

42nd meeting

Monday, 26 July 1993, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. Juan SOMAVÍA (Chile)

E/1993/SR.42

AGENDA ITEM 13

Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

1. Mrs. OGATA (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) presented her report for the period 1 January 1992 to 31 March 1993 (E/1993/20), a period that had been marked by a proliferation of humanitarian crises and massive movements of refugees and displaced persons, while at the same time the end of the cold war had opened up prospects for a political solution to a number of conflicts. That juxtaposition of opportunities and risks had led UNHCR to adopt a new strategy, combining the traditional activities of protection and assistance with a more innovative approach to the prevention and solution of refugee problems. That new strategy had three facets: prevention, preparedness for emergency situations, and solutions.

2. In Somalia, for instance, UNHCR had carried out a cross-border operation, launching a number of Quick-Impact Projects on both sides of the Kenyan frontier, with the result that the outflow of refugees from Somalia had almost stopped, even creating a propitious climate for the voluntary repatriation of a small number of refugees. It could thus be seen that there was a close link between prevention and durable solutions. It was now to be hoped that the recent deterioration in the situation in Mogadishu would not vitiate hopes for a major repatriation of Somali refugees in northern Kenya. In Europe, the tragedy in the former Yugoslavia had yet again illustrated the importance of prevention and the need to make the human rights machinery of the United Nations more effective, particularly where minority groups were concerned. Thus, UNHCR was seeking to strengthen its cooperation with those bodies and, throughout eastern Europe and the newly independent States, was endeavouring, in cooperation with IOM and the Council of Europe, to intensify programmes in the areas of training, legal advice and institution-building. Refugees must also continue to receive protection through asylum, at least on a temporary basis, and that right must therefore be strengthened, especially in the light of the measures adopted by some States to prevent potential refugees from seeking asylum or to reject them without a proper hearing. Prevention and protection must be matched by

preparedness and capacity to respond quickly and effectively whenever a crisis erupted. UNHCR had thus forged partnerships with non-governmental, intergovernmental and governmental organizations, and had even drawn on the military for logistical support. Over the previous 18 months, it had deployed emergency-response teams in some 10 countries: in Kenya, which had received about 400,000 refugees, mainly from Somalia; in Nepal, where there were 80,000 Bhutanese refugees, and in Bangladesh, to which 250,000 people had fled from Myanmar; in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan; in Benin and Ghana, which had received 200,000 refugees from Togo; and in Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea, where there were refugees from Liberia. The largest of the current emergency programmes concerned some 3.5 million refugees, internally displaced persons and besieged populations in the former Yugoslavia, and particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where UNHCR was leading the joint effort that also involved UNICEF, WHO, WFP and ICRC. The efforts of UNHCR were repeatedly thwarted by the total disregard for humanitarian principles on the part of the parties to the conflict, who prevented access to refugees and manipulated humanitarian action for political ends. UNHCR was determined to continue its work, but it needed the cooperation of the parties on the ground and the unwavering support of the international community. It was also aware that humanitarian action was no substitute for political action, and that only peace could put an end to the senseless bloodshed, the relentless persecution and the odious "ethnic cleansing". As the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina clearly showed, the effectiveness of UNHCR in emergencies was also determined by the prevailing security situation: in many cases, danger arose unexpectedly, and many staff of UNHCR and its partners risked their lives daily, while some had even sacrificed their lives. UNHCR had strengthened its internal resources in the fields of training, coordination and equipment, and was working closely with the United Nations system to improve security.

