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REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

Assistance to refugees in Somalia

Report of the Secretary-General

1. In its resolution 35/180 of 15 December 1980, on assistance to refugees in Somalia, the General Assembly, inter alia, requested the Secretary-General and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to continue their efforts to mobilize humanitarian assistance for the relief and rehabilitation of the refugees in Somalia. It also requested the Secretary-General, in co-operation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, to dispatch a mission to Somalia to make a comprehensive review of the refugee situation in the light of developments since the report of the United Nations interagency mission which visited Somalia in December 1979 (E/1980/44) and to arrange for the report of the review mission to be circulated as soon as it was published.

2. The Secretary-General, in co-operation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, arranged for a review mission to visit Somalia to consult with the Government on the refugee situation, to assess the international relief effort and to identify the requirements of the refugees for 1981 and later. The report of the review mission, which is annexed hereto, describes the present refugee situation in Somalia and the assistance required for the refugees in the camps as well as the assistance required to strengthen the government services in order to cater to the needs of the refugees.

\* A/36/50.

ANNEX

Report of the review mission to Somalia

(11 January-18 January 1981)

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## I. INTRODUCTION

1. On 15 December 1980, the General Assembly adopted resolution 35/180, in which it endorsed the appeal of the Secretary-General of 11 February 1980 as well as the appeals launched by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children's Fund and the World Food Programme (FAO/WFP) for urgent international assistance to help the Government of Somalia to provide the necessary care and attention to the refugees. The General Assembly also endorsed the appeal of the Economic and Social Council to the international community to increase further its assistance to the Government of Somalia and to the various refugee programmes sponsored by the Office of the High Commissioner in order to ensure continuous and adequate provision of emergency relief and humanitarian assistance to the refugees.
2. The General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, in co-operation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, to dispatch a mission to Somalia to make a comprehensive review of the refugee situation in the light of developments since the report of the United Nations interagency mission that had visited Somalia in December 1979 (E/1980/44). Arrangements were accordingly made for a mission to visit Somalia from 11 January to 18 January 1981. The mission was composed of representatives of the United Nations, including the United Nations Children's Fund, the United Nations Development Programme, the World Food Programme and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, and the World Health Organization. The mission was led by the Joint Co-ordinator of Special Economic Assistance Programmes in the Office for Special Political Questions.
3. The leader of the mission was received by the President of the Somali Democratic Republic, His Excellency Major-General Mohamed Siad Barre. The mission also met the Second Vice-President, the Minister for Local Government and Rural Development and the Minister for Planning.
4. During its stay, the mission held meetings with senior officials and technical staff concerned with the refugee programme and with economic and social development. The mission was divided into three groups to visit the main regions in which the refugee camps are concentrated, namely, Gedo, Hiran and the north-west region (West Galbeed). The mission was provided with all the information required to facilitate its work.
5. The mission met resident members of the diplomatic corps, including the representatives of a number of donor countries, to brief them on the mission's findings.
6. The mission also met representatives of a number of voluntary agencies who are making a major contribution to international relief efforts in the refugee camps.
7. The mission wishes to record its appreciation of the assistance it received

from the Government of Somalia. The Government made arrangements, including air and land transport, for the members of the mission to travel to the refugee camps. The mission also wishes to acknowledge the valuable assistance it received from representatives of the United Nations organizations and agencies serving in Somalia.

## II. SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

8. Somalia continues to face serious and massive problems as a result of the continued influx of refugees, which registered a sharp increase in the last quarter of 1980. The Somali socio-economic infrastructure is not capable of sustaining this burden.
9. The Government of Somalia has registered more than 1.2 million refugees in the camps in Somalia and the influx is continuing. Allowing for refugees who have left the camps, the mission estimates that there were over 1 million refugees in the 30 camps and seven transit centres at the time of the mission's visit. Based on the recent influx, the mission projects the average camp population for 1981 at 1.3 million. In addition to the refugees in the camps, the Government has estimated that there are about 800,000 people, mostly nomads, living in the countryside or staying with friends and distant kin in the major towns. This would suggest that the refugee population now equals nearly one quarter of the population of Somalia. The mission found no evidence that the refugees were considering returning to their homes in the near future.
10. The composition of refugee population remains as before: about 60 per cent children, 30 per cent women and 10 per cent men - mostly old, ill or handicapped. In some camps, however, the mission noted a larger proportion of younger men than had been the case in late 1979.
11. Delivery of food has improved and food stocks have increased. However, in some camps, for example, those in the Hiran region and the transit camps, stocks are insufficient and unbalanced. Storage facilities are still inadequate and these need to be constructed before the annual rains, due in next March and April, to prevent waste. There is still malnutrition among the refugee population, and medical personnel in the camps reported that the signs of protein deficiency were increasingly evident.
12. Though there has been an improvement to the supply of water to the camps, it is insufficient for essential needs, and has not kept pace with the increasing numbers. The shortage of potable water is a major concern.
13. The health situation in the camps remains serious. While a number of voluntary agencies are providing health services in most of the camps and the Somali Government has made its own modest health facilities available, medical care is extremely limited and medicines are in short supply.
14. Tents, clothing, shoes, soap, blankets, utensils and tools are in short supply everywhere.

15. Domestic fuel has become more scarce. Shrubbery and trees within a radius of 10 kilometres of some of the camps have been exhausted, causing irreparable environmental damage.
16. The lack of transport and petroleum products has become more serious and hinders the supply of food, other relief aid and potable water to the camps on a regular basis.
17. The handling of relief supplies has imposed a heavy burden on the two main ports, Mogadishu and Berbera, and has put in jeopardy the normal external economic relations of the country.
18. Educational programmes and self-help activities in the camps are limited and rudimentary in nature.
19. Increased international assistance is required for the refugees in the camps. For 1981, the mission estimates that the assistance required for the refugees in the camps is as follows:

	<u>United States dollars</u>
Food (283,000 tonnes) approximately . . . . .	\$174,500,000
Health requirements . . . . .	11,802,000
Water . . . . .	6,528,000
Construction of food storage and communal facilities . . . . .	5,000,000
Transport . . . . .	12,000,000
Clothing, blankets, utensils, tools and equipment . . . . .	5,000,000
Shelter . . . . .	6,700,000
Education . . . . .	5,230,000
Self-help activities . . . . .	3,240,000
Other assistance: assistance to the National Refugees Commission and programme support etc. . . . .	<u>4,600,000</u>
Total	<u>\$234,600,000</u>

The mission also recommends an expert study of the problem of providing wood or other domestic fuels for the camps.

20. Furthermore, the Government of Somalia needs international assistance, in kind and cash, to sustain and strengthen its own programmes of assistance for the refugees in the camps and outside. It also requires the help of the international community to accelerate its development projects and programmes to enable it to carry the heavy burden of such a large increase in the population for which it is responsible. Recommended multiyear additional assistance to develop the economic and social infrastructure in order to provide services which would benefit the

refugees in and outside the camps amounts to \$171,228,000. In addition, the mission recommends expert studies on the bulk handling at the port of Mogadishu on the expansion of the national secondary educational system, and on the animal health problem created by the influx of cattle into Somalia as well as an updating of the 1977 FAO/WFP study on the national food situation and the donation of equipment for the port of Berbera.

