—"Mogadishu Radio (Aidid)" location—went smoothly until it was near completion. At that time several agitators arrived on the scene and began to incite the crowd that had gathered. At Site 4, a major storage site located at the Aidid radio retransmission facility, the inspection team met some verbal resistance but was allowed to enter and conduct the inspection. At this site, the team was subjected to sniper fire throughout the day. It was at Site 3 that a large number of weapons were found, including 62 tow missiles, 2 Milan missiles and 1 SA-7, which were later removed. Thirteen technical vehicles and a number of machine-guns previously in storage were no longer present.

8. At about 10 a.m. in other areas in South Mogadishu, demonstrations began and the UNOSOM II Force Command headquarters was fired on. Pakistani and Turkish soldiers returned fire. Later, Pakistani units returning from incidents elsewhere in Mogadishu transited 21 October Road, where they encountered a large, carefully prepared three-sided ambush that resulted in extensive casualties. The quick reaction force was deployed in the afternoon to relieve the Pakistani forces pinned down in a facility known as the "cigarette factory" on 21 Oc-

tober Road. At feeding station No. 20, a Pakistani unit helping with food distribution was attacked by a carefully coordinated group of gunmen who used a crowd of women and children as a shield to overwhelm United Nations soldiers who refused to fire at the crowd. Several soldiers were murdered, others were wounded and the remainder were captured.

9. During these attacks, militia forces employed automatic weapons, RPGs and hand grenades. Serious disturbances continued throughout the day, including attacks on UNOSOM II civilian headquarters (where two hand grenades were thrown into its compound but did not explode), isolation of and attacks on Pakistani forces at checkpoints, random sniper attacks and armed road-blocks. As a result of the various attacks, in particular the large ambush on 21 October Road and the attack on feeding station No. 20, 25 Pakistani soldiers were killed, 10 listed as missing and 57 wounded (54 Pakistani, 3 United States). Casualties on the Somali side are believed to have been high but their numbers are not yet known.

10. Contact with USC/SNA was difficult to establish during the morning because of the intensity of the disturbances around UNOSOM II headquarters. The first contact was made through a UNOSOM II national officer at 1300 hours. This was followed by an afternoon meeting between a UNOSOM II official and two USC/SNA senior officials at USC/SNA headquarters, during which USC/SNA attempted to disassociate itself from the incidents, asserting that the disturbances were spontaneous outbursts by an angry public. In the light of the organized nature of the attacks, and several Aidid radio broadcasts accusing UNOSOM II of wrongly shooting women and children without provocation, the USC/SNA disclaimer is difficult to accept. At an early evening meeting, even as USC/SNA emissaries were assuring UNOSOM II officials of their good intentions and desire for the restoration of peace, Aidid radio and vehicle-mounted loudspeakers were continuing to agitate the public to attack UNOSOM II.

11. From the incidents of 5 June, it was clear that numerous weapons still remained with the public at large in Mogadishu. It was also clear that this would have to be factored into the UNOSOM II follow-up to the incidents, if security was to be maintained. Although investigations were not complete, the attacks constituted a gross violation of the cease-fire agreement and a blatant attack on United Nations troops.

12. Early on 6 June, General Aidid's personal broadcast over Radio Mogadishu fell far short of calming the situation as his emissaries had indicated was his intention. Instead, he articulated more anti-UNOSOM II rhetoric, urged calm if UNOSOM II acquiesced to his

demands and violence if it did not. At this juncture, it would appear that the General was seeking a confrontation with UNOSOM II in order to take control of the political reconciliation and of the efforts to reactivate the Somali judicial system.

13. UNOSOM II sent a written message to General Aidid advising him of the United Nations and international community's outrage and urging him to desist from the disastrous course he had set for himself and his followers. It was pointed out to General Aidid that that was the last opportunity for him to become part of the peace process.

14. In order better to protect the civilian staff of UNOSOM II and international agency and non-governmental organization (NGO) personnel after the 5 June attacks, the Special Representative decided to consolidate the staff of the operation into several secure and logistically supportable locations. From these sites UNOSOM II would continue to accomplish all essential work. Meanwhile, the Force Command was strengthening its posture and preparing for possible contingencies.

15. I have placed on record my appreciation and admiration for the courageous and disciplined manner in which the Pakistani and other UNOSOM II troops conducted themselves in very difficult circumstances while they were attempting to carry out their duties under the UNOSOM II mandate.

16. I have kept the Council fully informed of further developments relating to the situation in Mogadishu. On 6 June 1993 the Security Council, after considering the Secretary-General's report on the incidents in Mogadishu on 5 June, adopted resolution 837 (1993).

II. Action taken by UNOSOM II: First phase (12-14 June 1993)

17. Preparations for the implementation of Security Council resolution 837 (1993) were undertaken by UNOSOM II immediately following the adoption of that resolution. The object of the subsequent UNOSOM II actions was to restore security and law and order in Mogadishu by implementing a comprehensive programme for disarmament in the capital, neutralizing broadcasting systems and other propaganda mechanisms used to incite violence and preventing further violations of the cease-fire. This would make it possible to resume the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the civilian population, facilitate economic rehabilitation and reconstruction and promote political reconciliation for all Somalis. At the same time UNOSOM II instituted a thorough investigation of the incidents of 5 June with a view to taking the measures indicated in paragraph 5 of resolution 837 (1993). UNOSOM II meanwhile remained open to dialogue, to ascertain if there was a way

to carry out the resolution cooperatively. Regrettably, General Aidid and USC/SNA, by their actions, demonstrated that they did not desire a cooperative solution.

18. On 8 June 1993 a letter was addressed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to General Aidid, Chairman of USC/SNA, reminding him, *inter alia*, of the prohibition against the display of weapons and the requirement to cooperate fully in the disarmament programme in Mogadishu. However, efforts to deliver the letter to General Aidid personally were not successful until several days later. In a letter of the same date to the Chairmen of the 11 non-SNA Somali political factions, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General cautioned that no group or individual should seek to take advantage of the current tension in Mogadishu, and solicited the cooperation of all factions and movements towards the political and physical reconstruction of Somalia.

19. At 4 a.m. on 12 June, UNOSOM II began the implementation of the first phase of a programme pursuant to Security Council resolutions 814 (1993) and 837 (1993) to disarm Mogadishu South. This was an essential step in the light of the fact that the city was saturated with a vast arsenal of hidden illegal weapons, some of which had been used during the premeditated attacks of 5 June. In a series of carefully planned precision air and ground military actions, UNOSOM II disabled or destroyed ordnance, weapons and equipment located in three previously authorized weapons storage sites, and a related clandestine military facility used for the ambush on 5 June. These and subsequent strikes were conducted utilizing tactics that would minimize casualties as well as collateral damage to nearby areas. Where possible, ammunition not already destroyed was safely detonated by trained explosive ordnance personnel. The relay transmitter site for Radio Mogadishu was occupied and ammunition removed. Elements of the Pakistani, French, United States, Moroccan and Italian contingents participated in the first day's actions.

20. Another major objective of the coordinated military action called for by the Security Council in paragraph 3 of resolution 837 (1993) was the neutralization of Radio Mogadishu, the former Somali State radio, which had been taken over by USC/SNA and was being used to encourage violence against UNOSOM II. Two main targets associated with the radio system were the broadcast studio in downtown Mogadishu and a radio relay transmitter facility in one of the major authorized weapons storage sites. The broadcast facility was disabled by precision air attack in the early morning when minimally occupied. This timing avoided the military and civilian casualties that would have resulted from a ground assault to seize the facility. The radio relay transmitter facility, on the other hand, was taken by integrated air

and ground action, and held for the first day of operations. The site has since been evacuated and reusable equipment stored in a safe place. This equipment will be returned to the people of Somalia as soon as feasible. UNOSOM II intends to locate and take similar action in relation to Radio "Voice of the Somali Masses", which, since it started broadcasting recently, has issued inflammatory propaganda.

21. On 13 and 14 June UNOSOM II forces conducted additional precision air strikes on two clandestine weapons/ammunition storage sites within the SNA/Aidid Mogadishu stronghold area. One was a heavily guarded weapons, ammunition and vehicle storage area that held approximately 30 heavy weapons carrier "technical" vehicles in various states of repair. The site also served as a vehicle repair facility where "technical" were assembled. In addition, the site was reported to contain large numbers of small arms and crew-served weapons, as well as an ammunition cache that included significant quantities of large-calibre automatic-weapons ordnance. The other site held technical vehicles, small arms and ammunition, plus heavy engineering equipment used to construct barricades. On the morning of 15 June, aerial reconnaissance observed and destroyed a 122-mm BM21-1 mobile rocket launcher in the stronghold area near the USC/SNA headquarters. This weapon is an indiscriminate 36-tube area weapon with a range of 500 metres to 20 kilometres, capable of striking anywhere in Mogadishu.

22. The actions of 12 to 14 June formed part of a continuing effort as called for by Security Council resolutions 814 (1993) and 837 (1993) effectively to initiate the disarmament process and neutralize all heavy weapons. This includes known USC/SNA weapons and ammunition storage sites and caches in and around Mogadishu, and any other which immediately threatened the city. UNOSOM II facilities were used to call on citizens of Mogadishu to turn in their arms peacefully and to help in the identification of clandestine arms caches. Getting arms under control is fundamental to the restoration of law and order and public safety.

23. Preliminary reports indicate that civilian crowds, including women and children, were used by General Aidid and his supporters as human shields to screen attacks on UNOSOM II fixed guard posts or strong points. Similar tactics resulted in the deaths of 25 United Nations soldiers as a result of the attacks of 5 June and an undetermined number of Somali civilian deaths at KM-4 on 13 June 1993. Evidence in hand shows that a violent demonstration was staged by SNA elements in which the crowd was encouraged by agitators to attack Pakistani soldiers at a strong point. Shots were fired from the crowd at United Nations soldiers on the ground, and automatic weapons fire was directed at them

from an adjacent building. A United Nations rooftop covering position returned fire on those shooting at the UNOSOM II soldiers on the ground. Witnesses have stated that armed Somalis nearby fired into the crowd, confirming that that was a carefully staged incident calculated to create casualties before the world press and try to weaken the United Nations forces' effectiveness in dealing with organized mobs in the future. UNOSOM II's Force Command is developing revised tactics and additional riot control equipment has been introduced as a means of maintaining control of similar crowds. A UNOSOM II investigation of the 13 June incident at KM-4 has been initiated, and every effort will be made to ascertain the facts and take whatever preventive action may be required to avoid any further civilian casualties.

24. Although the investigation was not complete at this stage, it was already apparent that there was a conspiracy to commit premeditated acts of violence and that agitation by various means was used in an attempt to stir public anger. Those responsible had not yet been identified but it was apparent that elements of USC/SNA conducted the attacks.

III. Action taken by UNOSOM II: Second phase (17-25 June 1993)

25. At 1.30 a.m. on 17 June, UNOSOM II forces undertook a coordinated ground and air operation whose purpose was to search, clear and disarm the Aidid headquarters area in South Mogadishu known to be a USC/SNA stronghold. Several clandestine arms storage sites in this area had already been neutralized on 13 and 14 June.

26. This operation was carried out in a manner designed to minimize Somali casualties and to allow those in the stronghold to depart. Its objectives were successfully accomplished by mid-afternoon. Mines, hand grenades, weapons and numerous documents were evacuated from the enclave. Pakistani units operated inside the stronghold, while Moroccan, Italian and French forces formed a mechanized cordon around it, sealing the area. Outside and on the periphery of the cordon, the SNA militia initiated a series of attacks and ambushes from military strongpoints, coordinated in many instances with ostensibly unarmed groups of civilians. In at least one case, the "unarmed" civilians unleashed hand grenades at Moroccan troops who were holding their fire. Simultaneously, armed gunmen opened fire from a different direction. In the ensuing engagement, the outnumbered Moroccan troops fought valiantly, but suffered a large number of casualties, including their battalion commander who, although seriously wounded, continued to direct the defence of his besieged unit until his death. I wish on this occasion to pay a special tribute

to the Moroccan soldiers for their great courage and devotion.

27. Subsequent coordinated UNOSOM II operations drove the militia from a number of their strong points, including the Diger Hospital, which yielded a large number of militia prisoners from the hospital facility. The SNA militia used the hospital not only as a base for military operations but also as an ambush and defensive strong point with rifle and machine-gun positions firing against United Nations troops. Operations have continued to the present to attempt to locate additional clandestine weapons storage sites and to locate and disarm remaining elements of the SNA militia in Mogadishu.

28. The skill and courage with which United Nations coalition forces executed the cordon and the search, clear and disarm operation against the USC/SNA enclave and their professional response to the series of subsequent SNA attacks were impressive. By any measure, both the planned operation and the counteraction to SNA militia attacks represented significant successes. The positions of SNA and of General Aidid have been eroded, in terms of *attrition of forces, disruption of command/control/communications and loss of clandestine weapons and ammunition*. Concurrently, in the Belet Weyne region, Italian forces secured and destroyed two extensive SNA weapons inventories, which included large numbers of tanks, artillery pieces, mortars, machine-guns, anti-aircraft guns, mines and ammunition. Although some of the heavier equipment was unserviceable, much was still usable. In addition, over 30 artillery pieces located about 6 kilometres north of Mogadishu were destroyed by the quick reaction force. Although still a threat to stability, it is expected that the SNA militia in Mogadishu will now be less of an impediment to disarmament, political reconciliation and rehabilitation. Humanitarian assistance has already been stepped up in most sections of Mogadishu and should be back to normal soon.

29. UNOSOM II has continued to face the use of civilian crowds with women and children in front, screening armed attacks on United Nations troops. Such tactics require adequate crowd control measures and equipment. Although more capability is now on hand, additional crowd control equipment (e.g. tear gas/CS) is being acquired on an urgent basis.

30. As reported previously, UNOSOM II will continue its initial disarmament effort until satisfied it has neutralized all known USC/SNA weapons and ammunition storage sites and caches in and around Mogadishu and any others that threaten the city. After this is complete, UNOSOM II will undertake an orderly sector-by-sector disarmament of the city. However, the emphasis will shift to cooperative efforts involving Somalis and UNOSOM II as soon as feasible. UNOSOM II is regu-

larly appealing to the citizens of Mogadishu to turn in their arms peacefully and to help in the location of clandestine arms caches. Disarmament is fundamental to the restoration of law and order and public safety, as well as to unimpeded progress in political reconciliation and national rehabilitation.

31. The United Nations investigation of the recent events has continued to progress, with evidence mounting in support of the premise that there was an SNA conspiracy to commit premeditated acts of violence against UNOSOM II on 5 June; that violations of international humanitarian law have been committed by SNA militia; and that agitation to stir public antagonism is also still being generated.

32. For the reasons set out above, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia publicly called for the arrest and detention of General Mohamed Aidid on 17 June 1993. The arrest and detention of General Aidid would be carried out under UNOSOM II's existing mandate which, *inter alia*, authorizes such forceful action as may be required to neutralize armed elements that attack United Nations personnel. Moreover, and as reaffirmed in paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 837 (1993) "... the Secretary-General is authorized ... to take all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks ... including to secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment." General Aidid's militia continues to attack United Nations personnel with sniping, premeditated confrontations violating international humanitarian law, and provocative rhetoric. Moreover, there is increasing evidence that General Aidid deliberately and personally directed the use of women and children for attacks on UNOSOM II soldiers; and that he directed his militia to shoot into the crowd on 13 June in order to create casualties and embarrass the Pakistani forces and UNOSOM II before the assembled world press. For these reasons, he is considered by UNOSOM II to be a menace to public safety. Therefore, his detention would ensure safety, including that of the Somali people. Others will also be arrested if evidence is developed implicating them in the same or similar crimes or in related illegal activities subsequent to the 5 June attacks.

IV. Effect of the events of 5 to 18 June on the UNOSOM II humanitarian programme

33. Despite the very limited resources made available so far for the 1993 relief and rehabilitation programme, United Nations agencies and a large number of NGOs had succeeded, prior to the events of 5 June 1993, in implementing a wide range of humanitarian activities in various sectors. In addition to the provision of essential relief assistance, schools were being reopened, food-for-

work was gradually replacing free food distribution, income-generating activities were expanding and commercial enterprise was being re-established.

34. Following the attacks on UNOSOM II forces on 5 June, virtually all of the international relief workers in Mogadishu temporarily relocated to Nairobi. As a result of insecurity in Mogadishu South, many humanitarian programmes, including the distribution of food and medical supplies, came to a temporary standstill in that area. Understandably, the humanitarian agencies were concerned about the immediate and longer-term implications of the disruption in the delivery of urgently needed relief assistance. In addition to residents of Mogadishu, tens of thousands of displaced persons living in both parts of the city continue to rely exclusively on free food rations for their daily meals.

35. As soon as the security situation improved, UNOSOM II and those relief agencies with limited staff still in Mogadishu managed to restart the flow of relief assistance, initially to Mogadishu North. Beginning on 21 June, UNOSOM II forces were able to provide escorts to humanitarian agencies delivering food to distribution sites in Mogadishu South as well. On 22 June, food was delivered to seven sites each in both parts of the city. I would like to pay tribute to the dedicated humanitarian personnel who have maintained their operations under the difficult circumstances prevailing in Mogadishu.

36. The humanitarian programmes in other parts of the country have not been disrupted and staff belonging to United Nations agencies and NGOs continue to discharge their duties in many parts of Somalia. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that a number of areas depend on relief assistance that is dispatched from Mogadishu. It is, therefore, essential that the situation there return to normal as early as possible, so that all relief workers may return to their posts and the implementation of rehabilitation programmes proceed as planned.

37. My Special Representative travelled to Nairobi on 22 June to address the meeting of countries contributing humanitarian assistance to Somalia. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations agencies and NGOs working in Somalia were also represented. Admiral Howe reiterated to the participants his commitment to re-establish the momentum of the relief and rehabilitation programme. His presence at the meeting was also intended to allay fears among some humanitarian agencies that the humanitarian dimension of UNOSOM II's mission was being marginalized as a result of military actions in the past two weeks.

38. It is essential that the impartiality and neutrality of humanitarian assistance continue to be respected and that adequate resources be made available to speed up the implementation of the relief and rehabilitation

programmes in all parts of the country. In this context, it is important that the pledges made at the humanitarian meeting in Addis Ababa in March 1993 are converted into actual disbursements and that additional commitments are made. UNOSOM II will, for its part, continue with efforts to facilitate a positive environment for the successful implementation of the humanitarian programmes.

V. Observations

39. The unfolding of events in Mogadishu since 5 June 1993 must be seen against the background of the conditions that the United Nations Operation in Somalia was designed to remedy. It is the chaos, civil war, immense suffering and famine afflicting the Somali people that brought the international community and the United Nations to Somalia. The primary objectives of the mandate entrusted to UNOSOM II are to put an end to the plight of the Somali people, set them firmly on the path to economic rehabilitation and political reconciliation and promote the rebuilding of Somali society and political institutions. This requires the restoration of peaceful conditions throughout Somalia and the effective implementation of the process of disarmament. All the Somali factions committed themselves to such goals under the Addis Ababa agreements, and the Security Council assigned them to UNOSOM II as a priority task.

40. I consider that the UNOSOM II actions set out in the present report have been successful in making it possible to return to the pursuit of the main objectives of the United Nations in Somalia. UNOSOM II military enforcement actions have largely neutralized heavy weapons and the command and control facilities of the factions responsible for the large-scale violations of the cease-fire in Mogadishu. These actions have also made it clear that deliberate attempts to disrupt United Nations and NGO humanitarian relief supplies cannot be tolerated. Already, various elements of Somali society have shown not only an interest in restraint and reconciliation, but also in voluntary disarmament. The tragic price paid by United Nations personnel as well as Somalis in the recent series of events should never be forgotten. However, by demonstrating that it was willing to pay, and exact, the cost of peacemaking, the United Nations may well have saved many more lives and accelerated the disarmament, reconciliation and rehabilitation process.

41. Following the military operations conducted between 12 and 18 June, it is hoped that, barring any unforeseen developments, UNOSOM II will now be able to revert to the peaceful disarmament of all factions and

militias throughout the country. It had never been the intention of UNOSOM II to oppose any of the factions, as long as they refrained from violations of the cease-fire, acted with due regard to their own commitments to the Addis Ababa agreements and cooperated in the implementation of the mandate entrusted by the Security Council to this humanitarian operation. In fact UNOSOM II intends to continue to work with all the factions, in an effort to foster conditions for the implementation of the United Nations mandate.

42. The attacks on United Nations peace-keepers were tragic and disturbing incidents, but they will not divert the United Nations from its commitment to Somalia. All they prove is that, in the unique situation prevailing in that country, there are elements that continue to believe, and wrongly so, that their interests are best served by perpetuating chaos, destruction and death. These elements apparently consider that their political prospects would be diminished if conditions in Somalia were normalized and peace restored.

43. I now urge all Somali factions to join UNOSOM II in its mission of peace, disarmament and reconciliation as defined by the Security Council and agreed upon by the faction leaders at Addis Ababa. For my part, I am determined to pursue all necessary efforts to implement Security Council resolutions 814 (1993) and 837 (1993).

44. What the recent incidents in Mogadishu also demonstrated was the courage and devotion of the soldiers of UNOSOM II, who on several occasions sustained death or severe injury while defending themselves and attempting to minimize civilian casualties.

45. I regret and mourn the loss of 29 United Nations soldiers from Pakistan and Morocco, killed in the performance of their peace-keeping duties, and the wounding of 88 soldiers from Morocco, Pakistan and the United States of America. I also deeply regret the casualties suffered by Somali civilians who were caught up in the incidents or were used deliberately to screen military attacks against UNOSOM II troops. In concluding this report, I wish to pay a tribute to my Special Representative, Admiral Jonathan Howe, the Force Commander, Lieutenant-General Cevik Bir, and to all the soldiers and civilian staff of UNOSOM II, as well as the staff of the United Nations agencies and of the NGOs, including Somali employees, for the dedication, courage and commitment they have shown in the performance of their complex and dangerous mission. I would also like to express my appreciation to those Member States which have contributed to the success of this Operation.

Document 61

Further report of the Secretary-General submitted in pursuance of paragraph 18 of resolution 814 (1993), with annex on the re-establishment of police, judicial and penal systems

S/26317, 17 August 1993

Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 18 of Security Council resolution 814 (1993) of 26 March 1993, in which the Council requested me to keep the Security Council fully informed on action taken to implement the resolution, in particular recommendations for the establishment of Somali police forces, and on the progress achieved in accomplishing the objectives set out in the resolution.

2. The substance of resolution 814 (1993) reflects the complexity of the anarchic situation that had developed in Somalia from factional strife, causing prolonged suffering of its people. It was evident that, to reconstruct the country's political, social and material infrastructure on a lasting basis, much time and effort would be required. The effective action by the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in the early part of 1993 and, after 4 May, by the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) with an expanded mandate has led to a significant improvement in conditions almost all over Somalia. Unfortunately, the recalcitrance and narrow interests of certain elements have prolonged unstable and insecure conditions in Mogadishu, seriously hindering UNOSOM's efforts to help Somalia towards recovery.

3. The present report covers the activities of UNOSOM up to 31 July 1993. Section I deals with the organization of the mission. Section II contains an outline of developments on the progress made in the consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment in Somalia and the issues of cease-fire, disarmament and the removal of mines. A brief account of the progress made towards the re-establishment of the Somali police force, judicial and penal systems is covered in section III and my recommendations on the assistance UNOSOM could provide for the re-establishment of the Somali police force are to be found in the annex to the present report. The promotion and advancement of political reconciliation and the re-establishment of national and regional institutions and civil administration are dealt with in section IV. The relief, economic rehabilitation and repatriation of refugees and displaced persons are discussed in section V. Section VI covers public information activities in support of UNOSOM objectives. I have included my observations in section VII, for the consideration of the Council.

I. Organization of mission

4. Following the transfer of military command from UNITAF to UNOSOM on 4 May 1993, the organizational plan for assigning areas of responsibility was modified to reflect the composition of existing forces of UNOSOM. The nine UNITAF humanitarian relief sectors were realigned into four UNOSOM areas of responsibility: Kismayo, Baidoa, Merca-Mogadishu and Belet Weyne-Jalalasi.

5. In accordance with the UNOSOM operational plan, the consolidation of United Nations forces in areas for which UNITAF had undertaken responsibility was completed. UNOSOM Commanders continued normalization and stabilization actions and fine-tuning command and control of assigned units in their respective areas. A number of adjustments were necessary owing to the departure of the bulk of the United States units before 4 May, the Australian contingent on 16 May and the Canadian contingent on 1 June.

6. The reinforcement of UNOSOM military units has not been as rapid as planned but both Force Headquarters Command and total strength have been progressively built up. Current strength is a little over 20,000 troops and other military personnel from 27 countries. The additional deployments planned for the months of August and September 1993 will bring the force strength to the authorized level of 28,000. At the peak of its deployment, UNITAF had 37,000 troops distributed over approximately 40 per cent of the territory of Somalia. As at 31 July 1993, the UNOSOM contingent breakdown was as follows:

<i>Country</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Strength</i>
Australia	Movement control unit	30
Bangladesh	Infantry battalion	25
Belgium	Brigade headquarters Infantry battalion Total, Belgium	998
Botswana	Infantry company	204
Canada	Headquarters staff	5
Egypt	Infantry battalion	540

<i>Country</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Strength</i>	
France	Brigade headquarters Infantry battalion Aviation unit Logistics battalion Total, France	1 130	(The United States Quick Reaction Force, with a total of 1,167 all ranks, is deployed in support of UNOSOM, but is not part of the United Nations force.) Efforts will be made to have additional units deployed in the next few weeks, including:
Germany	Logistics unit	772	India Infantry brigade 4 983
Greece	Field hospital	110	Bangladesh Remaining contingent 935
India	Headquarters staff	5	Germany Remaining contingent 868
Italy	Brigade headquarters Infantry battalions Aviation unit Logistics/engineering Medical unit Total, Italy	2 538	Ireland Transport company 80 Nepal Infantry battalion 317 Republic of Korea Remaining contingent 189 Uganda Infantry company 300 Zambia Infantry battalion 500
Kuwait	Infantry company	108	
Malaysia	Infantry battalion	873	UNOSOM plans to expand to the central region to help to provide stability in a heretofore contested area, to the north-east, which is relatively stable, and to the southern border area to facilitate the return of the large numbers of Somali refugees from Kenya. However, these efforts are heavily dependent on the timing of arrival and size and capability of the additional forces.
Morocco	Infantry battalion Support unit Total, Morocco	1 341	7. As at 31 July 1993, UNOSOM military casualties were 39 killed and 160 wounded. Six Somali civilians working for UNOSOM were also killed.
New Zealand	Supply unit	43	8. From the outset, a major difficulty was created by the administrative and logistical requirements of supporting and deploying this very large number of troops from many countries within a relatively short time-frame. Administrative, financial and logistical procedures sometimes caused delays, impeding rapid deployment.
Nigeria	Recce battalion	561	9. Thus, the military component of UNOSOM has faced acute growing pains, which have slowed the mission's ability to fulfil its mandate. Some troop-contributing countries, especially those having recently joined UNOSOM, were not in a position to provide the troops within scheduled time-frames. Others found it difficult to provide their soldiers with adequate weapons and equipment. In some cases, the provision of weapons and equipment from third countries had to be arranged, causing further delays.
Norway	Headquarters company	137	10. These factors had a direct impact on the fulfilment of the mandate laid down by the Security Council. UNOSOM planning had assumed that, with the arrival of new troops, the mission would be in a position to deploy into the central and northern regions of Somalia by mid-July and August. Unfortunately, some of the scheduled reinforcements did not arrive in time and in some cases they arrived without the proper equipment. This delayed the capacity of UNOSOM to extend its operations throughout the country, which was essential
Pakistan	Brigade headquarters Infantry battalions Signal unit Supply and transport company Engineer squadron Medical unit Electrical and mechanical engineering workshop Ordnance company Total, Pakistan	4 973	
Republic of Korea	Engineer battalion	61	
Romania	Field hospital	236	
Saudi Arabia	Infantry battalion	678	
Sweden	Field hospital	130	
Tunisia	Infantry company	143	
Turkey	Infantry battalion	320	
United Arab Emirates	Infantry battalion	763	
United States	Logistical unit	2 703	
Zimbabwe	Infantry battalion	928	
Headquarters staff		284	
Provost Marshal section		68	
	Grand total	<u>20 707</u>	

to implement the mission's mandate. This also emboldened certain elements who seemed intent on undermining the efforts of the United Nations to bring stability, rehabilitation and political reconciliation to Somalia.

11. UNOSOM also comprises other important components with major roles in the implementation of the complex task of the mission. These include divisions dealing with humanitarian relief and rehabilitation, political affairs, justice, public affairs and administration and logistics. The work of these divisions is described in the relevant sections of the report.

II. The consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment

12. From the start of the tasks of UNOSOM in Somalia, certain factions overtly demonstrated their hostility to the international community's efforts to assist their country and to control the anarchic conditions that had developed in the preceding years. To illustrate, two days after UNOSOM took over responsibility for security from UNITAF, the militia of Ahmed Omar Jess launched an attack on the port city of Kismayo on 6 and 7 May 1993. Over time, control of Kismayo had changed hands several times amongst the various clans in the area. In March, the militia commanded by Mohamed Said Harsi (Morgan), from the Darod Harti sub-clan, had taken over the city and the militia of Jess of the Darod Ogadeni sub-clan was ousted from the city to Goobweyne. The attack by Jess's militia in May was repulsed by the Belgian forces of UNOSOM.

13. Hostile actions have been pursued by some factions in Mogadishu, particularly since 5 June 1993 when 24 UNOSOM soldiers from Pakistan were killed. Since my report of 1 July 1993 (S/26022), pursuant to resolution 837 (1993), the investigation called for by that resolution has been concluded. Its conclusions are being studied and a summary report will be presented to the Council.

14. I have repeatedly emphasized that disarmament is indispensable for the establishment of peace and security in Somalia. This is not only mandated by the Security Council, but also recognized by virtually all Somalis, including the leaders of political factions who agreed in Addis Ababa in January and March to such disarming and urged UNOSOM to apply strong and effective sanctions against those responsible for any violation of the cease-fire agreement of January 1993. They showed awareness that humanitarian and political progress could not be achieved rapidly unless stability was assured in the country. For the most part, Somalis strongly wish to shift from the cult of violence to the rule of law.

15. Disarmament efforts are aimed primarily at the militias which had intimidated and terrorized Somali society, and their heavy weapons. Voluntary disarmament is the basic assumption underlying the disarmament programme. If certain factions refuse to disarm voluntarily, UNOSOM is left with no choice but to disarm them through compulsion. Efforts to disarm and demobilize militias have to be complemented by a programme to rehabilitate, and reintegrate the ex-militiamen into productive life in society, to prevent their becoming hardened into lawless ways of life. Funding is urgently needed to expedite rehabilitation programmes.

16. There are reliable indications that increased activity by UNOSOM forces is having an effect on the United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA) militia operations in south Mogadishu. However, there is still potential for the militia to direct attacks against UNOSOM forces. The June incidents, and their aftermath, have provided ample evidence of the overabundance of heavy, medium and light weapons in the southern part of the city. Low-intensity attacks on key facilities, such as the Mogadishu port, the Force Command headquarters, the airfield and other main support bases, may continue. In these circumstances and as mandated by Security Council resolution 837 (1993), UNOSOM will have to maintain a forceful disarmament programme in south Mogadishu as long as resistance continues. More active patrolling, weapons confiscations, and operations against USC/SNA militia depots have been undertaken, together with a public information campaign to ensure that the population understands UNOSOM actions.

17. UNOSOM intends concurrently to encourage cooperative disarmament by the many factions that are already coming forward to participate. A cooperative process is being followed in the north-east and, gradually, in the central regions. The Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) military leadership in the north-east has expressed a wish to disarm voluntarily in cooperation with UNOSOM. A UNOSOM disarmament team has been assisted in examining many of the DSSF's stocks of heavy weapons and ammunition in the region, including Galkayo. Voluntary disarmament has been agreed upon, or is being negotiated, in the north-west and the Lower Juba, respectively. Other militias are stepping forward as well to begin discussions. It is to be hoped that such voluntary disarmament will become the norm in the whole of Somalia.

18. Over the last eight months, UNOSOM, and before that UNITAF, have removed and destroyed hundreds of tons of weapons and ammunition. During March and April alone, UNITAF had confiscated about 150 handguns; more than 750 rifles; more than 200 machine-guns and an equal number of other heavy weapons such

as rocket launchers and mortars; nearly 50 armoured vehicles including tanks, armoured personnel carriers (APCs), and self-propelled guns; more than 400 artillery pieces; almost 700 other weapons and close to 79,000 items of ordnance. These figures notwithstanding, the attainment of the level of disarmament required for a lasting peace in Somalia would involve continuation of a major effort on the part of UNOSOM. In this endeavour, the cooperation of neighbouring countries in helping to enforce the arms embargo is essential.

19. The removal of mines throughout Somalia remains an imperative prerequisite for the return of refugees and the resumption of agricultural and livestock production. It is also essential to the welfare of the population, since many mines were planted in populated areas as well. Preliminary estimates indicate that there are up to a million mines to be removed and that the largest concentration of mines is in the north-west. Efforts are now concentrated on ascertaining where exactly, within the general areas identified, the mines are located, as well as the type of mines and the estimated numbers. The most efficient type of removal equipment would be defined by the topography of the particular areas. An operational de-mining plan is being developed. At the moment, some UNOSOM contingents are removing mines from the roads in their respective areas of responsibility. Somalis in certain areas, such as Belet Uen, have also attempted to clear some mines that interfere with their livelihood. In the north-west, a consortium of European and North American countries is financing the removal of mines until the end of 1993.

20. Thus, the overall situation in Somalia has stabilized. Outside Mogadishu, in areas where UNOSOM forces are deployed, significant gains have been made in reducing banditry and in fostering the goodwill of the majority of the local population. UNOSOM has continued providing protection for humanitarian relief and undertaking disarmament operations in those areas, and these are gradually being expanded.

III. Assistance in the re-establishment of the Somali police force, judicial and penal systems

21. The key to establishing security and law and order in a system managed by Somalis lies in the re-establishment of the police, judicial and penal systems. Following the transition from UNITAF, UNOSOM has continued to support the Somali police force in the current UNOSOM area of operations and has endeavoured to assist in the north-east and north-west as well. UNOSOM has also developed, together with the Mogadishu legal and judicial community, mechanisms for the selection of judges and magistrates in Mogadishu, and has provided resources and assistance to the prison

population in that city. It has also encouraged the development of judicial and penal systems in other areas.

22. The report annexed to the present document details UNOSOM goals and strategies for the next two years and provides a one-year (May 1993-April 1994) budget estimate for the justice programme. Current embryonic programmes are very fragile and urgently in need of support. Immediate and adequate funding for these programmes is imperative, if the responsibility for maintaining a secure environment is to be assumed by the Somalis themselves as quickly as possible.

IV. Promotion and advancement of political reconciliation and the re-establishment of national and regional institutions and civil administration

23. Following the successful Informal Preparatory Meeting for the Conference on National Reconciliation which I convened in Addis Ababa in January 1993, the first session of the Conference was held on 15 March 1993, also in Addis Ababa. Two hundred and fifty participants from a broad cross-section of Somalia, representing political movements, community, religious and women's groups, civic and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as well as elders and eminent persons were invited to the Conference. On 27 March 1993, the Somali political leaders signed a comprehensive agreement covering disarmament and security issues, reconstruction and rehabilitation, restoration of property and the peaceful settlement of disputes and the establishment of a transitional mechanism. The Addis Ababa agreement was adopted at the closing meeting on 28 March 1993 of the first session of the Conference on National Reconciliation.

24. The agreement provides for a transitional period of two years, effective 27 March 1993. The transitional mechanisms will consist of the following four basic organs of authority:

(a) The Transitional National Council (TNC), which will act as the repository of Somali sovereignty and serve as the prime political authority having legislative functions during the transitional period. The Transitional National Council will comprise 3 representatives from each of the 18 regions of Somalia, including 1 woman from each region, 5 additional seats for Mogadishu, and 1 nominee from each of the 15 political factions that participated at the Conference. The total membership of the Transitional National Council will be 74;

(b) Central administrative departments, which will be responsible for the re-establishment and operation of departments of civil administration and social, economic and humanitarian affairs, thus preparing for the restoration of a formal Government;

(c) Regional councils, to be established in all 18 existing regions of Somalia, comprising 3 representatives from each district council in the region;

(d) District councils, to be established in the present districts in every region. Members will be appointed through election or through consensus-based selection in accordance with Somali traditions.

25. The agreement also provides for the appointment by the Transitional National Council of a Transitional Drafting Committee, to draft a transitional charter following the basic principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Somali traditional ethics.

26. In the agreement, the Somali parties invited the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to extend all necessary assistance to the people of Somalia for its implementation. In a statement issued on 29 March 1993, the Secretary-General urged the Somali leaders to proceed without delay to work out the practical arrangements for the implementation of the agreement. On 30 March 1993, the leaders decided on a programme of implementation and also agreed to appoint the Transitional Charter Drafting Committee immediately.

Implementation of the Addis Ababa agreement

1. Deliberations of the Addis Ababa committees

27. The Transitional Charter Drafting Committee met in Mogadishu from 15 to 20 April 1993. The initial Committee was composed only of the representatives of the 15 political factions. This was not in conformity with Security Council resolution 814 (1993) which, *inter alia*, requested the Secretary-General to encourage broad participation by all sectors of Somali society to promote the process of political settlement and emphasized the need for broad-based consultations and deliberations to achieve agreement on the setting up of transitional government institutions and for consensus on basic principles and steps leading to the establishment of representative democratic institutions.

28. It was therefore a major objective of UNOSOM to ensure that all Somalis, including political, faction and community leaders, women, professionals, intellectuals, elders and other social groups were suitably represented in the process of preparing the transitional charter. In consultation with representatives of the political factions, my Special Representative convened a meeting of a Subcommittee of the Transitional Charter Drafting Committee with broad-based participation, including equal numbers of political and non-political participants. The Subcommittee commenced its work on 26 April 1993 and focused on elaborating the following six chapters for the draft transitional charter, which had been identified dur-

ing the initial 15 to 20 April 1993 meeting: general principles; functions and powers of the Transitional National Council; central administrative departments; regional administration; judiciary; and transitional rules. The Subcommittee completed its work on 2 May 1993.

29. On 26 May 1993, my Special Representative convened a meeting of an expanded Transitional Charter Drafting Committee, comprising 30 representatives of political factions and an equal number of non-political participants. The Committee worked on refining the working paper produced by the Subcommittee. It completed its work on 4 June 1993 and set up a small working group to finalize the text of the Transitional Charter. The Group however had to suspend its work owing to the outbreak of violence in Mogadishu on 5 June 1993.

30. The Addis Ababa Conference also called for the creation of a committee on the peaceful settlement of disputes in order that claims for the restoration of private and public properties that were illegally confiscated, robbed, stolen, seized, embezzled or taken by other fraudulent means as well as all other disputes among Somalis should be settled in a peaceful manner.

31. This Committee held its first session in Addis Ababa from 19 to 21 March 1993. Its second session was convened by my Special Representative in Mogadishu from 15 to 21 April 1993, with the participation of all signatories to the Addis Ababa agreement. As in the case of the Transitional Charter Drafting Committee, my Special Representative, in consultation with the Somalis, expanded the composition of this Committee to ensure broad-based representation of all sections of the Somali society.

32. Another session of the Committee was convened from 25 May to 4 June in order to refine further the guidelines relating to such issues as compensation and procedures for the settlement of property claims.

33. The Cease-fire and Disarmament Committee established in Addis Ababa for the purpose of implementing the cease-fire and disarmament agreement signed by the leaders of the political factions on 8 January held several meetings in Mogadishu during the period 7 March to 25 May 1993 and undertook investigations into incidents of cease-fire violations. During its meetings, the Committee continued the process of developing procedures and guidelines for disarmament and for handling cease-fire violations. During its session of 30 and 31 March 1993, the Committee reached agreement on a set of penalties to be applied against factions violating the cease-fire. The agreed measures include condemnation of the offending party, withdrawal of militias that may occupy territory in violation of the cease-fire, withholding of any aid that the offending faction might be receiving, disarmament of the offending militia and compensation

to the victims. During the same session the Committee completed the process of delineating regions that should be disarmed simultaneously in implementation of the Addis Ababa agreement. At a further session, held on 27 and 28 April 1993, the Committee agreed that the disarmament process should also cover small weapons in the hands of the civilian population.

34. The Committee investigated the cease-fire violations during the incidents involving clashes between supporters of the Somali Patriotic Movement/Somali National Alliance (SPM/SNA) and Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) in Kismayo on 16 March, 3 April and 6 and 7 May 1993. The attacks on Kismayo of 6 and 7 May were investigated by a special committee previously established by the Cease-fire Committee, to which it reported its findings.

2. Establishment of district councils

35. It was agreed in Addis Ababa that the 92 districts of Somalia would be those that were functioning as at 31 December 1990. The Transitional Charter Drafting Committee subsequently decided that each district council would have 21 members, selected in accordance with Somali tradition. Any resident of a district over the age of 25 would be eligible for selection. Each district council would select three of its members to serve on the regional council and each regional council would in turn select three citizens of the region to serve on the Transitional National Council.

36. UNOSOM is assisting the Somalis to implement this part of the agreement. In May, UNOSOM began consultations with the Somali people on the establishment of district councils in the north-east region of Somalia. The UNOSOM Deputy Special Representative, Ambassador Lansana Kouyate, led a delegation to Bossaso for discussions with local leaders. Further consultations were conducted by a UNOSOM team in the districts of the Bari and Nugal.

37. The process continued in early June with a UNOSOM political team, led by the Director of Political Affairs, visiting the districts of the Niran region and consulting with elders, politicians, religious groups, women's organizations and intellectuals.

38. The consultations were interrupted briefly by the tragic events of June. However, in view of the importance of sustaining the Addis Ababa process, consultations were resumed on 27 June with UNOSOM visits to districts of the Gedo, Bakool, Lower Shebelle, Middle Shebelle and Bay regions.

39. The people consulted in these districts have expressed overwhelming support for the establishment of these institutions, through which the people of Somalia will assert their sovereignty. On 3 July 1993, Buur-Hakaba

in the Bay region became the first to celebrate formally the establishment of a district council. On 4 and 5 July 1993, Baidoa, also in the Bay region, and Hoddur in the Bakool region became the second and third to establish their district councils. By the end of July, a total of 21 district councils had been formed, including 2 in the north-east. The full list of district councils established as of 31 July 1993 is as follows:

Bakool region:	El Barde Hoddur Rabdhurre	Tieglo Wajid
Bay region:	Baidoa Bardale	Buur-Hakaba Qansah Dere
Gedo region:	Belet Hawa	Dolo
Hiran region:	Bulo Burti Jalalasi	Mahas
Lower Shebelle region:	Merca	Afgoye
Middle Shebelle region:	Balad Adale	Aden Yabel
Bari region:	Gardo	Bender Beyla

With such strong support from the people, it is anticipated that in the months ahead, many other district councils will be established around the country.

3. National reconciliation

40. In order to reinforce the process of national reconciliation which the Somali political leaders set in motion in Addis Ababa, UNOSOM has undertaken to help to resolve conflicts at the regional level and to assist in resolving intercommunal disputes. A regional peace conference was convened in Kismayo, one of the most conflict-ridden areas of the country. The conference brought together 152 elders from throughout the Juba region to discuss issues crucial to the restoration of normalcy in the region, such as the reopening of all areas of the region for the free movement of people and commercial traffic, reunification of communities, settlement of property claims, the cessation of hostilities and disarmament. The conference made good progress in its work, and the cooperation of the elders and religious leaders from communities hitherto in conflict brought relative stability to Kismayo, a city that had seen fighting as recently as May. On 6 August 1993 Conference representatives signed the Jubaland peace agreement in which the signatories committed themselves, on behalf of their clans, to end all hostilities among the more than 20 clans that inhabit Jubaland.

41. During the month of May 1993, UNOSOM also attempted to assist the Somalis in organizing a

regional conference on Galkayo and the central regions, another area where tension had persisted among the various militias despite the signing of the Addis Ababa agreement. The leaders of the factions most directly involved—Somali National Alliance (SNA), Somali National Front (SNF), Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and Somali National Democratic Union (SNDU)—were invited to Mogadishu. The conference however could not take place under the auspices of UNOSOM because of the position of Mohammed Farah Aidid, who insisted on assuming responsibility for the security and the entire organization of the conference. Consequently, the meeting was limited and excluded some of the key parties to the conflict who would not accept his terms. However, some of the agreements reached between SNA, SNDU and a faction of SSDF that took part in the limited meeting were positive and should contribute to the re-enforcement of the objectives of the Addis Ababa agreement, particularly disarmament and peaceful settlement of intercommunal disputes.

42. In the north-west, UNOSOM provided some logistical support for the regional reconciliation conference held in Boroma from March to May 1993. This conference settled a number of regional disputes and reached decisions pertaining to disarmament and the re-establishment of police forces. UNOSOM is assisting in the implementation of the decisions of the conference, consistent with the relevant Security Council resolutions on Somalia.

V. The provision of humanitarian assistance and economic rehabilitation

43. The Third Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia was held from 11 to 13 March 1993 in Addis Ababa. The meeting was attended by representatives of Governments providing humanitarian assistance to Somalia, regional organizations, United Nations agencies and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. One of the highlights of the meeting was the active participation of 190 Somali political leaders, community elders and representatives of women's organizations and indigenous NGOs. The Somali participants were the first to underline the importance of security and peace for the effective implementation of relief and rehabilitation programmes.

44. The 1993 relief and rehabilitation programme, which was launched at the March meeting, was endorsed as a valid and useful framework for activities for the remainder of the year. The programme called for US\$ 160 million and, as of 27 July 1993, \$16 million had been pledged. At the same time, it was recognized that flexibility would have to be maintained, taking into account the realities of the situation in Somalia. There was a consensus that national capacity-building should be given

urgent attention. Unless local institutions, including police, judiciary and local administrations, were established, rehabilitation efforts would not be very effective.

45. With available resources, United Nations agencies and NGOs have made considerable efforts to implement relief and rehabilitation programmes throughout Somalia. A number of indicators would suffice to show the broad picture: starvation has largely been eradicated; children who only a few months ago were dying of preventable diseases have now been protected through vastly improved nutrition and massive immunization programmes; schools shut down for three or four years, or destroyed, are steadily reopening; plans to open vocational and teacher training schools are well under way in some parts of the country; the *der* harvest was good and, thanks to the large amount of seeds and tools distributed, the prospects for the coming harvest are said to be excellent; livestock export, the main source of foreign exchange, has been supported and facilitated through extensive inoculation programmes and the provision of veterinary services; and the number of commercial ships arriving at Somali ports has steadily increased. Unless a lasting peace is established, however, these encouraging signs of recovery of economic and commercial activity could quickly be reversed.

46. Projects designed to generate employment have a particularly high significance in the range of rehabilitation programmes. Thousands of young Somalis continue to be engaged in armed banditry and need to be given an opportunity to be involved in rehabilitation and reconstruction schemes as the process of disarmament progresses. High priority must be accorded to funding projects that will generate jobs, which in turn will make a concrete contribution to a more secure environment.

47. As I mentioned in my report to the Security Council on the implementation of Security Council resolution 837 (1993) (S/26022), the attacks on UNOSOM forces on 5 June and subsequent events have obliged many of the international relief workers to relocate to Nairobi. As a result of insecurity in south Mogadishu, many humanitarian programmes had come to a temporary standstill. Understandably, humanitarian agencies were concerned about the immediate and longer-term implications of the disruption in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In spite of the difficult circumstances, a number of agencies maintained their operations to ensure that urgently needed relief supplies reached as many people as possible.

48. While the situation remains tense in Mogadishu South, it has been possible gradually to increase the coverage of humanitarian assistance with protection provided by UNOSOM forces. Humanitarian programmes in most other parts of Somalia were not disrupted with

the exception of areas dependent on supplies dispatched from Mogadishu. Staff attached to the Humanitarian Division of UNOSOM are now located in all the regions of Somalia, including the north-west, and are working together with Somalis and international relief workers in expanding rehabilitation schemes.

49. Informal consultations between the United Nations, Governments providing assistance to Somalia and NGOs have been held twice so far in Nairobi, on 22 June and 27 July. There is a clear commitment to work together to meet the immediate as well as the longer-term requirements. In the same way that efforts have been made to involve Somalis in the preparation of the 1993 Relief and Rehabilitation Programme, the challenge now is to ensure that they assume an active role in the longer-term recovery plan and effort.

50. In order to overcome continued dependence on relief assistance, the emergence of indigenous institutional structures at the community, district and regional levels is of critical importance. While the shift from relief to rehabilitation gains momentum, it is essential that adequate resources are made available to support activities that are responsive to the evolving political and security environments. To date less than 15 per cent of the requirements of the 1993 Relief and Rehabilitation Programme has been made available. Unless sufficient funds are provided for rehabilitation programmes, it will be difficult to achieve long-lasting peace and security. The following five areas require attention and urgent action to the end of 1993 in order to set the stage for longer-term development on a sustainable basis:

(a) *Continuing emergency relief operations.* Throughout most regions of Somalia, in both urban and rural environments, despite the successful efforts of the Somalis and the international community, there will continue to exist pockets of immense suffering and deprivation. The identification of these remaining areas, the quantification of affected persons and an assessment of their needs is an urgent and essential task. This will lead to a refinement of those strategies that will improve their condition and prepare them for a return to productive endeavour;

(b) *Resettlement.* An estimated 1.3 million Somalis are now located away from their homes either as internally displaced persons or as refugees in neighbouring countries. Whether they remain in their present environment or return home, the economic, political and social implications are enormous. Planning for the future is contained in UNOSOM's resettlement policy which is currently being implemented in several regions, albeit with minimum resources;

(c) *Reinvigoration of the productive sector, in particular agriculture, livestock and fisheries.* The agriculture, livestock and fisheries sector has traditionally made the

greatest contribution to Somalia's gross national product. Agriculture has been responsible for 65 per cent of employment and 70 per cent of its foreign exchange earnings. The challenge is to target support for the Somali efforts to return large numbers of their people to productive endeavour by removing constraints to expansion and growth;

(d) *Revitalization of the social services.* Somalis, in all regions, with extraordinary support from NGOs, United Nations organizations and UNOSOM, have made critical contributions to the re-establishment and maintenance of the education and health systems. The rebuilding of schools and health centres has proceeded steadily. These efforts have been possible only through volunteer contributions of Somali teachers, health workers and community leaders. The stage is now set for external contributions of low-cost high-value materials and supplies to enhance these volunteer efforts to improve the quality of Somali life;

(e) *Resuscitation of commerce and trade.* With minimal encouragement from external sources, Somalia's formal and informal private sector in all regions long ago began the task of breathing life into commercial and trading activities. Street vendors, farmers, businessmen and traders demand services from ports and airports in an effort to stimulate business and expand the base for employment. Somali and foreign investors have developed plans to expand business and provide a wide range of consumer services to their communities. These services include international transportation and telecommunications, petroleum distribution, banking and finance.

51. While efforts to implement the above priority programmes continue, consultations have been initiated with the World Bank on planning for long-term reconstruction and recovery. Two consultations with bilateral and multilateral donors have already been held and a third meeting is expected to take place on 21 October 1993 in Paris. UNOSOM intends increasingly to involve emerging Somali organizations in this process.

VI. Public information activities in support of UNOSOM activities

52. In accordance with paragraph 4 (f) of Security Council resolution 814 (1993), UNOSOM has developed appropriate public information programmes in support of United Nations activities in Somalia.

53. While international media attention has been more focused on UNOSOM's military and security-related actions in Mogadishu, the United Nations continues to implement a wide range of activities throughout the country to promote Somalia's political reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction. Fostering greater awareness of these activities and of UNOSOM's broad

mandate among the international media and the Somali people has been the primary objective of the public information programme, but without great success.

54. The public information activities of UNOSOM are coordinated closely with United Nations agencies and NGOs. Information materials are regularly prepared and distributed to international and Somali media at daily news briefings held at UNOSOM headquarters. Regrettably, these efforts have had little effect on the media.

A. Radio programming

55. The high rate of illiteracy in Somalia and its scattered population, in conjunction with its lack of infrastructure and telecommunications, has made radio programming an essential component of UNOSOM's public information campaign. Radio Maanta broadcasts a 45-minute programme 7 times a day. Broadcasts consist of information on UNOSOM activities, statements issued by my Special Representative and the Force Commander, features highlighting progress made in promoting Somalia's political reconciliation and economic recovery, recitations from the Koran and traditional Somali music.

56. Radio Maanta broadcasts on short-wave, reaching Mogadishu and outlying areas. The programme is also broadcast once a day over the Italian contingent's FM station in Mogadishu. However, Radio Maanta is not received clearly in many parts of the country because of the limited capacity of its present transmitter and aerial.

57. Countering anti-UNOSOM propaganda has been an important task of its information programme. UNOSOM's disarmament operation of 12 June effectively neutralized Radio Mogadishu, which had been under the control of USC/SNA and was a source of increasingly hostile propaganda against UNOSOM. Since that period, however, clandestine radio broadcasts have sought to disrupt Radio Maanta and other Somali broadcasts, by broadcasting at the same time and on the same frequency.

58. To extend Radio Maanta's outreach to the entire country and to prevent its being jammed by sources of hostile propaganda, additional transmitters are required in other parts of Somalia. A preliminary technical study suggests that the use of medium-wave transmitters should alleviate some of the transmission problems that Radio Maanta currently faces. The strengthening of this prime means of communication is being proposed as an urgent addition to the budget.

59. Until additional transmitters can be established, UNOSOM is examining the possibility of transmitting radio programming over the external short-wave radio services of neighbouring countries. Consultations on the matter are currently under way with authorities in Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya.

B. Print media

60. UNOSOM's Somali-language newspaper, *Maanta*, is published 6 days a week in Mogadishu and distributed to 11 other cities in Somalia. Its circulation, however, has been limited to 25,000 copies.

61. UNOSOM currently relies on the military to transport *Maanta* newspaper to other parts of Somalia. However, military aircraft have been unable to make daily deliveries of the paper. In Mogadishu, distribution has been hampered by the heinous murder on 7 July of six Somalis employed to deliver the newspaper. Other Somali staff of both *Maanta* and Radio Maanta have expressed concern for their personal safety. UNOSOM is at present considering an offer from a Somali contractor to undertake *Maanta's* distribution in Mogadishu. The provision of additional resources would enable UNOSOM to transmit the newspaper and other information materials, such as press releases, electronically to various cities in the country for local printing and dissemination.

62. UNOSOM has also recently introduced an English-language version of *Maanta*, for dissemination to United Nations agencies, NGOs and others in the international community.

C. Media relations

63. The peace-enforcement mandate of UNOSOM and the large number of Member States contributing military personnel have heightened the attention of the international media. To serve their needs for information, as well as that of the local Somali press, UNOSOM continues to extend its media outreach through press briefings, the issuance of media releases and fact sheets, answering media inquiries and coordinating media interviews of senior UNOSOM officials.

64. Regular daily briefings by the UNOSOM civilian and military spokesmen ensure an outflow of information on political, military and humanitarian aspects of the work of UNOSOM. Summaries of these briefings are prepared daily and transmitted to United Nations Headquarters in New York and to the United Nations Information Centre in Nairobi for redissemination.

65. UNOSOM has organized visits to different areas in Somalia for journalists and these have enhanced media coverage of UNOSOM humanitarian activities, such as flood relief or the distribution of food rations. Journalists have also accompanied UNOSOM officials engaged in consultations with community leaders throughout Somalia on the establishment of district and regional councils.

D. Public outreach

66. In addition to *Maanta* newspaper and radio programming, UNOSOM has sought to reach out to the

Somali population through its presence in the field. Regular updates on political, humanitarian and security-related aspects of UNOSOM's activities are translated and provided in both English and Somali to each of the UNOSOM zone offices for dissemination to local communities.

67. Leaflet drops and posters issued by UNOSOM military officials have also served to highlight UNOSOM objectives and activities.

68. Given the lack of telecommunications in Somalia, personal contact between UNOSOM officials and the Somali public has been an effective means of conveying UNOSOM's message. My Special Representative, his Deputy and other UNOSOM officials, especially those in the zone and sub-zone offices, have held numerous meetings with Somali community leaders, elders, women's and youth groups, representatives of businesses and political movements and local NGOs throughout Somalia to promote public understanding and support of UNOSOM's mandate and objectives. This programme will improve as zone and sub-zone offices become properly manned.

VII. Observations

69. The mandate established by Security Council resolution 814 (1993) reflected the deep complexities in the situation then prevailing in Somalia, which the United Nations undertook to resolve. It was evident that UNOSOM would need to receive full cooperation from the people of Somalia, especially the faction leaders, if it was to accomplish its tasks smoothly. At the same time, the international community had recognized that the complexities of the situation could lead to major difficulties in the tasks set for UNOSOM. It was precisely for this reason that the Security Council decided to establish UNOSOM II under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

70. Regrettably, the short-sighted attitudes of leaders of a few factions aggravated the difficult situation. Despite their deliberate attempts to obstruct UNOSOM from performing the tasks assigned by the Security Council, the overall situation in Somalia has undergone a major transformation. The course had already been determined by the highly effective intervention by UNITAF. Following the establishment of UNOSOM II, conditions in most parts of the country have stabilized. Humanitarian assistance is reaching its destinations, protected from attacks and looting by armed bandits and militia. People are going about their normal routines. Schools are reopening. Land is being tilled, crops are being planted and livestock even being exported. Local councils of clan elders are meeting and cooperating with the United Nations efforts to help Somalia to re-establish normal conditions. This contrasts starkly with the situation at the beginning of 1993, when the Somali people still were suffering from

the effects of a brutal civil war fuelled by the ambitions and enmities of warlords that had claimed hundreds of thousands of innocent Somali lives.

71. A major task that fell to UNOSOM after it took over responsibility from UNITAF was the disarmament of the armed groups who had terrorized the people and made extortion from humanitarian assistance agencies the source of their considerable income. At the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Summit in Cairo last June, I had the opportunity to exchange views with several African leaders on the situation in and relating to Somalia. There was strong support for the United Nations effort in Somalia, particularly for the need to take appropriate measures to ensure the full implementation of the disarmament provisions of the Addis Ababa agreement. These views were expressed in Cairo both in the resolution adopted by the OAU Council of Ministers and the statement issued by the Horn of Africa Standing Committee on 23 June 1993. In my discussions with the Secretaries-General of the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, strong support was also expressed for the United Nations role in Somalia.

72. The priority that UNOSOM gave to disarmament generated the hostility of a few clan leaders, fearful of losing their power, towards UNOSOM. The ambushing of UNOSOM personnel by such elements on 5 June and on subsequent occasions left UNOSOM no choice but to take forceful action to effect the disarming required under the Addis Ababa agreement. The exploitation of such actions to provoke hostilities towards UNOSOM has ill-served the people of Somalia and has led to loss of life for which the responsibility rests squarely with the faction leaders, in particular Mohammed Farah Aidid.

73. I am conscious of the feeling in some quarters that UNOSOM is deviating from its primary task of ensuring the safe distribution of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and reconstruction of Somalia, and is concentrating disproportionate efforts and resources in military operations. I know that some of this criticism is well motivated by good intentions. However, the international community has known from the beginning that effective disarmament of all the factions and warlords is *conditio sine qua non* for other aspects of UNOSOM's mandate, be they political, civil, humanitarian, rehabilitation or reconstruction. Unless disarmament is fully implemented, it would not be reasonable to expect UNOSOM to fulfil other aspects of its mandate. The fact that UNOSOM has been able to achieve the progress that it has in different parts of the country, despite the armed hostility that it faces almost daily from Mohammed Farah Aidid and his militia, is testimony to the Somali people's as well as UNOSOM's resolve not to be deterred by such obstacles as well as to the desire of the Somali people for peace and

normalcy. But the fact remains that the country will not enjoy complete stability unless and until the criminal elements have been apprehended and brought to justice as demanded by the Security Council in its resolution 837 (1993). I am convinced that the Security Council fully endorses this approach. It is important to realize the interface between the political, military and humanitarian components of the United Nations presence in Somalia.

74. In view of these circumstances, I have reached the conclusion that UNOSOM requires the assignment of an additional brigade in order to extend its activities, pursue the programme of disarmament in the central and northern regions of the country, restore security through disarmament in Mogadishu and adequately tackle the refugee problem. This additional troop strength should enable the military component to be more effective, more rapid and move widely. Such broader effectiveness should in turn enable UNOSOM to fulfil its mandate within a shorter period of time. This step would result in a temporary increase in UNOSOM's troop strength, and I would endeavour to meet the additional costs from within the appropriation levels already approved.

75. The restoration of security and stability to Somalia requires the re-establishment of the Somali police force, the judicial system and the penal system, in order to enable Somalis quickly to assume full responsibility for law and order in their country. The initial steps must be taken within the framework of the transitional machinery envisaged in the Addis Ababa agreement, beginning with the district and regional levels. Ultimately, this will facilitate the progressive disengagement of the United Nations from its present role in Somalia. Furthermore, once Somalia has surmounted the dangers posed by the wide prevalence of heavy weapons, a well-organized and effective police force would be able to limit the spread of light weapons. It is therefore imperative and urgent that resources in funds and training assistance, as well as in efficacious transitory arrangements, be made available by donor Governments.

76. A high priority for UNOSOM is its assistance to the political reconciliation process. District councils have been formed, and efforts to sustain this momentum will continue in order to form the regional councils and the Transitional National Council as quickly as possible. UNOSOM has also sponsored the reconciliation meetings of clan elders in various regions in Somalia, where the effects are apparent in the restoration of stable and secure conditions, in stark contrast with the suffering from inter-clan conflict. It is my hope that these successes will encourage peaceful reconciliation in other parts of the country.

77. Looking beyond the situation in Somalia, the focus of this report, it is necessary to give attention to the

serious problems encountered in establishing UNOSOM, which are symptomatic of the inadequacies of the present structure and procedure for coping with the heavy demands of the new generation of United Nations peace-keeping operations. Especially in UNOSOM, but also in the establishment of other large missions over the last two years, the delays and complications arising from the application by the Secretariat of established administrative, financial and logistical procedures, made their obsolescence obvious. As members of the Council are aware, measures already are under way to improve the procedures and practices in the Secretariat, and I am grateful for the support being received from various Governments.

78. Another serious and sensitive problem that arose in UNOSOM, and of which members of the Council are aware, is the one related to command and control over United Nations peace and security operations. The principle and practice of unity of command that was developed over decades of peace-keeping operations have come under strain in recent operations whose mandates fall, at times partially, under Chapter VII. Owing perhaps, to the particularly complex and dangerous conditions under which UNOSOM found itself operating, the actions of some contingent commanders had the effect of weakening the integrity of UNOSOM's military command structure. Following clarification at both the political and the operational levels, these difficulties were settled. In the case of the Italian contingent, which received undue media attention, I am glad to report that there is complete coordination between the United Nations and the Italian authorities and the matter has been resolved. The Italian contingent of 2,540 troops in Somalia is largely located in the Jalalasi area, with several units in northern Mogadishu. While there has been constant and complete coordination in the Jalalasi area, for the Mogadishu area a diversity of views has arisen about some modalities of the implementation of the United Nations mandate. Consequently, Italy has asked that its Mogadishu units be redeployed elsewhere in Somalia, and this request has been accepted through an exchange of letters between the Foreign Minister of Italy and myself. Talks are already under way to define where these units will be redeployed.

79. Nevertheless, this issue deserves attention in order to avoid future complications that could weaken the effectiveness of United Nations missions in the interest of international peace and security. When the Council authorizes an operation under Chapter VII of the Charter, clearly there will be an increased risk of casualties among military personnel under United Nations command. It is entirely understandable that Governments will be highly sensitive to this risk and that they will wish to ensure the highest possible security for their personnel. Yet, I am

certain that all States Members of the United Nations will agree that such risks can be minimized only if there is effective command and control on the ground by the Force Commander. This also ensures that the Commander is able to make the maximum use of his resources to achieve the objectives in the mandate received from the Council. Therefore it is clear that it is in the interest of the United Nations that the integrity of the command and control of United Nations military operations be respected in all peace and security operations, whether under Chapter VI or Chapter VII. Of course, it is essential that troop-contributing countries be fully consulted and be kept fully informed, at both the political and the operational levels. I am ensuring that this be done on a regular basis and I am confident that all concerned will cooperate in the common interest.

80. In concluding the present report, I wish to express my warm appreciation to my Special Representative, Admiral Howe, to the Force Commander, General Bir, and to all the men and women, soldiers and civilians, who have made a superb contribution to the furtherance of the United Nations mandate in Somalia under very difficult conditions. My appreciation also extends to the International Committee of the Red Cross, NGOs and the many Governments that have assisted and strengthened UNOSOM in the fulfilment of its historic tasks. Above all, I wish to pay profound tribute to the soldiers of UNOSOM, the Somalis working for UNOSOM, relief workers as well as the journalists who lost their lives in endeavouring to help Somalia, under United Nations auspices, in its hour of need.

Annex I

The re-establishment of security in Somalia: the police, judicial and penal systems

1. The Somali political leaders agreed during the first session of the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia, held at Addis Ababa in March 1993, *inter alia*, on the "need to establish an impartial national and regional Somali police force in all regions of the country on an urgent basis through the reinstatement of the former Somali Police Force and recruitment and training of young Somalis from all regions", and requested "the assistance of the international community" in that regard.

2. The Addis Ababa agreement also provided for the Transitional National Council, as the repository of Somali sovereignty, to establish an "independent judiciary".

3. In my previous reports (S/24992, para. 30; S/25168, para. 23 and S/25354, para. 46), I stated that the establishment of an effective Somali police force would be a crucial step to create a secure environment in Somalia.

4. The Security Council, in its resolution 814 (1993) of 26 March 1993, requested the "Secretary-General, through his Special Representative, and with assistance, as appropriate, from all relevant United Nations entities, offices and specialized agencies, to provide humanitarian and other assistance to the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy and promoting political settlement and national reconciliation, in accordance with the recommendations contained in his report of 3 March 1993". This included, assistance in the "re-establishment of Somali police, as appropriate, at the local, regional or national level, to assist in the restoration and maintenance of peace, stability and law and order, including in the investigation and facilitating the prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian law" (see resolution 814 (1993), para. 4).

5. In my report of 3 March 1993 (S/25354, para. 50), I indicated that I would bring to the attention of the Council my recommendations based on a more detailed assessment of the re-establishment of the Somali police force. The present report contains those recommendations.

I. The present security situation

6. Despite recent divisions in the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), which exerts administrative control over the region, the north-east seems to be secure and peaceful. There is practically no banditry problem. The traditional concern of the region has been possible attack by armed elements from across regional borders to the south and west. However, ongoing political reconciliation and disarmament programmes should reduce this threat. SSDF controls the security situation in the region. At present there are approximately 700 policemen in the region, about 70 per cent of whom were members of the former Somali National Police Force.

7. The Bay region also has a relatively satisfactory security situation except for banditry along the Hoddur-Baidoa road. The police patrol Baidoa, the capital of the region, without arms.

8. In the Gedo region, the security situation is relatively satisfactory, although isolated acts of banditry still occur. Police in Bardera conduct joint patrols with UNOSOM military forces in the city, but there is need for a rural guard to provide protection in outlying areas. For example, Somali refugees returning from Kenya recently were attacked by bandits about 50 kilometres from Bardera. The 2,000-strong police force which existed before the civil war was needed partly because of the long border with Kenya and Ethiopia.

9. The aftermath of the 5 June 1993 attack on UNOSOM military forces has caused serious security problems in Mogadishu. Security has deteriorated in the

city owing to the presence of large numbers of weapons and large numbers of clan fighters still residing in the city. Three thousand former members of the Somali police have been re-formed into a new police force. In general, police and weapons are confined to the stations at night, unless joint operations are planned with UNOSOM. Police have continued their duties during the recent security incidents involving UNOSOM military forces and participate with these forces in selected missions.

10. The crime problem in Afgoi is exacerbated by looters along the Merca-Afgoi road and others leaving Mogadishu who pass through the area. Rural guards or a mobile quick reaction force may be needed to assert control in this area.

11. After the successful conclusion of the four-month Borama conference, political conciliation among clans and a broad-based administration determined to disarm and demobilize the clan-based militias have emerged in the north-west region. Disarming and demobilization are expected to improve security in the region as the security problem in the north-west has stemmed primarily from clan-based militias.

12. In Kismayo, armed factions have conducted military raids into the city and control of the city has changed twice in the last four months from one faction to another. Likewise, the police have been reorganized twice in the city. UNOSOM political and military elements are working with elders of all clans/factions to defuse tension in the Kismayo region.

13. It is clear that, while the security situation in some parts of Somalia is still less than satisfactory (particularly in Mogadishu), security has improved in the north-east, north-west, Bay and Gedo regions. A critical element in creating the security conditions necessary for the re-establishment of the Somali police force is the disarmament of the entire country, a task which is part of the UNOSOM mandate.

14. The restoration of law and order, peace and stability in Somalia requires not only the strengthening of the police forces but also a legal system that provides the basis and framework for police activities. This should include the basic laws that the police will have to enforce; a judicial system to adjudicate the cases of those arrested by the police and a penal system that can detain and punish offenders. Additionally, as a result of the civil conflict in Somalia over the last five years, investigation and facilitating the prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian law will require a special approach, perhaps using international investigative staff and justices.

II. Proposed UNOSOM strategy

A. Police

1. Objectives

15. The attainment of the overall objective of UNOSOM with regard to the establishment of a national neutral police force must be approached through a framework comprising three tiers—national, regional and district—with police forces being answerable to appropriate local authorities in each tier. In the light of the fact that at the moment only at the district level have local authorities been established, i.e. district councils, implementation of the overall objective must, therefore, begin at that level and expand to the regional and national levels, involving ultimately the Transitional National Council when established. UNOSOM's role in this endeavour must remain that of a facilitator.

16. Expansion of the 5,000-person police force composed of former policemen into a force of 10,000 can be accomplished by bringing into the UNOSOM programme approximately 1,500 police operating in the north-east and approximately 1,500 police operating in the north-west. The police in these regions would need immediate on-station, in-service police training. Additionally, 2,000 persons would be recruited country-wide and undergo basic training in groups of 400. If training begins in October 1993, 5 cycles of 400 recruits in each cycle will produce 2,000 new policemen by December 1994.

17. The number of police required to perform law enforcement and security duties is a matter of continuing assessment. To develop an 18,000-person-strong police force (the number of police prior to the civil war) that can assume law enforcement and security duties by March 1995 (the currently projected time for completing the UNOSOM mandate), existing police units must be expanded and police forces developed in the smaller population centres throughout the country. While former policemen (approximately 3,000) will provide the foundation for this expansion, the police recruit training process also can help to reintegrate carefully selected ex-militia into Somali society by providing them with professional employment and discipline. The ex-militia would take a loyalty oath to Somalia and would be carefully observed during their training to ensure that factional loyalty is eliminated. An estimated 4,000 to 5,000 more recruits could be trained as policemen by December 1994 if two additional training academies are made available through international donor programmes.

18. A national police structure could be in place if the Transitional National Council so decides. Pending the establishment of the national structure, the police will be organized and operationally controlled on a regional and

district basis. The governmental authority could request that international police advisers continue their service, if needed.

2. Strategy

19. Until a Somali governmental structure is established, the police force(s) will be under the operational control of the regional and district councils. An international police component of UNOSOM will provide assistance to these entities in the discharge of their responsibilities and will provide advice and training to the police forces.

20. The regional police commanders will be assisted by international experts who will act as police advisers. Regional political and operational considerations will determine if UNOSOM will appoint a national police chief for the interim report.

21. During this period, close coordination and cooperation between the UNOSOM military and Somali police is critical in ensuring comprehensive and coordinated security policies and operations. However, upon the arrival of the full component of international police advisers, UNOSOM military forces will end their control of police activities. None the less, close policy and operational coordination will be maintained between the police advisers, UNOSOM military and the Somali police.

22. A police training academy/institute will be created and organized with the assistance of international police advisers. The police institute will begin its first basic police courses in October 1993. Refresher courses for serving police officers will be carried out throughout the country by mobile training teams. The institute will train 400 recruits per cycle in a three-month basic police training programme, thereby meeting the recruit training objective of 2,000 which will increase the police force to 10,000 by December 1994. Recruitment will be proportional among clans on a regional basis and the clan balance will be maintained throughout all phases of recruitment.

23. Additionally, the institute will maintain a police personnel evaluation centre and a police documentation centre, which will be available to the entire police force. Training programmes will be provided to basic, intermediate and supervisory police personnel. The institute also will provide instruction for magistrates and custodial corps personnel.

24. In providing assistance, UNOSOM will build on the Auxiliary Security Force initiated by the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) as the foundation of the UNOSOM-supervised Somali police force. UNOSOM will, however, conduct a review of members of the Auxiliary Security Force to determine if they meet the following requirements:

- (a) Two years' prior experience before 26 January 1991 with the former Somali Police Force;
- (b) No crimes committed against the Somali people;
- (c) No physical disability, with rare exceptions.

Those who do not meet the requirements will not be retained in the police force. Special care will be taken to retain the most competent. Where militia have been the foundation of existing police forces, UNOSOM will consider supporting those forces with salaries and equipment, but will require that militia undergo, in a timely fashion, basic police and human rights training. Police officers must renounce loyalty to political and paramilitary forces and take an oath to the objectives and goals of the new Somali National Police Force and to serve the Somali people and nation.

25. To increase the strength of the police to 10,000 throughout Somalia by December 1994, UNOSOM will start a new recruitment programme, as soon as the training facilities and the trainers are available, using as a minimum the following criteria. Recruits must:

- (a) Be between 18 and 25 years of age;
- (b) Not have committed any crime against the Somali people;
- (c) Have no physical disability;
- (d) Have a certain level of literacy;
- (e) Be selected by the local chief of police, recommended by community leaders and in consultation with the UNOSOM regional military commander, where applicable;
- (f) Be selected in such a way as to ensure a proportional balance of clan representation.

26. UNOSOM will evaluate, region by region, the need to organize and train mobile quick reaction forces. This type of force can be used to assist in rural area bandit apprehension, disarmament operations under the supervision of the UNOSOM military and other quick reaction missions. Where there is a need for a regional mobile quick reaction force, the force would be under the operational control of the UNOSOM regional international police adviser and the UNOSOM military commander.

27. Taking into account the security environment of each region, UNOSOM military and police advisers will determine on a station-by-station basis, the number of weapons that will be provided to each police station.

28. Initially, UNOSOM will provide modest salaries, undertake limited renovation of police facilities, provide basic transportation and communications equipment, conduct basic police training and provide some specialized training. The salary scale must be sustainable by revenues generated by the future Somali Government.

B. *Judicial system*

1. *Objectives*

29. By 31 October 1993, an interim three-tier judicial system will be in place. The 1962 Criminal Procedure and Penal Codes will be enforced. Initially, judges and magistrates for the system will be compensated modestly by UNOSOM and encouraged to consider this involvement as a civic responsibility. Court rooms and administrative workspace will be renovated and office equipment will be furnished for each court.

30. By 31 March 1995, the Transitional National Council will have determined the type of judicial system and laws of the country. The interim judicial system will be adjusted to accommodate the system called for by the Transitional National Council.

2. *Strategy*

31. After the Transitional National Council is formed, it will be asked by UNOSOM to take an early decision on the structure and organization of the judiciary and the applicable laws, both civil and criminal, throughout Somalia.

32. Since 4 May 1993, the 1962 Somali Criminal Procedure Code and Penal Code continue in force in areas where there exists a functioning judicial system. Consistent with the decision of the Boroma Conference, the Indian Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code, which was in use in the north-west prior to 1960, will be in force in that region.

33. The interim judicial system will be modelled on the 1962 court system and will have three levels: courts of appeal, regional courts and district courts. District courts are to hear civil and criminal cases where conviction would result in imprisonment for less than 10 years. Regional courts are to review cases from district courts and are to have original jurisdiction over criminal cases in which conviction would result in imprisonment for three years or more.

34. In Mogadishu a Judicial Selection Committee made up of 13 respected Somalis and advised by UNOSOM Justice Division officials will select judges and magistrates for the court system in the city and will oversee issues of ethics and discipline in the judiciary. Similar councils will be formed in other regions of Somalia for the selection of judges and magistrates.

35. Should Somali judges be threatened or intimidated and therefore either refuse to adjudicate particular cases or are pressured into issuing decisions not based on legal grounds, UNOSOM will consider, after consultation with the Judicial Selection Committee, a programme whereby consideration may be given to foreign judges being asked to serve in selected courts. (It should be noted that foreign judges did serve in the Somali court

system in the 1960s and foreign judges are serving in some East African countries today.) Upon request, UNOSOM military forces will provide security for judicial proceedings until Somali police forces are able to provide the required security.

36. A probable-cause hearing must be held within 48 hours of detention, unless there is no magistrate within a reasonable distance. The hearing will take place as soon as possible, depending on the location of magistrates and their schedules.

37. UNOSOM will have civilian judicial advisers assigned to provide advice and assistance in the re-establishment of the interim Somali judicial system.

38. As required by the UNOSOM mandate from the Security Council, UNOSOM police and judicial advisers will assist the Somali justice system in investigating allegations of serious criminal violations, including "crimes against the Somali people", and in facilitating the prosecution of criminals.

39. When security conditions require and until appropriate Somali prisons are renovated, UNOSOM will assist in maintaining a detention facility for persons whose security cannot be guaranteed in existing confinement facilities. United Nation standards on human rights will be respected in these facilities.

40. UNOSOM, with the assistance of the Police Institute and an appropriate university training faculty, will fund a judicial training or review programme for judges and magistrates and a court administration training programme for administrative staff.

41. UNOSOM will fund modest renovation of court facilities, provide limited equipment and supplies, training and modest salaries for judges and court administrative personnel.

C. *Prison system*

1. *Objectives*

42. By 31 October 1993, basic renovation of the prison facilities in Mogadishu and Hargeisa will have been completed, salaries paid and food for prisoners supplied. UNOSOM advisers will provide advice and supervision to detention facilities and prisons.

43. By 31 March 1994, if necessary, other prisons will have been re-established in other areas, including Bossasso and Kismayo.

2. *Strategy*

44. Humane treatment of prisoners is of the utmost concern.

45. UNOSOM will rehabilitate prison facilities in Mogadishu and Hargeisa and a juvenile detention centre in Mogadishu.

46. UNOSOM will employ members of the old Custodial Corps to manage the prisons. Initially, UNOSOM/ international donors will pay salaries for 1,000 members of the Custodial Corps: 400 in Mogadishu, 200 in Hargeisa, 200 in Bossasso and 200 in Kismayo. Salary levels will be calculated so they can be sustained by local revenues following UNOSOM's departure.

47. Custodial Corps personnel must fulfil the following conditions:

(a) Have had two years' custodial experience prior to 26 January 1991;

(b) Have committed no crime against the Somali people;

(c) Have been vetted by senior Custodial Corps personnel.

48. United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) will be requested to provide food for prisoners.

49. UNOSOM will supply an appropriate number of weapons for prison staff.

50. Upon request, UNOSOM military will back up external security when required.

51. UNOSOM prison advisers will give legal, penal and human rights assistance to prison officials located in their zones.

52. UNOSOM will ask the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), United Nations agencies (e.g. the World Health Organization) and NGOs (such as Amnesty International), to monitor conditions in the prisons and any human rights violations.

D. *Investigation of violations of international humanitarian law*

1. *Objectives*

53. In order further to meet the requirements of Security Council resolution 814 (1993), UNOSOM will establish an Office of Human Rights to "investigate and facilitate prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian law".

54. By 15 August 1993, the UNOSOM Office of Human Rights will be staffed by a six-person investigation team from Member States and will, among other things, assist in the establishment of a local Somali human rights committee.

55. At its forty-ninth session, in February-March 1993, the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations recommended, and the Economic and Social Council, on 28 July 1993, approved, the appointment of an Independent Expert on Human Rights for Somalia. In addition to the Independent Expert's specific human rights function, the Expert could act as Ombudsman for police, judicial and prison issues.

56. By the end of 1993, ongoing investigations possibly will lead to the apprehension of several suspects in several major human rights cases. International justices will conduct trials in these human rights violation cases if Somali justices decline to hear cases as a result of threats or intimidation.

2. *Strategy*

57. The Security Council, in its resolution 814 (1993) enjoins UNOSOM to assist in the "restoration of peace, stability, law and order, including investigation and facilitating the prosecution of serious violations".

58. UNOSOM will establish a team of international specialists which will investigate, in cooperation with the Somali police, human rights violations committed against the Somali people, as well as against international assistance workers. Such violations include mass murders of Somali citizens, murder, attempted murder and threats of bodily harm against international assistance workers and UNOSOM employees.

59. UNOSOM will establish a central registry of murders, attempted murders, threats to security and crimes against property. The registry will maintain investigation files on each case.

60. UNOSOM will establish a property claims investigation team to deal with crimes involving: theft of money, looting and destruction of United Nations agencies, the offices and warehouses of NGOs; looting and destruction of Somali Government buildings, infrastructure, vehicles and other assets; looting and destruction of diplomatic missions. The team will decide whether a reported property crime comes under its jurisdiction. All property crimes not under the jurisdiction of the team will be directed to the Somali police for investigation.

61. UNOSOM will encourage the Transitional National Council to establish a property claims division as a special division of the regular Somali court system to deal with crimes against property committed from 26 January 1991 to the present. This division of the court should have the authority to punish perpetrators of property crimes in accordance with applicable Somali laws and should be enabled to order restitution of property, or payment of damages, or both. This initiative will build on the work accomplished by the committee for the peaceful resolution of property disputes.

62. UNOSOM will encourage international human rights groups to assist Somali human rights organizations with human and financial resources.

63. The estimated one-year cost of establishing an internationally staffed office for investigation and facilitating prosecution of serious violations of humanitarian law is estimated at \$2,322,000. This office will be staffed under the peace-keeping budget and from international volunteers.

III. Financial aspects

64. The total cost of direct support of the re-establishment of the Somali justice system is estimated at \$45,130,000 for the first year (see appendix). It needs to be emphasized that this is considered the minimum amount required to start the Somali justice system going so that it may take over as soon as possible from UNOSOM the function of maintaining law and order. If nations donate actual equipment, budget requirements will be reduced. When I submitted the addendum to my last report (S/25354/Add.1), a detailed assessment of the extent of the disintegration of the Somali justice system and the destruction of its infrastructures had not been made. At that time, I proposed a figure of \$8,900,000 needed just to continue the support of the 5,000-person Auxiliary Police Force to be inherited from UNITAF.

65. To implement this programme, UNOSOM will have international police management and advisory staff at UNOSOM headquarters, zone, sub-zone and district levels to ensure daily contact with Somali police down to the station level. UNOSOM will also have the required international expertise to assist the Somalis to re-establish their judiciary and prison systems and to investigate serious violations of international humanitarian law. I estimate that the international staff needed for this undertaking will cost \$10,308,000 per annum. These positions will be funded under the peace-keeping budget.

66. In my previous report (S/25354, para. 89), I indicated my intention to maintain the United Nations fund for operations in Somalia authorized by the Security Council in paragraph 11 of its resolution 794 (1992). I am gratified to learn that there are a number of countries preparing to make further voluntary contributions to this fund or contributions in kind (Egypt, Germany, Netherlands and Norway). The amounts pledged may not, however, be sufficient to cover the costs of the re-establishment of the Somali justice system and the costs of international staff to provide the required assistance. In that event, I will not hesitate to recommend alternative financing arrangements to meet the shortfall.

67. Member States could contribute funding, equipment or training on either a nationwide or regional basis. If contributions are provided on a regional basis, UNOSOM would provide guidance to ensure inter-operability of equipment and to ensure a logical proportional

balance of equipment and training based on the needs of the regions.

IV. Observations

68. The overwhelming desire of the Somali people for the restoration of peace and law and order to their country and the eagerness of members of the former Somali police force and Custodial Corps, magistrates and judges who have resurfaced and offered their services to restore and re-establish their justice system have convinced me that the Somalis will respond positively and constructively to the assistance extended by the international community.

69. Successful police and justice systems in Somalia will cut the cost of peace-keeping operations as fewer military forces will be required to maintain security. In addition, with required basic infrastructures of the whole justice system rebuilt during the first year, significantly lower financial resources should be required during the second year to bring the system back to a level capable of maintaining internal security throughout the entire country.

70. The objectives of the UNOSOM humanitarian programme include assisting in the regeneration of the Somali economy and the re-establishment of its public finance system. There are indications that the Somali economy, at least the agriculture, livestock and trade sectors, have been relatively resilient in withstanding the civil war. It is expected, therefore, that the transitional national authority and regional authorities will be in a position to finance their newly re-established justice system as soon as their public finance system is restructured. It should be noted that the north-east region is financing its police force at a modest level substantially through revenue from the Bossasso port.

71. The full maintenance of internal security by the Somalis themselves would not only enable them to embark on their own rehabilitation, reconstruction and development process but, as I indicated in my previous report (S/25354, para. 86), would also render a substantial United Nations military presence no longer necessary. This modest expenditure to re-establish the Somali justice system would therefore enable a rapid reduction in the relatively large UNOSOM military expenditures. I consider, therefore, that this expenditure for the justice system is cost-effective.

Appendix

United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM)

Summary of financial implications for one year of operation (May 1993-April 1994)
(In thousands of United States dollars)

<i>Main expenditure group</i>	<i>Police</i>	<i>Judicial</i>	<i>Prison</i>	<i>Total</i>
1. Personnel costs (compensation to Somali personnel)	16 848	1 644	1 045	19 537
2. Renovation of premises	350	355	400	1 105

Main expenditure group

	<i>Police</i>	<i>Judicial</i>	<i>Prison</i>	<i>Total</i>
3. Supplies, services and equipment	735	850	40	1 625
4. Uniforms	1 500	-	200	1 700
5. Vehicle operation	13 052	579	388	14 019
6. Communications equipment	440	-	-	440
7. Weapons	3 000	-	96	3 096
8. Training	<u>3 540</u>	<u>68</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>3 608</u>
Projected (gross) requirements	<u>39 465</u>	<u>3 496</u>	<u>2 169</u>	<u>45 130</u>

Document 62

Executive summary of the report prepared by Professor Tom Farer of American University, Washington, D.C., on the 5 June 1993 attack on United Nations forces in Somalia

S/26351, 24 August 1993

1. In its resolution 837 (1993) of 6 June 1993, the Security Council reaffirmed, among other things, the authority of the Secretary-General to secure the investigation of the actions of those responsible for the armed attacks on 5 June 1993 on United Nations peace-keepers in Mogadishu, including those responsible for publicly inciting such attacks. The Council also requested the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of the resolution.

2. On 14 and 18 June 1993, the Secretary-General presented to the Council reports on actions relating to the 5 June and 12/13 June 1993 incidents in Mogadishu. The Secretary-General informed the Council that a more comprehensive investigation of the 5 June 1993 incident was being undertaken.

3. An independent expert, Professor Tom Farer of the American University, Washington, was engaged to carry out the investigation. On 12 August 1993, Professor Farer submitted his report to the Secretariat. The executive summary of the report is contained in the annex to the present document. The full report, together with its annexes, is available in English only for consultation in the Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations (room S-3727).

Annex

Report of an investigation into the 5 June 1993 attack on United Nations forces in Somalia by Professor Tom Farer

1. On 5 June 1993, 24 soldiers serving in Somalia under the United Nations flag were killed in a series of attacks on Pakistani units that began without warning at about 0930 hours and continued relentlessly until the late afternoon. An additional 56 Pakistani soldiers were wounded, of whom 11 were crippled for life. The attacks occurred in the southern sector of Mogadishu, an area the Somali National Alliance (SNA), a political faction led by General Mohamed Farah Hassan Aidid, had long dominated. A number of those killed and wounded were distributing food to Somali citizens at the time they were assaulted. Others were returning from participation in the inspection of an authorized weapons storage site. Still others were ambushed attempting to rescue those initially attacked and to evacuate the wounded, some of whom were bleeding to death on 21 October Road, the scene of the main assault.

2. In a unanimous response, the Security Council adopted resolution 837 (1993) in which the Council reaffirmed the Secretary-General's authority "to secure

the investigation of [the] actions [of the responsible parties] and their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment” and requested the Secretary-General “urgently to inquire into the incident, with particular emphasis on the role of those faction leaders involved.”

3. Shortly thereafter, Admiral Jonathan Howe, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Somalia, asked me to assume principal responsibility for conducting that inquiry. I accepted the proposal of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the basis of one critical understanding: I would have full freedom to conduct an inquiry that was both impartial and as complete as time and the difficult security situation in Mogadishu allowed. The present report 1/ is the result of an investigation carried out with the assistance of lawyers on the staff of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) and members of the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs. I and my colleagues began this inquiry without any presumptions concerning premeditation or responsibility. We have laboured to accumulate all available evidence and have been united in our determination to follow that evidence wherever it might lead.

4. Paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 837 (1993) contemplates the prosecution, trial and punishment of those responsible for attacks on UNOSOM II personnel. It does not, however, designate the tribunal before which the evidence gathered by the investigation should be presented; nor does it identify the applicable system or systems of law. Presumably the Council wished to postpone that decision pending completion of the investigation. In doing so, however, it left the investigators in a somewhat anomalous position, for the relevance of facts is a function of the legally defined elements of a crime. Without some appreciation of the crimes to be charged, investigators will find it difficult to establish rational limits to their inquiries.

5. Precisely in order to establish some limits, my colleagues and I decided to look to one national legal system and to international law for rules of criminal responsibility relevant to the events of 5 June and succeeding incidents. The State with the most indisputable claim under generally recognized jurisdictional principles to have its laws apply is Somalia, since the events occurred there and most, if not all, of the prospective defendants are Somali nationals. Under Somali law, the evidence produced to date could give rise to a variety of charges under the 1962 Somali Penal Code, which has never been revoked. The charges would fall within one or more of the following broad categories: crimes by individuals against the public administration; crimes against public order; crimes endangering public safety by force; and crimes against the life and safety of the individual. Persons who

planned or executed the attacks of 5 June would be guilty of at least 10 specific crimes within these categories, crimes ranging from “force or threats to a political, administrative or judicial body” to “carnage”, “murder” and “seizure of a person”.

6. With respect to international law, under the Nürnberg Principles, applied by the Allied Powers after World War II and subsequently reaffirmed by a unanimous General Assembly, individuals are subject to penal sanctions for conspiracy to commit and the commission of crimes against peace, crimes against humanity and violations of international humanitarian law. As originally defined to fit the circumstances of the World War’s atrocities, the crimes implied authors acting in the name of some sort of public authority. But in the years since Nürnberg, the emergence of internationally protected human rights, together with exponential growth in the interdependence of societies and in the vulnerability of public interests to conspiracies by private actors, has required an extension of international criminal law to include them. Thus private persons who attack international commercial aircraft or conspire to exterminate some ethnic group (i.e. to commit genocide) are international criminals even if they are unconnected with any Government.

7. No act could by its very character more perfectly exemplify an international crime than the use of force against United Nations soldiers to prevent them from carrying out their responsibilities. Such use of force is a plain challenge to the ability of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security and hence to that minimum order on which all other collective human interests depend. Hence, in order to find that an international crime was committed in the instant case, it is unnecessary to decide whether the persons who organized, planned, approved or executed the attack of 5 June constituted a de facto authority in a part of Somalia or simply a group of private persons intent on frustrating performance of a Security Council mandate.

8. The one other clearly premeditated action against the United Nations in Somalia that occurred between 5 June and the conclusion of this inquiry was the 13 June attack on the Kilometer Four strong point in south Mogadishu, which resulted in extensive casualties to Somali citizens. It appears possible that the assailants deliberately fired on civilians in order to produce bodies for the international media. At a minimum there is strongly persuasive evidence of an intention to draw defensive fire from United Nations positions that would inevitably result in such casualties. 2/ Under either hy-

1/ The complete report is available for consultation in the Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations.

2/ For a more detailed analysis of the evidence, see pp. 90-96 of the complete report.

pothesis about what occurred, a tribunal could find a violation of principles of international humanitarian law.

9. Whether the case falls under the precise terms of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 is not determinative. It is not even important. The Conventions were designed to cover inter-State wars and large-scale civil wars. But the principles they embody have a wider scope. Plainly a part of contemporary international customary law, they are applicable wherever political ends are sought through military means. No principle is more central to the humanitarian law of war than the obligation to respect the distinction between combatants and non-combatants. That principle is violated and criminal responsibility thereby incurred when organizations deliberately target civilians or when they use civilians as shields or otherwise demonstrate a wanton indifference to the protection of non-combatants. I believe that principle was violated on 13 June.

10. As we sought to identify the persons responsible particularly for the 5 June attacks, my colleagues and I accumulated and analysed both circumstantial and other forms of evidence bearing on the issues of opportunity, means and motive. As a practical precondition for illuminating the issues of means and opportunity, it was necessary to decide whether, as alleged by General Aidid, the virtually coincident attacks launched on 5 June could plausibly be read as the spontaneous response of Somalis in south Mogadishu to the shooting of a Somali national in front of Radio Mogadishu at about 0930 that morning. By themselves, the raw circumstantial facts render that claim implausible. 3/

11. On the morning of 5 June, Pakistani forces were attacked almost simultaneously in places scattered all across southern Mogadishu: at Brigade headquarters in the National Soccer Stadium, at two feeding stations and at several strong points, as well as at key points along streets connecting these places. But the principal assault fell on Pakistani troops at checkpoint 89 on 21 October Road. Various features of that assault testify powerfully to premeditation. One was the existence of what is known in standard infantry doctrine as a "killing zone". The zone is an area in which troops, narrowly confined by natural or man-made obstacles, are subjected to concentrated fire. A second was the nature of the obstacles in this case, namely sequential roadblocks, which were strengthened as the day progressed. A third telling feature of that assault was the firing discipline manifested by the attackers. For instance, initially all the assailants seemed to be located on the south side of the road. Gunmen who had positioned themselves on the north side remained hidden and silent until soft-sided trucks loaded with reinforcements entered the zone, at which point they opened a deadly crossfire.

12. Flank protection was another sign of careful planning. Pakistani units attempting to relieve the pressure at the heart of the killing zone by working their way around behind the elevated structures occupied by the assailants quickly ran up against waiting snipers who repulsed them. A fifth significant feature of the attack was the armament employed, including heavy machine-guns and anti-tank weapons (specifically rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs)). While AK-47s and other small arms are widely and readily available in all parts of the city, .50-calibre machine-guns and RPGs are not. Nor are the munitions they fire, which are, moreover, relatively heavy. Not only were such weapons employed, they were employed in and on the roof of the several multistory structures dotted around checkpoint 89 and so situated that accurate fire could be initiated as soon as substantial forces were in the killing zone.

13. A sixth feature was the assailants' sophisticated use of locations and camouflage: the shooters rarely exposed themselves; some appeared to flit from window to window; a number of the gun barrels that could be seen were covered with a greenish gauze. A seventh and particularly significant feature of the incident was its duration: the gunmen were able to sustain a withering fire from heavy as well as light weapons from mid-morning to late afternoon, over five hours. At no point did the rate of fire indicate any shortage of ammunition. Yet the Pakistani company trapped at checkpoint 89 found itself running short of ammunition well before the end of the attack, even though it was carrying a full complement and, moreover, because it was pinned down and had difficulty identifying targets it maintained a much lower rate of fire. Only careful pre-attack stocking of the ambush site or a prearranged system for resupplying the Somali attackers can plausibly explain the amplitude of their munitions.

14. The combined weight of these elements by itself flattens the claim of a spontaneous attack. And in considering the weight of the circumstantial evidence, they must be added to the near simultaneous attacks occurring elsewhere in south Mogadishu. People suddenly driven by overwhelming emotions do not normally construct roadblocks at peculiarly appropriate places or shrewdly calculate the best points at which to place heavy machine-guns in order to block even armoured vehicles from relieving besieged troops. Yet this is precisely what occurred on 5 June.

3/ For a more detailed discussion, see pp. 21-41 of the complete report.

15. The eloquent testimony of premeditation implicit in the raw facts of 5 June leads ineluctably to three questions:

- (a) Who had foreknowledge of the movements of Pakistani contingents on 5 June?
- (b) Who had the authority to deploy the gunmen required to carry out that day's assaults?
- (c) Who had strong and rational incentives for the assault?

Who, in other words, had the opportunity, the means and the motive to perpetrate this crime? A large and complex body of evidence leads ineluctably to the conclusion not simply that General Aidid had the requisite means, motive and opportunity, but that he had that trinity uniquely.

16. With regard to opportunity, 4/ on the afternoon of 4 June, UNOSOM officers officially informed Mohamed Hassan Awale Qaibdid, one of General Aidid's closest associates, that designated weapons sites would be inspected on the following day. He responded by stating that the inspections must not be performed and that, if they were, it would lead to "war". On the morning of 5 June, another Aidid confidante, Mr. Osman Atto, openly conceded foreknowledge of the outbreak of violence. While no one testified that the General had been informed by Qaibdid, it is grossly implausible that a matter which Qaibdid deemed so full of consequence would not be reported immediately to the man who was Chairman of SNA and its military leader, who was in Mogadishu and who resided and conducted business in a compound that was only a few moments' drive away from Qaibdid's. Furthermore, the uniform experience of persons from both the official international and the non-governmental communities who have had to negotiate with SNA was that high SNA officials, including Mr. Atto, either could not or would not take decisions on matters of any consequence without submitting them to the General for his approval. To believe that in this instance he was not informed and that his subordinates would have taken it upon themselves to start a war with the United Nations requires an exercise in wilful credulity.