3. Once the emergency was brought under control, UNHCR searched systematically for durable solutions. The past year had seen some encouraging progress in that regard: more than 1 million refugees had returned from Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran to Afghanistan; in March 1993, UNHCR had closed the last of the Cambodian refugee camps in Thailand and more

than 360,000 refugees had returned to Cambodia in time to participate in the elections. Over 60,000 Ethiopian refugees had returned from Kenya, while others were about to be returned from the Sudan; more than 100,000 refugees had already returned to Mozambique, and preparations were under way for the large-scale repatriation of about 1.5 million Mozambican refugees. Those preparations were not a simple matter, for it was necessary to ensure the security of those repatriated and to reintegrate them on their return; hence the need for close coordination with the other agencies of the United Nations system and with non-governmental organizations in order to achieve a continuum from relief to development and avoid new crises. In that connection, the continuing insecurity in Afghanistan aroused fears of failure, while the example of Cambodia showed the positive results that could be achieved through active collaboration between UNHCR and UNDP, which, in Cambodia, was poised to take over where UNHCR had left off, so as to try to meet the longer-term development needs of the returning refugees. Coordination and cooperation were the best means of rationalizing the activities of the United Nations system, and UNHCR was exploiting that formula to the full: its cooperative arrangements with WFP had recently been strengthened. Given the extreme importance it also attached to its partnership with the non-governmental organizations, UNHCR had organized a regional meeting with non-governmental organizations in Caracas at the beginning of July 1993 and was intending to organize other regional meetings, which might culminate in a global conference in Oslo to adopt a concerted plan of action.

4. Mr. VALENZUELA (Spain) said that the UNHCR three-pronged strategy of prevention, preparedness and solutions had already proved fruitful. In the field of prevention, action by UNHCR was essential to avoid the proliferation of crises. With regard to preparedness, UNHCR showed that it could respond to the most testing challenges, while manifestly positive solutions had been found in Central America, in the context of the International Conference on Central American Refugees, and in Cambodia—solutions which should serve as examples in Mozambique, Angola, Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa. That assessment only served to highlight the need further to enhance horizontal coordination and to take account of the interdependence between the humanitarian, economic, political and security dimensions of complex crises. Consideration must thus be given to the comparative advantage each institution offered, and the various mandates must be clearly defined, so as to avoid duplication and grey areas where the demarcation of responsibilities remained vague. In the field of international protection, Spain unreservedly supported the setting-up by UNHCR of its Working Group on International Protection, and the drafting of a Note on international protection; it also endorsed the publication of Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women, and of an Information Note on refugee children; with regard to the latter, it awaited with interest the updating of the 1988 Guidelines. Spain, which worked actively with

UNHCR, had recently adapted its legislation on the right of asylum, in the light of the new needs referred to in the report of UNHCR, participating in the intergovernmental consultations and other international meetings on the question, and had responded favourably to UNHCR calls for temporary protection. Like the High Commissioner for Refugees, Spain was convinced of the need for continuity from humanitarian relief to development, and of the importance of formulating development policies designed to prevent any intensification of migratory flows and population displacements.

5. With regard to the many humanitarian aid programmes being carried out in all regions of the world, Spain would continue to shoulder its responsibilities both at the national level and in the framework of the European Community, within the International Conference on Central American Refugees, for example, or in the former Yugoslavia. In the latter crisis, which was particularly complex, the action of UNHCR, which had been instructed by the Secretary-General to lead a colossal humanitarian effort, was exemplary. Spain once again assured UNHCR of its unwavering support.

6. It was in that spirit that Spain (E/1993/88) had requested the Secretary-General to enlarge the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme so as to enable it to become a member. His delegation requested a favourable recommendation on the subject by the Economic and Social Council, which might ask the General Assembly to provide an additional seat on the Executive Committee so that Spain could be elected to it at the Council's next session.

7. Mr. AL-FAHD (Kuwait) said that the report of the High Commissioner for Refugees (E/1993/20) provided an exhaustive inventory of the intense activity of UNHCR, which had not let up for a moment during the previous 18 months. The High Commissioner referred to the Iraqi refugees (*ibid.*, para. 164) who, following the Gulf war, currently found themselves in various countries, among them Kuwait, where UNHCR was seeking durable solutions to the problem in close cooperation with the Government. He wished to assure the Council that that cooperation would be maintained to the satisfaction of all the parties. Monitored by UNHCR, Kuwait had already completed the dismantling of a refugee camp on its frontier in which the situation had been steadily deteriorating. With the assistance of UNHCR and IOM, the Kuwaiti authorities had succeeded in permanently resettling 639 families, a form of definitive solution that would serve as a model for the future. UNHCR had entrusted 358 pending cases to the Kuwaiti authorities.