### III. GENERAL BACKGROUND

21. The general background to the refugee situation in Somalia was provided in some detail in the report of the mission to Somalia in December 1979 (E/1980/44), hereafter referred to as the "principal report".
22. Somalia is one of the least developed countries of the world, with a per capita gross national product of about \$125. Most of the country is arid and, under normal conditions, Somalia does not produce the basic food requirements of its estimated population of 4 million - 60 per cent of whom are nomads, 20 per cent farmers and the rest urban dwellers. The import of food items more than doubled between 1970 and 1976 and has continued on an increased scale in subsequent years.
23. Somalia's economic infrastructure is fragile, only 13 per cent of its land being arable; its economy is centred on livestock and farming. The monetary sector provides only limited opportunities for employment. Its transport system is rudimentary, with only about 2,300 kilometres of paved roads and 9,000 kilometres of unsurfaced roads. Internal transport is almost entirely by road haulage and is seriously limited by the shortage of trucks and buses and the inadequate road system. In addition, a severe shortage of petroleum products in recent months has seriously hindered the movement of essential goods and services, increased the country's balance-of-payments deficit and put in jeopardy the modest programmes and plans for economic and social development.
24. Merchandise exports of Somalia - consisting mainly of livestock, meat and hides and skins - have declined in real terms in recent years and this trend continued during 1980. Recorded imports, of which about one third are food items and one fourth petroleum products, continued to increase partly as a result of world inflation. The current deficit amounted to \$60 million in 1978, about \$122 million in 1979 and for 1980 it is estimated to be of the order of \$150 million.
25. In recent years, a large part of the deficit on current account was covered by remittances of Somalis working abroad. However, with the increasing deficit in the balance of payments, greater external assistance is needed, in the form of grants or loans on highly concessionary terms.
26. The Government's fiscal budget for 1978 showed a deficit of \$77 million on current account and the deficit for 1979 was estimated at \$23.6 million. The

deficit for 1980 is estimated to be about \$28 million. In past years, the Government had to resort to central bank financing, causing an increase in the internal price level and adversely affecting the balance of payments.

27. Somalia is subject to serious droughts, such as those that occurred in 1974/75 and in 1979/80. The latter affected all the regions of Somalia, causing a substantial loss of livestock. The decline in the food and commercial crops exacerbated the already serious food and balance-of-payments situations. Details of the effects of the drought on the economy of Somalia and the extent of international assistance needed to meet the situation are contained in the report of the mission sent by the Secretary-General to Somalia in September 1980 (A/35/560).

#### IV. REFUGEES IN SOMALIA

##### A. Number of refugees in the camps

28. Refugees began to arrive in Somalia from neighbouring regions of Ethiopia, as a result of the events in the Horn of Africa, in 1977 and the influx continued during 1978 and 1979. In December 1979, according to government estimates, there were approximately 1.2 million refugees in the country, of whom 475,000 were in refugee camps and the rest mostly in the rural areas. The influx of refugees continued during 1980, registering a sharp increase in the first three months and in the last four months of the year. According to the National Refugee Commission, 1.2 million refugees had entered the camps by 1 January 1981. In addition, the Government estimates that from 700,000 to 800,000 refugees, mostly nomads, are widely spread throughout the country.

29. Table 1 shows the total number of refugees who had entered the camps by the end of 1979, by various dates in 1979 and by 1 January 1981, according to government records.

Table 1. Number of refugees who entered the camps in the period 1979-1981

Date	Number of refugees	Daily increase since previous date
31 December 1979	474,286	-
31 January 1980	559,000	2,732
31 August 1980	799,000	1,126
1 January 1981	1,203,984	3,319
	<u>Rate of increase</u>	
Whole of 1980		1,993 per day



30. One matter of concern to the mission was the accuracy of the estimates of camp populations, on which so much of the relief programme is based. The mission visited refugee camps in the north-west (West Galbeed), Hiran and Gedo regions and held discussions with officials of the National Refugee Commission, camp commanders and regional administrative authorities. Although mission members did not cover each camp, discussions were held with international personnel who had visited, during December 1980 or January 1981, all the camps that the mission was unable to visit. It was evident to the mission that in some of the camps the actual number of refugees was less than the official figure. The mission discussed this matter with the Somali authorities.
31. Each refugee arriving at a transit centre or at the regional office of the National Refugee Commission is registered and allocated to a camp. The authority responsible at the camp signs a receipt for the number of refugees sent to the camp and is not permitted to accept refugees unless they arrive through the proper channels. Following its discussions with the authorities and an examination of the methods used to account for refugees, the mission concluded that the official figures for refugees is broadly correct as a measure of the number of refugees who have entered the camps.
32. However, in Somalia, where a number of refugee camps have been in existence since 1978, are spread over a wide area, and are relatively open with few restrictions on travel, movements out of the camp are not only possible but likely. In some cases it seems clear that women and children who have entered the camps without the male members of the family may well have left the camps to rejoin the men, particularly if the people are nomadic and the men had remained in the countryside tending the remnants of their herds. It is also likely that a number of refugees may have moved into rural and urban areas to join friends or distant kinfolk. The mission was informed that a small number of refugees may have left the camps to return home.
33. It is the mission's view that an accurate estimate of the number of refugees in the camps is essential for the proper planning of relief programmes and for avoiding imbalances in the supply of relief items. The mission is aware of the practical difficulties involved in carrying out a census of the refugee population in 30 camps and seven transit centres spread over four regions. Such a census at this stage is clearly beyond the capacity of the central and regional administrations, who are already devoting most of their time and resources to providing relief and assistance to the refugees.
34. The authorities in Somalia are fully aware of the need to provide better estimates of the actual numbers of refugees in the camps, and it is planned, over the next three months, to make such estimates using the information collected by international personnel working in each of the camps. It is recognized, however, that such a method will need to be followed up with improved procedures to arrive at more accurate figures.

35. It should be noted that no difficulties have been caused by any overestimate of the refugee populations of the camps, since the influx of refugees has been higher than expected and the rate of delivery of relief supplies has only approached 80 per cent of the planned programme.

36. The mission concurs with the decision of the Somali authorities to continue providing official figures on the present basis, as it is essential to know the number of refugees entering the camps in order to project future relief needs. This official figure for camp entrance will, however, need to be adjusted to arrive at the actual number of refugees remaining in the camps when better estimates are available of camp populations. On the basis of its visits to the various camps, and discussions with officials of the National Refugee Commission and international personnel serving in the camps, the mission believes that the actual number of refugees in the camps on 1 January 1981 was about 1 million, or some 200,000 less than the official figures for the numbers entering the camps. In recently established camps, the actual number of refugees corresponds to the number of refugees who have entered but in some of the older camps the present populations are somewhat less.

37. Table 2, provided by the National Refugee Commission, shows the number of refugees who had entered the various camps by 1 January 1981.

Table 2. Number of refugees who had entered the camps by 1 January 1981

Region/camp	Number of refugees	Location of camp
<b>Gedo: Luugh</b>		
		<u>Vis-à-vis Luugh</u>
Ali Matan	39,818	9 km south
Bulohawa		85 km south-west
Dorianley	37,069	10 km south
Halba I	38,490	15 km north
Halba II	39,048	15 km north
Hoddur		230 km north-east
Horseed	40,037	2 km west
Maganey	38,360	12 km south-west
Subtotal	272,153	
<b>Gedo: Garba Harre</b>		
		<u>Vis-à-vis Garba Harre</u>
Bur Dhubo	42,340	48 km south-east
El Wag a/		95 km south-west
Hila Mareer	38,641	57 km east
Malka Hidday	42,789	63 km east
Suriya	42,347	60 km east
Subtotal	166,117	
Total for the Gedo region	438,270	

Table 2 (continued)

Region/camp	Number of refugees	Location of camp
North-west		
		<u>Vis-à-vis Hargeisa</u>
Adi Addeys	35,892	80 km north-east
Agabar	45,892	53 km north
Alabadey		107 km south-west
Arabsio	2,730	40 km west
Borama		120 km north-west
Dam	47,704	9 km east
Daraya (Deray Ma'ant)	77,680	120 km north-west
Las Dhure	73,311	43 km north
Saba'ad	66,373	35 km north-east
Salaleh		60 km south
Tug Wajale	4,412	80 km west
Total for the north-west	353,994	
Hiran		
		<u>Vis-à-vis Belet Uen</u>
Amalo	18,530	20 km south
Crash	7,230	15 km north
Kokane	34,513	18 km north
Jalalaqsi I	35,330	188 km south
Jalalaqsi II	53,707	188 km south
Jalalaqsi III	42,429	188 km south
Jalalaqsi IV	40,519	188 km south
Luugh Jellow	50,307	25 km south
Sigalow	21,155	2 km north
Bo'	40,000	
Total for Hiran	343,720	
Lower Shebelle		
Coriolei I, II and III	68,000 (approximately)	7 km south-west of Coriolei
Total for Somalia as a whole	1,203,984	

a/ There are 17,000 refugees at El Wag who are not included in the figures for Gedo. They will be moved to Garba Harre camps.