17. Concerning means, 5/ on 5 June, General Aidid was the unchallenged political and military leader of the Habre Gidr clan, which was credited by UNOSOM intelligence with a readily deployable militia of some 500 men. Since clansmen of military age number in the many thousands, the clan is the principal focus of personal loyalty for Somalis and most Somali men have some experience in the handling at least of small arms, the numbers potentially deployable by the acknowledged leader of the clan was no doubt greater than the UNOSOM estimate of persons under arms. Estimates by UNOSOM officers of the minimum number of fighters required to

carry out the ambushes of 5 June vary from under 50 to 200. Taking the highest of these estimates, it is clear that even if the forces immediately available to SNA were only half what the UNOSOM Force Command had estimated, they would still have provided General Aidid with more than sufficient means.

18. Like other militia, and consistent with the experience of UNOSOM from 5 June to this day, SNA had access to automatic rifles, hand grenades, light and heavy machine-guns and RPGs. In its largest acknowledged weapons storage site, SNA had huge stocks of ammunition, as well as recoilless rifles and other heavy weapons. Since the sites had been established voluntarily by the armed factions after the arrival of and without any prior audit by the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), UNOSOM officials had no basis for determining what proportion of weapons and ammunition originally held by the factions had been deposited in the sites. Moreover, since the sites were entirely under the control of the factions, they could move material in and out at will. Assuming that the one UNITAF audit, effected after the sites were established, was accurate, then the discrepancies between it and the 5 June audit report of the UNOSOM inspectors indicate that at least the SNA sites functioned more as convenient entrepôts for weapons than as their prisons.

19. With regard to motive, 6/ in the case of General Aidid, means and opportunity coincided with ample motive. Simply by being in place as the dominant military force in the country, UNOSOM reduced the influence of those political leaders, General Aidid eminent among them, who had hitherto disposed of substantial forces. While UNOSOM remained in place, guns would no longer trump all other sources of influence. And to the extent UNOSOM succeeded in substantially disarming the warlords, they could not look forward to playing their trump after UNOSOM departed. The weapons site inspections of 5 June were an important step in that disarmament process.

20. The General's influence also was threatened by UNOSOM's incipient effort to re-establish a formal judicial system and a neutral police force, i.e. a functioning system of justice. An official judicial system would undermine the de facto political order the General had imposed on south Mogadishu. In conjunction with disarmament, the new police force would, as it grew and consolidated, spell the end of informal systems of domination. In addition, a largely fortuitous conjuncture of events may have

4/ For a more detailed discussion, see pp. 49-71 of the complete report.

5/ For a more detailed discussion, see pp. 42-49 of the complete report.

6/ For a more detailed discussion, see pp. 71-90 of the complete report.

added subjective grievance to the objective conflict between the General's interests and UNOSOM's mandate.

21. General Aidid could rationally have concluded that, by demonstrating his ability to turn Mogadishu into a zone of grave insecurity, he could force UNOSOM to alter its programmes so that they were compatible with his bid to play a, and probably the, leading political role in a reconstituted Somalia. He could have hoped, at a minimum, to force UNOSOM to negotiate every programme with him as if he were the formal independent political authority over half the country's capital and other territory where the Habre Gidr clan or its allies predominated. And, as a maximum goal, he could rationally have hoped so to increase the costs of the United Nations operation particularly for certain key national contingents as to trigger the operation's premature termination.

22. The corresponding risks may well have appeared acceptable. His experience with UNOSOM I could have encouraged miscalculation. Operating with only 500 troops shackled by the rules of engagement hitherto deemed appropriate for a Chapter VI mandate, UNOSOM I had been passive in the face of extortionate activities by SNA and other militia. Aidid's calculations of risk could also have been influenced by the passivity of United Nations forces in the former Yugoslavia. The General is, after all, a well-travelled man familiar with international relations. He attended military academies in Italy and the former Soviet Union and was for some years the Somali Ambassador to India.

23. The circumstantial evidence of means, opportunity and motive, powerful in itself, does not stand alone. It is buttressed by the testimony of a credible witness who appears to have had direct access to the General both before and after 5 June. The witness testifies to being present when General Aidid congratulated members of SNA for the 5 June ambush. If even that was not enough, the case against the General is further reinforced, indeed would appear to be clinched, by an essentially

self-authenticating document, a memorandum addressed to the General (and to his chief of security, Mr. Qaibdid) that summarizes the results of the interrogation of one of the five Pakistani soldiers taken prisoner on 5 June and subsequently turned over to Italian authorities by SNA officials. The information in this document, retrieved by UNOSOM soldiers from the house used as an office and residence by Mr. Qaibdid, is relevant only to the conduct of future military operations. Hence it strongly implies belief by the senior officials of SNA that they were at war with UNOSOM II. That belief would be baseless unless SNA had launched the 5 June assault.

Conclusions

24. The claim that General Mohamed Farah Hassan Aidid authorized the 5 June attack on Pakistani forces serving under the United Nations flag and that the attack was executed by elements of the political faction known as SNA is supported by clear and convincing evidence.

25. The attack of 5 June violated multiple provisions of the 1962 Somali Penal Code, which has never been repealed. It also constitutes a violation of international law and thus makes General Aidid and his senior colleagues liable to prosecution before an international tribunal or the criminal courts of any State.

26. The central principle of international humanitarian law—the obligation to respect the distinction between combatants and non-combatants—is violated and criminal responsibility thereby incurred when individuals or organizations use civilians as shields for military operations or otherwise demonstrate a wanton indifference to the protection of non-combatants. There is sufficient evidence to make out a *prima facie* case that the 13 June attack on the Pakistani strong point at the Kilometer Four roundabout in south Mogadishu was consciously designed by persons associated with SNA to cause the wounding or killing of non-combatants.

Document 63

Letter dated 27 August from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General concerning the Council's intention to study the recommendations in Professor Farer's report (document 62) on the re-establishment of Somali police forces

S/26375, 29 August 1993

I have the honour to refer to your report of 17 August 1993 (S/26317) pursuant to paragraph 18 of Security Council resolution 814 (1993) concerning the action

taken to implement that resolution, in particular recommendations for the establishment of Somali police forces, and on the progress achieved in accomplishing the objec-

tives set out in the resolution. The members of the Security Council have taken note of your report, for which they have expressed their gratitude to you.

The members of the Council intend to study the report carefully and review its content, as well as your

observations, as a basis for a possible course of action in the near future.

(Signed) Madeleine K. ALBRIGHT
President of the Security Council

Document 64

Statement made by the Secretary-General on 8 September 1993 to the informal contact group on Somalia stressing progress made in national reconciliation, reconstruction and rehabilitation in Somalia

UN Press Release SG/SM/5079, 9 September 1993

I welcome you to this informal meeting on Somalia. I am grateful to you for accepting my invitation to this meeting at short notice.

The purpose of this meeting is to exchange views, in an informal way, about the situation in Somalia. You are all familiar with the situation there. Most countries that are represented here have substantial troops in Somalia. Many of you, in addition, are playing and will be playing a significant role in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Somalia once the tragic conditions in south Mogadishu have been set right.

The attention of the media is focused on the events in Mogadishu. To some extent, this is understandable. However, what is not understandable is the fact that the media continues to ignore the positive progress which has been achieved in various fields in all parts of Somalia. In a moment, I shall mention some of these achievements. The former Prime Minister of Belgium, who came to see me in New York about two weeks ago, told me that he could not believe the transformation that he had witnessed in some parts of Somalia within the short span of six months. Similar sentiments have been expressed to me by leaders from other countries also.

Much attention continues to be focused on the security situation in South Mogadishu. But throughout the country, the Somali people are working hard to get their lives back in order. The United Nations and various specialized agencies, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations are helping them in that effort.

In the political area, on the basis of the agreement reached by the Somali parties in Addis Ababa, the United Nations is assisting the Somali people in establishing district and regional councils. I chaired the meeting in Addis Ababa in January where I met all the leaders and elders, including General Aidid. At that meeting, agree-

ment was reached on certain principles to facilitate settlement of the situation in Somalia. Twenty-five district councils have been established in various regions so far. Efforts are going on to expedite establishment of regional councils. The district and regional councils would serve as the building blocks in the Transitional National Council which, when established, will be the foundation of the new Somali government.

Progress continues to be made in the humanitarian effort which prompted international intervention in Somalia in the first instance. Starvation has largely been eradicated. Nutrition and immunization programmes have significantly reduced the death rate from preventable diseases. Schools which had been shut down for three to four years are now reopening. Tens of thousands of children are back in schools. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) is working with 57 communities to develop a model for rebuilding the primary education system. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has provided 50,000 sets of hand tools for use in Hargeisa which will be used in vocational training programmes. The printing of 90,000 Somali textbooks in Ethiopia has been agreed between the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the UNHCR. The UNESCO is also printing 200,000 textbooks in Nairobi.

On an average, 100,000 people receive dry food rations every month in Mogadishu. The World Food Programme is providing food supplies to the local Red Crescent Society of Belet Weyne for some 70,000 displaced persons in camps. In Kismayu, the World Food Programme is about to begin a food-for-work programme which will benefit about 3,000 displaced families of nomadic origin.

One of the highest priorities is the return and resettlement of 1.3 million refugees and displaced persons to Somalia. In southern Somalia, significant progress has been achieved in the settlement of displaced persons in Kismayu. In Gedo, a large number of displaced farmer families have started moving out of Bardera to return to their villages. The UNHCR continues with the repatriation programmes for refugees in the camps at the Kenyan border.

Seventy maternal and child health clinics have been rebuilt and another 20 are scheduled for completion this year. The UNHCR, together with non-governmental organizations, operates 20 hospitals, 49 mother/child health centres, 32 outpatient department and 151 rural health posts throughout Somalia. The World Health Organization (WHO) has begun a tuberculosis treatment campaign in various parts. Over 650,000 children have received vaccinations against measles, which was the number one killer of children in 1992.

Water systems are being repaired and rehabilitated. In Mogadishu, nearly three quarters of all households have access to water. Numerous small-scale projects are also under way in many areas. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) currently operates 26 veterinary clinics in south and central Somalia.

I would be the first to admit that we in the United Nations have not been able to project all this amount of good work to international public opinion. We are trying to remove our shortcomings in this respect. But I can tell you that it is not easy and the press tends not to be interested in aspects of reconstruction, rehabilitation and political reconciliation. I ask that Member States help in this respect.

As far as the security situation is concerned, during the period of the Unified Command there were 32,000 troops deployed in 30 per cent of the country. When UNOSOM took over, it was left with only 18,000 troops. The plan had been for 28,000 to be deployed throughout Somalia. In my last report to the Security Council, I explained that we would need a further 4,000 troops. We have only now reached the figure of about 22,000 — that is about 10,000 fewer than are needed for a minimum of security. We are in contact with Member States to send additional forces.

I have held long consultations with my advisors and have concluded that there is no alternative but to continue the process of disarmament. This is a prerequisite to the continued provision of humanitarian assistance and efforts to facilitate the return of refugees.

Document 65

Security Council resolution affirming the importance the Council attaches to the successful fulfilment of UNOSOM II's objectives and approving the Secretary-General's recommendations relating to the re-establishment of the Somali police, judicial and penal systems

S/RES/865 (1993), 22 September 1993

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992, 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992, 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992, 775 (1992) of 28 August 1992, 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992, 814 (1993) of 26 March 1993 and 837 (1993) of 6 June 1993,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 17 August 1993, 1/

Stressing the importance of continuing the peace process initiated by the Addis Ababa Agreement of 27 March 1993, 2/ and in this connection welcoming the efforts of African countries, the Organization of African Unity, in particular its Horn of Africa Standing Committee, the League of Arab States and the Organization of

the Islamic Conference, in cooperation with and in support of the United Nations, to promote national reconciliation in Somalia,

Also stressing the commitment of the international community to help Somalia regain a normal, peaceful life, while recognizing that the people of Somalia bear the ultimate responsibility for national reconciliation and reconstruction of their own country,

Expressing its appreciation for the improvements in the overall situation, which have been achieved by the

1/ *Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-eighth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1993, document S/26317.*

2/ *Ibid.*, document S/26317, sect. IV.

United Nations Operation in Somalia II, in particular the eradication of starvation, the establishment of a large number of district councils, the opening of schools and the resumption by the Somali people in most areas of the country of their normal lives,

Recognizing the continuing need for broad-based consultations and consensus on basic principles to achieve national reconciliation and the establishment of democratic institutions,

Calling upon all Somali parties, including movements and factions, to show the political will to achieve reconciliation, peace and security,

Also recognizing that the highest priority for the Operation is to assist the people of Somalia in the furtherance of the national reconciliation process and to promote and advance the re-establishment of regional and national institutions and civil administration in the entire country, as set out in resolution 814 (1993),

Noting with great concern, despite the improvements in the overall situation in Somalia, continuing reports of violence in Mogadishu and the absence of law enforcement and judicial authorities and institutions in the country as a whole, and recalling the request to the Secretary-General in resolution 814 (1993) to assist in the re-establishment of the Somali police and the restoration and maintenance of peace, stability and law and order,

Convinced that the re-establishment of the Somali police and the judicial and penal systems is critical for the restoration of security and stability in the country,

Gravely concerned at the continuation of armed attacks against Operation personnel, and recalling resolution 814 (1993), in which it emphasized the fundamental importance of a comprehensive and effective programme for disarming Somali parties, including movements and factions,

A

1. *Welcomes* the reports by the Secretary-General and his Special Representative on the progress achieved in accomplishing the objectives set out in resolution 814 (1993);

2. *Commends* the Secretary-General, his Special Representative and all personnel of the United Nations Operation in Somalia II for their achievements in greatly improving the conditions of the Somali people and beginning the process of nation-building apparent in the restoration in much of the country of stable and secure conditions, in stark contrast with the prior suffering caused by inter-clan conflict;

3. *Condemns* all attacks on Operation personnel and reaffirms that those who have committed or have ordered the commission of such criminal acts will be held individually responsible for them;

4. *Affirms* the importance it attaches to the successful fulfilment on an urgent and accelerated basis of the Operation's objectives of facilitation of humanitarian assistance and the restoration of law and order, and of national reconciliation in a free, democratic and sovereign Somalia, so that it can complete its mission by March 1995;

5. *Requests*, in that context, the Secretary-General to direct the urgent preparation of a detailed plan with concrete steps setting out the Operation's future concerted strategy with regard to its humanitarian, political and security activities and to report thereon to the Council as soon as possible;

6. *Urges* the Secretary-General to re-double his efforts at the local, regional and national levels, including encouraging broad participation by all sectors of Somali society, to continue the process of national reconciliation and political settlement, and to assist the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy;

7. *Calls on* all Member States to assist, in all ways possible, including the urgent full staffing of the Operation's civil positions, the Secretary-General, in conjunction with regional organizations, in his efforts to reconcile the parties and rebuild Somali political institutions;

8. *Invites* the Secretary-General to consult the countries of the region and regional organizations concerned on means of further reinvigorating the reconciliation process;

B

9. *Approves* the recommendations of the Secretary-General contained in annex I to his report of 17 August 1993 1/ relating to the re-establishment of the Somali police, judicial and penal systems in accordance with resolution 814 (1993), and requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps on an urgent and accelerated basis to implement them;

10. *Welcomes* the Secretary-General's intention to convene at the earliest possible date a meeting of Member States interested in supporting the United Nations Operation in Somalia II in the re-establishment of the police, judicial and penal systems, for the purpose of determining specific requirements and identifying specific sources of support;

11. *Requests* the Secretary-General to undertake actively and as a matter of great urgency an international recruiting programme for staffing the Operation's Justice Division with police, judicial and penal system specialists;

12. *Also welcomes* the Secretary-General's intention to maintain and utilize the fund established pursuant to resolution 794 (1992), and maintained in resolution 814 (1993), for the additional purpose of receiving contributions for the re-establishment of the Somali judicial and penal systems in addition to the establishment of the Somali police, other than for the cost of international staff;

13. *Urges* Member States, on an urgent basis, to contribute to that fund or otherwise to provide assistance

for the re-establishment of the Somali police, judicial and penal systems, including personnel, financial support, equipment and training to help attain the objectives outlined in annex I to the report of the Secretary-General;

14. *Encourages* the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to ensure continuation of the current police, judicial and penal programme from October to the end of December 1993 until additional funding from Member States is forthcoming, and to make recommendations as appropriate to the General Assembly;

15. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Council fully informed on a regular basis on the implementation of the present resolution;

16. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Document 66

Letter dated 1 October 1993 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council concerning UNOSOM II's presence in north-west Somalia

S/26526, 1 October 1993

About 10 days ago, the Acting Zone Director of UNOSOM for north-west Somalia ("Somaliland") was told by the authorities that all United Nations personnel should withdraw from the region. Subsequently, on 28 September 1993, Mr. Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, the "President" of "Somaliland" told the Acting Zone Director that his administration had set Wednesday, 29 September, as the deadline for the withdrawal of UNOSOM from the north-west. A message to that effect was communicated to my Special Representative for Somalia, Admiral Jonathan Howe. Mr. Egal also asked my Special Representative to inform him about the intention of the United Nations towards the region, both in the political and economic areas.

Despite the deadline of 29 September for UNOSOM's withdrawal from the north-west, Mr. Egal intimated that he could wait for a reply from the United Nations until

2 October 1993. On the evening of the original deadline, 29 September, the authorities in the north-west confirmed that UNOSOM must withdraw from the region by 2 October if no reply was received from the United Nations.

The Acting Zone Director has advised UNOSOM that he expected the security situation for United Nations personnel in the north-west to deteriorate if Mr. Egal did not receive a reply to his communication to my Special Representative. The United Nations Security Coordinator concurs with this assessment. In view of the security concerns and given the fact that the mandate of UNOSOM II is under Chapter VII of the Charter, I would like to seek the guidance of the Security Council on how to proceed on this matter.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Document 67

Letter dated 1 October from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General concerning UNOSOM II's presence in north-west Somalia

S/26527, 1 October 1993

The members of the Security Council have been apprised of the contents of your letter dated 1 October 1993 (S/26526) regarding the presence of UNOSOM II in north-west Somalia ("Somaliland").

The members of the Council express the hope that UNOSOM II will be able in due course to continue its work under its mandate in north-west Somalia ("Somaliland") using all peaceful means for the benefit of the population there.

The members of the Council are confident that you will take the necessary precautions for the safety and protection of all United Nations personnel deployed in north-west Somalia ("Somaliland").

(Signed) Ronaldo Mota SARDENBERG
President of the Security Council

Document 68

Statement issued by the Spokesman for the Secretary-General on 7 October 1993 concerning the statement made by President Clinton of the United States on the situation in Somalia

UN Press Release SG/SM/5126, 7 October 1993

The Secretary-General is very pleased at President Clinton's statement today. His analysis of the situation in Somalia, and of the role of the United Nations and the United States there, is fully consistent with the Secretary-General's. This is not surprising given the leading role of the United States in the United Nations in general and in the rescue of Somalia in particular.

The Secretary-General is grateful to President Clinton for having highlighted the many achievements of the United Nations in Somalia, and for having corrected many of the misperceptions which have surfaced in the last few weeks. The President has rightly emphasized that the ultimate responsibility of finding a solution to the crisis in Somalia, which requires rebuilding institutions which had virtually disappeared, lies with the Somalis. Out of humanitarian concern, the international community has taken action to fill a grave vacuum which had led to fratricidal conflict and resulted in great bloodshed and impaired the delivery of food and medicine to those who needed it. The world has witnessed the tragedy of Somalia, thanks to the ever-vigilant media.

The President has also correctly recalled that the mandate which we have been discharging in Somalia, given to us by the Security Council, comprises various aspects, including assuring the delivery of assistance to those who need it, promoting political reconciliation and disarming those elements who are responsible for the tragedy which has occurred and which, unfortunately, is still unfolding in a part of Mogadishu, the capital city. Understandably, attention has been drawn to the sensational events of the last few days, including the deaths of those, American and others, who went to Somalia on a mission of peace. Attention has been diverted from the fact that in most of Somalia today, virtually no one is starving, district councils are being formed and the nation is rising once again from the embers.

Next week the Secretary-General will be travelling personally to Somalia and to Addis Ababa to resume his efforts to promote political reconciliation. As before, he will be relying heavily on the assistance of the countries of the area, as well as regional organizations. He is happy to be able to count on the continued support of the United States Government in this effort.

Document 69

Joint statement dated 14 October 1993 of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference on their meeting on Somalia, held in Cairo

UN Press Release SGT/1818-SOM/44, 14 October 1993

CAIRO, 14 October — The Chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak, today hosted a meeting attended by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Secretary-General of the OAU, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. The meeting was called to discuss efforts to help promote peace and reconciliation in Somalia.

The following joint statement was issued after the meeting:

“Today in Cairo we reaffirm our joint determination to continue our ongoing search for common solutions to the problems of Somalia. We recall the terms of the Addis Ababa Agreement of 27 March 1993, and the undertaking made by Somali political leaders as part of that Agreement to commit themselves to continuing the peace process — under the auspices of the United Nations, and in cooperation with regional organizations, and neighbouring countries.

“We are committed to advancing the process of reconciliation and rebuilding begun by Somali leaders themselves. We emphasize our continued commitment to the principles of cooperation and peace. We also underscore our common commitment to pursuing a coordinated and comprehensive approach to the search for solutions to the difficult problems that lie ahead for Somalia.

“In the context of our continuing efforts to promote peace, reconciliation, and the rebuilding of Somalia:

“We invite all Somali parties to cooperate in finding solutions to Somalia’s problems.

“We take note of the constructive role already played by the countries of the region. In this connection, we welcome the leading role played by the President of Ethiopia, pursuant to mandates received from the OAU and the Intergovernmental

Authority for Drought and Development, and we appeal to him to continue his efforts.

“We recognize the achievements of the United Nations in providing humanitarian relief and security to most of Somalia, and salute the military and civilian personnel participating in these efforts.

“We express our gratitude to the many nations contributing personnel to the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNISOM II), and offer our deepest condolences to the families of those who have given their lives.

“We equally convey our deepest condolences to the Somali families who have lost their loved ones. Our profound sympathies also go to the Somali people as a whole.

“We commend the humanitarian work carried out by non-governmental organizations in Somalia, and encourage them to continue and intensify their efforts.

“We appeal to especially to the members of the OAU, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference to contribute the troops and resources that are needed for UNISOM II to successfully carry out its mission.

“We call for the setting up of a Special Fund for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Somalia, and urge all countries of Africa, the Arab world, and the Islamic community to contribute generously to its establishment and operation.

“We welcome the announcement that donor countries have agreed to attend a Humanitarian Conference on Somalia, which is to be held in Addis Ababa from 8 to 10 November 1993.”

Document 70

Report of Mr. Fanuel Jarirentundu Kozonquizi, the Independent Expert of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, on conditions in Somalia

A/48/510, 26 October 1993

I. Introduction

1. The mandate of the independent expert was established by the Commission on Human Rights under resolution 1993/86, adopted on 10 March 1993, and subsequently approved by the Economic and Social Council decision 1993/282 of 28 July 1993.

2. In paragraph 1 of the above-mentioned resolution, the Commission requested the Secretary-General to appoint for a period of one year a person having wide experience in the field of human rights as an independent expert, to assist the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia through development of a long-term programme of advisory services for re-establishing human rights and the rule of law, including a democratic Constitution, as well as the eventual holding of periodic and genuine elections by universal suffrage and secret ballot.

3. The Commission also requested the Secretary-General to give priority to implementing the programme recommended by the independent expert, as conditions in Somalia permit, including through the programme of advisory services of the Centre for Human Rights, in close cooperation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, the United Nations Peace-keeping Operation in Somalia and other United Nations entities, such as the Electoral Assistance Unit, as well as humanitarian and non-governmental organizations (para. 2).

4. Furthermore, the Commission urged the Secretary-General to consider recommending the establishment of a unit within the United Nations operation in Somalia to assist in the promotion and protection of human rights and in encouraging respect for humanitarian law, as well as the implementation of the recommendations by the independent expert (para. 3). The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 6 of the Commission's resolution.

II. Assessment of the current situation

5. Despite the widely reported atrocities committed against the Somali people by the regime of ousted president General Siad Barre for over two decades, since January 1991, violations of human rights have increased even more. The absence of an accountable Government, the lack of an infrastructure in the country, combined with a situation of almost total anarchy, renders even difficult the

capture and bringing to justice of the most wanted perpetrators of violations of human rights in the country.

6. The expert would like to refer in this connection to the fact that the United Nations had to offer a reward of \$25,000 for the capture of General Mohammed Farrah Aidid in the wake of the criminal attack committed against UNOSOM II forces, in which 25 Pakistani soldiers were killed, 10 listed as missing and 57 wounded (54 Pakistani, 3 United States).

7. Moreover, when United States Army Rangers captured the chief aide to General Aidid, Mr. Osman Atto, on 21 September 1993, it was reported that General Aidid's supporters threatened attacks on United Nations headquarters and on foreigners, if Mr. Atto were not released soon.

8. Although the expert concurs with the position adopted in the Security Council when it affirmed that "all officials of the United Nations and all experts on mission for the United Nations in Somalia enjoy the privileges and immunities provided for in the Convention on the Principles and Immunities of the United Nations of 1946 and in any other relevant instrument and that all parties, movements and factions in Somalia are required to allow them full freedom of movement and all necessary facilities", he considers it untimely to undertake, under the present circumstances, a field mission to investigate on the spot the rampant violations of human rights committed by the parties concerned.

9. Moreover, the expert received allegations as to human rights violations committed by the United Nations forces in Somalia. Those allegations include conduct in violation of the humanitarian law principles contained in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977, now considered to form part of customary international law.

III. Mandate of the independent expert

10. The mandate entrusted to the expert by the Commission on Human Rights should be implemented by its terms of reference in cooperation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and therefore activities proposed or already undertaken within the framework of UNOSOM II should be considered a point of departure for developing a long-term programme of advisory services.

11. In this connection, it is important to recall the political intention of 15 Somali leaders contained in the Addis Ababa Agreement on the First Session of the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia of 27 March 1993. A follow-up all-Somali peace conference was held in Mogadishu on 30 September and 1 October 1993 attended by 12 of the 15 Somali political movements which had signed the Addis Ababa Agreement.

12. The Agreement in section I (Disarmament and Security) provides, *inter alia*, that the leaders committed themselves to complete and simultaneous disarmament throughout the country in accordance with the disarmament concept and time-frame set by the Cease-Fire Agreement of January 1993.

13. The expert, therefore, can only deplore that despite several calls from the Security Council for a comprehensive and effective programme for disarming Somali parties, including movements and factions, the Somali leaders continue to violate their commitments made on 27 March and 1 October 1993. This includes their request to UNOSOM to apply strong and effective sanctions against those responsible for any violation of the Cease-fire Agreement.

14. The expert, furthermore, wholeheartedly concurs with the need, expressed in the Addis Ababa Agreement, to establish an impartial National and Regional Police Force in all regions of the country, but it is clear that a critical element in creating the security conditions necessary for the re-establishment of such a force is the real disarmament of the entire country.

15. With regard to restoration of property, the parties to the Agreement affirmed that all private or public properties that were illegally confiscated, robbed, stolen, seized, embedded or taken by other fraudulent means must be returned to their rightful owners. The expert welcomes in this connection the idea that UNOSOM will establish a property claims investigation team to deal with such crimes, and that all property crimes not under the jurisdiction of the team will be directed to the Somali police for investigation.

16. The expert considers the proposed establishment of transitional mechanisms, which should prepare the country for a stable and democratic future, a very essential part of the Agreement. The expert is convinced that his mandate related to the development of a long-term programme of advisory services could be very useful once all the four basic transitional organs of authority are effectively in place. He is aware that quick action is needed as the transitional period will last for a period of two years effective from the date of signature of the Agreement, that is, until 27 March 1995.

17. The following organs were established by the Agreement:

- (a) *The Transitional Council*, which will be the repository of Somali sovereignty. It would have the authority to appoint various committees, including the Transitional Charter Drafting Committee, which would draft a democratic constitution guided by Somali traditional ethics and basic principles of human rights. In addition, the Council should establish an independent judiciary as requested by the Security Council with the assistance of UNOSOM. By 31 March 1995, the Transitional National Council will have determined what type of judicial system and laws are required for the country. UNOSOM II intends to complete its mission by March 1995.
- (b) *Central Administrative Departments*, which will function under the supervision of the Transitional Council. Their primary function will be to re-establish and operate the departments of civil administration, social, economic and humanitarian affairs, and thus pave the way for the re-establishment and operation of a formal government.
- (c) *Regional Councils* shall be established in all existing 18 regions of Somalia. The Councils will be entrusted primarily with the task of implementing humanitarian, social and economic programmes in coordination with the Transitional National Council and they will also assist in the conducting of the internationally supervised census. The Regional Councils will liaise with UNOSOM II, United Nations specialized agencies, non-governmental organizations and other relevant organizations directly and through the Central Administrative Departments and the Transitional National Council. The Regional Councils shall also be responsible for law and order at the regional level. A regional police force and a regional judiciary will be the enforcement mechanism at the regional level.
- (d) *District Councils*. Thus far, 25 District Councils have been established. District Council members shall be appointed through election or through consensus-based selection in accordance with Somali traditions. The District Councils shall be responsible for managing public safety, health, education and reconstruction.

18. Regarding the investigation and prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian law required under Security Council resolution 814 (1993) of 26 March 1993, the expert will collaborate with UNOSOM and its recently established Office of Human Rights. The establishment of a local Somali human rights committee could facilitate, when conditions permit, on-the-spot investigation of violations of human rights.

19. The expert welcomes the idea of UNOSOM to establish a team of international specialists to investigate, in cooperation with the Somali police human rights violations committed against the Somali people, as well as international assistance workers. Such violations include mass murders of Somali citizens, murder, attempted murder and threats of bodily harm against international assistance workers and UNOSOM employees.

IV. Conclusions

20. The expert recognizes that under the present circumstances it is premature to propose any concrete activity to be undertaken under the advisory services programme. If the situation does not improve in the near future, he would consider recommending to the Commission on Human Rights to change his mandate or to revert the situation to other United Nations bodies.

21. Implementation of his current mandate can only take place once all parties concerned decide to commit themselves to the Addis Ababa Agreement of 27 March 1993. A complete disarmament of all sides is a *sine qua non* for security and stability in the country. An independent group of human rights monitors should be established to receive complaints and collect and investigate reports of violations of human rights and humanitarian law, transmit them to the UNOSOM Office or, where appropriate, to the Centre for Human Rights.

22. In conformity with the request of the Security Council, perpetrators of serious violations of human rights should be apprehended and brought to justice. International lawyers could conduct these trials, if Somali judges decline to hear cases as a result of threats or intimidation. Suspects would be given a trial in accordance with internationally accepted standards, but no impunity for those offences should apply.

Document 71

Report of the Secretary-General on emergency assistance for humanitarian relief and the economic and social rehabilitation of Somalia

A/48/504, 29 October 1993

I. Introduction

1. In its resolution 47/160 of 18 December 1992 on emergency assistance for humanitarian relief and the economic and social rehabilitation of Somalia, the General Assembly, *inter alia*:

“3. *Appeals* to all States and relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to continue to extend emergency assistance to Somalia, taking into account the report of the Secretary-General and the 100-day Action Programme for Accelerated Humanitarian Assistance endorsed at the Coordination Meeting for Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia held at Geneva on 12 and 13 October 1992;

...

“10. *Urges* the specialized agencies and other organizations of the United Nations system, in particular the United Nations Development Programme, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations Children’s Fund, the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the

World Food Programme, the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements and the United Nations Environment Programme, to continue to implement their assistance programmes in their respective fields of competence, within the framework of the United Nations Operation in Somalia, on the most urgent basis, in order to alleviate the suffering of the affected population in all parts of Somalia;

“11. *Appeals* to all parties concerned to terminate hostilities and to engage in a national reconciliation process that will lead to the re-establishment of peace, order and stability and also facilitate relief and rehabilitation efforts;

“12. *Calls upon* the Secretary-General to continue to mobilize international humanitarian assistance for Somalia;

“13. *Calls upon* all parties, movements and factions in Somalia to respect fully the security and safety of personnel of the United Nations and its specialized agencies and of non-governmental organizations, and to guarantee their complete freedom of movement throughout Somalia;

“14. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in view of the critical situation in Somalia, to take all measures necessary for the implementation of the present resolution, to apprise the Economic and Social Council at its substantive session of 1993 of the progress made and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session.”

The present report is submitted pursuant to the above request of the General Assembly.

Report to the Economic and Social Council

2. As requested by the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council was apprised, at its regular session of 1993, of progress made in the implementation of General Assembly resolution 47/160. The oral report, delivered by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, highlighted the generous response of the international community to the 100-day Action Programme, which covered relief requirements. At the same time, the Council was informed that there remained a substantial shortfall in funds for the 1993 Relief and Rehabilitation Programme. With large parts of the country enjoying much greater security, donors were urged to contribute additional funds so that the proposed rehabilitation projects could be implemented effectively. Their timely implementation would be expected to complement efforts to establish peace and security in all parts of Somalia.

II. Background

3. The protracted civil war has left Somalia's political, economic and social structures in ruins. By the latter half of 1992, minimal requirements for sustaining life were non-existent. Food, water and shelter were lacking. Five million Somalis were directly affected by the impact of the war. Just under 3 million people became either refugees or internally displaced persons. Delivery of social services had decreased to minimal levels. One third of the country's physical infrastructure had been either destroyed or was not operational. Two and a half million Somalis were in desperate need of the most basic nutritional and medical services. One and one-half million were in danger of imminent death from famine and disease. It is estimated that over 300,000 people died from starvation or as a result of the conflict during 1992 alone.

III. The 100-day action programme for accelerated humanitarian assistance for Somalia

4. The United Nations had launched the 100-day Action Programme for Accelerated Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia in October 1992. The Programme was

subsequently extended to the end of March 1993. The response to the Programme by the international community was prompt and generous. A total of US\$ 74 million, representing 90 per cent of requirements, was contributed by donors and channelled through United Nations organizations. The United Nations and the international community were ready and had built up the capacity to provide great quantities of relief supplies. However, that capacity was seriously compromised by widespread looting, extortion and large-scale diversion of relief aid.

5. The Second Coordination Meeting for Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia took place at Addis Ababa from 3 to 5 December 1992. The meeting provided an opportunity to review the relief programme and the obstacles encountered and to examine how to go forward in the face of the security problems that plagued humanitarian efforts. Discussions went beyond the scope of the programme itself, with participants emphasizing the need to gradually move from relief to rehabilitation and reconstruction.

6. One of the most important features of the meeting was the participation of Somali political and community leaders, non-governmental organizations and women's organizations. In addition to Somali representatives, Governments, United Nations organizations, intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, the World Bank, the Economic Commission for Africa, the Horn of Africa Committee, the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the Organization of the Islamic Conference also participated in the meeting and contributed to making it an expression of concrete and concerted international solidarity.

7. On 3 December, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, adopted a landmark resolution (resolution 794 (1992)) authorizing the use of all necessary means to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. The situation had deteriorated to such an extent that the need for armed protection of humanitarian personnel and relief convoys had become urgent.

8. The Somali political and community leaders attending the humanitarian meeting at Addis Ababa, welcomed the adoption of resolution 794 (1992) and issued a declaration in support of the historic decision to send forces to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance.

9. The first contingents of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) landed at Mogadishu on 9 December 1992 and gradually secured eight main centres in central and southern Somalia. The presence of UNITAF helped to open up access to remote areas and enabled the delivery of relief supplies to people who would otherwise have starved or died from disease and lack of water.

10. The port of Mogadishu was reopened after many months, and substantial quantities of food and other essential supplies were brought in. Both the port and the airport were put to full use, and improvements were also made to airports and airstrips in rural areas to cope with the massive airlifts of relief. At the same time, repair work was carried out on the major relief supply routes, and some mine clearance was undertaken. A fleet of trucks was brought in from neighbouring countries to accelerate the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

11. Many new non-governmental organizations established programmes in central and southern parts of Somalia—the area most severely affected by civil strife and famine. United Nations bodies were able to significantly increase their staff and to expand their activities. The cooperation between the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), non-governmental organizations and the United Nations was very close. International and local non-governmental organizations became major actors and have continued to play a crucial role in many parts of Somalia.

12. The deployment of security forces also enabled the distribution of seeds and tools and a rapid expansion of immunization programmes. It became possible for health and nutrition assessments to take place. The combined efforts of humanitarian agencies and organizations and the security forces led to a dramatic decrease in the death rates and in the levels of malnutrition.

13. One of the major achievements in that period was the high level of coordination between UNITAF and the relief community through the Humanitarian Operations Centre. United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations involved in the delivery of humanitarian assistance could discuss requests for emergency assistance, convoy escorts and security issues. Humanitarian Operations Centres were also established in six other locations.

14. In spite of the presence of UNITAF, the risk to relief workers remained high. A number of Somali and expatriate relief personnel were killed. Theft, looting and extortion continued to plague relief efforts. The resettlement of some 1 million internally displaced people and hundreds of thousands of refugees could not proceed owing to security problems. Armed bands began to create havoc in new areas, including neighbouring countries that had offered hospitality to Somali refugees.

15. It became clear that, unless determined efforts were made to put an effective and widespread disarmament programme into place, the delivery of relief supplies and rehabilitation activities would continue to be impeded. The agreements concluded at the Preparatory Meeting for a National Reconciliation Conference, convened by the Secretary-General in January 1993, were to

pave the way for national reconciliation and for disarmament.

IV. The 1993 relief and rehabilitation programme

16. By the beginning of 1993, the worst of the emergency appeared to be over and the focus was beginning to shift from relief to rehabilitation.

17. The Third Coordination Meeting for Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia was held from 11 to 13 March 1993, again at Addis Ababa. The meeting was attended by 190 Somali representatives—political leaders, community elders, a large number of women and local non-governmental organizations. The Somali participants were the first to underline the importance of security and peace for the effectiveness of rehabilitation programmes. Those who came from relatively peaceful areas made pleas for additional support, as they were anxious to consolidate initiatives they had taken to return to normalcy.

18. The 1993 Relief and Rehabilitation Programme, which was launched at the meeting, was designed to address the priority needs of Somalia. The Programme was endorsed as a valid and useful framework for relief and rehabilitation for the remainder of the year. It was seen as part of a continuing process of moving from conflict to peace and from survival to development. It was recognized that adjustments would be made and flexibility maintained, taking into account the reality of the situation in Somalia.

19. Many of the Somalis who attended the Coordination Meeting for Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia stayed on to take part in the proceedings of the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia, which the Secretary-General convened on 15 March 1993. The participation of a large number of Somalis from non-political groups provided a link between rehabilitation and reconstruction on the one hand and the establishment of peace and security on the other. In this way, the interface between humanitarian assistance and peacemaking was being given an impetus. And the message delivered to the political leaders was unequivocal: unless they took concrete steps towards establishing peace, the international community's willingness to assist Somalia would be seriously undermined.

20. The Conference on National Reconciliation endorsed the outcome of the Coordination Meeting for Humanitarian Assistance and condemned attacks on relief personnel and relief supplies. The message from the Coordination Meeting had, therefore, not been sent in vain.

21. On 26 March 1993, the Security Council adopted resolution 814 (1993) expanding the mandate of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). The Council requested the Secretary-General to provide

assistance to Somalia covering economic relief and rehabilitation; the repatriation of refugees and the resettlement of internally displaced persons; the re-establishment of national and regional institutions and civil administration; the re-establishment of Somali police; and mine-clearance. UNOSOM II took over the task of UNITAF in facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance and in continuing and expanding efforts to establish security throughout Somalia.

22. Relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts are central components of the overall attempts to rebuild Somalia and to achieve long-term stability. However, the actual amount of funds made available for these efforts has been disappointingly low. To date, only 20 per cent of the requirements of the 1993 Relief and Rehabilitation Programme (\$160 million) has been made available.

V. Challenges facing the humanitarian mission

23. One of the principal challenges now facing the humanitarian mission in Somalia is the prevention of a return to widespread human suffering. The creation of a secure environment throughout Somalia is essential for effective relief and rehabilitation activities, as well as eventual development work which must be undertaken. While activities in Mogadishu South have been curtailed as a result of continued instability in that part of the city, United Nations organizations and non-governmental organizations have extended their assistance to all parts of Somalia, including the north-west and north-east.

A. Continued relief requirements

24. The major problems in the emergency phase have, for the most part, been successfully addressed. However, there continue to exist pockets of acute nutritional and medical problems. Targeted feeding programmes of dry food distribution will continue for the foreseeable future. About 1 million affected Somalis require assistance through the provision of shelter, medical care and life-sustaining articles such as clothing, blankets and cooking utensils.

B. Resettlement

25. It is estimated that as many as 1.7 million people were forced to leave their homes as a result of the turmoil and the famine. Of these, over 1 million crossed into Kenya and Ethiopia. Over 250,000 persons moved to Mogadishu and about 60,000 persons to Kismayo and Baidoa. Some 20,000 persons have returned to Bardera over the last two years. The northern regions are supporting at least 250,000 internally displaced persons and refugees.

26. The number of refugees returning from camps in Kenya is not yet significant. It is estimated that some 70,000 refugees in the Mombasa area have returned by boat to Kismayo, Mogadishu and Bossaso. Full assistance packages are being provided to refugees returning to the Gado area, and minimal assistance to those spontaneously moving into the Lower and Middle Juba areas. It is estimated that these latter areas will receive the greatest number of refugees per square kilometre.

27. Until recently, political tension both in Dobley and around Kismayo, precluded the spontaneous return of refugees and displaced people to the Lower and Middle Juba. Agreements reached between elders at Dobley, the recently completed peace conference at Kismayo and the successful resettlement of more than half of the Kismayo displaced have increased the attraction of early return to home areas.

28. Humanitarian agencies have worked effectively in coordinating approaches to the issue of resettlement. An agreement is in place on providing support for resettlement efforts. This agreement is centred around several basic principles, which include the following:

(a) That the focus of all efforts should be directed towards development of community capacity to create a welcoming environment for returnees;

(b) That the decision to return must be freely arrived at and the timing of the movement determined by returnees themselves.

C. Rehabilitation of social services

29. Among the principal victims of the protracted conflict was an entire generation of Somali children denied access to education. Schools and educational institutions have been closed for long periods, and many teenagers and orphaned children joined the militia or gangs of looters and armed robbers.

30. As a result of the civil war, all the schools were thoroughly stripped of everything except the walls. Many had been used as graveyards. In the last six months, non-governmental organizations reported that over 23,000 primary students have been enrolled in 22 schools in the Bay, Bakool and Mogadishu and Lower Shabelle regions. This is the largest education programme being run in Somalia at the present time. It is a vital ingredient for the well-being of the community and confers benefits on present and future generations of Somali people.

31. Some 32 hospitals are now operating throughout the country, as well as 81 mother and child health centres. One hundred and three mobile vaccination teams are covering the country, working towards ensuring a sustainable immunization coverage. The estimates are that about 75 per cent of children under five years of age have received measles vaccinations under very difficult

operational conditions. Supplies, medicines and other equipment are made available to hospitals, health centres and pharmacies through United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations.

32. In the Juba Valley, collaborative efforts have been undertaken in order to assist in rehabilitation of school structures and provision of books and other equipment, as well as food, for teachers and students. Some 150,000 textbooks are being printed for distribution throughout Somalia. These texts conform to the former core curriculum and cover the Somali language, mathematics, science, Islamic studies and Arabic. One educational development centre has been established in Mogadishu and seven additional ones will be functioning by the end of 1994.

33. The teachers are now being identified, with the support of non-governmental organizations, to design and implement training workshops on the methodology of teaching, usage of books and guidelines, introduction of the new curriculum and management of resources, including textbooks. A scholarship programme for Somali university students to complete their studies abroad has been established, and contacts have been made with specialized institutions to get the programme under way.

34. Mogadishu's main water supply system has been rehabilitated to 40 per cent of its pre-war efficiency. City water-supply systems in Afgoi, Hargeisa and Berbera have also been rehabilitated. About 60 per cent of Hargeisa's population now has access to clean water. Adequate quantities of chlorine tablets are now available throughout the country to disinfect water. Sanitation activities in support of the safe water programmes include installation of pit latrines, provision of health education services, a major waste disposal exercise and emergency cleaning of sewage and drainage systems in Mogadishu.

35. Throughout 1992-1993, several attempts have been made by United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations to maintain sanitation projects within environmental health programmes. In Mogadishu, a food-for-trash project is proceeding on a trial basis. Bags of food are handed out three days a week in exchange for bags of trash collected by communities. Thirty-five feeding centres distribute 10 metric tons of food per site, three times a week. This exercise embraces all previous feeding centre beneficiaries. Other similar sanitation projects have been supported as food-for-work programmes throughout Somalia.

D. Rehabilitation of the agricultural sector

36. Agriculture has historically been responsible for two thirds of Somalia's employment and nearly three quarters of the country's foreign exchange earnings. A good measure of success has been achieved in reactivating

food production and the livestock sector. The provision of seeds and agricultural tools, together with good precipitation, has resulted in a substantial increase in the *gu* (rainy season) harvest. The delivery of relief food aid has been adjusted to take into account the availability of local food supplies. Relief organizations have also purchased food in the country in order to stimulate local production.

37. In the livestock sector, the supply of veterinary drugs and the vaccination of animals has facilitated the resuscitation of exports, with an estimated total of approximately 250,000 heads of livestock having been exported since April 1993.

38. Targeted support in these areas holds great promise for returning large numbers of enterprising Somalis to productive endeavour. These efforts will help remove some of the main constraints to expansion and growth.

E. Resuscitation of commerce and trade

39. Commercial and trading activities have shown very encouraging signs of recovery. Commercial traffic at Somalia's port has increased dramatically since December 1992, with ship movements at Mogadishu port having increased tenfold in the first half of 1993. Joint ventures between Somali and foreign investments are on the rise. One of the notable initiatives is the proposed restoration of telecommunications services. Another key development is the provision of fuel throughout the country by local companies.

F. Planning for economic recovery

40. UNOSOM, the World Bank and UNDP are collaborating effectively, and a detailed draft planning framework for reconstruction and recovery has been developed and will be examined at the next World Bank informal meeting on Somalia, scheduled to take place on 22 October 1993.

41. The purpose of developing the framework is to ensure that scarce domestic and international human and financial resources are used to their fullest potential to support the re-emergence of the country as a stable and economically productive member of the international community. Given the continuing fluid nature of the situation in all regions of the country, it is important that the process of programme planning and implementation be a dynamic one, and this requires a coordinating framework capable of responding to changing conditions.

42. The specific objectives of the framework are as follows:

- (a) To establish a common vision of the economic and social reconstruction, rehabilitation and development of Somalia;

- (b) To identify criteria that would lead to the establishment of priorities for reconstruction and rehabilitation;
- (c) To establish a mechanism for coordinated action on reconstruction and rehabilitation in an environment of constrained human and capital resources. The resultant mechanism should be capable of being passed on to a future Government of Somalia, whatever its form, as a basis for development planning.

43. Implementation of reconstruction is only viable if it takes place in the context of a gradual shift of civil authority from UNOSOM to a successor Somali authority. Somalia has potential for sustained growth, which in the long run could bring all Somalis above the poverty line. However, critical to the realization of these prospects for growth is the establishment of an environment of good governance, characterized by political stability, adequate supporting infrastructure and effective public institutions.

44. Somalia will need external assistance to start the process of reconstruction and rehabilitation of essential infrastructure, and while international partners are already investing in these areas, there is need to agree on priorities for action and a mechanism for coordination. In this respect, there are already signs that some of the interventions made in the relief phase of the crisis are unlikely to be sustainable in so far as the present and future capacity of the country is concerned. For example, the salaries now being paid by numerous agencies and organizations operating in Somalia, as well as payments for services, are at levels which cannot be sustained in the future.

45. In all these efforts, the sustained support of the international community is critical. In spite of setbacks, Somalia has come a long way from the devastating famine of 1991 and 1992. The international community has shown compassion to the suffering people of Somalia and has been generous in providing relief assistance.

VI. Information provided by organizations of the United Nations system

A. *United Nations Children's Fund*

46. During the period under review, UNICEF assistance has focused on providing relief and survival assistance to vulnerable populations, especially those directly affected by conflict and drought, and re-establishing access to basic social services, especially health, nutrition, water supply, sanitation and education.

47. UNICEF has directly implemented or supported supplementary feeding centres in the most severely affected famine areas of the central and southern regions.

At the height of the nutritional support programmes in November and December 1992, UNICEF was providing supplementary food and other assistance (feeding kits, etc.) for up to 177 feeding centres, reaching 164,000 beneficiaries. Despite very significant improvements in the nutritional status, indications are that, in many areas of central and southern Somalia that have not received sustained relief intervention, up to one half of the child population is malnourished.

48. The lack of access to basic health services, combined with a reduction in household food security, conflict and massive population displacement, have led to rampant and unnecessary deaths. By early 1993, UNICEF's response to these causes included provision of drugs, medicines, medical equipment and construction materials, training of health workers and logistical support to 20 hospitals, 49 mother and child health (MCH) centres, 32 outpatient departments and 151 rural/community health posts throughout Somalia. In most regions where MCH services constituted the only health service available to the population, UNICEF, in conjunction with other agencies and non-governmental organizations, concentrated on assisting the population to re-establish these community-based health services. With measles recognized as a significant threat to the child population, UNICEF, partner non-governmental organizations and local health authorities have targeted vaccination as a priority, along with vitamin A supplementation. Since August 1992, over 400 vaccinators have been trained, and the resource capacity significantly increased. By the end of May 1993, more than 640,000 children had received measles vaccinations and an equal number a dose of vitamin A.

49. Lack of access to potable water and limited sanitation facilities have led to very high rates of mortality and morbidity from diarrhoeal diseases. In a complementary approach with expanding access to potable water, use of oral rehydration salts (ORS) to prevent diarrhoeal dehydration has been a focus of basic health activities. Distribution of ORS sachets has been undertaken by UNICEF to health centres and hospitals operated by local and international non-governmental organizations and local health authorities throughout the country. In addition, workshops have been conducted for the control of diarrhoeal diseases. UNICEF has assisted in the reactivation of urban water supply systems in three major cities including Mogadishu, Hargeisa and Berbera, benefiting about 820,000 people. In addition, in conjunction with Swederelief and OXFAM, UNICEF has undertaken the reactivation of small-scale urban water supply in six locations, as well as the construction and relocation of 75 shallow wells in six other locations. It has also assisted in the chlorination of 500 wells all over the country.

50. In a programme to re-establish household food security and coping mechanisms, a number of farming families who remained in their communities along the Juba Valley and in the Lower Shabelle regions were assisted in a joint UNICEF/OXFAM programme prior to the minor rainy season (*der*) of October 1992. Agricultural inputs, as well as household utensils and shelter material, were provided to some 11,000 families in Lower Juba and to 7,000 families in Lower Shebelle. A seed multiplication programme was undertaken to ensure seed-availability for the major rainy season (*gu*), which commences around April.

51. As the situation in the north-west improved in 1992, UNICEF worked with 57 communities to develop a model for rebuilding primary education systems. Community-based school committees, formed by residents, were given responsibility for reconstructing school buildings, managing the facilities and recruiting teachers. UNICEF supported the provision of tools and construction materials, textbooks and education kits and the training of primary schoolteachers.

B. World Food Programme

52. The World Food Programme has continued to provide relief food to 1.2 million victims of the civil conflict. However, concerted action has been taken to phase out this relief assistance by August 1993, which is the period of the main harvest. In order to better address food security issues, dry ration distribution was shifted from towns to villages, to encourage the return of the displaced populations back to their villages of origin and to improve food availability at the household level. In the urban areas, a large part of the population continues to be without the means to support itself and needs assistance to meet basic food needs. Intensive and supplementary feeding programmes continue, as nutritional surveys have concluded that the rate of malnutrition and mortality is still high among children under the age of five.

53. Between February and May 1993, over 65 rehabilitation and resettlement projects were supported by WFP, targeting over 528,000 beneficiaries. The projects covered up to six regions in Somalia. As many as 21 non-governmental organizations, both international and national, participated as implementing partners of WFP. The Programme plans to expand this assistance, concentrating on the following activities throughout Somalia: targeted free distribution, vulnerable group feeding, food-for-work, institutional feeding (hospitals and prisons), assistance to the education sector, resettlement/repatriation and market sales schemes.

54. In the case of food-for-work, food aid has acted as an incentive to encourage people to undertake, for example, sanitation and water works schemes. In the

education sector, food, as a wage substitute, has encouraged the return of teachers to the school and increased the attendance of the children. As urban unemployment is an important issue that needs to be addressed, WFP and CONCERN have initiated a nutrition programme that provides commodities to newly emerging bakeries to make buns for the school programme. WFP and UNICEF are also developing other employment schemes. Programmes to resettle the internally displaced, as well as to assist the return of Somali refugees from neighbouring countries, constitute the largest part of the WFP programme in terms of beneficiaries and are considered a high priority. Finally, the WFP/CARE market sales programme has expanded into three other areas, in addition to Mogadishu. The programme has not only increased its market capacity, but the increase in funds will enable a more labour-intensive scheme to be supported.

55. WFP has taken the lead in food-aid coordination by chairing a committee of relevant United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations, which meets regularly, sharing information on food aid programmes and deliveries. The committee has also developed a strategy that ensures that crop and food supply assessments are carried out on a regular basis by the committee members, in order to ensure that up-to-date information is always available for consultation and quick intervention if necessary.

56. WFP has completed two assessments, one on truck rehabilitation and the second on the management of Mogadishu port. Both projects will be operational during the second half of 1993, as all of the necessary preparatory work has been completed and the funding is available.

C. United Nations Development Programme

57. The United Nations Development Programme, during the Coordination Meeting for Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia, held at Addis Ababa in December 1992, made a strong commitment to support development and initiated a number of projects that are now operational.

58. A rehabilitation programme strategy was formulated in December 1992 by a UNDP/Office of Project Services mission assessing needs initially in the northern region, and UNDP resources in the order of US\$ 20 million were programmed in close consultation with UNOSOM and other partners, including national and international non-governmental organizations. The Somalia Rehabilitation Programme (SOM/92/001) serves as a mechanism to establish a network of, initially, seven project implementation offices, each covering two to three districts, operated by a small expatriate team supported by national experts. Four project implementation offices are

now in the process of being established, and six international project staff have taken up their assignment in northern Somalia.

59. The Programme operates through local-level community groups and local authorities. Specific mechanisms to identify, select and approve sub-projects were developed at the outset of the project and, as the Programme evolves, are periodically reviewed.

60. A total of 19 sub-projects are operational in the northern region and one in the south. Sub-projects include school rehabilitation, bridge repair, re-establishing of market facilities, including collection of user fees, training of former militia in employable skills and negotiating agreements with local business groups to provide employment, repair of small irrigation facilities and provision of agricultural implements. Infrastructure repair activities include establishing technical and management capacities to ensure that the facilities are properly maintained. At present, 32 additional sub-projects have been identified. It is expected that the expansion of project activities will soon cover areas in the central and southern region.

61. One major subcontract with Save the Children, USA, co-financed by USAID, to rehabilitate large-scale irrigation systems and social infrastructure in the Lower Shebelle region, has demonstrated that development inputs in a region initially dominated by conflict can become productive again.

62. In order to support the political and peacemaking process, a project was approved to prepare a medium-term reconstruction and rehabilitation plan (SOM/93/001) for Somalia. In May 1993, a first phase technical planning team produced a framework for the preparation and coordination of the medium-term plan and terms of reference for the technical inputs. Subsequently, in consultation with donors and multilateral organizations, UNOSOM decided that it would take the responsibility for the overall coordination of the plan preparation and delegated the responsibility to the World Bank, in close coordination with UNDP, donors, other multilateral organizations and non-governmental organizations.

63. UNDP is funding an International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)-executed project (SOM/93/002) to restore air traffic control at Mogadishu International Airport, to be expanded to other airports at a later stage.

64. A UNDP project executed by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (SOM/93/003) aims to build the management capacities of the Mogadishu Port Authority and other ports in Somalia. A key component of these projects is to support the re-establishment of installations, which will help to generate much-needed revenue in the near future. This

project is being undertaken in close coordination with UNOSOM and WFP.

65. UNDP, with financial and material support from the Government of the United States of America, continues to operate the Mogadishu water supply system. This project (SOM/90/023) played a key role during the crisis in 1992 in preventing large-scale epidemics caused by contaminated water from shallow wells. A new phase, with activities proposed to build a water authority as the lead institution responsible for supplying town water, is under consideration. Under the same project, a sanitation programme is being implemented, which employs up to 1,000 Somalis, mostly women, through subcontracts with local non-governmental organizations.

D. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

66. The activities of UNHCR presently focus on implementation of the preventive zone cross-border operation in southern Somalia as well as on preparations for the anticipated return of refugees from Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya.

67. The cross-border operation from Kenya to Somalia commenced in September 1992, with UNHCR acting as lead agency. The operation initially aimed at preventing refugee outflows into neighbouring Kenya. Working closely with non-governmental organizations and local Somali leaders, a number of community-based Quick Lasting Impact Rehabilitation Projects (QLIPs) were initiated in sectors such as health, water, sanitation, education, agriculture and livestock. Progress achieved through the cross-border operation has created conditions favourable for large numbers of refugees in camps in eastern Kenya to opt for voluntary repatriation to the Gedo and Middle and Lower Juba regions in Somalia. Some 200,000 Somalis are expected to repatriate during the course of 1993 at an estimated cost of US\$ 48 million, covering basic services and rehabilitation needs.

68. Twelve international and eight local non-governmental organizations are involved in the implementation of 185 QLIPs in the sectors of water, health and sanitation, education, agriculture and infrastructure rehabilitation. Some 12,000 refugees have repatriated to the Gedo region with UNHCR assistance, while it is estimated that an additional 20,000 have returned spontaneously. To date, some 188,000 Somali refugees in refugee camps in Kenya have registered to return home. Security remains a major concern, however, particularly for the operations out of El-Wak through Doble.

69. In addition to the cross-border operations, UNHCR is assisting with the transport of internally displaced persons from designated areas, wishing to re-

turn to their home villages in the Gedo and Middle and Lower Juba regions in Somalia.

70. The operations plan for a returnee assistance programme in north-west Somalia was reoriented in 1992 towards implementation of community-based QLIPs to benefit both returnees and those who remained at home. Rehabilitation projects in sectors such as water, health and sanitation, education, agriculture and livestock will be implemented in areas of return.

71. In spite of the security constraints referred to above, the de-mining operation funded by UNHCR and implemented by Rimfire International, a company based in the United Kingdom, continued satisfactorily in 1992. UNHCR's contributions totalled some US\$ 3 million by the end of 1992. In 1993, some US\$ 2.3 million is foreseen to cover requirements of the de-mining operation. Estimated overall requirements for 1993 to cover rehabilitation and reintegration projects to benefit returnees in north-west Somalia amount to US\$ 13.9 million.

E. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

72. In addition to regular situation monitoring, FAO and WFP mounted a joint crop and food supply assessment mission to Somalia in February 1993 to estimate the 1992-1993 *der* (secondary) season cereal and pulse harvest and forecast the cereal import and food aid requirements until the *gu* (main) season harvest in August 1993. In April-May 1993, a FAO mission reviewed the possibility of setting up a food security unit and formulated a draft project document in support of the establishment of an early warning and food information system for implementation when conditions would permit.

73. FAO has identified and is currently implementing some 15 projects in the value of US\$ 5.3 million in Somalia. These projects are almost exclusively of an emergency assistance nature, aimed at reactivating the food and agriculture sector of the Somali economy. They involve emergency provision of cereals and vegetable seeds, pesticides, hand tools, animal traction assistance, emergency assistance to control trypanosomiasis in one district, decontaminating the East Africa Locust Control pesticides spill that occurred during the civil war, emergency assistance for desert locust control, reactivating veterinary clinics in various districts, provision of veterinary drugs, vaccination of livestock and rehabilitation of abattoirs, some modest provisions of fishing gear for fishermen and income-generating activities for women. FAO has scheduled a multidisciplinary mission with the objectives of reviewing the current state of food and agriculture in the country, rehabilitation activities and developing a programme approach for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the food and agriculture sector with

a view to achieving food security and sustainable agriculture and rural development.

74. The sources of financing for these projects consist of FAO's Technical Cooperation Programme amounting to more than US\$ 1.4 million, trust funds of US\$ 3.4 million from Italy, US\$ 1.1 million from the Netherlands, US\$ 1.2 million from Sweden and US\$ 0.6 million from Canada, France and a number of other donors, including UNDP, non-governmental organizations, etc. In addition, FAO now has a fully established representation to help monitor and support its field programme in the various parts of the country.

F. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

75. The first of the UNESCO-German supported "islands of education for peace" (or regional education centres) started its work on 1 April 1993 at Mogadishu. The first tasks will be to repair the selected school building, edit textbooks for grades I to IV and reprint them and prepare teachers' guides with lesson plans for each textbook.

76. Under the supervision of the UNESCO Education Adviser in Somalia, it is foreseen to prepare textbooks for children and a "teacher emergency package" consisting of developing support for schools, teachers and agencies engaged in the development of education in the Gedo region of Somalia.

77. UNESCO participated in a WFP-organized project identification mission to Somalia in February 1993. In the field of education, the mission identified three main options for using food aid: feeding children at school, using food as partial payment for teachers and reconstruction/rehabilitation of schools through food-for-work activities.

G. World Health Organization

78. WHO utilized funds from the Central Emergency Revolving Fund and commenced implementation of activities with a short lead-time. WHO has implemented emergency programmes aimed at reducing mortality and morbidity by improving access to basic health services.

79. The capacity of WHO on the ground has been reinforced with 9 international staff and 53 nationals in 8 offices in Somalia and logistics offices at Nairobi and in Djibouti.

H. International Fund for Agricultural Development

80. The North-West Region Agricultural Development Project (Phase II) was designed to increase the

productive capacity and incomes of about 6,250 small-scale subsistence farm families (45,000 people) by improving soil moisture conservation, increasing grain, fruit and vegetable production and strengthening local institutions.

81. The long-term objective of the Livestock Health Services Project (Livestock Development) is to reduce economic losses in the livestock sector by creating an efficient disease-control programme. The beneficiaries of the project were intended to be approximately 108,000 nomadic pastoralists and small-scale farm families who have an annual per capita income of approximately US\$ 50.

82. The Bay Region Agricultural Development Project (Phase II) was designed primarily to build upon phase I of the Bay Region Agricultural Development Project, taking advantage of the promising results obtained by applied research in assisting farmers with productive investments in areas where the preconditions for development have been established. The project is intended specifically to target about 25,500 farm families (180,000 people). Women represent a significant portion of the planned beneficiaries.

I. *Economic Commission for Africa*

83. ECA hosted, at its headquarters in Addis Ababa, the Second and Third Coordination Meetings for Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia in December 1992 and March 1993, respectively.

84. Even though the situation in Somalia still has a long way to go before it can be considered normal, ECA, within its mandate, and as the test of its Agenda on Emergency Humanitarian Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Affairs in Africa, has initiated the process of formulating a master plan for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country.

J. *World Bank*

85. In October 1992, the World Bank made available a grant of US\$ 20 million to assist in relief and rehabilitation. Most of this grant was used to help cover the costs of transport and logistics to deliver food and medical assistance and was implemented through agreements with WFP, UNICEF and WHO. The portion of the grant being implemented by WFP, however, is expected to include some post-relief assistance, financing a team of port management consultants who will be responsible for port administration.

86. The World Bank has organized a series of informal consultations with the aim of developing a planning framework for reconstruction and recovery.

The next such meeting is scheduled to take place on 22 October 1993.

K. *United Nations Environment Programme*

87. UNEP's assistance during the period under review, was largely limited to the assessment of the dumping of hazardous wastes in Somalia. A UNEP mission was fielded in October 1992 to carry out investigations on the alleged dumping of hazardous wastes.

L. *United Nations Population Fund*

88. UNFPA has interrupted its activities in Somalia because of the unstable situation. However, a request for assistance in undertaking a survey, which would cover social, economic, demographic and health aspects of the Somali people, is under consideration.

M. *United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat)*

89. UNCHS (Habitat) has expressed its readiness for immediate fielding of an assessment mission to identify housing and infrastructure needs, including other human settlements assistance and rehabilitation for the displaced at Mogadishu and other major towns.

N. *World Meteorological Organization*

90. WMO is ready to field a mission to assess the existing meteorological and hydrological facilities and to formulate a project for their rehabilitation once the security situation permits.

VII. *Assistance provided by Member States*

91. The Member States listed below have provided information on assistance rendered to Somalia in compliance with General Assembly resolution 47/160.

A. *Antigua and Barbuda*

92. The Government has made a cash contribution to the Trust Fund for Somalia - Unified Command.

B. *Denmark*

93. In 1992, Danish emergency assistance to Somalia amounted to DKr 104,915,439, channelled through international, as well as Danish, non-governmental organizations. In 1993, Danish emergency assistance has amounted to DKr 15,577,879, channelled through the Adventist Development Relief Agency, UNHCR and Danish non-governmental organizations.

C. Germany

94. In 1992 and 1993, Germany contributed an amount of approximately DM 78.5 million for bilateral humanitarian assistance so far. These funds were mainly used for projects of non-governmental organizations. Considerable amounts have also been spent for projects of ICRC, the "Technisches Hilfswerk" and for airlifts between Mombasa and Somalia. Furthermore, a food-for-work project in the north-western part of Somalia has been supported bilaterally.

95. During 1993, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development intends to take up again technical cooperation with projects in the north-eastern part of Somalia.

96. The projects that had already been started within the framework of emergency assistance include water projects (Technisches Hilfswerk), aid to communal reconstruction in the Gardo region, as well as consultancy and support to communities for infrastructural reconstruction in the areas of water supply, hygiene and construction of schools, streets and housing. It is also planned to rehabilitate veterinarian welfare centres.

97. The Government of Germany intends with these projects to integrate dismissed militiamen and thus to contribute to the social pacification and reintegration of these groups into their communities.

98. The costs of the already more concrete economic cooperation projects in Somalia are estimated at approximately DM 15 million.

D. Italy

99. Since last year, Italy has financed various programmes of emergency assistance to Somalia up to a total amount of 82.8 billion lire (approximately US\$ 55 million) of which 58 per cent is earmarked for multilateral assistance and 42 per cent for bilateral programmes.

100. In response to the Emergency Programme for Somalia and the Horn of Africa the Government of Italy approved a contribution of 36 billion lire, which was allocated to various projects implemented by United Nations organizations. The main areas of assistance include strengthening of coordination of international assistance, health care, water supply, sanitation, agricultural inputs and logistical support for food aid.

101. The Italian non-governmental organizations operating in Somalia, on the basis of a recent allocation of 11 billion lire, will work in close cooperation with United Nations agencies, which will provide technical and financial assistance, supplies and equipment on the basis of agreed strategies and work plans.

102. For the future, the Government of Italy intends to support activities in the main priority areas

discussed during the Coordination Meeting for Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia, which took place in March 1993 at Addis Ababa.

E. Liechtenstein

103. The Government of Liechtenstein has put 30,000 Swiss francs at the disposal of the International Committee of the Red Cross for a special assistance programme in Somalia.

F. Netherlands

104. The total assistance by the Netherlands for Somalia in 1993 amounts so far to f. 39,784,969. These funds have been channelled through organizations, UNOSOM, ICRC and non-governmental organizations. The major areas of assistance include food aid assistance to Somali refugees in Kenya, health and nutrition, water supply, sanitation, livestock development and other relief and rehabilitation programmes.

G. Norway

105. The Government of Norway has so far contributed approximately US\$ 6.4 million in official humanitarian assistance to Somalia in 1993. The contributions have been directed to various relief and rehabilitation projects being implemented by United Nations organizations, ICRC, the Norwegian Red Cross and non-governmental organizations. These projects include mine-clearance and awareness and rehabilitation of health facilities, schools and telecommunications.

106. In addition, Norwegian non-governmental organizations have contributed approximately US\$ 0.4 million to the above-mentioned projects.

H. Saudi Arabia

107. Since the civil war, food aid with a total value of US\$ 15 million has been provided. The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques donated US\$ 5 million from his private account to alleviate the burden of the famine crisis of the Somali people. The Government also donated 5,000 boxes of foodstuffs, which were delivered by the High Commission for the Collection of Donations to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Somalia.

I. Sweden

108. The Government of Sweden has contributed emergency assistance valued at Skr 163.8 million in the 1992-1993 fiscal year and Skr 56.4 million so far in the 1993-1994 fiscal year. The funds were channelled through United Nations organizations, ICRC and non-

governmental organizations and were allocated for relief and rehabilitation programmes and to cover the cost of a field hospital.

109. In addition, part of the Skr 210 million provided to UNHCR, ICRC and non-governmental organizations for programmes in Africa has been used for Somalia.

J. Turkey

110. The Government has contributed food, medicine and basic health care relief worth a total of 38.5 billion Turkish liras (US\$ 4.2 million).

VIII. Concluding observations

111. The instability in Mogadishu South in recent months obliged some of the humanitarian programmes to be disrupted, albeit on a temporary basis. The situation in that part of the city understandably causes concern since there continue to be relief needs in Mogadishu itself and a number of areas also depend on supplies being dispatched from Mogadishu.

112. The response to the United Nations appeal for funds for the 1993 Relief and Rehabilitation Programme has been disappointing, with only 20 per cent of the requirements met so far.

113. In spite of the shortage of resources and the instability in Mogadishu South, considerable and commendable efforts have been made by UNOSOM and United Nations organizations, ICRC and international and local non-governmental organizations to implement relief and rehabilitation programmes throughout Somalia. A number of indications would suffice to show the broad picture: starvation has largely been eradicated; children who, only a few months ago were dying of preventable diseases, have now been protected through vastly improved nutrition and massive immunization programmes; schools and vocational and teacher training centres are gradually reopening; food production has exceeded expectations; livestock development has been supported through the provision of veterinary services; and commercial activities have steadily increased.

114. These encouraging developments could quickly be reversed, however, unless increased and sustained assistance is provided by the international community. In particular, high priority must be accorded to funding projects that will make a concrete contribution to a more secure environment and to resettling refugees and displaced persons.

115. Under the auspices of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs and the Humanitarian Division of UNOSOM, a series of informal consultations have been held at Nairobi between the United Nations, Governments providing assistance to Somalia and non-governmental organizations. There is a clear commitment to work together to meet the immediate as well as the longer-term requirements.

116. As a follow-up to the Coordination Meeting for Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia, held in March 1993, and building on the subsequent series of consultations organized by UNOSOM and the World Bank, I shall be convening a conference on humanitarian assistance in November. As the shift from relief to rehabilitation gains momentum, it is essential that adequate resources be made available for rehabilitation programmes to be implemented in the next five to six months, until plans for longer-term recovery programmes can be put into effect. Unless the required support is forthcoming, the urgent task of achieving long-lasting peace and security will be made more difficult. Security is a prerequisite for the effective delivery of assistance for relief and rehabilitation, and without such assistance, it will be difficult to promote national reconciliation.

117. It is also absolutely essential that Somalis be fully involved in planning and implementing longer-term recovery and reconstruction programmes. It is expected that these key issues will be taken up at the proposed conference.

118. In concluding this report, I wish to pay a special tribute to all the Somali and international relief workers for the selfless way they have continued to help those in need.

Document 72

Letter dated 28 October 1993 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council requesting the extension of UNOSOM II's mandate until 18 November 1993

S/26663, 29 October 1993

I wish to refer to section B, paragraph 6, of Security Council resolution 814 (1993) of 26 March 1993, by which the Council:

“authorize(d) the mandate for the expanded UNOSOM (UNOSOM II) for an initial period through 31 October 1993, unless previously renewed by the Security Council”.

In section C, paragraph 19, of the same resolution, the Security Council:

“Decide(d) to conduct a formal review of the progress towards accomplishing the purposes of the present resolution no later than 31 October 1993”.

As you know, I have recently travelled to the region and had discussions with the heads of State and Government and other high-level officials who are interested in supporting the United Nations in Somalia. I undertook these talks also in the context of Security Council resolu-

tion 865 (1993), by which the Council requested me “to direct the urgent preparation of a detailed plan with concrete steps setting out UNOSOM II’s future concerted strategy with regard to its humanitarian, political and security activities ...”.

I am currently preparing to report to the Security Council on my talks in the region. These talks will have a bearing on my plan in pursuance of resolution 865 (1993). Accordingly, and in order to allow time for the preparation of this document and for other related consultations, I request the Council to extend the mandate under resolution 814 (section B, paragraph 6), until 18 November 1993. I should be most grateful if you would bring this request to the attention of the members of the Council for their decision.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Document 73

Security Council resolution extending the mandate of UNOSOM II until 18 November 1993 and requesting the Secretary-General to report to the Council on recent developments in Somalia

S/RES/878 (1993), 29 October 1993

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992, 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992, 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992, 775 (1992) of 28 August 1992, 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992, 814 (1993) of 26 March 1993, 837 (1993) of 6 June 1993 and 865 (1993) of 22 September 1993,

Having considered the letter dated 28 October 1993 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, 1/

Stressing the need for all the parties in Somalia to exercise maximum restraint and to work towards national reconciliation,

Expressing once again its commitment to a future concerted strategy in Somalia for the United Nations Operation in Somalia II and, in that context, to the undertaking of an in-depth consideration of its humanitarian, political and security activities on the basis of the concrete suggestions to be submitted by the Secretary-General as requested in resolution 865 (1993),

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1/ Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-eighth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1993, document S/26663.

1. *Decides* to extend the mandate of the United Nations Operation in Somalia II for an interim period terminating on 18 November 1993;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in his report to the Council concerning the further extension of the Op-

eration's mandate, which should be submitted in good time before 18 November 1993, to report also on recent developments in Somalia in order to enable the Council to take appropriate decisions;

3. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Document 74

Exchange of letters between Dr. Elisabeth Mann Borgese (11 September 1993) and the Secretary-General (response of 2 November 1993) concerning the situation in Somalia

Not issued as a United Nations document

Memorandum dated 11 September 1993, sent from Dr. Elisabeth Mann Borgese to the Secretary-General of the United Nations

Mr. Secretary-General:

I apologize for this unconventional message, but my deep commitment to the United Nations, and my conscience oblige me to approach you in the matter of Somalia.

I am a great admirer of your Agenda for Peace which, I think, is a break-through and will have, over time, a profound impact on the restructuring, not only of the membership, but of the very concept, of the Security Council.

What has happened in Somalia just now, on the other hand, seems to me a travesty and a perversion of the concept of peace-keeping. The killing of 150 civilians, mostly women and children, from a helicopter in the streets of Mogadishu is a dreadful thing in any case, even if it had been committed by a warring party. That it should have occurred in the name of the United Nations is deplorable beyond words.

As a concerned citizen, in a personal capacity, I beseech you to see to it that such horror should never more be repeated. I know I speak for millions of other concerned citizens. We need the United Nations more than ever. The world is unthinkable without it. But we cannot set our hopes on its blood-stained hands.

Sincerely yours,

Elisabeth MANN BORGESE

Dear Dr. Mann Borgese,

I have received your message of concern over the loss of innocent life in Mogadishu in operations involving forces of UNISOM II. In fact, I have just returned from an extended overseas trip which took me to a number of African countries, including Somalia.

I share your horror at the scene of women and children brought into the line of fire by callous local leaders. I can assure you that UN peace-keeping personnel wish nothing more than to protect and assist the population of Somalia. There is, however, a new and painful reality which clearly is emerging in this post-Cold War era. It is that ethnic, religious, cultural and tribal differences are creating hideous conditions of oppression, violence, and deliberate efforts to starve, intimidate, torture, expel or murder whole populations.

The United Nations, of course, cannot hope to deal with every crisis that occurs around the world. Neither, however, can it ignore those situations which affront the common standards of our humanity or threaten the very foundations of the international system of States. In these extreme cases, the cause of international peace and security requires efforts which reach beyond traditional peace-keeping measures conducted with the agreement of all parties to place UN forces into non-consensual or hostile surroundings where force must be employed and lives, even innocent lives, may be placed in danger.

I appreciate your words of support for the United Nations and hope that you will lend your influence to its work, even as it enters this most difficult and momentous time in its history.

Yours sincerely,

Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Document 75

Further report of the Secretary-General submitted in pursuance of paragraph 19 of resolution 814 (1993) and paragraph 5 of resolution 865 (1993) on the situation in Somalia, including the 3 October 1993 incident in Mogadishu, and presenting three options for the continuation of UNOSOM II

S/26738, 12 November 1993

Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 19 of Security Council resolution 814 (1993) of 26 March 1993 and paragraph A5 of Security Council resolution 865 (1993) of 22 September 1993.

2. Section I of the report describes the general situation at present. Section II reviews the successive stages of the mandate regarding Somalia and takes note of significant events since 31 July 1993, the closing date of my previous report. Section III sets forth my observations.

I. The general situation in Somalia at present

A. Humanitarian and economic

3. Somalia has come a long way from the devastating famine of 1991-1992. United Nations and non-governmental organization (NGO) assistance has now reached all parts of Somalia including the north-west and north-east.

4. The major problems of the emergency phase have, for the most part, been successfully addressed. There continue to exist pockets of acute nutritional and medical problems, and targeted feeding programmes of dry food distribution need to continue for the foreseeable future. About 1 million affected Somalis require assistance through the provision of shelter, medical care and life-sustaining articles such as clothing, blankets and cooking utensils.

1. Children and education

5. Among the principal victims of the protracted conflict was an entire generation of Somali children denied access to education. As a result of the civil war, all schools were thoroughly stripped of facilities and equipment. Schools and educational institutions have been closed for long periods and many teenagers and orphaned children joined the militia or gangs of looters and armed robbers.

6. In the last six months, NGOs, United Nations agencies and UNOSOM II forces have provided substantial assistance to the education sector. A large number of schools have been rehabilitated with military assistance.

NGOs have reopened schools and are paying incentives to schoolteachers, as well as providing school supplies. The World Food Programme (WFP) is supplying food for work and school lunches. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) is currently assisting 40,000 pupils in schools located in Adado, Afgoi, Baidoa, Bardhere, Belet Weyne, Dusa Mareb, Hoddur, Merca, Mogadishu, Raddhure and Wajit through the provision of education kits. In the south of the country, nine additional schools were opened in September with UNICEF support, bringing the number of schools in the south to around 51. More than 10,800 pupils are enrolled in classes. Just a few months ago less than 1,000 children in the region attended school.

7. One hundred fifty thousand textbooks are being distributed throughout Somalia. These texts conform to the former core curriculum and cover the Somali language, mathematics, science, Islamic studies and Arabic. One educational development centre has been established in Mogadishu by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and seven others can be functioning by the end of 1994.

8. Teachers are now being identified to design and implement training workshops on teaching methodology, introduction of the new curriculum and management of resources, including textbooks. A scholarship programme for Somali university students to complete their studies abroad has been established and contacts have been made with specialized institutions to get the programme under way.

2. Health

9. Some 32 hospitals are now operating throughout the country as well as 81 maternal and child health (MCH) centres. One hundred and three mobile vaccination teams are covering the country, working towards sustainable immunization coverage. Estimates are that about 75 per cent of children under 5 years of age have received measles vaccination under very difficult operating conditions. Supplies, medicines and other equipment are being made available to hospitals, health centres and pharmacies through United Nations agencies and NGOs.

10. Mogadishu's main water supply system has been rehabilitated to 40 per cent of its pre-war efficiency. City water supply systems in Afgoi, Hargeisa and Berbera have also been rehabilitated. About 60 per cent of Hargeisa's population now has access to clean water, and work will soon begin on a second phase, which will give the whole town access to clean water. Adequate quantities of chlorine tablets are now available throughout the country to disinfect water. Sanitation activities in support of safe water programmes include installation of pit latrines, provision of health education services, a major waste disposal exercise and emergency cleaning of sewerage and drainage systems in Mogadishu.

11. United Nations agencies and NGOs are continuing to pursue sanitation and employment projects with food-for-work programmes. In Mogadishu alone there are 120 such projects that provide food for teachers, hospital and sanitation workers. Other similar projects are supported throughout Somalia.

3. Agriculture

12. Agriculture historically has been responsible for two thirds of Somalia's employment and nearly three quarters of the country's foreign exchange earnings. A good measure of success has been achieved in reactivating food production and the livestock sector. The provision of seeds and agricultural tools, together with good precipitation, has resulted in a substantial increase in the rainy season harvest. The delivery of relief food aid has been adjusted to take into account the availability of local food supplies. Relief organizations also have been purchasing food in the countryside in order to stimulate local production and to provide seeds for the coming agricultural season to deficit areas.

13. In the livestock sector, the supply of veterinary drugs and the vaccination of animals has facilitated the resuscitation of exports. An estimated quarter of a million head of livestock have been exported since April 1993. Cattle export from Mogadishu has recently restarted.

14. Targeted support in these areas holds great promise for returning large numbers of enterprising Somalis to productive employment. These efforts can help to remove some of the main constraints to expansion and growth.

4. Commerce

15. Commercial and trading activities are showing encouraging signs of recovery. Commercial traffic at Somalia's ports has increased dramatically since December 1992. Civilian ship movements at Mogadishu port increased tenfold in the first half of 1993. Joint ventures between Somali and foreign investments are on the rise. Telecommunication services are now available in parts of

Mogadishu. Local companies are also providing fuel throughout the country.

5. Reconstruction and recovery

16. A draft framework for planning of long-term reconstruction and recovery has been prepared by a task force comprising donors, United Nations agencies and NGOs, under the coordination of the World Bank.

17. The purpose of the framework is to ensure that scarce human and financial resources are used to their fullest potential to support the re-emergence of the country as a stable and economically productive member of the international community. Given the fluid nature of the situation in all regions of the country, the process of programme planning and implementation must be a dynamic one, with a coordinating framework capable of responding to changing conditions.

18. The objectives of the framework are as follows:

- (a) To establish a common vision of the economic and social reconstruction, rehabilitation and development of Somalia;
- (b) To identify criteria and establish priorities for reconstruction and rehabilitation;
- (c) To construct a mechanism for coordinated action in an environment of constrained human and capital resources. The mechanism would be available to the future Government of Somalia as a basis for development planning.

19. Somalia will need external assistance to start reconstruction and rehabilitation of essential infrastructure. While international partners have begun to invest in these areas, there is need to agree on priorities for action and a mechanism for coordination. Some interventions made in the relief phase of the crisis, for example the levels of salaries now paid by numerous agencies, cannot be sustained in the future.

20. On 22 October 1993, the third informal meeting of donors, United Nations agencies and NGOs, organized by the World Bank, was held in Paris. Participants reviewed the draft framework and discussed the next steps. It was clear that continuing reconstruction in Somalia will be possible only in the context of movement towards a stable and generally acceptable political environment. The Somali people must contribute to the design of the framework and eventually take ownership of the planning process.

21. Relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts are central components of the overall attempt to assist Somalis to rebuild their country. In aspects of these efforts, the sustained support of the international community is critical, especially in this period of transition from relief to rehabilitation.

6. *Refugees and resettlement*

22. Humanitarian agencies have worked effectively in coordinating approaches to the issue of resettlement. An agreement is now in place on providing support for resettlement efforts. This agreement is based on the following:

(a) The focus should be on community capacity to create a welcoming environment for returnees;

(b) The decision and timing of return must be freely determined by the returnees themselves.

23. As many as 1.7 million people were forced to leave their homes as a result of the turmoil and the famine in Somalia. Of these, more than 1 million crossed into Kenya and Ethiopia. Over 250,000 persons moved to Mogadishu, and about 60,000 persons to Kismayo and Baidoa. The northern regions are supporting at least 250,000 refugees and internally displaced persons.

24. The number of refugees returning from camps in Kenya is increasing. It is estimated that about 70,000 refugees in the Mombasa area have returned by boat to Kismayo, Mogadishu and Bossaso. Assistance is being provided to approximately 800 refugees a week returning to the Gedo region and to those spontaneously moving into the Lower and Middle Juba areas. It is estimated that these latter areas will receive the greatest number of refugees per square kilometre.

25. Until recently, political tension both in Dobley and around Kismayo precluded the spontaneous return of refugees and displaced people to the Lower and Middle Juba. Agreements reached between elders in Dobley, the recently completed peace conference in Kismayo and the successful resettlement of more than half of the Kismayo displaced have increased the attraction of early return to home areas.

B. *Political*

1. *District councils*

26. My Special Representative and his staff continue their strenuous efforts to rebuild political institutions in Somalia. Thirty-nine district councils have been established so far out of a total of 73 districts, excluding the districts in the north-west and Mogadishu. In Mogadishu, consultations have begun on the establishment of district councils.

27. Training programmes for district councillors, which focus on various aspects of leadership, management and development, have been conducted for the district councillors from eight regions of Somalia with the assistance of the Life and Peace Institute of Sweden and the Eastern and Southern Africa Management Institute. As of 17 October, 651 councillors from 31 district councils had participated in the programmes. The Nordic

countries are also providing administrative starter kits to help the councils.

2. *Regional councils*

28. Regional councils have been established in six areas. I expect more regional councils to be inaugurated soon, moving Somalia closer to the January 1994 goal of establishing its Transitional National Council (TNC). In the meantime, a consultative body to UNOSOM II, which would include representatives of the factions, would be formed as soon as a majority of the membership of TNC has been nominated by the regional councils. Such a body would be named the Somali National Consultative Council (SNCC) and could, among other things, serve in an advisory capacity to UNOSOM II by providing its views on major national and regional issues and help to prepare for convening of TNC. Its advisory function would cease immediately after TNC is established. While SNCC, in its proposed form, was not anticipated by the Addis Ababa agreement, I believe its formation would not contradict the letter and spirit of the agreement as long as it enjoyed the support of the regional councils.

3. *National reconciliation*

29. In continuation of efforts described in my earlier report, UNOSOM II has continued to sponsor efforts towards reconciliation among the Somali people.

30. In the north-east and central regions—from Bossaso to Galkayo—my Deputy Special Representative and UNOSOM II political affairs officers have facilitated the reconciliation of two competing wings of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) leadership in the area. The success of this effort, if sustained, will lead to greater stability and facilitate disarmament and reconciliation among other factions and clans in the central region. Efforts towards the reconciliation of clans in the north-west in Erigavo also have been supported by UNOSOM II. The Gedo region is inhabited by both Rahaweyn and Marehan clans. The relations between these two clans have been tense as a result of the civil war. UNOSOM II has initiated reconciliation between the two clans.

31. In Mogadishu, UNOSOM II is undertaking a number of efforts to support various initiatives aimed at national reconciliation. Several meetings have been held between UNOSOM II officials and a 47-member supreme committee of the Hawiye sub-clan. These meetings are aimed at bringing together the sub-clans of the Hawiye for a pan-Hawiye conference. From 30 September to 1 October 1993, an all-Somali conference attended by 600 delegates was supported by UNOSOM II. This conference, like others, was part of efforts to reconcile the varying clans in Somalia. Another pan-Hawiye conference took place in Mogadishu from 14 to 16 October

1993 with the participation of Habr Gdir sub-clan. The conference, among other things, called for a peace rally in Mogadishu. Despite UNOSOM II's attempts to discourage it, the march was held on 17 October and provoked inter-clan fighting in Mogadishu.

32. My Special Representative travelled to Berbera in the north-west region on 6 November 1993 and met with Mr. Mohamed Egal and his senior officials. The discussion covered a range of topics, including assistance to the police, justice and penal systems, the disarmament/demobilization effort and the participation of the delegation of the north-west region in the Fourth Coordinating Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia scheduled to be held in Addis Ababa from 29 November to 1 December 1993.

33. It will be recalled that, on 1 October 1993, I wrote to the President of the Security Council (S/26526) regarding the request made by Mr. Egal's administration for UNOSOM II's withdrawal from the north-west region by 2 October 1993 and sought the guidance of the Security Council on how to proceed in view of the security concerns and given the fact that the mandate of UNOSOM II was under Chapter VII of the Charter. In his reply (S/26527), the President informed me that the members of the Council had expressed the hope that UNOSOM II would be able to continue its work in the region using all peaceful means, and had expressed the confidence that I would take the necessary precautions for the safety and protection of all United Nations personnel deployed in the region. As members of the Council are aware, the authorities in the region did not pursue the matter further and United Nations personnel continue to assist the people of the region. The recent visit of my Special Representative to the region has helped to clarify the issue further and the relationship between Mr. Egal's administration and UNOSOM II has been strengthened.

4. Police

34. Following Council approval of recommendations in my previous report (S/26317), UNOSOM II has continued to support small locally based police forces in the UNOSOM II areas of operation and has provided some support to police forces in the north-east and north-west regions. During the past six months, 5,000 former Somali policemen have been hired to assist in the performance of police functions. Three thousand were recruited in Mogadishu area and 2,000 in the various regions. These programmes are being funded from the UNOSOM II budget. UNOSOM II is in the process of finalizing a police training programme that should provide basic training for a large number of Somali policemen who would assist in the maintenance of law and order. Police experts from Italy, Canada and the United Kingdom of

Great Britain and Northern Ireland also have arrived and in coordination with UNOSOM II, are formulating assistance programmes which their respective Governments could implement. The United States of America has announced a US\$ 6 million grant for the re-establishment of the Somali judicial and penal systems, as well as a US\$ 2 million assistance programme for the police force and up to US\$ 25 million-worth of equipment, as required. Norway has contributed \$1 million and several other Governments have also indicated interest in assisting this programme.

35. UNOSOM II has started discussions with district and regional councils throughout Somalia regarding communications equipment, vehicles, uniforms, renovation of police stations, court houses and prisons, and the payment of salaries of policemen, judges, magistrates and custodial corps for a limited period of time.

5. Information

36. A crucial part of UNOSOM II's work continues to be its informational services. These convey news of such positive developments as the establishment of district and regional councils, the reopening of courts, and the restoration of normal economic activity. Radio Maanta broadcasts a 45-minute programme daily. The newspaper *Maanta* has the largest circulation in the country, with 31,000 Somali-language copies. I pay tribute to the Somali radio and newspaper staff, whose work has been invaluable in conveying the message of progress to the people of Somalia. Reporters, translators, printers and distributors continue to carry out their duties despite the loss of life of several of their colleagues and death threats to themselves.

C. Security

37. By mid-1993, the security situation throughout most of Somalia had vastly improved in comparison with 1992; it offered the potential for the eventual achievement of true stability. In subsequent weeks, however, as coercive measures of disarmament ceased and outbreaks of violence did not meet with effective responses, the situation became uncertain. Since the 9 October unilateral cessation of hostilities by the United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA), the situation has been generally quiet, but Mogadishu remains tense and, in the capital and elsewhere, major factions are reportedly rearming, apparently in anticipation of a return to widespread fighting sometime in 1994.

1. Disarmament

38. UNOSOM II is seeking to achieve voluntary disarmament, with emphasis on the militias and their heavy weapons. In the past two months some small

success has been achieved in disarming militia in the central and north-east regions of Somalia. Through continued contact with political and military leaders of SDDF, limited cantonnement of heavy weapons in Gardo or Garowe has occurred but this does not extend to the north-east and central regions. Progress in these regions as well as in the Juba regions of course depends on whether it is believed that the USC/SNA militia no longer poses a threat.

39. In the north-west, the initial process of disarmament, demobilization and retraining of militias is progressing. Approximately 5,000 militiamen are now being retrained at Manderla camp. The United Nations agencies, particularly the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and WFP, and NGOs are assisting in this effort. Even though the process has only recently begun, the regional authorities are expected to proceed systematically to enable the demobilized militiamen to become productive members of society. Elsewhere, limited voluntary disarmament has taken place in the Baidoa area, Doble and many other areas where United Nations forces are established.

40. The desire of the Somali people for peace and security through disarmament is clear. This is a message heard repeatedly as UNOSOM II officials meet Somalis throughout the country. At a peace conference held in Mogadishu on 1 and 2 October 1993 by 12 of the 15 political factions and attended by representatives from all segments of Somali society, including youth groups and women's organizations, the participants condemned the violence against UNOSOM II and called for the simultaneous disarmament of all militias throughout the country in accordance with the Addis Ababa agreement of 27 March 1993.

2. Demobilization

41. Demobilization is a particularly challenging problem in Somalia which has experienced years of conflict and a shattered economy. Many of the militiamen are youths who have been brought up in a violent society and have little experience other than war. Training and rehabilitation will require substantial resources and careful planning, in order to reintegrate them into society. The process may take years to complete, particularly if the economy is slow to recover.

3. Mine clearance

42. Somalia is 1 of the 10 most heavily mined countries in the world. De-mining will be indispensable to the rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts for decades to come. The debilitating effects of the widespread and largely indiscriminate nature of mine warfare as it has been conducted in Somalia are felt throughout the entire socio-economic spectrum. Thousands of kilome-

tres of roads, major trade arteries for local as well as international commerce, have been mined, as have traditional pasturage and migration routes used by the nomadic populations of the interior. Urban areas, small airstrips and even local watering holes have been extensively mined, with the heaviest concentration infesting the north-west. A similar danger exists in the north-central and southern areas of the country.

43. UNOSOM II efforts to deal with the Somalia-wide mine problem have been limited by lack of trained staff and the heightened security threat to the UNOSOM II presence and mission. Mine clearing that has been conducted by UNOSOM II military forces has been local in nature and directed primarily at keeping open lines of communication deemed necessary for accomplishing the immediate UNOSOM II mission. A de-mining effort funded by a consortium of countries and institutions has been taking place in the north-west, and a small corps of local ex-militia members has been trained as mine clearers. The funding for this venture will expire at the end of 1993.

4. Deployment

44. Over the next four months, the Indian Brigade will be deployed to the Baidoa area of responsibility and the Kismayo area to relieve the French, Belgian, Zimbabwe and Moroccan forces currently operating there. The Zimbabwean battalion will be located in Afgoye, relieving Pakistani forces, which, in turn, are being deployed in Mogadishu. The Moroccans have assumed control of the Merka area of responsibility, relieving two Pakistani companies for deployment to Mogadishu. Nepalese forces, which arrived at the end of October, have been given responsibility for the security of UNOSOM II civilian staff working and living in Mogadishu.

45. Two additional battalions from Egypt have already been deployed; the third battalion and a brigade headquarters are expected to arrive in a few weeks. Pakistan has agreed to strengthen its contingent with a division-level headquarters, a brigade headquarters, one mechanized infantry battalion and a tank regiment. The Egyptian forces will be deployed in the Medina area of Mogadishu, while the new Pakistani forces will reinforce the Pakistani troops now located in the capital. It would be prudent, however, not to discount the possibility of substantial delays or even review of such decisions as well as of additional withdrawals taking place.

46. UNOSOM II plans to expand the Italian area of responsibility as far north as Galkaia, provided that logistical requirements can be met. Any further major expansion will depend on the security situation in Mogadishu and on the availability of appropriate logistics and engineer forces and equipment. If the security situation and disarmament progress sufficiently, it is

hoped that some smaller deployments to the north-east will be possible and supportable logistically. Should, however, the security situation not improve, it would not be possible to deploy in that region because of constraints of adequate overall strength of UNOSOM II.

47. The present strength of UNOSOM II is 29,284 all ranks, broken down as follows:

<i>Country</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Strength</i>
Australia	Movement control	48
Bangladesh	Infantry battalion	945
Belgium	BDE HQ Infantry battalion	948
Botswana	Infantry company	326
Canada	Staff personnel	4
Egypt	Infantry battalions	1 100
France	BDE HQ Infantry battalion Aviation unit Logistical battalion Total, France	1 107
Germany	Logistical units	1 726
Greece	Medical unit	102
India	BDE HQ 3 infantry battalions Mechanized company Light mortar battery Signal company Medical unit Engineer squadron Logistical company Helicopter unit Total, India	4 937
Ireland	Transport company	79
Italy	BDE HQ 3 infantry battalions Aviation unit Logistical/engineering unit Medical unit Total, Italy	2 576
Kuwait	Infantry company	156
Malaysia	Infantry battalion	871
Morocco	Infantry battalion Support unit Total, Morocco	1 424
Nepal	Security Company	311
New Zealand	Supply unit	43
Nigeria	Recce battalion	614
Norway	Headquarters company	130

<i>Country</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Strength</i>
Pakistan	BDE HQ Infantry battalions 4 tank squadron Signal unit Supply and transport company Engineering squadron Medical unit Electrical and mechanical engineering workshop Military police company Ordnance company Total, Pakistan	5 005
Republic of Korea	Engineer battalion	252
Romania	Field hospital	236
Saudi Arabia	Infantry battalion	757
Sweden	Field hospital	148
Tunisia	Infantry company	142
Turkey	Infantry battalion	320
United Arab Emirates	Infantry battalion	662
United States	Logistical unit	3 017
Zimbabwe	Infantry battalion Signal company	895 63
	Military Police Company (composite)	100
	Headquarters staff	<u>240</u>
	Grand total	<u>29 284</u>

48. There are approximately 17,700 troops in the United States Joint Task Force in Somalia, which do not form part of UNOSOM II and are not under the operational command of the Force Commander of UNOSOM II. This number includes the Quick Reaction Force, which is deployed in support of UNOSOM II.