8. Mr. MANGACHI (Observer for the United Republic of Tanzania) said that the proliferation and intensification of the crises facing UNHCR obliged it first and foremost to adopt an innovative and comprehensive approach that went beyond the letter of its mandate. UNHCR had in any case clearly understood that it must meet the needs of the populations affected without re-

gard to their status as refugees, returnees or internally displaced persons. Such an approach would be extremely beneficial to the countries in question, particularly the least developed countries hosting large numbers of refugees and displaced persons in very difficult economic circumstances.

9. However, to enable UNHCR to be as effective as possible, a number of other measures must be taken as a matter of urgency. First, the donors should once again respond to the appeal of UNHCR by increasing their contributions. Given the restrictions imposed on refugees wishing to seek asylum in the developed countries, facilitating repatriation and resettlement in the country of origin would be a good way of defusing the crisis. Secondly, since the response of the donor countries had been uneven and pleas from Eastern Europe had been heeded more than those from other regions which had larger numbers of refugees, it would be necessary to make the donor community more aware of the various crisis situations through the media, and to encourage it to respond in a more equitable manner. Thirdly, while it was necessary to ensure continuity between emergency relief and longer-term development, the Bretton Woods financial institutions and the other development agencies must also coordinate their activities with those of UNHCR and incorporate the development needs of refugees and displaced persons into their own programmes. Fourthly, although the UNHCR mandate did not extend to internally displaced persons, experience showed that their problems and those of refugees were intertwined and that a common approach and solution to those problems were thus needed, especially in the developing countries. Consequently, using the latitude that various General Assembly and Economic and Social Council resolutions conferred on it in the matter, UNHCR had been able to assist such persons. Since the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme favoured initiatives of that type, there might be a case for officially extending its mandate to cover internally displaced persons, in the interests of finding a comprehensive solution to the refugee problem.

10. As could clearly be seen from the situations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Somalia, Angola, Mozambique, Liberia, Cambodia and South Africa, humanitarian assistance could never be a substitute for political solutions. It was disturbing to learn that more money was being spent on United Nations military operations than on humanitarian assistance, which was the main reason for international involvement. No doubt it was necessary to ensure the security of the affected populations and of the personnel involved in humanitarian activities; but to seek military prowess for its own sake was counterproductive, for the humanitarian dimension of the international involvement became blurred and the parties themselves began to speculate as to the real reasons behind the presence of international forces. Precisely because its mandate was humanitarian and non-political, UNHCR was in a particularly advantageous position to deal with the Governments in question in a neutral manner.

11. In any case, there should be no recourse to complex, risky and costly international solutions until regional possibilities for resolving the conflict had been exhausted. For that reason, his country firmly supported the initiative taken by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government at the twenty-ninth session of OAU, held in Cairo in June 1993, to establish a mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution. The international community should support that regional approach to the settlement of disputes.

12. It was in that spirit that the Tanzanian Government had hosted peace negotiations between the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front in Arusha. In Burundi, the repatriation of refugees was under way, with the active involvement of UNHCR. Repatriation of Mozambican refugees in Tanzania was also due to commence.

13. Mr. ELKARIB (Observer for the Sudan) said that a glance at the map showed that most refugee problems arose in the developing countries and regions. Consequently, for all its importance, political action remained futile unless it was accompanied by economic initiatives and action to foster development. The new focuses of UNHCR intervention, such as the insistence on voluntary repatriation, were commendable but would come to nothing unless the gap between assistance to returnees and the development needs of the communities concerned was filled.

14. The conference recently held at Geneva to organize assistance to repatriated refugees had not lived up to expectations. The non-governmental organizations and the international institutions should tell the truth, which was that it was necessary to ensure the development of the regions to which the refugees were fleeing. The Sudan, which spoke from experience, noted with concern the development of a new tendency to lump together refugee questions and peace and security problems, and to link humanitarian action and intervention by the Security Council. However, the example of Somalia clearly showed that the refugee problem could not be resolved through military force, particularly if the United Nations and the international institutions became parties to the conflict. As the World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna the previous month had concluded, it was violations of human rights in times of armed conflict that were at the root of the most serious refugee flows.