B. Number of refugees in 1981

38. The influx of refugees is continuing and is not likely to cease in 1981. If the refugees continue to enter the camps in 1981 at the average daily rate experienced in 1980 (about 2,000), the total number in the camps would reach 1.7 million by the end of the year. Even if the refugees entered at the lowest daily rate of 1980 (over 1,000), this number would exceed 1.3 million. The mission recommends that planning for relief measures for 1981 should be on the realistic assumption that on average the actual refugee population in the camps during the year would be 1.3 million. The mission found no evidence that the refugees were likely to return to their homes for some years to come. It should be emphasized that, if refugees continue to enter Somalia at the rates recorded during December and the first week of January (over 4,000 per day), the numbers during 1981 could be much higher.

C. Characteristics of refugees in the camps

39. The principal report noted that the refugees have come from one of the poorest regions in the world, which has been subject to severe droughts in recent years. As a result, malnutrition is common and most of the refugees suffer from disease. Approximately 60 per cent of the refugee population is composed of children, 30 per cent of women and the rest of men - most of whom are disabled or old. This age and sex distribution of the camp population continues to necessitate the inflow of international assistance at a high level and renders the effort to make the refugees at least partially self-sufficient very difficult. However, some self-help activities have been organized and a number of refugees have been trained to work as health aides and social workers. Small-farming and fruit-gardening projects have also been started. Moreover, a number of voluntary agencies, providing much-needed assistance in the camps, are using and training the refugees to perform various essential tasks, ranging from the digging of latrines to the repair of pumps and vehicles. Self-help activities, however, engage only a fraction of the refugees who are able and eager to work, and there is a need to expand self-help activities in the camps.

D. Government organization for refugees

40. In the principal report, the government organization for refugees was described (see E/1980/44, paras. 41-43). In addition to the administrative machinery created for the refugees at the centre - the National Refugee Commission - and in the camps, the regional governors and administrators are devoting much of their time and energies to providing relief to the refugees at the expense of their normal administrative and developmental tasks. The day-to-day administration of the refugee camps has been entrusted to the National Police Force and the Government had incurred an expenditure of \$6.3 million between 1 June 1978 and 31 August 1980 on this account alone.

41. The mission was informed that necessary changes and developments in the governmental organizational structure for refugees had taken place to respond fully to the needs of the situation. The mission is, however, of the view that the human and material resources at the disposal of the National Refugee Commission are inadequate and there is an urgent need to further strengthen the government refugee organization with international assistance channelled through UNHCR.

#### E. Role of international agencies

42. UNHCR has been entrusted with the basic responsibility for mobilizing international assistance for the refugees from multilateral and bilateral sources and has been acting as the lead agency in co-ordinating, organizing and monitoring the assistance for the refugees. Food aid is being channelled through WFP, which is responsible for its delivery at Somali ports and assists the Somali authorities in arranging its delivery to the camps. Both organizations will be faced with even greater demands in 1981 and there is a need to strengthen their offices further and to improve transport and communications, particularly between the capital and the regions in which the refugee camps are located.

43. UNICEF, WHO and the ILO, in co-operation with UNHCR, are carrying out programmes with regard to water, supplementary feeding, health and self-help activities. Taking into account the increasing needs of the refugees, all of these activities need to be expanded, especially the promotion of self-help activities.

#### F. Voluntary agencies

44. Some 30 voluntary agencies from a number of countries of Western Europe and the United States of America are contributing to the relief efforts and over 200 persons are now serving in the field. They have provided valuable assistance in organizing the camps, health facilities, personal sanitation, supply of potable water and other essential services in almost all the regions. In addition to their ongoing programmes, the voluntary agencies are planning further projects for 1981. The mission is of the view that more publicity deserves to be given to the efforts of these organizations and the valuable tasks they are performing so that additional resources are made available to them.

V. ASSISTANCE REQUIRED

A. Assistance required for refugees in the camps

1. Food

(a) Situation in 1980

45. The mission had estimated the basic food requirements for the refugees (640,000) in 1980 a/ to be 135,215 tonnes. As at 1 December 1980, 131,150 tonnes of food had arrived in Somalia. Since, however, the average camp population in 1980 had been calculated at the 1979 annual rate of increase of 1,000 persons per day while the actual rate of increase was much greater and the average camp population in 1979 rose to 750,000, there was a shortfall in food supplies. The shortage of sugar, in particular, was widespread, and this has hindered supplementary feeding programmes. Protein supplies were insufficient and there were periodic shortages of cereals. Inadequate general food supplies created a greater need for supplementary feeding in some cases.

(b) Requirements for 1981

46. Based on an average actual camp population of 1.3 million for 1981 and the Government-approved ration scale of 595 grammes per person per day, b/ the total requirements for the year are estimated to be about 283,000 tonnes, which would cost approximately \$174.5 million c.i.f. Somalia. (The cost can vary depending on the source of supply, cost of transportation etc.) Taking into account the opening stock, undelivered commitments for 1980 and pledges for 1981, together totalling 123,234 tonnes, a deficit of 160,230 tonnes remains to be met for current consumption. As it would not be advisable to be without stocks at the end of 1981, it will also be necessary to import an amount equal to the undelivered commitments for 1980 and pledges for 1981, which would serve as the opening stock for 1982 and provide some reserves.

47. The major additional food items required for consumption in 1981 are: maize, wheat, sorghum and rice (57,500 tonnes); wheat-flour/corn-soya-milk-blended foods (CSM) (31,400 tonnes); edible oil (11,100 tonnes); dried skim milk (16,800 tonnes); beans (15,300 tonnes); sugar (17,500 tonnes); dates etc. (4,700 tonnes) and meat (3,920 tonnes) as detailed in table 3.

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a/ Daily basic rations per person (in grammes): maize/sorghum - 250; rice - 75; wheat-flour - 75; oil - 40; dried skim milk - 50; sugar - 40; meat - 20; tea (adults only) - 3.

b/ In July 1980, a new ration scale was introduced, based on the considerations of nutritional content, cost, acceptability and donors' supply position, as follows (in grammes): maize, wheat, sorghum, rice - 300; wheat-flour, corn-soya-milk-blended foods (CSM) - 100; edible oil - 40; dried skim milk - 50; beans - 40; sugar - 40; dates/dried fruit - 10; meat - 10; tea - 3; salt - 2.