II. Significant events affecting UNOSOM II

49. UNOSOM II's record of general progress throughout most of Somalia has been seriously marred by the incidents that took place between 5 June and 3 October 1993. These incidents challenged the cause of disarmament and reconciliation in Somalia, created a situation of instability in South Mogadishu and stimulated factional elements elsewhere to prepare for a future of renewed fighting.

50. UNOSOM II is now at a critical juncture. To understand the present situation, it is important to recall the nature of the mandate as it has evolved over time through the various resolutions of the Council and, in this

context, to assess the situation comprehensively in the aftermath of 3 October 1993.

A. *Review of the mandate*

1. *United Nations Operation in Somalia*

51. In my first report to the Security Council on the situation in Somalia (S/23693), I noted that the tragic situation in the country was extraordinarily complex. It presented a special challenge to the international community in general, and to the Security Council in particular. I stressed that the problem had eluded conventional solutions. I noted the need to explore new avenues and innovative methods commensurate with the existing humanitarian and political situation in order to facilitate a peaceful settlement. The evolution of the United Nations mandate in Somalia has underscored the complexities involved.

52. Security Council resolution 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992 encapsulated the mandate which the Security Council had entrusted to the Secretary-General in its resolution 733 (1992) of 29 January 1992: to help the Somali parties to establish and maintain a cease-fire, to distribute humanitarian relief and to promote national reconciliation and a political settlement.

53. In resolution 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992, the Council took the further step of agreeing in principle to establish a security force to provide security for humanitarian activities in Mogadishu.

54. In resolution 775 (1992) of 28 August 1992, the Council decided to extend this mandate to cover other areas in Somalia. This was to be implemented, as originally stipulated in resolution 751 (1992), in consultation with the parties concerned. In practice, fulfilment of that condition proved to be impossible. Agreement could not be obtained for the deployment of United Nations forces in areas where the protection of humanitarian operations was most desperately needed. When agreement was obtained, it was violated; and the small unit whose deployment in Mogadishu was agreed to was far from adequate to control the increasingly violent and lawless situation in the city.

55. In my letter of 24 November 1992 to the President of the Security Council (S/24859), I described the deteriorating situation in Somalia and the factors that were preventing UNOSOM from implementing the mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council. I suggested that the basic premises and principles of the United Nations effort in Somalia should be reviewed. In my letter of 29 November 1992 (S/24868), I set out options for the Security Council's consideration. I informed the Council that, if it was to decide to authorize Member States to use forceful means to ensure the delivery of relief supplies to

the people of Somalia, the United States had expressed to me its readiness to take the lead in organizing and commanding such an operation, in which a number of other Member States would also participate.

2. *Unified Task Force*

56. The Council, responding promptly and positively to this initiative, adopted resolution 794 (1992) in which, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, it authorized the Secretary-General and Member States to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. Pursuant to that decision, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was established and deployed.

57. It was the wish of the Security Council that a transition back to peace-keeping operations be achieved promptly. In this regard, I emphasized that two conditions should be met. First, UNITAF should take action to ensure that the heavy weapons of the organized factions were neutralized and brought under international control and that the irregular forces and gangs were disarmed before it withdrew. Second, and equally essential, the authority entrusted to UNITAF should be exercised throughout Somalia. I stressed at that time that, unless effective action was taken to fulfil those two conditions, the international community's efforts to help the people of Somalia would continue to be at risk from heavily armed and lawless groups.

58. In my report to the Security Council of 26 January 1993 (S/25168), I congratulated UNITAF for rapidly and successfully securing major population centres and ensuring that humanitarian assistance was delivered and distributed without impediment. However, events in Kismayo and Mogadishu during the first half of 1993 demonstrated that the volatile situation continued to exist and that a secure environment had not been established. No deployment of troops took place to the north-east and north-west, or along the Kenyan-Somali border where security was a matter of grave concern. It was against this background that I stressed that, if the Council determined that the time had come to move to another stage in its operations in Somalia, it should be prepared to ensure that UNOSOM was fully in a position to carry out its tasks.

3. *United Nations Operation in Somalia II*

59. Security Council resolution 814 (1993) of 26 March 1993 acknowledged the need for a transition from UNITAF to an expanded United Nations Operation in Somalia, UNOSOM II. The mandate of UNOSOM II conferred authority for appropriate action, including enforcement action as necessary, to establish throughout

Somalia a secure environment for humanitarian assistance. To that end, UNOSOM II sought to complete, through disarmament and reconciliation, the task begun by UNITAF for the restoration of peace, stability, law and order. The mandate also empowered UNOSOM II to provide assistance to the Somali people in rebuilding their shattered economy and social and political life, re-establishing the country's institutional structure, achieving national political reconciliation, recreating a Somali State based on democratic governance and rehabilitating the country's economy and infrastructure.

60. The substance of resolution 814 (1993) reflected the complexity of the anarchic situation that had developed in Somalia from factional strife, causing prolonged suffering of its people. It was evident that, to reconstruct the country's political, social and material infrastructure on a lasting basis, time, effort and risk would be required.

4. *Factional attacks*

61. The effective actions of UNITAF and, after 4 May 1993, of UNOSOM II with its expanded mandate led to significant progress throughout most of Somalia. The necessity of achieving disarmament, including by coercive means if necessary, generated resistance by those fearful of losing power.

62. It is in this context that the ambush of 5 June 1993 took place, killing 24 Pakistani soldiers and wounding 40. The bodies of the victims were mutilated and subjected to other forms of degrading behaviour. Security Council resolution 837 (1993) of 6 June 1993 expressed grave alarm at the premeditated armed attacks by forces apparently belonging to USC/SNA against UNOSOM II personnel. Citing resolution 814 (1993), resolution 837 (1993) called for all necessary measures to be taken against those responsible for publicly inciting such attacks, including to secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment. My previous report to the Council (S/26022) contained a description of the 5 June 1993 attacks on UNOSOM II troops and the measures under way to implement Security Council resolution 837 (1993).

63. On 12 July 1993, the United States Quick Reaction Force, under the direction of UNOSOM II, conducted an operation against a major USC/SNA militia command and control centre located in a compound in South Mogadishu known as the "Abdi house". The purpose of the operation was to neutralize USC/SNA command and control capability and to continue disarmament of the hostile SNA militia throughout Mogadishu. UNOSOM II ground forces swept the area for communications equipment, arms and documents. Following the withdrawal of United Nations forces from the

site of the operation, journalists from the international press drove to the scene to cover the events. A large crowd of Somalis, some carrying weapons, surrounded the journalists and attacked them. Four journalists were murdered in the course of the attack.

64. On 8 August 1993, while on a routine patrol in South Mogadishu, four United States soldiers serving with UNOSOM II were killed when their vehicle was destroyed by a command-detonated device.

65. In my further report to the Council dated 17 August 1993 (S/26317), I comprehensively described the status of actions taken to implement resolution 814 (1993) of 26 March 1993. I stated that, despite the deliberate attempts of a few factional leaders to prevent UNOSOM II from performing the tasks assigned by the Security Council, the overall situation in Somalia had undergone a major transformation: humanitarian assistance was being delivered; people were going about their normal activities; schools were reopening; land was being tilled; and local councils of clan leaders were meeting and cooperating with United Nations efforts to help Somalia to re-establish itself.

66. On 5 September 1993, a Nigerian infantry company, which was in the process of taking over from the Italian contingent in Mogadishu, was attacked by gunmen. Seven Nigerian soldiers were killed and 10 wounded with 1 soldier missing. The missing soldier was subsequently released on 14 October; since his release, he has stated that he was tortured during his captivity.

67. On 9 September 1993, Pakistani soldiers were in the process of clearing roadblocks on 21 October Road in Mogadishu, with assistance of army engineers from the United States contingent, when they were ambushed by heavily armed militiamen numbering approximately 300. The UNOSOM forces defended themselves and requested assistance from the United States Quick Reaction Force. One Pakistani soldier was killed and two other Pakistani and three United States soldiers were wounded.

68. On 15 September 1993, two Italian soldiers were killed by snipers in Mogadishu.

5. *Resolution 865 (1993)*

69. On 22 September 1993, the Security Council, in resolution 865 (1993), reaffirmed all previous resolutions and underscored the importance it attached to the successful fulfilment on an urgent and accelerated basis of UNOSOM II's objectives of facilitation of humanitarian assistance and the restoration of law and order and of national reconciliation in a free, democratic and sovereign Somalia, so that it can complete its mission by March 1995. In that context, the Council requested the Secretary-General to direct urgent preparation of a detailed plan with concrete steps setting out UNOSOM II's

future concerted strategy with regard to its humanitarian, political and security activities.

B. *The 3 October 1993 incident*

70. On 3 October 1993, United States Rangers launched an operation in South Mogadishu designed to capture a number of key aides of Mohammad Farah Aidid who were suspected of complicity in the 5 June attack on Pakistani soldiers, as well as subsequent attacks on United Nations personnel and facilities. The operation was conducted in a highly dangerous area of Mogadishu. It succeeded in apprehending 24 suspects, including two key aides to Aidid. During the course of the operation, two United States helicopters were shot down by militiamen using automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades. As the Rangers were in the process of evacuating the 24 USC/SNA detainees, they came under concentrated fire. Eighteen United States soldiers lost their lives and 75 were wounded. One United States helicopter pilot was captured but subsequently released on 14 October 1993. The bodies of the United States soldiers were treated in a most despicable and humiliating manner.

71. The planning and execution of the Ranger operation of 3 October 1993 was decided by United States commanders and carried out by United States forces that were deployed in support of the UNOSOM II mandate, but were not under United Nations command or authority. Not until the rescue phase of the incident did a multilateral operation take shape.

72. Following the events of 3 and 4 October 1993 the United States reinforced its Quick Reaction Force with a joint task force consisting of air, naval and ground forces equipped with M1A1 tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles. President Clinton announced the intention of the United States to withdraw its forces from Somalia by 31 March 1994.

73. In all these incidents, the bodies of the peacekeepers who lost their lives were subjected to inhuman and insulting indignities. Such shocking behaviour has aroused justifiable condemnation, not only among the troop-contributing countries concerned, but also by the entire international public opinion. At the same time, it is a matter of deep regret that a large number of Somalis also have lost their lives during these encounters. What is particularly deplorable is the use of women and children by the gangs as human shields while attacking UNOSOM II personnel.

74. A total of 740 Somalis were arrested during the course of these operations. Six hundred ninety-eight of them have already been released. Decisions on the remaining 42 will be taken in the near future.

75. On 9 October 1993, USC/SNA declared a unilateral cessation of hostilities against UNOSOM II forces.

This has been followed by intensive United Nations efforts toward achieving an adequately stable political and security situation by March of 1994.

C. *Steps pursuant to resolution 865 (1993)*

76. In resolution 865 (1993), the Council affirmed the importance it attached to the successful fulfilment on an urgent and accelerated basis of UNOSOM II's objectives of facilitation of humanitarian assistance and the restoration of law and order, and of national reconciliation in a free, democratic and sovereign Somalia, so that it can complete its mission by March 1995. In that context, the Council requested the "Secretary-General to direct urgent preparation of a detailed plan with concrete steps setting out UNOSOM II's future concerted strategy with regard to its humanitarian, political and security activities".

77. I travelled to the Horn of Africa region in October to consult with the leaders of the region on UNOSOM II's future concerted strategy with regard to its humanitarian, political and security activities, as requested by the Security Council in its resolution 865 (1993). I had the opportunity to meet with and to discuss in great detail the situation in and relating to Somalia with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, President Hassan Gouled of Djibouti, President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya and President Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia. I visited Baidoa and Mogadishu, where I held talks with military and civilian officials of UNOSOM II as well as with Somali elders.

78. During my visit to the region, I also had occasion to attend a meeting convened on 14 October 1993 in Cairo by President Hosni Mubarak, the current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), with the participation of the Secretaries-General of OAU, the League of Arab States (LAS) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in an effort to help to promote peace and reconciliation in Somalia and to lay the groundwork for its continued reconstruction and development. It should be noted also that participants at the meeting were concerned about the consequences of the withdrawal of the United States troops from Somalia by 31 March 1994. In a joint communiqué issued at the end of the meeting, the participants reaffirmed their joint determination to continue their ongoing search for common solutions to the problems of Somalia. They committed themselves to advancing the process of reconciliation and rebuilding begun by Somali leaders themselves and recognized the achievements of the United Nations in providing humanitarian relief and security to most of Somalia. The Cairo meeting also called for the setting up of a trust fund for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Somalia and urged all countries of Africa, the Arab

world and the Islamic community to contribute generously to its establishment and operation.

79. I have decided to convene the Fourth Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia in Addis Ababa from 29 November to 1 December 1993. The meeting will review developments in the humanitarian situation in Somalia since the previous meeting in March and assess the current situation with a view to reaching agreement on actions that need to be taken in the immediate future, to include measures to enhance the transition from relief assistance to reconstruction and rehabilitation activities. The conference will also provide an opportunity to begin consultations on more long-term development planning. As in the previous humanitarian meetings, participants will include countries, regional organizations and relevant United Nations and other international organizations. Every effort will be made to ensure the widest possible Somali participation.

III. Observations

80. For over a year now, the Security Council has responded, in a flexible and creative manner, to the highly complex and continually evolving situation in Somalia. The international community has had no precedent to guide it in dealing with the tragic situation in Somalia. Consequently, the response of the Security Council has had to be adjusted, from time to time, to take into account different circumstances that have not been possible to anticipate. This explains the evolution of the international presence in Somalia from UNOSOM I to UNITAF to UNOSOM II. The wider international community as well as the people of Somalia, by and large, have appreciated the constructive responses of the Security Council.

A. *Fact of progress*

81. The uniqueness of the situation in Somalia, which riveted the attention of the international community on the situation there and led the Security Council to adopt the various resolutions so far, has changed in some important aspects. The most dramatic and visible change is of course the enormous success in reducing starvation deaths and conditions of famine in the country today. There have been other significant improvements as well in the fields of public health, education, agriculture, etc., which have been detailed in the earlier part of this report. This is not to suggest that the Somali society is completely back on its feet. Indeed, the situation even in these areas is fragile and needs careful watching as well as continued assistance from the international community.

82. In other important and crucial respects, however, the situation in Somalia continues to be unique. There is still no effectively functioning government in the

country. There is still no disciplined national armed force. There is still no organized civilian police force or judiciary, although impressive progress has been achieved in initiating the recreation of the police and judiciary. Consequently, the problems of Somalia must continue to engage the attention of the international community.

B. *The importance of disarmament*

83. I have always been firmly of the opinion that, without effective disarmament of all the factions and warlords in Somalia, it would not be possible for the country to enjoy lasting peace and stability. The Security Council has endorsed the crucial importance of disarmament in its various resolutions and conferred the necessary mandate on UNOSOM II. The enormous task of disarming Somalia can be achieved only with the cooperation of the Somali people and of neighbouring countries. Comprehensive disarmament will take a long time and will have to be conducted in phases, beginning with the demobilization and rehabilitation of the heavily armed militias. Finding hidden stockpiles of weapons will require the cooperation of the vast majority of the Somali citizens, who must genuinely want to change from rule by the gun to rule by law. The Somali police force will be one of the key instruments for creating the perception that this is a Somali programme. Disarmament must not destabilize the security balance and must equitably reduce the threat to all segments of the population. Clearly we must generate the support of the people, and cooperative methods ultimately are the only way to succeed. Fortunately, the desire for disarmament among the people appears to be strong.

84. It was the universal wish and even hope that disarmament would be achieved on a voluntary basis. This hope was based on the commitment of the Somali parties, embodied in the cease-fire agreement and the Addis Ababa agreement which they signed in January and March 1993 respectively, committing themselves to complete simultaneous disarmament throughout the country. At the same time, the Somali parties themselves had anticipated that the disarmament might not proceed smoothly and that some form of coercive action might become unavoidable. This explains their request to UNOSOM II, contained in the Addis Ababa agreement, to assist in the disarmament process and "to apply strong and effective sanctions against those responsible for any violation of the cease-fire agreement of January 1993".

C. *Efforts to achieve dialogue*

85. UNITAF achieved commendable results in the distribution of relief assistance in the country. However, the objective of ensuring a secure environment through-

out the country had not been achieved nor had adequate numbers of troops been deployed before UNITAF was withdrawn.

86. Voluntary disarmament did succeed to some extent both during UNITAF and in the early weeks of UNOSOM II. It was only after 5 June that it became necessary for UNOSOM II to resort to coercive methods to enforce disarmament in South Mogadishu. At the same time, it is a reality in Somalia that unless USC/SNA also is effectively disarmed along with other factions, the prospects for genuine peace and stability in the country would always remain bleak. In this connection, I welcome the unilateral declaration of cessation of hostilities by USC/SNA with effect from 9 October 1993. This initially led to somewhat reduced tensions in the city. However, threats made by General Aidid in his press conference of 6 November were followed by a demonstration and gunfire on 8 November aimed at preventing United States and UNOSOM II humanitarian and security operations in the city. Such actions raise serious questions about USC/SNA's sincerity.

87. Nothing would please me and UNOSOM II more than if USC/SNA were to respond positively to UNOSOM II's invitation to join the other factions in a meaningful dialogue. In an effort to build on the unilateral cessation of hostilities announced by USC/SNA, UNOSOM II has established a Mogadishu Security Advisory Committee, to which it has invited all the factions. USC/SNA boycotted the first meeting. It sent a representative to the second meeting on 4 November, but its representative used the meeting only to deliver a long speech against UNOSOM II, after which he left the meeting. USC/SNA did not attend the third meeting of the Mogadishu Security Advisory Committee, which was held on 8 November. In addition, after assuring the Ethiopian and United States representatives that it would participate in a smaller group involving the USC, UNOSOM II and the United States, USC/SNA also failed to show up for that separate meeting. In spite of these setbacks, UNOSOM II will persevere in its efforts to establish a dialogue with USC/SNA.

D. *The situation in perspective*

88. It should be obvious from the above that the situation in Somalia will continue to remain complex and complicated for the foreseeable future. This, in turn, would mean that the Security Council will have to display flexibility as well as firmness in any decision that it will take while renewing the mandate of UNOSOM II. That the mandate of UNOSOM II must be extended is, of course, self-evident.

89. I have given deep thought to what I should recommend to the Security Council in terms of a renewed

mandate for UNOSOM II. I have held extensive consultations with my Special Representative and the Force Commander, as well as my senior colleagues at Headquarters. I am conscious that the international community cannot take for granted forever the generosity of the troop-contributing countries, their readiness to put the lives of their sons and daughters on the line in pursuit of what is perceived to be a somewhat distant and ill-defined objective and the willingness of the States Members of the United Nations to make the necessary funds available on the present scale. Since, however, it is not for me to presume, in one way or another, the willingness of the Member States to make the necessary sacrifices, I have decided to present three options for consideration by the members of the Security Council.

90. Before I present the options, however, it is essential to put the situation in its proper perspective. The most significant development is that the United States has announced that it will withdraw all its combat troops and the bulk of its logistics support troops by 31 March 1994. The Governments of Belgium, France and Sweden earlier had announced their decisions to withdraw their contingents from UNOSOM II. It remains to be seen whether other troop-contributing countries also decide to withdraw their troops either before or after 31 March 1994. I have written to 42 Member States inviting them to contribute, or to increase their contribution, in terms of troops and logistics support. Here, I would like strongly to reject the insinuations made in some circles that only the troops from Europe and North America have the necessary qualities to implement the mandate given to UNOSOM II. The contingents from other continents have performed with exemplary courage, dedication and efficiency. It is none the less true that, for logistics support, UNOSOM II has had to depend primarily on the United States. The vacuum that would be created by the departure of the United States logistics contingent will have to be filled through other means. I am told that commercial arrangements can be made at a cost of about US\$ 33 million for the period ending 31 March 1994; this estimate does not include the cost of the equipment that the contractor would have to acquire from the United States.

E. *Three options*

91. In the first option, the present mandate of UNOSOM II would remain essentially unchanged as laid down by the Security Council in its resolutions 814 (1993), 837 (1993), 865 (1993) and 878 (1993). UNOSOM II would not take the initiative to resort systematically to coercive methods to enforce disarmament. Indeed, it is the hope of UNOSOM II that all factions, including USC/SNA, will cooperate to ensure peaceful conditions in the country. In Mogadishu, this

would mean that USC/SNA would remove its roadblocks and strong points throughout the city so that UNOSOM II is able to escort humanitarian convoys from and into the city. It would also signify that UNOSOM II personnel would be able to move freely throughout Somalia without any danger of being ambushed or subjected to remotely detonated mine explosions. Should these expectations not be met, however, UNOSOM II, under this option, must retain the necessary capability for coercive disarmament and retaliation against attacks on its personnel. UNOSOM II would also pursue its present plans in relation to the re-establishment of an impartial and professional Somali police force and judicial system. The objective would be to create and maintain secure conditions for humanitarian assistance and foster national reconciliation as well as of other elements of the existing mandate.

92. Were the Council to renew UNOSOM II as described above, it should reauthorize the maintenance of its present troop strength. Indeed, I feel that it would be necessary to deploy an additional brigade, the need for which I had mentioned in my previous report (S/26317). In addition, the Member States must fulfil their financial obligations, promptly and in full, which will amount to approximately US\$ 1 billion for one year. This option calls for sustained political will on the part of the troop-contributing countries, which must be prepared to make available the necessary troops and armament under United Nations command and to accept the risks associated with such a course of action.

93. In the second option, the Security Council would take a conscious decision that UNOSOM II would not use coercive methods anywhere in the country but would rely on the cooperation of the Somali parties in order to discharge its mandate. UNOSOM II would use force only in self-defence, for the protection of its personnel, in accordance with traditional peace-keeping practices. Disarmament would be entirely voluntary. In the event that inter-clan fighting resumes in different parts of the country, UNOSOM II, while making every effort not to be involved in it, must retain some capability to defend its personnel if so warranted by circumstances. The emphasis would be on ensuring unimpeded flow of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation of the infrastructure of Somalia, the repatriation of refugees, political reconciliation, the reorganization of the Somali police and judicial system and in keeping the main supply routes between Mogadishu and outside areas secure. As far as Mogadishu itself is concerned, efforts would continue to engage USC/SNA in a political dialogue and the security of the routes in Mogadishu would depend upon the goodwill of USC/SNA, as well as other factions.

94. Under this option, it would not be necessary fully to replace the contingent that would have with-

drawn by 31 March 1994 or those that might withdraw soon thereafter. The troop requirement would be of the order of 16,000 all ranks, with one brigade deployed in Mogadishu, one assigned to convoy duty and one for the security of refugees and of critical areas in need of assistance. A Force Logistics Supply Command of about 2,500 all ranks would also need to be established. The financial requirements for this option would be considerably less than the first option.

95. Under the third option, the mandate of UNOSOM II would be limited to keeping under its secure control the airport and port in Mogadishu as well as important ports and airports in other parts of the country so as to keep the supply routes open for humanitarian purposes. UNOSOM II would assist United Nations, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations in the delivery of humanitarian aid. It would help development agencies and programmes, especially UNDP, in undertaking development projects. It would, of course, continue to assist in the training of a Somali police force. This course of action would presuppose that the local authorities in various regions of Somalia would be prepared to cooperate with UNOSOM II and would provide a secure environment for the humanitarian and development functions mentioned above. The main feature of this option is its emphasis on the regions as opposed to the importance, under the other two options, of bringing about a secure environment in Mogadishu. This option would call for the deployment of about 5,000 all ranks. Under this option, as indeed under the other two options, UNOSOM II would continue to offer its good offices to resolve inter-clan differences and to promote harmony among all the factions. The financial requirement for the third option would be substantially less than the other two options.

96. There could theoretically be one more alternative, namely, a complete withdrawal of UNOSOM II from Somalia. I myself would reject this possibility. The international community must not abandon Somalia in view of the incontrovertible desire of the Somali people for the continued presence of UNOSOM II in their country. Total withdrawal would not be a responsible act.

97. In presenting these options, it is not my intention that the Security Council should pronounce on them or take a decision in favour of one of them at this stage. I have outlined the options in this report principally to alert the Security Council to the various possibilities as the situation evolves in the coming weeks and months. Nevertheless, I feel that the time might come, fairly soon, for the Council to consider these options and to decide on an appropriate course of action, depending on the prevailing circumstances and the willingness of Member

States to provide troops, the necessary finances and, equally important, the required political will.

F. *Continuing political effort*

98. In the meanwhile, UNOSOM II troop strength is adequate for the present purpose, although logistical capability may diminish somewhat by December 1993. UNOSOM II is not using coercive methods to ensure a secure environment which, by and large, is lacking mainly in South Mogadishu. UNOSOM II will continue to make a determined effort to initiate a political dialogue with all the factions, including USC/SNA. In this, UNOSOM II will seek and welcome support from Somalia's neighbours, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya, and from OAU, LAS and OIC. It is imperative that we all work together, and are seen to be working together, in this important common endeavour. At the same time, UNOSOM II will stand ready to protect its own personnel as well as the personnel of other intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. UNOSOM II might also have to be prepared to use force to keep open the lines of communication and supply routes in Mogadishu and elsewhere.

99. The importance of genuine national reconciliation in Somalia is self-evident. One must, however, take into account the possibility that, despite the best efforts on the part of all concerned, the process of national reconciliation might not succeed. In such an eventuality, the probability of a resumption of civil war in Somalia would be high. There are already reports, as yet not fully confirmed, of additional supplies of weapons entering the country. In that event, UNOSOM II, without the required resources, might become a hapless spectator to the tragedy. I shall, of course, immediately bring such developments to the attention of the Security Council.

G. *Financing*

100. I should like to emphasise the importance of ensuring reliable financing for UNOSOM II. The General Assembly, by its resolution 47/41 C, has authorized commitment for the operation of UNOSOM II for the period from 1 November 1993 to 28 February 1994 at \$84,700,000 gross per month, subject to the extension of the mandate beyond 31 October 1993 by the Security Council and the prior concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. Should additional resources be required for the extension period decided upon by the Council, recourse will be made to the Advisory Committee and to the General Assembly, as appropriate.

101. As at 9 November 1993, the outstanding assessments in connection with UNOSOM II amounted to \$140.6 million. This represents approximately

23.6 per cent of amounts assessed on Member States since its inception until 31 October 1993.

102. The Security Council, by resolution 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992 requested the Secretary-General to establish a fund through which contributions, where appropriate, could be channelled to States or operations involved in establishing a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. The total contributions to the Fund established as "The Trust Fund for Somalia - Unified Command", were US\$ 105 million. The expenses to date amount to US\$ 57 million. In its resolution 814 (1993), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to maintain the Fund for the additional purpose of receiving contributions for the maintenance of UNOSOM II forces following the departure of UNITAF forces and for the establishment of a Somali police force. The contributions received so far in this regard amount to US\$ 7 million.

H. *Logistics*

103. Owing to the withdrawal of the United States logistics contingent by 31 March 1994, changes are envisioned in connection with the provision of logistic support to UNOSOM II through the use of commercial contractors. This could result in an increase in the overall expenditure of the mission. In addition, the monthly cash flow requirements will increase. Whereas in the past, reimbursements to Governments could be delayed because of the late payment of assessed contributions, it will not be possible to delay the payment of invoices presented by commercial contractors for goods and services provided to UNOSOM II. In this regard, there has been an indication that over 35 per cent of any assessment to be made between now and the first half of 1994 will not be paid. This can only worsen the cash position of the UNOSOM II special account as indicated above.

104. I must indicate that, unless there is substantial improvement in the payment of assessments as currently forecasted, UNOSOM II will run into serious financial problems during the course of the next mandate extension.

I. *Recommendation*

105. I therefore recommend that the Security Council renew the existing mandate of UNOSOM II until 31 March 1994. Should circumstances warrant, I will immediately bring to the attention of the Security Council any developments that might have a bearing on the ability of UNOSOM II to discharge its existing mandate or which might make it desirable to modify UNOSOM II's mandate.

J. Concluding remarks

106. It is evident that the overwhelming majority of the Somali people want the United Nations to continue to support the process of reconciliation and rehabilitation which their representatives agreed upon in Addis Ababa in January and March 1993. They realize that the international community has devoted enormous resources and made considerable sacrifices to assist them in achieving this noble objective. The people of Somalia, I am convinced, are prepared to move forward with the process of national reconciliation and reconstruction if Member States are willing to stay the course.

107. In concluding the present report, I wish to express my deep appreciation to my Special Representative, Jonathan Howe, to my Deputy Special Representative, Ambassador Kouyate, to the Force Commander, General Bir, and to the men and women, civilian and military, of UNOSOM II. They have made an outstanding contribution to the implementation of United Nations mandate in Somalia, under difficult and dangerous conditions. My gratitude also extends to the International Committee of the Red Cross, to NGOs and relief agencies and to the many Governments that have assisted and reinforced the efforts of UNOSOM II. Above all, I pay tribute to the soldiers and the Somali workers of UNOSOM II who have lost their lives in endeavouring to help Somalia in its hour of need.

Document 76

Security Council resolution authorizing the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry to investigate armed attacks on UNOSOM II and requesting the Secretary-General to suspend arrest actions pursuant to resolution 837 (1993)

S/RES/885 (1993), 16 November 1993

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992, 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992, 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992, 775 (1992) of 28 August 1992, 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992, 814 (1993) of 26 March 1993, 837 (1993) of 6 June 1993, 865 (1993) of 22 September 1993, and 878 (1993) of 29 October 1993,

Also reaffirming its resolution 868 (1993) of 29 September 1993 on the need to ensure the safety and protection of United Nations personnel,

Recognizing the critical need for broad-based consultations among all parties and consensus on basic principles to achieve national reconciliation and the establishment of democratic institutions in Somalia,

Stressing that the people of Somalia bear the ultimate responsibility for achieving these objectives, and in this context noting in particular resolution 837 (1993), in which it condemned the 5 June 1993 attack on personnel of the United Nations Operation in Somalia II and called for an investigation,

Noting proposals made by Member States, and noting in particular proposals from the Organization of African Unity, including those in document S/26627 of 25 October 1993, in which the establishment of an

impartial commission of inquiry is recommended to investigate armed attacks on the Operation,

Having received and considered the reports of the Secretary-General of 1 July and 24 August 1993^{1/} on the implementation of resolution 837 (1993),

1. Authorizes the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry, in further implementation of resolutions 814 (1993) and 837 (1993), to investigate armed attacks on personnel of the United Nations Operation in Somalia II which led to casualties among them;

2. Requests the Secretary-General, having conveyed his views to the Security Council, to appoint the Commission at the earliest possible time and to report to the Council on its establishment;

3. Directs the Commission to determine procedures for carrying out its investigation, taking into account standard United Nations procedures;

4. Notes that members of the Commission will have the status of experts on mission within the meaning of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 2/ which shall apply to the Commission;

^{1/} Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-eighth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1993, documents S/26022 and S/26351, respectively.

^{2/} General Assembly resolution 22 A (I) of 13 February 1946.

5. *Urges* the Secretary-General to provide the Commission with all assistance necessary to facilitate its work;

6. *Calls* on all parties in Somalia fully to cooperate with the Commission;

7. *Requests* the Commission to report its findings through the Secretary-General to the Security Council as soon as possible, taking into consideration the need for a thorough inquiry;

8. *Requests* that the Secretary-General, under his authority in resolutions 814 (1993) and 837 (1993), pending completion of the report of the Commission, suspend arrest actions against those individuals who might be implicated but are not currently detained pursuant to resolution 837 (1993), and make appropriate provision to deal with the situation of those already detained under the provisions of resolution 837 (1993);

9. *Decides* to remain seized of this matter.

Document 77

Security Council resolution renewing UNOSOM II's mandate until 31 May 1994 and requesting the Secretary-General to submit an updated plan for UNOSOM II's future by 15 January 1994 so that the Council could undertake a fundamental review of the mission's mandate by 1 February 1994.

S/RES/886, 18 November 1993

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992 and all subsequent relevant resolutions,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 12 November 1993, 1/

Noting the significant improvement in the situation in most areas of Somalia achieved by the United Nations Operation in Somalia II as described in that report,

Noting also paragraph 72 of the report of the Secretary-General,

Recognizing that the people of Somalia bear the ultimate responsibility for national reconciliation and reconstruction of their own country,

Stressing the commitment of the international community to continue helping Somalia in its efforts to accelerate the process of national reconstruction and to promote stability, rehabilitation and political reconciliation and to regain a normal, peaceful life,

Recalling that the highest priority of the Operation continues to be to support the efforts of the Somali people in promoting the process of national reconciliation and the establishment of democratic institutions,

Affirming that the General Agreement signed in Addis Ababa on 8 January 1993 2/ and the Addis Ababa Agreement of the First Session of the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia, signed on 27 March 1993, 3/ establish a sound basis for resolution of the problems in Somalia,

Emphasizing in this context the crucial importance of disarmament in achieving lasting peace and stability throughout Somalia,

Condemning the continuing acts of violence and armed attacks against persons engaged in humanitarian and peace-keeping efforts, and paying tribute to those troops and humanitarian personnel of several countries who have been killed or injured while serving in Somalia,

Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to threaten peace and security in the region,

1. *Welcomes* the report of the Secretary-General;

2. *Commends* the Secretary-General, his Special Representative and the personnel of the United Nations Operation in Somalia II for their achievements in improving the conditions of the Somali people and in promoting the process of national reconciliation and reconstruction of the country;

3. *Decides*, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to renew the mandate of the Operation for an additional period expiring on 31 May 1994;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council by 15 January 1994, or at any time before that if the situation warrants, on the progress made in achieving national reconciliation by the Somali people and that made in the attainment of political, security and humanitarian goals, and also requests the Secretary-General, as part of that report, to provide an updated plan

1/ *Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-eighth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1993*, document S/26738.

2/ *Ibid.*, *Supplement for January, February and March 1993*, document S/25163, annex II.

3/ *Ibid.*, *Supplement for July, August and September 1993*, document S/26317, sect. IV.

setting out the Operation's future concerted strategy with regard to its humanitarian, political and security activities;

5. *Also decides* to undertake a fundamental review of the mandate of the Operation by 1 February 1994 in the light of the report of the Secretary-General and his updated plan;

6. *Urges* all parties in Somalia, including movements and factions, to accelerate their efforts to achieve political reconciliation, peace and security and immediately to abide by the cease-fire and disarmament agreements reached in Addis Ababa, particularly the immediate cantonnement of all heavy weapons;

7. *Underscores* the importance of the Somali people attaining specific goals in the context of political reconciliation, in particular the early establishment and effective functioning of all district and regional councils and an interim national authority;

8. *Stresses* in this regard the importance it attaches to the accelerated implementation by the Somali people, with the assistance of the United Nations and donor countries, of the recommendations contained in annex I of the report of the Secretary-General of 17 August 1993^{4/} and endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 865 (1993) of 22 September 1993, and in particular the establishment of an operational police, penal and judiciary system at the regional and district level as soon as feasible;

9. *Reminds* all parties in Somalia, including movements and factions, that continued United Nations involvement in Somalia depends on their active cooperation and tangible progress towards a political settlement;

10. *Welcomes and supports* the ongoing diplomatic efforts being made by Member States and international organizations, in particular those in the region, to assist United Nations efforts to bring all parties in Somalia, including movements and factions, to the negotiating table;

11. *Reaffirms* the obligations of States to implement fully the embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia imposed by paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992);

12. *Expresses concern* at the destabilizing effects of cross-border arms flows in the region, affirms the importance it attaches to the security of the countries neighbouring Somalia, and calls for the cessation of such arms flows;

13. *Welcomes* the Fourth Coordination Meeting for Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia, to be held at Addis Ababa from 29 November to 1 December 1993;

14. *Emphasizes* the relationship between national rehabilitation and progress in the process of national reconciliation in Somalia, and encourages donor countries to make contributions to Somalia's rehabilitation as demonstrable political progress occurs, and in particular to contribute urgently to rehabilitation projects in those regions where progress on political reconciliation and security has been made;

15. *Expresses its appreciation* to those Member States which have contributed to or provided logistical or other assistance to the Operation or offered to do so, and encourages those who are in a position to do so to contribute, on an urgent basis, troops, equipment, and financial and logistical support to enhance the Operation's capability to carry out its mandate and to ensure the safety of the personnel;

16. *Requests* the Secretary-General to ask the Somalia Trust Fund Committee to review claims and make payments on an urgent basis and urges Member States to make funds available directly or through the Somalia Trust Fund for priority projects, including the re-establishment of the Somali police and de-mining, on an urgent basis;

17. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

4/ *Ibid.*, document S/26317.

Document 78

Letter dated 23 November 1993 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council informing the Council of the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry authorized by resolution 885 (1993)

S/26823, 1 December 1993

The Security Council, on 16 November 1993, adopted resolution 885 (1993), which authorized "the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry, in further implementation of resolutions 814 (1993) and 837 (1993), to

investigate armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel which led to casualties among them". I was requested to appoint the Commission at the earliest possible time and to report thereon.

Following consultations, I have appointed a Commission of Inquiry to carry out the investigation. The Commission, consisting of three highly respected and distinguished international personalities, will comprise: The Honourable Matthew S. W. Ngulube, the Chief Justice of Zambia, as Chairman; General Emmanuel Erskine (Ret.) of Ghana; and General Gustav Hagglund of Finland.

Given the importance I attach to the work of the Commission, I have decided to establish a separate secretariat to assist it in carrying out its tasks. Mr. Winston Tubman of the Office of Legal Affairs has been designated

as Executive Secretary of this secretariat. Mr. Tubman is a former Minister of Justice of Liberia.

I have asked the members of the Commission to be available in New York today, 23 November 1993, for consultations and to determine procedures for carrying out their investigation, as directed by the Security Council.

I should be grateful if you would bring the contents of this letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS -GHALI

Document 79

Letter dated 30 November 1993 from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General taking note of the composition of the Commission of Inquiry

S/26824, 1 December 1993

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 23 November 1993 (S/26823) concerning the Commission of Inquiry established pursuant to resolution 885 (1993) of 16 November 1993 has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the composition of the Commission and welcome your decision to establish a separate secretariat to assist the Commission in carrying out its tasks.

The members of the Council look forward to receiving the Commission's report through you in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 885 (1993).

(Signed) José Luis JESUS
President of the Security Council

Document 80

Declaration of the Fourth Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia, Addis Ababa, 1 December 1993

Not issued as a United Nations document

1. Somalia is at a historic crossroads. The Somali people are exhausted, having suffered so much, for so long, from the continuing violence and turmoil. The Somali people are looking for urgent, sustainable solutions to their desperate situation. It is clear that time is running out.

2. Participants at the meeting were fully aware that international reserves of patience and funds are running out. The overriding need to open a new chapter demanded that a map be drawn up for both the Somalis and the donor community in a productive relationship, in pursuit of a solution to the plight of the Somali people.

3. Participants recognized that the leadership of Somalia has two choices: it can either move forward into

rebuilding a civil society, or it can return to the quagmire of man-made strife and famine. Participants agreed that the way forward must be determined by the Somali people themselves.

4. Participants concurred that at this critical stage, security, maintenance of law and order, and the creation of representative and accountable institutional structures are essential for rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts. Violence and threats of violence can no longer be tolerated. The participants, furthermore, agreed that rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance can and will be invested in those areas where stability and security have been attained and where the involvement of elders, local

NGOs and representatives of the international community is allowed.

5. The meeting welcomed and endorsed the declaration of the Somali participants that they stood ready to create peaceful conditions and a viable political atmosphere at district, regional and national levels for the smooth implementation of the humanitarian programmes. In this regard specific initiatives to be taken by the Somalis include disarming, with the assistance of the international community. There is also a need for support of local police forces as part of evolving judicial and penal systems, and where necessary, establishment of local security committees.

6. The meeting focused on three main elements of the challenge facing the Somali people and their international partners viz.,

- (i) the continuing emergency needs,
- (ii) the process towards reconstruction and rehabilitation, and
- (iii) economic management and governance.

Continuing emergency needs

7. The representatives of the international community reaffirmed its commitment to provide unconditionally essential emergency assistance to vulnerable groups, especially children. They also recognized resource constraints faced by the implementing partners and agreed to address the needs of United Nations agencies and international NGOs.

8. Further, the meeting underscored the importance of the Somali community being involved in identifying and assisting vulnerable groups and it stressed that emergency measures should be consistent with longer-term concerns of sustainable action.

Reconstruction and rehabilitation

9. The meeting acknowledged that security and stability are prerequisites for investment in reconstruction and rehabilitation and that the involvement of the respective Somali institutions will render reconstruction and rehabilitation more effective. The meeting also acknowledged the complexity of reintegrating nearly one seventh of the population who are presently away from their homes. However, Somali communities in all regions can promote reconstruction and rehabilitation by facilitating the voluntary return of displaced people and refugees who should contribute to the productive and economic life of those communities. Where appropriate, committees of elders and community leaders from camps for displaced

persons and recipient communities should be established to facilitate the process of reintegration.

10. The principal constraints identified in the rehabilitation of production, commerce and trade were inadequate marketing facilities, the collapse of economic infrastructure, the absence of a banking system, and the need for training and technical assistance. Somali participants emphasised, however, their readiness to do their utmost even under these difficult circumstances. Regarding marine resources, Somalia's waters are being fished with impunity and the stock of fish is being depleted with debilitating long-term implications for the protection of the marine environment and the sustainability of marine resources. In this regard, assistance is being sought from Eritrea and Kenya to assist in instituting measures to prohibit illegal fishing in Somali waters. The key constraints identified in the social sectors were the lack of infrastructure, unsustainable financing mechanisms and absence of public administration. Participants supported the full involvement of communities in designing sustainable systems for delivery of social services.

11. It was agreed that all actions in the process of reconstruction and rehabilitation should contribute to enhancement of efficient operations of the private sector in a free and open market system. Further, these actions should be part of a coherent interim strategy as well as be consistent with a long-term framework for reconstruction and rehabilitation. In particular, every effort should be made to ensure that such actions, particularly where they have recurrent cost implications, should be sustainable in the longer run. The importance of the participation of women in the process of reconstruction and rehabilitation was stressed, particularly where those actions impact on areas where women have a primary role.

Economic management and governance

12. The meeting agreed that systems of economic management and institution-building, together with associated mechanisms for donor coordination, should be established to ensure that a number of current and potential problems be effectively tackled. The major problems raised included the lack of sustainability associated with existing investment projects, the lack of mechanisms for allocating resources and accountability, the lack of instruments to plan and prioritize expenditures, and the lack of absorptive capacity in the Somali economy.

13. In order to move forward along the path of healing Somalia, the participants of the conference agreed to discharge their responsibilities as follows:

The Somali people

14. Participants recognized that the reconstruction and rehabilitation effort in Somalia must be founded on the basic principle of Somali ownership of the process. They agreed that ownership means not only that the Somali people are fully involved in the rehabilitation and reconstruction process, but that they must also bear responsibility for ensuring that the environment is conducive for reconstruction and development. In this connection, the participants welcomed the plan to launch immediately a Somali national United Nations Volunteers programme which will involve 500 Somali technicians and professionals as national UNV specialists and community development leaders.

15. All participants called for Somali initiatives in establishing viable civil institutions and appropriate mechanisms to facilitate the reconstruction and recovery of Somalia, as well as to determine realistic goals and priorities. It is essential that through these mechanisms, Somalis agree on overall resource allocation by regions.

16. The Somali representatives committed themselves:

- (a) to establish the necessary preconditions to end the debilitating insecurity currently plaguing Somalia, including taking steps to disarm the militia as agreed in the Addis Ababa accord of March 1993;
- (b) to establish regional development committees which would be responsible for prioritizing regional development activities and for mobilizing resources from communities in support of those activities;
- (c) to establish a Development Council, composed of representatives of Regional Development Committees, to prioritize development activities among regions participating in the Development Council. The Development Council will develop a mechanism for mobilizing resources and providing criteria for the allocation of those resources across regions and sectors;
- (d) to accept the principle of the right of voluntary return of all displaced persons and refugees as part of the peace process and reconstruction;
- (e) to establish, where appropriate, inter-party committees at various levels to solve issues relating to returning refugees and in particular the resolution of any outstanding issues relating to land ownership;
- (f) to establish mechanisms at the district level to ensure effective delivery of services.

The donor community

17. The donor community will be an effective supporter of the Somali people in the process of rehabilitation and recovery, once the necessary preconditions related to peace, security and reconciliation have been established.

18. The donor community regrets the absence of important elements of Somali political leadership from this meeting. Nevertheless, donors recognize the readiness of many regions to create the conditions necessary for rehabilitation and are prepared to assist these regions.

19. Donors agreed to fully support the Development Council, as well as regional development committee mechanisms to determine rehabilitation priorities, funding modalities and implementation.

20. Donors also agreed to collaborate and support the Development Office to ensure adequate communication, cooperation and coordination. Donors concurred that there should be common criteria for resource allocation to regions.

21. Donors further agreed to develop a common approach among themselves for the allocation of resources. In this regard, the Development Office would play the secretariat role, supporting an aid coordinating body composed of representatives of donors, United Nations agencies and programmes, NGOs, other multi-lateral and African institutions and organizations, and possibly countries in the region.

22. Donors also agreed to:

- (i) identify common security and institutional criteria for providing assistance to the regions;
- (ii) provide assistance to prioritize development activities within the framework developed by the Development Council;
- (iii) establish mechanisms for channelling recurrent cost funding in a sustainable manner, and in developing common accounting criteria;
- (iv) coordinate donor strategies for supporting Somali institutions of management and economic governance;
- (v) provide development assistance in a manner consistent with the World Bank-led Planning Framework; and
- (vi) work with the Development Committee and the Development Office in establishing sustainable salary levels for local employees.

The meeting also recognizes the contributions of the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

UNOSOM

23. UNOSOM committed itself to work with all *concerned agencies and organizations* to strengthen coordination of all aspects of the United Nations efforts throughout Somalia—humanitarian, political and peace-keeping. To facilitate this UNOSOM will intensify efforts to strengthen its operations in the field.

Division of Humanitarian Relief and Rehabilitation

24. The Division of Humanitarian Relief and Rehabilitation will be reorganized and strengthened to effectively respond to the transition from relief through rehabilitation and reconstruction to development with a coherent strategy, especially during the critical period immediately ahead. It should also strengthen its field presence.

25. The Development Office would embrace the *skills and experience of the Somali professionals*, United Nations agencies and NGOs. It should be staffed at the proper senior levels so as to support Somali efforts in the establishment of functioning public institutions, and economic instruments to manage the process of rehabilitation and development. Its functions will include:

- (i) serving as a secretariat for the Development Council, and of the aid coordinating body;
- (ii) provide analysis of policy and operational issues relevant to effectiveness of development activities in Somalia.

Agencies and programmes of the United Nations systems

26. Agencies and programmes of the United Nations systems and international non-governmental organizations must function as creative facilitators in the process of implementing donor assistance.

27. The United Nations system is fully committed to support the Somali people in their rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts. The United Nations system stands ready to work within the agreed institutional framework and mechanisms, to ensure close collaboration and coordination, including coordinating their own activities on a sectoral basis. In this context, organizations of the

United Nations system pledged their full support to UNOSOM and expressed their readiness to strengthen their presence and actions in Somalia. The United Nations system is prepared, by experience and commitment, to provide and participate in the coordination of the necessary inputs for transferring to the Somali people the ownership of the process for reconstruction and development of their country. The United Nations agencies and programmes expect to continue providing assistance and support as long as required, recognizing the needs to move beyond emergency and dependency to more normal modes of cooperation and coordination directed at sustained governance and growth.

NGOs

28. International NGOs reaffirmed their commitment to the Somali people and to continue to work with them towards the rebuilding of their nation and civil society.

29. International NGOs are already engaged in participatory processes with communities and emerging local structures in Somalia and they will continue to *maximize their efforts in these directions*.

30. All participants agreed to cooperate fully in the establishment of sectoral working groups, working under the guidance of the Development Council, comprising Somali professionals, appropriate United Nations agencies and programmes, UNOSOM, donors, local and international NGOs in developing sectoral strategies consistent with long-term sustainable development within the Planning Framework.

31. In the final analysis, all our efforts aim at restoring the belief in the future of Somalia. It is the fate of the children and future generations of the Somali people which is at stake. History will judge how divisions were set aside in order to achieve a better future for them. The humanitarian nightmare must not be allowed to return to haunt Somalia and the world.

32. Therefore, this Addis Ababa Declaration of the Fourth Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia should be translated into a six-month Plan of Action before the end of the year.

Document 81

General Assembly resolution on the situation of human rights in Somalia

A/RES/48/146, 20 December 1993

The General Assembly,

Guided by the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, the International Bill of Human Rights 1/ and other applicable human rights instruments,

Gravely concerned by the situation in Somalia, including the extensive damage and destruction of villages, towns and cities, the heavy damage inflicted by the civil conflict on the country's infrastructure and the still widespread disruption of many public facilities and services and the lack of a governmental authority to ensure even basic human rights,

Deploring the loss of human life in Somalia and attacks against personnel of the United Nations and of other humanitarian organizations in Somalia, which sometimes result in serious injuries or deaths,

Recalling Security Council resolution 733 (1992) of 21 January 1992, all subsequent relevant Security Council resolutions and General Assembly resolution 47/167 of 18 December 1992, and taking note of Commission on Human Rights resolution 1993/86 of 10 March 1993, 2/

Commending the ongoing efforts in Somalia of the United Nations, the specialized agencies, humanitarian organizations, non-governmental organizations, countries in the region and regional organizations,

Taking note with appreciation of the report of the independent expert on the conditions in Somalia, 3/ dated 26 October 1993,

1. *Commends* the independent expert for his report on the conditions in Somalia, in which he cited an increase in human rights violations fuelled by the absence

of an accountable government and the lack of infrastructure;

2. *Urges* all Somali parties in the conflict to confirm their commitment to the Addis Ababa Agreement of 27 March 1993;

3. *Urges* all Somalis to work together towards peace and security in Somalia and to guarantee the protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all Somalis;

4. *Calls upon* all parties to protect civilians, United Nations personnel and humanitarian relief workers from being killed, tortured or arbitrarily detained;

5. *Requests* that, following the restoration of political stability and security in Somalia, the Commission on Human Rights, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, consider establishing a group of independent human rights monitors, funded from within existing United Nations resources, to receive complaints and collect and investigate reports of violations of human rights and to transmit them, where appropriate, to the Centre for Human Rights of the Secretariat, in an effort to prevent human rights violations;

6. *Decides* to continue its consideration of this question at its forty-ninth session.

1/ See resolutions 217 A (III), 2200 A (XXI), annex and 44/128, annex.

2/ See *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 1993, Supplement No. 3 (E/1993/23)*, chap. II, sect. A.

3/ A/48/510.

Document 82

General Assembly resolution on assistance for humanitarian relief and the economic and social rehabilitation of Somalia

A/RES/48/201, 21 December 1993

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 43/206 of 20 December 1988, 44/178 of 19 December 1989, 45/229 of 21 December 1990, 46/176 of 19 December 1991 and 47/160 of 18 December 1992 and the resolutions and decisions

of the Economic and Social Council on emergency assistance to Somalia,

Recalling also Security Council resolution 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992 and all subsequent relevant resolutions, in which the Council, *inter alia*, urged all

parties, movements and factions in Somalia to facilitate the efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and humanitarian organizations to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to the affected population in Somalia and reiterated the call for the full respect of the security and safety of the personnel of those organizations and the guarantee of their complete freedom of movement in and around Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia,

Noting the cooperation between the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the countries of the Horn of Africa and the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement in their efforts to resolve the humanitarian, security and political crisis in Somalia,

Noting with appreciation the continued efforts made by the Secretary-General to assist the Somali people in their efforts to promote peace, stability and national reconciliation,

Welcoming the results of the Fourth Coordination Meeting for Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia, held at Addis Ababa from 29 November to 1 December 1993,

Noting also the significant improvement in the situation in most parts of the country achieved by the United Nations Operation in Somalia,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on emergency assistance for humanitarian relief and the economic and social rehabilitation of Somalia, 1/ and the statement made before the Second Committee of the General Assembly on 16 November 1993 by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, 2/

Deeply appreciative of the humanitarian assistance rendered by a number of States to alleviate the hardship and suffering of the affected Somali population,

Emphasizing the importance of the further implementation of its resolution 47/160 to rehabilitate basic social and economic services at the local and regional levels throughout the country,

Recognizing that the emergency phase of the present crisis is almost over and that the focus is shifting to rehabilitation and recovery,

1. *Expresses its gratitude* to all States and the intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations that have responded to the appeals of the Secretary-General and others by extending assistance to Somalia;

2. *Expresses its appreciation* to the Secretary-General for his continued and tireless efforts to mobilize assistance to the Somali people;

3. *Welcomes* the ongoing efforts of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the countries of the Horn of Africa and the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement to resolve the situation in Somalia;

4. *Urges* all States and relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to continue the further implementation of resolution 47/160 in order to assist the Somali people to embark on the rehabilitation of basic social and economic services as well as institution-building aimed at the restoration of civil administration at the local level in all those parts of the country where peace, security and stability prevail;

5. *Appeals* to all the Somali parties concerned to terminate hostilities on the basis of the Addis Ababa Agreement of 27 March 1993, 3/ and to engage in a national reconciliation process leading to the re-establishment of peace, order and stability, which are essential if relief and rehabilitation efforts are to be successful;

6. *Calls upon* all parties, movements and factions in Somalia to respect fully the security and safety of personnel of the United Nations and its specialized agencies and of non-governmental organizations and to guarantee their complete freedom of movement throughout Somalia;

7. *Calls upon* the Secretary-General to continue to mobilize international humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance for Somalia;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in view of the critical situation in Somalia, to take all measures necessary for the implementation of the present resolution, to apprise the Economic and Social Council at its substantive session of 1994 of the progress made and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session.

1/ A/48/504.

2/ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-eighth Session, Second Committee, 33rd meeting, and corrigendum.*

3/ See S/26317, sect. IV; see *Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-eighth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1993, document S/26317.*

Document 83

Further report of the Secretary-General submitted in pursuance of resolution 886 (1993), reviewing the options for the future mandate of UNOSOM II

S/1994/12, 6 January 1994

Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 886 (1993) of 18 November 1993.

I. Progress to date

A. Political aspects

2. The political mandate of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) is derived from the relevant Security Council resolutions and implemented through the framework of the Addis Ababa agreement of March 1993. This entails a delicately balanced, two-track approach: reconciliation among the national factions and promoting district and regional councils at the grass roots. Ideally, these tracks are complementary and mutually reinforcing in achieving national reconciliation and the foundation for representative governance.

1. National reconciliation

3. Progress in political reconciliation and reconstruction is central to the success of development efforts and the securing of international assistance to Somalia. This message has been repeatedly conveyed by the international community to the Somali political leadership. Two primary obstacles continue to impede progress on the political level: (a) deep divisions between the two main factional alliances, the Group of 12 and the Somali National Alliance (SNA); and (b) the continued rejection by SNA of all political initiatives undertaken by UNOSOM II.

4. A recent attempt to catalyse Somali national reconciliation was made at a political meeting following the Fourth Humanitarian Conference convened by the United Nations at Addis Ababa. From 2 to 11 December 1993, at the invitation of the Ethiopian Government and with the support of UNOSOM II, representatives of the two major alliances, the Group of 12 and the Somali National Alliance, met to discuss outstanding matters and disputes between them. Despite warnings from the international community that failure to achieve progress on the political front could drive away needed foreign assistance, the factional representatives failed to agree on a structure for face-to-face talks between the faction chairmen, and the initiatives unfortunately were not successful.

5. In fact, lacking a precise agenda, the informal political meeting bogged down almost immediately after it was convened over the issue of whether or not the United Nations should play a role in the national reconciliation process. Related to this issue was the relationship between the role of the United Nations and that of the President of Ethiopia as mandated by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) in this regard. Whereas SNA insisted that the United Nations had no role to play in political reconciliation, preferring this to be done by regional Powers, the Group of 12 held the view that UNOSOM II should remain in Somalia and that the United Nations must play a key role in the Somali political process.

6. Other contributing factors to the unsuccessful outcome of the political meeting included the sharp differences of opinion between the Group of 12 and SNA over the status of the district and regional councils that had been established. Whereas the Group of 12 fully supported the legitimacy of these councils, SNA called for a fundamental review of their status and mandate. Another factor was the difference between them as to whether or not the Addis Ababa agreement should be amended. Objecting to SNA's suggestion that the Addis Ababa agreement might be revised, the Group of 12 stated that the agreement should not be altered. Even regarding an appropriate forum for national reconciliation, there was a difference of opinion. Prior to the convening of the Humanitarian Conference, SNA proposed to convene a meeting of Somalis at Mogadishu for national reconciliation during the first part of January 1994. However, this was not accepted by the Group of 12. The SNA faction has also complained that the United Nations was instigating the Group of 12 into taking actions to exclude it from the Somali national reconciliation process. Owing to clearly differing perspectives on crucial and important issues, no real discussion of these issues could take place at Addis Ababa.

7. Since returning from Addis Ababa to Somalia, the Group of 12 has organized meetings at Mogadishu as well as in various regions and issued statements expressing its views as to the next steps to be taken. Following its meeting at Mogadishu from 13 to 18 December 1993, the Group of 12 issued a resolution and an interim plan of action which, *inter alia*, called for the establishment of

a permanent contact group for dialogue with SNA to speed up the implementation of the Addis Ababa agreement. As part of the internal efforts to achieve political reconciliation, the Imam of Hirab, who covers both the Abgaal and Haber Gedir sub-clans, has been holding consultations with the two sub-clans in order to mediate for peace in Mogadishu. Parallel to this effort are other initiatives being undertaken mainly at the regional level to achieve a general reconciliation: Garowe (in the north-east), Bula-Haji (Lower Juba), Bardhera (Gedo) and Mogadishu with the Hawadle and Murusade Elders. All are requesting UNOSOM's logistical and financial support. The question of the participation and involvement of SNA remains the central point of all these initiatives.

8. A key task of UNOSOM II in the coming weeks and months will thus be to try to assist in efforts to unblock the national reconciliation process among the Somali factions. All means at UNOSOM II's disposal will be committed towards providing Somali leadership with an ample "window of opportunity" to meet and resolve their differences. Simultaneously, UNOSOM II will continue to convey the message to Somali factional leaders that the international community is not prepared to wait indefinitely for an improved security environment in which to work on behalf of the Somali people.

2. District councils

9. In the past two months, considerable progress has been made in the establishment of district councils throughout the country. Fourteen additional councils have been certified during this period, bringing the total to 53 out of 81 districts (excluding the north-west).^{1/} In accordance with the Addis Ababa agreement, the district councils shall be responsible for managing the affairs of the district, including public safety, health, education and reconstruction. Many of the district councils, however, lack the resources to become fully operational.

10. Strong objections were voiced by SNA in regard to efforts by UNOSOM II to set up the district and regional councils. In December, I therefore requested Under-Secretary-General James O. C. Jonah to review the methodology and procedures utilized to determine the establishment of district and regional councils. From his report to me after his conversations with a number of Somalis and actual visits in December to some of the district councils, I am satisfied that at every stage, those involved in UNOSOM ensured that the Somali people themselves were in agreement with the methods and procedures used. In actual fact, each district council was certified by the elders and only witnessed by a United Nations official. Thus it could not be argued that the district and regional councils are being imposed on the people of Somalia. In addition, the Group of 12 is fully

satisfied with the methodology and procedures and has been urging that UNOSOM II complete the establishment of the district and regional councils.

11. One of the primary obstacles to the effective establishment of district councils in Somalia has been the opposition of SNA, which has refused to participate in the process and which has in some instances attempted to block the formation of councils through intimidation or the creation of shadow SNA district councils. In the greater Mogadishu area (Benadir region), the most politically sensitive area in which to form local government, efforts have already begun to establish councils in the 15 districts. The district council of Bondhere in North Mogadishu was certified on 6 December 1993. Since then, consultations have been undertaken in the Wadajir and Dharkenley districts in South Mogadishu; Karan, Yaqshid and Shibis in North Mogadishu; and Waeberi and Hamar Jab-jab in Central Mogadishu. UNOSOM II will proceed with its efforts in this area with cautious deliberation in view of the prevailing circumstances.

12. In addition to establishing additional district councils, efforts are continuing with a view to strengthening those councils already established. An inter-divisional team of UNOSOM II staff has been paying visits to each district to assess the particular support needed by local governments. Assistance from various donor countries and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has been essential in the provision of starter kits—basic office supplies and furniture—for the district councils. While most of these councils face predictable problems in their initial phase of operation, they represent an important step towards re-establishing viable and representative government in Somalia.

3. Regional councils

13. Since my last report, two additional regional councils have also been formed, bringing the total number of regional councils to 8 out of the 13 in Somalia, excluding the north-west. Three more regional councils, in Bari, Lower Juba and Mudug, are expected to be inaugurated soon. Only in the Middle Juba is the process facing obstacles, owing to a deteriorating security situation in two of the three districts there. Efforts are being made to stabilize the situation in that region with the aim of establishing councils in the two districts in question. In accordance with the Addis Ababa agreement, the regional councils shall be entrusted primarily with the task of implementing humanitarian, social and economic programmes in coordination with the Transitional National Council (TNC) and will also assist in the con-

^{1/} The legal status of several districts is still the subject of discussions between UNOSOM II and local Somali communities. As a result, the total number of districts said to exist in Somalia may vary.

duct of the internationally supervised census. In addition to maintaining liaison with UNOSOM II, United Nations specialized agencies, NGOs and other relevant organizations directly and through the central administrative departments and the TNC, the regional councils shall also be responsible for law and order at the regional level.

4. *Transitional National Council*

14. With the exception of the United Somali Congress (USC)/SNA faction, participants in the recent Addis Ababa political meetings expressed a strong intention to work towards the rapid establishment of the TNC. It is my hope to see the TNC established shortly, in accordance with the Addis Ababa agreement of March 1993. There is broad commitment among most sections of the Somali political spectrum for this crucial step towards the re-establishment of Somali sovereignty. Nevertheless, again reflecting the basic disagreements among the Somali factions regarding the status of the district and regional councils, strong objections were raised by SNA to the effort to establish the TNC.

15. At present UNOSOM II has received nine nominations for representatives from the 15 political factions, each of which may nominate one representative to the TNC. In addition, regional councils, which nominate three representatives each, have begun deliberations for the selection of their representatives to the TNC.

16. According to the March 1993 Addis Ababa agreement, progress towards the establishment of the TNC is a critical step in accelerating the assumption by Somalis of responsibility for political and economic processes. Once formed, the TNC can begin to address the many governmental and legal issues involved in the rehabilitation of Somali governance which go beyond UNOSOM II's mandate.

5. *Police and justice*

17. Progress has been made in the re-establishment of police forces and justice systems in Somalia, both of which are critical for the return of functional Somali governance and public order. This is particularly important in the north-east, where at present no United Nations military forces have been deployed. Pursuant to Security Council resolutions 814 (1993), 865 (1993) and 886 (1993), Unified Task Force (UNITAF)/UNOSOM II has now re-established 107 police stations in Somalia's districts, with one district court, one regional court and one appeal court functioning in Mogadishu, and 15 district courts, 5 regional courts and 5 courts of appeal re-established in the north-west. Both Mogadishu Central Prison and Hargeisa Prison are already functioning. Nationally, there are now 6,737 policemen at the regional and district levels, 311 judicial personnel in 8 regions and 26 districts, and over 700 prison officers in two regions.

18. The police, judicial and penal systems are still very fragile. It is imperative to consolidate and enhance these systems in order to secure law and order. With the mandate to accelerate the process of assumption by Somalis of the operations of the police and judicial systems, UNOSOM II plans to involve Somali police, prison, judicial and social service personnel in advisory capacities during this phase of the justice programme.

19. In order to enhance security, the Mogadishu police stations have been supplied with radio links among themselves and with the UNOSOM II forces Provost Marshal's Office. This will facilitate coordination between the Somali police and UNOSOM military. It is also planned to put in place a Somali police rapid deployment force known as Darawishta by March 1994. These improvements will allow reduction of the involvement of UNOSOM II military forces in the role of policing.

B. *Humanitarian situation*

20. Since my last report, UNOSOM II has renewed its effort to place humanitarian programmes at the forefront of its work in Somalia. This initiative was highlighted at the Fourth Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia, held at Addis Ababa from 29 November to 1 December 1993. Somali delegates and international donors reaffirmed their commitment to accelerate Somali control of the recovery and development process.

1. *The continuing emergency*

21. Though the fight to end famine in Somalia has been successful, several indicators suggest that in the past few months malnutrition levels are again on the rise in parts of Somalia, including Mogadishu and the Juba valley, two areas of ongoing conflict and insecurity. In the lower Juba valley, levels of acute malnutrition among children under five has doubled to 20 per cent. Targeting these vulnerable populations in spite of challenging security problems remains a top commitment of UNOSOM's humanitarian division and the NGOs, United Nations agencies and military forces with which it collaborates. Collectively these organizations have stepped up efforts in the past two months to provide emergency food relief and medical treatment wherever it is needed; notably, assistance has been provided to flood victims in the north-east of Somalia, to Ethiopian refugees in Mogadishu, to the disabled, orphans and schoolchildren and to returning refugees in the Juba valley.

2. *Resettlement*

22. UNOSOM II has continued to cooperate with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other agencies to facilitate the

safe and orderly return of Somali refugees and internally displaced persons. Successful resettlement projects have been particularly in evidence in the Juba valley, where since October over 3,000 persons have returned from camps in Kenya, Kismayo and Mogadishu. Careful monitoring and follow-up by cooperating agencies have ensured that these movements have occurred without significant setbacks. Insecurity in parts of Somalia has slowed and complicated resettlement programmes. None the less, assisting Somali families to return to their homes remains a top priority.

3. *The Addis Ababa Declaration*

23. In a significant step towards handing over to the Somalis the responsibility for the recovery of their country, representatives from Somali regions, political movements and the international donor community agreed at Addis Ababa on a regionally based strategy for the establishment of mechanisms for resource mobilization and allocation and the development of programmes and projects. The regional focus is an important step towards directing international development resources to those communities which have succeeded in creating and maintaining a secure environment in which development efforts can take place.

24. The strategy now being followed by the Humanitarian Division of UNOSOM II rests on the following six principal approaches agreed upon at the meeting in Addis Ababa:

- (a) Essential emergency assistance is unconditional and will continue to be provided to vulnerable groups;
- (b) Rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance will only be provided where stability and security exist;
- (c) Involvement of Somalis in all stages of rehabilitation and reconstruction is essential. Somali control of the process is a prerequisite to donor assistance;
- (d) Every effort must be made to ensure that rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts are sustainable;
- (e) All actions in the reconstruction and rehabilitation process should contribute to the enhancement of efficient operations of the private sector in a free and open market system;
- (f) The donor community will be fully supportive of the mechanisms being set up to determine rehabilitation priorities, funding modalities and implementation.

25. Broad agreements were reached at the Addis Ababa meeting regarding mechanisms which would facilitate the implementation of the provisions of the Declaration. Development committees will be established in the various regions and will be responsible for giving priority to regional development activities and for mobilizing resources from communities in support of those activities. A Development Council, composed of representatives of the regional development committees, will be formed to develop a mechanism for mobilizing resources and providing criteria for the allocation of those resources across regions and sectors. An Aid Coordination Body is to be set up to coordinate donor assistance to Somalia. It is envisaged that this body will comprise representatives of donors, United Nations agencies and programmes, NGOs, other multilateral and African institutions and organizations and possibly countries in the region. The United Nations Office of Development, under the umbrella of the Humanitarian Division of UNOSOM, will provide technical support for the regional development committees and serve as a secretariat for the Development Council and for the Aid Coordinating Body. The Office will embrace the skills and experience of Somali professionals, United Nations agencies and NGOs.

26. As agreed at the Addis Ababa meeting, a plan of action to guide the implementation of the provisions of the Addis Ababa Declaration is currently being finalized. It is intended to initiate implementing the regionally based strategy in those regions where a large measure of stability and security prevails. Combined United Nations/NGO/donor missions will be launched to each of these regions.

4. *The impact of insecurity*

27. Humanitarian programmes continue to face challenging security problems in Somalia. Insecurity in parts of the country, coupled with slow progress in political rehabilitation and reconciliation, has adversely affected humanitarian work. Under these circumstances, donors are reluctant to commit funding; NGOs sometimes suspend or withdraw operations for reasons of staff safety; agencies have difficulty recruiting and retaining qualified international staff; and costs of relief and development operations soar, owing in part to additional security requirements. Collectively these by-products of the political impasse have hampered UNOSOM II's efforts to move forward with humanitarian initiatives.

C. *Security issues*

28. Since my last report in mid-November (S/26738), the security situation in many parts of Somalia has given rise to concern. Outside Mogadishu, endemic

banditry continues to plague parts of the countryside. Outbreaks of localized inter-clan fighting have occurred, most notably in the contested portions of Lower Shabelle and the Lower and Middle Juba regions. A number of recent security incidents involving threats and actual attacks against international agencies in outlying regions has led to the temporary cessation of operations of a number of NGOs in the Lower Juba region and all of the NGOs in the Saakow district (Middle Juba region). Despite these incidents, however, the countryside continues to enjoy a level of security far superior to that of 18 months ago.

29. The Mogadishu area, in particular, remains tense. While direct armed confrontation between the SNA and UNOSOM II forces has been avoided, armed banditry on the streets of Mogadishu has grown considerably, making movement for Somali commercial traffic, UNOSOM personnel and international humanitarian relief supplies increasingly dangerous. In a number of separate incidents, casualties have been suffered by UNOSOM civilian and NGO staff, both international and local, on the streets of Mogadishu. Armed robbery directed at UNOSOM II or NGO vehicles and property is on the rise as well and often causes casualties. As a result, there has been a significant reduction in the presence of international NGOs willing to work in the current environment in Mogadishu.

30. Security for international staff remains a troublesome issue. UNOSOM remains at phase IV of the Security Evacuation Plan. Travel for all staff in and around Mogadishu is under armed escort only, with many areas of the city being out of bounds. The previous practice of hiring private cars until UNOSOM II received its United Nations-type vehicles has created a difficult problem owing to the frequent threats if an attempt is made to replace a civilian hired car with a United Nations vehicle. Hijacking of United Nations vehicles continues. A concerted effort is being made to provide sufficient hard-cover offices and sleeping areas in both South and North Mogadishu to reduce the risk of injury if there should be a resumption of hostilities. The long hours of work, the restricted travel, the substandard accommodation in many sites throughout Somalia, the inexperience of some staff and the constant security threat make it increasingly difficult to retain staff beyond a six-month initial assignment. Thus, there is a constant need to train new staff and at any one time there are a limited number of staff with institutional memory.

1. Disarmament and demobilization

31. It has been clear from the outset that general disarmament, beginning with the heavy weapons, is a necessary precondition for the establishment of the peaceful and secure environment which is required in order to

facilitate national reconciliation, rehabilitation and economic reconstruction. During the meeting held at Addis Ababa in January 1993, all the Somali parties had agreed that disarmament was essential to the restoration of peace and stability in Somalia. This fundamental objective was clearly reaffirmed in the Addis Ababa agreement of March 1993 by which the parties, *inter alia*, invited UNOSOM II to assist in the disarmament process and take appropriate action against those who might violate these provisions of the agreement.

32. Unfortunately, the commitments made at Addis Ababa have not been honoured by the Somali parties. In accordance with the mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council, and after deliberate attacks against it by one of the Somali parties, UNOSOM II tried to bring about disarmament through coercive means. However, as the members of the Security Council are aware, this course of action has proved to be impracticable.

33. Following the adoption of resolution 865 (1993), UNOSOM has sought to convince the Somali parties to undertake the disarmament process on a voluntary basis. It has developed plans to provide vocational training for young militiamen following their demobilization and is preparing the establishment of training centres in Mogadishu and in the Baidoa area to train demobilized personnel in skills that will help them reintegrate into society. It is intended that these centres will be operated and managed by the Somalis themselves, albeit with the initial involvement of UNOSOM II and the assistance of the relevant United Nations agencies.

34. Clearly, however, voluntary disarmament can only be successful if the Somali parties display the necessary courage and determination to put their recent past behind them and resolutely embark upon the difficult but challenging process of political reconciliation, institution-building and economic rehabilitation. Unfortunately, there are growing indications that the major factions are actively rearming in anticipation of renewed hostilities in the coming months. In Mogadishu, reports indicate that certain clans are replenishing their weapons supplies. It is also reported that clans are erecting defensive positions within the areas they consider as key strategic strongholds in the city. There also appears to be a build-up of troops in the Kismayo region south of Mogadishu.

35. The unwillingness of the parties to engage in a meaningful process of disarmament, at least at this time, regrettably shows that the present insecurity in Mogadishu and, to a lesser degree, in other parts of Somalia will continue to be a serious concern in the months ahead. I therefore wish to appeal to the parties to recommit themselves to the disarmament process agreed upon during the January and March 1993 meetings at Addis Ababa and to work constructively with UNOSOM II in order to

determine the modalities for the concrete implementation of these commitments.

2. De-mining

36. De-mining operations, urgently needed in parts of Somalia, require a degree of political stability and security that has frequently been absent precisely in those regions most in need of such operations. In the north-west, de-mining projects conducted by a professional international mine-clearing firm have continued in spite of a shortage of donor funding. Elsewhere in Somalia, insecurity has precluded the option of bringing in professional assistance from abroad to manage mine clearance. UNOSOM II is now exploring the possibility of facilitating local "self-help" mine-clearing endeavours where security permits and where Somali communities seek assistance.

3. Deployment

37. In a previous report (S/26317), I had indicated that an additional brigade would be required to enable UNOSOM II to accomplish the tasks entrusted to it by the Security Council. This would have brought the authorized troops strength of UNOSOM II to over 32,000 all ranks. However, over the past few months, a number of Governments, including Belgium, France and Sweden, have informed me of their intention to withdraw their contingents from UNOSOM II by the end of December 1993. Moreover, on 6 October the United States of America announced that it would withdraw its troops from Somalia by the end of March 1994. Accordingly, the French contingent (1,100 all ranks), the Belgian contingent (950 all ranks) and the Swedish Field Hospital (150 all ranks) were withdrawn from Somalia in December 1993. In addition, the United States withdrew 1,400 military logistics personnel at the end of December. As a result, the strength of UNOSOM II on 1 January 1994 was 25,945.

38. Four other Member States have given advance notice to the United Nations of the withdrawal of their contingents before the end of March 1994: Italy (2,300), Germany (1,350), Turkey (320) and Norway (140). The United States also will withdraw the rest of its military logistics personnel (1,400) by the end of March 1994.

39. The total of the withdrawals in paragraphs 37 and 38 above amounts to 9,110. This figure does not include the United States Quick Reaction Force (1,350), which will also be withdrawn at that time.

40. On the above basis, the troop strength available at the end of March 1994 will be 19,700. Two Member States have indicated their intention to deploy a total of 2,300 additional military personnel. However, the actual date of deployment is not known at this time.

D. Administrative questions

41. Administratively, UNOSOM II continues to face challenges related to the difficult working and security environment in South Mogadishu. The international staff of 199 currently assigned to the UNOSOM II Administration Division is insufficient to perform all the tasks assigned, and in particular, to ensure adequate control and management of financial accounts, supervision and registration of United Nations inventory, control of procurement activity and provision of timely management information.

42. While UNOSOM II makes every effort to pursue local purchases whenever feasible, virtually no material of suitable quantity or quality is available locally. Nearly all logistic support other than some service contracts must be purchased internationally. This fact, combined with the size of Somalia and the poor roads, necessitates an enormous airlift capability. Air rental and aviation fuel alone cost approximately US\$ 6.3 million per month.

43. The withdrawal of United States forces and the transfer of logistic support for all of UNOSOM II made it necessary to continue arrangements with an American contractor, which had initially been selected by the United States Government. Requests over the last two months to 42 Governments for logistical units have brought no positive response. The contract with the United States contractor was presented to, and recommended by, the Headquarters Committee on Contracts in accordance with the United Nations Financial Regulations and Rules. The contract is for a cost of approximately US\$ 32 million for a period of four months until the end of March 1994, during which period alternatives will be explored. By 28 December 1993, the contractor was in a position to provide supply support, produce and deliver water, provide short and long road transport for passengers and cargo and maintain facilities, roads and utilities.

II. Observations

44. The preceding sections of the present report describe the results achieved by UNOSOM II in fulfilling its mandate in the three interrelated fields, viz., political, humanitarian and security. While progress has been achieved, the mandate of UNOSOM II is far from being fully accomplished. I would consider UNOSOM II's mandate as being completed only when the Addis Ababa agreement of March 1993 is fully implemented, culminating in the holding of general elections and the installation of a popularly elected Government. This is predicated on the fulfilment of two indispensable conditions: a spirit of cooperation, compromise and commit-

ment on the part of the Somali people and the continued involvement of the international community.

45. As far as the international community is concerned, it has given ample evidence of its concern for the suffering people of Somalia. Nations around the world have sent their men and women to serve in Somalia with UNOSOM I, UNITAF or UNOSOM II or with one of the intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. Many lives have been lost, both military and civilian, in the search for peace and stability in Somalia. States Members of the United Nations have invested huge sums of money in an operation which has literally saved hundreds of thousands of lives, especially among the most vulnerable sections of Somali society. This sacrifice is indeed remarkable, particularly when put in the perspective of the international community having to make available immense resources, human and material, for many other United Nations operations in different parts of the world, and keeping in mind the severe economic difficulties which many countries, developing and developed, have been experiencing for the past few years.

46. However, there are unmistakable signs of fatigue among the international community as it continues to be called upon to extend such assistance through the United Nations. This is reflected in the increasing delays in obtaining personnel from Member States and even longer delays in obtaining their financial contributions.

47. At the same time, I am convinced that the international community does not wish to shirk its responsibility towards the Somali people. At the Fourth Humanitarian Conference held at Addis Ababa in November/December last year, representatives of the donor community reiterated their willingness to help Somalia in its national rehabilitation and reconstruction. But they made it clear that their offer to commit further resources was conditional on the Somalis doing their part in bringing about national reconciliation and establishing at least minimum levels of security. The response of the international community would be proportionate to the determination, maturity and wisdom displayed by the Somali people and their leaders in resolving their differences, through dialogue rather than through resort to the use of arms, and to their cooperation with the collective efforts of the international community to help them. This would certainly be true for assistance in reconstruction and development. However, as far as providing troops and finances for UNOSOM II is concerned, the fatigue I referred to above seems unlikely to dissipate altogether or soon.

48. The agreement signed in Addis Ababa in March 1993 offers the only agreed framework within which a solution to Somalia's manifold problems would have to be found. That agreement was signed by the leaders of

the 15 political parties, which now seem to be divided into two groups competing for political influence and domination. The March 1993 agreement remains valid and can only be modified with the consent of all the 15 factions. UNOSOM II cannot and will not stand in the way should the parties to the Addis Ababa agreement voluntarily decide to modify its terms. However, until that happens, it is incumbent on all the factions to adhere to it.

49. UNOSOM II is on the side of the Somali people. Its only endeavour is to help the people of Somalia so that they can once again be the effective masters of their destiny. UNOSOM II does not and will not take sides among various factions. UNOSOM II, of course, welcomes the cooperation which it has received over the past several months from the Group of 12. UNOSOM II looks forward to receiving similar cooperation from USC/SNA. The Group of 12 insists on UNOSOM staying on in Somalia and persevering with its mandate. This is also the view of the regional States as well as of the Organization of African Unity. It is only SNA which has a negative, even hostile, attitude towards UNOSOM II. My position is clear: the international community must not abandon the people of Somalia as long as an overwhelming majority of them desire the presence of the United Nations.

50. The main focus of UNOSOM II's activities in the period ahead will be on promoting Somali initiatives in the political, security and nation-building process. That process must be a Somali process and every effort is and will continue to be made to help the Somalis assume responsibility for it. After the traumatic experiences they have gone through over the past two years, it would not be reasonable to expect the Somali people to undertake such a heavy responsibility in a short period of time. They will have to be given the necessary encouragement and support for some more time.

51. This additional period would be utilized by UNOSOM II to create a sustainable momentum in the task of political reconciliation, establishment of a Somali police and justice system and laying the foundation for an effective system of civil, financial and economic administration at the local, regional and central levels.

52. It is my considered assessment that without the continued stabilizing presence of an adequate United Nations force, there would be an early resumption of civil strife and an unravelling of all that has been achieved at the cost of so much sacrifice, human and material. What can be achieved will therefore depend on the willingness of Member States to see the Somalia operation to its successful conclusion, so that the people of Somalia can look forward to a reasonably promising future after so many years of suffering and strife.

53. It is, however, extremely doubtful whether the required level of resources will be available after 31 March 1994. As has been pointed out above, the military strength of UNOSOM II will be down to 19,700 by the end of March this year. It should be kept in mind that UNOSOM II will be deprived of the specialized capabilities which had been available to several of the withdrawing contingents, as well as of the United States Quick Reaction Force, which will also have withdrawn at that time. I have approached a large number of Member States with a view to obtaining their contributions to UNOSOM II's military component. The United States has also made efforts in this regard. However, as of the date of the present report, not a single positive response has been received. While the possibility of some offers of new or additional troops should not be ruled out, it would be prudent at this stage to assume that the force level at the disposal of UNOSOM II after 31 March 1994 will not be much more than 19,700, and could even be less.

54. The question of the availability of timely and adequate financing for UNOSOM II operations is another important factor which must be taken into account. The United Nations has already spent US\$ 765 million for UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II so far. The cost of UNOSOM II operations for the period from 1 November 1993 to 31 March 1994 is estimated at US\$ 413.5 million. 2/ As of 31 December 1993, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNOSOM Special Account amounted to US\$ 100 million. The non-payment or late payment of assessed contributions makes it impossible for Member States to be reimbursed for their contribution to UNOSOM II. This, in turn, adversely affects the willingness of Member States either to maintain their contributions or to increase them or send new contingents, not only for a particular operation but to United Nations peace-keeping operations in general.

55. In my report of 12 November 1993 (S/26738), I outlined three options relating to the mandate and functioning of UNOSOM II as regards security. Whatever option is selected, the United Nations will continue its efforts to promote national reconciliation and institution-building.

- The first option is a continuation of UNOSOM II's current mandate, with the addition of an extra brigade. It would call for disarmament, coercive if necessary, as well as a capability for defence against attacks against UNOSOM II personnel;
- The second option calls for voluntary disarmament and the deployment of about 16,000 troops to protect ports, convoys and refugees;
- The third option calls for the deployment of only 5,000 troops, which would keep control over

Mogadishu port and airport as well as other important ports and airports.

56. My preference would be for the first option, since I am convinced that only a comprehensive mandate, as laid down by the Security Council in its various resolutions, would make it possible for UNOSOM II to create a secure environment and to accelerate its efforts to help the Somali people as they move along the process of national reconciliation and institution-building. However, for all the reasons that I have explained above, the first option will have to be excluded. Indeed, I am not even confident that UNOSOM II will have adequate human, material and financial resources or that the Somali leaders will have advanced enough on the road of national reconciliation to be able to undertake all the activities envisaged even under the second option as described in my previous report. This is mainly a result of the continued negative attitude of SNA towards UNOSOM II, reports of an arms build-up by all the factions in Somalia and the revival of inter-clan fighting and increased banditry.

57. I would therefore recommend the second option for the consideration of the Security Council. Under that option, UNOSOM II would not use coercive methods but would rely on the cooperation of the Somali parties. In the event that inter-clan fighting resumes in different parts of the country, UNOSOM II, while not becoming involved in it, will retain some capability to defend its personnel if circumstances so warrant. UNOSOM II would protect the important ports and airports in the country as well as the essential infrastructure of Somalia; keep open the main supply routes between Mogadishu and outside areas; pursue as a matter of utmost priority the reorganization of the Somali police and judicial systems; and help with the repatriation of refugees. As far as the humanitarian aspects are concerned, UNOSOM II will continue its efforts to provide emergency relief supplies to all in need throughout the country. With respect to rehabilitation and development, UNOSOM II will coordinate its activities in such a manner that programmes of assistance of the international community are supported in areas of their choice. As members of the Security Council are aware, the donor community made it very clear at the Fourth Humanitarian Conference in Addis Ababa that aid would go only to those regions where security prevailed and where counterpart Somali institutions were available. As far as the political processes in Somalia are concerned, UNOSOM II will continue to play a role as desired by the Somali people.

58. The number of troops required under this option would be of the order of 16,000 all ranks and the

2/ A/48/777, para. 7.

necessary support element. If this order of troop strength is not available or if the necessary financial resources are not available after 31 March 1994, I will bring the matter to the attention of the Security Council with, possibly, a modified recommendation regarding the mandate of UNOSOM II.

59. I should like to sound a note of caution and concern. As I have stated in paragraph 56 above, my preference continues to be for the first option. The success of UNOSOM II under the modified second option, as enunciated in paragraph 57 above, will depend, more than ever before, on the cooperation of the Somali parties. It is difficult to predict the course of action which different Somali factions might embark upon during the period following 31 March 1994. This would largely depend on their perception of UNOSOM II's capability to discharge its functions effectively. It is indispensable for all concerned to promote national reconciliation in parallel with the re-establishment and strengthening of the Somali institutions of police and justice. Should these efforts fail, we might witness renewed fighting and civil war in Somalia.

60. There is another, positive contingency that we should take into consideration. If the Somalis succeed in establishing the TNC in the near future, that would be a significant development. The international community would watch with interest the functioning of the TNC. In case the TNC is able to function reasonably effectively

through the Somali institutions of local self-government, it might have a bearing on the mandate of UNOSOM II. I shall naturally bring any such development to the attention of the Security Council.

61. As I conclude this report, I wish to reiterate my deep appreciation to my Special Representative, Admiral Jonathan Howe, to my Deputy Special Representative, Ambassador Lansana Kouyate, to the Commander of the United Nations Force, General Cevik Bir, and to the UNOSOM II soldiers of all ranks who have served the United Nations, with courage and devotion, in extremely difficult and dangerous circumstances. I also wish to convey my sincere gratitude to the men and women of the United Nations Secretariat who have served the cause of peace and humanitarian assistance in Somalia in some of the most dangerous conditions ever confronted by United Nations civilian personnel. I further wish to pay tribute to the International Committee of the Red Cross, the NGOs and to the participating agencies and programmes of the United Nations system, as well as to Governments which have extended direct assistance to the Somali people, thus supplementing the efforts of UNOSOM II. Above all, I pay tribute to the international and Somali personnel of UNOSOM II who made the supreme sacrifice in seeking to bring the help of the international community and the United Nations to the people of Somalia.

Document 84

Security Council resolution reducing the size of UNOSOM II and giving the mission a revised mandate without enforcement powers

S/RES/897 (1994), 4 February 1994

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992 and all subsequent relevant resolutions,

Reaffirming the decision taken in resolution 886 (1993) of 18 November 1993 to continue UNOSOM II up to 31 May 1994,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 6 January 1994 (S/1994/12),

Stressing the importance the Council attaches to the Somali parties fulfilling in good faith all obligations and agreements to which they commit themselves, and *affirming* once again that the General Agreement signed in Addis Ababa on 8 January 1993 and the Addis Ababa Agreement of the First Session of the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia signed on 27 March 1993 ("the Addis Ababa Agreements") constitute the basis for the resolution of the problems in Somalia,

Bearing in mind respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and *recognizing* that the people of Somalia bear the ultimate responsibility for setting up viable national political institutions and for reconstructing their country,

Expressing serious concern at reports that Somali factions are re-arming and that a troop build-up is taking place in some regions of Somalia,

Condemning the continued incidents in Somalia of fighting and banditry and in particular condemning violence and armed attacks against persons engaged in humanitarian and peace-keeping efforts,

Emphasizing the crucial importance of disarmament by all parties in achieving lasting peace and stability in Somalia,

Paying tribute to the peace-keepers and humanitarian personnel of several countries killed or injured while serving in Somalia and, in this context, *re-emphasizing* the importance the Council attaches to the safety and security of United Nations and other personnel engaged in humanitarian relief and peace-keeping throughout Somalia,

Affirming the importance of establishing, by the Somali people, of representative district and regional councils and of a transitional national council, as well as the importance of a re-established police force and a judicial system for the restoration of public order throughout Somalia,

Welcoming the efforts made at the Fourth Humanitarian Conference at Addis Ababa and *reaffirming* the commitment of the international community to assist the Somali people to attain political reconciliation and reconstruction,

Welcoming also political contacts and consultations between representatives of various parties in Somalia with a view to finding solutions to outstanding matters and disputes among them and promoting the process of political reconciliation,

Commending and supporting the ongoing diplomatic efforts being made by international and regional organizations and Member States, in particular those in the region, to assist United Nations efforts to persuade Somali parties to reach a political settlement,

Reaffirming the objective that UNOSOM II complete its mission by March 1995,

Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to threaten peace and security and having regard to the exceptional circumstances, including in particular absence of a government in Somalia, and *acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Welcomes* the report of the Secretary-General (S/1994/12);

2. *Approves* the Secretary-General's recommendation for the continuation of UNOSOM II, as set out in particular in paragraph 57 of his report, with a revised mandate for the following:

- (a) Encouraging and assisting the Somali parties in implementing the "Addis Ababa Agreements", in particular in their cooperative efforts to achieve disarmament and to respect the cease-fire;
- (b) Protecting major ports and airports and essential infrastructure and safeguarding the lines of communications vital to the provision of humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance;
- (c) Continuing its efforts to provide humanitarian relief to all in need throughout the country;
- (d) Assisting in the reorganization of the Somali police and judicial system;

(e) Helping with the repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons;

(f) Assisting also in the ongoing political process in Somalia, which should culminate in the installation of a democratically elected government;

(g) Providing protection for the personnel, installations and equipment of the United Nations and its agencies, as well as of non-governmental organizations providing humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance;

3. *Authorizes* the gradual reduction of UNOSOM II to a force level of up to 22,000, and necessary support elements, such force level to be reviewed at the next renewal of the mandate;

4. *Underlines*, in this context, the vital importance of placing at the disposal of UNOSOM II the necessary material means and military assets required to enable it to discharge its responsibilities in an effective manner as well as effectively to defend its personnel in case of armed attack;

5. *Approves also* giving priority to directing international reconstruction resources to those regions where security is being re-established and to local Somali institutions which are prepared to cooperate with the international community in setting development priorities in accordance with the Declaration of the Fourth Humanitarian Conference in Addis Ababa as set forth in paragraphs 23 and 24 of the Secretary-General's report;

6. *Underlines* the importance that the Council attaches to de-mining and *requests* the Secretary-General to make arrangements to ensure the start of de-mining operations as soon as possible wherever conditions permit;

7. *Calls upon* all parties in Somalia to cooperate fully with UNOSOM II and respect the cease-fire arrangements and other commitments entered into by them;

8. *Demands* that all Somali parties refrain from any acts of intimidation or violence against personnel engaged in humanitarian or peace-keeping work in Somalia;

9. *Reaffirms* the obligations of States to implement fully the embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia imposed by paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992);

10. *Commends* the Secretary-General, his Special Representative and the personnel of UNOSOM II for their efforts in improving the conditions of the Somali people and in encouraging the process of political reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction;

11. *Expresses* its appreciation to those Member States which have contributed troops or provided logistical or other assistance to UNOSOM II or have offered

to do so, and *encourages* those who are in a position to do so to contribute, on an urgent basis, troops, civilian personnel, equipment, and financial and logistical support so as to enhance UNOSOM II's capability to carry out its mandate;

12. *Expresses also* its appreciation to those States which have contributed humanitarian assistance or have supported the Somali Justice Programmes and encourages further such contributions on an urgent basis;

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General to consider, in consultation with the Organization of African Unity and

the League of Arab States, establishing contacts with the Somali parties with the view to arriving at an agreed timetable for implementing the "Addis Ababa Agreements" including the objective of completing the process by March 1995;

14. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to submit to it, as soon as the situation warrants, and in any case in good time before 31 May 1994, a report on the situation in Somalia and the implementation of this resolution;

15. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Document 85

Further report of the Secretary-General on UNOSOM, submitted in pursuance of paragraph 14 of resolution 897 (1994), with annex containing the text of the declaration issued by Somali political leaders in Nairobi on 24 March 1994

S/1994/614, 24 May 1994

I. Introduction

1. In paragraph 14 of its resolution 897 (1994) of 4 February 1994, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to submit to it, as soon as the situation warranted, and in any case in good time before 31 May 1994, a report on the situation in Somalia and the implementation of the resolution. After the adoption of resolution 897 (1994), the political process for national reconciliation in Somalia gained new impetus. The present report covers developments concerning that process, as well as progress achieved by other programmes of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) in helping to restore peace and stability in Somalia.

II. Political developments

2. On 8 March 1994, Admiral Jonathan Howe completed his tour of duty in Somalia as my Special Representative, having overseen the establishment of UNOSOM II and steering it through a difficult phase of the operation. Following his appointment as the Acting Special Representative, Ambassador Lansana Kouyate launched an initiative to normalize the relationship between UNOSOM II and the Somali National Alliance (SNA), while maintaining contacts with the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA) or Group of 12. The tone of the meetings reflected the intention of both sides to re-establish dialogue and to work out concrete arrangements, for example for security in Mogadishu, including reactivating the Police Committee, and for a cease-fire in

Lower Juba. The points of contention between SNA and UNOSOM were discussed at length and understandings were reached on them, which facilitated normalization of the relationship between UNOSOM and SNA.

3. Soon afterwards, in response to the deteriorating security situation in Kismayo, UNOSOM made every effort, within the context of its new mandate, to stop the serious inter-factional and inter-clan fighting that had erupted there. In mid-February, my Acting Special Representative travelled to Kismayo, Bossasso, Bardera, Nairobi and Addis Ababa, in addition to holding meetings in Mogadishu, for consultations with the Somali leaders connected with the conflict. The immediate objective was to induce them to stop the fighting. He was able to persuade them to meet at Nairobi on 15 March 1994 for consultations with the objectives of securing agreement on the indefinite cessation of hostilities and long-term solution to the problems of Lower Juba. Nairobi was chosen as the venue because many of the key personalities concerned with the Lower Juba region were present there.

4. The timing of the consultations on Kismayo coincided with the return to Nairobi of the Group of 12 leaders from Cairo, where, together with leaders of SNA, they had been invited by President Hosni Mubarak, the Chairman of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). With all the Somali political faction leaders assembled in Nairobi, my Acting Special Representative embarked on an effort to stimulate the national reconciliation process.

He succeeded in bringing together political leaders who had not spoken to each other for a long time. The reconciliation process gained momentum once the personal relationship between the political leaders had been re-established. Most importantly, he brought together General Mohamed Farah Aidid, Chairman of SNA, and Mr. Ali Mahdi, Spokesman of the Group of 12, which resulted in a constructive proposal to establish a national Government of Somalia.

5. The two sides finalized a declaration, in the form of a manifesto on national reconciliation, which was signed at Nairobi on 24 March 1994 by Mr. Ali Mahdi and General Aidid, on behalf of the Group of 12 and SNA respectively (see annex I).

6. The Nairobi declaration stipulated that, in order to restore sovereignty of the Somali State, a national reconciliation conference should be convened on 15 May 1994 to elect a President and Vice-Presidents, and to appoint a Prime Minister. The Conference would also complete and review the formation of local authorities, where needed, and establish them, where necessary, as a basis for regional autonomy and respect for community rights.

7. To prepare for the convening of the National Reconciliation Conference, the declaration made provisions for the holding of a meeting of the signatory factions to the 1993 Addis Ababa agreement and the Somali National Movement (SNM) of the north-west on 15 April 1994 at Mogadishu to set up rules and procedures for voting and criteria for participation in the Conference. The meeting would also discuss the ways and means of establishing the National Legislative Assembly, which would be constituted after the formation of the national Government.

8. Among the declaration's general principles, the political faction leaders reached an understanding on the inviolability of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Somali Republic; the repudiation of any form of violence as a means of solving conflict and implementation of a cease-fire and voluntary disarmament throughout Somalia; respect for, and preservation of, fundamental human rights and democratic principles; the creation of an atmosphere conducive to brotherly coexistence among all Somalis using traditional channels, cultural and political means; and the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country after the devastation of civil war.

9. In an appeal, the Somali leaders expressed their gratitude to the international community, particularly the United Nations, aid donor countries and countries of the region for their valuable assistance, and requested the continuation of those efforts until Somalia could stand on its own feet.

10. It should be noted that the Somali political faction leaders are no longer talking about the formation of a transitional national council, as stipulated in the Addis Ababa accords in March 1993. Instead, they are aiming at the formation of a National Legislative Assembly.

11. In principle, the faction leaders have accepted the district and regional councils established to date. They would like however to review a number of them. Two more district councils have been established since my last report, bringing the total to 55, out of 81 districts, excluding the north-west. The total number of regional councils remains at 8, out of 13, excluding the north-west. The establishment of new councils should be accelerated after the successful conclusion of the National Reconciliation Conference.

12. The two meetings scheduled in the Nairobi declaration will be entirely Somali affairs, with a view to finding a Somali solution to the Somali problem. UNOSOM, as it has done in the past few months, will only play the role of facilitator.

13. Shortly before 15 April 1994, the date set for the preparatory meeting, the two signatories of the declaration decided to postpone it to 25 April 1994 to give the political factions more time to conclude the deliberations of the technical committees they had set up. After inter-clan fighting broke out at Merka on 5 April, the Group of 12 took the position that they would not participate in the meeting until the SNA forces withdrew from that town. They were persuaded to relent on this condition, but subsequent inter-clan fighting between two sub-clans of the Hawiye at Mogadishu and the consequent deterioration in the security situation there resulted in some of the faction leaders asking for, among other things, a change of venue. Discussions were held between the two signatories regarding a new date and a new venue. UNOSOM was initially informed of an agreement to postpone the date to 10 May 1994 and to change the venue to Nairobi, but this was not confirmed. In the meantime, General Aidid has returned to Mogadishu.