15. The Sudan was a receiving country for refugees. It was a member of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme and participated actively in its work. It had been among the first to advocate repatriation and resettlement. It was also among those that were raising the alarm in the face of the disastrous ecological effects of refugee flows, which included drought and desertification. It thus took a close interest in the efforts made by UNHCR to organize compensation for the receiving countries, particularly the least developed among them. The other competent specialized agencies

should also concern themselves with that problem and evaluate the damage. That would be a good starting-point for subsequent compensation of the countries concerned. The Sudan wished to pay tribute to UNHCR for mobilizing the will of States and increasing the awareness of the private and public donors. But, concerned at the deficit UNHCR was likely to face in the years to come, it reiterated the appeal to the donors to honour the promises they had made and increase their contributions.

16. Mr. DOLGOBORODOV (Russian Federation) said he regretted that the events in the former Yugoslavia and the States that had resulted from the disintegration of the Soviet Union had betrayed the hopes raised by the ending of the cold war. In November 1992, realism had induced his country to accede to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, and to pass legislation to ensure their application in domestic law.

17. In the Russian Federation, the problem of refugees had taken on a new dimension, since it was difficult to draw a distinction between refugees and displaced persons, given the close admixture of populations in the region, as the result of mixed marriages, for instance. The collapse of the Soviet Union had resulted in flows of refugees from and to adjacent countries, placing considerable demands on those countries. The situation merited international action, particularly in the republics of central Asia.

18. While UNHCR had made satisfying efforts, the Russian Federation expected more of it and of the international community. It was very important to prepare an action plan for refugees in the Commonwealth of Independent States. His country was also mindful of the problems of refugees elsewhere, for example in Abkhazia and Georgia, from which it had evacuated 2,000 people. It was also taking action in Azerbaijan, Armenia and Tajikistan, and it was participating in the humanitarian effort in the former Yugoslavia, where two Russian divisions were deployed.

19. It was in full knowledge of the facts that UNHCR, which by its own admission was passing through the most difficult period in its history, had adopted a new strategy, which would undoubtedly be very effective. But it was necessary to go one step further and draw up an integrated programme of action linking humanitarian action, protection of human rights and peace-making, in a framework of partnership and goodwill, even where the consent of the parties directly involved was lacking. Preventive diplomacy was indispensable—a conclusion also reached by the recent Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, whose findings paralleled those of the report of UNHCR.

20. The Russian Federation was faced with a serious problem that added to the complexity of its situation, namely the problem of the Russian-speakers living beyond its frontiers. Refugee flows must shortly be expected, in Latvia and Estonia for example. The Confer-

ence on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the European Community were aware of the problem, and were taking an interest in the situation and in the rights of Russian-speakers abroad. There was thus an opportunity to implement a preventive strategy. And as a political solution must be sought, preventive diplomacy was also a means of restoring peace.

21. In his country's view, the efforts of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies competent in humanitarian matters should be more closely coordinated and intensified. Intensification should be based, not on broad principles, but on the experience gained by the United Nations, and coordination should be ensured by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Valuable lessons could be learnt from the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and other regions, from which a case could be made for rethinking the UNHCR mandate. A legal enlargement of that mandate might allow for the evacuation of populations from conflict zones, presupposing the creation of humanitarian corridors, organization of transport and the creation of assembly centres. The trend towards broadening the definition of refugee status should also be continued, for it was clear that UNHCR effectiveness was proportionate to the extent of its powers.

22. Mr. SEMACHKO (Ukraine) said that, more often than not, refugee problems had their origin in regional conflicts. With the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, Europe had made an unexpected contribution to confirming that pattern. Hence the growing importance of the role played by the United Nations and of action by UNHCR. UNHCR had set itself new guidelines and had defined a new, three-pronged strategy which appeared to be well thought out and effective. However, in his country's view, it needed to be supplemented by a protection strategy in the downstream phase, aimed at assisting countries receiving repatriated refugees, and by a preventive strategy in the upstream phase, aimed at eliminating the causes of departure. It was well known that the exodus was sparked off by massive violations of human rights. Those rights must therefore be protected.