Table 3. Food aid requirements, 1981  
(Tonnes)

Commodity	Total requirements	Quantity available or expected	Date to which need is covered	Deficit
Maize, wheat sorghum, rice	142,500	84,800	Mid July 1981	57,500
Wheat-flour/CSM	47,500	16,100	End April 1981	31,400
Edible oil	19,000	7,900	End May 1981	11,100
Dried skim milk	23,700	7,900	End April 1981	16,800
Beans	19,000	3,700	Mid March 1981	15,300
Sugar	19,000	1,500	End January 1981	17,500
Dates, dried fruit	4,700	-	-	4,700
Meat	4,700	774	End February 1981	3,920
Tea	1,420	560	Mid May 1981	860
Salt	950	-	-	950
Total	282,470	123,234		160,230

48. In addition, the Government estimates that over 180,000 tonnes of food will be needed for about 800,000 refugees living outside the camps. Further, the national food deficit is estimated to be of the order of 375,000 tonnes. It is, therefore, evident that no part of the food requirements of the refugees can be met from local sources. Indeed, the mission feels that the serious national food deficit is likely to put pressure on the food supplies in the refugee camps. Some movement of the refugees from the rural areas and towns to the camps is quite likely thus increasing the demand for relief goods at the camps and putting further strains on available services. This is particularly likely, if, as the mission suggests, some 200,000 refugees have left the camps over the past two years. These people may well reappear at the camps if the drought continues and there is a national food shortage.

(c) Logistics

49. Until mid-1980, donated supplies, with the exception of dried skim milk, were handed over to one of the two State trading corporations: the Agricultural

Development Corporation for maize and sorghum and the Ente Nazionale di Commercio for all other commodities. These corporations made deliveries to one of their regional or district stores for distribution to the camps. Under this arrangement, food was distributed from the national stocks, before the arrival of international assistance, and the national stocks were subsequently replenished on arrival of international assistance. The arrangement also allowed commercially purchased commodities discharged, say, at Berbera (north-west), to be sent to nearby refugee camps and an equivalent amount of the same donated commodity arriving, say at Mogadishu (south) to be sold commercially. Notwithstanding the saving of internal transport costs resulting from this practice, it meant that donated commodities might be found in communal markets, and accountability and monitoring were made very difficult.

50. After consultations between the major donors, WFP and the Government, the latter agreed to the exemption of all donated commodities from various port charges, demurrage, levies and customs duties. WFP was entrusted with the task of clearance and port-handling of all donated commodities and the National Refugee Commission was made responsible for the transport from ports to the camps. However, as the National Refugee Commission has not yet acquired the necessary capacity, WFP, using funds from UNHCR, has been helping to move a considerable proportion of the commodities, in co-operation with the Ministry of Local Government. Furthermore, the monitoring and feedback activities are now entrusted to a 10-member team of the League of Red Cross Societies assigned to WFP. It is planned to replace these personnel by longer-term United Nations volunteers later in 1981.

## 2. Health

51. The principal report had noted that, even under normal circumstances, the health profile in Somalia was far from satisfactory. Mortality rates were among the highest in the world and the country suffered from recurrent epidemics. The massive influx of refugees has compounded the health problems of Somalia, and bacterial diseases, tuberculosis, parasitic diseases, malaria, gastro-intestinal diseases, mycotic skin diseases and diseases of malnutrition were found to be common among the refugees.

52. The principal report had also noted that the refugee camps were characterized by overcrowding, an absence of environmental sanitation and poor personal hygiene. The refugees suffered from malnutrition and shortage of potable water. Health services in the camps were rudimentary or non-existent.

### (a) Developments in 1980

53. At present, the refugee health services are financed by the Government, UNHCR, UNICEF and voluntary agencies. UNHCR has financed the services of a number of expatriate teams, the purchase of drugs, construction of health facilities and procurement of transport. UNICEF mainly finances the programmes for immunization and the training of community health workers. Supplementary food has been made available through WFP. WHO is providing the services of a medical adviser to UNHCR, as well as support through its regular health projects. In addition to carrying out operations funded by UNHCR, some voluntary agencies are providing staff and supplies.



54. After the principal report had been issued, the Ministry of Health resumed responsibility for the refugee health services and in April a Refugee Health Unit was established. The Unit works in co-operation with UNHCR and the WHO Health Co-ordinator.

55. In May, a campaign was started in all the refugee camps to immunize children against tuberculosis, measles, diphtheria, pertussis (whooping cough), tetanus and poliomyelitis. This programme is still in progress owing to the continued influx of refugees. In June, a workshop on refugee health formulated guidelines for refugee health workers. Furthermore, the Ministry of Health in collaboration with UNICEF and WHO, has selected about 2,000 refugees for training as community health workers, and the programme is scheduled for completion in March 1981. Also, a central medical store was established in Mogadishu. At the camps, clinics are stored in temporary buildings constructed from local materials. Efforts have also been made to improve supplementary feeding.

56. Little progress has been achieved in the area of sanitation. While some voluntary agencies are assisting in and encouraging the construction of pit latrines, most of the camps have no sanitary facilities, mainly owing to lack of funds. Moreover, the location of the camps near the two main rivers, Shebelle and Juba, and at small streams, combined with the lack of proper disposal of human excreta, increases disease and pollutes the available sources of water.

57. According to a sample nutritional survey carried out in May 1980 for children under 5 years of age, 4 per cent were found to be suffering from severe malnutrition and 22 per cent from moderate malnutrition. A similar survey in September 1980 revealed that 2.5 per cent of the children were suffering from severe malnutrition and 12 per cent from moderate malnutrition. A comparative sample survey of non-refugee children, held in September 1980, showed that only 0.12 per cent suffered from severe malnutrition and 4.6 per cent suffered from moderate malnutrition. As a consequence, the need for supplementary feeding remains urgent and important even when compared with the standards of the last projection.

(b) Refugee health needs

58. The medical personnel at present employed in the camps are unable to meet even the minimum urgent requirements of the refugees. Assistance from the international community is urgently needed to strengthen the health services both inside and outside the camps.

59. In order to improve the general health situation, it is also necessary to undertake measures to increase the supply of potable water, to dig latrines, to construct clinics and storage facilities for medical supplies, to build accommodation for health workers and to ensure a regular supply of medicines. Teaching of basic hygiene and self-help for health remain essential. Simple laboratory and basic diagnosis facilities are also needed. District and regional hospitals, though theoretically available to the refugees, have insufficient beds, are, in some cases, inaccessible, and are deficient in drugs, equipment and supplies to cater to the needs of the refugees. An expansion of existing hospitals

and construction of new hospitals is necessary if basic medical care is to be made available to the refugees. Meanwhile, additional efforts are needed to provide basic hospital services in the camps.

(c) Health projects

60. The Somali Government has formulated the following five long-term projects for strengthening health services.

61. Strengthening of the health service infrastructure at the camps. In order to deal effectively with the majority of diseases, preventive and promotive aspects of health, as well as managerial and logistic support, require strengthening. It is proposed to establish one health centre for each 20,000 refugees in each camp, as well as health posts for smaller numbers. Expenditure on the implementation of this part of the three-year health project in 1981 is estimated at \$4.5 million.

62. Supplementary feeding. WFP has been providing supplementary food assistance, and supplementary and intensive feeding centres are operating in the refugee camps to cater to the needs of 15 per cent of the refugee population - mostly children. Additional inputs are required to meet the minimum needs of the refugees - numbering about 286,000 - and it is proposed to obtain a greater supply of supplementary food, to increase the number of feeding centres from 400 to 500, to provide 300,000 feeding kits and to ensure the supply of cooking fuel and equipment. The project is estimated to cost \$8.2 million over a period of three years. The expenditure for 1981 is estimated at about \$3 million.

63. Training and health education. To meet the essential health needs in the camps, it is proposed to train additional health workers from among the refugees and to strengthen health education schemes. The project is estimated to cost \$741,500 over a period of three years. The total cost for 1981 is estimated at \$375,400, of which \$337,000 is needed in international assistance.

64. Disease control. The purpose of this project is to prevent the spread of infectious diseases, which are the major cause of morbidity and mortality, and to establish disease control activities through immunization and control of tuberculosis, schistosomiasis and malaria. The project is estimated to cost \$3.4 million over three years. A sum of \$1,265,000 is needed in international assistance in 1981.