14. Meanwhile another development had prompted the signatories to choose an even later date. The leaders of SNM of the north-west had responded positively to the invitation issued by the political faction leaders in the Nairobi declaration. Mr. Abdirahman Ahmed Ali, who had been Chairman of SNM before the Boroma Conference which elected a new administration, was in touch with General Aidid and Mr. Ali Mahdi. He declared that the Somali people in the north and south of the country must sit together and resolve the issue in a manner that satisfied the desire and the rights of the people of "Somaliland" to have a separate status, on the one hand, and on the other hand maintained the unity and brotherhood of the Somali people. He announced

that the Somali National Movement (SNM) would attend all future Somali reconciliation conferences as it had in the past.

15. To allow sufficient time for SNM to undertake consultations, Mr. Ahmed Ali requested that the political factions' meeting be postponed to 30 May 1994. The response of the signatory factions to the Addis Ababa agreement was generally positive. However, Mr. Ahmed Ali's announcement was rejected by leaders in "Somaliland", including Mr. Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, its "President". Consultations among Somali political factions have since been under way to reach agreement on a new date and venue.

16. The signing of the Nairobi declaration provided an impetus for the signature on 27 March 1994 of an agreement on the process of resolving the situation in Lower Juba. The agreement was signed by members of a joint committee representing SNA and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), and called for a Lower Juba Reconciliation Conference at Kismayo on 8 April 1994. The agreement stated that the principle of reconciliation should be based on dialogue and that all differences and enmities should be settled through Somali ethics and traditions. A technical committee would decide on the number of participants who would come from all the clans of the region. The faction leaders were to ensure and observe a cease-fire as from 27 March 1994; pull out the militias and restrict them to agreed locations; and establish a mechanism to restore both movable and immovable property to its rightful owners and a joint committee to supervise the implementation of the agreement, with the assistance of UNOSOM.

17. The technical committee has been meeting at Kismayo since 10 April 1994 to finalize the criteria for participation in the Lower Juba Reconciliation Conference. It was agreed that 160 representatives of all clans should be selected to participate in the Conference. With the list of clan representatives finalized, the Conference opened at Kismayo on 24 May 1994. Despite the real effort made by both SPM and SNA for the organization of the Conference, there is a threat from SPM/SNA to disturb the process since Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess, its Chairman, did not sign the agenda for the Conference in Nairobi. Meanwhile, fighting erupted at Kismayo on 21 April between two Darod sub-clans creating another obstacle to the general reconciliation process in the region.

18. There have been intra-clan and intra-factional reconciliation efforts in other regions. In February 1994, leaders of two Darod sub-clans and a Digil sub-clan, together with the Chairmen of SPM, the Somali National Front and the Somali Democratic Movement, concluded a reconciliation agreement at Bardera in the Gedo region.

III. Security issues

19. Despite the political reconciliation efforts, national and regional, described above, the security situation in Somalia has been deteriorating. The various factions, in apparent anticipation of an eventual withdrawal of UNOSOM, are making efforts to rearm and have, in particular, resumed the construction of the combat vehicles known as "technicals". In the Kismayo area, a number of factions are contending—without success so far—to gain control of the Lower Juba Valley. As indicated in paragraphs 16 and 17 above, however, the Lower Juba Reconciliation Conference opened on 24 May 1994. On 10 April, the SNA militia successfully completed its campaign to seize Merka from an SNM faction. At about the same time, the Habr Gdir sub-clan militia, which has close ties with SNA, launched an assault on the Hawadle sub-clan, gaining control of the airport area and its approaches in South Mogadishu. The same sub-clans have also been involved in a tense confrontation in the Belet Weyne area, which seems to be the next major objective of SNA. Other SNA advances have been reported at Baidoa. In short, there have been concerted attempts, especially by SNA, to improve positions on the ground before the forthcoming National Reconciliation Conference.

20. At several locations, personnel from UNOSOM, United Nations organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been threatened, attacked or sometimes kidnapped by uncontrolled armed individuals. The most recent of these very unfortunate and serious incidents occurred on 16 May 1994 in South Mogadishu. A UNOSOM vehicle was attacked and five Nepalese soldiers were killed and one wounded. The wounded soldier was subsequently kidnapped from a local hospital. UNOSOM is working hard with local leaders to secure the release of the kidnapped soldier.

21. While the number of incidents involving United Nations organizations and NGO personnel has decreased in the past few weeks, the level of insecurity is unpredictable as disturbances and inter-clan fighting occur without warning. Banditry, especially in urban centres, is another major cause of concern. The cooperation of local elders has been very helpful in resolving difficulties relating to attacks and threats against UNOSOM and associated personnel as well as matters pertaining to their general security.

IV. Force structure and capabilities

22. The contingents of the following countries have completed their withdrawal from UNOSOM: Germany, Greece, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, Norway, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emir-

ates and United States of America. Since my last report, Pakistan has increased its contingent strength by approximately 2,000 all ranks. In its resolution 897 (1994), the Security Council revised the mandate of UNOSOM and authorized the gradual reduction of the UNOSOM force level to 22,000, including 2,500 logistics and necessary support elements.

23. The current UNOSOM force strength is 19,000 (as at 11 May 1994). In an effort to correct this shortfall, requests have been made to Member States to provide additional units, so far only Pakistan has agreed to deploy one helicopter unit.

24. The deficiencies in capacity that resulted from the withdrawal of the United States forces have not been made up in full, especially with regard to air operations and night capabilities. However, the shortfalls in the areas of armoured protection, logistics and communications have been adequately addressed.

25. Troops deployed in Somalia are committed to the following tasks in UNOSOM's present area of operations:

- (a) Security of major airports and seaports;
- (b) Security/patrolling of the routes leading to the interior so as to keep them open for humanitarian aid convoys;
- (c) Patrolling within the major towns and cities to allow for safe movement of UNOSOM and NGO personnel;
- (d) Escorting of humanitarian aid convoys;
- (e) Security of logistics convoys and installations;
- (f) Security of personnel and installations of UNOSOM, United Nations organizations and NGOs;
- (g) Providing assistance in the training of the Somali police.

26. To meet these requirements, UNOSOM's deployment has been modified following the recent withdrawals and is now as follows:

- (a) Baidoa-Kismayo: the Indian brigade with 4 battalions and the Botswana battalion, deployed in 10 different locations;
- (b) Outside Mogadishu: three battalions provided by Bangladesh, Nigeria and Zimbabwe deployed respectively at Afgoye, Merka and Balad, three strategic positions along the main lines of communication;
- (c) Mogadishu: three battalions, from Malaysia, Nepal and Pakistan, are responsible for the security of UNOSOM personnel, installations and equipment. The three Egyptian battalions secure the port and the airport. The rest of the Pakistani brigade—four infantry battalions, one tank regi-

ment and one helicopter squadron—provides the services of the UNOSOM Quick Reaction Force, secures the main route between the port, the airport, and UNOSOM compounds, holds nine company-size strong points or checkpoints, and patrols the key areas of the city. The brigade also participates in escorting humanitarian convoys in the Mogadishu area;

- (d) Belet Weyne: a company from Zimbabwe.

27. Despite the troop reduction, military contingents continue to participate in humanitarian activities. The military hospitals are treating hundreds of Somali patients daily at Mogadishu, Baidoa, Oddur, Wajid and Kismayo. Military units are committed heavily on a daily basis for water, food distribution and other humanitarian operations, averaging 25 such convoys per day. Military contingents also support the activities of the newly established Police Division in reconstituting the Somali National Police, by providing basic training to Somali police instructors and logistic support.

28. Although the UNOSOM force is not at present a direct target, increased inter-clan fighting at Mogadishu, Merka, Belet Weyne and in the Lower Juba Valley may eventually pose a potential threat to UNOSOM. Over the past few weeks, information coming from different sources has indicated that all factions are rearming. SNA militia have been on the offensive in various parts of southern Somalia, are in full control of South Mogadishu and have launched repeated attacks to control Belet Weyne. At Kismayo, there has been hectic movement of SPM militia in anticipation of an attack by SNA. An outbreak of hostilities on a large scale cannot be ruled out and might cause the fragile humanitarian situation to deteriorate.

29. With its present strength of 19,000, the force is already stretched very thin. The size of the Quick Reaction Force has been reduced from a battalion to a mechanized company, a tank squadron and a helicopter squadron. Since January 1994, seven strong points and checkpoints have been closed in Mogadishu because of the troop reduction and the requirement to release troops for higher priority tasks. Under the prevailing security conditions, the ability of the force to achieve its mandated tasks has become limited. The full deployment of the authorized level of 22,000 would enable UNOSOM to operate again in the middle Shabelle area, from Balad to Belet Weyne, and bring it back into the UNOSOM area of operation and also to meet fully its humanitarian convoy escort role. Any expansion of UNOSOM areas of deployment to incorporate the central region of Galcayo and ultimately the north-east would require the deployment of at least two additional battalions with integral support and logistics elements. This force does not currently exist in the theatre.

V. Police and Justice Programme

30. In its resolution 865 (1993), the Security Council expressed its conviction that the re-establishment of the Somali police, judicial and penal systems was critical for the restoration of security and stability in the country. The reduction of the UNOSOM force level and the instability in the security situation referred to in the relevant parts of the present report have increased the importance and urgency of achieving the objectives of the Somali Justice Programme. Successful implementation of the programme would contribute enormously to the achievement of the goal of Somali institutions being the main agents providing for the maintenance of law and order in Somalia. The United Nations and the international community have not relented in their efforts to achieve this objective. As at 22 May 1994, the total number of police recruits was 7,799.

31. Since my last report to the Security Council (S/1994/12, paras. 17-19), UNOSOM has made considerable efforts to build up its civilian police component for providing training, equipment and assistance in the establishment of a viable national Somali police force.

32. Of the 54 civilian police personnel authorized to staff the Police Division, 41 from the following countries had arrived in the mission area as at 15 May 1994:

Egypt	6
Ghana	6
Ireland	4
Italy	5
Malaysia	5
Netherlands	6
Republic of Korea	2
Sweden	2
Zimbabwe	5

The remaining civilian police personnel are scheduled to arrive shortly from Nigeria, Sweden and Zambia.

33. The north-east region merits special mention. Three hundred and sixty-seven former policemen have now been approved for reappointment but approximately 600 militiamen operating as policemen do not meet UNOSOM's criteria for recruitment. It is recognized, however, that the current UNOSOM policy of restricting appointment to persons who had served as members of the Somali police force for at least two years needs reconsideration. After proper training, selected demobilized ex-militiamen should also be able to qualify for induction into the police force.

34. Starting from the end of March, under the overall coordination and leadership of UNOSOM, the UNOSOM military component and the United States training team, provided by the International Criminal Investigations Technical Assistance Program (ICITAP), have played an important role in assisting the police programme. They have organized weapons training,

driver and mechanics maintenance training, foot and arms drill, supervisor training, administration and middle management training. ICITAP also provides logistical support in the refurbishment of police stations, as well as in training facilities. They are now in the process of refurbishing a provisional training school within the UNOSOM headquarters compound at Mogadishu to accommodate 100 trainees per session. Other locations, such as Hargeisa (north-west), Galdayo (north-east), Baidoa (central), and Kismayo (south), are being considered for training centres. Logistic support is likely to be provided by ICITAP. The main problem is that the destruction of facilities has been thorough and the lack of financial resources makes it possible to rehabilitate only one or two facilities for training the police forces of the whole country.

35. An armourer's course was started on 30 April 1994 with an initial group of 20 police officers. A training programme for trainers for refresher development courses commenced on 2 May 1994. The middle management station administration courses commenced on 14 May 1994 at Mogadishu. These courses will be replicated throughout the country. UNOSOM plans to train over 3,000 personnel by December 1994 and another 3,000 will be trained by Somali police officers who would have themselves undergone training with UNOSOM II.

36. Other training packages, including a refresher training programme, are being revised and updated to enhance the delivery mechanism. These are designed to ensure standardization of training throughout Somalia. Essentially, the police training programme involves the reinduction of a disciplined orientation into the Somali police personnel, as well as the enhancement of their capacity for general crime prevention duties and such specialist duties as investigation, criminal intelligence gathering, riot control, community policing, and human rights in law enforcement. UNOSOM Police Division is at present formulating a *Darawishita* (quick reaction force) training programme.

37. The UNOSOM police programme is in great part financed by voluntary contributions, in cash and in kind, from Governments. The following cash contributions have been received or pledged so far:

	(Millions of United States dollars)
Denmark	0.5
Japan	9
Netherlands	0.5
Norway	1
Sweden	1.6
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	<u>0.037</u>
United States of America	8
Total	<u>20.637</u>

Contributions in kind have been received from the following Governments:

	<i>(Millions of United States dollars)</i>
Germany	1.5
Italy	4.5
United States of America	<u>37</u>
Total	<u>43</u>
Total cash and in-kind contributions	<u><u>63,637</u></u>

38. Complementary to the police programme, UNOSOM's Justice Division has developed five different work programmes: judicial, correctional, juvenile justice, crime prevention and human rights.

39. The judicial work programme is now focused upon the repair and refurbishment of the courts, supply of equipment, stationery, furniture, statute books and training of judicial personnel. Assistance has been obtained from some Member States, regional institutions and organizations, NGOs and United Nations organizations and programmes. A mid-term assessment meeting is planned for June 1994, with a view to evaluating the progress made regarding assistance to the Somali Justice Programme, as a model for future United Nations interventions of this nature.

40. A work plan has been prepared for the refurbishment of 54 courts in 28 districts spread over 12 regions. Also, during the period from June to August 1994, the appropriate Somali authorities at the district and regional levels will be encouraged to appoint suitable personnel to staff these courts.

41. In the correctional work programme, efficient correctional management practices are being introduced into the prisons. Some projects for improvement of sanitation and prison facilities have been completed, in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Estimates for reconstruction or refurbishment of prisons in Somalia are being compiled.

42. Efforts have been made to relieve congestion in the two large prisons at Mogadishu and Baidoa. Constant monitoring of the cases and calling attention of the appropriate authorities to the plight of those "awaiting trial" who have been in prison for three months or more without trial, has led to judicial review of the cases and, in many instances, the release of detainees.

43. As the regional courts in some regions are now fully functioning, those offenders held for serious crime are now being tried. With the continuing improvement in the staffing of the Justice Division, it is expected that the deployment of officers to the various regions will make it possible for the Division to carry out its correctional programme throughout the country. The assistance of the

United Nations Volunteers has been particularly valuable in this regard.

44. Training courses to enhance the competence and managerial skills of prison personnel are due to be held in June. This will be undertaken with the assistance of the Arab Security Studies and Training Centre, the United Nations African Regional Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, and the Alliance of NGOs on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice.

45. As part of UNOSOM's juvenile justice programme, steps have been taken to improve conditions for detained juveniles. The main priority has been to secure their separation from adult prisoners, in accordance with the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (the Beijing Rules). With the support of United Nations organizations, including the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and NGOs, it is planned to establish a basic educational programme for juvenile prisoners.

46. A Street Children Redemption Educational and Recreation Pilot Project, supported by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), UNESCO and the World Food Programme (WFP), is being implemented in North Mogadishu. The first beneficiaries will be about 100 children, between the ages of 6 and 12 years. They will receive food and about four hours of basic education daily.

47. The United Kingdom Overseas Development Administration has agreed, in principle, to support a project formulated jointly by the Justice Division and the Save the Children Fund (UK) on the therapy of traumatized children in Somalia.

48. In its crime prevention programme, with the support of the European Forum for Urban Safety, in Paris, and the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime, at Montreal, the Division will formulate projects designed to develop institutional bonds of social control aimed at crime prevention and control. To this end, the Division is recruiting two crime prevention specialists (a social worker and a judge).

49. Through its human rights programme, the Division has investigated incidents of human rights abuses within the Somali Criminal Justice System. The results of the investigations have been discussed with the appropriate units, and mechanisms for avoiding such violations in the future have been jointly developed with such units. The Human Rights Section is currently identifying Somali human rights organizations with which it will cooperate in the promotion, protection and monitoring of human rights. Training programmes in human rights education for Somalis are also being developed with the assistance of some subregional and national institutes with speciali-

zation in this area, particularly the International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences, at Syracuse, Italy. Finally, the Section is cooperating closely with the Centre for Human Rights of the United Nations Secretariat in the development of its work programme.

VI. Disarmament and demobilization programme

50. In the Nairobi Declaration of 24 March 1994, the Somali political faction leaders explicitly expressed their support for the concept of voluntary disarmament. Regrettably, this commitment has not yet been honoured. Voluntary disarmament will be successful only if the Somali parties display the necessary determination to settle their disputes peacefully. In the past few weeks, on the contrary, there has, as reported above, been evidence that major factions are replenishing their weapons stockpiles. In Mogadishu, "technicals" have been spotted at different locations. Reports also indicate that clans are rebuilding defensive positions.

51. I appeal to the parties to implement the disarmament process agreed upon during the Addis Ababa meetings of 1993 and at the Nairobi meeting of March 1994. UNOSOM II is prepared to assist them in implementing their commitments. The UNOSOM force, which is already overstretched, would act as an honest broker in collecting surrendered weapons and safeguarding them for the Somali national Government. The selection of locations for the cantonment of weapons will have to be developed in concert with the Somali authorities.

52. In the north-west region, through the recently created National Demobilization Commission, an interim emergency programme for disarmament and demobilization was launched in February 1994. The programme, which was developed in conjunction with an advisory team established with the cooperation of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), focuses on two broad areas: (a) support for immediate disarmament in Hargeisa and the anticipated spread of disarmament to other areas, and (b) the commencement of an interim three-month support programme for demobilization and reintegration.

VII. De-mining programme

53. UNOSOM de-mining policy is based on the principle of using Somali deminers only. Recent experience shows that expatriate de-mining firms are not necessarily acceptable to local political authorities and a disproportionate amount of the fees is used to cover the security risks faced by the expatriates. Owing to the employment of Somali deminers, many of whom know where the mines are located and who enjoy the support of the local councils or authorities, larger areas have

become more accessible for de-mining. It is to be noted that, before any de-mining project is supported, the local de-mining NGO has to satisfy UNOSOM with documentary evidence that the local authorities have agreed that the project can be executed effectively and in reasonable safety within their community. UNOSOM also carries out the field survey of the project to ensure its viability. Periodic inspections are carried out during project implementation to ensure satisfactory completion. To increase the safety of Somali deminers, a mine clearance training facility is planned. This will be staffed by expatriate instructors, and located in North Mogadishu, with the ability to deploy instructor teams to any area in Somalia.

54. From January 1994 to date, UNOSOM has engaged six de-mining groups, of which three have completed their jobs, and 18 more are in the pipeline. In the last three months, the following ordnance has been destroyed:

Anti-tank mines	3 210
Anti-personnel mines	1 116
Unexploded ordnance	8 655

An additional 500 anti-tank mines have been removed. Seventy-one square kilometres of grazing/pastoral land and 318.5 kilometres of roadway have been cleared of mines.

55. With the restructuring and increased staffing of the Division, UNOSOM intends to accelerate the implementation of the de-mining programme. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and UNESCO have jointly implemented a mine awareness programme in the north-west and in the Galcayo area using posters, books and through group discussions in the communities.

VIII. Humanitarian situation

56. In spite of the significant progress made in 1993, the emergency situation continues and the welfare of large numbers of Somalis remains at risk. A major priority for 1994 is the provision of relief assistance to the most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. The Division for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in UNOSOM has continued to coordinate the provision of assistance to meet relief needs, resettle refugees and internally displaced persons and to contain the prevailing cholera epidemic throughout the country. However, security problems still plague relief efforts in a number of areas, affecting both the safety of humanitarian personnel and the regularity and efficiency of delivery of assistance.

A. *The continuing emergency*

57. Given the volatile situation in the country, humanitarian agencies operating in Somalia have been focusing their attention on the various scenarios that affect humanitarian activities. One major concern has been the increase in inter-clan conflicts and banditry and the resulting interruptions in the provision of relief assistance. Other contingency scenarios identified include food and water shortages, human and livestock epidemics and floods. The first step taken by the Division for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs was to form the Contingency Operations Group comprising representatives of United Nations organizations, the NGO Consortium and the UNOSOM force command. The Group meets regularly to consider changing emergency scenarios and needs and to put into place concerted response mechanisms. Some of the specific issues with which the Group has been dealing include developing early warning arrangements; ensuring availability of contingency stocks; identification of key facilities, installations and routes; and evacuation planning.

58. Somalia is slowly recovering from an extended period of widespread famine and dramatic reductions in food production. While the overall food supply situation has improved, poor rains during the short agricultural season have resulted in food shortages in some areas. The development of forward indicators of vulnerability has been one of the most important steps taken within the emergency contingency planning mechanism. The Food Security and Crop Assessment Task Force, chaired by WFP, is currently providing data and information on crop situations and food balances. United Nations organizations, particularly FAO and WFP, and NGOs are collaborating in field monitoring and surveillance through field missions which are dispatched to assess the food supply and condition of crops produced locally. Concerted early action made it possible, for example, to detect the partial crop failure in the Bay region and to take prompt remedial action by providing special food-for-work programmes. There is a projected shortfall in domestic food production in 1994 and arrangements are being made to ensure an adequate food supply for the population.

B. *Cholera outbreak*

59. In early February, Somalia was faced with a health emergency resulting from an outbreak of cholera. A Cholera Task Force was formed, under the auspices of UNOSOM, to coordinate the efforts of United Nations organizations, particularly the World Health Organization (WHO) and UNICEF, NGOs and Somali groups to deal with the epidemic, which spread rapidly and affected many parts of the country. As at 5 May, a cumulative

total of 12,444 cases and 492 fatalities had been reported. In addition to collecting and publishing statistical data on the spread of the epidemic, other actions taken include the setting up of treatment centres, chlorination of water sources, environmental sanitation, information campaigns and social mobilization. Responses to new outbreaks have been prompt resulting in a low fatality rate.

60. The recent outbreak of inter-clan fighting at Mogadishu interrupted the flow of medical supplies from the Somali Central Pharmacy at a very critical point in efforts to combat the epidemic. Consequently, UNOSOM arranged for contingency supplies of cholera kits and disinfection materials to be moved to its zonal offices in order to avoid too much reliance on supplies from Mogadishu. Earlier projections that the disease had reached a peak in April turned out to be premature and the most optimistic scenario at present is that it would not be over before the end of June 1994. It should be noted that humanitarian agencies are experiencing shortfalls in resources as a consequence of having to divert funds from their other programmes to combat the cholera epidemic.

C. *Resettlement*

61. There are still hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees in neighbouring countries who are willing to return to Somalia with assistance. The facilitation of the safe return of Somali refugees is one of the priority concerns of the United Nations. During 1993 and the first three months of 1994, some 88,000 Somalis were voluntarily repatriated from Kenya to the Gedo region. During the course of 1994, it is anticipated that another 70,000 persons will require transport facilities for resettlement—mainly to the Lower Juba region and along the Somali coastline. However, security problems and shortfalls in resources have slowed the repatriation programme, forcing UNHCR to issue an urgent appeal for additional funds without which it would not be in a position to continue the programme.

62. To date, the Humanitarian Division in UNOSOM has assisted in resettling 30,770 internally displaced persons. It is estimated that there are still over 600,000 such persons throughout Somalia. Resettlement operations will continue to rely on the relatively limited resources and personnel of international NGOs and United Nations organizations that provide food and settlement kits and also basic social services in the communities receiving the displaced persons. UNOSOM provides transport and security. It should be noted that transport is the most costly aspect in resettlement operations. Assisting Somali families to return to their homes will remain a priority. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) will be fielding an assessment mission at the end of May, at

the request of the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator, to make it possible to develop a comprehensive programme of assistance for resettling internally displaced persons.

D. Impact of security problems

63. The humanitarian organizations have been working closely with the UNOSOM force command better to coordinate international humanitarian efforts, plans and strategies. The main objective for the remainder of 1994 is to ensure that whenever feasible the deployment of UNOSOM troops and the strengthening of the Somali police complement the implementation of humanitarian activities. The Humanitarian Division has been working with force command to establish standard operating procedures and to improve the support provided to humanitarian programmes and personnel.

64. In spite of concerted efforts by UNOSOM and humanitarian agencies working in Somalia to render assistance to needy sectors and vulnerable groups, humanitarian activities continue to face difficult security constraints. Increased banditry and inter-clan and inter-factional fighting, together with attacks directed at humanitarian agencies and their staff, have forced a number of United Nations organizations and NGOs to suspend their assistance programmes and reduce or withdraw their staff. Following the recent killing of one of its staff, and because of the continued insecurity, UNHCR was forced to evacuate its staff from Afmadow and to reduce its presence in Kismayo. WFP closed its operations in Kismayo as a result of persistent intimidation of its personnel. WFP had withdrawn from Belet Weyne earlier. A number of international NGOs have been obliged to take similar steps.

E. Rehabilitation and reconstruction

65. As a follow-up to the Addis Ababa declaration, the first meetings of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body and its Standing Committee were held at Nairobi on 1 and 2 February 1994. One of the major steps taken was the adoption of a plan of action for the first semester of 1994 on assistance for rehabilitation activities. The key elements of the plan include safety and security criteria for donors to assist in reconstruction schemes; the need for the establishment of appropriate Somali institutions in the regions; and the desirability of involving Somalis in the planning and implementation of rehabilitation programmes. To date, multi-donor missions have visited Nugal and Bakool regions to hold discussions with local authorities responsible for development activities.

66. Bearing in mind the long-term nature of reconstruction and development activities, I have approved the

transfer of the United Nations Development Office from UNOSOM to UNDP, with effect from 1 May 1994. While it will be operated as a project by UNDP, the Development Office will function as an integral component of United Nations activities in Somalia. In that context, it will cooperate closely with UNOSOM and United Nations organizations operating in Somalia. The Development Office will be expected to provide institutional support and policy analysis to a future administration as an integral part of its functions.

IX. Administrative questions

67. Since the withdrawal of United States forces at the end of March 1994, logistic support for UNOSOM has been provided by a United States civilian contractor, Brown and Root Services Corporation, whose services were recommended and approved by the Headquarters Committee on Contracts as a sole source in accordance with the United Nations Financial Regulations and Rules until 1 October 1994, pending the effective bidding of the requirement. An Expression of Interest has been requested and several firms have responded positively. A Logistics Control Centre, staffed by 12 United States Government-loaned personnel, was established to monitor UNOSOM logistics operations and the support provided by the contractor.

68. While the overall staffing situation of UNOSOM has improved over the last six months (146 international Professional and 353 General and Field Service staff as at mid-April 1994), there still remains a large number of vacancies for which recruitment has proved to be difficult.

X. Financial implications

69. In the event the Security Council approves the extension of the mandate as recommended in paragraph 77 below, the related financial implications, based on my report to the General Assembly (A/48/850 and Corr.1), are estimated at \$464.7 million for a six-month period and are indicated in annex II to the present report. It would be my recommendation to the General Assembly that the cost relating thereto should be considered as an expense of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations.

XI. Observations

70. The Nairobi declaration of 24 March 1994 has brought the United Nations Operation in Somalia to a defining moment in its complex and stormy history. The issue that now confronts the Security Council is the extension of the UNOSOM II mandate, taking into

account the Council's objective, set out in resolution 897 (1994), that UNOSOM II complete its mission by March 1995. Renewal would signify the Member States' determination to fulfil the United Nations vision of assisting Somalia towards political reconciliation, national reconstruction and peace. Deciding to phase out the Somalia operation would signify abandonment of that vision and the risk of the country sliding back into the abyss from which it was barely rescued less than two years ago. The choice depends on two main factors, namely, the readiness of the Somali political and community leaders to fulfil their commitments to extricate the country from its present ordeal; and the readiness of troop and financial contributors, in the face of at times wrenching difficulties, to stay the course charted by the Security Council.

71. The present situation, though difficult, is not entirely devoid of hope. On the one hand, there is the unanimous commitment of the Somali parties to pursue the path of reconciliation and to work together to achieve voluntary disarmament and a permanent cease-fire. On the other hand, some of the factions have used their military strength to increase the areas under their control in order to enhance their negotiating positions.

72. All the Somali leaders have appealed to UNOSOM to continue supporting their reconciliation and rehabilitation efforts, which in itself is a positive development compared to the past attitudes of certain parties toward UNOSOM. This has enabled my Acting Special Representative over the past few months to pursue a political initiative. The result, so far, has been a resumption of the dialogue, normalization of UNOSOM's relationship with SNA, and the very important declaration adopted by the parties at Nairobi.

73. Unfortunately, for reasons explained elsewhere in this report, there have been considerable delays in implementing that agreement and the preparatory meeting is now scheduled for 30 May 1994, with no date fixed for the National Reconciliation Conference itself. A major effort is now required from the faction leaders if they are to retain the confidence of the international community in the sincerity of the commitments they entered into at Nairobi.

74. Meanwhile, the situation on the ground is a matter of growing concern. The withdrawal of several major UNOSOM contingents in March did not lead to civil war, as had been feared, nor to a resurgence of organized attacks on UNOSOM and on humanitarian agency and NGO personnel. However, there has been a steady deterioration of the security situation. Militia groups are rearming and are again constructing "technical" combat vehicles in anticipation of renewed fighting, particularly since the substantial military advances scored

by SNA in the Merka and the Mogadishu airport areas. Moreover, banditry is on the rise, partly as a result of the reduction in UNOSOM's strength.

75. Elsewhere in Somalia, UNOSOM's efforts to help foster reconciliation among various local clans have made some progress. This can be significant as the clans generally have much influence with the Somali political factions. Of considerable significance in this connection are the ongoing reconciliation efforts being mediated by the Imam of Hirab. If successful, these may result in reducing mistrust and hostility between General Aidid, Mr. Mohamed Ali Mahdi and Mr. Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, the leaders of the major contending factions in the United Somali Congress.

76. Despite this somewhat negative assessment of the political and security situations, I believe that the Somali people deserve a last chance. But this must be firmly tied to evidence of serious and productive pursuit of the reconciliation process. It must also entail strict observance of the cease-fire and cooperation with UNOSOM in preventing the recurrence of clashes and in resolving local clan and factional conflicts.

77. I accordingly recommend that the Security Council reaffirm its objective, set out in resolution 897 (1994), that UNOSOM II complete its mission by March 1995, and that, to this end, it now extend the UNOSOM II mandate for a period of six months. This extension would be at the present authorized strength of 22,000, and be subject to periodic reviews of the political and military situation and of progress towards reconciliation. The first such review would take place following my submission of a report on the outcome of the National Reconciliation Conference or on 15 July 1994 if the Conference had not taken place by then. Subsequent reviews would be scheduled at the discretion of the Security Council. I have instructed my Acting Special Representative to continue assigning top priority to his efforts for promoting political reconciliation in Somalia.

78. During the six-month period UNOSOM II would also continue to give priority to the speedy build-up of the Somali national police and justice system. This could be synchronized with a corresponding reduction of the UNOSOM military component, preferably beginning in November 1994. Until the Somali police force is in a position to shoulder its responsibilities, it is the considered opinion of the UNOSOM force Commander that the mandated level of 22,000 all ranks needs to be maintained to provide the requisite security. I have instructed my staff to make a major effort to rebuild the force to this level as soon as possible. A premature reduction in troop level would be counter-productive, since it would lead to a curtailment of the area where UNOSOM II can fulfil its

79. These recommendations are based on the assumption that the Somali leaders will prove able and willing to pursue the path to political reconciliation. Should this assumption prove unfounded, I will not hesitate so to report to the Security Council. In that event, I would not rule out recommending that the Council consider the withdrawal of the United Nations force in part or in full. I have accordingly instructed UNOSOM to formulate a comprehensive contingency withdrawal plan which would be ready for implementation should the Security Council so decide. There would probably be no alternative to this course of action, since, in the event of a failure of the political reconciliation process and/or a large-scale resumption of fighting, the continued flow of military and financial support for UNOSOM from Member States would surely diminish or cease altogether.

80. In my last report, I referred to the substantial resources generously made available to save hundreds of thousands of Somali lives. In spite of scarce resources and the proliferation of emergencies in other parts of the world, the international community has demonstrated compassion and patience in continuing to provide humanitarian assistance to the suffering people of Somalia. While relief requirements continue, and have recently increased because of the sudden outbreak of cholera, there is heightened concern that resources may not be available to meet those needs. The continuing security problems, in particular the threats and attacks directed at humanitarian agencies, are a growing cause for anxiety. When taken together with the prohibitive costs of delivering assistance for relief and rehabilitation, the circumstances under which humanitarian agencies are forced to operate can only be expected to lead to a reduced level of response. This in turn could leave those who are least able to help themselves in an even more precarious situation, and, worse still, result in a return to the tragic days of the worst phase of the emergency. The grave concern expressed by the donor community about the security situation should be another clear signal to the Somali political leaders to accelerate their efforts, in cooperation with UNOSOM, to achieve a political settlement and maintain peaceful conditions. If these efforts should bear fruit, there is still hope for collective international efforts to succeed in assisting Somalis to meet the continuing emergency needs and move towards the rebuilding of the economic and social fabric of their country.

81. In conclusion, I wish first of all to place on record again my deep appreciation for my former Special Representative, Admiral Jonathan Howe; his successor as Acting Special Representative, Ambassador Lansana Kouyate, and the two officers who have served as Force Commanders of UNOSOM II: General Cevik Bir and General Aboo Samah Bin Aboo Bakar. These officials

have demonstrated the highest qualities of leadership in some of the most difficult circumstances. My appreciation further extends to all the soldiers and civilians of all ranks and from many countries, including Somalia, who have devoted themselves to the effort of the United Nations to help the Somali nation in its hour of need. I further wish to convey my appreciation to ICRC, to the NGOs and to the many Governments that have supported UNOSOM in its efforts to carry out the Security Council mandate. Above all, I pay a tribute to the soldiers of UNOSOM, United Nations staff members, Somalis working for UNOSOM, and relief workers who made the supreme sacrifice in furthering the effort of the international community, under United Nations auspices, to bring succour to Somalia and restore peace in that country.

Annex I

Declaration by the leaders of the Somali political organizations

General principles

1. Following the informal consultations in Nairobi, from 11 to 23 March 1994, the political leaders of Somalia have reached an understanding based on the following principles:

- (a) Inviolability of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Somali Republic;
- (b) Repudiation of any form of violence as a means of resolving conflicts and implementation of cease-fire and voluntary disarmament throughout Somalia;
- (c) Respect for and preservation of fundamental human rights and democratic principles;
- (d) Creation of an atmosphere conducive to brotherly coexistence among all Somalis, using traditional channels, cultural and political means;
- (e) Rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country to recover from the devastation of the civil war.

2. In specific terms, the leaders have agreed to implement the following:

- (a) To restore peace throughout Somalia, giving priority wherever conflicts exist;
- (b) To hold a meeting of the signatory factions of the Addis Ababa peace agreement and the Somali National Movement (SNM) on 15 April 1994 in Mogadishu to set up rules and procedures of voting and criteria of participation in the National Reconciliation Conference. The meeting will also discuss the ways and the modalities to establish the National Legislative Assembly, which will be formed after the formation of the National Government;

- (c) In order to restore the sovereignty of the Somali State, a National Reconciliation Conference should be convened on 15 May 1994 to elect a President and Vice-Presidents (the number to be determined) and to appoint a Prime Minister;
- (d) To complete and review the formation of local authorities, where needed, and establish them, where necessary, as a basis for regional autonomy and respect for community rights;
- (e) To urge SNM to attend the above and all national reconciliation conferences, meetings and consultations;
- (f) To establish an independent judiciary.

Appeal to the international community

The Somali leaders wish to express their gratitude to the international community, particularly the United Nations, aid donor countries and countries of the region, for their valuable assistance and to request the continuation of these efforts until Somalia stands on its own feet.

Signed this 24th day of March 1994 on behalf of the Group of 12 and the Somali National Alliance:

(Signed) Ali Mahdi MOHAMED
Group of 12

(Signed) Mohamed Farah Hassan AIDID
(SNA)

Annex II
United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM)

Summary cost estimate for a six-month period
(Thousands of United States dollars)

1. Military personnel costs	198 940
2. Civilian personnel costs	61 680
3. Premises/accommodation	7 790
4. Infrastructure repairs	7 600
5. Transport operations	11 520
6. Air operations	79 620
7. Naval operations	-
8. Communications	5 200
9. Other equipment	7 460
10. Supplies and services	38 850
11. Elections-related supplies and services	-
12. Public information programmes	2 300
13. Training programmes	6 600
14. Mine-clearing programmes	4 950
15. Assistance for disarmament and demobilization	15 400
16. Air and surface freight	5 320
17. Integrated Management Information System	250
18. Support account for peace-keeping operations	4 560
19. Staff assessment	6 660
Total	<u>464 700</u>

Document 86

Letter dated 26 May 1994 from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General concerning the Council's decision to release the report of the Commission of Inquiry established pursuant to resolution 885 (1993)

S/1994/652, 1 June 1994

The members of the Security Council have received the report of the Commission of Inquiry established pursuant to resolution 885 (1993) to investigate armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel.

The Council has asked me to convey to you its decision that the report should now be circulated as a document of the Security Council in the normal manner.

The Council also asked me to indicate its thanks for the Commission's report.

It is noted that many of the suggestions in the report have already been acted upon by UNOSOM II and by the Security Council.

The members of the Council believe that the report demonstrates the complexity and difficulty of the operation in Somalia. Many lessons have been learned and the Security Council will be able to build upon that experience in future peace-keeping operations.

I should be grateful if this letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council at the same time as the report* is circulated.

(Signed) Ibrahim A. GAMBARI
President of the Security Council

*The report is contained in document S/1994/653.

Document 87

Security Council resolution renewing the mandate of UNOSOM II until 30 September 1994 subject to a review by the Council no later than 29 July 1994

S/RES/923 (1994), 31 May 1994

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992 and all subsequent relevant resolutions,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 24 May 1994 (S/1994/614),

Reaffirming the commitment of the international community to assisting the Somali people to attain political reconciliation and reconstruction,

Emphasizing in this context that the people of Somalia bear the ultimate responsibility for achieving national reconciliation and for rebuilding their country,

Stressing the importance the Council attaches to the Somali parties working seriously to achieve peace and national reconciliation in their country and to their fulfilling in good faith all obligations and agreements to which they commit themselves,

Welcoming the Declaration of the Leaders of the Somali Political Organizations signed in Nairobi, Kenya, on 24 March 1994 (S/1994/614, annex I), which, *inter alia*, committed the Somali parties to restore peace throughout Somalia, to set up rules and procedures of voting and criteria of participation in the national reconciliation conference, to convene a national reconciliation conference to elect a President, Vice-Presidents, and to appoint a Prime Minister, to complete and review the formation of local authorities, and to establish an independent judiciary,

Welcoming also the Lower Juba regional conference,

Concerned none the less at the delays in the reconciliation process, and at the deterioration in the security situation,

Condemning the continuing incidents of fighting and banditry and, in particular, violence and armed attacks against persons engaged in humanitarian and peace-keeping efforts,

Paying tribute to those troops and humanitarian personnel of several countries who have been killed or injured while serving in Somalia,

Re-emphasizing the importance the Council attaches to the safety and security of United Nations and other personnel engaged in humanitarian relief and peace-keeping throughout Somalia,

Paying tribute to the humanitarian work being undertaken by United Nations agencies and non-govern-

mental organizations in difficult conditions to assist the people of Somalia,

Taking note that all Somali leaders have appealed to UNOSOM II to continue supporting their reconciliation and rehabilitation efforts,

Reaffirming the objective that UNOSOM II complete its mission by March 1995,

Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to threaten peace and security and having regard to the exceptional circumstances, including in particular the absence of a government in Somalia, and *acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Welcomes* the report of the Secretary-General (S/1994/614);

2. *Decides* to renew the mandate of UNOSOM II for an additional period expiring on 30 September 1994, subject to a review by the Council no later than 29 July 1994 based on a report by the Secretary-General on the humanitarian mission carried out by UNOSOM and on the political and security situation in Somalia and progress made in achieving national reconciliation, in the light of which report and review the Security Council may request the Secretary-General to prepare options regarding UNOSOM's mandate and future operations;

3. *Commends* the Secretary-General, his Acting Special Representative and the personnel of UNOSOM II for their efforts towards improving the conditions of the Somali people and in encouraging the process of political reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction;

4. *Strongly urges* all parties in Somalia to cooperate fully with UNOSOM II, to carry out the commitments and implement the agreements which they have signed including those relating to the voluntary disarmament, and to pursue without further delay the negotiations aimed at achieving national reconciliation;

5. *Demands* that all parties in Somalia refrain from any acts of intimidation or violence against personnel engaged in humanitarian or peace-keeping work in the country;

6. *Reaffirms* the obligations of States to implement fully the embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia imposed by paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992);

7. Further welcomes the progress made by UNOSOM II in establishing the justice and police programmes and calls for their acceleration;

8. Expresses its appreciation to those Member States which have contributed troops or provided logistical or other assistance to UNOSOM II or have offered to do so, and *underlines*, in this context, the continuing importance of UNOSOM II having at its disposal the

necessary troops, civilian personnel, equipment and financial and logistic support to carry out its mandate effectively;

9. *Expresses* its appreciation to those Member States which have extended humanitarian assistance or have supported the Somali justice and police programmes and *encourages* further such contributions on an urgent basis;

10. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Document 88

Report of the Commission of Inquiry established pursuant to resolution 885 (1993) to investigate armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel

S/1994/653, 1 June 1994

The attached report of the Commission of Inquiry established pursuant to Security Council resolution 885 (1993) to investigate armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel which led to casualties among them is hereby circulated as a document of the Security Council in accordance with the letter dated 26 May 1994 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General (S/1994/652).

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Introduction

Establishment and Mandate of Commission

1. On 16 November 1993 the Security Council in resolution 885 (1993) authorized "the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry, in further implementation of resolutions 814 (1993) and 837 (1993), to investigate armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel which led to casualties among them".

2. The resolution further directed the Commission "to determine procedures for carrying out its investigation taking into account standard United Nations procedures" and requested the Commission to "report its finding through the Secretary-General to the Security Council as soon as possible, taking into consideration the need for a thorough inquiry".

3. Paragraph 8 of the resolution requested the Secretary-General, pending the Commission's report, to suspend arrest actions against persons not already detained pursuant to resolution 837 (1993), who might be implicated in attacks against UNOSOM II personnel.

4. The appointment of the Commission of Inquiry and the establishment of its Secretariat were announced on 24 November 1993. The Commission was composed of:

Hon. Matthew M.S.W. Ngulube (Chief Justice of Zambia), Chairman of the Commission

Lt. General (Retired) Emmanuel A. Erskine (Ghana), Member;
Former Force Commander of UNIFIL)

Lt. General Gustav Hagglund (Finland), Member;
(Chief of Defence Staff, Finland)

5. The Secretariat of the Commission was headed by an Executive Secretary, Mr. Winston A. Tubman of the Office of Legal Affairs at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. Mr. Tubman was assisted by Mr. Osamu Shiraishi of the Centre for Human Rights in Geneva (during the meetings in Mogadishu in December 1993 only) and Mr. Luke Mhlaba of the Legal Department of UNOSOM II. Administrative services were provided by Mr. Lars Skold of United Nations Field Service, Captain Magnus Gustafsson of UNIFIL and Ms. Mary Muturi of the Department of Political Affairs at the United Nations Headquarters in New York.

Procedures for Conduct of Commission's Inquiry

6. The Commissioners convened in New York on 22 November 1993. They paid a courtesy call on the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and held briefings with Ambassador Chinmaya R. Gharekhan, Special Political Adviser to the Secretary-General; Mr. James O.C. Jonah, Under-Secretary General for Political Affairs; Mr. Kofi Annan, Under-Secretary-General for Peace-Keeping Operations; and Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs Mr. Carl-August Fleishhauer. While in New York, the Commission adopted its rules of procedure.

7. The Commission travelled to Mogadishu on 30 November 1993. Upon its arrival the Commission issued a press statement announcing its programme and invited all those who might have useful information to come forward and make depositions regarding armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel.

8. During this first visit to Mogadishu, the Commission made a special effort to reach potential Somali witnesses, including General Mohamed Farah Aidid (see annex 1). Since the Commission realized that many Somalis would be uneasy visiting the heavily guarded UNOSOM II Headquarters compound, an office was opened in downtown Mogadishu for the taking of testimonies. This was announced in the media but no significant witnesses appeared there.

9. After conducting interviews and reviewing various documents, the Commission took a recess on 21 December 1993 and resumed in New York on 10 January 1994. It held meetings in Washington, D.C. and New York, before proceeding to Livorno, Italy, and thereafter again to Mogadishu to continue its work.

10. In carrying out its investigations, the Commission heard the testimony of 29 UNOSOM II officials, including some who had already left the mission area, and Somali citizens. A list of persons interviewed by the Commission appears in annex 2.

11. The interviews were conducted informally. A few witnesses were accompanied by lawyers or aides and all of them were assured of the confidential nature of their testimonies. No voice recordings were made.

12. The Commission also reviewed documentary material, including the report prepared by Professor Tom Farer and transcripts of the testimonies collected by him during his inquiry on behalf of UNOSOM II. In addition it examined UNOSOM II rules of engagement, operational plans, orders and reports, as well as incident reports.

13. The Commission made an aerial tour of the sites where attacks on UNOSOM II took place or which were related to the attacks.

14. From Mogadishu the Commission moved to Nairobi, where it deliberated on its initial findings while making further efforts to meet with USC/SNA leaders, especially General Aidid, who were then staying in the Kenyan capital, before writing its report. Additional communications were exchanged with General Aidid (see annex 1) but in the end no testimonies were given by the USC/SNA leaders.

15. The Commission wishes to thank the Secretary-General, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, and the UNOSOM II Force Commander and their staff, and all those who gave testimony for their cooperation and assistance without which the inquiry could not have been successfully undertaken.

16. The Commission would also like to acknowledge with gratitude the courtesy and cooperation extended to it by officials of the United States and Italian Governments on its visit to Washington, D.C., and Livorno.

17. During all of the above contacts and throughout its deliberations the Commission was able to operate in a fully independent manner and no attempt whatsoever was made by anyone to infringe its independence.

Structure of the Report

18. This report is in eight parts, followed by appendices. Part I traces the development of the crisis which led to United Nations intervention in Somalia. Part II explains the reasons for the invoking of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to enforce disarmament and part III is an account of the underlying causes of the armed clashes between UNOSOM II and the SNA, starting with attacks on Pakistani soldiers on 5 June 1993. Part IV describes the weapons inspections and the outbreak of attacks on UNOSOM II personnel on 5 June 1993, and part V discusses the fighting between UNOSOM II and SNA militia in the aftermath of the June 5 attacks. Part VI analyses the attacks and makes specific findings of fact, while part VII makes some general observations based on the attacks investigated. The report concludes in part VII with some recommendations about UNOSOM II in particular and peace-keeping and enforcement in general. The annexes at the back of the report provide additional material for a better grasp of the facts relating to the attacks.

I. The crisis leading to UN intervention in Somalia

The power vacuum and resultant civil war

19. The flight of President Mohamed Siad Barre on 26 January 1991 and the collapse of his Government left a power vacuum in which political movements fought each other in a bitter civil war for control of the country.

By the end of 1991, Mr. Ali Mahdi Mohamed and General Mohamed Farah Aidid, leading rival coalitions of political movements (see annex 3 for a list of Somali political movements), had emerged as the main contenders for political power.

20. Their militias were pitted against each other in the capital Mogadishu, the single most important strategic location in the overall struggle for control of the whole country.

21. United Nations estimates indicated that as a result of the civil war and drought 4.5 million people were threatened by malnutrition and related diseases and that between November 1991 and April 1993, as many as 300,000 persons had died and 1.5 million were particularly at risk.

22. It was in such political chaos and the attendant human tragedy, general mayhem and destruction of infrastructure and property that the United Nations first became seized of the Somali crisis, which it judged as constituting a threat to stability in the Horn of Africa and to international peace and security.

23. On 23 January 1992, resolution 733 (1992), which was to be the first of several resolutions on the situation in Somalia, was adopted by the Security Council. It imposed an embargo on arms supplies to Somalia, requested the Secretary-General to increase humanitarian assistance to the country and to contact the Somali parties concerned with a view to securing their agreement to a cessation of hostilities.

24. The principal objective of the United Nations intervention in Somalia was to avert a famine. To this end Security Council resolution 751 (1992), adopted on 24 April 1992, established the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM, later referred to as UNOSOM I).

25. Although it was realised that the civil war was a significant cause of the danger of famine, the United Nations did not assume any direct responsibility for ending the fighting or resolving the political impasse. UNOSOM I operated within the context of a cease-fire agreement between Ali Mahdi and General Aidid and covered the Mogadishu area only.

26. It sought merely to facilitate negotiation and agreement among the Somali leaders, leaving the responsibility for the restoration of peace and finding a political solution with them.

27. Resolution 751 also requested the Secretary-General, in cooperation with the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, to continue consultations with the Somali parties with a view to the convening of a conference on Somalia national reconciliation.

28. Under the resolution, UNOSOM I was to deploy 50 unarmed military observers to monitor the cease-

The UNITAF Mandate

fire and to provide security for humanitarian operations. All important measures undertaken by UNOSOM I in Somalia were therefore discussed with and agreed to by General Aidid and Ali Mahdi before being implemented.

29. The strategy of UNOSOM I was not to marginalise the Somali de facto leaders but to take them along on every move. Hence, although the need to engage international military personnel to provide security for relief operations had long been a United Nations objective, their deployment could not take place until August 1991 when the consent of the de facto Somali political leaders was given.

II. Chapter VII of the Charter is invoked

30. UNOSOM I proved incapable of meeting the challenge it faced due to its small size and the limited scope of its mandate. Consisting mainly of some 500 Pakistani troops who could not leave the harbour and airport of Mogadishu due to lack of consent of the de facto Somali political authorities, it was unable to deter attacks on humanitarian relief convoys.

31. The need for the United Nations to obtain consent to its Somalia operations from the rival political groups caused delays in taking urgently required action while the situation in the country continued to deteriorate. The absence of a national government created a unique situation in which no central authority with responsibility to enter into international relations for Somalia existed.

Media coverage raises international concern about Somalia

32. Meanwhile, worldwide media coverage depicting ghastly pictures of severely undernourished or sick Somali women and children facing certain death mobilised international opinion led by United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to demand a more effective international intervention in Somalia.

33. Following one of five options presented in a letter from the Secretary-General to its President dated 29 November 1992, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, authorised in resolution 794 (1992) the use of force to support humanitarian operations in Somalia.

34. In doing so, the Council was departing from its usual practice of seeking the consent of the de facto Somali authorities for its activities. Such consent was in conformity with traditional United Nations peace-keeping practice.

35. Pursuant to resolution 794 (1992) the United Nations Chapter VII objectives in Somalia were carried out by the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), an international coalition led by the United States.

36. The UNITAF mandate under Security Council resolution 794 (1992) was to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for the humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. This contemplated the use of military force, if necessary, to overcome obstruction of humanitarian operations.

37. UNITAF, which at its peak had a troop strength of approximately 37,000, began arriving in Somalia in December 1992 and was deployed in Mogadishu and the central and southern regions of the country.

38. Although operating under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, UNITAF did not interpret its mandate as requiring it to enforce disarmament of the Somali militias.

39. However, a general cease-fire agreement and a supplementary agreement signed in Addis Ababa by the political movements on 8 and 15 January 1993 respectively provided for the encampment of the militias and the handing over of their heavy weapons to a ceasefire monitoring group consisting of UNITAF or UNOSOM I personnel.

Cease-fire and disarmament under UNITAF

40. Under the Addis Ababa agreements of 8 and 15 January 1993, the political movements began to implement the ceasefire and disarmament arrangements on a voluntary and cooperative basis. UNITAF/UNOSOM I established a planning and monitoring team while the Somalis appointed their representatives on the cease-fire committee. In meetings held at UNOSOM I offices, a step-by-step blueprint for disarmament and demobilization was agreed. Cantonment sites were mutually chosen and transit sites for demobilized fighters were earmarked. The militias placed their heavy weapons in storage sites which they declared to UNITAF, together with inventories of all weapons stored. UNITAF then carried out routine inspections of these sites. The last inspection conducted by UNITAF was in February 1993. There were no formal modalities between UNITAF and the factions, a situation inherited by UNOSOM II.

41. From time to time, UNITAF also conducted weapons searches and confiscations independently of the agreement signed by the political movements. But these did not form part of a comprehensive disarmament plan nor were they considered by UNITAF as a central feature of its mandate. Thus the security situation in Somalia remained volatile and attacks on personnel involved in humanitarian work continued.

UNITAF's Departure

42. Meanwhile, UNITAF was anxious to withdraw from Somalia and hand over responsibility to the United Nations. UNITAF felt that its intervention had been effective in averting disaster, and that with the relative improvement in the security situation and the provision of much-needed food, medicines and other vital necessities to Somalis, its essentially humanitarian mission was accomplished.

43. Nonetheless, it was clear that this improvement could only be sustained by a replacement force having capabilities comparable to those of UNITAF.

Wider United Nations mandate: UNOSOM II

44. In this context, the United Nations Security Council adopted its resolution 814 (1993) on 26 March 1993, expanding the size and mandate of UNOSOM to include not only the protection of humanitarian relief supplies and personnel but also to compel the Somali militias to disarm. Thus, unlike UNITAF, whose participation in the disarmament process was subsidiary and derived from the cease-fire and disarmament agreements of 8 and 15 January 1993, the new UNOSOM (UNOSOM II) was mandated to disarm Somali militias under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

45. The new mandate authorised the use of force to overcome refusal by any of the militias to disarm. Such action, if it occurred, would be the first direct challenge to the political movements' military power. Ultimately, unless the militias disarmed, a collision between them and UNOSOM II was inevitable.

Initial problems facing UNOSOM II

46. UNOSOM II like any other peace-keeping operation was confronted with problems at its establishment. Contingents needed time to study the ground and familiarise themselves with a new cultural and political environment, particularly the implications of operating in a country in a state of civil war.

47. For the execution of its mandate, UNOSOM II had to develop standard operating procedures (SOPs). The staff needed time, expertise and structures to gather appropriate information to effectively carry out its mission.

48. Before UNOSOM II could accomplish these objectives, the events of 5 June occurred, plunging it into a peace enforcement role which greatly compounded its problems. Resolution 837 (1993) requiring UNOSOM II to arrest those responsible for the 5 June attacks further complicated its situation.

49. UNOSOM II was seriously short of the requisite staff with experience to execute the enormous tasks assigned to it. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General stated that he made sustained appeals to the United Nations Headquarters for specific staff to be made available to the mission but these could not be provided. UNITAF, which could have assisted with its staff, was unfortunately also leaving the mission area.

50. Finally, the mission was ill-equipped with operational *matériel* for the nature of its operations and the civil-war environment. Some of the contingents lacked appropriate hardware such as armoured personnel carriers (APCs) to protect their troops from small-arms fire.

The scope of the Chapter VII mandate

51. It is important to note that enforcement power or the Chapter VII aspects of the UNOSOM II mandate under resolution 814 (1993) applied specifically to military matters such as disarmament and ensuring that lines for the supply of relief remained open.

52. Enforcement power did not extend to Somalia's political process. There UNOSOM II's mandate was limited to assisting the Somalis in their efforts to achieve national reconciliation and the reconstitution of their political institutions.

53. Yet some of the major disagreements which created tensions between UNOSOM II and the USC/SNA centered on divergent views about UNOSOM II's political mandate.

III. Underlying causes of the armed clashes

54. Among the several incidents or situations which led to hostilities between the USC/SNA the most significant were: disagreement concerning the role of the factions in the political reconstitution of Somalia; the establishment of the Somali judiciary and police; the recapture of Kismayo by Siad Barre's son-in-law, General Hersi Morgan; the Galcayo conference; and control of Radio Mogadishu.

The reconstitution of political institutions

55. Fifteen Somali political movements met in Addis Ababa in March 1993 at a conference sponsored by the United Nations. At the official closure of that conference on 27 March, the leaders of the 15 movements signed the "Addis Ababa Agreement of the First Session of the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia". The agreement was meant to be the basic framework for Somalia's transition towards peace and the establishment of an elected government.

56. It stipulated a two-year transitional period during which the supreme political organ and repository of Somali sovereignty would be a Transitional National Council (TNC). Below it would be 18 regional councils and 92 district councils. The regional councils would be composed of delegates drawn from the district councils; members of the district councils would either be elected or chosen by consensus in accordance with traditional Somali practice.

57. The TNC would comprise one representative chosen by each of the 15 political movements; three representatives from each region, one of whom would be a woman; and five additional members representing Mogadishu.

58. As such, the Agreement ensured that the 15 political movements would not dominate the transitional institutions. Democratic participation was guaranteed through the restriction of the number of TNC members appointed by the factions, the reservation of a quota of TNC seats for women and the election or popular selection of district council members.

59. Significantly, the Agreement of 27 March did not envisage a specific role for the United Nations, beyond blandly inviting its Secretary-General and his Special Representative in Somalia, "in accordance with the mandate entrusted to them by the ... Security Council to extend all necessary assistance to the people of Somalia for the implementation of this Agreement".

60. When the UN-sponsored conference adjourned on 27 March, the Somali political leaders did not immediately disperse. They continued their discussions in Addis Ababa and all 15 movements signed a document entitled "Agreements Reached Between the Political Leaders at the Consultations Held in Addis Ababa, 30 March 1993".

61. This document went against the letter and spirit of the Agreement of 27 March by stipulating that the names of the three TNC members to be chosen from each district would be submitted by the political factions, and that where the factions in a region could not agree on a nominee, their differences would be settled in Addis Ababa or in the particular region.

62. The 30 March document made no mention of any reservation of seats for women. It stipulated a 45-day time-frame for the nomination of TNC members, a deadline which gave insufficient time to organize genuine elections at district council level.

63. Although it bore the signatures of the same leaders who had signed the Agreement of 27 March, UNOSOM II never embraced the 30 March document and the stage was set for clashes between UNOSOM II and some of the Somali political groups.

The Establishment of the Somali Judiciary and Police

64. UNOSOM II also exerted a significant influence on the procedures for the appointment of Somali police and judges, possibly frustrating the strategies of the USC/SNA and certainly further engendering its hostility.

65. When UNOSOM II took over responsibility from UNITAF, under an arrangement between UNOSOM I and UNITAF, some judges had been appointed by the USC/SNA and were presiding over what remained of the courts in Mogadishu. In early May, a team of United States Foreign Service officers assigned to UNOSOM II held a meeting in Mogadishu with Somali lawyers and other local groups interested in the rehabilitation of the judiciary in Somalia.

66. The meeting which was chaired by one of the US Foreign Service experts on secondment to UNOSOM II, Ms. Ann Wright, culminated in the setting up of a committee and the adoption of procedures for the selection of judges. The selection procedures allowed UNOSOM II to nominate some of the judges. The USC/SNA resented the erosion of its power in this area and opposed the selection of judges by UNOSOM II and not by the TNC as provided for in the 27 March Addis Ababa Agreement.

67. In a similar vein, the promulgation of the Somali Penal Code of 1962 as the criminal law in force in Somalia by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General was capable of being interpreted by the USC/SNA as an overstepping of the UNOSOM II mandate.

68. Further political frustration for the USC/SNA came when some of its officers visited a prison in Mogadishu to deal with a backlog of cases, only to be turned away by the new officer-in-charge of the prison on the ground that they had no authority to perform such a function.

69. The USC/SNA also felt that a police commission on which it was represented and which had been set up by agreement between General Aidid and Mr. Mahdi was being sidelined by UNOSOM II.

The situation in Kismayo

70. While the Addis Ababa conference was in progress in March, pro-Siad Barre forces under the command of General Hersi Morgan used women and children to disguise their infiltration of weapons into the southern port city of Kismayo, past the Belgian contingent of UNITAF. General Morgan's forces managed to drive out those of Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess, allies of General Aidid's movement within the SNA.

71. Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess made a bold and undisguised march towards Kismayo on 7 May in a bid

to recapture the city. The alerted Belgian contingent considered this a direct attack on their positions and they repelled Jess' forces, inflicting serious casualties. A Belgian soldier was injured by rifle fire during this infiltration. Kismayo, Somalia's second city, had special significance for General Aidid, as his militia had captured it in a fierce battle with forces loyal to Siad Barre.

72. The fall of Kismayo to General Morgan's forces angered the SNA, which accused the Belgian contingent of intervening in the fighting to protect General Morgan's militia and block Jess's capture of Kismayo. They saw the Belgians' failure to prevent General Morgan's infiltration into the city in March as evidence of UNOSOM II's lack of impartiality.

73. In making this accusation, the SNA made little distinction between UNITAF, which was in charge of Kismayo in March, and UNOSOM II, which took over responsibility on 4 May 1993.

The Galcayo conference

74. After the Addis Ababa conference of March 1993, General Aidid initiated consultations with Colonel Ahmed Abdillahi Yusuf, Chairman of the Political, Defence and Emergency Matters Committee of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). These consultations resulted in an agreement to hold a peace conference for the central region of Somalia.

75. In General Aidid's view, participation in the conference would be restricted to the political leaders of the region concerned. UNOSOM II would provide logistical support for the conference and security outside the conference hall. Somali leaders not from the central region would not be entitled to attend the conference. General Aidid saw himself as the convenor of the conference and would, as such, chair its proceedings and establish its agenda. Nevertheless, he invited the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, Admiral Jonathan Howe, to open the conference.

76. Later, when Ambassador April Glaspie, a United States Foreign Service Officer seconded to UNOSOM II was acting in place of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Lansana Kouyate, who was on leave, UNOSOM II became suspicious of Aidid's intentions. It sought to broaden participation in the conference, especially to include General Mohamed Abshir Mussa, Chairman of the SSDF.

77. Given the political rivalry between Abshir Mussa and Abdullahi Yusuf within the SSDF, UNOSOM II suspected a plot by General Aidid and Colonel Yusuf to undermine General Abshir Mussa. Despite being informed by General Abshir Mussa that he was fully aware of the conference being planned in Mogadishu, UNOSOM II was not assured. When the conference was due to start,

UNOSOM II, showing obvious deference, played host to General Mussa and provided him with transport and security in a bid to facilitate his participation at the conference.

78. UNOSOM II also insisted that the conference would not be presided over by General Aidid but by former President of the Somali Republic, Alman Abdalla Osman, an Aidid enemy who on arrival in Mogadishu immediately called for Aidid's arrest. UNOSOM II's stance caused displeasure to General Aidid who perceived UNOSOM II's behaviour as interference in Somali politics.

79. Further disagreement between UNOSOM II and General Aidid centred on the agenda of the conference. UNOSOM II took the same position as Mr. Mussa, by insisting that the situation in Kismayo be on the agenda. General Aidid on the other hand argued that problems involving other regions of Somalia would have to be discussed at different fora with the concerned leaders. In the end the joint UN/SNA conference was not held as planned, with General Aidid having to go ahead with a separate conference on his own.

80. The various issues of contention between the SNA and UNOSOM II became the subject of virulent propaganda on Radio Mogadishu, controlled by the SNA, against UNOSOM II in particular and foreigners in general.

Radio Mogadishu's Propaganda Against UNOSOM II

81. Radio Mogadishu, a war prize of the SNA captured from Ali Mahdi's militia, was particularly important as a means of communication among General Aidid's followers given Somalia's strong oral tradition and the low literacy rate of around 30 per cent.

82. When relations between UNOSOM II and the SNA deteriorated sharply in mid-May due to the events in Kismayo, the disagreements over the Galcayo conference and selection of judges, Radio Mogadishu broadcasts became markedly hostile to UNOSOM II.

83. This hostility is reflected in transcripts of broadcasts between 1 May and 4 June on the eve of the killing of 24 Pakistani soldiers. The broadcasts have a xenophobic tone, especially starting on 11 May, when they accuse UNOSOM II and the United States of being aggressors trying to colonize Somalia and to establish a trusteeship. They speak highly of Somalia's history of resistance to foreign domination and imposition.

84. UNOSOM II was very concerned about this propaganda which gave a negative perception of the United Nations and could stir up hostile sentiments towards UNOSOM II personnel from the Somali public.

85. At one point, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, Admiral Howe, had sought General Aidid's cooperation in ensuring that this propaganda be stopped and General Aidid had responded by calling for the establishment of a committee to monitor the operations of all radio stations in the country. However, such a committee was never established.

86. There was also concern within UNOSOM II that exclusive control of Radio Mogadishu by General Aidid gave him an unfair advantage over his political rivals to project his image and to achieve his political ambitions. It was felt that the radio station was a national asset to which all political movements should have access. Indeed, representatives of other political groups had written to UNOSOM II urging that the radio station be taken away from the SNA's exclusive control.

87. Radio Mogadishu thus became another sore point in relations between UNOSOM II and the SNA. There was some considerable debate among UNOSOM II officials about whether Radio Mogadishu should be shut down or otherwise taken off the air.

88. In mid-May, the Pakistani Brigade, which was responsible for the southern Mogadishu area, was asked to draw up plans on how Radio Mogadishu could be shut down or otherwise silenced if it continued its propaganda against UNOSOM.

89. The Pakistanis informed UNOSOM II that they were unable to do so as they did not have the personnel with the technical expertise to handle such an operation. It was suggested that the United States would supply the experts needed, but no action was taken and the initial plan appears to have been shelved.

90. Since Radio Mogadishu premises had been declared an authorized weapons storage site (AWSS), it was decided that during the weapons inspections of 5 June, US special forces technicians would accompany the inspection team to survey the radio installations.

91. Meanwhile, General Aidid and other SNA leaders were aware of discussions within UNOSOM on how to deal with the Radio Mogadishu issue. Rumours spread within SNA circles that UNOSOM intended to seize the radio station.

92. Given this context, the inspections of AWSS in southern Mogadishu on 5 June could not have come at a worse time for relations between UNOSOM II and the SNA.

93. Thus, while UNOSOM II was charged with the responsibility of assisting the Somali people in the rehabilitation of their political institutions at the local, regional and national levels its approach in carrying out this mandate as the foregoing incidents show was increasingly alienating the USC/SNA, which likened this approach to "trusteeship" or "colonization".

IV. The weapons inspections and outbreak of hostilities

94. Opinions differ, even among UNOSOM officials, on whether the weapons inspections of 5 June 1993 was genuine, or was merely a cover-up for reconnaissance and subsequent seizure of Radio Mogadishu. What is certain, however, is that the USC/SNA had declared Radio Mogadishu as an AWSS. In the execution of its mandate to disarm the factions and enforce a cease-fire, UNOSOM II was perfectly entitled to carry out inspections of AWSS. In any case UNITAF, despite interpreting its own mandate more narrowly, had established the practice of conducting such inspections.

95. The inspections provided a perfect opportunity to enter and survey the radio installations for any future operation should it become necessary. UNOSOM II had decided that such an operation might have to be carried out.

The Inspection Plan

96. Under the plan prepared by UNOSOM Force Headquarters, General Aidid would be given 12 hours' notice of the intended inspection. Four Pakistani units would carry out an inspection of the five sites declared by the USC/SNA to UNITAF.

97. Of these, three units would inspect one site each and the fourth would inspect two. Each unit would compile an inventory of weapons inspected, report on their operational efficiency and make a thorough reconnaissance for possible future operations. At the AWSS 5 (Radio Mogadishu), US special forces technicians would make a survey of the radio broadcast and transmission equipment.

98. Each unit was of company size and included a team of engineers and security personnel. The Pakistani Brigade was tasked by UNOSOM II Headquarters to prepare an operational plan for the inspections.

99. In case the inspection teams were refused access to the sites, they were to force entry. All were aware of the possibility of some hostile reaction to these inspections by the Somali supporters of the USC/SNA and lack of cooperation from its leadership.

100. In view of this risk, the Pakistanis had recommended that either no notice be given or if given, that no inspection be carried out until the SNA's reaction was communicated to them.

101. The letter notifying the SNA leadership of the inspection was delivered by Lt. Colonel Kevin McGovern, UNOSOM Deputy Chief of Intelligence and Timothy Byrne, Chief, Ceasefire and Disarmament Division, UNOSOM II Force Command, at General Aidid's residence on 4 June, a Friday and thus a public holiday in Mogadishu, at around 1700 hours.

102. The letter was addressed to Ambassador Alim, an adviser to General Aidid who was not present. The letter was therefore handed to Abdid Qaibdid, a member of Aidid's security who read it in the presence of the UNOSOM officers and commented to the effect that the SNA needed time to respond and that if UNOSOM insisted on conducting the inspections as planned, that would lead to a war.

103. After delivering the letter, Lt. Colonel McGovern recorded the USC/SNA's objections to the inspection in a memorandum which was signed by Colonel Giuseppe Pirotti, the UNOSOM Chief of Intelligence. The memorandum was delivered by Lt. Colonel McGovern to Major-General Thomas Montgomery, Deputy UNOSOM Force Commander and Commander of United States Joint Task Force (JTF). At the time, Major-General Montgomery was acting Force Commander in the absence of General Bir, who was on leave.

*The attacks on the Pakistani soldiers
(see map, annex 6)*

104. At 0700 hours on 5 June 1993, UNOSOM weapons inspection teams arrived simultaneously at the five AWSS in southern Mogadishu.

105. At around 0830, at AWSS 5, the location of Radio Mogadishu, a hostile crowd gathered as the inspection was in progress. Thirty minutes later it had increased to some 200 men, women and children. Several men were observed to be inciting the crowd against the Pakistani soldiers. A man was shot and probably killed when he tried to snatch a Pakistani soldier's rifle.

106. Notwithstanding this incident, the inspection was completed by about 0930 and the inspection party safely withdrew.

107. Just as the Pakistani troops withdrew from AWSS 5, another hostile crowd was assembling at Feeding Point 20 on National Street. The crowd started throwing stones at the 12 Pakistani soldiers manning this feeding point. From positions behind the women and children in the crowd, weapons were fired at the troops. The intensity of the attacks increased with rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and hand grenades being used.

108. Three soldiers were killed at the feeding point and six were taken prisoner, one of whom died in captivity.

109. Four APCs sent from a nearby strong point by the Pakistani Brigade headquarters to rescue the soldiers at the feeding point were obstructed by roadblocks and ambushed by heavy machine-guns positioned in surrounding buildings, and had to withdraw after some soldiers were killed and others wounded.

110. More APCs dispatched from the opposite side of FP20 were also similarly obstructed, subjected to intense fire and forced to withdraw.

111. Unable to help their own troops who were under attack, the Pakistani Brigade at around eleven o'clock requested from UNOSOM Force Headquarters the assistance of Italian tanks, which they understood to be on 30 minutes' call. These tanks did not reach Feeding Point 20 until after 1600 hours.

112. The Pakistani company returning from AWSS 3 (the retransmission site for Radio Mogadishu) was ambushed as it entered 21 October Road, on its way to the Brigade Headquarters at the Stadium. Crowds erected roadblocks to prevent the smooth passage of the Pakistani vehicles, which were subjected to increasingly intense fire from heavy machine-guns and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).

113. The Pakistanis came under the most fierce attacks as they reached the vicinity of Checkpoint 89 opposite the Cigarette Factory. At the same time, nearby Strong Points 42 and 50 also came under fire from gunmen who mingled with the crowds.

114. The Pakistani Brigade ordered reinforcements from their base at the Stadium, but the reinforcement units came under fire as soon as they left the stadium. After entering 21 October Road the reinforcement units were attacked by gunmen sheltering in the Saudi Relief Agency Building on the right.

115. The reinforcement units finally entered an area of intense criss-crossing fire in the vicinity of CP89, opposite the Cigarette Factory, where they and the vehicles returning from AWSS 3 were trapped. Most of the troops in this area, including members of the QRF, took shelter inside the Cigarette Factory.

116. At 1320 hours, US reconnaissance and Italian attack helicopters arrived on the scene. Italian helicopters, unable to locate the precise positions of opposing forces, opened fire with machine-guns, injuring three Pakistani soldiers. The helicopters withdrew after this error, and the SNA militia's machine-guns remained in place and continued firing for the rest of the afternoon.

117. At the end of the fighting later that afternoon, 24 Pakistanis were dead and 57 injured. Six Pakistani soldiers were missing, one of whom died in captivity, and five were released to UNOSOM II two days later by an official of the SNA. Also injured on 5 June were one Italian and three US soldiers.

118. The death of so many UNOSOM II forces in one day brought to light the enormity of the challenge that the United Nations faced in its mission to forcibly disarm Somalia. UNOSOM II had been aware that the area of the 21 October Road around the Cigarette Factory was inhabited by militia forces. But their battle preparedness and the quality and quantity of their weapons was not then entirely known.

119. Another serious question for UNOSOM II Force Command was whether they had failed to react quickly enough to the appeals for help by the Pakistani soldiers who were under attack. Of particular concern was the delay in despatching Italian tanks to Feeding Point 20.

120. The Italian Brigade, however, denied having delayed in responding to the appeals for assistance. They stated that shortly after 1100 hours, their attack helicopters had carried out operations in response to UNOSOM orders, and that they were involved in support operations during most of the afternoon.

121. The Italian Brigade Commander said he had brought an armoured platoon and tank company closer to Mogadishu on his own initiative from their base at Balad, and had intervened to assist the Pakistanis in their sector although this was the responsibility of the QRF. According to the Italian Brigade Commander, the order from UNOSOM II force headquarters to use the tanks had been given at 1400 hours, and the company had then moved to the Old Port for a briefing (arriving at 1500 hours), before proceeding to FP20.

122. The ferocity of the attacks and the death of so many UNOSOM II forces in one day proved to be the turning point in UNOSOM's operations in Somalia. The inadequacy of the military equipment and lack of preparedness of UNOSOM II forces for such armed confrontation was starkly demonstrated.

123. UNOSOM II officials and military commanders became more convinced of the need to take decisive action to disarm the factions in Mogadishu or at least to substantially reduce their capability to wage war. Authority for such action was already contained in resolution 814 (1993) of the Security Council, but a more specific authorization to take action against those responsible for the attacks on the Pakistani soldiers was granted in resolution 837 (1993).

124. Without investigation, blame for the attacks of 5 June was laid on the USC/SNA. The reaffirmation of the UNOSOM II mandate and the authorization of punitive action against the SNA leadership was given in resolution 837 (1993), which was adopted by the Security Council the next day.

V. Fighting between UNOSOM II and SNA militia—"the war"

125. The resolution resulted in a virtual war situation between UNOSOM II and the SNA, as the two sides attacked each other over a period of four months. A comprehensive list compiled by UNOSOM II showing the military actions of both sides is given as annex 4 to this report. A synopsis based on reports of the main incidents involving UNOSOM II is contained in annex 5.

126. There seem to be three distinguishable phases to the armed conflict: the first phase characterised by United Nations offensive operations; the second showing the SNA having the initiative; and the third when independent US special forces took up the offensive on behalf of UNOSOM II.

A. *United Nations offensive operations against USC/SNA*

127. In resolution 837 (1993) the Security Council expressed grave alarm at the "premeditated armed attacks launched by forces apparently belonging to the United Somali Congress (USC/SNA)" against the Pakistani forces. The resolution also condemned strongly "the use of radio broadcasts, in particular by the USC/SNA, to incite attacks against United Nations personnel".

128. It reaffirmed "that the Secretary-General is authorised under resolution 814 (1993) to take all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks ... including against those responsible for publicly inciting such attacks, to establish the effective authority of UNOSOM II throughout Somalia, including to secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment".

129. In what amounted to a direct targeting of the SNA's top hierarchy, the resolution requested the Secretary-General to "inquire into the incident, with particular emphasis on the role of those factional leaders".

130. In apparent acknowledgement of UNOSOM II's lack of readiness for a major confrontation, the resolution urged the "rapid and accelerated deployment of all UNOSOM II contingents to meet the full requirements of 28,000, all ranks, as well as equipment" in accordance with the Secretary-General's report of 3 March 1993.

131. Resolution 837 (1993) set the stage for a massive show of force by UNOSOM against the SNA. The timing of the commencement of such action depended on the UNOSOM II forces being ready in terms of available manpower and equipment.

132. One further reason why the military operations against the SNA could not begin immediately despite the further authority given by resolution 837 (1993) on 6 June was that planning was required. Additionally, operations could not commence without jeopardising the safety of the Pakistani soldiers who were being held in captivity, or international civilian staff, who had to be re-located to Nairobi while the UNOSOM II headquarters moved from the vicinity of the Kilometre 4 traffic circle to the more secure premises formerly used by the US Embassy.

133. While the United Nations was making preparations for the military showdown, the USC/SNA reaction to the 5 June attacks on the Pakistanis was somewhat

contradictory. Early reaction praised the valour shown by the Somali people in demonstrating against and resisting UNOSOM forces. But there was no direct admission by the USC/SNA militia of responsibility for the attacks on the Pakistanis. Instead, the statements attributed to the USC/SNA leadership, including General Aidid, and broadcasts on Radio Mogadishu, condemned what was described as wanton attacks by the UNOSOM forces on peaceful Somali demonstrators.

134. At the same time, General Aidid called for an impartial inquiry into the causes of the attacks. As it became clear that the United Nations was preparing to use force, General Aidid offered to use his influence to calm the situation in Mogadishu and called on the United Nations to use peaceful means in handling the crisis.

135. UNOSOM II felt they could not accept anything short of General Aidid and his top lieutenants submitting themselves to a judicial process to determine whether they were implicated in the attacks in any way. UNOSOM II believed that their hands in the matter were tied by the express wording of resolution 837 (1993).

136. Air strikes by UNOSOM II, followed by ground sweeps and arms searches in the heart of the so-called "Aidid enclave", a part of southern Mogadishu where General Aidid and other top USC/SNA leaders lived or had property, heralded what was to become a virtual war between UNOSOM II and the USC/SNA forces.

137. The UNOSOM II offensive started on 12 June 1993, with aerial bombardments of the SNA's weapons sites, including Radio Mogadishu, which were all destroyed. The Somalis reacted by staging a demonstration involving women and children near the Pakistani strong point (the former Egyptian Embassy) at Kilometre 4.

138. A shoot-out occurred involving the Pakistanis and unidentified Somali gunmen, resulting in the death of an unknown number of Somalis, as the crowd marched towards the Pakistani unit's position. Later, some reports corroborated Pakistani accounts that the Somali gunmen had fired into the crowd in a deliberate attempt to give the impression that the Pakistanis were shooting unarmed civilians.

139. The 13 June incident at Kilometre 4 revealed the tactical dilemmas faced by UNOSOM II forces in conducting combat operations in the midst of a hostile civilian population.

140. On 17 June UNOSOM II launched a major cordon and search operation in the SNA enclave (see annex 7). The operation had been carefully planned and rehearsed for days. All participating contingents had agreed to every step to be taken.

141. The operation began at 0130 hours, with AC-130 gunships attacking residences of the SNA lead-

ers. Before each strike the targeted building was illuminated and its occupants requested by loudspeakers to move out. Before sunrise the area was cordoned off by Moroccan and Italian forces and then Pakistani forces carried out the weapons search.

142. Moroccan forces came under intense fire and had to be rescued by the French. Five Moroccan soldiers, including the battalion commander, were killed and 40 wounded. The Moroccans stated that lack of information about SNA's strength and disposition, loss of the element of surprise occasioned by several rehearsals of the operation and the vulnerable location of the cordon contributed to the high casualties. Thereafter, UNOSOM did not carry out any multinational search operations of this magnitude.

143. The next major operation was conducted by Pakistani forces at "Atto's Garage" on 28 June. The Pakistani forces came under heavy fire during an attempted search of the site and were forced to withdraw. Two of their soldiers were killed and two others injured.

144. On 2 July Italian forces carried out a major search operation in the Heliuaa Village (see annex 9), one kilometre south of the Pasta Factory. The Italian Brigade Commander had forwarded the operational plan for this exercise to his higher authority in Italy for approval before its commencement.

145. According to the description of the events of that day by the Italians, the operation was carried out in a hostile atmosphere, with crowds throwing stones at the forces. The Italians stopped the search and, on their withdrawal, were ambushed on Imperial Road, and suffered three dead and 29 wounded.

146. The Italians managed to extricate their forces who were caught in the ambush, and evacuated Strong Point 42, which was under attack.

147. The incident brought to a head the controversy which had been simmering for some time between the UNOSOM II Force Command and the Italian Brigade command. The Italians favoured a softer approach and emphasised discussion and negotiation and felt that this approach had achieved good results whereas the strict enforcement policy of the UNOSOM II Command had caused the heavy casualties in the Pakistani sector. On 22 June, the Italians had protested against a QRF sweep of the SNA weapons sites carried out in the Italian sector, without prior consultation. The Italians said the QRF had left them to face the tension created by the sweep.

148. The UNOSOM II Force Command wished to teach the SNA a lesson on 2 July by attacking the Pasta Factory in full force, and felt that this goal was frustrated and the SNA morale was boosted when the Italians decided to disengage from the battle and also to withdraw from Strong Point 42. The UNOSOM II Force Command

also claimed that the Italians had not returned fire when attacked on 2 July, but the Italians insisted on the contrary.

149. The Force Commander ordered the Italians to retake Strong Point 42 by 10 July. On 9 July the Italians reoccupied Strong Point 42 following negotiation with the SNA instead of using force as the Force Commander had assumed. The Force Commander felt that the Italian approach reduced the effectiveness of UNOSOM II's punitive action against the SNA. The Italians were even accused of leaking information, letting arms pass through and paying bribes to the SNA so that their forces could be spared from the militia's attacks. The Italians denied these accusations and maintained that in accordance with common UNOSOM II practice, they only gave food and paid for services rendered, and that their policy of negotiation had helped them maintain peace in their sector.

150. The controversy received considerable publicity and may have contributed to the change in the pattern of the conflict during the first part of July.

B. SNA offensive against UNOSOM II

151. Annex 4 of this report clearly indicates that during the first month after the attacks of 5 June against the Pakistanis, there were very few attacks initiated by the SNA. UNOSOM II had the upper hand and all casualties occurred in connection with the UNOSOM II offensive operations.

152. After 2 July the SNA gradually took the initiative. UNOSOM II initiatives were limited to a few search and sweep operations conducted mainly by the QRF. On the contrary, the SNA increased its attacks dramatically from 6 July onwards. The feeling of being at war is reflected in UNOSOM II fragmental orders (fragos). Until 8 July they refer to UNOSOM II's adversaries as "hostile forces". After that date, the fragos use the phrase "enemy forces".

153. The bombing of the Abdi house on 12 July (see annex 8) may also have contributed to the change in the pattern of the conflict. In earlier operations, for instance on 17 June, UNOSOM II had taken great pains to ensure that residents had time to abandon a house before it was bombed. The 12 July operation was intended to eliminate the SNA command centre and its occupants. Therefore no warning was given in advance.

154. The casualties suffered in this operation were considerable. UNOSOM II estimated the number of Somali dead at 20; the International Committee of the Red Cross had figures of 54 dead and 161 injured while the SNA put the figure of those killed at 73.

155. Some accounts contradicted information given by UNOSOM II about the nature of the meeting at the Abdi House on the day it was bombed. These accounts

maintained that the meeting was that of elders of the Habr Gedir clan who were discussing how to make peace with UNOSOM II.

156. From the date of this incident, the SNA closed its ranks and Somalis appear to have stopped giving information to UNOSOM II. UNOSOM II became more cautious in its operations.

157. In June the SNA had used mainly small arms, hand grenades, rocket-propelled grenades and machine-guns. From 6 July mortar attacks became more and more frequent. At first they were inaccurate and often the shells did not explode; gradually they became more accurate. The mortar attacks were considered by UNOSOM II as the most difficult to counter, keeping both military and civilian personnel in a state of constant alert and fear. Total casualties caused by mortar fire numbered one killed and nineteen wounded.

158. Ambushes against United Nations vehicles became more diversified. In addition to attacks by fire-arms and RPGs, mines and command detonated explosives were used. To avoid being targeted, a fleet of United Nations vehicles was kept in Mogadishu harbour and unmarked leased cars with Somali number-plates were used in southern Mogadishu. Somali and national flags were flown on vehicles instead of the United Nations flag in the hope of avoiding attacks. Total number of casualties suffered in ambushes between 2 July and 3 October was 21 killed and 46 wounded.

159. From 10 August helicopters came under fire more frequently. Mainly small arms and RPGs were used. The first UNOSOM II casualties from such attacks were suffered on 2 September and the first helicopter was shot down on 25 September.

160. The overall pattern of the hostilities indicate that although there were engagements in almost all of south Mogadishu, the 21 October Road, especially around the Cigarette Factory, was a major flashpoint. Some testimonies indicate that the area was a virtual militia barracks. There was also a considerable presence of militia around the Pasta Factory.

161. It is significant that the Pakistani soldiers on 9 September were attacked from positions in the same buildings as on 5 June around the Cigarette Factory area. But in this area the presence and sometimes participation of women and children in the combat sectors posed the danger of unacceptable levels of civilian casualties and a major handicap to UNOSOM II forces.

162. The ambush of a Nigerian convoy advancing towards Strong Point 42 on 5 September (see annex 9) caused the heaviest casualties of that month in one single incident. When the Nigerian forces arrived at Strong Point 42 (Pasta Factory) to take over from the Italian Brigade at dawn on 5 September a crowd of hostile

Somalis greeted them with a demonstration and called for their departure.

163. The Somalis were apparently unhappy that the Nigerians would not maintain the same relations as the Italians had with the local population.

164. The differences of approach between the various contingents were manifested once again when the Italians and Nigerians encountered Somali protesters. The Nigerians apparently fired their weapons while the Italians started conducting negotiation.

165. While the Nigerians stated that they were fired upon by the Somalis, the Italians maintained that a Nigerian soldier at the SP lost his nerve and fired into the crowd. The Nigerians also alleged that Italians refused to come to their assistance during the attack. The Italians stated that they were not aware of the ambush and were not able to monitor the Nigerians' request for reinforcement since they were on different communication networks.

166. The Nigerians further suspected that their forces were "set up" for the ambush by the Italians, but the Commission was unable to find any supporting evidence of that. But the suspicions between the Italians and other UNOSOM II forces were bound to occur given their pursuit of divergent policies in Somalia.

C. Offensive by non-UN forces and cessation of hostilities

167. The difficulties faced by UNOSOM II, especially the failure to capture General Aidid despite the offer of a US\$25,000 bounty for anyone who might assist in that regard, gave indications that the United Nations military objectives might not be achieved.

168. While the United Nations was making every effort to protect its personnel and at the same time search for General Aidid, a special task force of United States Rangers was dispatched by the US Government to Mogadishu. The Rangers operated under a separate command from that of UNOSOM II. Their operations were notified to UNOSOM II, but often, only a short time in advance.

169. The Rangers' specific mission was to capture and arrest General Aidid and other high level USC/SNA leaders. Their first operation was an embarrassment as they mistakenly surrounded UNDP premises. The next four operations were successful. The sixth operation on 3 October (see annex 10) resulted in the heaviest US casualties in Somalia.

170. The aim of the 3 October operation was to capture top General Aidid followers meeting at the Olympic Hotel. Although these leaders were captured and taken away, the operation turned into a disaster when two helicopters were shot down and almost a company

of the Rangers were trapped in a deadly firefight with Somali militia.

171. This operation had been carried out entirely by the Rangers, and only very short notice was given to the UNOSOM II Force Command. When the Rangers were trapped, a rescue task force was assembled but was ambushed in the Kilometre 4 area and had to withdraw. An integrated rescue force composed of Rangers, US QRF, Pakistani tanks and Malaysian APCs was assembled.

172. Even this rescue team met stiff resistance which slowed down its advance towards the position of the trapped Rangers. The surviving and injured Rangers were finally rescued in the early hours of 4 October at the crash site of one of the helicopters.

173. Casualty figures for this operation were 18 soldiers killed (16 Rangers and 2 QRF); 1 Malaysian killed; 78 US, 9 Malaysian and 3 Pakistani soldiers wounded. The pilot of one of the helicopters was captured and shown on TV around the world. On 6 October a mortar shell caused 13 more US casualties in the Mogadishu airport.

174. Following these incidents the United States reversed its policy and announced that all US forces would be withdrawn from Somalia by 31 March 1994. This decision by the United States Government deprived UNOSOM II of its most potent single national contingent. Subsequently, European Governments with contingents serving in UNOSOM II also announced their intention to withdraw their troops by the same date.

175. The decision by the US Government left the United Nations with little choice but to change its policy and abandon the hunt for Aidid. The SNA announced a cease-fire on 8 October. The war was over.

VI. Analysis and findings

176. In analysing the attacks against UNOSOM II personnel and the resulting casualties, the Commission established the following questions:

1. Who carried out the 5 June attacks?
2. Why did the attacks occur?
3. Why were the casualties so heavy on 5 June?
4. Why did UNOSOM II misjudge the situation?
5. Why did the 5 June attacks evolve into a war?
6. Why were the hostilities so prolonged?
7. Did UNOSOM II's internal shortcomings contribute to the number of casualties?

177. The first four questions relate to the 5 June attacks while the last three relate to the fighting after resolution 837 was adopted.

178. By analysing the facts relating to the attacks and subsequent clashes, the discussion below seeks to find answers to these questions.

Who carried out the 5 June attacks?

179. In its resolution 837 (1993), although the Security Council all but flatly accused the SNA of the attacks on UNOSOM II troops of 5 June, it nevertheless requested the Secretary-General to investigate the attacks. Subsequently, Professor Tom Farer conducted an inquiry which found that the SNA and in particular its leader General Aidid bore responsibility for the 5 June attacks.

180. Neither General Aidid nor any of his officials had given testimony to the Farer investigation which ultimately based its findings largely on circumstantial evidence. The present Commission studied the Farer report in depth, particularly the transcripts of testimonies taken by Farer.

181. But unlike Farer, the Commission's task was to find facts and not to find fault or ascribe blame. The Commission has not made the same extensive reliance on circumstantial evidence as Professor Farer did. Instead, considerable effort was made by the Commission to obtain direct testimony from the SNA and in particular to hear from General Aidid himself, his answer to the charge that it was his SNA which attacked the UN forces on 5 June.

182. Unfortunately, the General did not give testimony to the Commission. It is, however, important to note the remarks attributed to General Aidid in an interview published in the 30 January 1994 issue of a Nairobi newspaper, *Standard on Sunday*, when asked: "How did (24) Pakistani soldiers meet their death...? Was that not part of the bloody clashes between the foreign forces and the Somali people?"

183. General Aidid replied: "Let me put this very clearly and properly. On 5 June 1993 a contingent of UNOSOM II troops, most of them Pakistani soldiers, attacked and occupied Radio Mogadishu station—the radio relay area and the main roads in the city—areas which are controlled by the SNA. Thousands of Somali citizens who were angered by the illegal occupation of the radio station by UNOSOM II troops took to the streets near the station. This was a very peaceful demonstration. The Pakistani troops, without caution and warning, then opened fire on the peaceful demonstrators. They (Pakistani) killed three people on the spot. This was the incident which triggered off the widespread rioting which resulted in the death of 35 Somalis and fifteen more injured. It was a result of the crossfire that the Pakistani troops unfortunately also lost their lives. But that is how every military confrontation goes. There were also valuable lives of Somali people lost in the process. There was no particular intention to murder the Pakistani troops." Remarks to similar effect expressed by General Aidid are reflected in transcripts of broadcasts of 5 and 6 June on Radio Mogadishu.

184. General Aidid's response raises several revealing questions. The Somali crowds were angry at the seizure of Radio Mogadishu, the General claims, yet surprisingly their spontaneous demonstrations have been characterized as peaceful. This is unusual and unlikely.

185. Since the area of the demonstration was "controlled by the SNA" the demonstrations and the shootings very likely were similarly controlled. If the Somalis saw Pakistani troops "without caution and warning" open fire on the peaceful demonstration killing three, the resulting deaths of the Pakistani troops more likely were an act of retaliation rather than of unfortunate crossfire.

186. In the absence of a more convincing explanation from the USC/SNA, the Commission believes that the SNA orchestrated the attacks. The reasons for believing so may be summarised into three as follows:

Firstly, all the attacks occurred within an SNA-controlled area. Secondly, the attacks were not random, but were well-coordinated and simultaneous. Thirdly, they took place in an area which is inhabited by SNA militia and, especially along the 21 October Road, in the vicinity of locations known to have been weapons depots for the army under the previous Government of Siad Barre, which was overthrown.

187. UNOSOM reports and previous investigations have labelled the attacks as having been pre-planned and premeditated. The Commission has not found any conclusive evidence to support that view. The SNA had taken south Mogadishu in fierce fighting from its main rival in a civil war that had not yet ended. It is likely that extensive preparations had been made by the SNA for a resumption of hostilities in Mogadishu. The well-armed militia lived in former army barracks and other facilities along the routes where the attacks of 5 June occurred. Consequently, they were very familiar with the entire area. The SNA's communication methods assisted by Radio Mogadishu broadcasts were able to dispatch messages very fast. Demonstrations, roadblocks and deployment of militia forces could be effected on very short notice as many later events showed during the clashes after 5 June.

188. Therefore it is quite possible that the attacks on 5 June were orchestrated by the SNA on the spur of the moment after the inspections had begun.

Why did the attacks occur?

189. Everyone from UNOSOM II who gave testimony to the Commission stated that clashes between UNOSOM II and the Somali armed factions were seen as inevitable. Therefore, when the events of 5 June occurred, their timing and magnitude were a surprise but not the events themselves.

190. The reason for the feeling that clashes were inevitable is easier to understand than to explain. By the

first half of 1993 when UNOSOM II was established the United Nations had had forty years' experience in international peace-keeping. Everyone knew what peace-keeping meant: namely, the end of armed clashes or a war brought on by a cease-fire between opposing forces which the United Nations stepped in to monitor. The United Nations intervention moreover would take place only upon the consent of the warring parties, and force would not be used by UN troops except in self-defence.

191. There was, therefore, little by way of precedent to guide the non-consensual intervention by the United Nations in Somalia which was carried out through UNITAF and UNOSOM II. The scale of physical devastation, famine and inability to deliver humanitarian assistance due to the civil war, compounded by the absence of a government in Somalia, provided the justification for a forceful United Nations intervention.

192. Problems attendant on the United Nations operations in Somalia became evident from the very onset when the question arose whether UNITAF would disarm the militias of the Somali factions by force. The UN Secretary-General in exchanges with US President Bush contended that UNITAF had so committed itself, but the United States, the lead nation of UNITAF, maintained the contrary. Force would be used only to remove obstructions to the relief effort the United States maintained; if no such threats were posed and if the weapons of the militias were not menacing, there would be and indeed there was no significant confrontation between UNITAF and them. UNITAF operated under Chapter VII but did not seek to disarm the militias; its primary interest was the securing of deliveries of international aid. In addition, it did not seek to marginalise or confront, but to take the Somali political movements along on every move.

193. UNOSOM II interpreted its mandate as not merely authorizing but requiring it to disarm the militias. This was in clear contrast to the way in which UNITAF had viewed its mandate.

194. Taken by themselves, the inspections would not necessarily have appeared threatening. The weapons storage sites were after all under the control of the factions themselves—the arms stored in the storage sites had been collected and deposited there by the factions themselves. UNITAF would perform only a monitoring role. Under the Addis Ababa Agreement as incorporated in Security Council resolution 814, UNOSOM II was empowered to take forceful action to disarm the militias.

195. If the inspections had uncovered discrepancies in the weapons supposedly stored, as UNOSOM II suspected they might, a non-confrontational typical UN peace-keeping approach would have obliged UNOSOM II to call the SNA's attention to its disarmament obligations. If the SNA persisted in breaches of those obligations, a more

forceful action by UNOSOM II might then be appropriate. Instead of proceeding in such a manner to exhaust peaceful remedies, UNOSOM II decided, as it had the right and authority to do by virtue of resolution 814, that its very first inspection would if necessary be carried out by military force. It moreover took pains to make the USC/SNA aware of that decision by the ultimatum-like letter of 4 June giving notice of the inspection.

196. In hindsight, it could be argued that it would have been better if UNOSOM II had postponed its inspections of AWSS on 5 June 1993 for the following reasons:

- The AWSS had been established by the militias and located in militia faction strongholds. They were guarded by the militias and were totally outside the control of UNOSOM II.
- Weapons had been stored in the AWSS at the will of the political movements which controlled the various militias.
- Access to sites and modalities for inspections might have been discussed and mutually agreed between UNOSOM II and respective Somali political movements. Such an arrangement could have been incorporated into a standing operating procedure (SOP) for inspections.
- The SNA's hostile reaction to the inspection notification was a clear indication that the militias might use violence to resist the inspections.

197. UNOSOM II officials decided to proceed with the planned inspections despite the SNA's strong objections because they felt that they had the mandate to use force to execute their tasks and therefore there was no need to discuss or negotiate with SNA on the matter.

198. UNOSOM II's decision that force would, if necessary, be used to carry out the inspections was not taken in isolation or in a context of calm cooperation between UNOSOM II and the SNA. Quite the opposite was the case, as demonstrated by the Radio Mogadishu propaganda broadcasts.