23. UNHCR also called for a comprehensive and integrated response, linking humanitarian action and protection of human rights with peace-making and peace-keeping, in the context of a strengthened partnership of all actors concerned. Since that partnership had perhaps not yet proved sufficiently effective, UNHCR had, in a welcome initiative, established cooperation links with the United Nations bodies that dealt with human rights.

24. Ukraine was very familiar with the problem of refugees: it had received those fleeing the ethnic conflicts in its region, in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Abkhazia and Russia. These had totalled some 20,000 in the first seven months of 1992. Honouring its international obligations, it was endeavouring to assist them. Thus, a presidential decree of March 1992 required the local authorities to receive refugees from the Republic of Moldova, also confirming their status. Moreover, the

Ukrainian Parliament was in the process of drafting a new definition of the status of those migrants. More recently, in the spring of 1993 the Government had set up a Ministry of Migration. Ukraine also had observer status with IOM and was contemplating becoming a party to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Together with UNHCR, WHO and ICRC, it had recently organized a seminar on the subject in Kiev. It could thus be seen that Ukraine was endeavouring to take action commensurate with the resources at its disposal.

25. But it was faced with another problem that should be of concern to the international community. It had inherited a problem of populations deported during the 1930s and 1950s: Germans, Greeks, Bulgarians, and especially Crimean Tartars. His Government had set up an assistance fund and an official commission to deal with the latter population. As a result, 180,000 Crimean Tartars had returned to Ukraine in 1993. The enormous problems in the areas of housing, employment, schooling and public health posed by such an influx could well be imagined. However, Ukraine had not closed its doors to them; it would do even more for them if its resources so allowed.

26. Tackling that grave problem single-handed, Ukraine counted on the international community to assist it in implementing the solutions referred to in the UNHCR report (E/1993/20): voluntary repatriation, local settlement and resettlement. In June 1992, Parliament had adopted a National Minorities Act guaranteeing all citizens equality before the law. That policy reflected the principles that guided UNHCR: prevention of refugee flows and reduction of their effects.

27. Mr. MUSA (Nigeria) said that 90 per cent of the world's refugees were now to be found in developing countries, mainly in Africa. The link between economic factors and the refugee phenomenon was thus too well known to need demonstrating. Economic difficulties, and particularly the debt burden, contributed to political instability and sparked off crises and conflicts that boosted refugee flows. Violations of human rights were another factor which drove individuals to flee their countries in many regions of the world. It was thus clear that, without determined action on the part of the international community to combat poverty and underdevelopment and to impose genuine respect for human rights in all countries, the search for durable solutions to the refugee problem would remain futile. Similarly, it was not enough to provide food aid to refugees and displaced persons in countries at war; what they needed above all else was peace and security.

28. His delegation noted with satisfaction the efforts made by UNHCR to provide international protection for refugees, a process which involved ensuring application of the principles of humanitarian law and respect for the fundamental rights of refugees. The physical security of refugees must be ensured at all stages of the process, including the phase of settlement in the receiving country.

While welcoming the fact that many countries had remained faithful to a generous asylum policy, his delegation expressed concern at the recorded violations of the principle of *non-refoulement*.

29. Adequate funding was indispensable if UNHCR was to fulfil its mandate. Chapter IV of the report (E/1993/20), which dealt with the financial position of UNHCR, deserved serious attention. The considerable increase in the number of refugees called for a corresponding increase in UNHCR resources, together with rigorous management of the funds allocated to it.

30. While the question was one that did not fall directly within the UNHCR mandate, particular attention should be accorded to the problem of internally displaced persons, a problem that assumed particularly serious proportions in Africa and the former Yugoslavia. Thought should be given to ways of providing assistance and protection to those persons, so that they did not swell the ranks of refugees in other countries.

31. Since any local or regional conflict now had repercussions at the world level, preventive diplomacy and the establishment of early warning systems must be essential components of any action taken to limit refugee flows.