65. Sanitation. The object of this project is to improve environmental sanitation by providing well-type latrines. It is estimated to cost \$8.6 million over three years. \$2.7 million will be needed in 1981 for the first phase of the project.

3. Water

66. The principal report had noted that although most of the refugee camps were situated either along the Juba and Shebelle rivers or close to other permanent water sources, in none of the camps were the refugees provided with an adequate

safe water supply, so that disease and general ill health were prevalent. The continued drought in 1980 has decreased the level of the rivers and the underground water table, thus reducing the supply of water obtained through wells and water-holes.

67. At present, three voluntary agencies are providing short-term water supply, through water-treatment plants and the digging of wells in the north-west, Hiran, Gedo and Coriolei regions. This supply meets only part of the minimum needs, however, and is temporary in nature. Furthermore, pending the completion of the long-term project described below, these temporary arrangements would have to be expanded.

68. A water-supply project, to provide safe drinking water to approximately 660,000 refugees living in 30 camps, at a rate of 20 litres per person per day, is being implemented by UNICEF, with funding by UNHCR. About 150 wells, 30 metres deep, are to be constructed near perennial and seasonal rivers bordering the camps. The original cost estimate of \$4.8 million has been revised upwards to about \$6 million to meet the additional cost of the project. The project is scheduled for full implementation in about 20-21 months.

69. As the average camp population is expected to reach 1.3 million in 1981, it has become necessary to extend this project; it is now proposed to construct 160 additional wells and the duration of the project will be prolonged by another 12 months. Using the equipment and organization of the original project, it is estimated that over \$3 million will be needed to meet the additional expenditure. The expenditure on this project in 1981 is estimated at \$5,528,000. In addition, the mission estimates that about \$1 million will be needed for the expansion of present temporary arrangements.

#### 4. Construction of food storage and communal facilities

70. The principal report had noted that the three main government food stores for the regions in which the refugees were concentrated (Hargeisa, Belet Uen and Luugh) did not have the capacity to handle both the normal food requirements and the amounts to be supplied to the refugees and it recommended that additional storage capacity should be created throughout the country. In addition, the mission had recommended that storage should be constructed at each of the camps.

71. Some storage and communal facilities were constructed in 1980 and more are under construction on an emergency basis. Many of them are makeshift, or temporary structures made out of local materials, and are not waterproof. The construction of some storage facilities has also been undertaken by voluntary agencies on an ad hoc basis. An Islamic Development Bank project, for the construction of health centres in the camps, is under tender and should be completed during 1981. In addition, UNHCR has ordered 11 prefabricated health units, and a voluntary agency will provide 300 units of community facilities by the end of 1981. These facilities will not, however, be sufficient to meet the essential needs. Food storage has to be constructed on an urgent basis, especially in the north-west, to avoid damage during the expected rainy season in April.

72. The Government has prepared a plan to construct food storage and community facilities in 1981/82, at a cost of \$12.3 million, as shown in table 4. Since however, \$2.7 million has also been proposed for the construction of classrooms under a separate project under education (see paras. 83-88 below and table 5), this amount has been deleted from the project, leaving a balance of \$9.6 million. Of this, about \$5 million will be needed in 1981.

Table 4. Construction requirements for food storage and community facilities, 1981/82

Number of facilities required	Type	Cost (Thousands of dollars)
276 <u>a/</u>	Food stores	2,003
53 <u>a/</u>	Health centres	690
	Health posts	855
	Classrooms	2,494
82	Administrative offices	226
	Community centres	53
	Feeding centres	718
	Regional workshops	138
	Total	7,177
	Implementation costs	5,123
	Total	12,300
	Cost of classrooms	2,700
	Total	9,600

a/ Minus existing units and units under construction and planned for 1981.

5. Transport

73. The need to transport large amounts of relief supplies from ports to refugee camps, the shortage of trucks and trailers, the poor condition of roads and the high cost of transport were all described in the principal report.

74. Though an increased supply of food and other relief items reached the Somali ports in 1980, the shortage of transportation did not allow an expeditious and balanced dispatch of food items to all the camps, notwithstanding the improvements described earlier and the fact that UNHCR purchased or channelled in kind donations of 107 trucks, 80 trailers and 60 other vehicles for relief purposes in 1980. Also, the financial position of the Government did not allow it to make any significant contribution towards the internal transport costs for the refugees, and initial funding was provided by UNHCR, which was later met with special donations.

75. In order to meet the food requirements of an average refugee population of 1.3 million in the camps, 23,600 tonnes of food items will have to be delivered to the camps every month. Consequently, the logistics problems and related costs will increase in 1981. It is estimated that \$12 million will be required to arrange the delivery of food items from ports to the refugee camps. As the National Refugee Commission is not in a position to bear these costs, it will be necessary for the international community to provide the means, mainly in the form of cash donations, for so doing.

76. The need to increase the capacity of the National Refugee Commission to handle the delivery of food items and other relief supplies will remain. The National Refugee Commission has estimated that it will require 93 additional 20-ton trucks with trailers for the proper distribution of food to all the refugee camps. It is also necessary to provide adequate spare parts, to finance the operating costs of the fleet and to establish workshops with supporting maintenance and logistic personnel.

77. The national needs of refined petroleum products are normally met by the IRAQSOMA refinery at Mogadishu. As a consequence of the Iraq-Iran conflict, however, the inflow of crude oil has ceased and the refinery is no longer in operation. If the refinery is unable to resume production in 1981, Somalia will have to import about 350,000 tonnes of refined petroleum products at high market prices. This will further increase the deficit of the balance of payments and impose another heavy burden on the Somali economy. To date, by means of rationing and other special efforts, sufficient petroleum products have been made available for the refugee programme, to which the Government of Somalia has given priority. Unless, however, Somalia is provided with assistance to enable the country to import the necessary petroleum products, organizations responsible for the refugee programme will find it increasingly difficult to ensure regular and timely movements of relief supplies.

6. Clothing, blankets, utensils, tools and equipment

78. Almost all of the refugees entering the camps continue to come without clothing, blankets, utensils, tools or equipment. The principal report had calculated that over \$4 million would be needed to provide those items to about 800,000 refugees by the end of 1980. Since, at the lowest rate of influx of 1980, the average number of refugees in the camps is likely to reach 1.3 million in 1981, the mission estimates that \$2.5 million will be needed to provide these items to the new entrants. Another \$2.5 million will be needed for the replacement of some of the items already supplied to the refugees, raising the total expenditure to about \$5 million.

7. Shelter and domestic fuel

79. The principal report had noted that all of the dwellings in the camps were constructed from locally available materials, for example, brush thatched with grass, and that these dwellings did not provide adequate shelter from heat, cold, wind and rain. Moreover, the construction materials that were available around many of the camps had been depleted and the shortage had been compounded by the use of the brush and trees as fuel for cooking purposes.

80. During its visit to various refugee camps, the mission observed that, although plastic sheets, tarpaulin and tents had been received and were being used for storing the relief supplies and housing personnel in some areas, the refugees continued to rely on local materials for the construction of shelters and for domestic fuel. As a consequence, bushes and trees are fast disappearing and sand dunes are expanding. A large part of the country is facing desertification and the extensive damage to the economy of the country, on this account, threatens to be permanent. The expected inflow of another 600,000 to 700,000 refugees during 1981 will further aggravate the situation.

81. The mission recommends that, at least for the new entrants, 10,000 family-size tents should be provided. Tarpaulin and plastic sheets are also needed, as protection against the elements, for the existing rudimentary dwellings. The amount and cost of assistance are shown below.