199. Apart from the irritation caused over Radio Mogadishu, relations between UNOSOM II and the SNA had deteriorated dangerously over the Galcayo Conference which the SNA had proposed and UNOSOM II had agreed to support. That Conference, to deal with essentially regional as opposed to national issues, was the SNA's idea. UNOSOM II's role would be to assist rather than to control. This role of assisting was consistent with UNOSOM II's mandate on political issues as set out in Security Council resolution 814 (1993) as well as in the report of the Secretary-General of 3 March 1993 on which that resolution was based.

200. Chapter VII of the Charter was invoked to establish UNITAF and UNOSOM II for two main reasons: to obviate the need for consent by Somalia to UN

actions deemed necessary inside Somalia to safeguard international peace and security and, secondly, to authorize the use of armed force to keep open the channels for the delivery of food and relief supplies to Somalia. Under UNOSOM II, Chapter VII was also relied upon for the compulsory disarmament of the militias.

201. Security Council resolution 814 (1993) invokes Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and confers enforcement powers upon UNOSOM II. In doing so it distinguishes between two powers: the power to disarm Somali militias and the power to assist the Somali people in the restoration of their country's political structure and organs. UNOSOM II was empowered to enforce disarmament by the use of military force under Chapter VII of the Charter if force was considered necessary. But regarding the rebuilding of Somalia's political structure and organs of governance UNOSOM II's role was limited to rendering assistance to rather than imposing solutions upon the Somali people.

202. It is against the foregoing background that UNOSOM II's actions should be viewed. Added to them was the action taken by UNOSOM to declare the Somali Penal Code of 1962 as the applicable law in Somalia. UNOSOM II in all these instances went beyond assisting and was imposing. The important question in this regard was not whether the substance of UNOSOM II's actions were for the benefit of the Somali people, but whether they were accepted by all the Somali parties or within UNOSOM II's mandate.

203. Reference was repeatedly made in testimonies of UNOSOM II to the Addis Ababa Agreements of January and March 1993 signed by the various Somali political movements. UNOSOM II maintained that these Agreements conferred upon it powers to enforce upon the Somali political groups various legal commitments they had assumed. The invoking by UNOSOM II of these Agreements of the factions as a basis of its powers might lead to some confusion if viewed independently of the Security Council resolution 814 (1993) which established UNOSOM II. Resolution 814 (1993) spells out UNOSOM II's mandate which only the Security Council can alter or expand. Since the resolution did not grant UNOSOM II powers to impose political solutions on the Somali people, none of the Somali factions could empower UNOSOM II to do so. UNOSOM II's mandate in the political area was to assist the Somalis achieve political reconciliation and re-build political structures.

204. For UNOSOM II to effectively carry out its mandate of assisting the Somalis, there had to be the agreement or at the very least the acquiescence of all the Somali parties. If the Addis Ababa Agreements were adhered to by all the political movements, UNOSOM II

could assist them implement it; once they disagreed as to its implementation UNOSOM II could not force them.

205. The insistence by UNOSOM II on enforcing political arrangements previously agreed but no longer accepted by all the political movements would amount to an imposition.

206. The manner in which UNOSOM II dealt with the two agreements signed at Addis Ababa by fifteen Somali political movements, on 27 March and 30 March 1993, not only cast doubt on whether UNOSOM II was properly interpreting its mandate on political matters, but also revealed an inconsistency in its approach. The 27 March Agreement provided among other things for the reconstitution of Somalia's political institutions by the Somali society generally including a specifically mentioned role for women.

207. The 30 March Agreement, concluded by the same fifteen Somali groups whose leaders signed the 27 March Agreement, gave the leading, almost exclusive role in the reconstitution of Somalia's political institutions to those political movements.

208. UNOSOM II preferred the agreement of 27 March to that of 30 March and has proceeded to implement the former accord. If UNOSOM II's preference coincided with a consensus among the Somalis there would be nothing wrong with UNOSOM II's assisting to implement that consensus.

209. In the absence of such a consensus, however, for UNOSOM II to impose what amounted to a political solution on Somalia was inconsistent with its mandate under Security Council resolution 814 (1993).

210. As of 4 June UNOSOM and SNA were on a collision course. The SNA which considered itself as the leading force in the overthrowing of the former government and the main building block of any future government of Somalia was pushed and marginalized by UNOSOM actions on a wide front: the Galcayo Conference, the Penal Code, the court appointments, the interpretation of the Addis Agreements and the control of Kismayo. Radio Mogadishu had criticized these UNOSOM II actions in harsh language and agitated the population in South Mogadishu. Rumours of UNOSOM II plans to seize Radio Mogadishu, the SNA's main power base, floated and were actually confirmed to the SNA leadership by UNOSOM II personnel.

211. It was in this atmosphere of rising tension that UNOSOM II suddenly decided to carry out its first ever inspection of SNA weapon sites including the highly sensitive Radio Mogadishu. It was effected against strong objections and warnings by the SNA who clearly considered them provocative. The size and military strength of the inspection teams left no doubt that UNOSOM II had decided to use force if necessary to impose its will.

212. Although UNOSOM II apparently misjudged the general situation and made some ill-advised decisions the Commission feels that this in no way justifies the viciousness of the SNA reaction on 5 June.

Why were the casualties so heavy on 5 June?

213. The main reason for the extent of casualties on 5 June was that UNOSOM was completely unprepared for such ferocious attacks which came as a lightning surprise. This is evidenced among other things by the fact that several key personnel were away on the morning of 5 June, particularly the Force Commander, the Chief of Operations and the top political advisers.

214. Some members of the Ceasefire and Disarmament Committee were happily unaware of the whole inspection exercise and actually meeting in South Mogadishu when the attacks began. The bulk of the QRF, the main Force reserve for military challenges, was in Kismayo, which UNOSOM considered at that time a more volatile place. Secondary reserves were not alerted from other contingents to assist the Pakistanis in case of emergencies. That is why, for instance, the Italian tanks could not be mobilised early to go to the assistance of the troops at FP20 when they came under attack.

215. The failure to inform the Pakistanis about the SNA's hostile reaction to the inspection notification letter is also a relevant factor in assessing the number of casualties from the 5 June attacks.

216. The Pakistani commanding officer in his operational plans for the inspection recommended that he be informed of the SNA's response to the notification. The Pakistanis testified that they would have reorganized their inspection teams and equipped them with stronger fighting and protective vehicles to enhance their military posture had they been aware of the SNA's response.

217. In the absence of this information, the inspection teams kept to their soft-skin vehicles which made the men intensely vulnerable, resulting in heavy casualties.

218. Better information on attackers' preparation and military capabilities for sustained but limited armed hostilities could have helped Pakistani inspection teams to have been better prepared to withstand the attack with minimum casualties.

219. Even though the staff of the Force Command and the Pakistani contingent expected some opposition to their inspection, they could not assess the possibilities of armed confrontation, which came as a surprise to the entire UNOSOM command, both in magnitude and ferocity. The achievement of surprise on the part of the SNA militia partly accounted for the high level of casualties on the Pakistan inspection troops.

Why did UNOSOM II misjudge the situation?

220. There was a lack of proper coordination between UNOSOM II Military Planning Division and the Political Division, responsible for coordinating cease-fire and disarmament matters. Being fully aware of the sensitivity of Radio Mogadishu, the head of the Political Division concedes that he would have advised against the inspection of the cantonment site close to the radio station, under those circumstances, if he had been informed about the planned inspection.

221. UNOSOM II did not have a sufficient number of trained and experienced civilian advisers to assist in the decision-making process. However, the Commission finds that UNOSOM II could have consulted its more experienced staff who were then available and could have given useful advice on the sensitivity of the AWSS inspections, which could possibly have had an important impact on the decision to proceed with the planned inspection. Lack of coordination between the military and political divisions and inappropriate political advice contributed to the misjudgement of the sensitivity and timing of the inspections.

222. Those political advisers who were specifically consulted apparently did not appreciate the political ramifications of the inspections and regarded them as a purely military affair.

223. There were no seasoned peace-keepers among UNOSOM military leadership to advise on the modalities of United Nations disarmament inspections and other useful practices learned during 45 years of United Nations peace-keeping.

224. The transition from a fighting posture to peace-keeping is indeed a very difficult one for any professional soldier. The use of force to achieve one's objective is at the heart of the military profession.

225. In peace-keeping the force and the enforcement action should be regarded as the last resort after all peaceful means have been exhausted. There was no one to teach the basics of peace-keeping to UNOSOM HQ and contingents.

226. Consequently, it was natural for the officers to resort to the tools they were trained for, to the use of force, particularly since they felt resolution 814 gave them the right to do so. False assessment of SNA capabilities in relation to [their] own assets made them believe it was as well safe to do.

227. Witnesses from UNOSOM have emphasized to the Commission the deficiencies in intelligence gathering means and personnel. They see it as a major reason to the misjudgement of the situation on 5 June. The worst case scenario, as predicted by UNITAF, visualized large demonstrations, but nothing more, as a reaction to the 5 June inspection.

Why did the events of 5 June evolve into a war?

228. After the 5 June attacks UNOSOM understandably was furious. It was natural to call for punitive action to be taken against those who had killed and wounded large numbers of United Nations soldiers who, as it was felt, had only tried to carry out the mission given to them by the world community.

229. With the outrage all over the world on the attacks the Security Council could do nothing less than to authorize the arrest and detention of the perpetrators.

230. Resolution 837 was interpreted by UNOSOM II to authorize not only the hunt for Aidid and other SNA leaders but as well the destruction of SNA power sources, the radio station and the weapon stores. However, the war did not break out immediately or suddenly after the passing of resolution 837 but evolved gradually. United Nations personnel, both civilian and military, had to be relocated to safer areas. Tanks, attack planes, attack helicopters and armoured personnel carriers had to be brought in to facilitate offensives against the SNA.

231. These offensives began with careful avoidance of collateral damage and evolved through the SNA response gradually to virtual urban warfare. It is arguable whether resolution 837 really initially envisaged bombing of houses, garages, radio stations and meetings. Presumably the war, when it started, followed its own dynamics.

232. If the weapons inspection of 5 June was not an enforcement action by UNOSOM II on the SNA then Security Council resolution 837 (1993) adopted the next day clearly was. The clashes between UNOSOM II and the SNA thereafter were a direct result of the implementation of resolution 837.

233. UNOSOM II not only found itself at war in the wrong environment, it was probably also handicapped in prosecuting that war because the US QRF and later the Ranger operation, all of which had connotations of war, were not under UNOSOM's control. If these operations were not under UNOSOM II, the question arises as to whether they were authorized by the United Nations. If they were not, then the SNA's right to defend itself was even more appropriate, and hence the evolution of the entire situation into a war.

Why were the hostilities so prolonged?

234. There seem to have been two main reasons why the hostilities went on until 8 October. UNOSOM II was unsuccessful in its endeavours to hunt down General Aidid and to suppress the SNA's resistance; and UNOSOM II believed it would succeed in these efforts given time.

235. UNOSOM's failure to win the war was partly due to internal shortcomings discussed in connection with question 7. Some UNOSOM Commanders claimed that

they could not achieve their objectives because their hands were tied and they could not resort to equally inhuman practices as their adversaries. On the other hand it seems that UNOSOM offensives were rallying the Habre Gedir clan behind Aidid and his lieutenants and increasing their resolve. UNOSOM II's pursuit of enforcement action in South Mogadishu among a civilian population already traumatised by war quickly became a nightmare. UNOSOM II was clearly aware of this danger and therefore evacuated most of its civilian personnel to Nairobi, but the Somali civilians had nowhere to go. Later, contentions by UNOSOM II that women and children were used by the SNA as human shields would have carried greater weight had it not been UNOSOM II itself which after 5 June initiated military actions using modern and powerful weapons within an urban area.

236. Experience has shown that even the most careful targeting and precision bombing cannot avoid collateral damage. The attacks on Digfer Hospital, Abdi house and other sites in Mogadishu certainly caused collateral damage apart from raising concerns as to whether they were proper military targets.

237. Since this reality appears not to have been taken into account, the impression given is that UNOSOM II had gone into a war of retaliation not just against the militia who could not be adequately isolated but against all Somalis in South Mogadishu.

238. To its credit UNOSOM II on many occasions was careful to warn of impending military action in particular areas. This was correct and good to avoid the civilian casualties but not for the UNOSOM II troops who because of these warnings were exposed to attacks. Caught in a dilemma UNOSOM II was forced to erect a wall of separation between its peace-keeping and its war-making personae—where its civil authorities were often kept in the dark about military actions. This dual role, exercised simultaneously, caused harmful confusion within UNOSOM II and, worse yet, made it possible for UNOSOM II to be portrayed simply as an enemy of the Somali people.

239. Because the Somalis, certainly those in the SNA, became targets of UNOSOM II's attacks after 5 June their counterattacks prolonging the war should be seen in that context.

240. After 2 July UNOSOM II was increasingly bunkered down in its positions whereas SNA activities and attacks multiplied. UNOSOM assessments, however, show repeatedly unfounded optimism (see annex 5 for examples). No reconciliation attempts were made by UNOSOM nor, it appears, by the United Nations in New York before the disaster in October.

Did internal shortcomings within UNOSOM II contribute to the number of casualties?

241. UNOSOM lacked the time, expertise and requisite intelligence to accurately evaluate the dispositions, strength and capabilities of the SNA against whom they had to operate.

242. UNOSOM did not appreciate the fact that the Somali attackers were well-armed men, reasonably skilled and well-commanded by former officers of the national armed forces who had received adequate training for command and control. They had been capable of militarily driving out Siad Barre, who was supported by the national armed forces, with all their arsenal of heavy war *matériel*, both in equipment and manpower resources. The Somali armed men fighting UNOSOM were not a bunch of rag-tag armed militia but a reasonably well-organised and trained group under a good command structure. To fight against or militarily oppose such armed men by UNOSOM therefore required better, well-coordinated command and control mechanism, fighting vehicles that provided both fire-power and protection, good communication systems and adequate knowledge of the terrain. UNOSOM's deficiency in all these areas resulting in its inability to respond effectively to the armed hostilities of 5 June, subsequent confrontations and excessive casualties is largely attributable to the fact that it was not militarily prepared for them.

243. The Force Commander of UNOSOM II was not in effective control of several national contingents which, in varying degrees, persisted in seeking orders from their home authorities before executing orders of the Force Command.

244. Many major operations undertaken under the United Nations flag and in the context of UNOSOM's mandate were totally outside the command and control of the United Nations, even though the repercussions impacted crucially on the mission of UNOSOM and the safety of its personnel.

245. Situations such as in UNOSOM II operations where some contingent commanders resorted to home authorities for clearances to carry out tasks assigned to them have obviously created immense difficulties for the Force Commander. This practice has been necessitated by the casualty factor. This partly accounts for the long delay in arrival of reinforcements responding to requests to support the Pakistani inspection teams when they found themselves in great difficulties on 5 June hostilities. Delays in execution of important tasks bordering on emergencies to support units in distress have contributed to increased loss of lives of troops.

246. Furthermore, where reaction from home authorities is in conflict with UNOSOM II instructions,

this practice has resulted in the contingent commander being compelled to disobey the instructions of the Force Commander, thereby creating political confrontation between the contributing government and the United Nations as the sponsoring authority. Such situations have occurred and have not been helpful to the cohesiveness of the command of UNOSOM II.

247. The principle of unified command applicable to United Nations peace-keeping operations is even more essential in peace enforcement operations. The quick response by the Malaysian and Pakistani contingents to join the QRF to rescue the Task Force Rangers on their 3 October 1993 operation helped to save lives, clearly demonstrating the efficacy of unified command.

248. The various shortcomings had an impact on the number of casualties but were not the decisive factor.

VII. Observations and conclusions

249. Because the mandate of UNOSOM II was based on Chapter VII of the Charter it is fundamentally different from UNOSOM I, a traditional peace-keeping and humanitarian mission. The difference is so significant that it needs to be clearly communicated to the troop-contributing countries. Similarly, the nature, purpose and justification of the intervention under Chapter VII need to be explained to the Somalis.

250. If the actions by UNOSOM II on 5 June were enforcement actions as the SNA had been given unmistakable reasons to view them, then the ensuing clash was not a peace-keeping but a peace enforcement operation.

251. With the United Nations having recognised that no Somali government existed, UNOSOM II faced a human rights dilemma when it had to detain people in executing its mandate. In the absence of courts, detentions came to be seen as arbitrary, exposed UNOSOM II to criticism and had to be stopped.

252. For all of the foregoing reasons, peace enforcement by UNOSOM II inside Somalia within the context of a civil war did not enhance the United Nations peaceful and humanitarian image.

253. The finding that a country is without a government as was done by the United Nations concerning Somalia has such far-reaching legal and political consequences that careful criteria for invoking it seem required. If the United Nations operates in a country it has thus characterized, it necessarily has to bear responsibility for at least some of the basic state concerns traditionally appertaining to a government and that could invariably raise the spectre of a United Nations trusteeship or neo-colonialism.

254. It is vital for units to be in a position to respond to requests for emergency fire support or rein-

forcement from other neighbouring units without having to wait for an order or authorization from Force headquarters in such an operation. However, such spontaneous responses are only possible if units have common communication facilities. In the absence of such facilities on 5 June the Pakistanis could not make a direct request to the Italian brigade for assistance with tanks; neither could the Nigerians make direct communication with the Italians at Strong Point 42 when the Nigerians were ambushed only a short distance away.

255. Many senior political advisors in UNOSOM II, especially on sensitive political issues, lacked experience and knowledge of United Nations peace-keeping practices and were insensitive to the local culture's requirements.

256. While the United Nations might undertake Chapter VII operations in reliance upon assurances of support from Member States, there is no guarantee that such Member States will honour these assurances. The Somali experience demonstrates the risk of Member States withdrawing their support, thus leaving the United Nations in the lurch to face the consequences of an unfinished operation.

257. The need to satisfy the United Nations requirement for reliable information and intelligence gathering capability is important if peace enforcement operations are to be successfully carried out.

258. Whenever there are casualties, home governments tend to become more and more involved. It is essential to have means for coordinating policy, concept of operations and operational procedures. There was no forum for such coordination at United Nations Headquarters since the military staff committee with representation from all participating countries which the Charter requires to direct Chapter VII operations has not been established. In traditional peace-keeping operations the necessary coordination in the field has normally been carried out by terms of reference issued by the Secretary-General and through SOPs issued by FC [Force Command] and approved by the Secretary-General. Neither of these guidelines were to be found in UNOSOM II. The main reason for this rather crucial deficiency seemed to have been the total lack of peace-keeping experience among UNOSOM II ranks and understaffing of UNOSOM II Headquarters during the initial period.

259. Use of force, and deadly force in particular, tends to create a cycle of vengeance that gradually escalates the conflict. The United Nations is helpless if confronted with the inhumane and unscrupulous means a reckless militia can resort to on home turf.

260. Nations are not prepared to accept substantial casualties for causes unrelated to their national interests.

This fact puts severe limitations on peace enforcement operations.

261. In hindsight it seems that the mandate given to UNOSOM II, at least as it was interpreted, was too pretentious in relation to the instruments and to the will to implement it.

VIII. Recommendations

262. Enforced disarmament in Somalia has proved unattainable without exposing international staff, both military and civilian, to hostile attacks resulting in casualties. Therefore in the present context, forced disarmament of the militias under Chapter VII should be abandoned.

263. The United Nations should not insist on a particular political formula for the resolution of the Somali conflict, but should within the framework of the fundamental principles and goals of its Charter assist all Somali political movements to reach consensus on political reconciliation and the re-building of the institutions of governance.

264. Without prejudice regarding who bears legal liability, *ex gratia* payments should be considered for those innocent Somali civilians who suffered injury as a consequence of UNOSOM II's implementation of Security Council resolution 837 (1993).

265. To this end, it may be convenient to set up a mechanism under the United Nations to determine the criteria for granting such payments.

266. The United Nations Headquarters should maintain a sufficient pool of appropriately trained and experienced personnel who can be made available to every new field peace-keeping mission.

267. When inviting Governments to participate in newly established peace-keeping missions, the United Nations should request them to include in their contingents some senior officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers with peace-keeping experience.

268. The practice of utilizing observers with wide and varied peace-keeping experience, at the initial stages of some newly established peace-keeping missions, should be adopted as a principle by United Nations Headquarters for the establishment of its peace-keeping missions.

269. Armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and other protective vehicles and gear are essential to protect troops and reduce casualties especially in peace enforcement operations. They should be made available for all participating contingents.

270. The United Nations should refrain from undertaking further peace enforcement actions within the internal conflicts of States. If the United Nations decides nevertheless to undertake enforcement operation, the

mandate should be limited to specific objectives and the use of force would be applied as the ultimate means after all peaceful remedies have been exhausted.

271. The United Nations should, where necessary, continue peace-keeping operations of the traditional type under its Charter, but with increased emphasis on preventive diplomacy, assistance in peaceful nation-building efforts and preparedness to respond quickly to emergencies.

272. Political control of United Nations peace-keeping operations should rest fully with the Secretary-General and there should be a unified command. However, the command structure for any peace enforcement action which the United Nations may undertake needs further study.

Annex 1

COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

Established by SC resolution 885 (1993)

MEMORANDUM

10 December 1993

To: H.E. General Mohamed Farah Aidid
Chairman, Somali National Alliance
Ghion Hotel, Room 119

Fax No.: (251-1) 515-381

From: Chief Justice Matthew S.W. Ngulube
Chairman of the Commission

Fax No.: (212) 963-3082

Subject: REQUEST FOR MEETING WITH
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

After one week in Somalia, the Commission of Inquiry established by the Security Council in resolution 885 (1993) is anxious to meet with you and other senior officials of the SNA to hear your side of the events concerning the armed attacks in Mogadishu in which many UNOSOM personnel and Somali citizens have been killed. UNOSOM's side of the events has been fully recorded and explained to the Security Council but the SNA's side has yet to be told. We assure you that the Commission is independent and impartial and seeks only to find the facts rather than to place blame. Once the facts are known the whole world will come to know what went wrong so that the proper measures can be taken to prevent their recurrence. We therefore would be pleased, if it is convenient to you, to travel next week to Addis Ababa to meet with you and other senior officials of the SNA. If any other time or place is preferred by you for meeting with the Commission, we shall make ourselves available.

* * *

SOMALI NATIONAL ALLIANCE

17/12/1993

To:
The Commission of Inquiry
Fax No. (212) 963-3082
Mogadishu, Somalia

Dear Sirs,

Refer to your fax dated on Dec. 10, 1993. We acknowledge the receipt of your fax and have recorded the message it contained.

We would like to express our reservations on the Commission's independence and neutrality. We believe that the Commission is not free from the influence of the UN Secretary-General who himself is a part of the June 5 controversy.

However, I am requesting the immediate and unconditional release of the SNA leaders and supporters unlawfully abducted and imprisoned, before having any contacts or meeting with the Commission.

Mohamed Farah AIDID
Chairman

* * *

COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON SOMALIA

Established by SC resolution 885 (1993)

20 January 1994

Hilton Hotel
P.O. Box 30624
Nairobi

Tel: 334000

H.E. General Mohamed Farah Aidid
Chairman, Somali National Alliance
Serena Hotel, Nairobi

Your Excellency

REQUEST FOR MEETING WITH
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

I thank you for your kind fax of 17 December 1993 which was in reply to mine of 10 December 1993.

I had noted with sympathy your request for the unconditional release of detained SNA leaders and supporters, a matter on which the Commission had by then already made a public statement and conveyed its view to those holding the detainees in favour of release. Although the detaining authorities took longer than we had hoped and expected, we are glad that they have been released.

Meanwhile, in relation to your reservation about our impartiality, I assure you of the Commission's complete neutrality and independence. We are committed to objectively

investigate the matters covered by our mandate for the Security Council and we intend to do so without fear or favour.

Since the cooperation of the SNA is essential for a balanced investigation I shall be grateful if you or your nominee would receive the Executive Secretary of the Commission, Mr. Winston Tubman, here in Nairobi to work out the details for SNA officials to meet with the Commission at an early date.

The Commission is at the Hilton hotel and I would really be most grateful to receive some indication on our request since it will be necessary to conclude the inquiry in the near future.

Sincerely yours

Matthew M.S.W. NGULUBE
Chief Justice of Zambia &
Chairman of the Commission

* * *

COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON SOMALIA

Established by SC resolution 885 (1993)

Safari Club Hotel
P.O. Box 43564 Nairobi
Tel. 330621/Fax 331201

9 February 1994

H.E. General Mohamed Farah Aidid
Chairman, Somali National Alliance
Serena Hotel, Nairobi

Your Excellency,

The Commission of Inquiry is now in the process of winding up its investigation and preparing its report in Nairobi. As we have not until now received any response to our letter to you dated on 20 January 1994, we are taking this opportunity to send you another copy in case the previous one was not delivered or was otherwise mishandled.

The Commissioners are due to leave Nairobi for New York on 15 January 1994.

Since we consider it of utmost importance to achieve a balanced investigation, we wish [to] renew our invitation to you to meet with the Commission. The Executive Secretary is available for a preparatory meeting with yourself or any of your representatives to clarify any preliminary issues if necessary.

Sincerely yours

Matthew S.W. NGULUBE
Chief Justice of Zambia
Chairman of the Commission

* * *

SOMALI NATIONAL ALLIANCE

MATTHEW M.S.W. NGULUBE
CHIEF JUSTICE OF ZAMBIA &
CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN,

Thank you very much for your letter dated Feb. 9, 1994, concerning your inquiry. We appreciate your interest in the events of last year in Mogadishu.

However, the mandate of your Commission is unclear to us at this time. Since last June we have been requesting the Security Council and the international community to send to Somalia a Commission of Inquiry. The proposed Commission was to determine the causes and consequences of the UNOSOM attacks on Somalia in which 13,000 of our citizens were killed, three times that number wounded, many of them crippled for life, and public and private properties valued in millions of US Dollars destroyed. Many of the UNOSOM troops were also killed or wounded. The Commission we requested was also to determine the full range of the UNOSOM activities and review the mandate of UNOSOM in light of its destructive operations. The Commission was also to address needs of the victims of the UNOSOM-initiated atrocities.

For purpose of both perception and reality, we proposed that the composition of the Commission to be as follows:

1. A prominent former Head of State like Jimmy Carter, Leopold Senghor, Julius Nyerere, Edward Heath, Helmut Schmidt or Pierre Trudeau to serve as Head of the Commission;
2. International jurists; and
3. Scholars, all from different countries. This was to insure the impartiality and independence of the Commission. But this is not to question the integrity of your Commission. Indeed, we have respect for you and members of your Commission.

But in our view, the composition of the Commission and the scope and direction of its investigation would determine the facts surrounding the causes and consequences of the last year's conflict in Somalia.

We will continue to request the Security Council to appoint a new Commission or expand your Commission's mission and composition. We hope that you will assist in making this request possible.

In the meantime, should you have further questions concerning our position, please feel free to contact us.

Sincerely yours,

Mohamed Farah AIDID
Chairman

Annex 2 Interviews

<i>Date</i>	<i>Person interviewed</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Person interviewed</i>
1. 3-4 Dec. 1993	Dr. Kapungu and Runo Bergstrom	18. 12 Jan. 1994	Amb. April Glaspie (USA)
2. 14 Dec. 1993	Lt. Col. Emmanuel Eihoda (NIG)	19. 12 Jan. 1994	Amb. Robert Gosende (USA)
3. 15 Dec. 1993	Col. Asif Duraiz Akhtar (PAK)	20. 17 Jan. 1994	Brig. Gen. Loi and officers of the Italian UNOSOM contingent
4. 15 Dec. 1993	Lt. Col. Mohamad Hamid Khan (PAK)	21. 17 Jan. 1994	Maj. Parotti (ITALY)
5. 15 Dec. 1993	Col. Maj. Omar Essakalli (MOR)	22. 25 Jan. 1994	Lt. Col. Samuel Butler, U3 Plans Officer
6. 16 Dec. 1993	Lt. Col. Tariq Salim Malik (PAK)	23. 25 Jan. 1994	Omar Halim, Chief of Staff (UNOSOM II)
7. 16 Dec. 1993	Maj. Umar Farooq Durani (PAK)	24. 25 Jan. 1994	Kenneth Menkhous, Special Political Advisor/US State Department
8. 16 Dec. 1993	Lt. Col. Sher Akbar Khan (PAK)	25. 26 Jan. 1994	Col. Ward, Chief Operations Officer
9. 17 Dec. 1993	Lt. Gen. Cevic Bir (TURK) (Force Commander)	26. 26 Jan. 1994	Mr. Don Teitelbaum, SRSG's Advisor/US State Department
10. 18 Dec. 1993	Capt. Abdi Latif (MAL)	27. 26 Jan. 1994	Lt. Col. Kevin McGovern, Deputy Chief Military Information Officer
11. 19 Dec. 1993	Amb. Richard Bogosian—US Liaison Office	28. 27 Jan. 1994	Col. Casper, Commander QRF on 3 Oct.
12. 17 Dec. 1993	Amb. Lansana Kouyate (DSRSG)	29. 28 Jan. 1994	Admiral Jonathan Howe, SRSG
13. 10 Dec. 1993	Five detainees at UNOSOM detention facility in Mogadishu	30. 28 Jan. 1994	Maj. Gen. Montgomery, Deputy Force Commander
14. 08 Dec. 1993	Osman Hassan Ali (Atto)	31. 29 Jan. 1994	Amb. L. Kouyate, DSRSG
15. 08 Dec. 1993	Omar Salad		
16. 10 Jan. 1994	Maj. Gen. Baril and Elizabeth Lindenmayer		
17. 11 Jan. 1994	Lt. Col. Salvatore Iacono (ITALY)		

Annex 3

1. Somali Africans Muki Organization (SAMO) Mr. Mohamed Ramadan Arbow, Chairman	9. Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) (SNA) Col. Ahmed Omar Jess, Chairman
2. Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA) Mr. Mohamed Farah Abdullahi, Chairman	10. Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) General Mohamed Abshir Musse, Chairman
3. Somali Democratic Movement (SDM) Mr. Abdi Muse Mayow, Chairman	11. Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM) (SNA) Col. Abdi Warsame Isaaq, Chairman
4. Col. Mohamed Nur Aliyou, Chairman (SNA)	12. United Somali Congress (USC) (SNA) General Mohamed Farah Aidid, Chairman
5. Somali National Democratic Union (SNDU) Mr. Ali Ismael Abdi, Chairman	13. United Somali Congress (USC) Mr. Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, Chairman
6. Somali National Front (SNF) General Omar Hagi Mohamed Hersi, Chairman	14. United Somali Front (USF) Mr. Abdurahman Dualeh Ali, Chairman
7. Somali National Union (SNU) Dr. Mohamed Ragis Mohamed, Chairman	15. United Somali Party (USP) Mr. Mohamed Abdi Hashi, Chairman
8. Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) General Aden Abdillahi Noor, Chairman	

Annex 4
Military actions

5 June – 22 October 1993

<i>Week (Sat-Fri)</i>	<i>SNA actions</i>	<i>UNOSOM action</i>
05-11 June	05 - Major 3 sided ambush + secondary ambush at FS-20. 25 KIA, 57 WIA (Pak), 2 Wia (US). 05 - Old UNOSOM compound attacked with small arms and two FRAG grenades.	05 - Scheduled inventory of 5 SNA Weapons Storage Sites. 07 - Destroyed (8) 155mm + 105mm Arty. (2) Technicals.
12-18 June	13 - Anti-UNOSOM demonstration, 4 Somalis killed near former Egyptian Embassy.	12 - Coordinated series of actions to remove Radio Mogadishu from SNA control and 3 previous authorized weapons sites. 13 - Air strike against unauthorized SNA weapon storage sites (Osman Atto). Technicals and 20 large containers of small arms. 15 - 2 suspected arms locations raided. 17 - Air ground search for arms. Aidid compound—large cache found. KIA: 4 (Mor), 3 (Pak); WIA: 3 (Fra), 8 (Pak), 4 (US), 2 (Ita), and 39 (Mor).
19-25 June	22 - RPG (1) attack on University Compound. 25 - RPG (1) attack on New Port.	19 - QRF destroyed 36 Arty pieces. 22 - QRF destroys SNA weapons site. Tanks, APCs, Arty, Crew served weapons + small arms.
26-02 July	28 - In search of Atto's Garage. 2 KIA, 2 WIA (Pak). 02 - Italian forces ambushed. 3 KIA + 29 WIA.	28 - Atto's Garage searched. 30 - QRF attacks Atto's Garage. 02 - Italian sweep Pasta Factory.
03-09 July	03 - RPG (1) attack at Airport. 06 - Mortar (2) attack Airport. 07 - Four <i>Maanta</i> Somali employees and two Somali policemen killed in ambush. 07 - Mortar (2) attack Airport. 08 - Ambush of Marine vehicles. 1 WIA. 09 - Ambush of UNOSOM vehicles. 09 - Mortar (2) attack Embassy Compound.	06 - QRF cordon + search. Weapons seized.

<i>Week (Sat-Fri)</i>	<i>SNA actions</i>	<i>UNOSOM action</i>
10-16 July	10 - New Port sniper, 3 WIA (French). 13 - Mortar (3) attack Sword Base. 14 - Mortar (Unk) attack Sword Base. 14 - RPG (3-4) attack New Port. 14 - Mortar (4) attack Airport.	10 - QRF search Medina area. 12 - "Abdi House" attacked. 4 international journalists beaten to death by Somalis.
17-23 July	17 - Mortar (1) attack Sword Base. 18 - Mortar (3) + RPG (3) attack Airport. 19 - 3 separate patrols ambushed. 20 - 2 convoys + separate vehicle fired on. 2 WIA Zimbabwe. 23 - Pakistani APC hits mine. 23 - SP-1 receives small-arms fire.	17 - QRF weapon sweep.
24-30 July	25 - 2 US Humvees ambushed. 2 WIA (US). 25 - 84mm RR (3) attack on Sword Base. 26 - Malaysian APC ambushed at CP-31. 28 - RPG (3) attack Sword Base.	28 - QRF weapon sweep.
31-06 August	03 - Mortar (8) attack University Compound + Embassy Compound. 03 - Mortar (6) attack Airport. 03 - RPG (1) attack Airport. 04 - Brown & Root vehicle hits mine. 04 - Mortar (4-6) attack Hunter Base. 04 - Mortar (7) attack Embassy Compound. 05 - Italian convoy ambushed Nations Road. 05 - Mortar (5) attack Sword Base.	01 - Pakistan search: 1 M-60 + 1 60mm mortar. 05 - QRF helicopter destroys 2 technicals.
07-13 August	08 - US Humvee command detonated mine. 4 KIA. 08 - Mortar (6) attack Embassy Compound. 08 - Mortar (4) attack University Compound. 10 - QRF helicopter receives small-arms fire (3 separate incidents). 10 - Mortar (4) attack Airport.	10 - UNOSOM Force clear 21 October Road of roadblocks. 11 - QRF aircraft destroys technical. 12 - QRF + Pakistani forces conduct search.

<i>Week (Sat-Fri)</i>	<i>SNA actions</i>	<i>UNOSOM action</i>
14-20 August	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 19 - U.S. convoy vehicles damaged by command detonated mine. 4 WIA. 19 - QRF helicopter receives small-arms fire. 20 - QRF helicopter receives small-arms fire and possible RPG fire. 20 - Mortar (6-7) attack University Compound. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 15 - QRF weapons search. 16 - Malaysian conducted search. Two 560mm mortars found in Benadir Hospital.
21-27 August	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 21 - QRF helicopter receives small arms fire and possible RPG fire. 22 - U.S. convoy (22 vehicles), one vehicle destroyed by command detonated mine; Ambush with small arms + RPGs. 6 WIA. 22 - Mortar attack (1) University Compound. 23 - RPG (1) Airport; Damage to 5 Italian helicopters + 1 fuel bladder. 24 - RPG (1) and mortar (4) attack Sword Base. 24 - QRF helicopter fired at with two RPGs. 26 - QRF helicopter hit by possible dud RPG; 6 inch hole in stabilizer. 26 - Mortar attack (4) Sword Base. 27 - Rocket attack (1) Embassy Compound; dud in Botswana tent. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 24 - Somali shot and killed attempting to escape from the detention center. 26 - Lead elements of US Rangers arrive.
28-03 Sept.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 28 - Mortar attack (1) Sword Base. 28 - Mortar attack (1) Airport. 29 - Mortar attack (3) Sword Base. 29 - RPG attack (3) Airport. 29 - Mortar attack (12) Airport. 29 - RPG attack (3) University Compound. 30 - Mortar attack (1) Sword Base. 31 - Mortar attack (9) Airport; 1 MI-17 damaged, 1 fuel bladder ruptured. 01 - Mortar attack (1) Airport. 01 - QRF helicopter fired on with small arms. 02 - QRF helicopter hit by small arms and RPG, 1 WIA. 03 - Mortar attack (1) Airport. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 30 - Ranger raid on UNDP/SNA C³. 01 - Bangladesh forces seized weapons cache, five 20mm twin mounts, one 30mm single mount, two 12.7mm HMGs.

<i>Week (Sat-Fri)</i>	<i>SNA actions</i>	<i>UNOSOM action</i>
04-10 Sept.	<p>04 - Mortar attack (3) Sword Base.</p> <p>04 - Mortar attack (3) Sword Base.</p> <p>05 - Nigerian ambushed on Balad Road SP-19 to SP-42. 7 KIA, 10 WIA, 1 MIA also 2 Pakistanis; WIA in secondary ambush 21 October Road.</p> <p>05 - QRF helicopter hit by small arms and RPG. 1 WIA.</p> <p>05 - Mortar attack (3) Sword Base.</p> <p>05 - Mortar attack (2) Airport.</p> <p>06 - Mortar attack (1) Airport.</p> <p>06 - RPG attack (1) Airport.</p> <p>06 - Mortar attack (2) Airport.</p> <p>07 - Mortar attack (1) Sword Base.</p> <p>08 - RPG attack (3) Airport.</p> <p>09 - Pakistani attacked on 21 October Road while clearing roadblock near SP89. Pak; 1 KIA, 2 WIA. U.S. 3 WIA/Lost 1 tank and 1 bulldozer.</p> <p>09 - Mortar attack (4) Sword Base.</p> <p>10 - Pakistani SP-31 mortar fire.</p> <p>10 - Mortar attack (1) Embassy Compound.</p> <p>10 - Mortar attack (1) University Compound.</p> <p>10 - Mortar attack (10) Sword Base.</p> <p>10 - Mortar attack (5) Sword Base.</p> <p>10 - Mortar attack (4) Sword Base.</p> <p>10 - Mortar attack (2) Airport.</p> <p>10 - Mortar attack (6) Airport.</p> <p>10 - Mortar attack (2) New Port.</p>	<p>07 - Ranger TF raid 17 detainees. 2 WIA.</p>
11-17 Sept.	<p>11 - Pakistani patrol comes under fire.</p> <p>11 - Mortar attack (6) Sword Base.</p> <p>12 - Mortar attack (2) Pakistani position at Stadium.</p> <p>12 - Mortar attack (2) SP-33.</p> <p>13 - Mortar attack (2) Embassy Compound.</p> <p>13 - Mortar attack (4) Embassy Compound.</p> <p>13 - Command Detonated mine between two Pakistani APCs.</p> <p>15 - Mortar attack (3) Embassy Compound. WIA: 2 (Nor), 1 (US), 2 (Pak), 2 (UNOSOM civilians).</p> <p>15 - Mortar + RPG attack SP 69.</p>	<p>12 - QRF sweep near Medina Hospital. 3 WIA.</p> <p>14 - Ranger TF forces conducts search net 31 detainees plus mortars and RPGs.</p>

<i>Week (Sat-Fri)</i>	<i>SNA actions</i>	<i>UNOSOM action</i>
	15 - QRF helicopter hit by small-arms fire.	16 - Pakistani forces clear roadblocks between SP-89 and 31. Small arms and RPG fire. Found 3 Command Detonated mines.
18-24 Sept.	<p>18 - RPG attack (1) Embassy Compound.</p> <p>18 - RPG attack (1) University. 1 WIA (US).</p> <p>18 - Mortar attack (3) Airport.</p> <p>19 - Mortar attack (5) Airport.</p> <p>19 - Mortar attack (5) Airport.</p> <p>21 - Pakistani APC hit by RPG on Afgooye Rd. 3 KIA, 7 WIA.</p> <p>21 - Mortar attack (4) New Port.</p> <p>23 - Mortar attack (3) Embassy Compound.</p> <p>23 - RPG attack (1) University.</p> <p>23 - Mortar attack (2) Sword Base.</p> <p>23 - Mortar attack (2) Sword Base.</p> <p>23 - Mortar attack (3) Airport.</p> <p>23 - QRF helicopter fired on by RPG.</p> <p>24 - Vehicle search at Km-7. 1 WIA (Pak).</p> <p>24 - Mortar attack (1) Airfield.</p> <p>24 - Mortar attack (1) Sword Base.</p>	<p>18 - Ranger TF conducts a search, netted 8 detainees (Atto's Garage).</p> <p>19 - QRF conducts search for mortar positions, fire from Digfer Hospital. 1 WIA (US).</p> <p>21 - Ranger TF captures Osman Atto.</p>
25-01 Oct.	<p>25 - QRF helicopter shot down. 3 KIA (US).</p> <p>25 - Mortar attack (1) Embassy Compound.</p> <p>25 - Mortar attack (6) Airport.</p> <p>26 - Mortar attack (4) Embassy, 1 WIA (Swe).</p> <p>27 - Pakistani APCs ambushed between SP-9 and Km-4 with RPGs. 2 WIA.</p> <p>27 - Rifle Grenade attack (4) Embassy Compound</p> <p>28 - Rifle Grenade attack (2) Embassy Compound. 1 WIA (Nor).</p> <p>28 - Mortar attack (5) Sword Base.</p> <p>30 - Rifle Grenade attack (1) Embassy Compound.</p> <p>01 - Mortar attack (3) Sword Base.</p> <p>01 - Mortar attack (4) Airport.</p>	<p>26 - Counter mortar fire used for first time.</p> <p>28 - Marochino Ginacarlo and 2 others detained (arms dealers).</p> <p>01 - QRF helicopter fires 2 TOW missiles into Pasta Factory.</p>

<i>Week (Sat-Fri)</i>	<i>SNA actions</i>	<i>UNOSOM action</i>
02-08 Oct.	02 - Mortar attack (4) Airport. 03 - Command Detonated mine destroys marine Humvee. 3 Marines WIA. 03 - Mortar attack (1) Embassy Compound. 03 - Mortar attack (8) Sword Base. 04 - Mortar attack (3) New Port. 04 - Mortar attack (2) Airport. 06 - Mortar attack (2) Airport. 1 KIA, 12 WIA (US). 07 - Mortar attack (4) Airport. 07 - RPG attack (2) Airport. 08 - Intruder cuts fuel pod at Airport.	02 - Multinational sweep of several areas. 03 - Ranger TF conducts raid, Hawilwadaag area. Seizes 24 detainees (2 key Aidid aides). Two helicopters lost. Rangers trapped; relieved by international TF. KIA; 15 (US), 1 (Mal). WIA: 78 (US), 9 (Mal), 3 (Pak).
09-15 Oct.	09 - QRF reports possible mortar attack on Airport (1) round. 12 - Pipeline between Seaport and Airport sabotaged. 15 - Mortar attack (1) Airfield Somalis killed and wounded.	09 - AC-130 test fires weapons.
16-22 Oct.	20 - QRF helicopter was fired on by RPG.	

Annex 5

Synopsis of the attacks on the personnel of UNOSOM II which led to casualties among them as drawn from official reports and other documents

{May - November 1993}

<i>Date</i>	<i>Incident</i>
7 May	Kismayo was attacked by the SPM-Jess (SPM-SNA) faction early in the morning on 7 May by 100-200 men, trying to infiltrate the city from different sides. The attempt to take back the town from General Morgan was pushed back by the Belgian troops. During this period the Belgians conducted each day a number of "show-of-force" operations such as mobile roadblocks, day and night patrols as well as active reconnaissance and helicopter surveillance. The military activity and screening activities obstructed the infiltration and enabled the Belgian troops to engage the militia of Omar Jess at an early stage. One Belgian officer was shot and wounded. An estimated forty Somalis of the attacking force were either killed or wounded.
13 May	In the town of BARYWEINE one Moroccan was killed at a checkpoint by an unknown Somali. Weapon and magazine of the soldier were reported missing.
5 June	At 7 o'clock in the morning, less than one day after notice had been given, teams of UNOSOM weapon inspectors arrived simultaneously at the five Authorized Weapon Storage Sites (AWSSs) in southern MOGADISHU which the USC/SNA, the faction controlled by Aidid, had previously identified as the places where

their heavy weapons had been deposited. A company of Pakistani troops accompanied each team. Shortly thereafter violence began with firefights and crowd disturbances all over South Mogadishu. The inspections had been completed, on the whole without incidents when, angry crowds began to gather in vicinity of kilometre four (K4), kilometre five (K5), and kilometer seven (K7).

Outside AWSS 5, which was also the site of RADIO MOGADISHU, a crowd began to gather by the gate. By 09.00 hrs, it had increased to some 200 men, women and children. Several men appeared and were perceived to be fanning and inciting the crowd. Reportedly, one Somali was shot and killed or wounded, when he tried to seize the rifle of a Pakistani soldier. One eyewitness stated that armed Somali militiamen joined the crowd and began shooting at the Pakistani soldiers outside the RADIO STATION, wounding two soldiers. The inspection was completed by 09.30 hrs.

At around the same time, at Feeding Point 20 (FP20), a crowd including women and children swelled outside the walls. Being incited by a man among the crowd, the crowd began to stone the Pakistani soldiers who were distributing food. The Somalis pressed on the soldiers until they were in personal striking distance. Armed men standing behind the women and children began shooting at the troops. The attack was intensified by rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and handgrenades. Vehicle drivers were struck by snipers at the outset to prevent escape. Of the 12 soldiers at FP20, three were killed at the food distribution site and six were taken prisoner. One of the six died in detention, while the rest were held for several days before being released.

Four armoured personnel carriers (APCs) sent from a nearby strongpoint by the Pakistani brigade headquarters to rescue the besieged soldiers at feeding point (FP) 20, encountered a roadblock, were ambushed, and subjected to heavy machine-gun fire from surrounding buildings, killing or wounding several soldiers. The APCs were forced to withdraw. More APCs were then dispatched from a strong point on the opposite side of FP20, but they also encountered a roadblock, intense fire from heavy machine-guns and were forced to withdraw. Before 12.00 hrs, the Pakistanis requested through UNOSOM headquarters help from the Italian tanks which were said to be thirty minutes away. (This request to support the withdrawal of Pakistani units from FP20 was received 14.00 hrs by the Italian Brigade. The Italians arrived at about 16.30 hrs at FP20 only to find the bodies of three soldiers.)

At approximately 10.45 hrs Italian helicopters were engaged in actions supportive of the Pakistani troops following a request from UNOSOM Headquarters. At 11.35 hrs Italian helicopters struck a second time against targets on the 21 OCTOBER ROAD; apparently Somali snipers (GRID 357 279).

By 10.30 hrs the Pakistani troops accompanying the inspection team at AWSS 3 were ambushed, on their way back to their headquarters at the STADIUM, in the wide area along 21 OCTOBER ROAD. A Pakistani vehicle was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) near the CIGARETTE FACTORY. In that particular incident two Pakistani soldiers were killed and two injured. At the same location, an apparent ambush ensued. Pakistani soldiers were caught in crossfire from three directions. Roadblocks were erected by crowds, preventing smooth passage of the Pakistani vehicles. Shots were fired at them from the buildings along the road and the side streets. The Pakistani troops were exposed to increasingly intense fire including heavy machine-guns and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) near CP 89. SP 42 and SP 50 were also under fire. Gunmen fired at the Pakistanis and then disappeared into the crowd of mostly women and children.

Reinforcements sent from the Pakistani headquarters to CP 89 received fire as soon as they left the STADIUM. As they approached CP 89, they were drenched with concentrated fire that ripped through the sides of their trucks and scout cars. Gunmen in the SAUDI RELIEF AGENCY BUILDING on 21 OCTOBER ROAD started shooting, creating a withering crossfire. Roadblocks were continuously fortified and more troops were trapped around CP 89. Most of the troops in the area, including a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) unit, took shelter inside the CIGARETTE FACTORY.

At 13.20 hrs, US reconnaissance and Italian attack helicopters arrived. Friendly machine-gun fire from the Italian helicopter wounded three Pakistani soldiers. No rockets were fired at the Somali machine-gun posts which continued firing to the end of the afternoon.

There were multiple reports of random gunfire and other violence at various locations, particularly along the US EMBASSY to K7 areas. Two US soldiers were shot near K4 and evacuated to the US HOSPITAL. Gunfire and violence continued throughout the day to include: random firefights between UN and Somali; shots being fired at AIRPORT and SWORD BASE personnel; an attempted penetration of the US EMBASSY COMPOUND by approximately 50 Somalis; an attack against UN residences; small arms fired against a US helicopter near the AIRFIELD and 60mm mortar fire near the UNITED ARAB EMIRATES COMPOUND south of the NEW PORT.

The total number of casualties was 24 Pakistanis killed, 57 Pakistanis wounded, 1 Italian wounded and 3 US personnel wounded.

Excerpts from interviews and reports

a. Mr. Osman Atto, responding to a question on the incident on 5 June 1993, stated that he heard that the fighting started at the RADIO STATION at 10.30 a.m. on 5 June. Mr. Atto claimed that the letter from UNOSOM announcing that there would be inspection of the AWSS was never received by the members of the Cease Fire Committee. It was delivered instead to the "ambassador", another person on the staff of General Aidid but unconnected to the Cease-fire Committee at 5.00 p.m. Friday. Prior to that for quite some time in the city, a rumour was circulating that UNOSOM wanted to take over Radio Mogadishu. Atto stated that if the letter announcing the inspection had been received by a member of the Cease Fire Committee, the incident of 5 June would not have happened.

b. Reports state that Pakistani troops did not possess armoured fighting vehicles, helicopters or armoured cars. The greater part of the casualties were taken while the Pakistani troops travelled in soft-skin vehicles while going to reinforce ambushed strongpoints. The apparent lack of armoured protection and firepower along with effective aerial cover to protect troops resulted in the high number of casualties. Despite the preparations of the Pakistani troops for the AWSS inspection, the furious reaction was not anticipated. The Pakistani reports describe previous relations as friendly between their troops and the Somali population. Therefore the element of surprise added to the gravity of events. No hostile actions were expected.

c. There have been widespread allegations that the requested reinforcements were delayed because the contingents, in this case the Italians, had to consult their government before responding to the requests, thereby delaying the

assistance from the time of the request between 10.00 am and 11.00 am until 16.50 p.m.

d. The SNA's AWSS fell within the Pakistani area of responsibility while those belonging to Ali Mahdi were in the Italian area. The Italians had allegedly notified the Cease-fire and Disarmament Division (U-3) that they had recently conducted an inspection of the Ali Mahdi AWSS and found little weaponry. They therefore saw no point in checking them again. In fact, the notification concerned the fact that the Ali Mahdi sites had been disestablished in March 1993, a decision made by the commander of the AOR (Area of Responsibility).

e. One senior officer within UNOSOM expressed the view that he felt "[the] business of inspecting the weapon sites was just to camouflage the operation against the radio station".

f. Another senior officer with a commanding post perceived the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM as if the contingents operated under the same rules of engagement as those applied by UNITAF. This meant to stop vehicles, confiscate weapons, to retaliate when fired upon and to carry out searches on the basis of received intelligence.

g. Prior to the 5 June inspection the Pakistanis had expressed the view that because there could be serious repercussions from the inspection, advanced warning should not be given the SNA as that would give them the opportunity to react against the inspections. If prior warning had to be given, the Pakistanis expressed the need for them to be told of the reaction of the Somalis. They claim they were not made aware of the angry USC-SNA reaction prior to the inspection. Had they been told they would not have undertaken the inspection in such an ill-prepared posture as they did.

12 June In response to the 5 June incident and pursuant to the mandate given to it by Security Council resolution 837, UNOSOM initiated operations, including attacks on selected targets in Mogadishu. On the morning of 12 June, AC-130 SPECTRE gunships attacked and destroyed the CIGARETTE FACTORY, ambush site of 5 June, AWSS 3 and AWSS 5, disabling RADIO Mogadishu, the STATION belonging to USC-SNA. The Quick Reaction Force (QRF) attacked and damaged AWSS 1, reattacked AWSS 3 and seized AWSS 4, the radio station retransmission site.

13 June The operations conducted on 13 June (and 14 June) were strikes done by AC-130 gunships on to UNOSOM known illegal arms and ammunition caches in the USC-SNA enclave of the city. The targets were ATTO'S GARAGE on 13 June (and AIDEED'S GARAGE on 14 June).

A large crowd estimated at 1,500 to 3,000, composed predominantly of women and children, marched down VIA LENIN towards the strong point K4. A man carrying a flag appeared and began exhorting the crowd through his megaphone. Pakistani troops fired warning shots without any effect. Meanwhile a much smaller crowd, no more than 60 people, was approaching the roundabout from the other side of the arch. Gunmen were spotted at the corners of two side streets on VIA LENIN nearest to the roundabout. They began firing at the EGYPTIAN EMBASSY building where the Pakistani troops were positioned. Sniper fire was seen to come from a nearby building. Shots were fired from behind the front rows of the crowd. All of a sudden armed men appeared on the scene and began firing at the Pakistanis and into the crowd. It appears from the evidence that the incident was staged, for the benefit of the international press, to show "a

massacre of noncombatants” by Pakistani forces. According to the Pakistani commanding officer, when all firing ceased, eight Somali persons appeared to have been hit. The actual number of casualties could not be confirmed. There were no casualties among the Pakistani troops.

Excerpts from interviews and reports

- a. A report by African Rights claims that Pakistani troops opened fire at the crowd, killing at least 10 civilians. Shots were also fired from both sides of the streets where demonstrators gathered. The report claims a total of 20 people were killed in the incidents.
- b. Amnesty International expressed concern about this incident when it says some 20 Somali civilian demonstrators, including women and children were killed by UNOSOM II Pakistani forces who had come under fire from gunmen in the vicinity. Their concern was about the fact that Pakistani forces may have used lethal force in violation of UN law enforcement guidelines such as the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials.
- c. In a statement from a Pakistani commander it is alleged that the Somali snipers were firing into the crowds apparently to create the false impression that the Pakistani soldiers were targeting women and children.

*17 June

Forces Command initiated strikes against targets in the vicinity of the Aideed enclave in MOGADISHU. The first phase commenced at 01.30 hrs on 17 June when Forces Command engaged AC-130 SPECTRE gunship in air strikes against selected targets in the Aideed controlled part of MOGADISHU. Damaged targets included suspected weapon caches, AIDEED'S RESIDENCE, JESS' RESIDENCE and ATTO'S RESIDENCE. Warnings were given by loudspeaker teams to enable non-combatants to clear the area.

The second phase began with Moroccan and Italian forces moving to isolate the enclave. French forces established a screen along 21 OCTOBER ROAD, and Pakistani forces conducted the clearing operation. The forces initially met limited resistance in carrying out their tasks. At 05.20 hrs, when the Moroccan forces were engaged in roadblock clearing, they encountered a crowd of 1,000 people, mainly women and children. The crowd was dispersed by teargas. Simultaneously, French troops killed four snipers in the CIGARETTE FACTORY area.

At approximately 09.30 hrs, crowds, now armed, approached the Moroccan forces. The USC-SNA militia led the crowd with women and children in front to within handgrenade range (35 m) before engaging Moroccan forces. At 09.45 hrs weapons of all calibers fired heavily at the Moroccan forces from the DIGFER HOSPITAL and the buildings in its neighbourhood. The Moroccans sustained twelve casualties in this firing alone. Fighting continued several hours and attack helicopters had difficulty in giving support to the Moroccan forces which were too close to the militia's heavy machine-guns. By the end of the fighting, over 100 of General Aideed's militiamen were captured. UNOSOM forces had confiscated large quantities of weapons, including artillery rounds, rocket-propelled grenades, TOW anti-tank missile, mortar launcher, rifle grenades, hand grenades and a large number of small arms.

The UNOSOM casualties included 5 Moroccans killed, 1 Pakistani killed, 40 Moroccans wounded, 1 Pakistani wounded, 3 US wounded and 3 French troops

wounded in action. Unconfirmed reports indicate that over 150 Somalis were killed in the fighting.

Excerpts from interviews and reports

a. The UNOSOM operational intent for the extensive operation was to continue to put pressure on USC/SNA militia and secure the main lines of communication and key facilities in the city. UNOSOM Forces Command also wanted to continue offensive operations to sever local command and control of SNA militias. The UNOSOM estimation was that it required precise fire directed at key targets within the city followed by an aggressive cordon and search operation. The stated objective was to neutralize the command and control of the USC/SNA militia, drive the militia from their base of operations, and conduct disarmament within southern MOGADISHU in order to restore humanitarian relief operations in the city.

b. The UNOSOM assessment of the operation was that the intense air and ground operations yielded the military objectives they had sought. The security situation in MOGADISHU was deemed to be in the hands of General Aideed and it was stated that if he relented from his campaign of illegal tactics and disruption of humanitarian activities, UNOSOM should be able to rapidly enter the next phase of planned operations. At this point it was felt from the UNOSOM operational command that the situation was in a period of consolidation, hopeful that growing pro-UNOSOM sentiment would erode General Aideed's political influence so as to fully strip him of his power.

c. It was stated that although UNOSOM remained militarily ready to respond to Aideed and his militia, the official objective was to avoid confrontation with him and to continue the disarmament process throughout the country. However, it was strongly stated that force structure and logistic support were, as it had been emphasized continuously for months, absolutely essential to the success of the humanitarian mission.

d. Statement from Moroccan commander that intelligence was insufficient for the operations and that this led to the fatal sniper attacks from DIGFER HOSPITAL rooftops and other buildings outside the cordon-and-search operation area forcing the troops to change their plans. Furthermore, there had been unconfirmed allegations of helicopter air-cover fire on own troops.

17-28 June The situation in Mogadishu was characterized as tense, but stable, with increasing escalations from the USC/SNA by means of nightly harassment of UNOSOM installations with rocket-propelled grenades and small-arms fire, weekly anti-UNOSOM demonstrations and increasingly frequent roadblocks along 21 OCTOBER ROAD, LENIN ROAD, NATIONAL STREET, and ARMED FORCES ROAD.

*28 June At 14.15 hrs a Pakistani force had been sent to carry out search operations at a compound known as Atto's garage (in the vicinity of GRID 376 291). During the search operations the Pakistanis were attacked by a Somali militia force of approximately fifteen men armed with AK-47 rifles, machine-guns, grenades, and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG-7). During the attack some soldiers became isolated and were later extracted by Pakistani forces. US Cobra helicopters provided support during the extraction operation.

Two Pakistanis were killed and three were wounded, an unknown number of Somalis were killed or wounded.

Excerpts from interviews and reports

- a. General Aideed had threatened to start a guerilla war on 26 June, utilizing hit and run tactics against UNOSOM II forces.
- b. Continued complaint from Forces Command that insufficient equipment would continue to cause unnecessary casualties until equipment should be available to the Pakistani Brigade. Despite this UNOSOM was said to have good cause to be optimistic. Forces Command was perceived to be growing rapidly. The addition of armoured vehicles was expected to greatly enhance the ability within Mogadishu and the credibility throughout Somalia. According to the UNOSOM assessment, Aideed's support was slipping away, the UNOSOM strategy was consequently believed to be proving effective. UNOSOM thought it was "patiently" applying pressure consistent with the force security requirements and with the overall operational plan.
- c. Criticism from the Pakistani command that the incident had vividly magnified the fact that search of a suspected place must not be undertaken in future unless dedicated tanks and gunships were incorporated in such operations. The Italian response regarding search and coordinated operations in the target area had also given birth to a lot of apprehensions. The political considerations pursued by the Italians were believed to have overridden the military operations.
- d. There exist widespread allegations that Italian troops neither carried out requested search for missing Pakistani soldier in ATTO HOUSE compound nor allowed the Pakistani troops to do the needful.

*2 July

Italian forces were attacked by militia fighters on the northern portion of 21 OCTOBER ROAD, in vicinity of the PASTA FACTORY. At 06.00 hrs the Italian Brigade conducted a cordon and search operation in the area 1 km south of the PASTA FACTORY (in vicinity of GRID 400 302). The actual search was done in the vicinity of GRID 402 295 and a 350 m radius of surrounding area. The operation was to be conducted in the HALIUAA village area with two buses and one helicopter in addition to ground forces. At 08.50 hrs three Italian soldiers were slightly wounded during the search operations by stones thrown at them. Fire was reported coming from PASTA FACTORY. At 09.30 hrs, the search continued in the area of the PASTA FACTORY. As the Italians had completed their task and were returning along BALAD ROAD/IMPERIAL ROAD, they came across roadblocks and received heavy fire from Somali militia. One Italian soldier and one Somali policeman were injured in this incident and one vehicle was destroyed. From this time heavy fighting was ongoing and at noontime Italian tanks had fired on the PASTA FACTORY. The Italian troops located at GRID 402 302 were withdrawing, receiving fire from the top of PASTA FACTORY. Seven Italians, three Somali police were wounded. At 12.02 hrs the Deputy Force Commander gave authority for Quick Reaction Force (QRF) Cobra helicopter gunships to engage the PASTA FACTORY and instructed the Italian Liaison Officer to ensure that friendly locations were known.

At 12.30 hrs the intelligence unit (U-2) reports to the Joint Operations Command (JOC) that they are in progress of planning an AC-130 SPECTRE air strike on the PASTA FACTORY. At 12.32 hrs the firing in vicinity of PASTA FACTORY was reported to be still continuing and was heavy, including rocket-propelled

grenade (RPG-7) and heavy machine-gun. At 12.45 hrs Italian forces were reportedly withdrawing from their locations. One tank had at that moment been fired on by anti-tank fire.

At 13.00 hrs Quick Reaction Force was ready to attack and five minutes later QRF attack helicopters were starting to engage targets. Helicopters were directed to attack tops of building only. Italian Liaison Officer also later verified that Italian troops were not in that area at the time of helicopter fire. At 13.13 hrs Italian forces had withdrawn 500 m SW of PASTA FACTORY. Due to ground fire two Italian helicopters were damaged and an Italian truck was hit by rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) fire. At 13.17 hrs Deputy Force Commander (DFC) informed QRF fire from helicopter to PASTA FACTORY to be stopped. At that time the Italians confirmed that there were no more enemy in the factory area and that their forces were returning to their compounds.

Three Italians were killed and 30 wounded in the incidents. Strong points 42 and 19 were abandoned in this incident and the return had to be negotiated later the same month. 67 Somali were reportedly killed and 103 wounded and another 7 arrested.

Excerpts from interviews and reports

a. The conduct of periodic reconnaissance of the PASTA FACTORY and MARACHIO's GARAGE had been ordered to be carried out at least once a week.

b. Intelligence (U-2) reports show that no reason for the attack against Italian forces was given by any faction. Reliable sources had indicated that the SNA militia was aware of the Italian cordon and search operation and the attack against them appeared to have been planned well in advance.

c. The incident raised fear within Forces Command that the will of coalition forces to pursue the aggressive operations was undercut by events. This forced UNOSOM to assume a more defensive posture. Allegations hardened regarding the refusals of the various contingents to implement orders given by FC to the UNOSOM troops, either due to lack of equipment or to national authorities' requirement to negotiate before engaging in military operations against USC/SNA. Later in mid-July the accusations against the Italians included that direct negotiation had been held with the USC/SNA and that the USC/SNA militia had greater freedom of movement in the Italian area than elsewhere.

7 July

In this incident four *Maanta* Somali employees and two Somali policemen were killed in an ambush. At 06.45 hrs, near BENEDIR HOSPITAL by the ZOBBE BUILDING, Major Ahmed Jama from CID (Criminal Investigation Department) and at that time working for *Maanta*, the UNOSOM daily news bulletin, and Yusuf Ali Sheikh, the driver together with four other persons were stopped by two cars carrying eight persons with guns. Major Madadal and Yusuf Ali Sheikh were killed on the spot. The other four were taken away along with the car. Shortly after the killing, four men, all belonging to the Haber Gider clan, arrived at the scene to check the bodies of the two persons killed. Later four bodies were said to have been dumped at a place called GUBTA, in an area controlled by Ali Mahdi supporters.

Of the six persons killed, the major and Captain Muse Hagi Abdi, from ORIENTAL POLICE STATION, belonged to the Isac clan, and the four others

were Ali Mahdi supporters. The perpetrators of the killing were allegedly Aideed supporters from the Saad clan.

9 July

Introduction of mortar fire into UNOSOM installations from the USC/SNA in addition to daily roadblocks and small-scale ambushes both daylight and night time. A targeting of US facilities could be noticed.

*12 July

Quick Reaction Force (QRF) conducts an operation against USC/SNA command and control centre, "ABDI HOUSE" under direction of UNOSOM. Four international journalists were killed by a Somali crowd.

At 10.15 hrs, the Quick Reaction Force conducted a raid on the house of Abdi Abdiid which was described as "a major SNA/Aideed militia command and control centre, serving as a militia meeting site, staging area and rally point". The raid was carried out on the basis of information that meetings would be held at the centre, and that the militia leaders would likely attend. Scout Weapon Teams from a US Task Force initiated the attack with TOW anti-tank missiles and 20 mm fire. Once the preparatory fires were completed, a company size air assault was conducted on to the house, as other elements from the Task Force secured the area of operations. After a short firefight in the compound, the airborne rangers searched and cleared the area, and retreated nine minutes later. The QRF had no casualties.

Excerpts from interviews and reports

a. According to UNOSOM announcement, the Somali militia casualties included 20 deaths, all male adults. There were no women or children present at the ABDI HOUSE at the time of the raid. Two Somalis wounded were detained. It was also announced that in the figures of those injured in the attack, there were no women, children or innocent civilian bystanders.

b. The ICRC announced that the Somali casualties were 215, including 54 dead. Aideid supporters distributed a list of 73 names who they claimed were killed in the attack, including women and children. They also claimed that hundreds were wounded. The casualties allegedly included participants in the political meeting in the ABDI HOUSE and civilians who were nearby.

c. The African Rights report alleged that an enraged crowd of residents turned upon the international journalists who were covering the scene of the attack and killed four of them. It was also stated that the journalists were taken to the scene by members of SNA, who were then unable to protect them from the wrath of the people.

d. The UNOSOM expectations counted on tanks to begin arriving 13 July and complete by 16 July, providing significant operational ability and enabling the emboldened forces to reassert themselves in the city.

e. The UNOSOM assessment was that the Pakistani and Italian forces were now patrolling more aggressively and establishing strong points to reopen locations and reverse the trend toward increasing violence against vehicles and compounds which had been witnessed over the previous week. UNOSOM sought to maintain pressure on Aideed and was in the process of positioning forces to do so.

f. An early unconfirmed report indicated that possibly 30 top SNA officials were present in the ABDI HOUSE at the time of the attack. The report also indicated that as many as 18 may have been killed (six were reported to be still

in the rubble of the house). In the afternoon of 12 July, the source reported that armed men were in the streets of Mogadishu hoping to exact revenge on the UN. The SNA had apparently put a price on the head of any US soldier or UN personnel killed.

g. Forces Command assessed that the strike against the ABDI HOUSE dealt a major blow to Aideded's militia and more precisely to their command and control ability. The attack was stated to tangibly change the scenario from static defense security to active pursuit of Aideded and that UNOSOM had regained the momentum needed to keep the SNA/USC threat off balance.

h. Concerns expressed by Amnesty International that dozens of unarmed civilians were killed, including some of the UN's own interlocutors from Somali political or sub-clan groups.

8 August

US HMMWV jeep was struck by a command detonated mine in MOGADISHU near HUNTER BASE on MEDINA ROAD as two MP vehicles were patrolling on JALLAD SIAD STREET in the MEDINA DISTRICT between SP16 and SP3. As the vehicles passed a crossroad in vicinity of GRID 314 238, heading from SP3 towards SP16, the first vehicle (the platoon leader's) was hit by an electrically controlled explosive charge device located on the side of the road. The explosion hit the centre of the vehicle, completely destroying the vehicle and mutilating the bodies. Three MPs were killed immediately. The fourth MP died of wounds received due to the explosion.

a. This was the second incident of this type; the first occurred on 4 August against a Brown & Root (logistics contractor) vehicle and the assessment was that this marked an attempt to step up the threat on UNOSOM.

22 August

A US convoy of 22 vehicles was attacked; one vehicle was destroyed by command detonated mine and an ambush with small arms and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) ensued. Six Americans were wounded.

*5 September

A major militia engagement ensued against deployed forces on BALAD ROAD near the PASTA FACTORY. The attack was directed against Nigerian soldiers during the hand-over of responsibility from Italian to Nigerian forces in vicinity of SP42. In a related incident, a Pakistani patrol attempting to aid a Nigerian unit was attacked as it travelled along 21 OCT ROAD.

On the morning of Sunday 5 Sep Nigerian forces were scheduled to begin transfer of control from the Italian to Nigerian forces (beginning at 05.00 hrs). The Nigerian Battalion was moving from BELET UEN to MOGADISHU. At about 04.00 hrs, crowds were reported gathering in vicinity of SP42 which is in the NE corner of the city, on BALAD ROAD, near the PASTA FACTORY, a known militia stronghold. Nigerian forces arrived at SP42 at approximately 06.05 hrs to assume control of the strong point from Italian forces. A local elder confronted the Nigerian forces demanding that they should have an agreement with him before taking over from the Italians. The Nigerian Company Commander told the elder that they were not yet taking over but merely coordinating transfer with Italian forces. The actual transfer was to be complete by 23.59 hrs on 6 Sep. The elder, as reported by the Nigerian contingent, said "the Nigerian troops will see" and he left.

Five minutes later the Somalis opened fire on the Nigerian soldiers. At about 07.00 hrs the situation had deteriorated and the Nigerians requested reinforcements who were sent from the OLD PORT northward through SP19 to extricate

the trapped Nigerian force. An Italian convoy en route to BALAD returned to NEW PORT. Italian Liaison Officer reported that the Italian Chief of Staff was at SP42 07.45 hrs attempting to calm the population. Italian G-3 (Operations Section) warned Nigerian Liaison Officer that he should tell his headquarters not to send additional troops to SP42 in order to avoid worsening the situation. The Italian G-3 was informed that a Nigerian unit intended to move from SP19 to SP42 and that the commander of SP19 was trying to dissuade them from doing so. The reinforcements were ambushed north of SP19 between SP19 and SP42, about 500 m south of the PASTA FACTORY. All casualties took place at the deliberate ambush site. Intense fighting took place between 07.00 hrs and 09.30 hrs. By 09.45 hrs the Nigerian Liaison Office had reported seven dead. Sporadic fighting lasted until approximately 13.00 hrs when the situation was relatively calm. Nigerians had by then returned to their camp at the OLD PORT and only Italians were at SP19 and 42.

In a related incident, a Pakistani patrol, moving along 21 OCTOBER ROAD to assist the Nigerian forces, was struck by small-arms fire and two Pakistanis were wounded.

Italian forces helped to extract a killed Nigerian from the ambush site. They also encouraged Nigerian forces to return to their camp and allow the situation to settle. The Italian forces resumed control over SP19 and 42. There were no more violent incidents until 13.50 hrs when an Italian patrol near SP19 fired on a speeding civilian vehicle which would not stop for a check. Two Somalis were killed and five wounded.

Seven Nigerians were killed and 8 wounded, 2 Pakistanis and 3 US were also wounded in action.

Excerpts from interviews and reports

a. The situation in MOGADISHU was assessed to include continued tension and militia activity directed against UNOSOM II forces by suspected USC/SNA forces at the time for 5 September. The intensity of the SNA nightly attacks had increased. Based on the conditions of some of the munitions being used and the sporadic methods of enemy fire control, UNOSOM had indications that Aideed's forces continued to suffer a shortage of ammunition. Further, UNOSOM had received continued indications that support for Aideed within the Haber Gider clan had deteriorated within the previous weeks.

b. Nigerian statements claimed that they had failed to sign an agreement with local Somali similar to the one Italians had signed at SP42. The Italian Regiment Commander had allegedly agreed to summon the elders for discussions with the Nigerians at 16.00 hrs on 5 September. The Italian Company Commander had during the initial firing until dawn intermittent discussions with the Somali leader and the Italian Commander had requested that the Nigerians should move away from the vicinity of the position of their APC so as not to draw fire unto them.

c. Nigerians had entertained suspicions that the Somalis must have been notified in advance about the hand-over of troops this time of the day. The Nigerians report a nonchalant attitude on the part of the Italians towards the plight of the Nigerians and an Italian refusal to give fire support. Furthermore, there were allegations referred to also in the media of disputes between Italians and UN/US as reason behind the Italian transfer out of Mogadishu.

d. Lack of APCs aggravated the impact of the roadblock ambush. Statements that the Italians had a good arrangement with the local Somali and that they were there with the consent of the elders persisted as strongly as they were denied by the Italians.

9 September

A Pakistani patrol was ambushed while clearing a roadblock on 21 OCTOBER ROAD near SP69. At about 13.25 hrs when Pakistani forces were attempting to clear 21 OCTOBER ROAD of roadblocks, three tanks and three or four APCs were attacked. The Pakistani troops were under fire of 106 mm recoilless rifles from near the CIGARETTE FACTORY. QRF helicopters came to give air support to the Pakistani troops, allowing them to return to their base. At about 16.15 hrs, some 1,000 Somalis moved toward a roadblock removed by US and Pakistani forces near SP89. QRF helicopters again intervened to assist the ground forces. One Pakistani M 48 tank and a US bulldozer were destroyed. The tank was hit by a 106 mm recoilless rifle and heavy machine-gun fire and caught fire. The bulldozer was destroyed by two TOW missiles. Intense militia activity in the vicinity of the CIGARETTE FACTORY continued until after dusk. One Pakistani was killed. Two Pakistanis and three US troops were wounded.

Excerpts from interviews and reports

a. Roadblocks for the days prior to 9 September had become a nuisance for UNOSOM. The roadblocks were removed three or four times daily to be reerected by women and children. The Somalis allegedly made a deliberate ambush using anti tank/auto weapons including recoilless rifles and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) in combination with effective roadblocks. The Pakistani report states that casualties were considerably less due to good protection and support by tanks and helicopters from US QRF. Though the tanks were of great assistance they proved to be totally unreliable being old models with petrol engines.

b. This incident was followed by media accusations of indiscriminate fire by UNOSOM troops on Somali crowds. UNOSOM admitting "numerous" casualties on the Somali side among the combatants, denied the allegations, which remain unconfirmed.

c. Two Pakistani tanks were moving behind the American APCs to give them rear cover while dozers cleared the 21 OCTOBER ROAD. Normally, a Pakistani Commander states, they would have returned fire while withdrawing, but they could not leave the area as the Americans were out of the vehicles and had taken up fighting positions. When one tank commander took his head up to address the Somalis using a megaphone he was fatally wounded when the Somalis fired a salvo at his tank.

d. The Pakistanis were still using M48 A2 tanks of 1957 model with 90 mm guns. In October they received M48 A5 tanks (diesel engines) with 105 mm guns, dispatched from Pakistan on 20 September.

15 September

At 1930, at the NEW PORT facility, sniper shots fired from abandoned buildings in front of MARTENI HOSPITAL killed two Italian soldiers who were doing physical exercise training under the lights at the NORTH PIER. At 10.20 hrs, three mortar rounds exploded on the UNOSOM Headquarters compound between the Norwegian company Headquarters building and the old kitchen. The raids caused no structural damage but caused personnel casualties. Among

the 11 wounded were: 2 Pakistanis, 2 Norwegians, 1 US officer, 3 Somali civilians and 3 UNOSOM civilians.

- 21 September A Pakistani armoured personnel carrier (APC) was hit by rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-7) on AFGOOYE ROAD, near the BENADIR HOSPITAL. This day Osman Atto, one of Aideed's top advisors and financier was captured. At 06.00 hrs, a mobile patrol of two tanks and two APCs was sent from the Pakistani contingent compound via K4 and K7 to SP69. At 06.15 hrs, the patrol encountered a roadblock near BENADIR HOSPITAL on AFGOOYE ROAD. The patrol encountered another roadblock at GRID 340 246. At 06.25 hrs, while crossing this roadblock, one APC was hit with an RPG-7 round from an unknown direction. The APC was hit in the fuel tank and caught fire. Eleven Pakistani soldiers abandoned the APC and were evacuated, but three including one officer, trapped inside could not be rescued, due to the intensity of flames and explosion of the ammunition inside the APC. Three Pakistanis were killed and seven wounded, including two seriously burned.
- 24 September At 06.15 hrs, a Somali truck approached SP7 from the direction of AFGOOYE ROAD. When the truck was stopped, a Somali jumped from the back of the truck and began firing at the Pakistani soldiers. A Pakistani soldier received five gunshot wounds to the right arm, right and left thigh. The gunman was shot and killed by a soldier.
- 25 September A Quick Reaction Force helicopter engaged by small-arms fire crashed. During ensuing search operations, Pakistani and US soldiers were fired upon and wounded.
- At about 02.10 hrs, one US UH-60 A/C "Black Hawk" helicopter was shot by small-arms fire, crashed and was destroyed in the vicinity of GRID 376 247. Two US crew members were wounded and evacuated to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) HOSPITAL. The remaining three US crew members were confirmed dead. During the rescue operation heavy gunfire came from the VILLA SOMALIA area. Three Pakistani soldiers and three US soldiers received gunshot wounds. Three US soldiers were killed, 5 wounded and 1 Pakistani was wounded in action.
- 27 September Two Pakistani armoured personnel carriers (APCs) were ambushed with rocket-propelled grenades (RPG-7s) and small arms in vicinity of K7. At 13.45 hrs, two APCs, on routine patrol between SP7 and K4, received small arms and RPG fire in the vicinity of GRID 336 248. Three RPGs were fired, two of which missed and one hit the leading APC. One officer and a soldier were seriously wounded.
- At about 1405, two more Pakistani APCs were ambushed in the vicinity of K7 by two Somalis with RPGs and small arms. Two Pakistani soldiers were wounded in the incident. The RPGs missed the APCs.
- UNOSOM casualties this day were one Pakistani killed and three wounded in action.
- 28 September At 20.20 hrs, Turkish Company guards at GATE 8 reported that there were armed Somalis in a factory building opposite the gate. The Somalis fired rifle grenades towards the EMBASSY COMPOUND. Grenades exploded very close to the HEADQUARTERS BUILDING. A Norwegian soldier was seriously wounded. Pakistanis reported they saw the launcher in the vicinity of BENADIR HOSPITAL.

At 2030, four mortar rounds were fired into SWORD BASE from GRID 3433 2598 close to DIGFER HOSPITAL. Two soldiers were wounded.

*3 October

Two separate incidents occurred this day. The minor incident involved a command detonated mine which destroyed a US Marine HMMWV (3 US soldiers wounded). The major incident that occurred was a result of UNOSOM operations to capture personnel. Ranger Task Force conducted a raid in HAWILWDAAG area and seized 24 detainees including two key Aidid aides. The UNOSOM forces received an extremely heavy and prolonged militia response. Two helicopters were shot down, US Rangers were trapped and relieved after lengthy and harsh fighting by an international task force, numerous vehicles were engaged.

The Ranger mission commenced at approximately 11.30 hrs on 3 Oct. The Task Force Rangers had received information that Aideed's advisors held a meeting near the OLYMPIC HOTEL. The critical execution portion began at 15.45 hrs. Twenty four detainees were captured including two key Aideed advisors; three of the detainees later died. As US troops and UH-60 A/C Black Hawk helicopters were dispatched to evacuate the Rangers with the detainees, one Black Hawk helicopter was shot down at 16.10 hrs. The ground troops of approximately 100 men moved to the crash site under intense fire with additional casualties. At 16.49 hrs a second helicopter was shot down.

A first rescue attempt was made by US Rangers and US QRF from the airfield through LENIN ROAD but were ambushed and forced to move back. The situation at the crash site was considered stable as they had been resupplied and had air cover.

Elements from the mission had requested standby support to be available at 15.37 hrs. The Quick Reaction Force QRF was notified at 15.37 hrs and Pakistani and Malaysian forces were notified at 16.15 hrs.

These elements, upon direction of the Deputy Force Commander (DFC) and the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) commander, immediately began preparations for movement to the port area where a rescue task force was to be organized. The Quick Reaction Command (QRC) of the QRF was the operational control to Task Force Rangers from 16.35 hrs to 19.07 hrs, when they returned to QRF control. The rescue Task Force elements moved between 16.40 hrs and 18.45 hrs to assemble for the Task Force Commander's briefing.

At 19.30 hrs the Pakistani Brigade reported they responded to a Joint Operations Centre (JOC) report of 1,000 Somalis in the vicinity of GRID 246 253 by readying strongpoints (SPs) to assist trapped US personnel who were in the OLYMPIC HOTEL area.

The Task Force Commander briefed the operational plan at 19.45 hrs. Task Force elements departed the airfield to join with other elements at the new operation staging area. The Task Force departed the NEW PORT at 23.00 hrs. One of the three Task Force companies remained in the port in reserve. At 23.20 hrs four tanks and three APCs left the port to support US QRF operations. The two Task Force companies which deployed reached SP207 at 23.45 hrs. One of the companies remained at SP207 to act as a tactical reserve for the company which was to move to the northern rescue site (crash site #1). From the time the Task Force reached SP207 until arrival at their respective objectives (crash site #1 and #2), the Task Force elements came under heavy sniper and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) fire and reinforced roadblocks. The elements were deci-

sively engaged in prolonged firefights en route to their respective objectives. A roadblock was encountered at GRID 370 244; main tank gun employed to blow it up quickly so as to maintain momentum and allow the movement to be resumed. Soldiers at SP207 and tanks received fire from numerous Somali positions. They suppressed fire with coordinated tank and dismounted fires. During defense of SP207 an officer was wounded by gunshot. He was evacuated to a field hospital and was reported in stable condition. Tanks and APCs were successful in dominating their area of operations while QRF helicopters engaged flank targets in adjacent built-up areas. At 00.05 hrs one mortar round exploded close by the armoured squadron ammunition dump near the STADIUM.

The elements arrived at their objectives at 02.28 hrs and 02.31 hrs respectively on the morning of 4 Oct 93. They seized their objectives and extracted more than 70 US soldiers and returned again, under intense fire, through SP207 to the STADIUM. At 02.40 hrs mortar rounds (unknown number) exploded near the tanks. Several rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) rounds were fired. Vehicles kept moving and responded aggressively, thereby silencing the attackers. An enemy mortar positioned at GRID 3697 2520 was engaged by Pakistani 81 mm mortars. Firing was halted after two salvoes due to helicopters in the area. Tanks and APCs covered withdrawal of UNOSOM forces. Some soldiers were recovered in Pakistani tanks and APCs, others were recovered to SP207 for transport in other APCs. During fighting between SP207 and the STADIUM a Pakistani soldier received shrapnel wounds in his face. Tank refuelling was carried out at great risk by three APCs which came through a mined route to a position 800 m east of target area.

They arrived at the STADIUM at 06.32 hrs. By 10.30 hrs on 4 Oct all QRF soldiers were escorted up to SP31 through the 21 Oct BYPASS ROAD.

Three US soldiers were killed in action, 36 wounded, 1 Malaysian killed, 10 Malaysian wounded, 1 Moroccan killed and 10 wounded, 3 Pakistani and 1 Italian wounded. An additional 15 US killed in action and 57 wounded were not listed in official UNOSOM casualties.

An estimation from UNOSOM states that 300-500 Somalis were killed and more than 700 wounded in the clashes.

Excerpts of interviews and reports

- a. The Executive Summary states the operation as one where a heavy joint and combined multinational task force alerted, moved at night, briefed, deployed at night, and successfully executed, at night, under intense combat conditions, their rescue plan to extract 70 soldiers (with wounded) in approximately eight hours. The summary states explicitly that there were no "time lapse" or "time gaps" since such operations are inherently complex.
- b. A Pakistani report states that the initial raid was exclusively planned by the Rangers. The plan was not communicated to other coalition contingents hence no contingency planning to support the operation by coalition contingents was done. The reports claim that QRF took seven hours to plan the rescue operation.
- c. A Pakistani commander states that nobody was told about the Ranger operation. After the Americans had had their planning meeting at 10.30 the Pakistanis were told by the Brigadier general commanding the Rangers that 75 people were stranded at the helicopter crash site. He said he had sent teams to go and rescue Rangers but each time the rescue teams had been fired upon and


forced to return. The Pakistani assignment was to protect the Americans while they went to the crash site, to seal off the area while the Americans went to extricate the Rangers, and to protect them during withdrawal from the area.


d. The Pakistani tanks were old and did not have night vision. The tanks were the 1957 model M48 A2 petrol tanks with 90 mm gun. They ran out of fuel during the operation and had to be brought one by one to a nearby strongpoint for refuelling. The Pakistani commander pictures his troops as "sitting ducks" in the tanks. Asked whether the high figure of casualties was due to the fact that those wounded had to stay there the whole night before being moved, the Pakistani commander replied that contact was made at 02.00 hrs, but that they failed to make contact with those at the crash site until they left. The Pakistani task was to cordon off the area. The Pakistani said they took a long way to get to the crash site and the Americans had difficulty making contact with the Rangers due to hostile action from the Somalis on the way.


e. A Malaysian commander testified that they were informed about 17.30 hrs to go to the NEW SEAPORT to give reinforcements for an operation by the Americans. They arrived at the NEW SEAPORT at 18.50 hrs. At that time one other Malaysian company had already arrived. The Malaysian troops provided only APCs and not any assault troops which instead were replaced by Americans. The troops set off at about 20.00. At 23.55 the progress of the troop was slow in entering the objective due to rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) fire, snipers and mortar fire. The Malaysian commander states that night vision equipment was available but that he had been called to duty so suddenly that he had no time to bring it with him.

f. Concern expressed by Amnesty International about large number of civilian casualties during the 3 Oct actions.


- 4 October Belgian helicopter pilot killed while conducting a reconnaissance in the vicinity of YAONTOY, 20 km north of KISMAYO.
- 14 October In Baidoa Region, at 5 km northwest of the village of BUUR DHUHUNLE, a Greek noncommissioned officer (NCO) was shot and killed. The NCO was travelling in a vehicle from WADJID to ODDUR when it was forced to stop because of a Somali on Somali clash.
- 12 November Bandits engaged by patrol shoot and kill Italian soldier on BALAD ROAD as the Italian patrol attempted to respond to the bandits.
- 13 November At 06.50 hrs, one marked UNOSOM vehicle was stopped by four gunmen while travelling along DAMWADAG ROAD. A UNOSOM personnel fired at the gunmen, killing one and wounding another, which ignited a gun battle, resulting in the death of the personnel who started shooting and two other UNOSOM personnel wounded.








INCIDENTS OF 2 JULY AND 5 SEPTEMBER



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Document 89

Further report of the Secretary-General on UNOSOM II submitted in pursuance of paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 923 (1994)

S/1994/839, 18 July 1994

I. Introduction

1. The present report, which covers developments relating to the political reconciliation process, the humanitarian mission, the security situation and institution-building in Somalia, is submitted to the Security Council in pursuance of paragraph 2 of resolution 923 of 31 May 1994.

2. My new Special Representative for Somalia, Mr. James Victor Gbeho of Ghana, arrived in Somalia on 1 July 1994. The outgoing Acting Special Representative, Mr. Lansana Kouyate, will stay on in Somalia until the end of July 1994 in order to ensure a smooth hand-over of responsibilities.

II. The humanitarian mission

3. Progress continues to be made towards the objectives of overcoming the emergency requirement and moving into the recovery phase by improving the situation of the most vulnerable, particularly women and children, and finding lasting solutions to the plight of the refugees and the internally displaced persons. But these gains on the humanitarian front remain extremely fragile in the face of continuing insecurity and in the absence of a structured indigenous capacity to deal effectively with the welfare of the vulnerable segments of the population and to cope with natural or man-made disasters.

4. The Division for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) has continued to provide services of coordination, information and logistical support to the humanitarian community, while pursuing its efforts to assist in the resettlement of the internally displaced persons and promoting the implementation of small-scale community projects in priority geographical areas and sectors where operational agencies are absent.

5. The period under review was marked by the containment of a potentially catastrophic cholera outbreak and the continuation of the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons. There were, at the same time, several important setbacks, which included the interruption, for security reasons, of the activities of the World Food Programme (WFP) in Kismayo as well as those of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Afmadu and Buale and the Save the Children Fund (UK) in Mogadishu.

A. Sectoral review

Food and nutrition

6. During most of 1993, WFP provided large-scale emergency relief assistance to approximately 1.2 million people. By the end of 1993, the situation had improved with the number of beneficiaries dropping to 650,000. WFP proceeded to shift its focus from relief to rehabilitation. By March 1994, WFP was supporting 550 small-scale rehabilitation schemes. These schemes are generating employment, revitalizing the agricultural sector, reactivating a market economy and promoting food self-sufficiency. Whereas in January 1993 emergency work accounted for 100 per cent of WFP assistance in Somalia, by May 1994 it stood at about 25 per cent, with some 130,000 people receiving emergency food assistance from WFP and approximately 520,000 benefiting from WFP-assisted rehabilitation and development activities.

7. During the last few months, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) has supported a total of 73 supplementary feeding centres in central and southern Somalia, assisting a monthly average of 53,000 children and women, down from an average of over 95,000 at the height of the emergency. In May, however, the number of beneficiaries of supplementary feeding started rising again because of a considerable increase in the price of food products in some regions resulting from poor harvests combined with insecurity which prevented access to markets. UNICEF is also supporting nutrition programmes, including the distribution of vitamin A supplements, to a monthly average of 40,000 children.

8. A report published by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)/WFP in mid-June forecasts food grain production of about 44,500 tonnes during the 1993/94 secondary rainy season, only one third of the corresponding output in the previous year, despite an increase of nearly 50 per cent in the area sown. Overall food grain production in 1993/94 is likely to be 60 per cent below the pre-civil war average. This serious setback, which is due to the failure of rains in the main growing areas, indicates a need for substantial cereal imports until the next main harvest in August. Food aid requirements for 1993/94 are estimated at approximately 343,000 tonnes. Pledges so far amount to 200,000 tonnes, leaving a shortfall of 143,000 tonnes.

Health

9. The containment of the cholera outbreak that started in early February 1994 has been largely a result of the coordinated efforts of the World Health Organization (WHO), UNICEF and many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and Somali groups, with significant logistics support by UNOSOM II. A total of 24,650 cases had been identified and 872 fatalities reported by the end of June. WHO is now concentrating its efforts on the north-western part of the country where the epidemic has not yet abated, while UNICEF is pursuing chlorination of water sources to prevent any resurgence of the disease and trying to change people's attitudes to sanitation.

10. During the period under review, WHO expanded its support to tuberculosis treatment programmes in Mogadishu, Belet Hawa (Gedo) and the north-western part of Somalia. WHO is in the process of supplying anti-malaria drugs, laboratory equipment and supplies to Mogadishu and Hargeisa. WHO, UNICEF and Pharmaciens Sans Frontieres (PSF) have continued to operate jointly a system of procurement and distribution of essential drugs and of primary health-care guidelines.

11. Between September 1993 and July 1994, UNICEF pursued its objective of vaccinating 142,000 children against tuberculosis and another 164,000 against four other preventable diseases, as well as 102,000 women of child-bearing age against tetanus. Despite security constraints, outreach campaigns were completed in Mogadishu North, Kismayo and the Juba Valley, and Bossaso. UNICEF is currently providing various forms of support to 24 hospitals, 105 mother and child health centres, 50 out-patient departments and more than 200 health posts, in addition to providing training to community health workers and traditional birth attendants.

Water

12. Support by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to the Mogadishu Water Supply System, which was started in June 1992 as an emergency assistance project, has been suspended as a result of recurring labour disputes resulting in threats against staff. In addition, emergency funding for this project is now exhausted and UNDP is seeking urgent contributions to allow for a continuation of supplies and services to the end of the year. Any interruption of this water supply scheme would expose up to 1 million Somalis to water-borne diseases and would make a resurgence of cholera more than likely. It would also aggravate the security situation and jeopardize stability in the Mogadishu region. Already, throughout the country, access to safe drinking water remains limited and many Somalis are forced to use contaminated water sources, leading to

exposure to water-borne diseases, despite efforts by UNICEF, UNHCR, several NGOs and national military contingents to dig new protected wells, rehabilitate others and assist urban water projects.

Agriculture and fisheries

13. In preparation for the current agricultural season, FAO has distributed 300 tonnes of cereal seeds, 10 tonnes of vegetable seeds and 62,000 hand-tools in cooperation with other United Nations organizations, NGOs and national military contingents. Plant protection teams are surveying and spraying against common crop pests. In north-western Somalia, FAO has rehabilitated slaughter houses. FAO and UNDP will soon take part in a fishery development project to cover areas from Merka to Adale.

Education

14. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), with some support from UNICEF, UNHCR and NGOs, has set up two education development centres, one at Mogadishu and the other at Baidoa, which have been used since 1993 for curriculum development, the design and production of teaching materials and textbooks, and teacher-training programmes, as well as support for the establishment of a local educational authority in the absence of a proper Ministry of Education. Workshops organized for Somali teachers cover the whole country as well as refugee camps in Kenya. A Somalia Open Learning Unit (SOMOLU) was launched at the end of March 1994 and already provides in-service teacher training to 105 teachers in Mogadishu. Arrangements are being made to offer SOMOLU programmes also in Baidoa and Hargeisa. UNICEF has provided material support to some 400 primary schools throughout Somalia. New emphasis is being put on support to Koranic schools that have remained active throughout the disturbances of the past years.

Shelter and survival

15. UNDP and the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat) are cooperating in the formulation of a programme to support shelter reconstruction and low-cost housing in the north-eastern region of Nugal and to assist the municipality of Hargeisa in the rehabilitation of physical facilities as well as the restoration of the municipality's management capabilities.

Transport

16. UNDP, in cooperation with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and with complementary inputs by WFP, is providing man-

agement support to the ports of Mogadishu and Kismayo. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and UNDP are also providing support for the strengthening of national capacities to manage Mogadishu airport.

B. Settlement and repatriation

17. There are still nearly 500,000 Somalis living as refugees in neighbouring countries as well as an estimated 400,000 displaced within their own country, the majority of them (240,000) in Mogadishu.

18. UNOSOM II has continued to take an active part in the resettlement programme for the internally displaced, with support from the military component for overnight transit arrangements, medical screening, transport and escorts and from NGOs, WFP and UNICEF for the identification of beneficiaries, arrangements with the leaders of villages of origin and the provision of food and domestic assistance. During the period under review, a total of 15,000 internally displaced persons have been helped to return to their places of habitual residence.

19. The humanitarian programme in Somalia has lacked an organization with the necessary experience to address the pressing needs of the displaced. This has forced the UNOSOM II Division for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs to assume a direct operational role. In early June, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) undertook a 10-day assessment mission to Somalia to develop a comprehensive programme for the resettlement of the remaining internally displaced persons. I welcome the initiative of IOM and urge Governments to provide the financial support needed to resolve this problem rapidly. However, not all internally displaced persons will wish to return to their previous areas of residence. UNDP has accordingly initiated consultations with the International Labour Organization (ILO) with a view to formulating a programme of employment and income-generation for displaced persons, particularly in the Mogadishu area.

20. The Liboi refugee camp in Kenya was closed on 17 June, bringing to three the number of Somali refugee camps that have ceased operations in the last six-month period. Of the 42,000 Somalis registered in Liboi, 24,000 chose to return voluntarily to their country while the remainder were transferred to another camp in Kenya away from the border. UNHCR, together with UNICEF and NGOs based in Somalia, is monitoring this self-organized repatriation and is ready to intervene to alleviate problems that may arise. Other voluntary return movements by land and sea are being planned by UNHCR with a view to supporting the repatriation of 35,000 Somalis from Kenya, another 15,000 from Ethiopia and up to 5,000 expected to return from Yemen. UNHCR has been severely hampered in its repatriation and reintegra-

tion activities in Somalia by lack of funding and had to issue a special appeal on 1 July 1994.

C. From relief to rehabilitation and reconstruction

21. Following the transfer of the United Nations Development Office (UNDO) from UNOSOM II to UNDP with effect from 1 May 1994, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between UNOSOM II and UNDP regarding UNOSOM II's continued cooperation with UNDO, including logistical support for the preparation of regional profiles and for technical or donor missions. In May, UNDO conducted a mission to Middle Shabelle to prepare a regional profile and, in late June, a technical mission was undertaken to the Nugal region. A multidonor mission to north-eastern Somalia is planned for July. It will be recalled that in paragraph 5 of resolution 897 (1994), the Security Council approved giving priority to directing international reconstruction resources to those regions where security was being re-established and to local Somali institutions which were prepared to cooperate with the international community in setting development priorities.

22. The Somali Rehabilitation Programme funded by UNDP, with a budget of US\$20 million, continues its activities through Project Implementation Offices in north-western, north-eastern and southern Somalia. Sub-projects are currently active in such fields as school rehabilitation, improvement of wells and boreholes and establishment of water committees, road construction, small-scale enterprise promotion through cooperatives, agriculture, fisheries, frankincense production, credit schemes and marketing of produce.

23. As already mentioned, the gains achieved in combating one of the greatest humanitarian crises remain extremely tenuous. There is genuine concern among the humanitarian organizations that their capacity to pursue the priority tasks of protecting the vulnerable, encouraging the voluntary repatriation of the refugees, resettling the internally displaced persons and promoting a transition to rehabilitation and reconstruction will be hampered by the rapidly diminishing resources available as well as by growing security problems.