32. Ms. MIYOSHI (Japan) stressed the importance attached by her country to the activities of UNHCR, to which Japan was now the second largest donor, its contributions having exceeded \$100 million in both 1991 and 1992. The UNHCR budget was expected to exceed \$1.4 billion in 1993. Given the size of that sum, the donor countries—which were themselves often faced with financial difficulties—were entitled to expect the greatest possible transparency and rigour in the management of UNHCR resources. In that regard, continued application of the administrative reform begun in 1990 was crucial. UNHCR must not fail to review its activities in order to make the necessary adjustments, even in the course of its financial year.

33. It was becoming more and more apparent that preventive measures were the best way of reducing the number of refugees. Her delegation welcomed the High Commissioner's efforts in that direction, for example, in the former Soviet Union. Voluntary repatriation was another durable solution. Encouraging progress had been made in that regard under the Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indo-Chinese Refugees, to which the Japanese Government had contributed \$15 million in July 1993. It had also contributed \$10 million to UNHCR activities in the former Yugoslavia, and the same amount to the programmes for Africa. It was to be hoped that the repatriation of refugees to the former Yugoslavia, Mozambique and other places would go ahead smoothly.

34. If the root causes of the problems that resulted in recurring crises and emergencies were to be addressed, humanitarian assistance must be linked more closely to the long-term development effort. In that regard, the De-

partment of Humanitarian Affairs should play a pivotal role in establishing the continuum from emergency relief to development, and the international agencies involved in development assistance should intervene at an earlier stage in order to ensure that continuity.

35. Mrs. FOSTIER (Belgium), speaking on behalf of the member States of the European Community, reaffirmed the Community's support for the activity of the High Commissioner and for the strategy set forth in her report (E/1993/20).

36. Mr. MOHAMMED (Observer for Iraq) said that the three-pronged strategy set out in the report of the High Commissioner (E/1993/20) could not fail to be supported by the international community and must be applied by all countries that genuinely wished to solve the refugee problem. In Iraq, UNHCR had been carrying out effective action in aid of refugees for a long time, with the assistance of the Iraqi authorities. It was therefore surprising to read in the report (*ibid.*, paras. 58 and 165) that UNHCR had been unable to obtain "appropriate safeguards" for the repatriation of Iraqi citizens who were refugees in Saudi Arabia and Turkey. It was not clear what safeguards were referred to, particularly since it was also stated in the report that a large number of Iraqi refugees had been able to return to their country without hindrance. He emphasized that none of the Iraqi refugees who had returned to Iraq had been harassed.

37. The report stated that durable solutions to the problem of the Iraqi refugees were being sought. The only obstacles preventing those refugees from returning to their country were economic in nature and due to the continued embargo on Iraq, which meant that the country was effectively under siege. The only durable solution to the problem of the refugees was the lifting of the embargo. That was the objective UNHCR should endeavour to achieve, so as to enable all Iraqi refugees to return to Iraq and live there in peace and dignity.

38. Mr. BENMOUSSA (Morocco) pointed out that, contrary to what was stated in the report of the High Commissioner regarding the Western Sahara repatriation programme (E/1993/20, para. 170), in its resolution 809 (1993) the Security Council had never requested the Secretary-General to engage in negotiations, but simply to use his good offices with a view to achieving a settlement of the problem. There was thus no call to use the word "negotiations" in the report. His delegation requested that account should be taken of its comments in future reports of UNHCR.

39. Mrs. OGATA (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) thanked delegations for their statements in support of her personal action and of the overall strategy of UNHCR, which had been very widely endorsed. Several delegations had stressed the importance of securing application of the principles of humanitarian law; UNHCR was determined to act to that end. While pointing out that Spain's request for membership of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Pro-

gramme was a matter for the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, she welcomed the request as an expression of Spain's interest in the activities of UNHCR.