Requirements for shelter

	<u>Thousands of dollars</u>
Family-size tents	2,800
Tarpaulin sheets	3,000
Plastic sheets	700
Materials, wires and tools	<u>200</u>
Total	<u>6,700</u>

82. As supplies of brushwood and trees within a radius of about 10 kilometres of the various camps have been used up, a serious shortage of domestic fuel has developed for cooking, heating, lighting and boiling water. This problem calls for urgent action. The donation of kerosene oil and stoves will go a long way towards meeting the situation. Furthermore, the mission believes that communal cooking facilities should be encouraged to economize on fuel. Some voluntary agencies are also planning to provide the solar cookers and to teach the refugees how to use them. The mission recommends that an expert study of the problem of supplying the full needs of the camps should be undertaken, with the help of the United Nations Environment Programme and others, on an urgent basis. In this connexion, it was noted that, because of the lack of shade during the heat of the day, many activities, for example, the "Koranic" (religious) schools, were held in the evening around large fires. The provision of large tarpaulins or tents to provide shade should be encouraged, so as to reduce to a minimum the use of scarce firewood.

#### 8. Education

83. Somalia has a compulsory and free system of education for all children and the Government has made considerable efforts to extend these facilities to the children in the camps. Enormous increases in the refugee population and the paucity of human and material resources have made it impossible for the Government to provide education to more than a small proportion of the refugee children, and only 40,000 out of 390,000 school age children have been enrolled so far. A large number of children attend the "Koranic" (religious) schools, however, where they get basic instruction in religion.

84. The mission observed that most of the classes were conducted in the open air. In all of the camps there were serious shortages of teaching aids, blackboards and exercise books.

85. The Somali Government has formulated a project according to which the educational programme in the camps will have a duration of four years. The intake age will be 9 years and the programme will cover the 9-12-year age group. At present there are about 200,000 children in this age group and the number is expected to increase to 320,000 by the end of four years. The project is expected to cover 65 per cent of the caseload: 205,000 children at the end.

86. The project will also provide for the training of teachers and construction of classrooms.

87. The total cost of the project is estimated at \$63,740,000, of which the Government will finance \$4,680,000. International aid amounting to over \$59 million will be needed over a period of five years.

88. Taking into account the difficulties faced by the Somali Government in dealing with the refugee situation in general and the education of the refugee children in particular, the mission considers the enrolment of 65,000 children in 1981/82, together with 20,000 students in 1980, as an absolute minimum. It recommends that international assistance amounting to \$5.2 million should be provided to meet this urgent need in 1981. The breakdown of this expenditure is shown in table 5.

Table 5. Requirements for international assistance for education, 1981

Item	Number	Cost (Thousands of dollars)
Students to be taught	65,000	2,140
Teachers to be trained	1,000	290
Classrooms to be constructed	550	2,700
Miscellaneous		100
		5,230

89. As the educational programme will meet only a part of the total educational needs of the children and no children less than nine years of age will come under this programme, the mission recommends that the system of "Koranic" education, at present spread over two years, should be strengthened and expanded to meet the needs of the children not covered by the programme. The "Koranic" teachers and their assistants should be requested to teach also the secular subjects such as functional literacy in Somali, numeracy, health, and hygiene. Such teachers would require some training to carry out the expanded functions. Incidentally, an experiment of this kind has been successfully implemented in a number of countries, including Bangladesh, Mauritania and Morocco.

9. Self-help activities

90. The principal report had pointed out that the problem of promoting self-help and employment activities among the refugees was daunting, as 60 per cent of the refugees were children, 30 per cent women - most with small children - and 10 per cent men - mostly old or disabled. Furthermore, they came from one of the least developed areas in the world, without means, education or training.

(a) Family life, education and day care

91. A five-year project, at a cost of over \$6 million, is proposed to help women and children adjust to the life in the camps, to provide refugee women with knowledge and skills in such areas as nutrition, food, health, child care, resource management and income-generating skills and to stimulate the physical, social and mental development of young refugee children. This would involve training 6 supervisors, 180 teachers and 1,800 assistant teachers, for the benefit of 90,000 women in the family life sector and 6 supervisors, 150 teachers and 750 assistant teachers, to reach 15,000 small children, in the day care sector during 1981. The estimated cost is \$2 million.



(b) Functional literacy and adult education

92. It is also proposed to provide basic literacy skills to all adult refugees, in the 15-45-year age bracket, under a five-year programme costing over \$5.5 million. The component for 1981 is estimated at \$1.24 million.

10. Other assistance required

93. The principal report had noted that, as a consequence of the influx of a large number of refugees, the government administration had become seriously overstrained at the national, regional and district levels, the administrative and the normal development programmes were being delayed, and the level of services provided to the host population had been jeopardized. The Government informed the mission that, up to the end of 1980, it had provided 2,275 Somalis for the refugee programmes as follows:

Teachers (primary education)	800
Teachers (family-life training programme)	72
Administration and logistics	818
Health	321
Drivers	210
General staff	<u>54</u>
	<u>2,275</u>

94. This manpower has been seconded or transferred to the National Refugee Commission by various Somali ministries. The heavy burden imposed by the relief programmes has grown during the last year and is certain to be much heavier in 1981.. While at the national level, it involves a major effort, it occupies almost all of the time of the administrators at the district level, at the expense of other essential efforts devoted to national reconstruction and development. While UNHCR, UNICEF and other intergovernmental and voluntary agencies are providing valuable support to the Government in this field, the need for international assistance, in the form of technical assistance and operational personnel in areas of health, sanitation, education, counselling, logistics, repair and maintenance, agricultural extension and transport, remains urgent and important. The cost of providing personnel and giving general programme support, including a reserve for contingencies, is estimated at \$4.6 million, in addition to such assistance recommended separately under specific areas.

95. In summary, the mission's estimate of the humanitarian assistance required solely for the refugees in the camps during 1981 is given in table 6. It should be noted that this total does not make any provision for strengthening the Government's health, education and other facilities to meet the demands of the large number of refugees outside the camps, nor for food for these people.

Table 6. Summary of humanitarian assistance,  
 for refugee camps, 1981  
 (Thousands of dollars)

Item	Amount
Food (283,000 tonnes), approximately	174 500
Health requirements:	
Health services at the camps	4 500
Supplementary feeding	3 000
Training and health education	337
Disease control	1 265
Sanitation	2 700
	11 802
Water	6 528
Construction of food storage and communal facilities	5 000
Transport	12 000
Clothing, blankets, utensils, tools and equipment	5 000
Shelter	6 700
Education	5 230
Self-help activities:	
Family life education and day care	2 000
Functional literacy and adult education	1 240
	3 240
Other assistance required: assistance to National Refugee Commission etc.	<u>4 600</u>
Total	<u>234 600</u>
An expert study for meeting the needs of domestic fuel	

B. Assistance to strengthen government services to cater to the needs of the refugees

96. The need to strengthen and augment a number of basic government services, particularly in the regions in which the refugees are concentrated, in order to meet the need of the refugees, remains urgent. Hospitals, road construction and maintenance, ports, water supplies, post primary education, agriculture and food production projects and food security require immediate international assistance.

1. Hospitals and other health facilities

97. The Government has formulated a three-year project at an estimated cost of \$68.7 million. This project has two components:

(a) Strengthening of the health service infrastructure at the camps: this component has been briefly described in paragraph 62 above;

(b) Strengthening of the supporting national health services: As the camp health services will be developed to only a limited extent, there will be a need for advanced treatment and other referral services, to be given to 2-5 per cent of the patients in the camps. Therefore, the national health services will need upgrading and expansion to cater to these needs as well as the needs of refugees outside the camps. Under this programme it is proposed to strengthen seven district or regional hospitals (Hargeisa, Borama, Belet Uen, Jalalaqsi, Luugh, Garba Harre and Coriolei). In addition, certain disease control measures, notably for tuberculosis and malaria, will be carried out on a national or regional basis. The mission recommends that a pre-feasibility study of this project, as proposed by the Government, should be undertaken as soon as possible.