III. Security issues

A. Security functions performed by UNOSOM II forces

24. In the implementation of its mandate, UNOSOM II endeavours to maintain security at key installations, escort relief convoys and protect personnel, particularly in emergencies and the precarious security situations resulting, especially, from banditry. With the training of more

Somali police, UNOSOM II forces are increasingly undertaking joint operations with the police, which helps to ensure Somali participation in security activities.

B. Inter-clan fighting

25. The security situation, especially in Mogadishu, has been marred recently by clashes among clans and sub-clans. The most serious of these erupted on 24 June 1994 in south Mogadishu between the Habr Gedir and Hawadle sub-clans and threatened to spread throughout Mogadishu and its environs. The Acting Deputy Special Representative issued an appeal to the parties to cease hostilities. This was widely publicized by the local press and radio stations. He also discussed ways and means of ending the hostilities with Mr. Ali Mahdi and General Mohamed Farah Aidid, and other political and military leaders, all of whom said that they agreed on the need to stop the fighting. They also said that they were willing to continue to support UNOSOM II's efforts for a comprehensive agreement to end the hostilities. It is understood that Abgal, Habr Gedir and Mursade elders have been meeting in Mogadishu to find ways of defusing the tension and restoring peace.

26. During the hostilities, UNOSOM II instituted the following security measures: (a) all UNOSOM II strong points throughout Mogadishu were placed on maximum alert; (b) Somali militias were prohibited from deploying "technicals", especially around strongpoint No. 7; (c) the Quick Reaction Force was placed on standby; (d) UNOSOM II Cobra helicopters flew periodically over areas of inter-clan fighting to monitor the situation; (e) movement of UNOSOM II personnel and vehicles was restricted; (f) patrolling of UNOSOM II's main supply routes was intensified; and (g) all personnel within the Embassy and University compounds were required to wear flak jackets and helmets when they moved inside these areas.

27. In addition to the deterioration in the security situation emanating from inter-clan fighting, a UNOSOM II convoy was ambushed in Mogadishu on 18 July 1994. Two Malaysian soldiers were killed and four (three Malaysians and one Italian) were wounded. During the course of the attack, 11 soldiers, including the 4 wounded, were abducted and subsequently released.

C. Impact of the deterioration in security on the provision of humanitarian assistance

28. The recurring outbreaks of inter-clan fighting that have affected Mogadishu over the last three months have brought to an almost total standstill, for almost half the reporting period, all humanitarian activities in the

capital city and its immediate vicinity. This instability has also resulted in a breakdown of already tenuous mechanisms to settle disputes (particularly those related to employment) between humanitarian agencies and the local community. The Save the Children Fund (UK) has had to suspend indefinitely its activities in Mogadishu, as has UNDP at the Mogadishu Water Supply Project. Access by commercial traffic to the port of Mogadishu was interrupted for two weeks and WFP operations there have been hampered by threats against staff and large-scale looting. Access roads to the port have often been blocked by armed militias. As a consequence, WFP was able to move only 10,000 tonnes of supplies out of the port during the second quarter of 1994, less than half the quantity programmed for the period. In many cases, United Nations agencies and NGOs are obliged to engage local security personnel to guard their property which involves the risk of a return to the lawless situation which characterized the earlier phase of the crisis in Somalia.

29. In outlying areas in the southern part of the country, the situation has been more stable, with the notable exceptions of Wajid, where an expatriate staff member of Medecins du Monde (Greece) lost his life in March, and parts of Lower Juba where several incidents took place, including the killing of a UNHCR staff member in April. It is hoped that the recent Lower Juba and Absame Reconciliation Agreements will improve security in that region. Most of the major security incidents outside Mogadishu have occurred in the southern part of Somalia where there is no permanent presence of UNOSOM II troops. Their presence in other locations has helped to reduce banditry and ensure the protection not only of expatriate staff but also of Somali personnel.

30. The uncertainties concerning the future size and deployment of troops have been a source of concern for the humanitarian community. The security of, and access to, seaports and airports, the protection of offices, residences and warehouses, the capacity to escort convoys and a rapid evacuation capability are considered by the United Nations agencies and NGOs operating in Somalia to be essential to their humanitarian work. As is evident from the present report, UNOSOM II is having increasing difficulty in providing these services in some parts of the country, notably in Mogadishu itself.

IV. Force structure, capabilities and miscellaneous tasks

A. Strength and deployment

31. The current force strength, including logistics support elements, is 18,790 as at 10 July 1994. The Force is deployed as follows:

<i>Contributing country</i>	<i>Unit</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Strength</i>
Australia	Movement control unit	Mogadishu	55
Bangladesh	Battalion	Afgoi	940
Botswana	Battalion	Bardera	420
Egypt	Brigade	Mogadishu Port and Airport	1 665
India	Brigade	Baidoa/Kismayo	4 920
Ireland	Transportation unit	Baidoa	90
Malaysia	Battalion	Mogadishu	955
Nepal	Security unit	Mogadishu	310
Nigeria	Battalion	Merka	700
Pakistan	Brigade	Mogadishu	6 875
Quick reaction force		Mogadishu	170
Romania	Hospital	Mogadishu	230
Zimbabwe	Battalion	Balad/Belet Weyne	900
Multinational Force	company headquarters	Mogadishu	<u>560</u>
Total			<u>18 790</u>

32. Outside Mogadishu, UNOSOM II forces are thinly stretched. Since March, there have been considerable troop reductions in the Balad/Belet Weyne area of responsibility. There is now only a company at Belet Weyne and a battalion at Balad, with no troops deployed between those two locations in the Middle Shabelle region of Jowhar/Jalalaxi. In substantial areas, regular patrols are the only contribution UNOSOM II can make to the maintenance of security. It is also becoming increasingly difficult to maintain the required range and number of escorts for humanitarian relief and logistical convoys. These difficulties will become more acute if the security situation deteriorates further.

B. Concept of operations

33. In the light of the revised mandate of UNOSOM II approved by the Security Council, its concept of operations focuses on consolidating activities in the current area of operations both inside Mogadishu and in outlying areas. The key elements of the concept are:

- (a) To secure key facilities and installations, particularly airports, seaports and lines of communications;
- (b) To maintain a continuous presence in key routes and within areas of responsibility through continuous patrolling;
- (c) To assist in re-establishing the Somali police through direct assistance and conducting joint patrols;

(d) To provide security for humanitarian aid convoys.

C. Miscellaneous tasks

Air operations

34. A plan is in place to re-establish Somali national civil control over Somali national airspace. There is close liaison with ICAO and progress is being made. A trust fund agreement for the collection of air navigation charges for aircraft overflying Somali airspace is being finalized and a contract with the International Air Transport Association (IATA) for the collection of funds is being prepared. Comprehensive developments have been initiated at Mogadishu airport. An airfield management team consisting of UNOSOM II military personnel is responsible for the operation of the airfield. Although the air traffic control services are currently being provided by military personnel, local civilian controllers are being trained and sufficient numbers should be available by October 1994 to enable UNOSOM II to fill only supervisory posts.

Humanitarian support

35. Humanitarian assistance provided by UNOSOM II troops covers a broad spectrum of activity, ranging from providing security escorts for humanitarian convoys to conducting specialized courses for the Somali police. Numerous community development projects have been conducted and the provision of medical aid to Somali civilians has been a priority for all military contingents. Contingents in the fertile lower Shabelle River region have concentrated on assistance to local agriculture, whereas contingents in urban areas such as Mogadishu have been supporting the development of community and vocational training projects in those areas where security conditions permit. UNOSOM II forces have assisted also in activities related to food for work projects, improvement of water supplies, resettlement of displaced persons, medical assistance, reconstruction and the provision of animal husbandry and veterinary aid.

Support to Somali police

36. The gradual transfer of security functions from UNOSOM II to the re-established Somali police force is a primary objective of the police programme. UNOSOM II is achieving this through the provision of security for police activities at key police and court facilities and providing basic training which is not available through other programmes, as well as assisting in the delivery of police vehicles, weapons and equipment. Courses in drill, weapons training, vehicle driving/maintenance and hygiene and sanitation are now being conducted by military personnel for 520 Somali police.

V. Disarmament and demobilization programme

37. In the Declaration of the Leaders of the Somali Political Organizations, signed at Nairobi on 24 March 1994 (S/1994/614, annex I), the Somali political faction leaders explicitly expressed their support for the concept of voluntary disarmament. In paragraph 4 of its resolution 923 (1994), the Security Council strongly urged all parties in Somalia to cooperate fully with UNOSOM II and to carry out the commitments and implement the agreements which they had signed, including those relating to voluntary disarmament. However, those commitments have not been honoured and it is evident that militias have been rearming and replenishing their weapons supplies. The number of "technicals" and vehicles with armed militia sighted near UNOSOM II compounds and strong points has increased in recent months. Somalis currently have no inclination to hand in their weapons voluntarily. Should they choose to do so, UNOSOM II is prepared to collect and safeguard all weapons handed in.

VI. De-mining programme

38. The de-mining programme has continued to expand since my last report and de-mining projects are wholly executed by Somali deminers. The number of de-mining groups has increased more than two-fold to 13 and 5 others will start shortly. There has been a similar increase in ordnance destroyed: anti-tank mines up by 60 per cent to 5,253, anti-personnel mines up two-fold to 2,223 and unexploded ordnance up two-fold to 20,150. In addition, 56 square kilometres of grazing land and 60 square kilometres of roads have been cleared of mines.

39. The environment in which de-mining can take place would be more secure if the reconciliation process was more successful. That would enable UNOSOM II to field more international staff to supervise and monitor de-mining activities.

VII. Police and justice programmes

40. The operations of the recently established Police Division, which was formerly part of the Justice Division, have as their main objective the re-establishment by the end of 1994 of a neutral and credible Somali police force with a strength of 10,000 personnel. At 8 July 1994, police recruits totalled 7,869. The Police Division has intensified its work related to the training of police personnel, the supply and use of equipment and other forms of logistical support, as well as the repair or refurbishment of police stations. At 8 July 1994, 96 of the 125 police stations had become operational.

41. With respect to the programme related to training, the 50 civilian police officers (CIVPOLs) contributed

by Member States have been deployed in those areas of the country where security conditions permit. These include Baidoa (Zimbabwe: five), Hargeisa (Netherlands: three; and Republic of Korea: two), Mogadishu (Ghana: one; Ireland: one; Italy: one; and Malaysia: three) and Bardera (Ghana: four). Deployment of CIVPOLs in Galkayo, Kismayo and Merka will proceed when security conditions permit and when accommodation and training facilities become available. An additional group of five police advisers is deployed in Baidoa, Bossasso, Galkayo and Mogadishu. More police advisers are expected to be deployed shortly in Afgoi, Balad, Bardera and Kismayo. The training team provided by the United States International Criminal Investigations Technical Assistance Program (ICITAP) was recently withdrawn temporarily from Somalia for security reasons.

42. One of the major obstacles to the implementation of the Somali police programme has been the lack of training facilities in the regions. The facilities that existed previously have either been destroyed, are in a bad state of repair or are occupied by squatters. With a view to meeting this shortage, especially in Mogadishu, ICITAP had assisted in the refurbishment of a training school within the United States Embassy compound at Mogadishu which can accommodate up to 100 trainees.

43. The *Darawishta* is a rapid deployment unit which will handle difficult situations in the regions involving banditry, robbery and other serious crimes. The current training of the *Darawishta* is expected to be completed by the end of September 1994. The trained personnel, expected to number approximately 2,000, will thereafter be assigned to the regions. The military aspect of the *Darawishta* training is very important if the unit is to operate effectively against crime in the regions.

44. The Justice Division is continuing with the consolidation of its work programmes in the judicial, correctional, juvenile justice, crime prevention and human rights fields. Work relating to the repair and refurbishment of 54 court houses in 28 districts is progressing, and plans for the refurbishment of an additional 38 district court houses, 8 regional court houses and 8 court houses for the Courts of Appeals are being prepared. The missions undertaken in May and June by Justice Division personnel identified 146 judges for the courts which are being re-established in Bari, Nugal, Mudug, Lower Juba, Bakool, Gedo, Hiran and Lower Shabelle regions.

45. In the correctional work programme, rehabilitation of 14 prisons in 9 regions is nearing completion. The Justice Division is liaising with the district/regional councils concerned on appointment of custodial guards for the additional prisons which are being refurbished. Training programmes for the custodial staff are scheduled to commence in July.

46. In the juvenile justice work programme, the Somali Law on the Juvenile Court and Reformatories has been translated into Italian and Somali and brief commentaries thereon are being compiled. In the correctional facilities re-established in Somalia, attention is being paid to the specific needs of juveniles, in order to ensure compliance with the relevant international standards and norms. The Street Children Redemption Educational and Recreation Pilot Project will commence as soon as security conditions in Mogadishu permit.

47. In its human rights programme, the Division is seeking to expand its work beyond monitoring the rights of detainees and prisoners, the rights of accused persons and the performance of the police, the courts and the prison authorities. The programme will also address such issues as the rights of women and children in Somalia. Educational courses in human rights, particularly through seminars, are now being arranged. The Justice Division has now begun the deployment of its officers to the regions, in order to provide assistance to the criminal justice institutions which are being re-established. Considerable assistance is being obtained from the United Nations Volunteers.

VIII. Political developments

48. My report of 24 May 1994 (S/1994/614, paras. 6 and 7) noted that, in the Declaration signed at Nairobi on 24 March 1994 (see para. 37 above), the Somali leaders decided to convene a National Reconciliation Conference on 15 May 1994, to elect a President and Vice-Presidents and to appoint a Prime Minister, and agreed that a Preparatory Meeting for the Conference should be convened on 15 April 1994. Both meetings were subsequently postponed owing to developments outlined in that report. These repeated delays were explained as being necessary in order to accommodate the participation of one faction from the north-west with a view to maintaining the territorial integrity of Somalia and to allow time for another faction in the north-east to resolve its leadership dispute. They nevertheless caused me considerable concern and raised grave doubts about the seriousness of the Somali leaders' commitment to national reconciliation.

49. No progress in this regard has been achieved since my report of 24 May. The Acting Special Representative has undertaken intensive consultations with the two signatories to the Nairobi Declaration, namely Mr. Ali Mahdi Mohamed, on behalf of the Group of 12, and General Mohamed Farah Hassan Aidid, on behalf of the Somali National Alliance (SNA) and its allied factions, and has tried tirelessly to secure their agreement on a new date and venue for the Preparatory Meeting. The Group of 12, however, expressed concern about the prevailing

security situation in Mogadishu and asked that the Meeting be convened in Nairobi instead. No agreement has so far been reached on either the date or venue. The date is now predicated on the conclusion of a number of regional and clan meetings and consultations that are claimed to be a crucial prelude to national reconciliation. These include the Lower Juba Regional Reconciliation Conference (held at Kismayo from 24 May to 19 June 1994); the Absame Reconciliation Conference (held at Doblely from 26 June to 9 July 1994); and the Congress of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), which is expected to be convened shortly with a view to resolving the dispute within the leadership of that party. The timetable agreed in March has already slipped by over three months and there is no clear indication of when the Preparatory Meeting, let alone the Conference itself, will take place.

50. The Lower Juba conference resulted in the signing by representatives of the 19 clans and sub-clans in that region of an agreement on 19 June 1994 which called for a general cease-fire to take effect in the region from 24 June 1994, the opening of all roads, campaigns of public awareness, the restoration of property to its rightful owners, the safety of the personnel and property of United Nations agencies and NGOs and the establishment of a system of administration for the region, as well as judicial organs and a prison system. Four committees were set up to oversee the implementation of the Agreement. On 19 June 1994, General Mohamed Said Hersi "Morgan" and Mr. Osman Atto, on behalf of the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) and SNA respectively, signed a statement pledging the support of their factions for implementation of the agreement. This was particularly significant because the conference had left it to the faction leaders to finalize arrangements relating to the cantonment and rehabilitation of militia members. The statement endorsed the conference's decision to make Kismayo a weapon-free zone.

51. The Lower Juba conference left the door open for the Absame sub-clans who were absent from the conference to join in the implementation of the agreement after the conclusion of their own intra-clan negotiations in Doblely. The Conference, attended by 500 delegates representing 11 Absame sub-clans, opened on 26 June 1994 in an atmosphere of celebration as the delegates welcomed a large number of refugees who had returned from Kenya in anticipation of the peace and stability they expected to result from the Lower Juba and the Absame conferences.

52. The Absame conference concluded on 9 July 1994 with the reading of an Absame Accord which, *inter alia*, set up mechanisms for the re-unification of the SPM and SNA (SNA) and for the peaceful settlement of prop-

erty disputes, and called for reconciliation between the Absame and other Somali communities, security for humanitarian agencies operating in Absame-controlled areas, and the establishment of courts, a prison system and a police force. In addressing the closing ceremony of the conference, my Special Representative underscored the need for the Absame community to enter into dialogue with other communities and to arrive at accommodative arrangements with the signatories to the Lower Juba peace agreement as part of the process of national reconciliation.

53. UNOSOM II has continued to assist in the setting up of district councils. Two additional district councils have been established in Las Koreh and Dahar in the Sanaag region since the signing of the Nairobi Declaration in March. This was the first time that people from a region located in "Somaliland" had invited UNOSOM II to assist them in establishing their local administrative structures. The number of district councils established to date now stands at 57 (out of a total of 92). 1/ The number of regional councils remains at 8 out of a total of 18.

IX. Observations

54. The present report has described UNOSOM II's continued efforts to improve the overall situation in Somalia, which is now significantly better than when UNOSOM was first deployed but worse than at the time of my last report on 24 May 1994. In many regions daily life is returning to normal and agricultural production is recovering. Progress is being achieved in the rebuilding of institutions, especially the police and the judicial system. These achievements are grounds for hope that the Somali people can resume normal lives after the hardship that they have suffered over the last several years. On the other hand, there has been a significant deterioration in the security situation, especially in Mogadishu, due both to a resumption of inter-clan fighting and to a further increase in banditry; and the national reconciliation process is advancing at a pace so slow that there is little or no reason to believe that the target of completing the process by March 1995 can be achieved.

55. Responsibility for this state of affairs rests squarely with the Somali leaders. Such progress as has been achieved cannot be consolidated, or further progress made, until the many factions in Somalia, and especially their leaders, decide to work seriously together to reach a durable political settlement that can ensure stability in their country. In this respect, the repeated postponement of the National Reconciliation Conference and its Preparatory Meeting raises serious concern and disappointment among those who have done so much to help Somalia. Regional conferences such as that in Lower Juba

can help to reduce insecurity and can contribute to national reconciliation but their achievements will be of little significance if the current tendency for a further fragmentation of factions is not reversed.

56. In these circumstances, the international community's growing concern about how long it will be expected to support efforts towards national reconciliation in Somalia is fully understandable. The repeated postponements of conferences, the emergence of new subgroups and the lack of a clear reconciliation process have created the impression that talks between Somali leaders at various levels could continue indefinitely. The impression is also created that, despite the prolonged suffering of the Somali people, certain Somali leaders are still not prepared to subordinate their personal ambitions for power to the cause of peace and stability in Somalia.

57. I would accordingly like, once again, to stress to the Somali leaders that the international community has dedicated substantial resources and shown great patience in the hope that it can help to re-establish Somalia as a society that is both peaceful and self-reliant. But this commitment cannot continue indefinitely in a world where there are so many situations of conflict and human suffering that call for the international community's attention. It is essential that Somali political leaders redouble their efforts to reach agreement on a basis of pluralism and mutual tolerance so that the international community can regain confidence that it will be able to complete its mission in Somalia by March 1995.

58. Meanwhile, I have asked my new Special Representative to prepare an in-depth assessment of the prospects for national reconciliation in Somalia. I have also decided to undertake a comprehensive review of the current troop strength of UNOSOM II. It is not clear to me that the present situation in Somalia permits the force to make a sufficiently effective contribution to the maintenance of security to justify its present size and cost. More than half of the force is currently located in Mogadishu but, through no fault of its own, it has been able to do little to mitigate the security consequences of major outbreaks of inter-clan fighting there. UNOSOM II's success in this area has been achieved by diplomatic rather than military means. I am inclined therefore to think that it may be feasible to commence a reduction in the level of troops at present assigned to UNOSOM II. I accordingly intend to dispatch shortly a special mission from Headquarters to discuss the extent of such reduction with my Special Representative and the Force Commander and to present specific recommendations to me. The Mission will, of course, pay special attention to the views of the

1/ The legal status of several districts is still the subject of discussions between UNOSOM II and local Somali communities. As a result, the total number of districts described as existing in Somalia may vary.

humanitarian agencies and NGOs. The essential tasks of ensuring the security of UNOSOM II personnel and humanitarian assistance programmes and personnel will remain a high priority in any reconfiguration of the military component of UNOSOM II, especially in the light of the recent ambush of UNOSOM II forces referred to in paragraph 27 above.

59. It is also, of course, essential that sufficient resources are made available to make it possible for the humanitarian agencies and NGOs to maintain their efforts. I urge the international community to increase its financial support for their programmes in the coming months.

60. I have continued to exchange views on the situation in Somalia with the Secretaries-General of the League of Arab States (LAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) with a view to furthering our cooperation in the search for lasting peace in that country. I wish to avail myself of this opportunity to express my apprecia-

tion to the three organizations for their cooperation with and support for the United Nations efforts in Somalia.

61. In conclusion, I would like to express my deep gratitude to Mr. Lansana Kouyate who, as Acting Special Representative, has demonstrated exceptional devotion and skill in his efforts to move Somali leaders towards compromise. I have every confidence that his successor, Mr. James Victor Gbeho, who assumes his responsibilities at a critical stage, will use his long experience to facilitate the negotiation of a durable political settlement in Somalia. I also would like to express my deep appreciation to the Force Commander, General Aboo Samah Bin Aboo Bakar, to all civilian and military personnel in UNOSOM II, United Nations agencies and NGOs, as well as to their Somali colleagues, for the courage and commitment they continue to demonstrate in fulfilling their tasks in this complex and hazardous mission. Lastly, I wish to pay tribute to those individuals of UNOSOM II and humanitarian agencies and NGOs who made the ultimate sacrifice in their efforts to ease human suffering and restore peace to Somalia.

Document 90

Letter dated 28 July 1994 from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General welcoming the decision to dispatch a special mission to Somalia and also the directive that an in-depth assessment of the prospects for reconciliation be prepared

S/1994/898, 30 July 1994

The members of the Security Council have reviewed the situation in Somalia as envisaged in resolution 923 (1994) of 31 May 1994. The review was considerably facilitated by the comprehensive nature of your report of 18 July 1994 (S/1994/839).

The Council members noted with satisfaction the gains made in Somalia on the humanitarian front, with the assistance of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations. They also welcomed the progress made in the re-establishment of the Somali police and justice systems as well as in de-mining activities.

The Council members share your serious concern at the very little forward movement registered in the Somali national reconciliation process since the Nairobi Declaration of 24 March 1994 and at the recent deterioration

in the security situation in Somalia. They are disappointed at the repeated postponements of the National Reconciliation Conference and its Preparatory Meeting, for which there is still no agreement on either the dates or the venue.

In view of the situation in Somalia, described in your report, the Council members considered most appropriate and timely your directive to your Special Representative for Somalia to prepare an in-depth assessment of the prospects for national reconciliation in Somalia. They also welcomed your decision to dispatch a special mission to Somalia and to present recommendations to the Security Council on the future size of UNOSOM II as soon as possible.

(Signed) Jamsheed K. A. MARKER
President of the Security Council

Document 91

Report of the Secretary-General on the prospects for national reconciliation in Somalia and the feasibility of beginning a reduction in the UNOSOM II force

S/1994/977, 17 August 1994

I. Introduction

1. In my previous report to the Security Council (S/1994/839), I informed the Council that I had asked my Special Representative to prepare an in-depth assessment of the prospects for national reconciliation in Somalia. I also said that I had decided to undertake a comprehensive review of the current troop strength of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) and would dispatch a special mission to discuss with the Special Representative and the Force Commander the extent of a reduction in the level of troops currently assigned to UNOSOM II, and to present specific recommendations to me.

2. The purpose of the present report is to apprise the Security Council of the outcome of these initiatives and to present to it recommendations on action to be taken during the period preceding the expiry of UNOSOM II's current mandate on 30 September 1994. Section II of the report contains an assessment of the prospects for national reconciliation. Section III discusses the feasibility of commencing a reduction in the level of troops while paying special attention to the views of the humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) active in Somalia and the essential tasks of ensuring the security of UNOSOM II personnel and humanitarian assistance programmes and personnel. The last section contains my observations and recommendations.

II. Prospects for national reconciliation

3. A durable political settlement remains the indispensable prerequisite for restoring peace and security, re-establishing central governmental structures and services, and commencing the process of rehabilitation and reconstruction of the economic and social infrastructures of Somalia. I have repeatedly expressed concern that the national reconciliation process is advancing at too slow a pace and that progress achieved in the rebuilding of institutions, especially the police and the judicial system, cannot be consolidated until the many factions in Somalia, and especially their leaders, decide to work seriously together to reach a durable political settlement. In my previous report, I reiterated my call upon the Somali political leaders to redouble their efforts to reach agreement on the basis of pluralism and mutual tolerance

so that the international community could regain confidence that it would be able to complete its mission in Somalia by March 1995.

4. The Security Council is aware that since the beginning of 1993 two major conferences have been held with the assistance and support of the United Nations in an effort to advance the peace process and to facilitate national reconciliation and unity. In the Addis Ababa Agreement of 27 March 1993, the 15 Somali factions agreed on a cease-fire and disarmament and on transitional arrangements leading to the establishment of a Transitional National Council. While some progress has been registered at the local and regional levels in the implementation of this Agreement, repeated violations of the cease-fire and lack of progress in disarmament, as well as factional disputes, inter-clan rivalries and conflicts have made it impossible to proceed with the establishment of a central administrative mechanism.

5. In an attempt to reactivate the process, the 15 signatories to the Addis Ababa Agreement adopted on 24 March 1994 the Nairobi Declaration in which they agreed, among other things, on the convening of a national reconciliation conference, to be preceded by a preparatory meeting, with a view to establishing an interim government. Ongoing factional disputes and conflicts and disagreements concerning modalities have made it impossible thus far to reach agreement on the date and venue for the preparatory meeting, which was originally scheduled for 15 April 1994. Consequently, the national reconciliation conference that was scheduled to take place on 15 May 1994 has been indefinitely postponed.

6. In addition to these efforts at the national level, inter-clan reconciliation meetings at the local, district and regional levels have also been sponsored by the United Nations to move forward the peace process. These include the Galkayo meeting (June 1993), the Jubaland peace conference (June-August 1993), the Lower Juba region Reconciliation Conference (Kismayo, June 1994) and the Absame Reconciliation Conference (Dobley, June-July 1994), as well as several other local and regional initiatives and conferences, including those by the Imam of Hirab with respect to the situation in Mogadishu. Taken together, these meetings have enhanced the prospects for national reconciliation.

7. It is now generally acknowledged that conflicts within the dominant Hawiye clan, to which both Mr. Ali Mahdi and General Mohammed Farah Aidid belong, constitute the major obstacle to national reconciliation. It is equally recognized that no meaningful progress can be made in the political process without first finding a solution to the conflict in Mogadishu, and in particular the conflict among the Hawiye sub-clans (Habr Gedir, Abgal, Hawadle and Murosade). The root causes of dissension and tension among the 15 factions are also by and large attributable to rivalries within the Hawiye clan. The recent hostilities in Merka, Mogadishu, Belet Weyne, Jalalaxi and the Lower Juba region are manifestations of this fact. If Hawiye reconciliation could be attained and the differences resolved between Mr. Ali Mahdi and General Aidid, the prospects for national reconciliation and the establishment of a national government would be significantly improved. Both General Aidid and Mr. Ali Mahdi have expressed their willingness to participate in a Hawiye reconciliation conference with the cooperation of other concerned factions and political leaders.

8. It is the view of my Special Representative that with the cooperation of the parties concerned and the support of the international community, the reconciliation of the Hawiye should be achieved in good time to create a favourable climate for the convening of a conference on national reconciliation and the establishment of an interim government in the last quarter of 1994. This would leave three months for consolidating agreed transitional arrangements for the interim government before the completion of the mission of UNOSOM II at the end of March 1995. While the international community obviously supports the attainment of this objective, it is for the Somali people as a whole to make every effort to achieve a comprehensive cessation of hostilities and to establish and consolidate an interim government before UNOSOM II completes its mission.

9. I am inclined to agree with the assessment of my Special Representative that the successful conclusion of the Hawiye conference would greatly facilitate the political reconciliation process. It was the intra-Hawiye feud that started the crisis in Mogadishu and its environs in 1991 and has been the main cause of the resumption of fighting since June 1994.

10. There are, however, no clear signs that preparations for a Hawiye conference are under way. In addition, it has been learnt that it takes a long time in Somalia to convene such meetings and bring them to a successful conclusion. In this instance, in particular, the convening of a successful conference by the end of September 1994 would necessitate major changes of approach from the principal actors. I have nevertheless instructed my Special Representative to provide all possible support to the

efforts deployed by the parties concerned to convene a Hawiye conference in the next few weeks.

III. Possible reduction in the UNOSOM II force

11. The Special Mission which I dispatched to Somalia to discuss with my Special Representative and the Force Commander the feasibility of a reduction in the Force's level arrived in Mogadishu on 28 July 1994 and remained in Somalia until 4 August 1994. It was headed by Major-General Timothy Dibuama and included Ms. Elisabeth Lindenmayer, Principal Officer, Department of Peace-keeping Operations and Mr. Tayé-Brook Zerihoun, Senior Political Affairs Officer, Department of Political Affairs. The Mission had lengthy and detailed discussions with my Special Representative, Mr. James V. Gbeho; the Force Commander, General Abooh Samah Bin Abu Bakar; and other senior civilian and military officials of UNOSOM II. The Special Mission also received extensive briefings by the Indian Brigade at Baidoa and Kismayo. At Mogadishu and Kismayo, the Mission met with representatives of United Nations agencies, humanitarian organizations and NGOs.

12. In the Special Mission's discussions with my Special Representative and the Force Commander, a consensus was reached to reduce the UNOSOM II Force to about 17,200 all ranks by the end of September 1994. The Force's current authorized strength is 22,000 all ranks and the actual strength on 2 August 1994 was 18,761. The proposed reduction thus represents some 8 per cent of the actual strength but would bring the Force to a level 21.8 per cent below its authorized strength. The Force would continue to perform the tasks assigned to it under its current mandate as provided for in Security Council resolution 897 (1994). These tasks include protection of major seaports and airports, providing security for humanitarian assistance operations, for UNOSOM II and support personnel and for installations and equipment of the United Nations and its agencies, as well as assisting in the re-establishment of the Somali police and judicial system.

13. The discussions at Mogadishu between the Special Mission and UNOSOM II also focused on the vital need to sustain, to the extent possible, the progress achieved in promoting stability in the regions. In many areas, appreciable progress has been made in negotiating regional agreements, training police units and initiating judicial arrangements, particularly in the regions referred to in paragraph 6 above. The support provided by the presence of military personnel of UNOSOM II has been a central factor in this regard, and the Special Mission concluded that any reduction should be at a pace that does not lead to a deterioration in security conditions.

14. In discussions with the Special Mission, representatives of humanitarian organizations expressed concern about the possible precipitous withdrawal of UNOSOM II troops from key regions in which they were currently operating. In order to be able to continue their activities, the humanitarian organizations consider it essential that the troops continue to provide security at key installations such as the airports and seaports at Mogadishu and Kismayo and the airport at Baidoa; escort relief convoys to selected destinations in the interior on a regular basis; provide protection for premises used by United Nations agencies and NGOs; and maintain adequate capabilities for emergency response and evacuation by helicopter. The critical nature of the security role being played by UNOSOM II troops, particularly outside Mogadishu, was emphasized by the representatives of humanitarian organizations, who feared that a sudden reduction in troops could lead to the withdrawal of United Nations agencies and NGOs in anticipation, or as a result, of heightened insecurity.

15. The Special Mission recommends that any further reductions beyond that described on paragraph 12 above should be carefully decided and take into account evolving circumstances. My Special Representative and the Force Commander stressed that a troop level of approximately 15,000 represents the critical minimum below which the mandated tasks of UNOSOM II could not be achieved. The Special Mission is of the view that the Force should not be subjected to any hasty and large-scale reduction, which could destabilize security conditions in Somalia. In this connection, it argues that a clear distinction should be made between a planned, phased reduction and a sudden, substantial cut in the troop strength. The plan prepared by the Force Commander for the gradual reduction of the forces culminating in the scheduled completion of the mission by March 1995 indicates that the level of 15,000 could be achieved by the end of October or during November 1994.

16. However, if substantial progress is achieved in the political process of national reconciliation, resulting in a markedly improved security environment, accelerated reductions in the troop level could be considered. An important consideration would remain that such reductions not affect the security of substantive and support personnel, both civilian and military, and troop levels should be adequate for the tasks entrusted to UNOSOM II. Should the Council decide to extend the mandate of UNOSOM II beyond March 1995, the phases in the planned reduction of troop levels would be adjusted accordingly.

IV. Observations

17. The humanitarian and national reconciliation efforts of the United Nations in Somalia are being undertaken in conditions of exceptional complexity. Despite considerable difficulties, the United Nations response has had a significant effect in addressing emergency relief and humanitarian assistance requirements, which were the original and primary priorities for the involvement of the international community in Somalia. Unfortunately, progress in national reconciliation and in bringing about security and stability, particularly in Mogadishu, has not kept pace with the achievements in the humanitarian area. The inordinate delay in implementation of agreements that the Somali factions have negotiated and endorsed, particularly in Addis Ababa and Nairobi, has continued to raise grave misgivings about the seriousness of their commitment to peace and national reconciliation.

18. The response of the international community ought to have shifted long ago from emergency relief to rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes. However, such efforts have been hampered by the slow progress in achieving political reconciliation and by a progressive deterioration of the security situation. The prospects for post-emergency recovery and rehabilitation also appear limited as a result of the lack of donor interest in the absence of tangible progress towards a political solution.

19. It is, however, too early to conclude that UNOSOM II cannot achieve the objectives for which it was established, although the omens do not appear promising. UNOSOM II continues to provide essential support and assistance to the humanitarian effort as well as to the police, judicial and penal programmes in Somalia. The Force also secures key ports, airports and installations and provides protection for United Nations and NGO personnel, as well as their material assets.

20. If, as a result of a rapprochement between the Hawiye sub-clans, national reconciliation can be achieved and an interim government established by the end of 1994, there would be just enough time to complete UNOSOM II's mandate by 31 March 1995. In such welcome circumstances, there might even be a case for extending the Mission, including the Force, for some months, though not necessarily at its present strength.

21. If, on the other hand, no significant progress has been made by the end of September 1994, particularly with respect to the Hawiye conference, the Security Council will have to decide how much longer it wishes to maintain a 15,000-strong Force just to provide some degree of protection to humanitarian operations and to United Nations and other international personnel. There would also be a need to take account of the readiness of troop-contributing countries to maintain their contingents in those circumstances.

22. It is apparent that the end of September 1994 will be a crucial period for both the national reconciliation process and the continued involvement of the United Nations in Somalia. In addition to the prospects of Hawiye reconciliation, the ongoing contest for the leadership of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), the dominant faction in the north-east region, is expected to be resolved. There should also be a clearer indication about the extent to which the recently concluded Lower Juba and Absame conferences are facilitating national reconciliation and the degree to which the political alliances made during those conferences will endure. In addition, the outcome of the various attempts that have been made to bring the Somali National Movement (SNM) of the north-west into the reconciliation process will also be known.

23. However, there are also disturbing developments which seem to militate against national reconciliation. The two antagonistic groups, the Somali National Alliance (SNA) and the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA), are continuing to encourage and facilitate the creation of new partisan factions, which are not parties to the agreements reached in Addis Ababa and Nairobi. This multiplication of factions will complicate further the prospects for the preparatory meeting and the subsequent national reconciliation conference and must be overcome without further delay.

24. It was thought at one time that the other segments of society, particularly the elders, could play a central role in the formation of a Somali Government. Given the fact that the factions were not effectively disarmed by the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) or by UNOSOM II, it has proved extremely difficult to marginalize them and they now often operate with the blessing of the elders. Despite these difficulties, it would seem that the prudent approach would be the one that is under way, i.e., the reconciliation of factions in the framework of the traditional structures, including in particular the initiative undertaken by the Imam of Hirab to reconcile the Hawiye.

25. Certain members of the Security Council, as well as many troop-contributing countries, have conveyed to me in clear terms that they are not prepared to continue indefinitely their costly commitments, particularly when there are no encouraging signs of the Somali

leader's readiness to assume responsibility for the proper governance of their own country on the basis of a durable national reconciliation. Similar views have been expressed by Member States with regard to the civilian police (CIVIPOL) programme. Some of them have informed me of their intention to withdraw their personnel from that programme. It is my hope that the Somali leaders concerned will realize that the nature and duration of international support to Somalia depend very much on their own resolve to achieve political compromise. The Security Council may wish to address a direct message to the principal Somali leaders to remind them that the future of their country lies in their hands.

26. In the light of the foregoing and after a careful review of the reports submitted to me by my Special Representative and the Special Mission, I have come to the conclusion that the United Nations should continue for a little longer to give the Somali leaders the opportunity to demonstrate that they are ready to cooperate with the United Nations and with each other in order to bring their country back from the abyss. I accordingly recommend that:

- (a) UNOSOM II should make every effort to facilitate the convening of a Hawiye conference by the end of September 1994;
- (b) The Force Commander should take immediate steps to reduce the Force level by 1,500, as recommended by the Special Mission, and thereafter bring it down to 15,000 all ranks as soon as possible;
- (c) In the light of the progress made towards national reconciliation up to the end of September 1994, I should report to the Security Council, by 15 October 1994 at the latest, on the future of UNOSOM II;
- (d) The Security Council consider approving, now or later, a one-month extension of the UNOSOM II mandate until 31 October 1994, to allow time for study of, and action on, the report I will submit to it by 15 October;
- (e) In the interim, contingency plans for the full range of options referred to in subparagraph (c) above should be elaborated and refined.

Document 92

Statement by the President of the Security Council concerning an attack on United Nations peace-keepers and the killing of seven Indian soldiers near Baidoa on 22 August 1994

S/PRST/1994/46, 25 August 1994

The Security Council takes note of the Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on Somalia (S/1994/977) and briefings by the Secretariat.

The Security Council, appalled by the killing near Baidoa on 22 August of seven Indian soldiers and the wounding of nine more serving with UNOSOM II, strongly condemns the premeditated attack on United Nations peace-keepers who were providing essential support and assistance to the humanitarian effort of the international community in Somalia carrying out the mandate of the Security Council. The Council expresses its condolences to the Government of India and the families of the soldiers who made the ultimate sacrifice in assisting the people of Somalia.

The Council expresses grave concern regarding the deteriorating security situation in Somalia and deplores attacks and harassment directed against UNOSOM II and other international personnel serving in Somalia.

The Council considers that a durable political settlement remains an indispensable prerequisite for restoring peace and security, re-establishing central governmental structures and services and commencing the process of rehabilitation and reconstruction of the economic and social fabric in Somalia.

The Council is gravely concerned by the lack of progress in reconciliation among Somali factions. It is particularly concerned by the fact that the national reconciliation conference, to which the 15 signatories of the Addis Ababa Agreement had agreed in Nairobi on 24 March 1994 and which was scheduled for 15 May 1994, has not taken place. The Council com-

mends the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to reinvigorate the process of national reconciliation, including through the encouragement of local and regional initiatives and conferences. In this regard, it attaches great importance to an accelerated inter-clan reconciliation, in particular, among the Hawiye sub-clans, with the involvement of all concerned.

The Council stresses that the nature and the duration of the international support and resources the international community is committing to Somalia, including the continuing presence of UNOSOM II, depend very much on the resolve of the Somali parties to achieve political compromise.

The Council reminds the Somali parties that the future of their country lies in their hands and urges them once again to make every effort to advance the process of political reconciliation in Somalia.

The Council believes that the Secretary-General's proposed initial reduction of the UNOSOM II troops is appropriate in the circumstances prevailing in Somalia. It stresses that priority attention should be given to ensuring the safety and security of UNOSOM II and other international personnel, including the staff of non-governmental organizations. In this context, it underlines the responsibility of the Somali parties for the security and safety of these personnel.

The Security Council invites the Secretary-General to submit to the Council well before 30 September 1994 a substantive report on prospects for national reconciliation in Somalia and on the possible options for the future of UNOSOM II.

Document 93

Report of the Secretary-General concerning developments in Somalia in the political, security and humanitarian fields

S/1994/1068, 17 September 1994

I. Introduction

1. In its presidential statement of 25 August 1994 (S/PRST/1994/46), the Security Council took note of my report of 17 August 1994 (S/1994/977) and requested me

to submit to it, well before 30 September 1994, a substantive report on prospects for national reconciliation in Somalia and on possible options for the future of the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II).

2. However, in the light of current developments in Somalia, the report called for by the Security Council will be submitted in two parts. The present part gives a factual account of recent developments in Somalia in the political, security and humanitarian fields. My assessment of progress concerning national reconciliation and my recommendations will be contained in the second part of the report, which I plan to submit by mid-October. The second part will draw upon the results of the visit to Somalia being currently undertaken by Mr. Kofi A. Annan, Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations.

II. Political developments

3. In its presidential statement of 25 August, the Security Council expressed concern that the national reconciliation conference, which the 15 signatories to the Addis Ababa agreement (see S/26317) had agreed to convene on 15 May 1994 in their Nairobi Declaration of 24 March 1994 (see S/1994/614, annex I), had not taken place. The Council commended the efforts of my Special Representative to reinvigorate the process of national reconciliation, including through the encouragement of local and regional initiatives and conferences. It also stated that it attached great importance to accelerated inter-clan reconciliation, in particular among the Hawiye subclans, with the involvement of all concerned. In this connection, the Council will recall that, in my previous report (S/1994/977), I expressed agreement with the assessment of my Special Representative that conflicts within the Hawiye clan constituted the major obstacle to national reconciliation and that the successful conclusion of a Hawiye peace conference would greatly facilitate the national reconciliation process.

4. Since my last report, my Special Representative has been engaged in intensive consultations with Mr. Ali Mahdi, General Aidid and the Imam of Hirab, Imam Mahamoud Imam Omar, concerning arrangements for convening the Hawiye peace conference and the national reconciliation conference. During their discussions, the Imam of Hirab confirmed to my Special Representative the willingness of both Mr. Ali Mahdi and General Aidid to participate in the conferences. In separate discussions with my Special Representative, both General Aidid and Mr. Ali Mahdi assured him of their support for the initiative of the Imam to resolve differences among the Hawiye subclans (Abgal, Habr Gedir, Hawadle and Murusade) as a prelude to the national reconciliation conference.

5. The Imam of Hirab advised my Special Representative that it would be necessary to arrange separate meetings between the Habr Gedir and the other subclans before proceeding to a plenary session of the Hawiye peace conference. He was confident that this process

would succeed and result in the establishment of district and regional councils in Benadir (Mogadishu) as well as the appointment of a governor for Benadir.

6. Over the past few weeks, the Imam has held meetings with various subclan leaders. His efforts culminated in the convening on 20 August 1994 of a meeting attended by 36 representatives from the Mudulood clan family (including Abgals) and the Habr Gedir. The participants unanimously agreed that, in order to facilitate the restoration of peace in Mogadishu, their respective "technicals" must withdraw to their original areas of control. A committee was accordingly established to monitor and oversee the removal of the "technicals".

7. Subsequently, a political subcommittee of the Hirab Reconciliation Committee, set up by the Imam in January 1994, was reconvened from 28 to 30 August 1994 at a hotel in north Mogadishu. During the meeting, the Hirab subclans (Abgal and Habr Gedir) agreed that all militia men should be withdrawn from contested areas with immediate effect. Agreement was also reached that all checkpoints and roadblocks set up by the various clan militias in the city should be removed by 3 September 1994. Furthermore, a joint committee was established to resolve the issue of the roadblocks and the positioning of militia at the entrance to Mogadishu seaport and airport.

8. On 3 September 1994, the Imam of Hirab also led a 13-man peace mission of the Mudulood clan family to Medina district, where he secured the agreement of feuding clans in the district to disarm their militias and to appoint a committee of elders to settle their disputes in accordance with Somali tradition.

9. Similar agreements have been reached by the Habr Gedir and Murusade in Mogadishu with a view to achieving a comprehensive peace agreement between the two subclans. A follow-up mechanism for the implementation of agreements reached, including a cease-fire monitoring committee and a committee of elders, has been established.

10. On the whole, the initiatives of the Imam and other concerned Hawiye clan leaders appear to have had a salutary effect on the security situation in Mogadishu, although continued sightings of "technicals" remain a cause for concern.

11. Members of the Council will recall that the Somali factions had indefinitely postponed the preparatory meeting for the national reconciliation conference, called for under the Nairobi Declaration. The postponement was intended to allow sufficient time for consultations on the participation of the Somali National Movement (SNM) in the national reconciliation process; for the convening of the Congress of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), which was to elect a new

leadership of the faction; and for the conclusion of the Lower Juba Reconciliation Conference.

12. The Lower Juba Reconciliation Conference was successfully concluded on 18 June 1994. There have been no major violations of the Lower Juba peace agreement and the cease-fire is holding. The implementation committee has been meeting in Kismayo with a view to formulating a plan of action for the implementation of the agreement. The leaders of the Lower Juba Reconciliation Conference and the Absame Reconciliation Conference have continued to meet in an effort to merge the two peace processes in order to consolidate peace in both the Lower and the Middle Juba regions. The Chairman of the Lower Juba Reconciliation Conference, General Mohamed Ibrahim Ahmed "Liqliqato", held successful meetings from 7 to 9 September 1994 with Imam Sayed Hussein, Chairman of the Absame Reconciliation Conference, and General Mohamed Said Hersi "Morgan". Agreement was reached at these meetings to set priorities for the Juba regions and to expedite the implementation of the Lower Juba and Absame peace agreements.

13. The Fifth Congress of SSDF, following two months of intensive consultations, elected Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf as its new Chairman on 22 August 1994. The election of Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf has been accepted and Mr. Abdirazak Haji Hussein, the nominee of the supreme committee of the Sultans of the north-east to the chairmanship of SSDF, has recognized the election of Abdullahi Yusuf. The Congress was concluded on 26 August 1994 and consultations are continuing to consolidate its outcome. Following his election as SSDF Chairman, Colonel Yusuf has affirmed his commitment to assist in bringing together the southern factions in Mogadishu in order to facilitate national reconciliation, on the basis of the Addis Ababa agreement and the Nairobi Declaration.

14. With respect to developments concerning the participation of SNM in the national reconciliation process as called for under the Nairobi Declaration, the SNM Chairman, Mr. Abdirahman Ahmed Ali, met with the chairmen of the other three north-west-based political factions (Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA), United Somali Party (USP) and United Somali Front (USF)) in Djibouti, from 13 to 17 August 1994, to consider the situation in the north-west. At the end of their meeting, they issued a joint statement declaring, *inter alia*, that secession of the north was neither feasible nor desirable and that the national reconciliation conference envisaged under the Nairobi Declaration was long overdue and should be convened not later than September 1994. The statement also proposed the adoption of a federal system of government for Somalia and conveyed an offer by the four

factions to use their good offices to mediate between the factions in the south.

15. A joint delegation of three of the north-west-based factions (SNM, USF and SDA) arrived in Mogadishu on 30 August 1994 to mediate between the factions of the south. The joint delegation informed my Special Representative that the purpose of their mission was to promote and facilitate national reconciliation. The north-west-based factions believed that they had a responsibility at that stage to play a special role in breaking the impasse among the factions of the south in order to advance national reconciliation. They outlined their plan, which included, first, securing the broad agreement of the southern factions to the concept of a federal system of government for the whole of Somalia. That would be followed by further efforts to find a basis for reconciling SNA and the Group of 12 in order to expedite the national reconciliation process and the formation of an interim Government. The joint delegation was confident that, through its mediation, the preparatory meeting for the national reconciliation conference would be convened by the end of September 1994, and that all signatories to the Addis Ababa agreement would participate in the meeting.

16. Since its arrival, the joint delegation of SNM, USF and SDA has also held consultations with General Aidid, and the Somali National Alliance (SNA), Mr. Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, Chairman of the United Somali Congress (USC), and Mr. Ali Mahdi. The north-west-based factions also intend to meet with the Imam of Hirab to discuss national reconciliation after their consultations with Mr. Ali Mahdi and General Aidid.

III. Military and security aspects

17. In its presidential statement of 25 August 1994, the Council expressed its belief that the Secretary-General's recommendations for a reduction of the UNOSOM II Force contained in his report of 17 August 1994 (S/1994/977) were appropriate in the circumstances prevailing in Somalia. The Council stressed that priority should be given to ensuring the safety and security of UNOSOM II and other international personnel, including that of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and underlined the responsibility of the Somali parties in that connection.

18. Accordingly, the Force Commander took immediate steps to reduce the Force level by 1,500 by the end of September 1994 and thereafter to bring it down to 15,000 all ranks by the end of October. These reductions will bring the Force to a level 31 per cent below the strength of 22,000 authorized by Security Council resolution 897 (1994).

19. It is planned to carry out the reduction process in two phases. Phase I is being achieved by repatriating

four units: one Pakistani infantry battalion of 879 all ranks and the Romanian field hospital of 234 all ranks, both located in Mogadishu; the Botswanan contingent of 423 all ranks, located in Bardera; and the Irish transport unit of 90 all ranks, located in Baidoa.

20. Phase II of the reduction, in October 1994, will be achieved by repatriating two additional infantry units from Nepal located in Mogadishu and one Nigerian infantry unit in Merka and reducing by 4.5 per cent all other national contingents and the Force headquarters.

21. The reduction plan has been adopted to make maximum use of forthcoming scheduled rotations and to repatriate soldiers who have completed their tour of duty. Furthermore, the plan retains the multinational structure of UNOSOM II and allows contingent commanders the flexibility of deciding which personnel will be repatriated from their contingents in order to maintain the operational capabilities of the Force. The plan involves withdrawing forces from those areas where the situation is relatively stable at present. The maximum possible time is thereby provided for humanitarian activities to continue under the protection of UNOSOM forces where protection is most needed.

22. Although the Force would continue to perform the main tasks assigned to it under its current mandate, security considerations have already begun to affect the performance of UNOSOM. The Force Commander has therefore decided to concentrate the troops. The purpose of the concentration, by deploying contingents strong enough to react successfully to an attack, is to avoid the repetition of the kind of incident that occurred in Belet Weyne on 29 July when a small UNOSOM contingent was overrun by a strong militia force. As a result of the concentration of forces and the reduction process, troops have already been withdrawn from several locations: Bardera, Hoddur, Wajid, Balad. Before the end of October, troops will have been withdrawn from several other locations. On account of the withdrawal of forces from the above areas, gaps will be created in the deployment of the Force, which could be exploited by hostile forces, thereby increasing the security task. Therefore, the Force, while continuing to protect major seaports and airports and escorting humanitarian convoys, will no longer be in a position to provide permanent protection to United Nations agencies and NGOs at the locations that have been vacated. UNOSOM will however have the capability to react promptly to any anticipated emergency and to carry out humanitarian projects within a radius of 150 kms. By the end of October 1994, UNOSOM II will be concentrated mainly in three locations: Mogadishu area, Baidoa and Kismayo.

23. UNOSOM II continues to support the re-establishment of a Somali police force by providing instruction

in basic training to Somali police instructors. However, the Force has been directed to discontinue further issue of police equipment provided by the United States of America and move such equipment to safer locations. Relocation has been completed. The withdrawal of civilian police personnel, already decided by some troop-contributing States, is another factor that increasingly slows down the police programme.

24. In spite of the agreements among Somali factions mentioned above regarding the removal of "technicals" and of checkpoints or roadblocks, such "technicals" are being observed in Mogadishu on a daily basis, particularly around the seaport and the airport. The "technicals" are mounted with machine-guns and recoilless weapons and manned by armed militia. Sporadic small-arms fire can be heard on a continuous basis in Mogadishu.

25. Outside Mogadishu, the threat posed by "technicals" and armed militia is permanent. A total of 17 "technicals" carrying machine-guns and manned by armed militia have been observed recently near Afgooye. Inter-clan fighting has erupted in the vicinity of Baledogle, between Mogadishu and Baidoa. On 7 September a UNOSOM logistics convoy of 18 trucks was ambushed near Wanlaweyn. Only one vehicle reached Baledogle.

26. The most serious of the recent incidents happened in Belet Weyne and in the Indian area of responsibility. On 29 July, in Belet Weyne, troops of the Zimbabwean contingent were completely overrun by a strong militia force. One UNOSOM soldier was killed and the UNOSOM troops had to abandon all their equipment to the militia. The Indian contingent had to face two serious incidents during the same week. On 22 August, an Indian unit escorting a supply convoy was ambushed by armed militia near Burlego, on the Baledogle-Baidoa road. Seven Indian soldiers were killed during this incident. On 31 August, three Indian doctors were killed in Baidoa when a rifle grenade exploded as they were leaving the officers' mess.

27. The most recent significant incident happened in Balad on 9 September. During a ceremony to hand over some United Nations equipment to the local authorities, the latter demanded that all United Nations equipment be handed over to them. In the afternoon of the same day, approximately 100 militia, supported by "technicals", attacked a UNOSOM position protected by troops of the Zimbabwean contingent, with a view to seizing all the equipment before the troops withdrew. UNOSOM troops reacted immediately in self-defence. Four militia members were killed and 39 captured during this incident. No casualties were incurred by the UNOSOM troops. The Zimbabwean contingent finally left Balad with all equipment and stores intact. Immediately upon

their departure, some 300 men, women and children rushed into the camp to pick up leftovers. These serious incidents again illustrate the very volatile and virtually uncontrollable situation in Somalia. Similar incidents can happen anywhere, at any time.

IV. The humanitarian mission

28. United Nations agencies and NGOs have continued to provide humanitarian relief to the most vulnerable segments of the population and rehabilitation assistance wherever conditions of access and security allowed these interventions.

29. The humanitarian situation in Somalia over the past few months has been characterized by relative stability of the major indicators of the health and nutritional status of the majority of the population. Despite sporadic problems, particularly in the Middle Shabelle, Lower Juba and Bay regions, the country as a whole is expecting a good harvest during this rainy season. Under normal conditions of internal stability, security and governance, international assistance should now be shifted to a post-emergency recovery and development phase. Unfortunately, this is not possible in most regions owing to continued banditry, fighting and unrealistic demands for the provision of security or the settlement of petty disputes.

30. In this context, several organizations have either withdrawn their international staff from certain locations or have simply ceased operation. In parallel, the services of coordination, information, logistic support and security that could be provided by UNOSOM have been reduced considerably through a combination of troop reductions, Somali political or military actions and budgetary restrictions. Indeed, following the departure or suspension of activities of UNOSOM in Bossasso, Belet Weyne, Hargeisa, Hoddur, Balad, Wajid and Bardera in recent weeks and the planned closure of Merka by the end of October, the geographical area where UNOSOM can effectively support humanitarian operations is now reduced to some 50 per cent of what it was in mid-1994.

31. Operations of the United Nations organizations have also decreased, but mainly in the southern part of the country where prevailing security conditions or the impending troop withdrawals have resulted in a temporary suspension of activities in certain locations.

32. The World Food Programme (WFP) is currently active in six regions: Baidoa, Wajid, Hoddur, Galkayo, Bossasso and Hargeisa. Luug was closed because of insecurity. Baidoa remains the logistical hub of the south and requires a strong UNOSOM military presence. Recent problems encountered by WFP in the delivery of commodities through Mogadishu seaport eased during the month of August. WFP, however, estimates

that its humanitarian operations in south-central Somalia would be at greater risk without the UNOSOM military presence. However, in northern Somalia, operations continue without the presence of UNOSOM troops.

33. Rain-fed and irrigated areas were surveyed and examined by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in Gedo, Lower Shabelle, Hiran, Juba Valley, Middle Shabelle, Bay and Bakool to determine crop performance. A plant protection campaign and crop demonstration programmes are being implemented. Somalia is one of the nations identified for inclusion in a land-cover mapping project that covers the East African nations and will address development planning, sustainable management, food security, early warning systems and environmental monitoring.

34. The World Health Organization (WHO) continues its operations in Mogadishu, Baidoa, Kismayo, Hargeisa and Bossasso. In its communicable diseases control programme, WHO continues to provide technical support and supplies to local authorities and NGOs involved in the control of endemic diseases. Its basic minimum needs and primary health-care programme and training and manpower development programme continue operations and will remain to do so, security conditions permitting.

35. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was planning to support a number of small-scale activities in the Lower and Middle Shabelle regions and Baidoa, but the absence of UNOSOM's security support in these areas could affect considerations to do so.

36. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) programmes in Somalia have continued to provide vital assistance to children, women and other vulnerable groups, particularly in the areas of health, nutrition, water and sanitation and basic education, in all major areas of the country. UNICEF has received important support from UNOSOM, particularly logistics and security. UNOSOM's provision of security at airports and seaports, and protection of convoys in central and southern Somalia, were and remain essential to UNICEF's programme.

37. UNESCO conducted several workshops and refresher courses for headmasters and teachers during the annual closure of schools in August in Somalia. A mine-awareness campaign in Somali refugee camps in Kenya will be completed in the coming weeks, covering 30,000 refugees. The production of textbooks and teacher guides in Somali progressed according to predetermined schedules. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)-Somalia now comes under the UNESCO programme of emergency education and rehabilitation (PEER) and, as such, contributes to activities outside Somalia.

38. The International Organization for Migration (IOM), under an agreement with the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, has now assigned a team to reinforce the efforts of UNOSOM's Division for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in assisting internally displaced persons in their return home. Despite numerous difficulties and lack of resources, return convoys continue to be organized regularly with essential support from UNOSOM troops.

39. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has resettlement operations in Kismayo, Bardera, Middle Juba and Hargeisa. Thirty thousand displaced people from Kenya are currently awaiting resettlement to Kismayo as soon as the security situation allows.

V. Concluding remarks

40. Subject to the cooperation of all concerned, the present efforts of the Somali parties, with the assistance of UNOSOM II, could lead to the convening of a Hawiye

peace conference and the preparatory meeting for the National Reconciliation Conference by the end of September 1994. My Special Representative will continue his efforts towards that end. However, we should not overlook the daunting difficulties that have, time and again, delayed and frustrated past efforts to implement the Addis Ababa and Nairobi agreements.

41. In my report of 17 August (S/1994/977), I indicated that the end of September would be a crucial period for both the national reconciliation process and the continued involvement of the United Nations in Somalia. In view of the current developments, as well as the assessment of the situation on the ground that is being undertaken by the Secretariat, I expect to be in a position by mid-October to submit to the Security Council, in the second part of my report, my assessment of the prospects of national reconciliation and recommendations for the future of the United Nations operation in Somalia. The Council may therefore wish to consider extending the mandate of UNOSOM II for a period of one month.

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Security Council resolution extending the mandate of UNOSOM II until 31 October 1994, prior to which the Council would decide on the operation's future mandate

S/RES/946, 30 September 1994

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992 and all other relevant resolutions,

Recalling further the statement of the President of the Security Council of 25 August 1994 (S/PRST/1994/46),

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 17 September 1994 (S/1994/1068),

Deeply concerned by the deteriorating security environment, *strongly condemning* the attacks and harassment against UNOSOM II and other international personnel serving in Somalia and *underlining* the responsibility of the Somali parties for the security and safety of these personnel,

Reaffirming that the people of Somalia bear the ultimate responsibility for achieving national reconciliation and for rebuilding their country,

Stressing that the nature and the duration of the international support and resources the international community is committing to Somalia, including the continuing presence of UNOSOM II, depend very much on

the resolve of the Somali parties to achieve political compromise,

Urging, in this context, the Somali parties to redouble their efforts to advance the process of national reconciliation in Somalia,

Noting the intention of the Secretary-General to submit to the Council by mid-October his assessment of the prospects of national reconciliation and recommendations for the future of the United Nations operation in Somalia,

1. *Decides* to extend the mandate of UNOSOM II for a period of one month expiring 31 October 1994, prior to which the Council will undertake a thorough examination of UNOSOM's mandate with a view to deciding on its future;

2. *Encourages* the Secretary-General to continue with and intensify preparations of contingency arrangements for the implementation of possible decisions, including withdrawal of UNOSOM II within a specified time-frame, which the Council may take;

3. *Declares* its readiness to consider sending a mission of the Council to Somalia at the appropriate time in order to convey directly to the Somali political parties the

views of the Council on the situation in Somalia and on the future of the United Nations presence there;

4. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Document 95

Report of the Secretary-General concerning assistance for humanitarian relief and the economic and social rehabilitation of Somalia

A/49/456, 30 September 1994

I. Relief and rehabilitation programmes

A. Introduction

1. In its resolution 48/201 of 21 December 1993 on emergency assistance for humanitarian relief and the economic and social rehabilitation of Somalia, the General Assembly, *inter alia*, requested the Secretary-General to apprise the Economic and Social Council at its substantive session of 1994 of the progress made in the implementation of the resolution and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session. As requested by the General Assembly, an oral report was delivered to the Economic and Social Council at its substantive session of 1994 by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs. The present report, covering the period October 1993 to August 1994, is submitted pursuant to the above request of the General Assembly.

2. While the most severe phase of the emergency in Somalia can be considered to be over, the humanitarian situation remains precarious. There is still need for continued relief assistance for vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, particularly displaced persons and refugees. The difficulties and delays being experienced in achieving a lasting political settlement at the national level have a direct impact on the security situation, which continues to impede the efficient delivery of humanitarian assistance and the transition from relief to reconstruction and development.

3. In spite of these obstacles, the international community, together with Somali relief organizations and personnel, has been able to make considerable progress in assisting Somalis in all parts of the country. The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have continued their humanitarian work in the face of serious security constraints which have claimed the lives of many Somali and expatriate relief workers. There are currently eight organizations of the United Nations family operating in Somalia, together with some 30 interna-

tional NGOs. This presence is vitally important, as only a handful of the several hundred national NGOs, formed during the last 18 months, have developed capabilities to assume responsibilities now carried out by international NGOs. As another part of UNOSOM's coordination function, its Division for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs also provides logistical support for the resettlement of internally displaced persons and promotes the implementation of small-scale community projects. UNOSOM military contingents continue to provide escorts for humanitarian convoys, assist in the resettlement of the displaced and undertake some humanitarian activities, such as medical services to the population and the implementation of small-scale projects.

B. Food security

4. The food-supply situation remains serious for a large segment of the population. The monitoring of food security and possible food deficits are vital factors affecting emergency contingency planning. A Food Security and Crop Assessment Task Force has been established by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP), with the participation of concerned NGOs. The Task Force prepares and disseminates data and information essential for projecting immediate and future food requirements. Towards the end of each planting season, field missions are dispatched to assess the food-supply and nutritional situation in the country, the level of food crops produced locally and the likely supplies of imported food and food aid.

5. An FAO/WFP report in mid-June forecast that food-grain production during the 1993/1994 "Der" (secondary) rainy season would be about 44,500 tons, only one third of the corresponding output for the preceding year, despite a nearly 50 per cent increase in the area sown. The food-grain output during the secondary rainy season was estimated to be 60 per cent below the average production in the pre-civil-war period. The aggregate food-grain production in 1993/94, covering the "Gu"

(main) rainy season crop harvested in August 1993 and the "Der" season crop harvested in January/February 1994, was estimated at 165,000 tons, which is only one quarter of the normal level. This serious set-back, due to the failure of rains in the main growing areas, points to the need for substantial cereal imports. Food-aid requirements for 1993/94 are estimated at approximately 343,000 tons. Pledges so far amount to 200,000 tons, leaving a shortfall of 143,000 tons.

6. In 1993, WFP provided large-scale emergency relief assistance to approximately 1.2 million people. By January 1994, the food-supply situation had improved and the total number of beneficiaries was reduced to 650,000 (130,000 direct recipients). With an improved food situation, the focus was also shifted from relief to rehabilitation schemes. By March 1994, the number of operational small-scale rehabilitation schemes supported with food aid stood at 550. By July 1994, the number had risen to 842, benefiting some 285,000 people per month. Through these schemes, WFP is assisting in generating employment, revitalizing the agricultural sector, reactivating a market economy and promoting food self-sufficiency. Donors provided 150,000 tons of food, with a total value of US\$90 million, in support of these programmes.

7. WFP is currently distributing approximately 5,000 tons out of a monthly target of 8,000 tons through Mogadishu and its eight field offices. The shortfall in delivery below the target value is due to the prevailing insecurity. With approximately 20 per cent of resources now devoted to meeting the continuing relief food requirements, food-for-work (FFW) is WFP's largest single component of the programme. While in late 1993 approximately 30 per cent of resources was devoted to FFW, the proportion is now closer to 80 per cent. The programmes being assisted by WFP include the rural-development and urban-services sectors, assistance to the primary-health-care and primary-education sectors, supplementary feeding for children and other feeding schemes, resettlement, and reintegration of demobilized militia.

C. Agriculture and fisheries

8. Agriculture has traditionally accounted for two thirds of Somalia's employment and nearly three quarters of the country's foreign-exchange earnings. Farming activities continue to be seriously constrained by massive displacement of people and the slow pace of their return to their farms due to the prevailing insecurity. While many efforts are being made by humanitarian agencies, the serious damage caused to irrigation systems by the civil war and the shortages of seeds and basic agricultural tools have not facilitated the rapid rehabilitation of the

agricultural sector. In preparation for the main 1994 agricultural season, FAO distributed 300 tons of cereal seeds, 10 tons of vegetable seeds and 62,000 hand tools in cooperation with other United Nations agencies and NGOs. Plant-protection teams carry out surveys and, if necessary, spray areas infested by crop pests. In north-western Somalia, FAO rehabilitated two slaughterhouses at Hargeisa and Berbera. In addition, it distributed 400 oxen and 200 ploughs to 1,000 farmers. FAO and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) will soon become involved in a fishery development project in the Merka-Adale area, which will provide fish for Mogadishu. Numerous farming cooperatives have been assisted by the Small-Scale Project Programme of UNOSOM's Humanitarian Division throughout the country.

D. Health

9. Although there has been an improvement in the general nutritional status of the population and in increase in health facilities, mortality rates remain unacceptably high. Cholera, tuberculosis and malaria pose serious problems, and most of the basic health needs are still unmet. To address health needs of children and women in particular, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), in cooperation with the World Health Organization (WHO) and NGOs, continues to support 224 health posts, 60 out-patient dispensaries, 112 maternity health care centres and 24 hospitals. Some 860 community health workers, traditional birth attendants, laboratory technicians and Extended Programme of Immunization (EPI) workers have been trained country-wide. Since September 1993, UNICEF has provided supplementary feeding to some 713,000 vulnerable children and women, an average of about 65,000 per month. Additionally, some 950,000 children were provided with vitamin A supplements.

10. An outbreak of cholera was first detected at the north-eastern town of Bosasso on 12 February 1994. The epidemic spread to almost all regions of the country. Through a coordinated effort by WHO, UNICEF, UNOSOM, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and many NGOs, measures were quickly taken to contain the epidemic. Isolation and treatment centres were set up, water sources were chlorinated, and an effective information campaign was launched. UNOSOM played a central role by providing coordination through the creation of a Cholera Task Force and by mobilizing its transport and logistics capacities to facilitate the movement of health workers and cargo needed to fight the disease. Various national military contingents participated effectively in this concerted task. In the light of the diversity of issues involved

in fighting cholera and in order to maximize the effectiveness of all aspects of the campaign, three separate sub-committees were established at Mogadishu and at most UNOSOM Zone Offices as soon as cholera outbreaks at the respective regions were confirmed. In addition, a UNESCO-WHO cholera control campaign in schools was started with materials designed and produced by UNESCO. A cumulative total of 26,197 cases have been identified and 1,050 deaths were reported as at 31 July 1994. WHO is now concentrating its efforts on the north-western part of the country, where the epidemic has not yet abated, while UNICEF is continuing its chlorination of water sources to prevent any resurgence of the disease.

11. During the period under review, WHO has expanded its support to tuberculosis-treatment programmes at Mogadishu and in other parts of Somalia. As part of its malaria assistance programme, WHO is in the process of supplying anti-malaria drugs, laboratory equipment and supplies to Mogadishu and Hargeisa. Several NGOs, UNICEF and WHO have cooperated in the publication of *Primary Health Care Guidelines for Somalia*. WHO, UNICEF and Pharmaciens Sans Frontières (PSF) continue to cooperate in the procurement and distribution of essential drugs. UNICEF achieved its objective of vaccinating 142,000 children against tuberculosis and another 164,000 against four other preventable diseases, as well as 102,000 women of child-bearing age against tetanus, between September 1993 and July 1994. WHO, in collaboration with the African Medical Research Foundation, has established a reference laboratory at Mogadishu capable of diagnosing common diseases in Somalia. Training has been provided and assessments completed by technologists at Hargeisa, Bosasso, Garowe and Gardo. Other assessments are planned for Baidoa in collaboration with the International Medical Corps (IMC).

12. WHO continued to manage the supply of essential drugs and deliver them to most parts of Somalia through the Mogadishu-based Somalia Central Pharmacy (SCP). Extensive planning and stockpiling of emergency supplies enabled WHO to assist very effectively in the cholera epidemic. Following the outbreak of inter-clan clashes at Mogadishu, decentralization has been accelerated with relocation of stocks to Bosasso, Baidoa, Hargeisa and Luuq. UNOSOM cooperates with the relevant humanitarian organizations to ensure the continued supply of medicines to all parts of the country.

E. Water and sanitation

13. Throughout the country, access to safe drinking water remains limited and many Somalis are forced to use contaminated water sources, leading to exposure

to water-borne diseases. In an effort to improve the situation, UNICEF, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), several NGOs and national military contingents have been supporting various schemes to increase the availability of safe drinking water, including the digging of new wells, the rehabilitation of existing wells and the implementation of water projects in urban areas. UNDP's support of the Mogadishu Water Supply System, which started in June 1992 as an emergency assistance project, has been of great importance for the Mogadishu area. It is currently suspended owing to recurring labour disputes which have resulted in threats against staff. In addition, funds for this project are exhausted, and UNDP is seeking urgent contributions to continue supplies and services until the end of the year. An interruption of this vital water-supply scheme exposes up to 1 million Somalis to water-borne diseases.

F. Education

14. In spite of logistical and security constraints, United Nations agencies and NGOs have provided substantial assistance in rehabilitating the education sector. A large number of primary and Koranic schools have been rehabilitated, and other assistance is being provided in the form of education kits, textbooks, incentives for teachers, school meals and the supply of equipment. According to some reports, the number of pupils attending primary schools is greater than before the civil war.

15. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has been assisting in the rehabilitation of Somalia's education sector within Somalia and also in camps for Somali refugees in Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Yemen, by providing services through Education Development Centres (EDCs). In addition to Mogadishu, EDCs at Baidoa and Hargeisa and a Regional Programme Centre at Nairobi have become operational. A consortium of United Nations agencies and NGOs has pooled resources to print primary-school textbooks, with corresponding teacher guides, which are printed in the low-cost print shop attached to each of the EDCs.

16. UNESCO also launched a Somalia Open Learning Unit at the end of March 1994 and has conducted 40 workshops in various subjects. Using open-learning techniques, the workshops offer pedagogic and administrative training. UNESCO has also been instrumental in establishing boards of education which, in the absence of a governmental entity, provide much-needed coordination in this sector. The boards have appointed inspectors to visit schools and to collect data. In a complementary programme, UNICEF is providing support to some 400 primary schools. New emphasis is being put on support to Koranic schools, which have remained active

throughout the disturbances of the past year. WFP provides school meals, incentives to teachers and assistance for the rehabilitation of schools.

17. While the establishment of a scholarship programme to enable students to complete university studies had been called for, to date no contributions have been pledged. A number of educational institutions with experience in this field have expressed interest in being associated with the implementation of such a scheme. Interested donors may wish to inform the Secretariat of their willingness to make funds available for launching a scholarship programme.

G. Refugees

18. There are still nearly 500,000 Somalis living as refugees in neighbouring countries. In 1993 and in the first three months of 1994, some 88,000 Somali refugees were voluntarily repatriated from Kenya, mainly to the Gedo region. UNHCR has provided direct support for the return of approximately 58,000 Somalis, while it is estimated that at least another 30,000 have returned unassisted. Following its overall success in the Gedo region, UNHCR closed some of its field offices in that region in order to be able to concentrate activities and resources in Middle and Lower Juba.

19. Camp closures and camp consolidation in Kenya have also been made possible by large-scale organized and spontaneous returns under various cross-border operations. UNHCR and WFP provide the returnees with food assistance for three months and a small package of household items. UNHCR, together with UNICEF and NGOs based in Somalia, is monitoring these self-organized repatriations. Other voluntary return movements by land and sea are being planned by UNHCR with a view to supporting the repatriation of 35,000 Somalis from Kenya, another 15,000 from Ethiopia and up to 5,000 expected to return from Yemen. UNHCR has been severely hampered in its repatriation and reintegration efforts by lack of funds and had to issue a special appeal on 1 July 1994.

H. Internally displaced persons

20. One of the other major problems being faced in Somalia is that of resettling the vast number of internally displaced persons. There are an estimated 400,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Somalia, with about 240,000 located at Mogadishu alone. The Resettlement Unit within UNOSOM is charged with the responsibility of coordinating and facilitating resettlement projects and establishing reliable data on the numbers of IDPs. During the past year, the Resettlement Unit coordinated the repatriation of 45,888 persons. UNOSOM has continued to take an active part in the resettlement programme, with support being provided by national military contingents

for overnight transit arrangements, medical screening, transport and escorts. UNOSOM also assisted organizations such as UNICEF, WFP and international NGOs in the identification of beneficiaries and in negotiations with village leaders.

21. In early June, at the request of the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) undertook a 10-day assessment mission to Somalia to develop a comprehensive programme for the resettlement of the remaining IDPs. The mission visited five areas in the country and held consultations with Somali authorities and representatives of the international community. The major problems identified by the mission included the deplorable situation in which IDPs are currently living; the lack of adequate security in parts of the country; logistical and transport constraints; and lack of a coordinated approach in addressing the problem. The mission concluded that there is an urgent need for a coordinated programme of assistance for displaced persons to be implemented through a phased approach. The current commendable schemes being overseen by the Humanitarian Division of UNOSOM would be accelerated in regions which are considered safe, with the aim of resettling 60,000 persons in the first phase, to last six months. The programme would be extended for a further period of 12 months to make possible the resettlement of the remaining 340,000 persons, with the hope that there will be sufficient improvement in the security situation in the coming months.

22. It is not expected that all IDPs will wish to return to their previous areas of residence. Taking this into consideration, UNDP has initiated consultations with the International Labour Organization (ILO), with a view to formulating a programme of employment and income generation for displaced persons, particularly in the Mogadishu area. It is essential that adequate resources should be made available to resettle IDPs and Somali refugees returning to their homes. The substantial investments made in overcoming the terrible famine in Somalia would be made even more meaningful if the international community were to continue to show solidarity with the hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced persons who need to resume a productive life and contribute to the reconstruction of Somalia.

I. De-mining and demobilization

23. Within the constraints which affect the overall humanitarian programmes in Somalia, attempts are being made to initiate and develop de-mining and demobilization schemes. Current de-mining activities are being carried out by UNOSOM, using Somali deminers. Thirteen de-mining groups have so far been engaged to work in areas where local authorities are cooperating with UNOSOM.

By July 1994, 5,253 anti-tank mines and 2,223 anti-personnel mines had been destroyed. In addition, 56 square kilometres of grazing land and 60 kilometres of roads had been cleared of mines. UNHCR and UNESCO have jointly implemented a mine-awareness programme in the north-west and in the Galcayo area. The environment in which de-mining can take place will be better secured if the reconciliation processes are successful. That would enable UNOSOM to field more international staff to supervise and monitor various de-mining activities and to provide training to local de-mining teams.

24. An encouraging start has been made in providing assistance to demobilization in the North-West. A scheme to train 3,000 former militia members is being supported by WFP and other organizations at Mogadishu. In the Nairobi Declaration of 24 March 1994, the Somali political-faction leaders expressed their support for the concept of voluntary disarmament. Should the political leaders eventually honour this commitment, it will be possible to start a programme for the demobilization and reintegration of armed militia throughout Somalia. Many of them are teenagers who need training to facilitate their reintegration into civil society.

II. Reconstruction strategies and efforts

25. While relief operations are being continued, a parallel process of rehabilitation and reconstruction must be implemented. At the Fourth Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia, held at Addis Ababa from 29 November to 1 December 1993, representatives from Somali regions, political movements and the international donor community reaffirmed their commitment to accelerating Somali control of the rehabilitation and development process. In the Declaration issued by the Meeting, the participants reaffirmed the commitment of the international community to unconditionally providing essential emergency assistance to vulnerable groups. They also stated their agreement that the Somali people should be fully involved in the rehabilitation and development process and must bear responsibility for ensuring an environment conducive to it. Assistance would be provided in those areas of the country in which stability and security had been attained. Moreover, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts should be sustainable and should contribute to enhancing efficient operations of the private sector in a free and open market system.

26. The Declaration called for Somali initiatives in establishing viable civil institutions and appropriate mechanisms to facilitate the reconstruction and recovery of Somalia. The Somali representatives committed themselves to establishing preconditions for ending insecurity; to establishing regional development committees to prioritize regional development activities and mobilize re-

sources; to establishing a development council, composed of representatives of those committees; to accepting the principle of the right of voluntary return of all displaced persons and refugees and establishing inter-party committees to solve issues relating to returning refugees; and to establishing mechanisms at the district level to ensure effective delivery of services.

27. The donor community recognized the readiness of many regions to create the conditions necessary for rehabilitation. The donors agreed to give full support to mechanisms established to determine rehabilitation priorities and the modalities for funding and implementation of projects and also agreed to develop a common approach among themselves for the allocation of resources. They also agreed, among other things, to identify common institutional and security criteria for providing assistance to the regions; to provide assistance to prioritize development activities; to establish mechanisms for channelling recurrent-cost funding in a sustainable manner; and to coordinate donor strategies for supporting Somali institutions of management and economic governance. For its part, UNOSOM committed itself to working with all agencies and organizations concerned in order to strengthen the coordination of all aspects—humanitarian, political and peace-keeping—of United Nations efforts throughout Somalia.

28. The Declaration called for an aid coordination body composed of representatives of donors, United Nations agencies and programmes, NGOs and other multilateral and regional institutions and organizations. In response to the Declaration, the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) was formed. The inaugural meeting of SACB, whose membership includes major bilateral and multilateral donors, United Nations agencies and non-governmental groups, was held at Nairobi on 1 and 2 February 1994. At the meeting, SACB endorsed a Plan of Action, prepared as a follow-up to the Addis Ababa Conference, which reaffirmed that international rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance would be provided to areas of Somalia able to achieve levels of peace and security sufficient for long-term donor involvement.

29. The United Nations Development Office for Somalia was established in September 1993 as part of UNOSOM. In view of the long-term nature of reconstruction and development programmes, it was decided to transfer the Development Office from UNOSOM to a UNDP project. The Development Office would function as an integral component of United Nations activities in Somalia and in that context would cooperate closely with UNOSOM. The Development Office became fully established in May 1994 and is currently assisting regional authorities and their development committees in identifying priority projects for funding by donors and in

strengthening their capacity to plan and manage the reconstruction and rehabilitation process at the regional level. The Development Office is also responsible for the establishment of the necessary institutional capacity that will lay the foundation for a future national planning and economic-management mechanism. It is also providing secretariat support for SACB and its Standing Committee.

30. UNDP and UNOSOM are currently supporting the preparation of a Somalia country paper to be submitted to the "International Conference on Women and Development" at Beijing, China, in September 1995. A number of women's organizations have been established in Somalia during the past two years and are engaged in a variety of community welfare and development activities. Assistance to these organizations is being provided by the United Nations and NGOs.

31. UNDP and the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat) are cooperating in the formulation of a programme to support shelter reconstruction and low-cost housing in the north-eastern region of Nugal and to assist the municipality of Hargeisa in the rehabilitation of physical facilities, as well as the restoration of the municipality's governance and management capabilities. UNDP and WFP, in cooperation with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), are providing management support to the ports of Mogadishu and Kismayo. A similar task is being carried out by UNDP and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in regard to training management personnel for the Mogadishu airport.

32. The Somalia Rehabilitation Programme funded by UNDP, with a budget of US\$20 million, continues its activities through Project Implementation Offices (PIOs) in north-western, north-eastern and southern Somalia. The programme works directly with local communities to help them identify and articulate their rehabilitation needs and priorities and to design and implement integrated area-based strategies. Subprojects are currently active in such areas as school rehabilitation, improvement of wells and boreholes, establishment of water committees, road construction, small-scale enterprise promotion through cooperatives, agriculture, fisheries, frankincense production, credit schemes and marketing of produce.

III. Impact of security problems

33. The humanitarian programmes of the United Nations and international NGOs have been severely affected by the deteriorating level of insecurity. Banditry and lawlessness have been on the rise. In the past year, several expatriate and national relief workers have been killed in different parts of Somalia. In addition, kidnappings, armed attacks, threats and the looting of vehicles

and equipment have been taking place with alarming frequency. Under these circumstances, NGOs and United Nations agencies have been forced to suspend or withdraw operations on various occasions. Consequently aid agencies are experiencing difficulties in recruiting and retaining qualified international staff. The costs of additional security continue to soar. The recurring flare-ups of inter-clan fighting that have troubled Mogadishu in recent months resulted in an almost total standstill of all humanitarian activities in the capital and its immediate vicinity for an extended period of time. This unstable environment has also resulted in a breakdown of the already difficult mechanisms for the settlement of disputes, particularly those related to the employment of local staff by international humanitarian agencies.

34. Organizations of the United Nations system and NGOs have demonstrated their solidarity with and support for the victims of civil war, natural disasters and epidemics over an extended period of time. An unacceptably high number of expatriate and national relief personnel have lost their lives. In spite of dedicated and determined efforts, the lack of a political settlement and the increasing level of insecurity are forcing many organizations to suspend or terminate their assistance programmes. With the reduction in UNOSOM troops and the uncertainty about the future of UNOSOM, the situation in Somalia could well deteriorate to such an extent that humanitarian organizations may simply become unable to continue their programmes in many parts of Somalia. United Nations agencies will meet at the beginning of November to consider modalities for working in Somalia after the eventual termination of UNOSOM's mandate. Consultations will also be held with donors and NGOs.

35. Despite the proliferation of emergencies elsewhere and the weariness of many donors with the slow pace of the national reconciliation process in Somalia, continued financial support is needed by United Nations agencies and NGOs operating in Somalia. While it is recognized that humanitarian assistance will continue to be provided unconditionally to meet continuing relief requirements, the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of such assistance must be improved. Moreover, if reconstruction and long-term development are to be addressed effectively, the establishment of lasting peace and security must be given priority.

IV. Information provided by Member States

36. The following information on humanitarian assistance to Somalia has been made available by Member States to the Secretariat.

Denmark

37. Approximately 5 million Danish kroner has been provided through an NGO for water-supply projects in 1994.

Finland

38. A total of 3,650,000 markkaa was made available to UNHCR and an NGO during 1993 and Fmk 1 million provided to UNICEF in 1994.

Germany

39. In 1993, a total of 15.7 million deutsche mark was provided for a variety of humanitarian assistance programmes and DM 40.3 million for food aid and for rehabilitation and reconstruction activities. During the first half of 1994, a total of DM 8 million has been granted for food aid and reconstruction programmes.

Italy

40. Emergency assistance has been provided through international organizations and Italian NGOs working in different parts of the country. Activities supported include reactivation of basic social and economic services, rehabilitation of the agricultural sector and water-supply projects.

Japan

41. A total of US\$8.2 million has been channelled through UNHCR and UNICEF and 12.3 million yen provided for three projects under Japan's small-scale grant aid scheme.

Norway

42. A total of 23.9 million Norwegian kroner has been donated through UNICEF and Norwegian NGOs for relief supplies and for rehabilitation schemes.

Saudi Arabia

43. A total of US\$42 million has been granted in support of relief and rehabilitation activities for the emergency in Somalia.

Sweden

44. A total of 123.3 million Swedish kroner has been granted in emergency assistance for the fiscal year 1993-1994 through United Nations agencies and NGOs.

Switzerland

45. In 1993, a total of 2.8 million Swiss francs was donated to United Nations agencies, ICRC and other organizations for humanitarian programmes. For the first half of 1994, SwF 0.5 million has been granted.

Turkey

46. During 1993, food aid and medical equipment valued at US\$4.2 million were provided. In addition, 22 scholarships have been granted to Somali students.

*United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland*

47. Since January 1994, a total of 3.13 million pounds in bilateral assistance has been made available, bringing the total spent from January 1992 to date on assistance to Somalia to £44 million.

Document 96

Report of the Secretary-General concerning national reconciliation, humanitarian activities and parameters for the reduction and withdrawal of UNOSOM II

S/1994/1166, 14 October 1994

I. Introduction

1. In my report of 17 September 1994 (S/1994/1068), which gave a factual account of recent developments in Somalia in the political, security and humanitarian fields, I indicated that I would submit by mid-October a second part of the report covering my assessment of progress concerning national reconciliation and making recommendations regarding the future of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II). I also indicated that

the second part would draw upon the results of the visit to Somalia being undertaken at that time by Mr. Kofi A. Annan, Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations. The present report is submitted in pursuance of the above. It covers developments up to 11 October 1994.

2. In its resolution 946 (1994) of 30 September 1994, the Security Council, having noted my intention to submit to the Council a second part of the report along the lines stated above, decided to extend the mandate of

UNOSOM II until 31 October 1994 and encouraged me to continue with and intensify preparations of contingency arrangements for the implementation of possible decisions, including withdrawal of UNOSOM II within a specified time-frame. The present report accordingly includes recommendations relating to such contingency arrangements.

II. Visit to Somalia of the Under-Secretary-General for peace-keeping operations

3. I asked the Under-Secretary-General to travel to Somalia to review with my Special Representative and the Force Commander of UNOSOM II the operation's needs during this critical phase and to assess progress concerning national reconciliation. He was accompanied by my Military Adviser, Major-General J. M. G. Baril.

4. The Under-Secretary-General met with many Somali leaders, including General Mohamed Farah Aidid of the Somali National Alliance (SNA), Mr. Ali Mahdi, Spokesman for the Group of 12 Somali factions, Mr. Abdurahman Ahmed Ali "Tur", Chairman of the Somali National Movement (SNM), Imam Mohamoud Imam Omar, the Imam of Hirab, and General Mohamed Ibrahim Ahmed "Liqliqato", Chairman of the Lower Juba Reconciliation Conference. He stressed the importance of moving the process of political reconciliation forward in order to achieve the objectives of the Addis Ababa Agreement of 27 March 1993 (see S/26317) and the Nairobi Declaration of 24 March 1994 (S/1994/614, annex I). He emphasized that the resources of the international community were not unlimited and that the commitment to assist Somalia could not be sustained indefinitely if the Somali leaders were unable to reach a compromise and set their country on the road to peace, reconciliation and reconstruction.

5. The Under-Secretary-General reported to me that he had found the Somali leaders he met quite keen on the establishment of a transitional government to fill the political vacuum that had existed for so long in Somalia. He had stressed to them that the achievement of such a significant step in the process of political reconciliation could be brought about only by compromise and good will among the leaders in order to save their country from sliding back into the abyss. Any attempt by one person to dominate the Somali political scene could only lead to a repetition of the recent history, turmoil, suffering and destruction in Somalia. It was, therefore, imperative for all Somalis to work together to achieve political stability in their country.

6. The Somali leaders took the position that significant developments regarding the political process were taking place within the framework of national reconciliation. At that time, they expected, with the assistance of

UNOSOM, to convene before the end of September the long-delayed preparatory meeting for the National Reconciliation Conference called for under the Nairobi Declaration of March 1994, to be followed by the National Reconciliation Conference in early October 1994. The Conference would be expected to conclude its deliberations during the third week of October. The Somali leaders further expected the National Reconciliation Conference to appoint a transitional government and to examine proposals relating to the establishment of a federal system of government. They indicated that that approach enjoyed wide support among the various political factions, including those from the north-west, as it would provide some autonomy to the regions of Somalia. Some Somali leaders also thought it desirable to have the transitional government establish a national Somali army. The Under-Secretary-General emphasized that, in order to achieve durable political reconciliation, the transitional government would have to be a broad-based one.

7. On the question of security of troops, the faction leaders were informed that attacks on United Nations peace-keepers and personnel, including staff of United Nations and non-governmental organizations, as well as United Nations property, would not be tolerated. The faction leaders were also informed that the United Nations expected them to take measures to deter militia under their control from mounting such attacks and to investigate the incidents and punish the perpetrators. The Under-Secretary-General also informed the leaders that UNOSOM would react vigorously against any attack or harassment directed against it and other international personnel and property.

III. Process of national reconciliation

8. During their meeting at Mogadishu on 16 September 1994, the leader of SNA, General Aidid, informed the Under-Secretary-General that it was now the view of SNA that the ongoing consultations within the Hawiye clan provided a sufficient basis for the political process in Somalia to proceed directly to the convening of the preparatory meeting at the end of September, to be followed immediately by the National Reconciliation Conference, which should not last more than three weeks. General Aidid contended that that new position of SNA made the convening of the Hawiye Reconciliation Conference unnecessary.

9. The reactions of the leaders of the other Hawiye subclans to this development have been mixed. Mr. Ali Mahdi, who was originally reluctant to participate in the clan conference but was eventually persuaded to do so, expressed his surprise. The Imam of Hirab, for his part, wanted more time for consultations. As at the time of writing of this report, the preparations for a Hawiye

Reconciliation Conference, of which so much had been expected, had not begun. Given the hopes placed in the Hawiye Reconciliation Conference, the proposal to bypass it would seem to be a negative development.

10. As for the preparatory meeting and the National Reconciliation Conference, my Special Representative has reported that General Aidid is insisting on convening the former himself. For their part, Mr. Ali Mahdi and the group of 12 have insisted that invitations for both the preparatory meeting and the National Reconciliation Conference should be issued by my Special Representative and they have made it clear that they would not attend any meeting convened by General Aidid. However, as a result of extensive negotiations which Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) has held with both General Aidid and Mr. Ali Mahdi, my Special Representative has recently been informed that General Aidid has now agreed in principle to UNOSOM issuing the invitations for the preparatory meeting. General Aidid's decision is expected to be confirmed in writing in the next few days. My Special Representative will continue to extend all possible support to the efforts of the Somali parties.

IV. Humanitarian activities

11. Humanitarian relief organizations have continued to provide support for the most vulnerable segments of the population wherever conditions of access and security allow. Under normal conditions of internal stability, security and governance, international assistance to Somalia would now be dedicated to recovery and reconstruction programmes. Unfortunately, in most regions rehabilitation interventions have had to favour ad hoc small-scale projects rather than district or regional reconstruction and development plans, because of continued insecurity and the lack of progress in the political reconciliation process. These conditions have also prevented the realization of expectations generated by the formation of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body and the United Nations Development Office. While some of the major humanitarian objectives have been met, any natural or man-made disaster in Somalia could result in a renewed massive emergency, given the absence of indigenous institutions with adequate organizational capacity and financial resources. In most regions, basic community services (health, water, education) would not be sustained without external support. It is essential, therefore, that relief programmes for the most vulnerable segments of the population, support for basic community services and food security and nutritional surveillance programmes be continued. In addition, the repatriation of some 500,000

refugees and the resettlement of up to 400,000 internally displaced persons must be tackled as soon as possible.

12. As I have indicated in previous reports, UNOSOM troops continue to fulfil an important role in providing security for humanitarian organizations and their activities. While the geographical area where they can support humanitarian operations has recently been reduced significantly, the protection of key installations, such as the seaports and airports of Mogadishu and Kismayo and the airport at Baidoa, and the provision of military escorts are of vital importance to continued humanitarian work in the central and southern parts of Somalia. The recent pattern of extending the UNOSOM mandate from month to month and the continuing uncertainty about the Mission's future have made planning difficult and have increased the vulnerability of relief personnel and supplies to attacks and looting.

13. At its most recent meeting, on 23 September 1994, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee expressed its concern about deteriorating security. It is the considered view of the representatives of United Nations organizations and other inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations that, in the absence of a political settlement, humanitarian organizations will not be able to continue their current programmes without the support of UNOSOM troops. As the withdrawal of UNOSOM troops approaches, it will be increasingly difficult to provide the necessary protection for humanitarian programmes. In most areas, withdrawal would oblige humanitarian organizations to evacuate international relief personnel, though in some cases they might be able to return after negotiating security and operational arrangements with local authorities. However, experience has shown that such ad hoc arrangements can be extremely tenuous. Even if they were to hold, access and delivery problems would probably be experienced when key installations and entry points were no longer secured.

V. Parameters for UNOSOM reduction and withdrawal

14. It will be recalled that, following the completion of the operation undertaken by the Unified Task Force and the transition from that Force to UNOSOM II in May 1993, it was envisaged that the international community's remaining tasks would be carried out within a specified period of time. The Somali political organizations and factions had committed themselves in the Addis Ababa Agreement to a political process which would run for a two-year transitional period, effective from the date of signature of the Agreement, that is until March 1995. During this period, transitional governing mechanisms would be established whose primary objective would be to foster the reconciliation of the Somali people by build-

ing up its democratic institutions, restoring the machinery of government at the national, regional and district levels, completing disarmament and launching a programme of rehabilitation and reconstruction of basic infrastructure. In the Addis Ababa Agreement, the leaders of the Somali organizations and factions had called on the United Nations and the international community to assist the people of Somalia in achieving those objectives. When the Security Council decided to accept the Somali leaders' call for assistance, it was envisaged that the two-year transitional period would be the time-frame within which the mission of UNOSOM II would be completed. This objective was reaffirmed in Council resolutions 865 (1993), 897 (1994) and 923 (1994).

15. As endorsed by the Security Council in a presidential statement of 12 August 1994, a gradual reduction of UNOSOM's strength is under way. By the end of October 1994, its force level will have been reduced to 15,000 all ranks. The deployment and capabilities of the reduced force will be concentrated in three major centres: Baidoa, Kismayo and Mogadishu. It will maintain a mobile reserve unit to respond to emergencies. In the Force Commander's judgement, the 15,000-troop strength is the minimum viable force level for continued implementation of the present mandate and the initiation and execution of a safe and orderly closure of the mission if this is decided by the Security Council.

16. With respect to security during the period of withdrawal, recent incidents at Belet Uen and Balad, in which UNOSOM personnel were attacked and assets looted, indicate that the withdrawal of UNOSOM troops and assets could be difficult and dangerous in some areas. In the worst-case scenario, UNOSOM forces would have to withdraw in face of hostile action by Somali factions and/or widespread banditry, which would prevent the use of commercial air and sea transport. In order to cope with this threat, it will be necessary for Member States to provide UNOSOM with the support required to extricate personnel and equipment safely from Somalia. I have accordingly approached several Member States who possess the naval and air assets required to reinforce UNOSOM during the critical withdrawal phase, whether or not such withdrawal is carried out under hostile conditions. Such assets would have to include naval elements with fire support and sealift capabilities, as well as military aircraft. In this connection, the Government of Italy has informed me that it is prepared to make available five to six ships and 300 to 400 marines for that purpose. I am expecting further contributions from other Governments. While hoping that its withdrawal can proceed smoothly, UNOSOM must prepare for the worst-case scenario. It is my estimation that a secure and orderly withdrawal of UNOSOM troops and assets will require

a period of between 60 and 120 days, depending on security conditions.

17. Every effort will need to be made to ensure that the withdrawal of the Force is properly coordinated under the authority of the Secretary-General. The security of the personnel of United Nations and non-governmental organizations, as well as those of UNOSOM, will depend critically on an orderly and well-coordinated process, with a single, clear and undisputed chain of command.

18. Lastly, the manner in which a final withdrawal of UNOSOM II is executed will have important implications for the future deployment of United Nations forces on peace-keeping missions.

VI. Financial aspects

19. The General Assembly, by its resolution 48/239 of 24 March 1994, provided financial resources for the maintenance of UNOSOM II through the period ending 30 September 1994 at a monthly rate of \$77,442,517 gross (\$76,382,417 net). Therefore, should the Security Council decide to extend the current mandate of UNOSOM II in accordance with the recommendations set out in paragraph 22 below, I shall request the General Assembly at its current session to make adequate financial provisions for the extension of UNOSOM II.

20. In this context, it may be useful to recall that the Security Council had agreed to the establishment of the Trust Fund for Somalia pursuant to resolution 794 (1992) and maintained in resolution 814 (1993) for the re-establishment of the Somali judicial and penal systems and the Somali police. The total cost of this programme is estimated at \$19.08 million, while cash contributions of only \$8.08 million have been received in respect of the police training programme. It is anticipated that the shortfall in funding the programme would amount to approximately \$11 million by March 1995. In view of the Organization's inability to attract adequate voluntary contributions for the Trust Fund, it may be necessary to utilize resources provided for UNOSOM from assessed contributions to meet the urgent needs of the police training programme.