AGENDA ITEM 4

Coordination questions (*continued*):

(a) Reports of the coordination bodies (*continued**)

40. Mr. TIRUMURTI (India), introducing a draft decision entitled "Reports of the coordination bodies considered by the Economic and Social Council" (E/1993/L.35), said that it was essentially based on paragraphs 42, 45 and 46 of the report of the Committee on Programme and Coordination (A/48/16, part I). In the draft decision, the Council reiterated the role played by CPC in coordination, welcomed the efforts made by the Secretary-General to streamline the subsidiary machinery of ACC, and stressed that the activities carried out at a system-wide level in the field of science and technology for development and new and renewable sources of energy should continue to be coordinated by the new subsidiary machinery. It was to be hoped that the draft decision would be adopted unanimously.

AGENDA ITEM 10

Non-governmental organizations (*continued***)

41. Mr. BAILLARGEON (Canada), introducing a draft resolution entitled "Review of the arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations" (E/1993/L.34) on behalf of Australia, Canada and New Zealand, said that the text, which represented a third draft, was the outcome of a series of consultations during which the sponsors had endeavoured to take full account of the legitimate aspirations of the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations. Two basic principles had guided its drafting: preservation of the prerogatives of the Council, which had the right to review the provisions it had itself adopted 25 years previously, and the need for greater openness *vis-à-vis* organizations representing society in the multilateral system.

42. There was no need to exaggerate the scope of the draft resolution, which in no way prejudiced the results of the study to be undertaken and confined itself to setting up a procedure, in strict accordance with Council decision 1993/214. He was thus surprised that some members of the Group of 77 wished to refer the entire matter back to the General Assembly. Quite apart from the loss of time that would entail, such a step would be

* Resumed from the 32nd meeting.

** Resumed from the 34th meeting.

contrary to the main thrust of the draft resolution, which was to confer more power on the Council.

43. In any case, the disagreements concerned five minor amendments which in no way altered the spirit of the original text. It was to be hoped that good sense would

prevail and that the draft resolution would be adopted by consensus, so that the review provided for could begin without delay.

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.

43rd meeting

Tuesday, 27 July 1993, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. Juan SOMAVÍA (Chile)

E/1993/SR.43

1. Mr. TISSOT (United Kingdom) noted that the Council was called upon to take action on a number of texts whose financial implications for the 1994-1995 biennium had not been evaluated. His country would therefore reserve its position on those texts pending their consideration by the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session. It also reserved the right to make specific statements on certain of them.

2. Mr. KUEHL (United States of America) said that, in the absence of a full statement of financial implications regarding a number of the draft resolutions and decisions submitted to the Council's consideration, his delegation's position on them was without prejudice to the position which it might adopt at the General Assembly once the financial implications of those proposals for the 1994-1995 biennium were known.

4. Mr. KUEHL (United States of America) said that his delegation had joined the consensus because it subscribed to the overall objectives of the third decade. Nevertheless, it believed that the draft programme of action for the third decade should focus on specific proposals essentially relating to prevention, such as pilot projects for the settlement of conflicts and the teaching of racial, religious and ethnic tolerance in all countries. Moreover, while the activities envisaged for South Africa under the programme of action could certainly contribute to prevention, it was important for the programme to be balanced and to provide aid to all regions suffering from discrimination.

5. The PRESIDENT said that the Council had thus completed consideration of item 17 of its agenda.

AGENDA ITEM 17

Implementation of the Programme of Action for the Second Decade to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination

REPORT OF THE SOCIAL COMMITTEE
(E/1993/104)

3. The PRESIDENT invited the Council to take action on the draft resolution concerning a third decade to combat racism and racial discrimination which was recommended for adoption in paragraph 10 of the Social Committee's report.

The draft resolution was adopted [resolution 1993/8].

AGENDA ITEM 19

Advancement of women

REPORT OF THE SOCIAL COMMITTEE
(E/1993/105)

6. The PRESIDENT drew the Council's attention to the nine draft resolutions and three draft decisions recommended for adoption by the Social Committee. The texts of draft resolutions I to VII and draft decisions I and II were contained in the report of the Commission on the Status of Women on its thirty-seventh session (E/1993/27 and Corr.1, chap. I, sects. A and B).

Draft resolutions I to VI were adopted [resolutions 1993/9 to 1993/14].

7. The PRESIDENT noted that draft resolution VII, entitled "Situation of and assistance to Palestinian