2. Improvement and maintenance of roads

98. Road transport from the ports to the refugee camps is used for almost all the relief supplies. Roads are divided into three categories:

(a) Asphalt roads 2,300 km

(b) Non-asphalt roads - usable during the rainy season 9,000 km

(c) Earth roads - usually not usable during the rainy season 20,000 km

99. The long and difficult supply lines from the ports to the refugee camps, especially in the south, and the lack of adequate roads are the major constraint on the movement of relief items to the camps, especially during the rainy season. In order to overcome this difficulty, it is planned to upgrade 283 kilometres of the feeder roads and construct 75 kilometres of new roads leading to camp sites, for use in all weather. In addition, it is proposed to provide adequate and regular maintenance for 1,112 kilometres of main roads leading to camp sites in four regions of Somalia. The total cost is estimated at \$41.1 million, as shown in table 7.

Table 7. Improvement and maintenance of roads

Item	Cost per kilometre (dollars)	Total cost (dollars)
Improvement		
283 kilometres	68,620	19,420,000 (approximately)
New construction		
75 kilometres	80,260	6,020,000 (approximately)
Maintenance		
1,112 kilometres	3,500 <u>a/</u>	3,892,000
Cost of equipment		10,803,000
Cost of technical assistance (three years)		963,000
Total		41,100,000 (approximately)

a/ Portion of the total cost on account of refugees.

### 3. Ports

100. Total food import requirements for the refugees in the camps in 1981 are estimated at about 283,000 tonnes. In addition, the Government has estimated the food requirements for the refugees outside the camps to be of the order of 180,000 tonnes. Commercial imports of food items, to meet part of the national needs, will amount to 84,000 tonnes. In addition, a national food deficit of 375,000 tonnes has to be met through imports. Food imports alone will therefore exceed 900,000 tonnes in 1981.

101. Almost all of the food items are imported through the two main ports of Somalia: Mogadishu in the south and Berbera in the north. These ports also handle the sizable imports of other relief goods. These relief shipments are in addition to the normal imports and exports of the country, which depend on Mogadishu and Berbera. Consequently, these ports have become congested and act as bottle-necks not only in the relief effort but also in the country's normal development.

102. It is essential to expand the operating capacities of both Mogadishu and Berbera ports in a systematic way. The mission recommends that a study should be undertaken for the installation of bulk-handling facilities at Mogadishu. The mission appreciates that this will take some time. Meanwhile, there is an urgent need for a number of short-term measures to ease the situation.

/...

103. The mission recommends that the donors should consider supplying as many relief items as possible on pallets to facilitate discharge and transportation. The pallets can later be used in stores in the refugee camps. It would also be useful if the relief items were packed in materials that could be used for storage or construction purposes in the camps.

104. The mission believes that the difficulties faced at Berbera, which handles about 10,000 tonnes of food items alone for the refugees in the camps, every month, necessitate the immediate provision of the following items:

Port needs

- 7 fork-lift vehicles
- 7 tractors
- 20 low-boys - flatbed trailers for the tractors - heavy-duty types and tonnage of 8-12 tonnes per flatbed
- 2 dockside vehicle cranes of 25 tonnes capacity each

Storage

- 12 large metal prefabricated modular-design buildings
- Fumigation equipment and supplies
- Conveyor roller ladders
- 3 250-lb Avery platform scales
- Tarpaulin or PVC plastic covers

Vehicles

- 12 8-ton trucks with spares
- 6 Land Rovers with spares

4. Water supplies

105. The water supply in Somalia, always a constraint on development, has been seriously affected by the continued drought and the influx of refugees. In order to meet the needs of a large number of refugees outside the camps and to offset partly the effects of the continued drought, the Government has drawn up an urgent plan to develop the ground-water potential of the country. It proposes that some 40 deep wells be drilled in Tog-dheer (2), the north-west region (3), Bari (3), Nugaal (4), Sanaag (4), Mudug (4), Hiran (3), Bakool (4), Gedo (4), Bay (3), Middle Juba (3), and Lower Juba (3), at an estimated cost per well of about \$96,000. In all, about \$3.8 million will be required for this scheme.

106. The Government also needs assistance, amounting to \$7,928,000, to improve and rehabilitate the existing wells.

5. Post-primary education

(a) Secondary education

107. Under the present educational plan, only primary education will be made available to refugees in the camps. There is no provision for post-primary education in the camps and at present there are not enough places in secondary schools to accommodate the graduates from the national primary schools, let alone the children from the refugee camps. While a few refugee children have been enrolled in the national secondary schools, there is an urgent need to expand the national secondary education system to provide higher education to at least a portion of the refugee graduates of primary schools. The mission recommends that an expert study of this need should be undertaken urgently. Meanwhile, it is provisionally estimated that about \$4 million will be needed to expand the existing secondary schools.

(b) Agricultural training

108. The principal report had noted that there was a serious shortage of technically trained agricultural personnel in Somalia and that, in order to meet the essential national requirements and the needs of the refugees, it was necessary to expand agricultural training institutions. The mission had recommended the expansion of the college of agriculture and of agricultural technical schools. Although no firm estimates of capital and operating costs for the expansion of agricultural training facilities have yet been made, the mission recommends that at least \$3.5 million should be made available to meet the initial requirements.

(c) Vocational education

109. The principal report had noted that the vocational education system in Somalia needed to be strengthened and expanded in order to provide skilled labour for the Government's own development programme. Unless it were expanded at least in some essential areas such as automotive repair, construction, electrical repair, welding and veterinary service, it would not be able to absorb the refugees requiring training. It has not so far been possible for the Government to examine this matter and prepare a project for international support. The mission recommends that detailed follow-up action in this field should be taken on an urgent basis.

6. Agriculture and food production projects

(a) Sorghum production

110. The main occupations in the areas where the refugees are concentrated are the raising of livestock and the production of drought-tolerant cereal crops or food legumes under dry-land conditions. As the refugees grew similar crops in their home areas, it is proposed to provide some opportunities to them to practice agriculture and acquire at least partial self-reliance. It is planned to employ some 260,000 refugees in dry-land sorghum production over an area of 100,000 hectares. With an estimated yield of 400 kilograms per hectare in two growing

seasons, the total yield is expected to be about 100,000 tonnes of sorghum. The project would cost \$16 million over a three-year period and make a significant contribution towards meeting the cereal grain requirements. Such a large scheme will require careful planning if it is to succeed.

(b) Halba agricultural settlement

111. In order to provide self-sufficiency in food production to some 800 refugee families in the Luugh district, it is proposed to establish an agricultural settlement on 400 hectares of land over a period of 3 years, at a cost of over \$4.5 million. The project is based on a pre-feasibility study made by consultants financed by UNHCR.

(c) Jalalaqsi agricultural settlement

112. Under this project, about 1,000 hectares of land will be brought under cultivation near the camps on the Shebelle river. The project will make about 2,000 refugee families self-sufficient in food at a cost of over \$6 million in three years.

(d) Dairy project

113. It is proposed to produce 20,000 litres of milk daily for the refugees in all the regions of refugee concentration. The project will cost \$5.5 million over three years.

(e) Poultry project

114. In order to meet part of the refugee food requirements, particularly for proteins, it is proposed to produce eggs and chickens. One poultry farm will be established in each of the north-west, Gedo and Hiran regions, at a total cost of \$3 million over three years.