VII. Observations

21. In my recent reports to the Council, I have repeatedly had to state that the process of national reconciliation has not kept pace with achievements in the humanitarian area and that security has been progressively deteriorating, especially at Mogadishu. The commitments that the Somali leaders had entered into under the Addis Ababa Agreement and the Nairobi Declaration were not being carried out. UNOSOM's goal of assisting the process of political reconciliation was becoming ever

more elusive, while the burden and cost of maintaining a high troop level was proving increasingly difficult for Member States to justify.

22. The protracted political impasse has created a vacuum of civil authority and of governmental structure, leaving the United Nations with no function to build on in its efforts to help Somalia emerge from its present chaotic condition. The presence of UNOSOM II troops has had limited impact on the peace process and limited impact on security in the face of continuing interclan fighting and banditry. The Council has already decided that the mission of UNOSOM II should end in March 1995. If the Council maintains this decision and all UNOSOM II forces and assets have to be withdrawn, time will be required to ensure that the withdrawal takes place in a secure, orderly and expeditious manner. As indicated in paragraph 16 above, this may take as long as 120 days. It may also require extensive air and sea support from Member States and it is important that the availability of such support is confirmed as soon as possible. In the light of these considerations, I recommend that the Security Council extend the Mission's mandate until 31 March 1995.

23. It should not, however, be assumed that there will be no progress in the process of national reconciliation. On the contrary, I have instructed my Special Representative that, during the new mandate period which I hope the Security Council will approve, he should maintain to the full his efforts to help the Somali leaders achieve national reconciliation, at least to the extent of agreeing to establish a transitional government. In the event that progress can be made in this direction, I shall not hesitate to revert to the Security Council with recommendations for the continuation of some United Nations presence in Somalia beyond March 1995 if that is justified by the overriding objective of restoring effective government.

24. It will be especially important to maintain unified command and control if the withdrawal of UNOSOM forces from Somalia has to be carried out in hostile circumstances. Any unilateral attempt by troop-contributing States to protect or extricate their contingents will be more likely to deepen the problem than to solve it. In such delicate situations, a breakdown in command and control can prove catastrophic. The Council is accordingly asked to urge troop-contributing States to respect the unity of command and control under the authority of the Secretary-General, his Special Representative and the UNOSOM Force Commander.

25. The five-month extension here recommended will give the Somali leaders time to begin consolidating

any positive achievements which may arise from the ongoing process of political reconciliation. I hope that the Somali leaders, faced by a strong and overwhelming desire on the part of the people of Somalia for peace and reconciliation, will finally find the inspiration to make peace. There is no other solution for the people of Somalia after the years of civil strife which have brought so much suffering and which have frustrated the efforts of the international community to help restore stability.

26. The international community has provided generous assistance to help overcome the worst aspects of the humanitarian crisis in Somalia. While humanitarian organizations are committed to continuing their operations, it must be made clear that they can only do their work if adequate security arrangements are in place. The Somali leaders will bear the ultimate responsibility for the safety of international and national relief personnel and their assets both during and after the withdrawal of UNOSOM troops. If, in the coming weeks and months, agreement were to be reached on the establishment of a transitional government and civil and administrative institutions, the work of humanitarian organizations and the much delayed transition to reconstruction and development would be facilitated. This positive scenario, however, remains for the time being only a hope and humanitarian organizations will continue to rely on the support of UNOSOM troops. It cannot be excluded that, following the withdrawal of UNOSOM, Somalia will plunge again into anarchy and chaos, the responsibility for which will rest squarely on the shoulders of its leaders.

27. The establishment of a viable and acceptable peace can only come from the Somalis themselves. The international community cannot impose peace on the people of Somalia; it can only assist in the process of re-establishing peace and security there. Such assistance, however, cannot be sustained indefinitely. But reaffirmation of the Security Council's decision that the UNOSOM II mandate should end in March 1995 will not mean United Nations abandonment of Somalia. Should the Somali authorities succeed in creating and maintaining favourable security conditions, the United Nations and the international community can continue to play a role in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Somalia, thus consolidating the achievements of the Unified Task Force and UNOSOM. The United Nations could also retain a certain presence after the withdrawal of UNOSOM, to continue assisting the Somali political organizations and factions in the process of national reconciliation. However, the feasibility of international assistance of this kind will be very much dependent on the degree of security prevailing in the country.

Document 97

Letter dated 18 October 1994 from Tunisia, as Chairman of the Group of Arab States, transmitting a letter from the Group concerning the situation in Somalia and the importance of a continued United Nations presence there to prevent the deterioration of security conditions and to facilitate national reconciliation

S/1994/1204, 22 October 1994; original in Arabic

I have the pleasure, as Chairman of the Arab Group for October 1994, to transmit to you herewith, at the request of the Group, the text of a letter concerning the situation in Somalia and the importance of a continued United Nations presence there to prevent a renewed deterioration of security conditions and facilitate national reconciliation among the different Somali factions.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Slaheddine ABDELLAH
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex Letter from the Arab Group to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

The Arab Group, referring to the resolution on the situation in Somalia adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States at its 102nd ordinary session, feels it necessary, after an extensive review and an in-depth study of that situation, to communicate to you its concerns regarding this matter:

1. In taking this initiative, the Group wishes to express its profound appreciation to the international community for its commitment, its generosity and its patience in dealing with the crisis in Somalia, thus warding off a major human crisis.

2. The Arab Group considers that, in spite of the slow pace observed in achieving national reconciliation and in finding a political solution, some perceptible progress has been achieved in the decline in fighting among factions and the greater inclination of their leaders towards negotiation. In view of these favourable, albeit slow, developments and the likelihood that a sudden, total withdrawal of the United Nations forces from Somalia might create a void that would lead to a new flare-up of war in the country, the Arab Group strongly recommends proceeding on the basis of the following principles:

- The mission of the United Nations forces in Somalia, namely to ensure a stable environment favourable to humanitarian activities and conducive to a suitable political solution, should be continued;
 - Any withdrawal of the United Nations forces from Somalia must take place gradually, in successive stages, so as to enable the Somali leaders to overcome their differences and form a central authority;
 - A political mission must be sent by the Security Council as soon as possible to apprise the Somali people of the Council's view regarding the future of the United Nations forces in Somalia and the need to speed up the process of reconciliation. The mission, moreover, must be sent before the Security Council takes any further decision regarding the future of the peace-keeping forces in Somalia;
 - In conjunction with a gradual reduction of the United Nations forces in Somalia, available funds must be employed to raise the country's economic and social level, to rebuild, to continue the reconciliation process and to arrive at a political solution;
 - The Somali leaders must, without any further delay, hold an expanded conference on reconciliation to constitute a critical turning-point in the reconciliation process;
 - The United Nations must redouble its efforts to encourage national reconciliation and arrive at a political solution in Somalia. To that end, it must coordinate its efforts with those of the central dispute-settlement structure of the Organization of African Unity, neighbouring States and the League of Arab States.
3. The Arab Group strongly feels the need at this stage for a continued United Nations presence to ensure the future of Somalia. The tragic experience of Rwanda following the abrupt reduction of international forces there should be a sufficient lesson to the international community. Additional efforts must therefore be made to prevent any escalation of tension in Somalia.

4. The Arab Group appeals to the Security Council to extend the mission of the international forces in Somalia, in an initial stage, to the end of March 1995 and urges the international community as a whole to assist in the reconciliation process during this period. It wishes to emphasize the need for Somali leaders to cooperate with the international community in the endeavour to find a solution to the crisis in Somalia and to make every effort to arrive at an acceptable political solution in the shortest possible time.

5. The Arab Group reaffirms its commitment to striving in every conceivable way, in a spirit of cooperation, coordination and joint endeavour, to assist the United Nations in its efforts in that direction. It is essential, in the present situation, to endeavour to avert chaos and help create a civil society. The responsibility for averting violence and chaos and constituting a national government belongs first and foremost to the Somalis themselves. It is the task of the international community to extend a helping hand to assist them in achieving those goals.

Document 98

Note by the President of the Security Council concerning the composition of the Security Council mission to be sent to Somalia

S/1994/1194, 21 October 1994

1. At the consultations of the whole held on 20 October 1994, the members of the Security Council decided to send a mission to Somalia.

2. The members of the Council agreed that the mission, which will depart for Somalia on 24 October

1994, will be composed of the following seven members of the Council: China, France, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russian Federation and United States of America.

Document 99

Security Council resolution extending the mandate of UNOSOM II for an interim period expiring on 4 November 1994

S/RES/953 (1994), 31 October 1994

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992 and all other relevant resolutions,

Recalling further its resolution 946 (1994) of 30 September 1994, in which it, *inter alia*, declared its readiness to consider sending a mission of the Council to Somalia at the appropriate time in order to convey directly to the Somali political parties the views of the Council on the situation in Somalia and on the future of the United Nations presence there,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 14 October 1994 (S/1994/1166),

Having decided, at the consultations held on 20 October 1994, to send a mission to Somalia (S/1994/1194), and *convinced* that it should consider the report of this mission before completing its review of the mandate of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) and deciding on its future,

1. *Decides* to extend the mandate of UNOSOM II for an interim period expiring on 4 November 1994;

2. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Document 100

Report of the Security Council mission to Somalia (26-27 October 1994)

S/1994/1245, 3 November 1994

We have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Security Council's mission to Somalia, which took place on 26 and 27 October 1994. The report is submitted to the Security Council in accordance with a decision taken by the Council during informal consultations on 20 October 1994.

(Signed) WANG Xuexian
(China)

(Signed) Hervé LADSOUS
(France)

(Signed) Colin KEATING
(New Zealand)
(Chairman)

(Signed) Isaac E. AYEWAH
(Nigeria)

(Signed) Kamran NIAZ
(Pakistan)

(Signed) Yuriy V. FEDOTOV
(Russian Federation)

(Signed) Karl F. Inderfurth
(United States of America)

I. Introduction

1. In resolution 946 (1994) of 30 September 1994, the Security Council declared its readiness to consider sending a mission of the Council to Somalia at an appropriate time to convey directly to the Somali political parties the views of the Council on the situation in Somalia and on the future of the United Nations presence there.

2. At the consultations of the whole held on 20 October 1994, the Security Council decided to send such a mission, which would depart for Somalia on 24 October 1994. At that time, the Council adopted an informal document entitled "Somalia: guidelines for Security Council mission" (see annex I).

3. The mission of the Security Council was led by Mr. Colin Keating, Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the United Nations. Other members of the mission were Mr. Wang Xuexian (China), Mr. Hervé Ladsous (France), Mr. Isaac E. Ayewah (Nigeria),

Mr. Kamran Niaz (Pakistan), Mr. Yuriy V. Fedotov (Russian Federation) and Mr. Karl F. Inderfurth (United States of America). The mission was assisted by two United Nations Secretariat staff: Ms. Elisabeth Lindenmayer (Department of Peace-keeping Operations) and Mr. Shigeru Mochida (Department of Political Affairs).

4. Prior to its arrival in Somalia, the mission members prepared a statement to be delivered to Somali faction leaders (see annex II).

5. The mission visited Somalia on 26 and 27 October. Its programme of work (see annex III) included meetings with Mr. Ali Mahdi Mohamed, Spokesman for the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA), and General Mohamed Farah Aidid, Chairman of the United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA) (see annexes IV and VI). The mission received briefings on recent political developments from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, H.E. Mr. James Victor Gbeho, and on the military aspects of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) operation relevant to withdrawal from the Force Commander, General Aboo Samah Bin Aboo Bakar. The mission also had a meeting with representatives of United Nations agencies and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) operating in Somalia (see annex IX). In Nairobi, the mission had the opportunity to exchange views with the representatives of the Horn of Africa countries (see annex VIII) and the members of the Security Subcommittee of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) (see annex X). The Chairman and the members of the mission also held a press conference each, in Mogadishu and Nairobi respectively.

II. Activities of the mission

6. The mission's arrival in Mogadishu on 26 October coincided with consultations being held by factions allied with Mr. Ali Mahdi in North Mogadishu, and by factions associated with General Aidid in South Mogadishu, following the issuance of the memorandum on 14 October by General Aidid's USC/SNA and 11 other factions, calling for the convening of a national reconciliation conference on 27 October 1994.

A. Briefings by UNOSOM II

1. Briefing by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General

7. On 26 October, Ambassador Gbeho briefed the mission on current political developments. In particular, the mission was apprised of his intensive efforts to discourage General Aidid from convening a national reconciliation conference without the participation of those factions allied with Mr. Ali Mahdi. The mission was informed of General Aidid's decision to reschedule the convening of such a conference to 1 November 1994, which had been communicated to the Special Representative only a few hours prior to the mission's arrival in Mogadishu.

8. According to the Special Representative, the only remaining obstacle to the convening of an inclusive national reconciliation conference was actually the procedural question regarding who should be represented and take the decision to establish a Government. In his observation, there was already a broad agreement to stop fighting, to convene a national reconciliation conference and to establish a national Government by the end of the year. He felt that one solution to the question of participation might be for both sides to agree to set up a credentials committee as is often customary with conferences. This idea apparently was acceptable to Mr. Ali Mahdi but not to General Aidid. The Special Representative was concerned that General Aidid would unilaterally proceed with convening a national reconciliation conference on 1 November and declare a Government, which, in his assessment, would invite renewed fighting. He urged the mission to counsel the factions strongly to proceed on the basis of an inclusive approach to national reconciliation.

2. Briefing by the Force Commander

9. The Force Commander's briefing on 26 October covered an overview of the current deployment and operation of UNOSOM II troops; the security conditions in each area of responsibility of UNOSOM II in southern Somalia; the current status of force reduction, its effects and existing vulnerabilities, including a review of recent cases of withdrawal from outlying areas that involved the forced transfer of assets to local parties; UNOSOM II's assistance to the Somali police; and the withdrawal planning scenarios and support requirements. The Force Commander made a special reference to the fact that the flow of arms into Somalia was continuing unabated despite the Security Council's arms embargo.

10. The members of the mission focused on the details of withdrawal and practical difficulties associated with it, in particular implications on time requirements

for completion of the withdrawal. The Force Commander explained that the estimated requirement of 120 days for withdrawal assumed the continuation of current security conditions and the availability of shipping and offshore support from Member States, including hospital ships and amphibious support. According to the Force Commander, an emergency withdrawal could be accomplished much more quickly. An intermediate scenario was also outlined. He made it clear that, if any of the assumptions changed, then the time required for withdrawal would also change. He further indicated that the kind of support asked of Member States would depend on what UNOSOM II needed to take out of Somalia. He stated, in that connection, that he would advise the Security Council through the Secretary-General if the situation changed for the worse.

B. Meetings with Somali faction leaders

1. Meeting with Mr. Ali Mahdi and faction leaders associated with him

11. On 26 October 1994, the Security Council mission, accompanied by the Special Representative, held a meeting with Mr. Ali Mahdi and 13 faction leaders (see annex IV) associated with him under SSA. These 13 faction leaders included the chairmen of several signatory factions to the Addis Ababa agreement, those of a few new factions and even a "new chairman" of USC/SNA who, according to Mr. Ali Mahdi, had replaced General Aidid. The joint statement addressed to the mission by Mr. Ali Mahdi and his colleagues is reproduced in annex V.

12. H.E. Mr. Colin Keating, Chairman of the mission, read out the message of the Security Council, prepared on the basis of the guidelines adopted by the Council. The texts of the message and the guidelines, the title of which had been adjusted to read "Elements of presentation made by the Security Council mission", were subsequently presented to Mr. Ali Mahdi.

13. The message of the Security Council was well received by Mr. Ali Mahdi and the faction leaders present. In responding to the message on behalf of his colleagues, Mr. Ali Mahdi assured the mission of their continued cooperation with the Secretary-General and the Security Council. He stated that SSA factions had never been involved in any confrontation with the United Nations and he pledged that SSA would cooperate in the phasing out of the military component of UNOSOM, but added that it would also seek the cooperation and assistance of the United Nations in the reconstruction of Somalia. He appealed to the international community not to abandon Somalia only because of the obstructive policies of one of the faction leaders. The Chairman and members of the mission, while noting the assurances of cooperation ex-

pressed by Mr. Ali Mahdi, reminded him and his colleagues that in the coming weeks, the Security Council would be monitoring the situation in Somalia to judge if their words were matched by actual developments on the ground.

2. Meeting with General Aidid and faction leaders associated with him

14. On 27 October 1994, the Security Council mission, accompanied by the Special Representative, met with General Aidid and 12 other faction leaders (see annex VI) currently associated with him, including the leaders of 4 splinter groups of the signatories to the Addis Ababa agreement. The memorandum jointly prepared by these 13 factions was presented to the mission. The text of the memorandum is reproduced in annex VII.

15. Ambassador Keating made a statement identical to that delivered earlier to Mr. Ali Mahdi and the SSA, conveying the message of the Security Council. In underlining the importance the mission attached to an inclusive national reconciliation conference, he added that any regime that would emerge from a non-inclusive national reconciliation conference could not expect to acquire legitimacy or recognition in the eyes of the international community. The texts of the message and the guidelines (Elements of presentation made by the Security Council mission) were subsequently presented to General Aidid.

16. In response to the message, General Aidid said that he and his colleagues were determined to resolve the Somali crisis and that they would do everything possible to ensure that the remaining influential leaders were represented at the national reconciliation conference. However, he added that the 13 leaders present represented 95 per cent of the population of Somalia and would, therefore, proceed with the conference even if the remaining leaders did not join. He explained that the Somalis should not be expected to secure 100 per cent support of the population before forming a Government, since such was not the case elsewhere in the world.

17. On behalf of his colleagues, General Aidid assured the mission that they would protect the personnel and property of UNOSOM during the phasing out of UNOSOM II. He also assured them that UNOSOM and other international personnel would be treated with respect as they were considered guests of the Somali people. General Aidid added that Somalia needed the assistance of international NGOs and would ensure their protection following the withdrawal of UNOSOM II, and he repeatedly expressed the hope that the United Nations and the international community would continue to assist Somalia with reconstruction and other areas after the withdrawal of UNOSOM II.

18. Responding to questions from members of the mission regarding participation in the conference by Mr. Ali Mahdi, from whom they had detected a sense of willingness to enter into dialogue with General Aidid, the latter informed the mission that he and his colleagues would welcome Mr. Ali Mahdi's participation in the conference through USC, led by Mr. Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, and that he could also join the broad-based Government by competing for a post as a member of Somali society and as a member of the Central Committee of USC.

19. While expressing appreciation for the assurances given with respect to the establishment of a broad-based Government and the security of UNOSOM II during withdrawal and of humanitarian assistance activities after that, the Chairman and members of the mission stated to General Aidid and his colleagues that the international community would be observing with keen interest the situation on the ground to determine whether or not the assurances given in the meeting would be matched with deeds, and that the United Nations and the international community would be judging the worthiness of future cooperation with Somalia based on such cooperation as they would receive. In particular, the mission urged General Aidid and his colleagues to use the coming few days to ensure that the conference would be inclusive, and stated that the Security Council would give its full support to the Special Representative in his efforts to provide channels of communication and to facilitate reconciliation among the Somali factions.

C. Meeting with the representatives of the Horn of Africa countries

20. On 27 October in Nairobi, the mission, at its request, met with the representatives of the Horn of Africa countries, namely Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and the Sudan (see annex VIII), to brief them on its mandate and the result of its visit to Somalia. The members of the mission stressed the importance that the Security Council attached to cooperation with regional organizations such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as well as with the neighbouring countries of Somalia. The representatives of the Horn of Africa countries assured the mission that neighbouring countries had always expressed their willingness to be involved in addressing the problem of Somalia, that they were already playing a role and that they would continue to do so.

21. Ambassador Keating laid particular emphasis on the fact that the mission's message to the faction leaders had been that a national reconciliation conference had to be genuinely inclusive, that there could not be any artificial exclusion of concerned Somali parties, and that the international community would judge the legitimacy

of any regime that would emerge from the conference from such a perspective.

22. In view of the possible consequences of failure to achieve national reconciliation in Somalia and of the special leverage that the neighbouring countries have with the Somali factions, the members of the mission urged cooperation between the United Nations and the Horn of Africa countries, including in making the existing arms embargo on Somalia effective. Such cooperation should be aimed at promoting national reconciliation by discouraging a non-inclusive, and encouraging an inclusive, national reconciliation conference and an interim Government in Somalia.

D. Meeting with United Nations agencies and NGOs and the Somalia Aid Coordination Body

23. On 27 October 1994, the mission met with representatives from United Nations agencies and international NGOs in Mogadishu (see annex IX). They expressed appreciation of UNOSOM II's contribution to the protection of aid convoys, guarding of ports, etc. They understood the inevitability of UNOSOM II's withdrawal and stated their realization that, in the long run, they must conduct their activities without UNOSOM II's assistance. While declaring their commitment to continue their work even after the withdrawal of UNOSOM II, they all shared the concern that security conditions in Somalia would worsen following withdrawal. Some expressed a desire for some form of assistance in that regard during the transitional period leading to and immediately after withdrawal and for access to certain UNOSOM physical assets. Others disagreed. In general, value was seen in an ongoing United Nations presence.

24. In response to queries about the withdrawal plan, the Special Representative pledged to brief the agencies and NGOs at the next meeting with them now that UNOSOM II had a draft withdrawal plan. He took the opportunity to assure the representatives that UNOSOM II included all international staff of agencies and NGOs in its emergency withdrawal plan, should that become necessary.

25. Also on 27 October 1994, the mission met with the members of the SACB Security Subcommittee in Nairobi (see annex X). In sharp contrast with the United Nations agencies and NGOs that the mission had met in Mogadishu, this group held a negative view of an ongoing United Nations role in facilitating political reconciliation. They expressed their intention to continue their activities after the withdrawal of UNOSOM II.

26. However, the Ambassador of Ethiopia, a member of the Subcommittee, expressed a strongly dissenting view, saying that, while the fatigue of the international community was understandable, immediate abandon-

ment of Somalia by the United Nations was not desirable because there was no infrastructure in Somalia to facilitate political reconciliation or to permit coordination of reconstruction of the country. He added that Somalia's neighbours were too poor to help and that only the international community could do so.

III. Observations and recommendations

A. UNOSOM mandate

27. The Security Council mission concluded that 31 March 1995 was the appropriate date to be included in the Security Council's resolution as the end of the mandate of UNOSOM II. None of the Somali factions requested a longer extension, nor did the humanitarian organizations or NGOs.

28. Withdrawal of the military component of UNOSOM II will be complex and potentially dangerous. Somali cooperation with withdrawal is possible but cannot be taken for granted. Availability of military assets from Member States to cover such a withdrawal will be essential and will, in some respects, determine the completion of the withdrawal. The availability of commercial shipping will also be a key factor if withdrawal is to be orderly and if equipment is to be repatriated. Of overriding importance in this entire exercise will be the safety of personnel.

29. Issues that will arise include possible transfer of certain assets of humanitarian value (e.g. pumps, generators, etc.) to local Somali communities and NGOs.

B. Security Council message to Somali factions

30. The message based on the guidelines agreed to by the Council was conveyed in the form of a prepared statement and its text was given to the faction leaders.

31. The factions were told of the Council's expectation that they would cooperate with UNOSOM's withdrawal and that they understood that the international community's ability to provide humanitarian/reconstruction/development assistance in the future would depend upon achieving a secure environment. This, in turn, would depend on political reconciliation.

32. The mission made it clear that only a genuinely inclusive approach to political reconciliation was likely to lead to such a secure environment, and therefore that the legitimacy of any unilaterally declared governments would be doubtful.

C. The future

33. The mission confirmed to all concerned Somali parties, representatives of the neighbouring States, and United Nations agencies and NGOs engaged in humani-

tarian activities, the Council's desire not to abandon Somalia.

34. The humanitarian organizations and NGOs confirmed their intention to continue to operate in Somalia if security conditions permitted. Their views were sharply divided as to whether the United Nations could or should seek to assist in this regard.

35. All Somali authorities and most agencies viewed the ongoing role of the United Nations in providing facilitation and support for the political process as useful. Successful political reconciliation would take a long time and the United Nations should recognize that reality. Security conditions may, however, present problems to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in performing such a role after the UNOSOM military component withdraws.

36. The question of the United Nations role in assisting with security in the post-UNOSOM period was raised. Any such role would require careful consideration by the Secretary-General and the Security Council.

D. Role of neighbouring States

37. The ambassadors of the Horn of Africa countries in Nairobi were briefed on the Council's message to the parties and were urged to use their bilateral contacts to promote genuine national reconciliation and to refrain from supporting any divisive action by any of the Somali factions. The risks of a return to civil war were noted, including the possible impact on regional stability and renewed refugee flows. In that connection, they were also urged to support the Security Council's efforts to have the arms embargo observed.

38. The important role that OAU and other regional organizations could play to ameliorate the situation in Somalia was underlined.

E. Conclusion

39. The visit accomplished its purpose of clarifying the mission's understanding of the issues involved in the critical decision to be taken by the Council. The mission also served the purpose of clarifying the Somali leaders' understanding of the issues involved as well.

40. The Somali factions received the Council's message with a surprising degree of acceptance.

41. Assurances were given by two divided groups of Somali factions on cooperation with UNOSOM withdrawal, on long-term security for humanitarian assistance and on their intention to bring about genuine political reconciliation.

42. The Somali parties were left in no doubt that the Council would weigh these assurances in the light of their actions.

43. The mission's visit provided a timely opportunity to influence political events in a positive direction. The mission is hopeful that its visit may have had some useful impact.

44. However, everything that the mission saw left its members with a profound sense of unease and a fear that, whether or not UNOSOM leaves, political reconciliation or the emergence of a Government that enjoys widespread acceptance is far from certain. The risk of a return to civil war is real.

45. The Security Council should continue to receive reports and monitor the situation in Somalia, given its role to date, even after the withdrawal of UNOSOM.

Annex I

Guidelines for the Security Council mission

1. The date already foreseen for termination of the United Nations mission in Somalia (UNOSOM) is the end of March 1995. The lack of progress in the peace process and on national reconciliation among Somalis, taken together with the lack of Somali cooperation over security issues, have fundamentally undermined the United Nations objectives in Somalia. In these circumstances, continuation of UNOSOM beyond March 1995 cannot be justified.

2. This implies an orderly and progressive phasing out of the military component of UNOSOM in advance of that date. The Somali lack of cooperation with that process is more likely to accelerate it than to retard it.

3. The United Nations will be ready to sustain a facilitating or mediating political role beyond March 1995 if that is what the Somalis want and if they are willing to cooperate with the United Nations.

4. The United Nations will continue to work with regional organizations, in particular the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and with the Governments of neighbouring countries to promote reconciliation in Somalia and the re-emergence of a civil society there.

5. The United Nations will do its best to sustain humanitarian activities throughout Somalia and to encourage non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to do likewise, but their ability to do so will depend almost entirely on the degree of cooperation and security offered by the Somalis.

6. The United Nations will remain ready to provide, through its various agencies, rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance if the situation in Somalia develops in such a way as to make that practicable.

Annex II

Message conveyed by the Security Council mission to the Somali faction leaders on behalf of the Council

Mogadishu, 26 and 27 October 1994

We have come a long way in order to meet personally with you and deliver a solemn message to you on behalf of the Security Council. This is an exceptional step for the Council to take, matching both the gravity of the situation that now confronts Somalia and the depth of the concern felt by the international community.

In dispatching this mission, the Council wanted to make sure that all the Somali faction leaders, and indeed all Somalis, would realize that their country is at a crossroad and that the Council is about to take decisions that will profoundly affect the future role of the United Nations in Somalia.

The Security Council is faced with a critical decision in view of unusual circumstances. It is essential for all Somali leaders to realize that the responsibility for what will now happen to their country will rest squarely on their shoulders.

You will need to respond to the overwhelming desire of the Somali people for peace and reconciliation. This has been, for the past two and a half years, the path that the United Nations has consistently urged the Somali leaders to follow. At Addis Ababa in 1993 and in Nairobi in 1994 you had all agreed to do so. There is no other path.

In this connection, the Security Council mission wishes to convey to the Somali people, especially its leaders, a sense of the profound disappointment felt by the international community at the lack of progress in achieving political reconciliation and an improvement in the security conditions.

As you know, the Secretary-General has reported to the Security Council that the political reconciliation process is at an impasse. The result has been a vacuum of civil authority and governmental structure. This has left the United Nations with no basis to underpin its efforts to help Somalia to emerge from the present crisis. Security conditions have continuously deteriorated, especially in Mogadishu, and the tragic toll in lives of peace-keepers and relief workers and Somali personnel has continued to rise. As you are also aware, the date already foreseen for termination of the United Nations peace-keeping mission (UNOSOM) is the end of March 1995. In the absence of adequate Somali cooperation, the assumptions underlying the UNOSOM deployment in Somalia have been fundamentally undermined and so have the prospects of achieving the United Nations objectives as set out by the Security Council. In these circumstances, continuation of UNOSOM beyond March 1995 cannot be justified.

This implies an orderly and progressive phasing out of the military component of UNOSOM in advance of

31 March 1995. The Security Council mission expects the Somali leaders to cooperate in creating the security conditions that will facilitate the phasing-out process. Any lack of cooperation along these lines would be likely to accelerate rather than retard this process. This mission would welcome assurances that every effort will be made to ensure that the security of United Nations personnel and assets will not be put at risk.

The termination of the UNOSOM mandate will not mean that the United Nations will abandon Somalia. The United Nations will be ready to sustain a facilitating or mediating political role beyond March 1995 if that is what the Somali leaders want and if they are willing to cooperate with the United Nations to that end.

For its part, the United Nations will continue to work with regional organizations, in particular OAU, and with the Governments of neighbouring countries to promote reconciliation in Somalia and the re-emergence of a civil society there.

Furthermore, the Secretary-General has asked his Special Representative to continue his efforts to help the Somali leaders to achieve national reconciliation.

However, whether or not the continued efforts at a political settlement bear fruit, the Security Council appeals to all Somali factions and clans to forgo resort to violence as a means of sorting out their differences. The people of Somalia have suffered enough. Their ordeal must come to an end. They long for peace. A resumption of large-scale civil strife would be an indescribable disaster which must be avoided.

In particular, it is essential for the Somali factions at this stage to agree on convening a broad-based national reconciliation conference along the lines set out in the Nairobi declaration of March 1994.

A conference without the participation of all 15 Somali factions that signed the Nairobi declaration, plus the Somali National Movement (SNM), would be a recipe for continued strife and violence and the United Nations could not be a party to a divisive move of this kind. The mission urges all Somali leaders to meet in an inclusive reconciliation conference and to get on with the vital task of forming an interim Government.

The Security Council mission wishes to assure the Somali people that the United Nations, together with its agencies and programmes, will do its best to sustain humanitarian activities throughout Somalia and to encourage non-governmental organizations to do likewise. But their ability to do so will depend almost entirely on the degree of cooperation and security offered by Somalis. Continued attacks and looting will make it impossible to carry on the humanitarian activities effectively.

The United Nations will remain ready to provide, through its various agencies, rehabilitation and construc-

tion assistance if the situation in Somalia develops in such a way as to make that practicable. In this regard, the Unified Task Force and UNOSOM take satisfaction in the fact that starvation was stopped in Somalia through the joint efforts of the international community and many Somalis.

Lastly, the Security Council mission wishes to remind the faction leaders that the international community has made tremendous personnel and financial commitments to Somalia. These commitments cannot continue indefinitely, particularly in the absence of a meaningful improvement of the situation. The Council must reassess its involvement in Somalia in the broad context of its world-wide agenda. This is the thought that the mission wishes to impress upon the Somali leaders.

Annex III Programme of the Security Council mission to Somalia

Wednesday, 26 October 1994

1020 hours	Arrival at UNOSOM II headquarters
1040-1225 hours	Briefing by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, H.E. Mr. James Victor Gbeho
	Working lunch with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and senior members of UNOSOM II
1350-1550 hours	Meeting with Mr. Ali Mahdi and the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA)
1730-1955 hours	Briefing by the Force Commander of UNOSOM II, General Aboo Samah Bin Aboo Bakar

Thursday, 27 October 1994

0800-0935 hours	Meeting with General Aidid, the Somali National Alliance (SNA) and associated factions
1050-1110 hours	Press conference
1200-1320 hours	Meeting with United Nations agencies and international NGOs
	Working lunch with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and senior members of UNOSOM II
	Transfer to Nairobi
2005-2030 hours	Press conference
2050-2130 hours	Meeting with representatives of the Horn of Africa Group (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sudan)
2135-2215 hours	Meeting with members of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB)

Annex IV

List of leaders present at the meeting with Mr. Ali Mahdi

26 October 1994

(titles as presented)

Mr. Ali Mahdi Mohamed	Interim President
Mr. Abdulkadir Zobe	Vice President
Gen. Mohamed Abshir Muse	Chairman, SSDF
Gen. Adan Abdullahi Nur	Chairman, SPM
Adv. Abdi Muse Mayo	Chairman, SDM
Mohamud Khalif	Vice-Chairman, SNF
Omar Hashi Adan	Vice-Chairman, USC/PM
Mohamed Ramdan Arbo	Chairman, SAMO
Adv. Mohamed Ragis	Chairman, SNU
Adv. Abdullahi Moallim	Head of USC delegate
Mohamed Abdi Hashi	Chairman, USP
Mr. Mukhtaar	Vice-Chairman, SSNM
Mr. Caana Nuug	Vice-Chairman, SDA
Abdinasir Ahmed Adan Serjto	Chairman, USC/SNA (Gyr. Habar Gedir)
Abdullahi Hirs Drishe	Chairman, SSV (Saleeman/Habar Gedir)

Annex V

Memorandum dated 26 October from the
Somali Salvation Alliance

To: The Security Council delegation (by hand)
H.E. Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali
Secretary-General of the United Nations
New York

cc: Ambassador Victor Gbeho
Special Representative of the Secretary-General
in Somalia
UNOSOM, Somalia

On behalf of the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA), we submit to you this memorandum exposing our views on the present political situation, reflecting the deep aspirations of the vast majority of the Somali people who uphold peace, nationalism and democracy and firmly reject all attempts to plunge Somalia back into civil war, tribalism and military dictatorship.

We aim to highlight the relevant factors and crucial issues of the present political situation, putting the emphasis on the indispensable active mediation role that in our view the United Nations is to assume in the ongoing national reconciliation process to ensure the achievement of a just and lasting solution to Somalia's political crisis, which is the common concern of our people and the international community.

Furthermore, we would like to outline herewith our views on major issues of national interest that need to be addressed together with concrete and practical proposals

to enhance the reconciliation process, overcome the present standstill caused by the illogical attempt of a minority group to hijack the reconciliation process and dictate its will to the majority. We oppose the present sterile contraposition and animosity among the political factions and favour an innovative problem-solving approach stemming from the mutual comprehension and clear understanding that today the common and unique objective of all patriotic and peace-loving people is to keep the Somali nation from falling back again into the horrors of civil war and starvation.

We would like to take this opportunity, on behalf of the Somali people and the political organizations members of our Alliance, to express to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, H.E. Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and to his assistants, to the Security Council and to the member countries that have contributed in different ways to the United Nations mission in Somalia, in particular to the people and Government of the United States of America, our deep gratitude and sincere appreciation for the historic humanitarian intervention and peace mission to rescue our people and assist Somalia to stand again on its feet and regain its legitimate position among the family of nations.

On UNOSOM's early withdrawal from Somalia

In our view today Somalia is again at the crossroads. The choice is between genuine reconciliation and permanent confrontation, lasting peace and endless interclan fighting, justice and equality, and total dismemberment of the Somali nation.

The political climate and the security situation in the capital, Mogadishu, and in the country as a whole that showed tangible progress at the beginning of this year has been negatively affected externally by the pressures for the early withdrawal of UNOSOM and internally by the renewed attempt of the SNA group, encouraged by the appeasement tactics of UNOSOM officials, to transform unilaterally the planned national reconciliation conference into a launching pad for the self-proclamation of its military dictatorship.

Clearly the pressures for the abandonment of Somalia in this crucial moment will only favour the forces that oppose the return of Somalia to peace and democracy and that are committed to frustrating the successful accomplishment of the United Nations mission in Somalia and the reinstatement of the United Nations sovereignty and the establishment of a genuine Government of national unity.

The SSA leadership would like to inform the United Nations Security Council mission of the encouraging new positive trends, currently under way, towards the peaceful settlement of the existing political differences through

a genuinely broad-based national reconciliation process. In particular we would like to mention here the recent USC/SNA conference and the election of Abdinadir Mohamed Adan "Serjito" as the Chairman of USC/SNA.

We would like to underline to the Security Council mission the fact that UNOSOM's early withdrawal will wholly nullify all the valuable achievements that cost the international community a high toll in human lives and massive inputs of material and financial resources.

On UNOSOM's mistakes, shortcomings and deviations

We are of the opinion that the stubborn opposition and obstruction of the SNA group to the implementation of the Addis Ababa agreements and the Nairobi Conference declaration is the root cause of the present stalemate. The persistent aggressive actions carried out by the SNA against several Somali clans in the central and southern regions, pursuing their declared objectives of territorial expansion, disrupted the progress so far made and the gradual return to normal life achieved by the interclan peace and reconciliation agreements reached by the clan traditional leaders and elders at the regional level, in the central regions, Mogadishu, Kismayo, Dhobley, etc.

The recent events in Hiran region and in Lower Shabelle are clear proof of the escalation of the subversive activities of the SNA, culminating in the unprovoked attack against the UNOSOM military contingents in Beled Weyn and Merka.

We are seriously disappointed and concerned by UNOSOM officials' continued appeasement attitude and constant submission to SNA group's unchallenged deceptive tactics and diktats to the extent of renouncing its proper active mediation role in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. In our view this is based on long-standing misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the basic realities of the Somali political situation and society, which erroneously overestimated the role of General Aidid and the SNA group and based UNOSOM's decisions on the baseless assumption of SNA group's "key role" in the solution of Somalia's political crisis. On the contrary, UNOSOM persistently neglected the broad popular support enjoyed by the SSA political organizations throughout the country and systematically downplayed the fundamental role and the principled stand of these political organizations in favour of a peaceful settlement and the rebuilding of Somalia on a new democratic basis.

Notwithstanding the fact that in such a large and complex mission like UNOSOM, errors and deviations are possible, the deviations and shortcomings on the part of UNOSOM officials are beyond any reasonable expect-

tation and are actually jeopardizing the achievement of the ultimate objectives of its mission.

In fact, since the early stage of UNOSOM I, UNOSOM officials constantly pursued a policy of employing in key and sensitive positions officials connected with General Aidid and the SNA group. In spite of the existing hostilities between the SNA group and UNOSOM, General Aidid supporters enjoyed more than 85 per cent of the benefits earmarked for the Somali population in terms of employment opportunities, contract awards and project implementation, house and vehicles' rental.

The officially admitted theft of 4 million United States dollars is evident proof of UNOSOM mismanagement and unaccountability, benefiting on the other hand Aidid's group and penalizing the majority.

The recent SNA attack against the UNOSOM Zimbabwean contingent in Beled Weyn, and the looting of their weapons, ammunitions and military vehicles, met a bland verbal protest and is still unanswered. This behaviour casts serious doubts on UNOSOM officials' connivance with the SNA group, considering the fact that the Zimbabwean contingent of 168 soldiers was not only promptly supported but was ordered to a humiliating surrender, and the call for the immediate return of the weapons, ammunition and military vehicles remained empty words to keep quiet internal and international public opinion.

Furthermore, the fuel used by the SNA in their military attack against Beled Weyn was airlifted by UNOSOM to Galkayo together with a consistent number of persons under the pretext of logistical support to a non-existing interclan reconciliation meeting in Mudug region and the cover of transporting displaced people to their district of origin. The same happened in Merka and Brava in the Lower Shabelle region where UNOSOM military contingents stationed there stepped aside and passively assisted SNA aggression against the civilian population of these towns.

Moreover, UNOSOM officials, deviating from their previous stand of impartiality and respect for Somali political organizations' autonomy as per the Addis Ababa agreements, unexpectedly interfered in the internal affairs of SSDF by endorsing arbitrarily the self-appointment of Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf as Chairman of SSDF in open contrast with the decisions of the SSDF traditional leaders confirming General Mohamed Abshir Muse as the legitimate interim Chairman of SSDF for a period of one year.

This interference will only contribute to further confusing the present situation, together with the unilateral decision of UNOSOM officials to assign to Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf a "mediation role" without the prior consensus of the concerned political organizations and their leaders.

The UNOSOM officials are passively observing the SNA group's manoeuvres and attempting to replace three political organizations signatories of the Addis Ababa and Nairobi agreements, namely SAMO, SNU and SSNM, and their legitimate leaders, with three prefabricated SNA affiliations with the complicity of the SNA "appointed Chairmen".

We also strongly object to the channelling of the allocated fund for the Sool and Sanaag regions through the secessionist authority of the north-west. By doing so we feel that UNOSOM violates both United Nations Security Council resolution 897 (1994) and the recommendations of the donors at the fourth humanitarian conference held in Addis Ababa in December 1993.

UNOSOM's response concerning this subject was that it was pressured by the United Kingdom Government through its mission at United Nations Headquarters.

On the national reconciliation process

The UNOSOM policy of appeasement towards SNA is the cause of the continuous postponement of the Preparatory Meeting of the National Reconciliation Conference planned for 15 April 1994 and the subsequent convening of the National Reconciliation Conference on 15 May 1994 in accordance with the Nairobi Conference declaration of last March.

UNOSOM submitted to the unilateral position advanced by the SNA group under the pretext of the indispensable conclusions of the fifth SSDF Congress in Qardho, the Absame Conference in Dhobley and the SNM request to participate in the national reconciliation process after they reversed their former secessionist stand and now advocated the unity of the country on a federal basis.

The ultimate objective of these delay tactics advanced by General Aidid and accepted by UNOSOM aimed to gain time for his political manoeuvres directed to secure the recognition of the "appointments" of Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf as SSDF Chairman, of Colonel Omar Jess as Chairman of the "unified" SPM and of Abdurahman Ahmed Ali as the SNM Chairman.

The above manoeuvres and the clear renunciation by UNOSOM of its active mediation role encouraged General Aidid and the SNA group to embark on a unilateral call for the convening of a national reconciliation conference to deliberate under their dictate in an attempt to grab political power through undemocratic and deceptive tactics.

We clearly state here that SSA firmly opposes the above manoeuvres and the unilateral SNA call for the convening of a national reconciliation conference organized by it. Our principled stand has always been and still remains the following:

- (a) The National Reconciliation Conference should be convened under the auspices of the United Nations and with its active mediation to ensure that its deliberations and agreements will be recognized and guaranteed by the United Nations and the international community;
- (b) The National Reconciliation Conference should be preceded by a Preparatory Meeting to decide jointly the date, venue, participation criteria, procedures, chairing, etc.;
- (c) Participation in the National Reconciliation Conference will be limited to the following 16 political organizations: the 15 political organizations signatories of the Addis Ababa agreements and Nairobi Conference declaration of March 1994 and SNM;
- (d) The political organizations' delegations should include, among others, political leaders, intellectuals, traditional religious chiefs, community elders and women's groups to ensure the broad participation of all social strata;
- (e) The earliest date for the convening of the preparatory meeting could be the beginning of November and the National Reconciliation Conference about 20 November. A final decision should be made jointly by all the 16 political organizations after the positive conclusion of their ongoing consultations;
- (f) We reiterate our firm commitment to participate in a United Nations-sponsored national reconciliation conference.

We strongly recommend the United Nations Security Council mission to ensure the strict adherence by UNOSOM of the spirit and letter of the Security Council resolutions and support UNOSOM to assume an active mediation role based on genuine impartiality among all Somali political factions in accordance with the agreements of Addis Ababa and Nairobi with the ultimate objective of restoring peace, stability and democracy.

The National Reconciliation Conference will have the priority objectives of reconciling existing political differences on major issues of national interest and pave the way for the establishment of a central Government of national unity that will lead Somalia to free and fair democratic elections within about two years.

In all stages—the consultations, preparatory meeting and during the conference itself—UNOSOM should play an active role of mediator and monitoring, to ensure the adherence of the conference to the agreements of Addis Ababa and Nairobi signed by all the participants. The Conference should reach concrete and functional solutions to the following key issues:

- (a) The future constitutional setup of the Somali State; unitary State/federation, parliamentary/presidential;
- (b) Composition and powers of new State organs: presidency/parliament/central Government/judiciary;
- (c) Regional autonomy: power of the autonomous regions and balance of power between the central Government and the regions.

The Conference should deliberate upon and set up specific guarantees against the restoration of military dictatorship and should dissipate reciprocal suspicion and distrust, and reassure specifically the minority social groups and communities about their legitimate worries by setting up also guarantees against clan hegemony that is a legacy of the past dictatorial regime.

On the implementation mechanism and guarantees

The setting up of an effective implementation mechanism is an issue of particular concern for the success of the National Conference. The failures and shortcomings of the previous reconciliation conference were due to the lack of an appropriate implementation mechanism agreed upon to follow up and monitor the effective implementation of the agreements reached. Specific and adequate guarantees are indispensable safeguards against violations and breaches of commitments.

In case the peace process does fail, we strongly propose that a Cambodia type of United Nations administration be imposed on Somalia for a period not less than three years so that law and order can be retained. The militia must be disarmed and de-mining is vitally important. Also this administration will lead Somalia to civic elections.

Annex VI List of leaders present at the meeting with General Aidid

*27 October 1994
(titles as presented)*

Mohamed Farah Aidid	Chairman, USC/SNA
Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed	Chairman, SSDF
Ahmed Omar Jess	Chairman, SPM/SNA
Mohamed Qanyare Afrah	Chairman, USC
Mohamed Nur Aliyo	Chairman, SDM/SNA
Abdiaziz Sheik Yusuf	Chairman, SSNM/SNA
Sheikh Jama Haji Hussein	Chairman, SAMO
Ismail Babu Hurreh	Vice-Chairman, SNM
Abdurahman Dualeh Ali	Chairman, USF
Ali Ismail Abdi	Chairman, SNDU
Omar Mungani Aweys	Chairman, SNU
Ahmed Guure Adan	USP
Mohamed Farah Abdullahi	Chairman, SDA

Annex VII

Memorandum dated 27 October 1994 submitted to the Security Council mission to Somalia by the 13 signatories

1. We wish to take this opportunity to welcome warmly the Security Council mission to Somalia, and would like to express our deep appreciation for the continued efforts of the Security Council to assist the Somali people to resolve their political differences. We also wish to express to the delegation our sincere commitment to work towards the achievement of a durable political settlement to restore peace and security in our country and to re-establish in it a broad-based Government which can, with the cooperation of the international community, begin to rehabilitate and reconstruct the economic and social fabric of our society.

2. We are happy to note that the mission has arrived in Somalia at a time when the myth that Somalis were hopelessly divided into two opposing camps has been proven wrong by the recent encouraging developments. The mission has arrived when most of the political leaders representing the vast majority of the people have agreed to resolve their political differences and have taken a common political stand as reflected by the Mogadishu memorandum of 14 October 1994, signed by 12 of the 16 political organizations.

3. We are happy to inform you today that peace and stability as well as a sense of national reawakening are materializing throughout the whole of Somalia, encompassing the northern and southern regions of the country, making the fear of national disintegration, secession and clan warfare recede into the shadows of history, and moving forward the peace process and the prospects for a comprehensive national reconciliation conference. Although the Somali political organizations that are present with you today have contributed to the creation of this hopeful atmosphere, we must admit that it is our people, the Somali masses, whose popular will to overcome the trepidations of civil war and national chaos has contributed the most to the materialization of this new era that is beginning to dawn in Somalia. The sustained pressure of the international community to prod us towards making peace instead of war has also contributed its share towards the creation of this atmosphere of dialogue and discussion.

4. The Somali political organizations have come a long way from the politics of the gun to the politics of dialogue and discussions and have contributed a great deal towards making peace realizable and security attainable. The political organizations held two major conferences since the beginning of 1993. In the Addis Ababa agreement of 27 March 1993, the Somali political organizations reached an agreement to stop hostilities, disarm

the feuding groups and make arrangements that could have led towards the establishment of a transitional national council. In the Nairobi declaration of 24 March 1994 it was agreed to make the necessary arrangements to form a transitional government. In addition to these two major conferences, the political organizations held a series of meetings at the local, district and regional levels to move forward the peace process as well as to reverse the tide of secession in the north of the country in a peaceful manner. Among these meetings were:

- (a) The central region peace conference, held successfully in Mogadishu on 4 June 1993 between SSDF, SNDU and SNA;
- (b) The Lower Juba reconciliation conference, held in Kismayo on 4 June 1994;
- (c) The Hirab peace conference, held in Mogadishu in January 1994;
- (d) The Absame reconciliation conference, held in Doblely in June-July 1994;
- (e) The Murusade-Habargidir peace conference, held in Mogadishu in June 1994;
- (f) The SNM conference with SNA and the announcement of the end of the secession of the north from the rest of the country on 29 April 1994;
- (g) The SNM, SDA, USF and USP northern-based political organizations' Djibouti meeting, from 13-17 August 1994;
- (h) The consultations and subsequent declaration of the 12 political organizations to hold a national reconciliation conference on 27 October 1994.

5. The convening of this reconciliation conference is in many ways the culmination of the efforts of the Somali political organizations and the United Nations under the auspices of the Security Council to maintain national unity and find a sustainable political settlement for the Somali problem as a prerequisite for restoring peace and security, re-establishing central government structures and services, and commencing the process of rehabilitation and reconstruction of our country. The conference will work towards the formation of a broad-based transitional national Government with a federal structure to be agreed upon and ratified by the transitional national mechanism as well as a national reconstruction plan with the vision, versatility and applicability necessary to put it into action. We will need the support of the international community and particularly that of the United Nations to work out the details of this plan as well as to find the means to execute it successfully.

6. The convening of this reconciliation conference is also a continuation of the efforts we have made to find a durable political settlement to our problem in the Addis

Ababa and Nairobi conferences. The criteria for participation in this conference would therefore be based on the following understanding:

- (a) Participant organizations must be members of the 15 signatory political factions of the Addis Ababa agreement of 27 March 1993, plus the participation of SNM as stipulated in the above agreement;
- (b) It is important to note here that the agreement specifies that it is the signatory factions as factions *per se* rather than as individual names that signed for the factions that carry the authority of representation;
- (c) In case of change of leadership through a democratic process or means (elections) in any particular faction, the newly elected leader of that faction will thereafter be the legitimate representative leader of the faction in the reconciliation conference, in accordance with the constitution of that faction.

7. As previously agreed upon and accordingly announced on 14 October 1994, the opening of the National Reconciliation Conference was scheduled to take place on 27 October 1994. However, in deference to the request of the Security Council mission to Somalia to meet with the Somali political leaders on 27 October 1994, and in consideration of the wishes of some Somali faction leaders as well as to the appeal of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Somalia, we decided to reschedule the opening date of the National Reconciliation Conference to take place on 1 November 1994. We believe that this postponement will provide all concerned parties sufficient time to express their views on this critically important conference and prepare themselves adequately for it. We call upon all our Somali brothers to respond positively to this gesture and join us in participating in this conference where the problems facing Somalia will be discussed and resolved. We request the international community to give its support and assistance to this forthcoming National Reconciliation Conference.

8. We wish to inform the distinguished members of the mission that, after the opening ceremony of the conference, we will continue consultations with political leaders who are not in the conference until a common understanding on major political issues is achieved. We reject violence as a means of settling disputes between political factions, and we put a high premium on the process of reconciliation through discussions and dialogue. To bring about this process, over 1,000 delegates, observers and guests will attend the conference, representing every segment of the Somali society, including

clan elders, religious leaders, women, youth, intellectuals, professionals and local non-governmental organizations.

9. We would like to reiterate our commitment to finding a durable settlement to our current problem. We also believe in the democratic process and adhere to it in resolving national issues. It is the acceptance of the rights of the majority and the protection of the rights of the minority which underlies this process. We constitute 13 organizations of the constituent signatory members of the Addis Ababa and Nairobi agreements. Nevertheless, we are calling upon the remaining three members to join us so that together we could shoulder the responsibility of saving our nation from chaos, warfare and disintegration.

Signatories

1. SAMO	Sheikh Jama Haji Hussein	Chairman
2. SDA	Mohamed Farah Abdullahi	Chairman
3. SDM (SNA)	Mohamed Nur Aliyo	Chairman
4. SNDU	Ali Ismail Abdi	Chairman
5. SNM	Abdirahman Ahmed Ali	Chairman
6. SNU	Omar Mungani Aweys	Chairman
7. SPM (SNA)	Ahmed Omar Jess	Chairman
8. SSDF	Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed	Chairman
9. SSNM	Abdiaziz Sheik Yusuf	Chairman
10. USC (SNA)	Mohamed Farah Aidid	Chairman
11. USC	Mohamed Qanyare Afrah	Chairman
12. USF	Abdurahman Dualeh Ali	Chairman
13. USP	Ahmed Guure Adan	Chairman

Annex VIII

List of ambassadors of the Horn of Africa countries

1.	Ambassador of Djibouti to Kenya	H.E. Saleh Haji Farah Dirir
2.	Ambassador of Ethiopia to Kenya	H.E. Ofato Alew
3.	Ambassador of Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa Standing Committee's envoy to Somalia	H.E. Lissane Yohannes
4.	Ambassador of Eritrea to Kenya	H.E. Beyene Russom
5.	Ambassador of the Sudan to Kenya	H.E. Elsir Mohammed Ahmed

Annex IX

List of participants: United Nations agencies and international NGOs

1.	Talib Ali	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations-Somalia Operation
2.	M. Devadoss	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization-Somalia

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|------------------------|---|-------------------------|--|
| 3. Robert Hagan | World Health Organization-Somalia | 29. J. F. Pietri | Action Internationale contre la Faim |
| 4. Raymond A. Collins | Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees-Mogadishu | 30. Nancy Smith | Oxfam-UK |
| 5. E. Hounsokou | UNHCR | 31. Nigel Tricks | Daikonia Caritas Germany (DCG) |
| 6. Erling Dessau | United Nations Development Programme-Somalia | 32. De Mey Piet | Comitato Internazionale per lo Sviluppo (CISP) |
| 7. Piet Winnubst | World Food Programme headquarters | 33. Ga'al Rashid | CISP |
| 8. Ferdinando Zanusso | WFP-Somalia | 34. Savorani Guido | CISP |
| 9. Raymond Janssens | United Nations Children's Fund headquarters | 35. Ali Sheikh Arhi | Somali National Consortium (SNC) |
| 10. Pierce Gerety | UNICEF Somalia | 36. Ahmed Mohamed Ahmed | SNC |
| 11. Beverly Irwin | WorldVision International | 37. Dr. Gutaale | SNC |
| 12. David Neff | Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere, Inc. (CARE) | | |
| 13. Korky Schaetker | International Medical Corps | | |
| 14. Julian Bauer | ECOTERRA International | | |
| 15. Robert Meredith | World Concern | | |
| 16. Ramos Artiach | Médecins sans frontières-Spain | | |
| 17. Mohamed Abdirahman | American Friends Service Committee | | |
| 18. Alwahab M. Mohamed | International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) | | |
| 19. Farah Sheikh | African Muslim Agency (AMA) | | |
| 20. Mahamud Ahmed | Al-Hamramain Islamiċ Foundation (HIF) | | |
| 21. Ahmed Abdulle | CARE | | |
| 22. Sukyung Yoon | Hisan | | |
| 23. Bill Condie | UNICEF | | |
| 24. Ibrahim Koroma | United Nations Volunteers/UNDP | | |
| 25. Edward Johns | United Nations Conference on Trade and Development | | |
| 26. Joe Brunswig | International Civil Aviation Organization | | |
| 27. Ken Perkins | International Development and Relief Board (IDRB) | | |
| 28. Omar A. Abdi | Muwafaq Charity Foundation (MCF) | | |

Annex X

List of participants: SACB Security Subcommittee

- Mr. Sigurd Illing, Chairman, SACB Standing Committee European Commission, Special Envoy to Somalia
- Mr. Giovanni Brauzzi, Vice-Chairman, SACB Standing Committee, Counsellor, Italian Embassy
- Mr. Gerry McCrudden, First Secretary, British High Commission
- Mr. Ron Ullrich, Director, United States Agency for International Development, Somalia
- Mr. Jack Hjelt, Deputy Director, United States Agency for International Development, Somalia
- Mr. Basi Papadopoulos, Head of Unit, Horn of Africa, European Commission
- H.E. Mr. Lissane Yohannes, Horn of Africa Standing Committee
- Mr. Erling Dessau, Resident Representative, UNDP, Somalia
- Mr. S. Varadachary, Director, United Nations Development Office for Somalia
- Mr. Alexandros Yannis, Personal Assistant to the Chairman, SACB Standing Committee
- 2-3 NGO representatives

Document 101

Security Council resolution extending the mandate of UNOSOM II for a final period until 31 March 1995

S/RES/954 (1994), 4 November 1994

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992 and all other relevant resolutions,

Noting with appreciation the work of the Security Council's mission in transmitting directly to Somalia's political parties the views of the Council on the situation in Somalia and on the future of the United Nations in that country,

Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General dated 17 September 1994 (S/1994/1068) and 14 October 1994 (S/1994/1166), and the oral report of the Security Council's mission to Somalia given on 31 October 1994,

Paying tribute to the thousands of personnel of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), and to the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) as well as humanitarian relief personnel who have served in Somalia, and honouring, in particular, those who have sacrificed their lives in this service,

Noting that hundreds of thousands of human lives have been rescued from famine in Somalia through the efforts of the United Nations and the international community,

Commending the efforts of the special representatives of the Secretary-General to bring Somali factions together in national reconciliation,

Reaffirming that the people of Somalia bear the ultimate responsibility for achieving national reconciliation and bringing peace to Somalia,

Convinced that only a genuinely inclusive approach to political reconciliation would provide for a lasting political settlement and re-emergence of a civil society in Somalia,

Recalling that the date already foreseen for termination of the current United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) is the end of March 1995,

Recognizing that the lack of progress in the Somali peace process and in national reconciliation, in particular the lack of sufficient cooperation from the Somali parties over security issues, has fundamentally undermined the United Nations objectives in Somalia and, in these circumstances, continuation of UNOSOM II beyond March 1995 cannot be justified,

Recognizing further that termination of the mandate of UNOSOM II by the end of March 1995 implies a secure and orderly phasing out of its military component in advance of that date,

Noting the assurances of cooperation and non-interference with such withdrawal received from all Somali parties during the Council's mission to Somalia,

Re-emphasizing the importance the Council attaches to the safety and security of United Nations and other personnel engaged in humanitarian relief and peace-keeping in Somalia,

Underlining particularly, in this context, the overriding need for all possible measures and precautions to be taken to ensure that UNOSOM II does not suffer any casualties in the process of withdrawal,

Emphasizing its willingness to encourage the Secretary-General to sustain a facilitating or mediating political role for Somalia beyond March 1995 if that is what the Somalis want and if the Somali parties are willing to cooperate with the United Nations,

Concerned that the United Nations should continue to work with regional organizations, in particular the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the League of Arab States, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and with the Governments of neighbouring countries to promote reconciliation in Somalia and the re-emergence of a civil society there,

Recognizing also the impact that the situation in Somalia has had on neighbouring countries including, in particular, flows of refugees,

Noting also that the United Nations will do its best to sustain humanitarian activities in Somalia and to encourage non-governmental organizations to do likewise, but that their ability to do so will depend almost entirely on the degree of cooperation and security offered by Somali parties,

Confident of the willingness of the United Nations to remain ready to provide through its various agencies rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance, including assistance to the police and judiciary to the extent that the situation in Somalia develops in such a way as to make that practicable,

Noting further the interest of humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations in cooperating with the United Nations after the withdrawal of UNOSOM II in transitional arrangements for mutual assistance,

Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to threaten peace and security, and having regard to the exceptional circumstances including, in particular, the

absence of a government in Somalia, *acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* to extend the mandate of UNOSOM II for a final period until 31 March 1995;

2. *Affirms* that the primary purpose of UNOSOM II until its termination is to facilitate political reconciliation in Somalia;

3. *Welcomes* the intention of the Secretary-General, expressed in paragraph 23 of his report dated 14 October 1994, to continue throughout the period of the mandate of UNOSOM II, and even afterwards, the efforts of his special representative to help the Somali parties achieve national reconciliation;

4. *Urges* all Somali factions to negotiate as soon as possible an effective cease-fire and the formation of a transitional government of national unity;

5. *Decides* that every effort should be made to withdraw all UNOSOM II military forces and assets from Somalia in a secure and orderly manner as soon as possible, as described in the Secretary-General's report dated 14 October 1994, before the expiry date of the current mandate of UNOSOM II and without compromising on the paramount need of ensuring the safety of UNOSOM II personnel;

6. *Authorizes* UNOSOM II military forces to take those actions necessary to protect the UNOSOM II mission and the withdrawal of UNOSOM II personnel and assets, and, to the extent that the Force Commander deems it practicable and consistent, in the context of withdrawal, to protect personnel of relief organizations;

7. *Emphasizes* the responsibility of the Somali parties for the security and safety of UNOSOM II and other personnel engaged in humanitarian activities and in this context strongly demands that all parties in Somalia refrain from any acts of intimidation or violence against such personnel;

8. *Requests* Member States to provide assistance in the withdrawal of all UNOSOM II military forces and assets, including vehicles, weapons, and other equipment;

9. *Requests* that the Secretary-General keep the Council informed about the progress of the withdrawal process;

10. *Invites* the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference to continue their efforts in cooperation with the United Nations in the search for lasting peace in Somalia;

11. *Calls upon* all Member States, in particular the neighbouring States, to continue to provide support for all Somali efforts towards genuine peace and national reconciliation and to refrain from any action capable of exacerbating the conflict situation in Somalia;

12. *Reiterates* the need for the observance and strict monitoring of the general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia, as decided in paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992) and in this regard *requests* the Committee established by resolution 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992 to fulfil its mandate as described in paragraph 11 of that resolution, in particular to seek the cooperation of neighbouring States for the effective implementation of this embargo;

13. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to continue to monitor the situation in Somalia and to the extent possible to keep the Security Council informed in particular about developments affecting the humanitarian situation, the security situation for humanitarian personnel in Somalia, repatriation of refugees and impacts on neighbouring countries; and to report to the Security Council before 31 March 1995 on the situation in Somalia and to submit suggestions concerning the role that the United Nations could play in Somalia beyond that date;

14. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Document 102

Letter dated 10 November 1994 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council transmitting the statement of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee on Somalia concerning the future of humanitarian assistance in Somalia following the termination of the mandate of UNOSOM II

S/1994/1392, 7 December 1994

I should like to call to the attention of the members of the Security Council the attached statement of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee on Somalia. The Committee, established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 46/182 of

19 December 1991, includes representatives of United Nations organizations, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations active in humanitarian assistance operations. The statement also reflects the conclusions

of a special meeting convened at Nairobi on 24 and 25 October 1994, with the participation of all interested entities, to review the future of humanitarian operations in Somalia following the termination of the mandate of the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II).

I believe that the statement will contribute to the deliberations of the Council and hope that members of the Council will give full consideration to the various issues raised therein.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Annex **Statement of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee** **on Somalia**

During the 1992/1993 humanitarian emergency in Somalia, hundreds of thousands of lives were saved thanks to the massive relief operations undertaken by United Nations organizations and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations under the security protection of Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) forces.

With the end of the acute emergency phase, Somalia has faded away from the world media's attention. The donor community is increasingly disillusioned by the failure of the national reconciliation process and is furthermore called upon to support new dramatic humanitarian situations elsewhere. The mandate of UNOSOM is scheduled to expire in March 1995, and with it, the important programme support and operational services which UNOSOM has provided to humanitarian relief operations.

Nevertheless, the United Nations organizations working in Somalia reconfirm their commitment to continue to the maximum extent possible emergency and rehabilitation activities even beyond the expiration of the UNOSOM mandate. Intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations have played a vital role in this effort and, it is hoped, will continue to do so. The immediate goal is to continue to address the pressing needs of the most vulnerable groups, including nearly 900,000 externally and internally displaced persons representing close to 20 per cent of the total population. The hope is that the Somali leaders will rapidly end their destructive rivalry so that the country can engage in rehabilitation and reconstruction under acceptable conditions of security and stability.

Unfortunately, this is not possible in most regions of Somalia. Even the very basic community services such as health, water supply and primary education are unlikely to be sustained much beyond the withdrawal of external financial or management support. Banditry and threats to life and property continue to take a heavy toll on the

capacity of relief workers to deliver assistance and launch sustainable rehabilitation programmes.

In fact, the security situation in most parts of the country has deteriorated steadily throughout 1994. The offices, staff quarters and warehouses of United Nations organizations and non-governmental organizations are regularly besieged and harassed by heavily armed gunmen who move freely in the streets of Mogadishu and in the countryside. The withdrawal of United Nations forces in the absence of a political settlement will exacerbate this situation and could result in the withdrawal of staff and the cessation of humanitarian activities in significant areas. Under such a scenario, any natural disaster or any return to the generalized lawlessness of the pre-UNITAF period would rapidly degenerate into a predictable new emergency and its intolerable consequences on human lives and the internal and external displacement of people.

To minimize the potential negative impact on humanitarian and rehabilitation activities, as the mandate of UNOSOM II draws to an end, it is important to ensure an orderly transition to the traditional mandates of United Nations organizations. This process should start as early as feasible so that new operational, security, coordination and management mechanisms can be put in place well before UNOSOM completes its mission.

Relief and development workers in Somalia stress that security at major airports and seaports as well as rescue and evacuation capacity remain essential to their work and their ability to field staff and carry out programmes. Without a continued military presence or new security arrangements, it will not be possible to provide the necessary assistance to the Somali people.

United Nations organizations have agreed to adopt a common and coordinated approach to retain or replace the essential programme support and operational services formerly provided by UNOSOM. They are committed to developing a common framework for action with the full participation of all operational partners. To this end, it is proposed that a United Nations coordination team be established, composed of senior representatives of United Nations organizations active in Somalia and chaired by the Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), who will also serve as Humanitarian Coordinator. Full advantage will be taken of the differing security conditions in the various parts of the country to implement emergency and rehabilitation programmes whenever and wherever possible.

The Security Council is urged to support this process of transition by considering possible arrangements for the establishment of protected humanitarian operational bases at essential ports and airports, by authorizing the transfer to operational United Nations organizations and international non-governmental organizations of equip-

ment and assets now being used by UNOSOM and by making available to the new coordination arrangement the core UNOSOM humanitarian and security staff as soon as possible. United Nations organizations urge that positive consideration be given to the funding of security requirements by a special allocation so as not to divert voluntary funds made available for humanitarian activities.

The international donor community has in the past generously supported humanitarian efforts in Somalia.

Their continued support is essential to continuing these efforts after the withdrawal of UNOSOM military forces.

In the final analysis, all international assistance in Somalia must be founded on the basic principle of Somali responsibility. This means that the Somali people must determine the course of their future. Equally important, they must bear responsibility for ensuring conditions which will permit the effective implementation of humanitarian, rehabilitation and development programmes.

Document 103

Letter dated 2 December 1994 from the Secretary-General to the Organization of African Unity, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the League of Arab States concerning the situation facing UNOSOM II and inviting the three organizations to continue their peace efforts in Somalia

Not issued as a United Nations document

Excellency,

I am writing to you to keep you informed of the recent developments relating to the situation in Somalia and the actions taken by the United Nations in this regard.

As requested by the Security Council, I presented my assessment of the prospects for national reconciliation and recommendations regarding the future of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) in my reports, S/1994/1068 and S/1994/1166, copies of which are attached. Regrettably, I had to inform the Council that UNOSOM's goal of assisting the process of political reconciliation was becoming ever more elusive, while the burden and cost of maintaining a high troop level was proving increasingly difficult for Member States to justify. The continuing presence of UNOSOM troops has had limited impact both on the peace process and on security, in the face of persistent inter-clan fighting and banditry. Based on that overall assessment, I noted that if the Council maintained its earlier decision to end the mission of UNOSOM II in March 1995, time would be required to ensure a secure withdrawal of UNOSOM forces and assets. I stressed, however, that reaffirmation of the Security Council's decision to end UNOSOM II mandate by March 1995 would not mean that the United Nations was abandoning Somalia. Accordingly, I have instructed my Special Representative to vigorously continue his efforts to help the Somali leaders achieve national reconciliation, at least to the extent of agreeing to establish a transitional government.

Subsequent to these reports, the Security Council sent a mission to Somalia in late October in order to

convey its views directly to the parties. On 4 November 1994, the Council adopted resolution 954 (1994), of which I also enclose a copy, extending UNOSOM II mandate for a final period until 31 March 1995. In that resolution, the Council affirmed that the primary purpose of UNOSOM II until its termination was to facilitate political reconciliation in Somalia. It also requested me to submit to it before 31 March 1995 suggestions concerning the role that the United Nations could play beyond that date.

The United Nations system will continue to do its best to sustain humanitarian assistance activities and to provide rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance. The feasibility of a United Nations political presence and the provision of international assistance, however, will depend on the degree of security prevailing in the country.

The continued participation of regional organizations and neighbouring States in the search for lasting peace in Somalia would be essential. In resolution 954 (1994), the Security Council invited the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference to continue their efforts in cooperation with the United Nations in the search for lasting peace in Somalia. It called upon all Member States, in particular the neighboring States, to continue to provide support for all Somali efforts towards genuine peace and national reconciliation and to refrain from any action that might exacerbate the situation in Somalia. The Council also reiterated the need for the observance and strict monitoring of the embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia.

I am confident that I will be able to count on your personal contribution and on your Organization's continued cooperation and assistance in addressing these concerns.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Document 104

Letter dated 7 December 1994 from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General concerning emergency and rehabilitation activities in Somalia beyond the expiry of the mandate of UNOSOM II

S/1994/1393, 7 December 1994

I have the honour to inform you that your letter of 10 November 1994 concerning the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) on Somalia has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the information contained therein.

The Council continues to believe that the United Nations should do its utmost to sustain humanitarian activities in Somalia. The Council therefore welcomes the statement by the members of IASC reconfirming their commitment to continue to the maximum extent possible emergency and rehabilitation activities even beyond the expiry of the mandate of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), and their agreement to adopt a common and coordinated approach to such activities. The Council has consistently recognized that the cooperation of the Somalis on security issues is critical to the continuation of humanitarian activities and agrees fully

with the IASC conclusion that the Somali people bear responsibility for ensuring conditions which will permit the effective implementation of humanitarian, rehabilitation and development programmes.

In this context, the members of the Council recall their willingness to encourage you to play a facilitating or mediating political role in respect of Somalia after March 1995 if that is what the Somalis want and if the Somali parties are willing to cooperate with the United Nations. They also note that, in resolution 954 (1994), the Council requested you to continue to monitor the situation in Somalia and the security situation for humanitarian personnel in Somalia and they look forward to receiving your report at an appropriate time.

(Signed) Manzi BAKURAMUTSA
President of the Security Council

Document 105

Note verbale dated 13 December 1994 from the United Republic of Tanzania referring to Security Council resolution 954 (1994) and expressing the full support and cooperation of the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania in facilitating the withdrawal of the military component of UNOSOM II

S/1994/1437, 21 December 1994

The Permanent Representative of the United Republic of Tanzania to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to refer to the latter's note verbale dated 9 November 1994 regarding Security Council resolution 954 (1994) of 4 November 1994 on "The situation in Somalia".

In this connection, the Permanent Representative of the United Republic of Tanzania has the honour to inform the Secretary-General that the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania is willing to cooperate in facilitating the withdrawal of the military component of the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) as re-

quested in the letter from Mr. Kofi Annan, Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations dated 26 October 1994, and referred to in the facsimile message of

4 November 1994. The exploratory UNOSOM II team is welcome to visit the United Republic of Tanzania for the purpose at a time deemed convenient.

Document 106

General Assembly resolution concerning assistance for humanitarian relief and the economic and social rehabilitation of Somalia

A/RES/49/21 L, 20 December 1994

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 43/206 of 20 December 1988, 44/178 of 19 December 1989, 45/229 of 21 December 1990, 46/176 of 19 December 1991, 47/160 of 18 December 1992 and 48/201 of 21 December 1993 and the resolutions and decisions of the Economic and Social Council on emergency assistance to Somalia,

Recalling also Security Council resolution 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992 and all subsequent relevant resolutions, in which the Council, *inter alia*, urged all parties, movements and factions in Somalia to facilitate the efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and humanitarian organizations to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to the affected population in Somalia and reiterated the call for the full respect of the security and safety of the personnel of those organizations and the guarantee of their complete freedom of movement in and around Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia,

Recalling, in particular, Security Council resolution 954 (1994) of 4 November 1994, in which the Council, *inter alia*, decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Operation in Somalia II for a final period until 31 March 1995 and to withdraw all forces of the Operation before the expiry date of the current mandate, and noting the interest of humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations in cooperating with the United Nations after the withdrawal of the Operation in transitional arrangements for mutual assistance, security conditions permitting,

Noting the cooperation between the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the countries of the Horn of Africa and the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement in their efforts to resolve the humanitarian, security and political crisis in Somalia,

Noting with appreciation the continued efforts made by the Secretary-General to assist the Somali people in their efforts to promote peace, stability and national reconciliation,

Noting with concern that the failure of the Somali parties to achieve political reconciliation and to maintain

secure conditions in some parts of the country impedes the full transition from relief operations to reconstruction and development,

Reaffirming the importance it attaches to the results of the Fourth Coordination Meeting for Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia, held at Addis Ababa from 29 November to 1 December 1993,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General of 30 September 1994 on assistance for humanitarian relief and the economic and social rehabilitation of Somalia, 1/

Deeply appreciative of the humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation support rendered by a number of States to alleviate the hardship and suffering of the affected Somali population,

Recognizing that the emergency phase of the present crisis can be considered over and that there is a need for a parallel process of rehabilitation and reconstruction alongside the ongoing relief operations in those areas where security and stability have been attained,

Re-emphasizing the importance of the further implementation of its resolution 47/160 to rehabilitate basic social and economic services at local and regional levels throughout the country,

1. *Expresses its gratitude* to all States and the intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations that have responded to the appeals of the Secretary-General and others by extending assistance to Somalia;

2. *Expresses its appreciation* to the Secretary-General for his continued and tireless efforts to mobilize assistance to the Somali people;

3. *Welcomes* the ongoing efforts of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the countries of the Horn of Africa and the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement to resolve the situation in Somalia;

1/ A/49/456.

4. *Urges* all States and relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to continue the further implementation of resolution 47/160 in order to assist the Somali people in embarking on the rehabilitation of basic social and economic services as well as institution-building aimed at the restoration of civil administration at the local level in all those parts of the country where peace, security and stability prevail;

5. *Appeals* to all the Somali parties concerned to terminate hostilities and to engage in a national reconciliation process that will allow for the transition from relief to reconstruction and development;

6. *Calls upon* all parties, movements and factions in Somalia to respect fully the security and safety of

personnel of the United Nations and its specialized agencies and of non-governmental organizations and to guarantee their complete freedom of movement throughout Somalia;

7. *Calls upon* the Secretary-General to continue to mobilize international humanitarian, rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance for Somalia;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in view of the critical situation in Somalia, to take all measures necessary for the implementation of the present resolution, to apprise the Economic and Social Council at its substantive session of 1995 of the progress made and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its fiftieth session.

Document 107

United Nations Consolidated Inter-agency Appeal for Somalia, 1 January – 30 June 1995, issued on 22 December 1994 (excerpt)

Not issued as a United Nations document

Executive summary

Despite the absence of progress on the political front in Somalia, during 1994 United Nations agencies and international organizations in collaboration with local and international NGOs and UN military contingents sustained humanitarian assistance to needy populations in Somalia through the provision of food and non-food relief. Monitoring of vulnerable pockets in the country was provided through, among other things, an early warning system composed of humanitarian affairs coordinators and personnel of UN agencies, NGOs, and other organizations stationed throughout Somalia. These efforts contributed greatly to ending the acute phase of the emergency. As the emergency receded, agencies and organizations began to encourage self-reliance and community initiatives, and provided direct support in the form of supplies, training and management services. Food-for-work schemes replaced free food distributions as the preferred mode of delivering food assistance while agricultural assistance took the form of targeted interventions rather than the large-scale distributions of seeds and tools previously undertaken.

Nevertheless, it is clear that despite the progress achieved in 1994, given the political stalemate in Somalia and the insecurity which persists in certain areas of the country, emergency needs may become more acute during the first six months of 1995 as UNOSOM completes its withdrawal. In other areas where there is stability, ex-

tended relief and short-term rehabilitation activities are expected to continue.

The United Nations agencies and organizations working in Somalia have renewed their intention to continue to carry out humanitarian relief and rehabilitation assistance in 1995. The development of the programmes proposed through this Appeal are, however, founded on a number of key considerations:

The first consideration is that the appealing agencies will require the proactive support and involvement of the Somali people, their leaders and their communities, in order to work towards the humanitarian objectives put forward in this Appeal. Without this proactive support and commitment from the Somali people to ensure that the agencies are enabled to carry out their activities safely and securely, it is unlikely that the proposed projects will meet with any degree of success. It is also certain that in the absence of this support, the relief needs will increase, and the progress which was made by agencies and committed Somali partners in 1994 will more than likely be undone.

The second consideration is that the projects included in this Appeal must address priority emergency relief needs or, since government structures are currently absent in Somalia, short- to medium-term rehabilitation needs. Whilst a number of the proposed projects relate to institution-building at the local level and therefore border on developmental activities, all of these specific rehabilitation projects have evolved out of the unfortunate fact that Somalia is in a state of civil war. It is thus clear that

if the projects are to be self-sustaining, encouragement must be given to developing and supporting entities which are capable of sustaining the activities proposed.

The third consideration is that the activities proposed in this Appeal must not overlap with or duplicate those to be undertaken by other humanitarian relief partners. In this regard, the assistance proposed in this Appeal has been well coordinated with other proposed or ongoing humanitarian assistance efforts in the same geographic or programmatic areas. Thus although this Appeal relates to humanitarian activities to be carried out by United Nations agencies and the International Organization for Migration, its contents have been shared in draft form with local and international NGO partners as well as with inter-governmental organizations active in Somalia. Their comments and suggestions are reflected in this document. Also, as is evident from the various project summaries, a significant amount of the resources requested by the agencies in this Appeal will go towards supporting activities implemented by international as well as Somali NGOs.

The final consideration is that in a context of political unrest and against a background of uncertainty, considerable flexibility must be built into projections for humanitarian assistance to Somalia in 1995. This is essential to respond to the changing needs that are likely to occur during the year. As a result, a period of only six months has been chosen by the agencies in order to cover the transition between humanitarian operations protected by a special UN mission (UNOSOM II) and those humanitarian operations which follow the departure of UNOSOM military forces. Although longer term projections appear difficult in the current situation, some of the agencies and organizations have opted to give an indicative figure of their requirements for the full year. This is done through the relevant Project Summaries, while in the consolidated tables by Agency and Sector, only the requirements for six months are reflected. Updates will be provided to donors well before June 1995 to project requirements for the full year on the basis of the pace of implementation and the conditions prevailing in the country at the time.

Within the context of these considerations, United Nations agencies and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) are requesting through this Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal a total of US\$70,310,235 for their activities during the first half of 1995.

The largest amount requested in this Appeal is that of US\$24.8 million sought by WFP. In 1995 WFP will use its food resources as a means to fund a variety of institutional rehabilitation programmes. Therefore WFP's activities in the early part of 1995 will span many sectors including the education sector through a programme, for

which US\$3.8 million is sought, to provide food to schoolchildren, as well as to teachers in lieu of salary; the health sector, through a programme, for which US\$ 4.9 million is sought, to provide food to health and hospital workers, in-patients, supplementary feeding, and food to vulnerable groups; the agriculture sector, for which US\$ 3 million is sought for the provision of food assistance and agricultural inputs to farmers; and the demobilization and income generation sector, for which US\$4.2 million is sought, to provide skills training and food-for-work to encourage demobilization. In addition to this, WFP will establish a Monitoring and Reporting Unit at a cost of US\$379,125, to monitor programme resources and ensure that they reach their intended recipients and are utilized as planned. At the request of donor countries, WFP has agreed to establish a Food Security Assessment Unit at a cost of US\$432,625, in order to provide timely information to agencies and donors on the situation in Somalia. WFP is also seeking US\$5.5 million to support rehabilitation through food monetization, and to assist in resettlement and repatriation efforts through the provision of rations and food-for-work activities to returnees at a cost of US\$2.4 million. WFP will channel 47,408 mts of cereals, pulses, vegetable oil, milk powder, sugar and blended foods into Somalia through its programmes in early 1995.

The second largest amount is that of US\$14.6 million sought by UNICEF to carry out its activities. UNICEF will work with a range of partners including other UN agencies, international and national NGOs, local authorities, regional and district councils and community organizations in the implementation of its programmes. Of the funding sought by UNICEF, the largest portion is US\$ 5.5 million which will go towards providing Primary Health Care (PHC) services to, among others, 840,000 children under five years of age, and 448,000 pregnant and lactating women. UNICEF's nutrition interventions, for which US\$1.5 million is sought, will target the same population in addition to 225,000 children and 90,000 pregnant and lactating women in central and southern zones. UNICEF is also seeking funding of US\$4.6 million to increase access to safe drinking water and improved sanitation facilities and to strengthen community involvement in the water supply and sanitation sector. Finally US\$2.9 million is sought by UNICEF for interventions in the education sector including increasing access to education for children and women, and providing treatment and protection to psychologically traumatized children and women through training programmes.

UNHCR is seeking US\$10.7 million for two projects. Of the funding being sought, approximately US\$5.0 million will fund reintegration assistance to around 600,000 Somali refugees who are being repatriated to

northwest Somalia from eastern Ethiopia and Djibouti, and their communities of return. The balance of US\$5.7 million will go towards UNHCR's Somalia/Kenya cross-border and repatriation activities which will facilitate the return of 45,000 Somali returnees and encourage the stabilizing of population movements in communities of return by improving local living conditions through Quick Impact Projects (QIPS). This second project will be undertaken outside of northwest Somalia.

UNDP is requesting US\$6.2 million for three projects which it will implement in 1995. US\$1.9 million is sought to rehabilitate Afgoy well-field, the only water supply system in Mogadishu, and maintain its pumping and distribution system. US\$ 3.1 million is sought to carry out activities related to the demobilization of militia including providing them with training, adult education, counselling and employment opportunities. UNDP is also seeking US\$1.1 million to assist in the development, with the International Labour Office (ILO), of small businesses through a revolving credit scheme to generate employment opportunities for unemployed youth, female-headed households and internally displaced persons.

US\$3.9 million is sought by WHO to continue to provide material and technical assistance to the health sector in Somalia. WHO will focus its activities on, *inter alia*, epidemiological surveillance and disease control, the provision of essential and emergency drugs particularly to women and children, and health manpower development.

IOM is seeking US\$3 million to resettle internally displaced persons (IDPs) located primarily in Mogadishu. IOM's programme consists of identifying and registering IDPs, and facilitating the return of an initial 60,000 who have the wherewithal, with some targeted support, to become productive citizens again.

FAO is requesting US\$2.6 million for seven projects mainly targeting returnee and destitute Somalis. These include the provision of agricultural inputs, draught animals, and assistance in crop pest management to returnee and destitute farmers and, the provision of poultry to destitute and returnee female-headed households as an income-generating activity in northwest Somalia. FAO will also provide fishing gear to subsistence-level fishing communities in north and south Somalia. FAO intends to rehabilitate the abattoirs of Engavo, Burao and Las Anod in northwest Somalia and, in order to generate employment opportunities for low-income families, will, in parallel, establish animal hide and skin preparation units near the abattoirs. FAO will also establish an early warning information system for food security in order to provide quick and reliable information, as well as an analysis of the food security situation in Somalia, to the relevant policy makers.

There are two UNV Project Summaries included in this Appeal document. The first project details the UNV requirements of UN Agencies for the first half of 1995. UN Agencies are requesting a total of 40 new United Nations Volunteer (UNV) posts to assist in the implementation of projects included in this Appeal, as well as an extension of seven existing posts. For this the UN Agencies are appealing directly for US\$1 million in funding. Included in this amount is US\$ 304,000 being sought by UNV itself for eight new UNV posts to cover humanitarian needs which arise over the first six months of 1995, as well the extension of the seven existing posts. Under the second UNV project, UNV is requesting a further US\$1.8 million to provide technical support and capacity-building assistance to local NGOs, community-based organizations (CBOs) and communities involved in relief and initial rehabilitation programmes. For this project, a further 10 UNV posts are required at a cost of US\$240,000. This brings the total which UNV is appealing directly for via this Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal to US\$2.1 million.

UNESCO is seeking US\$1.7 million to target interventions such as teacher training, textbooks, teacher guides, distance-education materials and other resources which will contribute to the rehabilitation of Somalia's education sector. UNESCO will reach Somalis in-country and in refugee camps in Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Yemen through its activities during the first half of 1995.

Finally, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) is requesting US\$403,511 to fund posts and operational costs of the Relief and Rehabilitation Coordination Unit (RRCU) of the recently established United Nations Coordination Team (UNCT). The RRCU will serve as the secretariat of the UNCT in Somalia, monitor and report on emergency relief and rehabilitation needs and activities in Somalia, and support in-country coordination efforts.

...

PART I

CURRENT SITUATION AND HUMANITARIAN NEEDS

Chapter I Introduction

Overview

Between 1991 and mid-1993, hundreds of thousands of lives were lost in Somalia as a result of fighting and famine. Up to 1.5 million Somalis, or roughly 25 percent of the total population, were displaced inside Somalia or in neighbouring countries.

The initial courageous interventions by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and a few non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and United Nations organizations under the most trying security and logistical circumstances saved large numbers of people from starvation and death. The launching of a massive international airlift by mid-1992 helped this effort, and at the end of the same year, the deployment of UNITAF and UNOSOM II troops created conditions that allowed a vast expansion of relief activities through United Nations organizations and scores of NGOs.

Among the untold success stories of the international intervention in Somalia under the United Nations umbrella is the fact that the acute phase of the emergency has been overcome. At the end of 1994, most of the standard indicators of the health and nutritional status of the population show remarkable stability. Agricultural and livestock production is on the increase, although pre-war levels of production have not yet been reached. United Nations organizations and international NGOs continue to implement projects in all of Somalia's eighteen regions. In most of these regions they work without the protection of UN troops.

As Somalia enters its fifth year of ravage, instability and insecurity, the failure of Somali leaders to honour the commitments of national reconciliation made in Addis Ababa in 1993, and in Nairobi in 1994, continues to be a major setback. Although security conditions have been sufficiently stable in a few regions so as to allow some limited rehabilitation assistance, gains on the humanitarian front have not been matched by tangible and sustainable steps towards reconstruction and development.

Clearly the textbook notion of a continuum between relief and development has not materialized in Somalia. Although grass-roots development activities can be envisaged in some regions, the current situation in most parts of the country can be described as one of "suspended continuum", characterized by a protracted relief phase.

Disillusionment with an ever elusive political reconciliation process, and the extremely high costs of ensuring "protected" access and delivery of relief assistance for humanitarian organizations, have led the international community to decide upon the withdrawal of all United Nations troops by 31 March 1995. The challenge now facing the Somali people and the international community is how to ensure that the transition between humanitarian operations protected by a special UN Mission (UNOSOM II), and humanitarian operations which follow the end of such a mission, is managed in an orderly and timely fashion so that essential relief assistance can continue uninterrupted. Failure to do so will result in a predictable new emergency which will, as in the past,

exact a tragic toll in human lives and have severe consequences for stability in the sub-region.

It is recognized that some of the activities proposed in this Appeal span the borderline between relief and development as they relate to institution-building at the local level. Thus, although many of these projects fall outside of the humanitarian mandate established for UN Consolidated Inter-Agency appeals, they are nevertheless all linked to the fact that Somalia is currently in a state of civil war. The almost total absence of sustainable structures of governance in the country makes it imperative to lend this form of support under emergency operations if the cycle of recurring disaster and dependency is to be broken.

In the final analysis, the activities of the UN agencies in partnership with NGOs and Somali communities are an affirmation of faith in a better future for the people of Somalia, and an investment in that future through support for programmes to meet basic human needs. These programmes provide the underpinning of a sustainable peace process, even if only at the level of a few communities and regions. UN agencies and the International Organization for Migration call on the international community to support the activities presented in this Appeal, for these activities may serve as the only deterrent to the recurrence of the tragedy of 1991-1992.

Objectives for humanitarian action in 1995

UN agencies are committed to pursuing humanitarian relief and rehabilitation activities in Somalia in 1995. Their capacity to do so will depend primarily on active support and participation from Somali communities and leaders. Equally important will be their ability to work harmoniously towards common objectives, and to support the efforts of other relief and rehabilitation organizations. Four major objectives which will need to be pursued by UN agencies in the coming period are: to preserve humanitarian gains and further address the needs of the most vulnerable; to strengthen early warning systems, contingency planning and emergency preparedness; to create linkages between the relief phase and reconstruction and development assistance; and to develop common operational support services.

In order to ensure that humanitarian gains are preserved and the needs of the most vulnerable continue to be addressed, UN agencies will target much of their assistance towards internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, and other vulnerable groups such as women and children, the handicapped, and the poorest segments of the population who live in areas affected by chronic food deficits. Food assistance will be provided, with the aim of accelerating the transition from relief distribution to food-for-work projects supporting rehabilitation. To en-

sure the continued functioning of schools, clinics and hospitals, water systems and sanitation programmes, supplies as well as support to management services in the form of on-the-job training will be provided. Agencies will continue to provide assistance for the voluntary repatriation of refugees and the resettlement of internally displaced persons.

In an effort to strengthen early warning systems, contingency planning and emergency preparedness, existing mechanisms for the monitoring of food security will need to be improved, and the monitoring of population movements re-activated. The management and dissemination of information must also be improved so that the relevant data can inform decisions and stimulate action in a timely manner. Plans of the various organizations will be designed in such a way as to minimize over-reliance on a single supply route or centralized warehousing within Somalia. Agencies will adopt decentralized management and decision-making processes that will increase flexibility, as required by the changing conditions of security and stability in each region.

To ensure that linkages are created between the relief phase and reconstruction and development assistance, simple and low-cost rehabilitation activities in the form of small-scale quick-impact projects will be pursued wherever possible, with an emphasis on agriculture, veterinary services and basic community infrastructure rehabilitation. Community-based income-generating activities will be developed, with particular emphasis on projects supporting demobilization. Assistance will be provided to support the capacity of community-based organizations (CBOs) and national NGOs to become a positive force in the planning and implementation of the relief and rehabilitation process, and in sustaining basic services within communities. UN organizations in the implementation of their programmes and formulation of their strategy will cooperate closely with the UN Development Office for Somalia (UNDOS) and the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB).

The withdrawal of UNOSOM will mark the end of a number of important services previously available to relief and rehabilitation organizations. To the extent possible, UN organizations will pool their resources and harmonize the management of their existing services in order to develop common alternative support mechanisms in the fields of security, transport and communications. This will be done in full cooperation with UNOSOM during the transition phase. This cooperation will hopefully include concrete support through the transfer of equipment and assets. UN organizations will also adopt common guidelines and payment scales for staff and services and define minimum guarantees of security for their presence and activities in each region.

Implementation strategy

In implementing their programmes, UN organizations will adopt flexible decision-making processes and administrative procedures suited to an instable and often volatile situation. Agencies have to be ready to adapt their approaches to changing circumstances and to operate in an unconventional manner should the situation warrant it. The success of WFP in dealing with security issues in certain locations illustrates the capacity of UN organizations to re-negotiate the terms of their presence and assistance. UN organizations can also develop alternative operational modes using the existing examples lent by UNICEF, in the case of its approach of regionally decentralized management, and UNHCR, in the case of its cross-border formula.

While continuing to rely on international NGOs as principal partners, UN organizations will continue their commitment to Somali participation, mainly through strengthening genuine and tested community-based organizations (CBOs) and national NGOs. Partnership arrangements or joint ventures between international NGOs and national NGOs or CBOs will be a preferred mode of channelling assistance. This approach will need to be supported by intensive training and capacity-building of these local entities, and by support to national coordination bodies.

Finally, UN organizations recognize that their action in Somalia must be adapted to the varied reality of each region and that they may need to move their operations away from the sterile Manichean politics of the capital city until such time as a government of national unity is established and functioning effectively. This applies equally to programmatic, security and logistic matters.

The coordination mechanism

Decentralization will need to be combined with a collegial, consensual approach for a joint UN strategy to succeed. At their recent inter-agency meeting in Nairobi on 24-25 October 1994, the UN agencies and organizations recognized that coordination both of shared logistical resources and of operational activities is imperative for greater coherence in policies, cohesion in approach, and cost effectiveness, both during and after the withdrawal of UNOSOM. Towards this end, the inter-agency meeting recommended that a UN Coordination Team (UNCT) be established, composed of senior representatives of UN agencies and organizations active in Somalia. It was agreed that the UNCT be chaired by the UNDP Resident Representative and that consideration should also be given to designating the Resident Representative as Humanitarian Coordinator. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) (a constitutional

committee of the UN established pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 46/182 of 19 December 1991 has also endorsed the recommendations of the meeting. The IASC is comprised of the operational UN agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), and representatives of 3 international NGO networks. The UNCT will operate with the full support and participation of UNOSOM, and the Humanitarian Coordinator will also continue to benefit from the necessary guidance of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG).

Following the recommendations of the inter-agency meeting for the timely start to a transitional mechanism, the UNCT held its first meeting in Nairobi on 25 November 1994. The meeting was attended by the SRSG, and Representatives of UN Agencies and the IOM, and chaired by the UNDP Resident Representative. The UNCT, as the UN inter-agency coordination mechanism for Somalia, will also cooperate with both international and Somali NGO consortia, and work to support the coordination efforts of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB), a group which brings together donors, UN agencies and international organizations, including international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), which are active in Somalia. The Team will also facilitate the exchange and dissemination of information concerning the activities of UN agencies and organizations in Somalia.

Structurally, the UNCT will be supported by the Relief and Rehabilitation Coordination Unit, a small technical secretariat composed of professional and support staff. It is envisaged that specialized sectoral analysis and coordination of activities among UN agencies and organizations and the NGO community could be carried out under the leadership of the organization with the most relevant mandate and experience in the specific sector.

Security constraints

Fears have been expressed that the process of withdrawal of UN troops could spark off widespread violence and looting which will also affect international organizations and their personnel. Similarly, major installations previously protected by UN troops, such as seaports in Kismayo and Mogadishu, and airports, which are essential to the logistics of any operation, could become objects of conflict between factions and groups lured by potential income.

Planning for the six-month period covering the withdrawal of UNOSOM and the immediate post-UNOSOM phase must therefore take into account the following assumptions with regards to the security environment:

- (i) In the event that a national government is formed, it will undergo a period of limited effec-

tiveness while it establishes functioning institutions and asserts its authority;

- (ii) Certain factions and groups may attempt to re-establish lucrative "protection" services for staff, premises, warehouses and convoys;
- (iii) The winding down of UNOSOM will result in unemployment and loss of income, particularly in Mogadishu. This may lead to violence during the transition phase. Following the departure of UNOSOM, disgruntled employees, contractors, or landlords might turn aggressively to UN organizations or NGOs seeking continued employment or submitting claims related to their past services for UNOSOM;
- (iv) Important differences will continue to exist between regions with regards to security and stability. The critical regions will be those from which troops are being withdrawn and where inter-clan tensions continue. As of mid-December 1994, it would appear that Mogadishu and Lower Juba are the most vulnerable areas, with real uncertainty in the Bay region;
- (v) Precautionary relocations of international staff out of certain areas, if deemed necessary during the withdrawal of troops, will be accompanied by a continuation of essential activities through local staff during which period agencies will observe the situation, whilst re-negotiating terms and conditions of cooperation with the local community and leadership; and
- (vi) Areas where UN agencies and international NGOs already operate without support from UN troops should remain relatively stable. Where security permits, agencies may expand operations.

The responsibility for ensuring the safety and security of staff members and property of the humanitarian organizations rests primarily with the Somali people. Consequently, a community-based and decentralized approach to security appears to be the most appropriate and feasible in the absence of a national government. During the Nairobi inter-agency meeting of 24 and 25 October 1994, the UN organizations also recommended that the cost of common security services should be covered from sources other than voluntary contributions.... The issue of security requirements is currently a subject of discussion within the United Nations and the proposed requirements are included in this Appeal for information. Should it not be possible to work out another formula outside the operational budgets of agencies, donors will be invited to contribute towards these requirements at a later date.

Document 108

Letter dated 14 February 1995 from the Secretary-General sent to the heads or acting heads of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the International Organization for Migration, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations Children's Fund, the United Nations Development Programme, the World Food Programme and the World Health Organization, asking them to continue their programmes in areas of Somalia considered to be safe and to coordinate their efforts with the Special Representative

Not issued as a United Nations document

As you know, I am deeply committed to ensuring a continuation of the efforts of the United Nations in the political reconciliation process as well as in the field of delivery of humanitarian and other assistance in Somalia in the post UNISOM phase. I am, however, concerned about the security of United Nations' personnel as well as those of other organizations working with the United Nations.

In the light of the recommendations made by my Under-Secretary-General for Peace-Keeping Operations as well as by my Security Coordinator, I have decided that my Special Representative will not, at this time, move to Kismayo. A decision on the location of his headquarters will be made following a further assessment of the situation. I would, however, like to request you to continue implementing your programme and activities and maintain your presence in Somalia in areas considered safe

mentioned in the report of my Security Coordinator and wherever else safe conditions could be obtained and where appropriate security measures are in place.