(f) Afforestation for refugee camps

115. In order to meet part of the refugee requirements for fuel, timber and food, as well as trees for shade, windbreaks, forage and green manure and to prevent land degradation, it is proposed to start afforestation in the north-west, Gedo Hiran and Lower Shebelle regions over a period of three years. About \$3.4 million will be needed for each unit.

(g) Sand-dune stabilization

116. In order to stabilize sand dunes encroaching on agricultural lands and to provide gainful employment to some 2,000 refugees, it is proposed to plant commiphora bushes and cactus etc. The project will cost \$3.8 million over a period of three years.

117. A summary of the assistance required to strengthen government services to cater to the needs of the refugees is given in table 8.

Table 8. Assistance to strengthen government services

Item	Cost (dollars)
Strengthening of hospitals and national health facilities <u>a/</u>	68,700,000 <u>b/</u>
Improvement and maintenance of roads <u>a/</u>	41,100,000
Construction of 40 deep wells	3,800,000
Assistance for existing wells	7,928,000
Extension of secondary education	4,000,000
Assistance for agricultural training	3,500,000
Sorghum production <u>a/</u>	16,000,000
Halba agricultural settlement <u>a/</u>	4,500,000
Jalalaqsi agricultural settlement <u>a/</u>	6,000,000
Dairy project <u>a/</u>	5,500,000
Poultry project <u>a/</u>	3,000,000
Afforestation for refugee camps <u>a/</u>	3,400,000
Sand-dune stabilization <u>a/</u>	3,800,000
Total	171,228,000

a/ Multi-year project.

b/ Part of this project is also covered under part A of the programme.

#### 7. Food security

118. The food shortage in Somalia was serious in 1980 and the total deficit of cereals, wheat flour, and edible oil alone was estimated to be about 230,000 tonnes for the largely urban market.

119. Somalia continues to suffer from serious drought. The Shebelle and Juba rivers are at abnormally low levels this year; indeed their water levels are said to be the lowest in 29 years. The main (Gu) domestic cereal crop harvested in 1980 was poor in the north and centre and below average in the south. Dry weather in October has further adversely affected the secondary season (Der) crop to be harvested in February 1981.

120. The Somali Government has estimated its minimum national deficit of maize, sorghum, rice, wheat flour, edible oil and sugar for 1980 to be about 375,000, as detailed in table 9.



Table 9. National requirements and availability of food, 1981  
 (Tonnes)

Commodity	Requirements	Crop	Commercial imports	Deficit
Maize, sorghum	375,000	150,000	15,000	210,000
Rice	90,000	1,000	24,000	65,000
Wheat-flour	45,000	-	25,000	20,000
Edible oil	45,000	15,000	15,000	15,000
Sugar	120,000	50,000	5,000	65,000
Total	675,000	216,000	84,000	375,000

121. The threat of the food crisis at present faced by Somalia is described in a note by the Government of Somalia, appended to the present report.

122. The existence of the national herd, which meets most of the food needs of 60 per cent of the population, is in peril as a consequence of the drought in the northern and central regions and the inter-riverian areas. The problem has been compounded by the entry of livestock into Somalia from the neighbouring regions in Ethiopia. The Government estimates that about 3 million head of undernourished cattle have entered the country suffering from diseases not prevalent in Somalia. These cattle need forage as well as animal health services, including preventive measures against the spread of diseases carried by them to the national herd. A disease prevention and control programme will require vehicles, medicines and staff. The mission recommends that the Government should approach FAO for an expert study of this problem as a matter of urgency. Such a study would provide a basis for soliciting international assistance.

123. In 1977, a Food Security Action Plan was drawn by a FAO/WFP mission, involving the provision of an emergency stock of cereals to ensure food supplies in times of drought, a crop forecasting and early warning system, and training for food-stock management. Little progress has so far been achieved in implementing this plan. The mission recommends that this study should be updated as soon as possible, taking into account the presence of the large number of refugees in Somalia, as a basis for international support.

124. In addition, the mission recommends the following:

- (a) Expert study of bulk handling at the port of Mogadishu;
- (b) Donation of equipment for the port of Berbera (see para. 105 above);

/...

- (c) Expert study for the expansion of the national secondary educational system;
- (d) Expert study of the animal health problems etc. created by the influx of cattle into Somalia;
- (e) Updating of the 1977 FAO/WFP study on the national food situation.

C. Accelerated development projects

125. As stated earlier in this report, the large number of refugees in Somalia and their continued influx at a high rate have imposed a heavy burden on the meagre resources of the country and strained its fragile economy. International assistance increased during the last year and the most basic need, namely, food, was met with donations from the international community. However, Somalia, as the host country, had to provide the greater part of the relief assistance, mostly in kind, to the refugees, even at the risk of permanent damage to its own economic infrastructure.

126. The Government estimates that there are about 800,000 refugees, with about 3 million cattle, outside the camps spread over the rural areas. Moreover, as stated earlier in the report, of the 1.2 million refugees who entered the camps by the beginning of 1981, about 200,000 appear to have moved out of the camps and into the rural areas. The presence of such a large number of refugees outside the camps imposes a direct burden on the Somali economy, which the Government of Somalia is unable to sustain without large-scale international assistance. The need for such assistance, aimed at strengthening the socio-economic infrastructure of Somalia, and for the development of the vital areas of its economy, had been emphasized in the principal report.

127. It had been recommended in the principal report that international assistance should be provided to accelerate the implementation of a number of projects in the regions most affected by the refugee influx. Such projects, identified in the Government's Three-Year Development Plan, were listed in the principal report (see E/1980/44, p. 76, table XI).

128. During its review of the situation in January 1981, the mission noted that no tangible progress had been achieved towards the accelerated implementation of these projects. The mission believes that the need for assistance has become even more urgent in view of the ever-increasing burden on the Somali economy imposed by the continued influx of refugees. The mission hopes that the international community will respond generously to the requirements of the refugees in Somalia and will provide assistance for the accelerated development projects.

APPENDIX

Note by the Government of Somalia on the 1981 food crisis in Somalia

1. Projections of the supply and demand for food for the normal Somali population and the ever-growing number of refugees, inclusive of those in the camps and those at large, indicate the certainty of most serious shortfall in the calendar year 1981.
2. The ongoing refugee crisis and recurring drought are both major contributing factors - in both the short and the long term. Refugees continue to arrive daily at the de facto borders and at this time the Shebelle river is already dry and measurements of the other major stream - the Juba - indicate that it will dry at and below the points where commercial irrigation has been developed, within the week. Renewed flow cannot be predicted for several months. Thus, if the Gu rains should also fail, livestock losses are very likely to exceed even those of the devastating "long-tail" drought of 1973-1975.
3. Bearing in mind the projected 1981 food needs of the normal population of the Republic (some 5 million) and the refugees in camps (estimated at an average of 1.3 million) and "at large" (estimated an additional 800,000), the equivalent of 1,085,740 metric tons of food will be required, if the WHO level of country-average intake and the Government-approved minimum ration scales for refugees are to be sustained.
4. Taking into account available statistics on the nation's meagre food stocks, the remaining 1980 pledges due in early 1981, the 1981 pledges to date, the promises of bilateral donors and the Government's import and domestic production prognostications - a massive shortfall, currently the equivalent of some 779,435 metric tons of food, is still indicated. Moreover, this critical condition could be greatly exacerbated if the threatened drought deepens; already the stocks of certain essential food commodities for the refugee camps have a reserve numbered in days.
5. This problem is compounded by current severe restrictions in fuel availability, which, since they are already affecting distribution, are also receiving urgent government attention at this time. The emergency provision of water supplies, particularly to the refugees, is already seriously hampered.
6. Thus, it is the sad but considered responsibility of the Government to draw the urgent attention of the World Food Programme and other related United Nations agencies, concerned voluntary agencies and all friendly Governments to this most dangerous situation.

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