Given the difficult conditions prevailing throughout the country, I would recommend that your representative maintain close contact with my Security Coordinator.

I would like to emphasize the importance that I attach to the role of my Special Representative who will maintain the overall responsibility for the coordination of all United Nations activities in Somalia. I look forward to your continued support and cooperation with him.

With warm regards

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Document 109

Statement by the Secretary-General announcing a safe and orderly withdrawal of UNOSOM II

UN Press Release SG/SM/5571-SOM/66, 2 March 1995

On this day, 2 March 1995, the United Nations, with the generous support of the Combined Task Force "United Shield" (France, India, Italy, Malaysia, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and the United States), completed the withdrawal of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II). I am happy to announce that the withdrawal was carried out in a safe and orderly manner, ahead of schedule and virtually without a hitch. All the soldiers and international staff of UNOSOM left Somalia soil safely, and so did the troops of the Combined Task

Force which had landed at Mogadishu on 28 February to provide support for the withdrawal of the United Nations peace-keepers.

In view of the volatile situation prevailing in Somalia, the withdrawal was a complex exercise that required a concerted planning effort and was implemented in a skillful and coordinated manner. This was the final stage of a broader phase-out which began in November of 1994 and involved the departure of the 15,000 troops then deployed in Somalia.

nity to facilitate the search for peace and reconciliation and to bring humanitarian assistance. This effort will continue. The United Nations will not abandon Somalia. However, the feasibility of international assistance, both in the political and humanitarian areas, will depend on the cooperation extended to the United Nations and the humanitarian agencies by the Somali leaders, the resources made available for them and the degree of security prevailing in the country. I hope that the Somali people

will find the courage and wisdom to achieve political reconciliation and to bring peace to their country.

I take this opportunity to extend my thanks to the countries that have contributed peace-keeping contingents to UNOSOM and to the soldiers who served with devotion and courage under the flag of the United Nations. At this time, I wish to pay a particular tribute to the Member States that were successful in their mission of supporting the withdrawal of UNOSOM.

Document 110

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia submitted in pursuance of paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 954 (1994)

S/1995/231, 28 March 1995

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of resolution 954 (1994) of 4 November 1994, by which the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) for a final period until 31 March 1995. In paragraph 13 of the resolution, the Council requested me to report to it before 31 March 1995 on the situation in Somalia and to submit suggestions concerning the role that the United Nations could play in Somalia beyond that date.

2. The present report covers the political developments since my last report (S/1994/1166) dated 14 October 1994. It includes a general assessment of what has been achieved by the United Nations in Somalia in political, humanitarian, military and security matters and the police and justice programme, as well as financial aspects, followed by a section on the withdrawal of UNOSOM II. The report also presents some thoughts on the role that the United Nations could play in Somalia beyond the conclusion of UNOSOM II's mandate on 31 March 1995.

II. Political developments since the last report

3. On 14 October 1994, 12 factions and organizations associated with the Somali National Alliance (SNA) announced in a memorandum their decision to convene a national reconciliation conference in Mogadishu on 27 October 1994. They appealed to the leaders of four of the signatories to the Addis Ababa agreement (S/26317) aligned with the Group of 12, namely the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM), the Somali National Front (SNF), the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) and the United Somali Party (USP), to join them in that conference and, *inter alia*, requested UNOSOM II to extend invita-

tions for the conference to the Chairmen of 16 factions and organizations listed in the memorandum. These 16 factions included splinter groups from the Somali African Muki Organization (SAMO), the Somali National Union (SNU) and the Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM), which have no official standing within the context of either the Addis Ababa agreement or the Nairobi declaration (S/1994/614, annex I).

4. Following the publication of the memorandum of 14 October 1994, my Special Representative urged all Somali leaders to intensify their consultations in order to facilitate the convening of a broad-based or all-inclusive national reconciliation conference, which would include the representatives of all the recognized factions from the two sides, namely the SNA and the Group of 12.

5. On 17 October 1994, the Group of 12 addressed an appeal to the SNA for the two sides to come together in a broad-based conference with the participation of all signatories to the Addis Ababa agreement and the SNM. The Group of 12 adopted a charter on 23 October 1994 by which it officially reconstituted itself into the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA), an umbrella organization of 14 factions and organizations originally formed in February 1994. Mr. Ali Mahdi was elected Chairman of the Alliance.

6. Despite the intensive contacts and informal consultations that followed, the two sides did not succeed in reaching agreement on the convening of an all-inclusive conference. Consequently, my Special Representative appealed to the SNA factions to postpone the convening of their conference in order to allow more time for consultations with the SSA. On 26 October 1994, the SNA factions announced the postponement of the convening of their conference to 1 November 1994 in deference to the impending visit of the Security Council mission to Somalia.

7. The Security Council mission, led by H.E. Mr. Colin Keating, Permanent Representative of New Zealand, visited Somalia from 26 to 27 October 1994 and met with the leaders of the SSA and the SNA factions and organizations respectively to convey to them the special message from the Security Council on the situation in Somalia and on the future of the United Nations presence there (see S/1994/1245, annex II).

8. On 1 November 1994, however, the SNA factions convened their unilateral conference in south Mogadishu with a view to establishing an interim Government within 45 days. On the same day, my Special Representative issued a statement in which he pointed out that the unilateral decision of the SNA factions to hold their own conference was contrary to the understanding reached between them and all other concerned factions that invitations for a national reconciliation conference would be extended by UNOSOM II to the leaders of recognized factions, after the completion of the necessary consultations. On this basis, my Special Representative declined an invitation to attend the SNA-sponsored unilateral conference in an observer capacity. From that point on, there was a rift between General Aidid and my Special Representative, who continued to take the position that the national reconciliation conference must be all-inclusive and that the United Nations would not be in a position to support a partisan Government.

9. Mr. Ali Mahdi, on his part, convened a parallel meeting of SSA leaders in north Mogadishu to prepare their response to the anticipated announcement of an interim Government by the SNA-sponsored conference. On 3 November 1994, the SSA leaders informed my Special Representative that they had completed contingency plans to establish their own national Government in the event that the SNA-sponsored conference unilaterally announced an interim Government. They also expressed the view that the SNA-sponsored conference contravened all agreements previously reached among the recognized factions and reiterated their position that the solution to the Somali crisis could come only from a national reconciliation conference with the participation of all recognized political organizations and all strata of Somali society, including traditional chiefs and elders, religious leaders, intellectuals and women.

10. My Special Representative continued to emphasize to both sides the need to have a genuine all-inclusive and broad-based conference, and offered facilities at UNOSOM II headquarters for the SSA and the SNA factions to hold further consultations aimed at reaching agreement to this end. He warned both sides that UNOSOM II would extend the necessary assistance only for such a conference.

11. The SSA and the SNA factions eventually appointed six representatives each, who held a series of meetings in south Mogadishu from 4 to 8 November 1994 to discuss substantive issues relating to the convening of a national reconciliation conference, including the question of a preparatory meeting. The meetings, however, resulted in a stalemate. Subsequently, in further efforts to break this deadlock, UNOSOM II facilitated two meetings at its headquarters between Mr. Ali Mahdi and Col. Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, Chairman of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), who had been mandated by the SNA factions and organizations to discuss on their behalf the convening of an all-inclusive conference with the SSA. At the request of both the SNA and the SSA, UNOSOM II also arranged for General Mohamed Said Hersi "Morgan", Vice-Chairman of SPM/SSA, to travel from Kismayo to Mogadishu for consultations. While in Mogadishu, General Morgan met separately with Mr. Ali Mahdi and the SSA factions and with Col. Abdullahi Yusuf in an effort to reconcile the SSA and the SNA factions. Other faction leaders from the two sides held meetings at UNOSOM II headquarters with a view to facilitating agreement between them.

12. These efforts did not yield any further progress and, by the beginning of December 1994, the parallel SNA conference and the SSA meeting were indicating their intentions to announce their separate Governments. These potentially destabilizing moves have not so far materialized and the SNA conference and the SSA meeting are still in session. Their discussions have reportedly focused on the nature of a federal system of government, the powers of the central Government *vis-à-vis* regional authorities, the distribution of government posts and the drafting of a transitional charter. It was also reported that the four committees established at the opening of the SNA-sponsored conference to deal with reconciliation, rehabilitation, security and drafting of a charter respectively had completed their work.

13. My Special Representative visited Addis Ababa on 29 December 1994 to meet with President Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia and discuss ways of bringing Mr. Ali Mahdi and General Aidid together to resolve their differences over the convening of a genuine national reconciliation conference. President Meles Zenawi has been acting under the mandate of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD). Following these discussions, the President of Ethiopia sent a fact-finding mission to Somalia at the beginning of January 1995, which maintained close contact with my Special Representative. Subsequently, at the beginning of March 1995, President Meles Zenawi dispatched to Somalia a delegation of ethnic Somali leaders from Ethiopia,

Kenya and Djibouti in order to persuade political and traditional leaders throughout the country to come together and work for national reconciliation.

14. Also in December 1994, a delegation of the League of Arab States (LAS) visited Somalia and met with the SSA and the SNA factions to assist in expediting the process of national reconciliation. Subsequently, LAS, jointly with OAU and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), held a meeting on Somalia in Cairo on 22 and 23 February 1995 at which the United Nations participated as an observer. The participating organizations agreed on the need to continue and intensify joint efforts to assist the Somalis in reaching national reconciliation as soon as possible. To that end, they decided to send a joint mission to Addis Ababa to hold consultations with the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution at a date to be determined.

15. Meanwhile, contacts between the SSA and the SNA factions continued through January and February 1995 to discuss new initiatives offered by both sides to break the political impasse. On 6 February, the SSA formally presented its plan of action, which is a proposal for national reconciliation in Somalia. The proposal called for the convening of a unified and all-inclusive national reconciliation conference on 25 February 1995 or any other agreed date, which would include representatives from the SSA, SNA, SNM and Mr. Egal's alliance from the north-west, as well as traditional chiefs and elders, religious leaders, intellectuals and women. The United Nations would play a mediatory and supportive role in the preparation and convening of the conference. In a press conference on that occasion, Mr. Ali Mahdi stressed that the SSA plan of action was merely a proposal that was subject to modification. Expressing the hope that the SNA would react favourably to the proposal, he stressed that no one political faction or alliance could form a Government of national unity.

16. In the weeks preceding the withdrawal of UNOSOM II, my Special Representative held discussions, initiated in January 1994 and continued since then, with the SNA and the SSA to urge them to form joint committees to manage the operations of the Mogadishu seaport and airport. In January 1995, the SSA and the SNA succeeded in establishing a negotiating committee. Following the announcement of the SSA plan of action, the SNA-SSA negotiating committee was given a wider mandate to coordinate political and economic matters relating to reconciliation among the Habr Gedir and Mudulood clans, work out modalities for bringing General Aidid and Mr. Ali Mahdi together and merge the two separate conferences/meetings on national reconciliation sponsored by the SNA and the SSA respectively.

17. On 19 February 1995, Mr. Ali Mahdi and Mr. Osman Hassan Ali "Atto", a high-ranking official of the SNA, had a meeting that led to significant political developments during the last two weeks of UNOSOM II's withdrawal. On 21 February 1995, a peace agreement was signed by General Aidid and Mr. Ali Mahdi on behalf of the SNA and the SSA respectively to promote national reconciliation and a peaceful settlement. In that agreement, the two sides, *inter alia*, accepted the principle of power-sharing; pledged not to seek the presidency through military means but through democratic elections; agreed to the resolution of disputes through dialogue and peaceful means; and agreed on a common platform for tackling problems. It also included provisions for the confinement of "technicals" to designated areas and discouraged the open carrying of arms in the streets of Mogadishu. In addition, it called for the removal of roadblocks and the reopening of the main markets in the city.

18. In another significant development, on 23 February 1995, the two sides reached agreement on the establishment of two joint committees to manage the operations of the Mogadishu airport and seaport. This agreement was endorsed by General Aidid and Mr. Ali Mahdi. It provides a basis for cooperation between the Somali parties and organizations within the United Nations system. UNOSOM II and the United Nations agencies have committed themselves to provide assistance to the two committees. The Mogadishu seaport was reopened to civilian traffic on 9 March under the administration of the joint committees of the SSA and the SNA. The reopening of the seaport resulted from the signing of a third agreement between Mr. Ali Mahdi and General Aidid on 5 March 1995. This agreement allowed for the resumption of operations at the seaport in view of the need to offload ships and dhows carrying badly needed commodities. On 8 March, the two leaders initialled a fourth agreement to establish a security committee comprising militia and police officers from both sides. The security committee would ensure the exclusion of unauthorized "technicals" from the airport and seaport and arrange for the police force to provide security inside these facilities, while joint militias with specially marked "technicals" would secure the outer perimeters as well as the routes used to deliver commodities to the markets.

19. My Special Representative has extended an invitation to the chairmen of the two committees to visit Nairobi for consultations with the United Nations Coordination Team (UNCT) (see para. 35 below) in order to discuss arrangements for reactivating civilian operations at the airport and seaport. One subject to be discussed is the return to Mogadishu of the equipment for operating the seaport and airport facilities, without which only small ships can be serviced. This equipment, currently stored in

the United Nations logistics base in Brindisi, Italy, will be returned to Mogadishu when conditions permit. In the meantime, I agreed provisionally with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) that it would continue to act in civil aviation matters with regard to Somalia, pending further guidance from the Council and/or the re-establishment of governmental authority in Somalia.

20. The signing of these agreements has had a salutary effect on the political process as a whole, with both the SNA and the SSA emphasizing that there will be no more war between them. My Special Representative has reported that, on the basis of the agreements reached, the SNA and the SSA militias are presently collaborating in providing security at the Mogadishu airport and seaport in cooperation with the Somali police force. As a result of these agreements and arrangements, the situation in Mogadishu has improved, and it is understood that both sides have now settled down to serious discussions on the convening of a broad-based national reconciliation conference. Also on their agenda are the establishment of a regional council and the appointment of a governor for the Benadir region (Mogadishu).

21. During the reporting period, UNOSOM II continued to encourage and assist the Somali people to establish district councils. On 20 November 1994, it certified the district council for the city of Kismayo, bringing the number of district councils to 58 out of a total of approximately 92. In addition, 8 out of a total of 18 regional councils have also been established. There is continued interest in the formation of district and regional councils. In recognition of their importance, I authorized UNOSOM II, during its withdrawal phase, to donate to them some essential equipment, including generators, water pumps, office equipment and furniture. In Mogadishu, I also approved the donation of four generators in order to facilitate the continued provision of potable water to the city and its surrounding villages. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has agreed in principle to support institution-building in Somalia in the post-UNOSOM II era and to extend necessary assistance to the regional and district councils to strengthen their capacity for local government and administration. UNDP is currently discussing funding arrangements in regard to assistance to these councils with interested donors, including the Life and Peace Institute of Sweden.

III. Assessment of the achievements of the United Nations in Somalia

A. Political aspects

22. From the beginning of the United Nations involvement in Somalia, the attainment of cease-fires and the promotion of national reconciliation have been

among the Organization's major goals. To help to achieve national reconciliation, two major conferences were held with the assistance and support of the United Nations, namely the National Reconciliation Conference in March 1993, which yielded the Addis Ababa agreement, and the consultations in Nairobi in March 1994, which led to the Nairobi declaration. There was significant representation of the civil society of Somalia at each of these major conferences. More than 250 representatives of community organizations, elders, scholars, as well as women's groups, participated in the Addis Ababa Conference, while a significant number of elders was present at the consultations in Nairobi. Although the implementation of these agreements has been forestalled by subsequent developments, the two agreements continue to serve as the major frame of reference in the Somali parties' discussions of a political settlement.

23. The United Nations has also sponsored inter-clan reconciliation meetings at the local level. These include the Jubaland Peace Conference in June and August 1993, the Garowe Peace and Cooperation Conference in December 1993, the Digil/Merifle-Rahanweyn-Aulihan Conference in Bardera in February 1994, the Lower Juba Region Reconciliation Conference in June 1994 and the Absame Reconciliation Conference from June to July 1994. These conferences, and the agreements that resulted from them, have significantly contributed to the prevention of interclan fighting, largely limiting the area of conflict to south Mogadishu.

24. The United Nations has also helped to arrange a series of cease-fires, starting in February 1992, when the consultations that I had convened with the representatives of Mr. Ali Mahdi and General Aidid yielded the first cease-fire agreement in Mogadishu. That cease-fire was expanded into a nationwide cease-fire in January 1993. When a resumption of fighting in Kismayo threatened the relative peace in the Lower Juba area in February 1994, my Acting Special Representative was instrumental in re-establishing the cease-fire. He also used the occasion to bring the numerous parties concerned to intensive consultations in Nairobi, which led to the Nairobi declaration in March 1994. More recently, my Special Representative has worked closely with prominent elders to mitigate the sporadic, but at times intense, interclan fighting that resumed in south Mogadishu in June 1994. Combined with the stabilizing effect of the peace-keeping force, these efforts have contributed greatly to the achievement and maintenance of relative peace in Somalia as a whole.

25. As already mentioned, UNOSOM II has certified 58 district councils to date, including the 2 district councils in the Sanaag region in the north-west, which were formed in response to the wishes of the people there.

It has also certified 8 regional councils out of a total of 18. UNOSOM II, in collaboration with the Life and Peace Institute, has given assistance to district and regional councils by refurbishing or rebuilding their offices and providing them with administrative kits and equipment, as well as by organizing seminars for district and regional counsellors in administration and management. In addition, the Life and Peace Institute has assisted district and regional councils through food-for-work projects. The SNA's opposition to the formation of these councils, however, has prevented the creation of the Transitional National Council (TNC), which the Addis Ababa agreement envisaged would be formed from the representatives of the district and regional councils. It is hoped that these councils will be able to function as partners of the international community in rehabilitation and development when security permits.

B. Humanitarian aspects

26. By 1992 Somalia was a devastated country. The magnitude of human suffering was overwhelming as hundreds of thousands of lives were lost as a result of civil war, drought and famine. In the famine zones, approximately one third of all Somali children under the age of five died from starvation and diseases related to malnutrition. Out of a total estimated population of 8 million Somalis, 4.5 million lives were at risk, including 1 million children. Farms were destroyed, livestock killed, food harvests burned and homes razed to the ground. Some 2 million persons had been violently displaced from their home areas and fled either to neighbouring countries or elsewhere within Somalia. Towns and cities were plunged into a nightmare of insecurity. All institutions of governance, and at least 60 per cent of the country's basic infrastructure, had disintegrated.

27. Despite these conditions of anarchy and extreme insecurity, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and a number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) determinedly maintained a continuous presence in the country, providing humanitarian relief to hundreds of thousands of Somalis. Although the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)—already present in the north of Somalia—recommended operations in Mogadishu in December 1991 and was joined three months later by the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations involvement in the delivery of humanitarian assistance began in earnest in mid-1992. Through the combined efforts of the United Nations, ICRC and NGOs, humanitarian assistance programmes expanded and over a quarter of a million lives are estimated to have been saved during the famine emergency, while millions of Somalis were able to benefit from humanitarian relief.

28. Since then, the humanitarian situation in Somalia has changed dramatically in a number of respects. Drought conditions, which were particularly acute in 1992 and 1993, have improved considerably. In 1994, the April-June *Gu* (short rain) season harvest was very successful and reached close to 75 per cent of pre-war production of basic cereals, while the September-January *Der* (long rain) harvest exceeded pre-war levels. The timely provision of food and non-food relief through the humanitarian assistance programme also contributed significantly to the prevention of a new famine emergency. At the height of the famine between 1992 and 1993, WFP delivered an average of 35,000 tons of food per month to approximately 1.5 million Somalis. By the end of 1994, food-for-work schemes had replaced free distribution as the main mode for delivery of food assistance, and the number of direct recipients of relief assistance from WFP dropped to around 21,000 people per month, with a further 280,000 Somalis benefiting from food-for-work schemes. By December 1994, WFP was delivering up to 6,000 tons of food monthly and in 1995 it plans to channel around 10,000 tons of food into Somalia each month. WFP intends to use its food resources as an incentive to encourage Somalis to participate in a variety of institutional rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes, while continuing to provide supplementary feeding assistance and food to vulnerable groups when necessary.

29. Since the start of the relief and emergency programmes of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in 1992, vegetable and cereal seeds, farm tools and pesticides have been successfully distributed to around 300,000 destitute farmers and their families. More recently, the efforts of humanitarian organizations in the areas of agriculture and fisheries have focused mostly on sustainable agricultural and rural development under the direction of FAO. United Nations agencies and NGOs have worked to resuscitate Somalia's agricultural production by assisting in the rehabilitation of agricultural infrastructure and capacity-building. A UNICEF-supported project in southern Somalia provided seeds and tools to support the resettlement of 60,000 displaced farmers. In 1994, FAO provided targeted community assistance in agriculture and livestock to approximately 80,000 farming families, moving away from large-scale distribution of seeds and tools. The provision of veterinary drugs and the vaccination of animals by FAO and NGOs has led to a reactivation of exports, with an estimated total of around 500,000 livestock having been exported since 1993.

30. Up to 1.5 million Somalis, or roughly 25 per cent of the total population, were displaced inside Somalia or in neighbouring countries between 1991 and

mid-1993. Of this number, a total of 121,630 refugees and 45,327 internally displaced persons have been successfully reintegrated into their home areas with the assistance of the United Nations agencies, national and international NGOs, ICRC and the Intergovernmental Organization for Migration (IOM). As conditions in their home areas improved, a further 80,430 refugees have returned to Somalia spontaneously. Approximately 500,000 Somali refugees remain in neighbouring countries. While the numbers of internally displaced persons registering to return home doubled from 71,000 in June 1994 to over 150,000 in December 1994, there are still 350,000 internally displaced persons, almost half of whom are in Mogadishu.

31. Between 1992 and 1995, UNICEF and its NGO partners vaccinated well over 1 million Somali children and women against diseases such as measles, tuberculosis and tetanus. Since 1992, UNICEF has provided supplementary food and other assistance for approximately 600,000 beneficiaries. These include, since May 1993, an average of 65,000 vulnerable children and women per month, as compared to 168,000 in January 1993. These figures, considerably lower than those prior to May 1993, reflect generally improved food availability in much of central and southern Somalia. Access by the Somali population to health services and facilities has improved greatly. The factors contributing to this development include the continuing distribution by the World Health Organization (WHO) of essential drugs and medical supplies to cover the needs of some 2.2 million Somalis since 1992, as well as the availability, under the auspices of UNICEF and WHO, of the skilled services of an additional 1,800 professional health workers who have been trained and technically supervised in emergency preparedness, health planning and management, and in the diagnosis and treatment of malaria, tuberculosis, cholera and other illnesses. WHO provided basic drugs and medical equipment to 11 hospitals, 113 national NGOs and 46 international NGOs working in the health sector. Logistical support and other assistance is being provided by UNICEF for the rehabilitation of the public health infrastructure, including some 450 health posts, centres and hospitals.

32. Between 1991 and 1992 the lack of access to potable water resulted in devastatingly high rates of mortality and morbidity from diarrhoeal diseases. Since June 1992, UNDP has operated the Afgoy well-field which provides piped water to over 1 million residents of Mogadishu and which has been rehabilitated to 40 per cent of its pre-war efficiency, a factor that has contributed greatly to preventing the spread of large-scale epidemics caused by contaminated water from shallow wells. Agencies estimate that the cholera epidemic that

struck various parts of Somalia during the early months of 1994 caused 1,349 deaths out of a reported total of 34,789 cases. This epidemic would have wrought much greater devastation in the absence of a functioning water supply system. WHO has established laboratories in Somalia for water-testing and for the diagnosis of cholera and other epidemics. Over the past three years, UNICEF has assisted in the reactivation of 8 urban water supply systems, the chlorination of more than 1,200 water sources daily during the cholera epidemic and the construction of 380 wells and 12 boreholes, thereby increasing access to potable water to over 1.5 million people in Somalia.

33. Similar developments have taken place in the field of education. Since January 1993, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has catered for the educational needs of more than 250,000 children through the reintroduction of a standardized curriculum, the provision of more than 1 million textbooks and teacher guides. UNESCO has also provided teacher training for 267 schools with a total student population of over 150,000. UNICEF, in conjunction with UNESCO, has trained 550 primary school teachers throughout Somalia. Access to education for Somalis has expanded through UNESCO's teacher emergency packages, developed for use in rural areas and in refugee and internally displaced person camps where school buildings do not exist or are in a state of disrepair. UNESCO also continues to carry out workshops and refresher courses for headmasters and teachers in Somalia, and has carried out a mine-awareness campaign for 30,000 Somali refugees in camps in Kenya. To date, more than 500,000 Somalis have received basic education and training through UNESCO programmes. Since 1993, UNICEF has helped to form school committees in 115 communities, provided material and rehabilitation assistance to around 450 schools, including community-based Koranic schools, and undertaken activities that have benefited over 150,000 pupils in Somalia.

34. In the light of these developments, the humanitarian assistance programme in Somalia has shifted its focus towards a consolidation of its achievements. The challenge for the United Nations and its humanitarian partners is to sustain this progress in Somalia's conflict-ridden environment and, concomitantly, to move forward to rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction, without prejudice to emergency relief where this is necessary.

35. To meet this challenge in a post-UNOSOM II era, a United Nations Coordination Team (UNCT) was established under the chairmanship of the UNDP Resident Representative, who is also the Humanitarian Coordinator. With the assurances provided by the donor

consortium for Somalia, i.e. the Somalia Aid Coordination Body, that it will maintain support to humanitarian programmes in Somalia, UNCT is, among other things, interacting with national and international NGOs as well as with the donor community in an effort to harmonize and ensure coherence among the activities of operational partners. The Humanitarian Coordinator also intends to formalize a coordinated relationship with recognized district and regional councils to ensure that the task of rebuilding Somalia also lies in the hands of dedicated and capable Somalis.

36. The United Nations agencies and organizations will monitor and report on the humanitarian situation in Somalia through the continued presence of national and international humanitarian staff working throughout the country. To improve the coordination of activities and programmes of the humanitarian partners, the active linkages established by UNCT with the donor and NGO communities will be intensified at the field level to maximize the use of available resources among the humanitarian partners.

37. The humanitarian agencies expect that for the foreseeable future they will continue to operate in a context of political unrest and against a background of uncertainty. Their commitment to remain in Somalia depends on the demonstration of good will and cooperation by the Somali people and leaders. Without the active support of the Somali people, it is unlikely that future humanitarian programmes will meet with much success, and more than likely that the gains, made through the combined efforts of international agencies and committed Somali partners, will be undone.

38. In the absence of national institutions capable of coping even with minor emergencies, Somalia will remain vulnerable to future disasters. Humanitarian relief needs will almost certainly continue for a while, requiring targeted interventions on the part of the humanitarian agencies so as to ensure that the country does not revert to another crisis. To this end, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat launched a United Nations consolidated inter-agency appeal for Somalia, covering a period of six months beginning in January 1995. The agencies requested a total of US\$70 million for their activities during the first half of 1995. Most of the activities will be community-based and will thus rely fully on the involvement of the Somali people. United Nations agencies will provide support to capacity-building programmes, while assisting local NGOs as well as community-based organizations in the areas of relief and initial rehabilitation. The focus will encompass assistance in the areas of agriculture, fishing and reconstruction. At present, UNDP continues with the implementation of integrated, community-based rehabili-

tation that includes schools and water systems. It has also launched credit schemes for women, as well as activities aimed at income generation. The ongoing implementation by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) of quick impact programmes is providing the stability required for the return in 1995 of some of the over 500,000 Somalis who remain refugees. Its renovation and rehabilitation of essential facilities complements the activities of IOM with internally displaced persons.

39. One of the critical issues for Somalia will be the need to provide jobs for the large numbers of unemployed and thus to contribute to the revitalization of the economy and stimulate the productive capacities of communities devastated by war. The United Nations agencies have factored this consideration into their planning for 1995. Another critical issue for the humanitarian agencies and for the Somali people is that of demobilization. In 1994, around 25,000 demobilized militia were assisted by UNDP and other United Nations agencies. The success of the demobilization programmes planned by the agencies in 1995, through the provision of skills training and food-for-work incentives, will have far-reaching effects for the peace and reconciliation process and for the stability of the country.

40. It is essential that the progress made by the United Nations agencies, international organizations and national and international NGOs over the past three years should not be reversed. To date the United Nations appeal for Somalia has received less than 10 per cent of the resources requested. I urge the international donor community to provide funding for the activities planned by United Nations agencies and other relief organizations. Such funding is urgently needed not only for the achievement of these objectives, but also to ensure that Somalis are in a position to rebuild their society and break the cycle of despair.

C. Deployment of military personnel

41. Following the introduction in mid-1992 of 50 unarmed military observers and 500 security personnel, the United Nations deployed up to 30,000 military and logistic personnel after the withdrawal of the United Task Force in Somalia (UNITAF) in early May 1993. In addition to the mandate approved by the Security Council for the establishment of a secure environment in which humanitarian assistance could be delivered and distributed safely, the UNOSOM forces undertook activities ranging from providing security escorts for humanitarian convoys to conducting specialized courses for the Somali police. They also assisted in the implementation of community development projects and in the provision of medical aid to Somali civilians.

D. *Police programme*

42. It will be recalled that UNOSOM II was mandated to assist Somalis in the re-establishment of a 10,000-strong Somali police force by the end of 1994. However, financial constraints made it necessary to reduce the contemplated force strength to 8,500. As of 1 March 1995, this number was operational in Somalia, 2,000 of them being deployed in the north-west region.

43. The police training programme was actively pursued and, by the end of 1994, a total of 2,179 policemen of all ranks had attended refresher courses to revitalize lost or waned police skills resulting from years of absence from work as a result of the collapse of the Somali State machinery four years ago.

44. At the end of January 1995, Somali police were operational in 82 district stations. The police officers had a visible presence on the roads and in various communities. They engaged in foot or mobile patrols and other forms of static and fixed-point duties, receiving complaints from the public and conducting investigations into criminal cases. Under the programme, vehicles, communication equipment, typewriters, stationery, fuel and lubricants were supplied to the police to assist them in the discharge of their duties. Substantial quantities of police uniforms were also received from donors. Following the commencement of the withdrawal of UNOSOM II, vehicles and military equipment in stock from supplies provided by the donor community were shipped out of Somalia at the request of donor Governments.

45. The police programme administered by UNOSOM II was funded from voluntary contributions in cash and in kind by the donor community. International support for the programme, which included payment of salaries for the Somali police, will cease on 31 March 1995 with the expiry of the UNOSOM II mandate and the exhaustion of resources in the Trust Fund established for this purpose. Unless resources are made available to continue the programme beyond that date, the whole police programme will be jeopardized and security conditions in a number of areas might deteriorate. I appeal to the donor community for additional voluntary contributions for the Somali police programme that could be channelled through appropriate agencies operating in Somalia.

E. *Justice programme*

46. During the reporting period, training was provided by UNOSOM II for judicial personnel in judicial administration and ethics, juvenile justice, sentencing practices and attitudes, human rights and the rule of law. Currently, there are 11 appeal courts, 11 regional courts and 46 district courts functioning in all regions and 46

districts of Somalia, with a total staff of 374. All of these courts have been supported by UNOSOM II, including through the repair/refurbishment of some of the court and prison facilities. In addition, some vehicles were supplied.

47. UNOSOM II also provided support to 12 prisons, including food, water and medical services for inmates. Six hundred and seventy two custodial guards were certified and paid by UNOSOM II. WFP supplied dry rations and vegetable oil to the prisons.

48. Arrangements have been concluded with UNESCO to begin educational and vocational training programmes at the prisons, starting with Mogadishu Central Prison. UNESCO also expressed interest in taking over and continuing these components of the project after the departure of UNOSOM II.

F. *Financial aspects*

49. The total cost of UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II (1 May 1992-28 February 1995) was approximately US\$ 1.64 billion. Contributions received for the Trust Fund for Somalia as of 10 March 1995 amounted to \$21.6 million, consisting of \$21.5 million for the re-establishment of the Somali police force and judicial system and \$0.1 million for the support of UNOSOM II forces. Expenditures from the Fund for the re-establishment of the Somali police force and judicial system were authorized in the amount of \$15.2 million.

50. The General Assembly, by its resolution 49/229 of 23 December 1994, provided an amount of \$253,704,400 gross (\$250,495,600 net) for the maintenance of UNOSOM II for the period from 1 October 1994 to 28 February 1995. The revised cost estimate for the final mandate period from 1 October 1994 to 31 March 1995 will be submitted to the resumed forty-ninth session of the General Assembly.

51. It should be noted that the cash-flow situation of the special account of UNOSOM II remains precarious. As of 10 March 1995, unpaid assessed contributions to the account since the inception of the Operation totalled \$387.2 million (\$15.0 for UNOSOM and \$372.2 for UNOSOM II). Consequently, reimbursement of troop costs has been made only up to the period ending 30 September 1994. In addition, amounts are outstanding for contingent-owned equipment. The total unpaid contributions to all peace-keeping operations as at 10 March 1995 totalled \$1,679 million.

IV. *Withdrawal of UNOSOM II*

52. The initial phase of withdrawal of UNOSOM II forces, following the Security Council's decision to that effect, entailed redeploying troops to Mogadishu from Baidoa, Baledogle, Afgoye and Kismayo. The pull-

back from Kismayo was supported by an Indian naval task force, comprising two frigates, one logistic ship and six helicopters. Between 28 December 1994 and 5 January 1995, the Zimbabwean and Malaysian contingents were repatriated. The personnel of the Pakistani hospital was repatriated on 11 January 1995. Force headquarters staff was reduced by 50 per cent by 15 January 1995 and relocated from the Embassy Compound to the airport.

53. By 2 February 1995, with the repatriation of the Indian, Zimbabwean and Malaysian contingents, some force headquarters personnel and those of the Pakistani hospital, UNOSOM II troop strength was reduced to 7,956, comprising Pakistani, Egyptian and Bangladeshi contingents and the remaining force headquarters personnel. As the withdrawal accelerated, military support provided by UNOSOM troops to United Nations agencies, human rights organizations and NGOs still engaged in humanitarian activities was greatly reduced. With the major reductions starting in mid-February, it was no longer possible for UNOSOM II troops to extend the necessary protection to humanitarian agencies within the city of Mogadishu. Accordingly, agencies were advised to evacuate their international staff to Nairobi by 14 February 1995.

54. The Humanitarian and Southern Compounds were vacated on 30 January 1995, leaving one platoon of the Pakistani Brigade to secure those buildings in the Southern Compound that were required for the tactical defence of the airport. The UNOSOM II administration moved ahead of schedule in vacating the University and Embassy Compounds and completed the task by 31 January 1995. Consequently, the Pakistani Brigade and all troops located in the area were relocated to the airport on 2 February 1995. Thereafter, all troops were concentrated in the airport, new seaport complex and the old seaport area.

55. From 8 to 10 February, Mr. Kofi Annan, Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, went to Somalia to review preparations for the complex final phase of the operation, in which a combined task force, commanded by Lt. General Anthony C. Zinni (United States of America) and composed of forces from France, India, Italy, Malaysia, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and the United States, was to assist the withdrawal. Mr. Annan met with my Special Representative, the Force Commander and civilian and military personnel from UNOSOM II, representatives of the United Nations humanitarian agencies and the NGOs and the Commander of the combined task force. He also examined possible arrangements for the continued United Nations presence in Somalia.

56. The withdrawal of UNOSOM II proceeded with minimal interruption. Under the plans elaborated by

UNOSOM II in consultation with the combined task force, it was decided that the withdrawal would be completed by 6 March 1995, three weeks ahead of the time-limit set by the Security Council.

57. The final phase of the troop withdrawal started with the repatriation of approximately 1,750 Pakistani personnel from 12 to 15 February. This was followed by the repatriation of the Egyptian brigade, comprising 1,160 personnel, from 17 to 20 February. From 23 to 27 February, an additional 2,600 personnel from the Pakistani contingent and force headquarters staff were repatriated, leaving a balance of approximately 2,500 Pakistani and Bangladeshi military personnel, which constituted the UNOSOM II rearguard.

58. The Mogadishu seaport was handed over to the combined task force and closed to commercial traffic on 28 February. My Special Representative and his staff, as well as the Force Commander and the last remaining staff of the force headquarters, left Mogadishu by air on 28 February 1995. The withdrawal of the rearguard of UNOSOM II commenced on 27 February 1995 and was successfully completed on 2 March 1995. The combined task force forces that had landed in Mogadishu on 28 February 1995 to cover the withdrawal of UNOSOM II also departed from Mogadishu on 3 March without any casualty, thereby bringing operation "United Shield" to a successful conclusion.

59. The withdrawal of all international staff from Somalia was completed on 28 February 1995 with the exception of 25 United Nations civilian personnel and 11 contractual logistic staff plus 1 shipping representative. This group supervised the shipment of the last consignments of UNOSOM II assets committed to the mission's rearguard. They were removed from Mogadishu with the UNOSOM II military rearguard on 3 March 1995. In addition to contingent-owned equipment, over 156,000 cubic metres of United Nations-owned and United Nations-leased assets valued at about US\$120 million were shipped out of Somalia by sea and air during the last two months of UNOSOM II's presence. The UNOSOM II offices have been temporarily relocated to Nairobi. Force headquarters closed its operations in Nairobi on 8 March 1995. The withdrawal from Somalia was thus successfully completed well ahead of schedule in an orderly and organized manner, with all the soldiers and international staff of UNOSOM II, as well as the troops of the combined task force, able to leave Somalia safely.

60. Equipment worth US\$235,761, which was vital for the support of local communities, was donated to Somali district councils. United Nations agencies operating in Somalia requested that some of UNOSOM II's residual assets be transferred to them, in order to facilitate the continuation of their humanitarian assistance and

development projects after the withdrawal of UNOSOM II. Arrangements were made to sell some of these assets to them at depreciated cost.

61. Special arrangements were also made for the custody of UNOSOM II's communications equipment (estimated value US\$500,000), which was moved to Nairobi. As soon as conditions allow the return of the United Nations political and agency offices to Mogadishu, the communications equipment will be brought back to Somalia to serve the needs of these offices.

V. Observations

62. The present report marks a point of transition in the efforts of the United Nations to succour a people and a country caught in the throes of famine, civil war and the collapse of all institutions of government. It has been a difficult mission that did not attain all the objectives that the Security Council set for it. Nevertheless, as the preceding sections of the present report have shown, the United Nations Operation in Somalia can claim major accomplishments, especially when one recalls that in late 1992 3,000 men, women and children were dying daily of starvation and this tragedy was ended by the international relief effort. As far as national reconciliation is concerned, the international community, through the efforts of UNITAF and UNOSOM I and II, strove to create an environment conducive for the Somali leaders to achieve this goal. The most the international community could do for the Somali parties was to afford every opportunity for them to agree among themselves on the modalities to re-establish their political and administrative structures based on a broad-based reconciliation, leading to the reconstruction of their country. If the political will to achieve a durable compromise was lacking, the responsibility lies with the Somali leadership.

63. Against this background, the Security Council took the decision under resolution 954 (1994) to withdraw UNOSOM II from Somalia by the end of March 1995. The Council had been prepared to pursue its peace-keeping efforts as long as it felt that the United Nations presence was receiving the cooperation of the Somali factions, thus enabling it to make a significant contribution. However, over the last few months, it was concluded that the United Nations presence in Somalia was no longer promoting national reconciliation. There was no clear evidence of political will on the part of the warring parties to negotiate a mutually acceptable solution. Agreements reached under United Nations auspices unravelled and security continued to deteriorate, especially in Mogadishu. United Nations peace-keepers and humanitarian convoys were threatened and, in a number of instances, viciously attacked. The Somali leaders did not heed repeated warnings, including from the Council's

own special mission in October 1994, that if they did not show a minimum of political will the United Nations presence would have to be reconsidered. In these circumstances, continuation of UNOSOM II could no longer be justified.

64. The experience of UNOSOM II has thus confirmed the validity of the point that the Security Council has consistently stressed in its resolutions on Somalia, namely, that the responsibility for political compromise and national reconciliation must be borne by the leaders and people concerned. It is they who bear the main responsibility for creating the political and security conditions in which peacemaking and peace-keeping can be effective. The international community can only facilitate, prod, encourage and assist. It can neither impose peace nor coerce unwilling parties into accepting it.

65. There are also important lessons to be learned about the theory and practice of multifunctional peace-keeping operations in conditions of civil war and chaos and especially about the clear line that needs to be drawn between peace-keeping and enforcement action. The world has changed and so has the nature of the conflict situations which the United Nations is asked to deal with. There is a need for careful and creative rethinking about peacemaking, peace-keeping and peace-building in the context of the Somali operation. Some of my initial conclusions may be found in my recent position paper, the "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace" (S/1995/1).

66. On numerous occasions, I have stated that the withdrawal of UNOSOM II does not mean that the United Nations is abandoning Somalia. The United Nations agencies and organizations, as well as NGOs, have voiced their determination to continue humanitarian operations in Somalia. In 1994, they worked at introducing primary rehabilitation as the protective measure for sustaining the success achieved in the emergency relief phase. Their focus in the post-UNOSOM II era will be on rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction, without prejudice to emergency relief where that is necessary. The fulfilment of this objective will also, however, depend primarily on the willingness of the Somali people to cooperate effectively and reliably with the agencies and NGOs. In view of the current security situation, all their international staff left Mogadishu on 14 February for other parts of Somalia and Nairobi. As of 20 March 1995, 30 international staff continue to operate in the country. As soon as the security situation permits, the international staff will return to Mogadishu where the agencies have retained skeleton offices run by Somali staff. Elsewhere in the present report, I have referred to the critical funding needs for the activities planned by United Nations agencies and for the police and justice programmes.

67. The experience of UNOSOM II has demonstrated the vital link between humanitarian assistance, which is geared towards the immediate amelioration of emergency situations, and assistance in achieving national reconciliation, which is necessary to ensure stability in the long term so that the positive results of humanitarian assistance can be preserved and a recurrence of the tragedy avoided. The two must go together; one cannot be a substitute for the other. With this in mind, I will continue to make available my good offices to assist the Somali factions to arrive at a political settlement and I will maintain a political presence in the area for this purpose. The size and mandate of that presence will depend on whether the Somali factions want the United Nations to play a facilitating or mediating role and are ready to cooperate with it. Its location should be in Mogadishu but this will depend, initially at any rate, on security considerations. It was because of the lack of security in Mogadishu that I directed my Special Representative to move temporarily to Nairobi at the end of February; but it remains my intention to re-establish a United Nations political presence in Mogadishu as soon as practicable.

68. For the time being, I have instructed my Special Representative to remain in Nairobi, pending further instructions, in order to monitor the situation in Somalia and coordinate United Nations humanitarian activities there. I expect to be in a position to take decisions about the level and mandate of the United Nations political presence in Mogadishu by mid-April 1995, at which time I shall report my intentions to the Security Council. My present inclination is to maintain a small political office there consisting of a representative with a small support staff.

69. During the past few weeks, there have been some signs that the withdrawal of UNOSOM II may have triggered among Somali leaders an enhanced awareness of their responsibilities. If some Somali leaders perceived the presence of a large number of peace-keeping troops as a hindrance, this has now been removed, possibly encouraging them to restart a political process in their country. I am encouraged by the fact that the withdrawal of UNOSOM II has coincided with the signing of agreements that have so far helped to avert fighting over the

sea and airports in Mogadishu and allowed the reopening of the Mogadishu seaport. During the last four weeks, Mr. Ali Mahdi and General Aidid concluded four political agreements which the SNA and the SSA are implementing in a joint effort. It is the first time since the Nairobi declaration of March 1994 that the two leaders have put their signatures to any peace agreement. These indications of a possible *rapprochement* between them may justify the hope that the Somali leaders will find the strength and the courage to pursue a more productive peace process in the coming weeks. While the recent history of Somalia suggests that such signs must be examined with caution, they could develop into an encouraging trend.

70. Elsewhere in the present report, I have given an account of the successful withdrawal of UNOSOM II with the generous support of the combined task force's "United Shield" operation. This was a complex exercise that required a sophisticated planning effort. It was implemented in a skilful and coordinated manner. I wish once again to express my gratitude to the Member States that joined together to support the United Nations in this way. It was an inspiring instance of international cooperation and mutual assistance.

71. In conclusion, I should like to record my appreciation to my Special Representative, Ambassador James Victor Gbeho, and the UNOSOM II Force Commander, General Aboo Samah Bin Aboo Bakar, as well as to their predecessors, all of whom have demonstrated high qualities of leadership in difficult circumstances. My gratitude also goes to all the UNOSOM II civilian staff, international and Somali, and to the soldiers of all ranks from many countries who devoted themselves to translating into reality the commitments of the United Nations to the people of Somalia. This expression of appreciation applies equally to the personnel of the combined task force. Above all, I wish to pay a profound tribute to the UNOSOM II military and civilian staff, to the officials of United Nations agencies and programmes and to the staff of NGOs who made the supreme sacrifice to help Somalia in its hour of need. Finally, I should like to express my deep sympathy to the families of those who lost their lives as a result of the tragedies that befell Somalia over the past few years.

Document 111

Statement by the President of the Security Council calling on the Somali parties to pursue national reconciliation

S/PRST/1995/15, 6 April 1995

The Security Council has considered carefully the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia dated 28 March 1995 (S/1995/231) and notes the successful conclusion of the withdrawal of UNOSOM II forces from Somalia. It expresses its appreciation to those Governments and agencies that have provided the personnel, humanitarian assistance and other support to the peace-keeping operation in Somalia, including those Governments which participated in the multinational operation for UNOSOM's withdrawal. It pays tribute in particular to all personnel who sacrificed their lives in this service.

The Security Council underlines that the timely intervention of UNOSOM II and the humanitarian assistance given to Somalia helped to save many lives and much property, mitigate general suffering and contributed to the search for peace in Somalia. The Council notes that, over the past three years, the United Nations and the international community have made significant efforts to restore peace and stability and facilitate the re-emergence of a civil society. However, the continuing lack of progress in the peace process and in national reconciliation, in particular the lack of sufficient cooperation from the Somali parties over security issues, undermined the United Nations objectives in Somalia and prevented the continuation of UNOSOM II mandate beyond 31 March 1995.

The Security Council believes that the Somalia operation provides important lessons for the theory and practice of peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building.

The Security Council remains convinced that only a genuinely representative and broad-based approach to reconciliation will bring about a lasting political settlement and allow for the re-emergence of a civil society in Somalia. The Council reaffirms, based on its experience in UNOSOM II, that the people of Somalia bear the ultimate responsibility for achieving national reconciliation and restoring peace to Somalia. The international community can only facilitate, encourage and assist the process, but not try to impose any particular solution on it. The Council, therefore, calls upon the Somali parties to pursue national reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction in the interest of peace, security and development.

The Security Council notes the recent agreements reached between the factions in Mogadishu, especially on the control of sea and airport facilities. It expresses the hope that this encouraging development is indicative of a new spirit of cooperation among the factions and that it will lead to further progress in the search for a lasting peace in Somalia.

The Security Council supports the view of the Secretary-General that Somalia should not be abandoned by the United Nations, which will continue to assist the Somali people to achieve a political settlement and to provide humanitarian and other support services provided that the Somalis themselves demonstrate a disposition to peaceful resolution of the conflict and to cooperation with the international community. It welcomes the Secretary-General's intention to continue a small political mission, should the Somali parties so wish, to assist them in coming together in national reconciliation and looks forward to the report which the Secretary-General has indicated he will forward on this matter. The Council urges close cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations, in particular the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), as well as the Governments of neighbouring countries in these efforts. The Council considers it essential that the Somali parties clearly express their acceptance of such assistance and their willingness to cooperate with the United Nations.

The Security Council recognizes that humanitarian assistance in Somalia is an important element in the effort to restore peace and security in the country. It is therefore important to sustain United Nations humanitarian activities in Somalia and to encourage non-governmental organizations to do likewise. However, their ability to do so will depend on the degree of cooperation and security offered by the Somali parties. The Council welcomes the willingness expressed by the international humanitarian agencies and NGOs to continue to provide rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance in areas where security is guaranteed by the Somalis. The Council stresses that the creation of a long-lasting, stable and secure environment throughout the country is vital for the resumption of large-scale activity in these fields.

The Security Council reaffirms the obligations of States to implement fully the embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia imposed by paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992), and calls on States, especially neighbouring States, to refrain from actions capable of exacerbating the conflict in Somalia.

The Security Council requests the Secretary-General to continue to monitor the situation in Somalia and to keep it informed about further developments. The Council will remain seized of the matter.

Document 112

Letter dated 18 April 1995 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council concerning a continued United Nations political presence in Somalia

S/1995/322, 21 April 1995

In my report to the Security Council of 28 March 1995 on the situation in Somalia (S/1995/231), submitted in pursuance of Security Council resolution 954 (1994), I indicated that I expected to be in a position to take a decision by mid-April 1995 about the level and mandate of a continued United Nations political presence in Mogadishu. I further indicated that the size and mandate of that presence would depend on whether the Somali parties wanted the United Nations to play a facilitating or mediating role and were ready to cooperate with it, and that its location should be in Mogadishu, the security situation there permitting.

In the presidential statement of 6 April (S/PRST/1995/15), the Security Council welcomed my intention to continue a small political mission, should the Somali parties so wish, to assist them in coming together in national reconciliation. In this connection, the members of the Council may wish to take note of the enclosed press release which was issued by the Somali National Alliance on 11 April 1995. I shall stay in touch with the parties with a view to overcoming reservations such as those expressed therein.

In order to determine whether the present situation in Mogadishu is sufficiently secure to allow for the establishment of an office in that location, I recently dispatched a security assessment mission there. That mission's report is currently under preparation and the Council will be apprised of its findings as soon as they are available.

Meanwhile, I have concluded that the retention of a full-time Special Representative at the under-secretary-general level cannot be justified at the present time in view of the limited possibilities for United Nations political efforts related to Somalia. Mr. Victor Gbeho is therefore preparing to return to his home country. Instead, I have decided to establish a small political office, headed by a representative at the D-2 level and assisted by two Profes-

sional officers and a limited number of support staff. The office will monitor the situation in Somalia and keep contact with the parties concerned to the extent possible. The office will operate temporarily from Nairobi but will be relocated to Mogadishu as soon as circumstances permit.

I should be grateful if you could bring these matters to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Annex

Press release by the Somali National Alliance dated 11 April 1995

The death and destruction which resulted from the foreign interference in Somalia in which tens of thousands of innocent Somalis lost their lives and billions of dollars' worth of public and private property was destroyed has left in the minds of the Somali people painful memories which may take a long period of time to heal.

As a consequence, no Somali with a sense of nationalism, or who wishes for the revival of the United Nations reputation in this country, can accept that the United Nations now opens an office in Somalia.

It is quite strange that the United Nations in general and the Secretary-General in particular claim that they want to help reconciliation in Somalia when they themselves created most of the rival factions in Somalia and supplied them with arms and money to finance their war activities.

We believe that the office decided by the United Nations to be opened in Somalia is intended to perpetuate its previous activities to finance prolonged civil wars and instigate further hostilities and conflicts in Somalia.

Substantial progress has been made in Somalia as far as peace and reconciliation is concerned since the final

departure of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and the Somalis have not missed them. Peace and security have returned to the capital, and the wanton killings and banditry have ended.

United Nations activities in Somalia were correctly defined in a simple statement by the representative of the European Union in Somalia, Mr. Illing, who visited Mogadishu three weeks after UNOSOM's departure:

"The best that the United Nations did for Somalia was to decide to leave that country", Mr. Illing was quoted as saying. He further stated that "Just two weeks after the departure of UNOSOM the Somalis have made

more progress than in the two and a half years of the United Nations Operation in Somalia".

Because of all the above-mentioned facts as well as many others, it is even inappropriate to talk about the United Nations political return to Somalia for the time being, let alone for it to re-establish an office here.

The Somali people need neither the United Nations nor any other foreigners to mediate between them in their reconciliation process; they are capable of sorting out their political differences and achieving their own reconciliation and will not accept any further interference in their own political affairs.

Document 113

Letter dated 21 April 1995 from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General concerning a continued United Nations political presence in Somalia

S/1995/323, 21 April 1995

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 18 April 1995 (S/1995/322) concerning a continued United Nations political presence in Somalia and the establishment of a small political office to monitor the situation there has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security

Council. They note the information contained in the letter and welcome the decision contained therein.

(Signed) Karel KOVANDA

President of the Security Council

Document 114

Letter dated 31 May 1995 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council concerning the United Nations political office for Somalia

S/1995/451, 6 June 1995

I have the honour to refer to my letter of 18 April 1995 concerning the situation in Somalia (S/1995/322), in which I told you of my intention to inform the members of the Security Council of any new developments concerning the small United Nations political office for Somalia, which is presently operating out of Nairobi, and of the conclusions of the security assessment mission that had just been dispatched to Mogadishu.

With regard to security, a new set of guidelines for Mogadishu has been adopted on the basis of the mission's conclusions. These guidelines include the provision that international United Nations staff members are authorized to travel to Mogadishu and stay there no longer than three days a week. I should point out, however, that the

instability and unpredictability of security conditions in the Somali capital since the mission took place have severely curtailed visits by international staff.

I have twice taken the necessary steps, in late April and in early May, to dispatch special envoys to Mogadishu to request the views of Somali leaders concerning a possible United Nations political presence in their country. This effort has yielded no results, because of the opposition of the two principal leaders. Indeed, Mr. Ali Mahdi refused to meet with my first envoy because the envoy had been associated with the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM); as for my second envoy, his visit failed to take place, since at the last minute General Aidid went back on his decision to see him.

It is worth pointing out, however, that a wide range of leaders representing the main Somali factions, including a wing of the United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA), favourably welcomed my intention to set up a United Nations political office in their country.

Under these circumstances, I have decided that the political office for Somalia currently operating out of Nairobi will be kept there until an improvement in the

situation allows it to be transferred to Mogadishu. I have also decided to reduce the staff of this office to one director at the D-2 level, one Professional staff member and one General Service staff member.

I should be grateful if you would bring this information to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Document 115

Letter dated 2 June 1995 from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General concerning the United Nations political office for Somalia

S/1995/452, 2 June 1995

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 31 May 1995 (S/1995/451) concerning the political office for Somalia and the conclusions of the security assessment mission dispatched to Mogadishu has been brought to the

attention of Council members. They agree with the decision contained in your letter.

(Signed) Detlef GRAF ZU RANTZAU
President of the Security Council

Document 116

Report of the Secretary-General on assistance for humanitarian relief and the economic and social rehabilitation of Somalia

A/50/447, 19 September 1995

I. Introduction

1. In its resolution 49/21 L of 20 December 1994 on assistance for humanitarian relief and the economic and social rehabilitation of Somalia, the General Assembly, *inter alia*, noted with concern that the failure of the Somali parties to achieve political reconciliation and to maintain secure conditions in some parts of the country had impeded the full transition from relief operations to reconstruction and development. The Assembly appealed to all the Somali parties concerned to terminate hostilities and to engage in a national reconciliation process that would allow for such transition, and called upon all parties, movements and factions in Somalia to respect fully the security and safety of personnel of the United Nations and its specialized agencies and of non-governmental organizations.

2. The General Assembly called upon the Secretary-General to continue to mobilize international hu-

manitarian, rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance for Somalia, to apprise the Economic and Social Council at its substantive session of 1995 of the progress made in the implementation of the resolution and to report thereon to the Assembly at its fiftieth session. As requested by the Assembly, an oral report was delivered to the Economic and Social Council at its substantive session of 1995 by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs. The present report has been prepared in response to the above request by the Assembly.

II. Relief and rehabilitation programmes

A. General

3. By the end of 1994, the acute phase of the emergency in Somalia had been overcome. Owing largely to the international relief effort, the health and nutritional status of the population has improved significantly, con-

trasting dramatically with the situation at the peak of the crisis in 1992 when 3,000 men, women and children were dying daily from starvation. Agricultural and livestock production has increased owing to favourable climatic conditions combined with the effective distribution of food-security inputs. Community-based interventions by the United Nations and its partners have vastly improved the population's access to health, water and education services in the country. A considerable number of refugees and internally displaced persons have returned to their communities to resume a productive life and contribute to the reconstruction of Somalia.

4. In spite of these positive developments, the country is still a long way from being self-sufficient in meeting the basic needs of its population. The devastating civil war scarred virtually every aspect of Somali society, destroying at least 60 per cent of the country's basic infrastructure and causing an estimated 1.5 million people to flee from their home areas to neighbouring countries or elsewhere within Somalia. In view of the tremendous scale of the devastation, the recovery process will require considerable time, an expansion of international efforts and, most importantly, the active support and involvement of the Somali people to enable the agencies to carry out their activities safely and securely. In addition, the political instability and climate of insecurity that continue to characterize Somalia provide a prime breeding ground for new emergencies, with vulnerable groups being the most at risk, including displaced persons, refugees, women, children and the disabled. The situation underlines the necessity of achieving peace and national reconciliation to ensure that humanitarian gains are not reversed and to enable the country's full recovery.

5. United Nations agencies and their partners require sufficient funding and resources to address adequately the emergency and primary rehabilitation requirements in Somalia. Insufficient financial resources in the first half of 1995 limited the ability of United Nations agencies to provide target populations with adequate food and non-food inputs. Emergency and rehabilitation requirements for Somalia for the first six months of 1995, as reflected in the United Nations consolidated inter-agency appeal of January 1995, amounted to \$24.8 million in the food aid sector and \$45.4 million in the non-food sector. As of 15 August 1995, contributions for food aid totalled \$10.3 million. Contributions for non-food activities amounted to \$3.7 million. An estimated additional \$6 million was contributed to international non-governmental organizations and other international organizations operational in Somalia in the first half of 1995, outside of the framework of the United Nations appeal.

B. Food security

6. Drought conditions subsided and agricultural production improved considerably in 1994, compared to the period of the 1992/93 emergency. Plentiful rains in 1994 led to two exceptionally good harvests in Somalia. The August 1994 *gu* (main) season harvest reached 312,000 tons, which represents about 65 per cent of pre-war levels, and the output of the January 1995 *der* (secondary) harvest totalled 95,000 tons, which exceeded the pre-war average and assisted in improving the general food security situation across the country.

7. However, assessments of the 1995 *gu* season harvest indicate that crop output in the rainfed areas will be diminished owing to insufficient and scattered rains. While the agricultural output in irrigated areas is expected to be satisfactory, production in rainfed areas is estimated at no more than half of last year's harvest. Barring any further pest infestations or security constraints in agricultural areas, total cereal production in the country is estimated to reach, at best, 80 per cent of last year's harvest. Furthermore, in spite of the overall improvement in the agricultural situation in 1994, the majority of Somalis remain poor and their food security levels are negatively affected by the absence of institutions of governance, widespread unemployment, and limited international recovery and development assistance in the country.

8. Although no major cereal shortage is expected, the anticipated increase in food prices resulting from reduced agricultural production will lower the purchasing power of vulnerable groups in the country. Signs of a deteriorating nutritional status began to emerge in the second half of 1995 in some parts of the country, particularly in the Juba Valley of southern Somalia and in Mogadishu, with an increase in malnutrition rates reported among returnees, internally displaced persons and other vulnerable groups. The precarious food supply situation in the country is compounded by continuing insecurity and political instability. The major seaports in Somalia, including the port of Mogadishu, are functioning only intermittently, limiting the potential level of commercial food imports to the country. Estimated food aid requirements for 1995/96 amount to 129,500 tons. Pledges and carry-over stocks of the World Food Programme (WFP) stand at 77,500 tons, leaving a shortfall of 52,000 tons.

9. In view of the improved food supply situation in 1994, WFP continued to shift the focus of its assistance from relief to rehabilitation schemes. Over 4 million people in Somalia benefited from this assistance through the implementation of about 10,000 projects. The programme consists primarily of food-for-work schemes, which WFP implements through an integrated multi-sectoral approach

in the areas of health, education, agriculture, water, infrastructure rehabilitation, income generation, women's development, demobilization and resettlement. WFP reduced the amount of food aid allocated for relief distribution to approximately 10 per cent of its assistance programme by the end of 1994, and it has remained at that level in 1995. With the departure of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and some international non-governmental organizations, WFP has become increasingly reliant on national non-governmental organizations, regional administrations and local community structures, which comprised about 90 per cent of its implementing partners by the end of 1994. In total, WFP provided some 66,000 tons of mixed food commodities in 1994 through its eight field offices.

10. In 1994/95, WFP also contributed significantly to Somalia's rehabilitation process through its food monetization programme. Over \$5 million was generated in Somalia through the sale of nearly 7,000 tons of high-value food commodities not produced in the country. These funds were utilized to provide non-food inputs to 240 rehabilitation projects, creating about 4,000 jobs and strengthening general food security in the country.

11. In January 1995, WFP established a Food Security Assessment Unit, supported by the United States Agency for International Development and the European Union, to monitor weather conditions, food production, market prices, consumption and food availability trends, as well as the nutritional and health status of populations throughout Somalia. In close collaboration with other United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations, the Food Security Assessment Unit collects, analyses and disseminates data and information required for estimating immediate and future food requirements and for operationalizing a comprehensive early warning system in Somalia. In the event of natural disasters, WFP provides immediate food assistance to affected populations. Nearly 50,000 people affected by severe flooding in parts of the country in November 1994 were provided with emergency food rations. WFP also provides regular support to other vulnerable groups, including 14,000 orphans and 1,200 disabled persons.

C. Agriculture and fisheries

12. As more and more people have returned to their farms, the agricultural sector has shown encouraging signs of recovery. At the same time, the resumption of farming activities by returnees has increased the need for agricultural rehabilitation efforts in the country. During the civil war, agricultural machinery was looted, and bore-holes, wells and nurseries were destroyed. To contribute to the process of agricultural rehabilitation, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

(FAO) has distributed seeds and basic agricultural tools to tens of thousands of destitute farmers and returnees, in collaboration with partner non-governmental organizations and local authorities. About 6,000 farmers are receiving assistance through WFP-supported food-for-work schemes for the rehabilitation of wells, water catchments and irrigation canals. In preparation for the 1994 *gu* season, WFP provided pre-harvest food support to over 8,000 farming families in the bay region. In October 1994, WFP began a local grain procurement programme to support Somali farming communities and stimulate local grain markets. Some 11,000 tons of locally produced cereals had been purchased by June 1995. An animal traction project in the north-east, executed by FAO, has benefitted 800 farming families by increasing their crop production and relieving the workload of children previously engaged in ploughing. FAO continues its plant-protection activities by surveying and combating locust and pest infestations throughout the country. The plant protection campaign includes a component to train national personnel in pest control measures.

13. FAO also vaccinated livestock, rehabilitated slaughterhouses and trained nomads in basic veterinary skills in 1994/95. Support was extended to village-level associations to reactivate veterinary clinics, which have helped to reduce the incidence of disease and mortality rates among livestock. FAO has provided assistance in animal certification procedures, which has made possible the resumption of livestock exports from Somalia. In coastal areas, WFP has supported the establishment or expansion of several fishing cooperatives. However, implementation of an FAO and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) fisheries development project in the Merka-Adale area near Mogadishu has been suspended owing to continuing insecurity in the area.

14. In March 1994, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) commenced implementation of the 32-month Beyond Relief Programme designed to assist in restoring the agricultural and livestock production capacity of rural populations in the areas of Baidoa, Wajid and the Middle and Lower Shabelle districts of Somalia. The main activities executed by the Beyond Relief Programme were contracting local blacksmiths to produce 50,000 harvesting knives and distributing these to rural communities in Baidoa and Wanle Weyne. In addition, an emergency Quelea-bird eradication programme was implemented and proved to be highly successful, resulting in a satisfactory sorghum harvest.

D. Health

15. By the end of 1994, most of the standard indicators of the health and nutritional status of the population showed considerable stability. In spite of this

overall improvement, the health status of a large segment of the population in Somalia remains precarious owing to a number of factors, including restricted access to food on the market, poor access to health-care services and the heavy workload of many women. Diarrhoeal diseases, malaria and pneumonia are among the leading causes of childhood morbidity in the country. To improve health conditions in the country, United Nations agencies and their partners in 1994 strengthened their interventions in the health and nutrition sector. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), in collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO) and non-governmental organizations, continues to support health-care facilities, expanding its coverage to include 129 maternity health-care centres, 93 out-patient dispensaries, 391 health posts and 24 hospitals. Some 790 community health workers, traditional birth attendants, nurses, auxiliaries, trauma counsellors and vaccinators have been trained since September 1994.

16. UNICEF continues to provide supplementary feeding to an average of 22,000 malnourished children, pregnant women and lactating mothers every month, targeting those areas of the country where malnutrition persists. An average of 20,500 children a month receive vitamin A supplements to assist with disease prevention. More than 1,500 tons of Super Unimix was distributed to 34 UNICEF-supported feeding centres in central and southern Somalia. Nutrition surveys, conducted regularly by UNICEF and several international non-governmental organizations, serve to ensure a rapid response in areas affected by malnutrition, particularly among vulnerable groups such as displaced persons and returnees, as well as drought- or conflict-affected populations.

17. An outbreak of cholera that began in parts of Somalia in February 1994 declined in the last months of 1994. However, cholera resurfaced at Kismayo and Mogadishu in February 1995, indicating a seasonal cycle of the epidemic. Concerted action by WHO, UNICEF, WFP, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and partner organizations, including Somali non-governmental organizations, succeeded in rapidly containing the renewed cholera outbreak in 1995. WHO provided over 54 tons of treatment drugs and other supplies, and consolidated the information to monitor the cholera situation throughout the country. UNICEF, in collaboration with its partners, established isolation and treatment centres, chlorinated water sources, provided oral rehydration salts and other supplies and carried out intensive health education and social mobilization campaigns in affected areas. Educational materials on cholera prevention, designed and produced by UNESCO, were used in the anti-cholera campaign. WFP food incentive schemes also contributed

to the anti-cholera activities. Médecins sans frontières (Belgium) operated a cholera treatment centre at Kismayo and assisted in monitoring the outbreak. By June 1995, the situation had been brought under control, and water samples collected from wells continued to test negative for cholera. A total of 10,496 cholera cases were identified in the country during the first half of 1995, and 197 deaths were reported, representing a case fatality rate of 1.88 per cent. These figures indicate an improvement over the 1994 cholera outbreak, when a total of 28,334 cases were reported and 1,206 deaths recorded, representing a case fatality rate of 4.26 per cent. To ensure preparedness for responding to any renewed outbreak of the disease, there is an urgent need to replenish the country's cholera prevention and treatment supplies.

18. WHO continued to expand its support to tuberculosis treatment programmes in various parts of the country. Some 4,000 tuberculosis patients completed therapy during 1994, and a total of approximately 10,000 cases were expected to be treated in 1995. WHO assistance to blood bank services has improved the safety of blood transfusion in parts of the country. The multi-sectoral community-based WHO Basic Minimum Needs programme, which has resumed in Somalia and is expanding at the rate of one village per month, has positively impacted the quality of life of populations in the target areas. To combat malaria, a major health problem in rural and coastal areas, WHO has continued to distribute anti-malarial drugs and to develop malaria control strategies with local authorities. WHO is also working with Somali researchers on the development of chemotherapy protocols for malaria treatment in the country. An NGO-operated leprosy treatment centre benefiting 300 patients is receiving technical advice, drug supplies and laboratory support from WHO.

19. To guard against a recurrence of the 1992 tragedy in which tens of thousands of children died from measles in Somalia, UNICEF has vaccinated a cumulative total of 900,000 children against the disease. Between September 1994 and July 1995, over 95,000 children were immunized against measles, 125,000 against tuberculosis and another 143,000 against four other preventable diseases. In addition, over 106,000 women of child-bearing age were vaccinated against tetanus. To improve immunization levels in urban areas, UNICEF, WHO and partner non-governmental organizations are expanding outreach activities from health posts and maternity health-care centres. A reproductive health programme, implemented by WHO in collaboration with UNICEF, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and several non-governmental organizations, was initiated in March 1995 in response to high levels of maternal morbidity and mortality associated with nutritional defi-

ciencies, complications during birth and limited access to pre- and post-natal care in Somalia. WHO continued to provide essential drugs to 56 local non-governmental organizations and 12 international non-governmental organizations from its Somalia Central Pharmacy at Mogadishu and satellite warehouses in many parts of the country. UNICEF supplied drugs, vaccines and medical equipment to health facilities and distributed basic and renewable drug kits to all maternity health-care centres and most out-patient dispensaries and health posts in the country. Between January and June 1995, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) provided over 66 tons of medical supplies to hospitals and health posts throughout the country.

20. The re-establishment of laboratory services and surgical capabilities has been supported through the provision of technical assistance, reagents and training activities. Since September 1994, 33 Somali professionals have benefited from hands-on laboratory training under WHO supervision, and 4 hospital laboratories have been provided with equipment and supplies. WHO, UNICEF and international non-governmental organizations are planning to strengthen the disease surveillance system in Somalia. WHO technical guidelines and other health education literature in the Somali language are being printed and distributed in collaboration with UNESCO. United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations and Somali health professionals are cooperating in the design of a joint health and nutrition strategy with a view to improving standardization, coordination, planning and sustainability in the health sector in Somalia.

21. WFP continues to support the health sector in the country through its various food-for-work and food incentive schemes. On a monthly basis, 7,000 health-care workers in nearly 100 hospitals, clinics, leprosy camps, health posts and maternity health-care centres receive WFP food-for-work allowances. Approximately 8,000 in-patients a month, as well as malnourished children and pregnant and lactating women, benefit from special feeding programmes. WFP also provides food incentives to instructors and participants in community health worker training courses.

E. Water and sanitation

22. The prevalence of unsafe drinking water and poor sanitation and hygiene practices continues to affect the health and nutritional status of people throughout Somalia. A large segment of the population lacks adequate water and sanitation facilities, owing to massive displacement and destruction of infrastructure during the civil war. To address the problem, United Nations agencies and their partners have been undertaking efforts to improve the population's access to safe drinking water,

thus reducing exposure to water-borne diseases. Over the past year, UNICEF rehabilitated 145 open wells, of which 50 were fitted with handpumps. At Boroma, two boreholes and a water storage tank were rehabilitated and reconnected to the town's water supply system. In addition, some 120 latrines were constructed to improve sanitation conditions in schools throughout the country. By the end of 1995, UNICEF expects to rehabilitate an additional 100 open wells and 100 small urban water systems, as well as complete the rehabilitation of the major water supply system at Baidoa.

23. In many villages, WFP supports the rehabilitation and maintenance of water systems through food-for-work schemes for technicians and support staff. The building of protective fences to combat the contamination of water sources is also supported. FAO, in collaboration with UNDP, is assessing the pesticide residue level in water from drinking wells along the Hargeisa river, which is suspected of having been polluted by pesticides when a major warehouse containing pesticides was damaged in the town during the civil war. UNDP continued to support the rehabilitation and operation of the Mogadishu water supply system, which provides water to about half of the city's population. In June 1995, however, the supply of water from the station came to a halt because of lack of fuel to operate the station's main generators. In addition, funds for the project are exhausted and UNDP is seeking urgent contributions to continue its assistance. UNICEF expanded its training activities in the water and sanitation sector. A total of 800 mechanics received on-the-job training in handpump maintenance, and personnel from 30 non-governmental organizations were trained in pump installation. In addition, UNICEF trained 55 people to repair water systems, and a total of 175 people were trained in social mobilization for improved water and sanitation practices.

F. Education

24. To assist in the revitalization of the education sector and to restore a level of stability to the lives of school-aged children in Somalia, United Nations agencies continued efforts to improve access to basic education. UNICEF and its partners supported the rehabilitation of 44 schools and distributed 1,865 education kits to a total of 585 primary and Koranic schools throughout the country. UNESCO, in collaboration with its partners, has so far produced one million primary-level textbooks. Twenty-four titles and their corresponding teacher guides have been introduced to schools. About 15,000 teachers and support staff receive monthly food baskets from WFP in exchange for their services in over 500 schools, and about 80,000 students are provided with daily meals or high-protein snacks to boost their nutritional levels and

encourage attendance. WFP also supports the rehabilitation of school buildings through its food-for-work and monetization schemes.

25. UNESCO continues to support the rehabilitation of the education sector through its education development centres at Mogadishu, Baidoa and Hargeisa, its emergency action response centres at Garbaharey and Hoddur, and a regional programme centre at Nairobi. A total of 87 teacher-training workshops have been conducted by UNESCO in 12 regions of the country, as well as in Somali refugee camps in Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia and Yemen. Teacher-training guides developed by UNESCO have been utilized in collaboration with UNICEF to provide refresher training courses to 744 primary and Koranic schoolteachers and 60 headmasters. In addition, 4,000 copies of "Child Care in Islam" were printed by UNICEF and distributed to schools in the north-east, and another 12,000 copies are under print for distribution in other areas of the country.

26. As part of UNESCO's Somalia Open Learning Unit, practising but untrained teachers are receiving in-service training in pedagogic and administrative subjects, leading to a diploma. An emergency education package developed by UNESCO has been distributed in rural areas and in camps for internally displaced persons to provide the basic materials required to enable effective learning to take place in situations where school buildings do not exist or are in disrepair. In a joint UNICEF and UNESCO programme, over 90 trainers, inspectors and administrators received training, with the goal of ensuring that educational officers capable of exercising training, supervisory and inspectorate functions are present in each region of the country. Some 86 teachers were trained in the provision of psycho-social support to war-traumatized children as part of a UNICEF pilot project in Baidoa. WFP continues to support teacher-training programmes through the provision of food incentives for participants and instructors.

27. UNICEF continues to promote the introduction of a primary education curriculum in community-based Koranic schools in order to expand access to basic education in the country. UNICEF also increased its efforts to raise the community's awareness of the importance of educating young girls through the organization of workshops and the distribution of 18,000 posters throughout the country. UNESCO continued to support the establishment of regional boards of education in several areas, and UNICEF assisted in the formation of school committees in 115 communities to improve the management and sustainability of local education systems in the absence of central authority. In addition, in 1994 UNESCO launched a comprehensive adult literacy programme in Somalia. The United Nations Develop-

ment Office for Somalia, a UNDP project, in collaboration with UNESCO is conducting surveys and undertaking data collection on the education sector in all regions of the country.

G. Refugees

28. Although some refugee camps in Kenya were closed as a result of the large number of Somalis who were repatriated, approximately 157,000 Somali refugees are still registered in camps in Kenya. Another 300,000 Somali refugees were registered in camps in Ethiopia, Djibouti and Eritrea as of June 1995. In addition, the outbreak of fighting in north-west Somalia since November 1994 has caused a renewed exodus of people from the country. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and its partners continue to implement voluntary repatriation programmes, prepare the ground in Somalia for returning refugees and assist local communities to meet the needs of the returnees and the communities themselves.

29. Over 500 quick impact projects have been designed to facilitate the rehabilitation of essential infrastructure that was destroyed or damaged during the civil war. Under this programme, public and agricultural infrastructure, schools and veterinary services are being rehabilitated, thus contributing to the reintegration of returning populations and improving the absorptive capacity of recipient communities. From Kenya, over 60,000 refugees were voluntarily repatriated from camps to the Gedo region. Voluntary repatriation from the Kenyan coastal camps began in December 1994, and over 12,000 Somalis returned to the Kismayo area of Lower Juba over a 10-week period. WFP continued to facilitate the return of refugees through community reintegration projects and farm rehabilitation schemes. Seeds and agricultural tools were distributed to needy returnees and residents of the recipient communities. In March 1995, ICRC provided mosquito nets, seeds, fishing materials and other non-food items to over 30,000 returnee and resident families in the Juba Valley. With crop failure resulting in a deterioration of the nutritional status of returnees in the Marere area of Lower Juba, ICRC began an emergency food aid programme benefiting over 1,000 families and established a feeding centre for malnourished children in April 1995. UNHCR and its partners will continue efforts to enhance coordination for repatriation and returnee programmes and to ensure the stability of returning populations and recipient communities.

H. Internally displaced persons

30. The presence of a large number of internally displaced persons, who are among the most vulnerable

groups in the country, continues to be a major concern for United Nations agencies and their partners. In addition to the substantial hardships faced by displaced persons owing to lack of food, inadequate health services and security problems, the large population of internally displaced persons presents serious obstacles to rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts in the country and brings significant pressure to bear on already highly stressed towns and cities where the displaced are concentrated. A survey is being conducted by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) at Mogadishu. The survey has identified a total of 96 camps for internally displaced persons in the city and suggests a total population of some 70,000 internally displaced persons in Mogadishu. There are an estimated 300,000 to 400,000 internally displaced persons country-wide.

31. Assistance has been extended to internally displaced persons in the form of food and non-food humanitarian relief as well as resettlement and reintegration support. Between September and December 1994, 25 resettlement operations were carried out, assisted by UNOSOM, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations, in which a total of 14,211 internally displaced persons were returned to their villages of origin in 12 regions of the country. The returnees received resettlement kits from UNICEF, in-transit and interim food rations from WFP, and seeds and tools from FAO. WFP also provided substantial support for community reintegration projects in areas of resettlement which benefited over 7,000 returnee families from Mogadishu alone. During the phase-out of UNOSOM, responsibility for the general coordination of return-to-home programmes for internally displaced persons was shifted to IOM. In mid-December 1994, a further 1,680 internally displaced persons were returned to the Bakool region, with substantial logistical and other support provided by national non-governmental organizations as well as elders from within the communities of the internally displaced persons. All return-to-home programmes for internally displaced persons have been suspended since March 1995 because of financial constraints and insufficient donor response to resettlement appeals. IOM is planning a return and reintegration programme for internally displaced persons presently in Mogadishu, but implementation of the programme will require additional support from the international community.

32. UNICEF, in cooperation with other United Nations agencies and partner non-governmental organizations established emergency health posts in villages around Hargeisa and at Kismayo to provide medical treatment to displaced persons and returnees, as well as potable water and oral rehydration salts. UNICEF also

provided tools, latrines and other water and sanitation assistance to displaced persons in coastal communities affected by cyclones and flooding in late 1994. WFP has initiated a number of income-generation projects benefiting displaced families living in camps around Mogadishu. The second phase of the IOM survey in Mogadishu camps involves collecting information on the health and educational status of the internally displaced persons. IOM also intends to conduct surveys of the camps, as well as return and reintegration operations in other areas of the country. Between January and June 1995, ICRC provided non-food relief items to over 35,000 displaced families in Mogadishu, Galcayo and the north-west. IOM, in collaboration with United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations, is monitoring the reintegration efforts of returnees in areas of resettlement. Some 185,000 people have been displaced since November 1994 as a result of renewed conflict in the north-west, and WFP has provided emergency food rations to a portion of this conflict-affected population.

1. *De-mining and demobilization*

33. An essential component for the full recovery and reconstruction of Somalia is an effective process of de-mining and demobilization of combatants. Towards this end, United Nations agencies and their partners are pursuing initiatives aimed at supporting this process and contributing to a climate of peace and security in the country. Some 2,000 former combatants are assisted per month in WFP-supported farm rehabilitation projects as well as vocational training programmes that enable ex-militia to acquire income-earning skills. UNESCO and UNHCR continue implementation of a mine awareness programme covering 36 towns and villages in the north-west. The mine awareness package developed by UNESCO for Somalia contains cloth charts, leaflets and other mine-warning educational materials, including a low-cost video. As part of its education-for-peace strategy, UNESCO commissioned a play promoting demobilization and disarmament, which has so far been staged in 15 district headquarters in four regions, for a cumulative total audience of 69,200 people. The play is also being distributed in the form of video and audio tapes. UNDP is formulating a project that will support the socio-economic reintegration of demobilized militia and other war-affected populations in Somalia. The project's participatory community-based approach will encourage the process of voluntary demobilization and sustainable reintegration of ex-militia through the creation of viable economic alternatives.

III. Reconstruction strategies and efforts

34. While recognizing that the humanitarian situation in Somalia remains fragile, United Nations agencies are committed to undertake efforts to begin the process of rehabilitation and reconstruction even before the achievement of national reconciliation, without prejudice to the provision of emergency relief assistance wherever and whenever required. One year after the adoption of the Declaration of the Fourth Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia, held at Addis Ababa from 29 November to 1 December 1993, which defined the conditions for aid activities in Somalia, donors and other international partners reviewed the criteria for continuing their rehabilitation and development assistance to the country. That review resulted in the adoption by the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) on 17 February 1995 of a Code of Conduct for International Rehabilitation and Development Assistance to Somalia. SACB comprises donors, United Nations agencies and international organizations, including international non-governmental organizations.

35. The Code of Conduct reaffirmed the willingness of donors, United Nations agencies and international non-governmental organizations to consider rehabilitation and development assistance in areas where a number of conditions are fulfilled, and stressed the necessity of moving towards the establishment of a more stable environment which will permit Somali and international organizations to operate in safety and security, and at a lower operational cost. Such an environment will ensure that resources can be used to maximum effect to promote the welfare of the Somali people, especially the most vulnerable groups. In the Code of Conduct, the collective membership of SACB also agreed that international assistance to Somalia is founded on the basic principle that responsibility for its effective execution shall remain with the Somali people and that responsible Somali authorities are therefore expected to assume their proper role to ensure that conditions exist for the effective implementation of aid activities.

36. The Code of Conduct outlines a set of principles that define the circumstances required for the successful and sustainable implementation of rehabilitation and development assistance. For their part, the responsible Somali authorities must guarantee that secure conditions prevail for aid agencies and their staff and that they will pursue and bring to justice the perpetrators of criminal acts. The responsible Somali authorities must also provide the necessary conditions for the implementation of rehabilitation and development activities by providing office and residential premises to agencies (where available), as well as by allowing agencies to decide how to meet their own transport and local staffing needs.

37. The Code of Conduct further calls on responsible Somali authorities to exempt all aid personnel and aid-related cargo from duties, taxes and other forms of levy and to publish a scale of reasonable tariffs for the payment of services rendered at the demand of an agency for the clearance of aid cargo at ports and airports. In return, international aid agencies working with the Somali people will maintain impartiality in the conduct of their activities, develop a coordinated approach to programme implementation and pay due regard to local social customs and cultural and religious values. SACB is closely monitoring the implementation of the Code of Conduct with a view to advising donors and international partners to take appropriate action whenever deemed necessary, including suspension of activities.

38. To pursue rehabilitation in the absence of a central government, the United Nations strategy in Somalia focuses on the implementation of community-based interventions aimed at rebuilding local infrastructures and increasing the self-reliance of the local population. Implementation of the UNDP-funded Somalia Rural Rehabilitation Programme continues, with area offices established at Boroma, Burao, Bossaso and Baidoa and sub-offices at Gabiley and Hargeisa. The Programme strives to revitalize local economies and build the capacity of communities through the introduction of a multisectoral package of sustainable rehabilitation projects in which community members participate fully at all stages of planning and implementation. The Programme has had considerable positive impact on the daily lives of people in the target communities through the rehabilitation of public buildings, schools, community centres, water supplies and health centres. This has led to a boost of community confidence manifested in a return of refugees and a higher level of private investment. Implementation of a similar project, executed by the United Nations Volunteers, for the integrated agricultural and area development of the Juba Valley started in December 1994.

39. To complement these rural-based efforts, UNDP and the International Labour Organization (ILO) are cooperating in the formulation of a programme to support income-generation and training activities at Baidoa, Bossaso and Kismayo. The programme will address the problems of poverty and unemployment among specific sections of the urban population, including women, youth, internally displaced persons and the disabled. As soon as security conditions permit, UNDP and the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat) are planning to begin implementation of an urban settlement and management programme at Hargeisa, to provide assistance in shelter reconstruction, low-cost housing and capacity-building for municipal authorities.

40. UNDP, in collaboration with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), continues to provide management support to Somalia's main ports. While project activities at the port of Mogadishu have been suspended for security reasons since the withdrawal of UNOSOM, support to the ports of Kismayo, Berbera and Bossaso has expanded. Assistance activities include the provision of equipment, training of port management personnel and support in establishing recognized port authorities that meet international standards. Similarly, UNDP and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) continued efforts to re-establish acceptable standards for safe civil aviation in the country. Since the cessation of operations at Mogadishu airport in early 1995, assistance has been extended to upgrade other airports in the country and to establish sustainable revenue-generating airport systems in collaboration with local authorities.

41. The United Nations Development Office for Somalia, a UNDP project, continues its efforts to establish the necessary institutional capacity on which to base a future national planning and economic management mechanism. Towards this end, the Office is conducting socio-economic surveys and collecting additional information for the purpose of creating databases that will assist in the planning and coordination of rehabilitation and development activities in the country. The Office, in collaboration with several non-governmental organizations, is also undertaking a series of studies on local administrative structures in Somalia with a view to assisting local bodies to develop responsive, equitable and efficient systems of governance. The Office continues to provide secretariat support for SACB and its Standing Committee.

42. In preparation for the Fourth World Conference on Women at Beijing, UNDP assisted Somali women to prepare a country paper for presentation at the Conference in September 1995. UNDP also organized and coordinated the participation of Somali women at the Conference and supported several preparatory workshops held at different locations in Somalia, which made the selection of participants possible and identified priority issues for presentation at Beijing. The preparatory workshops also led to the creation of an umbrella non-governmental organization called the Somali Women's Organization for National Development. A symposium on the culture of peace in Somalia was organized by UNESCO at Sana'a, Yemen, in April 1995, in which 70 Somali intellectuals from within and outside Somalia took part.

IV. Coordination arrangements

43. As described in preceding sections of this report, continued political instability and the absence of central authority in Somalia have increased the importance of close coordination and cooperation among United Nations agencies and their partners. The withdrawal of UNOSOM in March 1995 marked the end of a number of coordination, logistical and other support services previously available to relief and rehabilitation organizations in the country. In the months prior to the final departure of UNOSOM, United Nations agencies and organizations recognized the need for establishing effective coordination mechanisms for the post-UNOSOM transition period. Towards this end, the United Nations Coordination Team was established in October 1994, composed of senior representatives of United Nations agencies and organizations operational in Somalia.

44. The United Nations Coordination Team is chaired by the UNDP Resident Representative for Somalia, who also serves as the United Nations Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator for the country. The establishment of the United Nations Coordination Team as the United Nations inter-agency coordination mechanism for Somalia was endorsed by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee on Somalia (IASC) in November 1994. In a letter to the Secretary-General dated 7 December 1994, 1/ the President of the Security Council, on behalf of the members of the Council, took note of the IASC statement and welcomed the commitment of the agencies to continue emergency and rehabilitation activities in post-UNOSOM Somalia. The United Nations Coordination Team provides a weekly forum for information exchange and decision-making on the programmes of United Nations agencies, and provides guidance on achieving greater coherence in policies and approaches in order to maximize efficiency in the implementation of agency mandates. The United Nations Coordination Team also cooperates with both international and national consortia of non-governmental organizations and works in close collaboration with SACB. The United Nations Coordination Unit, administered by UNDP, was created to serve as a small technical secretariat to the Team, as well as to contribute to policy harmonization and to develop systems for information management and the provision of common services to operational agencies, including an inter-agency security system.

45. In order further to strengthen inter-agency cooperation, specialized sectoral analysis and coordination of activities among United Nations agencies and the

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community of non-governmental organizations are being carried out under the leadership of the organization with the most relevant mandate and experience in the specific sector. In the health sector, UNICEF has organized coordination forums involving non-governmental organizations, United Nations agencies and donors, aimed at formulating common health strategies and an agreed work plan incorporating the views of all health agencies. Similar efforts are being undertaken for the education sector under the lead of UNESCO. The Food Security Assessment Unit established by WFP collaborates closely with other United Nations agencies and their partner organizations to monitor the agricultural situation and provide comprehensive early-warning information for Somalia. IOM provides the multisectoral coordination necessary for return and reintegration efforts relating to internally displaced persons. The United Nations Development Office for Somalia is laying the institutional foundations to facilitate the coordination of longer-term rehabilitation and development activities in the country.

46. Coordination of technical support services, including security, medical evacuation, communications and logistics, is being pursued with a view to improving the cost-effectiveness of operations through the pooling of United Nations agency resources. In the area of air transport, a total of three light aircraft operated by UNICEF, UNDP and WFP, with additional aircraft under the aegis of the European Community Humanitarian Office, are available to transport the personnel and cargo of United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations and donors to and from Somalia, and a system is in place to coordinate the flight schedules of these aircraft.

V. Impact of security problems

47. The withdrawal of United Nations military contingents from Somalia in the first months of 1995 necessitated the temporary evacuation of international personnel for security reasons. However, a return to widespread anarchy and disorder following the departure of UNOSOM did not materialize in the size and scope predicted. As a result, international agency personnel were able to return to most areas of the country within weeks after the final departure of United Nations troops. In general, the security situation in most parts of the country has remained stable enough to allow the continuation of relief and rehabilitation activities, and United Nations assistance programmes are being carried out in 15 of the country's 18 regions, with a total of about 40 United Nations international personnel posted in different locations at any one time.

48. In spite of the relative stability, inter-clan conflict, violence and banditry are unfortunately regular occurrences in some areas of the country, disrupting relief

and recovery efforts and endangering the safety of civilians as well as humanitarian personnel in those areas. Over the past year, several national relief workers have been killed in Somalia, and kidnappings, armed attacks, threats and the looting of vehicles and equipment have persisted, affecting both national and international personnel. As a result, United Nations agencies and international non-governmental organizations have been forced temporarily to suspend or withdraw operations in several locations. Conflict in north-west Somalia forced United Nations international staff to relocate from Hargeisa in November 1994 for a five-month period, and from Burao in March 1995. United Nations operations at Bossaso, Baidoa and Kismayo were temporarily suspended pending the satisfactory resolution of security threats. The offices of United Nations agencies at Bardera, Belet Weyn and Galcayo remained closed over most of the past year owing to security concerns.

49. In Mogadishu, the political and security situation since the UNOSOM withdrawal has not stabilized sufficiently to allow the return of United Nations international staff on a permanent basis. Based on the findings of a security assessment mission to the city in April 1995, the United Nations Security Coordinator decided to allow the return of a limited number of essential and emergency-related international staff to Mogadishu on the condition that the personnel remain for a period not to exceed three days per week. Since then, the security situation in Mogadishu has deteriorated, with increased incidents of banditry and lawlessness perpetrated by armed groups on the streets of the city. The tense atmosphere in Mogadishu is compounded by widespread unemployment and by the political developments of June 1995. In view of the situation, United Nations agencies maintain the operation of their programmes in the city through their national officers. While some international non-governmental organizations continue to operate in Mogadishu, the presence of expatriate staff is minimal.

50. In March 1995, the main political factions in Mogadishu formed a joint committee to take over the operation and management of the seaport and the main international airport in the city. The airport has, however, remained closed since the UNOSOM withdrawal. The seaport has remained operational under the supervision of the joint committee, but inter-factional clashes and labour disputes have resulted in frequent cessations of port operations. The first United Nations vessel to arrive in Mogadishu since UNOSOM left the city, a UNICEF-chartered ship, docked at the port in late April 1995 and was able to unload its medical and educational supplies safely. The continued closure of the airport and the uncertain future of seaport operations severely affects the ability of the United Nations and its partners to deliver

relief and rehabilitation supplies to the city, which in turn impacts operations throughout Somalia, particularly for the south-central regions. As a result, creative and alternate means of transporting commodities to Somalia are required.

51. In the face of political instability and insecurity, United Nations agencies in the post-UNOSOM period have adopted common strategies for protecting the safety and security of personnel and property in the country. These strategies include maintaining a constant dialogue with local authorities, seeking acceptance of the Code of Conduct for International Rehabilitation and Development Assistance to Somalia and other guarantees of security from community leaders in areas of operation and taking collective action when confronted with security threats. For example, as a result of threats made to personnel of one United Nations agency at Bossaso in April 1995, the offices of all United Nations agencies in the town were closed. This concerted action by the United Nations agencies had the effect of convincing community leaders to take measures to ensure the protection of United Nations personnel, and the offices were re-opened three weeks later.

52. As part of efforts to coordinate technical support services, a common security network has been developed, utilizing the shared resources of United Nations agencies, under the direction of the United Nations Coordination Team. The inter-agency security plan includes the posting of security officers of the United Nations Coordination Team to cover all areas where Nations agencies are operational, the regular monitoring and assessment of the security situation throughout Somalia and the establishment of adequate evacuation and preparedness plans in cases of emergency. While these security measures are undertaken to enable the provision of assistance to affected populations, United Nations agencies will only operate in areas where reasonable assurances of security can be obtained. In this regard, the responsibility for ensuring the safety and security of staff members and property of the humanitarian organizations rests primarily with the Somali people.

VI. Assistance provided by Member States

53. In addition to the activities described above, several Member States have provided information on assistance to Somalia in compliance with General Assembly resolution 49/21 L.

Finland

54. As of June 1995, the Government of Finland had contributed Fmk 1,000,000 in assistance to Somalia under the auspices of ICRC. Finland is processing a contribution to Somalia via UNHCR.

Germany

55. From 1992 through 1994, humanitarian assistance to Somalia provided by the Government of Germany totalled DM 137,256,376. Of this amount, DM 53,833,800 constitutes Germany's portion of the assistance rendered by the European Union. A contribution under the current United Nations inter-agency consolidated appeal is under consideration.

Ireland

56. In 1994, the Government of Ireland contributed, through the Irish Battalion of UNOSOM, a total of £Ir 37,895.82 in humanitarian assistance to Somalia. Of this amount £Ir 27,895.82 went to the humanitarian relief programme in Baidoa, while £Ir 10,000 went towards emergency assistance for relief operations in Baidoa. In 1995, a donation of £Ir 272,591 was made to the Irish non-governmental organization Trocaire for rehabilitation assistance in the health and education sectors.

57. In fiscal year 1994, the Government of Japan provided US\$2 million for assistance to Somali refugees in Kenya, US\$200,000 for assistance to Somali refugees in Djibouti, and US\$1.5 million for the repatriation of Somali refugees in Kenya and under the cross border operation. All of these contributions were made to UNHCR. The Government of Japan also provided a total of US\$11,320,000 to WFP towards assistance for African refugees affected by the conflicts in Somalia, Liberia and the Sudan.

Luxembourg

58. In 1993, the Government of Luxembourg provided US\$57,877 for emergency and humanitarian assistance to Somalia.

Yemen

59. Despite its economic difficulties, Yemen is currently sheltering more than 60,000 Somali refugees in its cities and is doing so in cooperation with UNHCR. Yemen, in cooperation with UNESCO, hosted a seminar from 17 to 20 April 1995 entitled "A culture of peace in Somalia". It was attended by 70 Somali intellectuals representing various regions and political trends. At the seminar, an appeal was made for a halt to violence and for commitment to the peace and reconciliation process with a view to rebuilding Somalia.

VII. Concluding observations

60. Since the last report of the Secretary-General on assistance for humanitarian relief and the economic and social rehabilitation of Somalia (A/49/456), the coun-

try, while the current situation remains fragile, has slowly moved towards recovery and reconstruction. However, insecurity in many areas of the country continues to affect negatively the pace of recovery and has prolonged the need for humanitarian assistance, particularly for vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. Faced with continued inter-clan conflict and the absence of central authority, Somalia continues to suffer from a chronic crisis of governance characterized by banditry, political instability, violence and the threat of a renewed full-scale civil war. While the overall humanitarian situation in Somalia has improved over the past year, these gains remain precarious in the absence of peace and effective civil institutions.

61. Until March 1995, UNOSOM continued to provide an umbrella structure for the humanitarian operations of United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations, as well as substantial logistical support for the resettlement of internally displaced persons and military escorts for humanitarian convoys. In late 1994, United Nations agencies and organizations reaffirmed their commitment to continue operations in the country beyond the termination of the mandate of UNOSOM, in cooperation with the Somali people and subject to favourable security conditions. Following the departure of UNOSOM in early 1995, 8 organizations of the United Nations system have maintained and in some cases expanded their humanitarian and rehabilitation activities in 15 of the country's 18 regions. Some 40 international non-governmental organizations maintain a presence in the country, playing a critical role in the relief and rehabilitation process.

62. In a context of political unrest, United Nations agencies in the post-UNOSOM period have developed appropriate strategies to maintain effective operations and ensure that their relief and rehabilitation activities have the most positive impact on the intended beneficiaries. United Nations agencies and organizations have focused on community-based efforts, adopting a

low-profile regional approach and maintaining operational centres in those areas where security of personnel can be guaranteed. United Nations agencies are taking a flexible approach in their relationships with the variety of local authorities and the growing number of regional administrations that are being established in various areas of Somalia. The current situation in the country has underscored the importance of effective coordination of activities and policies among United Nations agencies and their partners, and appropriate measures have been taken to increase and enhance inter-agency cooperation in Somalia. One form of such cooperation is the direct link that the United Nations agencies have established and maintained with the international donor community at the field level through the SACB.

63. The situation in Somalia poses a question for the international community: how can agencies obtain funding for humanitarian assistance in a situation where the emergency has receded but the country is far from out of danger? In the absence of national institutions capable of coping even with minor emergencies, Somalia will continue to remain vulnerable to future disasters. How then can the transition from relief to reconstruction occur when the balance can be so easily tipped, and the gains made over the past three years through the combined efforts of international relief agencies and committed Somali partners so easily undone?

64. What is sorely required in today's Somalia is a commitment from donors to proactively support the presence and targeted programmes of United Nations agencies and organizations so as to prevent Somalia from slipping back into another period of acute crisis. I take this opportunity to ask donors to support generously current efforts to assist the Somali people. Such efforts can help Somalis sustain a process of rehabilitation and reconstruction, thus enabling them to move away from the destructive process which has threatened to consume their country.

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